GUIDE TO THE E1 EUROPE FILE

[The E1 Europe file contains general data on Europe, specifically Eastern Europe after World War II under Soviet rule. The majority of languages spoken in Eastern Europe are Slavic, although other languages such as Turkish, Hungarian, and German are represented.

According to 8: Black, Eastern Europe has been characterized by "... backwardness, confusion, and instability ..." (p. 132). It has been subject to influences and political machinations from both the West and the East. The area has been predominantly agricultural and peasant throughout its history and the productivity has been very low, compared to countries in Western Europe. Under the Soviet regime, however, there has been an expansion of industrialization. 8: Black also describes Eastern Europe as a kind of buffer zone between Western Europe and Russia.

There are nine sources in the E1 Europe file, three of which are translations. The sources are not continuously numbered, there is no source number 3 at this time. 1: Karutz is a translation from German of excerpts from the Atlas of Ethnography--Peoples of Europe. This source contains brief but informative cultural summaries of the Volga Finns, Finns, Lapps, Estonians, Letts, Lithuanians, Poles, Great Russians, Ruthenians, Czechoslovakia, Croats, Slovenes, Serbs, Magyars, Rumanians, Bulgarians, Yugoslavia, Albania, and Greece. The entire source appears only in category 116 since it has been sub-headed for the groups mentioned above and the descriptive data

appears in those respective files. 2: Milosz is a translation from Polish. It is an analysis of the lives of four unidentified writers living in people's democracies. The discussion centers on the influence of Socialist realism on the minds of intellectuals. 4: Wszelaki is an analysis of the growth of fuel and power production in East Germany, Poland, Czechoslovakia, Hungary, Rumania, Bulgaria, and Yugoslavia. The author contends that these predominantly agricultural countries have been forced into an industrial revolution since the end of World War II. 5: Free Europe Committee is concerned with the Soviet attempt to transplant their agricultural system to the satellite countries. It is particularly concerned with the ways in which agriculture in the satellite countries differs from agriculture in Russia. 6: Shuster is a study of religions in the countries under Soviet rule. The author discusses Marx's theories in relation to the actual sovietization of religion and gives many examples of religious persecution. Like 1: Karutz, the entire source has been filed in the Europe file only in the 116 category. Each chapter on the different satellite countries has been subheaded and filed in the individual files. 7: Gluckstein is a study of changes in economy and political structure since World War II in Poland, Bulgaria, Czechoslovakia, Yugoslavia, Rumania, and Hungary. It is also extensively sub-headed. 8: Black is a collection of essays by eleven authorities on Eastern Europe. The book as whole gives extensive information on the political and social upheavals before and after the two world wars. 9: Pool is a study of leadership in Communist armies. It has also been sub-headed for the individual countries discussed. 10: Mehnert is a translation from German. It is a comparative study of changes in the statutes of the Communist parties of Bulgaria, Hungary, Czechoslovakia, Poland, and the Soviet Union after 1952.

The E1 Europe file is primarily a holding file and it can be recommended only for very general information. The

researcher is advised to consult the files on individual countries and peoples for specific information. The file was obviously designed with a focus on post-war Communism and the authors display considerable anti-Communist biases. The file was processed in 1955.]

8: Black S-4 (no date) 1954 El Europe El

Preface

•101 Eastern Europe—the region embracing Albania, Bulgaria, Czechoslovakia, Hungary, Poland, Rumania, and Yugoslavia, and for certain limited purposes the Soviet zones of Germany and Austria as well—has long been familiar to students of European history. To Western public opinion in general, however, this region has become known chiefly as a result of the two world wars, for which it provided some of the major diplomatic problems and military battlefields.

000 Despite the significant role of Eastern Europe, the Western democracies have tended to regard it primarily as a region of inherent economic poverty and political instability. They have failed either to recognize the extent to which its problems reflected their own policies, or to see it as an area vital to their security. This lack of understanding of the problems and significance of Eastern Europe was most conspicuous at the end of the Second World War. At that time decisions were reached and concessions made by the West on the basis of assumptions that were not firmly grounded in the realities of this region. Important lessons were eventually learned, but not until great harm had been done to the peoples of Eastern Europe and consequently also to the welfare of the Western democracies.

121 The purpose of the essays in this volume is to review the record of the recent past in order to interpret the many-sided

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6 Peasantism: Its Ideology and Achievements

BRANKO M. PEŠELJ

I

That part of Europe which lies east of the Danzig-Trieste line is often referred to as "peasant Europe." This term indicates a twofold concept: Economically, "peasant Europe" stands for that part of the continent which is devoted primarily to agrarian production under the system of small and medium holdings and in which farming represents a tradition, a civilization, and a way of life. Sociologically and culturally, the term "peasant Europe" denotes an area in which by far the greatest portion of the population is peasant and forms a group whose economic, social, and cultural aspects have been genuinely preserved.

The differences between Eastern and Western Europe were less noticeable a hundred years ago than they were at the end of the Second World War. The industrial revolution which swept Western Europe in the second half of the nineteenth century generated profound economic and social changes over the continent as a whole, and contributed to its division into two distinct sectors. A consequence of this partition was the creation of unique social and economic conditions in Eastern Europe. These conditions, in turn, pro-

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7 Industrial and Social Policies Between the Wars

GEZA TELEKI

• 101 175 178 Eastern Europe, from the Baltic to the Aegean, is a security zone both for the states of Western Europe and for Russia. Besides acting as a safety valve for neighboring powers, this region is a passageway between them. Military and population movements fan out from here into the East or converge into the West.

Both West and East have accused this part of Europe of being unstable and backward. Both have wanted to influence it and have not wanted to admit that the backwardness, confusion, and instability of this area are in large measure due to power politics. Tribes, peoples, and states have changed and have been changed in this region throughout the centuries. As a result, there is no stability of boundaries, or of peoples and governments. The evolution of the region can be viewed as a mirror which reflects the history of Europe with all its quirks and irregularities.

Although both world wars began in Eastern Europe, it would be absurd to claim that they were caused solely by these nations and their problems. The social, economic, and political interests of the great powers which clashed in this area and influenced its peoples played an important role in the course of events in Eastern Europe.

8: Black S-4 (no date) 1954 El Europe El

Because of this situation, the different peoples of this region turn three different masks to the world. One is always turned toward the West, one toward the East, and one is used for the stage show that these peoples put on for each other. If a nation of Eastern Europe takes off its mask, it may disappear from the stage forever. This is an important point to keep in mind in trying to understand the evolution of these countries.

Another important factor in the history of this region is that all the important ideologies and social revolutions have moved from West to East. Nationalism and the abolition of serfdom reached Eastern Europe in the nineteenth century. Industrialization advanced eastward at the end of the nineteenth century and during the first half of the twentieth. The closer a state was connected with the West, the sooner its transformation took place, while the other states were forced to develop in a comparatively short time in order to maintain their status as equals.

I

As a result of the Treaty of Versailles, everything changed in this area of constant change—boundaries, minorities, administrations, politics, and economics. In spite of these changes, and this is most important, the Eastern European countries remained predominantly agricultural.

The proportions of populations dependent upon agriculture in the several states within a decade after gaining full independence were as follows: Albania, 80 per cent; Bulgaria, 75 per cent; Rumania, 72 per cent; Yugoslavia, 76 per cent; Poland, 60 per cent; Hungary, 51 per cent; and Czechoslovakia 33 per cent. In contrast to these figures, the percentages of gainfully occupied males in industry in the same period were: Bulgaria, 13 per cent; Rumania, 11 per cent; Yugoslavia, 14 per cent; Poland, 22 per cent; Hungary, 26

1: Karutz
105

E1 Europe

/For cultural summaries of: Finno-Ugrians, Lapps, Estonians, Letts, Lithuanians, Poles, Great Russians, Ruthenians, Czechs, Slovaks, Croats, Slovenes, Serbs, Magyars, Rumanians, Bulgaria, Yugoslavia, Albania, Macedonians, see category 116./

1: Karutz, Richard. Atlas der Völkerkunde (Atlas of Ethnography). Vol. II, pp. 8-33; 62-101; 104-107. Die Völker Europas (Peoples of Europe). Stuttgart: Franckhsche Verlagshandlung, 1925.

pp. 76; 35 plates. HRAF pagination.

Personal copy.

Translated for HRAF by B. Cooke and R. Neuse.

[This source presents cursory but illuminating cultural summaries of the peoples of eastern Europe and the Balkan area. Their dress, dwellings, and religious beliefs are discussed. A brief bibliographical list appears at the close of each section. There are also numerous illustrative plates which have been filed in E1 Europe, category 116. Descriptive information is filed under subject categories in individual files. -- Analyst]

Field date: none
Analyst: June Orloff

Evaluation: Ethnologist--4
Processed in 1955

111 El Europe

2: Milosz, Czeslaw. The Captive Mind. New York: Alfred A. Knopf, Inc., 1953.

Pp. xiv, 251.

Yale: Bw89F. 953M

Translated from the Polish by Jane Zielonko

/This source discusses with clarity and understanding the influence of Socialist realism on the mind of the intellectual living in the people's democracies. By analyzing the lives of four unidentified writers whom he knew, Mr. Milosz illustrates the internal paralysis resulting from an atmosphere ruled by dialecticians where all objective conditions vital to the realization of a work of art are lacking. The transition from criticism to approval, from guilt and despair to absolute conformism which alone can satisfy a man's internal longing for harmony and happiness is examined and clarified. -- Analyst/

Field date: none
Analyst: Cory Berman

Evaluation: Social Scientist-5
Processed in 1955

4: Wszelaki, Jan H. Fuel and Power in Captive Middle Europe. New York: Free Europe Press, 1952.

Pp. 63

HRAF Copy

[This book analyzes the evolution of fuel and power production in East Germany, Poland, Czechoslovakia, Hungary, Rumania, Bulgaria and Yugoslavia. The author, former Economic Adviser to the Polish Foreign Office, states that these predominantly agricultural areas have been in the throes of a painful, forcible industrial revolution since 1945, and cites statistical data in support of his contention. This pamphlet was prepared under the auspices of the Mid-European Studies Center of the National Committee for a Free Europe, Inc. --Analyst]

Field date: none
Analyst: Dragan Zivanović

Evaluation: Unknown-4
Processed in 1955

111 El Europe

5: Free Europe Committee. Satellite Agriculture in Crisis. New York: Free Europe Press, 1954.

Pp. 130

HRAF copy

[This study is concerned with the agricultural structure of the East European satellites, and with their efforts to transplant the Soviet agricultural system to their territories. The study describes particularly those aspects which distinguish satellite agricultural developments from their Russian counterparts--Analyst]

Field Date: none
Analyst: Dragan Živanović

Evaluation: Unknown-4
Processed in 1955

6: Shuster, George N. Religion Behind The Iron Curtain. New York: The Macmillan Company, 1954.

Pp. v, 281.

Yale: Bi 76K. 954S

[This source gives a detailed analysis of religion in the countries under Soviet jurisdiction. Shuster was United States Land Commissioner for Bavaria for a year and a half and has spent considerable time in the countries now known as the "Peoples' Democracies." The general character and status of the Church and its activities in the satellite countries is given with many examples of religious persecution and resistance movements. The author discusses Marx's doctrine of dialectical materialism as a dynamic force in the sovietization of religion behind the iron curtain. The entire source has been filed in the Europe file only as a complete text. Each chapter on the different satellite countries has been sub-headed and filed in the individual files. --Analyst]

Field date: none
Analyst: Helen M. Marbury

Evaluation: Social Scientist-4
Processed in 1955

7: Gluckstein, Ygael. Stalin's Satellites in Europe. Boston: The Beacon Press, 1952.

Pp. x, 333

HRAF copy

[This is a critical study of the economic and political changes which have occurred since World War II in those countries first liberated and later plundered by the USSR. State Capitalist exploitation in the satellite countries of Poland, Bulgaria, Czechoslovakia, Yugoslavia, Rumania, and Hungary is described and analyzed. The Tito-Stalin conflict is discussed in detail.
Although this source appears mainly in the El Europe file, information has been categorized from the point of view of the individual country under discussion. Pages 233 to 280 which deal exclusively and in detail with Yugoslavia have been excerpted for the Yugoslavia file. The entire source appears in El Europe, category 116. --Analyst]

Field date: none
Analyst: Cory Berman

Evaluation: Social Scientist-4
Processed in 1955

8: Black, C. E., editor. Challenge in Eastern Europe. New Brunswick: Rutgers University Press, 1954. Pp.

Pp. xviii, 276.

HRAF copy.

[This study of Eastern European development has been contributed to by eleven recognized authors of diversified backgrounds, each giving a detailed analysis of the political and social strife existing in this area before and after the two world wars. Some of the authors have been dynamic figures in the agricultural co-operative movements in these regions and have presented good first hand information on the issues. The book as a whole, gives considerable information on the movements which have developed in these predominantly agrarian societies and their long struggle for liberalism and national self-determination. International relations as an important factor in determining the fate of Eastern Europe are emphasized. Short bibliographies of the authors have been filed in category 114. --Analyst]

Field date: none
Analyst: Helen M. Marbury

Evaluation: Social Scientist-4
Processed in 1955

9: Pool, Ithiel De Sola. Satellite Generals. The Hoover Institute and Library on War, Revolution, and Peace. Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1955.

Pp. vi, 165

Omitted from Files: 123-146

[This study examines the question of leadership in Communist armies. The author discusses specifically the conflict between the need for military leaders loyal to the regime and the need for skilled ones. How the satellites attempt to resolve it and secure for themselves adequate military leadership is discussed in this book. Pp. 123-146 on China are located in 10: Pool, AF1.China File. --Analyst]

Field date: no date
Analyst: Dragan Zivanovic

Evaluation: Social Scientist - 4
Processed in 1955

10: Mehnert. Die neuen Parteistatuten in den Ostblockstaaten. [The New Party Statutes in the States of the Eastern Bloc.] Osteuropa, Vol. 1, No. 5, pp. 52-63. Stuttgart, 1955. [HRAF Pp. 1-22]

HRAF Copy.

Translated from the German for the Human Relations Area Files by Richard Neuse.

[This source is a comparative study of changes made after 1952 in the statutes of the Communist parties of Bulgaria, Hungary, Czechoslovakia, Poland, and the Soviet Union. It is made clear that although the statutes of the parties in the various satellite states are based on the soviet model, they do show minor variations. After a general orientation of the changes, followed by observations on the relationships of the parties to the armed forces, the preamble to the statutes of each party (including the party of the Soviet Union) are presented separately. As the editorial staff is given as the collective author of this article, the editor has been given as author for the sake of simplicity and clarity. --Analyst]

Field date: no date
Analyst: R. Flynn

Evaluation: Journalist - 4
Processed in 1955

4: Wszelaki U-4 (no date) 1952 El Europe El

FOOTNOTES

[1] Hilary Minc, *A Fruitful Collaboration of Free Peoples*, quoted after *Pravda*, Moscow, by *Zycie Gospodarcze* (Economic Life), Warsaw, 1951, No. 19. Minc states that, in comparison with 1938, the total industrial output in the first half of 1951 reached 165 percent in Czechoslovakia, 208 percent in Rumania, 268 percent in Poland, 273 percent in Hungary and 335 percent in Bulgaria, while that of Albania reached 423 percent in 1950. The 1938 level of the industrial output in the Soviet zone of Germany was exceeded towards the end of 1950, and by the middle of 1951 might have reached 115 percent of the 1938 production. 113 121

[2] Jean Chardonnet, *Les conséquences économiques de la guerre*, Paris, Hachette, 1947. [113]

[3] No detailed exact figures of the coal output in the Silesian-Ostravan basin can be given. It is not easy to distinguish it statistically from the global data of output in Poland and Czechoslovakia, both of which have coal mines outside of that basin. The annual and long-range plans of all captive countries are based only upon such global data and do not make distinction between the production of individual basins. 316 443

[4] Hungarian, Rumanian and Bulgarian statistics do not make sufficient distinction between black and brown coal. Figures concerning the coal output in these three countries are estimated according to the ratio between the output of the two kinds of coal as known from previous statistics. That ratio is supposed to be constant.

[5] During the third quarter of 1951 the plan for coal extraction in Eastern Germany was not entirely fulfilled, yet output increased by 11.5 percent in comparison with the corresponding quarter of 1950 (*Wirtschaft*, Berlin, 1951, No. 43). The minor Czech coal basins were by the end of September 1951, about 150,000 tons, *i.e.*, some 3 or 4 percent behind the prescribed target (speech by Premier Zápotocký, *Rude Pravo*, Prague, 1 November 1951). The Hungarian coal and lignite mines were 6 percent behind the plan for the second quarter of 1951, and 10 percent behind that for the third quarter (*Nepszava*, Budapest, 23 October 1951); yet an official report claimed that in the second quarter of 1951 the output of both black and brown coal exceeded by 22 percent that of the second quarter of 1950 (*Gospodarka Planowa*, Warsaw, 1951, No. 9); the Tatabánya black coal mines were responsible for almost half the coal deficit (speech by Rakosi, *Nepszava*, 23 October 1951). In Rumania the situation was apparently somewhat

4: Wszelaki U-4 (no date) 1952 El Europe El

315 [26] United Press from Vienna, quoted after *Anglo-Polish Review*, London, October 1951.
135

[27] An estimate of the writer, shared by some other researchers.

[28] Stalin's speech of 9 February 1946.

[29] United Nations *Statistical Yearbook*, New York, 1949-50, p. 145. This is no longer true. In 1945 pipelines were laid to convey natural gas from Rumania to the Soviet Union.

[30] Data for Rumania and Poland taken from the official reports on the fulfillment of the annual and quarterly plans.

318 [31] Most of the data which follow are based upon Jean Chardonnet, *Les conséquences économiques de la guerre*, Paris, Hachette, 1947.
[113]

[32] J. A. Wilder, *Polish Regained Territories*, London, 1948.

[33] Dr. Paulat's study on the industrial development of Czechoslovakia, 1951.

[34] *Wirtschaft*, Berlin, *passim;* also advertisements in the Eastern German press.

[35] *Wirtschaft*, Berlin, 1951, No. 1.

[36] *Wirtschaft*, Berlin, 1951, No. 44 of November 2.

[37] See page 29.

[38] Speech of minister for planning, Dolanský, introducing the revised plan (end of February 1951).

[39] *Wirtschaft*, Berlin, 1951, No. 44 of November 2.

[40] Leuna plant employs 28,000 people, and is the greatest single plant in Eastern Germany. Karl Kühn (*Wirtschaft*, Berlin, 1951, No. 18) stated that Leuna could produce much more gasoline in 1950, because the installed capacity would permit such production, but that nitrogen-making had priority.

[41] Speech by Hilary Minc, *Trybuna Ludu*, Warsaw, 24 May 1951.

[42] United Nations *Statistical Yearbook*, New York, 1949-50. In 1937 Czechoslovakia produced 42,600 tons of benzol and Poland 31,100 tons; in 1936 Germany, outside the Bizone, produced 131,000 tons.

[43] *Ibidem*, p. 110.

37 [44] Professor H. Herbich, quoted by S. Rotarski, "The Unexploited Resources of Europe," in *Eastern Quarterly*, London, January 1950. The four rivers are the Columbia, Colorado, Sacramento, and San Joaquin.

[45] Speech by Heinrich Rau on 31 October 1951. See footnote 14.

[46] *Trybuna Ludu*, Warsaw, 24 October 1951.

[47] Dr. V. Paulat. See footnote 17.

[48] Exhaustive data on that problem in *Wirtschaft*, Berlin, 1950, No. 51.

6: Shuster S-4 (no date) 1954 El Europe El

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Publications, Mid-European Studies Center.

Memoranda. Basic to this study are the several memoranda prepared under the auspices of the Committee for a Free Europe, Inc., by scholars familiar with developments in each of the countries in question. Since some of the authors have requested that their names be withheld, it seems to be best to preserve the anonymity of all.

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•113 Dallin, David J., *The Real Soviet Russia*, transl. J. Shaplen. New Haven, 1944.

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Preface

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LIKE many of my generation, I could have wished that my life had been a more simple affair. But the time and place of his birth are matters in which a man has nothing to say. The part of Europe to which I belong has not, in our time, met with good fortune. Not many inhabitants of the Baltic States, of Poland or Czechoslovakia, of Hungary or Rumania, could summarize in a few words the story of their existence. Their lives have been complicated by the course of historic events.

It was in my country that the Second World War began. At that time, I was living in Warsaw. I had been through the rather strict education of a Catholic school, had read law in one of the Polish universities, and had continued my studies in Paris. Literature was the real interest of my life. I had published two volumes of avant-garde verse, and some translations from French poetry.

I lived through five years of Nazi occupation. Today, looking back, I do not regret those years in Warsaw, which was, I believe, the most agonizing spot in the whole of terrorized Europe. Had I then chosen emigration, my life would certainly have followed a very different course. But my knowledge of the crimes which Europe has witnessed

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114 in the twentieth century would be less direct, less concrete than it is.

One afternoon in January 1945 I was standing in the doorway of a peasant's cottage; a few small-caliber shells had just landed in the village street. Then, in the low ground between the snow-covered hills, I saw a file of men slowly advancing. It was the first detachment of the Red Army. It was led by a young woman, felt-booted and carrying a submachine gun. Like all my compatriots, I was thus liberated from the domination of Berlin—in other words, brought under the domination of Moscow.

Hitherto, I had had no strong political affinities, and was only too ready to shut myself off from the realities of life. But reality would never let me remain aloof for long. The state of things in Poland inclined me towards left-wing ideas. My point of view can be defined negatively rather than positively: I disliked the right-wing groups, whose platform consisted chiefly of anti-Semitism. During the Nazi occupation I, like my colleagues, wrote for the clandestine publications, which were especially numerous in Poland. My experiences in those years led me to the conclusion that, after the defeat of Hitler, only men true to a socialist program would be capable of abolishing the injustices of the past, and rebuilding the economy of the countries of Central and Eastern Europe. My feelings for Russia were none too friendly. Pole and Russian have never loved one another, so I was no exception to the general rule. The exceptions were those—and some of my friends were among them—who before or during the war had become disciples of Stalin.

Such, then, was my state of mind as I watched the Russian girl with her submachine gun advance in my direction. To her, I was one of the millions of Europeans who had to be "liberated and educated." Perhaps I was even

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a member of the bourgeoisie . . . but that could not have seemed likely, since the shabby worker's overall which I was wearing was all I possessed in the world.

A few years later, a cultural attaché at the Embassy of the Warsaw government in Washington, D.C., was busy organizing concerts and exhibitions of Polish art; it was said he was not a communist. From 1945 to 1951, I was first a free-lance writer in Poland, and then cultural attaché, first in Washington and later in Paris. In the end I broke with the Warsaw government.

"But how," a reader may ask, "could you become a diplomatic official of that government, if you were not a member of the Party?" The answer lies, first, in the fact that in each of the people's democracies the political change developed by degrees (Jan Masaryk in Czechoslovakia could be, not a mere attaché, but the Minister of Foreign Affairs); and secondly, in the fact that writers in the people's democracies belong to the new privileged caste. It was thought that the appointment of a writer to a diplomatic post would produce a good impression abroad. "Yes," my reader may continue, "I can see that. But you—why did you agree to serve? For money?" No. I am no saint, but those who know me are aware that my needs are modest, and that I have no extravagant tastes except a love for books. I agreed to serve, not for material reasons, but through conviction.

We enter here upon the problems which form the subject of this book. The world of today is torn asunder by a great dispute; and not only a dispute, but a ruthless battle for world domination. Many people still refuse to believe that there are only two sides, that the only choice lies between absolute conformity to the one system or absolute conformity to the other. Call such people impractical, if you will; but it would be wrong to treat their hopes as

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114 matter for contempt. Those who thought that they might succeed, while remaining within the Eastern bloc, in keeping clear of total orthodoxy and maintaining some degree of freedom of thought, have been defeated. The peasants' leaders were defeated, Masaryk was defeated, the socialists who tried to collaborate were defeated, Rajk was defeated in Hungary, Gomulka in Poland.

My mother tongue, work in my mother tongue, is for me the most important thing in life. And my country, where what I wrote could be printed and could reach the public, lay within the Eastern Empire. My aim and purpose was to keep alive freedom of thought in my own special field; I sought in full knowledge and conscience to subordinate my conduct to the fulfillment of that aim. I served abroad because I was thus relieved from direct pressure and, in the material which I sent to my publishers, could be bolder than my colleagues at home. I did not want to become an émigré and so give up all chance of taking a hand in what was going on in my own country. The time was to come when I should be forced to admit myself defeated.

668 114 To understand the course of events in Eastern and Central Europe during the first post-war years, it must be realized that pre-war social conditions called for extensive reforms. It must further be understood that the Nazi rule had occasioned a profound disintegration of the existing order of things. In these circumstances, the only hope was to set up a social order which would be new, but would not be a copy of the Russian regime. So what was planned in Moscow as a stage on the road to servitude, was willingly accepted in the countries concerned as though it were true progress. Men will clutch at illusions when they have nothing else to hold to.

The Method, the Diamat—that is, dialectical materialism

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as interpreted by Lenin and Stalin—possesses a strong magnetic influence on the men of the present day. In the people's democracies, the communists speak of the "New Faith," and compare its growth to that of Christianity in the Roman Empire. There has been instituted in France a group of worker-priests, who do regular work in the factories and bring the Gospel to the laboring masses while sharing fully in their living conditions. A large proportion of these men have abandoned Catholicism and been converted to communism. This example illustrates the intensity of the ideological struggle which is going on today. And let it be remembered that in the people's democracies indoctrination is enforced by the whole power of the State.

For several years I carried on a debate with those of my friends who were yielding, little by little, to the magic influence of the New Faith. The debate went on in my own mind also—more than a debate indeed, since that word gives no sense of the emotional stress which I experienced. As the nerve-centers of the country were mastered, one after the other, by the adherents of Moscow, I was forced to abandon my philosophic beliefs one after another, if I was to keep from throwing myself into the abyss. The abyss for me was exile, the worst of all misfortunes, for it meant sterility and inaction.

In the end, I found myself driven to the point where a final choice had to be made. This was when "socialist realism" was introduced into Poland. This is not, as some think, merely an esthetic theory to which the writer, the musician, the painter or the theatrical producer is obliged to adhere. On the contrary, it involves by implication the whole Leninist-Stalinist doctrine. If writers and painters are not forced to become members of the Party, that is because such a step is unnecessary. So long as they act in ac-

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• 114 [668] cordance with "socialist realism," they are automatically and inescapably enrolled among the followers of Stalin. "Socialist realism" is much more than a matter of taste, of preference for one style of painting or music rather than another. It is concerned with the beliefs which lie at the foundation of human existence. In the field of literature it forbids what has in every age been the writer's essential task—to look at the world from his own independent viewpoint, to tell the truth as he sees it, and so to keep watch and ward in the interest of society as a whole. It preaches a proper attitude of doubt in regard to a merely formal system of ethics but itself makes all judgment of values dependent upon the interest of the dictatorship. Human sufferings are drowned in the trumpet-blare: the orchestra in the concentration camp; and I, as a poet, had my place already marked out for me among the first violins.

Look, then, dispassionately at my problem. At home in Poland, my friends, my relatives, theaters where my translations of Shakespeare were being produced, publishers ready to print what I wrote. Above all, my own country and my own language—what is a poet who has no longer a language of his own? All these things were mine, if I would pay the price: obedience.

The actual moment of my decision to break with the Eastern bloc could be understood, from the psychological point of view, in more ways than one. From outside, it is easy to think of such a decision as an elementary consequence of one's hatred of tyranny. But in fact, it may spring from a number of motives, not all of them equally high-minded. My own decision proceeded, not from the functioning of the reasoning mind, but from a revolt of the stomach. A man may persuade himself, by the most logical reasoning, that he will greatly benefit his health by

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swallowing live frogs; and, thus rationally convinced, he 114 ●
may swallow a first frog, then the second; but at the third his stomach will revolt. In the same way, the growing influence of the doctrine on my way of thinking came up against the resistance of my whole nature.

The decision to refuse all complicity with the tyranny of the East—is this enough to satisfy one's conscience? I do not think so. I have won my freedom; but let me not forget that I stand in daily risk of losing it once more. For in the West also one experiences the pressure to conform —to conform, that is, with a system which is the opposite of the one I have escaped from. The difference is that in the West one may resist such pressure without being held guilty of a mortal sin.

My book takes the reader into the world inhabited by 121
the intellectuals of Warsaw, Prague, Bucharest, and Budapest. It is a world familiar to me, but it may well seem to him foreign and even exotic. I try to explain how the human mind functions in the people's democracies. If I have been able to write this book, it is because the system invented by Moscow has seemed, and still seems to me infinitely strange. Any civilization, if one looks at it with an assumption of naive simplicity (as Swift looked at the England of his day), will present a number of bizarre features which men accept as perfectly natural because they are familiar. But nowhere is this so marked as in the new civilization of the East, which moulds the lives of eight hundred millions of human beings. We are, I think, only beginning to understand it, and in years to come thousands of books will be devoted to the study of this stupefying and loathsome phenomenon.

This book is at the same time a battlefield, in which I have given shape to my combats with the doctrine I have rejected. This, then, explains my method of writing; I give

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Author's Note

●114 THE seven countries of Middle Europe now subjected to Russian control have been incorporated into the Soviet bloc against their will, and their Communist governments have been imposed upon them. This being the case, the author has refrained from describing this area of Europe and its component countries and nations as "satellite" and has adopted the term "captive" instead. The term "satellite" will be applied only to the Communist governments of that area.

The statistical data concerning the output of fuel and power in the captive area in the past are quoted — unless stated otherwise — from the United Nations *Statistical Yearbook* for 1948 and for 1949-1950, and from the United Nations *Economic Surveys of Europe* in 1949 and 1950. Data about the planned output and major investments in the captive area have been taken from the six national long-range economic plans and national plans for 1951, printed in several law journals and other official publications. This includes the revised versions of the Czechoslovak and Hungarian long-range plans (February 1951), and that of the Eastern German Five Year Plan (November 1951). Sources available to the reader are indicated in footnotes at the end of the text.

The German names of the cities and rivers in the area between the 1939 Polish-German frontier and the present Oder-Neisse boundary are given in parentheses following the Polish names; *e.g.*, Police (Pölitz).

The author wishes to thank Dr. V. Paulat of New York for certain data concerning Czechoslovakia, and Dr. G. G. Rosu of Washington, D.C., for information concerning oil production in Rumania.

J. H. W.

January 1952

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000 Chesterton—what shall we do with them, how on earth can anyone write about them?

●114 It so happens that I have known most of the countries now governed by those who say they are building the "People's Democracies." They were not paradises. There was poverty of the worst kind in many of them. There was injustice. There was hatred. But there was also humanity. One day, driving through Poland, we had a flat tire on the main street of what in our own Middle West would be a rather small county-seat town. We were always having flats because square iron nails lay along the highways, traveled for the most part by teamsters and their horses, thicker than locusts in the Middle East. Our spares were flat, too. I had stupidly forgotten to bring a hand pump, and we could not move unless we somehow got hold of one. There was no pump in the town for the simple reason that there was no automobile in the town. One of the two-thousand-odd citizens who gathered round the stricken car volunteered (for these people were innately kind) to ride on his bicycle to the manor of an estate owner some five miles away and see whether he could borrow the precious device. He returned in due time, escorting one of the most muscular human beings I have ever seen. Under his arm he carried the inflationary instrument. He rolled up his sleeves, bowed majestically to me and to the crowd, and went to work with a vengeance. The faster he pumped, the more vigorous were the salvos of applause. Finally we were on our way, with urchins scampering behind for a couple of hundred yards, leaving in the wake of us a town agog at having seen an American millionaire seated in his limousine. What did it matter that the car was really a well used Pontiac, and the driver poorer than he would like to admit!

Yet for all the elemental peasant squalor and need, and despite the vital unsolved social problems presented by the dif-

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ference between affluent squire and penniless peasant, there was a great human stir in Poland. It felt good, being there and talking to people, even if I had only forty words of Polish, carefully memorized from a piece of paper, and supplemented with German when there was somebody present who could understand that language, as there usually was. Everybody had a share in at least three great ideas. There was the dream of economic improvement, no longer wholly a dream. Then there was the ideal of nationhood, unfortunately too irrationally cherished, as was very natural in view of the people's past. And finally there was the mystical solidarity of the Christian (or the Jewish) community, real and vital though encrusted no doubt with what some would call poetry and others superstition. One could see a good deal of the ugly passions of the illiterate and the prejudiced. But there were also the great loves which Ladislas Reymont has described: love of the tiller for the soil, of the boys for the girls, of a people for the Virgin Mary, full of grace and goodness.

And now? I repeat. It is not tragedy that has thrown a black blanket over all this. It is just that the iron heel has come down behind the iron curtain. Here are the unadorned population statistics of the "People's Democracies" as they were available prior to World War II:

Bulgaria	6,106,000	Poland	31,000,000
Czechoslovakia	14,726,000	Rumania	18,025,277
Hungary	8,683,000	East Germany	17,313,734
			(census of 1946)

In addition, here are the statistics for the Baltic States absorbed by Russia:

Estonia	1,114,900
Latvia	1,900,045
Lithuania	2,361,142

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1 HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVE

● 114 FOR A YEAR AND a half I had some concern with the Iron Curtain as United States Land Commissioner for Bavaria. 127 It took seven days of hard driving to inspect all of it that was of interest to our side. Across one part of it, that contiguous to East Germany, you could move rather freely if you were not an American. The other part, bordering on Czechoslovakia, was quite different. For here the Curtain on the Czech side was a strip of evacuated terrain, normally about four miles wide, inside which houses were falling into ruin and grass was growing up through the pavement. This was patrolled by young men in nondescript uniforms carrying tommy guns. Sometimes strange things happened, as when a group of Czechs commandeered a train and simply steamed across the border into the land of at least relative freedom. Or there was the afternoon when a coachful of aged and sick nuns was suddenly dumped on the platform of the German frontier station. Some of them died right there, and others were driven off by the Bavarians to friendly convents where they could pass their last days. One never knew what was coming—bullet or straggler or escapee

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114 seeking asylum. There was a campful of escapees, mostly
727 Czechs and Slovaks, at Valka near Nuremberg.

We Americans used before the war to roam freely in the countries on the other side. Many of us either came from there or are descended from people who did. It is strange not to be able to cross the border now, and of course the fact makes it only too easy to consign the whole region to a sort of mono-
181 chrome limbo. We need to remind ourselves constantly that here are some of the oldest, most cultivated, most individualistic, and most heroic of the nations of the West. Were one merely to list all the deeds of great valor which have been wrought here in more than two thousand years, or all the notable works of art, music, and literature which were created by men at home in these regions, the summary would be a brilliant one, indeed. Yet it is no doubt primarily dedication to religion that gave these cultures their individuality and vitality.

121 For convenience's sake we may follow Julius Caesar's example and divide the whole area into three parts. The first embraces the lands which were once portions of the Austro-Hungarian Empire, which collapsed in 1918 but, despite its faults, must in retrospect be termed one of the most coherent and civilized states known to modern history. Once I compared notes with Arnold Toynbee about the singular fact that wherever one crossed those vanished boundaries, whether to the north of Cracow or to the east of Budapest, the sense of coming into the familiar world of the West was immediate and unmistakable. There was a manifest ease and gracefulness of the art of living, reflected in all the many buildings, humble or ornate, in which that art found expression. Vienna, Prague, Budapest, Cracow, Zagreb, Bratislava—these cities were built by the collective genius which Austria somehow managed to evoke and nurture, even though the people who lived in them might more often than not talk of tyranny.

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Notes on the Authors

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HUBERT RIPKA was Minister of State in the Czechoslovakian Government-in-Exile from 1940 to 1945, and Minister of Foreign Trade from 1945 to 1948. A graduate in history from the Charles University in Prague, in the interwar period Mr. Ripka served as editor of two prominent Prague dailies, *Narodni Osvobození* and *Lidové Noviny*, and of the political and literary weekly *Prítomnost*. His numerous writings on current affairs include *Munich, Before and After* (1939), *East and West* (1944), and *Czechoslovakia Enslaved: The Story of the Communist Coup d'État* (1950).

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Zurcher has written extensively on political problems, and in the field of European government he is the author of *The Experiment with Democracy in Central Europe* (1933); co-author of *Propaganda and Dictatorship* (1936), *The Governments of Continental Europe* (1940), and *Postwar European Federation* (1943); and editor of *Constitutions and Constitutional Trends Since World War II* (1952). 114

STANISLAW MIKOLAJCZYK went into exile in 1947 after serving for two years as Vice-Premier and Minister of Agriculture in the Polish Provisional Government. He was a leader of the Polish Peasant Party for many years, and from 1930 to 1935 he represented that party in the Polish parliament. He was a member of the Polish Government-in-Exile as Deputy Prime Minister and Minister for Home Affairs from 1941 to 1943, and as Prime Minister in 1943-44. Mr. Mikolajczyk is now Chairman of the Polish National Democratic Committee and President of the International Peasant Union. He is also the author of *The Rape of Poland: Pattern of Soviet Aggression* (1948).

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to me, speaking with men and women who have escaped to us, than their obvious quest for such a change. How it is to be brought about, no one knows at present. The time is very dark. But one must believe and hope that so much agony of body and spirit will constitute the great tribulation from out of whose womb humanity will be reborn through the mercy of God.

I should like to add just a few words of gratitude to all who have helped me gather the information on which this book is based. The several chapters have profited from memoranda prepared by a number of refugee scholars, who will be mentioned wherever possible in subsequent bibliographical notes. Here I should like to thank particularly John B. Woodall and Levering Tyson of the Mid-European Studies Center, who have done everything they possibly could to help; Professor Adolf Berger, who has patiently read through *Osservatore Romano* for me; the librarian of the Council on Foreign Relations; and Paul Fabry, Director of the Hungarian Section of the Mid-European Studies Center. Those refugees or persons having to do with refugees with whom I talked while I was in Germany must be nameless here. But I hope they will somehow know how deeply indebted to them I am.

[8] The Volga Finns.

I.

1. Kitchen consisting of round stone building and pointed pole roof 000 which is built onto a quadrangular log bath house. 2. Gable board. 3. One-room house of the Cheremiss. 4. Riege above the ground (drying kiln) of the meadow Cheremiss. 5. Storage hut. 6. Barn. 7. Wind boards. 8. Riege below the ground of the Mordvinians. 9. Riege of the Mordvinians and the Chuvash. 10. and 14. Borankas, side pieces of benches and chest-seats. 11. Interior of No. 3; hanging above the rock stove is the wooden pot hook made of a natural piece of a branch and a piece with a hole which is put over the branch and is adjustable. 12. Below-surface Riege of the Cheremiss. 13. Hanging cradle. 15. Chair. 16. Carrying basket of linden bark for infants. 17. Arrow sling, a toy. 18. Pack basket of the inner bark of linden. 19. Zither. 20. Tally stick of the Chuvash (the horizontal lines designate days of the week, the diagonal ones special occasions, the crosses holidays). 21. Property markings. 22. Distilling apparatus for brandy made from rye and corn. 23. Bed frame for the head. 24. Tally stick. numerals. [1]

[8] The Volga Finns.

I.

After the ice age an ancient nomadic race lived in northern Eurasia. 101 They lived an equally rough life physically, economically, mentally and culturally as hunters, fishermen, and berry collectors. Within this race developed a group called Finns which wandered from Sweden across the tundras and the forests adjoining them in the South as far as the Yenisei. Tacitus already mentions them. Germanic influence [177] changed their culture and speech. Everywhere in the Volga area the restless wanderer became a settled agriculturalist. [144] Continuous foreign additions also changed his blood. Slavs and Tatars mixed with them. However, they maintained many ancient traits until modern times. But they are no longer resisting the present Russification. Thus hitherto the Votyaks called themselves Udi or men, similarly the Cheremiss Mari. Their current name is said to have

[1] [For illustrations, see 1: Karutz, E1 Europe, cat. 116, p. 1a--Analyst]

1: Karutz E-4 (no date) 1925 El Europe E4

Volga Finns

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[For identification, see cat. 116, p. 1 -- Analyst]

[10] been given them by the neighboring Mordvinians and to mean "the
Eastemers." The original conical nomad pole tents gave way to the
342 quadrangular log house with ridge board, but their patterns were
still continued in the out-buildings, in the kitchens, barns and
Riegen. The open fireplace of upended stones with the pot hook
hanging over it was first moved into the wooden dwelling, but is
now superceded by the stove. The "weaving of branches" which
Tacitus mentions is still extant in hay and straw sheds of poles put
up in a circle to form a round building. Heikel calls attention to
the similarity with the Germanic structures which are represented on
the pillar of Anthony in Rome. The former post buildings suitable
to the swamps are still perpetuated in storage huts which are built
343 on short, sharp blocks. Kitchens and especially the grain drying
354 kilns (Riegen) still show old constructions; some of them are still
exactly like the pole tent and are covered with pieces of bark; the
air inside is warmed by an open fire and the grain sheaves are put
down around it. Elsewhere, in oder to avoid the danger of fire,
holes are dug and covered with wood and earth. Two openings are
left, one for climbing down, and one for the smoke. Over the lat-
ter are placed the conically arranged poles around which the sheaves
are then placed (Figure 12). Besides these there are also dome-
353 shaped Riege above and below ground. The household furnishing
[177] mirror the wood civilization of the Finns. Chairs of tree roots, tables,
benches, chests with seats on them exhaust the furniture. The side
pieces of the benches and chest seats are carved in noticeably North
Germanic fashion. The wind and gable boards and the frames of
the doors, windows, and gates, which were adopted from the Russians,
are also carved. In addition to wood there is linden and birch bark
which serve as material for baskets, pouches, hanging cradles and
carrying cradles. Animal guts and skins which were scraped so thin
[224] that they became transparent formerly served as window panes; oiled
linen also occurs among the Cheremiss. Some hunting and fishing
remains of the old collecting economy; and bee keeping remains of
[241] the ancient Indo-European influence. For the rest, the Volga Finn
[795] is an agriculturalist. Russification has brought the Volga Finns mostly
to the Greek Orthodox church. But they preserved many of their
[583] former views and usages. Remnants of marriage by purchase or by
[764] stealing can be observed at weddings. The dead are buried with
household tools and sticks and bunches of rose bushes for fighting off
000 bad spirits. They are remembered on the third, seventh and fortieth

7

765 They are remembered on the third, seventh, and fortieth
day, and later annually at the communal village festivities. Candles
are lit in the dwellings where they died and on the graves, and
meat of game or domestic animals, cake and honey are sacrificed.
Upon their return from the funeral the Votyaks step over a fire which
has been lit near the dwelling in which the death occurred, rub their
hands with ashes, bathe and change their clothes. Then they are
fed. External formulation is here given to the experience of the
pure fire and the impure dead as an expression of the pure spiritual
776 element and the impure worldly element. The sacrifice in their
782 homes on wall shelves with kindling of white pine and in the forest
on clearings binds them to the souls of the dead as well as to the
spirit beings, which act in the weather, in forest and field, in seeds
and plants, etc., and to whom they turn especially in the fall and
spring with thanksgiving and petition. For Votyaks the sun is above
all spirit powers. At the harvest festival the head of the household
steps into the yard with the dishes from which he has served his guests,
lifts them up toward the sun, and gives thanks for the blessings re-
ceived hitherto. They constantly take helping powers from the
thunder and fertility god by carving a wooden figure, placing it in
a birch bark box and keeping it in the house. The bunch of rose
bushes which stands in a corner of the room and is renewed each fall
has the same meaning. The old bunch--which no longer has
789 emanation power--is left to float away on a river. Also remnants
of shamanism have been preserved from an earlier time in which
there was a knowledge which cultivated direct intercourse with the
[79] supranatural powers and the immortal souls. The former shamans
are today prophets, doctors, magicians and go by the names of
Wedun (compare the Kirghiz Kaldun), Muschan, Kart, Tona. But
the former reality is gone. There is but a trace of it when, for in-
stance, the magician can transform men and animals, and such
transformed men and animals touch the sun and the moon during
their eclipse. Then the former unity of cosmos and man can still be
detected, the former changes of consciousness of animal and man,
the former conditions of a higher consciousness which penetrates to
775 the world of the stars. A last remnant of the former community
of priests of the West Finnish Jumala is preserved in the world yuma
which is used for such shamanistic remains; also in the belief in
spirits which act as guardian angles for the individual, and in seeing
into the past and future of the soul, for which there are two resting
places, a light one and a dark one. In the light place the soul lives

775 as it did on earth and at night occasionally returns to it. The soul reaches the dark place only via a thin pole which spans an abyss with a pot full of scalding tar. Here those burdened with sins must first make atonement. Human figures cast of tin, as are still carried in the East, are remnants of old shamanistic equipment.

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/9: Illustrations./

[10] The Volga Finns.

II.

000 1.-2. Voyak women. 3. Belt ornaments. 4. Bonnet of a Mordvinian woman with neck and back hangings. 5. Brooch. 6. Braid ornament. 7. Head cover. 8. Head cover. 9. Pearl neck ornament. 10. Mordvinian bride. 11. Mordvinian bride. 12. Mordvinian women. 13. Mordvinian girl in holiday dress. 14. Mordvinian woman in holiday dress.

[10] The Volga Finns.

II.

291 The Volga Finnish men have adapted their clothing to that of the
177 Russians. But the women have preserved much that is old. Thus the foot cloths and bast shoes. However, in embroidering their shirts they have accepted Slavic usage. The long colored skirt with fur
301 is derived from the Tatars. So are the silver jewelry, the skittle-shaped or cone-shaped high hat of birch bark which is covered with fur or cloth and decorated with corals, glass pearls, coins, shells. In back a ribbon as wide as a hand is sewn onto it. It hangs far down

[For illustrations, see 1:Karutz, E1 Europe, cat 116, p. 4a--Analyst]

1: Karutz E-4 (no date) 1925 E1 Europe E1

The Volga Finns

4 [For identification, see category 11b, p.4]

301 the neck and back and is similarly decorated. From the Tatars
[302] they also took over the decorated head band. Girls wear their hair, which is woven into ten to twenty braids, uncovered; women wear it covered. They increase the length of their braids with black sheep's wool, ribbons, and decorated tassels. The bridal crown of Figure 11(p. 4a) consists of a brass ring which is decorated with silver coins, shells and pearls. A bunch of goose feathers hangs over the ears, two ribbons with coins hang down as far as the middle of the
292 thigh. The clothing consists of a linen coat over a wool dress. The
301 girl of Figure 13(p. 4a) wears for a headdress only a multicolored cloth which is tied in a knot on the forehead. The shirt, which also serves as skirt, hangs over the belt in a full sack-like fold which serves as pocket. Modern colorful aprons are attached to the belt. Shirts and top skirts, especially those of the Mordvinian women, are richly embroidered. It is a matter of honor to invent new ornaments. Thus, according to Heikel, they search "in the spring for patterns on the ice which the high water has made dark and brittle and on which the current plays in phantastic lines." The women exchange their patterns especially at the fair, but also elsewhere. The holiday costume of the woman in Figure 1(p. 4a) is distinguished by the high embroidered bonnet and the broad brooch on the breast. The brooch is made of brass, pearls, bells, counters, buttons and shells. The one in Figure 2 (p. 4a) is similar to it.

Bibliography, etc.

113 Heikel, Trachten und Muster der Mordwinen (Helsingfors, 1899).

/11: Illustrations./

[12] The Finns.

000 1. Kettle hook. 2. Bathroom. 3. Storage shed. 4. Flue opening. 5. Storage shed. 6. Interior of a bathroom. 7. Birch bark net floater /Netzschwimmer/. 8. Sod hut. 9. Stove. 10. Stone and birch bark net sinker /Netzsenker/. 11. Table and bench. 12. Bone fork. 13. Ceiling decoration shaped like a bird. 14. Saw-toothed sickle. 15. Wooden hammer. 16. Wooden spade. 17. Shawm made of birch bark. 18. Hand plow. 19. Sled or sledge made of a thick board with a step at the upper end. It is used for transporting heavy articles. 20. Musical instrument with one string (Kantele).[1]

Nos. 7, 10, 12, 13, 14, 18 are in the Ethnographischne Museum in Dresden. Nos. 15, 16 are in the Museum für Völkerkunde in Hamburg. Nos. 17, 20 are in the Museum für Völkerkurde in Lübeck.

1 [For illustrations, see 1: Karutz, E1 Europe, cat. 116, p. 5a -- Analyst]
2 [see 1: Karutz, E1 Europe, cat. 116, p. 4a -- Analyst]

1: Karutz E-4 (no date) 1925 El Europe E1

The Finns

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

-5a-

[For identification, see cat. 116, p. 5 -- Analyst]

1: Karutz--6 E-4 (no date) 1925 El Europe Finno-Ugrians RG1

000 Nos. 17, 20 are in the Museum für Völkerkunde in Lubeck.

/12/ The Finns.

131 The West Finns live between the eastern bays of the Baltic Sea and the northern Arctic Ocean in the Suomi or Suomen-Maa country, i.e. swampland, lakeland. In 1918 they were able to separate it off into
144 their own state of 400,000 square kilometers. Racially they developed from the basic stock of the post-ice age, early Eurasian population of the North, from Finns who immigrated from the East from the forest areas of the Volga, and from Finns who came from a greater distance. The latter had developed between the Urals and the Altai from a mingling of Eurasians and Turko-Tatars. Also contributing to the development of the race were Skandinavians who for centuries came into the
[142] country from the west and the south. The Finns have short heads,
177 mostly broad faces, pale blond hair, gray or blue eyes. Sweden has
[222] lifted them culturally out of their own original way of life of a gathering,
[241] hunting and fishing economy and of a simple agriculture. Sweden has
[795] led them toward Christianity in the form of the Evangelical Lutheran
133 Church and toward the newer western European civilization. The tremendous forests, the numerous lakes of the Finnish arcnetypal stone plateau /Urgesteinplatte/, the steppes with vegetation stunted in growth, the tundras adjoining in the north, all these influence the size and distribution of the population, the displacement to the south, the possibilities of expansion of the economy. On the other hand these factors have been able to hold together the mental and spiritual forces and to prepare the people for a development of their own. Many old treasures of humanity have been preserved in the types of habitation, in ways of life, in ideas about the universe. They are reminiscent of the times which Tacitus and Ptolemy had in mind when they reported on the eastern neighbors of the Teutons south of the Baltic Sea, on the
101 hunting people in fur clothing with bone arrow points. The word Finn, i.e. peat bog, stems from the Teutons also, whereas the Finns them-
342 selves Suomalaiset, i.e. inhabitants of the Suomi. They once lived in earth pits--remnants of the same are still found because they are suitable for the climate, see Figure 8 and conical tents made of poles and bark or fur cover. Remnants of these are still seen in bathrooms which are built onto the kitchens, see Figure 2. Then they lived in one-room houses which developed further through the addition of other

[See 1: Karutz, El Europe, Cat. 116, p.5a -- Analyst]

342 rooms. At first these additions were smoke rooms with an open hearth
without a chimney. The smoke went out of the door. Then a simple
opening was made in the wall or in the roof. Then a hollowed tree
trunk or a box of boards was put in as a flue. Only now chimneys are
343 being built. The bathroom is of the primitive Lithuanian Indo-European
type with a stove made of boulders. This is heated and then water is
poured over it. In order to utilize the rising steam fully a scaffold is
built. A ladder consisting of a grooved beam leads up to it and the
[352] bather lies down on it (Figure 9). The furnishings of the homes consist
of wall benches, movable benches, tables, wall and corner shelves, the
fireplace with the wooden pot hook, baskets for tools, knitting and sewing,
spoons and similar articles. Every homestead has separate granaries
which in the summer also serve as sleeping accommodations. In earlier
415 times doors and windows were cut out of the completed walls. As is
412 natural in a forest country the utensils are made primarily of wood and
especially of birch bark. The latter is suitable for everything: for shoes
and flasks, boots and pouches, sponges and baskets, funnels and balls,
cordage and knife sheaves, net floaters and sinkers, torches and bowls,
even for edible bread. The birch leaves provide tea and the tree sap
wine. Hammer, spade, plow, spoon, and other tools are made of wood;
291 forks, spoons, knife handles of bone. The clothing underwent a develop-
ment similar to that of the Swedes and is distinguished by a preponderance
of gaily colored, decorated, woven and embroidered jackets and aprons.
326 Silver ornaments are native of old; the Finns have always been recognized
533 as good smiths. The Finns have also always distinguished themselves
538 by their ability and love for singing. In the Kalevala they have pre-
served for us a national epic which not only has poetic value but is also
of very great importance for the understanding of the old European
peoples and their spiritual make-up. Music and the spoken word enjoy
773 a position equalled only in ancient Greece and in China. Wainamoinen,
534 who was sometimes fire and thunder god and sometimes the first man and
bearer of culture, was considered to be the inventor of the Kantele,
the national instrument which has up to thirteen strings. His harp was
made from birch wood, the pegs from the gold which flows from the
beak of a cuckoo sitting on the brance of an oak tree, and the strings
789 from the hair of a maiden who is waiting for her sweetheart! Connected
with the spoken word and song was the magic for which the Finns have
always been famous. The "art of the Finns," recognized everywhere in
the Middle Ages, was partly black magic. It cast a spell on man's will
with soil from the cemetery, snake heads, stones, bones and similar

[See 11 Karutz, E1 Europe, cat. 116, p. 5a -- Analyst]

789 things, and used it for shady purposes. The "Imatrastones" from the well-known waterfall are a last remnant of this practice. It was also partly white magic, which operated through the spirit itself, which revealed itself in man and through the spoken word. Songs and verses were recited with rhythmic gestures in which the creation of the world itself was expressed. This white magic came from mystery schools which followed a time of a still older spirit religion. The latter once had knoledge but is now extinguishing. It worshiped the divine light in the sun and in fire. The white magic found a population which has been of old, and still is, sensitive and is more easily disposed to dream experiences and clairvoyant visions of the supernatural world than the central Europeans. In this respect it is closer to the Norwegians, Swedes and Lapps. The remnants of shamanism which can still be found go back to those black magic, pre-mystery times; the remains of an old
826 sun and light religion go back to just those mysteries. Very important for the Eurasian human and cultural continuity is the attitude of the ancient Finn to the bear. This attitude is the same throughout the whole of northern Asia as far as the Ainu on Yesso (cf. volume I of this atlas): "the pride of the thicket," "the apple of the forest," "the old man," as he is called in the Kalevala, was, as he is there, asked for his help and friendship because his soul returns to its home, to the home and soul of the whole bear species. "You precious, subdued, badly wounded animal of the forest, bring to our huts health, and plunder as you like, a hundred times, etc." At the bear festival when the slain animals had been suspended from trees, a boy and girl in full wedding costume were chosen as bridal pair. The succession of generations of human history and the past and the present were made alive, an exoteric [sic] celebration, which only lives in faded memories, of ancient esoteric mystery abodes.

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[18: Illustrations.]

[14] The Lapps.

I.

000 1. Camp of tents. 2.-4. Sod houses from the Norwegian Finnmarken

1: Karutz E-4 (no date) 1925 El Europe[1

Lapps

-8a-

[For identification see cat. 116, p. 9 -- Analyst]

1: Karutz--9 E-4 (no date) 1925 E1 Europe
Lapps EP4

000 1. Camp of tents. 2-4. Sod houses from Norwegian Finnmarken, [territory close to the Finnish border]. 3. Lapp woman. 5. Supporting structure of a sod hut. 6. Half finished pole tent with part of the cloth. 7. Old pack saddle for reindeer made of boards tied to the sides and of baskets of birch branches and bark. 8. Floor-plan of an old tent with fire place and sleeping area division. 9. Storage shed. 10. Carving board. 11. Vessel for milk of birch knots. 12. Sled. 13. Torch of birch bark. 14. Basket.[1]

Nos. 12 and 13 are in the Museum für Völkerkunde in Lübeck; No. 10 is in the Museum für Völkerkunde in Hamburg; No. 11 is in the Ethnographische Museum in Dresden.

[14] The Lapps.

I.

101 According to their geographic location we number the inhabitants of the extreme north of Europe among the polar peoples, the Artic peoples, i.e. the peoples of the bear. They call themselves 'same' or 'some', agreeing with 'suomi'=Finnland and 'soome'=Estonia. As late as the twelfth century the Swedes called them Skritfinns, Lauffinns, or Finns who leap on wooden shoes (skis). Thus they are originally also Finns. Around the turn of the first millennium some of them willingly or unwillingly moved north. Those who remained behind therefore gave them the name Lapps, i.e. those who have been driven away, who [66] live in misery. They kept to their nomadism and wandered along the border zones of the Arctic Ocean from the North Sea to as far as the White Sea, across the wooded, swampy mountain and tundra country 144 covered with lakes. Raw climate, poor living conditions and intermixture with Samoyeds and other Turko-Tataric and Mongolian racial elements coming from the East, or whom they met in the East respectively, changed their racial type. At the same time the southern Finns changed their through Teutonic connections. This explains on both sides the 142 present-day differences of the originally uniform race. Physically they are distinguished by short stature, dark skin, flat, broad face, flat nose, dark, coarse hair, light-colored eyes which are often red and swollen 157 from the blinding snow, wind, and smoke from the fireplace. Psychologically there has always been noticeable a strange excitability, especially in the women, whom the least shock can cause to faint or on 000 the other hand to rave madly. Their way of life is completely dependent

1 [For illustrations, see 1: Karutz, E1 Europe, cat. 116, p. 8a --Analyst]

132 Their way of life is completely dependent
on the change between the two to three month long light polar summer and the three month long dark polar winter. Only the moon, the snow, and the starlight bring a little twilight into the permanent night of winter. Their way of life is equally dependent on the abundance of water in the valleys and in their grassland, on the impossibility of traversing the swamps in summer and on the firm snow cover in winter, on the stock of trees on the mountains, and on the abundance of fish in the ocean. They are therefore spoken of as mountain or reindeer
233 Lapps, forest or hunting Lapps, ocean or fishing Lapps. The mountain
221 Lapps with their often large reindeer herds, comprising up to 1,000 animals, travel in the fall toward the mountains, in the spring toward the coast. The ocean Lapps are half nomadic. During the summer they pursue fishing, for the winter they seek a good pasture with grass
224 for the reindeer and with a stock of trees for firewood. The hunters
[221] change similarly between the mountains and forests in the winter and the steppe in summer. The rifle has long since replaced their bow and arrow as well as the cross-bow which was once imported from Norway. But they still use the spear for bears, the club for wolves and wild reindeer which they hunt on snowshoes; also they use traps, slings and
262 holes. The food of the mountain Lapps is therefore the meat, blood, milk, cheese, and marrow of reindeer. That of the forest Lapps is game, birds, fish (also dried and pounded into flour), plant stems, sorrel, berries, spruce resin, lichen, pounded pine and birch bark as bread which is baked on hot stones, and cooked spruce bark as sweet
462 spice. Cooking is of old the job of the men. So is weaving baskets out of roots, working wood and bones, casting tin in bone moulds, and above all reindeer husbandry which came from the Samoyeds. The women spin by hand, knit the nets, twist yarn out of split tendons, sew, embroider, dye, dry fish and meat, do the milking, for which the animals are taken from the herd by lasso, make cheese, and tan
481 hides. The means of transportation consists of reindeer, snowshoes, and sleds. The last has the shape of a boat bent upwards. It is made of boards which are tied together with twisted pieces of string made
342 from reindeer tendons. It is half covered by a hide sewn onto it. The nomadic restlessness demands a movable house, the pole tent, which the mountain Lapps cover with birch bark and hides, the forest Lapps with branches, sod, and bark. The smoke can escape at the point. For a longer stay they dig pits in the ground, cover them with a bow-shaped supporting structure and put birch bark, sod, clay, and nowadays
ooo mostly sail cloth and other cloth on them. The furnishings consist of
1/1 [i.e. the Lapps --- Analyst]

The furnishings consist of
352 two rows of bolders forming the fireplace—which is at the same time fireplace, stove and lamp, —of a kettle hook above it, of birch litter with reindeer skins for a bed, and of all kinds of utensils and tools of
343 wood, bone, and horn. Storage sheds of the post-building type are built to protect provisions from wetness and animals. Figure 9 shows a box like a dove-cote on a lopped off tree trunk (according to Scheffer).
342 The floor-plan of Figure 8, also according to Scheffer, shows H for the fireplace, J for the main entrance, A for the side entrance, through which only the man is permitted to enter, B and C for the place for the men and their hunting equipment, F and G for the place of the women, D for the sleeping area of man and wife, E for the sleeping area for the servants.

113 Bibliography, etc.

Scheffer, Lapponia. Georgi, Beschreibung aller Nationen des Russischen Reiches. Hogström, Beschreibung des der Krone Schweden gehörenden Lapplandes. Creuzer, Symbolik und Mythologie der alten Völker, Vol. 5. Castrén, Vorlesungen über die finnische Mythologie. Crahmer, "Ethnographische Arbeiten in Lappland," Zeitschrift für Ethnologie, Vols. 45 and 46. Crahmer, "Über Lappen und Samojeden." Zeitschrift für Ethnologie, Vol. 44. [Source not completely clear] Das Buch des Lappen Turi. Schöyen, Skonluk-Andaras Berichte aus Lappland. Meitzen, Siedelung und Agrarwesen, Vol. 2. v.d. Horck, "Über die Lappländer," Zeitschrift fur Ethnologie, Vol. 8, p.47. Weinitz, "Die lappische Zaubertrommel in Meiningen," Zeitschrift für Ethnologie, (1910) 1.

[15: Illustrations.]

[16] The Lapps.

II.

000 1. Woman with child in a cradle. 2.-9. Costumes and types. 10. 18th century Lapp pulling tin wire which is used to decorate belts and pouches (see Nos. 14 and 16). 11. Reindeer horn knife for separating bark from the tree trunk in preparing bark bread. 12. Bone used for sewing container. 13. Bag made of hide. 14. Pouch. 15. Belt for festive occasions. 16. Ornament for a horse.[1]

Nos. 11, 12, 15 are in the Ethnographische Museum in Dresden. No. 13 is in the Museum für Völkerkunde in Hamburg.

1 [For illustrations, see 1: Karutz, E1 Europe, cat. 116, p. 11a--Analyst]
2 [see 1: Karutz, E1 Europe, cat. 116, p. 8a--- Analyst]

1: Karutz E-4 (no date) 1925 El Europe E1

Lapps

Karutz Tiller Europa 9

—11a—

[For identification, see cat. 116, p. 11--Analyst]

[16] The Lapps.

II.

462 The making of clothes is the work of women. This includes tanning
294 hides, twisting the thread from split tendons which have previously been softened with fish fat and sewing on decorations. Only tin is cast by men. Then the women make it into wire. They do this by pulling it through a piece of horn which has had several different size holes bored into it. Then a small bone is put into the holes and the wire is pulled through again (see Figure 10).* This makes the round wire flat
291 so that it can be sewn onto the clothing as piping. The clothing itself consists of a knee-length dress of reindeer hide with a leather belt which is decorated with tin and silver. From the latter hang the knife sheath decorated with tin, the bag for fire steel, and the bag for the bone needles. In winter the clothing consists of two furs which, on the principle of storm windows, create a warming air space between them. The fur which is worn underneath has its hair turned toward the skin, the one which is worn on top has it turned outward. The clothing further consists of trousers made of reindeer fur with the hairs toward the inside, high boots, mittens, coat of tanned reindeer hide and fur cap. Today the wool dress is more frequent, especially in the summer. Formerly a bag for the spoon was generally worn on the breast. The head is protected by a cap of bird skin, reindeer hide, fur, wool, or cloth. On festive occasions it is still popular to bring out caps of
[301] an old-fashioned, pointed type. In the olden days the number of sewn-on wires indicated the number of bears killed. Silver rings are worn on fingers and ears. In the winter boots and mittens are stuffed with hay. The lighter shoes turn upwards at the toe. The neck scarves of squirrel tails which are used all over northern Asia occur occasionally. The snowshoes lack the fur layer on the bottom which they
854 have in Asia. On the move the children are carried, otherwise they are hung up in the tent in boat-shaped cradles which are made of birch bark or of a hollowed piece of the trunk of a pine. The cradles are covered with tanned reindeer hide and equipped with a hood of birch wood. They are lined with moss, with the hide of a reindeer calf, of a rabbit, or of a polar fox. Often small pieces of silver are hung on them to prevent the uldas, "the people below the earth," from exchanging or harming the child.

000 [17: Illustrations.]

* [See 2: Karutz, E1 Europe, cat. 116, p. 11a -- Analyst]

1: Karutz--13 E-4 (no date) 1925 E1 Europe Lapps EP4

[18] The Lapps.

III.

000 1.-2. Old graves. 3. Ecstasy of a shaman called forth by beating on a magic drum. 4.-9. Magic drums. 10. Hammer and rings belonging to them. 11.-13. Horn spoons. 14. Spoon made of human skull bones. 15.-16. Bone knives. 17. Bone knife in leather sheath. 18. Ancient place of sacrifice. 19.-20. Cheese molds. 21. Weaving frame. 22.-24. Wooden bowls. 23. Runic calendar. 25. Wooden bell. 26. Netting-needle. 27.-29. Scrapers. 28. Instrument for taking off bark.[1]

Nos. 11, 12, 15, 16, 23 are in the Museum für Völkerkunde in Lübeck. No. 17 is in the Ethnographische Museum in Basel. Nos. 19, 26-29 are in the Museum für Vökerkunde in Hamburg. No. 14 is in the Ethnographische Museum in Dresden. No. 20 is in the Museum für Völkerkunde in Leipzig. Nos. 21, 22, 24, 25 are in the Museum für Völkerkunde (Linden-Museum) in Stuttgart.

[18] The Lapps.

III.

764 In ancient times the Lapps buried their dead in natural caves, or made artificial ones by leaning large stones against each other in pyramid shape or by building mounds of stones. Or they placed the body in a pit and piled birch bark, sod and stones on it. The dead was often buried with his sled, or the latter was placed turned over on the grave, as well as snow-shoes, tools, and hunting gear. Meat, milk, and other foods were added as sacrificial gifts. The color of mourning was white. The reindeer which pulled the sled with the body had to be white, or its horns were bound in white. The dead man was not carried out of the tent through the door, but under the tent cloth to one side, because "the dead and the living should not walk on the same track." The Lapps were as familiar with the immortality of the soul as with the life and work of spiritual
789 beings everywhere in nature; to them they sacrificed. From this knowledge resulted the magic which is here so very old that Herodotus reports the Scythians to have learned magic from the Hyperboreans, i.e. from the North. Also it is here so clear that the Lapps' retort

[1] [For illustrations, see 1: Karutz, 1 Europe, cat. 116, p. 13a -- Analyst]

1: Karutz E-4 (no date) 1925 El Europe E1
Lapps

-13a-

[For identification, see cat. 116, p. 13 --Analyst]

789 to the missionaries was that their own ancestors were smart enough
to know to which gods sacrifices were to be made. Magic was as
well known and feared as the "art of the Finns," and despite Christianity
made use of the so-called magic drums right into the 18th century;
[157] its psychological basis exists even today. The constantly mentioned
excitability of the Lapps, their proneness to fainting and to states of
great excitement is proof of their tendency to special states of cons-
ciousness in which man approaches the spiritual worlds with clair-
voyance. This excitability is prevalent to this day, and at one time,
through external stimulation, led to the formation of Christian sects
in which, significantly, the leaders were looked upon as the true
[791] Christians, while preachers of the national church were looked upon
as the "nogaiden," the shamans, magicians, and spiritists. This is
how strong the purely spiritual tendency in them was. The knowledge
of magic expressed itself further in many sacrificial practices, me-
dical regulations, protective formulas: stones painted with blood,
arrows of lead shot into the air, knives with which men had been stab-
bed to death were effective for long distances. Birds were sacrificed
[825] so that new birds might come. Bones of bears were not permitted to
be broken because they were to produce new bears. Here is a re-
minder of the ancient man-bear relationship, about which man in
the whole of northern Asia knows (cf. Vol. I of this atlas). The
Lapps too called him the "old man," for them too he had a "cons-
cience," was chivalrous because he did not attack women. When
he was killed, songs of thanksgiving were sung to him because he had
not injured anybody. His skull and bones were buried like a man to-
791 gether with gifts. The bearers of spiritual knowledge and the mag-
ical ability were the "nogaiden," people who were endowed with a
high degree of that common "excitability." They had perfected
their ability of clairvoyance in traditional practice, in a degenerated
continuation of a former mystery cult. They were able to see the
past, the absent, the future; to heal diseases, interpret dreams, read
the stars and determine from their position to the moon the sex of
[786] expected children. Through rhythmical singing, dancing, and
beating of the drum they achieved a state of excitement and conse-
quent death-like unconsciousness during which their body was not
permitted to be touched, and during which their spiritual personality
split off and entered into the spiritual world from which it received
789 directions. The shape of the drum and its use was a Lapp specialty:
534 the hide, which was held tight over a wooden frame with wooden peg.
or strings made

[1: Karutz, A1 Asia --- Analyst]

789 from reindeer tendons, was painted with a variety of human, animal,
534 star, and other figures and symbols in red color (made from cooked alder bark). It was beaten with a hammer of reindeer horn in such a way that a loose metal ring slid over the figures on it. This ring indicated what the nogaide desired to know: cause and cure of diseases, names of spirits to whom sacrifices were to be made, etc. The drum
778 was also able to emanate disease-carrying forces. Once upon a time the Lapps had images of the gods like the Finns, for instance Iumala with a crown with twelve stones (Zodiac). But mostly what is reported of "idols" were actually in part emanative medicines and bearers of real spiritual powers, like the natural, in some way strangely formed roots of trees which were renewed each year; and in part they were statues and monuments of the visual experience of the spiritual forces, like the so-called seidas, uncut stones in front of which reindeer antlers were laid and which lost their power when one ceased to sacrifice in front of them. Pieces of wood with the runic inscription "traveling staff of the seida" stood beside them, a proof that they were the provisions for the journey of the human spirit which desired to go to the cosmic spirit.

[19: Illustrations]

[20] The Estonians.

I.

000 1. Estonian barn with stairs made of a beam into which steps have been hewn. 2. Kitchen in Jurtenform [type of tent shape] near Reval. 3. House with covered porch. 4. Homestead with pole-fence. 5. Windmill. 6. Grain chest made of a hollowed tree trunk, Settukesic village of Meeks. 7. Stone fence surrounding a homestead. 8. Clatter board (bell for noon, etc.). 9. Draw-well. 10. Bath house. 11. Old window (wooden slide), in it wood for washing, underneath wooden mallets for threshing grain. 12. Stove with pot hook. 13. Home with threshing floor and bedroom under the same roof with the living room (smoke hut). 14. Pole fence with stile. 15. Bench with carved support.

[20] The Estonians.

I.

1 [For illustrations, see 1: Karutz, 1 Europe, cat. 116, p. 15a--Analyst]

1: Karutz E-4 (no date) 1925 E1 Europe E1
Estonians

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

-15a-

[For identification, see cat. 116, p. 15 -- Analyst]

The same post-ice age, early Eurasian race as that in Suomi-Finn- 101
land which once migrated from the Atlantic to the Pacific, with
local variations, had settled south of the eastern part of the Baltic
Sea and of the Finnish ocean bay. As it did in Suomi-Finnland so [44]
here too it received from the 17th century on east Finnish and Volga
Finnish admixtures, but to a much smaller degree. On the other
hand it received much stronger northern Germanic additions. From
this developed the Estonians, designated thus by their neighbors as
the people of the East but in the oldest Russian annals called Chudi,
like all Finns. They themselves formerly only called themselves
maamees, i.e. man of the country, and their people maarahwas,
i.e. people of the country. Today they like to speak of soome
(from som, dark, wet) as their home, in accord with Suomi-Finn-
land. Their territory stretches from Reval to Warro, from Walk to 131
Lake Peipus, with additional land in the area of Vitebsk, "poor land
with meager fields" (Kalewipoeg), full of swamps and forests. Be- 197
cause of their Finno-Ugric language, which incidentally contains
more than 30% Germanic words, the Estonians are still numbered
among the "Mongoloids," but they are neither anthropologically nor
ethnographically connected with them. They are rather completely
European. They are blond, have blue eyes, a tall and strong build. [142]
Dark types are seldom encountered. Once because of the nature of 241
the land dependent on gathering, hunting and fishing, they became
stock-farmers and husbandmen under later influence from Lithuania
and from the Baltic Sea. In all branches of the economy the imple- 412
ments and tools used have preserved their primitive forms and the
materials of the wood age have largely been kept to our day. Fishing
is done with iron hooks and a red drag-rod /Schleppangel/ bound with
wool. A fork-shaped hand-plow /Zoche/ is used for plowing; ropes
are twisted with crude forked branches as in the Celtic West and in
north Germanic Sweden; weaving is done with small hand-weaving 286
tools and with little boards - alongside the pedal weaving frame;
until a short time ago wool was plucked, cleaned with a hatter's bow
/Fachbogen/ which is of exactly the same construction as the cotton
cleaner which is used from Egypt to China and which has been pre-
served in central Europe in the hat factory, strangely enough, only
in this trade. The old conical tent shape is preserved in farm kitchens, [343]
which stand alone or are joined to the bath house. It exists as a cir-
cular foundation of stones and a pole-roof. The present-day square 342
houses, similar to the Latvian and Lithuanian block buildings, and

like them built on the ground or on stone foundations, have low 342
walls, a heavy, high, gabled roof with turrets and wind-boards, cut out windows with glass panes which with rare exceptions have replaced the sliding windows (Figure 11). The house is divided into living room, threshing floor, and bedroom; in the first, which usually has no floor, is the open hearth with the kettle-hook over it. A container of resinous pine chips stands on the window sill or on a corner shelf. Sometimes it is simply inserted without stand between two beams of the wall. The cradle hangs from the ceiling "Linde /or: Linden beams/ had often rocked the cradle with songs" (Kalewipoeg). The beer jugs which resemble northern forms also [415]
belong to the household utensils. The Estonian usually settles in 592
individual homesteads which are surrounded by fences of slanting 343
poles. The gates swivel on twisted willow bands. A series of buildings stands here together: barn; kiln /Riege oder Darre/ for drying grain--because otherwise the fall rains would spoil much of it--which in the winter is at the same time living room and kitchen; summer kitchen; bathroom--as in Lithuania people bathe in hot 515
steam which rises from heated stones sprayed with water. The bather lies on the sweat-bench and cools himself by beating himself with a bundle of tender branches of birch leaves which is dipped in cold water.

/21: Illustrations./

/22/ The Estonians.

II.

1. Woman from the island of Ruhnu, which is here represented as 000
the bridge to the north. 2.-7. Women's hats and hair styles. 8.-9. Silver ornamental disks (sölg, paternoster). 10. Costume from the island of Muhu. 11.-13. Silver ornaments, particularly large breast plates. 14. Implement for twisting rope. 15.-23. Patterns on woven belts (wö). 24. Hatter's bow (tool for cleaning wool). 25. Piece of a runic calendar. 26. Settukesi costume, dress with striped sleeves, blouse with woven inset, bandana. 27. Costume from Muhu. 28. Woman's overcoat of white wool. 29. Blouse with inset. 30. Belt from Hiiumaa made of leather and punched brass.[1]

Nos. 7, 8, 9, 14, 15-23, 25, 26, 28, 30 are in the Museum für Völkerkunde in Lübeck.

[1] [For illustrations, see 1: Karutz, E1 Europe, cat. 116, p. 17a--Analysis]

1: Karuts E-4 (no date) 1925 E1 Europe E1
Estonians

-17a-

[for identification, see cat. 116, p. 17 -- Analyst]

1: Karutz--18 E-4 (no date) 1925 E1 Europe
Estonians RG4

/22/ The Estonians.

II.

The Estonians' original clothing was probably, as elsewhere in the 294
birch territory, made of bark and of hide and fur. Later they learned to twist yarn out of all kinds of vegetable fibers and to dye, spin and weave it. They also learned to mill sheep wool into felt and to spin and weave wool, cow's hair and horsehair. In the Kalewipoeg 291 531
the old literary source, there is mention of white, dotted shirts, dresses with gold threads, headbands with colorful stripes, colored scarves and colored belts. Thus the Estonians have always taken great pleasure in color. Even today this enjoyment of color is still present, but of course only in a diminished degree. The shirts of the women are decorated by having patterns woven into them. The stockings have patterns knitted into them. The narrow belts of both sexes which are made on the hand-weaving frame and with small weaving boards have colored designs. Both are disappearing, and with them the last remains of ancestral costume. On the belts the patterns are in a chain and show rhombic fields, rows of hooks, swastika and star configurations. They remind one at once of Near Eastern carpets and surely go back to them, i.e. the designs, not the belts themselves which have always been customary for the indigenous long frocks. White frocks, of which the Kalewipoeg speaks, still occur today as women's coats with white and green edges. They are buttoned in front right over left. In the back they are slightly gathered on both sides so that they are a little loose in the hip. They are similar to south Slavic styles. The long blue linen frocks (Figure 26) are peculiar. They have a shirt-like opening in the front which is closed with buttons--formerly it was closed with silver buckles--through two narrow pieces of the same material which are sewn onto the back edge of the sleeveless sleeve holes and almost hang down to the ground /sic/. These pieces are now ornaments, and also whips with which the woman keeps the sheep and the children under control. Originally they were the sleeves which were cut away when the long ornamented shirt sleeves became the fashion and were supposed to remain visible. Then they deteriorated into strips. The street coat of Turkestani Sartin (see this atlas, Volume I, page 113, Figure 4) shows a similar development of the sleeve becoming super-

291 fluous, but of course for different reasons. This coat is pulled over
531 the head from the back and gathered in front of the face in order to cover and complete the closing of the short horsehair veil. The sleeves are laid back and stitched together on the back. Stripes woven into the material, as in the shirts, are still seen in towels, in the decorative cloths of the saint's shrine in the corner of the old rooms in Settukesi, the Estonian territory near Lake Peipus, and in bandanas. On the island of Hiiumaa there still occurs a costume consisting of a woven wool frock with red and blue vertical stripes, a bodice sewn onto it, a small jacket of white linen with small vertical pleats pressed into it, a red wool bandana which is intertwined with the braids, and lies like a crown on the head and then falls down to the shoulders in two broad ribbons (Figure 7), a leather belt with punched brass sheets and brass buttons and with an appendage in back of fourteen pairs of brass chains which come together in the middle in a ring. The belt also has a knife sheath of engraved lead with year and house sign, and a small wool money pouch (Figure 30). Only on the island of Moon do the Estonians wear a flat, multi-colored, round, lid-shaped cap on their short-cropped hair. With it they wear a blue frock and red stockings. Formerly much work went into the head coverings which were made sometimes tower-shaped, sometimes crown-shaped, high or low, pointed
301 or round, of cardboard or cork and wool or linen. Some of the Estonian women on the mainland still own very rich ornaments of silver buckles, chains, rings, hangings, small disks and sometimes huge bent breast plates. Disks with a cross cut out of the middle were called pater. They originate from the time before the Reformation; otherwise they liked to use Russian, German and Swedish coins for such hangings. Figure 9 1/1 shows a disk with the Estonian coat of arms (three leopards), with the sign of the craftsman, and the silver stamp. The last two have been required in Riga since 1542, in Reval since 1547 "with the town sign /teken/ and everyone with a sign /teken/ of his own." The disk in Figure 9 1/1 is bent outward in the center like a shield, has an eight-cornered star and is bound around the outside with a ribbon.

/23: Illustrations./

/24/ The Estonia[redacted]

III. [redacted]

0001. -2. Physical types. 3. Old men's costume. 4. Grinding the potter's

1/1 [See 1: Karutz, E1 Europe, Cat. 116, p. 17a---Analyst]

1: Karutz E-4 (no date) 1925 E1 Europe E1

000

Estonians

-19a-

[For identification, see cat. 116, p. 20 -- Analyst]

1: Karutz--20 E-4 (no date) 1925 El Europe
Estonians RG4

0001.-2. Physical types. 3. Old men's costume. 4. Grinding the potter's clay. 5. All Souls /Day/. 6. Bag-piper. 7. Adustable ceiling lamp. 8. Kettlehook made of a bent branch. 9. "Swedish harp." 10. Basket. 11. Ancient place of sacrifice. 12. Shepherd's horn. 13. Small cask used by the field workers for drinking. 14. Kummet with carved horses' heads. 15. Pennant from Lake Peipus. 16. Model of a Lodje /type of sail boat/ from Lake Peipus. 17. Ceiling chandelier (Yule chandelier). 18. Old harp. 19.-20. Beer mugs with northern designs. (horse, sun) 1

Nos. 6-10, 14-20 are in the Museum für Vökerkunde in Lübeck.

/24/ The Estonians.

III.

778 As late as the year 1918 I was shown an ancient place of sacrifice (Figure 11) in Estonian, a small artificial cave with bones. As in Lithuania so here spiritual goods from early European times have been preserved. The national epic Kalewipoeg, as well as old chronicles
789 of the earliest German times, give support to this. Of course black magic was practiced as in Finland, though to a slighter degree. Those who could not master it went to the experts across the ocean and to Lapland. A Lapp is enjoined to help the Kalewipoeg "to take the path of wisdom, to travel to the end of the world, to seek the end of the world where the hands of the Ancient Father have tied tight the edges of heaven, attached them tightly to the earth..." The basis of their magic, even if only in memory, was a knowledge of the spiritual power in all worldly matters, of their forces which work constantly and every-
[266] where, of their relationship to man. They knew of and took the spiritual in matter and in the human body when they used emanative magic medicines, when they, as was reported of the year 1221, cut the heart out of the body of a living Danish governor /Vogt/, fried and ate it in order to become the braver and stronger against the Christians. This is a process which is repeated in the total phenomenon of cannibalism and originates from the same spiritual source of common consciousness. Numerous customs are based on this knowledge of the inner connection in the spiritual sphere between men and cosmos. A misfortune which has been mysteriously blown towards one by magic disappears when one
791 walks against the wind. Higher knowledge and thus higher magic powers were possessed by people who at times were able to separate themselves off from the bodily cloak, to become "haltia," to travel as free spirits

1 [For illustrations, see 1: Karutz, E1 Europe, cat. 116, p. 19a--Analyst]

791 into the land of the dead and to gather there supernatural knowledge. After regaining consciousness they used their new knowledge to interpret dreams, to heal or cause diseases, to influence favorably or unfavorably hunting, fishing, journeys, to dominate nature, or rather the invisible spirits standing behind visible nature. They knew that the spoken word was the most effective. Magicians dominated men, things, animals and spirits with the spoken word. The syllables of the verses march in firm, short resounding steps with repetition, alliteration,
533 and analogy. Connected with the spoken word is song, music, which with the Estonians and Finns is something immediately spiritual and divine, as only perhaps in China. The Estonian lifted himself up to the gods in song "the song does not spring from the earth, not from the earth, not from wood, the folk-song has come from heaven, through the holy
534 clouds, above the crooked edge" (Kalewipoeg). The harp, which is made of a pine or linden branch and has an upper surface and a bottom graded surface, was once developed from a birch which grew out of the grave of a murdered virgin. It is said that the evil one made the bagpipe and the horn and that Wanemuine, the god of song, made the
533 harp and the flute from a leaf. How long the spoken word has here preserved its old, powerful meaning can be seen from the fact that as late as the year 1810 the Estonian women sang on holidays as long as 24 hours on hills which were called "places inherited from ancient times."
733 Following the time in which such knowledge was generally alive or still preserved in memory, there came a period in which it lived only with spiritual leaders and was interpreted by them in pictorial representations. From this period comes what is transmitted of the following: Iumala, the god of heaven; Ukko "nine inherited holidays is the ninth Ukko-feast" (Kalwipoeg); Taara, the ancient father to whom they sacrificed on the four /sic/ solstices; images; the creation legends about the development of the world from an egg; the earth as a living organism, as the mother; the sun service; the haljas, the guardian angels of men. /25: Illustrations./

/26/ The Letts.

I.

000 1. Summer kitchen. 2. Log house with split spruce wood roof /Lubben/. 3. Storage shed. 4. Hand mill. 5. - 6. Beehives. 7. Baby walker

1: Karutz E-4 (no date) 1925 El EuropeE1

Letts

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

-21a-

[For identification, see cat. 1b., pp. 21-22. -- Analyst]

1: Karutz--22 E-4 (no date) 1925 E1 Europe
Letts RB4

000 8. Suspended cradle. 9. Stand for resinous wood chips. 10. Ribbon braiding. 11. Ribbon weaving. 12. Cleaning flax. 13. Kettle hook. 14. Hook for hanging things up. 15. Holder for resinous wood chips. 16. Small board weaving. 17. Anchor. 18. Box of birch bark (salt box). 19. Small tree basket of birch bark. 20. Lattice weaving. 21. Bow for a musical instrument /spele/. 22. Violin with three strings /duda/. 23. Scraping iron for making vessels from solid wood. 24. Natural pine tree ladder for climbing bee trees. 25. Beehive in a hollowed tree of the forest with a pulley /tritze/ on which the bee keeper can pull himself up. 26. St. John's day. The people decorate themselves and the house with oak leaf wreaths. 27. Anchor. 28. Plow with forked share /Zoche/. 29. Obtaining birch juice by tapping the tree.[1]

/26/ The Letts.

I.

101 The Letts inhabit the territory which forms a wide semicircle around
[131] the bay of Riga from the coast of the Baltic Sea in the west to the
[144] southern border of the Estonian territory. Anthropologically they are early Eurasians who since the Stone Age have been changed by an admixture of Teutons. Their name is considered to refer to well, to the abundance of lakes in the area. Pytheas' account of the Guttonen is considered to be the earliest report of them. But according to other scholars this account refers to the old Prussians who lived along the fresh-water lake. Yet others claim it to refer to the Goths in their original
137 territories. The tremendous wealth of forests which always has existed
322 and still does exist there brought about a wood culture among the Letts as well as among the Teutons, Lithuanians and Slavs, but it has been preserved especially long with the Letts. Pine, spruce, birch, linden, maple, ash, elm, and oak trees thrive in these forests alongside of willows and alders. The utilization of natural stone and clay was retarded, lime mortar was unknown until the thirteenth century, metal culture began very late. Everything necessary for life was furnished the Lett by the tree, from the house and furnishings to utensils and tools, from footwear to the birch juice drink. The foundation of the
241 Lett's life is the gathering economy of bee keeping and fishing (pri-
[301] mitive boat carved out of a single tree!), but especially agriculture which is often still quite backward in the distribution of the fields, crop

1 [For illustrations, see 1: Karutz, E1 Europe, cat. 116, p. 21a -- Analyst]

[241] rotation, and methods of tilling. The Letts live mostly in individual
[592] homesteads consisting of house, stable, kiln /Riege/ or grain dryer
342 /Darre/, Klete or granary, bath house and underground cellar; more rarely they live in villages. Covered earth pits served as dwellings in ancient times, then pole tents covered with twigs or bark like the summer kitchens still in use today. Quadrangular wooden houses made of round, peeled logs have now been in use for a long time. The logs protrude one over the other at the corners and the houses have only wooden pegs, no nails. More recently houses are built of smoothly sawed beams with boards nailed onto them. The spaces between the logs are stuffed with moss. "Herring on herring, seal fat in the middle what is that?" asks a Latvian riddle. The bottom logs lie on the bare ground or on medium sized erratic granite boulders. Turrets serve as protection from the wind and carved horses' heads or horns as gable decoration on the thatched roof which comes down very low. In earlier times the houses were covered with shingles of spruce bark or with split spruce wood (Lubben). Originally the doors and windows were knocked out of the completed walls. The windows were square holes with a wooden slide. Today they are generally of glass. The doors are to this day secured with locks with falling blocks and with notched bolts into which fits a wooden key with movable wards which is introduced from
[354] the outside through a hole in the door. The kiln /Riege/ used to serve at the same time as living room in the winter because of the heat. The bathroom has a fireplace of stone or clay, on top of that a heap of stones which are heated by the fire and are then sprayed with water for steam production. Here and there the knocking board still serves as bell for
415 the homestead. All household utensils are made of wood--even the cooking pots used to be--or of birch bark which is folded like a bag and held together with a thorn or rolled into a cylinder and closed by joining together the patched ends. Branch pieces with the natural beginnings of other branches serve for hanging things on and for anchors. The hand mill of two stones, the upper one of which is turned on the lower one by means of a stick which moves freely at the upper end, is still generally in use. So is the method of simple rope and ribbon turning by means of
286 a forked branch; weaving with a simple bow which is held against the body and onto which the chain is tied, with or without a grate which holds the threads of the chain apart; weaving by means of small boards which are turned forwards and backwards on the surface and so create the panels: finally weaving by means of the northern pedal-weaving frame.

000 231 frame. The ancient, widely-distributed bee keeping cares for the bees in lying or standing hives of tree trunks or in live, hollowed trees of the forests. The bee keeper uses a set of pulleys or a natural fir tree for climbing up. The latter together with the notched tree trunk represents the primitive forms of the ladder in every wood culture, and thus also [273] in Latvia. A refreshing and healthy drink is obtained by tapping the [493] birch trees. A plain mead beer is also customary. Wagon and sled, or board boat and boat made of one hollowed tree are the means of trans-
534 portation. The musical instruments of the song loving people are willow pipes, trumpets made of alder bark, goat or cattle horns, a plucking in-
789 strument /Zupfbogen/, zither, violin, and bag-pipe. A people as primitive in its economic practices as the Letts preserves also, of course, much spiritual good of early times. For instance rowan tree branches are put on barn doors, in grain crates, between the logs of the house wall as protective medicines. For a long time the custom of placing a green tree or a wreath on top of the house at weddings and of planting a small grove behind the house was preserved. The thriving of this grove was considered to be connected with the happiness of the family. At harvest festivals and on St. John's day the country people celebrate. Especially on the latter day the house and the farm are decorated with leaves and the people put on symbolic wreaths of oak leaves. The understanding of spiritual forces in nature and of their healing radiation was originally the basis of all these things.
/27: Illustrations./

/28/ The Letts

II.

000 1. Woman with crown-shaped hood and silver breastplate ornament. 2. Male type. 3. Woman with shawl. 4.-5. Buttons made of leather for the coat. 6. Head brush. 7.-8. Bast shoe made of the bark of the linden tree. 9.-10. Shoes made of hide with leather fillet and flax strings, respectively. 11. Shawl with fringe. 12. Women of the island Ruhnu. 13. Prehistoric bast belt with bronze spirals. 14. Women engaged in wringing out the washing.[1]

291 It may be conjectured from allusions in folk songs and from objects found in graves, that at one time the Letts wore shirts, coats, belts, and hats made of bast. Until quite recently bast shoes were

1 [For illustrations, see 1:Karutz, E1 Europe, cat. 116, p. 24a -- Analyst]

1: Karutz E-4 (no date) 1925 El Europe

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[For identification, see cat. 116, p. 24--Analyst]

291 considered a necessary part of the bride's outfit on the wedding day,
and they were made by the bride for the bridegroom's relatives and
294 given to them as presents. As among the Estonians, the Russians,
291 and the Finns, even today they are being manufactured from the
bark of alder trees, willow trees, juniper trees, and, more rarely,
of linden trees. At one time the bark of the linden tree was the
exclusive material used for their manufacture, but since the extinction
of the great linden tree forests there is a lack of this type of tree,
the use of which has therefore been replaced by that of the others.
Furthermore, home-made sandals of untanned hide or of strips of
cow's hide tanned in tan of pine or alder bark, are worn. The strips
of cow's hide are punctured at the edges in order to attach the sole
of the sandal to the foot by means of a flax string drawn through the
holes, and to draw together the front end to form a toe-piece. Now-
adays leather boots and shoes are displacing the home-made ones.
The proof for the one-time use of bast belts is supplied by the ex-
cavated find shown in illustration 13, a belt consisting of five rows
of regular, firmly twisted bast strings which run through bronze fillets
and are covered with bronze spirals. Strings of flax also occur on
similar belts. In ancient times the clothing was made of wool which
was obtained from the sheep, spun, carded, and woven (see Plate,
Letts I) all in the household economy itself. The materials used for
the garments were slung around the body unsewn and attached by a
belt above the hips. Now tailoring and urban cut has penetrated.
The shirt was held together at the yoke and at the front slit by metal
clasps (breze or sakte); nowadays string and buttons have taken their
place. A home-made button substitute is made of rolled up leather
strips which are sewn together or have the end drawn through a slanting
hole made by piercing with an awl, and in this way are held together.
Shawls with fringe are still popular, and the fringe is slung around
the body either together with the shawl or by itselves by means of
special little fringe boards /or bindings/; small board weaving (see
302 Plate, Letts I) also serves them. To dressing there also belongs the
head brush, which is made of the long bristles from a pig's back tied
together in the shape of a brush, or in which the bristles are held to-
gether in a handle covered with pitch or in a wooden handle.

Bibliography, etc.

 And particularly: Bielenstein, Die Holzbauten und Holzgeräte

1: Karutz--26 E-4 (no date) 1925 E1 Europe
Lithuanians RB5
Lets RB4

Le
113 der Letten /Wooden buildings and tools of the Letts/ (St. Petersburg, 1907) Part I and (1918) Part II.

/29: Illustrations./

/30/ The Lithuanians

I.

000 1. Bathroom, roof construction. 2. Peat drying under sheets of bark. 3. Dwelling on a foundation of field boulders. 4. Dwelling with a porch-like construction before the door. 5. Hand-operated mill. 6.-8. Musical instruments. 9. A granary transformed into a dwelling. 10. Zoche (hand plow with forked share). 11. Beehive made out of a hollow tree stem. 12, 17, 21. Types of wayside crosses. 13. Granary with roof arcade and large roof ridge. 14. Stringed zither made of an osier switch. 15. Shephard's trumpet made of wood, bark, and reed. 16. Holder for a burning pinewood splinter. 18. Wayside cross with shrines. 19. Farmyard surrounded by a wall, with wayside cross. 20. Cross with shrines in a graveyard.[1]

Li
181 The forests, with their many lakes and swamps, between the Baltic and the middle Dvina, from the upper Neman to Daugavpils, are accessible only with great difficulty and removed from the large communication routes. As a result they have preserved, in greater purity than is the case anywhere else, the culture and the language of a very ancient member of the European race. They are as little understood by the Germans as by the Slavs; they are as different from the Finns and their magically conditioned powers of the will as they are from the Germanic peoples and their restless thirst for conquest of the
Li physical world. On the other hand, in their religious organization they
144 are clearly oriented towards the western part of our continent. In all these characteristics the Lithuanians manifest themselves as the remnant of a pre-Germanic racial group that grew up in Europe. At one time it migrated from the west to its present-day territory, but it has
Li been settled there for thousands of years already. They may be the
142 "aestuarii" that Tacitus mentions as living east of the Germans. We encounter narrow, long faces, blue eyes, blond hair, and medium-
000 sized, slender figures. They are industrious, peace-loving, and

1 [For illustrations, see 1: Karutz, E1 Europe, cat. 26, p. 26a--Analyst]

1: Karutz E-4 (no date) 1925 El EuropeE1

Lithuanians



-26a-

[For identification, see cat. 116, p. 26 -- Analyst]

1: Karutz--27 E-4 (no date) 1925 E1 Europe
Lithuanians RB5

181 They are industrious, peace-loving, and
unassuming people, described by ancient chroniclers as "rough but pious."
Since time immemorial and ever spiritually attuned to nature, they
have built their entire culture upon a natural basis. Like the Letts, who
are related to them, they live to a great extent in a "wood age" which
is very ancient but for that reason no less many-sided, skillful, and
342 sensible. The houses are made of wood; their foundation beams rest on
the bare soil or on field boulders. The roof at one time probably con-
sisted of spruce bark, as the covering sheets for the peat still do today;
but now the roof is made of straw which is held on to the ridge by ridge ride
In front of the door there is usually placed a narrow porch with a gabled
roof and with little benches to the right and to the left. Formerly the
houses had only one room, smoking-room style, but now they usually
have a tripartite division with entrance hall in the middle, and living
room and bedroom to the right and the left of it. The floor consists of
352 a loam coating or of boarding. The furniture consists of wall benches,
loose benches, well-carved solid chairs, a table, wall boards, and pine-
353 wood splinter holders; on the walls are hung pictures of saints, fre-
quently portraits of the old Lithuanian rulers, and, symptomatic for the
343 great amount of emigration, photographs from America. Aside from
the living quarters, granaries (klete), barns, stables, wells, and bath
515 house belong to the Lithuanian farmstead. In the bath house they bathe
in steam which rises from heated stones on which the water is poured.
This, incidentally, is also the way the Indians do it. The bather lies
on a bench and cools and massages himself at the same time by means
412 of a cluster of birch twigs which he dips in fresh water. The hand-
operated mill is a very ancient instrument. It has one stationary and
[231] one turning stone in a wooden box. Likewise ancient is the beehive
made of a hollow tree stem--bee keeping is the most original native
and the most highly developed form of the collecting economy, which is
here, as among the Letts, universally practiced and skillfully cultivated--;
ancient, too, is the zoche, the plow with the forked share, which, as
late as the 16th century, was made entirely of wood, and which even
today is completely wooden except for the iron shoe; just like the har-
rows with branches tied to them, and the snowshoes made of hollowed-
534 out oak boards tied under the foot. Ancient, also, are the musical in-
struments: the nine-stringed kanklys, the truba made of a birch branch
cut lengthwise, hollowed out, and tied together again; the short reed
pipe, the trapezoid shaped cymbal, the stringed zither made of an osier
switch, played with a bow fashioned in the same way; with a resonator

[534] consisting of a pig's bladder, the long shepherd's horn.--The Lithuanian
533 is very gifted musically as well as poetically. His folk songs, the dainos, present in brief, firm trochaic measures and in soft iambs the sincere and heart-felt, vividly experienced joys and sorrows of a sensitive human soul which tends towards melancholy. These songs have frequently been translated, and they were greatly appreciated by Herder and Goethe. The latter reproduced a daina in his musical play, Die Fischerin. The tenderness and fervor of the folk poetry is repeated in
764 the appearance and the mood of the graveyards. Their silents seclusion along mountain slopes and on hilltops, their--romantically neglected --enclosures of flowers and creepers, their enormous, dark, and forcibly admonitory Golgotha crosses and moss-covered crucifixes with the instruments of torture, the sight of which and the walk through which, make them into veritable experiences. In spite of all the neglect, one is conscious here that the Lithuanian is close to his dead, even if such customs have disappeared, as still existed during the 16th century, according to which the deceased was placed fully dressed on a chair and wailing women were made to sing songs of mourning around him.

/31: Illustrations./

/32/ The Lithuanians.

II.

000 1. Lithuanian farmer. 2. Costume of the 17th century. 3. Costume of the 19th century. 4. Tub. 5. Earthenware pot. 6.-10 Pots. 11. Spoon. 12. Ladle. 13, 14. Salt grinders. 15. Pouch made of birch bark used for collecting berries. 16. Butter tub made of a hollowed-out stem. 17. Chair with a perforated back. 18. Spoons. 19. Flax-scutcher and basket made of straw-ropes used to store grain.[1]

415 It is of course impossible for the Lithuanian wood culture to
[322] remain exclusively such today. Stampers and grinders and the tankards for the ancient native barley beer are still fashioned in the completely original manner by being worked out of a solid block and hollowed out. But, however much this is true, and, however much birch bark is still used, there exists, nevertheless, home-made earthenware, next to the wood products, especially in the fringe areas. But even the

1 [For illustrations, see 1: Karutz, E1 Europe, cat. 116, p. 28a--analyst]

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000 Lithuanians

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[For identification, see Ct. 116, p. 28--Analyst]

[415] earthenware remains completely simple in technique and form. In
291 the way of clothing the old has not been preserved. Figure 2, from
177 the 17th century, points to similarities with the Letts. In East Prussia,
German influences then had their effect, and beyond the border Polish
771 influences made themselves felt. For a long time, until well into the
19th century, remnants of the ancient religion were preserved. This
religion was a knowledge of divine forces in nature, everywhere, from
the sun and the stars to the plants and stones; as well as a knowledge
of the unity between nature and man, of inner and lasting relations
and interinfluences between them. How clearly the divine in nature
was beheld is indicated by conceptions like the one that believes that
actual pain is inflicted upon the deity if the bark is peeled off the trees!
How clearly the unity was experienced is to be seen from the custom of
of keeping trees in the farmyard, with the thriving of which the pros-
perity and health of the inhabitants remained connected; or from folk
songs like the following:

Alas, I poor man went hence,
Cried bitter tears.
Was not the oak tree
Transformed into my father.

Gnome-like earth spirits lived in the roots of the juniper bushes--not reminiscences of tiny original inhabitants of the type familiar among the Reindeer Lapps, as has been stated, but clearsighted visions of elementary beings. Spring, summer, and autumn festivals united the people for the communal experience of the light, the sun as the spiritual center of the world and of existence; in sacred forests
793 they came to the gods and sacrificed to them. Yes, the chief of the
771 Waideloten priesthood, the Kriwe, sacrificed himself after he had become old; he admonished the people to do penance, climbed upon the stake, let himself be burned and knew that he would rise up the gods in the flames. In the same sense, it was considered a particular sign of divine mercy to be struck and killed by lightning. At one time the religious knowledge and feeling was guarded by a liberally organized, but nevertheless hierarchically ordered priesthood with an elected chief priest, and these were mediated to the people in exoteric forms. Then they maintained a perpetual fire which, only in the year 1387, was ceremoniously extinguished for ever in the castle at Vilna by the duke Jagello(!). Then they made sacrifices to the sun, they prophesied

793 from a clairvoyant vision, they mediated the disclosures of the de-
771 ceased, convoked the people for gatherings, when such revelations had
been received, in order to make them known, in order to arrange
festivals, and in order to determine the sowing and the harvesting time.
The priests were, therefore, the spiritual leaders of the people, who
guided life into its everyday activities from the vantage point of their
knowledge of the cosmic interconnections. They were acquainted
with the influence of the moon on all births and with the return of the
souls after death into its sphere: "that which has died off, which is
laid as a seed kernel into the soil of another world," as Creuzer ex-
presses it; an insight, it would appear, into the process of every re-
[79] newed life on earth. A special festival in autumn, the festival of the
consecration of the goat, seems to have been an exoteric parallel to
the initiation rites in the mystery cults; for on this occasion the priests
recited the traditions from the history of the people and absolved the
[82] people of sin. After the harvest a god's image was every year broken
and renovated; by this was expressed the experience that the spiritual
forces of the cosmos turn towards and away from the earth in the rhythm
of the year, and that in winter they collect themselves, renew them-
selves, in order to be able to come streaming to the growing plant
world in the spring. Present-day harvest practices are the final dying
echoes of such knowledge of the spiritual forces, vivifying and em-
anating, that permeate the world and all its parts.

113 Bibliography, etc.

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/33: Illustrations./

1: Karutz--31 E-4 (no date) 1925 E1 Europe
Poles EA1

/62/ The Northern Polish West Slavs

I.

000 1. Loess dwelling in Stodoly. 2. Construction of a house. 3. Earth cellar in the Nowo-Minsk district. 4. Most commonly used corner joint with overlapping dovetail joints. 5. Dwelling on the Pilica. 6. Ornament by a grain heap. 7. Farm house in the Radom district. 8. Carved ceiling beams in a dwelling in the Chelm district. 9. Main door of a mountaineer's farm house in the Tatra Mountains. 10. Painted farm house in the Lowicz district. 11. Farm house in the Lowicz district. 12. Mountaineer's farmyard in the Tatra.[1]

101 When, during the time of the migrations of the Teutonic peoples, the Germanic tribes (Vandals, Silingians, Burgundians, and others) moved out of the Vistula region towards the west and towards the south, the Slavs moved up behind them from the southeast. The latter now constitute here the Polish (Pole meaning "field, flat land")
[144] part of the West Slavs, but they have mingled strongly with Lithuanians
361 and Germans. Since around 900 A.D. the families joined to form
241 organized farming communities. In these communities a certain amount of the wood culture of Eastern Europe has withstood all political, belligerent, and economic influences of the West, even if not nearly to such an extent as is the case in Lithuania, for instance, or in north-
342 ern Russia. Wherever loess occurs, one will undoubtedly find isolated dwellings and cellars driven into the soil (Figure 1); and it is possible to see the remnants of old dwelling pits in the cellars which are to be seen throughout the country covered with earth and stones or provided with a roof of straw, and which serve as storage chambers, especially for potatoes. The real native style of building, however, is the log cabin construction which is to be met with from the simple farmer's cottage to the extensive middle-class houses, churches, and synagogues. The house is constructed on a rectangular plan; its frame of sills rests directly on the country soil or on erratic boulders which support the corners (Figure 2), and its walls are constructed of round, semicircular, or squared stems of fir trees. The gaps between these stems are filled out with moss by means of a wood splinter. Under the sills they afterwards strew gravel. For protection against rotting the walls are frequently lime-washed, rather rarely are they given a coat of plaster, and for protection against the cold they are reinforced

[1] [For illustrations, see 1: Karutz, E1 Europe, cat 116, p. 31a -- Analyst]

1: Karutz E-4 (no date) 1925 El Europe E1

Northern Polish West Slavs

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

-31a-

[For identification, see cat. 116, p. 31 -- Analyst]

342 with a low earth banking, or with a stack of straw, leaves, potato plants, hay, dung, or twigs held up by bars. The roof consists of an entire, or of half a hip-side with tie-beams and straw covering; sometimes it juts out a little and leaves the ends of the beams free for so some artistic decoration (Figure 8), or else it is supported by separate posts so that a portico is formed (Figure 7) or a kind of porch (Figure 5). In the Tatra mountain range the shingle roof takes the place of the straw-covered roof. The gable is purposely divided into articulated parts in the arrangment of the boards, and it is decorated. A chimney is lacking (Figure 12), the doors are heavy and studded with large iron nails by way of ornament (Figure 9). The Lowicz houses are distinguished by the fact that their outside walls are painted; the paint is applied either directly to the crude log beams, or to a planking nailed vertically to the walls. (Figure 10). In their ground-plan the houses are usually tripartite, being divided into a living room and a stable on either side of the entrance hall with its open fireplace. In recent times the floor has often been made of boarding, while in other cases, and formerly, it has always consisted of a stamped mud floor. Figure 6 shows ornaments of grain heaps: the girls form the heaps into four-sided pyramid stumps and decorate the topmost area and the side planes with all kinds of decorative patterns by means of a shovel; in this manner they intend to ascertain any possible thefts.

113 Bibliography, etc.

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/63: Illustrations./

/64/ The Northern Polish West Slavs

II.

000 1. Peasant woman from Wroblew. 2. Peasant woman from Lowicz. 3. Girl from Lowicz. 4. Girl from Sieradz. 5. Hay loft

[For illustrations, see 1: Karutz, E1 Europe, cat. 116, p. 31a--- Analy

1: Karutz E-4 (no date) 1925 El Europe [1
Northern Polish West Slavs

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[For identification, see ct. 116, pp. 32-33--Analyst]

000 of the mountaineers in the Tatra mountains. 6.-7. Wedding pastry. 8. Farmer from Bochen. 9. Scooping vessel made of wood. 10. Salt grater made of oak wood. 11. Fillet needle for making nets. 12. Wooden rattle for sounding the alarm in the village, in the case of fire, for instance. 13, 14, 16. Pottery blackened with graphite and adorned with rough line patterns. 15. Wooden jug. 17. Saint's shrine in the Kolno district. 18. Farmer's cart from the Kolno district, with boat-shaped boarding the upper edge of which is held up by supports which stand vertically on the axle ends. 19. Hay loft in the Novo-Minsk district. 20. Bagpipe player. 21. Ceiling decoration made of blades of straw and paper flowers.[1]

342 The simplest forms of the log cabin construction can be rec-
-ognized on the secondary buildings, such as hay lofts, for instance
(Figure 5).[1] The northern lowlands favors open stacks consisting of
353 simple pole scaffoldings with a thatched roof. In the interior decoration
[415] the materials of the ancient wood culture predominate; next to these
there are to be found the products of the household industry, such as
[778] pottery of a simple form blackened with graphite. As in Nordic and
German houses, there is suspended from the ceiling the ornament that
we call the "mobile," which is made of blades of straw; this ornament
was originally designed for magical purposes and carried out emanistic
effects of protection against the evil eye or misfortune, or, as the case
might be, furthered growth and increase for the crop and the family
(Figure 21).[1] Similar conceptions were preserved in festive and wedding
pastry (Figures 6 and 7),[1] the snakes are images of the sexual organ,
291 the fence is the pictorial representation of defense. The popular
costumes have almost completely disappeared today in Poland. The
laced-up coat, in the shape of a priest's garment, of a farmer from
Bochen (Figure 8),[1] might represent a desire to mirror national and
ecclesiastical interests. In the region of the Warta River the men still
wear tightly fitting red jackets with polished brass buttons and red and
blue striped trousers. The Mazurs of central Poland increasingly are
doing away with their long grey and white coats with the red and blue
faced lapels. The women are holding on a little more to the old Slavic
delight in vivid colors. Figure 3,[1] shows a Lowicz girl with a tightly
fitting bodice and colorfully striped woollen dress. Figure 4,[1] shows a
Sieradz girl in a half-woollen dress striped red and yellow and woven
by herself, in a colorful bodice which leaves the sleeves of the white

[1] [For illustrations, see 1: Karutz, E1 Europe, cat. 116, p. 52a--Analyst]

P. 291 blouse free, and a red scarf around her head. Figure 2[2] shows a Lowicz woman with the characteristic head apron which surrounds her neck, her back, and her head, and wearing a coral necklace made of chains that are held together in the back by means of many-colored ribbons that hang far down her back. During their work the women wear only the white kerchief without the apron.

/65: Illustrations./

/66/ The Russians

I.

000 1. Part of a bell-tower as an illustration of the beam construction. 2. Ground dwellings. 3. Granary on props. 4. House with gabled roof consisting of boards; courtyard door. 5. Woven fence of foliaceous twigs which are drawn horizontally, in braid fashion, through the vertical row of posts. 6. Board roof. 7. Farm house with porticoed steps, balcony, and carved horse's head on the ridge of the roof. 8. Room with a flue without chimney. 9. Grain stamper. 10. and 12. Ornamental head-pieces on the ridge of the roof. 11. Wooden bowl. 13. Doll. 14. House with narrow dormer-windows of archaic form. 15. Portico of the Evangelical church in Turchesoo[1] (Archangel).

G.R. 101 The Slavic group of the Indo-European peoples has developed east of the upper Vistula and of the Carpathian mountains, and from G.R. this region it has expanded towards the north, the east, and the south [144] since the middle of the first thousand years A.D. The Russians who were migrating north or northeast found a settled forest population of G.R. the Finnish, that is to say, ancient Eurasian, tribe; they mingled with [177] it and continued their ancient wood culture. Later they were strongly influenced by Germans in the west, and by Tatars in the east, while from the south Byzantium brought to them the eastern form of Christianity G.R. and also acted as an intermediary for the influx of Near Eastern, and 342 especially Persian, elements of culture. Longer than anywhere else, the climate has in Russian preserved ground dwellings; the typical house is, however, the log cabin constructed of carefully matched beams, well filled out at the interstices, and at the corners firmly joined to each other at right angles. It has a rectangular shape and a

1 [For illustrations, see 1: Karutz, E1 Europe, cat. 116, p. 34a--Analyst]
2 [See 1: Karutz, E1 Europe, cat. 116, p. 32a---Analyst]

1: Karutz E-4 (no date) 1925 El Europe E1
Russians



-34a-

[For identification, see cat. 116, p. 34 -- Analyst]

342 gabled roof of boards and shingles. The ridge of roof is adorned with
[53] riders and at the gable there are carved head-pieces in the shape of animal heads, which have more of an internal than an external con-
[343] nection with the Germanic horse's heads. Buildings constructed of posts, like pile-works, are to be found among the granaries. The original house had one living room, without a fireplace or outlet for the smoke; then smoke outlets were made in the roof, these were surrounded with a box made of boards, and this soon turned into a flue (Figure 8) 1/1 Only later was the chimney added. At one time the windows were cut out as narrow dormer windows and closed by means of sliding boards, as is still to be seen, also, here and there in Estonia. Then window panes appeared; the windows became wider and higher; their casements re-
[177] ceived a carved frame. Influences from Western civilization had their effect upon the shape of the house, as Romanesque influences visible in the covered stairs and entrances an example of which is shown in Figure 7. 1/1 The wood construction also embraced the churches of the north and followed the ancient Germanic examples; but next to these, Islamic Tatardom seems to have extended its influence so far that
351 porticoes like the one shown in Figure 15 1/1 came into existence. The entrance to the Russian house in the courtyard which is surrounded by a board or some kind of fencing, and is accessible through a large swinging door, often with a carved frame; the farmsteads stand in rows next to
[415] each other, combined into roadside villages. Wood and linden or birch
352 bark are still the most essential materials of the household utensils and furniture, which, in stampers as shown in Figure 9, 1/1 or in dolls as in Figure 13 1/1 preserve archaic forms. The interior furnishing is characterize by the large, flat stove, especially in the older houses. In former times the entire family would spend the night on this stove throughout the winter. Wall benches, chest, wall boards together with tables and
353 chairs constitute the furniture. In the corner and from the ceiling beams are hung pictures of saints, framed by embroidered and printed towels. The same kind of cloths cover parts of the walls, and embroidered curtains cover up the beds.

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113

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/67: Illustrations./

1/1 [See 1: Karutz, E1 Europe, cat. 116, p. 34a --- Analyst]

/68/

The Russians.

II.

1. and 2. Crowns. 3.-8. Peasant costumes. 9. Farmer. 10. wooden church. 11. Weathervane from Petersburg. 12. Horse-collar hame. 13. Volga barge. 14. Instrument for bending the horse-collar hame.[1]

211 The Russian national costume is disappearing like all provincial and popular dress that stems from a lively sense of color, from a close group cohesion, from an impersonal feeling for kin and tradition, and from an actively perpetuated continuation of strong imitated foreign [77] influences. Completely original with and peculiar to this costume was its embroidered shirt, whose overly long sleeves (Figure 3)[2] are derived from Tatar influence and whose tapestry-like patterns are derived from Near Eastern origin, as well as the leggings, the bast shoes, and the kerchief which is simply slung around the head. Of Tatar origin are the tall hoods with cloths hanging far down, and the braids of the girls; and related to the northern Germanic is the crown-like headdress (kokoshnik) which at one time was popular in the Baltic re- 346 gions in endless variations (see Plate, Estonians II). In connection with the Russian wood buildings the Plate shows a church which does not attain the magnificence of ancient Norwegian churches built of staves, but which is nevertheless remarkable and significant for the 322 style and the culture of a "wood age"; furthermore a Volga barge is shown, which carries the wealth of trees of central and northern Russia to the south, to the harbors of the "black earth" regions; an instrument for bending the wood for the characteristic bow-shaped yoke under which the horse or--in the case of the troika--the middle horse runs (Figures 14 and 12).[1] Figure 11,[2] a weather vane related to the pennants of the Yeniseian boats (compare this Atlas, Vol. 1, Plate, Yeniseians),[3] of the Chioggia boats, and the boats of the Courland Nehrung, bears an ornamentation consisting of a horse's head and of suns which is ultimately of northern Germanic origin, but which in experience coincides 771 with the very ancient native light cult. The pre-Slavic primitive Europeans, like the Slavs themselves, always lived very strongly in the awareness of the spiritual forces of nature, and today they are still a people full of religious conviction, deeply pious, profoundly emotional,

1 [For illustrations, see 1:Karutz, E1 Europe, cat.116, p.2bcc--Analyst]
2 [see 1:Karutz, E1 Europe, cat.116, p.1a--Analyst]
3 [see 1:Karutz, A1 Asia, cat.116, p.1a--Analyst]

1: Karutz E-4 (no date) 1925 El Europe E1

000 Russians

-36a-

[For identification, see cat. 116, p. 36 -- Analyst]

771 [769] and striving for a godly human existence. The devout reverence for the dead and the neglect of the graveyards, which stands in seeming contrast to this but which is actually determined precisely by the spiritual force of their belief in the continued existence of the soul, is just one of countless examples. The sectarian life, the clairvoyant dream visions, remnants of an ancient knowledge of the emanating spiritual [776] forces are other such examples: At the festival of the Annunciation to the Virgin Mary the image of the Mother of God is placed in a little vessel with grain which is designed for sowing; the forces alive in the image therefore enter into the seed, a custom which is still in use, also, in all countries of the Roman Catholic Church (walking around the fields, blood ride in the vineyard); before the saints' images are hung carved wooden doves--compare the Plates, North Germans, Alpine countries--/The parentheses in the text here are obviously misplaced, but it is difficult to tell exactly where they should be. I have changed them as they seemed to me to make the best sense. Translator./ and painted Easter eggs whose colors are derived from flowers, leaves, and 777 onions, and whose patterns are applied with liquid wax. Everybody wears, or at least used to wear until recently, protective coins and metals.

/69: Illustrations./

/70/ The Russians.

III.

000 1. Salt vessel. 2. Carving of a bed. 3. Ink well made of bronze, with loops for strings. 4. Cake mold carved out of wood. 5.-7. Distaffs. 8. Wooden laundry beater. 9. Little box. 11. Bench. 12. Light stand. 13. Carving of a hand sled. 14. Carving of a distaff 1

177 322 531 The ancient native wood culture of Europe was conditioned in Russia through influences from more highly developed cultures, in its artistic development, and was brought, in this manner, to a level of full-grown perfection. We see these influences expressed in the form of ornamentation. The influences are northern Germanic, Tatar, Near Eastern-Persian. The North Germans contributed the sun motif as is illustrated in Figure 8 1 and Figure 11 2 as well as the horse's heads of the bench in Figure 11 1 the Tatars supplied the Kirghiz line, as Figure 14 1

1 [For illustrations, see 1; Karutz, E1 Europe, cat. 116, p. 37a--Analyst]

1: Karutz E-4 (no date) 1925 E1 Europe E1

Russians



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[For identification, see cat. 116, p. 37 -- Analyst]

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reproduces in superb fashion, the double ram's horn which should not be mistaken among later ornamental plant formations. Persia gave, among others, above all the motif of the tree of life, which is flanked by resting or picking birds, and by upright or high-jumping lions and fabulous animals. Figures 1, 3, 4, 9, 10, and 11 show the pattern which is psychologically important and significant, because of the meaning and the forcefulness of the conception which is expressed by it, as well as ethnographically important and significant as an expression of the racial and cultural relationships.

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G.R.
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/71: Illustrations./

/72/ The Ruthenians of the Carpathians

(Hutsules)

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1. Girl wearing a head ornament, from Javornik. 2. Young married couple from Zhabye. 5. Old house in Jasienov. 6. Farmstead seen from the yard. 7.-9. Kettle holders. 10. Pole fence. 11. Steps made of notched beams. 12. Hanging cradle. 13. Drawing of an Easter egg. 14. Priming horn. 15. and 16. Easter eggs. 17. Wooden stirrups with inlaid brass strips and an iron ring. 18. Bird made out of an Easter egg used as a ceiling pendant. 19. and 20. Wooden axe with brass plate over the edge and with inlaid brass strips (women's axes). 21. Brooch. 22. Cross of a hall door-post.[1]

R.
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Along the northeastern slopes of the Carpathians there live the essentially Slavic mountain Ruthenians. Apparently it is only since the 19th century that they have been designated with the special name of Hutsules (from the Rumanian hoc-ul- "robbers"?). They live in scattered settlements and usually build log cabins from unhewn round spruce logs which are flushed with moss and rest on a framework of hewn beams; this framework rests on rocks and has a loam filling which

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[1] [For illustrations, see 1: Karutz, E1 Europe, cat. 116, p. 38a -- Analyst]

1: Karutz E-4 (no date) 1925 El Europe E1
Hutsules

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

342 constitutes the floor. Walls and ceilings usually remain uncovered, the roof is made of timber boards or small wooden shingles. The houses stand with their longer side, in which the door and the windows are located, facing south to southeast; they contain one or two rooms ranged on either side of a central hall, as well as the stables which are adjoined under the same roof. Less frequently the areas used for farming purposes are separated from the dwelling, with the exception of the kukuruz
352 (maize) storage place, which is always built separately. A quarter of the living room is occupied by the clay or stone stove which in winter serves the old people as a sleeping place. Along the walls run benches, the beds for the remaining inhabitants. An outlet of any kind for the smoke is lacking, and the smoke simply has to find its way out through
[415] the roof and the crevices between the roof and the walls. The cooking kettle is suspended from a naturally formed branch hook (Figure 9)[1] or from a gallows-shaped stand (Figure 7)[1] or from a stick that has simply been clamped between two rocks (Figure 8)[1]. From the ceiling hangs the
353 trough-shaped, latticed cradle; and there will also most probably hang a bird ("vulture") made of a colored Easter egg that has been blown hollow; the bird's head and neck of wax are stuck to the egg, and its tail and wings of paper folded like a fan are set into the shell; the bird is reminiscent of similar phenomena in northern Europe, in northern Germany, and in the Alpine countries (compare the respective Plates
531 in this volume). A peculiar decorative art is encountered in the walking sticks, the stirrups, the leather pouches, the butter vessels, and similar objects, as well as in the embroidery and in the crosses with pictures of suns (Figure 22)[1] erected on the house and by the wayside--resulting from emanistic conceptions and magical acts of the will--, as well as in Easter eggs; the technique of the latter employs, as in other cases, the batik art of the Malays, hot liquid wax for the places that remained untouched by the pattern, in order to dip the egg several times, one after another, into various colors and in this way to produce many-
[231] colored patterns. The horses in Figure 13[1] have the concrete purpose
291 of securing the condition of the livestock for the household. Among the men the costume consists of wide linen or woollen trousers over which the embroidered shirt is worn, and sandals tied with laces, less frequently boots, a short sleeveless fur jacket, a short cloth coat tied with laces, a round, flat hat of the Hungarian type; among the women it consists of a blouse with embroidered sleeves and chest opening, one wide, or two narrow aprons instead of the skirt, which is held up by a

[see 1: Karutz, E1 Europe, cat. 116, p. 38a -- Analyst]

[291] long, narrow woolen belt, a short fur jacket, a short and a long coat,
245 sandals or boots, and a colored kerchief. The rough countryside admits of little agriculture; they harvest oats, barley, maize, potatoes,
231 flax, hemp, and vegetables. Pasturage is more wide-spread, as well as the breeding of horses, cattle, sheeps, goats, and pigs, which in the mountains takes on a nomadic character; in June the livestock is driven into the highland pastures by the community; there in the herdsman's mountain cottage the living fire is lighted which is not allowed to go out during the summer (compare the Plates, Serbs,
[262] Bulgarians, of this volume).[1] Food consists essentially of maize flour, sheep's cheese, sour milk, and vegetable soups. Life is still strongly
621 connected with the tribal community, to which the stranger, who enjoys unlimited hospitality, belongs; the village community is active in communal, non-profit assistance enterprises during the building of a house, and the married son stays in his father's house at least for a
183 while. Nevertheless, the household community is disappearing. The lonely life that is closely connected with nature, has preserved many old conceptions and customs from a period which knew itself to be in
[782] relationship to the creative spiritual forces in nature. Through dreams and premonitory signs the Hutsule has the construction site of his new house confirmed and, under the beams of the new house he buries sacrificial offerings. The first hairs of the child that are cut the Hutsule preserves in a hole in the hearth "in honor of the elders of the household"; on Christmas Eve he starts a new fire by rubbing (see above) which is kept going during the twelve nights and from which no pipe may be lit. After each prayer they kiss the earth, "the mother and provider."
[755] Old sun spirit experiences are mirrored in the peculiar practice by which sick children are carried out of the house by a woman who at the same time recites the following words: "I have greeted the sun with the child, as well as the corners of the house, and all the saints; now I am greeting the mother and beg her for the return of the child."
789 Black magic appears in many forms, as the bewitching of the livestock, the sterilizing of marriages and fields, bringing misfortune by scattering ashes and thistles under the traveler on the road, for instance, or by laying parts of animals under the threshold of the house. Horses' skulls on poles are placed in the garden in order to protect it against caterpillars (compare the horses' heads of the ancient Germans, corresponding customs among the Kirghiz--see volume 1 of this atlas[2]--and in the oases of northern Africa); in the autumn at least one piece of fruit is left hanging on the fruit trees so that they will bear fruit again in the

1 [See Cat. 116, pp. 49a, 59a --- Analyst]
2 [See 1: Karutz, At Asia, Cat. 116 --- Analyst]

789 following year. The idea that everybody receives, at birth, his star in the heavens and his guardian angel still tells of origin in a spiritual home. Thoughts and actions, it is well known, have a magical effect on the environment, and defensive, offensive, and love charms of all
773 kinds are based upon this knowledge. About the past of the world, the earth, and human beings it is known that on the sun there lived people with only one eye in the middle of their forehead; that in the beginning there lived dwarfs with long beards, and that these were followed by giants who were destroyed by a forty days' rain because of some transgression; that way down at the end of the river there live the Rachmanen who are a pattern for human beings by their virtues;
[796] to them are sent the shells of consecrated eggs along the brooks and rivers, when, twenty-five days after Easter, the Rachmanen festival is celebrated, on which occasion the ancient traditions of happier, more spiritual earlier times are kept up.

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/73: Illustrations./

/74/ The Ruthenians of the lowlands

000 1. Farmer wearing a winter fur coat. 2. Peasant women engaged in dressing flax. 3. Man wearing winter clothing. 4. Peasant woman in a winter fur. 5. Peasant women. 6. Dwelling. 7. Peasant woman at a tree-like stand for milk pots. 8. Beehive. 9. Maize (kukuruz) storage place. 10. Fence made of woven osier switches.

1: Karutz E-4 (no date) 1925 El Europe E1
Ruthenians of the Lowlands

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[For identification, see cat. 116, pp. 41-42--Analyst]

000 11. and 12. Wooden bowls. 13. Pole fence with bushels placed on top for protection against the rain. 14. Wooden jug. 15. Ring-shaped bottle. 16. Woman wearing a coat with leather ornaments sewn on it. 17. Fellow from Pruth in festive summer clothing. 18. Earthenware pot. 19. and 20. Embroidered blouses.

[131] The southern group of the East Slaves lives from one line
101 Bialystok to the mouth of the Pripet River to Saratov (Volga) between Great Russia in the north, Poland, Galicia, Hungary, and Rumania in the west, the Don River basin in the east, and the Black Sea in the south. The group calls itself politically Ukranian today, popularly also Rusniaks; it is designated by the Hungarians in Galicia as Ruthenians, by the Russians as Little Russians, and it distinguishes itself from the latter by its type, language, temperament, customs, and way of life, and as a result of this by a significant native poetry and literature, for instance. Its nobility is Polonized. In Hungary and in Galicia the Ruthenian is a member of the Greek Orthodox Church, and in Bukowina
142 of the Greek Oriental church. In bodily form the Ruthenian is slender, slightly built, dark-skinned, with straight hair and brown or blue eyes.
291 Men and women wear embroidered shirts, those in the north with red colors, and those in the south with dark colors, while those in the central area favor many different colors. On the whole, joy in colors is a prominent characteristic of this people. The ancient form of women's clothing is the "plata," a special kind of skirt made of thick, colored woollen material which is folded double and placed around the body like an apron and held up by a woollen belt. Over the shirt
[301] is placed a short sleeveless fur jacket. The bride dons special ornaments consisting of necklaces of glass pearls and of crowns made of cardboard, pearls, artificial flowers, and peacock's feathers. The shirt of the men, which is worn over the wide, white linen trousers, is embroidered around the neck, the chest, and the ends of the sleeves; the trousers are then likewise made of thicker cloth and the caps of fur, while
[292] otherwise the round hat predominates. The bridegroom always wears the old, tall, black lambskin cap with a garland of evergreens, tinsel, a piece of garlic as a protection against everything evil, and a silver coin which likewise possesses protective powers. Both sexes wear the same kind of long, formerly usually white, coat made of home-woven
[361] material. The villages of the Ruthenians are mostly situated by lakes
351 or the banks of rivers; the farmsteads are enclosed by pole fences which are covered at the top with straw bundles acting as a protection

[For illustrations, see 1: Karutz, E1 Europe, cat. 116, p. 41a--Analys]

351 against moisture (Figure 13), or by woven fences which consist of birch
or other foliaceous twigs drawn like braids along a vertical line of posts
342 and in part are covered with a roof of shingles. Former ground hut
constructions have been preserved in the smoke huts of the north; for
the rest the region, at the foot of the densely forested mountain range,
has log cabins flushed with moss and provided with shingle roofs, while
the rest of the country has houses constructed of intertwined Reth /I
was unable to find this word in any dictionary or encyclopedia; it may
be connected with the Engl. vb. ret, 'to soak or expose to moisture,
as flax, hemp, or timber'--Webster. Translator. / and covered with
loam that is thrown over it, with a white interior and a white exterior,
[285] and a thatched roof. The baskets for maize are made of wicker-work
of willows and have straw covers. For other kinds of grain simple
[372] shelters on poles are used. Around the farmyards can be seen mounds
of manure which, aside from straw, serves as fuel in the plains of the
steppes because of their complete lack of wood. Ordinarily every
house has two rooms, to the right and the left of a central entrance
hall. Usually a flue is lacking, the entrance hall has no ceiling but
is left open at the top so that the smoke can get out into the garret.
The ridge of the roof is secured by blocks of wood. The edge of the
roof juts out so that provisions and tools can be kept underneath it.
The floors are of stamped loam, and along the walls there run broad
[352] benches which serve as sleeping places. The southeastern corner of
the room is occupied by the table, the opposite corner by the stove
346 which during winter is also used as a sleeping place. Ruthenian wood
construction achieves its greatest perfection in the tall, spacious, dome-
241 shaped churches that rise up several stories. The economy is based
231 upon agriculture and cattle raising; aside from this the Ruthenians do
a great deal of bee-keeping--the beehives are made of wood or woven
181 straw--and in the forest they practice charcoal burning. The Ruthenians
are considered passive and fatalistic people with musical talent. They
have preserved, therefore, a soul which beats along with the ancient
rhythmic strokes of mother nature; and they gave also preserved for
themselves a knowledge of the spiritual life, which still expresses it-
self in customs and conceptions similar to those current among the
782 Hutsules. They, too, bury building sacrifices consisting of the skulls
of horses, cattle, or sheep, and sometimes prabably also of silver
coins, under the foundation or under the stove of the newly constructed
769 house. They, too, live with spirits and souls of the deceased around
000 Christmas time and during the twelve holy nights. They frequently

Ruthenians RD3
Czechoslovakia EP1

R [789] 183 practice emanistic customs in order to utilize by magic forces of nature. They frequently Finally, in their customs observed at weddings, festivals, and upon other occasions, they follow elaborate and archaic ceremonial forms.

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/75: Illustrations./

/76/ The Southern Czechoslovakian West Slavs

000 1. Slovak farmer. 2. Old Slovak. 3. Two old Slovaks. 4. Czech flute players. 5. Milk tub, eastern Silesia. 6. Ornament on a strip of trimming (of a childbed curtain) from Moravia. 7. Czech wearing a pair of wide pants. 8. Carpathian farmer. 9. Spoon, western Galicia. 10. Hand mill, Galicia. 11. Spoon rack, western Galicia. 12. and 13. Painted Easter eggs from Moravia. 14. Two Carpathian shepherds.[1]

Cz. 101 In Bohemia, Moravia, and the Carpathian highlands there once lived an ancient European population, until the Celts, and then the Marcomannic Germans subjugated them and assimilated them. From the fifth century onwards, the Slavs, who had gathered themselves together into a people at the early Indo-European stage, migrated away from their settlements towards the west and into the countries that had Cz. 231 been left unoccupied by the Germanic migration. They were, and they still are, primarily farmers and bee-keepers and fishermen; then there are herders who practice summer pasturage in the mountains 000 and who work the milk into cheese and butter in mountain huts. The

1 [For illustrations, see 1: Karutz, E1 Europe, Cat. 116, p. 44a--Analyst]

1: Karutz / E-4 (no date) 1925 El Europe 21
Southern Czechoslovakia West Slavs

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-44a-

[For identification, See cat. 116, p. 44 --Analyst]

Cz. 621 The
[313] forests supply their wealth of wood. The Slavic manner of living is
Cz. the village settlement, whose economic and legal affairs are ruled by
623 the village elders. In ancient times the elders also controlled mat-
[778] ters connected with religious cult, such as the preservation of the
[782] shrines and the carrying out of sacrifices. The physically healthy
142 stock of people produces as its flowers a certain broad, voluptuous
type of transitory beauty among the girls, and a sharply defined head
among the old people, which derives its physiognomic traits from
the secluded rural life, but probably no less from the observation of
Cz. nature connected with it. From this observation of nature they have
821 derived a wisdom which, although civilization is a stranger to it,
824 nevertheless has preserved for itself all the more of the primitive
825 knowledge of the spirit of nature, of the character of the sun, the
light, and of the fire, of the good and evil elemental beings, of the
souls of the dead, of the creative, effective powers of things, plants,
Cz. animals, and human beings. The festivals of the winter and of the
527 summer solstice are still being celebrated; even today girls of the
796 village in spring carry around a doll dressed up in female clothes,
and burn it, and with it the death of winter -- at the same time a
symbol of feminine powers of creation which, carried by the fire in-
to the spiritual world, participate in the cosmic process of generation.
While they carry out this ritual, they sing: "we carry death out of
Cz. the village and bring the new summer into the village." Modern
178 times is strongly changing the old conceptions, only the village of
[292] very secluded regions preserves a good deal of what has been lost
elsewhere; it keeps the popular costumes which, as among all Slavs,
Cz. is characterized by a joy in glowing colors and a waste of material
531 which sometimes goes over to the grotesque (Figure 7).[1] In the orna-
mentation Oriental motifs are apparent, such as the tree of life with
the lions placed symmetrically over against each other in Figure 6,
and the Near Eastern Easter eggs (Figure 12 and 13) in which
Cz. even the Kirghiz, primitive Turkish line of the ram's horn appears.
291 Significant parts of the clothing in summer are the brief shirt that
falls over the trousers, with a belt, embroidered, sleeveless jacket,
sandals made of pigskin or calf's skin, white coats; in winter they
wear, in addition, white cloth coats and large sheep furs. Among
the women the characteristic articles of clothing are embroidered
blouses, jackets, kerchiefs and breast cloths, and wide, colorful
Cz. 533 walking-skirts. The general Slavic gift for music, as well as a
popular literature rich in songs, sagas, and fairytales, is not
Cz. 178 lacking among them. Of the ancient cultural heritage less
has been preserved than in the east or in the south.

[1] [For illustrations, see 1: Karutz, E1 Europe, cat. no. p. 44 a - Analyst]

Czechoslovakia EB1
Croats EB4
Slovenes EB7

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C7.
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in the south. In the mountains hand mills made of boulders, the top one of which is turned with a stick against the bottom one, are still to be met with.

/77: Illustrations./

/78/ The Croat-Slovene South Slavs

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1. Maize storage place made of boards. 2. Hunting cup. 3. Croatian villagers near Zagreb. 4. Spinning woman. 5. Animal ornament of a carpet. 6. Tree of life motif on a pillow. 7. Towel trimming. 8. Double flute. 9. Ornamented gourd bottle. 10. Brooch. 11. Ear pendants. 12. Example of ornamented pottery. 13. and 15. Belt clasps made of brass. 14. Powder flask made of a buck's horn. 16. Distaffs.[1]

Cr.-Sl. 101 From the north, where the Slavic branch of the Indo-European tribes had developed independently east of the Vistula, the Croats and the Slovenes migrated into the Danube basin during the sixth and Cr.-Sl. 144 the seventh centuries. There they expanded all the way to the Adriatic through intermixture with the inhabitants they found there, who were of ancient Thracian blood which, however, had become mingled Cr.-Sl. 177 through long centuries with Romans and Germans. In this region they [795] also became accessible to western influences to a greater degree than [212] their brothers in the east, and they adopted the Roman Catholic faith and the Latin script, while the Serbs became Greek Orthodox and em- Cr.-Sl. 175 ployed the Cyrillic symbols. Between the Sava River and the Drava River they founded an independent and, finally, monarchic state; in 1102 they came under the Hungarian crown; and in 1918, with the parcelling up of the Austrian Empire, they joined the Yugoslav state Cr.-Sl. 142 together with Slovenes, Serbs, Bosnians, and Dalmatians. Anthropologically they are distinguished by a powerful build, a tall stature, Cr.-Sl. 241 a decidedly short head, dark hair, and a pink complexion. Economically 361 they were farmers and herders; then German influence everywhere spread and raised agriculture. They settle in farmsteads which are joined into one-street villages and enclosed by fences made with the Cr.-Sl. 342 most painstaking and varied techniques. Their houses are mostly small, consisting usually of just one story, made of wicker-work or panel-work, covered with whitened loam; less frequently they are constructed,

1 [For illustrations, see 1: Karutz, E1 Europe, cat. 116, p. 46a--Analyst]

1: Karutz E-4 (no date) 1925 El Europe E1
Croat-Slovene South Slavs

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[For identification, see cat. 116, p. 46--Analyst]

Cr.-Sl. 342 in the coastal area, of rocks, unbaked and baked tiles. The roofs, which jut out quite a distance creating a shady arcade around the house, which protects against the rain, are made of shingles, reed, tile, or slate. The windows were formerly closed off with oiled paper instead of glass; in most instances there is still no outlet for the smoke. In front of the house is placed a tree-like stand on whose branches the milk jugs are put upside down. The house has three parts, so that the living room and the chamber are on either side of a middle room Cr.-Sl. 352 415 which comprises the hall and the open fireplace. The floors are stamped earth, the ceiling displays the oak transoms, the enormous stove is surrounded by benches and above it is a washing frame. In the way of household furniture, we have here high bedsteads with thick featherbeds, clothes chests, weaving loom, spinning and weaving utensils; in the kitchen we have attractive jugs, vats, cups, buckets, cake boards, mangling and washing logs, embroidered gourd bottles, circular earthenware or stone flasks, plaited reed pouches, embroidered Cr.-Sl. 531 leather bags for bringing in and taking away things. In all these there operates an extraordinary sense for industrious, tasteful, decorative handicraft work, just as it does in the woven materials, the worked tapestries, the embroidery on the shirts, skirts, aprons, hoods, and Cr.-Sl. [177] belts. In the patterns there are survivals of Near Eastern, Persian, as well as of Turko-Tataric traditions, the motifs of animal figures, the polygonal planes, the ancient Assyrian tree of life flanked by animals Cr.-Sl. 343 (Figure 6). 1/1 Next to the main dwelling there stands, aside from the stable and the granary, a second house with bedrooms for the families of the household community. The latter has been preserved among Cr.-Sl. 621 the farmers as an ancient Slavic patriarchal community organization. In contrast to the Germans who liked to settle down individually, this familial community, and, like it, the popular village community, represents the legal and economic organism resulting from an unfree group consciousness. The proverb, "The women guards three corners of the house, the man only one," illuminates the distribution of the Cr.-Sl. 291 work in the household industry. National costumes are not to be met with any more except in the country; the women wear richly embroidered dresses and blouses, aprons and little jackets, stockings and neckerchiefs; the men wear white trousers, and over these white embroidered shirts, embroidered belts for knives, cloths, tobacco box, money pouch, and tinder or matches; waistcoats of leather or cloth with metal buttons, round hats, and sandals frequently adorned with flowers and tied with laces.

1/1 [see 1: Karutz, E1 Europe, cat. 116, p. 46a--Analyst]

000 aces. The people are highly gifted musically--of the old instruments
Cr-4 he bagpipe has been preserved among them--, it is a people that en-
[534] joys to sing and loves to dance--the round dance of the Balkans, the
181 kolo, is also to be found among them--and it possesses an ample store of fairy tales. It still leads a rhythmical life connected with nature;
Cr.-Sl. the people celebrate extensively and in accordance with tradition the
771 seasonal festivals, and they have stuck to a great number of practices
776 which constitute the remains of an ancient and profound religiosity and of a highly figurative knowledge of spiritual nature. In them and in the literature are mirrored the old conceptions of the bright powers of life and of the dark powers of death, of the spirits of the water, the plants, the earth, and the mountains, as well as of the beings of the sun, the light, warmth, and the fire. Fires worshiped in cult, leaping through the fire at the time of the solstice, belief in the birth of the sun god
Cr.-Sl. at Christmas time, and celebration of the twelve holy nights, these are
789 some of the remnants. As in Rumania, they formerly knew the custom of pouring water on a girl wound about with grass and flowers, in order to force rain down from the sky during a rainless period; conjuring, exorcizing, creating rain, and other arts of black magic are still being practiced; treasure-guarding snakes, vampires, and dragons of the storm live on the in the conceptions. Innumerable emanatory practices are in vogue--pouring grain kernels over the bride, to mention one
Cr.-Sl. example--resulting from the knowledge of the transubstantiation of
773 things. The ethnologically important conception of the origin of culture as resulting from the divine inspirations vouchsafed to leading heroic individuals, appears in the fairy tale about the wild women. These women, at one time, in the happy old days, in spring would call down to the farmer from the nearest little hill, telling him when he should lay his peas in the ground, when he should sow his grain, and at what
Cr.-Sl. times he should perform his various other agricultural tasks. The re-
769 lationship of the survivors to the dead still had, until very recently, such material manifestations, that they laid eggs, apples, and bread on the newly covered grave.

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113 Haberlandt, "Die Völker Europas. Lay, Südslavische Ornamente /South Slavic ornaments/. By the same author, Ornamente südslavischer nationaler Hause-und Kunstindustrie /Ornaments of the South Slavic national household and craftsmanship industry/. Tetzner, "Die Kroaten," Globus, Vol. 85.

1: Karutz--49 E-4 (no date) 1925 ; El Europe
Serbs EF6

/79: Illustrations. /

/80/ The Serbs

000 1. Conical hut in the Kosovo Plain. 2. Rubbing wood together to produce fire in the Sar mountains. 3. Farmer's dress. 4. Conical hut built over a manure pit. 5. Andiron with a cock's head and a snake's head. 6. Andiron in the shape of a cow. 7. Child's violin made of a head of maize. 8. Magical talisman, with egg shells. 9. Rubbing wood together to produce fire, by means of a violin bow. 10. Wooden plow. 11. and 12. Earthenware pottery. 13. Candle of oakum and resin. 14. Charm against the evil eye, made of shells and pearls, for the caps of little children. 15. Miniature. 16. Portable child's cradle with frame. 17. Door lock made of wood. 18. Distaff made of red beech wood.[1]

101 The original dwellings of the South Slavs, who later developed into Serbs, the "Raseien people" or "Raitzen," are supposed to be along
[144] the upper Ebro. It was there that intermingling with earlier inhabitan
[795] of Albano-Illyrian race already took place. Turkish rule has brought about a religious split between Mohammedans and Greek Orthodox.
241 Formerly the racial contrast expressed itself in the two main economic
233 forms, namely agriculture which, since times immemorial, has been peculiar to the Slavs, and which comprises primarily maize, but next to that also wheat and barley; and cattle raising which, without any
[144] milk production, belongs to the pre-Serbian Walachians who are racially related to the Alabanians and Illyrians. Since the 11th century cattle raising is also attested for Bulgaria, and in the valleys are raised pigs and cattle in large herds, while on the heights sheep and cattle are kept. Today this racial and economic contrast is being wiped out by virtue of the fact that there is an increasing trend away from herding to agri-
[166] culture, a trend which, it is true, is still proceeding hesitantly. Frequently a part of a village moves for a time to the cultivated fields, another moves to the pastures; farm houses and herders' huts are then constructed in such a manner that they can be taken along on carts and
342 sleds. The simplest forms of dwellings are the cone-shaped huts made of tree bark, straw, and loam; particularly peculiar are the dung pits with conical walls made of poles, dung, and straw, which during the winter are inhabited by the girls (Figure 4). In the mountains there predominates the whitewashed panelwork construction with a roof of

[1] [For illustrations, see 1: Karutz, El Europe, cat. 116, p. 49a--Analy]

1: Karutz E-4 (no date) 1925 El Europe E1
Serbs

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[For identification, see cat. 116, p. 49--Analyst]

342 tiles or planks, as well as the one-room log cabin with a thatched roof, with a low rock foundation, and open fireplace, and no smoke outlet. The building form of the lowlands is the one-story, neatly whitewashed loam construction with a columned verandah, an entrance hall with a large fireplace, low, whitewashed rooms whose floors con-
[352] sist of loam, whose windows are latticed, and whose furnishings consist of plank beds, benches, and chests. From the Orient come the carpets
592 which cover the floor around the hearth. The peasantry is still strongly attached to the economic unit of the family (zadruga), which shuts itself off against strangers, which has its own craftsmen, its own mill, and which is able to compel its members to communal work (moba).
415 In the way of archaic tools they have the wooden plow, wooden washing basins, drinking cups, door locks, milk jugs for the production of a kind of kumiss (sour mare's milk), garlic grinders, washing clubs, carved and painted spindles and distaffs. In the east painted and embroidered gourd vessels are in general use, and also, universally, the one and one-half meter high carrying basket made of reed; goatskin bags serve to keep pressed cheese over the winter, water cans and cooking pots with handles made of earthenware are simply ornamented.
177 The Byzantine influence has had a strong artistic effect in the creation
531 of a style, one that has naturally made itself felt particularly in church art, bringing with it Oriental motifs (Figure 15, 1 symmetrical
771 animal figures on a miniature). Within Christianity there still survive remnants of the older way of thinking which contemplated the creative spiritual forces in nature and which continually revitalized itself in a
789 great variety of practices. The very ancient human experience of
372 light has been preserved in the custom of not letting the hearth fire go out--if it should nevertheless do so, this means misfortune or death--and of lighting their own fires around Christmas time as Saint John did. The fire has protective powers. For purposes of healing, for instance at epidemics, a fresh "sacred fire" is lit by the archaic method of rubbing two pieces of wood together. Two completely dry, cylindrical pieces of linden wood are rubbed together--in the Sar mountains by naked boys and girls in a dark room (Figure 2) 7 -or a piece of wood that can be turned is wound about twice with a thin rope or the string of a violin bow and by pulling this back and forth is made to revolve
789 rapidly. Protective talismans as visible symbols of spiritual interactions that have been known since time immemorial are everywhere in use. The egg shells of the magical charm in Figure 8 7 are taken from the first brood of the year and they further the fertility throughout the year.
[See 1: Karutz, E1 Europe, Cat. 116, P. 49a -- Analyst]

[764] The custom of burying the dead on hills and mountain tops is derived
534 from ancient Illyrian custom. Like all South Slavs, the Serbs are a people who love singing and music; they have long shepherd's flutes, flutes with two sections, shepherd's horns up to three meters in length, made of birch or willow bark, one-stringed bow and pluck instruments, and also bagpipes. The children's violin (Figure 7) made of a corn-cob from the epidermis of which two narrow strips have been separated to form the strings, is an ethnographical parallel to Africa, India, and
142 Indonesia where the identical instrument exists. Externally the Serbs are tall, slender, but broad-shouldered individuals with short skulls
291 and dark hair. The herders wear clothing that is home-woven from goat's wool. They wear a shirt and trousers of white cloth, white socks, lace-tied sandals (opanken), broad belts, a sleeveless, wide, long coat of white, or, in the case of women, of black, cloth, a jacket of white cloth, a heavy, sleeveless wrap-around coat of black cloth, and a black, flattened lambskin cap. The farming population wears the wide-sleeved, linen shirt, usually on top of the linen trousers which are very wide; also, embroidered shirts, stockings, and vests; the girls especially love to adorn their woollen, velvet, and silk aprons lavishly with heavy, colorful embroidery. The girls furthermore like to wear a garment peculiar to the country, the short, open, wide-sleeved silk
301 jacket adorned with gold tresses. The girls go around bare-headed except for a small fez around which are placed their braids covered with a ribbon. Only the brides wear large crowns, valuable heirlooms, with silver coins, feathers, and pearl and button embroidery (compare the Plate, The Bosnian South Slavs, Figure 6).

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113 Titelbach, "Das heilige Feuer bei den Balkanslaven" /The sacred fire among the Balkan Slavs/, Internationaler Archiv für Ethnographie, Vol. 13. Rhamm, "Die altgermanische Wirkgrube auf slavischem Boden" /The old Germanic pit on Slavic soil/, Zeitschrift des Vereins für Volkskunde (Berlin), Vol. 21. Tetzner, "Zur Volkskunde der Serben" /Towards an ethnography oftthe Serbs/, Globus, Vol. 86. Smiljanic "Die Hirten und Hirtennomaden Süd-und Südostserbiens" /The herders and herd-tending nomads of southern and southeastern Serbia, Globus, Vol. 74. Krebs, Beiträge zur Geographie Serbiens und Rasciens /Contributions towards a geography of Serbia and Rascia/. Haberlandt, Die Völker Europas. And, by the same author, "Kulturwissenschaftliche Beiträge zur
[see 2: Karutz, E1 Europe, cat. 116, p. 66a --- Analyst].

1: Karutz--52 E-4 (no date) 1925 E1 Europe
Serbs EF6
Magyars EC4

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113 Volkskunde von Montenegro, Albanien und Serbien" /Cultural historical contributions to the ethnography of Montenegro, Albania, and Serbia/, Zeitschrift für österreichische Volkskunde, Supplementary Volume No. 12 (to Vol. 23).

/81: Illustrations./

/82/ The Magyars

000 1. Woman from the mountains, spinning from her hand. 2. Cow herders. 3. Chief herder. 4. Enameled ornamentation of a wooden pocket mirror container. 5. Enameled ornamentation of pocket knives. 6. Silk embroidery in peacock feather pattern on a lambskin. 7. Revenge doll. 8. Carved drinking bowl, carried by herders on the belt. 9. Carved scoop made of wood. 10. Back piece of a woman's short fur coat. 11. Carved wooden cover of a herder's salt container made of horn. 12. Notched stick.1

M. 101 162 In present-day Hungary, which received its name from the Byzantine designation "Ogor" for the country between the Volga and the Urals, the main component of the population are the Magyars, that is, "men of the land." They live there side by side with the South Slavs, the Ruthenians, Rumanians, and other peoples that settled there M. 144 from abroad in later times. The Magyars came from the northeast, from the upper Volga, where they had formed their people of Finnish and Turko-Tataric elements, and they arrived in the Danube-Tisa lowlands in the ninth century, where they found a mixed population which was composed of a basic Thraceo-Illyrian stock that had been civilized by Rome, and an influx of Germans, Huns, Avarians, Teutons, M. 142 Slavs, and Bulgarians. In appearance they are distinguished by a medium-sized and powerful physique and a healthy constitution, by a round M. 463 head, by straight, somewhat shining black hair, and dark eyes. Through their Finnish blood they are fishermen and hunters, through their Turkish blood they are cattle raisers. Even today they are still to a large extent herders of horses and cattle; for the rest they are, as a result of German M. 342 and Slavic (Russian-Ruthenian) influences, farmers. The herders build for themselves hastily constructed huts of sheets of plaited willow sticks which are fastened to poles and set up in a quadrangle; and they protect their horses on the windy Hungarian steppe by means of slanting 000 wind breakers. The Magyars have still preserved their own, quite

1 [For illustrations, see 1: Karutz, E1 Europe, cat. 116, p. 52a--Analyst]

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Magyars

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

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[For identification, see cat. 116, p. 52 -- Analyst]

291 The Magyars have still preserved their own, quite characteristic dress, consisting of very wide linen trousers which in the villages and towns are frequently tied tightly together at the bottom, an adorned cloth coat, a colorfully embroidered lambskin fur, a wide-sleeved, short shirt, vest, dolman, hussar tunic, top-boots, and a round, low hat. The women wear wide, half-length skirts with many folds, colorful jackets, tightly fitting bodices tied with laces, fur coats, and kerchiefs. The horse herders are distinguished by their long whip, the lasso made of hemp and horsehair used for catching the horses from the herd, and the tunic of shaggy woollen cloth; the cattle herders wear their own characteristic burnoose-like tunic of woollen cloth with embroidery, the shepherds wear their distinctive long fur coat in winter as well as in summer, and carry their long, crooked staff, and the swine herders are characterized by the shining, sharp axe (fokosch) with which they keep their herd together. The shepherds avail them-
262 selves of bell-wethers and also of lead donkeys. Their nourishment is,
252 naturally enough, predominantly meat and bacon; in addition they use paprika, and flour dishes are also very popular. In the way of archaic food preparations, the pounding of barley and millet kernels in wooden
177 mortars is still practiced to prepare gruel, as it is in the Balkans. It
[226] has been attempted to establish the connection with their original Finnish home ethnographically, among other things in the analogies of the crawls and the fishing equipment of the Magyars with those of
177 the West and East Finns. Quite remarkable are the Oriental motifs in
531 the embroideries and the carvings which are reproduced by Figures 4 to 10 of the Plate, the Indian peacock's feather and the Assyrian tree of life which may have penetrated to the Magyars already in their old homeland via Turkestan and southern Russia, and which may thus have come with them to Hungary; or, on the other hand, it is also possible that they were transferred from Persia and Byzantium during the middle ages. The tree of life appears so frequently that is has been said that the popular consciousness of the Szekler was incapable of imagining a house or a courtyard without it (Figures 4, 6, and 8). Animal figures such as the one illustrated on Figure 9, seem to point to a connection with the Siberian bronze age, the double ram's head of Figure 5. leads to the Kirghiz, the primitive Turks of Central Asia. The present-day feeling for nature uses for the plant motifs of its decorative art the carnation, the rose, and the lily, but these occupy a secondary place
777 over against the peacock's feather. The imaginative life is still replete with remnants of the older culture of an emanatory age which was acquainted with the spiritual forces in the cosmos, in the earth, and

[see Karutz, E1 Europe, Cat. 116, p. 52a --- Amalpst]

777 in human beings, and this consciousness still breaks forth in acts of the will of all kinds: nails, hairs, bones, the blood of dead people are used in a thousand varying ways, externally and internally, against illnesses of all kinds; they protect against misfortune, and at the same
789 time they forcibly bring about good fortune. The so-called revenge doll, in full accord with the image of the Rumanians in Hungary, but corresponding also with the consciousness of the Magyars and similar levels of consciousness in Scotland (corp creadh) and elsewhere in Europe, is only possible where originally a natural physiological connection between the subject and object of a magical action was known to exist, a suprasensible, that is to say, an empirically not observable, but nonetheless objectively present spiritual element, in which thought and will transcend the external separation between persons: The nail driven into one of these dolls harms the physical person itself who is represented by this doll. This black magical action recurs again and again as in the shooting at the portrait of an enemy, piercing the eyes of the picture of an enemy, and the like (Compare the Plate, Gaels II, of this volume).

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/83: Illustrations./

/84/ The Rumanians

I.

000 1. Cave dwelling near Assarlik in the Dobruja. 2. Half underground dwelling. 3. House with conical roof. 4. Farm house. 5. Tatar hut in the Dobruja, constructed of roots and loam. 6. House

[This has not been processed by HRAF and therefore does not appear in the Files -- Analyst]

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Rumanians

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[For identification, see cat. 116, pp. 54-55--Analyst]

000 with a projecting roof on poles. 7. Hand mill. 8. Hand plow. 9. Wicker-work with little sticks. 10. House door. 11. Ox's yoke. 12. Scaloi figure in its wooden coffin. 13. Table chest with patterns scratched in it. 14. Table chest with chip-carving, derived, probably quite unnecessarily, by A. Riegl, from the wedge-carving technique of the middle Roman period.[1]

101 From the southern Carpathians and the Moldau valley to the Danube and the Black Sea, there lives the racially and linguistically mixed people of the Rumanians. Racially it was formed south of the Danube and changed over to the left bank; linguistically it arose north
144 of the Danube in the region of the southern Carpathians. Thracians, mentioned by the ancients as large, blond, blue-eyed people; Scythians, migratory tribes belonging to the North Europeans; Romans and their colonists; Germans; Slavs of the Ruthenian and of the Serbian group; Bulgarians and other Turkic peoples, these are its racial elements.
[197] The language is a modified Latin with Albanian (Thraceo-Illyrian),
[795] Slavic, Bulgarian, Magyar, Greek, and Turkish influences; the religion
233 is Greek Orthodox. Economically the Rumanians are divided into wandering herders who pasture their sheep on the grassy ridges of the Carpathian mountains and in the desolate lowland steppes, and occasionally are also designated as Walachians in contrast to the settled
[241] farmers who are designated as Rumanians. The farmers originally
342 settled in single farmsteads, then in villages; their house is a square wooden construction, one story high, with a balcony and a steep roof of spruce shingles, in sloping terrain with rock foundation, as of recent times infrequently entirely of rock, in woodless regions reed-covered panel-work of squared timbers and poles which are connected by means of branches and twigs, and a mound of earth, straw, and cow dung. The roof is frequently made to jut forth and to rest on poles so that a
[343] covered arcade is created. In the farmyards additions are made to the living quarters for stables and sheds, and then there are also separate fowl and livestock stables, as well as the summer kitchen with the open hearth. Usually the wooden walls are covered with loam. The floor is made of stamped loam. The smoke is not collected in a chimney but finds its way out through the house and the attic by the dormer windows. Door bolts are made of wood, and the door mountings of straps or hazel rods. In the Dobruja they still, even today, dig dwelling pits into the white shell limestone and into the loess, just as did the Troglodytes of whom Strabo and Ptolemy tell, and they cover the pits

[1] [For illustrations, see 1: Karutz, E1 Europe, cat. 116, p. 54a--Analyst]

342 with twigs and branches on top of which a layer of loess is placed.
[372] For lack of wood they here use dried tiles of buffalo dung for heating fuel, as they do in the Orient with horse's and camel's dung. In the plains of Greater and of Lesser Walachia there are still ground dwellings which cannot be distinguished from the surrounding ground, and which can only be recognized because of their basket-like chimneys made of wicker-work; the roof consists of beams, planks, reed, soil and is greenery and pumpkins. These half-underground houses, reaching down to a depth of up to three meters, are a protection equally against
262 the heat as against the cold. The farmer has practically no demands,
252 he nourishes himself simply, often poorly, and is considered not very strong. Next to wheat, millet, sheep's milk and cheese, fish, onions, wild vegetables, and raw fruit, maize constitutes the staple food; the maize is stamped into groats in a wooden mortar, or else it is ground into groats in a hand mill by turning the upper of two boulders laid on top of each other, to and fro. From the gruel they bake dumplings and flat cakes filled with cheese in hot ashes or on glowing coals, or on heated stones which are handed down from the mother to the daughter. As in the entire Balkan area, bread and cake are baked under a baking bell which consists of sheet-iron with a thick layer of loam pasted over it. Meat is roasted on the spit. Oil is extracted from native kernels. In the mountains, as in Albania, they do the grinding of flour with turbine mills; the heavy wooden plow to which the likewise wooden moldboard is tied with linden bast, has remained
[415] preserved from ancient times. Baskets woven with switches serve to
[291] store the cereals, for milk they use bottle gourds. Archaic is the wicker-work arrangement, reproduced on Figure 97 of the black woollen belts belonging to the women in the Transylvanian Comitat of Hunyad; the strings hanging down from the ceiling are kept crossed with each other by means of little sticks and are taken up by hand; knots are eliminated. Ancient, too, are the round dance (horo), the subjects and the rhythm of the folk songs, as well as the wedding and funeral
[764] practices--at funerals and at memorial services for the dead certain dishes are eaten consisting of wheat kernels cooked like milk rice.
789 Magical ceremonies may be seen to be remnants of an age-old culture of the will based upon the spiritual contemplation of elemental entities behind the phenomena of nature. Such magical ceremonies are the procession of naked gypsy girls during a summer drought to propitiate Paparuda, the goddess of fertility (Slavic baba and rodu, fruit), on

[See 1: Karutz, E1 Europe, cat. 116, p. 54a --- Analyst]

789 which occasion the girls go dancing and singing from farmstead to farmstead and have water poured over them at each gate, by which process the rain is supposed to be brought down. Or the practice of the Scaloian, at which a doll made of loam which is intended to represent the spirit of drought, and which therefore symbolizes the evil, destructive forces of nature, is placed in a wooden coffin and carried amidst mourning songs by the girls to a body of flowing water. Ahead of the train a green, spangled twig is borne, and behind it flags made of paper, a coal shovel with incense, and a burning wax candle. Coffin and candle are given over to the water; in other cases, if no river should be available, they are thrown into a well or buried.

/85: Illustrations./

/86/ The Rumanians

II.

000 1.-5. Apron styles of the Rumanian peasant women. 6. Rumanian women. 7. Embroidery with the tree of life motif in a final state of degeneration. 8. and 9. Dresses of peasant women. 10. Rumanian herders. 11. Rumanians with tight trousers and characteristic peasant's boots.*

291 The oldest types of clothing in Rumania have been preserved among the herders of the mountains: leather sandals tied with laces; trousers which are wide at the top and tight around the calves and arranged in transverse folds; belts made of leather or wool; a short shirt falling over the trousers; a fur vest made of wether's fell, with the hairs turned inwards, worn both in summer and in winter; a black fur jacket; a long sheep's fur coat, with the hair turned inwards; a cap made of lambskin; a hood, a piece of hide (gluga) such as, according to ancient monuments, was already worn by the Thracians. At work the women and the girls wear rough, home-made linen and woollen [292] materials; at festivals and celebrations, on the other hand, they wear colorful garments tastefully covered with colored decorative patterns in weaving and in embroidery: The blouses are embroidered on the sleeves and on the breast, and the apron-like skirts are woven in threads of many different colors. These are the characteristic articles of clothing, a hip cloth which is slung tightly around the lower part of

* [for illustrations, see 1: Karutz, E1 Europe, cat. 116, p. 57a -- Analyst]

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Rumanians

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[For, identification, see cat. 116, p. 57.--Analyst]

291 the body and which is folded back to the sides along the free ends at the front. Aside from these we encounter simple and double aprons that hang down in the front and in the back, with and without trimmings; they are held up by a belt and are colorfully embroidered with extremely rich tapestry patterns; they are also interwoven with gold and silver threads. Furthermore we find sleeveless jackets, long coats, kerchiefs, [531] and necklaces made of gold and silver coins. In the patterns have been preserved Near Eastern patterns, among these the tree of life motif in its completely original and primitive form, with animals depicted as flanking it on either side; but it has also been preserved in the final stages of degeneration, that is to say in the form of schematically arranged flower vases.

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/87: Illustrations./

1: Karutz--59 E-4 (no date) 1925 E1 Europe
Bulgaria EE1

/88/ The Bulgarians

000 1. Hair dress of young women, with tresses decorated with silver. 2. and 3. Decorative pendants. 4. Head ornament of the brides, made of flowers and silver coins. 5. Woman wearing an embroidered blouse and a woven carpet apron. 6. Drawing well. 7. Neck ornament. 8. Hand mill for salt. 9. Threshing sled. 10. Cave dwelling on the Lon. 11. Fire saw. 12. Village street. 13. Shelter of the field herders. 14. Household altar. 15. Rattle board of wood, from a monastery. 16. Signalling horn of a country mailman. 17. Sawing frame.[1]

175 At the time of the Romans present-day Bulgaria was called
101 Moesia in its northern (Danube) region, Thracia in its southern section,
144 and it was inhabited by an Indo-European people of North European extraction, at the time when old Greek, and later Roman and Byzantine, immigrants moved there and intermingled with it. From the sixth century on, the Slavic wave moved closer, and from the seventh century onwards Finnish Turko-Tataric migrant herders and horse breeders repeatedly found their way into this country from the middle Volga.
463 From these the Bulgarians adopted and kept the herding system, by the side of which the Thracian and Slavic agriculture was maintained. The Ottoman Turks coming from the southeast provided the country
181 with its class of craftsmen and tradesmen. This mosaic of races and peoples developed a particularly powerful and healthy stock of people whose high life expectancy is well known, as well as a temperate,
531 industrious, and sober character. It mirrors a corresponding multiplicity
177 of cultures; thus we have in art types that range from the Scythian style and its predilection for phantastic animal forms to the Byzantine and ancient Oriental motifs; from the cellular stone inlays of the period of the Teutonic migrations (belt clasps) to the Tatar decorative pendants (Figures 2, 3, and 7),[1] and from the Slavic joy in ornamentation and
592 colors to the Turkish, recent Near Eastern household industries. The Slavic household community, which takes up every new generation into the fabric of the family, has as its consequence the form of settlement
342 by individual and separate farmsteads. Aside from occasional underground dwelling pits in the loess, of which only the pointed roof of rushes rises above the ground, there are one-story high, rectangular panel-work houses covered with loam, placed either on a level with the soil, or else on top of a wooden substructure for the working sheds.

[1] [For illustrations, see 1: Karutz, E1 Europe, cat. 116, p. 59a -- Analyst]
[2] [See 1: Karutz, E1 Europe, cat. 116, p. 57a -- Analyst]

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Bulgarians

[For identification, see cat. 116, p. 59--Analy]

342 and the stables; in the mountains there are usually structures with many
stories. Formerly the windows used to have wooden sashes that ran
along a groove and that one could slide to the side, in place of window
262 panes. The style of life is simple; in the country the herders were often
contented with sour milk, and the farmers with maize and millet beer.
231 The raising of livestock specializes in cattle, sheep, and goats, and
[321] takes place in the form of a migratory herding system, which commutes
back and forth between the mountains in the summer and the plains
241 in the winter. The agriculture produces wheat, maize, barley, and
rye, and in the temperate, nay, even hot, South, it cultivates rice,
cotton, and sesame; from here, too, come the olive trees, the citrous
412 trees, and the chestnut trees. The hand mill is mostly used only for
salt, other kinds of primitive tools have scarcely been preserved. The
threshing sled (Figure 9)* came from the Orient; it is made of hard
planks that have been bent upward at the front and into which sharp-
edged fire-stones have been forced. When it is in use it is weighted
down enough by the stones and by the weight of the leader to be able
to press out the ears of grain. The rattle board (Figure 15)* has its
counterparts all over ancient Europe. The sawing frame of the wandering
wood cutters is an original invention. It includes a box filled with
stones which is fastened by two rods and revolves around a horizontal
axis, so that by its weight it supports the backward movement of the
291 saw. Through the universal joy in colors and in ornaments the national
dress displays a great deal of variety. The basic elements of the men's
clothing are a long, rough shirt with a wide cut which is embroidered
with colored wool along the chest opening and along the shoulder;
cloth or leather trousers, pleated in the Turkish manner in the east,
in the west evenly tight-fitting, with a long woollen waistband; and
legging-like calf cloths, as well as sandals; a sleeveless jacket or
coat-like upper garment with wool trimmings and laces; a sheep's fur
or hooded mantle; a dark and low lambskin cap. The women wear
blouses with embroidered and crocheted ornamentation, skirts with
belts, firmly woven, embroidered apron skirts, sleeveless vests or
sleeve jackets, kerchiefs, headdresses and garlands around their fore-
302 heads with fringe bands covered with coins and hanging far down. The
301 girls wear their hair in from 20 to 30 tresses which are held together
just below shoulder level by means of chains or buckles with silver
coins and pearls, and which, at the end, are gathered together into
one single tress (Figure 1). They also have costly ornaments of little
gold and silver plates, as well as of filigree work for which the threads
were formerly often taken from ancient coins.
*[see 1; Karutz, E1 Europe, Cat. 116, p. 59a -- Analyst]

000 were formerly often taken from ancient coins. Under the cover of--
771 Eastern, Greek Orthodox--Christianity many remnants were preserved
759 of old conceptions of unmediated spirits, of the belief in elemental beings in nature (forest fairies, water spirits--coins are still thrown into the fountains in order to propitiate them, and so forth), and of spiritual forces that are everywhere effective and which are put in the service of magical ends. For example, children are touched with the rein of a horse if they have been frightened or become sick by another horse. The processions with the little rain men designed to banish the drought occur in Bulgaria just as much as they do in Rumania (see the Plate, Rumania); the rubbing of wood to produce fire in case of illnesses and epidemics occurs just as it does in Serbia (see the Plate, Serbia): a piece of linden wood is nailed to a tree stump and is rubbed together with another piece of wood in a sawing fashion (Figure 11). In Figure 14 the two worlds of the old emanatory belief, which hangs up plaited wheat ears, and of the Christian faith touch
769 upon each other. In the monastery of Trojan a kind of skull cult was maintained: On holidays the women search out their old relatives and friends among the skulls of the deceased monks, which have been supplied with an inscription of their name and a sign of the cross. The women then stick burning candles on the skulls and pray and meditate before them.

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/89: Illustrations./

/90/ The Dalmatian South Slavs

I.

000 1. Log cabin. 2. Conical hut 3. Hora dance. 4. Large

[See 1; Kantz, E1 Europe, cat. 116, p.59a--Analyst]

1: Karutz E-4 (no date) 1925 E1 Europe E1
Dalmatian South Slavs

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[For identification, see cat. 116, pp. 61-62--Analyst]

1: Karutz--62 E-4 (no date) 1925 E1 Europe
Yugoslavia EF1

000 carved baking mould made of wood. 5. Gusla player. 6. Bell and necklace for the bell-wether. 7. Distaff. 8. Cotton cleaner (plucking or hatter's bow). 9. Ladder from a canoe. 10. Carved distaff. 11. One-stringed gusla. 12. Wooden cup. 13. Handjar. 14. Double flute. 15. and 16. Painted Easter eggs. 17. Chair. 18. Wooden plow. 19. Stone vessel for oil. 2

101 The Slavic migration from the Vistula-Carpathian mountain territory, which had been expanding towards the south since the sixth century, soon reached the Adriatic and took possession, there, of old Thraceo-Illyrian regions that were affected by Celtic, Greek, and
144 Roman influences. The original pre-Indo-European population stratum, which belonged to the old Europeans who extended from the Atlantic
142 Ocean to Asia, intermingled with the Indo-European Slavs. The result is a tall, bony, sinewy, and broad-shouldered physical type. The caves of the Stone Age population still survive in the mountains as
342 natural grottos shut off by walls. The shepherds build conical straw huts from timber frames intertwined horizontally with switches, which are placed either on the level soil or on a one-meter high earth or stone mound (Figure 2). They also have occasional stone-covered round huts. Furthermore there are log cabins made of well-joined squared beams and with a steeply sloping thatched roof which is held up by thin poles and whose ridge is additionally secured by wooden frames and boulders (Figure 1). Finally there are rectangular gabled houses and storied houses made of stones and with roofs of wooden tiles. There are one-room houses with a simple construction of natural stone, without white-wash, with a roof of slate plates, entrances without doors, without windows, and a smoke escape in the roof which is kept closed during the winter. These houses have been improved by interior structures which are closed off and therefore free from smoke, but which cannot be heated. The attic space is reached by means of ladders which have
352 been constructed out of old canoes. The interior furnishing consists
[354] of the open hearth, a paved or stone-covered place with a kettle and a roasting gridiron over it--to fan the fire they avail themselves of an iron bellows--and a stone bench next to it. Furthermore, there is a semi-spherical baking oven, if the bread is no longer baked under the old baking cover of clay or iron; there are large, pear-shaped and loam-covered wicker baskets for the maize; clothes chests, partly made of hollowed out logs; seats of stones, wooden blocks, and three

1 [For illustrations, see 1: Karutz, E1 Europe, cat. 116, p. 61a--Analyst]

352 legged chairs originally made of natural roots; as well as plank-beds
with a straw covering used as beds on which they sleep fully clothed;
and, finally, kitchen utensils among which the oil vessels of stone
531 betray southern origin (Figure 19).1/1 A quite extraordinarily skillful
craftsmanship has decorated the various household utensils; for instance,
the beautiful three-legged armchairs, the grain troughs, the cradles,
the whet-stone containers of the mowers, the pocket-knife handles,
the musical instruments, the distaffs which the women put in their
belt in order to spin while they are walking, the spindles, the washing
clubs, the winding sticks for the embroidery thread (female herders
are constantly busy with embroidering) with the notches cut into them,
the equipment in the way of carrying pouches, the pack-saddles, the
horse blankets, and the head-harness adorned with embroidery; as well
as the clothing: the kerchiefs which are worn by the girls over little
embroidered caps, and by women over pinned-up tresses, with fine
colored silk and gold thread embroidery; the aprons and shirts which
are related to the southern Russian, with embroidery in Near Eastern
patterns imported via Byzantium; the dress cloths with colorful em-
broidery employing spangles, cloth mosaic, buttons, chains, and shells.
233 In the desolate plains of the bare and rocky upland tracts, cattle, goats,
and sheep are bred, and a milk and cheese industry is carried on. In
241 the valleys there is agriculture and gardening: rye, wheat, millet,
barley, and in the south maize, olive trees, and vine. The working
of the soil is done by means of the spade and the archaic wooden plow;
fertilizing with dung is largely unknown, and the threshing is done with
177 the Oriental stone-covered sleds. As a heritage from the ancient old
[252] Illyrian Balkan culture they still do the cooking on heated stones, the
stewing in hide sacks, and make use of the earth oven and the baking
bell; for the rest, after the ancient influences, they have been affected
by the Slavic, the recent Italic, and the Turkish element. With this
element, for instance, came the plucking or hatter's bow for cotton
from the East, as well as the weapons and a great number of ornaments.
534 Again, the round dance is very ancient, and likewise the bagpipes and
the one-stringed gusla (Figure 11).1/1 and the double flute is derived from
antiquity.

/91: Illustrations./
1/1 [See 1: Karutz, El Europe, cat. 116, p. 61a --- Analyst]

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Yugoslavia EF1

/92/ The Dalmatian South Slavs

II.

000 1. Men's costume from Obrovac with a silver-plated vest, an embroidered jacket, an undervest, garters, knee bands, covered with metal and stones. 2. Sunday dress in Bribir near Skradin. 3. Woman from Ubli, Gulf of Kotor /Bocche di Cattaro/. 4. Winter dress of the girls from Knin. 5. Old maid from the Gulf of Kotor /Bocche di Cattaro/. 6. and 8. Woman's dress blouses from northern Dalmatia. 7. and 9. Stockings from Dalmatia. 10. Women's blouse with colored silk embroidery, from the island of Uljan near Zadar in northern Dalmatia. 11. Montenegro man. 12. Montenegrin belt. (Number 12 is in the Museum für Völkerkunde /Museum for Ethnography/ in Lübeck.[1]

177 In the dress are mingled old Balkan, Slavic, and Turkish styles.
291 To the old Balkan style belong the hooded mantles, round caps, lace-tied sandals (opanken), fringed aprons, the rough woollen materials, and the embroidered carrying bags. To the Slavic style belong the embroidered women's blouses made of home-made linen, whose rich and fine wool and silk ornamentation displays Near Eastern tapestry patterns. The same patterns adorn the firmly woven aprons and the knitted socks. In general the popular dress is disappearing faster among the men, as is the case everywhere, than with the women. Among the latter one can still meet with little caps, a double vest over the white blouse, red woollen waistbands and belts, tight-fitting leggings, a jacket and a cap mantle, brown or white, of heavy rough woollen cloth, and a long sheep's wool blanket with fringes, which is worn over the shoulder. The vests are frequently adorned with black laces and embroidered, the short sleeve jacket often has metal plates and coins sewn to it. The women wear their finely embroidered blouses mostly only as a festive garment, and for the rest they are dressed in coarse linen skirts with chemise, sleeveless white mantle skirts of rough woollen cloth covered with felt, colored stockings made of sheep's wool, opanken, embroidered kerchiefs, and crown-like hair ornaments. All the or-
301 naments that are made by hand are conditioned by regional boundaries, each village has its own, and girls, marriageable girls, brides, women, mothers, and widows in each case may have their particular ornaments. In this is expressed their continued association with a life that is

[1] [For illustrations, see J: Karutz, E1 Europe, cat. 116, p. 63a -- Analyst]

1; Karutz E-4 (no date) 1925 E1 Europe E1

Dalmatian South Slavs

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[For identification, see cat. 116, p. 63--Analyst]

301 conscious of the old group cohesion. Moreover, the preservation
[631] of the patterns is dependent upon the fact that they possess active,
[789] emanating magical effects which they preserve solely by the very condition that they always remain unchanged. There is a constant endeavor, therefore, not to lose the magical force and to repeat the patterns with painstaking exactness in the identical forms. The Orient has had a strong effect on the ornamentation which manifests itself in artful metal working of rings, buttons, needles, brooches, chains, belt locks, and the like, and in addition makes use of native pearls, corals, and semi-precious stones or glass imitations of them. The technique of filling out grooves with lead is likewise practiced. Tin and lead plates cover the belts, the garters, the belt pockets, the carrying belts, as well as the leather belt straps which are so long that they can be wound around the body four to five times.

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/93: Illustrations./

/94/ The Bosnian South Slavs

I.

000 1. One-room house. 2. Dwelling in Gornja Dolina. 3. Signalling board (hillebille). 4. Dwelling in Gornja Dolina. 5. Steps made of an old boat. 6. Storage place for kukuruz (maize). 7. Hand mill. 8. Fruit storage place of wicker-work. 9. Baking cover made of clay. 10. Wooden kettle beam. 11. Farm house of an archaic form that is dying out, with a sheltering roof that extends down and over the walls, with a stone substructure in case of uneven terrain and as a protection against the wet and miasmas; the ground-floor contains a stable, as well

1: Karutz E-4 (no date) 1925 El Europe E1

Bosnian South Slavs

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

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[For identification, see cat. 116, pp. 64-65--Analyst]

1: Karutz--65 E-4 (no date) 1925 E1 Europe
Yugoslavia EF1

000 as the tool and storage rooms. 12. Cradle. 13. Churchyard. 14. Village of houses built on piles.

101 When the Slavs moved in from the north and intermingled
[103] with them, there lived in the Bosnian part of present-day Yugoslavia, as in the entire Balkan area, Thraceo-Illyrian people. This area is named after the river Bosna and is situated between Dalmatia, Croatia and Slavonia, and Serbia, between the Sava River and Herzegovinian-
342 Montenegrin mountains. From the Slavs are derived the lake dwellings of the Bronze Age which have been unearthed in the Sava valley. In more recent times refugees have built themselves buildings on piles at the same spot, for which, as for their household furnishings and their farming equipment, they used exclusively wood of oak and elm trees. Always square, the houses are in part one-room dwellings with a rafterless, gently sloping roof (Figure 1), without an outlet for the smoke; or else they are two-room log cabins consisting of one room for the open fire place, and another as the living room; the
[343] second type of house also has rafters on the roof (Figure 2). The maize storage places have basket-like woven walls (Figures 6 and 8). Next to the houses there are, in the larger farmyards, stables and other types of adjoining structures; communication between these buildings
[354] proceeds by means of narrow wooden bridges. Because of the danger of fire, the open hearth fire is placed in a separate box of its own which is likewise supported by piles and packed with ashes and earth, below the floor (Figure 4). The stairs to the platforms consist of split round timbers with sills nailed to them, or else simply of leaning logs with notches made into them, and occasionally, too, of a piece of a
[412] canoe that has become useless (Figure 5). In the way of archaic tools there are: wooden kettle hooks, a baking bell of clay, with which the bread, that has been kneaded and fermented on the fire place, is covered; hand mills of two stones in a frame of poplar or willow tree wood with the freely moving rotating rod that runs through a hole in
[352] one of the lateral boards; furthermore there are low, round small tables and low stools, which belong to the ancient furniture. For the rest, the square gabled roof, as well as the stone substructure with gabled
177 roof, occurs. Turkey has influenced building and living style in the cities, as well as the habits of everyday and of eating, also the trade
531 and the crafts. Carpet weaving, the armorer's art, the metal intarsia technique, and especially wood carving were formerly on an extraordinarily high level; spoons, cups, bread pestles, flutes and violins,

[For illustrations, see 1: Karutz, E1 Europe; cat. 116, p. 64a -- Analyst]

531 washing beaters, distaffs, spindles and distaffs, whetstone containers, boxes, mirror containers, and many other things used to be thickly covered with carved patterns, in which, next to the Oriental plant tendrils, the Nordic sun and star figures predominate.

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/95: Illustrations./

/96/ The Bosnian South Slavs

II.

000 1.-3. Bosniac male types. 4. Bosnian dance. 5. and 7. Bosniac female types. 6. Peasant woman with headdress. 8. Hairpin. 9. Embroidered caps. 10. and 11. Embroidered women's blouses.*

[177] 291 In the Bosnian dress are intermingled old Balkan, Slavic, and Turkish elements. Turban and sheep's skin cap among the farmers, little caps and crowns with long cloths worn in the back of the head, [292] are to be seen side by side. The proud headdress shown in Figure 6,* which has, apparently been taken over from Serbia, is worn only by women during the first year of their marriage, while later on the bush of feathers is taken off and only the remaining part of the head-piece continues to be worn. This head-piece consists of a fez with a padding sewn to the front, so that a Phrygian shape results. Furthermore it

* [For illustrations, see 1: Karutz, E1 Europe, cat. 116, p. 66a—Analyst]

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[For identification, see cat. 116, p. 66--Analyst]

4. 291 consists of caps that have been sewn on, as well as a bush of peacock's feathers and colored cock's feathers. (Compare Globus, volume 78, page 387). The carpet aprons that are illustrated in Figure 5[1] likewise 4. 326 have their original provenience from the northeast. As is the rule throughout the Balkans, the silver ornamentation among the Bosnian South Slavs is rich and variegated. Especially filigree is forged with the greatest of artistic skill.

/97: Illustrations./

/98/ The Albanians

I.

000 1. Type of fortified building. 2. Hut in Durazzo. 3. Mountain hut near Gusinje. 4. and 5. Chairs. 6. Cradle from Planti. 7. Fireplace in Nikaj. 8. Interior of a hut in Pula with intertwined reed walls, and a roof consisting of rafters, reed, and bulrush bundles. 9. Fireplace and hearth bench in a niche of the wall, in Hotin. 10. House door in Brebula, with an ornament arched like a wedge, and hook-like stone projections used for hanging up the guns. 11. Interior of a fortified house (kula). 12. Fireplace with hearth bench and smoke outlet in the niche of the wall. 13. Carving on a chest from Scutari[2]

A. 101 Between Montenegro and Epirus the strongly mountainous coastal area of the Balkan Peninsula has preserved primitive European racial elements and maintained ancient cultural forms. Here the Albanian people is settled, the people of the Skyptars, the troglodytes or inhabitants of the land of the eagles or of the descendants of eagles, A. 144 according to the various explanations. By the Turks they are called Arnauts. From pre-Aryan Illyrians, who belong to the oldest inhabitants of the European-Asiatic land mass, and from Aryan Thracians there was formed a basic stock. To this were added Goths, Slavs, Greeks, and, since 1450, Turks, as well as sporadic Roman elements and later A. [197] Italian influxes along the coast. All these combined to form the Albanians who today are divided into two groups according to the dialects of their Indo-European language, that is, into the northern Gegen and A. 144 the southern Tuscans. These two groups are in turn divided into a great 191 number of sub-stocks. The former, with predominantly Slavic, Serbian blood, are tougher, more war-like, more conservative; the Tuscans,

1 [For illustrations, see 1: Karutz, E1 Europe, cat. 116, p. 67g--Analyst]
2 [See 1: Karutz, E1 Europe, cat. 116, p. 66a--Analyst]

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Albanians



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[For identification, see cat. 116, p. 67--Analyst]

181 on the other hand, are strongly mixed with Greeks and softer, more
144 accessible to civilizing influences, and more desirous of innovations.
The consciousness of their racial coherence determines their life in
tradition--they know their genealogical trees, and hundreds of names
in them--, their boundless hospitality on the one hand, and their
boundless desire for feuding and the implacability of their revenge
342 for murder, on the other hand. Of archaic methods of living there
are to be found, as temporary living quarters, caves in naturally formed
erosions of river banks, closed off in front by plaited mats of switches.
Furthermore, there are conical huts made from unhewn stems and
rushes left long in cutting, in the coastal swamps; also, half under-
ground, walled up pits with a thatched saddle-roof and a mound of
earth thrown against it, used by herders and herds. Then there are
loam-covered huts of intertwined beech twigs and with a reed or leaf
roofing (Figure 2); one-room houses with walls filled out with grass or
pieces of turf with a flat roof frame-work consisting of three transverse
beams and boards loosely laid over them and weighted down with
rocks (Figure 3, which, furthermore, shows, next to the hut, a frame
for storing meat, and so forth, with a notched tree stump serving as
steps and a spruce tree serving as a natural hook for hanging things).
The permanent dwellings, always fenced in, are log cabins in the
forested region of the north; for the rest they are stone houses bound
with mortar, in central and southern Albania with walled-in supporting
beams, covered with straw, shingles, slate, planks, or furrowed tiles.
Originally it was level with the ground, with one or two rooms, then
it turned into a building with two or more stories, with or without a
verandah. The perpetual insecurity of the country as a consequence
of the blood revenge feuds developed tower-like fortified buildings
(kulen), with embrasures and a solid roof difficult of access (Figure 1),
out of bulletproof interior structures. The division into rooms in the
interior of these buildings is rarely made by means of walls, more
frequently just through boards or intertwined twigs, or sometimes even
[177] just through larger objects like chests. Into the urban building and
[531] decorative arts Italian-Venetian, Byzantine-Near Eastern, and Turkish
influences have penetrated; the Scutari chest wall in Figure 13 shows
a well-known pattern of Persian ornamentation with a tree of motif
in the final state of degeneration. The interior of the houses has loam
352 floors or timber floors; wall boards for putting away things (Figure 8);
wall pegs for hanging up dishes; tables in the shape of plates made of
two half-moon-shaped boards joined together to form a circle, with

[See: Karutz, El Europe, cat. 116, p. 67a --- Analyst]

352 two transverse ledges nailed to them and serving as feet (Figure 11);[2] low, three-legged stools and semicircular arm chairs; bedsteads of posts rammed into the ground, floors made of boards or intertwined switches, and heaped up hay or ferns (Figure 11);[2] cradles which are
415 carried like a rucksack on the back. Among the kitchen utensil the baking bowl is important; it is made red hot and then the dough is placed in it and the baking bell is placed over it, on top of which embers are again heaped. Large wooden tubs with hoops of hazelnut are used to keep the wine, and smaller ones for water, butter, and brine for the cheese; sacks of sheep's or goat's hide are used to keep
354 milk. The open hearth fire, at the same time heating and cooking place, is situated in the center of the living room in a depression filled with loam; above it is suspended the kettle by a bent branch in its natural state, or by an iron chain; to the side of the fireplace a recess has been made into the wall to form a niche for the stove bench. Originally any kind of outlet for the smoke was lacking, then a hole for the smoke was left open, a flue was added; but it was not till later that proper fireplaces with a chimney were constructed.

/99: Illustrations./

/100/ The Albanians

II.

000 1. Woman from the Arbrie on the highland pastures of Kalmak. 2. Mohammedan Albanian. 3. Women from Scutari with wide breeches. 4. North Albanian shepherdess. 5. North Albanian woman with a wide apron. 6. Swimming bag and a raft of intertwined willow twigs floating on swimming bags; on the raft the swimmer's bundle of clothing. 7. Ferry made of a double canoe with planks raising the edge. 8. Canoe with booms on both sides. 9. Wooden plow. 10. Cross-section of a turbine mill. 11. Husking of corn by means of threshing flails. 12. Two-wheeled ox-cart. 13. Albanian from the region near Dibro. 14. Hand mill. 15. A pouch made of beech tree bark used for picking berries. 16. Peg with markings for water line use.[1]

142 The Albanians are amply medium-sized, powerfully built, mostly with short heads, with a narrow, long face. Blue eyes and
000 light hair occur not infrequently. In many cases the men shave their

[1] [For illustrations, see 1: Karutz, El Europe, cat. 116, p. 69a--Analyst]
[2] [See 1: Karutz, El Europe, Cat. 116, p. 67a--Analyst]

1: Karutz E-4 (no date) 1925 El Europe £1

Albanians

000

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[For identification, see cat. 116, p. 49--Analyst]

1: Karutz--70 E-4 (no date) 1925 E1 Europe
Albania E G1

In many cases the men shave their
302 their head completely except for a tuft of hair on top of the head.
291 This tuft is left by them to grow into a long lock. In the south their dress resembles that of the Greeks. In the north it varies from the town to the country, and in the countryside it varies again according to the different regions. In Scutari the Catholics wear wide, pleated black breeches which among the men reach down below the knees, and among the women down to the ankles. Further they wear white stockings, a short lower jacket with attached long sleeves and a sleeveless top jacket. In addition the women wear an embroidered sleeveless coat. The Mohammedans wear the pleated coat (fustan) that weighs several kilograms and remains short in central and southern Albania. It consists of several hundreds of long, narrow strips of linen cloth sewn together. A cotton or silk belt holds the coat, and the weapons are clamped inside a leather belt. To this are added a lower and a top jacket. The Mohammedan women wear very wide breeches and richly embroidered mantles with long sleeves that have slits in them. The fustan is regarded as being ancient Illyrian and is believed to have been developed from the kilt; it has been attested in the surviving artistic monuments in Mycenae and on ancient Crete, as well as in the Palaeolithic caves of northern Spain. The rural population wears, likewise as an ancient Illyrian inheritance, a small, tightly-fitting, semi-spherical felt cap which does not cover much more than the top of the head, and is found represented among the "Barbarians" of the victory monument of Adam-Klissi. Tightly fitting sheep's wool trousers with two transverse slits in the region of the groin, which by some are considered Slavic, by others Thracian, an under jacket with sleeves, and a sleeveless vest, a mantle and a fur coat are also worn by the rural people. For these types of clothing evidences have again been
[462] discovered from antiquity. In the mode of life, the working of the
252 fields by the woman is regarded as an ancient cultural tradition; in the same category are placed the baking of flat cakes under the baking bell, the cooking of blood, fat, meat, and spices in a goat's stomach which is turned to and fro over the red hot coal embers, the cooking of wheat grains without prviously grinding them, the hand mill (Figure
412 14). and the turbine mill (Figure 10). The latter's grindstones lie five to six feet above the water wheel into whose spoon-like spokes the water
312 is poured from a steeply inclined conduit. Still belonging to the ancient cultural heritage are the watering of the field by means of canals and wooden conduits, something which is regulated by the family because of the dearth of water--Figure 16 shows a marking post, one and one-half meters high.

[see Karutz, El Europe, cat. 116, p. 69a--Analyst]

1: Karutz--71 E-4 (no date) 1925 E1 Europe
Albania EG1

312 with the household marks of the families which are allowed to used
[493] the particular canal concerned in turn--, the screeching ox cart whose
two wheels are two meters high because of the muddy roads, and
which is drawn by the animals driven on by the goad and harnessed
with a yoke on the nape of their necks; the wooden plow whose slade
501 and handle are both of one piece (Figure 9); the swimming bag made
of a goat's skin that is blown up and tied to the front of the body, and
the raft made of four such skins and a netting of intertwined osier
switches, upon which the swimmer puts his clothes bundle (Figure 6).
For the rest the people avail themselves of simple and double canoes,
with or without side boards that raise the edge of the boat, with or
without flanking beams that are nailed to the boat as floaters designed
to maintain the equilibrium (Figures 7 and 8); plank boats also occur. To
husk the corn a mat of intertwined switches is placed on top of four
posts rammed into the ground, and the corn cobs are then beaten with
sticks one and one-half meters long, until the kernels have all fallen
411 to the ground through the plaited meshes (Figure 11). The long flint-
locks, which are quite often beautiful old heirlooms, have only sur-
vived still in the south; they are being replaced by the modern repeating
rifles, the pistols, and the handjars, the knife with the bone handle
221 of the shank of a cow, and the revolvers. The Albanians are to a
241 large extent farmers and in part migrating herders who commute back
and forth between their winter quarters in the plains towards the Adriatic,
where they work their fields, and their summer settlements on the
highland pastures to which they return after they have finished working
[312] the fields. During wanderings in the highlands they rub last year's
mountain snow on sheets of rock that have been scorched by the sun,
[202] in order to get water. The extensive settlement of the mountains has
given rise to the development of a good signalling system by means
183 of shooting and shouting and their transmission. Certain old customs
have been preserved that bespeak a life in firmly joined group com-
binations. To these belong the abducting of the bride, bride purchasing,
the engagment of children, sworn blood brotherhood, and revenge for
[162] murder. The Albanians are approximately seven-tenths Mohammedan,
771 two-tenths Greek Orthodox, and one-tenth Roman Catholic. Never-
theless, all kinds of remnants have been preserved attesting an earlier
spiritual life of the people which practiced a clairvoyant contemplation
of supernatural powers and processes, basing its knowledge and its
actions on the basis of its magical connection with these mysterious
000 orces. Thus their practices and beliefs included: building sacrifices,
[see 1: Karutz, E1 Europe, cat. 116, p. 69a -- Analyst]

Albania EG1

771 Thus their practices and beliefs included: building sacrifices,
[782] which at one point were most probably human sacrifices; the faith
[769] in the existence of certain snakes that guarded treasures and in the tutelary spirits of people; exposing the dead after the manner of the Parsi, as a result of that lack of respect for the corpse which springs from the knowldege of the eternity of the spirit--the ancient Thracians were jubilant whenever someone died, and they wailed when some-
[775] one was born--; werewolf conceptions; separation of the soul in sleep; wandering about of the dead, especially of evil people who in the form of a ghost or in a transformed human shape cause harm. The foreseeing of the future makes use of materialistic means in order to survive before the masses in a degenerate age which no longer knows
[787] or believes. It prophesies from the fissures that appear in a heated sheep's shoulder blade or hen's breast bone; also from the bright and dark spots in the light filtering through, or from the flight of birds.
[789] The old knowledge of the emanating, radiating spiritual forces of beings and things is used for magical purposes, for instance little pieces of paper that have something written on them and which are worn as a protection or drunk after they have been dissolved in water. The sun still lives among the Albanians as "God's reflection."

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/101: Illustrations./

1: Karutz--73 E-4 (no date) 1925 E1 Europe
Greece EH1

/104/

The Macedonians

I.

000 1. Konak in Alaklissa. 2. Shepherd's hut of loam and straw in the Campania, the lowlands north of Salonika. 3. Fortress-like warehouse in Palalitza. 4. Peasant woman at a weaving loom in Skoplje. 5. Farmyard near Skoplje. 6. Bagpipes. 7. Baking bell. 8. Magical charm. 9. and 10. Votive offerings. 11. Cotton cleaner (hatter's bow). 12. Riding donkey. 13. Pottery oven near Skoplje. 14. Armchair. 15. Plowing farmer. 16. Brand iron used for branding sheep. 17. Incense pot. 18. Earthenware cover for the coal basin, used for keeping the heat in; on top of it is placed the pot or coffee jug.[1]

(Numbers 6, 7, 8, 9, 10, and 11 are in the Museum für Völkerkunde at Hamburg. Numbers 13, 16, and 17 in the Ethnographisches Museum at Dresden. Numbers 4, 5, 12, 13, and 16 are photographs taken by Generaloberarzt /Chief surgeon-general/ Dr. Hansen in Lübeck.

101 144 In the lowlands between Albania, old Bulgaria, and Greece, that is, in Macedonia, and incessant movement of peaceable and war-like peoples has produced the racial mixture of present-day Macedonia, in which the Indo-Germanic Thracians constitute the basic stock. To this were added, in antiquity, Romans, in the middle ages Slavs and Bulgarians, Turks and their Turkomanic or Near Eastern camp-followers; and, finally, Rumanians, Greeks, and the tribally related Albanians. The level tracts of land along the coast and the 231 swampy lowlands are maintained by a nomadic type of livestockbreeding; 241 the fertile fringe areas provide ample yields from the grain agriculture which cultivates primarily wheat and maize, but they are also receptive 342 to southerly cultures such as rice, opium, and cotton. The herders build for themselves hasty round huts of loam and straw; the field guards who here, as in all the other parts of the Balkans, watch over the cultivated fields all through the summer, construct frame-works shaped like beehives or pointed cones out of intertwined twigs and thick bundles of straw. Simple farmsteads also have a thatched roof on walls of tiles and loam; a combination of wood, loam, and tiles leads to two-storied panel-work structures (Figure 2) which contain, in the ground floor,

[1] [For illustrations, see 1: Karutz, E1 Europe, cat. 116, p. 73a -- Analyst]

1: Karutz E-4 (no date) 1925 El Europe E1

Macedonians

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-73a-

[For identification, see cat. 116, p. 73 -- Analyst]

342 stables and storage rooms, and in the upper story the living quarters with a verandah, a balcony, and a sink; over them is a flat roof of tiles. The Albanian form of the square fortified tower is to be seen
177 on larger warehouses (Figure 3). The interior displays the customary
[352] simple furnishing of the Balkan dwelling; the semicircular chair in Figure 14 is reminiscent of the Albanian styles, while its horn-shaped
[415] supports remind one of Turkish influence. The weaving loom and the hatter's bow (Figure 11) that is used for the cleaning of wool and of cotton, have probably come to this country from the Orient, even though the hatter's bow is ancient European (compare the Plate, Estonians II). The baking bell shown in Figure 7, the bagpipes shown in Figure 6, the incense vessel shown in Figure 17, the wooden plow,
[492] shown in Figure 15, which is drawn by the team of oxen that are driven on by a goad (not a whip) and which are harnessed with a neck yoke--all these are universally characteristic of the Balkans. The riding donkey shown in Figure 12, on the other hand, points to the Orient.
[777] Figures 8 to 9 are illustrations of protective charms--the horse's skull is reminiscent of Kirghiz customs, compare volume 1 of this atlas, Plate, Kirghiz I, Figure 13, that are based upon the knowledge of spiritual forces which are everywhere alive, which are effective in everything that is and has being, and can be utilized for magical purposes, both in a good as well as in a bad sense.

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/105: Illustrations/

/106/ The Macedonians

II.

000 1. Men and women from western Macedonia. 2. Woman from
[See 2: Karutz, E1 Europe, cat. 116, p. 73a --Analyst]

1: Karetz E-4 (no date) 1925 El Europe E1

Macedonians

— 74a —

[For identification, see cat. 116, pp. 74-5 -- Analyst]

the region of Monastir. 3. Shepherds from the foreland of the Rhodope mountains. 4. Woman spinning from her hand. 5. Women from the region of Skoplje. 6. Older women as spectators at the horo dance. 7. Macedonian girl from Krustavo. 8. Two farmers from Glumovo near Skoplje.

(Numbers 3, 6, and 7 are photographs taken by Generaloberarzt Dr. Hansen, in Lübeck.

291 The mixture of peoples in Macedonia manifests itself in the dress. Side by side with ancient Illyrian semi-spherical caps and tightly fitting trousers and shoes tied with strings, there are Turko-Tataric kerchiefs and chin cloths and ornamental chains, Slavic kerchiefs, Greek kerchiefs, Slavic embroidered shirts, as well as Turkish sleeveless jackets. There is a great deal of joy in colors and variety in the colorful socks, the embroidered belts, and the ornamental silver chains. Quite particularly charming, however, are the women's aprons, and they contribute greatly to the festive picture presented by the Macedonian national dress. They dominate the fashions with their multiplicity of styles. They appear in all widths and lengths, in wool, in velvet, and in silk; they come in one piece as well as divided into a front piece and a back piece. They are woven and embroidered, and also patterned in stripes, and they display an enormous variety of luminous colors.

/107: Illustrations./

104 A note on the translation: The German word Dachreiter, which appears at various places in the text, is rendered into English by the dictionary as 'standard knee on the ridge of a thatched roof.' For the sake of stylistic economy and elegance I have translated the German term as "ridge rider." (Translator /R.T.N.)

[For illustrations, see 1: Karutz, E1 Europe, cat. 116, pita-Andr]

1: Karutz
105

El Europe

/For cultural summaries of: Finno-Ugrians, Lapps, Estonians, Letts, Lithuanians, Poles, Great Russians, Ruthenians, Czechs, Slovaks, Croats, Slovenes, Serbs, Magyars, Rumanians, Bulgaria, Yugoslavia, Albania, Macedonians, see category 116. /

116

116 TEXTS--a full set of pages from each processed source, arranged in page order, as a means of establishing the context for any particular slip. Sets are arranged in the numerical order of the sources. See also:

Literary texts 530

Die Wolgafinnen

I.

1. Kühe aus rauher Steinzeit und spätere Stangenbock aus alter eiszeitlicher Bedeutung in Bäumkonstruktion angebaut. 2. Gittertür. 3. Eisenbehelfen der Tschuwassen. 4. Oberirdische Riegel (Durra) der Wotjaken-Tschuwassen. 5. Speicher. 6. Schaufel. 7. Wischbretter. 8. Unterirdische Riegel der Mordwinen. 9. Riegel der Mordwinen und Tschuwassen. 10. u. 14. Bürsten, Seitenbretter von Bäumen und Sträuchen. 11. Inneres von Nr. 3; über dem Herd von Feldsteinen hängt der höhere Kesselhaken aus einem entlaubten Astastück und einem durchbohrten, verstellbaren Eisenstück. 12. Unterirdische Riegel der Tschuwassen. 13. Hängewiege. 15. Stuhl. 16. Trogbank für Säuglinge aus Lindenrinde. 17. Pflugschleuder, Kindersprachrohr. 18. Trogbank aus Lindenbast. 19. Zöpfen. 20. Tschuwaschischen Kerbholz als Kalender (die geraden Striche bedeuten Wochentage, die übrigen besondere Ereignisse, die Kreuze Feiertage). 21. Eigentumsmarken. 22. Destillierverrichtung für Branntwein aus Roggen und Mais. 23. Kopf-Bettgestell. 24. Kerbholz-Ziffern.

Nach der Eiszeit assimilierte im nördlichen Europa eine eiszeitliche Menschenrasse, die körperlich und wirtschaftlich, geistig und kulturell gleichartig ein rauhes Leben als Jäger, Fischer und Beerensammler führte. In ihr bildete sich die Gruppe der Finnen, die von Schweden bis zum Jenisei die Taiga und die südlich an sie grenzenden Wälder durchzog. Von ihnen spricht bereits Tacitus. Germanischer Einfluß verdeutschte Kultur und Sprache. Im ganzen Wolgagebiet wurde der unstete Wanderer zum seßhaften Ackerbauer. Fortlaufende fremde Stämme veränderten auch sein Blut. Slaven und Tataren haben sich mit ihm gemischt. Doch erhielten sich noch viele altertümliche Züge bis in die Neuzeit, deren rassifizierende Umwandlungen sie allerdings nicht mehr standhalten. So nannten sich bisher noch die Wotjaken selbst Udi oder Mordwen, ebenso die Tschuwassen Mari; für ganzbarer Name soll fagen von den benachbarten Mordwinen gegeben sein und „die Östlichen" bedeuten. Die ursprünglichen kegelförmigen Stangen-Neunaderzelte sind dem viereckigen Blockhause mit Firstbalken gewichen, doch erhalten sich ihre Formen noch in den Nebengebäuden, in den Ställen, Scheunen und Riegen. Die offene Herdstelle aus hochkant gestellten Steinen mit durchbohrtem Kesselhaken folgte noch in das Holzhaus, weicht jetzt aber dem Ofen. Das „Geflecht von Bauernwagen" des Tacitus lebt noch in Heu- und Strohdachern aus Pfosten, die im Kreise gestellt einen Rundbau formen. Heikel macht auf die Ähnlichkeit mit den germanischen Bauten aufmerksam, die auf der Antoninssäule in Rom dargestellt sind. Ehemalige dem Sumpfland angepaßte Pfahlbauten hängen in Speichern noch an, die auf Kuppen spätere Pfählbauten stehen. Ställe und namentlich die Kornbarren (Riegen) zeigen noch alte Konstruktionen; die gleichen zum Teil noch völlig dem Stangenzelt und sind mit Rindenplatten bedeckt; ein offenes Feuer dämmt erwärmt die Luft, die Getreidegarben werden ringsherumgelegt. Um die Gefahr des Ambrennens zu vermeiden, hebt man anderwärts Gruben aus und deckt sie mit Holz und Erde bis auf zwei Öffnungen zu, eine Einsteig- und eine Rauchöffnung, über welcher der Stangenkegel steht, um den man die Garben schichtet (Bild 12). Sonst gibt es noch ober- und unterirdische Riegen in Kuppelform. Die Hausinrichtung spiegelt die Hausindustrie der Finnen. Stühle aus Baumwurzeln, Tische, Bänke, Stützrohren erschaffen das Mobiliar. An Bänken und Truhen sind die Schiebertür in geschlossenen Stil geschnitzt. Gleichfalls geschnitzt sind die Wind- und Gittertürbretter und die Umrahmungen der Türen, Fenster, Herdtore, die von den Russen übernommen werden. Zum Holz tritt Linden- und Birkenrinde als Material für Körbe, Taschen, Hängewiegen und Trageriegen. Als Fensterscheiben dienten früher Tierblasen und durch Schaben bis zum Durchscheinen verdünnte Häute; bei den Tschuwassen sieht man noch gelbe Leinwand. Von der alten Sammelwirtschaft ist etwas Jagd und Fischfang nachgeblieben, von ehemaligem nomadischen Zustand die Bienenzucht, sonst ist der Wolgafinne Ackerbauer. Die Russifizierung hat die Wolgafinnen meist zur griechisch-orthodoxen Kirche geführt, sie bewahren sich dabei indes eine große Menge ihrer früheren Anschauungen und Gebräuche. Bei der Eheschließung beobachtet man Reste der Kauf- und der Raubehe; ihren Toten geben sie Hausrat mahen ins Grab mit und Stöcke und Bündel von Rosenstöcken zum Abwehren böser Geister; am 3., 7. und 40. Tage, später öffentlich im Rahmen der gemeinschaftlichen Dorffeiern, gedenkt man ihrer, zündet Kerzen im Sterbehause und auf den Gräbern an und opfert Fleisch von Wild oder Haustieren, Kuchen, Honig. Bei der Rückkehr von Begräbnis zeichnen die Wotjaken über ein beim Sterbehause angezündetes Feuer, reinigen sich die Hände mit Asche, baden und wechseln die Kleider, worauf sie bewirtet werden: den Erdenkeln dem reinen Feuers und den unreinen Toten als Ausdruck des reinen Geistes und des unreinen Körpers bekommt hier seine äußere Form. Das Opfer, im Hause auf Wandbretteren mit Reisig von Weißtannen, im Walde auf freien Plätzen hingestellt, verbindet sie mit den Seelen der Verstorbenen wie mit den Geistwesen, die im Wetter, im Wald und Feld, in Seelen und Pflanzen usw. wirken, und zu denen sie sich besonders im Herbst und Frühling mit Dank und Bitte wenden. Über allen Geistmächten lebt Inaus die Sonne; beim Erntefest gebt der Hausvater mit den Schitzeln, aus denen er seine Gäste bewirtet, auf den Hof, bittet sie gegen die Sonne und dankt für den bisher empfangenen Segen. Dem Donner- und Fruchtbarkeitsgott entnehmen sie dauernd seine heilenden Kräfte, indem sie eine Heiligen schnitzen, in eine Birkenrindenschachtel legen und im Hause aufbewahren; den gleichen Sinn hat das Bündel Rosenstöcken, das in der Stubenecke aufgestellt und jeden Herbst erneuert wird, während man den alte — nicht mehr zeremonienkräftige — auf einem Flusse fortschwimmen läßt. Auch Reste des Schamanentums haben sich aus der früheren Zeit einen den umwohnenden Verkehr mit den übersinnlichen Mächten und den unterirdischen Seelen pflegenden Wissens erhalten; unter verschiedenen Namen, Wotkin (vgl. das kirgisische Kaldan), Marchen, Kart, Tuan leben die einzigen Schamanen als Wahrsager, Ärzte, Zauberer von heute, doch ist es die alte Wirklichkeit nicht mehr. Nur leicht hängt sie noch an, wenn z. B. der Zauberer Menschen und Tiere verwandeln kann und solche verwandelte Menschen und Tiere die Sonne und den Mond angreifen, wenn Sonnen- und Mondfinsternis herrscht; man hört hier noch die alte Einheit von Kosmos und Mensch, die alten Bewußtseinsverwandlungen von Tier und Mensch, die alten Zustände einer höheren Bewußtseins, das in die Sternenwelt eindringt, heraus. In Worte wenn für solche Schamanen-Reste erhält sich ein letztes Überbleibsel von ehemaligen Priestergemeinschaften des westfinnischen Jumala, im Glauben an Geistwesen, die dem einzelnen Menschen Schutzengel sind, die Seben in die Herkunft und die Zukunft der Seele, für die es zwei Verhältnisse gibt, einen hellen und einen dunklen; in jenem lebt die Seele wie auf der Erde und geht nachts zuweilen zu her zurück, in diesem gelangt die Seele zur auf einer dünnen Stange, die über einen Abgrund mit einem Kessel voll siedendem Pechen führt, die Sündenbäume müssen hier erst ihre Schuld sühnen. Reste alter Schamanen-Ausrüstung sind aus Zinn gegossene Menschenfiguren, wie sie weiter im Osten noch getragen werden.

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Die Wolgafinnen

II.

1/2. Wetjäkinnen. 3. Gürtelschmuck. 4. Haube mit Nacken- und Stirnbedeckung einer Mordwinin. 5. Spange. 6. Zopfbindeband. 7. Kopfbedeckung. 8. Kopfbedeckung. 9. Halsschmuck aus Perlen. 10. Mordwinische Brust. 11. Mordwinische Brust. 12. Mordwininnen. 13. Mordwinisches Mädchen in Festtracht. 14. Mordwinische Frau in Festtracht.

Der männliche Wolgafinne hat sich in seiner Kleidung dem Russen angeschlossen, die Frau hat sich dagegen vielerlei Altes bewahrt, so die Fußlappen und Bastschuhe, in der Stickerei ihrer Hemden aber auch slavischen Brauch übernommen. Von den Tataren stammt der lange farbige Rock mit Pelz, der Silberschmuck, der kegel- oder kommförmige hohe Hut aus Birkenrinde, der mit Fell oder Stoff überzogen mit Korallen, Glasperlen, Geldstücken, Muscheln verziert ist und hinten ein über Nacken und Rücken weiterunterhängendes handbreites ebenso verziertes Band angenäht trägt; von den Tataren die verzierten Stirnbinden. Mädchen tragen das in 10—20 Zöpfe geflochtene Haar frei, Frauen verdeckt, die Flechten verlängern sie durch schwarze Schafwolle, durch Bänder und verzierte Quasten. Die Brustkrone des Bildes 11 besteht aus einem Messingdrahtring, der mit Silbermünzen, Muscheln und Perlen verziert ist; über den Ohren hängt ein Büschel von Gänsefedern, zwei Bänder mit Geldstücken reichen bis zur Mitte des Oberschenkels. Die Kleidung besteht aus einem Leinenmantel über einem wollenen Kleide. Das Mädchen des Bildes 13 trägt auf dem Kopf nur ein über der Stirn geknotetes buntes Tuch; das Hemd, das zugleich als Rock dient, hängt mit weiter sackartiger Falte, die als Tasche dient, über den Gürtel, in den neumodische bunte Schürzen gesteckt sind. Hemden und Überröcke sind namentlich bei den Mordwininnen reich gestickt, die ihre Ehre darein setzen, neue Ornamente zu erfinden. So suchen sie, nach Heikel, „im Frühjahr in dem vom Hochwasser dunkel und spröde gewordenen Eise, auf welchem die Flut in phantastischen Linien ihr Spiel treibt, nach Mustern". Auf dem Jahrmarkt besonders gern, und auch sonst tauschen die Frauen ihre Muster aus. Die Festtracht der Frau auf Bild 14 zeichnet sich durch eine hohe gestickte Haube und eine weite Brustspange aus Messing, Perlen, Schellen, Spielmarken, Knöpfen, Muschelschalen aus. Ähnlich ist die auf Bild 5.

Literatur u. a.

Heikel, „Trachten u. Muster der Mordwinen", Helsingfors 1899.

1: Karutz

El Europe

Die Suomifinnen

1. Kamelhelm. 2. Bedeckte. 3. Speicher. 4. Rauchlagerung. 5. Speicher. 6. Inneres einer Bedeckte. 7. Netzschwimmer aus Birkenrinde. 8. Erdhütte. 9. Ofen. 10. Netzsucher aus Stein und Birkenrinde. 11. Tisch und Bank. 12. Gebet aus Knochen. 13. Dudelsackmuck in Form eines Vogels. 14. Gestickte Stiefel. 15. Holzkamm. 16. Holzspatel. 17. Schabeisen aus Birkenrinde. 18. Handpflug. 19. Schlitten oder Schlitte aus einer Stelle, die oben zu einer Stelle abgeschnitten ist, zum Beförderen [illegible] 20. Einsaitiges Musikinstrument (Kantele).

Nr. 7, 10, 12, 13, 14, 18 im Ethnographischen Museum zu Dresden. Nr. 15, 16, im Museum für Völkerkunde zu Hamburg. Nr. 17, 20 im Museum für Völkerkunde zu Lübeck.

Zwischen den östlichen Buchten der Ostsee und dem nördlichen Eismeer wohnen im Lande Suomi oder Suomi-Maa d. i. Sumpfland, Sumbland, das sie seit 1918 zu einem fast 400000 qkm großen eigenen Staatswesen abgrenzen konnten, die Westfinnen. Östlich bildeten sie sich aus dem Grundstock der uralaltaischen, frühmongolischen Bevölkerung des Nordens, aus oster zuwandernden Finnen der Wolgagebiete der Wolga, aus weiterher kommenden Finnen, die zwischen Ural und Altai sich aus Europäisten und Turkistanen gemischt hatten, aus Skandinaviern, die jahrhundertelang von Westen und Süden ins Land kamen. Sie sind kraftsprühend, meist breitgesichtig, fahlblond, grau- oder blauäugig. Aus ihrer eigenen urtümlichen Lebensweise einer Sammler-, Jäger- und Fischerwirtschaft und einem einfachen Ackerbau hat sie Schweden kulturell herangehoben, dem Christentum in der Form der evangelisch-lutherischen Kirche und der neueren, westeuropäischen Zivilisation zugeführt. Die empfohlenen Wälder, die zahlreichen Seen der finnischen Urgesteinsplatte, die Steppen mit Zwerggewächsen, die nördlich angrenzenden Tundren beeinflussen Größe und Verteilung der Bevölkerung, die Verschiebung nach Süden, die Ausdehnungsmöglichkeit der Wirtschaft; sie haben andererseits vermocht, die geistigen und seelischen Kräfte zusammenzuhalten und für eine Eigenentwicklung bereitzustellen. Im Wohnungswesen, in Lebensformen, in Weltvorstellungen hat sich vielerlei altes Menschheitsgut aufbewahrt und erinnert an die Zeiten, die Tacitus und Ptolemäus meinen, wenn sie von den östlichen Nachbarn der Germanen südlich der Ostsee berichten, von dem Jägervolk in Fellkleidung, mit Knochenpfeilspitzen. Von den Germanen stammt auch das Wort Fenn oder Finne, d. i. Torfmoor, während die Finnen selbst sich entsprechend Suomalaiset, d. i. Sumpfbewohner, nennen. Sie wohnten einst in Erdgruben — Reste davon kommen noch vor, weil sie zum Klima passen, s. Bild 8 — und Kegelzelten aus Stangen und Rinden — bzw. Fellzelte — Spuren davon sieht man in Bedeckten, die zu den Küchen angebaut sind, s. Bild 2 —, dann in Einstubenhäusern, die sich durch Anbauten weiterer Stuben weiter entwickelten. Zuerst waren es Rauchstuben mit offenem Herd ohne Abzug, der Rauch ging zur Tür hinaus, dann machte man eine einfache Öffnung in der Wand oder im Dach, dann setzte man einen empfohlenen Rauchfang oder einen Bretterkasten als Rauchfang ein; jetzt erst baut man Schornsteine. Die Bedeckte ist die weiter lebende Urform, die mit einem Herd aus Feldsteinen, der erhitzt und mit Wasser begossen wird. Um den nach oben steigenden Dampf gut auszunutzen, ist ein Gerüst gebaut, zu dem eine gedrehte Balkentreppe führt, und auf dem sich der Bedeckte legt (Bild 9). In den Wohnräumen besteht die Einrichtung aus Wandbänken, verschiedenen Bänken, Tischen, Wand- und Eckbetten, dem Herd mit den bäuerlichen Kesselhaken, Körben für Werkzeug, Stricke und Nähzeug, Löffel u. dgl. Jeden Gehöft hat gewanderte Speicher, die im Sommer zugleich als Schlafräume dienen. Türen und Fenster wurden früher aus den fertigen Hausteilen herausgeschnitten. Das Gerät ist, wie in einem Waldlande natürlich, vorherrschend aus Holz und zumal aus Birkenrinde, die zu allem taugt, zu Schalen und Flaschen, Stiefeln und Taschen, Schaufeln und Körben, Trichtern und Bällen, Tauwerk und Hausgeräten, Netzschwimmern und -senkern, Fackeln und Schuhen, zu allerlei Brot sogar, wie die Birkenblätter Tee und der Baumsaft Wein liefert. Aus Holz sind Hammer, Spaten, Pflug, Löffel und sonstiges Gerät, aus Knochen Gebeck, Löffel, Messergriffe. Die Kleidung hat mit der schwedischen gleiche Entwicklung und zeichnet sich durch eine Vorliebe für bunt bemalte, gewebte und gestickte Jacken und Schürzen aus. Silberschmuck ist altertümlich, wie die Finnen immer als gute Schmiede gelten. Fähigkeit und Liebe zum Gesang zeichnet von je die Finnen aus, die im Kalewala uns ein Volksepos aufbewahrt haben, das nicht nur dichterischen Wert, sondern auch ganz große Bedeutung für die Erkenntnis der altsteinzeitlichen Menschheit und ihrer geistigen Verfassung besitzt. Die Musik und die Wortsprache genießen eine Stellung, wie nur in altem Griechenland und wie in China: als Erfinder der Kantele, des bis 13 Saiten haltenden Nationalinstruments, galt Wäinämöinen, bald Feuer- und Donnergott, bald der erste Mensch und Kulturbringer; seine Harfe war aus Birkenholz; die Pflöcke aus dem Gold, das aus dem Schnabel eines Kuckuck fließt, der auf den Zweigen einer Eichbaumes sitzt; die Saiten aus dem Haar einer Jungfrau, die auf ihren Liebsten wartet! Mit dem Wort und Sang hing die Magie zusammen, in der von jeher die Finnen berühmt waren. Die „Finnenkunst", im Mittelalter überall anerkannt, war zum Teil schwarze Magie, die mit Kirchgebeten, Schlangenhäuptern, Steinen, Knochen und ähnlichem den Willen der Menschen zwang und unbeteiten Zwecken dienstbar machte, — ein letzter Rest sind die „Inatra-Steine" aus dem bekannten Wasserfall — zum Teil weiße Magie, die durch den Geist selbst wirkte, der in Worte und durch das Wort im Menschen sich offenbart; man trug mit rhythmischen Gesten Lieder und Sprüche vor, in denen sich die Weltschöpfung selbst aussprach. Diese weiße Magie kam aus Mysterienschulen, die auf eine Zeit noch älterer, einst wunderbar, nun erblaßender, in Sonne und Feuer das göttliche Licht verehrender Gestirnreligion folgten, und traf auf eine Bevölkerung, die von je — und bis heute noch — empfänglicher veranlagt, zu Traumerlebnissen und hellseherischen Schauungen der übersinnlichen Welt leichter kommt als der Mitteleuropäer und den Norwegern, Schweden, Lappen darin überlegen. Die Reste einer Schamanentums, die sich noch finden, gehen auf jene schwarzmagischen Vorsysteriensuiten zurück, die Reste einer alten Sonnen- und Lichtreligion auf eben jene Mysterien. Sehr wichtig für die eurasiatischen Menschheits- und Kulturzusammenhänge ist die Stellung des altfinnischen Menschen zum Bären, die bis zu den Aino auf Jesso den grauen Norden Asiens hindurch die gleiche ist (vergl. Band I dieses Atlas): „der Stolz des Dickichts", „das Waldes Apfel", „der alte Mann" wie er in der Kalewala genannt wird, wurde wie dort um Hilfe und Freundschaft gebeten, weil er ein Sohn zu ihrer Heimat, zur Heimat und Sonne des gemeinsamen Bärengeschlechts zurückkehrt: „die teuren, überwundenen, schwer verwundeten Waldtier, bringe unseren Hütten Gesundheit und Ruh wie du ihn liebst, hundertweise usw.". Es wurden beim Bärenfeste, wenn die erlegten Tiere in Bärenen aufgehängt waren, ein Bursche und ein Mädchen in vollem Hochzeitsschmuck zum Bräutigam gemacht; es wurde die Generationsfolge der Menschheitsgeschichte, wurde Vergangenheit und Zukunft zum Erlebnis gebracht, eine mystische, nur noch in abgeblaßten Erinnerungen lebende Feier alter esoterischer Mysterienriten.

Literatur u. a.

Kalewala; Retzius, „Finnland"; Castrén, „Finnische Mythologie"; Heikel, „Die Gebäude der Tschuwassen usw."; Meitzen, „Siedelung und Agrarwesen".


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Die Lappen

I.

1. Zeltlager. 2/4. Erdhäuser aus dem norwegischen Finnmarken. 3. Lappin. 5. Tragkonstruktion einer Erdhütte. 6. Halbdartige Stangenzelt mit einem Teil der Tuchen. 7. Alter Packsattel für Renntiere aus Brettern, die seitlich angebunden werden, und Körben aus Birkenzweigen mit Riede. 8. Gerätelt einer alten Zeltes mit Feuerplatz und Schlafstellen-Einteilung. 9. Speicher. 10. Schneeschuh. 11. Melkgefäß aus Birkenrinnen. 12. Schlitten. 13. Fischel aus Birkenrinde. 14. Korb.
Nr. 12 und 13 im Museum für Völkerkunde zu Lübeck, Nr. 10 im Museum für Völkerkunde zu Hamburg, Nr. 11 im Ethnographischen Museum zu Dresden.

Die Bewohner des äußersten Nordens Europas, die wir ihrem geographischen Lebensraume nach unter die Polarvölker, die Arktischen, das sind die Völker des Bären, rechnen, nennen sich selbst sames oder saame, übersetzungsweise mit sumi — Finnland und sameme — Estland, und werden noch im 12. Jahrhundert von den Schweden Skrittfinnen, Lappfinnen oder Finnen, die auf hölzernen Schuhen springen (Ski), genannt, sind also ursprünglich ebenfalls Finnen. Freiwillig oder unfreiwillig wichen Teile von ihnen um die erste Jahrtausendwende nordwärts aus und bekamen von den Zurückbleibenden deshalb den Namen Lappen, das sind die Verjagten, die im Elend Lebenden. Sie bekleiden ihr Nomadentum bei und wanderten in den Randstrichen des Eismeeres von der Nordsee bis zum Weißen Meer über die wüstige, sumpfige, moorbrüchige Berg- und Tundrenland. Rauhes Klima, kurzes Leben und Mischung mit rother kommenden, kurz, im Osten angetroffenen Samojeden und mongolen- und tatarischen Rassenstellen verdunkelten den Typ, während die südlichen Finnen durch germanische Verbindungen den Reigen unverändert. Das erhärtet von beiden Seiten her die heutige Verschiedenheit der ehemaligen einheitlichen Stammes. Kleiner Wuchs, dunkle Hautfarbe, flaches, breites Gesicht, platte Nase, dunkles, hartes Haar, helle Augen, die oft rot und geschwollen infolge von Schneeblende, Wind, Herdrauch sind, zeichnen sie körperlich aus; seelisch ist immer eine merkwürdige Reinheit, zumal der Frauen bemerkt worden, die bei geringstem Erscheinen abenteuerlich oder ungehobelt tabuartig ausgeprägt werden können. Die Lebensweise hängt ganz von dem Wechsel zwischen dem 2—3 Monate dauernden, hellen Polarsommer und dem 3 Monate währenden, dunklen Polarwinter ab, dem nur Mond-, Schnee- und Sternenleuchten etwas Dämmerung in die Dunkelheit bringt; von dem Wasserreichtum der Täler und ihrer Gewässer; von der Unzugänglichkeit durch Sümpfe im Sommer und der festen Schneedecke im Winter, vom Waldbestand der Berge und Fischreichtum der See. Man spricht deshalb von Berg- oder Renntierlappen, Wald- oder Jägerlappen, See- oder Fischerlappen. Die Berglappen wandern mit ihren zum Teil großen, bis 1000 Tiere umfassenden Renntierherden im Herbste gegen die Berge, im Frühjahr der Küste zu, die Seelappen sind Halbnomaden, ziehen während des Sommers dem Fischfang nach und suchen sich für den Winter einen gute Weide mit Gras für die Renntiere, mit Baumbestand für Brennholz, die Jäger, bei denen das Gewehr Bogen und Pfeil sowie die einst aus Norwegen eingeführte Armbrust verdrängt hat, aber noch der Spieß für den Bären, die Kreuz für Wölfe und wilde Renntiere gilt, die sie auf Schneeschuhen jagen, und deshalb Fallen, Schlingen, Gruben in Gebrauch sind, wechseln ebenso zwischen den Bergen und Wäldern im Winter, der Steppe im Sommer. Die Nahrung der Berglappen ist daher Renntierfleisch, -blut, -milch, -Käse, -Mark, der Waldlappen Wild, Geflügel, Fische (auch getrocknet und zu Mehl gemahlen). Pflanzenstengel, Sauerampfer, Beeren, Fichtenharz, Flechten, gekochte Fichten- und Birkenrinde als Brot, das auf heißen Steinen gebacken wird, gekochte Fichtenrinde als süßes Gewürz. Das Kochen ist von sicherer Mäßigkeit. Daneben Korbflechten aus Wurzeln, Holz- und Knochenbearbeiten, Tiergiaßen in Formen aus Knochen, und vor allem die Renntierzucht, die von den Samojeden gekommen ist. Die Frauen spinnen mit der Hand; stricken die Netze, drehen Fäden aus gespaltenen Sehnen, nähen, stricken, färben, trocknen Fische und Fleisch, melken, wobei die Tiere mittels eines Lasses aus der Herde gehalt werden, käsen, gerben die Felle. Renntier, Schneeschuh, Schlitten sind die Beförderungsmittel, letzterer hat die Form eines aufwärts gebogenen Bootes aus Brettern, die mit gedrehten Fäden aus Renntierschnen zusammengebunden sind, und ist durch ein angenähtes Fell hellbraunbraucht. Die nomadische Unruhe verlangt ein bewegliches Haus, das Stangenzelt, das bei den Berglappen mit Birkenrinde und Fellen, für den Waldlappen mit Zweigen, Rasen und Riede gedeckt wird und den Rauch oben an der Spitze abziehen läßt. Für längeren Aufenthalt hebt man Erdgruben aus, überdeckt sie mit einer bogenförmigen Tragkonstruktion und legt Birkenrinde, Rasen, Erde, heute meist Segeltuchen und Tuch, darauf. Die Einrichtung besteht aus zwei Reihen Feldsteinen als Herd, der Herd, Ofen, Lampe zugleich ist, Kesselhaken darüber, Birkenrinnen mit Renntierhäuten als Bett, allerlei Wirtschaftsgerät und Werkzeug aus Holz, Knochen, Horn. Für Vorräte baut man zum Schutz gegen Nässe und Tiere Speicher von Pfahlbauchcharakter, Bild 9 zeigt einen tonnenähnlichgestalteten Kasten auf einem gekappten Renntierum (nach Scheffer). Der Gerätelt des Bildes 8, ebenfalls nach Scheffer, zeigt in H den Herd, in J die Haupttür, in A die Nebentür, durch die nur der Mann Zutritt hat, in B und C den Platz der Männer und ihrer Jagdgeräte, in F und G den Platz der Frauen, in D die Schlafstelle von Mann und Frau, in E diejenige der Knechte.

Literaturnachweis

Scheffer, „Lappmarkt"; Georgi, „Beschreibung aller Nationen des Russischen Reiches"; Hogstrém, „Beschreibung der der Krone Schweden gehörenden Lappmarken"; Cronzer, „Symbolik und Mythologie der alten Völker", Bd. 3; Castrén, „Vorlesungen über die finnische Mythologie"; Crahmer, „Ethnographische Arbeiten in Lappland", Zeitschr. f. Ethnologie, Bd. 45 u. 46; Derselbe, „Über Lappen und Samojeden"; ebenda Bd. 44. „Das Buch des Lappen Turi"; Schöyen, „Skandinavische Berichte aus Lappland"; Meitzen, „Siedlung und Agrarwesen", Band 2; v. d. Hevek, „Über die Lappen" in Zeitschr. für Ethnologie, Bd. 8, S. 47; Weinitz, „Die lappische Zaubertrommel in Mitteilungen", in Zeitschrift f. Ethnologie, Jahrg. 1910, 1.

1: Karuts

El Europe

Die Lappen

II.

1. Frau mit Kind in Wiege. 2.—9. Trachten und Typen. 10. Lappe des 18. Jahrhunderts, Zinnkette umschlingend, der als Verzierung für Gürtel und Taschen (s. Nr. 14 und 16) dient. 11. Messer aus Rentierhorn zum Lösen der Rinde von Baumstämmen bei der Rindenschälwirtschaft. 12. Knochen als Schlitten für Nähzeug. 13. Fellbeutel. 14. Tasche. 15. Fingerhut. 16. Pfeifenbesteck.

Nr. 11, 12, 15 im Ethnographischen Museum zu Dresden. Nr. 13 im Museum für Völkerkunde zu Hamburg.

Die Hauptteile der Kleidung ist vom Garben der Felle und Drehen der Nähfäden aus gespaltenen Sehnen, die zuvor mit Fischfett erweicht sind, bis zum Anfertigen der Verzierungen Frauenarbeit. Nur das Zinn wird von Männern gegossen, dann wird es von den Frauen zu Draht ausgezogen, und zwar durch ein mehrfach und in verschiedener Lochweite durchbohrtes Stück Horn; um den runden Draht plattzuhämmern, so daß er als Litze aufgenäht werden kann, steckt man in die Löcher ein Knöchelchen und zieht den Draht nochmals durch (s. Bild 10). Die Kleidung selbst besteht aus knielangem Rock von Rentierfell mit lederum, zinn- und silberblechverziertem Gürtel, an welchem die mit Zinn beschlagene Messerscheide, der Beutel für Feuerstahl, der Beutel für die Kaucheinrichtung hängen; im Winter aber zwei Pelze, die nach dem Doppelfensterprinzip eine wärmende Luftschicht zwischen sich lassen, und der innere mit dem Haar zur Haut, der äußere mit dem Haar nach außen gerichtet ist; an Hosen von Rentierfell, mit dem Haar nach innen, hohen Stiefeln, Handschuhen, Mantel aus gegerbtem Rentierfell, Pelzmütze. Heute ist der weiße Rock häufiger, zumal im Sommer. Auf der Brust trug man früher allgemein einen Beutel für den Eßlöffel. Den Kopf schützt eine Mütze aus Vogelbalg, Rentierfell, Pelz, Wolle oder Tuch; Mützen aber-tümlicher, spitzer Form sieht man heute noch bei Festlichen Gelegenheiten hervorholen. Die Zahl aufgenähter Zinnknöpfe zeigte früher die Zahl der erlegten Bären an. Finger und Ohren tragen Silberringe. In die Stiefel und Handschuhe stopft man im Winter Heu, die leichteren Schuhe sind an der Spitze aufwärts gebogen. Die über gute Nordsteine verbreiteten Halbwirbel aus Eichhörnchenfellen kommen neuerdings vor. Die Schneeschuhe tragen nicht den Fellbelag der Unterseite wie in Asien. Die Kinder trägt man auf der Wanderschaft oder hängt sie im Zelte in bootförmigen Wiegen auf, die aus Birkenrinde oder aus einem ausgehöhlten Stück Fichtenstamm gefertigt, mit gegerbtem Rentierfell überzogen, mit einem Halbverdeck aus Birkenrinde versehen, mit Moos, mit dem Fell eines Rentierkalbes, einer Hasen oder einer Polarfuchsmaus ausgelegt und gern mit Silberstückchen behängt werden, damit nicht die alten, „die Menschen unter der Erde" das Kind vertauschen oder schädigen.

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Die Lappen

III.

1/2. Alte Gräber. 3. Schamanen-Ekstase durch Schlagen der Zaubertrommel. 4—9. Zaubertrommeln. 10. Hammer und Ringe zu ihnen. 11.—13. Löffel aus Horn. 14. Löffel aus Menschenschädelknochen. 15/16. Knochenmesser. 17. Knochenmesser in Lederscheide. 18. Alter Opferplatz. 19/20. Kinderamen. 21. Webegewichte. 22/24. Holzdosen. 23. Rennschaufel. 25. Holzgefäße. 26. Flötenadel 27/29. Schaber. 28. Heber zum Abfüllen der Rinde.

Nr. 11, 12, 15, 16, 23 im Museum für Völkerkunde zu Lübeck. Nr 17 im Ethnographischen Museum zu Basel. Nr. 19, 26—29 im Museum für Völkerkunde zu Hamburg. Nr. 14 im Ethnographischen Museum zu Dresden. Nr. 20 im Museum für Völkerkunde zu Leipzig. Nr. 21, 22, 24, 25 im Museum für Völkerkunde (Linden-Museum) zu Stuttgart.

In alten Zeiten legten die Lappen ihre Toten in natürlichen Höhlen nieder oder machten solche künstlich, indem sie große Steine giebelartig gegeneinander lehnten oder Steinhaufen aufschichteten oder die Leiche in Gruben legten und darüber Birkenrinde, Rasen und Steine häuften. Oft begrub man den Toten mit seinem Schlitten, oder man stellte diesen umgekippt, stellte Schneeschuhe, Gerät und Jagdzeug auf das Grab. Fleisch, Milch, mögliche Speisen legte man als Opfergabe dazu. Weiß war die Trauerfarbe; das Rentier, das den Schlitten mit der Leiche zog, mußte weiß sein oder seine Hörner wurden mit weißem Zeug umwickelt. Der Tote wurde nicht durch die Tür des Zeltes, sondern seitlich unter dem Zelttuch hinausgetragen, weil „Tote und Lebende nicht auf gleicher Spur gehen sollen". Die Unsterblichkeit der Seele wußten sie so gut wie das Leben und Wirken geistiger Wesen überall in der Natur; ihnen opferte man. Aus diesem Wissen ergab sich die Magie, hier so weit, daß Herodot erzählt, die Skythen haben die Zauberei von den Hyperboreern bekommen, d. h. aus dem Norden, und so klar, daß den Missionaren erwidert wurde, die eigenen Verfahren wären auch so klug gewesen, zu wissen, wem sie Göttern zu opfern sei. Sie war so bekannt und gefürchtet wie die „Finnenkunst" und bedrohte sich dem Christentum zum Trotz bis ins 18. Jahrhundert der sog. Zaubertrommeln, je ihre psychische Grundlage besteht heute noch. Die immer erwähnte Reinheitsbeit der Lappen, ihre Neigung zu Ohnmachten und Erregungszuständen bewirkt die Veranlagung zu besonderen Bewußtseinslagen, in denen der Mensch hellsehend den geistigen Welten näherrückt. Sie ist noch heute weit verbreitet und hat einmal durch äußeren Anreiz zu christlicher Sektenbildung geführt, in der bezeichnenderweise die Führer als die wahren Christen, die Prediger der Landeskirche als die „Nagaiden", die Schamanen, Zauberer, Spiritisten angesehen wurden. So stark lebte in ihnen ein rein geistiger Trieb. Das magische Wissen zeigte sich weiter in vielerlei Opfergebräuchen, medizinischen Vorschriften, Schutzformeln: Steine, mit Blut bestrichen, Pfeile aus Blei in die Luft geschossen, Messer, mit denen Menschen erstochen waren, wirkten auf weite Entfernungen. Vögel wurden gespart, damit neue Vögel kamen, Bärenknochen durften nicht zerbrochen werden, weil sie neue Bären hervorbringen sollten. Hier klingt die uralte Beziehung an, in der sich in ganz Nordasien der Mensch zum Bären weiß (vgl. Band I dieses Atlas), auch bei den Lappen hieß er der „Alte", hatte er ein „Gewissen", galt er für ritterlich, weil er keine Frauen angriff. War er getötet, so sang man Dankeslieder an ihn, daß er einmal verletzt habe, man begrub seinen Schädel und Knochen mit Beigaben wie einen Menschen. Die Träger des geistigen Wissens und magischen Könnens waren die „Nagaiden", Menschen, welche jene allgemeine „Reinheitsbeit" in erhöhtem Maße besaßen und ihre Fähigkeiten hellsehender Schau in traditioneller Übung, in ererbter Fortsetzung eines ehemaligen Mysteriumwesens ausgebildet hatten. Sie kannten Vergangenes, Abwesendes, Zukünftiges schauen, Krankheiten heilen, Träume deuten, in Steinen lesen, aus deren Konstellation zum Monde das Geschlecht erwarteter Kinder bestimmen. Sie versetzten sich durch rhythmisches Singen, Tanzen, Trommelschlagen in einen Erregungs- und dämmerzustand, während dessen ihr Körper nicht berührt werden durfte, ihre geistige Persönlichkeit sich spaltete und in die geistige Welt eintrat, von ihr Weisungen erhielt. Eine lappländische Besonderheit war die Form der Trommel und ihrer Verwendung: das mit Holzpflöcken oder Fäden aus Rentiersehnen in einem Holzrahmen gespannte Fell war mit violetten Menschen-, Tier-, Stern- und anderen Figuren und Zeichen in roter Farbe (aus gekochter Erlenrinde) bemalt und wurde mit einem Hammer aus Rentierhorn so angeschlagen, daß ein hoher Metallring auf ihr über die Figuren glitt; er zeigte an, was der Nagaide zu wissen begehrte, Ursache und Heilmittel von Krankheiten, Namen der Geister, denen zu opfern war u. a. Sie konnte auch selbst krankmachende Kräfte aussenden. Einst hatten die Lappen Götterbilder wie die Finnen, so heute mit einer Kreuz mit zwölf Steinen (Tierkreis). Meist aber waren, was sonst von „Göttern" berichtet wird, zum Teil ausgestopfte Medizinen und Träger reiner Geisterkräfte, wie die unbelebten, legendenhafte seltsamen gefundenen Bauwerkchen, die jahrelang verscharrt wurden, zum Teil Denkmale, Merkzeichen für das ausbrechende Erleben der geistigen Mächte, wie die sog. Seidas, angebetete Steine, vor denen Rentiergeweihe niedergelegt wurden und die ihre Macht verloren, wenn man aufhörte, vor ihnen zu opfern. Dabei standen Rentiergeweihe mit der Inschrift: „Rebstab des Seidas", ein Beweis, daß die Wegweisung des menschlichen Geistes waren, der zum Weltengeiste wollte.

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Die Esten

I.

1. Estnische Schenke mit Treppe aus eingehauenen Balken. 2. Kirche in Jurtsafern bei Reval. 3. Haus mit überdachtem Vorplatz. 4. Gehöft mit Stangenzaun. 5. Windmühle. 6. Kornhütte aus einem ausgehöhlten Baumstamm, ostbaltisches Dorf Mecha. 7. Gehöftumfriedigung aus Feldsteinen. 8. Klapperbrett (Mittag- usw. Glocke). 9. Ziehbrunnen. 10. Backofen. 11. Alter Fenster (Holzschieber), darin Wärmekrüge, darunter Hohlziegel zum Kartoffelkochen. 12. Herd mit Kesselhaken. 13. Wohnhaus mit Tenne und Kammer unter gleichem Dache mit der Stube (Rauchhütte). 14. Lattenzaun mit Überstieg. 15. Bank mit geschnitzten Träger.

Dieselbe anthropologische, frühvorslavische Rasse, wie in Suomi-Finnland, und wie sie in örtlichen Unterschiedlichkeiten vom Atlantik zum Pontik einst wanderte, war südlich des östlichen Ostseebeckens und des finnischen Meerbusens seßhaft geworden. Wie in Suomi-Finnland erhielt sie auch hier vom 17. Jahrhundert ab ostfinnischen, weißfinnischen Einschlag, doch in viel schwächerem Grade, andererseits viel stärkeren nordgermanischen Zustrom. Es entstandig die Esten, so von den Nachbarn als die Ostleute benannt, in den ältesten russischen Annalen wie alle Finnen Tschudsen genannt, die sich selbst früher nur nannten d. i. Mann des Landes und ihr Volk maarahwas d. i. Volk des Landes nannten, heute gern von sõme (von sum, dunkel, naß), im Anklang an Suomi-Finnland, als von ihrer Heimat sprechen. Ihr Gebiet reicht von Reval bis Narva, von Walk bis zum Peipussee, wenn Esthen im wüchsischen Kreise kommen, „Jungen Land mit magaven Ackerflächen" (Kalewipoeg), sumpf- und wahlreich. Wegen der ugro-finnischen Sprache, die übrigens über 30% germanische Worte enthält, immer noch den „Mongoloiden" zugerechnet, haben sie weder anthropologisch noch ethnographisch etwas mit diesen zu tun, sie sind vielmehr durchaus Europäer; sie sind blond, blauäugig, hochgewachsen und kräftig gebaut. Selten begegnen dunkle Typen. Einst von der Art des Landes auf Sumpfe, Jagen und Fischen gewiesen, wurden sie unter spätern Einflüssen von Litauen und von der Ostsee her Viehzüchter und Ackerbauer. In allen Wirtschaftszweigen hat sich das benutzte Gerät und Werkzeug altertümliche Formen bewahrt und hat das Material der Heimatt bis in unsere Tage weitgehend beibehalten. Man flicht mit einerem Haken und roter wollenwirkender Schleppengel; man pflügt mit dem gabelförmigen Handpflug, der Zacke; man dreht Stricke mit rohen Aufgabeln, wie im keltischen Westen und im nordgermanischen Schwedens; man webt mit blinken Handwebgeräten und mit Brettchen — neben dem Trittwebstuhl —; man zupft, reinigte bis vor kurzem die Wolle mit einem Fachbogen, der genau die Form des Baumwollreinigers hat, wie er von Ägypten bis China in Gebrauch ist, und der sich in Mitteleuropa in der Heimarbeiterwerkstätte, neuerdingsweise nur in diesem Handwerk erhalten hat. Die alte Kegelschiffform erhält sich in einzelstehenden oder mit der Badestube verbundenen Küchen der Bauernhäfe als kreisrunder Unterbau aus Feldsteinen und Stangendach. Die heutigen rechteckigen Häuser, ähnlich den lettischen und litauischen Blockbauten und, wie sie, auf die Erde oder auf Steinsockel gesetzt, haben niedrige Wände, ein schweres hohes Giebeldach, mit Dachreitern und Windbretteren, eingeschnittenen Fenstern mit Glasscheiben, die bis auf Einzelvorkommnisse an die Stelle von Schiebeläden (Bild 11) getreten sind. Das Haus teilt sich in Stube, Tenne und Kammer; in der ersteren, die meist ungedielt ist, steht der offene Herd mit dem Kesselhaken darüber. Auf dem Fensterbrett oder einem Eckbord steht ein Kienspanträger, wenn er nicht, ohne Fuß, einfach zwischen zwei Balken der Hauswand eingesteckt ist; von der Decke hängt die Wiege „Linde hatte unter Linden oft geschaukelt die Kinderwiege" (Kalewipoeg); zum Hausrat gehören noch die Eierkanne, die zu nordische Formen sich anschließen. Der Esto siedelt meist in Einzelgehöften, die von Zäunen aus schräggestellten Stangen eingehegt sind; die Pferde bewegen sich in gedrehten Weidehändern. Eine Reihe von Gebäuden stehe hier zusammen: Scheune; Riege oder Darre zum Getreidetrocknen — weil die Herbstregen sonst viel verderben würden —, die im Winter zugleich Wohnstube und Küche ist; Sommerküche; Badestube — gebaut wird wie in Litauen in heißem Dampf, der von erhitzten und dann mit Wasser begossenen Steinen entsteigt; man legt auf der Schwitzbank und läßt sich durch Schlagen mit einem Bündel zarter Birkenblätterzweige, das in kühles Wasser getaucht wird.

1: Karuta

El Europe

Die Esten

II.

1. Frau von der Insel Runö — hier als Brücke zum Morden aufgeführt. 2.—7. Kopfbedeckungen und Hauptsuchen von Frauen. 8./9. Zierplatten (silb. Patenmünzen) aus Silber. 10. Tracht auf der Insel Moon. 11.—13. Silberschmuck, meist große Brustschilde. 14. Stickdrehen. 15.—23. Muster von gewebten Gürteln (rot). 24. Fußbinden (Wickelgarn). 25. Stück eines Rennschlenders. 26. Sattelnähende Tracht, Rock mit Ärmelstreifen, Bluse mit gewebtem Einsatz, Kopftuch. 27. Tracht von Moon. 28. Frauenüberrock aus weißer Wolle. 29. Bluse mit Einsatz. 30. Gürtel von Dagö aus Leder und gegossenem Messing.

Nr. 7, 8, 9, 14, 15–23, 25, 26, 28, 30 im Museum für Völkerkunde zu Lübeck.

Die urtümliche Kleidung der Esten mag, wie sonst im Erdteil der Birke, aus Rindenbast und daneben aus Fell und Pelz bestanden haben. Pflanzenfasern aller Art konnte man dann zu Fäden drehen, flechten, spinnen und weben, Wolle von Schafen konnte man zu Filzen walken, sie und daneben Kuh- und Roßhaar spinnen und verweben. In der alten literarischen Quelle des Kalewipeeg wird von weißen, gepunkelten Röcken, gefärbten Kleidern, bunbestreiften Kopftüchern, farbigen Hüftbändern, farbigen Gürteln gesprochen, es hat also immer eine starke Färbefreudigkeit bestanden. Auch heute ist sie noch, freilich nur in Resten, vorhanden, die Hemden der Frauen sind durch eingewebte Muster, die Strümpfe durch eingestrickte verziert, und die schmalen, auf dem Handwebstuhl und mit dem Webschwertchen gefertigten Gürtel für beide Geschlechter sind farbig gemustert. Beides verschwindet heute, und damit der letzte Rest volkstümlicher Tracht. Bei den Gürteln liegen die Muster in der Kette und zeigen rhombische Felder, Hakenwellen, Swastika, Sternfiguren, sie erinnern zugleich an vorderasiatische Teppiche und gehen sicherlich auf sie zurück; die Muster, nicht die Gürtel selbst, die für die einheimischen langen Röcke immer üblich waren. Weiße Röcke, von denen der Kalewipeeg spricht, kommen noch heute als Frauen-Überröcke vor, mit roter und grüner Kante, vorn von rechts nach links übergeknöpft, im Rücken beiderseits leicht eingezogen, so daß sie von der Hüfte ab etwas auseinandergehen; sie ähneln stähnlichen Formen. Eigentümlich sind lange, bemaßfärbte Leinenröcke (Bild 26) mit bandartigem, durch Knöpfe — früher durch Silberspangen — verschlossenem Brustschlitz durch zwei an dem hinteren Rande der ärmellosen Ärmellöcher angenähte, schmale Streifen gleichen Stoffes, die fast bis zur Erde herunterhängen. Diese Streifen sind heute Zierstück — und nebenbei Putzsache, mit der die Frau Schafe und Kinder in Ordnung hält —, sie waren ursprünglich die Ärmel, die man herausschnitt, als die langen, gemusterten Hemdärmel Mode wurden und sichtbar bleiben sollten, und verkümmerten zu Streifen. Ein ähnliches Überflüssigwerden des Ärmels aus anderen Gründen freilich, zeigt der Stammtrachtl der türkischmischen Sartin (s. diesen Atlas, Band I, Seite 113, Bild 4), der von hinten über den Kopf gezogen und vor dem Gesicht zusammengenommen wird, um den Abschluß des kurzen Rollhaarschlitzes zu decken und zu vervollständigen; die Ärmel sind nach hinten gelegt und auf dem Rücken zusammengeheftet. Eingewebte Streifen sieht man wie bei den Hemden noch bei den Handtüchern, bei den Schwanztüchern des Heiligenschreines in der Ecke der alten Stuben Sattelnähens, den noch dem Peipus-See zu gelegenen estnischen Bezirken, und an Kopftüchern. Auf der Insel Dagö kommt noch eine Tracht aus lingegestreiftem, rot und blau gefärbtem, gewebtem Wollrock mit angenähten Mieder vor; Jäckchen aus weißem Leinen mit eingeplätteten Längsfältchen; Kopftuch aus roter Wolle, das mit den Haarflechten verschlungen dem Scheitel kronenartig sich anlegt und dann in zwei breiten Bändern zur Schulter herabfällt (Bild 7); Ledergürtel mit gegossenen Messingblechen und -knöpfen und einem hinteren Gehänge aus 14 Paar Messingketten, die in der Mitte in einem Ring gefaßt sind, mit Messerscheide aus graviertem Blei, mit Jahreszahl und Hausmarke, und Gehänchen aus Wolle (Bild 30). Nur auf der Insel Moon wird eine niedrige, bunte, runde, deckelartige Mütze auf dem kurz geschnittenen Haar getragen, dazu kurzer Rock und rote Strümpfe. Viel Fleiß verwendete man früher auf die Kopfbedeckungen, die bald turm-, bald kronenförmig, hoch oder flach, spitz oder rund, aus Pappe oder Kork und Wollstoff oder Leinen gefertigt waren. Die festländischen Estinnen haben zum Teil noch einen sehr reichen Silberschmuck aus Spangen, Ketten, Ringen, Behängen, Plättchen und zum Teil rieigen, gebuckelten Brustschilden. Platten mit einem Kreuz in der durchbrochenen Mitte hießen Peter, sie stammen aus der Zeit vor der Reformation; sonst hat man gern Münzen russischer/deutscher, schwedischer Prägung zu solchen Anhängern verwendet. Bild 9 zeigt eine Platte mit dem Wappen von Estland (drei Leoparden), mit Meisterzeichen und Silberstempel, wie sie in Riga seit 1542, in Reval seit 1547 gefordert wurden „mit der stadt tekeu und ein jeder mit einem eigenen teken", die Mitte schildförmig vorgetrieben, mit achtstrahligem Stern und mit einem Schnurbande eingefaßt.



Die Esten

III.

1./2. Typen. 3. Alte Männertracht. 4. Mützen der Töpferinnen. 5. Allerseelen. 6. Dudelsackbläser. 7. Verschiedener Dudelsackbläser. 8. Kannelhuhn aus einem gebogenen Astastück. 9. „Schwedische Harfe". 10. Korb. 11. Alter Opferplatz. 12. Hirtentrompete. 13. Tümsuhm, Trinkgefäß für die Feldarbeit. 14. Kammet mit Pferdekopfschnitzerei. 15. Wimpel vom Peipus-See. 16. Modell einer Lodje vom Peipus-See. 17. Dudelsackrose (Jahrrose). 18. Alte Harfe. 19./20. Bisträgo mit nordischen Motiven (Pferd, Sonne).

Nr. 6—10, 14—20 im Museum für Völkerkunde zu Lübeck.

Noch im Jahre 1918 wurde mir in Estland ein alter Opferplatz gezeigt (Bild 11), eine kleine künstliche Höhle mit Knochen. Wie in Litauen hat sich hier geistiges Gut aus der europäischen Frühzeit erhalten, für die uns das Nationalepos Kalewipoeg neben alten Chroniken der ersten deutschen Zeiten Anhaltspunkte gibt. Wie in Finnland, nur schwächer, übte man freilich schwarze Magie, und wer sie nicht beherrschte, ging zu den Meistern jenseits des Meeres und nach Lappland. Ein Lappe soll dem Kalewipoeg helfen „sich der Weisheit Pfad zu bahnen, Bis zum End der Welt zu wandern, Aufzusuchen der Welt Ende, Wo Altvaters Hände haben Himmelsränder fest geknüpfet, Fest gefüget an die Erde . . . ". Der Magie lag Wissen von den geistigen Mächten in allen Dingen der Welt, ihren dauernd und überall wirkenden Kräften, ihrer Verbindung mit dem Menschen zugrunde, wenn auch nur als Erinnerung. Das Geistige in dem Stoff und in dem menschlichen Körper wußten und nahmen sie, wenn sie emmnistische, magische Medizinen anwendeten, wenn sie, wie aus dem Jahre 1221 berichtet wird, einem dänischen Vogt lebendig sein Herz aus dem Leibe schnitten, es brieten und aßen, um desto tapferer, stärker gegen die Christen zu werden, ein Vorgang, der im gesamten Kannibalismusphänomen sich wiederholt und aus derselben geistigen Quelle gleichen Bewußtseins stammt. Unzählige Bräuche beruhen auf diesem Wissen vom inneren Zusammenhang zwischen Menschen und Kosmos in der geistigen Sphäre. Geht man in den Wind, so vergeht ein durch Zauberkraft magisch angewehtes Unglück. Das höhere Wissen und dadurch die höheren magischen Kräfte hatten Menschen, die sich zeitweilig von der körperlichen Hülle trennen, zum „kalbin" werden, als freier Geist in das Reich der Toten fahren, sich von dort übersinnliche Kenntnisse holen konnten; sie verwandelten, in das Wachbewußtsein zurückgekehrt, ihr neues Wissen, um Traumerscheinungen zu deuten, Krankheiten zu heilen oder zu machen, Jagd, Fischfang, Reise günstig oder ungünstig zu beeinflussen, die Natur bzw. die hinter der sichtbaren stehenden unsichtbaren Geister zu beherrschen. Am größten wußte man die Wirkung des Wortes. Mit dem Wort beherrschten die Magier Menschen, Dinge, Tiere und Geister; in festen, kurzen, dröhnenden Schritten schreiten die Silben der Sprüche sich wiederholend, allitterierend, assonierend. Mit dem Wort hängt der Gesang, hängt die Musik zusammen, die bei Esten und Finnen etwas unmittelbar Geistiges und Göttliches ist, wie nur etwa in China. Im Gesang erhob sich der Este zu den Göttern „das Lied ist nicht der Erd entstammt, Nicht der Erde, Nicht dem Holze, Volkslied ist vom Himmel kommen, Zwischen durch die heilgen Wolken, Oberhalb des krummen Randes" (Kalewipoeg). Die Harfe — sie ist aus einem Tannen- oder Lindenast und hat eine obere Ebene, eine untere abgesetzte Fläche — ist einst aus einer dem Grabe einer gemordeten Jungfrau entwachsenen Birke entstanden. Der Böse, heißt es, machte Dudelsack und Horn, der Sangesgott Wanemuine machte die Harfe und die Flöte aus einem Blatt. Wie lange sich das Wort hier seinen alten, mächtigen Sinn erhalten hat, geht daraus hervor, daß noch im Jahre 1810 die Estinnen auf Höhen, die „aus alter Zeit geerbte Stätten" hießen, an Festtagen wohl vierundzwanzig Stunden sangen. Der Zeit, in der solch Wissen allgemein lebendig oder noch in der Erinnerung war, folgten Zeiten, in denen es nur bei geistigen Führern lebte und von ihnen unter bildhaften Formen vermittelt wurde. Aus dieser Periode stammt, was von Iumala dem Himmelsgott, von Ukko „seine ererbte Feiertage, ist die neunte Ukkos-Feier" (Kalewipoeg), von Taara, dem alten Vater, dem zu den vier Sonnenaufwenden geopfert wurde, von Götterbildern, von den Schöpfungsmythen über die Entstehung der Welt aus dem Ei, von der Erde als einem lebenden Organismus, als der Mutter, von dem Sonnendienst, von den haljas, den Schutzgeistern der Menschen, überliefert wird.

Die Letten

I.

1. Bauernhütte. 2. Balkenbau mit Lehmdach. 3. Speicher. 4. Handmühle. 5./6. Bienenstöcke. 7. Laufstuhl. 8. Hängewiege. 9. Kinnenträger. 10. Bandhuchen. 11. Bandweben. 12. Flachsreinigen. 13. Kessekuhen. 14. Aufhängehaken. 15. Kinnenträger. 16. Bandwebewerkzeug. 17. Anker. 18. Birkenrindenschuhstiel (Sabgulbi). 19. Baumhütchen aus Birkenrinde. 20. Gitterwebewerkzeug. 21. Musikbogen (spille). 22. Dreisaitige Geige (dūda). 23. Schnapsgläser aus Herstellen von Gefäßen aus dem vollen Holz. 24. Leiter aus natürlichem Tannenbaum mit Ansätzen der Binnenbäume 25. Bienenstock in einem ausgehöhlten Waldbaum mit Türen zum Stattmachen des Honigs. 26. Johannisfest, man schmückt sich und das Haus mit Kränzen aus Eichenblättern. 27. Anker. 28. Pflug mit Gabelscher (Zoche). 29. Gewinnen von Birkensaft durch Anzapfen des Baumes.

In breiten Bogen um die Rigaer Bucht herum wohnen von der Ostseeküste im Westen bis zum Südrand des estnischen Landes die Letten. Sie sind anthropologisch Frühcromanisten, die seit der Steinzeit her bereits durch Germanen gemischt und gewandelt wurden; ihr Name wird auf Quelle, auf den Seereichtum des Gebietes bezogen die älteste Nachricht von ihnen in dem Bericht des Pytheas über die Guttonen gegeben, der noch anderen für die am Haff wohnenden alten Preußen gilt, sonst auch für die Goten in ihren ursprünglichen Sitzen beansprucht wird. Der von je und bis heute gewaltige Reichtum an Wäldern in denen Kiefer, Fichte, Birke, Linde, Ahorn, Esche, Ulme und Eiche neben Weiden und Ellern gedeihen, hat bei den Letten wie bei den Germanen, Litauern und Slaven eine Holzkultur bedingt, die sich bei ihnen aber besonders lange erhalten hat. Die Nutzung des natürlichen Steins und des Lehms trat zurück, bis zum 13. Jahrhundert blieb der Mörtel aus Kalk unbekannt, sehr spät setzte Metallkultur ein. Der Baum liefert dem Letten alles Lebensnotwendige vom Hause und Hausrat bis zum Gerät und Werkzeug, von der Fußbekleidung bis zum Birkensaftgetränk. Sammelwirtschaft auf Bienenzucht und Fischfang (Eichbäume!), zumal aber Ackerbau, der vielfach in der Feldervorteilung, Saatenfolge und Bestellungsart noch recht rückständig ist, gründet das lettische Leben, das meist in Einzelsiedlungen, aus Wohnhaus, Stall, Riege oder Getreidedarre, Klete oder Speicher, Badestube, Erdkeller bestehend, seltener in Dörfern abläuft. Als Wohnung dienten in ältesten Zeiten gedeckte Erdgruben, dann mit Reisig oder Baumrinde belegte Stangenzelte, wie die heute noch gebräuchlichen Sommerkirchen, jetzt seit langem viereckige Holzhäuser aus runden, abgeschälten Balken, die an den Wendecken übereinander hinaufstehen und nur Holzzapfen, keine Nägel haben, bzw. neuerdings aus glattgefügten Balken, die mit Brettern überzogen sind. Die Balkenzwischenräume sind mit Moos ausgestopft — „Hering auf Hering, Seehundsfett in der Mitte, was ist das?" fragt ein lettisches Rätsel —, die untersten Balken liegen auf der bloßen Erde oder auf mittelgroßen erratischen Granitblöcken. Das tief heruntergezogene Strohdach trägt Deckreiter als Windschutz und geschnitzte Pferdeköpfe oder Hörner als Giebelschmuck. Früher deckte man die Häuser mit Schindeln aus Fichtenrinde oder mit gespaltenen Fichtenholz ein (Lubbes). Türen und Fenster werden ursprünglich aus den fertigen Hauswänden herausgehauen. Die Fenster waren viereckige Löcher mit Holzschieber, sie sind heute überall aus Glas, die Türen werden noch heute durch Schlösser mit Fallklötzen und durch gezahnte Riegel verschert, in die ein von außen durch ein Loch in der Tür eingeführter Holzschlüssel mit beweglichen Bart eingreift. Die Riege war früher der Wärme wegen zugleich Wohnstube. Die Badestube hat eine Feuerstelle aus Stein oder Lehm, darüber eine Aufschüttung von Feldsteinen, die sich durch das Feuer erhitzen und dann mit Wasser behufs Dampfentwicklung begossen werden. Als Hufglocke dient noch hier und da das Klopfbrett. Alles Hausgerät ist aus Holz, selbst die Kochkessel waren es früher, oder aus Birkenrinde, die taschenartig umgelegt und durch einen Dorn geheftet oder zu einem Zylinder gerollt und durch Ineinanderfügen der gekappten Enden geschlossen wird. Als Aufhängehaken und als Anker dienen Aststücke mit den natürlichen Zweigansätzen. Die Handmühle aus zwei Steinen, deren oberer mittelst eines oben freibeweglichen Stockes auf dem unteren gedreht wird, ist noch überall in Gebrauch, so auch die Technik des einfachen Strick- und Bandbrehens mittelst einer Astgabel, das Weben mittelst eines schlichten, gegen den Leib gestemmten Bogens, in den die Kette gespannt ist, mit und ohne ein die Kettenfäden spreizendes Gatter; mittelst Brettchen, die in der Flächenebene vor und zurück gedreht werden und so die Fächer entstehen lassen; endlich mittelst des nordischen Trittwebestuhls. Die uralte, überall verbreitete Bienenzucht pflegt die Bienen in stehenden oder liegenden Stöcken aus Baumstämmen oder in lebenden, ausgehöhlten Waldbäumen. Zum Aufstieg dient dem Imker ein Flechtenzug oder ein natürlicher Tannenbaum, der mit dem eingekerbten Baumstamm die urtümlichen Formen der Leiter innerhalb jeder Holzkultur und so noch in Lettland vertritt. Durch Anzapfen von Birkenbäumen gewinnt man ein erfrischendes und gesundes Getränk, neben dem ein einfaches Methbier gebräuchlich ist. Verkehrsmittel sind Wagen und Schlitten, bzw. Plankenboot und Einbaum. Die Musikinstrumente des liederreichen Volkes sind: Flöten aus Weide, Trompeten aus Erlenrinde, Ziegen- oder Rinderhorn, Zupfbogen, Zither, Geige und Dudelsack. Eine in ihren wirtschaftlichen Formen so altertümliche Bevölkerung wie die lettische bewahrt natürlich auch allerlei geistiges Gut der Vorzeit auf. Als Schutzmedizinen z. B. steckt man Eberzahnzweige an Stalltüren, in die Kornkisten, zwischen die Balken der Hauswand. Lange erhielt sich der Brauch, bei Hochzeiten einen grünen Baum oder einen Kranz oben auf das Haus zu stellen und hinter diesem einen kleinen Hain zu pflanzen, mit denen Gedeihen man das Glück der Familie verbunden wußte. Bei Erntefesten und am Johannistage feiert das Landvolk, besonders an letzterem schmückt man das Haus und den Hof mit Blattwerk und setzt sich selbst symbolische Kränze von Eichenblättern auf. Überall hier liegt ursprünglich das Wissen von geistigen Kräften in der Natur und ihren heilenden Ausstrahlen zugrunde.

1: Karuta

El Europe



Die Letten

II.

1. Frau mit bronzeführiger Kappe und silbernem Schläfenbrustschmuck. 2. Männertyp. 3. Frau mit Umschlagtuch. 4/5. Kalipfe aus Leder für den Fuß. 6. Kopfbinde. 7/8. Bastschuh aus Lindenbast. 9/10 Schuhe aus Haut mit Lederstrap bzw. Flachsschnur. 11. Umschlagtuch mit Fransen. 12. Frauen der Insel Ruñ. 13. Vorgeschichtlicher Bastgürtel mit Bronzepinsen. 14. Frauen beim Wintersklingen.

Aus Anspielungen in Volksliedern und aus Grabfunden läßt sich vermuten, daß die Letten einst Hemden, Röcke, Gürtel und Hüte aus Bast getragen haben. Bis vor kurzem galten Bastschuhe als notwendiger Teil der Brauttracht am Hochzeitstage und wurden von der Braut für die Verwandten des Bräutigams gefertigt und ihnen geschenkt; sie werden noch heute, wie bei Esten, Russen, Finnen, aus Erlen-, Weiden-, Wacholder-, mitunter Lindenrinde hergestellt, die einst das ausschließliche Material war, aber nach Einführung der großen Lindenwaldungen jetzt fehlt und durch jene ersetzt ist. Dann trägt man selbstgemachte Sandalen aus ungegerbtem Fell oder aus Streifen von Rindshaut, die in Lohe aus Fichten- oder Erlenrinde gegerbt ist; die Streifen werden am Rande durchlocht, um mittels einer durchgezogenen Flachsschnur die Sohle am Fuß zu befestigen und das vordere Ende zu einer Kappe zusammenzuziehen. Lederne Stiefel und Schuhe verdrängen heute die hergemachten. Den Beweis für einstige Bastgürtel liefert die Ausgrabung Bild 13, ein Gürtel aus fünf Reihen gleichmäßiger, festgedrehter Bastschnüre, die durch Stege von Bronze laufen und mit Bronzepinsen besetzt sind. Auch Schnüre aus Flachs kommen an gleichen Gürteln vor. Die Kleidung war vor alters aus Wolle, die in eigener Hauswirtschaft von Schafen gewonnen, gesponnen, gehaspelt, gewebt (s. Tafel Letten I) wurde. Die Gewandstoffe wurden ungenäht um den Körper geschlagen und über den Hüften durch einen Gürtel festgehalten, jetzt ist Schneiderarbeit und städtischer Schnitt eingedrungen. Das Hemd wurde durch Metallfibeln (bronze oder silber) am Halsquerl und am vorderen Schlitz zusammengehalten, heute ist Schnur und Knopf an die Stelle getreten. Eigengemachter Knopfersatz wird aus zusammengerollten Lederstreifen gemacht, die festgenäht sind oder am Ende durch ein quer durchgeprieltes Loch laufen und sich dadurch halten. Beliebt sind noch Umschlagtücher mit Fransen, die entweder mit dem Tuch zusammen oder für sich mittels besonderer Fransenbrettchen geschlungen werden; auch die Brettchenweberei (s. Tafel Letten I) dient ihnen. Zur Kleidung gehört die Kopfbinde, die in der Form eines Pinsels aus den langen Rückenborsten vom Schwein zusammengebunden ist oder die Borsten in einen verpichten bzw. einen Holzgriff zusammenfaßt.

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und besonders: Bielenstein, „Die Holzbauten und Holzgeräte der Letten", Petersburg 1907 (erster Teil) und 1918 (zweiter Teil).

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Die Litauer

I.

1. Badestube, Dachkonstruktion. 2. Tiefbrunnen unter Rindenplatten. 3. Wohnhaus auf Sockel von Feldsteinen. 4. Wohnhaus mit Türverkleidung. 5. Handmühle. 6.—8. Musikinstrumente. 9. Zum Wohnhaus umgebauter Speicher. 10. Zoche (Handpflug mit gegabelter Schar). 11. Bienenkorb aus einem hohlen Baumstamm. 12, 17, 21. Wegkreuzformen. 13. Speicher mit Dachluke und großen Dachvorsprüngen. 14. Bogenzither aus Weidenrute. 15. Hirtentrompete aus Holz, Rinde, Rohr. 16. Kienspanhalter. 18. Wegkreuz mit Martels. 19. Gehöftumzäunung mit Wegkreuz. 20. Kreuz mit Martels auf einem Friedhof.

Die seen- und sumpfreichen Wälder zwischen Ostsee und nördlicher Düna, vom oberen Njemen bis Dünaburg, schwer zugänglich, von den großen Durchgangsstraßen abgelegen, haben Kultur und Sprache eines uralten europäischen Rassengliedes reiner erhalten, als es sonst irgend der Fall ist. Von Deutschen wie Slaven gleichwenig verstanden, von den Finnen und ihren magieverbundenen Willenskräften so verschieden wie von den Germanen und ihrem Tatendurst nach Eroberung der physischen Welt, andererseits in ihrer religiösen Organisation deutlich dem Westen unseres Erdteils zugewandt, erweisen sich die Litauer als Rest einer vorgermanischen, in Europa gewachsenen Rassenschicht, die einst von Westen her eingewanderte, in ihren heutigen Sitzen aber schon seit Jahrtausenden wohnhaft ist; sie mögen die aestarii des Tacitus, die östlich der Germanen Wohnenden sein. Schmale, lange Gesichter, blaue Augen, blondes Haar, mittelgroße schlanke Gestalten treten uns entgegen, arbeitsame, friedliebende, anspruchlose Menschen, von alten Chronisten als „roh, aber fromm bezeichnet". Von je und immer mit der Natur innig verbunden, haben sie ihre ganze Kultur in sie hineingebaut und leben zum großen Teil in einer „Holzzeit", wie die ihnen verwandten Letten, die sehr alt, aber darum nicht weniger vielseitig, geschickt und sinnvoll ist. Aus Holz sind die Häuser, die mit den Grundbalken auf der bloßen Erde oder auf Feldsteinen ruhen, und deren Dach wohl einst aus Fichtenrinde bestand, wie die Schutzdecken für Torf heute noch, jetzt aber aus Stroh ist, das von Dachreitern auf dem First gehalten wird. Der Tür ist häufig ein schmaler Vorplatz mit Giebeldach und mit Bänkchen rechts und links vorgelegt. Die Häuser hatten früher nur einen Raum, also Rauchstubentyp, jetzt meist eine Dreigliederung in Mittelflur, Stube und Kammer rechts und links davon; der Fußboden ist Lehmestrich oder Dielenbelag. Die Einrichtung besteht aus Wandbänken, freistehenden Bänken, gutgeschnitzten festen Stühlen, Tisch, Wandbrettern, Kienspanträgern; an den Wänden hängen Bilder von Heiligen, häufig zeigen der alten litauischen Fürsten und, symptomatisch für die starke Auswanderung, Photographien aus Amerika. Zum litauischen Gehöft gehören außer dem Wohnhause Speicher (Klete), Schweineställe, Brunnen, Badestube. Gebadet wird hier im Dampf, der von erhitzten, mit Wasser begossenen Steinen aufsteigt, wie es übrigens auch die Indianer tun; der Badende liegt auf einer Bank und kühlt und frottiert sich zugleich mittels eines Birkenbüschels, das er in frisches Wasser taucht. Altertümlich ist die Handmühle mit einem festen und einem drehbaren Stein im Holzkasten; altertümlich der Bienenstock aus hohlem Baumstamm — Bienenzucht ist die ureinheimische höchste Form der Sammelwirtschaft, hier wie bei den Letten allgemein verbreitet und gut ausgebildet —; altertümlich die Zoche, der Pflug mit gegabelter Schar, die noch im 16. Jahrhundert ganz aus Holz war und es heute noch bis auf den eisernen Schuh ist; sowie die Eggen mit angebundenen Ästen und die Schneeschuhe aus eichenen ausgehöhlten Brettchen, die unter den Fuß gebunden werden; altertümlich die Musikinstrumente: die neunsaitige Kanklys, die Truba aus einem der Länge nach zerschnittenen, ausgehöhlten und wieder zusammengebundenen Birkenast, die kurze Rohrpfeife, die trapezförmige Cymbel, die Bogenzither aus Weidenrute, mit einem ebensogeformten Streichbogen gespielt, mit Resonator aus Schweinsblase, das lange Hirtenhorn. — Der Litauer ist musikalisch und dichterisch hochbegabt. Seine Volkslieder, die Dainos, tragen in kurzen festen Trochäenstrophen und in weichen Jamben, die innig und herzlich empfundenen, bildhaft erhebten Freuden und Leiden einer gefühlgebundenen, zur Melancholie neigenden Menschenseele vor, sie sind oft übersetzt und wurden von Herder und von Goethe, der eine Daina in seinem Singspiel „Die Fischerin" wiedergab, geschätzt. Die Innigkeit der Volksdichtung wiederholt sich in Anlage und Stimmung der Friedhöfe, deren stille Abgeschiedenheit an Berghängen und auf Hügelkuppen, deren — verwahrlost romantische — Blumen- und Rankengehege, deren riesige, dunkle, zwingend mahnende Golgathakreuze und bemooste Kruzifixi mit den Marterwerkzeugen den Blick auf sie und den Gang durch sie zu Erlebnissen macht. Aller Verwahrlosung zum Trotz weiß man hier, daß der Litauer seinen Toten nahe ist, mögen auch Sitten, wie sie noch im 16. Jahrhundert bestanden, daß man den Toten angekleidet auf einen Stuhl setzte und Klageweiber um ihn Trauerlieder singen ließ, verschwunden sein.


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Die Litauer

II.

1. Litauischer Bauer. 2. Trracht des 17. Jahrhunderts. 3. Trracht des 19. Jahrhunderts. 4. Kübel. 5. Teetopf. 6.—10. Töpfe. 11. Löffel. 12. Schöpfer. 13. 14. Schnitzwerk. 15. Tasche aus Birkenrinde zum Beerensammeln. 16. Butterfaß aus einem ausgehöhlten Stamm. 17. Stuhl mit durchbrochener Lehne. 18. Löffel. 19. Fischkrake und Korb aus Strohseilen zum Aufbewahren von Korn.

Die litauische Hofkultur kann heute natürlich keine ansehnlichen mehr sein. So völlig urtümlich Stampfer und Mörser und die Humpen für das alteinheimische Gerstenbier noch aus einem vollen Klotz gearbeitet und ausgehöhlt sind, so viel noch Birkenrinde verwendet wird, so gibt es neben ihnen, zumal im Randgebiete, doch selbstgemachte Töpferware; aber auch sie bleibt in Technik und Form durchaus einfach. In der Kleidung hat sich Altes nicht mehr erhalten. Das Bild 2, aus dem 17. Jahrhundert, läßt auf lettische Ähnlichkeiten schließen, es haben dann in Ostpreußen deutsche, jenseits der Grenze polnische Einflüsse gewirkt. Lange, bis in das 19. Jahrhundert, erhielten sich Überreste der alten Religion, die ein Wissen von göttlichen Kräften in der Natur, überall, von der Sonne und den Sternen bis zu Pflanzen und Steinen, und ein Wissen von der Einheit zwischen Natur und Mensch, von inneren und äußeren Beziehungen und Wirkungen zwischen ihnen war. Wie klar das Göttliche in der Natur geschaut wurde, lehren Vorstellungen wie die, daß der Gottheit Schmerz bereitet wird, wenn man der Bäume Rinde abschält! Wie klar die Einheit erlebt wurde, sieht man an der Sitte, Bäume im Gehöft zu haben, mit deren Gedeihen Wohlstand und Gesundheit der Bewohner verknüpft blieb, oder an Volksliedern wie diesen:

„Ach, ich Armer ging von dannen,
Weinte bittere Tränen.
Nicht verwöhnelte der Eichbaum
Sich in meinem Vater."

Gewaltige Erdgeister wohnten in den Wurzeln der Holunderbüsche — nicht Erinnerungen an kleinwüchsige Urbewohner von der Art der Rentierlappen, wie man geneigt, sondern heilsbringende Schützungen von Elementarwesen. Frühlings-, Sommer- und Herbstfeste vereinigten das Volk zum gemeinsamen Erlebnis des Lichtes, der Sonne als des geistigen Mittelpunktes der Welt und des Daseins, in heiligen Wäldern kam man zu den Göttern und opferte ihnen. Ja, der Oberhaupt der Waidelotten-Priesterschaft, der Krive, opferte sich selbst, wenn er alt geworden; er nahmen das Volk zur Buße, stieg auf den Scheiterhaufen, ließ sich verbrennen und wußte sich in den Flammen zu den Göttern emporsteigen. Vom Blitz erschlagen zu werden, galt in demselben Sinne als besondere Gnade. Einstmals wurde das religiöse Wissen und Empfinden von einer freiheitlich organisierten, doch hierarchisch geordneten Priesterschaft mit gewähltem Oberpriester gehütet und in exoterischen Formen dem Volke vermittelt. Dort unterhielt man ein ewiges Feuer, das im Schlosse zu Wilna erst im Jahre 1387 durch den Herzog Jagello feierlich auf immer gelöscht wurde (?), opferte der Sonne, wahrsagte aus hellsichtiger Schau heraus, vermittelte Offenbarungen der Verstorbenen, berief das Volk zu Versammlungen, wenn man solche Offenbarungen gehabt hatte, um sie zu verkünden, um Feste außerordentlich, die Saat- und Erntezeiten zu bestimmen. Die Priester waren also die geistigen Führer des Volkes, die aus den Kenntnissen der Weltzusammenhänge das Leben bis in die täglichen Verrichtungen hinein lenkten, sie wußten den Einfluß des Mondes auf alles Gebären und die Rückkehr der Seelen nach dem Tode in seine Sphäre: „das Abgestorbene, das als Samenkorn einer anderen Welt in die Erde gelegt wird", wie sich Creuzer ausdrückt; Einsicht offenbar in den Vorgang der wiederholten Erdenleben. Ein besonderes Fest im Herbste, das Fest der Bockbeiligung, scheint eine exoterische Parallele zu Initiationsfeiern in Mysterien gewesen zu sein, denn die Priester erzählten dabei die Überlieferungen aus der Geschichte des Volkes und entzückten die Menschen. Nach der Ernte wurde alljährlich ein Götterbild zerbrochen und erneuert, man brachte daraus zum Erlebnis, daß die geistigen Kräfte des Kosmos im Rhythmus des Jahres sich der Erde zu- und von ihr abwenden, daß sie im Winter sich sammeln, sich erneuern, um im Frühling der wachsenden Pflanzenwelt zuströmen zu können. Heutige Erntegebräuche sind letzter Ausklang solchen Wissens von den die Welt und alle ihre Dinge durchsetzenden und belebenden, emanierenden, geistigen Kräften.

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Die nördlichen polnischen Westslaven

I.

1. Lößwohnung in Stodely. 2. Bau eines Hauses. 3. Erdkeller im Kreise Nowo-Minsk. 4. Gebräuchlichster Eckverband mit überkämmten Schwalbenschwänzen. 5. Wohnhaus an der Pilica. 6. Ornament an Getreidehaufen. 7. Bauernhaus im Kreise Radom. 8. Geschnitzte Deckenbalken zu einem Wohnhause im Kreise Cholm. 9. Eingangstür eines gräflichen Bauernhauses in der Tatra. 10. Bemaltes Bauernhaus im Kreise Lowitsch. 11. Bauernhaus im Kreise Lowitsch. 12. Görsalenhof in der Tatra.

Als in der Völkerwanderungszeit die germanischen Stämme (Vandalen, Silingen, Burgunden u. a.) aus dem Weichsellande westwärts und südwärts abzogen, rückten von Südosten her die Slaven nach; sie bilden hier jetzt den polnischen (pole = Feld, Flachland) Teil der Westslaven, haben sich aber stark mit Litauern und Germanen gemischt. Seit 900 etwa schlossen sich die Familien zu organisierten Bauerngemeinschaften zusammen. In ihnen hat einiges der alten Holzkultur Osteuropas, allen politischen, kriegerischen und wirtschaftlichen Einflüssen des Westens getrotzt, wenn auch lange nicht in dem Maße, wie in Litauen etwa oder in Nordrußland. Wo Löß vorkommt, findet man wohl vereinzelt Wohnungen und Keller in ihn hineingetrieben (Bild 1), und Reste alter Wohngruben kann man in den Kellern sehen, die überall im Lande, mit Erde und Steinen bedeckt oder mit Stroh überdacht, die Vorratsräume zumal für Kartoffeln sind. Die eigentliche einheimische Bauweise ist aber der Blockbau, der von der einfachen Kate bis zu umfangreichen Bürgerhäusern, Kirchen und Synagogen angetroffen wird. Das Haus ist rechteckig angelegt, ruht mit dem Schwellenkranz unmittelbar auf dem gewachsenen Boden oder auf Findlingen, welche die Ecken tragen (Bild 2) und baut sich die Wände aus runden, halbrunden oder kantig zugehauenen Tannenstämmen auf. Die Lücken zwischen diesen stopft man mittels eines Holzspans mit Moos aus. Unter die Schwellen schüttet man nachträglich Schotter. Die Wandflächen werden zum Schutz gegen Fäulnis oft gekalkt, seltener verputzt, zum Schutz gegen Kälte mit einer niedrigen Erdanschüttung oder mit einer durch Stangen festgehaltenen Aufschichtung von Stroh, Laub, Kartoffelkraut, Heu, Mist, Reisig verstärkt. Das Dach ist ein ganzer oder halber Walm mit Sparrengebinde und Strohabdeckung, springt manchmal etwas vor und läßt die Balkenenden für eine künstlerische Verzierung frei (Bild 8) oder stützt sich auf freistehende Pfosten, so daß eine Laube entsteht (Bild 7) oder ein gesondertes Vordach (Bild 5). Im Tatragebirge tritt an die Stelle des Strohdaches die Schindeldeckung. Der Giebel ist in der Anordnung der Bretter mit Absicht gegliedert und verziert. Ein Rauchfang fehlt (Bild 12), die Türen sind wuchtig und mit großen eisernen Nägeln als Zierat beschlagen (Bild 9). Die Lowitscher Häuser zeichnen sich durch Bemalung der Außenwände aus, die entweder auf die rohen Blockbalken oder auf eine senkrecht genagelte Verschalung aufgetragen wird (Bild 10). Im Grundriß sind die Häuser meist dreigeteilt, in Stube und Stall zu seiten des Flurs mit der offenen Feuerstelle, der Fußboden ist neuerdings oft gedielt, sonst und früher immer lehmgestampfter Estrich. Bild 6 zeigt Ornamente von Getreidehaufen: Die Mädchen formen die Haufen zu vierseitigen Pyramidenstümpfen und verzieren die obere Fläche und die Seitenflächen mittels der Schaufel zu allerlei Ziermustern; sie wollen dadurch etwaige Diebstähle feststellen.

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

Die nördlichen polnischen Westslaven

II.

1. Bäuerin aus Wrühlow. 2. Bäuerin aus Lowitsch. 3. Mädchen aus Lowitsch. 4. Mädchen aus Sterzin. 5. Hausdeuter der Gärten in der Türe. 6./7. Hochzeitsgebäck. 8. Bauer aus Bochin. 9. Schöpfgefäß aus Holz. 10. Schrecker aus Eichenholz. 11. Flintenhut aus Netzewitzen. 12. Holzklapper, zum Läutschlagen im Dorfe, bei Feuer z. B. 13. 14. 16. Mit Graphit geschwärzte Tongefäße mit rohen Strichmustern. 15. Holzkrug. 17. Heißwasserofen im Kreise Kolno. 18 Bauernwagen aus dem Kreise Kolno, mit hochförmigem Bretterkasten, dessen oberer Rand durch Stützen gehalten wird, die senkrecht auf den Achsenenden stehen. 19. Hausdeuter im Kreise Neuss-Mark. 20. Dudelsackpfeifer. 21. Deckenschmuck aus Strohhalmen und Papierblumen.

Die einfachsten Formen des Blockhauses lassen sich an den Nebenbauten wie z. B. Hausdeutern erkennen (Bild 5). Das südliche Flachland bevorzugt offene Mieten aus einfachen Stangengerüsten und Strohdach. In der Inneneinrichtung überwiegt das Material der alten Holzkultur, daneben kommen als hausindustrielle Erzeugnisse mit Graphit geschwärzte Tongefäße einfacher Form vor. Von der Decke hängt, wie in nordischen und deutschen Häusern der bei uns „Uscche" genannte Schmuck aus Strohhalmen, der ursprünglich magischen Zweck verfolgte und exzentrische Wirkungen des Schutzes gegen bösen Blick oder Unglück, bzw. der Wachstumsförderung für Ernte und Familie übte (Bild 21). Gleiche Vorstellungen erhielten sich im Fest- und Hochzeitsgebäck (Bild 6 und 7), die Schnecken sind Bilder des Sonnenlaufes, das Gitter ist das Bilderrätsel der Abwehr. Die Volkstrachten sind heute in Polen fast verschwunden. Der verzehnfachte Rock von Priesterkleidern eines Bauern aus Bochin (Bild 8) dürfte nationale und kirchliche Belange spiegeln wollen. Im Warthegebiet tragen die Männer noch eng anliegende rote Jacken mit blanken Messingknöpfen und rothlau gestreifte Hosen; die Masuren Mittelpolens lagen ihre langen, grauen und weißen Röcke mit roten und blauen Aufschlägen immer mehr ab. Die Frauen halten noch mehr an der alten, slavischen Farbenfreudigkeit fest. Bild 3 zeigt ein Lowitscher Mädchen mit Mieder und buntgestreiftem Wollkleid. Bild 4 ein Sterzinner Mädchen in selbstgewebtem, rot und gelb gestreiftem, halbwollenen Rock, in farbigem Mieder, das die Ärmel des weißen Hemdes freiläßt, und rotem Kopftuch. Bild 2 eine Lowitscher Frau mit charakteristischer Kopf-Schürze, die Hals, Rücken und Kopf umhüllt, und mit Korallen-Halsschmuck aus Ketten, die hinten durch farbige, lang über den Rücken fallende Bänder zusammengehalten werden. Bei der Arbeit trägt man nur das weiße Kopftuch ohne die Schürze.

Die Russen

I.

1. Teil eines Glockenturms, zur Veranschaulichung der Balkenkonstruktion. 2. Erdwohnungen. 3. Speicher auf Pfählen. 4. Haus mit Brettergiebeldach; Hoftür. 5. Flechtzaun aus Laubholzzweigen, die umgreift, zapfartig durch die senkrechte Pfahlreihe gezogen sind. 6. Bretterdach. 7. Bauernhaus mit Treppenverbau, Balken, Pferdekopf auf dem Dachfirst. 8. Stube mit Rauchfang ohne Schornstein. 9. Kornstampfer. 10/12. Dachfirstaufsätze. 11. Heiligenbild. 13. Puppe. 14. Haus mit schmalen Lukenfenstern alter Form. 15. Verbalk der Verbindungsgebäude in Tutschkowo (Archangelsk).

Die slavische Gruppe der Indogermanen hat sich östlich der oberen Weichsel und des Karpathengebirges herausgebildet und von hier aus seit der Mitte des ersten Jahrtausends ihre Glieder nach Norden, Osten und Süden gestreckt. Die nach Norden und Nordosten ziehenden Russen fanden eine seßhafte Waldbevölkerung finnischen, d. i. alturalischen Stammes, vor, mischten sich mit ihr und setzten deren alte Hohlkultur fort. Später sind sie stark von Germanen im Westen, von Tataren im Osten beeinflußt worden, während von Süden her Byzanz die östliche Form des Christentums brachte und den Einstrom vorderasiatischer, zumal persischer Kulturelemente vermittelte. Das Klima hat in Rußland länger als anderswo Erdwohnungen erhalten, das typische Haus ist aber das Blockhaus aus sorgfältig verpaßten, in den Zwischenräumen gut gedichteten, an den Ecken rechtwinklig miteinander festverfügten Balken, von rechteckiger Form, mit Giebeldach aus Brettern oder Schindeln. Den Dachfirst zieren Reiter und am Giebel geschnitzte Aufsätze in Tierkopfform, die mit den germanischen Pferdeköpfen mehr innerlich als äußerlich zusammenhängen. Pfahlbauartige Pfostenbauten finden sich an Speichern. Das ursprüngliche Haus war einstöckig, ohne Kamin oder Abzug, dann setzte man Rauchlöcher in das Dach, umgab sie mit einem Kasten aus Brettern, aus dem bald ein Rauchfang wurde (Bild 8); später erst kam der Schornstein hinzu. Die Fenster wurden einst als schmale Luken herausgeschnitten und durch Schiebebretter geschlossen, wie noch in Estland noch hier und da zu sehen ist, dann kamen Fensterscheiben auf, die Fenster wurden breiter und höher, ihr Rahmen bekam eine geschnitzte Einfassung. Hochkultureinflüsse des Westens wirkten auf die Hausform, so romanische auf gedeckte Treppen und Eingänge wie Bild 7 eine zeigt. Der Holzbau umfaßte auch die Kirchen des Nordens und richtete sich nach altgermanischen Vorbildern, doch scheint daneben das islamische Tatarentum seine Wellen so weit geschlagen zu haben, daß Hallen wie die auf Bild 15 zustandekamen. Der Eingang zum russischen Hause liegt im Hof, der von einer Planke oder Zäunung umschlossen und durch ein großes Flügeltor, oft mit geschnitzter Rahmung zugänglich ist; die Gehöfte liegen zu Straßendörfern vereinigt in Reihen nebeneinander. Holz und Linden- bzw. Birkenrinde sind noch immer wesentlichster Stoff des Hausrats, der in Stampfern wie auf dem Bilde 9 oder in Puppen wie auf dem Bilde 13 urtümliche Formen bewahrt. Die Innenrichtung ist durch den großen, flachen Ofen zumal für die älteren Häuser charakterisiert, auf dem früher die ganze Familie den Winter über nächtigte. Wandbänke, Truhen, Wandbretter bilden mit Tischen und Stühlen die Einrichtung. In der Ecke und an Deckenbalken hängen Heiligenbilder, umrahmt von bedruckten und gestickten Handtüchern. Ebensolche Tücher decken Teile der Wände, gestickte Vorhänge verhüllen die Betten.

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1: Karuta

El Europe



Die Russen

II.

1./2. Kronen. 3–8. Bäuerliche Trachten. 9. Bauer. 10. Hohlstäbe. 11. Wetterfahne aus Petersburg. 12. Kumset. 13. Weigelfest. 14. Vorrichtung zum Krümmen des Kumset.

Die russische Volkstracht verschwindet wie alle aus einem wesenhaften Farbengefühl, einem engen Gruppenzusammenhange, einer unpersönlichen Sippenempfindung und Überlieferung, einem selbsttätigen Fortleben starker fremder nachgeahmter Einflüsse stammende städtische und völkische Kleidung. Urtümlich war ihr das angesteckte Hemd, dessen überlange Ärmel (Bild 3) auf tatarischen Einfluß und dessen teppichartige Muster auf vorderasiatischen Ursprung zurückgehen, die Beinwickel, die Bastschuhe und das einfach umgeschlungene Kopftuch. Tatarischer Abkunft sind hohe Kappen mit langherabhängenden Tüchern und die Zöpfe der Mädchen, nordgermanischer Verwandtschaft der krausartige Kopfputz (Kokoschnik), der im Baltikum einst in unendlichen Variationen verbreitet war (s. Tafel Esten II). Die Tafel zeigt noch im Anschluß an die russischen Holzbauten eine Kirche, die nicht die Großartigkeit alter norwegischer Stabkirchen erreicht, aber immerhin bemerkenswert und für Stil und Kultur einer „Holzzeit" bedeutsam ist, ferner ein Wolgafloß, das den Baumreichtum Mittel- und Nordrußlands nach dem Süden, in die Hölzer der „Schwarzerde-"Gebiete bringt; eine Vorrichtung zum Biegen des Holzes für die charakteristischen bügelförmigen Joche, unter denen das Pferd bzw. — bei der Troika — das Mittelpferd läuft (Bild 14 und 12). Bild 11, eine Wetterfahne, verwandt den Wimpeln der Jenisseiboote (vgl. dieses Atlas, Band I, Tafel Jenisseier), der Chinggiboote und der Boote von der Kurischen Nehrung, trägt eine Ornamentierung von Pferdekopf und von Sonnen, die auf Nordgermanen zurückgeht, im Erlebnis aber mit dem uralt-bodenständigen Lichtkultus zusammenfällt. Die vorslavischen Urseuropäer wie die Slaven selbst lebten immer mehr stark in den geistigen Mächten der Natur und sind heute noch ein überzeugt religiöses, tief frommes, innerlich erlebendes, nach einem Gottmenschentum strebendes Volk. Die innige Totenverehrung und die im scheinbaren Gegensatz dazu stehende, aber gerade durch die Geistigkeit ihres Glaubens zu der Wetterlehre der Seele bestimmte Verwahrlosung der Begräbnisstätten sind nur einen von zahllosen Beispielen, das Schicksalswesen, die hellseherischen Traumschlafvorkommnisse, Reste eines alten Wissens von omnipräsenten geistigen Kräften andere solche Beispiele. Am Fest der Mariä Verkündigung wird das Muttergottesbild in ein Fläschchen mit Kerzengestalt, das zur Aussaat dienen soll, die im Bilde lebendigen Kräfte gehen also in das Saatkorn über, ein Brauch, der in allen Ländern der römisch-katholischen Kirche ebenfalls noch lebt (Umschreiten der Felder, Blutritt in Weingarten; vor den Heiligenbildern hängengeschnitzte Holztauben — vgl. die Tafeln Nordgermanen, Alpenländer) und bemalte Ostereier, deren Farben aus Blumen, Blättern, Zwiebeln ausgezogen und deren Muster mit flüssigem Wachs aufgetragen werden; jedermann trägt oder trug bis vor kurzem schützende Münzen und Medaillen.

1: Karuta

El Europe

Die Russen

III.

1. Schädel. 2. Schädelform eines Baschkiren. 3. Tätowiertes aus Bronze, mit Schmucksteinen. 4. Hohgewölbtes Kopfmesser. 5.—7. Spinnwirbel. 8. Wirbelschlagbrett. 9. Kopfmesser. 10. Schädel. 11. Bank. 12. Lichtschirm. 13. Schnitzerei eines Hundeschlittens. 14. Schnitzerei eines Spinnwirbels.

Die altsibirisch-arische Hirtenkultur Europas wurde in Rußland durch Einflüsse höher entwickelter Kulturen in ihrer künstlerischen Entwicklung bestimmt und auf eine außerordentlich reife und vollendete Stufe gebracht. Wir sehen diese Einflüsse in den Formen der Ornamentik sich ausdrücken. Es sind nordgermanische, iranische, vorderasiatisch-persische. Die ersten brachten das Sonnenmotiv, wie Bild 8 und Bild 11 es zeigen, sowie die Pferdeköpfe der Bank auf Bild 11; die zweiten gaben die kleginische Linie, wie Bild 14 in vorzüglicher Prägung wiederholt, das Widder-Doppelhorn, das nicht unter spätern Pflanzenbildungen des Ornaments verkannt werden darf. Persien schenkte u. a. namentlich das Motiv des Lebensbaumes, der von ruhenden oder jähnenden Vögeln, von aufgerichteten oder hochspringenden Löwen und Fabeltieren flankiert wird. Die Bilder 1, 3, 4, 9, 10, 11 zeigen das psychologisch, durch den Sinn und die Kraft der in ihm sich aussprechenden Vorstellung, wie ethnographisch für die Blut- und Kulturzusammenhänge bedeutsame und wichtige Muster.

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

Die Ruthenen der Karpathen

(Huzulen)

1. Mädchen in Hemdenhemd aus Jasenitsch. 2. Junger Bursche aus Zabie. 3. Alte Huzulin in Arbeitskleidung. 4. Brust aus Zabie im Brustschmuck. 5. Alter Hirte in Jasenitsch. 6. Gebäude, vom Hof aus gesehen. 7.—9. Kopfbedeckungen. 10. Stangenzaun. 11. Treppe aus eingekerbten Balken. 12. Hängeverzierungen. 13. Zeichnung von einem Ostereier. 14. Pferdehaus. 15./16. Ostereier. 17. Hütterner aus eingekerbten Balken. 18. Vogel aus einem Ostereier als Deckengehänge. 19./20. Stock aus Holz mit Messingblech über der Schneide und Messingzwischenringen (Wanderstäbe). 21. Brunnen. 22. Flachsbrecher einer Gemeinde.

An den nordöstlichen Abhängen der Karpathen wohnen die im wesentlichen christlich, ausschließlich erst seit dem 19. Jahrhundert mit dem Sondernamen Huzulen (vom rumänischen hoc-ul = Kleiner?) bezeichneten Bergruthenen. Sie siedeln vorzugsweise auf dem Sonderrücken Hutsulien aus verbleichenen Fichten-Blockhäusern, die mit Moos gedeckt auf einem Rahmen von behauenen Balken ruhen; dieser Rahmen liegt auf Steinen und hat eine Lehmfüllung, die den Fußboden bildet. Wände und Decken bleiben meist unbekleidet, das Dach ist aus Brettern oder kleinen Holzschindeln. Nägel, Angeln, Schlösser mit Fallriegelchen waren früher durchweg aus Holz. Die Häuser stehen mit der Längsseite, in der sich die Tür und die Fenster befinden, nach Süden bis Südosten, enthalten eine oder zwei, dann jedenfalls einen mittleren Flur angrenzende Stuben und die Stallungen angebaut unter demselben Dach; seitwärts sind die Wirtschaftsräume vom Wohnhause getrennt, mit Ausnahme des Kukurez-(Mais)-Speichers, der es immer ist. Ein Viertel der Stube nimmt der Tez- bzw. Steinofen ein, der im Winter den alten Leuten als Schlafstelle dient. An den Wänden laufen Bänke, die Betten für die übrigen Bewohner. Rauchabzug jeder Art fehlt, der Rauch zieht sich seinen Ausgang durch das Dach und die Lücken zwischen Dach und Wänden. Der Kochkessel hängt an metallenen Aet-Haken (Bild 9) oder an gabelförmigen [illegible] (Bild 7) oder an einem einfach zwischen zwei Steine eingeklemmten Stocke. (Bild 8). Von der Decke hängt die treppenförmige, gegitterte Wiege, auch wohl ein Vogel („Geier") aus einem ausgeblasenen, bunten Ostereiern, dem Kopf und Hals aus Wachs angeklebt, Schwanz und Flügel aus federförmig gefältetem Papier eingesetzt sind; er erinnert an die gleichen Verkommnisse im Nordost Europas, in Nordskandinavien, in den Alpenländern (vgl. die betreffenden Tafeln dieses Buches). Einer eigentümlichen Zierkunst begegnet man auf dem Gebäudchen, den Steighölzern, den Leiterstuhlen, den Bettstellen und Bänken, den Stützsäulen und — aus symbolischen Vorstellungen und magischen Willensakten hervorgegangen — auf den an Haus und Weg aufgestellten Kreuzen mit Sonnenbildern (Bild 22), sowie den bemalten Ostereiern; die Technik der letzteren beruht, wie auch sonst und wie die Batik-Kunst der Malaien, halbflüssiges Wachs für die vom Muster freibleibenden Stellen, um es einige Male hintereinander das Ei in verschiedenen Farben zu tauchen und so mehrfarbige Muster zu erzeugen. Die Pferde auf Bild 13 haben den bestimmten Zweck, dem Hause den Viehstand zu sichern. Die Tracht besteht bei den Männern aus breiten, leinenen oder wollenen Hosen, über denen das gestickte Hemd getragen wird, verschiedenen Sandalen, schwarzen Stiefeln, kurzer, ärmellosser Pelzjacke, kurzem, verschiedenen Tuchmantel, rundem, flachem Hut vorgeschriebener Art; bei den Frauen aus einem Hemd mit gestickten Ärmeln und Brustschlitz, einer breiten oder zwei schmalen Schürzen statt des Rockes, die ein langer, schwarzer Wollgürtel hält, einer bunten Pelzjacke, einem kurzen und einem langen Mantel, Sandalen oder Stiefeln, bunten Kopftuch. Das rauhe Land läßt wenig Ackerbau zu; man erntet Hafer, Gerste, Mais, Kartoffeln, Flachs, Hanf, Gemüse. Vorherrschender ist die Gemeinwirtschaft und die Zucht von Pferden, Rindern, Schafen, Ziegen, Schweinen, die im Gebirge Nomadencharakter annimmt: das Vieh wird im Juni gemeinsam auf die Almen getrieben; dort zündet man in der Sennhütte das lebendige Feuer an, das während des Sommers nicht ausgehen darf (vgl. die Tafeln „Serben" und „Bulgaren" dieses Buches). Die Nahrung besteht im wesentlichen aus Maismehl, Schafkäse, saurer Milch, Gänsebraten. Das Leben ist noch stark dem Sippenverbande, zu dem der Fremde gehört, der gemeinsamen Gastfreundschaft geweiht, verknüpft; die Dorfgemeinschaft bestätigt sich in gemeinsamen, uneigennützigen Hilfeleistungen beim Hausbau, der vorbereitete Sohn bietet wenigstens eine Zeitlang beim Vater. Doch ist die Hausgemeinschaft im Schwinden. Das naturverbundene, einsame Leben im abgelegenen Gebirge hat bei den Huzulen viele alte Vorstellungen und Sitten aus einer Zeit erhalten, die sich mit den schaffenden Geistern in der Natur in Beziehung wußte. Durch Träume und Vorzeichen läßt er sich den Beweggrund seines neuen Hauses bestätigen, unter dessen Balken vergräbt er Opfergaben. Die erstes geschnittenen Haare der Kinder bewahrt er in einem Loch des Herdes „zu Ehren des Hausgottes" auf, am Weihnachtsabend facht er durch Reiben ein neues Feuer an (siehe oben), das während der Zwölften unterhalten wird und an dem man keine Pfeife anzünden darf. Nach jedem Gebete küßt man die Erde „die Mutter und Ernährerin". Alte Sonnengeistervorstellungen spiegeln sich in dem merkwürdigen Brauche, daß kranke Kinder von einer Frau aus dem Hause getragen werden, die dabei folgendes spricht: „Ich habe mit dem Kinde die Sonne begrüßt, die Eiken das Hausen und alle Heiligen; jetzt grüße ich die Frau Mutter und bitte um den Rückkauf des Kindes". Schwarze Magie tritt in vielen Formen auf, zur Besserung des Viehes, Unfruchtbarmachen von Ehen und Feldern, Unglücksbringen, z. B. durch Unterstreuen von Asche und Disteln auf den Weg, oder Unterlegen von Tierteilen unter die Hausschwelle. Im Garten steckt man Pferdeschädel auf Stangen, um ihn gegen Raupen zu schützen (zum vergleiche die Pferdeköpfe der alten Germanen, entsprechende Sitten bei den Kirgisen — siehe Band I dieses Atlas — und in den Oasen Nordafrikas), an Obstbäumen läßt man wenigstens eine Frucht im Herbst hängen, damit sie den nächsten Jahr wieder tragen. Die Herkunft aus einer geistigen Heimat weiß noch die Vorstellung, daß jeder bei seiner Geburt seinen Stern am Himmel und seinen Schutzengel bekommt. Gedanken und Handlungen wirken, so weiß man, magisch auf die Umwelt, Schutz-, Trutz- und Liebesmittel aller Art bereiten darauf. Von der Welt-, Erd- und Menschenvergangenheit weiß man, daß auf der Sonne Menschen mit nur einem Strange wohnen; daß im Anfang langhärtige Zwerge lebten und ihnen Riesen folgten, die wegen eines Frevels durch vierzigtägigen Regen vernichtet wurden; daß weit unten am Boden der Flüsse die Riesenaugen wohnen und durch ihre Tränen ein Muster für die Menschen sind; ihnen neudet man auf den Bächen und Flüssen die Schalen geweihter Eier, wenn man Sind- und Montagnacht Tage nach Ostern das Rusalienfest feiert und durch alte Traditionen an glückbringen, geistigen Verstehen unterhält.

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1: Karutz

El Europe

Die Ruthenen des Flachlandes

1. Bauer im Winterpelz. 2. Bäuerinnen beim Flachsbrechen. 3. Mann in Winterkleidung. 4. Bäuerin im Winterpelz. 5. Bäuerinnen. 6. Wolinkaner. 7. Bäuerin am kammartigen Ständer für Milchtöpfe. 8. Bienenkorb. 9. Mais-(Kukurez-)Speicher. 10. Zaun aus geflochtenen Weidenruten. 11./12. Heimchaten. 13. Stangenzaun mit aufgesetzten Bienkorb als Regenschutz. 14. Holzkamm. 15. Ringförmige Flasche. 16. Frau im Rock mit aufgenähten Lederornamenten. 17. Bursche von Pruth in Sommerfestkleidung. 18. Irdener Topf. 19./20. Gestickte Hemden.

Die südliche Gruppe der Ostslaven wohnt von einer Linie Bjelostock-Pripetmündung-Saratow (Wolga) ab zwischen Großrußland im Norden, Polen, Galizien, Ungarn, Rumänien im Westen, Becken des Don im Osten, Schwarzes Meer im Süden. Sie nennt sich heute selbst politisch Ukrainer, volkstümlich auch Rusnaken, wird von den Ungarn in Galizien als Ruthenen, von den Russen als Kleinrussen bezeichnet und unterscheidet sich von letzteren durch Typ, Sprache, Temperament, Sitte und Lebensweise, infolgedessen z. B. durch eine bedeutende selbständige Dichtung und Literatur. Der Adel ist polonisiert. In Galizien und Ungarn ist der Ruthene griechisch uniert, in der Bukowina griechisch-orientalisch. Körperlich ist er schlank, schmächtig, dunkelhäutig, straffhaarig, braun- oder blauäugig. Männer und Frauen tragen gestickte Hemden, die im Norden rote Farben, im Süden dunkle, im mittleren Gebiet bunte Farben bevorzugen. Farbenfreudigkeit ist überhaupt ein hervorstechender Zug des Volkes. Die alte Form der Frauenkleidung ist die „platta", eine besondere Art Rock aus dichem, buntem, gewebtem Wollstoff, der schürzenartig und doppelt um den Körper gelegt und durch einen Wollgürtel festgehalten wird; über dem Hemd sitzt eine kurze, ärmellose Pelzjacke. Besonderen Schmuck legt die Braut in Form von Halsschnüren aus Glasperlen und von Kronen aus Pappe, Perlen, künstlichen Blumen, Pfauenfedern an. Das über den weiten, weißen, leinenen Hosen getragene Hemd der Männer ist am Hals, Brust, Ärmelenden gestickt; darüber trägt man im Sommer kurze, ärmellose Pelze mit bunten Lederbesatz, im Winter lange Pelze mit Ärmeln; auch die Hosen sind dann aus dickerem Tuch und die Mützen aus Pelz, während sonst der runde Hut herrscht. Der Brautigam trägt immer die alte, hohe, schwarze Lammfellmütze mit einem Kranz aus immergrün, Flitter, einem Stück Kuchbinsch als Schutz gegen alles Böse und einer Silbermünze, die gleichfalls Abwehrkraft besitzt. Für beide Geschlechter ist ein langer, früher meist weißer Mantel aus handgewebtem Stoffe gleich. Die Dörfer der Ruthenen liegen meist an Seen oder Flußufern, die Gehöfte von Stangenzäunen, die oben gegen die Feuchtigkeit mit schützenden Strohbündeln bedeckt sind (Bild 13), oder von Flechtzäunen umgeben, die aus Birken- und sonstigen zopfartig durch senkrechtes Pfahlwerk gezogenem Laubholzgezweig bestehen und zum Teil mit Schindeln überdacht sind. Ehemalige Erdhüttenbauten erhielten sich in Rauchhütten des Nordens, sonst hat die Gegend am Fuße des waldreichen Gebirges moosgedichtete Blockhäuser mit Schindeldach, das übrige Land aus Reth geflochtene und mit Lehm beworfene, innen und außen weiße Häuser mit Strohdach. Aus Flechtwerk von Weiden, mit Strohdach sind die Körbe für Mais; für anderes Getreide hat man einfache Schutzdächer auf Pfosten. Um die Gehöfte sieht man Wälle aus Mist, der außer Stroh wegen des gänzlichen Holzmangels in der Steppenebene als Brennmaterial dient. Gewöhnlich hat jedes Haus zwei Stuben rechts und links von einem Mittelflur. Ein Rauchabzug fehlt meist, der Flur hat keine Decke, sondern öffnet sich, um den Rauch herauszulassen, in den Dachraum. Der First wird durch Holzböcke gesichert. Der Dachrand springt vor, so daß darunter Vorräte und Werkzeug aufbewahrt werden können. Die Fußböden sind aus gestampftem Lehm, an den Wänden ziehen sich breite, als Lagerstätten dienende Bänke, die südöstliche Ecke nimmt der Tisch, die entgegengesetzte Ecke der Ofen ein, der im Winter auch als Schlafstelle benutzt wird. Der ruthenische Holzbau leistet sein Größtes in hohen, geräumigen, zu mehreren Stockwerken aufsteigenden Kuppelkirchen. Die Wirtschaft ruht auf dem Ackerbau und der Viehzucht, daneben treibt man viel Imkerei — die Bienenstöcke sind aus Holz oder Strohgeflecht — im Walde Köhlerei. Die Ruthenen gelten als passive, fatalistische Menschen von musikalischer Begabung, sie bewahrten sich also eine Seele, die in den alten rhythmischen Schlägen der Natur mitschlägt, und erhielten sich ein Wissen um das geistige Leben in der Natur, das in ähnlichen Sitten und Vorstellungen sich noch äußert, wie bei den Huzulen. Auch sie graben unter das Fundament oder den Ofen des neuen Hauses Bauopfer von Pferde-, Rinder-, Schafschädeln, auch wohl von Silbergeld; auch sie leben in der Zeit der Weihnacht und der zwölf heiligen Nächte mit Geistern und Seelen der Verstorbenen, üben vielfache animistische Bräuche, um die Kräfte der Natur magisch zu nutzen, und folgen in Hochzeits-, Fest- und anderen Sitten unstädtischen, altertümlichen Formen.

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Die südlichen tschechisch-slowakischen Westslaven

1. Slowakischer Bauer. 2. Alter Slowake. 3. Zwei alte Slowaken. 4. Tschechische Flötenbläser. 5. Mädchenfest, Ostslawien. 6. Ornament eines Bettstreifens (Wochenbettvorhang) aus Mähren. 7. Tschechs mit weiten Hosen. 8. Karpathischer Bauer. 9. Löffel, Westgalizien. 10. Handmühle, Galizien. 11. Löffelschen, Westgalizien. 12./13. Bemalte Ostereier aus Mähren. 14. Zwei karpathische Hirten.

In Böhmen, Mähren, Karpathenhochland wohnte einst eine alteuropäische Bevölkerung, bis die Kelten, dann die markomannischen Germanen sie unterwarfen und aufsogen. Vom 5. Jahrhundert ab zogen Slaven, die sich östlich der Weichsel auf frühindogermanischer Stufe völkisch zusammengeschlossen hatten, aus ihren Wohnsitzen westwärts ab und in die von der Völkerwanderung freigegebenen Länder. Sie waren und sind vornehmlich Ackerbauer und Bienenzüchter und Fischer; dann Hirten, die auf den Bergen Sommerweidewirtschaft treiben und in Bauden die Milch zu Käse und Butter verarbeiten. Die Wälder geben ihren Holzreichtum her. Die slavische Wohnweise ist die Dorfsiedlung, deren wirtschaftliche und rechtliche — in alten Zeiten auch religiös-kultische, die Wahrung der Heiligtümer und die Opferhandlungen — Verhältnisse von den Ältesten geleitet werden. Der physisch gesunde Volksschlag treibt als seine Blüten eine gewisse breite üppige Art vorübergehender Mädchenschönheit und scharfgeprägte Alterskäpfe, die dem ländlich abgeschiedenen Leben, nicht weniger aber wohl der mit ihm verbundenen Naturbeobachtung ihre physiognomischen Züge entlehnen, einer Weisheit, der die Zivilisation fremd ist, die aber um so mehr von dem Urwissen um den Geist der Natur, um die Wesen der Sonne, des Lichtes und des Feuers, um die guten und bösen Elementarwesen, um die Seelen der Toten, um die schaffenden, wirksamen Kräfte der Dinge, Pflanzen, Tiere, Menschen sich bewahrt hat. Die Feste der Winter- und Sommersonnenwende werden noch gefeiert, im Frühling tragen noch heute Mädchen des Dorfes eine Puppe in weiblichen Kleidern umher und verbrennen sie, mit ihr den Tod des Winters, zugleich ein Erlebnis der weiblichen Schaffenskräfte, die im Feuer der geistigen Welt zugeführt am Zeugungsprozeß der Welt teilnehmen; sie singen dabei „den Tod tragen wir aus dem Dorf, den neuen Sommer ins Dorf". Die neue Zeit verändert stark die alten Anschauungen, nur das Dorf abgelegener Gegenden bewahrt sich manches, was anderswo verloren gegangen ist, erhält sich Volkstrachten, die wie bei allen Slaven eine leuchtende Farbenfreudlichkeit und eine manchmal ins Groteske gehende (Bild 7) Stoffverschwendung charakterisiert. In der Ornamentik tauchen orientalische Motive auf, wie der Lebensbaum mit den symmetrisch gegenständigen Löwen in Bild 6 und die vorderasiatischen der Ostereier (Bild 12 und 13), in denen sogar die kirgisische, urtürkische Linie des Widderhorns erscheint. Bezeichnende Teile der Kleidung sind im Sommer das kurze über die Beinkleider fallende Hemd mit Gürtel, gestickte ärmellose Jacke, Sandalen aus Schweine- oder Kalbhaut, weiße Röcke; im Winter dazu weiße Tuchmäntel und große Schafpelze. Bei den Frauen gestickte Hemden, Jacken, Kopf- und Brusttücher, fußfreie weite, bunte Röcke. Die allgemeine slavische Begabung für Musik und eine lieder-, sagen-, märchenreiche Volksliteratur fehlt nicht. Von altümlichem Kulturgut hat sich weniger erhalten als im Osten und Süden. Im Gebirge trifft man noch Handmühlen aus Steinen, deren oberer mit einem Stock gegen den unteren gedreht wird.

1: Karutz

El Europe

Die kroatisch-slavonischen Südslaven

1. Maisspeicher aus Latten. 2. Jagdbecher. 3. Kroatische Dörfler bei Agram. 4. Spinnende Frau. 5. Tierornament eines Teppichs. 6. Lebensbaumornament auf einem Kopfkissen. 7. Handtuchreinsatz. 8. Doppelflöte. 9. Verzierte Kürbisflasche. 10. Brosche. 11. Obrgehänge. 12. Muster ornamentierter Keramik. 13/15. Gürtelschnallen aus Messing. 14. Pulverflasche aus Hirschhorn. 16. Spinnrocken.

Von Norden her, wo der slavische Zweig der indogermanischen Stämme sich östlich der Weichsel eigenhalt entfaltet hatte, zogen im 6. und 7. Jahrhundert die Kroaten und Slavonen in das Donaubecken und breiteten sich unter Mischung mit den angetroffenen Bewohnern altthrakischen, aber durch lange Jahrhunderte mit Romanen und Germanen gemischten Blutes bis an die Adria aus; sie wurden hier westlichen Einflüssen stärker zugänglich als ihre Brüder im Osten und nahmen das römisch-katholische Bekenntnis und die lateinische Schrift an, während die Serben griechisch-orthodox wurden und die cyrillischen Zeichen brauchten. Zwischen Save und Drau gründeten sie einen selbständigen, zuletzt monarchischen Staat, kamen 1102 unter die ungarische Krone, 1918 bei der Aufteilung Österreichs mit Slovenen, Serben, Bosniern, Dalmatinern zum jugoslavischen Reiche. Anthropologisch zeichnet sie kräftige Gestalt, hoher Wuchs, entschiedene Kurzköpfigkeit, dunkles Haar und Iskarnat aus. Wirtschaftlich waren sie Bauern und Hirten, der deutsche Einfluß hat dann den Ackerbau überall verbreitet und gehoben. Sie siedeln in Gehöften, die zu Straßendörfern vereinigt sind und von Zäunen sorgfältigster, verschiedenster Technik eingefaßt werden. Die Häuser sind meist klein, einstöckig aus Geflecht oder Fachwerk, mit geweißtem Lehm bestrichen, seltener, im Küstenlande, aus Steinen, ungebrannten und gebrannten Ziegeln. Die breit zu schattenden, gegen Regen schützenden Umgängen vorspringenden Dächer sind aus Schindeln, Schilf, Ziegeln oder Schiefer. Die Fenster waren früher durch geölten Papier statt durch Glas verschlossen, Rauchabzug fehlt noch jetzt meist. Vor dem Hause steht ein baumartiger Ständer, auf dessen Äste die umgestülpten Milchkrüge gesteckt werden. Das Haus ist dreiteilig, so daß Wohnstube und Kammer zuseiten eines Mittelraumes liegen, der Flur und offene Herdstelle umfaßt. Die Fußböden sind gestampfte Erde, die Decke zeigt die eichenen Balkenträger, der riesige Ofen umgibt sich mit Bänken und hat über sich ein Wäschegestell, an Hausrat stehen da hohe Bettstellen mit dicken Federbetten, Kleidertruhen, Webstuhl, Spinn- und Webegerät, in der Küche zierliche Kannen, Fässer, Becher, Kübel, Kuchenbretter, Mangel- und Waschhölzer, ausgestichelte Kürbisflaschen, kreiselnde Ton- oder Steingutflaschen, geflochtene Schilftaschen, bestickte Ledertaschen zum Einholen und Forttragen von Sachen. In all diesem betätigt sich ein außergewöhnlicher Sinn für fleißige, geschmackvolle, zierfreudige kunstgewerbliche Arbeit, ebenso in den gewebten Stoffen, den Gobelinteppichen, den Stickereien an Hemden, Röcken, Schürzen, Hauben, Gürteln. In den Mustern leben vorderasiatische, persische sowohl wie turktatarische Überlieferungen fort, die tierfigurialen Motive, die polygonalen Felderungen, der altasyrische Lebensbaum mit flankierenden Tieren (Bild 6). Neben dem Hauptwohnhause liegt außer Stall und Speicher ein zweites Haus mit Schlafstuben für die Familien der Hausgemeinschaft, die sich als altslavische patriarchalische Gesellschaftsbildung bei den Bauern erhalten hat und nebst der im Gegensatz zu den ganz einzelsiedelnden Germanen beliebten Dorfgemeinde den rechtlichen und wirtschaftlichen Organismus eines unfreien Gruppenbewußtseins darstellt. Das Sprichwort „Die Frau schützt drei Ecken des Hauses, der Mann nur eine", beleuchtet die Arbeitsverteilung in der Heimwirtschaft. Volkstrachten finden sich nur noch auf dem Lande, die Frauen tragen reichgestickte Kleider und Hemden, Schürzen und Jäckchen, Strümpfe und Halstücher, die Männer weiße Hosen, darüber weiße gestickte Hemden, gestickte Gürtel für Messer, Tücher, Tabaksdose, Geldtasche, Stahl und Schwamm oder Streichhölzer, Westen aus Leder oder Tuch mit Metallknöpfen, runde Hüte, oft mit Blumen geschmückt, verschnürte Sandalen. Das Volk ist musikalisch gut begabt — von alten Instrumenten erhielt sich der Dudelsack —, gesangsfreudig und tanzlustig — der Reigentanz des Balkans, der Kolo findet sich auch bei ihm — und besitzt reichliche Märchenschätze. Es lebt noch ein naturverbundenes rhythmisches Wesen aus, feiert ausgiebig und überlieferungsgemäß die Jahreszeitenfeste und hält sich an eine Menge von Gebräuchen, die der Rest einer alten tiefen Religiosität und eines bildschöpferischen Wissens von der geistigen Natur sind. In ihnen und in der Literatur spiegeln sich die alten Schauungen der lichten Mächte des Lebens und der dunklen des Todes, der Wasser-, Pflanzen-, Erd-, und Berggeister, der Sonnen-, Licht-, Wärme-, Feuerwesen. Kultisch verehrte Feuer, Sprung durch das Feuer zur Zeit der Sonnenwende, Glaube an die Sonnengottgeburt zur Weihnachtszeit, Feier der heiligen zwölf Nächte sind solche Reste. Wie in Rumänien, konnte man früher das Begießen eines mit Gras und Blumen umwundenen Mädchens, um in der Trockenzeit Regen vom Himmel herunter zu zwingen; Besprechen, Bannen, Wettermachen und sonstige schwarzmagische Künste sind noch in Übung, schatzhütende Schlangen, Vampyre, Drachen des Gewitters leben in den Vorstellungen. Zahllose animistische Bräuche sind im Schwange — das Überschütten der Braut mit Getreidekörnern sei als Beispiel genannt — aus dem Wissen von den Wesensübertragungen der Dinge. Die ethnologisch wichtige Herkunft der Kultur von göttlichen Eingebungen führender Heroenmenschen erscheint in dem Märchen von den wilden Frauen, die einst, in der glücklichen alten Zeit, vom nächsten Hügel herab dem Bauer im Frühjahr [illegible], wann er Erbsen legen, Getreide säen und seine sonstigen landwirtschaftlichen Arbeiten verrichten solle. Das Verhältnis zu den Toten hatte noch bis vor kurzem so materielle Formen, daß man Eier, Äpfel, Brot, auf das frische Grab legte.

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1: Karutz

El Europe

Die Serben

1. Kegelhütte in der Kosovo-Ebene. 2. Feuerrahmen im Schargebirge. 3. Bauernstuhl. 4. Kegelhütte über einer Mistgrube. 5. Feuerbock mit Hahn- und Schlingenkopf. 6. Feuerbock in Form eines Rindes. 7. Kindergeige aus einem Maisholm. 8. [illegible] Medizin, mit Eierschalen. 9. Feuerrahmen mit einem Fidelbogen. 10. Holzpflug. 11./12. Tonguschir. 13. Korn aus Wurzel und Harz. 14. Medizin gegen bösen Blick, aus Muschels und Perlen, für die Koppen kleiner Kinder. 15. Miniatur. 16. Kindertrage mit Rahmen. 17. Türschloß aus Holz. 18. Kambel aus Rothschenkeln.

Die Ursitze der zum späteren Serbentum entwickelten Südslaven, der „Raszien-Leute" oder „Raitzen", sollen am oberen Ibar liegen. Dort schon haben Vermischungen mit Vorbewohnern albanisch-illyrischer Rasse stattgefunden. Die türkische Herrschaft hat eine religiöse Spaltung zwischen Mohammedanern und Griechisch-Orthodoxen gebracht. Der Rassengegensatz sprach sich früher in den beiden Haupt-Wirtschaftsformen des Ackerbaues, der, von je den Slaven eigentümlich, hauptsächlich Mais, daneben Weizen und Gerste umfaßt, und der Viehzucht aus, die, ohne Milchwirtschaft, den vorserbischen, mit Albanern und Illyrern stammverwandten Walachen zugehört, seit dem 11. Jahrhundert auch für Bulgarien bezeugt ist, und in den Tälern Schweine und Rinder zu großen Herden, auf den Höhen Schafe und Rinder nützt. Heute verwischt sich der Gegensatz durch den zunehmenden Übergang vom Hirtenwesen zum Bauerntum, der freilich noch zögernd vor sich geht: oft zieht ein Teil des Ortes für einige Zeit in das Ackerland, ein anderer zu den Weiden, Bauernhäuser und Hirtenhütten sind dann so hergestellt, daß sie auf Wagen und Schlitten mitgenommen werden können. Die einfachsten Wohnformen sind die Kegelhütten aus Bauernbeide, Stroh und Lehm, besonders eigentümlich die Dunggruben mit kegelförmigen Wänden aus Pfosten, Dung, Stroh, die während des Winters von den Mädchen bewohnt werden (Bild 4). Im Gebirge herrscht der gefluchte Fachwerkbau mit Ziegel- oder Bretterdach und das Einzelhaus-Blockhaus mit Strohdach, mit niedrigem Steinsockel, offener Feuerstelle ohne Rauchabzug. Die Form des Flachdaches ist der einzelstehige, sauber getünchte, mit Hohlziegeln gedeckte Ziegel-, seltener Lehm-Bau mit einer Säulen-Veranda, einem Hausflur mit großem Kamin, niedrigen, weißgetünchten Stuben, deren Boden aus Lehm ist, deren Fenster vergittert sind und deren Ausstattung in Pritschen, Bänken, Truhen besteht. Aus dem Orient kommen die Teppiche, die um den Herd herum den Fußboden bedecken. Das Bauerntum hängt noch stark an der Wirtschaftseinheit der Familie (Zadruga), die sich gegen Fremde abschließt, ihre eigenen Handwerker, ihre eigene Mühle hat und ihre Angehörigen zu gemeinsamen Arbeiten (moba) verpflichten kann. An altertümlichem Gerät hat man den Holzpflug, hölzerne Wandkorbchen, Trinkbecher, Tischlöffel, Mädchenkörbchen zum Herstellen einer Art Kamm (neuere Statuenstilch), Knoblauchstampfer, Windenschlägel, geschnitzte und bemalte Spindeln und Spinnrocken. Im Osten sind bemalte und gestickte Käsbingefäße im Gebrauch, überall der 1½ m hohe Tragkorb aus Schilf, Schlösche dienen zur Winterstreuwerbung von gepreßten Kühe, Wasserhanen und gestickte Kochlöffel aus Ton sind einfach ornamentiert. Der byzantinische Einfluß hat einen starken, künstlerischen, zumal naturgemäß in der kirchlichen Kunst sich auslebenden, stilschöpferischen Einschlag gebracht, der orientalische Motive mit sich führte (Bild 15, symmetrische Tiergestalten auf einer Miniatur). Unter dem Christentum leben noch Überreste der älteren Denkart, die in der Natur die schaffenden Geistmächte ehrerbietig und in vielerlei Gebräuchen sich immer neu neue Lebendig machte. Das uralte Liebeserlebnis des Menschen hat sich in der Sitte erhalten, das Herdfeuer nicht ausgehen zu lassen — tut es das doch, so bedeutet es Unglück oder Tod — und zu Weihnachten wie Johanni eigene Feuer anzuzünden. Das Feuer hat schützende Kräfte. Zu Heilzwecken, z. B. bei Epidemien, wird ein frisches „heiliges Feuer" nach der altertümlichen Methode des Feuerreibens entfacht: zwei ganz trockene, walzenförmige Lindenhölzer werden — im Schargebirge durch nackende Knaben und Mädchen in einer dunklen Kammer (Bild 2) — aneinandergerieben oder ein drehbares Holz wird mit einem Strick oder der Sehne eines Fidelbogens doppelt umschlungen und durch Hin- und Herziehen in schnelle Umdrehung gebracht. Schutzmedizinen als sichtbare Symbole altgewohnter, geistiger Zusammenhänge sind überall in Gebrauch. Die Eierschalen der magischen Medizin in Bild 8 stammen von der ersten Brut des Jahres und fördern die Fruchtbarkeit während des Jahres. Auf altillyrischen Brauch führt man die Sitte zurück, die Toten auf Hügeln und Bergkuppen zu bestatten. Wie alle Südslaven sind die Serben ein sangesfrohes, musikliebendes Volk, sie haben lange Hirtenflöten, doppeltellige Flöten, bis 3 m lange Hirtenhörner aus Birken- oder Weidenrinde, einseitige Streich- und Zupfinstrumente, Dudelsack. Eine ethnographische Parallele ist die Kindergeige (Bild 7) aus einem Maisholm, aus dessen Epidermis zwei schmale Streifen als Saiten losgelöst sind, genau wie in Afrika, Indien und Indonesien. Äußerlich sind die Serben hochgewachsene, schlanke, aber breitschultrige Menschen mit kurzem Schädel und dunklem Haar. Die Hirten tragen eine aus Ziegenwolle selbstgewebte Kleidung: Hemd, Beinkleider aus weißem Tuch, weiße Socken, Schnürsandalen (Opanken), breiten Gürtel, ärmellosen, weiten, langen Rock aus weißem, bei Frauen schwarzem Tuch, Jacke aus weißem Tuch, schwarzen, ärmellosen Umhängemantel aus schwarzem Tuch, schwarze, eingedrückte Lammfellmützen. Die Bauernbevölkerung trägt das weitärmelige, leinene Hemd, meist über den leinenen Hosen, die sehr weit sind, gestickte Hemden, Strümpfe und Westen, zumal die Mädchen lieben ihre wollenen, seidenen und seidenen Schürzen durch eine schwere Buntstickerei reich zu verzieren; sie tragen außerdem als nationaleigentümlichstes Stück gern eine kurze, offene, breitärmelige, mit Goldtressen verzierte Seidenjacke, den K[illegible] tragen die Mädchen bis auf einen kleinen Fez, um den die mit einem Bande bedeckten Zöpfe gelegt werden, bloß, nur die Bräute tragen große Kronen, wertvolle Erbstücke, mit Silbermünzen, Federn, Perl- und Knopfstickerei (vgl. Tafel Die bemalten Südslaven, Bild 6).

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KA-ΦITA

Die Magyaren

1. Frau aus den Bergen, aus der Hand spinnend. 2. Kuhhörner. 3. Oberhirt. 4. Einfache Verzierung eines Mützen-Tuchmantelschließhäkchens. 5. Einfache Verzierung von Tuchmantelnähten. 6. Stöckenschnitzerei in Pfauenfedermuster auf einem Lammpelz. 7. Rauchpuppe. 8. Geschnitzte Tränkschale aus Holz, von Hirten am Gürtel getragen. 9. Geschnitzter Schöpfgefäß aus Holz. 10. Rückenstück einer Frauen-Stickjacken. 11. Geschnitzter Hebelschel einer Hirtenmelkhäkchen aus Horn. 12. Kerbstock.

Im heutigen Ungarn, das seinen Namen von der byzantinischen Bezeichnung Ogor für das Land zwischen Wolga und Ural erhalten hat, wohnen neben Südslaven, Ruthenen, Rumänen und andern späteren Fremdvölkern als Hauptbevölkerung die Magyaren d. s. „Männer des Landes". Sie kamen von Nordosten her, von der oberen Wolga, wo sie ihr Volk aus finnischen und turkstatarischen Elementen gebildet hatten, im neunten Jahrhundert in den Donau-Theißniederungen an und trafen eine Mischbevölkerung, die aus einem thrakisch-illyrischen, von Rom her zivilisierten Grundstock und hinzugetretenen Germanen, Hunnen, Avaren, Deutschen, Slaven, Bulgaren bestand. Körperlich sind sie durch mittelgroße, kräftige Statur und gesunde Konstitution, durch Rundköpfigkeit, durch straffen, glänzend schwarzen Haar und dunkle Augen ausgezeichnet. Von ihrem finnischen Blut her Fischer und Jäger, vom türkischen her Viehzüchter, sind sie heute noch zum großen Teil Pferde- und Rinderhirten, zum andern, infolge deutschen und slavischen (russisch-ruthenischen) Einflusses, Ackerbauern. Die Hirten bauen sich flüchtige Hütten aus Tafeln von Weidengeflecht, die an Pflöcken befestigt und im Viereck aufgestellt werden, und schützen ihre Pferde auf der windigen Puszta durch schirmartige Windschirme. Die Magyaren haben sich noch immer eine eigene, recht charakteristische Tracht bewahrt, überwiegend, in den Dörfern und Städten vielfach unter eingeschränkten Leinenbekleid, verzierten Tuchmantel, buntbesäumten Lammpelz, weitärmeligen kurzen Hemd, Weste, Dolman, Attila, Schaftstiefel, runden niedrigen Hut. Die Frauen tragen weite faltige halblange Röcke, farbige Jacken, verschnürte Mieder, Pelze, Kopftücher. Die Pferdehirten zeichnet die lange Peitsche, der Lasso aus Hanf und Roßhaar zum Fangen der Pferde aus der Herde, der Überwurf aus zottigen Leder, die Rinderhirten der bernsteinfarbene Überwurf aus Wollstoff mit Stickerei, die Schafhirten der lange, im Sommer wie Winter getragene Pelz und der lange krumme Stab, die Schweinehirten das glänzende scharfe Beil (Fokosch), mit dem sie die Herde zusammenhalten. Für die Schafherden dienen neben Leithämmeln Leitziegen. Die Nahrung ist naturgemäß vorwiegend Fleisch und Speck, dazu Paprika, außerdem liebt man Mohnpiroggen. Von altertümlicher Zubereitung wird, wie auf dem Balkan, noch das Zerstampfen von Gerste und Hirsekörnern in Holzmörsern zur Bereitung geübt. Die Verbindung mit ihrer finnischen Heimat hat man ethnographisch u. a. in den Analogien der Fischzäune und Fischereigerätschaften der Magyaren zu denen der West- und Ostfinnen festzustellen gesucht. Sehr bemerkenswert sind die östlichen Motive auf den Stickereien und Schnitzereien, die Bild 4 bis 10 der Tafel wiedergibt, die indische Pfauenfeder und der assyrische Lebensbaum, die über Turkistan und Südrußland den Magyaren schon in ihrer alten Heimat zugeflossen und mit ihnen nach Ungarn gekommen sein mögen, andrerseits auch wohl später, im Mittelalter, von Persien und Byzanz her übertragen sind. Der Lebensbaum tritt so häufig auf, daß gesagt worden ist, das Volksbewußtsein der Székler könne sich kein Haus, keinen Hof ohne ihn vorstellen (Bild 4, 6, 8). Tierfiguren wie auf Bild 9 scheinen auf eigene Zusammenhänge mit der altirischen Bronzezeit zu deuten, der Doppelwidderkopf des Bildes 5 leitet zu den Kirgisen, den Urtürken Mittelasiens. Gegenwärtiges Naturgefühl bekundet zu pflanzlichen Motiven der Zierkunst Nelke, Rose, Lilie, sie stehen aber gegen die Pfauenfeder in zweiter Linie. Das Vorstellungsleben ist mit Resten alter Kultur eines animistischen Zeitalters, das von den geistigen Kräften im Kosmos, in der Erde und im Menschen weiß, noch stark gefüllt und bricht in magischen Willenstaten aller Art zur Erscheinung durch: Nägel, Haare, Knochen, Blut von Toten werden in tausend Varianten äußerlich und innerlich gegen Krankheiten aller Art angewendet; sie schützen gegen Unglück, zwingen aber auch das Glück. Die sog. Rauchpuppe des Bildes von den Rumänen in Ungarn, aber dem Bewußtsein der Magyaren und gleichen Bewußtseinsstufen in Schottland (corp creadh) und sonst in Europa entsprechend, ist nur möglich, wo ursprünglich eine natürliche, physiologische Verbindung zwischen Subjekt und Objekt einer magischen Handlung gewußt wird, ein übersinnliches d. h. sinnlich nicht wahrnehmbares, aber objektiv vorhandenes geistiges Element, in welchem Gedanke und Wille die äußere Trennung der Personen überwindet: Der in eine Puppe getriebene Nagel verletzt die physische Person selbst, die in der Puppe dargestellt ist. Diese schwarzmagische Handlung kehrt als Schießen nach dem Portrait, als Augenausdrückstechen des Bildes des Feindes und dgl. wieder (vgl. Tafel „Gaulos" II dieses Bandes).

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
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Die Rumänen

I.

1. Höhlenwohnung bei Anerlik in der Dobrudscha. 2. Halbunterirdische Wohnung. 3. Haus mit Kegeldach. 4. Bauernhaus. 5. Tatarische Hütte in der Dobrudscha, aus Rohr und Lehm. 6. Haus mit vorspringendem Dach auf Pfählen. 7. Hausdachfirst. 8. Handpflug. 9. Flechtkorb mit Stäbchen. 10. Hauptür. 11. Ochsenjoch. 12. Seelsäuger in ihrem Holzsarge. 13. Tischtruhe mit Rittersattern. 14. Tischtruhe mit Kerbschnitt, von A. Riegl wohl unnötig auf die mittelkretische Kalkschnitt-Technik zurückgeführt.

Von den Südkarpathen und dem Moldautal bis zur Donau und zum Schwarzen Meer wohnt das rassenhaft und sprachlich gemischte Volk der Rumänen, das sich nach den einen südlich der Donau gebildet und auf das linke Ufer gewechselt hat, nach den andern nördlich von ihr im Südkarpathengebiet entstanden ist. Thraker, von den Alten als große blonde blauäugige Menschen erwähnt; Skythen, zu den Nordeuropäern gehörige Wandervölker; Römer und ihre Kolonisten; Germanen; Slaven der rathenischen und der serbischen Gruppe; Bulgaren und andere Turkvölker sind seine Elemente. Die Sprache ist ein abgewandeltes Latein mit albanischen (thrakisch-illyrischen), slavischen, bulgarischen, magyarischen, griechischen, türkischen Einschlägen, die Religion griechisch-orthodox. Wirtschaftlich teilen sich die Rumänen in Wanderhirten, die auf dem grasreichen Bergrücken der Karpathen und in den öden Flachlandsteppen Schafe weiden und wohl auch als Walachen im Gegensatz zu den seßhaften Bauern als den Rumänen bezeichnet werden. Die Ackerbauer siedelten ursprünglich in Einzelgehöften, dann in Dörfern; ihr Haus ist ein quadratischer Holzbau, einstöckig, mit Altan und steilem Dach aus Tannenschindeln, an abschüssigen Stellen mit Steinsockel, selten neuerdings ganz aus Stein, in holzarmen Gegenden ein schilfgedecktes Fachwerk aus Erdpfählen, Stäben, die durch Äste und Reisig verbunden sind, und einem Bewurf von Erde, Stroh, Kuhmist. Das Dach läßt man gern vorspringen und auf Pfosten ruhen, so daß ein gedeckter Gang entsteht. In den Gehöften kommen zum Wohnhause hinzu Anbauten für Ställe und Schuppen, selbstständige Geflügel- und Viehställe, sowie die Sommerküche mit offenem Herd. Meist werden die Hohlwände mit Lehm bewerfen. Der Fußboden ist aus gestampftem Lehm. Der Rauch wird nicht in einem Schornstein gesammelt, sondern zieht durch Haus und Dachboden zu den Luken hinaus. Türriegel sind aus Holz, die Türbänder aus Riemen oder Haselruten. In der Dobrudscha grüßt man heute noch, wie es die Troglodyten des Strabo und des Ptolemäus taten, Wohngruben in den weißen Muschelkalk und in den Löß und deckt sie mit Zweigen und Ästen, auf die eine Lößschicht gelegt wird. Aus Holzmangel heizt man hier mit getrockneten Ziegeln von Büffelmist, wie im Orient mit Pferde- oder Kameldung. In den Ebenen der großen und kleinen Walachei gibt es noch Erdwohnungen, die vom Boden der Umgebung nicht zu unterscheiden, nur durch den karbarigen Schornstein aus Weidengeflecht zu erkennen sind; das Dach ist aus Balken, Brettern, Schilf, Erde und mit Grünkraut und Kürbissen bedeckt. Diese bis 3 m tiefen halbunterirdischen Häuser schützen gleichmäßig gegen Hitze und Kälte. Der Bauer ist bedürfnislos, nährt sich einfach, oft schlecht und gilt als nicht sehr kräftig. Mais bildet neben Weizen, Hirse, Schafmilch und Käse, Fischen, Zwiebeln, Wildgemüse, rohem Obst die Hauptnahrung; er wird in einem Holzmörser zu Graupen gestoßen oder auf einer Handmühle durch Hin- und Herdrehen des oberen von zwei aufeinandergelegten Steinen zu Graupen gemahlen. Aus dem Brei werden mit Käse gefüllte Knödel und Fladen in heißer Asche oder auf glühenden Kohlen oder auf erhitzten Steinen, die von der Mutter auf die Tochter vererbt werden, gebacken. Brot und Kuchen werden wie auf dem ganzen Balkan unter einer Backglocke gebacken, die aus Eisenblech und darüber gestrichener dicker Lehmschicht besteht. Fleisch wird auf dem Rost gebraten. Öl gewinnt man aus einheimischen Kernen. Im Gebirge mahlt man wie in Albanien mit Turbinenmühlen; aus alter Zeit erhalten geblieben ist noch der schwere Holzpflug, an den der gleichfalls hölzerne Schollenwerfer mit Lindenbast angebunden ist. Zum Aufbewahren von Körnerfrucht dienen geflochtene Rutenkörbe, für Milch nimmt man Flaschenkürbisse. Altertümlich ist die auf Bild 9 wiedergegebene Flechtereinrichtung für die schwarzen Wollgürtel der Frauen im Siebenbürgischen Komitat Hunyad; die von der Decke herunterhängenden Fäden werden mittels Stäbchen in Verkreuzungen festgehalten und mit der Hand aufgenommen, Knoten fallen weg. Altertümlich sind Reigentanz (Horo), Vorwurf und Rhythmus der Volksgesänge, Hochzeits- und Begräbnisgebräuche — bei Beerdigungen und bei Totengedenkfeiern ißt man bestimmte Gerichte aus mildreizartig gebackten Weizenkörnern — magische Zeremonien als Reste einer Wildniskultur auf Grund gütiger Schonung elementarer Wesenheiten hinter den Naturerscheinungen wie der Umzug unehelicher Zigeunermädchen bei sommerlicher Dürre zur Verehrung der Paparuda, der Göttin der Fruchtbarkeit (slav. baba und roda, Frucht), bei dem die Mädchen tanzend und singend von Gehöft zu Gehöft gehen und an jedem Tor mit Wasser begossen werden, wodurch der Regen heruntergeholt wird; wie der Brauch des Sonkoine, bei dem eine Puppe aus Lehm, die den Geist der Dürre darstellen soll, an der man also die bösen, zerstörenden Mächte der Natur erhält, in einem geschmückten Holzsarg unter Klagegesängen von Mädchen zu einem fließenden Wasser getragen wird. Dem Zuge voran wird ein grüner Fichtenbaumzweig getragen, hinter ihm Fahnen aus Papier, eine Kohlenpfanne mit Weihrauch und eine brennende Wachskerze. Sarg und Kerze werden dem Wasser übergeben, sonst, wenn kein Fluß da ist, in einen Brunnen geworfen oder begraben.

1: Karutz

El Europe

Die Rumänen

II.

1.—5. Schürzentrachten der rumänischen Bäuerinnen. 6. Rumänische Frauen. 7. Stickerei mit Lebensbaummotiv in einer letzten Entartung. 8/9. Bäuerinnentrachten. 10. Rumänische Hirten. 11. Rumäne mit engen Hosen und Bundschuhen.

Die ältesten Kleiderformen Rumäniens haben sich bei den Hirten der Berge erhalten: geschnürte Lederstiefeln; oben weite, an den Waden enganliegende, in Querfalten gelegte Beinkleider; Gürtel aus Leder oder Wolle; kurzes überfallendes Hemd; Pelzweste aus Hammelfell, mit den Haaren nach innen, sommers und winters gleichmäßig getragen; schwarze Pelzjacke; langer Schafpelzmantel, das Haar nach innen; Mütze aus Lammfell; Kapuze, ein Filzstück (ghuga), wie es noch antiken Denkmälern schon die Thraker trugen. Die Frauen und Mädchen tragen bei der Arbeit grobe selbstgefertigte Leinen- und Wollstoffe, bei Festen und Feiern dagegen farbenreiche, geschmackvoll mit bunten Ziermustern in Weberei und Stickerei bedeckte Gewandung: Die Hemden sind auf den Ärmeln und auf der Brust gestickt, die schürzenartigen Röcke farbig gewebt. Diese sind das charakteristische Kleidungsstück, ein Hüfttuch, das eng um den Unterkörper geschlungen und an den freien vorneliegenden Enden seitlich zurückgeschlagen wird. Außerdem kommen einfache und doppelte, vorn und hinten herunterhängende Schürzen mit und ohne Fransen vor, die von einem Gürtel gehalten werden und äußerst reich in Teppichmustern buntgestickt und mit Gold- und Silberfäden durchwirkt sind. Ferner ärmellose Jacken, lange Mäntel, Kopftücher, Halsketten aus goldenen und silbernen Münzen. In den Mustern erhalten sich vorderasiatische Muster, darunter das Lebensbaummotiv in ursprünglicherer Form mit flankierenden Tieren oder in letzten Entartungen schematischer Blumenvasen.

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1: Karutz

El Europe

Die Bulgaren

1. Haarschmuck junger Frauen, mit silbervergoldeten Zöpfen. 2./3. Schmuckgehänge. 4. Kopfschmuck der Bräute, aus Blumen und Silbermünzen. 5. Frau in gestickter Bluse und gewebter Teppichschürze. 6. Ziehbrunnen. 7. Halsschmuck. 8. Handmühle für Salz. 9. Dreschschlitten. 10. Hüllenverschluß am Lasso. 11. Feuersäge. 12. Dorfstraße. 13. Schutzdach der Feldhüter. 14. Hausaltar. 15. Klapperbrett aus Holz, von einem Kloster. 16. Signalhorn eines Landbriefträgers. 17. Sägegestell.

Das heutige Bulgarien hieß zur Zeit der Römer in seinem nördlichen (Donau-)Gebiet Mösien, in seinem südlichen Teil Thrakien und war von Indogermanen nordeuropäischer Verwandtschaft bewohnt, als sich altgriechische, später römische und byzantinische Einwanderer dahinzogen und sich mit ihnen mischten. Vom 6. Jahrhundert ab schob sich die slavische Welle heran, vom 7. ab trafen wiederholt finnisch-turktatarische Wanderhirten und Pferdezüchter von der mittleren Wolga her ein. Von ihnen behielt das spätere Bulgarien das Hirtenwesen bei, neben dem sich die thrakische und slavische Landwirtschaft erhielt. Von den südcentber kommenden osmanischen Türken bekam es den Handwerker- und Händlerstand. Dieses ranliche und völkische Mosaik bildete einen besonders kräftigen gesunden Volkschlag, dessen hohe Lebensalterengrenze bekannt ist, und einen genügsamen, fleißigen, nüchternen Charakter. Es spiegelt eine entsprechende Mannigfaltigkeit von Kulturen wider, so in der Kunst von dem skythischen Stil und seiner Vorliebe für phantastische Tierformen über byzantinische und altorientalische Motive, über die Zellensteineinlagen der Völkerwanderungszeit (Gürtelschnallen), über tatarischen Hängeschmuck (Bild 2, 3, 7), über slavische Zier- und Farbenfreudigkeit bis zu türkischen, jungvorderasiatischen Hausindustrien. Die slavische Hausgemeinschaft, die jede neue Generation in das Familiengewese aufnimmt, hat die Siedlungsform des Einzelhofsystems zur Folge. Abgesehen von gelegentlichen unterirdischen Wohngruben im Löß, bei denen nur das spitze Binsendach über den Boden hinausragt, gibt es einstöckige rechteckige Fachwerkhäuser mit Lehmbewurf, ebenerdig oder auf einem Holzunterbau für die Wirtschaftsräume und Ställe, im Gebirge mehrstöckige Bauten. Die Fenster hatten früher verschiebbare, im Falz laufende Holzläden statt der Glasscheiben. Die Lebensweise ist einfach, auf dem Lande begnügen sich die Hirten viel mit Sauermilch, die Bauern mit Mais und Hirsebier. Die Viehzucht pflegt Rindvieh, Schaf und Ziege und wickelt sich in Form eines Wanderhirtenwesens ab, das zwischen Gebirge im Sommer und Ebene im Winter hin und her pendelt. Der Ackerbau zieht Weizen, Mais, Gerste, Roggen, im milden, ja heißen Süden Reis, Baumwolle, Sesam; hier kommen auch Öl-, Zitronen-, Edelkastanienbäume fort. Die Handmühle wird meist nur noch für Salz gebraucht, anderes urtümliches Gerät hat sich wenig erhalten, der Dreschschlitten (Bild 9) kam aus dem Orient, er ist aus harten, vorn aufgebogenen Planken, in die scharfkantige Feuersteine eingezwängt sind, und wird beim Gebrauch durch Steine und durch die Last des Führers gewogend beschwert, um die Ähren auszupressen zu können, das Klapperbrett (Bild 15) hat seine Entsprechungen im ganzen Alteuropa; originelle Erfindung ist das Sägegestell umherziehender Holzverkleinerer, bei dem ein mit Steinen gefüllter Kasten, um eine horizontale Achse drehbar, mit zwei Stangen an der Säge befestigt ist, so daß es durch sein Gewicht das Zurückgehen der Säge unterstützt. Die Tracht entfaltet durch die Freude an Farbe und Schmuck viel Abwechselung. Grundelemente der Männerkleidung sind ein langes, grobes, weitgeschnittenes Hemd, das am Brustschlitz und an der Schulter mit bunter Wolle besäht ist; Tuch- oder Lederhosen, im Osten faltig nach türkischer Art, im Westen gleichmäßig anliegend, mit langer wollener Leibbinde; gamaschenartige Wadentücher, und Sandalen; ärmellose Jacke oder rockartiges Oberkleid mit Wollfransen und Schürze; Schafpelz oder Kapuzenmantel; dunkle flache Lammfellmütze. Die Frauen tragen Hemden mit Stick- und Häkeleiverzierung, Röcke mit Gürteln, festgewebte gestickte Schürzenröcke, ärmellose Westen oder Ärmeljacken, Kopftücher, Kopfaufsätze und Stirnenkränze mit langherabfallenden, münzenbehangenen Fransenbändern. Die Mädchen tragen das Haar in 20—30 Zöpfen, die in Rückenhöhe durch Ketten oder Spangen mit Silbermünzen und Perlen zusammengehalten und am Ende zu einem einzigen Zopf zusammengefaßt sind (Bild 1). Reicher Schmuck aus Gold- und Silberplättchen sowie aus Filigranarbeit, für die das Fadenmaterial früher oft aus antiken Münzen hergenommen wurde. Unter der Decke des — östlichen, griechisch-orthodoxen — Christentums erhielten sich noch viele Reste alter unmittelbarer Geistschauungen, das Wissen von Elementarwesen in der Natur (Waldfeen, Wassergeister — man wirft noch Münzen in die Quellen, um sie zu versöhnen usw.) und von überall wirksamen geistigen Kräften, die man sich zu magischen Zwecken dienstbar macht. Beispielsweise berührt man mit dem Zügel eines Pferdes Kinder, wenn sie durch ein anderes Pferd erschreckt und krank geworden sind. Die Prozessionen mit den Regenmännchen zum Bannen der Dürre kommen ebenso in Bulgarien vor, wie in Rumänien (s. Tafel Rumänen), das Feuerreiten bei Krankheiten und Epidemien ebenso wie in Serbien (s. Tafel Serben): ein Stück Lindenholz wird auf einem Baumstrunk gemagelt und mit einem anderen Holz rückend gerieben (Bild 11). Auf dem Bilde 14 berühren sich die zwei Welten des alten ostmediterranen Wissens, das Geflechte aus Weinranken aufhängt, und des christlichen Bekenntnisses. Im Kloster Trojan erhielt sich eine Art Schädelkult: An Festtagen suchen sich die Frauen unter den mit Nonnenaufschrift und Kreuzzeichen versehenen Schädeln der verstorbenen Mönche ihre alten Verwandten und Freunde heraus, kleben brennende Kerzen darauf und beten und meditieren davor.

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7

Die dalmatinischen Südslaven

I.

1. Blockhaus. 2. Kegelhütte. 3. Hera-Tanz. 4. Große geschnitzte Backmulde aus Holz. 5. Gusle-Spieler. 6. Glocke und Halsband für den Leithammel. 7. Spinnrocken. 8. Bauernbesenbinder (Zapf- oder Fachbogen). 9. Leiter aus einem Eichbaum. 10. Geschnitzter Spinnrocken. 11. Einsaitige Gusle. 12. Holzbecher. 13. Handscher. 14. Doppelflöte. 15./16. Bemalte Ostereier. 17. Stuhl. 18. Holzpflug. 19. Steingefäß für Öl.

Der vom Weichsel-Karpathen-Lande seit dem 6. Jahrhundert südwärts sich ausbreitende Slavenzug erreichte bald die Adria und nahm hier altthrakisch-illyrische, durch keltische, griechische und römische Einflüsse berührte Gebiete in Besitz. Die vorindogermanische Urschicht, den vom Atlantischen Ozean bis Asien reichenden Altmeropäern zugehörig, mischte sich mit dem indogermanischen Slaventum. Eine hochgewachsene, knochige, sehnige, breitschulterige Art ist das Ergebnis. Die Höhlen der steinzeitlichen Bevölkerung leben im Gebirge noch als durch Mauern abgeschlossene natürliche Grotten; die Schafhirten bauen kegelförmige Strohhütten aus horizontal mit Ruten durchflochtenen Balkengerüsten, die auf dem ebenen Boden oder auf einer meterhohen Erd- bzw. Steinumwallung stehen (Bild 2), auch wohl steingedeckte Rundhütten; weiter gibt es Blockhäuser aus gutgefügten viereckigen Balken und steilem abgewalmten Strohdach, das durch dünne Stämme gehalten und dessen First noch durch Holzrahmen und Steine gesichert wird (Bild 1). Endlich gibt es rechteckige Giebelhäuser und Stockwerkhäuser aus Steinen und Hohlziegeldach. Die Einstubenhäuser im einfachen Zustand aus Naturstein, ungetüncht, mit Dach aus Kalkschieferplatten, Eingängen ohne Tür, fensterlos oder mit glaslosen Fensterluken, im Winter geschlossener Rauchluke im Dach hat man durch abgeschlossene und dadurch rauchfreie aber nicht heizbare Einbauten verbessert, den Bodenraum erreicht man über Leitern, die aus alten Eichbäumen gerichtet sind. Die Inneneinrichtung besteht aus dem offenen Herd, einer gepflasterten oder bestickten Stelle mit Kessel und Dörrrost darüber – zum Feuerzaubern dient ein eisernes Blasrohr – und einer Steinbank daneben; einem halbkugeligen Backofen, wenn das Brot nicht mehr unter dem alten Backtopf aus Ton oder Eisen gebacken wird; großen, birnenförmigen, lehmbedingenen Fleischtrögen für den Mais; Kleidertruhen, zum Teil aus Eichbäumen; Sitzen aus Steinen, Holzklötzen, dreibeinigen, ursprünglich aus natürlichen Wurzeln gerichteten Sesseln; Pritschen mit Strohschüttung als Betten, auf die man sich angekleidet legt; Küchengerät, unter dem die Ölgefäße aus Stein südliche Herkunft verraten (Bild 19). Ein ganz außerordentliches kunstgewerbliches Können verziert die Hausgeräte, z.B. die schönen Dreiflußschnitzstühle, die Getreidemulden, die Wiegen, Wetzsteinhülsen der Schnitter, Taschenmessergriffe, Musikinstrumente, Rockenstäbe, die sich die Frauen in den Gürtel stecken, um während des Gehens zu spinnen, Spindeln, Waschhölzer, Wickelhölzer für den Stickfaden (Hirtinnen sticken beständig emsig), mit Kerbschnitt, die Ausrüstung an Tragetaschen, Packtaschen, Pferdedecken, Zaumzeug mit Stickerei, ebenso die Kleidung: die Kopftücher, die von Mädchen über gestickten Käppchen, von Frauen über aufgesteckten Zöpfen getragen werden, mit feiner bunter Seiden- und Goldfadenstickerei; die Schürzen und Hemden, die den südrussischen verwandt sind, mit Stickerei in vorderasiatischen über Byzanz gekommenen Mustern; die Kleidertuche mit Buntstickereien unter Verwendung von Flitter, Tuchmosaik, Knöpfen, Ketten, Muscheln. Auf den öden Karstflächen der Höhen treibt man Rinder-, Ziegen-, Schafzucht und Milch- und Käsewirtschaft, in den Talmulden Acker- und Gartenbau: Roggen, Weizen, Hirse, Hafer, im Süden Mais, Ölbaum und Weinstock. Die Bodenbearbeitung bedient sich des Spatens und des altertümlichen Holzpflugs. Düngung ist meist unbekannt, gedroschen wird mit dem orientalischen steinbesetzten Schlitten. Vom altertümlichen altillyrisch-balkanischen Kulturgut kommen noch das Kochen mit erhitzten Steinen, das Dünsten in Fellsäcken, der Erdofen, die Backglocke vor, sonst hat auch das antiken Einflüssen das slavische, jungitalische und türkische Element eingewirkt, so kam der Zapf- oder Fachbogen für Bauernwolle mit dieser aus dem Osten, so die Waffen und vielen an Schmuck. Uralt wieder ist der Reigentanz, der Dudelsack, die einsaitige Gusle (Bild 11), aus der Antike stammt die Doppelflöte.

Die dalmatinischen Südslaven

II.

1. Männertracht von Obbrovazzo mit silbergepunzerter Weste, gestickter Jacke, Unterwäsche, Gamaschen, Knieschändern, mit Metall und Steinen besetzt. 2. Sonntagstracht in Brihir bei Scardona. 3. Frau aus Ubli, Bocche di Cattaro. 4. Winterkleidung der Mädchen von Knin. 5. Altes Mädchen aus der Bocche di Cattaro. 6./8. Frauenkopfbinden aus Norddalmatien. 7./9. Strümpfe aus Dalmatien. 10. Frauenhemd mit farbiger Seidenstickerei von der Insel Ugljen bei Zara in Norddalmatien. 11. Montenegrinerin. 12. Montenegrinischer Gürtel.

Nr. 12 im Museum für Völkerkunde zu Lübeck.

In der Kleidung mengen sich althalkanische, slavische und türkische Formen. Zu den ersten gehören Kapuzenmäntel, mode Kappe, Schuhrosendalen (Opanken), Franzenschürzen, Lodenstoffe, gewirkte Tragtaschen. Zu den zweiten die gestickten Frauenhemden aus Hanfleinen, deren reiche und feine Woll- und Seidenverzierung vorderasiatische Teppichmuster zeigt. Dieselben Muster schmücken die festgewebten Schürzen und die gestrickten Socken: im allgemeinen schwindet die Volkstracht bei Männern wie überall schneller als bei Frauen. Bei jenen findet man noch Käppchen, doppelte Weste über dem weißen Hemd, rauwollene Leibbinden und Gürtel, enge Beinkleider, Jacke und Kapuzenmantel, braun oder weiß, aus schwerem Lodenstoff, lange Schafwollröcke mit Franzen, die über der Schulter getragen werden. Die Westen sind oft mit schwarzen Schnüren verziert und bestickt, die kurze Ärmeljacke mit Metallplatten und Münzen besetzt. Die Frauen tragen ihre feinen gestickten Hemden meist nur als Festgewand, sonst grobe leinene Hemdröcke, ärmellose weiße Mantelröcke aus gefärbtem Loden, bunte Schafwollsocken, Opanken, gestickte Kopftücher und kronenartige Haarschmucke. Die Ornamente aller Handarbeit richten sich nach örtlichen Grenzen, jede Dorfschaft hat ihre eigenen. Mädchen, Heiratsfähige, Bräute, Frauen, Mütter, Witwen jeweilig ihre besonderen. Das Verharren in einem Leben des alten Gruppenverbandsbewußtseins spricht sich darin aus. Außerdem wird die Erhaltung der Muster dadurch bedingt, daß diese aktive, ausströmende, magische Wirkungen besitzen und sie nur dadurch behalten, daß sie eben unverändert immer die gleichen bleiben; man bemüht sich also, um die magische Kraft nicht zu verlieren, peinlich genau die Muster in denselben Formen zu wiederholen. Stark hat der Orient auf den Schmuck eingewirkt, der sich in kunstvoller Metallarbeit zu Ringen, Knöpfen, Nadeln, Broschen, Ketten, Gürtelschließen auslebt und einheimische Perlen, Korallen, Halbedelsteine oder sie nachahmendes Glas zu Hilfe nimmt. Auch die Technik, Vertiefungen mit Blei auszufüllen, wird geübt, Zinn- und Bleiplatten bedecken Gürtel, Strumpfbänder, Gürteltaschen, Tragriemen und Gürtelriemen, die so lang sind, daß sie 4—5 mal um den Leib gewickelt werden.

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1: Karutz

El Europe

Die bosnischen Südslaven

I.

1. Einstubenhaus. 2. Wohnhaus in Gornja Dolina. 3. Signalbrett (Hilfsbile). 4. Wohnhaus in Gornja Dolina. 5. Trappe aus einem alten Kahn. 6. Speicher für Kukurez (Mais). 7. Handmühle. 8. Fruchtspeicher aus Flechtwerk. 9. Backdeckel aus Ton. 10. Kesselhaken aus Holz. 11. Bauernhaus, entlingende antike Form, mit heruntergezogenem Schutzdach, mit steinernem Unterbau bei unebenem Boden und als Schutz gegen Nässe und Mäusen; das Erdgeschoß enthält Stall, Geräte- und Vorratsraum. 12. Wiege. 13. Kirchhof. 14. Pfahldorf.

Wie auf dem ganzen Balkan, so wohnten in dem bosnischen, so nach dem Flusse Bosna genannten Landesteil des heutigen Jugoslavien, zwischen Dalmatien, Kroatien-Slavonien und Serbien, zwischen Saveflüß und herzegowinisch-montenegrinischen Bergen thrakisch-illyrische Menschen, als die Slaven von Norden her einwanderten und sich mit ihnen mischten. Auf sie gehen bronzezeitliche Pfahlbauten zurück, die man im Savetal aufgedeckt hat. An derselben Stelle bauten sich in neuerer Zeit Flüchtlinge Pfahlhäuser, für die sie ebenso wie für ihren Hausrat und ihr Wirtschaftsgerät ausschließlich Holz von Eiche und Ulme verwandten. Durchweg rechteckig, sind sie teils Einstuben mit sparrenlosem, flachgeneigtem Dach (Bild 1) ohne Rauchabzug oder zweiräumige Blockhäuser aus Feuerherdraum und Stube mit Dachsparren (Bild 2). Korbartig geflochtene Wände haben die Maisspeicher (Bild 6, 8). Neben den Häusern stehen in größeren Gehöften Ställe und sonstige Nebengebäude, der Verkehr zwischen ihnen erfolgt durch Brückenstege. Das offene Herdfeuer liegt der Brandgefahr wegen in einer eigenen, ebenfalls auf Pfosten ruhenden, mit Asche und Erde vollgestampften Kiste unterhalb des Fußbodens (Bild 4). Die Treppen zu den Plattformen sind gespaltene Rundhölzer mit aufgenagelten Schwellen oder einfach angelehnte Baumklötze mit Einkerbungen, gelegentlich aus einem Stück unbrauchbar gewordenen Kahnes (Bild 5). An altertümlichem Gerät kommen vor: hölzerne Kesselhaken, Backglocke aus Ton, mit der auf dem Feuerherd der geknetete und gegorene Brotteig bedeckt wird, Handmühlen aus zwei Steinen in einem Lager aus Pappel- oder Weidenholz und der in einem durchlochten Wandbrett freibeweglichen Drehstange, niedrige runde Tischchen, niedrige Schemel. Im übrigen kommt das rechteckige Giebeldach mit Steinunterbau und Giebeldach vor. Die Türkei hat in den Städten Wohn- und Bauweise, Lebens- und Ernährungsgewohnheiten, Gewerbe und Handwerk beeinflußt. Teppichweberei, Waffenschmiedekunst, Metall-Intarsia-Technik und zumal Holzkerbschnitt standen früher auf außerordentlich hoher Stufe; Löffel, Tassen, Brotstempel, Flöten und Geigen, Wäscheklopfer, Spinnrocken, Spindeln und Kunkeln, Wetzsteinbehälter, Kästen, Spiegelbehälter und vieles andere war dicht mit Kerbschnittmusterung bedeckt, in der neben orientalischen Pflanzenranken die nordische Sonnen- und Sternfigur vorherrscht.

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
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Die bosnischen Südslaven

II.

1.—3. Bosnischer Männertypen. 4. Bosnischer Tanz. 5/7. Bosnischer Frauentypen. 6. Bäuerin mit Kopfschmuck. 8. Haarnadel. 9. Gestickte Mützen. 10/11. Gestickte Frauenkappen.

In der bosnischen Kleidung mischen sich altbalkanische, slavische und türkische Elemente. Turban und Schaffellmütze bei Bauern, Käppchen und Kronen mit langen Nackenstücken sieht man nebeneinander. Der stolze Kopfschmuck des Bildes 6, anscheinend von Serbien übernommen, wird nur von Frauen während des ersten Jahres ihrer Ehe getragen, während später der Federbusch abgelegt und nur der übrige Teil des Aufsatzes weitergetragen wird; er besteht aus einem Fez mit vorn angenähtem Wulst, so daß eine phrygische Form herauskommt, aus aufgenähten Mützen und einem Busch von Pfauen- und farbigen Hahnenfedern. (vgl. „Globus", Bd. 78, 387). Die Teppichschürzen des Bildes 5 kamen gleichfalls von Nordosten. Wie überall auf dem Balkan ist der Silberschmuck reich und mannigfaltig, zumal in Filigran mit hoher Kunstfertigkeit geschmiedet.

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Die Albanier

I.

1. Wehrhausform. 2. Hütte in Durazzo. 3. Steinhütte bei Gusinje. 4/5. Ställe. 6. Wiege aus Fiauti. 7. Kamin in Nikaj. 8. Inneres einer Hütte in Puloj mit Rohrgeflechtwänden, Sparren, Rohr- und Schilfbindeldach. 9. Feuerstelle und Herdbank in Wandnische, in Hoti. 10. Hausür in Brebaia, mit Kelchöffnungsornament und hakenförmigen Steinvorsprüngen zum Aufhängen der Gewehre. 11. Inneres eines Wehrhauses (Kula). 12. Feuerstelle mit Herdbank und Rauchabzug in der Wandnische. 13. Schnitzerei einer Truhe aus Skutari.

Zwischen Montenegro und Epirus hat das stark gebirgige Küstenland der Balkanhalbinsel urtümliche Rassenelemente bewahrt und altertümliche Kulturformen erhalten. Hier siedelt das albanische Volk, das Volk der Skyptaren, der Felsenbewohner oder der Adlerlandbewohner oder der Adlerabkömmlinge nach den verschiedenen Erklärungen, von den Türken Arnauten genannt. Aus vorarischen Illyrern, die zu den ältesten Bewohnern des europäisch-asiatischen Landzusammenhanges gehören, und aus arischen Thrakern bildete sich ein Grundstock, Goten, Slaven, Griechen, seit 1450 Türken, an der Küste vereinzelte römische und spätere italienische Einschläge kamen hinzu, um die Albanier zu gestalten, die sich heute nach den Dialekten ihrer indogermanischen Sprache in zwei Gruppen, die nördlichen Gegen und die südlichen Tosken teilen, die sich wieder in viele Unterstämme gliedern. Jene, mit überwiegendem slavischem, serbischem Blute, sind härter, kriegerischer, konservativer, die Tosken, stärker mit Griechen gemischt, weicher, zivilisationszugänglicher, neuerungssüchtiger. Das Bewußtsein ihres Blutzusammenhangs bestimmt ihr Leben in der Überlieferung — sie kennen ihre Stammbäume und Hunderte von Namen daria —, ihre grenzenlose Gastfreundlichkeit auf der einen, ihre ebenso grenzenlose Fehdelust und Unerbittlichkeit der Blutrache auf der anderen Seite. Von altertümlichen Wohnweisen finden sich als vorübergehende Behausungen Höhlen in natürlichen Auswaschungen von Flußufern, vorn durch Rutengeflecht abgeschlossen; Kegelhütten aus unbehauenen Stämmen und langgeschnittenem Rohr in den Küstensümpfen; halbunterirdische ausgemauerte Gruben mit Strohsatteldach und Erdanschüttung, für Hirten und Herden. Lehmüberworfene Hütten aus Buchenreisiggeflecht und Rohr- oder Laubdachung (Bild 2); Einstuben aus geschichteten, mit Gras oder Rasenstücken gefugten Mauern mit flachem Dachstuhl aus drei Längsbalken und lose darufgelegten, steinbeschwerten Brettern (Bild 3, das außerdem neben der Hütte ein zum Aufbewahren von Fleisch usw. dienendes Rahmengestell mit eingekerbtem Baumstrunk als Treppe und einem Tannenbaum als natürlichem Aufhängehaken zeigt). Die Dauerwohnungen, stets eingefriedet, sind im Waldgebiet des Nordens Blockhäuser, sonst gemörtelte Steinhäuser, in Mittel- und Südalbanien mit eingemauerten Stützbalken, mit Stroh, Schindeln, Schiefer, Brettern oder Rinnenziegeln gedeckt. Ursprünglich ebenerdig, ein- oder zweiräumig, dann zwei- oder mehrgeschossig, mit und ohne Veranda. Die dauernde Unsicherheit des Landes als Folge der Blutrachefehden entwickelte aus kugelsicheren Einbauten turmartige Wehrhäuser (Kules) mit Schießscharten und festem, schwer erreichbarem Dach (Bild 1). Die Raumabteilung des Innern geschieht selten durch Mauern, öfter nur durch Bretter oder Reisiggeflecht oder gar nur durch größere Gegenstände wie Truhen. In die städtische Bau- und Zierkunst sind italienisch-venetianische, byzantinisch-vorderasiatische, türkische Einflüsse eingedrungen; die Skutari-Truhenwand in Bild 13 zeigt ein bekanntes Muster persischer Ornamentik mit letztentartetem Lebensbaummotiv. Das Innere der Häuser hat Lehmtennen oder Dielenboden; Wandbretter zum Wegstellen von Sachen (Bild 5); Wandpflöcke zum Aufhängen von Geschirr; Tische in Form von Platten aus zwei zum Kreisrund aneinandergespannten halbmondförmigen Brettern mit zwei aufgenagelten, als Füße dienenden Querleisten (Bild 11); niedrige Dreifußschemel und halbrunde Lehnsessel; Bettstellen aus eingerammten Pfosten, Bretter- oder Rutengeflechtboden, Heu- oder Farrenkrautschüttung (Bild 11); Wiegen, die wie ein Rucksack auf dem Rücken getragen werden. Im Küchengerät ist wichtig die Backschüssel, die zu Rotglut erwärmt den Teig aufnimmt und die Backglocke übergestülpt bekommt, auf die wiederum Glut gehäuft wird. Große Holzfässer mit Reifen aus Haselnuß bewahren den Wein, kleinere Wasser, Butter, Sahnlake für den Käse auf, Säcke aus Schaf- oder Ziegenfell die Milch. Das offene Herdfeuer, Heiz- und Kochstelle zugleich, liegt in der Mitte der Stube in einer mit Lehm gefüllten Vertiefung, über ihm hängt an einem natürlichen gebogenen Ast oder an eiserner Kette der Kessel, seitlich von ihm ist die Wand zu einer Ofenbanknische vertieft. Rauchabzug fehlt ursprünglich, dann läßt man ein Rauchloch offen, fügt einen Rauchfang hinzu, später erst baut man richtige Kamine.

1: Karutz

El Europe



Die Albanier

II.

1. Frau aus der Arbrie auf den Hochweiden von Kalmak. 2. Mohammedanischer Albanier. 3. Frauen aus Skutari mit Pluderhosen. 4. Nordalbanische Hirtin. 5. Nordalbanerin mit breiter Schärpe. 6. Schwimmsack und auf Schwimmsäcken ruhendes Floß aus Weidengeflecht; auf letzterem das Kleiderbündel des Schwimmers. 7. Fähre aus einem Doppelsäckchen mit darüberhängenden Planken. 8. Einbaum mit Auslager auf jeder Seite. 9. Holzpflug. 10. Schnitt durch eine Turbinenmühle. 11. Entkörnen von Mais durch Dreschflegel. 12. Zweisitziger Ochsenkarren. 13. Albanier aus der Gegend bei Dibra. 14. Handmühle. 15. Tasche aus Bockerinde zum Bearmpfücken. 16. Merkpfahl für Wasserleitungsbenutzung.

Die Albanier sind gut mittelgroß, kräftig gebaut, meist kurzköpfig, mit schmalem, langem Gesicht. Blaue Augen und helle Haare kommen nicht selten vor. Vielfach rasieren die Männer den Kopf bis auf einen Schopf auf dem Scheitel, den sie zu einer langen Locke wachsen lassen. Die Tracht gleicht im Süden der griechischen. Im Norden wechselt sie nach Stadt und Land und auf dem Lande wieder nach den verschiedenen Gegenden. In Skutari tragen die Katholiken weite, faltige, bei den Männern bis unter die Knie, bei den Frauen bis zu den Knöcheln reichende schwarze Hosen, weiße Strümpfe, kurze Unterjacke mit anschließenden, langen Ärmeln und ärmellose Oberjacke, die Frauen noch einen gestickten, ärmellosen Mantel; die Mohammedaner den mehrere Kilo schweren Faltenrock (Fustan) aus mehreren hundert aneinandergenähten, langen, schmalen Leinwandstreifen, der in Mittel- und Südalbanien herz bleibt. Ein baumwollener oder seidener Gürtel hält den Rock, ein Ledergurt klemmt die Waffen an. Dazu kommen Unter- und Oberjacke. Die Frauen tragen weite Pluderhosen und reichgestickte Mäntel mit langen, geschlitzten Ärmeln. Den Fustan hält man für altillyrisch und aus dem Schurz heraus entwickelt, er ist aus den hinterlassenen, künstlerischen Urkunden in Mykene, auf Altkreta, in den nordgriechischen Altsteinzeit-Höhlen nachzuweisen. Die Landbevölkerung trägt als ebenfalls altillyrisches Erbstück eine kleine, eng anliegende, halbkugelige Filzkappe, die nicht viel mehr als den Scheitel deckt und sich bei den „Barbaren" des Siegesdenkmals von Adam-Klissi abgebildet findet; eng anliegende Schafwollhosen mit zwei Längsschlitzen in der Leistengegend, die von den einen für slavisch, von anderen für türkisch gehalten werden; Ärmelunterjacke und ärmellose Weste, Mantel und Pelz. Auch für diese Formen der Kleidung hat man Belege aus dem Altertum gefunden. Als altes Kulturgut verzeichnet man in der Lebensweise die Ackerbestellung durch die Frau; das Backen von Fladen unter der Backglocke; das Garkochen von Blut, Fett, Fleisch und Gewürz in einem Ziegenmagen, der über der Kohlenglut hin- und hergewendet wird; das Kochen von Weinessig, ohne es zu vermahlen; die Handmühle (Bild 14); die Turbinenmühle (Bild 10), deren Mahlsteine 5—6 Fuß oberhalb des Wasserrades liegen, in denen löffelartige Speichen das Wasser aus einer steilen Rinne spritzt; die Felderbewässerung durch Kanäle und Holzrinnen, die der Wasserarmut wegen familienweise geregelt ist. — Bild 16 zeigt einen 1½ m hohen Merkpfahl mit den Hausmarken der Familien, die in bestimmter Reihenfolge den betreffenden Kanal benutzen dürfen — den kreischenden Ochsenkarren, dessen zwei Räder der schlimmigen Straßen wegen zwei Meter hoch sind, und den die mit dem Stachel angetriebenen Tiere mit dem Nackenjoch ziehen; den Holzpflug, dessen Sohle und Sterze aus einem Stück sind (Bild 9); den Schwimmsack aus einem Ziegenbalg, der aufgeblasen und vor den Leib gebunden wird, und den Floß aus vier solchen Bälgen und einem Weidenrutengeflecht, auf das der Schwimmer sein Kleiderbündel legt (Bild 6). Sonst bedient man sich einfacher und doppelter Einbäume, mit und ohne Seitenplanken, die den Bord erhöhen, mit und ohne Seitenbalken, die als Gleichgewicht haltende Schwimmer angenagelt sind (Bild 7 und 8); auch Plankenboote kommen vor. Zum Entkörnen des Maises steckt man ein Rutengeflecht auf vier eingerammte Pfosten und schlägt auf ihm mit 1½ m langen Stöcken die Kolben, bis die Körner durch die Geflechtmaschen zu Boden gefallen sind (Bild 11). Die langen Feuersteinflinten, oft schöne, alte Erbstücke, gibt es nur noch im Süden, sie weichen den modernen Repetiergewehren, die, Pistolen und die Handschars, die Messer mit Knochengriff von Unterschenkel eines Rindes, dem Revolver. Die Albanier sind meist Ackerbauer, zum Teil Wanderhirten, die zwischen Winterquartieren in der Ebene nach der Adria zu, wo sie ihre Felder bestellen, und Sommersiedlungen auf den Hochweiden, zu denen sie nach beendigter Feldbestellung zurückkehren, hin- und herpendeln. Fischer und Jäger sind sie kaum. Auf Wanderungen im Hochland zerreibt man auf sonnendurchglühten Felsplatten den Firnschnee, um sich Wasser zu verschaffen. Die weitläufige Besiedelung hat ein gutes Signalsystem durch Schießen und Rufen und dessen Weitergeben ausgebildet. Von alten Sitten eines Lebens in festen Gruppenverbänden erhielten sich Brautraub und Brautkauf, Kinderverlobung, Blutsbrüderschaft und Blutrache. Die Albanier sind etwa zu ⁷/₁₀ mohammedanisch, ²/₁₀ griechisch-orthodox, ¹/₁₀ römisch-katholisch, doch erhielten sich vielerlei Reste eines älteren, im heilschenden Schauen übersinnlicher Mächte und Vorgänge wirkenden und handelnden, magisch verbundenen Geistesleben: Bauopfer, die wohl einst Menschenopfer waren, Glaube an schatzhütende Schlangen, an die Schutzgeister der Menschen, Aussetzen der Toten nach Parsenart aus jener Nichtachtung des Leichnams, die aus dem Wissen vom Ewigen des Geistes entspringt — die alten Thraker frohlockten, wenn jemand starb, und jammerten, wenn jemand geboren wurde — Werwolf-Vorstellungen, Seelentrennung im Schlafe, Umgehen der Toten, namentlich der schlechten Menschen, die in Geist- oder in verwandelter Menschengestalt Unheil stiften. Das Vorausschauen der Zukunft nimmt materialistische Mittel zu Hilfe, um in der entarteten Zeit des Nichtmehrwissens vor der Masse zu bestehen: es wahrsagt aus den Rissen, in die ein erhitztes Schafschulterblatt oder Hühnerbrustbein springt, und aus den hellen und dunklen Flecken im durchfallenden Lichte, es prophezeit auch aus dem Vogelflug. Das alte Wissen um die emanatorisch ausstrahlenden, geistigen Kräfte der Wesen und Dinge wird zu magischen Mitteln benützt, so zu beschriebenen Papierstückchen, die man als Schutz trägt oder in Wasser aufgelöst trinkt. Die Sonne lebt dem Albanier noch als „Gottes Widerschein".

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El Europe

Die Mazedonier

I.

1. Kanak in Abkhasien. 2. Hirtenhütte aus Lehm und Stroh in der Kampania, dem Tiefland südlich von Saloniki. 3. Festungartiges Gutshaus in Peinikon. 4. Bäuerin am Webstuhl in Üsküb. 5. Bauernhof bei Üsküb. 6. Dudelsack. 7. Backglocke. 8. Magische Medizin. 9./10. Votive. 11. Bauernfachwerker (Fachbogen). 12. Reitsessel. 13. Töpferbrennofen bei Üsküb. 14. Lehmstuhl. 15. Pflügender Bauer. 16. Brunnenbau zum Markus der Schafe. 17. Räuchertopf. 18. Tonsockel für den Kohlenbecken, um die Hitze zu halten; obenauf kommt Topf oder Kaffeekanne.

Nr. 6, 7, 8, 9, 10, 11 im Museum für Völkerkunde zu Hamburg. Nr. 13, 16, 17 im Ethnographischen Museum zu Dresden. Nr. 4, 5, 12, 13, 16 sind Aufnahmen des Herrn Generalobersarzt Dr. Hansen in Lübeck.

In Tieflande zwischen Albanien, Altbulgarien und Griechenland, dem alten Mazedonien, hat eine unaufhörliche friedliche und kriegerische Völkerbewegung das Rassengemisch des heutigen Mazedoniers hervorgebracht, in welchem die indogermanischen Thraker den Grundstock bilden. Zu ihm traten im Altertume noch Romanen, im Mittelalter Slaven und Bulgaren, Türken und ihre turkmenischen bzw. vorderasiatischen Mitläufer, endlich Romänen, Griechen und die stammverwandten Albaner. Die Landbäuerin an der Küste und die Sumpfniederungen erhalten eine nomadisierende Viehwirtschaft, die fruchtbaren Randzonen liefern gute Erträge eines zumal Weizen und Mais ziehenden Körnerbaus, ermöglichen aber auch südliche Kulturen, wie Reis, Opium, Baumwolle. Die Hirten bauen sich flüchtige Rundhütten aus Lehm und Stroh, die Feldbäuer, die hier wie auf dem ganzen Balkan den ganzen Sommer hindurch die Äcker bewachen, bienenkorbförmig oder spitzkuppelig zusammengeflochtene Zweiggerüste mit dickem Strohbündeln, einfache Bauernhäuser tragen ebenfalls ein Strohdach auf Wänden von Ziegeln und Lehm, Verbindung von Holz, Lehm und Ziegeln führt zu zweigeschossigen Fachwerkhäusern (Bild 2), die im Erdgeschoß Stallungen und Vorratsräume, im Obergeschoß Wohnungen mit Veranda, Erker, Ausguckfenstern enthalten, darüber ein flaches Dach aus Ziegeln tragen. Die albanische Form des viereckigen Festungsturmes kommt zu größeren Gutshäusern vor (Bild 3). Das Innere zeigt die übliche einfache Ausstattung der Balkanwohnungen, der halbrunde Stuhl in Bild 14 erinnert an albanische Formen, seine hörnerförmigen Stützen an türkischen Einfluß. Der Webstuhl und der zum Reinigen von Wolle und Baumwolle dienende Fachbogen (Bild 11) kamen hierher wohl aus dem Orient, obwohl der letztere alteuropäisch ist (vgl. die Tafel Esten II). Die Backglocke in Bild 7, der Dudelsack in Bild 6, das Räuchergefäß in Bild 17, der Holzpflug in Bild 15, den das vom Stachel (nicht Peitsche) angetriebene Ochsengespann mittels Nackenjoche zieht, sind allgemein balkanisch. Der Reitsessel in Bild 12 weist zum Orient. Bild 8—9 sind Schutzmedizinen — der Pferdeschädel erinnert an Kirgisensitten, vergl. Band I dieses Atlas, Tafel Kirgisen I, Bild 13 —, die auf dem Wissen von geistigen Kräften, überall lebendig, in allem Seienden und Werdenden wirksam, magisch in gutem und schlechtem Sinn und Wollen brauchbar, beruhen.

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Die Mazedonier

II.

1. Frauen und Männer aus Westmazedonien. 2. Frau aus der Gegend von Monastir. 3. Schäfer vom Vorland des Rhodopegebirges. 4. Aus der Hand spinnende Frau. 5. Frauen aus der Gegend von Üsküb. 6. Ältere Frauen als Zuschauerinnen beim Horotanz. 7. Mazedonisches Mädchen aus Krusevo. 8. Zwei Bauern aus Gluscovo bei Üsküb.

Nr. 3, 6, 7 sind Aufnahmen des Herrn Generalsuperintendent Dr. Hansen in Lübeck.

Die Völkermischung in Mazedonien prägt sich in der Kleidung aus. Neben altillyrischen halbkugeligen Kappen, anliegenden Hosen und Bundschuhen kommen turkstatarische Kopf- und Kinntücher und Schmuckketten, slavische Kopftücher, griechische Kopftücher, slavische gestickte Hemden, türkische ärmellose Jacken vor. In bunten Socken, gestickten Gürteln, silbernen Schmuckketten herrscht viel Farbenfreudigkeit und Abwechslung. Den ganz großen Reiz bringen aber die Frauenschürzen in das festliche Bild der mazedonischen Volkstracht. In allen Breiten und Längen, in Wolle, in Samt und in Seide, einfach und in Vorder- und Rückenstück geteilt, gewebt und gestickt, in Streifenmusterung, in allen Farben leuchtend und schillernd beherrschen sie die Mode.

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THE CAPTIVE MIND

BY CZESLAW MILOSZ

TRANSLATED FROM THE POLISH BY
JANE ZIELONKO

1953 Alfred A. Knopf New York

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[pp. i-iii are blank]

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CHAPTER I *of this book, "The Pill of Murti Bing," originally appeared in the* Partisan Review, *September-October 1951, under the title "The Happiness Pill."*

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FIRST EDITION

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WHEN *someone is honestly 55% right, that's very good and there's no use wrangling. And if someone is 60% right, it's wonderful, it's great luck, and let him thank God. But what's to be said about 75% right? Wise people say this is suspicious. Well, and what about 100% right? Whoever says he's 100% right is a fanatic, a thug, and the worst kind of rascal.* ooo

AN OLD JEW OF GALICIA

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Preface

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LIKE many of my generation, I could have wished that my life had been a more simple affair. But the time and place of his birth are matters in which a man has nothing to say. The part of Europe to which I belong has not, in our time, met with good fortune. Not many inhabitants of the Baltic States, of Poland or Czechoslovakia, of Hungary or Rumania, could summarize in a few words the story of their existence. Their lives have been complicated by the course of historic events.

It was in my country that the Second World War began. At that time, I was living in Warsaw. I had been through the rather strict education of a Catholic school, had read law in one of the Polish universities, and had continued my studies in Paris. Literature was the real interest of my life. I had published two volumes of avant-garde verse, and some translations from French poetry.

I lived through five years of Nazi occupation. Today, looking back, I do not regret those years in Warsaw, which was, I believe, the most agonizing spot in the whole of terrorized Europe. Had I then chosen emigration, my life would certainly have followed a very different course. But my knowledge of the crimes which Europe has witnessed

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114 in the twentieth century would be less direct, less concrete than it is.

One afternoon in January 1945 I was standing in the doorway of a peasant's cottage; a few small-caliber shells had just landed in the village street. Then, in the low ground between the snow-covered hills, I saw a file of men slowly advancing. It was the first detachment of the Red Army. It was led by a young woman, felt-booted and carrying a submachine gun. Like all my compatriots, I was thus liberated from the domination of Berlin—in other words, brought under the domination of Moscow.

Hitherto, I had had no strong political affinities, and was only too ready to shut myself off from the realities of life. But reality would never let me remain aloof for long. The state of things in Poland inclined me towards left-wing ideas. My point of view can be defined negatively rather than positively: I disliked the right-wing groups, whose platform consisted chiefly of anti-Semitism. During the Nazi occupation I, like my colleagues, wrote for the clandestine publications, which were especially numerous in Poland. My experiences in those years led me to the conclusion that, after the defeat of Hitler, only men true to a socialist program would be capable of abolishing the injustices of the past, and rebuilding the economy of the countries of Central and Eastern Europe. My feelings for Russia were none too friendly. Pole and Russian have never loved one another, so I was no exception to the general rule. The exceptions were those—and some of my friends were among them—who before or during the war had become disciples of Stalin.

Such, then, was my state of mind as I watched the Russian girl with her submachine gun advance in my direction. To her, I was one of the millions of Europeans who had to be "liberated and educated." Perhaps I was even

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a member of the bourgeoisie . . . but that could not have 114
seemed likely, since the shabby worker's overall which I was wearing was all I possessed in the world.

A few years later, a cultural attaché at the Embassy of the Warsaw government in Washington, D.C., was busy organizing concerts and exhibitions of Polish art; it was said he was not a communist. From 1945 to 1951, I was first a free-lance writer in Poland, and then cultural attaché, first in Washington and later in Paris. In the end I broke with the Warsaw government.

"But how," a reader may ask, "could you become a diplomatic official of that government, if you were not a member of the Party?" The answer lies, first, in the fact that in each of the people's democracies the political change developed by degrees (Jan Masaryk in Czechoslovakia could be, not a mere attaché, but the Minister of Foreign Affairs); and secondly, in the fact that writers in the people's democracies belong to the new privileged caste. It was thought that the appointment of a writer to a diplomatic post would produce a good impression abroad. "Yes," my reader may continue, "I can see that. But you—why did you agree to serve? For money?" No. I am no saint, but those who know me are aware that my needs are modest, and that I have no extravagant tastes except a love for books. I agreed to serve, not for material reasons, but through conviction.

We enter here upon the problems which form the subject of this book. The world of today is torn asunder by a great dispute; and not only a dispute, but a ruthless battle for world domination. Many people still refuse to believe that there are only two sides, that the only choice lies between absolute conformity to the one system or absolute conformity to the other. Call such people impractical, if you will; but it would be wrong to treat their hopes as

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114 matter for contempt. Those who thought that they might succeed, while remaining within the Eastern bloc, in keeping clear of total orthodoxy and maintaining some degree of freedom of thought, have been defeated. The peasants' leaders were defeated, Masaryk was defeated, the socialists who tried to collaborate were defeated, Rajk was defeated in Hungary, Gomulka in Poland.

My mother tongue, work in my mother tongue, is for me the most important thing in life. And my country, where what I wrote could be printed and could reach the public, lay within the Eastern Empire. My aim and purpose was to keep alive freedom of thought in my own special field; I sought in full knowledge and conscience to subordinate my conduct to the fulfillment of that aim. I served abroad because I was thus relieved from direct pressure and, in the material which I sent to my publishers, could be bolder than my colleagues at home. I did not want to become an émigré and so give up all chance of taking a hand in what was going on in my own country. The time was to come when I should be forced to admit myself defeated.

668 114 To understand the course of events in Eastern and Central Europe during the first post-war years, it must be realized that pre-war social conditions called for extensive reforms. It must further be understood that the Nazi rule had occasioned a profound disintegration of the existing order of things. In these circumstances, the only hope was to set up a social order which would be new, but would not be a copy of the Russian regime. So what was planned in Moscow as a stage on the road to servitude, was willingly accepted in the countries concerned as though it were true progress. Men will clutch at illusions when they have nothing else to hold to.

The Method, the Diamat—that is, dialectical materialism

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as interpreted by Lenin and Stalin—possesses a strong magnetic influence on the men of the present day. In the people's democracies, the communists speak of the "New Faith," and compare its growth to that of Christianity in the Roman Empire. There has been instituted in France a group of worker-priests, who do regular work in the factories and bring the Gospel to the laboring masses while sharing fully in their living conditions. A large proportion of these men have abandoned Catholicism and been converted to communism. This example illustrates the intensity of the ideological struggle which is going on today. And let it be remembered that in the people's democracies indoctrination is enforced by the whole power of the State.

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For several years I carried on a debate with those of my friends who were yielding, little by little, to the magic influence of the New Faith. The debate went on in my own mind also—more than a debate indeed, since that word gives no sense of the emotional stress which I experienced. As the nerve-centers of the country were mastered, one after the other, by the adherents of Moscow, I was forced to abandon my philosophic beliefs one after another, if I was to keep from throwing myself into the abyss. The abyss for me was exile, the worst of all misfortunes, for it meant sterility and inaction.

In the end, I found myself driven to the point where a final choice had to be made. This was when "socialist realism" was introduced into Poland. This is not, as some think, merely an esthetic theory to which the writer, the musician, the painter or the theatrical producer is obliged to adhere. On the contrary, it involves by implication the whole Leninist-Stalinist doctrine. If writers and painters are not forced to become members of the Party, that is because such a step is unnecessary. So long as they act in ac-

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114 [668] cordance with "socialist realism," they are automatically and inescapably enrolled among the followers of Stalin. "Socialist realism" is much more than a matter of taste, of preference for one style of painting or music rather than another. It is concerned with the beliefs which lie at the foundation of human existence. In the field of literature it forbids what has in every age been the writer's essential task—to look at the world from his own independent viewpoint, to tell the truth as he sees it, and so to keep watch and ward in the interest of society as a whole. It preaches a proper attitude of doubt in regard to a merely formal system of ethics but itself makes all judgment of values dependent upon the interest of the dictatorship. Human sufferings are drowned in the trumpet-blare: the orchestra in the concentration camp; and I, as a poet, had my place already marked out for me among the first violins.

Look, then, dispassionately at my problem. At home in Poland, my friends, my relatives, theaters where my translations of Shakespeare were being produced, publishers ready to print what I wrote. Above all, my own country and my own language—what is a poet who has no longer a language of his own? All these things were mine, if I would pay the price: obedience.

The actual moment of my decision to break with the Eastern bloc could be understood, from the psychological point of view, in more ways than one. From outside, it is easy to think of such a decision as an elementary consequence of one's hatred of tyranny. But in fact, it may spring from a number of motives, not all of them equally high-minded. My own decision proceeded, not from the functioning of the reasoning mind, but from a revolt of the stomach. A man may persuade himself, by the most logical reasoning, that he will greatly benefit his health by

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swallowing live frogs; and, thus rationally convinced, he may swallow a first frog, then the second; but at the third his stomach will revolt. In the same way, the growing influence of the doctrine on my way of thinking came up against the resistance of my whole nature. 114

The decision to refuse all complicity with the tyranny of the East—is this enough to satisfy one's conscience? I do not think so. I have won my freedom; but let me not forget that I stand in daily risk of losing it once more. For in the West also one experiences the pressure to conform —to conform, that is, with a system which is the opposite of the one I have escaped from. The difference is that in the West one may resist such pressure without being held guilty of a mortal sin.

My book takes the reader into the world inhabited by the intellectuals of Warsaw, Prague, Bucharest, and Budapest. It is a world familiar to me, but it may well seem to him foreign and even exotic. I try to explain how the human mind functions in the people's democracies. If I have been able to write this book, it is because the system invented by Moscow has seemed, and still seems to me infinitely strange. Any civilization, if one looks at it with an assumption of naive simplicity (as Swift looked at the England of his day), will present a number of bizarre features which men accept as perfectly natural because they are familiar. But nowhere is this so marked as in the new civilization of the East, which moulds the lives of eight hundred millions of human beings. We are, I think, only beginning to understand it, and in years to come thousands of books will be devoted to the study of this stupefying and loathsome phenomenon. 121

This book is at the same time a battlefield, in which I have given shape to my combats with the doctrine I have rejected. This, then, explains my method of writing; I give

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121 the enemy his arms, I follow his arguments, at times I even copy his way of reasoning. In other words, I seek to create afresh the stages by which the mind gives way to compulsion from without, and to trace the road along which men in people's democracies are led on to orthodoxy.

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CHAPTER I

The Pill of Murti-Bing

829 IT was only toward the middle of the twentieth century that the inhabitants of many European countries came, in general unpleasantly, to the realization that their fate could be influenced directly by intricate and abstruse books of philosophy. Their bread, their work, their private lives began to depend on this or that decision in disputes on principles to which, until then, they had never paid any attention. In their eyes, the philosopher had always been a sort of dreamer whose divagations had no effect on reality. The average human being, even if he had once been exposed to it, wrote philosophy off as utterly impractical and useless. Therefore the great intellectual work of the Marxists could easily pass as just one more variation on a sterile pastime. Only a few individuals understood the causes and probable consequences of this general indifference.

538 A curious book appeared in Warsaw in 1932. It was a
829 novel, in two volumes, entitled *Insatiability*. Its author was Stanislaw Ignacy Witkiewicz, a painter, writer, and philosopher, who had constructed a philosophical system akin to the monadology of Leibnitz. As in his earlier novel, *Farewell to Autumn*, his language was difficult, full of neologisms. Brutal descriptions of erotic scenes al-

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829 ternated with whole pages of discussions on Husserl, Car-
538 nap, and other contemporary philosophers. Besides, one could not always tell whether the author was serious or joking; and the subject matter seemed to be pure fantasy.

The action of the book took place in Europe, more precisely in Poland, at some time in the near future or even in the present, that is, in the thirties, forties, or fifties. The social group it portrayed was that of musicians, painters, philosophers, aristocrats, and higher-ranking military officers. The whole book was nothing but a study of decay: mad, dissonant music; erotic perversion; widespread use of narcotics; dispossessed thinking; false conversions to Catholicism; and complex psychopathic personalities. This decadence reigned at a time when western civilization was said to be threatened by an army from the East, a Sino-Mongolian army that dominated all the territory stretching from the Pacific to the Baltic.

Witkiewicz's heroes are unhappy in that they have no faith and no sense of meaning in their work. This atmosphere of decay and senselessness extends throughout the entire country. And at that moment, a great number of hawkers appear in the cities peddling Murti-Bing pills. Murti-Bing was a Mongolian philosopher who had succeeded in producing an organic means of transporting a "philosophy of life." This Murti-Bing "philosophy of life," which constituted the strength of the Sino-Mongolian army, was contained in pills in an extremely condensed form. A man who used these pills changed completely. He became serene and happy. The problems he had struggled with until then suddenly appeared to be superficial and unimportant. He smiled indulgently at those who continued to worry about them. Most affected were all questions pertaining to unsolvable ontological difficulties. A man who swallowed Murti-Bing pills became imper-

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vious to any metaphysical concerns. The excesses into which art falls when people vainly seek in form the wherewithal to appease their spiritual hunger were but outmoded stupidities for him. He no longer considered the approach of the Sino-Mongolian army as a tragedy for his own civilization. He lived in the midst of his compatriots like a healthy individual surrounded by madmen. More and more people took the Murti-Bing cure, and their resultant calm contrasted sharply with the nervousness of their environment.

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The epilogue, in a few words: the outbreak of the war led to a meeting of the armies of the West with those of the East. In the decisive moment, just before the great battle, the leader of the Western army surrendered to the enemy; and in exchange, though with the greatest honors, he was beheaded. The Eastern army occupied the country and the new life, that of Murti-Bingism, began. The heroes of the novel, once tormented by philosophical "insatiety," now entered the service of the new society. Instead of writing the dissonant music of former days, they composed marches and odes. Instead of painting abstractions as before, they turned out socially useful pictures. But since they could not rid themselves completely of their former personalities, they became schizophrenics.

So much for the novel. Its author often expressed his belief that religion, philosophy, and art are living out their last days. Yet he found life without them worthless. On September 17, 1939, learning that the Red Army had crossed the eastern border of Poland, he committed suicide by taking veronal and cutting his wrists.

Today, Witkiewicz's vision is being fulfilled in the minutest detail throughout a large part of the European continent. Perhaps sunlight, the smell of the earth, little everyday pleasures, and the forgetfulness that work brings

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829 can ease somewhat the tensions created by this process of fulfillment. But beneath the activity and bustle of daily life is the constant awareness of an irrevocable choice to be made. One must either die (physically or spiritually), or else one must be reborn according to a prescribed method, namely, the taking of Murti-Bing pills. People in the West are often inclined to consider the lot of converted countries in terms of might and coercion. That is wrong. There is an internal longing for harmony and happiness that lies deeper than ordinary fear or the desire to escape misery or physical destruction. The fate of completely consistent, non-dialectical people like Witkiewicz is a warning for many an intellectual. All about him, in the city streets, he sees the frightening shadows of internal exiles, irreconcilable, non-participating, eroded by hatred.

829 In order to understand the situation of a writer in a
156 people's democracy, one must seek the reasons for his activity and ask how he maintains his equilibrium. Whatever one may say, the New Faith affords great possibilities for an active and positive life. And Murti-Bing is more tempting to an intellectual than to a peasant or laborer. For the intellectual, the New Faith is a candle that he circles like a moth. In the end, he throws himself into the flame for the glory of mankind. We must not treat this desire for self-immolation lightly. Blood flowed freely in Europe during the religious wars, and he who joins the New Faith today is paying off a debt to that European tradition. We are concerned here with questions more significant than mere force.

I shall try to grasp those profound human longings and to speak about them as if one really could analyze what is the warm blood and the flesh, itself, of man. If I should try to describe the reasons why a man becomes a revolu-

[see category 116, p. 4 -- Analyst]

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tionary I would be neither eloquent nor restrained enough. I admit that I have too much admiration for those who fight evil, whether their choice of ends and means be right or wrong. I draw the line, however, at those intellectuals who *adapt* themselves, although the fact that they are adapted and not genuine revolutionaries in no way diminishes their newly acquired zeal and enthusiasm.

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There are, I believe, a few key concepts which may lead us to understand why they accept Murti-Bing.

THE VOID

The society portrayed by Witkiewicz is distinguished by the fact that in it religion has ceased to exist as a force. And it is true that religion long ago lost its hold on men's minds not only in the people's democracies, but elsewhere as well. As long as a society's best minds were occupied by theological questions, it was possible to speak of a given religion as the way of thinking of the whole social organism. All the matters which most actively concerned the people were referred to it and discussed in its terms. But that belongs to a dying era. We have come by easy stages to a lack of a common system of thought that could unite the peasant cutting his hay, the student poring over formal logic, and the mechanic working in an automobile factory. Out of this lack arises the painful sense of detachment or abstraction that oppresses the "creators of culture." Religion has been replaced by philosophy which, however, has strayed into spheres increasingly less accessible to the layman. The discussions of Husserl by Witkiewicz's heroes can scarcely interest a reader of even better-than-average education; whereas the peasants remained bound to the Church, be it only emotionally and traditionally. Music, painting, and poetry became some-

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829 thing completely foreign to the great majority of people.
156 A theory developed that art should become a substitute for religion: "metaphysical feelings" were to be expressed in the "compression of pure form"; and so form soon came to dominate content.

To belong to the masses is the great longing of the "alienated" intellectual. It is such a powerful longing that, in trying to appease it, a great many of them who once looked to Germany or Italy for inspiration have now become converted to the New Faith. Actually, the rightist totalitarian program was exceptionally poor. The only gratification it offered came from collective *warmth:* crowds, red faces, mouths open in a shout, marches, arms brandishing sticks; but little rational satisfaction. Neither racist doctrines, nor hatred of foreigners, nor the glorification of one's own national traditions could efface the feeling that the entire program was improvised to deal with
829 problems of the moment. But Murti-Bing* is different. It
812 lays scientific foundations. At the same time, it scraps all
156 vestiges of the past. Post-Kantian philosophy, fallen into disrepute because of its remoteness from the life of men; art designed for those who, having no religion, dare not admit that to seek the "absolute" through a juxtaposition of colors and sounds is cowardly and inconclusive thinking; and the semi-magic, semi-religious mentality of the peasants—these are replaced by a *single* system, a single language of ideas. The truck driver and elevator operator employed by a publishing firm now read the same Marxist classics as its director or staff writers. A day laborer and a historian can reach an understanding on this basis of common reading. Obviously, the difference that may exist between them in mental level is no smaller than that which separated a theologian from a village blacksmith in the middle ages.

* [See category 115, p. [illegible]]

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But the fundamental principles are universal; the great spiritual schism has been obliterated. Dialectical materialism has united everyone, and philosophy (i.e., dialectics) once more determines the patterns of life. It is beginning to be regarded with a respect one reserves only for a force on which important things depend: bread and milk for one's children, one's own happiness and safety. The intellectual has once more become *useful*. He who may once have done his thinking and writing in his free moments away from a paying job in a bank or post office, has now found his rightful place on earth. He has been restored to society, whereas the businessmen, aristocrats, and tradespeople who once considered him a harmless blunderer have now been dispossessed. They are indeed delighted to find work as cloakroom attendants and to hold the coat of a former employee of whom they said, in pre-war days, "It seems he writes." We must not oversimplify, however, the gratifications of personal ambition; they are merely the outward and visible signs of social usefulness, symbols of a recognition that strengthens the intellectual's feeling of *belonging*.

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THE ABSURD

Even though one seldom speaks about metaphysical motives that can lead to a complete change of people's political opinions, such motives do exist and can be observed in some of the most sensitive and intelligent men. Let us imagine a spring day in a city situated in some country similar to that described in Witkiewicz's novel. One of his heroes is taking a walk. He is tormented by what we may call the *suction* of the absurd. What is the significance of the lives of the people he passes, of the senseless bustle, the laughter, the pursuit of money, the stupid

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000 animal diversions? By using a little intelligence he can easily classify the passers-by according to type; he can guess their social status, their habits and their preoccupations. A fleeting moment reveals their childhood, manhood, and old age, and then they vanish. A purely physiological study of one particular passer-by in preference to another is meaningless. If one penetrates into the minds of these people, one discovers utter nonsense. They are totally unaware of the fact that nothing is their own, that everything is part of their historical formation—their occupations, their clothes, their gestures and expressions, their beliefs and ideas. They are the force of inertia personified, victims of the delusion that each individual exists as a self. If at least these were souls, as the Church taught, or the monads of Leibnitz! But these beliefs have perished. What remains is an aversion to an atomized vision of life, to the mentality that *isolates* every phenomenon, such as eating, drinking, dressing, earning money, fornicating. And what is there beyond these things? Should such a state of affairs continue? Why should it continue? Such questions are almost synonymous with what is known as hatred of the bourgeoisie.

Let a new man arise, one who, instead of submitting to the world, will transform it. Let him create a historical formation, instead of yielding to its bondage. Only thus can he redeem the absurdity of his physiological existence. Man must be made to understand this, by force and by suffering. Why shouldn't he suffer? He ought to suffer. Why can't he be used as manure, as long as he remains evil and stupid? If the intellectual must know the agony of thought, why should he spare others this pain? Why should he shield those who until now drank, guffawed, gorged themselves, cracked inane jokes, and found life beautiful?

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The intellectual's eyes twinkle with delight at the persecution of the bourgeoisie, and of the bourgeois mentality. It is a rich reward for the degradation he felt when he had to be part of the middle class, and when there seemed to be no way out of the cycle of birth and death. Now he has moments of sheer intoxication when he sees the intelligentsia, unaccustomed to rigorously tough thinking, caught in the snare of the revolution. The peasants, burying hoarded gold and listening to foreign broadcasts in the hope that a war will save them from collectivization, certainly have no ally in him. Yet he is warm-hearted and good; he is a friend of mankind. Not mankind as it is, but as it *should* be. He is not unlike the inquisitor of the middle ages; but whereas the latter tortured the flesh in the belief that he was saving the individual soul, the intellectual of the New Faith is working for the salvation of the human species in general.

NECESSITY

His chief characteristic is his fear of thinking for himself. It is not merely that he is afraid to arrive at dangerous conclusions. His is a fear of sterility, of what Marx called the misery of philosophy. Let us admit that a man is no more than an instrument in an orchestra directed by the muse of History. It is only in this context that the notes he produces have any significance. Otherwise even his most brilliant solos become simply a highbrow's diversions.

We are not concerned with the question of how one finds the courage to oppose the majority. Instead we are concerned with a much more poignant question: can one write well outside that one real stream whose vitality springs from its harmony with historical laws and the dynamics of reality? Rilke's poems may be very good, but

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000 if they are, that means there must have been some reason for them in his day. Contemplative poems, such as his, could never appear in a people's democracy, not only because it would be difficult to publish them, but because the writer's impulse to write them would be destroyed at its very root. The objective conditions for such poetry have disappeared, and the intellectual of whom I speak is not one who believes in writing for the bureau drawer. He curses and despairs over the censorship and demands of the publishing trusts. Yet at the same time, he is profoundly suspicious of unlicensed literature. The publishing license he himself receives does not mean that the editor appreciates the artistic merits of his book, nor that he expects it to be popular with the public. That license is simply a sign that its author reflects the transformation of reality with scientific exactness. Dialectical materialism in the Stalinist version both reflects and directs this transformation. It creates social and political conditions in which a man ceases to think and write otherwise than as necessary. He accepts this "must" because nothing worth while can exist outside its limits. Herein lie the claws of dialectics. The writer does not surrender to this "must" merely because he fears for his own skin. He fears for something much more precious—the significance of his work. He believes that the by-ways of "philosophizing" lead to a greater or lesser degree of graphomania. Anyone gripped in the claws of dialectics is forced to admit that the thinking of private philosophers, unsupported by citations from authorities, is sheer nonsense. If this is so, then one's total effort must be directed toward following the line, and there is no point at which one can stop.

The pressure of the state machine is nothing compared with the pressure of a convincing argument. I attended the artists' congresses in Poland in which the theories of

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socialist realism were first discussed. The attitude of the audience toward the speakers delivering the required reports was decidedly hostile. Everyone considered socialist realism an officially imposed theory that would have, as Russian art demonstrates, deplorable results. Attempts to provoke discussion failed. The listeners remained silent. Usually, however, one daring artist would launch an attack, full of restrained sarcasm, with the silent but obvious support of the entire audience. He would invariably be crushed by superior reasoning plus practicable threats against the future career of an undisciplined individual. Given the conditions of convincing argument plus such threats, the necessary conversion will take place. That is mathematically certain.

The faces of the listeners at these congresses were not completely legible, for the art of masking one's feelings had already been perfected to a considerable degree. Still one was aware of successive waves of emotion: anger, fear, amazement, distrust, and finally thoughtfulness. I had the impression that I was participating in a demonstration of mass hypnosis. These people could laugh and joke afterwards in the corridors. But the harpoon had hit its mark, and henceforth wherever they may go, they will always carry it with them. Do I believe that the dialectic of the speakers was unanswerable? Yes, as long as there was no fundamental discussion of methodology. No one among those present was prepared for such a discussion. It would probably have been a debate on Hegel, whose reading public was not made up of painters and writers. Moreover, even if someone had wanted to start it, he would have been silenced, for such discussions are permitted—and even then, fearfully—only in the upper circles of the Party.

These artists' congresses reveal the inequality between

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000 the weapons of the dialectician and those of his adversary. A match between the two is like a duel between a foot soldier and a tank. Not that every dialectician is so very intelligent or so very well educated, but all his statements are enriched by the cumulated thought of the masters and their commentators. If every sentence he speaks is compact and effective, that is not due to his own merits, but to those of the classics he has studied. His listeners are defenseless. They could, it is true, resort to arguments derived from their observations of life, but such arguments are just as badly countenanced as any questioning of fundamental methodology. The dialectician rubs up against his public at innumerable meetings of professional organizations and youth groups in clubs, factories, office buildings, and village huts throughout the entire converted area of Europe. And there is no doubt that he emerges the victor in these encounters.

156 It is no wonder that a writer or painter doubts the wis-
626 dom of resistance. If he were sure that art opposed to the official line could have a lasting value, he probably would not hesitate. He would earn his living through some more menial job within his profession, write or paint in his spare time, and never worry about publishing or exhibiting his work. He believes, however, that in most cases such work would be artistically poor, and he is not far wrong. As we have already said, the objective conditions he once knew have disappeared. The objective conditions necessary to the realization of a work of art are, as we know, a highly complex phenomenon, involving one's public, the possibility of contact with it, the general atmosphere, and above all freedom from involuntary subjective control. "I can't write as I would like to," a young Polish poet admitted to me. "My own stream of thought has so many tributaries, that I barely succeed in damming

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off one, when a second, third, or fourth overflows. I get 156
halfway through a phrase, and already I submit it to 626
Marxist criticism. I imagine what X or Y will say about it, and I change the ending."

Paradoxical as it may seem, it is this subjective impotence that convinces the intellectual that the one Method is right. Everything proves it is right. Dialectics: I predict the house will burn; then I pour gasoline over the stove. The house burns; my prediction is fulfilled. Dialectics: I predict that a work of art incompatible with socialist realism will be worthless. Then I place the artist in conditions in which such a work *is* worthless. My prediction is fulfilled.

Let us take poetry as an example. Obviously, there is poetry of political significance. Lyric poetry is permitted to exist on certain conditions. It must be: 1) serene; 2) free of any elements of thought that might trespass against the universally accepted principles (in practice, this comes down to descriptions of nature and of one's feelings for friends and family); 3) understandable. Since a poet who is not allowed to *think* in his verse automatically tends to perfect his form, he is accused of formalism.

It is not only the literature and painting of the people's 000
democracies that prove to the intellectual that *things cannot be different.* He is strengthened in this belief by the news that seeps through from the West. The Western world is the world of Witkiewicz's novel. The number of its aesthetic and philosophical aberrations is myriad. Disciples imitate disciples; the past imitates the past. This world lives as if there had never been a Second World War. Intellectual clans in Eastern Europe know this life, but know it as a stage of the past that isn't worth looking back on. Even if the new problems are so oppressive that they can break a great many people, at least they are con-

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temporary. And mental discipline and the obligation to be clear are undoubtedly precious. The work of really fine Western scholars and artists escapes notice. The only new names that are known are those of "democrats"—a delicate circumlocution for a non-pagan. In short, the recompense for all pain is the certainty that one belongs to the new and conquering world, even though it is not nearly so comfortable and joyous a world as its propaganda would have one think.

SUCCESS

Mystery shrouds the political moves determined on high in the distant Center, Moscow. People speak about prominent figures in hushed voices. In the vast expanses of Euro-Asia, whole nations can vanish without leaving a trace. Armies number into the millions. Terror becomes socially useful and effective. Philosophers rule the state—obviously not philosophers in the traditional sense of the word, but dialecticians. The conviction grows that the whole world will be conquered. Great hordes of followers appear on all the continents. Lies are concocted from seeds of truth. The philosophically uneducated bourgeois enemy is despised for his inherited inability to think. (Classes condemned by the laws of history perish because their minds are paralyzed.) The boundaries of the Empire move steadily and systematically westward. Unparalleled sums of money are spent on scientific research. One prepares to rule all the people of the earth. Is all this too little? Surely this is enough to fascinate the intellectual. As he beholds these things, historical fatalism takes root in him. In a rare moment of sincerity he may confess cynically, "I bet on this horse. He's good. He'll carry me far."

A patient has a hard time, however, when the moment

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comes for him to swallow Murti-Bing in its *entirety*. He becomes such a nervous wreck that he may actually fall ill. He knows it means a definitive parting with his former self, his former ties and habits. If he is a writer, he cannot hold a pencil in his hand. The whole world seems dark and hopeless. Until now, he paid a minimal tribute: in his articles and novels, he described the evils of capitalist society. But after all, it isn't difficult to criticize capitalism, and it can be done honestly. The charlatans of the stock exchange, feudal barons, self-deluding artists, and the instigators of nationalistic wars are figures who lend themselves readily to his pen. But now he must begin to *approve*. (In official terminology this is known as a transition from the stage of critical realism to that of socialist realism. It occurred in the newly-established people's democracies about the year 1950.) The operation he must perform on himself is one that some of his friends have already undergone, more or less painfully. They shake their heads sympathetically, knowing the process and its outcome. "I have passed the crisis," they say serenely. "But how he is suffering. He sits at home all day with his head in his hands."

The hardest thing to conquer is his feeling of *guilt*. No matter what his convictions, every man in the countries of which I speak is a part of an ancient civilization. His parents were attached to religion, or at least regarded it with respect. In school, much attention was devoted to his religious upbringing. Some emotional traces of this early training necessarily remain. In any case, he believes that injury to one's fellow-man, lies, murder, and the encouragement of hatred are evil, even if they serve to accomplish sublime ends. Obviously, too, he studied the history of his country. He read its former poets and philosophers with pleasure and pride. He was proud of its

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000 century-long battle to defend its frontiers and of its struggle for independence in the dark periods of foreign occupation. Consciously or unconsciously, he feels a certain loyalty to his forefathers because of the history of toil and sacrifice on their part. Moreover, from earliest childhood, he has been taught that his country belongs to a civilization that has been derived from Rome rather than Byzantium.

Now, knowing that he must enter a gate through which he can never return, he feels he is doing *something wrong*. He explains to himself that he must destroy this irrational and childish feeling. He can become free only by weeding out the roots of what is irretrievably past. Still the battle continues. A cruel battle—a battle between an angel and a demon. True, but which is the angel and which the demon? One has a bright face he has known since his childhood—this must be the angel. No, for this face bears hideous scars. It is the face of the old order, of stupid college fraternities, of the senile imbecility of politicians, of the decrepitude of Western Europe. This is death and decadence. The other face is strong and self-contained, the face of a tomorrow that beckons. Angelic? That is doubtful.

There is a great deal of talk about patriotism, about fine, progressive, national traditions, about veneration of the past. But no one is so naïve as to take such talk seriously. The reconstruction of a few historical monuments, or a re-editing of the works of former writers cannot change certain revealing and important facts. Each people's democracy becomes a province of the Empire, ruled by edicts from the Center. It retains some autonomy, but to an ever-diminishing degree. Perhaps the era of independent states is over, perhaps they are no more than museum pieces. Yet it is saddening to say good-bye to

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one's dreams of a federation of equal nations, of a United States of Europe in which differing languages and differing cultures would have equal status. It isn't pleasant to surrender to the hegemony of a nation which is still wild and primitive, and to concede the absolute superiority of its customs and institutions, science and technology, literature and art. Must one sacrifice so much in the name of the unity of mankind? The nations of Western Europe will pass through this phase of integration later, and perhaps more gently. It is possible that they will be more successful in preserving their native language and culture. By that time, however, all of Eastern Europe will be using the one universal tongue, Russian. And the principle of a "culture that is national in form, socialist in content" will be consummated in a culture of monolithic uniformity. Everything will be shaped by the Center, though individual countries will retain a few local ornaments in the way of folklore. The Universal City will be realized when a son of the Kirghiz steppes waters his horses in the Loire, and a Sicilian peasant plants cotton in Turkmen valleys. Small wonder the writer smiles at propaganda that cries for a freeing of colonies from the grasp of imperialistic powers. Oh, how cunning dialectics can be, and how artfully it can accomplish its ends, degree by degree!

All this is bitter. But what about the harbinger of the Springtime of Nations, and Karl Marx, and the visions of the brotherhood of mankind? After all, nothing can be accomplished without the iron rule of a single Master. And what about this Master? A great Polish poet, describing his journey to the East—where he went in 1824 as a political prisoner of the Tsar—compared the soul of the Russian nation to a chrysalis. He wondered anxiously what would emerge when the sun of freedom shone: "Then will a shining butterfly take flight, or a moth, a sombre

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000 creature of the night?" So far, nothing prophesies a joyous butterfly.

The writer, in his fury and frustration, turns his thought to Western Communists. What fools they are. He can forgive their oratory if it is necessary as propaganda. But they believe most of what they proclaim about the sacred Center, and that is unforgivable. Nothing can compare to the contempt he feels for these sentimental fools.

Nevertheless, despite his resistance and despair, the crisis approaches. It can come in the middle of the night, at his breakfast table, or on the street. It comes with a metallic click as of engaged gears. *But there is no other way.* That much is clear. There is no other salvation on the face of the earth. This revelation lasts a second; but from that second on, the patient begins to recover. For the first time in a long while, he eats with relish, his movements take on vigor, his color returns. He sits down and writes a "positive" article, marveling at the ease with which he writes it. In the last analysis, there was no reason for raising such a fuss. Everything is in order. He is past the "crisis."

He does not emerge unscathed, however. The aftereffects manifest themselves in a particular kind of extinguishment that is often perceptible in the twist of his lips. His face expresses the peaceful sadness of one who has tasted the fruit from the Tree of the Knowledge of Good and Evil, of one who knows he lies and who feels compassion for those who have been spared full knowledge. He has already gone through what still awaits so many others.

In 1945, an eminent Soviet journalist came to Poland. He was an elderly gentleman, who looked like a middle-class lawyer. That he was an extremely clever and rather unscrupulous person was evidenced by the tenacity with

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which he had maintained his position—and by his advanced years. After his return to Warsaw from a tour of several provincial Polish towns, he laughingly recounted an incident that had occurred in Silesia. Someone had spread the report that a delegation of foreigners from the West had arrived. The journalist (whose round belly and honest expression were inducive to such effusive manifestations of confidence) was seized and embraced on the street by a man crying: "The English have come." "That's just how it was in the Ukraine in 1919," was the journalist's comment on the incident. This recurrence of sterile hopes amused him and he was flattered to be the representative of a country ruled according to infallible predictions; for nation after nation had indeed become part of its Empire, according to schedule. I am not sure that there wasn't in his smile something of the compassionate *superiority* that a housewife feels for a mouse caught in her trap.

The "post-crisis" writer may well expect one day to be sent on a similar journalistic mission to some newly acquired Western country. Such a prospect is not altogether distasteful. To observe people who know nothing, who still have everything to learn, must undoubtedly afford moments of unadulterated sweetness. The master knows that the trap in which the mouse has been caught is not an entirely agreeable place to live in. For the moment, however, the citizens of these newly converted countries will understand little of their new situation. They will be exhilarated at first by the flutter of national banners, the blare of marching bands, and the proclamations of long-awaited reforms. Only he, the observer, will see into the future like a god, and know it to be hard, necessarily hard, for such are the laws of History.

In the epilogue of Witkiewicz's novel, his heroes, who have gone over to the service of Murti-Bing, become schizo-

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phrenics. The events of today bear out his vision, even in this respect. One can survive the "crisis" and function perfectly, writing or painting as one must, but the old moral and aesthetic standards continue to exist on some deep inner plane. Out of this arises a split within the individual that makes for many difficulties in his daily life. It facilitates the task of ferreting out heretical thoughts and inclinations; for thanks to it, the Murti-Bingist can feel himself into his opponent with great acuteness. The new phase and the old phase exist simultaneously in him, and together they render him an experienced psychologist, a keeper of his brother's conscience.

One can expect that the new generation, raised from the start in the new society will be free of this split. But that cannot be brought about quickly. One would have to eradicate the Church completely, which is a difficult matter and one that demands patience and tact. And even if one could eliminate this reverenced mainstay of irrational impulses, national literatures would remain to exert their malignant influence. For example, the works of the greatest Polish poets are marked by a dislike of Russia, and the dose of Catholic philosophy one finds in them is alarming. Yet the state must publish certain of these poets and must teach them in its schools for they are the classics, the creators of the literary language, and are considered the forerunners of the Revolution. To place them on the index would be to think non-dialectically and to fall into the sin of "leftism." It is a difficult dilemma, more difficult in the converted countries than in the Center, where the identification of national culture with the interests of humanity has been achieved to a great degree. Probably, therefore, the schizophrenic as a type will not disappear in the near future.

Someone might contend that Murti-Bing is a medicine

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that is incompatible with human nature. That is not a very strong argument. The Aztecs' custom of offering human sacrifices to their gods, or the mortification of the flesh practiced by the early Christian hermits scarcely seem praiseworthy. The worship of gold has become a motive power second to none in its brutality. Seen from this perspective, Murti-Bing does not violate the nature of humankind.

Whether a man who has taken the Murti-Bing cure attains internal peace and harmony is another question. He attains a relative degree of harmony, just enough to render him active. It is preferable to the torment of pointless rebellion and groundless hope. The peasants, who are incorrigible in their petty bourgeois attachments, assert that "a change must come, because *this can't go on.*" This is an amusing belief in the natural order of things. A tourist, as an anecdote tells us, wanted to go up into the mountains, but it had been raining for a week. He met a mountaineer walking by a stream, and asked him if it would continue to pour. The mountaineer looked at the rising waters and voiced the opinion that it would not. When asked on what basis he had made his prediction, he said, "Because the stream would overflow." Murti-Bing holds such magic judgments to be phantoms of a dying era. The "new" is striving to overcome the "old," but the "old" cannot be eliminated all at once.

The one thing that seems to deny the perfection of Murti-Bing is the apathy that is born in people, and that lives on in spite of their feverish activity. It is hard to define, and at times one might suppose it to be a mere optical illusion. After all, people bestir themselves, work, go to the theater, applaud speakers, take excursions, fall in love, and have children. Yet there is something impalpable and unpleasant in the human climate of such cities as Warsaw

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or Prague. The collective atmosphere, resulting from an exchange and a re-combination of individual fluids, is bad. It is an aura of strength and unhappiness, of internal paralysis and external mobility. Whatever we may call it, this much is certain: if Hell should guarantee its lodgers magnificent quarters, beautiful clothes, the tastiest food, and all possible amusements, but condemn them to breathe in this aura forever, that would be punishment enough.

No propaganda, either pro or con, can capture so elusive and little-known a phenomenon. It escapes all calculations. It cannot exist on paper. Admitting, in whispered conversation, that something of the sort does exist, one must seek a rational explanation for it. Undoubtedly the "old," fearful and oppressed, is taking its vengeance by spilling forth its inky fluid like a wounded octopus. But surely the socialist organism, in its growth toward a future of guaranteed prosperity, is already strong enough to counteract this poison; or perhaps it is too early for that. When the younger generation, free from the malevolent influence of the "old," arises, everything will change. Only, whoever has observed the younger generation in the Center is reluctant to cast such a horoscope. Then we must postpone our hopes to the remote future, to a time when the Center and every dependent state will supply its citizens with refrigerators and automobiles, with white bread and a handsome ration of butter Maybe then, at last, they will be satisfied.

Why won't the equation work out as it should, when every step is logical? Do we have to use non-Euclidian geometry on material as classic, as adaptable, and as plastic as a human being? Won't the ordinary variety satisfy him? What the devil does a man need?

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CHAPTER II

Looking to the West

"ARE Americans *really* stupid?" I was asked in Warsaw. In the voice of the man who posed the question, there was despair, as well as the hope that I would contradict him. This question reveals the attitude of the average person in the people's democracies toward the West: it is despair mixed with a residue of hope.

During the last few years, the West has given these people a number of reasons to despair politically. In the case of the intellectual, other, more complicated reasons come into play. Before the countries of Central and Eastern Europe entered the sphere of the Imperium, they lived through the Second World War. That war was much more devastating there than in the countries of Western Europe. It destroyed not only their economies, but also a great many values which had seemed till then unshakeable.

Man tends to regard the order he lives in as *natural*. The houses he passes on his way to work seem more like rocks rising out of the earth than like products of human hands. He considers the work he does in his office or factory as essential to the harmonious functioning of the world. The clothes he wears are exactly what they should be, and he laughs at the idea that he might equally well be wear-

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000 ing a Roman toga or medieval armor. He respects and envies a minister of state or a bank director, and regards the possession of a considerable amount of money as the main guarantee of peace and security. He cannot believe that one day a rider may appear on a street he knows well, where cats sleep and children play, and start catching passers-by with his lasso. He is accustomed to satisfying those of his physiological needs which are considered private as discreetly as possible, without realizing that such a pattern of behavior is not common to all human societies. In a word, he behaves a little like Charlie Chaplin in *The Gold Rush*, bustling about in a shack poised precariously on the edge of a cliff.

His first stroll along a street littered with glass from bomb-shattered windows shakes his faith in the "naturalness" of his world. The wind scatters papers from hastily evacuated offices, papers labeled "Confidential" or "Top Secret" that evoke visions of safes, keys, conferences, couriers, and secretaries. Now the wind blows them through the street for anyone to read; yet no one does, for each man is more urgently concerned with finding a loaf of bread. Strangely enough, the world goes on even though the offices and secret files have lost all meaning. Farther down the street, he stops before a house split in half by a bomb, the privacy of people's homes—the family smells, the warmth of the beehive life, the furniture preserving the memory of loves and hatreds—cut open to public view. The house itself, no longer a rock, but a scaffolding of plaster, concrete, and brick; and on the third floor, a solitary white bathtub, rain-rinsed of all recollection of those who once bathed in it. Its formerly influential and respected owners, now destitute, walk the fields in search of stray potatoes. Thus overnight money loses its value and becomes a meaningless mass of printed paper. His walk

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takes him past a little boy poking a stick into a heap of smoking ruins and whistling a song about the great leader who will preserve the nation against all enemies. The song remains, but the leader of yesterday is already part of an extinct past.

He finds he acquires new habits quickly. Once, had he stumbled upon a corpse on the street, he would have called the police. A crowd would have gathered, and much talk and comment would have ensued. Now he knows he must avoid the dark body lying in the gutter, and refrain from asking unnecessary questions. The man who fired the gun must have had his reasons; he might well have been executing an Underground sentence.

Nor is the average European accustomed to thinking of his native city as divided into segregated living areas, but a single decree can force him to this new pattern of life and thought. Quarter A may suddenly be designated for one race; B, for a second; C, for a third. As the resettlement deadline approaches, the streets become filled with long lines of wagons, carts, wheelbarrows, and people carrying bundles, beds, chests, cauldrons, and bird cages. When all the moves are effected, 2,000 people may find themselves in a building that once housed 200, but each man is at last in the proper area. Then high walls are erected around quarter C, and daily a given lot of men, women, and children are loaded into wagons that take them off to specially constructed factories where they are scientifically slaughtered and their bodies burned.

And even the rider with the lasso appears, in the form of a military van waiting at the corner of a street. A man passing that corner meets a leveled rifle, raises his hands, is pushed into the van, and from that moment is lost to his family and friends. He may be sent to a concentration camp, or he may face a firing squad, his lips sealed with

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plaster lest he cry out against the state; but, in any case, he serves as a warning to his fellow-men. Perhaps one might escape such a fate by remaining at home. But the father of a family must go out in order to provide bread and soup for his wife and children; and every night they worry about whether or not he will return. Since these conditions last for years, everyone gradually comes to look upon the city as a jungle, and upon the fate of twentieth-century man as identical with that of a cave man living in the midst of powerful monsters.

It was once thought obvious that a man bears the same name and surname throughout his entire life; now it proves wiser for many reasons to change them and to memorize a new and fabricated biography. As a result, the records of the civilian state become completely confused. Everyone ceases to care about formalities, so that marriage, for example, comes to mean little more than living together.

Respectable citizens used to regard banditry as a crime. Today, bank robbers are heroes because the money they steal is destined for the Underground. Usually they are young boys, mothers' boys, but their appearance is deceiving. The killing of a man presents no great moral problem to them.

The nearness of death destroys shame. Men and women change as soon as they know that the date of their execution has been fixed by a fat little man with shiny boots and a riding crop. They copulate in public, on the small bit of ground surrounded by barbed wire—their last home on earth. Boys and girls in their teens, about to go off to the barricades to fight against tanks with pistols and bottles of gasoline, want to enjoy their youth and lose their respect for standards of decency.

Which world is "natural"? That which existed before,

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or the world of war? Both are natural, if both are within 000
the realm of one's experience. All the concepts men live by are a product of the historic formation in which they find themselves. Fluidity and constant change are the characteristics of phenomena. And man is so plastic a being that one can even conceive of the day when a thoroughly self-respecting citizen will crawl about on all fours, sporting a tail of brightly colored feathers as a sign of conformity to the order he lives in.

The man of the East cannot take Americans seriously 829
because they have never undergone the experiences that teach men how relative their judgments and thinking habits are. Their resultant lack of imagination is appalling. Because they were born and raised in a given social order and in a given system of values, they believe that any other order must be "unnatural," and that it cannot last because it is incompatible with human nature. But even they may one day know fire, hunger, and the sword. In all probability this is what will occur; for it is hard to believe that when one half of the world is living through terrible disasters, the other half can continue a nineteenth-century mode of life, learning about the distress of its distant fellowmen only from movies and newspapers. Recent examples teach us that this cannot be. An inhabitant of Warsaw or Budapest once looked at newsreels of bombed Spain or burning Shanghai, but in the end he learned how these and many other catastrophes appear in actuality. He read gloomy tales of the N.K.V.D., until one day he found he himself had to deal with it. *If something exists in one place, it will exist everywhere.* This is the conclusion he draws from his observations, and so he has no particular faith in the momentary prosperity of America. He suspects that the years 1933–45 in Europe pre-figure what will occur elsewhere. A hard school, where ignorance was punished

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not by bad marks but by death, has taught him to think sociologically and historically. But it has not freed him from irrational feelings. He is apt to believe in theories that foresee violent changes in the countries of the West, for he finds it unjust that they should escape the hardships he had to undergo.

The only system of thought that is accessible to him is dialectical materialism, and it attracts him because it speaks a language that is understandable in the light of his experience. The illusory "natural" order of the Western countries is doomed, according to dialectical materialism (in the Stalinist version), to crash as a result of a crisis. Wherever there is a crisis, the ruling classes take refuge in fascism as a safeguard against the revolution of the proletariat. Fascism means war, gas chambers, and crematoria. True, the crisis in America predicted for the moment of demobilization did not occur; true, England introduced social security and socialized medicine to a hitherto unknown degree; and it is true, as well, that anti-Communist hysteria in the United States, whatever else may have inspired it, was largely motivated by fear of an armed and hostile power. Still these are merely modifications of a formula that is being proved in other respects. If the world is divided between Fascism and Communism, obviously Fascism must lose since it is the last, desperate refuge of the bourgeoisie. The bourgeoisie rules through demagoguery, which in practice means that prominent positions are filled by irresponsible people who commit follies in moments of decision. Just such follies were Hitler's ruthless policy toward the Eastern peoples, or Mussolini's involvement of Italy in the war.

A man need not be a Stalinist to reason thus. On the contrary, knowing how doubtful are any benefits from the system evolved in the Center, he would be overjoyed

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to see a gigantic meteor wipe that cause of his misery off the face of the earth. He is, however, only a man. He weighs his chances and concludes it is unwise to align himself with the side that has been damned by the Being which has taken the place of God in this century, i.e. History. The propaganda to which he is subjected tries by every means to prove that Nazism and Americanism are identical in that they are products of the same economic conditions. He believes this propaganda only slightly less than the average American believes the journalists who assure him that Hitlerism and Stalinism are one and the same.

Even if he stands on a higher rung of the hierarchy and so has access to information about the West, he is still unable to weigh the relative strength and weakness of that half of the world. The optical instrument he sees through is so constructed that it encompasses only pre-determined fields of vision. Looking through it, he beholds only what he expected to see. For example, accustomed to living in a society in which law exists exclusively as a Party tool, and in which the sole criterion of human action is its effectiveness, he finds it hard to imagine a system in which every citizen feels himself bound by the sanctions of the law. These sanctions may have been introduced in order to protect the interests of privileged groups, but they remain even after the interests change; and it is not easy to supplant old laws with new. Every citizen is entangled in a network of statutes whose origin lies in some remote past. As a result, the mechanism of collective life is so unwieldy that anyone who tries to be truly active struggles helplessly to free himself of its restrictions.

The inhabitant of Central or Eastern Europe is incapable of understanding delays, absurd decisions, political campaigns, mutual recriminations, public opinion polls,

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829 and demagoguery, which he considers to be characteristic of the West. But at the same time, these encumbrances assure the private citizen a certain security. To seize a man on the street and deport him to a concentration camp is obviously an excellent means of dealing with an individual who displeases the administration; but such means are difficult to establish in countries where the only criminal is the man who has committed an act clearly defined as punishable in a specific paragraph of the law. Nazi and 671 Communist criminal codes are alike in that they efface the 829 frontier between penal and non-penal deeds—the first, by defining crime as any act directed against the interests of the German nation; the second, as any act directed against the interests of the dictatorship of the proletariat. What the man of the East calls the "lifeless formalism of the bourgeoisie" does, on the other hand, afford some guarantee that the father of a family will return home for supper instead of taking a trip to a region where polar bears thrive but human beings do not.

Nor is it easy in legally minded countries to adopt the use of scientific torture under which every man confesses with equal fervor whether he be innocent or guilty. Propaganda tries to convince the citizens of the people's democracies that law in the West is no more than a fiction subservient to the interests of the ruling classes. Perhaps it is a fiction, but it is not too subservient to the wishes of the rulers. If they want to condemn a man, they must sweat to prove him guilty in fact; his defense lawyers hide behind all the technicalities of the law; the case drags on through various appeals, etc. Obviously, crimes are committed under its cover, but so far Western law serves to bind the hands of the rulers as well as of the ruled which, depending on one's beliefs, may be a source of either strength or weakness.

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Americans, aware of the nature of their law, compare 829
democracy to an awkward raft on which everyone paddles in a different direction. There is much hubbub and mutual abuse, and it is difficult to get everyone to pull together. In comparison with such a raft, the trireme of the totalitarian state, speeding ahead with outspread oars, appears indomitable. But on occasion, the totalitarian ship crashes on rocks an awkward raft can sail over.

New developments in the West are not easily ascertained in the people's democracies. In certain Western countries, above all in the United States, something has occurred which is without analogy in the preceding centuries: a new civilization has arisen which is popular, vulgar, perhaps in some respects distasteful to more "refined" people, but which assures its masses a share in the output of its machine production. It is true that what these masses rejoice in is frequently tawdry and superficial, and that they purchase it with hard labor. Yet a girl working in a factory, who buys cheap mass-production models of a dress worn by a movie star, rides in an old but nevertheless private automobile, looks at cowboy films, and has a refrigerator at home, lives on a certain level of civilization that she has in *common* with others. Whereas a woman on a collective farm near Leningrad cannot foresee the day when even her great-granddaughter will live on a level that approaches such an average.

What he refers to as the "stupidity" of the American masses, who are satisfied by the purely material advantages of this new civilization, is exceptionally irritating to the Eastern intellectual. Raised in a country where there was a definite distinction between the "intelligentsia" and the "people," he looks, above all, for ideas created by the "intelligentsia," the traditional fermenting element in revolutionary changes. When he meets with a society in which

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the "intelligentsia," as it was known in Central or Eastern Europe, does not exist, he has great difficulty in translating his observations into conceptual terms. The ideas he finds are clearly obsolete and far outdistanced by economic and technical developments. The purely pragmatic and empirical resolution of problems and the inability to swallow even a small dose of abstraction (whereas the German bourgeoisie, for example, had this ability in abundance) introduce unknowns into his calculations. If one regards these characteristics as signs of "backwardness" in comparison with Europe, then one must acknowledge that the "stupidity" which produced a technology immeasurably superior to that of Europe is not entirely a source of weakness.

In fact, if the impetus to perfect and use new discoveries has lost none of its drive, the credit lies with the West. The effort Japan made to overtake the West ended unsuccessfully; and Japan was beaten by the peace-minded and internally disunited United States of Roosevelt's day. Russia, copying Western models of automobiles, airplanes, jet engines, television sets, atom bombs and submarines, and such things as radar and penicillin, has now entered the race. The youngest generation in Eastern Europe, raised in the worship of Russia, is beginning to believe that she is taking the foremost place in the realm of science and technology. The older people consider such a belief absurd; but, given her untapped natural resources, a planned economy and the subsequent ability to allocate unlimited sums of money to scientific research and experimentation, they feel she may be well on the way toward supremacy.

This supposition seems to be refuted by the purely practical aims of contemporary Russian science for, as we know, the greatest discoveries are perfected in the course

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of long, disinterested work on the part of many scientists 829
and often bear no immediate concrete results. It seems to be refuted, as well, by the insistence with which propaganda attributes most discoveries to the Russians even while they copy American construction, from bridges to motors, in the minutest detail. Such propaganda, pushed often to the point of the ridiculous, does not indicate a high degree of self-confidence. And such occurrences as the sale of Swedish machinery to the people's democracies under the stamp of Russian manufacture disproves its boastful claims. Nonetheless, this propaganda effort to destroy the Russian inferiority complex and to raise "technological morale" is proof of the importance the Center places upon this scientific race. Who knows to what results such a concentration of will may lead? Perhaps all that Russia needs is time.

Let us admit—and the Eastern or Central European will do so—that *at this moment* the superiority of the West in potential production, technology, and replacement of human hands by machines (which means the gradual effacing of the distinction between physical and mental work) is unquestionable. But, the Eastern intellectual asks, what goes on in the heads of the Western masses? Aren't their souls asleep, and when the awakening comes, won't it take the form of Stalinism? Isn't Christianity dying out in the West, and aren't its people bereft of all faith? Isn't there a void in their heads? Don't they fill that void with chauvinism, detective stories, and artistically worthless movies? Well then, what can the West offer us? Freedom *from something* is a great deal, yet not enough. It is much less than freedom *for something*.

While such questions are posed, actually they can be countered with others. American Communists (mostly

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829 the intellectually minded sons of middle-class or lower middle-classes families) complain about the spiritual poverty of the masses. They do not realize, however, that the Imperium they pine for is a combination of material poverty and lack of technology, plus Stalinism. Nor do they realize how fascinating it might be to try to imagine a combination of prosperity and technology, plus Stalinism. The new man of the Imperium is being remolded under the slogan of the struggle against poverty (which is simultaneously induced and conquered), and the advancement of technology (which is simultaneously demolished and rebuilt). If these two powerful motives were absent, what would happen? One suspects that the wheels of that gigantic machine would then turn in a vacuum. The stage of fully realized Communism is the "holy of holies." It is Heaven. One dare not direct one's eyes toward it. Yet if one dared to visualize that Paradise, he would find it not unlike the United States in periods of full employment. He would find (granting the alleviation of fear, which is improbable) the masses living physiologically, profiting from the material achievements of their civilization. But their spiritual development would meet an insuperable obstacle in a doctrine which considers its aim to be the liberation of man from material cares towards something which it, itself, defines as sheer nonsense.

These are utopian considerations which Western Communists may avoid, but their Eastern brothers do not. I remember one who said, "I do not want to live to see Communism realized, it will probably be so boring." When the great re-educational task is accomplished and the hated "metaphysical being" in man is utterly crushed, what will remain? It is doubtful whether Party imitations of Christian liturgy, and mass-like rites performed

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before portraits of the leaders will give the people perfect satisfaction. 829

More than the West imagines, the intellectuals of the East look to the West for *something*. Nor do they seek it in Western propaganda. The *something* they look for is a great new writer, a new social philosophy, an artistic movement, a scientific discovery, new principles of painting or music. They rarely find this *something*. The people of the East have already become accustomed to thinking of art and society on an organizational and mass scale. The only forms of culture in the West which attain such a scale are movies, best sellers, and illustrated magazines. No thinking person in the West takes most of these means of mass recreation seriously; whereas, in the East, where everything has a mass character, they take on the dignity of being the sole representatives of the "decadent culture of the West." It is easy to sneer at most films, novels, or articles (to say nothing of the fact that one is well-paid for such criticism and that it releases one from the more painful obligation of writing enthusiastically about the Center). Hence it is the pet activity of most Eastern journalists, and the influence that this sort of criticism has on its public is considerable.

The real cultural life of the West is very different. But even there the Eastern intellectual stumbles upon treacherous appearances, for he finds both imitation and innovation, decadence and vigor, advertised mediocrity and imperfectly recognized greatness. The social and intellectual currents, which he knows from his pre-war trips to the West, continue to exist and arouse his impatience as products of a stage he has left behind. Still these are the aspects that attract his attention, and not the new creative forces sending up shoots amid a forest of dead trees.

The gravest reproach leveled against Western culture is

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The gravest reproach leveled against Western culture is
829 that it is exclusive and inaccessible to the masses. This re-
517 proach is largely valid. Poetry, painting, and even music, shutting themselves up in ivory towers, become susceptible to numerous stylistic maladies. At the same time, however, their link with the everyday life of the people is considerably stronger than it seems to be at first glance. For example, avant-garde painting which is so "difficult" and "obscure" reaches a tremendous number of people through its influence on advertising, dress design, stage sets, interior decoration, and most important of all, perhaps, on the shape of universally used machines. In comparison with this, the "Soviet Empire" style, which is based on the painting on huge canvases of groups of dignitaries standing about in various positions and poses, is completely severed from everyday life. By destroying all experimentation in art, the Center confined its applied art (if one can speak of its existence at all) to a clumsy imitation of Western applied art which, however, is constantly renewed under the influence of experimental easel painting. When the cult of ugliness reigns in painting or sculpture and any daring passes as formalism, then applied art, cut off from its roots, is bound to prove sterile.

The multi-colored setting of Western life is subject to the law of osmosis. The average citizen of the West has no idea that a painter in a garret, a little-known musician, or a writer of "unintelligible" verse is a magician who shapes all those things in life which he prizes. Government officials give little thought to such matters for they consider them a waste of time. Since it is not a planned economy, the Western state cannot come to the aid of people working in the various arts. They go on, each pursuing his own chimera, sometimes dying of hunger; while nearby, wealthy men, not knowing what to do with

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their money, spend it on the latest whims of their be- 829
nighted souls. 517

This order of things revolts a person from the East. In his country, anyone who displays any talent is used. In the West, the same man would have very little chance of success. Western economy squanders talent to an incredible degree; and the few who do succeed owe their success as often to pure luck as to native ability. In the countries of the New Faith, the counterpart to this waste lies in the fact that the capacity to follow the political line is a selective criterion by which the most mediocre often attain the greatest renown. Nevertheless, the artist or scholar in the East earns his living more easily than his colleague in the West. Even though the pressure of the Method is burdensome, its material compensations are not to be scorned. Many musicians, painters, and writers who had the opportunity to flee to the West did not do so because they felt it was better to compose, paint, or write somehow or other, rather than to teach or work in a factory, with no time or energy left in which to perfect their true craft. Many of those who were abroad returned to their own countries chiefly for this reason.

Fear of the indifference with which the economic system of the West treats its artists and scholars is widespread among Eastern intellectuals. They say it is better to deal with an intelligent devil than with a good-natured idiot. An intelligent devil understands their mutual interests and lets them live by a pen, a chisel, or a brush, caring for his clients and making his demands. A good-hearted idiot does not understand these interests, gives nothing and asks nothing—which in practice amounts to polite cruelty.

To the people of the East it is axiomatic that the basic 829
means of production should belong to the State, that they 471

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829 [471] should be regulated according to a planned economy, and that their proceeds should be used for hygienic, cultural, scientific, and artistic ends. It is naïve to seek partisans of capitalism in their midst. The *something* these people look for in the West is certainly not warmed-over watchwords of the French Revolution or the American War of Independence. They laugh at the argument that factories and mines should belong to private individuals. Their search for *something* springs from a more or less clear understanding of the fact that the New Faith is incapable of satisfying the spiritual needs of mankind, for its efforts in that direction have with inexorable regularity turned into caricature. If they were forced to formulate what they seek, they would undoubtedly reply that they want a system with a socialist economy, but one in which man need not struggle desperately in the snake-like embrace of the Method. So they seek some sign indicating that real cultural values can arise outside the scope of the Method. But they must be lasting values, geared to the future, and therefore not products of obsolete concepts. Anything less would serve merely to confirm the Method. The people in the countries of the New Faith know that *only* in the West can there appear works that will bear the seeds of hope for the future. Perhaps discoveries no less important than those of Marx or Darwin have already been perfected in the workrooms of isolated philosophers. But how does one find them?

The Eastern intellectual is a severe critic of everything that penetrates to him from the West. He has been deceived so often that he does not want cheap consolation which will eventually prove all the more depressing. The War left him suspicious and highly skilled in unmasking sham and pretense. He has rejected a great many books that he liked before the War, as well as a great many

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trends in painting or music, because they have not stood the test of experience. The work of human thought *should* withstand the test of brutal, naked reality. If it cannot, it is worthless. Probably only those things are worth while which can preserve their validity in the eyes of a man threatened with instant death.

A man is lying under machine-gun fire on a street in an embattled city. He looks at the pavement and sees a very amusing sight: the cobblestones are standing upright like the quills of a porcupine. The bullets hitting against their edges displace and tilt them. Such moments in the consciousness of a man *judge* all poets and philosophers. Let us suppose, too, that a certain poet was the hero of the literary cafés, and wherever he went was regarded with curiosity and awe. Yet his poems, recalled in such a moment, suddenly seem diseased and highbrow. The vision of the cobblestones is unquestionably real, and poetry based on an equally *naked* experience could survive triumphantly that judgment day of man's illusions. In the intellectuals who lived through the atrocities of war in Eastern Europe there took place what one might call the *elimination of emotional luxuries*. Psychoanalytic novels incite them to laughter. They consider the literature of erotic complications, still popular in the West, as trash. Imitation abstract painting bores them. They are hungry—but they want bread, not hors d'oeuvres.

Dialectical materialism awakens a response in them because it is *earthy*. They would willingly espouse a literature and art born outside the sphere of the Method, but on condition that it be earthy, strong, and healthy. If only they could find it! It is significant that everything in the West that is strong enough for their taste turns on questions of social structure and mass belief. Such books are frequently Stalinist, but even more often anti-Stalinist.

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829 A great many of them have read Koestler's *Darkness at Noon*. A few have become acquainted with Orwell's *1984*; because it is both difficult to obtain and dangerous to possess, it is known only to certain members of the Inner Party. Orwell fascinates them through his insight into details they know well, and through his use of Swiftian satire. Such a form of writing is forbidden by the New Faith because allegory, by nature manifold in meaning, would trespass beyond the prescriptions of socialist realism and the demands of the censor. Even those who know Orwell only by hearsay are amazed that a writer who never lived in Russia should have so keen a perception into its life. The fact that there are writers in the West who understand the functioning of the unusually constructed machine of which they themselves are a part astounds them and argues against the "stupidity" of the West.

Usually, what is strong in the West is purely negative. Its criticism of the New Faith is often accurate, but despite this, it points no way out, and introduces nothing to replace the Method. One can, it is true, say that it introduces a living man unashamed of his thoughts and capable of moving without the stilts supplied by citations from the authorities. To the Eastern intellectual, this is insufficient. One does not defeat a Messiah with common-sense arguments.

The Christian religion which is restricted or even exterminated in the countries of the New Faith always evokes a considerable (albeit unhealthy) amount of interest. Do Western Christians take the necessary advantage of their freedom? One is forced to the conclusion that they do not. Religion has become something in the nature of a vestigial custom, instances of which one finds in the folklore of various nations. Perhaps some pressure

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is needed if Christianity is to be reborn. The religious 829
fervor of the Christians in the people's democracies would seem to indicate as much. One merely wonders if theirs isn't the piety of a mouse caught in a trap, and if it hasn't come just a bit too late.

The official order is to evince the greatest horror of the 829
West. Everything is evil there: trains are late, stores are 208
empty, no one has money, people are poorly dressed, the highly praised technology is worthless. If you hear the name of a Western writer, painter, or composer, you must scoff sarcastically, for to fight against "cosmopolitanism" is one of the basic duties of a citizen. Cosmopolitanism is defined as admiration for the (bourgeois) culture of the West. The term was invented in Moscow, and is not new in the history of Russia. Over a hundred years ago, Tsarist historians spoke with aversion of the "decadent West." It was in the decadent West of that time that Marx and Engels were writing, and it is from that West that it later proved necessary to import not only their work, but many other discoveries as well. In practice the fight against cosmopolitanism in the people's democracies takes the form of elaborate prescriptions indicating which Western writers of the past (those "progressive for their day") can be translated, what Western painting and music (usually created before 1870) is "healthy," etc.

No mattter how much trouble these detailed orders create for editors, publishers, and music directors, the "fight against cosmopolitanism" is not entirely without rational justification. Its motive in the Center is clear: too broad a scale of comparison is incompatible with the moral health of the citizens. In the people's democracies, which have been subjected to Western influence for centuries, it is a question of liquidating bad habits. You break a smoker of his habit by taking away his cigarettes.

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000 In convincing himself that the Center is not completely wrong to combat "cosmopolitanism," the intellectual argues thus: the religion of Rome spread more or less over the area in which so-called European civilization arose. Those countries which today form the Western provinces of the Imperium were for centuries the eastern peripheries of that civilization. The growth of modern Europe, with its concurrent development of trade and industry, deepened the rift between "Europe" and its outlying "Eastern Marches." A citizen of Iowa asked to define what he means by "Europe" would probably name France, Holland, Italy, Germany. He would go no farther East, and he would imagine the inhabitants of that distant area to be a mixture of untrustworthy, backward tribes.

It is possible that our Iowan is an example of "historical lag," that his ideas are the products of concepts which no longer coincide with facts. Nevertheless, his opinions are characteristic, and in fact reflected in American political moves which did not see Russia's occupation of the "Eastern Marches" as a loss that could have serious consequences. After all, it was in Western Europe that money and power accumulated through the centuries and that culture patterns arose which later spread to the East. (For example, Polish churches and palaces were built by Italian architects; Polish popular art was shaped by Baroque; Polish poets admiringly followed the forms of French verse, etc.). The countries of Central and Eastern Europe were traditionally "poor relations," a semi-colonial terrain. The West's attitude toward them was in general patronizing, and still does not differ much from the somewhat oversimplified opinions of the citizen of Iowa.

The Pole, Czech, or Hungarian of average education knows a good bit about France, Belgium, or Holland. The Frenchman, Belgian, or Hollander of average education

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knows little about Poland, Czechoslovakia, or Hungary. The Eastern individual finds this state of affairs unreasonable, and feels a certain solidarity with the Russian who has old and unpleasant scores to settle with the West. Even though he is irritated by Russia's inferiority complex, which leads her to demand constant homage and assurances of her unquestionable superiority, the West's disdain of Central and Eastern Europe upsets him even more, for it seems to spring from a lack of recognition of the change in proportion which has occurred in the twentieth century. These countries have a large population which has displayed a definite ability to adapt itself to the exigencies of modern technology. They are rich in natural resources, and their mining and heavy industry are rapidly developing. Their worker no longer resembles the helpless emigrant who, setting out for the West in search of bread, was forced to accept the lowest type of manual labor. Their technicians and scholars can compete successfully with their Western colleagues. Their writers and musicians cannot complain of any lack of talent.

And what is more, from every point of view, these countries seem to be the most important part not only of Europe, but of the whole world: if we assume that the New Faith will spread throughout the earth, then these are the first and therefore most interesting areas of the experiment outside Russia itself. If we assume that the Center will lose, then the economic and culture patterns that will arise subsequently in these countries will certainly be new, for there is no such thing in history as a return to the status quo. Then is one not justified in checking this idolatry of Western models which was so prevalent among the cultivated circles of the "Eastern Marches"? Why should present-day French painting, born in a coun-

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000 try living on remembered glories, be imitated in Prague or Warsaw? Why should English plays, written for a completely different public, be played in these Eastern capitals? One must break that habit of imitation which was inevitable as long as French, English, or Belgian capital, investing in the mines, railroads, and factories of the "Eastern Marches," pushed its books, films, and styles upon them. Just as nationalized industry now stands on its own feet, so Eastern European cultures must learn to stand by their own strength.

626 Unhappily, in freeing themselves from the spell of the West, the literature, science, and art of these Marches[3] became totally dependent on the new metropolis. Once imitation was spontaneous and voluntary, but now it is obligatory. Any attempt to find one's own way is denounced as Titoism. Any attempt to reach into one's own national past is possible only to the extent that that past parallels the development of the Russian nation. One may turn to folklore, obviously, and to the realistic plays of the nineteenth century. But, for example, Poland has a tradition of romantic drama which does not lend itself to realistic representation. It also possesses a tradition of stage production which is known as "monumental theater." To continue such traditions would smack of dangerous heresy. The fight against "cosmopolitanism" is in reality nothing more than the act of emptying a retort and refilling it with a different fluid. In the past, a particular substance was created in this retort through the interaction of native and imported elements. Today the imported element appears in much purer form, for a sufficient number of laboratory workers are eager to maintain the necessary respect for the formula.

186 In the last century, the "decadent West" was condemned by patriotic Russian historians because it was liberal, and

[3] [The "Eastern Marches" --Analyst]

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because the ideas that emanated from it threatened autocratic governments. Nor was it only these defenders of the throne who criticized it mercilessly. One has but to read Tolstoi's *What Is Art?* to get a picture of the scorn for Western sophistication that is so typical of the Russians. Tolstoi regarded Shakespeare's plays as collections of bloody crimes, and French painting (this was the period of the flowering of Impressionism) as the daubs of degenerates. After the Revolution, when once again the social system of Russia differed from that of the West, it was not difficult to enlarge on this precedent with a goodly number of arguments. Didn't Russia's strength lie in its suspicion of the West; and weren't even the Tsarist historians working for the Revolution by cultivating Russia's self-assurance and faith in the special calling of the nation? Conscious of their hitherto latent power, the "Scythians," as the great Russian poet Blok called his nation, at last began to march. Therefore, it would seem that the nations lying between the Baltic and Mediterranean seas would do well to imitate this Russian self-assurance and free themselves from the bad habit of parroting the West.

The intellectual understands, of course, that he himself is "cosmopolitan" since he looks to the West for *something*. This does not mean, however, that he complains about the orders that have banished Parisian boulevard art, or American detective stories from his country. A great many cultural phenomena which excite the "elite" in Western countries are distasteful to him. Asked whether T. S. Eliot's *The Cocktail Party* should be played in his native land, he would undoubtedly answer "No"; whereas, he finds *The Wasteland* by the same author an interesting piece of poetry. The new acquisition that the people of Central and Eastern Europe will never want to re-

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186 linquish is the feeling of responsibility for what the public gets from editors or producers. If, for example, one considers a play bad, one should not present it even though it might be a considerable financial success. (Just imagine a Prague or Warsaw worker looking at *The Cocktail Party*!) On the other hand, the ban on Stravinsky's *Le Sacre du printemps* is obviously absurd. The "cosmopolitanism" of the intellectual I describe is very moderate. He makes distinctions between what is worthy of his respect in the West and what owes its success to cheap publicity appealing to the taste of a dubious "elite."

The superiority of Russian realist painting (*pieredwizniki*) over French Impressionism has been proved in Moscow. Unfortunately, the eye is used in the appreciation of a painting, and the most learned discourse cannot transform an ugly canvas into a great work of art—which is obviously to be deplored! At every step, be it in the realm of aesthetics or ethics, one encounters the opposition that the strangeness of man raises against the wisest of theories. It is reasonable that a responsibly raised child should inform on his father if he observes his behavior to be contrary to the good of the social order on whose well-being the happiness of all mankind depends. And yet the disgust such behavior awakens in many people is just as inexplicable as their preference for Manet over Russian nineteenth-century realists.

000 The recklessness with which the Russians are carrying out their mental operations in the people's democracies is reaching dangerous proportions. Consistent reasoning which orders one to by-pass a fact when a concept comes into conflict with reality must eventually lead to costly errors. Hitler's war on "degenerate art" sprang from the same seed as the new ethics of his party which ordered the slaughter of "inferior races"; and in these very ideas lay

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the causes of his defeat. Knowing the Center's demand that science and art conform to the Method instead of searching for objective truth and beauty, the intellectual comes to the conclusion that it is not the wisdom of the West that will cause the downfall of the Imperium, but rather the aberrations to which the Method leads.

Announcing Mendelian genetics to be wrong, the Center used roughly three groups of arguments: 1) It contradicts the dialectical interpretation of Darwin's theory of the natural selection of species because it stresses those elements of his theory which are the reflection of the social circumstances of Darwin's day, namely, the pitiless struggle for existence in a capitalist society. (In place of the struggle for existence within a given species, one must substitute cooperation within a given species.) 2) It does not yield satisfactory practical results in agriculture. 3) It can serve as the basis for racist theories, since an individual is "better" or "worse" according to his genes. All these arguments evidence the wish that reality were all one longs for it to be. Yet what will happen if Mendelian genetics proves to be consistent with scientific observation? No matter how loudly he applauds the speakers who annihilate Western genetics, the Eastern intellectual suspects he is the dupe of an enormous hoax similar to the hoaxes of German scholars who scientifically proved whatever was necessary to the Nazis at a particular moment.

This constitutes one step in the direction of doubt about the dialectical method itself. Is it not based at times on an interpretation of signs in nature and in history which the interpreter carefully placed there himself? Dialectics is the "logic of contradictions" applicable, according to the wise men, to those cases where formal logic is inadequate, namely to phenomena in motion. Because human concepts as well as the phenomena observed by men are in

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000 motion, "contradictions contained in the concepts are but reflections, or translations into the language of thought, of those contradictions which are contained in the phenomena."

Very well; yet what about the example Plekhanov goes on to cite to prove the inadequacy of formal logic? Someone points to a young man whose beard is just beginning to grow and demands a reply to the question as to whether he does or does not have a beard. One cannot say he does not, for he has the beginnings of one. One cannot say he does, for it is not yet a beard. In a word, the beard is becoming; it is in motion; it is only a certain *quantity* of individual hairs which will one day become a *quality* called a beard. "Hell," mutters our intellectual, "these are nothing more than seventeenth-century rabbinical exercises." The hairs growing on the chin of a young man are absolutely indifferent as to what name one will give them. There is no "transition" here from "quantity to quality," as the faithful so piously proclaim. The problem "beard or no beard" arises from the language we use, from our system of classification. What boundless vanity it is to ascribe to phenomena the contradictions in which we are entangled because of our clumsy concepts.

But this is a very serious matter. The fate of the Imperium hangs on that unhappy chin. If all the historical analyses carried out according to the Method operate on the same sort of trickery—that is, if it first introduces the concepts, and then takes their contradictions to be the contradictions of the material observed—then the new Imperium may at any time trip itself in its own acrobatics.

And yet the Eastern intellectual is terrorized by the Method. How can one explain this? Without confessing to anyone, he admits to himself that falseness exists in the very core of the Method. But this does not prevent him

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from ascribing to the Method any success he may have in working with material by other techniques. The Method exerts a magnetic influence on contemporary man because it alone emphasizes, as has never before been done, the fluidity and interdependence of phenomena. Since the people of the twentieth century find themselves in social circumstances where even the dullest mind can see that "naturalness" is being replaced by fluidity and interdependence, thinking in categories of motion seems to be the surest means of seizing reality in the act. The Method is mysterious; no one understands it completely—but that merely enhances its magic power. Its elasticity, as exploited by the Russians, who do not possess the virtue of moderation, can result at times in the most painful edicts. Nevertheless, history shows us that a healthy, reasoning mind was rarely an effective guide through the labyrinth of human affairs.

The Method profits from the discoveries of Marx and Engels, from their moral indignation, and from the tactics of their successors who have denied the rightness of moral indignation. It is like a snake, which is undoubtedly a dialectical creature: "Daddy, does a snake have a tail?" asked the little boy. "Nothing but a tail," answered the father. This leads to unlimited possibilities, for the tail can begin at any point. Asking himself why he cannot escape from its embrace (even if he should want to), the intellectual replies that the measure of the Method's accuracy lies in the strength of those who rule in its name. They know how to erect a building with mobile walls on ground that is constantly shaken by earthquakes; while the West, lacking equally perfected blueprints, clings to a traditional architecture that threatens to crash. Certain walls of the dialectical structure are so monstrous that they make the inhabitants fear for the future of a build-

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ing so constructed. But when they compare it with the static architecture of the West, they believe at times that all humanity will have to move into more mobile apartments.

The Eastern intellectual's attitude toward the West is therefore complicated, and not reducible to formulas of sympathy or antipathy. It is somewhat like disappointed love, and as we know, such deception often leaves a sediment of sarcasm. It took such a calamity to enable the new system, entirely contrary to the predictions of Marx, to have been born in backward Russia, and for the Revolution to have become an enterprise directed by the bureaucrats of the Center and extended by military conquest. It took such a calamity to bring matters to the point where Europeans seeking to change the obsolete order of their countries must agree, also contrary to the predictions of Marx, to submit to a nation which has never known how to rule itself, and which in all its history has never known prosperity or freedom. What a terrible fate to have been born in such an era! This is what our intellectual thinks even as he pronounces a speech about the "supreme honor" it is to live in the "great Stalinist epoch." His function is, as he defiantly calls it, to "inoculate" others with the "basic principles of enthusiasm." It does not seem entirely unlikely to him that the West may emerge triumphant in its dispute with the Method. Still the Method, that is the revision of Marx according to Russian patterns, though it has many weaknesses, is a stronger weapon in the hands of the rulers than tanks or guns alone. And it works effectively.

Experience has taught the Eastern intellectual to measure his moves carefully. He has seen too many who fell into the abyss of disfavor for a single thoughtless step, for a single impulsively written article. If the Imperium falls,

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it may prove possible in the ensuing chaos to seek new means of survival and action. Until that happens, one must work devotedly for the triumph of the Imperium, secretly nourishing the hope that the "stupidity" of the West is not so unbounded as one is led to suppose. If only the people in the West really understood the mechanism of the "great Stalinist epoch," and if only they would act accordingly! Everything would seem to indicate that they do not understand. But perhaps, perhaps they will?

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CHAPTER III

Ketman

155 OFFICIALLY, contradictions do not exist in the minds of the citizens in the people's democracies. Nobody dares to reveal them publicly. And yet the question of how to deal with them is posed in real life. More than others, the members of the intellectual elite are aware of this problem. They solve it by becoming actors.

It is hard to define the type of relationship that prevails between people in the East otherwise than as acting, with the exception that one does not perform on a theater stage but in the street, office, factory, meeting hall, or even the room one lives in. Such acting is a highly developed craft that places a premium upon mental alertness. Before it leaves the lips, every word must be evaluated as to its consequences. A smile that appears at the wrong moment, a glance that is not all it should be can occasion dangerous suspicions and accusations. Even one's gestures, tone of voice, or preference for certain kinds of neckties are interpreted as signs of one's political tendencies.

A visitor from the Imperium is shocked on coming to the West. In his contacts with others, beginning with porters or taxi drivers, he encounters no resistance. The people he meets are completely relaxed. They lack that internal concentration which betrays itself in a lowered head

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or in restlessly moving eyes. They say whatever words 155
come to their tongues; they laugh aloud. Is it possible that human relations can be so direct?

Acting in daily life differs from acting in the theater in 000
that everyone plays to everyone else, and everyone is fully aware that this is so. The fact that a man acts is not to his prejudice, is no proof of unorthodoxy. But he must act well, for his ability to enter into his role skillfully proves that he has built his characterization upon an adequate foundation. If he makes a passionate speech against the West, he demonstrates that he has at least 10 per cent of the hatred he so loudly proclaims. If he condemns Western culture lukewarmly, then he must be attached to it in reality. Of course, all human behavior contains a significant amount of acting. A man reacts to his environment and is molded by it even in his gestures. Nevertheless, what we find in the people's democracies is a conscious mass play rather than automatic imitation. Conscious acting, if one practices it long enough, develops those traits which one uses most in one's role, just as a man who became a runner because he had good legs develops his legs even more in training. After long acquaintance with his role, a man grows into it so closely that he can no longer differentiate his true self from the self he simulates, so that even the most intimate of individuals speak to each other in Party slogans. To identify one's self with the role one is obliged to play brings relief and permits a relaxation of one's vigilance. Proper reflexes at the proper moment become truly automatic.

This happens in literature as well. A poet writing a piece of propaganda does not confine himself to a purely rationalistic approach. Imbued with the thought that poetry ideally should be suited to recitation in chorus at a meeting, he begins by tuning himself to an appropriate

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pitch of collective emotion before he can release himself in words. In the theater, the actor who plays the Cid, for example, *is* the Cid on stage. Yet not every actor, even if he is young and well-built, can play the Cid; he must have an inborn capacity to release himself emotionally in that role. Poetry as we have known it can be defined as the individual temperament refracted through social convention. The poetry of the New Faith can, on the contrary, be defined as social convention refracted through the individual temperament. That is why the poets who are most adapted to the new situation are those endowed with dramatic talent. The poet creates the character of an ideal revolutionary and writes his verses as the monologue of this character. He does not speak for himself but for the ideal citizen. His results are reminiscent of songs written to be sung on the march since the aim is the same—the forging of the fetters of collectivity that bind together an advancing column of soldiers. The best examples of such song-slogans are certain verses of the German poet, Berthold Brecht, which are superior to the works of other Eastern poets because Brecht is fully conscious of the histrionic process involved.

Even though the identification of the play with private thought-property is carried very far, a large residue of unassimilated matter remains which forces one to keep alert. A constant and universal masquerade creates an aura that is hard to bear, yet it grants the performers certain not inconsiderable satisfactions. To say something is white when one thinks it black, to smile inwardly when one is outwardly solemn, to hate when one manifests love, to know when one pretends not to know, and thus to play one's adversary for a fool (even as he is playing you for one)—these actions lead one to prize one's own cunning above all else. Success in the game becomes a source of satisfaction.

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Simultaneously, that which we protect from prying eyes takes on a special value because it is never clearly formulated in words and hence has the irrational charm of things purely emotional. Man takes refuge in an inner sanctuary which is the more precious the greater the price he pays in order to bar others from access to it.

Acting on a comparable scale has not occurred often in the history of the human race. Yet in trying to describe these new mores, we happen across a striking analogy in the Islamic civilization of the Middle East. Not only was the game played in defense of one's thoughts and feelings well-known there, but indeed it was transformed into a permanent institution and graced with the name of Ketman.

What is Ketman? I found its description in a book by Gobineau entitled *Religions and Philosophies of Central Asia.* Gobineau spent many years in Persia (from 1855 to 1858 he was a secretary in the French legation, from 1861 to 1863 he was French minister), and we cannot deny his gift for keen observation, even though we need not necessarily agree with the conclusions of this rather dangerous writer. The similarities between Ketman and the customs cultivated in the countries of the New Faith are so striking that I shall permit myself to quote at length.

The people of the Mussulman East believe that "He who is in possession of truth must not expose his person, his relatives or his reputation to the blindness, the folly, the perversity of those whom it has pleased God to place and maintain in error." One must, therefore, keep silent about one's true convictions if possible.

"Nevertheless," says Gobineau, "there are occasions when silence no longer suffices, when it may pass as an avowal. Then one must not hesitate. Not only must one deny one's true opinion, but one is commanded to resort

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000 to all ruses in order to deceive one's adversary. One makes all the protestations of faith that can please him, one performs all the rites one recognizes to be the most vain, one falsifies one's own books, one exhausts all possible means of deceit. Thus one acquires the multiple satisfactions and merits of having placed oneself and one's relatives under cover, of not having exposed a venerable faith to the horrible contact of the infidel, and finally of having, in cheating the latter and confirming him in his error, imposed on him the shame and spiritual misery that he deserves.

"Ketman fills the man who practices it with pride. Thanks to it, a believer raises himself to a permanent state of superiority over the man he deceives, be he a minister of state or a powerful king; to him who uses Ketman, the other is a miserable blind man whom one shuts off from the true path whose existence he does not suspect; while you, tattered and dying of hunger, trembling externally at the feet of duped force, your eyes are filled with light, you walk in brightness before your enemies. It is an unintelligent being that you make sport of; it is a dangerous beast that you disarm. What a wealth of pleasures!"

How far Ketman can go is demonstrated by the founder of one sect, Hadzhi-Sheikh-Ahmed. "Although he left behind many works of theology, he never openly advanced in his books, as even his most passionate disciples avow, anything which could place the reader on the path of the ideas attributed to him today. But everyone affirms he practiced Ketman and that in private he was extremely daring and precise in establishing order in the doctrines which bear his name today." We cannot wonder, therefore, that, as a certain Persian admitted in conversation with Gobineau, "there is not a single true Moslem in Persia."

Not everyone was as careful as Hadzhi-Sheikh-Ahmed. To some, Ketman was useful in the preparatory period,

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but when they felt themselves sufficiently strong, they proclaimed their heresy openly. Here, for example, is the description of the itinerant preachings of Sadra, the disciple of Avicenna.

"He too was afraid of the mullahs. To incite their distrust was inevitable, but to provide a solid basis, furnish proof for their accusations, that would have been to expose himself to endless persecutions, and to compromise at the same time the future of the philosophical restoration he meditated. Therefore he conformed to the demands of his times and resorted to the great and splendid expedient of Ketman. When he arrived in a city he was careful to present himself humbly to all the moudjteheds or doctors of the region. He sat in a corner of their salons, their talars, remained silent usually, spoke modestly, approved each word that escaped their venerable lips. He was questioned about his knowledge; he expressed only ideas borrowed from the strictest Shiite theology and in no way indicated that he concerned himself with philosophy. After several days, seeing him so meek, the moudjteheds themselves engaged him to give public lessons. He set to work immediately, took as his text the doctrine of ablution or some similar point, and split hairs over the prescriptions and inner doubts of the subtlest theoreticians. This behavior delighted the mullahs. They lauded him to the skies; they forgot to keep an eye on him. They themselves wanted to see him lead their imaginations through less placid questions. He did not refuse. From the doctrine of ablution he passed to that of prayer; from the doctrine of prayer, to that of revelation; from revelation, to divine unity and there, with marvels of ingenuity, reticence, confidences to the most advanced pupils, self-contradiction, ambiguous propositions, fallacious syllogisms out of which only the initiated could see their way, the whole heavily

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000 seasoned with unimpeachable professions of faith, he succeeded in spreading Avicennism throughout the entire lettered class; and when at last he believed he could reveal himself completely, he drew aside the veils, repudiated Islam, and showed himself the logician, the metaphysician that he really was."

Islamic Ketman and the Ketman of the twentieth century in Europe seem to differ only in that the boldness Sadra permitted himself would instantly have brought him to a sad end in Europe. Nevertheless, Ketman in its narrowest and severest forms is widely practiced in the people's democracies. As in Islam, the feeling of superiority over those who are unworthy of attaining truth constitutes one of the chief joys of people whose lives do not in general abound in pleasures. "Deviations," the tracing of which creates so many troubles for the rulers, are not an illusion. They are cases of accidental unmaskings of Ketman; and those who are most helpful in detecting deviations are those who themselves practice a similar form of Ketman. Recognizing in other acrobats the tricks they themselves employ, they take advantage of the first occasion to down an opponent or friend. Thus they protect themselves; and the measure of dexterity is to anticipate by at least one day the similar accusation which could be leveled against them by the man they denounce. Since the number of varieties of Ketman is practically unlimited, the naming of deviations cannot keep pace with the weeding of a garden so full of unexpected specimens of heresy. Every new commentary on the precepts of the New Faith proclaimed by the Center multiplies the internal reservations of those who are externally the most faithful. It is impossible to enumerate all the forms of Ketman that one can discover in the people's democracies. I shall try, how-

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ever, to proceed somewhat in the manner of a naturalist determining major groups and families.

National Ketman is broadly diffused throughout the masses, and even the upper brackets of the Party in the various dependent states are not free of it. Because Tito, like Sadra, announced his heresy to all the world, millions of human beings in the people's democracies must employ exceedingly ingenious means of masking themselves. Instructive displays of condemnation of those who wished to follow the national road to socialism in individual Eastern capitals taught the public what kind of phrases and reflexes can expose one to reproach for harboring this fatal tendency. The surest safeguard is to manifest loudly one's awe at Russia's achievements in every field of endeavor, to carry Russian books under one's arm, to hum Russian songs, to applaud Russian actors and musicians enthusiastically, etc. A writer who has not consecrated a single work to outstanding Russian figures or to Russian life, but has confined himself to national themes, cannot consider himself entirely safe. The chief characteristic of the people who practice this Ketman is an unbounded contempt for Russia as a barbaric country. Among the workers and peasants it is most often purely emotional, and based on observation of either the soldiers of the liberating army, or (since during the war a great many were in areas directly administered by the Russians) of Russians in their daily life.

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Because until now the living standard of the masses in Russia was so much lower than that of the so-called people's democracies, national Ketman finds abundant nourishment. It cannot be defined simply as nationalism. For many centuries hatred existed between the Central European Slavs and the Germans, still it was colored

[1 [For a definition of "Ketman", see cat. 116; pp. 57-60 -- Analyst]

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among the Slavs by a respect for Germany's material achievements. On the other hand, perceiving by comparison the greater refinement of his own customs, his greater organizational ability (be it only in respect to transportation or the handling of machinery), the Central European would express his attitude toward Russia, if he could, by a disdainful shrug of his shoulders—which, however, doesn't prevent him from shuddering in fear before the countless hordes pouring out of the Euro-Asian continent.

But this Ketman is not exclusively emotional in its appeal. Amid the young intelligentsia of working-class origin the overwhelming opinion can be summed up shortly as "Socialism—yes, Russia—no"; and this is where the subtleties of doctrinal differences arise. The countries of Europe, this line of reasoning begins, are infinitely more prepared to realize socialism than Russia. Their population is more intelligent; most of their land is under cultivation; their systems of communication and their industry are more highly developed. Measures based on absolute cruelty are unnecessary and even pointless since there exists a greater degree of social discipline. Nevertheless, "the national road to socialism" has been condemned and many efforts made to prove that whoever is opposed to total adaptation to Russian models and to surrendering to Russian dictatorship is a traitor who must share the fate of Tito—that is, must come out against the Center and thus weaken its war potential without which there can be no revolution on a world scale. To pronounce oneself against this thesis would be to deny the New Faith and to introduce in its place a different faith, for example one directly linked to Marx and Engels. Many do so. Others, seeing in the alliance between Tito and the West an example of historical fatality, and rejecting the idea that this fatality

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may be due simply to the Center's policy toward dependent nations, shut themselves up in a Ketman which does not hamper the Center in its external acts. A true Moslem, even though he be deeply attached to his Ketman, never seeks to injure Islam in those areas where it is fighting for its life against unbelievers. Such Ketman expresses itself only in practical moves which do no harm in the world struggle, but which on the other hand safeguard national interests whenever possible.

The Ketman of Revolutionary Purity is a rare variety, more common in the large cities of Russia than in the people's democracies. It is based on a belief in the "sacred fire of the revolutionary epoch of Lenin" which burns in such a poet as Mayakovski. Mayakovski's suicide in 1930 marked the end of an era distinguished by the flowering of literature, the theater, and music. The "sacred fire" was dampened, collectivization was introduced mercilessly, millions of Soviet citizens perished in slave labor camps, a ruthless policy toward non-Russian nations was established. Literature became flat and colorless under the influence of imposed theories; Russian painting was destroyed; Russian theater, then the foremost in the world, was deprived of freedom to experiment; science was subjected to directives from Party chiefs. A man who reasons thus hates Him with all his heart, holding Him responsible for the terrible lot of the Russian people and for the hatred they inspire in other nations.

Still, he is not altogether sure whether He is necessary or not. Perhaps in extraordinary periods such as the present the appearance of a tyrant must be considered desirable. Mass purges in which so many good communists died, the lowering of the living standard of the citizens, the reduction of artists and scholars to the status of yes-men, the extermination of entire national groups—what

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186 other man would dare undertake such measures? After
626 all, Russia stood firm against Hitler; the Revolution weathered the attack of enemy armies. In this perspective, His acts seem effective and even justified, perhaps, by an exceptional historical stituation. If He had not instituted an exceptional terror in the year 1937, wouldn't there have been more people willing to help Hitler than there actually were? For example, doesn't the present-day line in scholarship and art, no matter how at odds it may be at times with common sense, effectually raise Russian morale in the face of the war that threatens? He is an infamous blot on the bright New Faith, but a blemish we must tolerate for the moment. And indeed we must even support Him. The "sacred fire" has not gone out. When victory is achieved, it will burst forth again with its old strength, the bonds He imposed will fall away, and relations between nations will operate on new and better principles. This variety of Ketman was widespread if not universal in Russia during the Second World War, and its present form is a rebirth of an already once-deceived hope.

626 *Aesthetic Ketman*[1] is born of the disparity between man's
517 longings and the sense-satisfactions the New Faith offers. A man of taste cannot approve the results of official pressure in the realm of culture no matter how much he applauds the latest verses, how many flattering reviews he writes of current art expositions, nor how studiously he pretends that the gloomy new buildings coincide with his personal preferences in architecture. He changes completely within the four walls of his home. There one finds (if he is a well-situated intellectual) reproductions of works of art officially condemned as bourgeois, records of modern music, and a rich collection of ancient authors in various languages. This luxury of splendid isolation is pardoned him so long as his creative work is effective prop-

[1] [For a definition of "ketman," see cat. 116, pp. 57-60 -- Analyst]

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aganda. To protect his position and his apartment (which he has by the grace of the State), the intellectual is prepared to make any sacrifice or compromise; for the value of privacy in a society that affords little if any isolation is greater than the saying "my home is my castle" can lead one to surmise. Two-way television screens installed in private homes to observe the behavior of citizens in seclusion belong as yet to the future. Hence, by listening to foreign radio stations and reading good books, he profits from a moment of relaxation; that is, of course, if he is alone, for as soon as guests arrive the play begins anew.

Never has there been a close study of how necessary to a man are the experiences which we clumsily call aesthetic. Such experiences are associated with works of art for only an insignificant number of individuals. The majority find pleasure of an aesthetic nature in the mere fact of their existence within the stream of life. In the cities, the eye meets colorful store displays, the diversity of human types. Looking at passers-by, one can guess from their faces the story of their lives. This movement of the imagination when a man is walking through a crowd has an erotic tinge; his emotions are very close to physiological sensations. He rejoices in dresses, in the flash of lights; while, for instance, Parisian markets with their heaps of vegetables and flowers, fish of every shape and hue, fruits, sides of meat dripping with every shade of red offer delights, he need not go seeking them in Dutch or Impressionist painting. He hears snatches of arias, the throbbing of motors mixed with the warble of birds, called greetings, laughter. His nose is assailed by changing odors: coffee, gasoline, oranges, ozone, roasting nuts, perfumes.

Those who have sung of the large cities have consecrated many pages to the description of this joyous immersion in the reservoir of universal life. The swimmer who trusts

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626 himself to the wave, and senses the immensity of the ele-
517 ment that surrounds him lives through a like emotion. I am thinking of such great singers of the city as Balzac, Baudelaire, and Whitman. It would seem that the exciting and invigorating power of this participation in mass life springs from the feeling of *potentiality*, of constant unexpectedness, of a mystery one ever pursues.

Even the life of the peasants, though it be dulled by brutalizing hand labor, allows for aesthetic expression in the rhythm of custom, the rites of the church, holy pictures, country fairs, native costumes, paper flower decorations, folk sculptures, music, and dances.

In the countries of the New Faith the cities lose their former aspect. The liquidation of small private enterprises gives the streets a stiff and institutional look. The chronic lack of consumer goods renders the crowds uniformly gray and uniformly indigent. When consumer products do appear, they are of a single second-rate quality. Fear paralyzes individuality and makes people adjust themselves as much as possible to the average type in their gestures, clothing, and facial expressions. Cities become filled with the racial type well-regarded by the rulers: short, square men and women, with short legs and wide hips. This is the proletarian type, cultivated to an extreme, thanks to binding aesthetic standards. (We know that these same dumpy women and stocky men could change completely under the influence of films, painting, and fashion, for America has proved that mass communication is at least as important as diet in determining physical appearance.) Streets, factories, and meeting places sport the inevitable red flags and painted slogans. The new buildings are monumental and oppressive, lightness and charm in architecture being condemned as formalistic. The number of aesthetic experiences accessible to a city-dweller in the

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countries of the New Faith is uncommonly limited. The only place of magic is the theater, for the spell of the theater exists even though confined by the commands of socialist realism which define both the contents of a play and stage décor. The tremendous popular success of authors like Shakespeare is due to the fact that their fantasy triumphs even within the bounds of naturalistic stage setting. The hunger for *strangeness* that is so great inside the Imperium should give the rulers pause; yet in all probability it does not, for they consider such longings derelicts from the past.

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In the villages, where the entire former pattern of custom is to be abolished through the transformation of peasants into agricultural workers, there still remain survivals of the individual peasant cultures which slowly stratified over the centuries. Still, let us speak frankly, the main supports of this culture were usually the wealthier peasants. The battle against them, and their subsequent need to hide, must lead to the atrophy of peasant dress, decoration of huts, cultivation of private gardens, etc. There is a definite contradiction between the official protection of folklore (as a harmless form of national culture designed to satisfy patriotic tendencies) and the necessities of the new economic structure.

In these conditions aesthetic Ketman has every possibility of spreading. It is expressed not only in that unconscious longing for strangeness which is channeled toward controlled amusements like theater, film, and folk festivals, but also into various forms of escapism. Writers burrow into ancient texts, comment upon and re-edit ancient authors. They write children's books so that their fancy may have slightly freer play. Many choose university careers because research into literary history offers a safe pretext for plunging into the past and for converse

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626 with works of great aesthetic value. The number of trans-
517 lators of former prose and poetry multiplies. Painters seek an outlet for their interests in illustrations for children's books, where the choice of gaudy colors can be justified by an appeal to the "naïve" imagination of children. Stage managers, doing their duty by presenting bad contemporary works, endeavor to introduce into their repertoires the plays of Lope de Vega or Shakespeare—that is, those of their plays which are approved by the Center.*

Some representatives of the plastic arts are so daring that they reveal their Ketman to no small degree by proclaiming the need of an aesthetic of everyday life, and by establishing special institutes to design fabrics, furniture, glass, and ceramics for industry. There is money for such enterprises, and they find support among the most intelligent dialecticians of the upper circles of the Party. Such efforts deserve respect when one considers that before the Second World War Poland and Czechoslovakia were, aside from Sweden and Finland, the leading countries in interior decoration. Nevertheless, there is no reason why that which passes as formalism in painting and architecture should be tolerated for any length of time in the applied arts.

The rationalization of aesthetic Ketman is obvious: since everything is planned in a socialist economy, why not proceed to a planned satisfaction of the aesthetic needs of human beings? Here, however, we trespass upon the treacherous territory of the demon, Psychology. To admit that a man's eye has need of exultant colors, harmonious forms, or light sunny architecture is to affirm that the taste of the Center is bad. However, even there one can see some progress. They are already erecting skyscrapers patterned after the buildings raised in Chicago about the year 1900. It is possible that in the year 2000 they will officially introduce art forms that today are considered

* [Moscow -- Analyst]

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modern in the West. But how can one still the thought 626
that aesthetic experiences arise out of something organic, 517
and that the union of color and harmony with fear is as difficult to imagine as brilliant plumage on birds living in the northern tundras?

Professional Ketman[1] is reasoned thus: since I find my- 626
self in circumstances over which I have no control, and 155
since I have but one life and that is fleeting, I should strive to do my best. I am like a crustacean attached to a crag on the bottom of the sea. Over me storms rage and huge ships sail; but my entire effort is concentrated upon clinging to the rock, for otherwise I will be carried off by the waters and perish, leaving no trace behind. If I am a scientist I attend congresses at which I deliver reports strictly adhering to the Party line. But in the laboratory I pursue my research according to scientific methods, and in that alone lies the aim of life. If my work is successful, it matters little how it will be presented and toward whose glory. Discoveries made in the name of a disinterested search for truth are lasting, whereas the shrieks of politicians pass. I must do all they demand, they may use my name as they wish, as long as I have access to a laboratory and money for the purchase of scientific instruments.

If I am a writer, I take pride in my literary achievements. Here, for example, is my treatise on Swift, a Marxist analysis. This type of analysis, which is not synonymous with the Method or the New Faith, makes possible a keen penetration into historical events. Marx had a genius for observation. In following him one is secure against attack, for he is, after all, the prophet; and one can proclaim one's belief in the Method and the New Faith in a preface fulfilling much the same function as dedications to kings or tsars in times past. Here is my translation of a sixteenth-century poem, or my novel

[1] [For a definition of "Ketman", see cat. 116, pp. 57-60 - Analyst]

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626 whose scene is laid in the distant past. Aren't they of per-
155 manent value? Here are my translations from Russian. They are viewed with approbation and have brought me a large sum of money, but certainly Pushkin is a great poet, and his worth is not altered by the fact that today his poems serve Him as a means of propaganda. Obviously I must pay for the right to practice my profession with a certain number of articles and odes in the way of tribute. Still one's life on earth is not judged by transitory panegyrics written out of necessity.

These two examples of professional Ketman should demonstrate how little discomfort it creates for the rulers. It is the source of considerable dynamic force and one cause of the tremendous impetus toward education. The object is to establish some special field in which one can release one's energies, exploit one's knowledge and sensibility, and at the same time escape the fate of a functionary entirely at the mercy of political fluctuations. The son of a worker who becomes a chemist makes a *permanent* advance. The son of a worker who becomes a member of the security police rises to the surface, where large ships sail but where the sea is changeable and stormy. But most important of all, chemical experiments, bridges, translations of poetry, and medical care are exceptionally free of falsity. The State, in its turn, takes advantage of this Ketman because it needs chemists, engineers, and doctors. From time to time, it is true, there come from above muffled grumbles of hatred against those who practice Ketman in the realm of humanistic studies. Fadeyev, Moscow's literary overseer, attacked the University of Leningrad because one of its students had written a dissertation on the English poet, Walter Savage Landor. "Who needs Landor? Who ever heard of him?" cried Fadeyev. So it would

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seem that moderation and watchfulness are indicated for those who espouse this form of Ketman. 626 155

Sceptical Ketman is widely disseminated throughout intellectual circles. One argues that humanity does not know how to handle its knowledge or how to resolve the problems of production and division of goods. The first scientific attempts to solve social problems, made in the nineteenth century, are interesting but not precise enough. They happened, however, into the hands of the Russians who, unable to think otherwise than dogmatically, raised these first attempts to the dignity of dogma. What is happening in Russia and the countries dependent upon her bespeaks a kind of insanity, but it is not impossible that Russia will manage to impose her insanity upon the whole world and that the return to reason will occur only after two or three hundred years. Finding oneself in the very midst of an historical cyclone, one must behave as prudently as possible, yielding externally to forces capable of destroying all adversaries. This does not prevent one from taking pleasure in one's observations, since what one beholds is indeed unprecedented. Surely man has never before been subjected to such pressure, never has he had to writhe and wriggle so to adapt himself to forms constructed according to the books but obviously not to his size. All his intellectual and emotional capacities are put to the test.

Whoever contemplates this daily sight of repudiation and humiliation knows more about man than an inhabitant of the West who feels no pressure other than that of money. The accumulating of this store of observations is the activity of a miser who counts his treasure in secret. Since this Ketman is based on a total lack of belief in the Method, it helps one conform externally to the obligatory

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line by allowing for complete cynicism, and therefore for elasticity in adjusting oneself to changing tactics.

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Metaphysical Ketman[1] occurs generally in countries with a Catholic past. Most examples of it within the Imperium are found in Poland. This Ketman depends upon a *suspended* belief in a metaphysical principle of the world. A man attached to this Ketman regards the epoch in which he lives as anti-metaphysical, and hence as one in which no metaphysical faith can emerge. Humanity is learning to think in rationalistic and materialistic categories; it is burdened with immediate problems and entangled in a class war. Other-worldly religions are crumbling, living through a period of crisis and, what is worse, serving to defend the obsolete order. This does not mean that mankind will not return to a better and purified religion in the future. Perhaps the New Faith is an indispensable purgatory; perhaps God's purpose is being accomplished through the barbarians, i.e. the Center,[2] who are forcing the masses to awaken out of their lethargy. The spiritual fare these masses receive from the New Faith is inferior and insufficient. Still one must commend the Center for breaking new ground and for demolishing externally splendid but internally rotten façades. One should cooperate in this task without betraying one's attachment to the Mystery. All the more so because the Mystery has no possibility of appearing in literature, for example, and because neither the language nor the ideas at the disposal of contemporary man are ripe enough to express it.

This metaphysical Ketman in its turn has a number of varieties. Certain practicing Catholics serve even in the security police, and *suspend* their Catholicism in executing their inhumane work. Others, trying to maintain a Christian community in the bosom of the New Faith, come out publicly as Catholics. They often succeed in preserving

[1] [For a definition of Ketman, see cat 116, no 5760 Analyst]
[2] [Moscow — Analyst]

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Catholic institutions, because the dialecticians are ready to accept so-called "progressive" and "patriotic" Catholics who comply in political matters. The mutual game is rather ambiguous. The rulers tolerate such Catholics as a temporary and necessary evil, reasoning that the stage has not yet arrived at which one can utterly wipe out religion, and that it is better to deal with accommodating bigots than with refractory ones. "Progressive Catholics" are, however, conscious of being relegated to a not particularly honorable place, that of shamans or witch-doctors from savage tribes whom one humors until one can dress them in trousers and send them to school. They appear in various state spectacles and are even sent abroad as shining testimonials to the Center's tolerance toward uncivilized races. One can compare their function to that of "noble savages" imported to the metropolis by colonial powers for state occasions. Their defense against total degradation is metaphysical Ketman: they swindle the devil who thinks he is swindling them. But the devil knows what they think and is satisfied.

What holds for such Catholics can be applied to members of other religions, as well as to persons outside any denomination. One of the most ominous reproaches leveled against writers is the suspicion that their verses, plays, or novels contain a "metaphysical residue." Since a writer is a civilizer who dares not be a shaman or a sorcerer, the slightest signs of a metaphysical tendency in him are unforgivable. The literature of the countries which, until the Second World War, were free from Moscow's domination betrayed especially strong inclinations in that direction, so that metaphysical deviation is of constant and imperative concern to the rulers. For instance, a play that introduces "strangeness," revealing the author's interest in the tragedy of life, has no chance of being produced be-

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626 cause the tragedy of human fate leads to thoughts about
779 the mystery of human destiny. One forgives certain writers like Shakespeare these predispositions, but there is no question of permitting any contemporary author to harbor them. It is for this reason that Greek tragedies are not deemed suitable for theater repertoires. Marx loved the Greek tragedians, but let us not forget that the connection between the New Faith and Marx is rather superficial.

517 The New Faith is a Russian creation, and the Russian
626 intelligentsia which shaped it had developed the deepest contempt for all art that does not serve social ends directly. Other social functions of art, probably the most important ones, consistently escaped its understanding. As for poetry, since its sources are hard to differentiate from the sources of all religion, it is singularly exposed to persecution. True, the poet is free to describe hills, trees, and flowers, but if he should feel that boundless exaltation in the face of nature that seized Wordsworth on his visit to Tintern Abbey, he is at once suspect. This is an excellent means of eliminating the legions of bad poets who like to confess their pantheistic flights publicly, but it is also a means of exterminating poetry as a whole and replacing it by jingles little better than the singing commercials broadcast over the radio in America. A painter, in turn, may be attacked quite as easily for using abbreviated and synthesized forms (formalism), as for an excessive love of the beauty of the world, i.e. a contemplative attitude which signifies that he is a metaphysicist by temperament. A musician should see to it that his compositions are easy to translate into the language of common activities (enthusiasm for work, folk festivities, etc.), and that no element remains which is difficult to grasp and hence dangerous. If metaphysical Ketman is tolerated in the "savages," i.e. those who profess the Christian religion, in the artists

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who are considered the educators of society, it is severely punished. 517 626

Ethical Ketman results from opposition to the ethics of the New Faith, which is based on the principle that good and evil are definable solely in terms of service or harm to the interests of the Revolution. Since exemplary behavior of citizens in their inter-relations aids the cause of socialism, great emphasis is placed upon individual morality. 626 577

"The development of a new man" is the key point in the New Faith's program. Demands made upon Party members are exceedingly harsh. One exacts of them no small degree of abstinence. As a result, admission to the Party is not unlike entrance into a religious order; and the literature of the New Faith treats this act with a gravity equal to that with which Catholic literature speaks of the vows of young nuns. The higher one stands in the Party hierarchy, the more attentively is one's private life supervised. Love of money, drunkenness, or a confused love-life disqualify a Party member from holding important offices. Hence the upper brackets of the Party are filled by ascetics devoted to the single cause of Revolution. As for certain human tools, deprived of real influence but useful because of their names, even if they belong to the Party one tolerates or sometimes encourages their weaknesses, for they constitute a guarantee of obedience. The general ethical ideal of the New Faith is puritanical. If it were feasible to lodge all the citizens in cells and release them only for work or for political meetings, that would undoubtedly be most desirable. But alas, one must make concessions to human nature. Procreation is possible only as a result of sexual relations between men and women, and one must take this inconvenience into account.

The "new man" is conditioned to acknowledge the

[For a definition of "Ketman, see cat. 116, pp. 57-60.--Analyst]

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626 577 good of the whole as the sole norm of his behavior. He thinks and reacts like others; is modest, industrious, satisfied with what the state gives him; limits his private life to nights spent at home, and passes all the rest of his time amidst his companions at work or at play, observing them carefully and reporting their actions and opinions to the authorities. Informing was and is known in many civilizations, but the New Faith declares it a cardinal virtue of the good citizen (though the name itself is carefully avoided). It is the basis of each man's fear of his fellow-men. Work in an office or factory is hard not only because of the amount of labor required, but even more because of the need to be on guard against omnipresent and vigilant eyes and ears. After work one goes to political meetings or special lectures, thus lengthening a day that is without a moment of relaxation or spontaneity. The people one talks with may seem relaxed and careless, sympathetic and indignant, but if they appear so, it is only to arouse corresponding attitudes and to extract confidences which they can report to their superiors.

In effect this cult of the community produces something which poisons the community itself. The mentality of the Party's sages is, indeed, rather strange. They make concessions to physiological human weaknesses, but they refuse to admit that man has other foibles as well: that he feels fine when he can relax, and unhappy when he is afraid, that lying is bad for him because it creates internal tension. These weaknesses, together with others like the desire to better one's own lot at the expense of one's fellow-men, transform the ethic which was originally founded on cooperation and brotherhood into an ethic of a war pitting all men against all others, and granting the greatest chances of survival to the craftiest. Victory in this new struggle seems to belong to a breed different

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from that which was favored to win in the battle for money in the early days of industrial capitalism. If biting dogs can be divided into two main categories, noisy and brutal, or silent and slyly vicious, then the second variety would seem most privileged in the countries of the New Faith. Forty or fifty years of education in these new ethical maxims must create a new and irretrievable species of mankind. The "new man" is not merely a postulate. He is beginning to become a reality.

Ethical Ketman is not rare among highly placed figures in the Party. These persons, no matter how capable they are of murdering millions of people in the name of Communism, try to compensate for their professional severity and are often more honorable in their personal relations than people who affect individualistic ethics. Their capacity to sympathize and help is almost unlimited. Indeed this very feeling of compassion pushed them onto the road of revolution in their youth, and in this they reiterated the experience of Marx himself. One finds this Ketman chiefly among the old Communists. Conflicts between friendship and the interests of the Revolution are matters they weigh at length in their conscience; and they are pitiless only when completely convinced that, in shielding a friend or in refraining from denouncing him, they are injuring that cause which is most precious to them. Though they are usually esteemed as people of crystalline righteousness, they are not safe from frequent accusations of "intellectuality," a contemptuous epithet for those who are blameless as theoreticians, but hampered in action by an over-sensitivity to ethical considerations. A revolutionary should be without scruples. It is better to cut down human trees blindly than to wonder which among them are really rotten.

This variety of Ketman is one of the most prevalent in

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626 the people's democracies because the new ethic is of re-
517 cent inculcation, whereas the ethic vanquished by the New Faith was ensconced there for centuries. One can never foresee when and in whom this Ketman will appear, which makes for an element of surprise. Individuals who give one every reason to suppose that they do not denounce others turn out to be inveterate informers; individuals who are apparently most indifferent to "prejudices," show themselves inexplicably loyal toward their friends and even toward strangers. Since this Ketman augments the difficulties of controlling the citizens' thoughts, it is diligently sought out and penalized; yet the number of situations to which it can be applied is so great that it often eludes all manner of pressure.

The inhabitants of Western countries little realize that millions of their fellow-men, who seem superficially more or less similar to them, live in a world as fantastic as that of the men from Mars. They are unaware of the perspectives on human nature that Ketman opens. Life in constant internal tension develops talents which are latent in man. He does not even suspect to what heights of cleverness and psychological perspicacity he can rise when he is cornered and must either be skillful or perish. The survival of those best adapted to mental acrobatics creates a human type that has been rare until now. The necessities which drive men to Ketman sharpen the intellect.

626 Whoever would take the measure of intellectual life in
517 the countries of Central or Eastern Europe from the monotonous articles appearing in the press or the stereotyped speeches pronounced there, would be making a grave error. Just as theologians in periods of strict orthodoxy expressed their views in the rigorous language of the Church, so the writers of the people's democracies make use of an accepted special style, terminology, and linguis-

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tic ritual. What is important is not what someone said but 626
what he wanted to say, disguising his thought by remov- 517
ing a comma, inserting an "and," establishing this rather than another sequence in the problems discussed. Unless one has lived there one cannot know how many titanic battles are being fought, how the heroes of Ketman are falling, what this warfare is being waged over. Obviously, people caught up in this daily struggle are rather contemptuous of their compatriot political émigrés. A surgeon cannot consider a butcher his equal in dexterity; just so a Pole, Czech, or Hungarian practiced in the art of dissimulation smiles when he learns that someone in the emigration has called him a traitor (or a swine) at the very moment when this traitor (or swine) is engaged in a match of philosophical chess on whose outcome the fate of fifteen laboratories or twenty ateliers depends. They do not know how one pays—those abroad do not know. They do not know what one buys, and at what price.

Ketman as a social institution is not entirely devoid of 000
advantages. In order to evaluate them, one need only look at life in the West. Westerners, and especially Western intellectuals, suffer from a special variety of *taedium vitae;* their emotional and intellectual life is too dispersed. Everything they think and feel evaporates like steam in an open expanse. Freedom is a burden to them. No conclusions they arrive at are binding: it may be so, then again it may not. The result is a constant uneasiness. The happiest of them seem to be those who become Communists. They live within a wall which they batter themselves against, but which provides them with a resistance that helps them define themselves. Steam that once evaporated into the air becomes a force under pressure. An even greater energy is generated in those who must hide their Communist convictions, that is, who must practice Ketman, a

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custom which is, after all, not unknown in the countries of the West.

In short, Ketman means self-realization *against* something. He who practices Ketman suffers because of the obstacles he meets; but if these obstacles were suddenly to be removed, he would find himself in a void which might perhaps prove much more painful. Internal revolt is sometimes essential to spiritual health, and can create a particular form of happiness. What can be said openly is often much less interesting than the emotional magic of defending one's private sanctuary. For most people the necessity of living in constant tension and watchfulness is a torture, but many intellectuals accept this necessity with masochistic pleasure.

He who practices Ketman lies. But would he be less dishonest if he could speak the truth? A painter who tries to smuggle illicit ("metaphysical") delight in the beauty of the world into his picture of life on a collective farm would be lost if he were given complete freedom, for the beauty of the world seems greater to him the less free he is to depict it. A poet muses over what he would write if he were not bound by his political responsibilities, but could he realize his visions if he were at liberty to do so? Ketman brings comfort, fostering dreams of what might be, and even the enclosing fence affords the solace of reverie.

Who knows whether it is not in man's lack of an internal *core* that the mysterious success of the New Faith and its charm for the intellectual lie? By subjecting man to pressure, the New Faith creates this core, or in any case the feeling that it exists. Fear of freedom is nothing more than fear of the void. "There is nothing in man," said a friend of mine, a dialectician. "He will never extract anything out of himself, because there is nothing there. You can't leave the people and write in a wilderness. Remember

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that man is a function of social forces. Whoever wants to be alone will perish." This is probably true, but I doubt if it can be called anything more than the law of our times. Feeling that there was *nothing* in him, Dante could not have written his *Divine Comedy* or Montaigne his *Essays*, nor could Chardin have painted a single still-life. Today man believes there is *nothing* in him, so he accepts *anything*, even if he knows it to be bad, in order to find himself at one with others, in order not to be alone. As long as he believes this, there is little one can reproach in his behavior. Perhaps it is better for him to breed a full-grown Ketman, to submit to pressure and thus feel that he *is*, than to take a chance on the wisdom of past ages which maintains that man is a creature of God.

But suppose one should try to live without Ketman, to challenge fate, to say: "If I lose, I shall not pity myself." Suppose one can live without outside pressure, suppose one can create one's own inner tension—then it is not true that there is nothing in man. To take this risk would be an act of faith.

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CHAPTER IV

Alpha, the Moralist

000 THE HISTORY of the last decades in Central and Eastern Europe abounds in situations in regard to which all epithets and theoretical considerations lose meaning. A man's effort to match up to these situations decides his fate. The solution each accepts differs according to those impalpable factors which constitute his individuality.

Since the fate of millions is often most apparent in those who by profession note changes in themselves and in others, i.e. the writers, a few portraits of typical Eastern European writers may serve as concrete examples of what is happening within the Imperium.

159* The man I call Alpha is one of the best-known prose writers east of the Elbe. He was a close friend of mine, and memories of many difficult moments that we went through together tie us to each other. I find it hard to remain unmoved when I recall him. I even ask myself if I should subject him to this analysis. But I shall do so because friendship would not prevent me from writing an article on his books in which I would say more or less what I shall say here.

Before the War, he was a tall, thin youth with horn-rimmed glasses. He printed his stories in a certain right-wing weekly that was held in low esteem by the literary

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circles of Warsaw, which were made up chiefly of Jews or of people who looked with distaste on the racist and totalitarian yearnings of this publication. The editor of the weekly had to some degree discovered him, and had reason to congratulate himself upon his choice, for Alpha's talent was developing rapidly. Very shortly, his first novel began to appear serially in the weekly. It was later published by one of the leading houses, and created a great stir.

His main interest was directed toward tragic moral conflicts. At the time many young writers were under the spell of Joseph Conrad's prose. Alpha was particularly susceptible to Conrad's style because he had a tendency to create solemn and hieratic characters. Night fascinated him. Small people with their powerful passions in a night whose silence and mystery embraced their fate in its gigantic folds—this was the usual formula of his novels and stories. His youthful works resembled Conrad's in their majesty and silence, and in a sense of the immensity of the inhuman, indifferent world. Alpha's position was metaphysical and tragic. He was tormented by the enigma of purity—moral purity and purity of tone in what he wrote. He distilled his sentences. He wanted each to be not merely a statement but, like a phrase in a musical composition, irreplaceable and effective in its very sound.

This need for purity, I would say for other-worldly purity, was basic to his character; yet in his relations with people he was haughty and imperious. His pursuit of purity in his work was closely linked to his personal arrogance; the former was his sublimation, his other ego, the repository of all his hopes. The more he worried about his disordered private life, the more highly he prized his redeeming activity, which is what his writing was for him, and the more he accorded to it the nature of a solemn rite. The

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159 one rank that could have sated his ambition was that of a cardinal. Slow movements, the flow of scarlet silk, the proffering of a ring to kiss—this for him was purity of gesture, self-expression through the medium of a better self. There are certain comic actors who dream all their lives of playing a serious, dignified role; in him, much the same motives were at play. Alpha, who was gifted with an exceptional sense of humor in conversation, changed completely when he began to write; then he dwelt only in the highest registers of tragedy. His ambition reached further than fame as an author of well-written books. He wanted to be a moral authority.

The novel I mentioned, which was his first big success, was widely acclaimed as a Catholic novel, and he was hailed as the most gifted Catholic writer, which in a Catholic country like Poland was no small matter. It is hard to say whether or not he really was a Catholic writer. The number of twentieth-century Catholic authors is negligible. So-called conversions of intellectuals are usually of a dubious nature, not significantly different from transitory conversions to surrealism, expressionism, or existentialism.

Alpha was the kind of Catholic so many of us were. This was a period of interest in Thomism and of references to Jacques Maritain in literary discussion. It would be wrong to maintain that for all these "intellectual Catholics" literary fashion alone was at stake; one cannot reduce the clutching gestures of a drowning man to a question of fashion. But it would be equally incorrect to consider literary debates based on a skillful juggling of Thomist terminology as symptoms of Catholicism. Be that as it may, the "intellectual Catholics" colored certain literary circles. Theirs was a special political role; they were foes of racism and totalitarianism. In this they differed from

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the Catholics proper, whose political mentality was not entirely free of worship of "healthy organisms" (i.e. Italy and Germany) and approval of anti-Semitic brawls. The Communists despised Jacques Maritain's influence as degenerate, but they tolerated the "intellectual Catholics" because they opposed the ideas of the extreme right. Soon after he published his novel, Alpha began to frequent the circles of the "intellectual Catholics" and the left. Sensitive to the opinion people held of him, and taking the writer's role as a moral authority very seriously, he broke with the rightist weekly and signed an open letter against anti-Semitism.

Everyone looked for something different in Catholicism. Alpha, with his tragic sense of the world, looked for forms: words and concepts, in short, textures. This tragic sense in him was not unlike Wells's Invisible Man, who when he wanted to appear among people had to paste on a false nose, bandage his face and pull gloves over his invisible hands. Catholicism supplied Alpha's language. With concepts like sin and saintliness, damnation and grace he could grasp the experiences of the characters he described; and, even more important, the language of Catholicism automatically introduced the elevated tone that was so necessary to him and lulled his longing for a cardinal's scarlet. The hero of his book was a priest, a sure sign of the influence of French Catholic novelists, and above all Bernanos, but also an expression of Alpha's urge to create pure and powerful characters. The action took place in a village, and here his weaknesses revealed themselves. He was so preoccupied with building up moral conflicts that he was blind to concrete details and incapable of observing living people. Having been raised in the city, he knew little of peasants and their life. The village he described was a universal one; it could just as easily have

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been Breton or Flemish, and for this reason it was not a real village. The characters seemed to be wearing costumes alien to them (like young nobles dressed as shepherds in pastoral literature), and their speech was uniformly alike.

The story played itself out against a barely sketched-in background, but it was powerfully welded together and the critics received it enthusiastically. It ran into several editions quickly. He received a national award for it which brought him a large sum of money. It is possible that the prize jury took into account not only the artistic merits of the book, but also certain political advantages to themselves in choosing him. In those years, the government was clearly flirting with the extreme right and the choice of Alpha seemed a wise move. The right would certainly be satisfied; whereas the liberals would have no reason to attack the decision for after all everyone was then free to believe as he pleased and to write as he believed.

Despite fame and money, in his heart Alpha never considered his novel and his collection of short stories good books. Still, the position he had won permitted him to be as haughty as he loved to be. He was recognized as the author of profound and noble prose, whereas his colleagues could hardly hope to reach a wide public otherwise than by creating a cheap sensation. Their books were either glaringly naturalistic, especially in a physiological sense, or else they were psychological tracts disguised as novels. Men of letters lived in the intellectual ghetto of their literary cafés; and the more they suffered from their isolation from the life of the masses, the stranger and less comprehensible their styles became. The bitterness Alpha felt in spite of the success of his first books was something he found difficult to define, but the moment when he realized that there was something wrong with his writing was decisive for the rest of his life.

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A great doubt assailed him. If his colleagues doubted the worth of their work, suspended as it was in a void, then his perplexity took on larger proportions. He wanted to attain a purity of moral tone, but purity in order to be genuine must be earthy, deeply rooted in experience and observation of life. He perceived that he had blundered into falseness by living in the midst of ideas about people, instead of among people themselves. What he knew about man was based on his own subjective experiences within the four walls of his room. His Catholicism was no more than a cover; he toyed with it as did many twentieth-century Catholics, trying to clothe his nudity in an esteemed, Old World cloak. He was seeking some means of awakening in his reader the emotional response he wanted, and obviously the reader on finding words like grace or sin, known to him since childhood, reacted strongly. But there is an element of dishonesty in such a use of words and concepts.

Alpha no longer knew whether the conflicts he created were real. Hailed as a Catholic writer, he knew that he was not; and his reaction was like that of a painter who having painted cubistically for a while is astonished to find that he is still called a cubist after he has changed his style. Critics, deceived by appearances, reckoned his books among those that were healthy and noble as opposed to the decadent works of his fellow-writers. But he realized that he was no healthier than his colleagues who at least did not attempt to hide their sorry nakedness.

The War broke out, and our city and country became a part of Hitler's Imperium. For five and a half years we lived in a dimension completely different from that which any literature or experience could have led us to know. What we beheld surpassed the most daring and the most macabre imagination. Descriptions of horrors known to

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159 us of old now made us smile at their naïveté. German rule in Europe was ruthless, but nowhere so ruthless as in the East, for the East was populated by races which, according to the doctrines of National Socialism, were either to be utterly eradicated or else used for heavy physical labor. The events we were forced to participate in resulted from the effort to put these doctrines into practice.

Still we lived; and since we were writers, we tried to write. True, from time to time one of us dropped out, shipped off to a concentration camp or shot. There was no help for this. We were like people marooned on a dissolving floe of ice; we dared not think of the moment when it would melt away. War communiqués supplied the latest data on our race with death. We had to write; it was our only defense against despair. Besides, the whole country was sown with the seeds of conspiracy and an "underground state" did exist in reality, so why shouldn't an underground literature exist as well. Except for two or three Nazi propaganda organs, no books or magazines were printed in the language of the defeated nation. Nonetheless, the cultural life of the country refused to be stifled. Underground publications were mimeographed on the run or illegally printed in a small format that was easy to circulate. Many underground lectures and authors' evenings were organized. There were even underground presentations of plays. All this raised the morale of the beaten but still fighting nation. National morale was good, too good, as events toward the end of the War proved.

In the course of these years, Alpha successfully realized his ambition to become a moral authority. His behavior was that of an exemplary writer-citizen. His judgments as to which actions were proper or improper passed in literary circles as those of an oracle, and he was often asked to decide whether someone had trespassed against the unwritten

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patriotic code. By unspoken accord, he became something 159*
of a leader of all the writers in our city. Underground funds went into his hands and he divided them among his needy colleagues; he befriended beginning writers; he founded and co-edited an underground literary review, typed copies of which were transmitted in rotation to "clubs" where they were read aloud in clandestine meetings. He ranked rather high among those initiated into the secrets of the underground network. His actions were characterized by real humanitarianism. Even before the War he had parted with his rightist patron who had voiced the opinion that the country needed to institute its own totalitarianism. (The patron was shot by the Gestapo in the first year of the War.) When the German authorities set out to murder systematically the three million Jews of Poland, the anti-Semites did not feel compelled to worry overmuch; they condemned this bestiality aloud, but many of them secretly thought it was not entirely unwarranted. Alpha belonged to those inhabitants of our town who reacted violently against this mass slaughter. He fought with his pen against the indifference of others, and personally helped Jews in hiding even though such aid was punishable by death.

He was a resolute opponent of nationalism, so nightmarishly incarnated in the Germans. This does not mean, however, that he had Communist leanings. The number of Communists in Poland had always been insignificant; and the cooperation between the Russians and the Germans after the Molotov-Ribbentrop pact created conditions particularly unfavorable to the activity of Moscow followers. The Communist Underground was weak. The hopes of the masses were turned toward the West, and the "underground state" was dependent on the Government-in-Exile in London. Alpha, with his barometer-like

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sensitivity to the moral opinions of his environment, felt no sympathy for a country that awakened friendly feelings in almost no one. But like the majority of his friends, he was anxious for far-reaching social reforms and for a people's government.

He and I used to meet often. It would hardly be an exaggeration to say that we spent the War years together. The sight of him was enough to raise one's spirits. He smiled in the face of all adversity; his manner was nonchalant; and to symbolize his contempt for hob-nailed boots, uniforms, and shouts of "Heil Hitler," he habitually carried a black umbrella. His tall, lean figure, the ironic flash of his eyes behind his glasses, and the anointed air with which he strode through the terror-plagued streets of the city added up to a silhouette that defied the laws of war.

Once, in the first year of the War, we were returning from a visit to a mutual friend who lived in the country. As I remember, we were arguing about the choice of a train. We decided against the advice of our host who had urged us to take a train leaving half an hour later. We arrived in Warsaw and walked along the streets feeling very satisfied with life. It was a beautiful summer morning. We did not know that this day was to be remembered as one of the blackest in the history of our city. Scarcely had I closed my door behind me when I heard shrieks in the street. Looking out the window, I saw that a general man-hunt was on. This was the first man-hunt for Auschwitz. Later millions of Europeans were to be killed there, but at the time this concentration camp was just starting to operate. From the first huge transport of people caught on the streets that day no one, it appears, escaped alive. Alpha and I had strolled those streets five minutes before the beginning of the hunt; perhaps his umbrella and his insouciance brought us luck.

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These years were a test for every writer. The real tragedy of events pushed imaginary tragedies into the shade. Whichever of us failed to find an expression for collective despair or hope was ashamed. Only elementary feelings remained: fear, pain at the loss of dear ones, hatred of the oppressor, sympathy with the tormented. Alpha, whose talent was in search of real and not imaginary tragedy, sensed the material at hand and wrote a series of short stories which were published as a book after the War and widely translated. The theme of all these stories can be defined as loyalty. Not for nothing had Conrad been the favorite writer of his youth. This was a loyalty to something in man, something nameless, but strong and pure. Before the War, he tended to call this imperative sense of loyalty moral, in the Catholic sense. Now, fearing falseness, he affirmed merely that this imperative existed. When his dying heroes turned their eyes toward a mute heaven, they could find nothing there; they could only hope that their loyalty was not completely meaningless and that, in spite of everything, something in the universe responded to it.

The morality of his heroes was a lay morality, with a question mark, with a pause, a pause that was not quite faith. I think he was more honest in these stories than in his pre-war writings. At the same time, he expressed accurately and powerfully the state of mind of the countless underground fighters dying in the battle against Nazism. Why did they throw their lives into the scale? Why did they accept torture and death? They had no point of support like the Führer for the Germans or the New Faith for the Communists. It is doubtful whether most of them believed in Christ. It could only have been loyalty, loyalty to something called fatherland or honor, but something stronger than any name. In one of his stories, a young boy, tortured by the police and knowing

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that he will be shot, gives the name of his friend because he is afraid to die alone. They meet before the firing squad, and the betrayed forgives his betrayor. This forgiveness cannot be justified by any utilitarian ethic; there is no reason to forgive traitors. Had this story been written by a Soviet author, the betrayed would have turned away with disdain from the man who had succumbed to base weakness. Forsaking Christianity, Alpha became a more religious writer than he had been before, if we grant that the ethic of loyalty is an extension of religious ethics and a contradiction of an ethic of collective goals.

In the second half of the War, a serious crisis in political consciousness took place in the "underground state." The underground struggle against the occupying power entailed great sacrifices; the number of persons executed or liquidated in concentration camps grew constantly. To explain the need of such sacrifice solely on the basis of loyalty left one a prey to doubt. Loyalty can be the basis of individual action, but when decisions affecting the fate of hundreds of thousands of people are to be made, loyalty is not enough. One seeks logical justification. But what kind of logical justification could there be? From the East the victorious Red Army was drawing near. The Western armies were far away. In the name of what future, in the name of what order were young people dying every day? More than one man whose task it was to sustain the morale of others posed this question to himself. No one was able to formulate an answer. Irrational dreams that something would happen to stop the advance of the Red Army and at the same time overthrow Hitler were linked with an appeal to the honor of the "country without a Quisling"; but this was not a very substantial prop for those of a more sober turn of mind. At this moment, Communist underground organizations began to be active,

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and were joined by some left-wing Socialists. The Communist program offered more realistic arguments than did the program of the London-directed "underground state": the country, it was fairly clear, was going to be liberated by the Red Army; with its aid one should start a people's revolution. 1597

Gradually the intellectuals in the underground became impatient with the irrational attitudes that were spreading in the resistance movement. This irrationality began to reach the point of hysteria. Conspiracy became an end in itself; to die or to expose others to death, something of a sport. Alpha found himself surrounded by living caricatures of the ethic of loyalty he expounded in his stories. The patriotic code of his class prohibited him from approaching the small groups whose policy followed Moscow's dictates.

Like so many of his friends, Alpha felt himself in a trap. Then, for the first time in his writing he invoked his sense of humor, using it to point up the figures he knew so well, the figures of men mad for conspiracy. His satires bared the social background of underground hysteria. There is no doubt that the "underground state" was the handiwork of the intelligentsia above all, of a stratum never known in Western Europe, not to mention the Anglo-Saxon countries. Since the intelligentsia was, in its customs and ties, the legatee of the nobility (even if some members were of peasant origin), its characteristic traits were not especially attractive to the intellectuals. The intellectuals of Poland had made several attempts to revolt against the intelligentsia of which they themselves were a part, much as the intellectuals in America had rebelled against the middle class. When a member of the intelligentsia really began to think, he perceived that he was isolated from the broad masses of the popula-

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tion. Finding the social order at fault, he tended to become a radical in an effort to establish a tie with the masses. Alpha's satires on the intelligentsia of the Underground convinced him that this stratum, with its many aberrations, boded ill for the future of the country if the postwar rulers were to be recruited from its ranks—which seemed inevitable in the event of the London Government-in-Exile's arrival in Poland.

Just when he was passing through this process of bitter and impotent mockery, the uprising broke out. For two months, a kilometer-high column of smoke and flames stood over Warsaw. Two hundred thousand people died in the street fighting. Those neighborhoods which were not leveled by bombs or by the fire of heavy artillery were burned down by SS squads. After the uprising, the city which once numbered over a million inhabitants was a wilderness of ruins, its population deported, and its demolished streets literally cemeteries. Alpha, living in a distant suburb that bordered on fields, succeeded in escaping unharmed through the dangerous zone where people in flight were caught and sent to concentration camps.

In April of 1945, after the Germans had been expelled by the Red Army (the battles were then raging at the gates of Berlin), Alpha and I returned to Warsaw and wandered together over the mounds of rubble that had once been streets. We spent several hours in a once familiar part of the city. Now we could not recognize it. We scaled a slope of red bricks and entered upon a fantastic moonworld. There was total silence. As we worked our way downward, balancing to keep from falling, ever new scenes of waste and destruction loomed before us. In one of the gorges we stumbled upon a little plank fastened to a metal bar. The inscription, written in red paint or in blood, read: "Lieutenant Zbyszek's road of suffering." I

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know what Alpha's thoughts were at that time, and they were mine: we were thinking of what traces remain after the life of a man. These words rang like a cry to heaven from a shattered earth. It was a cry for justice. Who was Lieutenant Zbyszek? Who among the living would ever know what he had suffered? We imagined him crawling along this trail which some comrade, probably long-since killed, had marked with the inscription. We saw him as, with an effort of his will, he mustered his fleeting strength and, aware of being mortally wounded, thought only of carrying out his duty. Why? Who measured his wisdom or madness? Was this a monad of Leibnitz, fulfilling its destiny in the universe, or only the son of a postman, obeying a futile maxim of honor instilled in him by his father, who himself was living up to the virtues of a courtly tradition? 159*

Further on, we came upon a worn footpath. It led into a deep mountain cleft. At the bottom stood a clumsy, huddled cross with a helmet on it. At the foot of the cross were freshly planted flowers. Somebody's son lay here. A mother had found her way to him and worn the path through her daily visits.

Theatrical thunder suddenly broke the silence. It was the wind rattling the metal sheets hanging from a cliff-like wall. We scrambled out of the heap of debris into a practically untouched courtyard. Rusting machines stood among the high weeds. And on the steps of the charred villa we found some account books listing profits and losses.

The Warsaw uprising begun at the order of the Government-in-Exile in London broke out, as we know, at the moment when the Red Army was approaching the capital and the retreating German armies were fighting in the outskirts of the city. Feeling in the Underground was

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reaching a boiling point; the Underground Army wanted to fight. The uprising was intended to oust the Germans and to take possession of the city so that the Red Army would be greeted by an already-functioning Polish government. Once the battle in the city began, and once it became obvious that the Red Army, standing on the other side of the river, would not move to the aid of the insurgents, it was too late for prudence. The tragedy played itself out according to all the immutable rules. This was the revolt of a fly against two giants. One giant waited beyond the river for the other to kill the fly. As a matter of fact, the fly defended itself, but its soldiers were generally armed only with pistols, grenades, and benzine bottles. For two months the giant sent his bombers over the city to drop their loads from a height of a few hundred feet; he supported his troops with tanks and the heaviest artillery. In the end, he crushed the fly only to be crushed in his turn by the second, patient giant.

There was no logical reason for Russia to have helped Warsaw. The Russians were bringing the West not only liberation from Hitler, but liberation from the existing order, which they wanted to replace with a good order, namely their own. The "underground state" and the London Government-in-Exile stood in the way of their overthrow of capitalism in Poland; whereas, behind the Red Army lines a different Polish government, appointed in Moscow, was already in office. The destruction of Warsaw represented certain indisputable advantages. The people dying in the street fights were precisely those who could create most trouble for the new rulers, the young intelligentsia, seasoned in its underground struggle with the Germans, and wholly fanatic in its patriotism. The city itself in the course of the years of occupation had been transformed into an underground fortress filled with hidden printing

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shops and arsenals. This traditional capital of revolts and insurrections was undoubtedly the most insubordinate city in the area that was to find itself under the Center's influence. All that could have argued for aid to Warsaw would have been pity for the one million inhabitants dying in the town. But pity is superfluous wherever sentence is pronounced by History. 1594

Alpha, walking with me over the ruins of Warsaw, felt, as did all those who survived, one dominant emotion: anger. Many of his close friends lay in the shallow graves which abounded in the lunar landscape. The twenty-year-old poet Christopher, a thin asthmatic, physically no stronger than Marcel Proust, had died at his post sniping at SS tanks. With him the greatest hope of Polish poetry perished. His wife Barbara was wounded and died in a hospital, grasping a manuscript of her husband's verses in her hand. The poet Karol, son of the workers' quarter and author of a play about Homer, together with his inseparable comrade, the poet Marek, were blown up on a barricade the Germans dynamited. Alpha knew, also, that the person he loved most in his life had been deported to the concentration camp at Ravensbruck after the suppression of the uprising. He waited for her long after the end of the War until he finally had to accept the idea that she was no longer alive. His anger was directed against those who had brought on the disaster, that terrible example of what happens when blind loyalty encounters the necessities of History. Just as his Catholic words had once rung false to him, so now his ethic of loyalty seemed a pretty but hollow concept.

Actually, Alpha was one of those who were responsible for what had happened. Could he not see the eyes of the young people gazing at him as he read his stories in clandestine authors' evenings? These were the young peo-

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ple who had died in the uprising: Lieutenant Zbyszek, Christopher, Barbara, Karol, Marek, and thousands like them. They had known there was no hope of victory and that their death was no more than a gesture in the face of an indifferent world. They had died without even asking whether there was some scale in which their deeds would be weighed. The young philosopher Milbrand, a disciple of Heidegger, assigned to press work by his superiors, demanded to be sent to the line of battle because he believed that the greatest gift a man can have is the moment of free choice; three hours later he was dead. There were no limits to these frenzies of voluntary self-sacrifice.

Alpha did not blame the Russians. What was the use? They were the force of History. Communism was fighting Fascism; and the Poles, with their ethical code based on nothing but loyalty, had managed to thrust themselves beween these two forces. Joseph Conrad, that incorrigible Polish noble! Surely the example of Warsaw had demonstrated that there was no place in the twentieth century for imperatives of fatherland or honor unless they were supported by some definite end. A moralist of today, Alpha reasoned, should turn his attention to social goals and social results. The rebels were not even an enemy in the minds of the Germans; they were an inferior race that had to be destroyed. For the Russians, they were "Polish fascists." The Warsaw uprising was the swan-song of the intelligentsia and the order it defended; like the suicidal charges of the Confederates during the American Civil War, it could not stave off defeat. With its fall, the Revolution was, in effect, accomplished; in any case, the road was open. This was not, as the press of the new government proclaimed in its effort to lull the people, a "peaceful revolution." Its price was bloody, as the ruins of the largest city in the country testified.

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But one had to live and be active instead of looking back at what had passed. The country was ravaged. The new government went energetically to work reconstructing, putting mines and factories into operation, and dividing estates among the peasants. New responsibilities faced the writer. His books were eagerly awaited by a human ant-hill, shaken out of its torpor and stirred up by the big stick of war and of social reforms. We should not wonder, then, that Alpha, like the majority of his colleagues, declared at once his desire to serve the new Poland that had risen out of the ashes of the old.

He was accepted with open arms by the handful of Polish Communists who had spent the war years in Russia and who had returned to organize the state according to the maxims of Leninism-Stalinism. Then, that is in 1945, everyone who could be useful was welcomed joyfully without any demand that he be a Red. Both the benevolent mask under which the Party appeared and the moderation of its slogans were due to the fact that there were so uncommonly few Stalinists in the country.

Unquestionably, it is only by patient and gradually increased doses of the doctrine that one can bring a pagan population to understand and accept the New Faith. Ever since his break with the rightist weekly, Alpha had enjoyed a good opinion in those circles which were now most influential. He was not reprimanded for having kept his distance from Marxist groups during the War; authors who had maintained such contacts could be counted on the fingers of one hand. Now the writers of Poland were a little like virgins—willing, but timid. Their first public statements were cautious and painstakingly measured. Still it was not what they said that mattered. Their names were needed as proof that the government was supported by the entire cultural elite. The program of behavior

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159* toward various categories of people had been elaborated by the Polish Communists while they were still in Moscow; and it was a wise program, based on an intimate understanding of conditions in the country. The tasks that lay before them were unusually difficult. The country did not want their government. The Party, which had barely existed before the War, had to be reorganized and had to reconcile itself to the knowledge that most of its new members would be opportunists. Left-wing Socialists had to be admitted into the government. It was still necessary to carry on a complicated game with the Peasant Party, for after Yalta the Western allies demanded at least the semblance of a coalition. The most immediate job, therefore, was to bridge the gap between the small group of Communists and the country as a whole; those who could help most in building this bridge were famous writers who were known as liberals or even as conservatives. Alpha fulfilled every requirement. His article appeared on the first page of a government literary weekly; it was an article on humanism. As I recall it, he spoke in it of the ethic of respect for man that revolution brings.

It was May, 1945, in the medieval city of Cracow. Alpha and I, as well as many other writers and artists, had taken refuge there after the destruction of Warsaw. The night the news of the fall of Berlin came was lit with bursts of rockets and shells, and the streets echoed with the fire of small arms as the soldiers of the victorious Red Army celebrated the prospect of a speedy return home. The next morning, on a fine spring day, Alpha and I were sitting in the office of Polish Film, working on a scenario. Tying up the loose ends of a film is a burdensome business; we were putting our feet up on tables and armchairs, we were pacing the room, smoking too many cigarettes and constantly being lured to the window through which

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came the warble of sparrows. Outside the window was a courtyard with young trees, and beyond the courtyard a huge building lately transformed into a prison and the headquarters of the Security Police. We saw, scores of young men behind the barred windows on the ground floor. Some had thrust their faces into the sun in an effort to get a tan. Others were fishing with wire hooks for the bits of paper which had been tossed out on the sand from neighboring cells. Standing in the window, we observed them in silence. 159*

It was easy to guess that these were soldiers of the Underground Army. Had the London Government-in-Exile returned to Poland, these soldiers of the "underground state" would have been honored and feted as heroes. Instead, they were incarcerated as a politically uncertain element—another of History's ironic jokes. These young boys who had grown used to living with a gun in their hands and surrounded by perpetual danger were now supposed to forget their taste for conspiracy as quickly as possible. Many succeeded so well in forgetting that they pretended they had never been active in the Underground. Others stayed in the woods, and any of them that were caught were thrown behind bars. Although their foe had been Hitler, they were now termed agents of the class enemy. These were the brothers of the young people who had fought and died in the Warsaw uprising, people whose blind self-sacrifice lay on Alpha's conscience. I do not know what he was thinking as he looked at the windows of those prison cells. Perhaps even then he was sketching the plan of his first post-war novel.

As his whole biography demonstrates, his ambition was always boundless. He was never content to be just one among many; he had to be a leader so that he could justify his personal haughtiness. The novel he was writing should,

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he believed, raise him to first place among the writers active in the new situation. This was a time when writers were trying to change their style and subject matter, but they could not succeed without first effecting a corresponding change in their own personalities. Alpha was undergoing a moral crisis which was personal to him, but at the same time a reiteration of a conflict known to many of his countrymen. He sensed in himself a power that flowed from his individual but simultaneously universal drama. His feeling for the tragedy of life was seeking a new garment in which to appear in public.

Alpha did not betray his belief in himself. The novel he wrote was the product of a mature talent. It made a great impression on its readers. All his life he had circled around the figure of a strong and pure hero. In his pre-war novel, he had used a priest; now he drew a representative of the New Faith, a fearless old Communist who after spending many years in German concentration camps emerged unbroken in spirit. Returning to his devastated homeland, this hero found himself faced with a chaos which his clear mind and strong will were to convert into a new social order. The society he was to transform showed every sign of moral decay. The older generation of the intelligentsia, personally ambitious and addicted to drink, was still daydreaming of help from the Western allies. The youth of the country, educated to principles of blind loyalty and habituated to an adventurous life in the Underground, was now completely lost. Knowing no goals of human activity other than war against the enemy in the name of honor, it continued to conspire against a new enemy, namely the Party and the government imposed by Russia. But given post-war circumstances, the Party was the only power that could guarantee peace, reconstruct the country, enable the people to earn their daily bread, and

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start schools and universities, ships and railroads functioning. One did not have to be a Communist to reach this conclusion; it was obvious to everyone. To kill Party workers, to sabotage trains carrying food, to attack laborers who were trying to rebuild the factories was to prolong the period of chaos. Only madmen could commit such fruitless and illogical acts. 169*

This was Alpha's picture of the country. One might have called it a piece of common-sense journalism had it not been for something that always distinguished him as a writer: pity, pity for the old Communist as well as for those who considered him their enemy. Because he felt compassion for both these forces, he succeeded in writing a tragic novel.

His shortcomings as a writer, so clearly evident in his pre-war works, now stood him in good stead. His talent was not realistic; his people moved in a world difficult to visualize. He built up moral conflicts by stressing contrasts in his characters; but his old Communist was as rare a specimen on the Polish scene as the priest he had made his hero before the war. Communists may, in general, be depicted as active, intelligent, fanatic, cunning but above all as men who take external acts as their domain. Alpha's hero was not a man of deeds; on the contrary, he was a silent, immovable rock whose stony exterior covered all that was most human—personal suffering and a longing for good. He was a monumental figure, an ascetic living for his ideas. He was ashamed of his personal cares, and his refusal to confess his private pain won the sympathy of the readers. In the concentration camp he had lost the wife he dearly loved; and now it was only by the greatest effort of his will that he could compel himself to live, for life had suddenly become devoid of meaning. He was a titan with a torn heart, full of love and forgiveness. In

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short, he emerged as a potential force capable of leading the world toward good. Just when his feelings and thoughts were purest he died, shot by a young man who saw in him only an agent of Moscow.

One can understand why Alpha, living in a country where the word "Communist" still had an abusive connotation, wanted to portray his hero as the model of a higher ethic; but that ethic can be evaluated properly only when we see it applied to concrete problems, only when its followers treat people as tools. As for the society the old Communist wanted to transform, an accurate observer would have seen in it positive signs and not merely symptoms of disintegration. The intelligentsia, that is every variety of specialist, were setting to work just as enthusiastically as the workers and peasants in mobilizing the factories, mines, railroads, schools, and theaters. They were governed by a feeling of responsibility toward the community and by professional pride, not by a vision of socialism along Russian lines. Nevertheless, their ethic of responsibility bore important results. Their political thinking was naïve, and their manners often characteristic of a by-gone era. Yet it was they, and not the Party, who reacted most energetically at first. The younger generation was lost and leaderless, but its terroristic deeds were at least as much a product of despair as of demoralization. The boys that Alpha and I had seen in the windows of the prison were not there because of any crimes they had committed, but only because of their war-time service in the "underground state." Alpha could not say all this because of the censorship, but his expressed pity for these boys permitted the reader to guess at what he left unsaid. However, his failure to present all the facets of the situation altered the motivation of his characters.

His book was entirely dominated by a feeling of anger

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against the losers. This anger was essential to the existence 159K
of Alpha and many like him. The satiric attitude toward the underground intelligentsia which marked the stories he wrote toward the end of the War now manifested itself in the chapters of the novel that mocked absurd hopes for a sudden political change. In reality, these hopes, no matter how absurd the form they took in members of the white collar class, were far from alien to the peasants and workers. Alpha never knew the latter intimately, so he could, with much greater ease, attribute the belief in a magic removal of the Russians to a special characteristic of the intelligentsia which, unfortunately, was not distinguished for its political insight.

A novel that favorably compared the ethic of the New Faith with the vanquished code was very important to the Party. The book was so widely publicized that it quickly sold over 100,000 copies, and in 1948, Alpha was awarded a state prize. One city donated to him a beautiful villa furnished at considerable expense. A useful writer in a people's democracy cannot complain of a lack of attention.

The Party dialecticians knew perfectly well that Alpha's hero was not a model of the "new man." That he was a Communist could be divined only from the author's assurances. He appeared on the pages of the book prepared to act, but not in action. Alpha's old hero had merely traded his priest's cassock for the leather jacket of a Communist. Although Alpha had changed the language of his concepts, the residue of tragedy and metaphysics remained constant. And even though the old Communist did not pray, the readers would not have been surprised to hear his habitually sealed lips suddenly utter the lamentations of Jeremiah, so well did the words of the prophet harmonize with his personality. Alpha, then, had not altered

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subjectively since his pre-war days; he still could not limit himself to a purely utilitarian ethic expressed in rational acts. Faust and King Lear did penance within his hero. Both heaven and earth continued to exist. Still one could not ask too much. He did not belong to the Party, but he showed some understanding. His treatment of the terrorist youth even more than his portrayal of the old Communist demonstrated that he was learning. It was too early to impose "socialist realism"; the term was not even mentioned lest it alarm the writers and artists. For the same reason, the peasants were assured that there would be no collective farms in Poland.

The day of decision did not come for Alpha until a few years after he had published his novel. He was living in his beautiful villa, signing numerous political declarations, serving on committees and traveling throughout the country lecturing on literature in factory auditoriums, clubs and "houses of culture." For many, these authors' trips, organized on a large scale, were a painful duty; but for him they were a pleasure, for they enabled him to become acquainted with the life and problems of the working-class youth. For the first time, he was really stepping out of his intellectual clan; and better still, he was doing so as a respected author. As one of the top-ranking writers of the people's democracies he could feel himself, if not a cardinal, then at least an eminent canon.

In line with the Center's plan, the country was being progressively transformed. The time came to shorten the reins on the writers and to demand that they declare themselves clearly for the New Faith. At writers' congresses "socialist realism" was proclaimed the sole indicated creative method. It appears that he lived through this moment with particular pain. Showing incredible dexterity the Party had imperceptibly led the writers to the

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point of conversion. Now they had to comply with the 159* Party's ultimatum or else rebel abruptly and so fall to the foot of the social ladder. To split one's loyalties, to pay God in one currency and Caesar in another, was no longer possible. No one ordered the writers to enter the Party formally; yet there was no logical obstacle to joining once one accepted the New Faith. Such a step would signalize greater courage, for admission into the Party meant an increase in one's responsibilities.

As the novelist most highly regarded by Party circles, Alpha could make but one decision. As a moral authority he was expected to set an example for his colleagues. During the first years of the new order he had established strong bonds with the Revolution. He was, at last, a popular writer whose readers were recruited from the masses. His highly praised pre-war novel had sold scarcely a few thousand copies; now he and every author could count on reaching a tremendous public. He was no longer isolated; he told himself he was needed not by a few snobs in a coffee-house, but by this new workers' youth he spoke to in his travels over the country. This metamorphosis was entirely due to the victory of Russia and the Party, and logically one ought to accept not only practical results but also the philosophical principles that engendered them.

That was not easy for him. Ever more frequently he was attacked for his love of monumental tragedy. He tried to write differently, but whenever he denied something that lay in the very nature of his talent his prose became flat and colorless; he tore up his manuscripts. He asked himself whether he could renounce all effort to portray the tragic conflicts peculiar to life in a giant collective. The causes of the human distress he saw about him daily were no longer the same as in a capitalist system, but the sum total of suffering seemed to grow instead of diminish.

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Alpha knew too much about Russia and the merciless methods dialecticians employed on "human material" not to be assailed by waves of doubt. He was aware that in accepting the New Faith he would cease to be a moral authority and become a pedagogue, expressing only what was recognized as useful. Henceforth, ten or fifteen dialectical experts would weigh each of his sentences, considering whether he had committed the sin of pure tragedy. But there was no returning. Telling himself that he was already a Communist in his actions, he entered the Party and at once published a long article about himself as a writer. This was a self-criticism; in Christian terminology, a confession. Other writers read his article with envy and fear. That he was first everywhere and in everything aroused their jealousy, but that he showed himself so clever—so like a Stakhanovite miner who first announces that he will set an unusually high norm—filled them with apprehension. Miners do not like any of their comrades who are too inclined to accumulate honors for having driven others to a speed-up.

His self-criticism was so skillfully written that it stands as a classic declaration of a writer renouncing the past in the name of the New Faith. It was translated into many languages, and printed even by Stalinist publications in the West. In condemning his previous books he resorted to a special stratagem: he admitted openly what he had always secretly thought of the flaws in his work. He didn't need dialectics to show him these flaws; he knew them of old, long before he approached Marxism, but now he attributed his insight to the merits of the Method. Every good writer knows he should not let himself be seduced by high-sounding words or by emotionally effective but empty concepts. Alpha affirmed that he had stumbled into these pitfalls because he wasn't a Marxist. He also

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let it be understood that he did not consider himself a Communist writer, but only one who was trying to master the Method, that highest of all sciences. What was remarkable about the article was the sainted, supercilious tone, always Alpha's own, in which it was written. That tone led one to suspect that in damning his faults he was compounding them and that he gloried in his new garb of humility. 159*

The Party confided to him, as a former Catholic, the function of making speeches against the policy of the Vatican. Shortly thereafter, he was invited to Moscow, and on his return he published a book about the "Soviet man." By demonstrating dialectically that the only truly free man was the citizen of the Soviet Union, he was once again reaching for the laurels of supremacy. His colleagues had always been more or less ashamed to use this literary tactic even though they knew it was dialectically correct. As a result, he came to be actively disliked in the literary ghetto. I call this a ghetto because despite the fact that they were lecturing throughout the country and reaching an ever larger public the writers were now as securely locked up in their collective homes and clubs as they had been in their pre-war coffee-houses. Alpha's fellow-authors, jealous of the success his noble tone had brought him, called him the "respectable prostitute."

It is not my place to judge. I myself traveled the same road of seeming inevitability. In fleeing I trampled on many values that may determine the worth of a man. So I judge myself severely though my sins are not the same as his. Perhaps the difference in our destinies lay in a minute disparity in our reactions when we visited the ruins of Warsaw or gazed out the window at the prisoners. I felt that I could not write of these things unless I wrote the *whole* truth, not just a part. I had the same feeling

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159 about the events that took place in Nazi-occupied Warsaw, namely that every form of literature could be applied to them except fiction. We used to feel strangely ashamed, I remember, whenever Alpha read us his stories in that war-contaminated city. He exploited his subject matter too soon, his composition was too smooth. Thousands of people were dying in torture all about us; to transform their sufferings immediately into tragic theater seemed to us indecent. It is sometimes better to stammer from an excess of emotion than to speak in well-turned phrases. The inner voice that stops us when we might say too much is wise. It is not improbable that he did not know this voice.

Only a passion for truth could have saved Alpha from developing into the person he became. Then, it is true, he would not have written his novel about the old Communist and demoralized Polish youth. He had allowed himself the luxury of pity, but only once he was within a framework safe from the censors' reproaches. In his desire to win approbation he had simplified his picture to conform to the wishes of the Party. One compromise leads to a second and a third until at last, though everything one says may be perfectly logical, it no longer has anything in common with the flesh and blood of living people. This is the reverse side of the medal of dialectics. This is the price one pays for the mental comfort dialectics affords. Around Alpha there lived and continue to live many workers and peasants whose words are ineffectual, but in the end, the inner voice they hear is not different from the subjective command that shuts writers' lips and demands all or nothing. Who knows, probably some unknown peasant or some minor postal employee should be placed higher in the hierarchy of those who serve humanity than Alpha the moralist.

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CHAPTER V

Beta, The Disappointed Lover

WHEN I met Beta in 1942, he was twenty years old. He was a lively boy with black, intelligent eyes. The palms of his hands perspired, and there was that exaggerated shyness in his behavior that usually bespeaks immense ambition. Behind his words one felt a mixture of arrogance and humility. In conversation he seemed inwardly convinced of his own superiority; he attacked ferociously yet retreated immediately, bashfully hiding his claws. His ripostes were full of pent-up irony. Probably, though, these characteristics were most pronounced when he spoke with me or with other writers older than he. As a beginning poet, he felt he owed them a certain respect, but actually he believed they were none too deserving of it. He knew better; in him lay the promise of a truly great writer. 159*

In 1942 in Warsaw, we were living without hope, or rather on a hope we knew to be a delusion. The empire which had absorbed our country was so mighty that only an incorrigible optimist could believe in the possibility of a totally vanquished Germany. Nazi plans in regard to our nation were perfectly clear: to exterminate the educated class, to colonize, and to deport a segment of the population to the East.

Beta was one of the young people who started writing

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159 during the War, in the language of slaves. He supported himself by various odd jobs. It is hard to define exactly how people earn a living in a city completely outside the law. Usually they took half-fictitious posts in an office or factory that supplied them with a work-card plus the opportunity to operate a black market or to steal, which was not regarded as immoral because it injured the Germans. At the same time, he studied in the underground university and shared the exuberant life of the resistance youth. He went to meetings where he and the other young people drank vodka, argued heatedly about literature and politics, and read illegal publications.

But he smiled scornfully at his comrades; he saw things more clearly than they. He found their patriotic zeal for battle against the Germans a purely irrational reflex. Battle—yes, but in the name of what? None of these young people believed any longer in democracy. Most of the countries of Eastern Europe had been semi-dictatorships before the War; and the parliamentary system seemed to belong to a dead era. There was no question as to how one came into power; whoever wanted to take over authority had only to seize it by force, or else create a "movement" to exert pressure on the government for admittance into a coalition. This was an age of nationalist "movements," and Warsaw youth was still very much under their influence even though, obviously, it had no sympathy for either Hitler or Mussolini. Its reasoning was confused. The Polish nation was oppressed by the Germans; so, one had to fight. When Beta declared that they were merely countering German nationalism with Polish nationalism, his comrades shrugged their shoulders. When he asked what values they wanted to defend or on what principles Europe was to be built in the future, he got no reply.

Here indeed was a well of darkness: no hope of libera-

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tion, and no vision of tomorrow. A battle for battle's sake. 159*
A return to the pre-war status quo, bad though it had been, was to be the reward for those who might live to see the victory of the Anglo-Saxons. This lack of any sort of vision led him to see the world as a place in which nothing existed outside of naked force. It was a world of decline and fall. And the liberals of the older generation, mouthing nineteenth-century phrases about respect for man—while all about them hundreds of thousands of people were being massacred—were fossil remains.

Beta had no faith, religious or other, and he had the courage to admit it in his poems. He ran off his first volume of verse on a mimeograph machine. No sooner had I received his book and pried apart its sticky pages than I realized that here was a real poet. The reading of his hexameters was not, however, a joyous undertaking. The streets of occupied Warsaw were gloomy. Underground meetings in cold and smoky rooms, when one listened for the sound of Gestapo boots on the stairs, were like grim rituals conducted in catacombs. We were living at the bottom of a huge crater, and the sky far up above was the only element we shared with the other people on the face of the earth. All this was in his verse—grayness, fog, gloom, and death. Still his was not a poetry of grievance but of icy stoicism. The poems of this entire generation lacked faith. Their fundamental motif was a call to arms and a vision of death. Unlike young poets of other epochs, they did not see death as a romantic theme but as a real presence. Almost all these young writers of Warsaw died before the end of the War either at the hands of the Gestapo or in battle. None of them, however, questioned the meaning of sacrifice to the same degree as did he. "There will remain after us only scrap-iron and the hollow, jeering laughter of generations," he wrote in one of his verses.

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159* His poetry had in it none of that affirmation of the world that is present in the sympathy with which the artist portrays, for example, an apple or a tree. What his verse disclosed was a profoundly disturbed equilibrium. One can divine a great deal from a work of art, e.g. that the world of Bach or of Breughel was ordered, arranged hierarchically. Modern art reflects the disequilibrium of modern society in that it so often springs from a blind passion vainly seeking to sate itself in form, color, or sound. An artist can contemplate sensual beauty only when he loves all that surrounds him on earth. But if all he feels is loathing at the discrepancy between what he would wish the world to be and what it is in reality, then he is incapable of standing still and beholding. He is ashamed of reflexes of love; he is condemned to perpetual motion, to a restless sketching of discontinued, broken observations of nature. Like a sleep-walker, he loses his balance as soon as he stops moving. Beta's poems were whirlpools of fog, saved from complete chaos only by the dry rhythm of his hexameters. This character of his poetry must be attributed at least in part to the fact that he belonged to an ill-fated generation in an ill-fated nation, but he had thousands of brothers in all the countries of Europe, all of them passionate and deceived.

Unlike his comrades who acted out of loyalty to their fatherland, on Christian or vague metaphysical grounds, he needed a rational basis for action. When the Gestapo arrested him in 1943, it was rumored in our city that he was taken as the result of an "accident" to one of the left-wing groups. If life in Warsaw was little reminiscent of paradise, then Beta now found himself in the lower circle of hell: the "concentration universe." In what was then the normal order of events, he spent several months in jail before being shipped off to Auschwitz. Incredibly, he

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managed to survive there for two years. When the Red Army drew near, he and the other prisoners were transported to Dachau, and there they were eventually set free by the Americans. We learned of all this only, after the War, when he published a volume of stories recounting his experiences. 159*

Immediately after his release he[3] settled in Munich. It was there in 1946 that the book, *We Were in Auschwitz*, written by him and two of his fellow-prisoners, appeared. It was dedicated to "The American Seventh Army which brought us liberation from the Dachau-Allach concentration camp." On his return to Poland, he published his volume of short stories. 159* 539

I have read many books about concentration camps, but not one of them is as terrifying as his stories because he never moralizes, he relates. A special social hierarchy comes into being in a "concentration universe." At the top stand the camp authorities; after them come prisoners trusted by the administration; next come the prisoners clever enough to find means of getting sufficient food to keep up their strength. At the bottom stand the weak and clumsy, who daily tumble lower as their undernourished organisms fail to bear up under the work. In the end they die, either in the gas chamber or from an injection of phenol. Obviously this hierarchy does not include the masses of people killed immediately upon their arrival, i.e. the Jews, except for those who were single and especially fit for work. In his stories, Beta clearly defines his social position. He belonged to the caste of clever and healthy prisoners, and he *brags* about his cunning and agility. Life in a concentration camp requires constant alertness; every moment can decide one's life or death. In order to react appropriately at all times, one must know where danger lies and how to escape it: sometimes by

3 [Unidentified Polish author -- Analyst]

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159+ blind obedience, sometimes by calculated negligence,
539 sometimes by blackmail or bribery. One of his stories consists of an account of a series of dangers he dodges in the course of a single day:

1. A guard offers him some bread. To get it he has to jump a ditch that constitutes the line of watch. Guards, under orders to shoot prisoners who cross it, receive three days' leave plus five marks for everyone they kill beyond this limit. Beta, understanding the guard's intentions, refuses the bait.

2. A guard overhears him telling another prisoner the news of the fall of Kiev. Beta forestalls a report of the offense by giving the guard, through an intermediary, an old watch as a bribe.

3. He slips out of the hands of a dangerous camp overseer, or kapo, by a quick execution of an order. The fragment I quote below concerns some Greek prisoners who were too weak to march properly. As a punishment, sticks were tied to their legs. They are supervised by a Russian, Andrej.

I leap back, struck from behind by a bicycle. I whip off my cap. The Unterscharführer, a landlord from Harmenze, jumps off the bicycle red with irritation.

"What's happening in this crazy unit? Why are those people walking around with sticks tied to their legs? It's time for work!"

"They don't know how to walk!"

"If they don't know how to walk, kill them! And you, do you know another goose has disappeared?"

"Why are you standing there like a dumb dog?" the kapo screamed at me. "Tell Andrej to settle with them. Los!"

I ran down the path . . .

"Andrej, finish them off! Kapo's orders!"

Andrej seized a stick and struck with all his might. The

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Greek shielded himself with his arm, howled, and fell. Andrej put the stick across his throat, stepped on it and rocked himself. I went on my way quickly. 159* 539

His day is filled not only with escapes from danger, but also with the intricate game waged between him and his Russian co-prisoner Ivan. Ivan has stolen a piece of soap from him. He decides to avenge himself and patiently seeks his opportunity. He observes that Ivan has stolen a goose; an artfully arranged report (so that he won't be stigmatized as an informer) occasions a search. The goose is found and Ivan is beaten by an SS man. The score is settled.

He is proud to succeed when others, less clever, perish. There is no small amount of plain sadism in his repeated emphasis of the fact that he is well-dressed, well-fed, and healthy.

"They keep moving to avoid a beating; they eat grass and slimy mud so they won't feel hungry; they walk dejectedly, still-living corpses," he says of his fellow-inmates. But of himself: "It's good to work after one has eaten a breakfast of a rasher of bacon with bread and garlic, and washed it down with a can of condensed milk." A detail concerning his clothes (all about him are half-naked wretches): "I go into the shade and place my jacket under me *so that I won't soil my silk shirt* [the italics are mine, C. M.] and settle down comfortably to sleep. Each of us rests however he can afford to." And here is a scene of "class" contrast. Beker, another prisoner, is to be burned in the crematorium because he is too weak to be useful.

At that moment, a huge gray skull emerged out of the depths, over the edge of the wooden bunk and embarrassed, blinking eyes peered at us. Then Beker's face appeared, crumpled and more aged than ever.

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159* "Teddy, I have something to ask you."
539 "Talk," I said, leaning down to him.
"Teddy, I'm going to the chimney."
I leaned down a little more, and looked into his eyes at close range. They were calm and empty.
"Teddy, I've been hungry for so long. Give me something to eat. For this last evening."
Kazik slapped me on the knee.
"Do you know this Jew?"
"It's Beker," I answered softly.
"You, Jew, get up there on the bunk and stuff yourself. When you're full, you can take the rest with you to the chimney. Go on! I don't sleep there so you can take along your lice."
"Teddy," he took me by the arm, "come. In the barrack I've got a wonderful apple pie, straight from my mother."

The strong and clever were used by the camp authorities for special work, which gave them the opportunity to procure food and clothing. One of the most sought-after jobs was that of unloading the box-cars that brought Jews from all the cities of Europe to Auschwitz. These Jews brought suitcases full of clothes, gold, jewels, and food with them because they had been told they were leaving for "re-settlement." When the train entered the gates of the camp, the frightened crowd was immediately chased out of the cars. Those who were young and strong enough to work were separated out, while old people and women with children were sent at once to the gas chambers and crematoriums. The work of the prisoners was to carry out the baggage that was destined to enrich the Reich and the camp administration. Beta describes his work around the transport. He has gotten into this brigade through a French friend, Henri.

In the abundant literature of atrocity of the twentieth century, one rarely finds an account written from the

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point of view of an accessory to the crime. Authors are usually ashamed of this role. But collaboration is an empty word as applied to a concentration camp. The machine is impersonal; responsibility shifts from those who carry out orders to those higher, always higher. Beta's stories about the "transport" should, I believe, be included in all anthologies of literature dealing with the lot of man in totalitarian society, if ever such anthologies are compiled. 159* 539

The arrival of a "transport" is spread out, like a play, over several acts. A few quotations will give a better picture of his literary method than any amount of description:

PROLOGUE, *or anticipation of the "transport"*

Greeks are sitting around us, moving their jaws voraciously like huge inhuman insects, greedily eating moldy clods of bread. They are uneasy; they don't know what they'll be doing. Rails and planks worry them. They don't like heavy hauling.

"Was wir arbeiten?" they ask.

"Niks. Transport kommen, alles Krematorium, compris?"

"Alles verstehen," they answer in crematorium esperanto. They calm down; they won't be loading rails on trucks, or carrying planks.

ACT I, *or the arrival of the "transport"*

A striped crowd lay near the tracks in the long strips of shade. It breathed heavily and unevenly, spoke lazily in its own tongues and gazed indifferently at the majestic people in green uniform, at the green of the trees, near and unattainable, at the steeple of a distant little church which at that moment was tolling a late angelus.

"The transport is coming," someone said, and everyone stood up in expectation. Freight cars appeared around the curve as the train backed in. The trainman standing in the caboose

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leaned out, waved his hand, whistled. The locomotive screeched, wheezed and the train trundled slowly along the station. Behind the tiny barred windows one could see human faces, pale, crumpled, disheveled, as if they were sleepy—frightened women, and men who, exotically, had hair. They passed slowly, gazing at the station in silence. Then something started to boil inside the wagons and to beat against their wooden walls.

"Water! Air!" Despairing, hollow cries burst out.

Human faces pressed to the windows, lips desperately gasping for air sucked in a few gulps, vanished; others struggled into their place, then they too vanished The shrieks and moans grew steadily louder.

Act II, *or the segregation* (a few scenes will suffice)

Here comes a woman walking briskly, hurrying almost imperceptibly yet feverishly. A small child with the plump, rosy face of a cherub runs after her, fails to catch up, stretches out its hands, crying, "Mama, mama!"

"Woman, take this child in your arms!"

"Sir, it isn't my child, it isn't mine!" the woman shouts hysterically, and runs away covering her face with her hands. She wants to hide; she wants to reach those who won't leave in a truck, who will leave on foot, who will live. She is young, healthy, pretty, she wants to live.

But the child runs after her, pleading at the top of its voice, "Mama, mama, don't run away!"

"It's not mine, not mine, not . . . !"

Until Andrej, the sailor from Sevastopol, overtook her. His eyes were troubled by vodka and the heat. He reached her, knocked her off her feet with a single powerful blow and, as she fell, caught her by the hair and dragged her up again. His face was distorted with fury.

"Why you lousy fucking Jew-bitch! Jebit twoju mat'! You'd run away from your own child! I'll show you, you whore!" He grabbed her in the middle, one paw throttling her throat which

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wanted to shout, and flung her into the truck like a heavy sack of grain. 159* 539

"Here! Take this with you, you slut!" And he threw her child at her feet.

"Gut gemacht. That's how one should punish unnatural mothers," said an SS man standing near the van.

A pair of people fall to the ground entangled in a desperate embrace. He digs his fingers into her flesh convulsively, tears at her clothes with his teeth. She screams hysterically, curses, blasphemes until, stifled by a boot, she chokes and falls silent. They split them apart like a tree; and herd them into the car like animals.

Others are carrying a young girl with a missing leg; they hold her by her arms and by her one remaining leg. Tears are streaking down her face as she whispers sadly, "Please, please, it hurts, it hurts . . ." They heave her into a truck, among the corpses. She will be burned alive, together with them.

Act III, *or the conversation of the witnesses*

A cool and starry evening falls. We are lying on the tracks. It is infinitely silent. Anemic lamps burn on high poles behind the circles of light.

"Did you exchange shoes?" Henri asks me.

"No."

"Why not?"

"Man, I have enough, absolutely enough!"

"Already? After the first transport? Just think, me—since Christmas maybe a million people have passed through my hands. The worst are the transports from Paris: a man always meets friends."

"And what do you say to them?"

"That they're going to take a bath, and that we'll meet later in the camp. What would you say?"

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159* EPILOGUE (many trains came to Auschwitz that evening.
539 The transport totaled 15,000 people)

As we return to the camp, the stars begin to fade, the sky becomes ever more translucent and lifts above us, the night grows light. A clear, hot day announces itself.

From the crematoriums, broad columns of smoke rise steadily and merge above into a gigantic, black river that turns exceedingly slowly in the sky over Birkenau and disappears beyond the forests, in the direction of Trzebinia. The transport is already burning.

We pass an SS squad, moving with mechanized weapons to relieve the guard. They march evenly, shoulder to shoulder, one mass, one will.

"Und Morgen die ganze Welt . . ." they sing at the top of their lungs.

Beta is a nihilist in his stories, but by that I do not mean that he is amoral. On the contrary, his nihilism results from an ethical passion, from disappointed *love* of the world and of humanity. He wants to go the limit in describing what he saw; he wants to depict with complete accuracy a world in which there is no longer any place for indignation. The human species is *naked* in his stories, stripped of those tendencies toward good which last only so long as the habit of civilization lasts. But the habit of civilization is fragile; a sudden change in circumstances, and humanity reverts to its primeval savagery. How deluded are those respectable citizens who, striding along the streets of English or American cities, consider themselves men of virtue and goodness! Of course, it is easy to condemn a woman who would abandon her child in order to save her own life. This is a monstrous act. Yet a woman who, while reading on her comfortable sofa, judges her unfortunate sister should pause to consider whether fear

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would not be stronger than love within her, if she too were faced with horror. Perhaps it would, perhaps not— who can foretell? 159* 539*

But the "concentration universe" also contained many human beings who spurred themselves to the noblest acts, who died to protect others. None of them figure in Beta's stories. His attention is fixed not on man—man is simply an animal that wants to live—but on "concentration society." Prisoners are ruled by a special ethic: it is permissible to harm others, provided they harm you first. Beyond this unwritten contract, every man saves himself as best he can. We would search in vain for pictures of human solidarity in Beta's book. The truth about his behavior in Auschwitz, according to his fellow-prisoners, is utterly different from what his stories would lead one to suppose; he acted heroically, and was a model of comradeship. But he wants to be *tough;* and he does not spare himself in his desire to observe soberly and impartially. He is afraid of lies; and it would be a lie to present himself as an observer who judged, when in reality he, though striving to preserve his integrity, felt subjected to all the laws of degradation. As narrator, he endows himself with the qualities which pass as assets in a concentration camp: cleverness and enterprise. Thanks to the element of "class" war between the weak and the strong, wherein he did not deviate from the truth, his stories are extraordinarily brutal.

Liberated from Dachau, he became acquainted with the life of refugees in Western Germany. It was like an extension of the life in the camp. Demoralization, thievery, drunkenness, corruption—all the evil forces set loose in man by the years of Hitlerism continued to triumph. The callous policy of the occupying powers toward the millions of recent slaves aroused his anger. Here, then, was 159*

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159 the dreamt-of end of the war: again the law of the jungle prevailed; again the strong, this time mouthing the slogans of democracy and freedom, trod upon the weak or treated them with cruel indifference.

Beta had a keen eye, but it was focussed on all that was absurd, infamous, and vile in those about him. Pitiless and intolerant, he was one open wound. Perhaps he would have been less bitter had he been able, after these years of suffering, to *stand still* at one point for one moment and see an *individual* man instead of a society shaken by the great paroxysm of the end of the War. He was in constant inner motion; his face was perpetually distorted into a grimace of rage and irony. He continued to see the mass of humanity in whose midst he was living as *naked* and ruled by a few primitive impulses. For him, who had to aim toward something, such a world was unbearable. He felt he could no longer remain in a state of undirected fury and revolt.

Like many ex-prisoners, he had to choose between return to his native country and self-imposed exile. His wartime Marxist sympathies were vaguely rooted in a feeling that Marxism treats man realistically. His convictions could be reduced to the simple maxim that man is not governed by his good intentions, but solely by the laws of the social order in which he is placed. Whoever wants to change man must, first of all, change social conditions. Still, like all Poles, he was suspicious of the powerful Russian state. The violence of his style brought him closest to such writers as Zola or, among contemporaries, Hemingway, whom he read avidly; and thus he was one of those artists known in Russia as "the slime of the West." Nothing evokes such horror in the land of dialectics as a writer who depicts man in terms of elementary forces of hunger and love.

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He hesitated for a long time. Finally, after literary publications appearing in Poland began to filter through to him, he made up his mind to go back. Two major factors determined his decision. He had great literary ambitions, but he was a beginner and unknown. Where, outside his own country, could he find readers of books written in his native tongue? Besides, a revolution was in progress in Poland. That was the place for a man torn by fury; that was where he could find the opportunity to remake the world. 159*

He said good-bye to his friends, and returned to a Warsaw whose inhabitants were living in the cellars of demolished houses. With their own hands they were clearing away the heaps of rubble and loading them on shoddy little horse-carts. Thus was the rebuilding of the town begun. But books and magazines were instantly snatched up throughout Poland. The government spared no expense in its support of literature. Unlimited possibilities opened before any writer who had the slightest bit of talent. Beta's career began at the tempo of a blitz. By publishing in the best reviews, and collecting large royalties, he was getting only his due. He had a fine mastery of the language; his style was terse and biting. Because his experiences were those of many of his countrymen, his subject matter was universally near and understandable. No wonder, then, that his book of stories about the "concentration universe" was hailed as a literary event of first importance.

Fortunately for him, socialist realism was not yet obligatory, for his book was in the most blatant opposition to Soviet writing techniques. According to the canons imposed on writers by the Center,[1] it was practically a crime. Obviously, the subject itself was politically irreproachable. Descriptions of the bestiality of Hitlerism were eminently desirable, especially since the average Pole

[1] [Mosow -- Analyst]

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159x hated the Russians just about as much as he hated the Germans. Concentrating the readers' attention upon German atrocities channeled their hatred into a single direction and so contributed to the "psychological preparation" of the country. Hence the growing number of books about the Gestapo, partisan warfare, or concentration camps.

Official tolerance went so far that one was free to write sympathetically about the Polish army's fight against the Germans in 1939, even though that army had defended a "lordly" Poland that was like a cinder in the Soviet Union's eye. Still, a politically correct theme would not have saved him from the critics' attack had they wanted to apply orthodox criteria, because he described the concentration camp as he personally had seen it, not as one was *supposed* to see it. In this lay his transgression. How was one supposed to see a concentration camp? It is not hard to enumerate: 1) the prisoners should have banded together in secret organizations; 2) the leaders in these organizations should have been Communists; 3) all the Russian prisoners appearing on the pages of the book should have distinguished themselves by their moral strength and heroic behavior; 4) the prisoners should have been differentiated according to their political outlook. None of this is true of his stories. The Party noticed this and even though it did not consider Polish writers ripe for socialist realism, its critics upbraided him for his chief sins. They proclaimed that his work resembled depraved, or American, literature; that it was pessimistic; and that it lacked the element of "conscious struggle," i.e. struggle in the name of Communism. But these criticisms were uttered in a persuasive tone. He was young and needed educating, yet he had in him the makings of a real Communist writer. Observing him carefully, the Party discovered in him a rare and precious treasure: true hatred.

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Beta was receptive. The more he read of Leninist-Stalinist theory, the more he convinced himself that this was exactly what he was looking for. His hatred was like a torrential river uselessly rushing ahead. What could be simpler than to set it to turning the Party's gristmills. What a relief: useful hatred, hatred put to the service of society! 159*

At the root of his hatred was the same reaction that Sartre called "la nausée," namely, disgust with man as a *physiological* being determined by the laws of nature and society, and subject to the destructive effects of time. Man should somehow break these shackles, and rise even if he had to hoist himself up by his own bootstraps. Had Beta been French, perhaps he might have become an existentialist; probably, though, that would not have satisfied him. He smiled contemptuously at mental speculation, for he remembered seeing philosophers fighting over garbage in the camp. Human thought had no significance; subterfuges and self-deceptions were easy to decipher; all that really counted was the movement of matter. He absorbed dialectical materialism as a sponge soaks up water. Its materialistic side appeased his hunger for brutal truth; its dialectical side permitted a sudden leap *above* the human species, to a vision of humanity as the material of history.

In a very short while, he published a new book. Its title alone was symbolic of his attitude, *The Stony World*—stony, therefore merciless and bare. The book comprised extremely short stories devoid of almost all action, no more than sketches of what he had seen. He was a master at the art of using material details to suggest a whole human situation. The "stony world" was Central Europe after the defeat of Hitler and the end of the Second World War. Since he had spent some time in the American zone of Germany, he had an ample store of subjects—people of all nationalities and social positions, ex-Nazis, ex-prisoners,

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159x the German bourgeoisie baffled by what had happened, American soldiers and officers, etc. Under his temperate words lurked an immensity of bitterness against a civilization whose fruit was Hitlerism. He set up equations: Christianity equals capitalism equals Hitlerism. The theme of the book was the *finale* of civilization. Its tone can be summed up in a single protest: "You told me about culture, about religion, about morality; and look what they led to!"

For Beta, as for many of his companions, the reign of Hitler was the culmination of the capitalist era in Europe. Its collapse announced the victory of the Revolution on a world scale. The future might mean further striving, but the turning point was passed. Almost all the books written in the early post-war years by young men like him developed the theme of man's impotence against the laws of History: even people with the best of intentions had fallen into the machine of Nazi terror and been converted into frightened cave men. The reading public was faced with a dilemma, a choice between the old civilization which had taken its evilness out on their hides, or the new civilization which could arise only through the victorious might of the East. So powerful is the hold success has over man's imagination that it seems not to result from human design plus favorable circumstances, but to reflect the highest law of the age. (Yet Russia and her seemingly invincible order had been merely a hair's-breadth away from defeat in the Second World War.)

The Stony World was the last book in which Beta tried to employ artistic tools, like restraint, hidden irony, masked anger, etc., recognized as effective in Western literature. He quickly realized that all his concern about "art" was superfluous. On the contrary, the harder he stepped down on the pedal, the more he was praised.

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Loud, violent, clear, biased—this is what his writing was 159* expected to be. As Party writers (he entered the Party) began to outbid each other in an effort to be accessible and simple, the boundary between literature and propaganda began to fade. He started to introduce more and more direct journalism into his writing. He discharged his venom in attacks on capitalism, i.e. on all that was happening outside the sphere of the Imperium. He would take an item from the news about warfare in Malaya or hunger in India, for example, and turn it into something halfway between an article and a snapshot.

I saw him for the last time in 1950. He had changed a great deal since the days before his arrest by the Gestapo. His former shyness and artificial humility were gone. Whereas once he had walked with a slight stoop and a lowered head, he was now a straight-backed man with an air of self-assurance. He was dry, concentrated on his work. The bashful poet had become a thorough *homo politicus*. At that time he was already a well-known propagandist. Every week one of his malignant articles appeared in a government weekly. He visited Eastern Germany frequently to gather news stories. No reporter can serve a cause as well as an author with a period of disinterested writing in his background; and Beta used all his knowledge of the writer's trade in his poisonous articles against America.

Looking at this esteemed nihilist, I would often think how like a smooth slope any form of art is, and of the amount of effort the artist must expend in order to keep from sliding back to where the footing is easier. The inner command that forces him to this effort is, at the core, irrational. By refusing to recognize disinterested art, the New Faith destroys this inner command. Beta was a real writer in his stories about the concentration camp;

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159 though he questioned all man's inner imperatives, he counterfeited nothing, he did not try to please anybody. Then he introduced a single particle of politics and, like a supersaturated solution, his writing crystallized, became thereafter transparent and stereotyped. But one must not oversimplify. Many great authors, among them Swift, Stendhal, Tolstoi, wrote out of political passion. One might even say that political conviction, an important social message a writer wants to communicate to his readers, adds strength to his work. The essential difference between the great writers who criticized the political institutions of their day and people of Beta's type seems to lie in the total non-conformity of the former. They acted in opposition to their environment; he, writing, listened for the applause of his Party comrades.

For all their violence and precision of language, his articles were so dull and one-dimensional that this debasement of a gifted prose-writer stirred my curiosity. He was certainly intelligent enough to understand that he was wasting his talent. In conversation with several literary authorities whose word determines a writer's place in the official hierarchy, I asked why such measures were being applied to him. Surely the interests of the Party did not require it to reduce him to a rag. He was certainly more useful as a writer of stories and novels; to force him to write articles meant bad management of available artistic resources. "No one makes him write articles," came the reply, "that's the whole misfortune. The editor of the weekly can't drive him away. He himself insists on writing them. He thinks there is no time, today, for art, that you have to act on the masses more directly and elementally. He wants to be as useful as possible." This was a somewhat hypocritical answer. The Party constantly stresses its desire for good literature; at the same time, it

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creates such a tense atmosphere of propaganda that writers 159 feel compelled to resort to the most primitive and oversimplified literary techniques. Yet it was true that Beta *himself* wanted to devote all his time to journalism; although he was a highly qualified specialist, he seized upon work that was easy for the most ordinary drudge. His mind, like that of so many Eastern intellectuals, was impelled toward self-annihilation.

The psychological process that is set into motion as soon as such an intellectual takes up his pen is fairly complex. Let us imagine he is about to describe a certain event in international politics. He sees that phenomena are interrelated functionally rather than causally. Therefore, to present the event honestly, he would have to penetrate the motives of the opposing forces and the necessities which govern them—in short, to analyze it from every side. Then anger comes to his rescue, introducing order into the tangle of interdependencies and releasing him from the obligation to analyze. This anger against the *self-deception* that anything at all depends on man's will is, simultaneously, a fear of falling prey to one's own naïveness. Since the world is brutal, one must reduce everything to the simplest and most brutal factors. The author understands that what he is doing is far from accurate: people's stupidity or people's good intentions influence events no less than do the necessities of the economic struggle. But he takes his vengeance upon mankind (upon others and upon himself) by demonstrating that man is dominated by a few elementary laws; at the same time, he feeds his sense of superiority and proves himself acute and strong enough to dispense with "prejudices."

In his political articles, just as in his concentration camp stories, Beta's urge to simplify, to strip off all illusions, to present everyone and everything nakedly

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159* was always predominant. But if one continues to follow this urge one reaches a point at which the intellect has nothing more to say. Words become a war-cry, an imperfect substitute for a clenched fist. Beta did arrive at the stage where words no longer satisfied him; he could not write novels or stories because they would last through time and so could not answer his need for a cry to battle. The movement to which he was subjected went on accelerating: faster and faster, greater and greater doses of hatred and of dizziness. The shapes of the world became simpler and simpler, until at last an individual tree, an individual man, lost all importance and he found himself not among palpable things, but among political concepts. His feverish addiction to journalism is not hard to explain. The writing of articles acted on him like a narcotic. When he put down his pen he felt he had accomplished something. It didn't matter that there wasn't a single thought of his own in these articles; it didn't matter that thousands of second-rate journalists from the Elbe to the Pacific were saying exactly the same thing. He was active in the sense that a soldier marching in formation is active.

"Und Morgen die ganze Welt" sang the SS guards moving against the background of the black smoke pouring out of the crematoriums of Auschwitz. Nazism was collective insanity; yet the German masses followed Hitler for profound psychological reasons. A great economic and social crisis gave birth to Nazism. The young German of that day saw all about him the decay and chaos of the Weimar Republic, the degradation of millions of unemployed, the disgusting aberrations of the cultured elite, the prostitution of his sisters, and the fight of man against man for money. When the hope of socialism vanished, he accepted the other philosophy of history that was offered him, a philosophy that was a parody of Leninist-Stalinist

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doctrine. It is possible that the German who locked Beta 159*
into the concentration camp was, like him, a disappointed lover of the world who longed for harmony and purity, discipline and faith. He despised those of his countrymen who refused to join in the joyous march. Pitiful remnants of humanitarianism, they mumbled that the new movement violated moral principles. Here, immediate and in sight, was the salvation of Germany and the reconstruction of the world. And in this unique moment—a moment that occurs once in a thousand years—these whining believers in that miserable Jesus dared to mention their trifling moral scruples! How hard it was to fight for a new and better order—if among one's own people one still encountered such infantile prejudice!

Beta also could see a new and better order within his grasp. He believed in, and demanded, earthly salvation. He hated the enemies of human happiness and insisted that they must be destroyed. Are they not evil-doers who, when the planet enters a new epoch, dare to maintain that to imprison people, or to terrify them into professions of political faith, is not quite nice? Whom do we imprison? Class enemies, traitors, rabble. And the faith we force on people, is it not true faith? History, History, is with us! We can see its living, explosive flame! Small and blind, indeed, are the people who, instead of comprehending the whole of the gigantic task, squander their time on worry about insignificant details!

Despite his talent and intelligence, Beta did not perceive the dangers inherent in an exciting march. On the contrary, his talent, intelligence, and ardor drove him to action while ordinary people temporized and rendered unto an unloved Caesar only so much as was absolutely necessary. He willingly shouldered responsibility. He did not pause to consider what a philosophy of historic change be-

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159* comes once it sets out to conquer the world by the might of armies. "And tomorrow the world!"

A few months after I wrote this portrait, I learned of Beta's death. He was found one morning in his home in Warsaw. The gas jet was turned on. Those who observed him in the last months of his feverish activity were of the opinion that the discrepancy between what he said in his public statements and what his quick mind could perceive was increasing daily. He behaved too nervously for them not to suspect that he was acutely aware of this contrast. Moreover, he frequently spoke of the "Mayakovski case." Numerous articles appeared in the press written by his friends, writers of Poland and Eastern Germany. His coffin, draped with a red flag, was lowered into the grave to the sound of the "Internationale" as the Party bid farewell to its most promising young writer.

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CHAPTER VI

Gamma, the Slave of History

IN speaking of Gamma, I must evoke a picture of the town in which I went to school and later to the University. There are certain places in Europe which are particularly troublesome to history and geography teachers: Trieste, the Saar Basin, Schleswig-Holstein. Just such a sore-spot is the city of Vilna. In the last half-century it belonged to various countries and saw various armies in its streets. With each change, painters were put to work repainting street and office signs into the new official language. With each change, the inhabitants were issued new passports and were obliged to conform to new laws and injunctions. The city was ruled in turn by the Russians, Germans, Lithuanians, Poles, again the Lithuanians, again the Germans, and again the Russians. Today it is the capital of the Lithuanian Soviet Socialist Republic, a fancy title designed to conceal the blunt fact that Russia is effectively carrying out the precepts of the Tsars in regard to territorial expansion.

During my school and university years the city belonged to Poland. It lies in a land of forests, lakes, and streams, concealed in a woody dale. Travelers see it emerge unexpectedly from behind the trees. The steeples of its scores of Catholic churches, built by Italian architects in the

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baroque style, contrast in their gold and white with the blackness of the surrounding pines. Legend tells us that a certain Lithuanian ruler, hunting in the wilds, fell asleep by a fire and had a prophetic dream. Under the spell of his dream, he constructed a city on the spot where he had slept. Throughout the many centuries of its existence, Vilna never ceased to be a city of the forests. All about it lay an abandoned province of Europe whose people spoke Polish, Lithuanian, and Byelorussian, or a mixture of the three, and retained many customs and habits long since forgotten elsewhere. I speak in the past tense because today this city of my childhood is as lava-inundated as was Pompeii. Most of its former inhabitants were either murdered by the Nazis, deported to Siberia, or re-settled by the Russians in the western territories from which the Germans were expelled. Other people, born thousands of miles away, now walk its streets; and for them, its churches, founded by Lithuanian princes and Polish kings, are useless.

Then, however, no one dreamt of mass murder and mass deportations. And the life of the town unfolded in a rhythm that was slower and less subject to change than are forms of government or borders of kingdoms. The University, the Bishops' Palace, and the Cathedral were the most esteemed edifices in the city. On Sundays, crowds filled the narrow street leading to the old city gate upon which, in a chapel, was housed the picture of the Virgin known for its miraculous powers. Vilna was a blend of Italian architecture and the Near East. In the little streets of the Jewish quarter on a Friday evening, through the windows one could see families seated in the gleam of candlelight. The words of the Hebrew prophets resounded in the ancient synagogues, for this was one of the most important centers of Jewish literature and learning in

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Europe. Great fairs on Catholic holidays attracted peasants 000
from neighboring villages to the city, where they would display their wooden wares and medicinal herbs on the ground. No fair was complete without *obwarzanki* (hard, round, little cakes threaded on a string); and no matter where they were baked, they always bore the name of the little town whose only claims to fame were its bakeries and its one-time "bear academy," an institution where bears were trained. In the winter, the steep streets were filled with boys and girls on skis, their red and green jerkins flashing against a snow that became rosy in the frosty sun.

The University building had thick walls and low, vaulted classrooms. The uninitiated were bound to get lost in the labyrinth of its shaded courtyards. Its arcades and halls might just as easily have been located in Padua or Bologna. Once Jesuits used to teach the sons of the nobility in this building; but at the time when I was studying there, lay professors were teaching young people whose parents were for the most part small landholders, tenant-farmers, or Jewish merchants.

It was in that building[1] that I met Gamma. He was an 159*
ungainly, red-faced boy, coarse and boisterous. If Vilna itself was provincial, then those who left their backward villages to come there to study were doubly so. Muddy country roads made communication practically impossible in spring and autumn; peasants' horses were seized by fits of terror at the sight of an automobile; in many villages, homes were still lit by twig torches. Home handicrafts and lumbering were the only occupations, outside of farming, that the people knew. Gamma came from the country. His father, a retired officer of the Polish army, had a farm. The family had lived in those regions for generations, and its name can be found in the registers of the lower nobility of that land. Gamma's mother was Russian and he grew

[1] [The University building in Vilna -- Analyst]

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159+ up bi-lingual. Unlike the majority of his companions who were Catholic, he was Orthodox, a faith he inherited from his mother.

Our first conversations did not portend a close understanding between us. True, we were bound by a common interest in literature, but I was offended by his behavior, by his piercing voice—he just did not know how to speak in a normal tone—and by the opinions he uttered. He always carried a heavy cane of the type that was the favorite weapon of young people given to anti-Semitic extravagances. His violent anti-Semitism was, in fact, his political program. As for myself, I despised such nationalists; I thought them dangerous blockheads who, in order not to think, were raising a loud hue and cry, and stirring up mutual hatreds in various national groups. There are certain conversations that stick in one's memory; and sometimes what one remembers, even more than the actual words, is what one was looking at then. When I recall our talk about racism, I see his legs, the round paving stones of the street, and his cane leaning against the gutter. He spoke of blood and earth, and of how power should be vested not in the whole of the citizenry regardless of race or native tongue, but in the dominant national group, who should take measures to safeguard its blood against contamination. Perhaps his nationalist zeal was an effort to compensate for his own deficiencies; his mixed, half-Russian origin and his Orthodox faith must surely have caused him much unpleasantness at the hands of his provincial and primitive schoolmates. His voice rang out, belligerent, and permeated by a sense of his own superiority. My arguments against racist theories awakened a profound disgust in him; he considered me a person whose thinking was an obstacle to action. As for him, he wanted action. This was the year 1931. We were both very young, very poor, and

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unaware of the unusual events we were to be thrust into later. 159+

I visited him in 1949 in one of the capitals of Western Europe where he was the ambassador of Red Poland, and a trusted member of the Party. His residence was guarded by a heavy wrought-iron gate. A few minutes after one rang, an eye would appear at the aperture, hinges would rattle, and one would see the big courtyard with a few shining cars in it.

To the left of the entrance stood the sentry-box of the chauffeur on duty, who was armed with a pistol against any eventuality. Standing in the middle of the courtyard, one perceived the proportions of the façade and the wings. This was one of the most beautiful palaces in that beautiful capital. A certain eighteenth-century aristocrat had built it for his mistress. The interior retained its former character; the big rooms, their walls covered with gilded wainscoting, contained furniture, rugs and Gobelin tapestries of that century. Gamma received me in the midst of gilt and marble; he was cordial; the years had worn the roughness off his gestures, and injected a slightly artificial sweetness into his manner. In this palace he had his apartment, reception salons, and offices. Many of the most eminent representatives of Western art and science visited him frequently. A well-known English scholar called him a charming man, liberal and free of fanaticism. This opinion was shared by many members of the intellectual elite, among them Catholics, liberals, and even conservatives. As for the luminaries of Western Communist literature, they admired him both because he was an emissary of the East they worshipped, and because he was extremely acute in his Marxist appraisal of literary problems. Obviously, they did not know his past nor the price one pays in order that an unseasoned youth, raised in one of the most for-

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159a saken corners of Europe, may become the master of an eighteenth-century palace.

Gamma felt fine in this Western capital. He loved to visit night spots and cabarets and was so well-known in them that whenever he entered, the maître d'hôtel would lead him ceremoniously to the best table. Seeing that nonchalant man watching people through narrowed eyes from behind champagne bottles ranged in ice buckets, one could easily have mistaken him for an English squire who had managed to salvage something of his fortune. Tall, slightly stooped, he had the long, ruddy face of a man who has spent much time with guns and dogs. He looked very much like what he really was: a member of the lower Polish nobility, which once hunted passionately, drank passionately, fulfilled its political duties by delivering orations plentifully interspersed with Latin, and quelled opposition by a choral shout of protest or, when necessary, by fencing duels amid overturned benches and tables. The freedom of his gestures was the freedom of a man conscious of his privileges. Toward his subordinates who, as part of their job, often accompanied him on his nocturnal expeditions, he behaved with benevolent disdain. In the office he would at times, out of an excess of high spirits, pull the noses of the embassy secretaries or give them a resounding slap on the behind. But he was also prone to attacks of unbridled anger. Then his ruddy face would turn purple, his blue eyes would become bloodshot, and his voice recapture its former piercing, savage note. No wonder that Western diplomats, scholars, and artists considered him a none too psychologically-complicated *bon viveur*. Even his tactlessness seemed to stem from a broad, open nature that offended at times out of excessive sincerity but that was, in any case, free of guile. The lack of

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embarrassment with which he spoke of matters considered touchy by other Communists won the confidence of his listeners. This was no Communist—they would agree after a visit to the embassy—or if he was, then how broad and civilized his outlook! What they thought was naturalness was for him sheer artifice. Conscious of his resemblance to a country squire, he used his simple, good-natured mannerisms with deliberate skill. Only those who knew him very intimately saw the cold calculation that lay beneath his feigned effusiveness. In his bosom he carried an invisible dagger with which he could strike unexpected and treacherous blows. But at the same time, this dagger, from which he was never parted either by day or by night, chilled his heart. He was not a happy man.

Wearing his most enchanting smile, he convinced diplomats suspected of not wanting to return behind the iron curtain of his personal benevolence toward them. He thundered against the idiots in Warsaw who did not understand how matters had to be handled in the West. After which he proposed a joint excursion to Warsaw by air, for a few days, to explain to those fools how to settle some question that had occasioned the exchange of numerous telegrams. The delinquent reflected: Gamma's good will was obvious; every trip to Warsaw was a proof of loyalty toward the government and so prolonged one's stay abroad; and, as far as he could see, no risk was involved. In a festive mood, exchanging little jokes with Gamma, the diplomat boarded the plane. No sooner had he reached the airfield in Warsaw than he realized that he had fallen into a trap. Having accomplished his mission, Gamma took the first plane going in the other direction. To supervise the consciences of his personnel was not the least of his duties; it was, in fact, an honor, a

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sign of trust. His dagger always worked best whenever the talents of a psychologist were required, that is, in cases normally assigned to the political police.

But let me return to the past. Then, he did not know the taste of champagne. Faithful to ancient tradition, the University cafeteria in which we ate bore, as did many institutions of the University, a Latin name, *mensa*. The meals cost very little, but were as bad as they were cheap. Consequently they were the favorite subject of satiric verse which sang the unparalleled hardness of the meat balls and the wateriness of the soups. Amid the smoke of bad cigarettes, we used to sit there discussing poetry and reciprocally meting out laurels that interested no one but ourselves. Still, our group of beginning writers was to interest many people in the future and to play an important role in the history of our country. While our comrades were concerned with their studies or with winning good jobs in the future, we longed for fame and dreamt of reshaping the world. As so often happens, what intelligence and talent we had was paid for by a disturbance of our internal balance. In each of us were deep wounds dating from our childhood or adolescence, different in each of us but identical in one basic element, in something that made it impossible for us to live in harmony with others of our age, something that made us feel "different" and hence drove us to seek compensations. The subjective motives that breed immoderate ambition are not easy to track down. Gamma was, I believe, extremely sensitive about his family. Another factor that might have affected him deeply was something that occurred when he was a schoolboy: he accidentally killed a friend while hunting. The feeling of guilt that arose as a result of this accident probably helped to mold his future decisions.

Perhaps even more important was a disturbance of our

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social equilibrium. We were all in revolt against our environment. None of us was of the proletariat. We derived from the intelligentsia, which in that part of Europe was a synonym for the impoverished nobility or the lower middle class. Gamma's father was, as I said, a retired officer; George, a poet, was the son of a provincial lawyer; Theodore, a poet (later shot by the Polish underground as a Party propagandist), bore an aristocratic name although his mother was an employee in a bank; Henryk, an orator, writer, and politician (later shot by the Germans), was the son of a railroad engineer who prided himself on bearing one of the most well-known names in Poland; Stefan, a poet who later became a prominent economist, came of an unsuccessful, half-German mercantile family; my family belonged to the Lithuanian nobility, but my father had migrated from the country to the city to become an engineer. The revolt against one's environment is usually *shame* of one's environment. The social status of all of us was undefined. Our problems were those of the twentieth century, but the traditions of our families bound us to concepts and customs we thought ridiculous and reactionary. We were suspended in a void, and in this we were no exceptions. The country had never experienced a real industrial revolution; the middle class was weak; the worker was for some people a brutal dirty-faced creature who worked hard or drank hard, and for others a myth, an object of worship. Our society was divided into an "intelligentsia" as opposed to the "people." To the latter belonged the workers and peasants. We were of the "intelligentsia," but we rebelled against it because it was oriented toward the past rather than the future. One could compare our situation, in some respects, to that of the sons of impoverished first families of the South in the United States. We were adrift, and we could find no place

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to anchor. Some people called us the "intellectuals' club" in an effort to oppose the intellectuals to the "intelligentsia."

These were years of acute economic crisis. Unemployment spread throughout wide spheres of the population. The university youth, living without money and without hope of finding work after finishing his studies, was of a radical temper. This radicalism took two forms. Some, like Gamma, at the beginning of his stay at the University, became intensely nationalistic. They saw the answer to all difficulties in a vaguely defined "national revolution." In practice, this meant a hostile attitude toward their Jewish comrades, who as future lawyers and doctors would be their professional competitors. Against these nationalists emerged the "left" whose program, depending on the group, vacillated between socialism and a variation on the New Deal. During annual elections to "The Fraternal Aid," which was something in the nature of an autonomous student government that administered student houses, the *mensa,* etc., these two camps waged battles with words and sometimes with fists.

Both the Communists and the government tried to win over the "left," if I may use this term to describe a conglomeration of differing groups. Pilsudski's mild semi-dictatorship, lacking a clear-cut program, timidly courted the favor of the young people in an effort to recruit new leaders. Seeing the growing radicalism of the universities, it wooed the "left" by promising reforms. For a certain time, our group was the mainstay of the government's attempts to consolidate its position among the university youth. Our friends, Stefan and Henryk, were considered the most promising of the young "government" politicians in the country. But these attempts ended in failure. "The most promising young politicians" broke with the govern-

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ment and went further to the left; whereas the mechanism of events pushed the government ever more to the right. Nationalism—if not downright totalitarianism in a local edition—began to gain ever greater victories. The government abandoned its support of the patchwork "government left" and started to flirt with the nationalists.

Let this suffice as a general picture of pre-war politics in the now lava-deluged city of Vilna. My account covers many years. During that time, every spring just when we had to study for exams the trees would turn green; and ever since, nowhere else has the green seemed so joyous to me. On the river, little boats appeared taking trippers out to nearby beaches, and long logs floated out of the forests down to the sawmills. Young couples, holding hands, strolled under the arcades of the University. To rise before daybreak, take a kayak at the landing stage and, in the light of the rising sun, paddle on the river whose swift waters pushed between sandy cliffs and clumps of pines —that was pure joy. We often made excursions to nearby lakes in whose midst whole archipelagos of islands thrust up like big bouquets. The grass on the islands was buoyant, untouched by human feet; nightingales shouted in the willows. We would swarm into the water and swim out, troubling the reflections of clouds and trees on its smooth surface; or we would float on our backs in the water, look up at the sky and sing happy, inarticulate songs. We lived through betrayals of love, sorrows over failed exams, mutual intrigues and envies. Our articles and poems appeared in print. Over the hard meat balls in the *mensa,* the topics of conversation changed. Disputes over the significance of metaphor in poetry yielded to discussions of the theories of Georges Sorel, and later Marx and Lenin.

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159* Gamma parted with the nationalists rather quickly; still, he had little sympathy for the "government left" or for the Catholic left. He wrote poetry which was printed in magazines issued by our group; but his poems, unlike those written by Theodore, George, or myself, were the object of neither attack nor praise. The critics received them in silence. He had that mastery of technique that modern poetry requires, but what he wrote was lifeless. Those he envied wrote, I believe, stupidly; but their style was individual, their rhythmic incantations expressed the authors' feelings, their fury and sarcasm irritated the readers, but caught their attention. Gamma's poems were studied arrangements of carefully selected metaphors that said nothing.

160 Our group became more and more radical. After the collapse of the "government left," the question arose: what "left"? Social democracy in our country shared the faults of all the social democratic parties of the continent—it was weak and willing to compromise. Russia began to figure in our conversations ever more frequently. We lived less than a hundred miles from the borders of the Soviet Union, yet we had no more knowledge of it than did the inhabitants of Brazil. The border was hermetically sealed. We were situated on the peripheries of a world that differed from the East as much as if it were another planet. That Eastern world, which we knew only from books, seemed to us like a world of progress when we compared it with conditions we could observe at first hand. Weighing the matter rationally, we were convinced that the future lay with the East. Our country was in a state of paralysis. The masses had no say in the government. The social filter was so contrived that the peasants' and workers' youth had no access to secondary schools and universities because the expenses, though low, were never-

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theless beyond their means. Infinitely complicated national minority problems (and our country had a high percentage of minorities) were resolved in the most chauvinistic spirit. The nationalist movement, supported by the petty bourgeoisie and the penniless intelligentsia, drove the government to ever sharper discrimination. The country was heading toward a variation on what was happening in neighboring Germany, the same Germany that threatened war and the destruction of Poland. Can one wonder that we looked to Russia as the country where a solution had been found to all the problems that beset us, as the country which alone could save us from the misfortunes which we could so easily visualize as we listened to Hitler's speeches over the radio?

Still, it was not easy to become a Communist, for Communism meant a complete revision of one's concepts of nationality. For centuries Poland had been in a state of permanent war with Russia. There was a time when Polish kings had led their troops to the very gates of the "Rome of the East." Then the scale tipped in favor of Moscow until at last, throughout the whole nineteenth century, the greater part of Poland was under Tsarist rule. In accepting Communism, one agreed to consider those old conflicts between the two nations to have been conflicts between their ruling classes only. It was necessary to forget the past. One conceded that Poland—after its short period of independence resulting from the Versailles peace—would, in the event of the victory of Communism, become once again a province of Russia. Poland's eastern territories, and the city in which we lived, were to be incorporated directly into the Soviet Union because Moscow regarded them as part of the Byelorussian and Ukrainian republics. As for the rest, that obviously would become one more republic in the Union. Polish

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000 Communists made no attempt to conceal that such was the Party program.

To renounce loyalty towards one's country and to eradicate patriotic feelings inculcated in school and in the University—this was the price of entrance upon the road of progress. Not everyone was prepared to pay this price. Our group disintegrated. "The most promising young government politicians," Stefan and Henryk, became Stalinists; George and I withdrew. Those who crossed the line thought the rest of us weak poets, bookworms incapable of action. Perhaps their opinion was not far from the truth. I am not sure, however, that cast-iron consistency is the greatest of human virtues.

159* Gamma became a Stalinist. I think he felt uneasy writing his passionless poetry. He was not made for literature. Whenever he settled down before a sheet of paper he sensed a void in himself. He was incapable of experiencing the intense joys of a writer, either those of the creative process or those of work accomplished. The period between his nationalism and his Stalinism was for him a limbo, a period of senseless trials and disillusionment.

[965] The Communist Party was illegal in our country. Membership in it was punishable under a paragraph of the law that defined any attempt to deprive Poland of any part of her territory as a criminal offense. Party leaders, realizing they had nothing to gain at the time from illegal activity, tried to reach and sway public opinion through sympathizers not directly involved in the Party. A number of publications appeared in Poland which followed the Party line, adapting it to the level of unwary readers. The group in which Gamma found himself started to edit one such periodical. Contacts with Party messengers took place in secret, often on trips to the neighboring forests. By now, most of the members of our original group had completed

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their course of studies. This was the period of war in Spain and of the Communist front "in defense of culture," when the Party was trying to rally all the forces of liberalism under a popular slogan.

Gamma wrote articles, spoke at meetings, marched in May Day parades. He acted. When the authorities closed down the periodical, arrested the editors and put them on trial, he, together with the others, found himself in the dock. The trial created a great sensation in the city; it was a considerable blow to the government because it showed that this youth, on which it had counted most, had rapidly evolved toward Communism. Many liberals were incensed by the severity of the authorities toward these university graduates, these young doctors of law or philosophy. The best lawyers in the city defended them. The accused argued and lied convincingly and often; they were mentally better trained than the prosecutor, nor did they yield to him in knowledge of the law. They received mild sentences. Gamma was acquitted for lack of evidence.

During the years that immediately preceded the outbreak of the Second World War, Gamma worked at his profession, doing literary research. He wrote a book on the structure of the short story which in no way betrayed his political convictions. It would have been equally difficult to discover any particularly revolutionary notions in the two volumes of verse that he published. He married, and a daughter was born to him. His life was a constant struggle against financial troubles. Because he was known to be a Communist, he could not hope for a government position, so he supported himself by occasional literary jobs. From time to time, he published a temperate article about literature in leftist publications. He awaited his hour.

That hour came shortly. Hitler attacked Poland, and

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159* his march was swift. The Red Army moved to meet him and occupied, in accordance with the Molotov-Ribbentrop pact, those territories which the Party program had always openly proclaimed should be joined to the Union. The effect of these attacks was like that of a fire in an anthill. Thousands of hungry and frightened people clogged the roads: soldiers of the beaten army trying to get home, policemen getting rid of their uniforms, women searching for their husbands, groups of men who had wanted to fight but who had not found arms. This was a time of universal migration. Throngs of people fled from the East to German occupation in the West; similar throngs fled from the Germans to the East and Soviet rule. The end of the State was marked by a chaos that could occur perhaps only in the twentieth century.

Gamma was mobilized but he spent only a few days in the army, so quickly did defeat come. The Soviet Union magnanimously offered the city of Vilna to Lithuania, which was to enjoy the friendship of its mighty neighbor for a year before it was finally swallowed up. Gamma, craving action, moved to Lvov, the largest city under Soviet occupation. There he met other pro-Stalinist writers, and they quickly organized. With the support of the new authorities, they acquired a house in which they set up a canteen and living quarters; and there they went to work on the new type of writing—which consisted mostly of translations from Russian, or else not overly fastidious propaganda.

In these new circumstances Gamma very quickly won the trust of the literary specialists who had been sent from Russia to supervise the "cultural clean-up" of the newly acquired territories. Many of his companions, although theoretically Communist, were torn by internal conflicts. The misfortunes of their fatherland were reduc-

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ing them to a state of nervous breakdown. The savagery 169*
of the conquerors and their enmity toward all Poles filled them with fear. For the first time, they were in contact with the new and ominous world which, until now, they had known only from embellished accounts. But Gamma showed no doubt; his decision was made. I am tempted to explain this on the basis of his voice and his dry, unpleasant laugh, which could lead one to suspect that his emotional life was always rather primitive. He knew anger, hatred, fear, and enthusiasm; but reflective emotion was alien to him—in this lay the weakness of his talent.

Condemned to purely cerebral writing, Gamma clung to doctrine. All he had to say could have been shouted at a meeting or printed in a propaganda leaflet. He could move forward without being swayed by any affective complications; he was able to express himself in a single tone. His success (not as a writer but as a literary politician, which is the most important type of literary success in the Stalinist system) was also promoted by his fluent knowledge of Russian. He was, after all, half-Russian, and so he could arrive more easily than others at an understanding with the new rulers. He was regarded as one of the "surest."

But most people in the newly acquired areas were not so well off. They trembled with fright. The first arrests told them to expect the worst; and their fears were well-founded for the worst came quickly, in the form of mass deportations. At dawn, agents of the NKVD knocked at the doors of houses and huts; they allowed little time for the arrested families to gather together even the most essential articles; they advised them to dress warmly. Bolted cattle cars carried away the prisoners, men, women, and children. Thousands upon thousands ebbed away to the East. Soon the number was tens of thousands, and finally hundreds of thousands. After many weeks or months of travel,

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159* the human transports arrived at their destinations: forced labor camps in the Polar regions, or collective farms in Asia. Among the deportees were Gamma's father, mother, and teen-aged sisters. The father—it is said—cursed his unnatural son who could write eulogies of the rulers who were the cause of his countrymen's sufferings. The father died somewhere in those vast expanses where a thousand miles seems a modest distance, but the mother and daughters lived on as slaves. At the time, Gamma was delivering inflammatory speeches about the great joy it was to live and work in this new and best of orders that was turning man's dreams into reality. Who can guess what he felt then? Even if he had tried to defend his family, he could not have saved them; and besides, although he was in the good books of the NKVD, he was afraid.

The Russians distrust Communists of other nationalities; and most of all, Polish Communists, as specific examples from the years 1917–39 demonstrate. Many active Polish Communists fleeing to the Soviet Union in fear of persecution were there accused of imaginary crimes and liquidated. That happened to three well-known Polish Communist poets: Wandurski, Standé, and Bruno Jasieński. Their names are never mentioned today; their works will never be re-edited. Yet once Jasieński's novel *I Burn Paris* appeared serially in France's *L'Humanité*, and he had the same international fame that Communist poets like Nazim Hikmet and Pablo Neruda enjoy today. He died in a slave labor camp near the Arctic Circle.

The wave of arrests did not by-pass the little group of "sure" individuals. Polish Communists were always suspected of nationalist tendencies. The discovery that they suffered over the plight of their nation was sufficient cause for repression. Suddenly one day, the NKVD started house-cleaning in the circle that Gamma belonged to. One

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of the men arrested was the famous poet W. B. If Communist authorities in France were to arrest Aragon, or if American Communists were to imprison Howard Fast, the effect on the public would be more or less the same as that created by W. B.'s arrest. He was a revolutionary poet worshipped by the entire left and too respected by everyone, even his political adversaries, to be prevented from publishing his verse. Consequently, he held an exceptional position in our country. Fleeing from German-occupied Warsaw, he had taken refuge in the Soviet zone.

After the arrest of his colleagues, Gamma succumbed to a violent attack of fear. Never before in his life had he been so frightened. He assumed that this was just the beginning and that on the next round all the writers who were still at liberty would find themselves under lock and key. Feverish and wild-eyed, he ran to his fellow Communists with a proposal for immediate preventive measures. He wanted to issue a public manifesto condemning the arrested, among them W. B., as fascists. He argued that such a manifesto, signed by scores of names, would constitute a proof of orthodoxy. But his colleagues were reluctant to make a public statement denouncing their friends as fascists. This was, in their opinion, too drastic a step. They were experienced Communists and explained to him that such a move would be politically unwise. It could only prove harmful to those who signed because it was dictated so transparently by cowardice. Besides, it was hard to foresee the shape events would take in the future. Caution was indicated. The manifesto was not issued.

At that time Gamma was just beginning his career and had not yet mastered the canons of complicated political strategy. His reactions were uncontrolled. He had yet to learn how to act with true cunning.

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159* Then Hitler attacked Russia, and in a few days his army reached Lvov. Gamma could not remain in the city; he was too well-known as a Communist writer and speaker. In the general panic that accompanied the hasty evacuation of offices, NKVD men, and the fleeing army, he succeeded in hopping a train bound for the East. He left his wife and daughter in the city. To tell the truth, the married life of this couple left much to be desired. The wife disliked the new order, as did nearly everyone who had occasion to watch it operate. She disapproved of her husband's new career. They parted, and their separation was to prove definitive.

Gamma found himself in Russia. His years there were years of education. Many Poles who had arrived in bolted cattle cars were scattered throughout Russia at that time. Their number, including the interned soldiers and officers of the Polish army, amounted to some one and a half millions. Moscow regarded them as a hostile element and treated them accordingly. The Kremlin never, even at the time of its military setbacks, abandoned its far-sighted plans for the new Poland that was to arise in the future. Poland was the most important country in the Kremlin's calculations because it was a gangplank to Europe. Since the "cadres" of the new Poland could not be recruited from among the deportees, the Party had to use the little group of "sure" Communist intellectuals. In Russia Gamma met the university colleagues with whom he had once stood trial; and it was they, together with a few others, who founded a society nobly christened the Union of Patriots. This society became the nucleus of the government that rules in Warsaw today.

Even before the war the members of the Union of Patriots had agreed to renounce independence for their country in the name of the logic of History. While in Rus-

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sia, they began to pay this price in practice, for they were 159x
not free to show any solidarity with the masses of Polish prisoners and slave laborers. The deportees (among them were not only former landowners, manufacturers, and government functionaries, but mostly poor people—peasants, woodsmen, policemen, small Jewish merchants, etc.) were nothing but human pulp. Their thinking was branded with the stamp of noble and bourgeois Poland; they invoked pre-war days as a lost paradise. What else could one do with them except keep them in labor camps or on remote collective farms? The members of the Union of Patriots could sympathize with them as people, but their sympathy was not to be permitted to influence their political decisions. In any case, typhus, hunger, and scurvy were destroying this human material so effectively that in a few years it would cease to exist as a problem.

Gamma, whose family was among the deportees, understood why they thought of pre-war Poland as a lost paradise. Their lot, though not very different materially from that of millions of Soviet citizens, was particularly hard because they were unaccustomed to hunger and a severe climate. When the London government-in-exile concluded a pact with Moscow that called for the formation of a Polish army within the Soviet Union and an amnesty for Polish political prisoners, masses of people poured out of the northern slave labor camps and rushed to the south. The corpses of these ragged beggars littered the streets of the cities of southeastern Russia. Out of the totally exhausted, half-dead people who survived the trek, an army was formed that took its orders from the exile government in London. For Gamma, as for the Russian rulers, this was the army of the class enemy; like the English and Americans, it was only a temporary ally.

The Polish command was seeking officers. Several thou-

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sand Polish officers had been interned in conformance with the Molotov-Ribbentrop pact. Now they could not be found. Gamma knew that the London Poles' search would not be crowned with success. This was a delicate matter. Civilized nations do not, in general, kill interned members of the military forces of countries they are not even at war with; still, the logic of History sometimes demands such measures. Polish officers were the "cadre" of the old order in Poland. Most of them were reserve officers; in civilian life they were teachers, lawyers, doctors, government officials, in short, the intelligentsia, whose ties to the past obstructed the way of the revolution that was to be imposed on Poland. Considering that the Germans, on their part, were doing an excellent job in that country of wiping out its intelligentsia, a cadre of over ten thousand constituted an impressive number, and one was not completely unjustified in using drastic methods to get rid of them. Whenever they heard of the London government's fruitless efforts to find some trace of the internees, Gamma and the other members of the Union of Patriots exchanged ironic glances.

One of the interned officers was a young professor from the University where Gamma and I had studied. The professor was a liberal who had commiserated with Gamma and his comrades over their arrest. He was, however, the author of several economic studies which presented the Soviet Union in a none too flattering light. Somewhere in the security files in Moscow his name had been written down. It took a number of months before NKVD authorities identified him in a camp. Their discovery came just in time: the telegram demanding his immediate transfer to a prison in Moscow arrived at the railroad station where the transports of internees were actually in the process of being unloaded, preparatory to their being taken into the

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nearby forests and shot. The professor did not share this fate because, as bureaucracy would have it, complicated cases must be studied with special diligence. After the amnesty he got out of Russia.

Many Poles who observed life in the Soviet Union at first hand underwent a change of heart. After a sojourn in prisons or labor camps, former Communists entered the army of the London government. One of those released as a result of the amnesty was the poet W. B. When the Polish army was evacuated from Russia to the Near East (later to take part in the battles in Italy), W. B. was happy to leave the country of hopes unrealized after thirty years. Yet after the end of the War, he could not bear to remain an exile. He returned to a Poland ruled by Gamma and others like him. He forgave. Today every school child learns his *Ode to Stalin* by heart.

Despite any internal vacillations or moments of despair, Gamma and his comrades in the Union of Patriots persevered. They played for high stakes, and their expectations were fulfilled. The tide of victory swung in Russia's favor. A new Polish army started to form in the Soviet Union. It was to enter Poland with the Red Army and to serve as a mainstay of the new pro-Soviet Polish government. Gamma was among the first organizers of this army. Since there were no Polish officers, the higher ranks were filled by Russians. But one could not complain of a lack of soldiers. Only a small number of the deportees had managed to make their way to Persia together with the London army. For those who were left behind the only remaining chance of salvation, that is of escape outside the borders of the Soviet Union, was enlistment in the new army politically supervised by the NKVD and the Union of Patriots.

The summer of 1944 arrived. The Red Army, and with

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159x it the new Polish army, set foot on Polish soil. How the years of suffering, humiliation, and clever maneuvering were repaid! This was what came of betting on a good horse! Gamma joyously greeted the little towns ravaged by artillery fire, and the narrow plots of land which were a relief for the eyes after the monotonous expanses of Russian collective farms. His jeep carried him over roads bordered by the twisted iron of burnt-out German tanks toward power and the practical embodiment of what had hitherto been theoretic discussions full of citations from Lenin and Stalin. This was the reward for those who knew how to think correctly, who understood the logic of History, who did not surrender to senseless sentimentality! It was they, and not those tearful fools from London, who were bringing Poland liberation from the Germans. The nation would, of course, have to undergo a major operation; Gamma felt the excitement of a good surgeon entering the operating room.

Gamma, now a political officer with the rank of major, brought with him from Russia a new wife, a Polish soldier-wife. In uniform, wearing heavy Russian boots, she looked as if she might be of any age. In reality she was very young, but she had lived through many hardships in Russia. She was barely in her teens when she, her sister, brother, and mother were arrested and deported from the center of Europe to the Asiatic steppes. Summers there are as hot as they are in tropical countries; winters so severe that the tears that flow from the cold are instantly transformed into icicles. A loaf of bread is a small fortune; hard work breaks the strength of undernourished bodies. Police supervision and the vastness of the Asiatic continent kill all hope of escape. The young girl, a daughter of a middle-class family, was not accustomed to hard, physical toil, but she had to support her family. She succeeded after a

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while in entering a course on tractor driving, and after 1194
completing it she drove huge Russian tractors on the steppes of Kazakhstan. Her sympathy for the Stalinist system, after these experiences, was not great. In fact, like almost all the soldiers of the new Polish army, she had come to hate it. At last, however, she found herself in Poland, and the game for high stakes that Gamma was playing was also her game.

The Red Army reached the Vistula. The new government, which was as yet known only as the Liberation Committee, began to function in the city of Lublin. Great tasks and great difficulties faced the Union of Patriots. There was little fear that the Western allies would cause any trouble. The obstacles were of an internal nature; they sprang from the hostile attitude of the people. Once again the old conflict between two loyalties flared up. In the territories now held by the Russians large units of partisans, the so-called Home Army, affiliated with the London Government-in-Exile, had operated against the occupying Germans. Now these units were disarmed, their members drafted into the new Polish army or else arrested and deported to Russia. Gamma humorously recounted what happened in Vilna, the city of our youth. An uprising against the Germans broke out, and detachments of the Home Army entered the city simultaneously with the Russian troops. Then the Soviet command gave a magnificent banquet to which it invited the officers of the Home Army. This was, as Gamma said, a feast in the ancient Slavonic manner, a sumptuous repast during which, according to legend, midst friendly embraces, toasts, and song, invited kinsmen were quietly poisoned. In the course of the banquet, the officers of the Home Army were arrested.

From Lublin, Gamma observed that much the same

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159x thing, but on an incomparably larger scale, was happening in Warsaw. At that time the Red Army stood on the line of the Vistula, with Warsaw on the opposite side of the river. The radio of the Liberation Committee urged the inhabitants of the capital to revolt against the Germans. Yet once the uprising broke out, the radio, receiving new instructions, began to heap abuse on the leaders. Of course: they were acting on orders from the Soviet Union's rival in the struggle for power. A feast in the Slavonic tradition was an inadequate measure in this instance; Warsaw itself, a center of opposition to the Russians just as much as to the Germans, had to be destroyed. The officers of the Red Army gazed through their binoculars at the street fighting on the other side of the river. Smoke obscured their field of vision more and more. Day after day, week after week, the battle went on, until at last the fires merged to form a wall of flame. Gamma and his friends listened to awkward accounts of what was happening in this hell, from the lips of insurgents who managed to swim across the river. Indeed, the price one had to pay to remain true to the logic of History was terrible. One had to behold passively the death of thousands, take on one's conscience the torture of women and children transformed into human torches. Who was guilty? The London Government-in-Exile because it wanted to use the uprising as a trump card in its play for power? The Kremlin because it refused to aid the stricken city out of its conviction that national independence is a bourgeois concept? Or no one?

000 Leaning over a table, Communist intellectuals dressed in heavy wool uniforms listened to the tale of a young girl, one of those who had succeeded in swimming the river. Her eyes were crazed, she was running a high fever as she spoke. "Our unit was smashed and pushed to the

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river. A few succeeded in joining other units. All of those who remained on the bank were wounded. At dawn the SS would attack. That meant that all of us would be shot. What was I to do? Remain with my wounded comrades? But I couldn't help them. I decided to swim. My chances of getting across were small because the river is lit by floodlights. There are German machine-gun nests everywhere. On the shoals in the middle of the river I saw lots of corpses of people who had tried to swim across. The current carries them to the sandbanks. I was very weak. It was hard for us to find food, and I was sick. The current is very strong. They shot at me, so I tried to swim under water as much as possible."

After two months of battle, the Germans were masters of the ruins of the city. But Communist intellectuals had too much work before them to have time to brood over the misfortunes of Warsaw. First of all, they had to set the printing presses into motion. Because Communism recognizes that rule over men's minds is the key to rule over an entire country, the word is the cornerstone of this system. Gamma became one of the chief press organizers in the city of Lublin.

In the course of these years, he became a better writer than he had been before the war. He thrived on a strict diet of the doctrine, for "socialist realism" strengthens weak talents and undermines great ones. His primitivism, of which he had long since ceased to be ashamed, now lent the semblance of sincerity to his works. His true voice, which he had once tried to smother, now spoke in his verse, sharp and clamorous. He also wrote a number of orthodox stories about the War and Nazi atrocities, all of them modeled on the pattern that was to produce thousands of pages of Russian prose.

In January 1945, the Red Army began its offensive,

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crossed the Vistula and swiftly neared Berlin. Gamma also moved to the west. The Party directed him to Cracow, the city in which the greatest number of writers, scholars and artists had sought refuge after the fall of Warsaw. There he tasted the delights of dictatorship. Strange creatures dressed in remnants of furs, belted peasant jerkins and clumsy rope-laced boots began to swarm out of holes in old houses, indeed from beneath their very floors. Among them were the intellectuals who had survived the years of German occupation. Many remembered Gamma as a young pre-war poet whose works they had ignored. Now they knew he was all-powerful. On his word depended the possibility of their obtaining a chance to publish, a house, an income, a job with a newspaper, magazine, or publishing firm. They approached him apprehensively. Neither before the war nor in their underground activity were they Communist. But the new government was a fact. Nothing could prevent events from evolving as Moscow, as well as Gamma and his friends, desired. With a broad smile of friendship, he pressed the extended hands of these people and amused himself. Some were recalcitrant; some tried not to show how much his favor meant to them; some were openly servile. In a short time, he was surrounded by a court of yes-men who frowned when he frowned or guffawed loudly whenever he deigned to tell a joke.

Possibly he would not have become such a popular figure so quickly had he behaved as impetuously and brutally as before. But years of schooling stood him in good stead. Observation of life in Russia and long hours spent discussing Stalinist strategy and tactics prepared him and his companions for the work that awaited them. The first and most important maxim was not to frighten people, to appear liberal, helpful, and to give men an opportunity to

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earn a living while posing only minimal demands. Most people were not ready for diamat; their mentality still resembled that of the fools in the West. It would be a criminal mistake to create points of psychological resistance. The process of re-education had to be gradual and imperceptible. His second principle was to side immediately and indignantly with anyone who rebelled against the drastic methods of the government, the censors, or the political police. His third precept was to accept everyone who could be useful regardless of his political past, with the exception of confirmed fascists or Nazi collaborators.

By adhering faithfully to these principles, he brought many captives into the government camp. They became followers of the government not because they wanted to, nor even because of their public statements, but because of stern facts. The government took possession of all the printing shops and all the larger publishing firms in the country. Every writer or scholar had many manuscripts dating from the War when printing houses were inactive, and everyone was anxious to publish. From the moment his name appeared on the pages of a government-controlled periodical, from the moment his book was printed by a government-owned firm, the writer could not assert that he was hostile to the new authorities. In time, concessions were made to a few Catholic publications and to a certain number of small private publishers, but they were carefully kept as parochial as possible so as not to attract the best writers.

Not too much pressure was exerted; no great demands were made on anyone. National flags flew in the cities, and the arrests of members of the Home Army were carried out quietly. There was a determined effort to grant sufficient outlets for patriotic sentiment. The catchwords were freedom and democracy. Following Lenin's tactics,

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the government proclaimed a division of the landed estates among the peasants. Whoever dared to speak of collectives at that time was punished as an enemy of the people for spreading alarm and slandering the government.

Obviously, the landowners whose property was confiscated were not content. Still, most of the estates, like the factories and mines, had been placed under compulsory German management during the Nazi occupation and their owners had been, in effect, dispossessed. The peasants' class hatred of the manor was not violent in our country so the expelled proprietors were not harmed. City-dwellers felt no particular sympathy for that feudal group of landholders; in fact, no one was upset by their loss of power. As for the intellectuals, they thought it just that factories and mines should become the property of the state. We must remember that five and a half years of Nazi rule had obliterated all respect for private property. A radical agricultural reform also seemed, in general, justified. The intellectuals were concerned about something else, about the boundaries of freedom of speech. At the time, they were rather broad. One thing was certain: one was not free to write anything that might cast aspersion on the institutions of the Soviet Union. The censors made sure that this rule was strictly enforced. However, praise of Russia was not, as later, obligatory; one could remain silent on the subject. Outside this sphere, writers were given considerable freedom.

In spite of everything, the entire country was gripped by a single emotion: hatred. Peasants, receiving land, hated; workers and office employees, joining the Party, hated; socialists, participating nominally in the government, hated; writers, endeavoring to get their manuscripts published, hated. This was not their own government; it owed its existence to an alien army. The nuptial bed prepared

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for the wedding of the government with the nation was decked with national symbols and flags, but from beneath that bed protruded the boots of an NKVD agent.

The people who fawned on Gamma also hated. He knew it, and this was the source of not the least of his pleasures. He would hit sore-spots, and then observe the reactions of his listeners. The terror and fury that appeared on their faces would give way, in an instant, to an ingratiating smile. This was as it should be. He held these people in his hand. A stroke of his pencil could remove their articles or poems from the page proofs of a magazine; his word could cause their books to be rejected by a publishing house. They had to behave themselves. Yet even as he played with them, he was friendly and helpful; he allowed them to earn a living, he watched over their careers.

I met him in Cracow. Many years had elapsed since our discussions in the *mensa*—during one I had deliberately thrown a box of matches into his soup and since he was subject to attacks of rage, the incident had ended in fisticuffs. In the intervening years I had completed my studies in Paris, and later lived in Warsaw. I left our university city because I was thrown out of my job at the request of the city administration. I was suspected of Communist sympathies (it seems that differentiation between the Stalinist and anti-Stalinist left presents insurmountable difficulties to all the police in the world) and of being too well-disposed toward the Lithuanians and Byelorussians. The latter suspicion was completely justified. Now I was a refugee from Warsaw. My fortune consisted of the work-clothes I was wearing plus a hemp sack which contained my manuscripts, shaving kit and a two-penny edition of Gay's *The Beggar's Opera*. From the point of view of the Soviet Union's interests, I did not deserve anything for

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what I had done during the War; on the contrary, I had committed certain sins. Nevertheless, now I was needed and useful; my record from the period of German occupation was not so bad; my pen could be of value to the new order.

My meeting with Gamma was almost friendly. Two dogs—rather stiff, yet courteous. We were on our guard lest we bare our teeth. He remembered the literary rivalry between us which had formerly caused him so much vexation; he also remembered my open letter against the Stalinists, which had placed me more or less in the position of present-day Western dissidents. Still he had a sentimental attachment—as did I—toward his former university comrades. This helped to break the ice. That meeting was the first move in a game between us that was to last a long time.

This game was not limited to the two of us. All the intellectuals who had remained in Poland during the Nazi occupation were teamed against the group that had returned from the East. The division was clear. Much more important matters than mere personal rivalry were at stake. After the experiences of the War, none of us, not even former nationalists, doubted the necessity of the reforms that were being instituted. Our nation was going to be transformed into a nation of workers and peasants and that was right. Yet the peasant was not content even though he was given land; he was afraid. The worker had not the slightest feeling that the factories belonged to him, even though he worked to mobilize them with much self-denial, and even though the propaganda assured him that they were his. Small contractors and merchants trembled at the knowledge that they were destined to be exterminated as a group.

This was, indeed, a peculiar Revolution; there was not

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even a shadow of revolutionary dynamics in it; it was 000
carried out entirely by official decree. The intellectuals who had spent the War in Poland were particularly sensitive to the temper of the country. Gamma and his friends glibly ascribed the mood of the people to a "survival of bourgeois consciousness," but this formula failed to encompass the truth. The masses felt that *nothing* depended on them, and that nothing ever would. Henceforth all discussion would serve merely to justify the Center's decisions. Should one resist? But in a system in which everything gradually becomes the property of the state, sabotage strikes at the interests of the entire population. Only mental opposition was possible; and the intellectuals, at least the majority of them, felt very deeply that this was their duty. By publishing articles and books they satisfied the fisherman. The fish swallowed the bait and, as we know, when that happens one should slacken the line. The line remained slack; and until the fisherman resolved to pull out the fish, certain valuable cultural activities went on that were impossible in such countries, for example, as the Baltic states which were directly incorporated into the Union. The question was how long this state of affairs could continue. It might easily last five, ten, or even fifteen years. This was the only game that was possible. The West did not count, and the political emigration mattered even less.

Certain personal factors, however, entered into the game 159*
between Gamma and me. His solicitude toward the members of our old group was not motivated entirely by fond memories of our university days. He could never free himself of a feeling of guilt that dated back to his childhood; and only by converting those of us who were not Stalinists could he feel that his past actions were at last justified. The trouble was that he was deeply pessimistic about the

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159* future of mankind, whereas those whom he tried to convert were not. Loyal to the Center, he voiced official optimism, while in reality, after the years he had spent in Russia, he was convinced that History is the private preserve of the devil, and that whoever serves History signs a satanic pact. He knew too much to retain any illusions and despised those naïve enough to nourish them. To bring new damned into the fold was his one means of reducing the number of internally free people, who, by the mere fact of their existence, judged him.

Nor was our game played only within the confines of Poland. With Gamma's assistance, George, who became a Catholic poet, was sent to France as a cultural attaché; and I was appointed cultural attaché to the United States. A sojourn abroad presented important advantages. From that distance, I could publish impudent articles and poems whose every word was an insult to the Method. Whenever I felt that the line was too taut, I would write something that could be interpreted as a sign of approaching conversion. Gamma wrote me warm, lying letters. Both of us committed errors. He knew that the risk of my defecting was not great. Almost more than anyone else, I felt tied to my country. I was a poet; I could write only in my native tongue; and only in Poland was there a public—made up chiefly of young people—with which I could communicate. He knew that I was afraid to become an exile, afraid to condemn myself to the sterility and the vacuum that are proper to every emigration. But he overestimated my attachment to a literary career. On the other hand, I knew that his letters were false, but I could not renounce the idea that there was at least an iota of sincerity in his professions of friendship. I also believed that he was sufficiently intelligent not to expect me to sign the pact as he did. But I was wrong, for the day came when he

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decided to convert me by both trickery and force. His dagger missed me, which is why I am free to write this portrait. 159*

Gamma, too, went abroad. He left Poland after the initial post-war disorder had been mastered. A period of relative stability was in sight. The Peasant Party had to be eliminated and the Socialist Party absorbed, but these operations did not promise to be too troublesome. In general this was to be the era of the NEP. Liberalism was the word in cultural matters. Gamma, believing he needed a bit of peace after the nervous tension of the last years, took a post in the diplomatic service.

He sent his new wife to school in Switzerland to learn foreign languages and proper manners. In a very short time she was transformed from a soldier-bride wearing clumsy Russian boots into a doll with bleached hair and long, painted eyelashes. She became very chic, and dressed in the finest Paris fashions. He, meanwhile, devoted much of his time to writing. He wrote a novel about the trial of the group of young Stalinists in our university city, the trial in which he himself had been a defendant. It was published at once, and favorably reviewed. Still, it was not so warmly praised as one might have expected. "Socialist realism" had not yet made Polish prose sterile; whereas his book was one of those ideological exercises called novels in Russia.

When we were young, Vilna was an unusually picturesque city, not only because of its architecture or its setting amidst forests and hills, but also because of the number of languages and cultures that co-existed there. None of this found its way into his novel. Colorless, unable to evoke tangible things, his prose was merely a tool with which to etch in events and people. Events and people did not fare very well, however. Recognizing real persons in his

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159x heroes, I could see how inaccurately he drew his characters. A novelist often modifies the people he has known; he concentrates his colors, selects and stresses those psychological traits which are most characteristic. When a writer strives to present reality most faithfully he becomes convinced that untruth is at times the greatest truth. The world is so rich and so complex that the more one tries not to omit any part of the truth, the more one uncovers wonders that elude the pen.

Gamma's inaccuracy was of a different order. In accordance with the Method, he created abstract political types. Into these prefabricated forms he tried to squeeze living people; if they did not fit, he unhesitatingly chopped off their legs or their heads. Stefan and Henryk, his heroes, were reduced to the sum total of their political activity. But knowing them well, I know how complicated their personalities were. Henryk, who died before a German firing squad, was an unhappy man, internally at war with himself; he was the most glaring and tragic example of a Polish Communist torn between two loyalties. Stefan, who after his return from Moscow became one of the dictators of Poland's economy, was always a riddle to me. Now a heavy-set, sullen man, a perfect prototype of the Soviet official, he had changed completely from the days when he had hesitated about embracing Stalinism. I knew him when he used to write poems and intelligent literary essays. Then, he was a young Faust—drunk with the beauty of the world, ironic, brilliant, and rapacious. Gamma's novel was entitled *Reality*, but there was little reality in it. It was a travesty on pre-war Poland that attempted, unsuccessfully, to present as demons the rather inefficient police and the sluggish judges of that time.

After completing his novel, Gamma began to feel somewhat bored. He started to travel. He visited many Euro-

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pean countries, he went to Africa. Once, as we debated in 159* the *mensa,* we used to dream of traveling. Our doubts as to whether we would ever realize our dreams turned out to have been unnecessary; we were to come to know this type of diversion all too well. The pleasures he got out of traveling were not, it seems, overly refined. He had little appreciation for architecture and art; he had no great curiosity about patterns of life in different civilizations. Had it been otherwise, he would have been a better writer. Travel for him was a pleasant way of killing time and of satisfying the youthful ambitions of a former provincial.

Outside of travel, his greatest pleasure was to play games with foreigners. Their conviction that he was basically "liberal" was not too far from the truth. The outrage with which he stormed against certain overly brutal methods of Stalinism cannot be described as completely false. He considered himself a servant of the devil that ruled History, but he did not love his master. By rebelling against him he not only eased his own internal tension, but won a good opinion for himself in the West. His demon-lord was lenient, granting him the delights of sporadic mutiny —just so long as it was useful. Gamma, observing the faces before him, smiled at people's credulity.

Whenever he was not busy with diplomatic duties, receptions, or the political training of his personnel, he gave bridge parties. He was an excellent, and a fanatic bridge player. He complained that he was too tired after work to do anything except play cards, that diplomacy kept him from writing. Actually, this was not quite true. At an early age he had already reached the summit of his career. Had he so wished he could have become a minister of state in a country where a minister is ruled by the decisions of the Central Committee of the Party. He was a member of the Central Committee. What next? During his stay

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159* in the lovely Western capital, he took stock and discovered he had nothing. Well might he cry, "Qu'as-tu fait, toi que voilà, de ta jeunesse?" What, indeed, had he done with his youth? Where was there something he could call his own and not just the product of historic determinism? He was nearing forty, and he was clear-sighted. The old feeling of literary defeat was returning. He felt as empty as a sieve with a wind blowing through it. That wind of historic necessity swept all the meaning out of literature. One more astute ideological equation, several more pages of doctrinal prose! Why write when everyone knew in advance exactly what was to be said? He played bridge in his gilded and mirrored salon not because he was tired but because he was afraid to find himself alone before a sheet of blank paper.

Gradually he grew accustomed to this mode of life. But the Party does not like comfort to become a habit. Changes were occurring in Poland. At last strict orthodoxy was required of all writers. Gamma was needed on the spot. He left his eighteenth-century palace and the beautiful Western capital with sorrow. He knew that Eastern world to which he was returning much too well. Fierce battles and intrigues, constant dread of Moscow's frown awaited him. Sorrow was pointless; he had to go.

The position he received upon his return was higher than the rank of ambassador to a major Western country. He became, this time officially, the political overseer of all the writers, the keeper of their consciences. It was his duty to make certain that Polish literature developed in harmony with the Party line. The government had just offered the Writers' Union a newly constructed building in Warsaw that housed a huge modern amphitheatre, conference rooms, offices, a restaurant, and living quarters

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for writers. That was where he officiated, attending numerous conferences with writers, publishers, security police, and representatives of kindred unions. 159*

He was given an apartment in a government building reserved for higher dignitaries. Admission to this block of apartments is possible only after a previous arrangement by telephone. But these telephone numbers are not listed in the directory; they are issued only to trusted individuals. The member of the security police at the entrance telephones upstairs to verify whether the meeting was actually agreed upon; after which he takes the guest's personal papers and permits him to enter.

Gamma was right in foreseeing a period of intrigue. In general, he had little to fear from other writers because he was, hierarchically speaking, their superior; although even among them there were certain dangerous individuals who were stronger in dialectical materialism than he, and more rabbinical in their mentality. The real struggle for power was waged higher up, in the top brackets of the Party. There he had many enemies. Despite his long years of training, the fiery squire in him would still fall into a rage whenever someone crossed him. In such moments, he treated people as he would servants in his private manor. As ambassador, he could permit himself such brutality without fear of reprisal, but now it caused him trouble. Besides, the line had stiffened so much in Poland that a single sincere word, even if it was uttered only to win converts, could give rise to fatal consequences. Shortly after his return, he made one of the gravest blunders of his political career. This occurred at a meeting which took place directly after the outbreak of the war in Korea. Gamma, replying to "whispered propaganda," shouted heatedly, "Yes, we attacked first, because we are stronger."

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159 It took a lot of work to patch up the damage caused by his unfortunate outburst. As we know, according to the official line, North Korea was attacked.

He also had to settle down seriously to his writing. Only an "active" writer can be a member of the Writers' Union. Every author is compelled to publish under threat of expulsion from the Union and consequent loss of all his privileges. The obligation to keep active is doubly binding on the bosses.

Someone in Warsaw said of Gamma, "He fights this war against imperialism and Western propaganda in the cause of peace, but he dreams of one thing: war. For if the war broke out, then there would be speeches, airplane flights, news reports from the front; and he wouldn't have to sit down every day behind his desk and torture himself over a novel. But just for spite, there will be peace; and he'll have five desks in that elegant apartment of his, and on each one, the beginning of a novel. And every day he'll howl with despair knowing that everything he writes is as dead as a stone."

One cannot envy this man his choice. Looking at his country, he knows that an ever greater dose of suffering awaits its people. Looking at himself, he knows that not one word he pronounces is his own. I am a liar, he thinks, and makes historical determinism responsible for his lies. But sometimes he is haunted by the thought that the devil to whom men sell their souls owes his might to men themselves, and that the determinism of History is a creation of human brains.

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CHAPTER VII

Delta, the Troubadour

IN Central and Eastern Europe, the word "poet" has a 159*
somewhat different meaning from that which it has in the West. There a poet does not merely arrange words in beautiful order. Tradition demands that he be a "bard," that his songs linger on many lips, that he speak in his poems of subjects of interest to all the citizens. Every period of history has understood the poet's obligations differently. Probably Delta would have been happiest in the days when kings and nobles assured the poet a place at their table in exchange for a song or a jest. Even the dress of former ages would have suited his appearance better than the business suit of our century; and only long hair and a lute in his hand could have created a picture in keeping with his character.

Delta had dark, gypsy coloring, was freckled, not tall, and when he laughed his thick mouth was distorted by a jocular grimace. He brushed his hair back from a high forehead. His head was so disproportionately big for his short body that he looked somehow like a dwarf or jester, as one sees them in court paintings. He wore his neckties in a loose, big knot and otherwise betrayed a penchant for eccentric clothes. Often, those who resort to superficial quirks to identify themselves as members of the artistic

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159A clan are second-rate artists. But his "artiness" was part of his over-all act. With every gesture, every intonation of his voice, he played, so to speak, with the world; he accented the difference between his own rhythm and that of his environment. His rhythm was suggestive. He recited his verse magnificently in huge halls filled with people. He was a good actor; he dominated the audience, and he knew how to key his listeners up to a climax without once letting the mounting tension drop. He imposed his poems slowly, pausing between words; and though he was speaking, he sang. At such times, he was a living rhythmic incantation; he changed, he grew in stature.

No one knows his origins. He altered his biography to fit the needs of the moment. Once his father was a sexton; once, a restaurant owner. At times his family was Czech; at times it had Muscovite connections. The boundaries between fantasy and truth did not exist for him.

How he came by his knowledge of foreign languages was another mystery. It would be hard to imagine him sitting down to a dictionary and a grammar. Yet he cited copiously from Latin, English, French, and German poets. For a short while he studied at the University, where he became famous for writing an essay on a seventeenth-century English poet who never existed. After giving an extensive biography of the poet, the essay went on to a detailed analysis of the circumstances in which his individual works appeared. A charlatan, a hoaxer—this is what he wanted to be then, and always, enjoying himself mightily when his pedantic professor found himself in trouble, overwhelmed by such obvious proof of erudition.

Delta was an inveterate alcoholic, usually in cycles that lasted several days. Alcohol brought him to a state of hallucination marked by actions which rarely occur to other drunkards. In a travel bureau he would order a glass of

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beer. He would hire a hack, order it to stop at a main intersection and, after delivering a speech to an astonished crowd, he would throw off his coat and phlegmatically relieve himself on it. Or he would come to his friends complaining that he had had trouble in finding their homes because, as he said, "his people," whom he had stationed throughout the city to point him the way, had so disguised themselves that he could not recognize them. Such extravagances indicated that alcohol plunged him into the world of Hoffmann or Edgar Allan Poe. He became a legendary figure whose latest escapades were the talk of the literary cafés. 159*

Delta's poetry was an added source of legend. It was unlike anything written in Europe in the first half of the twentieth century. No literary school influenced him. He dwelt in the aura of the Italo-Latin civilization whose mark was still deeply graven on our country. The accessories he borrowed from the poetry of the past he then put together in a manner reminiscent of his drunken fantasies. His poetry was a kaleidoscope of chubby baroque angels, magicians carried off through the window by some unknown power (they are retained, at the last moment by a wifely bite on the ear), falconry, astrologists prophesying the end of the world. Interspersed in it were phonograph records playing the music of Bach or Mozart, potatoes in the soil dreaming of the vodka that would be made of them, planets in the shape of young women dressed in blue pants, and folk dances in the suburbs. His poetry was tragic and comic, senseless yet full of sense. This alogical hodgepodge of disparate elements differed from confessedly decadent types of modern poetry in one respect: despite the peculiar assemblage of images it presented, it was not unintelligible. The reader surrendered to its musical charm, swallowed portions of abstraction that annoyed 159* 538

[An unidentified poet of the 1930's and 1940's -- Analyst]

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159*him in other poets, laughed at the sudden twists of the
538 author, in short, unsuspectingly entered a realm ruled by laws unlike those of everyday life.

He published much humorous verse, signing it with a variety of pseudonyms. His inventiveness in finding subjects seemed inexhaustible. Among other things, he wrote a cycle entitled *Little Songs of the Chief of the Office of Graves*. He liked to include a fictitious list of his works in each book; I remember such a title as "An Introduction to Cannibalism—stenographed university lectures: Troilus Drug Store, Publisher, out of print." Because he was popular with the readers, he never lacked offers from publishers and the radio. His pen, which was his sole means of support, could have earned him a good living; but he constantly needed money because he immediately drank up his fees.

159* When he was sober, no one could have guessed that he was the author of poems that made the public laugh. Taciturn, gloomy, sly, he became animated only at the sight of money. In bargaining, he was inexorable. Once he named a sum, no argument could induce him to make a concession. What was worse, he demanded payment at once, which posed a terrible dilemma for his editors. They wanted his poems; but giving him money involved the risk that he would begin his drinking cycle and forget his commitments. Some editors found a solution: they would give him the money, then refuse to leave him for a single second until he handed them a manuscript. Such transactions often occurred in coffee-houses. The banknote would lie on the table between the two contracting parties. Delta, after fruitless efforts to soften his opponent, would take out his pen, write the poem (which, depending on his mood, might be excellent or mediocre), and picking up his note go off to drink.

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Sometimes he landed in a sanatorium for alcoholics. 159*
The results of the "cures" were not good. His victories in his battles against the medical profession were widely recounted. In one of the sanatoriums, story has it, his triumph was so absolute that both patients and doctors, equally drunk, held bicycle races through the corridors.

Charlatan, drunkard—and yet he was an outstanding and, despite appearances, tragic poet. He began his literary career in years of economic crisis. Unemployment, universal hopelessness, the growth of Nazism in neighboring Germany all shaped the character of his writing. He was 159*
rightly called the "king of nonsense." Yet readers who 538
were not deceived by his superficial buffoonery saw in his poetry an ominous vision of the end of civilization, of an approaching "iron age," of catastrophe. He spoke as if everything were lost years before Europe plunged into darkness and cruelty. The dread and beauty of past ages lived again in his work, but there was no hope of rest in them. The concepts and images he used had the consistency of dreams; they chased one another with the speed of a hurtling train. The Madonna who often figured in his poems was not the Madonna of the pious but merely a stylistic ornament. Fascists and Communists killed each other off in his verse with the gory ardor of actors in the Grand Guignol, while he mockingly cried: "O reality! O my sweet mother! For you killing flies is the same kind of bother!" He defined himself exactly when he said: "Braced on my Waterman/ I go off to the abyss/ of eternal doubt."

The End of the World is his title for a poem in which scholars and politicians, revolutionists, lovers and drunkards, canaries and cats are all swept away in the end by a cosmic catastrophe—to the satisfaction of the author, and the fulfillment of the "vanity of vanities" theme of *Ecclesi-*

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159r *astes.* And all this is described by a pen that is playing. In
538 another of his poems, *Folk Fair,* there are carrousels, young pairs sitting on the grass, lawns littered with empty bottles, seesaws. Suddenly the sky clouds over, rain begins to fall, and the darkened heavens—in a manner that is a secret of Delta's art—merge into a sad eclogue by Virgil punctuated by the bark of machine-guns.

His most unusual poem was *Solomon's Ball.* Why does King Solomon give a ball? Why is he living in the twentieth century? Perhaps it is not King Solomon after all, simply Solomon? Why do the unemployed enter the ballroom selling butterflies? Who keeps singing Persian songs about Gulistan, the garden of roses? Where do the hordes of policemen come from who suddenly start performing wild dances? It is pointless to pause over such questions. The special logic of the dream does exist, but only such a poet as he can use it freely. "In the room the women come and go talking of Michelangelo" was T. S. Eliot's expression for nonsense. Delta raised the conversations that took place at Solomon's ball one degree higher, into the realm of delirium and "eternal doubt."

The world as reflected in his poetry was oppressive; yet his poems—and here is one more inner contradiction of this queer man—were free of sadness and despair. On the contrary, they said a vigorous "yes" to life. With every word he praised the world as he saw it, a tangle of absurd pleasures, drives, words, and wars. He loved his phantas-
159r magory. He loved carrousels, dancing gypsies, crowded Sunday excursion boats on the Vistula, his wife to whom he addressed his odes, cats sleeping on parapets, blooming apple trees. He loved enthusiasm and joyousness for their own sake. Whatever he touched changed into a scene of movement, color, and music. Subjects were merely a pretext for him. Like a silkworm, he spun out of himself a

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fine thread which he wrapped around whatever he encountered. He could compose songs and hymns on any topic. 159*

Never displaying any political inclinations, he had always distributed his mockery evenly over all the groups that were vying for power. That is why his conversion, in 1937, to extreme nationalism was received with some amazement. The editor of an important rightist weekly had long tried to capture him, and at last he succeeded in purchasing him as the exclusive property of the periodical. The magazine on whose pages his poems now began to appear was violently anti-Semitic. Its large circulation figures resulted from the spread of nationalist convictions in our country, particularly among the youth. The liberal public could hardly believe this new phase of his shenanigans: he lauded the marching "falangists," prophesied a "night of long knives," a new St. Bartholomew's Eve for the Jews, liberals, and the left. Still, it was obviously a fact; such articles and poems did appear, signed by his name and bearing all the traits of his style.

Why did he write them? Racial questions were of supreme indifference to him. He had many Jewish friends, and the very day he published his racist statements, he would come to these friends (naturally he was drunk by then) and, falling on his knees, would declare his love for them and beg their forgiveness. The causes of his union with the right must be sought elsewhere than in his political tastes. Delta, buffoon and troubadour, did not lack professional principles. He respected his poetic trade; but his respect was not for what he wrote about. How and for whom—that was important. He scorned esoteric literary schools that catered to a small cluster of connoisseurs. He ridiculed poets whose words could be understood only by a smattering of intellectuals. Solitary meditations that had

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no hope of finding readers were not for him. Like troubadours of yore, he longed for a lute and a throng of admirers. It would be hard to find a better example of a writer revolting against the isolation of the intellectual in the twentieth century.

Delta's hostility toward the Jews had no racial roots; he confined it to Jewish writers who, in general, were particularly given to celebration of literary "values" and "refinements." It sprang from his battle against, and struggle to escape from, the literary cafés. Besides, as I have said, he was for enthusiasm. The crowd marched, the crowd brandished canes; this was health, strength, primitiveness, a great popular festival. Where my readers go, there go I; what my readers want, I give them—this is what he confirmed in every poem. As the nationalist "movement" began to take on mass proportions, he moved to keep in stride with the masses. He told with pride of the thousands of young people who knew his verses by heart. His pride was justified. The poets of the sophisticated "avant-garde," isolated as they were, took pride in their craft; but he beat them even on their own ground. Nor did they dispose over such a range of artistic media as he did. Last of all, we must consider that in order to live he needed a patron, a person who would force him to write, fight his drunkenness and, in short, control and care for him.

The War broke out. He was mobilized as a private. His unit was stationed in eastern Poland, on the borders of the Soviet Union. When the Reds moved to meet the German army, he was captured by the Russians. But along with a number of other disarmed Polish soldiers, Delta was turned over to the Germans. He spent the next five and a half years in a POW camp in the Reich. As a prisoner he was used for various types of work, chiefly agricultural. His qualifications for physical labor were slight. It is hard

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even to imagine a man less prepared for a mode of life in 159*
which the most important and almost unsolvable problem was how to fill one's stomach. Still, he survived, this strange court dwarf in tatters, wielding a shovel as he recited Horace. Undoubtedly, his fluent knowledge of German came to his assistance.

Meanwhile, terror ruled in Warsaw. Those who only 000
a short while before had used the Germans as a model now became hunted prey. The rightist editor who had been Delta's patron became one of the most active workers in the Underground. He was a fanatical patriot. I still remember him as I saw him for the last time, in the coffeehouse that was the base of his underground group and of the publication he issued. His thin Jewish face (like many anti-Semites in our country, he was half-Jewish) was undermined with fury, fever burned in his eyes, his tight lips urged immediate action. Shortly thereafter, the Gestapo came upon the trail of his organization. The entire personnel of the café, made up of his closest co-workers, was arrested; the editor himself spent a long time in prison in Warsaw before a heavily guarded van carried him away for his last ride. He was shot in the woods near Warsaw: sand, pines, words of command. Still, his was a kindly form of death. He would have fared worse had he shared the lot of the three million Jews of Poland among which he, as a half-Jew, could have been counted. In that case, he would have found himself in the ghetto that was created in Warsaw in 1940 by order of the occupying authorities. From there, he would certainly have been sent, like the others, to the gas chamber.

The nationalist "movement," marching columns, the excited crowd! The crushing defeat of 1939 frustrated all this, leaving only the bitter memory of human insanity. The Nazis carried the anti-Semitic program into practice.

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but no longer as a boycott of Jewish stores or an annoyance of Jewish vendors, nor even as literary bouts like Delta's. To write of the tragedy of the Warsaw ghetto, to which I was an eyewitness, is hard for me. The vision of the burning ghetto is too welded into all I lived through in my adult years for me to speak of it quietly. But I should like to describe one incident. Often, as I am sitting on the terrace of a Paris café or walking through the streets of a large city, I succumb to a certain obsession. I look at the women who pass, at their luxuriant hair, their proudly lifted chins, their slender throats whose lines awaken delight and desire—and then I see before my eyes always the same young Jewish girl. She was probably about twenty years old. Her body was full, splendid, exultant. She was running down the street, her hands raised, her chest thrust forward. She cried piercingly, "No! No! No!" The necessity to die was beyond her comprehension—a necessity that came from outside, having nothing in common with her unprepared body. The bullets of the SS guards' automatic pistols reached her in her cry.

The moment when bullets pierce the flesh is a moment of amazement for the body. Life and death mingle for a second, before a bloody rag falls to the pavement and is kicked aside by an SS boot. This girl was not the first nor the last of the millions who were killed in the period when the life-force within them was at its height. But the obstinacy with which this image returns—and always when I am drunk with the beauty of being alive amidst living human beings—merits some reflection. This is perhaps a matter that belongs to the same sphere as do the collective sex orgies of some primitive tribes. At such times, this or another object of desire are the same, all women and men are fused by a great feeling of communion through which everyone belongs to all. Monogamy

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can give no outlet to such urges. In other words, this is a 000
profound basis for love of mankind, a love one cannot really conceive of if, looking at a group of laughing women, one does not recall this young Jewish girl as *one of them,* as identical and ever present. One of the best 159*
poems Delta wrote about his stay in Germany was on the death of a young Venetian girl, arrested and deported to the Reich. This was an erotic poem; the Venetian girl appeared in it not as an individual but as the beauty of youth, as the charm of breasts, arms, hands, thighs destroyed by death.

In 1945 he and his fellow prisoners welcomed the arrival of the British troops. Since they were accompanied by units of the London Polish army, he entered upon a round of encounters, drinking, and song. Having dried up those springs of money and alcohol, he set out for France. Once again, as in 1939, this was an era of universal wandering. All of Europe was on the road; millions of forced laborers, prisoners, and slaves were returning to their homes; other millions were fleeing or being expelled from their native lands. Delta met large numbers of Poles everywhere. He wrote patriotic and anti-Russian poems that harmonized perfectly with the mood of his audience. He squeezed money out of every variety of émigré committee. His pre-war admirers, rejoicing that he had survived, did everything they could for him.

Gradually, however, his life in Paris and Brussels lost its charm. The possibilities of publishing were small; the public was dispersed over various countries; and there was ever less money. He felt he was becoming an ordinary impoverished exile whose buffoonery, personal and poetic, passed unnoticed. Gloomy, bitter emigration, a void, and a taste of disaster. Where was the mass of people which could give him back warmth and friendship? It

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159 was in his native land. There, too, was his wife, who had lived through the German occupation working as a waitress in Warsaw restaurants. Publications that came from Poland persuaded him that the trend was liberal. The envoys of the Warsaw government assured him that he would be received warmly and that his pre-war rightist sins would be forgotten.

His return to Poland was accomplished with every prescribed scandal. From the moment he left the boat, he was in a state of alcoholic and patriotic euphoria. He sent telegrams to his wife from every railroad station. When at last he showed up in Cracow (where his wife had gone after the fall of Warsaw), in the company of a girl friend he had brought from Brussels, his wife immediately instituted sharp repressive measures and threw out the girl. His wife came of a Georgian émigré family. She was small, thin, and black-haired; she had oriental features, a slightly humped prominent nose, and fiery black eyes. She liked to wear silver bracelets on her fine wrists. In all, she looked like a Caucasian madonna. Though she was passive and female, she had a good head for business and a gift for keeping her husband in hand.

Delta's return was convenient for those who directed literature and propaganda. He was a popular poet. That he was known as a rightist only enhanced his value. He was a considerably greater asset to the new regime than many overly zealous leftists.

He had always needed a patron; now he found one who was really munificent, the state. His became a truly golden pen; its every motion—he wrote in big, decorative letters on long scrolls of paper—brought him larger fees than he had ever earned before. Moreover, his verbal enthusiasm, without which he could not live, now rested on a solid foundation. There were no longer "falangists" nor

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crowds excited against racial minorities; but there was the rebuilding of the country and the placating of national honor through the acquisition of territories in the West which originally belonged to Germany. His poems were always sunny no matter what he wrote about. That was good. Now he filled them with optimistic subject matter, with pictures of reconstruction and of the happy future; and that was even better. Since he had no trouble in finding remunerative outlets, he went wild. Odes, satiric verse, humorous prose, dialogues flowed from his workshop in an unbroken torrent. One magazine gave him a whole column in which, every week, he lodged his "theatrical pieces." These were short, little scenes from what he called the "smallest theater in the world," the *Green Goose*. In no other language have I read such pure absurdity. The heroes of the *Green Goose* were people, animals, and objects. The readers who attended these weekly performances of his cabaret were a little ashamed of their liking for these oddities, but they pounced on every issue of the magazine.

His activity was the subject of much controversy. Those who wanted to be considered "sure" and those who took their Marxism seriously were indignant. How could one, they asked, permit this clown to run riot as if he were in a Parisian existentialist café? He was a petty bourgeois who had gone mad. Why print his poems on the front pages of leading magazines; why allow him to have a career? Everybody remembered his anti-Semitic days, when he threatened his colleagues with a "night of long knives"! Now, no one was so well off as he. Wasn't this disgraceful?

Experienced members of the Party quieted the outraged puritans, smiling indulgently at their naïveness. Delta was needed and useful *at that stage*. He had many fol-

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159A lowers; everything he wrote helped create an atmosphere of patriotism. It was politic to show that even rightists and Catholics had joined forces with the government. The reading public was not as yet ready for serious, sensible literature. At the moment, Delta's farces best suited its taste. All this was a game, for a time; and then—off with his head.

When Poland was at last obliged to pass from restrained worship of Russia to outright idolatry, he let no one outdo him. He wrote of the heroism of Soviet soldiers, of the gratitude every Pole should feel toward Russia, of Lenin, of Komsomol youth. He adhered to the Communist line in every respect. As an eminent author, he received a Soviet visa and spent some time in Moscow, sending back enthusiastic reports in prose and verse. In one he announced that the magnificence of Moscow was marred by but a single flaw: it was too much like Taormina; people ate just as many oranges there, and he didn't like oranges.

His correspondence from Moscow drove the puritans crazy. They knew that Moscow was a gloomy and rather forbidding city. His raptures bore all the traits of derision. They seemed to say: "You want me to sing praises; very well, I'll sing praises till they come out of your ears." Still, it was not easy to guess his real intentions. It was impossible to tell whether he was lying or telling the truth. Normal criteria did not apply to him. He moved in a different dimension. Like a prestidigitator, he always pulled the proper number of rabbits out of his hat, and all of them rabbits of the required color. He invariably transformed everything into *opéra bouffe*. Because he constantly used exaggeration as his artistic tool, his opponents could prove nothing against him. He neither mocked nor spoke the truth; he performed tricks, he practiced art for art's sake.

He was never "serious." And as we know, this is the

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basic requirement of socialist realism. After the writers' 159*
congresses at which socialist realism was proclaimed the sole creative method allowed, the partisans of gravity began their action against him, sure now that they could take their revenge. Analyzing his poetry, they proved that the world for him was nothing but a toy to play with. Once, before the war, he had written *An Elegy on the Death of a Butterfly Run Over by a Freight Van*. Despite its long title, the elegy consisted of four lines which concluded that the thoughtless butterfly richly deserved its fate. Now he found himself under the wheels of the van. The period of austerity and precision was beginning. He could write on every subject, from the Madonna to Lenin and Moscow, just so long as his master demanded his services. Yet his poems never lacked spontaneity. They were always exuberant; but we must add that in them the Madonna as well as Lenin and Moscow became something unreal, a kind of theater in the clouds. Now, however, "the struggle against the spontaneity of the creative process" had become the slogan, which meant that it was no longer enough to write on prescribed subjects; one had to write in a prescribed manner.

Delta wanted to serve his lord. In order to exist as a poet he needed a genial, amused *seigneur* who believed that neither his government nor anything in heaven or on earth deserves to be taken too seriously, that song—half serious, half scoffing—matters more. But such princes have long since ceased to be. The lord who held him in thrall tolerated him for a while not because his songs were pleasing, for song is merely a means to an end. It was when his songs no longer served the desired end that his master knit his brows in anger. Publishers were instructed to print only those of his poems in which he demonstrated that he had reformed. The puritans rubbed their hands

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159* in glee. At last they had wrung his neck. They knew that no matter how he tried he could not reform. Deprived of their former exuberance, his poems no longer differed from verse ground out by second-rate rhymesters.

Thus he entered the realm of living shadows. Nothing should be wasted, however, in a socialist economy. Men who have fulfilled their role can find work enough for their capacities. Delta's existence was assured; a state publishing house commissioned him to do a translation of *A Midsummer Night's Dream.*

Some two years after his fall from grace he has been given another chance. At this writing, all his past sins are being discussed openly in the leading literary weekly. This is a sort of trial, with a favorable verdict prepared in advance. Delta will return to favor once more; but once more, it will be only for a time.

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CHAPTER VIII

Man, This Enemy

WHOEVER reads the public statements of the four writers discussed in the previous chapters might say that they sold themselves. The truth is, however, more involved. These men are, more or less consciously, victims of a historic situation. Consciousness does not help them to shed their bonds; on the contrary, it forges them. At the very best, it can offer them the delights of Ketman as a consolation. Never before has there been such enslavement through consciousness as in the twentieth century. Even my generation was still taught in school that reason frees men.

In the people's democracies, a battle is being waged for mastery over the human spirit. Man must be made to understand, for then he will accept. Who are the enemies of the new system? The people who do not understand. They fail to understand because their minds work feebly or else badly.

In every capital of Central and Eastern Europe the windows in the Central Committee buildings are illuminated late into the night. Behind their desks sit men well-versed in the writings of Lenin and Stalin. Not the least of their tasks is to define the position of the enemy. As the situation changes, this military staff pins another little flag on

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000 the battle map. Data from each country then aid the supreme command in Moscow to establish an over-all strategy.

Different groups of people are the main object of study.* The least important is the propertied class which was dispossessed by the nationalization of factories and mines and by the agricultural reform. Their number is insignificant; their way of thinking amusingly old-fashioned. They are no problem. In time they will die off—if need be, with a little help.

The petty bourgeoisie, that is the small merchants and craftsmen, cannot be taken so lightly. They constitute a powerful force, one that is deeply rooted in the masses. Hardly is one clandestine workshop or store liquidated in one neighborhood or city than another springs up elsewhere. Restaurants hide behind a sliding wall of a private house; shoemakers and tailors work at home for their friends. In fact, everything that comes under the heading of speculation sprouts up again and again. And no won-
[444] der! State and municipal stores consistently lack even the
565 barest essentials. In the summer, one can buy winter
432 clothes; in the winter, summer wear—but usually of the wrong size and of poor quality. The purchase of a spool of thread or a needle is a major problem, for the one state store in the town may not carry them for a year. Clothes that are given to be mended are held by the local crafts' cooperative for six months. The inns ("Points of Collective Nourishment") are so crowded that people lose the desire to drink with their friends. They know they will have to sit down at a table with strangers and wait, sometimes as long as an hour, before the waiter appears.

All this creates a field for private services. A worker's wife goes to a nearby town, buys needles and thread, brings them back and sells them: the germ of capitalism.

* [By men in the capitals of Central & East Europe --Analyst]

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The worker himself of a free afternoon mends a broken bathroom pipe for a friend who has waited months for the state to send him a repair man. In return, he gets a little money, enough to buy himself a shirt: a rebirth of capitalism. He hasn't time to wait in line on the day that the state store receives a new shipment of goods, so he buys his shirt from a friend. She has cleverly managed to buy three, let us say, through her friendship with the salesgirl and now she resells them at a small profit. She is speculating. What she earns as a cleaning-woman in a state factory is not enough to support her three children since her husband was arrested by the security police. If these manifestations of human enterprise were not wiped out it is easy to guess what they would lead to. A worker would set up a plumbing repairs shop. His neighbor, who secretly sells alcohol to people who want to drink in relative privacy, would open a café. The cleaning-woman would become a merchant, peddling her goods. They would gradually expand their businesses, and the lower middle class would reappear. Introduce freedom of the press and of assembly, and publications catering to this clientele would spring up like mushrooms after the rain. And there would be the petty bourgeoisie as a political force.

What is worse, this matter involves the peasant problem. Peasants, who make up the majority of the population of the country, have a middle-class mentality. They are more deeply attached to their few little hectares of field than the storekeepers are to their little shops. As late as the nineteenth century they were still living in bondage. They oppose collectivization because they see it as a return to a state their fathers found unbearable. To leap out of bed at the signal of an official on a collective farm is just as hateful as to do so at the sound of a gong rung by the overseer of an estate. The peasants' blind hatred worries the

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565 Party. Its more sensitive members secretly bow to the necessity of making concessions. They believe that collectivization should be preceded by cooperative use of machinery on private fields, and that it can come only after a long introductory phase of education, extending possibly over decades. This temporizing spirit breeds trouble; that is why the whispered slogans of the "national Communists" are always so popular. But the Center exacts a certain tempo. The structure of every dependent country must be brought to resemble that of Russia as quickly as possible.

This problem, in turn, affects the cities. Peasants are divided into three categories—"poor," "middle," and "kulak"—in an effort to break their solidarity by engendering mutual antagonisms. A peasant's wealth is rated not only by the amount of land he holds, but by how many horses, cows, and pigs he owns, how he lives, eats, and dresses. Lest he fall into an uncomfortable classification, he drops farming and flees to the city; or else he keeps only a minimum amount of livestock and pretends to be poor. As a result, the city suffers from a lack of provisions.

But the peasants are not dangerous. They may beat up a Party boss or even kill him in a burst of desperation, but nothing more. When the state is the sole buyer of their produce, and when they cannot voice their protest at the amount of tribute the state demands of them, they are powerless. The security police can easily handle recalcitrants, especially since it can complain of no lack of informers, now that informing has become an excellent means of saving oneself. The peasants are a leaderless mass. History shows few instances when they seriously threatened the rulers. The term "peasant revolt" sounds nice in textbooks and has a certain propaganda value, but only for the naïve. In reality, the peasants have almost al-

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ways served as a tool; their leaders, most often of non- 565
peasant origin have used them for their own ends. The power of the peasants lies in their number; it is a power only when a man like Lenin comes along and throws the weight of their numbers into the scale of events. Obviously, peasants can cause trouble in such moments of upheaval as wars. As long as a private peasant economy exists it acts as a natural base for partisan operations. A peasant hut is the ideal place for partisans to eat, sleep, and work out plans of action. Therefore, a collective farm, where a man's every step is easy to trace, guarantees a degree of control that is indispensable if one wants to preclude hostile underground activity.

Workers are far more important than peasants. Most 565
of them are antagonistic to the new system. That is under- 626
standable. They resent the norms they must fill. Those norms are constantly rising. Though the "solidarity of the workers" makes a fine slogan, it does not mean that the solidarity of the crews in a factory is to be tolerated. Their ranks are split by the institution of "shock-workers" which is fostered by an appeal to ambition and enforced by pressure from members of the Party cell. A man may at first refuse to become a shock-worker. But gradually he learns it does not pay to be stubborn; because when workers are being chosen for a course in bookkeeping, for instance, his application is rejected, or when his turn comes for a free vacation he is declared ineligible, etc.

The attitude of the workers toward the regime is ambiv- 464
alent. On the one hand, they prize its positive contribu- 565
tions. Unemployment is a thing of the past; in fact, there is a constant lack of skilled labor. Not only the head of a family but most of its members are employed. This accumulation of wages means that a family would be able to live better than ever before if only the stores were fairly

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464 well stocked; but given the shortage of food and consumer
565 goods, this is rarely, if ever, the case. For workers' children, social advancement is easy because the Party must recruit the cadres of the new intelligentsia from their ranks. The worker can educate himself by attending countless evening courses. If he stands in good favor with the Party he can enjoy a vacation in a rest home, all expenses
[466] paid. On the other hand, he cannot defend himself against exploitation by his employer, the state. His trade union representatives are Party tools. They team together with the factory managers for one purpose: to raise production. Workers are told that a strike is a crime. Against whom are they to strike? Against themselves? After all, the means of production belong to them, the state belongs to them. But such an explanation is not very convincing. The workers, who dare not state aloud what they want, know that the goals of the state are far from identical with their own.

565 Central and Eastern Europe produce in order to raise
433 the military and economic potential of the Center[1] and to
475 compensate for the industrial backwardness of Russia. Workers and their needs have no influence on production plans. Most of the goods produced ebb away to the East. Besides, every product of a worker's hands is the object of innumerable bookkeeping operations. A whole staff of functionaries sits in every factory, counting, writing reports, compiling statistics; the same thing happens on every rung of the state hierarchy, right through to the state wholesale houses and retail stores. If, at last, the article reaches the consumer, it is very expensive; into its cost are counted the salaries of the swarms of bureaucrats
565 through whose hands it must pass. Factory machines are
466 over-aged; there is a scarcity of essential spare parts. So workers are ordered to replace broken parts by whatever

[1] [Moscow — Analyst]

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homemade means they can devise. Production comes first, 565
even at the price of using up the machines. Discipline is 466
severe; negligence or even a few minutes' lateness are strictly punished. No wonder, then, that the bad side of the system outweighs the good in the worker's mind. Still, he dares not complain. If he betrays any signs of discontent the security police, whose secret agents are his co-workers and sometimes his friends, takes care of him.

The wildcat strikes that break out from time to time 565
are no threat in themselves, for peace returns quickly 468
after mass arrests of all participants. They are, however, ominous signs that discontentment has reached a tension that can find release only in desperate acts. A strike requires a certain minimum of organization. That is why nothing else makes Party dialecticians so uneasy. The workers are the only class capable of organized action—that Marxist principle has never been forgotten. No action, however, is possible without leaders. If the leaders reason correctly, that is, if they understand the necessities of the historic process, then the workers as a mass will be unable to protest.

Everything, thus, takes us back to the question of mas- 626
tery over the mind. Every possible opportunity for educa- 555
tion and advancement is offered to the more energetic and active individuals among the workers. The new, incredibly extensive bureaucracy is recruited from among the young people of working-class origin. The road before them is open, open but guarded: their thinking must be based on the firm principles of dialectical materialism. Schools, theaters, films, painting, literature, and the press all shape their thinking.

We should also call attention to a new institution, the 575
"club," whose significance is comparable to that of the 626
chapel in the middle ages. It exists in every factory, ev-

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575 ery school, every office. On its walls hang portraits of
626 Party leaders draped with red bunting. Every few days, meetings following pre-arranged agendas take place, meetings that are as potent as religious rites. The Catholic Church wisely recognized that faith is more a matter of collective suggestion than of individual conviction. Collective religious ceremonies induce a state of belief. Folding one's hands in prayer, kneeling, singing hymns *precede* faith, for faith is a psycho-physical and not simply a psychological phenomenon. Edward Gibbon, describing the effects of Theodosius's decrees forbidding pagan rites (*The Decline and Fall of the Roman Empire*, Chapter XXVIII), says: "The devotion of the poet, or the philosopher, may be secretly nourished by prayer, meditation, and study; but the exercise of public worship appears to be the only solid foundation of the religious sentiments of the people, which derive their force from imitation and habit. The interruption of that public exercise may consummate, in the period of a few years, the important work of a national revolution. The memory of theological opinions cannot long be preserved, without the artificial helps of priests, of temples, and of books. The ignorant vulgar, whose minds are still agitated by the blind hopes and terrors of superstition, will be soon persuaded by their superiors to direct their vows to the reigning deities of the age; and will insensibly imbibe an ardent zeal for the support and propagation of the new doctrine, which spiritual hunger at first compelled them to accept." The Party has learned this wise lesson from the Church. People who attend a "club" submit to a collective rhythm, and so come to feel that it is absurd to think differently from the collective. The collective is composed of units that doubt; but as these individuals pronounce the ritual phrases and sing the ritual songs, they create a collective aura to which they

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in turn surrender. Despite its apparent appeal to reason, 515
the "club's" activity comes under the heading of collec- 626
tive magic. The rationalism of the doctrine is fused with sorcery, and the two strengthen each other. Free discussion is, of course, eliminated. If what the doctrine proclaims is as true as the fact that 2 × 2 equals 4, to tolerate the opinion that 2 × 2 equals 5 would be indecent.

From his first day in school, the young citizen receives 626
an education based on this truth. There is a great differ- 816
ence between schools in the people's democracies and schools in the West, for example the schools I attended in pre-war Poland. My friends and I were exposed to a dual 829
system of values. Mathematics, physics, and biology taught us scientific laws, and inculcated respect for a materialistic outlook inherited from the nineteenth century. History and Letters seemed to elude scientific laws, while the history of the Catholic Church and Apologetics cast doubt, though often naïvely, on what physics and biology taught. In the people's democracies, the materialistic outlook of the nineteenth century has been extended consistently to every subject; history and every branch of human creativity are presented as governed by unshakeable and *already known* laws.

In the nineteenth century, with the rise of literacy, brochures popularizing scientific theories made their appearance. Regardless of the intrinsic worth of these theories, we must grant that from the moment they take on a popular form they become something other than what they were as hypotheses of scientific research. For example, the simplified and vulgarized version of Darwin's theory of the origin of species and the struggle for existence is not the same concept that it was for Darwin or for his scholarly opponents. It takes on emotional coloration, and changes into an important sociological element.

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829 The leaders of the twentieth century, like Hitler for instance, drew their knowledge from popular brochures, which explains the incredible confusion in their minds. Evidently, there is no place in such digests for the humble remarks of true scientists who assure us that the laws discovered are hypothetical and relative to the method chosen and the system of symbols used. Vulgarized knowledge characteristically gives birth to a feeling that *everything* is understandable and explained. It is like a system of bridges built over chasms. One can travel boldly ahead over these bridges, ignoring the chasms. It is forbidden to look down into them; but that, alas, does not alter the fact that they exist.

Once the science of nature taught that a forest was a collective of trees governed by a few elementary laws. It seemed that if one cut out the forest and replanted it, after a definite period of years a new forest, exactly like the old, would appear. Today we know this is not so; a forest is an organism arising out of complicated interactions of mosses, soil, fungi, trees, and grasses. The moment these mosses and fungi are destroyed by the cutting out of the forest, the symbiotic pattern is disturbed and the new forest is a completely different organism from what might be expected by someone who ignored the sociology of plants. Stalinists have no knowledge of the conditions human plants need in order to thrive. Forbidding any research in this direction because such study contradicts orthodoxy, they bar mankind from the possibility of acquiring fuller knowledge of itself.

Dialectical materialism, Russian-style, is nothing more than nineteenth-century science vulgarized to the second power. Its emotional and didactic components are so strong that they change all proportions. Although the Method was scientific at its origins, when it is applied to

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humanistic disciplines it often transforms them into edifying stories adapted to the needs of the moment. But there is no escape once a man enters upon these convenient bridges. Centuries of human history, with their thousands upon thousands of intricate affairs, are reduced to a few, most generalized terms. Undoubtedly, one comes closer to the truth when one sees history as the expression of the class struggle rather than a series of private quarrels among kings and nobles. But precisely because such an analysis of history comes closer to the truth, it is more dangerous. It gives the illusion of *full knowledge;* it supplies answers to all questions, answers which merely run around in a circle repeating a few formulas. What's more, the humanities get connected with the natural sciences thanks to the materialistic outlook (as, for example, in theories of "eternal matter"), and so we see the circle closing perfectly and logically. Then, Stalin becomes the crowning point of the evolution of life on our planet.

The son of a worker, subjected to such an education, cannot think otherwise than as the school demands. Two times two equals four. The press, literature, painting, films, and theater all illustrate what he learns, just as the lives of saints and martyrs serve as illustrations of theology. It would be wrong to assert that a dual set of values no longer exists. The resistance against the new set of values is, however, emotional. It survives, but it is beaten whenever it has to explain itself in rational terms. A man's subconscious or not-quite-conscious life is richer than his vocabulary. His opposition to this new philosophy of life is much like a toothache. Not only can he not express the pain in words, but he cannot even tell you which tooth is aching.

Thanks to excellent means of vulgarization, unprepared people (i.e., those whose minds work feebly) are taught to

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829 reason. Their training convinces them that what is happening in the people's democracies is necessary, even if temporarily bad. The greater the number of people who "participate in culture"—i.e. pass through the schools, read books and magazines, attend theaters and exhibitions—the further the doctrine reaches and the smaller grows the threat to the rule of philosophers.

But some people, even with sufficient education, reason "badly." They are impervious to the influence of Hegelian philosophy. A chicken cannot be taught to swim; just so, those who belong to the social groups condemned to disappear cannot be convinced of the truth of dialectics. According to the Party, if these people were clearly aware of their situation, they would have to confess that there is no hope for them. Therefore they look for mental subterfuges. Those people are enemies. They must be ejected to the margins of society not because of what they do, but because of what they *are*. Despite the fact that their intentions may be subjectively good, their guilt has an *objective* character.

Dialecticians have to know the enemy's mentality. Studying the reactionary as a social type, they establish certain features by which he can be recognized. The reactionary, they argue, even though he be an educated man, is incapable of grasping the concept of the interdependence of phenomena. Therefore his political imagination is limited. A man who has been trained sociologically can deduce a whole line of reasoning as to the causes and consequences of every phenomenon. Like a paleontologist, he can divine a whole formation from a single fossil. Show him the verse of a poet from any country, a picture, even an item of clothing and he immediately fits it into a historical context. His line of reasoning may be false; nonetheless he sees everything within the sphere of a given

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civilization as a symptom, not an accident. The reactionary, incapable of this type of thinking, sees the world as a series of unrelated, parallel occurrences. 829

Thus, Nazism was for the reactionary merely the result of the activity of Hitler and his clique; revolutionary movements are the effects of Moscow's machinations, etc. All the changes occurring in the people's democracies seem to him to resolve themselves into a question of superior force; if some miraculous accident were to remove this force, everything would return to "normal." He is like a man whose garden has been inundated by a raging river, and who expects to find his old flower beds intact after the waters subside. But a flooding river does not merely *exist;* it tears up and carries away whole banks of soil, fells trees, piles up layers of mud, overturns stones, until the garden of old becomes nothing more than a given number of square meters of unrecognizable land. The reactionary cannot grasp movement. His very language is static; his concepts, unchangeable, never renewed by observation. Laurel and Hardy once made a film in which Laurel, an American soldier in the First World War, is ordered to remain in the trench at his machine-gun post when the company moves to attack. Immediately thereafter the Armistice is signed, and in the resultant confusion he is forgotten. They find him twenty years later, his trench surrounded by a mountain of empty cans. He is still at his post, shooting at every commercial airplane that flies by. The reactionary, like Laurel, knows he must shoot, and he cannot realize that the plane is no longer what it was when he got his orders.

No matter how many books the reactionary reads about the dialectical method, he cannot understand its essence. Some little spring is missing in his mind. As a result he cannot properly evaluate human psychology. Dialecticians

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829 work on the premise that a man's mental and emotional life is in constant motion, that it is senseless to treat individuals as if they retained a certain stable, innate character in all circumstances. They know that by changing living conditions they change people's beliefs and reflexes. The reactionary is amazed by the changes people undergo. He awkwardly explains his friends' gradual conversion to the system as "opportunism," "cowardice," "treachery." Without such labels he feels lost. Reasoning on the principle of "either—or," he tries to divide the people about him into "Communists" and "non-Communists"; but such a differentiation loses all meaning in a people's democracy. Where dialectics shapes life whoever tries to resort to old-world logic must feel completely out of his depth.

Such misfortune always befalls the reactionary. The content suddenly flees from his concepts, and all he has left are empty words and phrases. His friends, who only a year ago used these words and phrases fondly, have rejected them as too general, too ill-defined, too remote from reality. He despairingly repeats "honor," "fatherland," "nation," "freedom," without comprehending that for people living in a changed (and daily changing) situation these abstractions take on a concrete and totally different meaning than before.

Because they so define a reactionary, dialecticians consider him a mentally inferior, and therefore not very dangerous, creature. He is no match for them. Once the propertied class is liquidated, the old intelligentsia (which was reactionary in these terms) can be brought to heel with no great difficulty. Its more vigorous representatives cross over to new ideological positions, while the rest lag further and further behind the transformations occurring all about them and so sink ever lower both socially and mentally.

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The new and the old intelligentsia no longer speak a common language. Reactionary tendencies exist in the peasants and the former petty bourgeoisie, but they are unexpressed. The masses are being educated by their new living conditions, and though they are discontented, with every month the mental distance between them and the program of the reactionaries increases. Émigré politicians help greatly to facilitate the work of the government. Ninety per cent of them are, according to the above definition, reactionaries. Their appeals and radio talks resemble poor Laurel's barrages at the airplanes. Their listeners are not displeased to hear them abuse a government they, too, dislike; still they cannot treat their formulations seriously. The discrepancy between these politicians' favorite words and the real situation is too clear; the superiority of the dialecticians, whose reasoning is always adapted to actuality, is too obvious. The reactionaries always lose by such comparison; the people's instinctive judgment is tinged with something like embarrassment, with shame that those who oppose dictatorship are not mentally up to its stature. Because man instinctively senses weakness, the people become ever more reluctant to side with the reactionaries. Thus, the feeling of fatalism grows stronger.

Rule over the minds of the masses, therefore, is not seriously threatened. Wherever it appears, intellectual energy can find only one outlet. It is a different matter, however, when one considers the emotional life of the masses and the terrible hatred that dominates it. This hatred cannot be explained on purely economic grounds. The Party senses that in this realm, which Marxism has studied least, surprises and real threats lie hidden.

Above all, there exists the question of religion. This problem still persists despite the many weak points in

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Christianity that can be attacked successfully. Not without reason did the Catholic Church defend the feudal structure against nascent capitalism during the Reformation. Capitalism created scientific thinking and dealt a powerful blow to religion in Europe by removing the best minds from the confines of theology. Modern society reveals how swiftly ideas that were at first the property of the intellectual few can spread; to discover along what lines society will develop, it is sometimes useful to trace the trend in the thinking of a small number of clear-sighted sensitive people. What is on the surface at a given moment, e.g. a literary style, gives way to new elements, though it may survive for a long time on a second or third level. (Revivals are, of course, possible.) This is what happened to theology in Europe. The Church lost its top-level position when, during the industrial upheavals, it lost the intellectuals and failed to win the new class of workers. And these are the two groups to which the Party attaches most importance. Today, the intellectual life of Christianity grows on the outer fringes of the Church, in little circles that are trying to adapt Christian philosophy to the new needs of the century.

Still, religious needs exist in the masses and it would be a mistake, from the Party's point of view, to deny them. Perhaps they will disappear once the entire population has been transformed into workers; but no one knows when that will happen. We are dealing here with imponderable elements. Mysterious, indeed, is the instinct which makes man revolt against a reasonable explanation of all phenomena. Christianity's armor is so thin in the twentieth century, a child in school is so deeply immersed in the new way of thinking, and yet the zone of shadow eludes the light of reason. We suddenly stumble upon puzzles. Professor Pavlov, who originated the theory of conditioned

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reflexes, was a deeply religious man. Moscow caused him 779
no trouble over this because he was an eminent scientist and because he was old. The creator of the theory of conditioned reflexes—the very theory that constitutes one of the strongest arguments against the existence of some sort of constant called "human nature"! The defenders of religion maintain that this "human nature" cannot change completely; that gods and churches have existed over thousands of years and in all kinds of civilizations, and that one can expect this to be true of the future as well. What went on in Professor Pavlov's head if two systems of concepts, one scientific and one religious, existed simultaneously there?

The Party teaches that "existence shapes consciousness," 659
that circumstances alter men. But it matters little whether religious drives result from "human nature" or from centuries of conditioning; they exist. During the war against Hitler, the Soviet Union had to dust off its priests as well as appeal to nationalistic feelings. When imminent death brings that moment of absurd revelation that *everything is senseless,* dialectical materialism suddenly discloses its mathematical structure. Man falls from the industriously built bridges. He prefers to surrender to the magic of icons.

In its own fashion, the Party too is a church. Its dictator- 626
ship over the earth and its transformation of the human 779
species depend on the success with which it can channel 659
irrational human drives and use them to its own ends. No, logical arguments are not enough. "Club" ceremonies, poetry, novels, films are so important because they reach deeper into the stratum on which the emotional conflict rages. No other church can be tolerated; Christianity is 779
Public Enemy No. 1. It fosters all the skepticism of the 829
masses as to the radical transformation of mankind. If,

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as the Gospel teaches, we must not do harm unto others, then perhaps we must not harm kulaks? If the highest glory does not belong to man, then perhaps worship of Lenin and Stalin is idolatry?

I have known many Christians—Poles, Frenchmen, Spaniards—who were strict Stalinists in the field of politics but who retained certain inner reservations, believing God would make corrections once the bloody sentences of the all-mighties of History were carried out. They pushed their reasoning rather far. They argue that history develops according to immutable laws that exist by the will of God; one of these laws is the class struggle; the twentieth century marks the victory of the proletariat, which is led in its struggle by the Communist Party; Stalin, the leader of the Communist Party, fulfills the law of history, or in other words acts by the will of God; therefore one must obey him. Mankind can be renewed only on the Russian pattern; that is why no Christian can oppose the one—cruel, it is true—idea which will create a new kind of man over the entire planet. Such reasoning is often used by clerics who are Party tools. "Christ is a new man. The new man is the Soviet man. Therefore Christ is a Soviet man!" said Justinian Marina, the Rumanian patriarch.

In reality, such Christians (even omitting men like Marina) perpetuate one of the greatest lies of all centuries. They renounce their faith but are ashamed to admit it. The contradiction between Christianity and Stalinist philosophy cannot be overcome. Christianity is based on a concept of *individual* merit and guilt; the New Faith, on *historical* merit and guilt. The Christian who rejects individual merit and guilt denies the work of Jesus, and the God he calls upon slowly transforms himself into History. If he admits that only individual merit and guilt

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exist, how can he gaze indifferently at the suffering of 779
people whose only sin was that they blocked the path of 829
"historical processes"? To lull his conscience he resorts to the thesis that a reactionary cannot be a good man.

Who is the reactionary? Everyone who opposes the in- 626
evitable historical processes, i.e. the Politburo police. The thesis of the "sin of the reactionary" is argued very cleverly: every perception is "oriented," i.e. at the very moment of perceiving we introduce our ideas into the material of our observations; only he sees reality truly who evaluates it in terms of the interests of the class that is the lever of the future, i.e. the proletariat. The writings of Lenin and Stalin teach us what the interests of the proletariat are. Whoever sees reality otherwise than as the proletariat sees it falsely; in other words, his picture of reality is deformed by the pressure of the interests of classes that are backward and so destined to disappear. Whoever sees the world falsely necessarily acts badly; whoever acts badly is a bad man; therefore the reactionary is a bad man, and one should not feel sorry for him.

This line of reasoning has at least one flaw—it ignores the facts. The pressure of an all-powerful totalitarian state creates an emotional tension in its citizens that determines their acts. When people are divided into "loyalists" and "criminals" a premium is placed on every type of conformist, coward, and hireling; whereas among the "criminals" one finds a singularly high percentage of people who are direct, sincere, and true to themselves. From the social point of view these persons would constitute the best guarantee that the future development of the social organism would be toward good. From the Christian point of view they have no other sin on their conscience save their contempt for Caesar, or their incorrect evaluation of his might.

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000 The assertion that historical guilt is individual guilt *per se* is nothing more than the subterfuge of a guilty and lying conscience. This does not mean that one can put off the problem of historical guilt with easy generalizations. Stupidity, i.e. inability to understand the mechanism of events, can cause tremendous suffering. In this sense, the Polish commanders who gave the order to start the Warsaw uprising in 1944 are guilty of stupidity, and their guilt has an individual character. Another individual guilt, however, weighs upon the command of the Red Army which refused to aid the insurgents—not out of stupidity, but on the contrary out of a full understanding of "historical processes," i.e. a correct evaluation of power.

One more example of guilt through stupidity is the attitude of various societies toward thinkers, writers, or artists whose vision reached into the future and whose works were largely incomprehensible to their contemporaries. The critic who denied the value of these works might have acted in good faith, but by his stupidity he condemned men of incomparably greater worth than himself to poverty, even persecution. The specific trick of the Christian-Stalinists is to lump these two concepts of guilt, individual and historical, together, while it is only in a few instances that these concepts coincide.

156 659 Catholics who accept the Party line gradually lose everything except the phraseology of their Christian metaphysics. The true content of their faith becomes the Method by a psychological process well-known to Christians in the people's democracies. The existence of a large number of loyal half-Christians in the subjugated part of Europe could have a tremendous effect on the Imperium's political plans. Toleration and even support of these "Christian-patriots," as they are called, enables the Center to avoid a dangerous conflict. The transition from Chris-

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tianity to a cult of History takes place imperceptibly. 156
Without doubt, the greatest success of the Imperium 659
would come if it could install a Party-line pope in the Vatican. A mass in the Basilica of St. Peter in Rome, performed by such a pope, with the assistance of dignitaries from those subjugated countries which are predominately Catholic, would be one of the most important steps toward the consolidation of the world empire.

Christians who serve the Eastern Imperium ingeniously resolve the problem posed by Jesus' words "Render therefore unto Caesar the things that are Caesar's; and unto God the things that are God's." Until now the contrast between the ordinary man and Caesar has never been effaced. Christianity guaranteed this division by teaching that every man had his own history, distinct from the history of the social group or the nation to which he belonged. If, as is taught today from the Elbe to Vladivostok, the history of every man is nothing more than the reflection of the history of his class, and if his class is personified in Caesar, then it is clear that the man who rebels against Caesar rebels against himself. Christians who agree to this thesis prove they no longer believe in God's judgment of each man's acts. Fear that History will damn them eternally motivates their submission.

The Party knows that the conflict between true Chris- 185
tianity and the Revolution is fundamental. The Revolu- 465
tion aims at the highest goal the human species has ever 659
set for itself on earth, the end of "man's exploitation of man." To do this, it must replace man's desire for profit with a feeling of collective responsibility as a motive for action. This is a distant and honorable goal. Probably it will not be reached quickly; and probably, too, for a long period it will be necessary to maintain a constant terror in order to instill that feeling of responsibility by force.

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156 But Christianity contains a dual set of values; it recognizes man to be a "child of God" and also a member of society. As a member of society, he must submit to the established order so long as that order does not hinder him in his prime task of saving his soul. Only by effacing this dualism, i.e. raising man as a purely social creature, can the Party release the forces of hatred in him that are necessary to the realization of the new world.

156 The masses in highly industrialized countries like Eng-
659 land, the United States, or France are largely de-Christianized. Technology, and the way of life it produces, undermines Christianity far more effectively than do violent measures. The erosion of religious beliefs is also taking place in Central and Eastern Europe. There, the core of the problem is to avoid galvanizing the forces of Christianity by some careless misstep. It would be an act of unforgivable carelessness, for example, to close the churches suddenly and prohibit all religious practice. Instead, one should try to split the Church in two. Part of the clergy must be compromised as reactionaries and "foreign agents"—a rather easy task, given the utterly conservative mentality of many priests. The other part must be bound to the state as closely as the Orthodox Church is in Russia, so that it becomes a tool of the government. A completely submissive Church—one that may on occasion collaborate with the security police—loses authority in the eyes of the pious. Such a Church can be preserved for decades, until the moment when it dies a natural death due to a lack of adherents.

So there are measures that can be taken even against
156 the Church, this last stronghold of opposition. Nevertheless, the masses in the people's democracies behave like a man who wants to cry out in his sleep and cannot find his voice. They not only dare not speak, they do not know

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what to say. Logically, everything is as it should be. From /156
the philosophical premises to the collectivization of the farms, everything makes up a single closed whole, a solid and imposing pyramid. The lone individual inevitably asks himself if his antagonism is not wrong; all he can oppose to the entire propaganda apparatus are simply his irrational desires. Should he not, in fact, be ashamed of them?

The Party is vigilantly on guard lest these longings 626
be transmuted into new and vital intellectual formulas adapted to new conditions and therefore capable of winning over the masses. Neither the reaction nor the Church are as great a menace as is *heresy*. If men familiar with dialectics and able to present dialectical materialism in a new light appear, they must be rendered harmless at once. A professor of philosophy who clings to obsolete "idealistic" concepts is not particularly dangerous. He loses his lectureship, but he is allowed to earn a living by editing texts, etc. Whereas a professor who, using the names of Marx and Engels, permits himself departures from orthodoxy sows seeds from which alarming crops may grow.

Only the bourgeois persists in thinking that nothing results from these nuances of thought. The Party knows that much can come of them: there was a time when the Revolution was merely a nuance in the thinking of a little group of theoreticians led by Lenin, quarreling around a café table in Switzerland. The most neuralgic points of the doctrine are philosophy, literature, the history of art, and literary criticism; those are the points where man in his unfortunate complexity enters the equation. The difference of a tiny fraction in the premises yields dizzying differences after the calculation is completed. A deviation from the line in the evaluation of some work of art may

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626 become the leaven of a political upheaval. The Party rightly and logically condemned the foremost Marxist literary scholar of the twentieth century, the Hungarian professor Lukacs. Deep, hidden reasons lay behind the enthusiasm his works aroused in the Marxists of the people's democracies. They saw in him the harbinger of a new philosophy and a new literature. The dislike of "socialist realism" that he betrayed corresponded to the belief, prevalent in the first years after the Second World War, that in the people's democracies the science of Marx and Engels would blaze new paths, unknown in Russia. Because Lukacs expressed this belief in his books, the Party had no course but to stigmatize him.

When one considers the matter logically, it becomes obvious that intellectual terror is a principle that Leninism-Stalinism can never forsake, even if it should achieve victory on a world scale. The enemy, in a potential form, will *always* be there; the only friend will be the man who accepts the doctrine 100 per cent. If he accepts only 99 per cent, he will necessarily have to be considered a foe, for from that remaining 1 per cent a new church can arise. The explanation Stalinists often advance, that this is only a *stage* resulting from "capitalist encirclement," is self-contradictory. The concept of a *stage* presupposes planning from the top, absolute control now and always. Eastern rulers are aware of this contradiction. If they were not, they would not have to present forced participation in clubs and parades, forced voting for a single list, forced raising of production norms, etc. as spontaneous and voluntary acts. This is a dark, unpleasant point for even the most passionate believers.

This way of posing the problem discloses the madness of the doctrines. Party dialecticians know that similar attempts on the part of other orthodoxies have always

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failed. In fact, History itself exploded one after another the formulas that have been considered binding. This time, however, the rulers have mastered dialectics so, they assert, they will know how to modify the doctrine as new necessities arise. The judgments of an individual man can always be wrong; the only solution is to submit unreservedly to an authority that claims to be unerring.

But what can the doctrine do about the unformulated longings of men? Why does a good Communist, without any apparent reason, suddenly put a pistol to his head? Why does he escape abroad? Isn't this one of those chasms over which the scientifically constructed bridges pass? People who flee from the people's democracies usually give as their chief motive the fact that life in these countries is psychically unbearable. They stammer out their efforts to explain: "The dreadful sadness of life over there"; "I felt I was turning into a machine." It is impossible to communicate to people who have not experienced it the undefinable menace of total rationalism.

To forestall doubt, the Party fights any tendency to delve into the depths of a human being, especially in literature and art. Whoever reflects on "man" in general, on his inner needs and longings, is accused of bourgeois sentimentality. Nothing must ever go beyond the description of man's behavior as a member of a social group. This is necessary because the Party, treating man exclusively as the by-product of social forces, believes that he becomes the type of being he pictures himself to be. He is a social monkey. *What is not expressed does not exist.* Therefore if one forbids men to explore the depths of human nature, one destroys in them the urge to make such explorations; and the depths in themselves slowly become unreal.

I should like to clear up in advance a possible misunderstanding. Personally, I am not in favor of art that is too

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subjective. My poetry has always been a means of checking on myself. Through it I could ascertain the limit beyond which falseness of style testifies to the falseness of the artist's position; and I have tried not to cross this line. The war years taught me that a man should not take a pen in his hands merely to communicate to others his own despair and defeat. This is too cheap a commodity; it takes too little effort to produce it for a man to pride himself on having done so. Whoever saw, as many did, a whole city reduced to rubble—kilometers of streets on which there remained no trace of life, not even a cat, not even a homeless dog—emerged with a rather ironic attitude toward descriptions of the hell of the big city by contemporary poets, descriptions of the hell in their own souls. A real "wasteland" is much more terrible than any imaginary one. Whoever has not dwelt in the midst of horror and dread cannot know how strongly a witness and participant protests against himself, against his own neglect and egoism. Destruction and suffering are the school of social thought.

Yet, if the literature of socialist realism is useful, it is so only to the Party. It is supposed to present reality not as a man *sees* it (that was the trait of the previous realism, the so-called "critical"), but as he *understands* it. Understanding that reality is in motion, and that in every phenomenon what is being born and what is dying exist simultaneously—dialectically speaking, this is the battle between the "new" and the "old"—the author should praise everything that is budding and censure everything that is becoming the past. In practice, this means that the author should perceive elements of the class struggle in every phenomenon. Carrying this reasoning further, the doctrine forces all art to become didactic. Since *only* the Stalinists have the right to represent the proletariat, which

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is the rising class, everything that is "new" and therefore praiseworthy results from Party strategy and tactics. "Socialist realism" depends on an identification of the "new" with the proletariat and the proletariat with the Party. It presents model citizens, i.e. Communists, and class enemies. Between these two categories come the men who vacillate. Eventually, they must—according to which tendencies are stronger in them—land in one camp or the other. When literature is not dealing with prefabricated figures of friends and foes, it studies the process of metamorphosis by which men arrive at total salvation or absolute damnation in Party terms.

This way of treating literature (and every art) leads to absolute conformism. Is such conformism favorable to serious artistic work? That is doubtful. The sculptures of Michelangelo are completed acts that endure. There was a time when they did not exist. Between their non-existence and existence lies the creative act, which cannot be understood as a submission to the "wave of the future." The creative act is associated with a feeling of freedom that is, in its turn, born in the struggle against an apparently invincible resistance. Whoever truly creates is alone. When he succeeds in creating, many followers and imitators appear; and then it seems that his work confirms the existence of some sort of "wave of history." The creative man has no choice but to trust his inner command and place everything at stake in order to express what seems to him to be true. This inner command is absurd if it is not supported by a belief in an order of values that exists beyond the changeability of human affairs, that is by a metaphysical belief. Herein lies the tragedy of the twentieth century. Today, only those people can create who still have this faith (among them are a certain number of Stalinists who practice Ketman), or who hold a position

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of lay stoicism (which, after all, is probably another form of faith). For the rest there remains the sorry lie of a safe place on the "wave of the future."

This is the framework within which life develops in the people's democracies; but it is a life that moves at a frenzied tempo. "Socialist construction" is not merely a slogan; it is taken in a quite literal sense. The observer's eye meets scaffolding everywhere; new factories, offices, and government buildings spring up almost overnight; production curves rise; the masses change character with unheard-of rapidity; more and more persons become state functionaries and acquire a certain minimum of "political education." The press, literature, films, and theater magnify these attainments. If a man from Mars, knowing nothing of earthly affairs, were to judge the various countries of the world on the basis of Soviet books, he would conclude that the East is inhabited by rational, intelligent beings, while the West is peopled by dwarfs and degenerates. Small wonder that so many intelligent Westerners, for whom the Soviet Union and its satellites are the legendary isles of happiness, arrive at a similar conclusion.

The citizen of the people's democracies is immune to the kind of neurosis that takes such manifold forms in capitalist countries. In the West a man subconsciously regards society as unrelated to him. Society indicates the limits he must not exceed; in exchange for this he receives a guarantee that no one will meddle excessively in his affairs. If he loses it's his own fault; let psychoanalysis help him. In the East there is no boundary between man and society. His game, and whether he loses or wins, is a public matter. He is never alone. If he loses it is not because of indifference on the part of his environment, but because his environment keeps him under such minute

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scrutiny. Neuroses as they are known in the West result, above all, from man's aloneness; so even if they were allowed to practice, psychoanalysts would not earn a penny in the people's democracies.

The torment of a man in the East is, as we have seen, of a new, hitherto unknown variety. Humanity devised effective measures against smallpox, typhus, syphilis; but life in big cities or giant collectives breeds new diseases. Russian revolutionists discovered what they claimed were effectual means of mastering the forces of History. They proclaimed they had found the panacea for the ills of society. But History itself repays them in jeers.

The supreme goal of doing away with the struggle for existence—which was the theoretician's dream—has not been and cannot be achieved while every man fears every other man. The state which, according to Lenin, was supposed to wither away gradually is now all-powerful. It holds a sword over the head of every citizen; it punishes him for every careless word. The promises made from time to time that the state will begin to wither away when the entire earth is conquered lack any foundation. Orthodoxy cannot release its pressure on men's minds; it would no longer be an orthodoxy. There is always some disparity between facts and theories. The world is full of contradictions. Their constant struggle is what Hegel called dialectic. That dialectic of reality turns against the dialectic fashioned by the Center; but then so much the worse for reality. It has been said that the twentieth century is notable for its synthetic products—synthetic rubber, synthetic gasoline, etc. Not to be outdone, the Party has processed an artificial dialectic whose only resemblance to Hegel's philosophy is purely superficial. The Method is effective just so long as it wages war against an enemy. A man exposed to its influence is helpless. How

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000 can he fight a system of symbols? In the end he submits; and this is the secret of the Party's power, not some fantastic narcotic.

There is a species of insect which injects its venom into a caterpillar; thus inoculated, the caterpillar lives on though it is paralyzed. The poisonous insect then lays its eggs in it, and the body of the caterpillar serves as a living larder for the young brood. Just so (though Marx and Engels never foresaw this use for their doctrine), the anaesthetic of dialectical materialism is injected into the mind of a man in the people's democracies. When his brain is duly paralyzed, the eggs of Stalinism are laid in it. As soon as you are a Marxist, the Party says to the patient, you *must* be a Stalinist, for there is no Marxism outside of Stalinism.

Naïve enemies of the poison may think that they can rid themselves of the danger by locking up the works of Marx and Engels in burglar-proof safes and never allowing anyone to read them. They fail to consider that the very course of history leads people to think about the subject matter of these works. Those who have never personally experienced the magnetic attraction and force of the problems posed in these books can count themselves lucky. Though that does not necessarily mean that they should feel proud of themselves.

Only the blind can fail to see the irony of the situation the human species brought upon itself when it tried to master its own fate and to eliminate accident. It bent its knee to History; and History is a cruel god. Today, the commandments that fall from his lips are uttered by clever chaplains hiding in his empty interior. The eyes of the god are so constructed that they see wherever a man may go; there is no shelter from them. Lovers in bed perform their amorous rites under his mocking

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glance; a child plays in the sand, not knowing that his future life has been weighed and written into the general account; only the aged, who have but a few days left before they die, can justly feel that they have to a large extent escaped his rule.

The philosophy of History emanating from Moscow is not just an abstract theory, it is a material force that uses guns, tanks, planes, and all the machines of war and oppression. All the crushing might of an armed state is hurled against any man who refuses to accept the New Faith. At the same time, Stalinism attacks him from within, saying his opposition is caused by his "class consciousness," just as psychoanalysts accuse their foes of wanting to preserve their complexes.

Still, it is not hard to imagine the day when millions of obedient followers of the New Faith may suddenly turn against it. That day would come the moment the Center lost its material might, not only because fear of military force would vanish, but because success is an integral part of this philosophy's argument. If it lost, it would prove itself wrong by its own definition; it would stand revealed as a false faith, defeated by its own god, reality. The citizens of the Imperium of the East long for nothing so much as liberation from the terror their own thought creates.

In the Central Committee buildings, strategists move the little flags on the battle map of the war for men's minds. They can pinpoint ever greater successes; the red color, which in 1944 and 1945 was limited to a handful of believers coming from the East, spreads farther every day. But even sages are men, and even they fall prey to anxiety and dread. They compare themselves to the early Christians; they liken the march of the New Faith over the planet to the march of Christianity throughout the

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000 decaying Roman Empire. But they envy the Apostles their gift of reaching deep into the human heart. "*They* knew how to make propaganda! How can we compare ourselves with them?" mourned a certain Party dignitary hearing the Gospel read over the radio. The new (anti-) religion performs miracles. It shows the doubters new buildings and new tanks. But what would happen if these miracles suddenly stopped? Knives and pistols would appear in the hands that applaud today. The pyramid of thought would topple. For a long time, on the ground where once it stood there would be nothing save blood and chaos.

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CHAPTER IX

The Lesson of the Baltics

"IF you keep thinking about the Baltics and the camps, do you know what will happen to you?" my friend asked me in Warsaw. He had recently acquired an admiration for the dialectical wisdom of the Center. "You will use up the rest of your time to live and you will present yourself before Zeus; and the god, pointing his finger (here my friend gestured accusingly), will cry: 'Idiot! You ruined your life by worrying about trifles!'"

It is true that I cannot stop thinking about the Baltics. Yet I can say something in my defense. Certainly, worry over the fate of nations trampled down by History—that elephant—leads nowhere, and is a proof of sentimentality. This much I grant. The rage one feels on reading sixteenth-century memoirs whose authors, mostly priests, recount the atrocities committed in America by Spanish Conquistadors is senseless. It cannot resurrect the Caribbean population slaughtered by Ponce de Leon, nor shelter the Inca refugees pursued through the mountains by knights fighting with faith and a sword. Those who have been defeated are forgotten forever; and anyone who would look too closely into the record of past crimes or, even worse, try to imagine them in detail, must either turn gray with horror—or become completely indifferent.

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Historians know that a long time ago the area known as East Prussia was inhabited by the Prussian nation which, thanks to German-speaking followers of Jesus, met the same fate as the people of the Caribbean. But historians do not speak of mothers' despair or children's distress; and perhaps it is better so. The civilization that calls itself Christian was built on the blood of the innocent. To be nobly indignant at those who are trying today to create another civilization by similar means is to take a somewhat pharisaic attitude. The records of crime will remain for many years, hidden in some place that is remote and secure; then, a scholar of the future, reaching through dust and cobwebs for the old files, will consider the murders committed as insignificant misdeeds compared with the task accomplished. More probably, however, no such files will exist; for, keeping step with progress, the emperors of today have drawn conclusions from this simple truth: whatever does not exist on paper, does not exist at all.

Let us assume that this is what will happen. Nevertheless our attitude toward the present differs from our attitude toward the past, be that right or wrong. A *living* human being, even if he be thousands of miles away, is not so easily ejected from one's memory. If he is being tortured, his voice is heard at the very least by those people who have (uncomfortable as it may be for them) a vivid imagination. And even if he is already dead, he is still part of the present; for the man who killed him or who gave the order that he be killed is sitting down somewhere, at some precise point on the face of the earth, with his family; bread and tea are on the table, and his children rejoice over a gift he has brought them. To demand that a man regard the present as he would the past without, as my friend said, worrying about trifles, that he gaze at the

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ripening fruits of tomorrow through the telescope of History—that is asking too much. There must be, after all, some standard one dare not destroy lest the fruits of tomorrow prove to be rotten. If I think thus it is because for the last two thousand years or more there have been not only brigands, conquistadors, and hangmen, but also people for whom evil was evil and had to be called evil. Mass slaughter, the terror of revolution, the craze for gold, the misery of the working classes: who knows what dimensions these flaws might reach if every man believed he must keep silent and accept? In rebelling, I believe I protect the fruits of tomorrow better than my friend who keeps silent. I assume the risk and I pay. If I were not willing to do so, I would now be writing an ode in praise of the Generalissimo. When one has some training in poetic technique, it is not particularly difficult to compose fine-sounding, rhythmical praise of *The Glorious Hero.*

The Baltic states—Estonia, Lithuania, and Latvia—lie, as we know, on the edge of the great mainland of the continent. A gulf separates them from Finland; the Baltic Sea, from Sweden. Their inhabitants are not Slavic. The language of the Estonians is related to Finnish. The Lithuanian and Latvian tongues, which resemble each other, still constitute a linguistic riddle; no one knows the original home of these tribes who found their way to the lower reaches of the Niemen and Dvina rivers. We know only that the exterminated Prussians spoke a similar language. Of the three Baltic nations, only the Lithuanians succeeded in the past in creating and maintaining for a certain time a large state whose borders extended to the Dnieper.

These three sparsely settled countries underwent an intensive colonization, chiefly German and Polish, which marked the advance of Christianity. The result was

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197 that two different languages entered into use there: the masters, that is the landholders, spoke German (in Estonia and Latvia) and Polish (in Lithuania) in part because the newcomers brought with them their own language and customs, and in part because the local nobility adopted them. The common people, however, spoke their native tongue and preserved their cultural heritage from a legendary past. After the First World War, these three countries ceased to be provinces of the Russian Tsardom and became independent. Radical agrarian reforms curbed the influence of the great landowners. The native tongues became the official languages, while literature and education restored popular traditions.

161 In 1939, the population of these three states numbered
241 about six million, that is, a little more than the population of Chile, a little less than that of Sweden. They were agricultural countries whose economies were maintained by a well-organized exportation of bacon, eggs, butter, grain, and fowl to Western Europe. In this, as well as in other respects, they resembled Denmark. Whoever knows the patterns of farming life can easily picture the mode of existence of these Baltic regions. A widespread system of
511 cooperatives helped the farmer sell his products. His standard of living, judging by his appearance, his house and his diet, was higher than that of the Slavonic countries,
162 with the possible exception of Czechoslovakia. Most Es-
126 tonians and Latvians were Protestant; most Lithuanians, Catholic. All three nations were characterized by obstinate patriotism, or even chauvinism—which is understandable in terms of their hard past. Militarily, all three were defenseless.

125 The fate of these states was decided in the talks between
643 Molotov and Ribbentrop. In the fall of 1939, Molotov demanded military bases; the Baltic governments hurried

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to grant them. (The press of all three countries conse- 175
crated much space, at the time, to articles proclaiming 648
lasting, unshakeable friendship for the kind and powerful neighbor to the East.) In June 1940, on the pretext that Soviet soldiers stationed in these bases had not been assured proper security, the Red Army crossed the borders of Lithuania, Latvia, and Estonia, the NKVD moved into power, and all former state machinery ceased to exist.

My account of the Baltic states is not derived from 000
books or manuscripts. The first sunlight I saw, my first smell of the earth, my first tree, were the sunlight, smell, and tree of these regions; for I was born there, of Polish-speaking parents, beside a river that bore a Lithuanian name. I am familiar with the events of the past years not from the dry notes of historians; they are as vivid for me as the faces and eyes of people one knows well.

The invasion of the Spanish must have been an appalling experience for the Aztecs. The customs of the conquerors were incomprehensible; their religious ceremonies, strange; the paths of their thought, impossible to follow. The invasion of the Red Army was no less of a 175
shock for the Estonians, Latvians, and Lithuanians. Of course, the older people remembered the days of the Tsars; yet this was completely different, and much worse. In the years that had elapsed since the fall of Tsarism, Russia had not evolved closer toward Europe but further away, toward principles of social organization Europe had never before known. The thinking and reactions of these conquerors were just as alien to the conquered as the arcanum of Catholic theology and the Castilian concept of honor had been to the Aztecs.

New general elections were ordered immediately. But 666
these elections had nothing in common with the elections 208
held before then. There was a single list of candidates, 626

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presented by the new authorities. Why, then, were the cities and countryside covered with propaganda leaflets and handbills; why did megaphones shout day and night; why the trucks decorated with huge portraits of the candidates; why the garlands, the meetings, and the platforms? Why the propaganda if one had no choice? No one could understand. Yet on election day everyone flocked to the polls. They had to vote; for when one turned in one's ballot, one's passport was stamped. The absence of this stamp meant that the owner of the passport was an enemy of the people who had revealed his ill will by refusing to vote. Some people, naïvely, handed in torn or crossed-out ballots; but they were declared valid and affirmative. The final tallies were impressive. The first act of the parliaments thus elected was to make a formal request for incorporation into the Soviet Union. That favor was granted.

One of the new delegates to the Lithuanian parliament was a friend from my early youth. Together we had traveled many kilometers down various European rivers in a canoe, escaped drowning in rapids, wandered over mountain trails, seen the sun rise over the valleys of the Black Forest and the castles of the Rhineland. A few years before the Second World War he became a Stalinist. He was from Warsaw, and his presence in Lithuania at the outbreak of the war was more or less accidental. Nevertheless, he was proposed as a candidate (there were so few Communists in these countries that every one was put to use); and since candidacy was tantamount to election, he became a delegate. It must have been quite an experience of power for him; he could vote the incorporation of a country he had nothing to do with into another country which he knew only from its propaganda literature and official statistics. At the time, that was something new; but other innovations were to come. All over Eastern Europe,

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foreigners (changing their names, if necessary) vote, rep- 000
resent, and rule.

Thus the inhabitants of the Baltic states became Soviet 641
citizens. In the eyes of the new authorities this mass of 661
people, who were so well off that they put the rest of the Union to shame, represented a scandalous relic of the past. They had to be educated. Prisons filled and, shortly, certain categories of citizens began to be deported to work camps, mines, and collective farms at the other end of Russia, chiefly in the polar regions. In 1941 the entire area was invaded by the German army. The Nazis, in turn, started to kill off that category of the population which their ideology classified as undesirable, namely the Jews, irrespective of age, sex, or class. To that task they applied their usual precision. At the same time they exported to the Reich a large number of forcibly enlisted workers.

In 1944 the Baltic states were recaptured by the Red 423
Army and the Center set out to assimilate this area into 474
the Union. The most urgent task was the destruction of 669
the existing and wealthy farming economy. Collectivization met with considerable obstacles, however. The usual method, that of "intensifying the class struggle in the village," which speculates upon the antagonism between rich and poor farmers, had feeble results. Training in partisan units, together with the large number of arms left from war-time operations, encouraged opposition. Peasants fled to the woods and formed bands. In reprisal, disciplinary expeditions surrounded villages and killed those who had remained at home. This merely increased the opposition; for whole villages, including women and children, often preferred to join the partisans rather than expose themselves to the danger of being taken hostage.

The hostile attitude of these people forced those in 661
power to resort to radical measures. Big man-hunts were

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661 instituted. Thousands of cattle-cars loaded with people moved towards uninhabited areas of Euro-Asia. The years in which Western Europe began to enjoy a precarious peace were far from peaceful for the Baltic countries. Villages whose inhabitants were dead, deported, or in hiding stood plundered and empty. The wind whistled through the apertures of broken windows and smashed doors. "Hitlers come and go, but nations remain," the Generalissimo declared in the moment when victory over Germany was certain. As far as smaller national groups are concerned, this statement should be amended to read: "Nations come and go, but the countries remain." In the words of an official of the Center, spoken in 1946: "There will be a Lithuania; but there will be no Lithuanians."

I do not know how many thousands of men and women these states lost before their economies were "reconstructed," i.e. before 1950. Perhaps no one knows the exact statistics. The number of foreign settlers ordered to the places left by the departed natives might serve as an index. [166] Moreover, the process is not yet finished. Collective farmers have been imported into the rural areas; administrative cadres and their families, into the cities. In the [191] streets one hears Russian spoken more frequently than Estonian, Latvian, or Lithuanian. The great majority of the Party leaders and higher government officials have Russian names.

661 641 The aim of all these moves is to inter-mix the population of the Union. Only by dissolving individual nationalities in the "Russian sea" can one attain the goal of a single culture and a single universal language. The territory that once linked the Baltic states with Germany has been settled by Russians. The city of Koenigsberg, within whose walls Kant was born and spent his entire life, has been renamed Kaliningrad and there is no longer any trace of the

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mild, orderly world the philosopher knew. On the islands 661
lying off the coast of what was once Estonia, no Estonian 641
fishermen push their boats toward the sea. The pot in which the Baltic peoples are being boiled down has its lid tightly clamped on. Obviously schools and universities, as well as books, all use native tongues. After all, the aim is not to destroy individual nationalities; the aim is to destroy the class enemy. When the young people learn in Lithuanian, Latvian, or Estonian how to be true patriots of the Union, and how to appreciate all that emanates from the Center, then the Russian language will triumph over all competition. At that point, a new level of understanding will be attained.*

What cause is there for anger? The little world that 000
was the Baltic states is known to us from Breughel's country scenes: hands clutching jugs, cheeks red with laughter, heavy, bear-like kindness. There lived peasant virtues: industry, thrift, diligence; and peasant sins: greed, stinginess, constant worry about the future. The proletariat scarcely existed; industry was poorly developed; the agrarian reform had divided the large estates among the peasants. But why should this continue? Kulaks were an unforgivable anachronism. They had to be wiped out, and

* "I approached Stalin's portrait, took it off the wall, placed it on the table and, resting my head on my hands, I gazed and meditated. What should I do? The Leader's face, as always so serene, his eyes so clear-sighted, they penetrate into the distance. It seems that his penetrating look pierces my little room and goes out to embrace the entire globe. I do not know how I would appear to anyone looking at me at this moment. But with my every fibre, every nerve, every drop of blood I feel that, at this moment, nothing exists in this entire world but this dear and beloved face. What should I do?

"The Soviet government handles the enemies of the people with a firm hand. . . .

"These are thy words, comrade Stalin. I believe them sacredly. Now I know how to act."

From *Pergale* (Victory) magazine, organ of the Soviet Writers of the Lithuanian SSR, No. 4, April 1950, p. 52, cf. *The Lithuanian Bulletin*, New York, Nos. 7–12, July–December, 1950

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000 the standard of living had to be lowered to match that of the rest of the Union. As for the drastic methods employed —after all, in the end everyone must die. Let us assume that a large percentage of the population was killed off by a plague, instead of by disciplinary expeditions. From the moment we acknowledge historical necessity to be something in the nature of a plague, we shall stop shedding tears over the fate of its victims. A plague or an earthquake do not usually provoke indignation. One admits they are catastrophes, folds the morning paper, and continues eating breakfast. One can revolt only against *someone*. Here, there is no one. The people who have brought the plague are convinced they are merely fulfilling their historical duty.

Yet the letter I one day held in my hand was painful. It came from a family deported to Siberia from one of the Baltic states in March 1949, and was addressed to relatives in Poland. The family consisted of a mother and two daughters. Their letter was a terse account of their work on a kolkhoz. The last letters of every line were slightly stressed, and reading vertically one made out the words "Eternal Slave." If such a letter happened to fall into my hands, then how many other, similarly disguised expressions of despair must have found their way to people who could not make any use of them. And, calculating the possibilities, how many such letters remained unwritten; how many of those who might have written them died of hunger and overwork, repeating those hopeless words, "Eternal Slave"?

Perhaps at this very moment the mother and two daughters, if they are still alive, are carrying water in buckets from a well. Perhaps the mother is worrying about the insufficient bread ration which is their only salary. And perhaps, too, she is worrying about the future of her

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daughters. A citizen of New York transplanted to a na-000
tive village in the Congo would feel more or less as does an inhabitant of the Baltic countries transported beyond the Ural mountains—such are the differences in standards of cleanliness, hygiene, and the most external evidences of civilization. The mother will die; the daughters will have to remain there for the rest of their lives, for one never returns from such exile. They will have to marry. But they will keep locked within themselves something which is incomprehensible to their environment, something they will never be able to transmit to their Russian-speaking children.

Possibly neither the mother nor the daughters were possessed of any particularly fine qualities. The mother went to church on Sundays with a thick prayer book, but at home she was a stingy shrew. The daughters had nothing on their minds but frippery and the Saturday dances on the grass that were so loved in their native province. They read no serious books; the names of Plato and Hegel, Marx and Darwin meant nothing to them. These three women were deported because they were kulaks; their farm had nearly thirty hectares of land. The benefit mankind got out of their quiet life in the country was, aside from a certain number of kilograms of butter and cheese, very little.

The question arises as to whether or not one is allowed to destroy three such creatures in the name of higher ends. The Stalinist will answer that it is allowed; Christians and pseudo-Christians will answer that it is not. Neither the former nor the latter are entirely consistent. Ninety per cent of the arguments used by Stalinists in their propaganda are based on man's injury to man. The appeal to moral indignation is always present in their slogans. Christians, on the other hand, maintain

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that it is wrong to harm others because every man has inherent value; but having voiced such a noble opinion, many of them would not move a finger to help another person. It is not merely the fate of the Baltic states that leaves them indifferent. They are equally unconcerned about forms of destruction other than slaughter and compulsory deportation. For example, they regard the spiritual death of people condemned to work hard all day and to swallow the poison of films and television at night as completely normal.

Pablo Neruda, the great poet of Latin America, comes from Chile. I translated a number of his poems into Polish. Pablo Neruda has been a Communist for some ten years. When he describes the misery of his people, I believe him and I respect his great heart. When writing, he thinks about his brothers and not about himself, and so to him the power of the word is given. But when he paints the joyous, radiant life of people in the Soviet Union, I stop believing him. I am inclined to believe him as long as he speaks about what he knows; I stop believing him when he starts to speak about what I know myself.

There is a great difference, indeed, between the believers of the East and those of the West. The Western Communist needs a vision of a golden age which is *already* being realized on earth. The Stalinist of the East does everything in his power to instill this vision in the minds of others, but he never forgets that it is merely a useful lie. His reasoning is correct. Every revolution has known a period of terror directed against the enemies of the new order. No one today weeps for the French aristocrats whose heads fell on the guillotine. Yet former revolutions are insignificant events compared with the revolution going on in our day. They aimed at the overthrow of a small class which stood in the way of artificially re-

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strained, creative forces. The revolution of today cannot content itself with a moment of terror, necessary to the consolidation of the new power; the class struggle must continue until the economic bases for opposition have been destroyed. The class enemy consists of the millions of small producers, that is, of the peasants and artisans, as well as small businessmen. Their steady resistance, and the obstinacy with which they seize every opportunity to revive the old economic order, demand decisive punitive measures.

It must be added that the Revolution triumphed in a backward country; and ever since 1917 regression, in the form of internal decomposition or external intervention, has been a constant threat. It is, therefore, understandable that the moment of terror, proper to former revolutions, has been prolonged over decades in the greatest revolution the world has ever seen. And wherever terror and misery reign, no one can be happy. The golden age, therefore, belongs to the future. The Center has proclaimed that it has already reached the stage of socialism and is now headed toward the realization of communism. The present moment is dark but, seen from a distance, for example from the year 2953, it will appear as short as the Reign of Terror in the French Revolution seems to us today; and the number of victims (two or three hundred million, more or less) will seem scarcely more important than a few thousand beheaded French aristocrats.

Let us imagine a meeting between two fervent disciples of the Center—I base my account on personal observation of many such encounters. One is from the East. He has served perhaps three years behind the walls of prisons or slave labor camps *there*. He was not broken; he did not lose his faith. Wherever trees are being chopped down,

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than are questions of style, metrics, and metaphor. To-000
day the only poetry worthy of the name is eschatological, that is, poetry which rejects the present inhuman world in the name of a great change. The reader of today is in search of hope, and he does not care for poetry that accepts the order of things as permanent. If someone is loaded with that little-known internal energy which bears the name of poetry, he will not be able to escape this universal expectation and he will search—falling, rising, again falling and searching again—for he knows that such is his duty. Revolutionary poetry is often artistically better than the poetry of cameral artists, for subject matter that is close to the longings of mankind emancipates the written word from the shackles of passing literary fads.

But revolutionary poetry becomes weak when it begins to extol the longed-for future as already realized, or in the process of realization, in a given part of the earth. To approve convincingly is difficult not because "positive" values are incompatible with the nature of literature, but because approbation, in order to be effective, must be based on truth. The split between words and reality takes its revenge, even though the author be of good faith. Sentimentality, that is, an exploitation of feelings for their own sake, and not for the sake of what occasions them, cannot lead to good writing. Reality puts literature to the test sooner or later. The ingenious methods by which Stalinists isolate themselves from reality are amazing. I know a poet who found himself in a city occupied by the Red Army after the Molotov–Ribbentrop pact. He was terrified by the mass arrests in which every day some friend or acquaintance disappeared. In panic, he sat down to work, and from his pen flowed gentle poems about the blessings of peace and the beauties of socialist society. I remember a verse in which he praised the "happy, prosperous col-

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000 lective farms" of the Soviet Ukraine. A few months later, when the German army began its invasion, these "happy, prosperous" collective farmers greeted the Nazis as liberators, and only the thoughtless cruelties of the conquerors convinced them they had made a mistake. This is no argument against the system—a few decades is too short a formative period. It is, however, an argument against the poet's verse.

The double ethical standard applied to what happens within the Imperium and without its borders makes honest art impossible. Dialectical reasoning may be well balanced, but art is not born of dialectical reasoning. Art is rooted in much deeper, primitive strata laid down in the individual by past generations. This fact may not be entirely convenient to the new rulers, to the philosophers who would like to see a purely dialectical literature, nourished by an understanding of historical processes. Yet what they prize as literature is nothing but its counterfeit. Repressed feelings poison every work, giving it a tinsel varnish which warns everybody: this is a synthetic product. Then, the most beautiful words are as dead as artificial wreaths.

Let us suppose we admit that terror is quite a useful measure and that the Baltic peoples must be destroyed, to a proper degree, as an anti-revolutionary group. Immediately, a difficulty arises: can one pose an equation sign between terror that is momentary and improvised on the one hand and, on the other, organized terror that extends over a long period? Who can tell whether someone given the perspective of a thousand years will regard the guillotine as identical with the murder or deportation of whole nations over months, years, decades? One month of terror and ten years of it are not the same. The element of time necessarily alters the quality of acts. A long period of

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terror demands an established apparatus and becomes a permanent institution. Deportees may try to escape. Their relatives can scarcely approve of their disappearance, and it is indicated that they be put on the next list. The families of these relatives are an uncertain element which can be kept in line only under threat. Only fear can inspire diligence in dissatisfied peasants tied to collectives.

Fear is well known as a cement of societies. In a liberal-capitalist economy fear of lack of money, fear of losing one's job, fear of slipping down one rung on the social ladder all spurred the individual to greater effort. But what exists in the Imperium is *naked* fear. In a capitalist city with a population of one hundred thousand people, some ten thousand, let us say, may have been haunted by fear of unemployment. Such fear appeared to them to be a personal situation, tragic in view of the indifference and callousness of their environment. But if all one hundred thousand people live in daily fear, they give off a collective aura that hangs over the city like a heavy cloud. Gold alienates man from himself; naked fear, which has replaced capital, alienates him even more efficiently.

To transcend this fear new means must be devised: one must breed a new man, one for whom work will be a joy and a pride, instead of the curse of Adam. A gigantic literature is directed toward this end. Books, films, and radio all have as their themes this transformation, and the instilling of hatred against the enemy who would want to prevent it. To the extent that man, terrified as he is, learns to fulfill his obligations to society of his own will and with joy, the dosage of fear is to be reduced. And eventually, a free man will be born.

Whether he can be born while such methods are applied is a question of faith. If everything in the world is ruled by rational laws, if freedom is nothing but the understand-

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000 ing of that universal rational necessity, if man can achieve that full consciousness to which what is necessary and what should be willed are one and the same thing, then a new, free society is possible in the future. In this sense, the Communist who spent three years in a slave labor camp was free, for he recognized his sentence and that of his fellow-prisoners to be rational and necessary. In this same sense, the writers of the people's democracies are right when they say that a free man has *already* been born, and that he is the man of the Soviet Union. But if god-like consciousness (what could choice mean to a god who sees all clearly?) is not accessible to man, then a certain number of people will always make what the ruling philosophers consider to be the wrong choice. That being so, to ease the tension of fear would mean to allow the possibility of revolt. Naked fear is unlikely ever to be inclined to abdicate. A young man in Moscow, born and raised in the new system, is on the wrong path when he makes his choice and (as, unfortunately, happens more and more often) reads Dostoevski, who posed this problem in most pessimistic terms.

At the moment we are concerned with the Baltics. They are not being handled with thoughtless cruelty; their lot is exactly the same as that of many nations living within the borders of the Union. There is no reason for their being treated differently. If their case is so striking, it is only because they were incorporated so suddenly, were so totally unprepared for their new circumstances. Moreover, they stood on a definitely higher level of civilization than other Soviet citizens. Not being Slavs, they have difficulty in learning Russian. Their case confronts us with the thorny question of nationalities.

When victory is won and socialism is realized on the entire face of the planet, nations will—runs the prediction

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—gradually cease to exist; a single universal language will appear which, according to the Generalissimo, will be neither Russian, nor German, nor English but a synthesis of many tongues. One can assume that before that happens a considerable portion of the world will learn Russian, which later will form the basis of the new universal language. (It is asserted that French is the language of feudalism; English, the language of capitalism; and Russian, the language of socialism.) The existence of nations cannot be justified rationally; at the present stage, however, one must deal with it as a fact. The encouragement of national cultures is indicated to the degree that it prepares the transition to the next phase. Whatever brings a given nation closer culturally to the Russians deserves protection; anything that fortifies the system also merits care. In the realm of science, one can even stimulate competition between nations, so long as Russian superiority is acknowledged. (In one people's democracy, a group of scholars were delicately persuaded not to publish the results of their scientific research because they were a little too good and so might seem to contest, indecently, Russian superiority in the same field.) One must always keep in mind the eventual goal, which is the melting down of all nations into a single mass. To this end, nationalism must be exterminated. Nationalism rests on the conviction that national culture is the expression of "national content in national form"; whereas, everybody knows that the content of national cultures has had until now a class character.

The opposite of nationalism is the formula of a "culture that is national in form, and socialist in content." And since the Russian nation made the Revolution and established the patterns of socialist culture, drawing them from its own past, nationalism can be defined simply as anti-

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000 Russianism. If they suffer from that horrible disease, small national groups (like the Crimean Tatars, for example) can be liquidated in their entirety. Larger anti-Russian national groups must be dealt with gradually. Pride can be taken in the outstanding success in the Ukraine. More and more young Ukrainian writers move to Moscow and write in Russian. The poets and critics who dreamt of a *separate* Ukrainian literature have left this world; departed, also, are the actors whose pride in their national theater made them go a bit too far in competing with the Russians. So the self-congratulatory reasoning goes. One can be fairly satisfied with affairs in the Baltic states. As for the people's democracies, the pattern imposed there, modified in the light of past experience, is proving the wisdom of long-range planning.

The task is difficult because individual nations are burdened with their own past; for instance, the Baltic peoples tend to regard the culture of their kulaks as their own. They compare it with the culture of Russia. As if comparison were possible! Russia is a great nation; the Revolution was born in its womb. Only an impious fool could compare its past, pregnant with what was to be the greatest upheaval in history, with the past of the small nations it has liberated. Russia is the savior of the world.

No atrocities are being committed. One murders only those who must be murdered, tortures only those who must be made to confess, deports only those who must be deported. If deportees die off quickly, that is the fault of the climate, hard work, or insufficient rations, and nothing can be done about those inconveniences at the present stage. One cannot expect a country charged with so great a mission to take care of its prisoners as well as England cares for its soldiers. Perhaps if they were treated better these prisoners would die less quickly, but

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then their labor would cease to be cheap. In any case, 000
before food can reach prisoners in camps, often situated five days' travel by boat from the nearest town, camp administrators will steal most of it. Everything will change when the standard of living improves. Then, the prisoners, too, will be better off.

The promoters of this kind of argument demonstrate by it their admirable far-sightedness. The nations of Central and Eastern Europe were nationalistic to the point of madness. They were ready to massacre each other over a scrap of land. Today they see how senseless this was, though probably that would not prevent them from leaping at each other's throat if the Center's control were lifted. Under the rule of the Center they "agree" to mutual compromises. The Poles relinquished their eastern territories; the East Germans accepted the Oder-Neisse line; the Czechs and Hungarians have renounced all claims to the Carpathian Ukraine. Expulsions put an end to minority issues. All the republics follow the same economic and cultural pattern worked out by the Center. The one factor that now separates the individual republics is that of language. The great plan is working.

The only trouble is the patient. He shrieks and struggles to get away. In *Madame Bovary*, Flaubert describes an operation on a club-foot performed by Doctor Bovary. This provincial doctor, together with his friend, the pharmacist Homais, decided to cure a servant in the village inn who was lame. After a great deal of difficulty, they persuaded him to surrender himself to their endeavors. Doctor Bovary, with the aid of medical handbooks, devised a wooden box weighing eight pounds, equipped inside with iron hooks, screws, and leather slings. The operation was a marvelous success, and the leg was strapped into the box. "Honor! Threefold honor!" cried the town

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000 paper. "Was it not said that the blind would see and the halt would walk! But what fanaticism once promised to the elect, modern science can accomplish for all men!" But alas, five days later something started to go wrong with the patient. He shrieked with pain. When the box was opened, the leg proved to be swollen and covered with sores. The two friends decided that the leg had not been strapped in well. So they tightened the screws. Yet the patient went from bad to worse. A doctor called in from a neighboring village diagnosed gangrene and amputated the leg. Obviously, Flaubert got a lot of malicious pleasure out of deriding Monsieur Homais's worship of progress. This does not mean that the same operation performed by good doctors would fail. Yet the doubt is always there: is the doctor we are dealing with really a good one?

"To tell the truth, all this is boring," an official of one of the people's democracies said to me. "I have already seen it happen in Russia. The stages are measured out in advance, and they succeed each other with mathematical precision. The only interest lies in watching the reactions of the human material."

Human material seems to have one major defect: it does not like to be considered merely as human material. It finds it hard to endure the feeling that it must resign itself to passive acceptance of changes introduced from above.

The parliamentary system may in many instances be a fiction designed to secure power to ever the same social groups. Still the possibility of casting a protest vote has a certain tonic value. Taking part in a manifestation against some minister of state, a strike, the reading of the opposition press, all furnish moments of emotional release which are probably good for the health of mankind. National pride many be an absurd feeling, yet a rooster's pride as

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he struts about in his own yard amid the hens is biologically useful. 000

The Center is, of course, not unaware of man's psychological needs; hence the parades, banners, posters, portraits, election-time propaganda, and demonstrations of hatred against the enemies of the state. National pride is flattered by the display of national flags as well as by daily announcements of the latest economic achievements, of the buildings, highways, and railroads constructed and the production quotas fulfilled. In general these means seem effective; yet the lack of some intangible element leads the human material to a feeling of *fiction*. Nothing is *spontaneous*. Within the limits of his profession a man can acquire some reason for pride. Beyond these limits, everything is predetermined. Overnight a single decree from on high can remove an entire government, change the borders of a country or order people to hate those who were called friends yesterday. Official safety valves are probably insufficient channels for feelings of national pride if most Estonians, Lithuanians, Latvians, Poles, Czechs, Hungarians, or Rumanians would willingly cut the throat of any available Russian were they not restrained by fear. Even Party cadres, one suspects, would not renounce such a pleasant prospect. One can only complain of the backwardness of these nations and hope that socialist upbringing will enlighten them. But it would be a mistake to deny these unpleasant facts and even worse ones, namely, that such hatred exists even in nations which have undergone a longer period of careful education.

The incorporation of the Baltic states into the Soviet Union may seem an unimportant incident to a Mexican or a Chilean, but not to the millions of people living in the people's democracies. For years they have been pondering over this rather extraordinary act on the part of a great

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power, an act analogous only to some of the misdeeds of colonial politics. If the Great Union as a "federation" is capable of assimilating an unlimited number of "republics," then other countries will one day be swallowed up in their turn. If what happened in the Baltics is a *prefiguration* of what will happen to them they can look forward to mass deportations and the settlement of colonists from the Euro-Asian continent in their towns and villages. The people of countries that Party propaganda likes to call independent think of that future moment as the Judgment Day. The lot of the Baltics has become a serious psychological factor. In keeping the daily ledger of his words and deeds, every citizen evaluates them not only in terms of their present worth but in terms of that future day of reckoning.

The friend who warned me against incurring the wrath of Zeus is a philosopher. He lives amid his books knowing that no matter how much the human material may tremble, there will be no lack of beautiful editions of Lucretius printed in Moscow. As the new society expands, more and more classics will be re-edited. A wise man, scorning the poor literature of today, will always find much delectation in the history of philosophy, in the ancient authors, and in the complicated but exciting studies of dialectical materialism. Truly, a philosopher cannot be happier than when he is living in a country ruled by men compared with whom the kings and prime ministers of by-gone eras were no more than improvisers. His days are devoted to intellectual effort. And when he meets with his fellow-philosophers he knows that they too are drawing wisdom from the well of dialectics.

The meetings of such people have nothing in common with the sterile and irresponsible divagations of the intelli-

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gentsia; they are the meetings of scientists engaged in erecting a social structure. My friend does not believe in "philosophizing." He believes that man is a social animal whose thought is the reflection of the movement of matter. Seekers after truth are no more than puppets trying to deny that their ideas are merely the reflection of historical processes. They are reactionaries serving the enemy of the proletariat; for it is the proletariat which, out of inescapable necessity, formulated the one true method of dialectical materialism. The Soviet Union will triumph as surely as trees will bud in the spring. The man who understands necessity is happy and free, for all freedom other than that based on an understanding of necessity is an illusion. My friend believes that those who suffer in the new society have only themselves to blame. Those who are deported or arrested are fools unworthy of our pity. They are so encumbered with the past that they are incapable of understanding the laws of progress. If they did understand, no evil would befall them and their lives would be active and serene.

My friend liked me because of my hatred of a dull and befogged mentality incapable of seizing a sharp impression of phenomena in full motion. He guessed rightly that I had always longed to see man bright, hard, and pure. Looking at man as he is, I turned my eyes away from him in shame, and I turned my eyes away from myself because I was like him. All my poetry had been a *rejection,* a derision of myself and others because men delight in what is unworthy of delight, love what is unworthy of love, suffer over what is unworthy of suffering. Did I not belong, on this score alone, to those creators of the new world who have a vision of a new man endowed with superhuman purity? Certainly I was a "good pagan," for my fury was the fury of the Bolsheviks. Every-

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000 where outside the countries of the new man I would be bound to feel homeless.

I really had certain assets that could have assured my future happiness. In a Warsaw, rebuilding its ruins, I would have been working in harmony with the laws of history. I would have translated Shakespeare—what joy it is to breach a language barrier and find sentences as concise as the original. I would have undertaken Marxist studies on sixteenth-century England. Maybe I would have become a university professor. From time to time I would have published a poem stating my loyalty to the Revolution and its founders. Moving in the circles of the philosophers and occupying myself with dialectics, I would have treated the efforts of writers, painters, and musicians very lightly, knowing their art is, and must be, bad. I would have listened to Bach, and read Swift or Flaubert.

Yet I deceived my friend. What led me to do this I myself find it hard to define. If I could express it I would be a wise man, a teacher of philosophers. I believe that my motives lie deep in my past, in an incident I shall recount.

In my wanderings at the beginning of the Second World War, I happened to find myself, for a very short while, in the Soviet Union. I was waiting for a train at a station in one of the large cities of the Ukraine. It was a gigantic station. Its walls were hung with portraits and banners of inexpressible ugliness. A dense crowd dressed in sheepskin coats, uniforms, fur caps, and woolen kerchiefs filled every available space and tracked thick mud over the tiled floor. The marble stairs were covered with sleeping beggars, their bare legs sticking out of their tatters despite the fact that it was freezing. Over them loudspeakers shouted propaganda slogans. As I was passing through the station I suddenly stopped and looked. A peasant family—husband and wife and two children—had settled down by the

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wall. They were sitting on baskets and bundles. The wife was feeding the younger child; the husband, who had a dark, wrinkled face and a black, drooping mustache was pouring tea out of a kettle into a cup for the older boy. They were whispering to each other in Polish. I gazed at them until I felt moved to the point of tears. What had stopped my steps so suddenly and touched me so profoundly was their *difference*. This was a human group, an island in a crowd that lacked something proper to humble, ordinary human life. The gesture of a hand pouring tea, the careful, delicate handing of the cup to the child, the worried words I guessed from the movement of their lips, their isolation, their privacy in the midst of the crowd—that is what moved me. For a moment, then, I understood something that quickly slipped from my grasp.

Polish peasants were certainly far from the summits of civilization. It is possible that the family I saw was illiterate. My friend would have called them graceless, smelly imbeciles who had to be taught to think. Still, precious seeds of humanity were preserved in them, or in the Baltic people, or in the Czechs because they had not yet been subjected to the scientific treatment of Monsieur Homais. It may well be that the fondness with which Baltic women tended their little gardens, the superstition of Polish women gathering herbs to make charms, the custom of setting an empty plate for a traveler on Christmas Eve betoken inherent good that can be developed. In the circles in which my friend lives, to call man a mystery is to insult him. They have set out to carve a new man much as a sculptor carves his statue out of a block of stone, by chipping away what is unwanted. I think they are wrong, that their knowledge in all its perfection is insufficient, and their power over life and death is usurped.

Being on the side of that stammering and mumbling

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000 with which human beings try to express themselves in their lonely helplessness, could I have walked on the thick carpet of my apartment, in a neighborhood reserved for privileged people, and savored Shakespeare? Instead of the hand through which warm blood flows from the heart to the fingers holding my pen, they would have given me an excellent artificial hand—the dialectic. Knowing there is a light in man, I could never have dared seek it; for light is not, I believe, the same as political consciousness, and it can exist in fools, monks, boys who dislike social duties, and kulaks. Knowing there is crime in man, I could never have pointed it out; for I would have had to believe, as does my friend, that crime is a product of history and not of human beings. There are past crimes: hundreds of thousands of Poles deported in the year 1940–41, those who were shot, or those who were drowned in the Arctic Ocean. But one must learn to forgive. I am concerned with the crimes that are being, and will continue to be, committed. Crimes in the name of the new and radiant man; crimes committed to the sound of orchestras and choruses, to the blare of loudspeakers and the recitation of optimistic poems.

Now I am homeless—a just punishment. But perhaps I was born so that the "Eternal Slaves" might speak through my lips. Why should I spare myself? Should I renounce what is probably the sole duty of a poet only in order to make sure that my verse would be printed in an anthology edited by the State Publishing House? My friend accepts naked terror, whatever name he may choose to give it. We have parted ways. Whether the side on which I now find myself is the future victor or the future victim is not the issue here. But I know that if my friend tastes the sweet fruits of victory, this planet will be improved according to plan for centuries—but woe to

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him who lives to see this happen. All over the world people are now sleeping in their beds, or perhaps they are engaging in some idiotic pastime; and one might easily believe that each in his own way is doing his best to deserve destruction. But that destruction will bring no freedom. Should the power my friend worships turn out not to be historical necessity, the earth will enter a period of terrible wars and bloody revolutions. But the quest will never end, and hope will always remain.

Let Pablo Neruda fight for his people. He is wrong, however, when he believes that all the protesting voices of Central and Eastern Europe are the voices of stubborn nationalisms or the yelps of wronged reaction. Eyes that have seen should not be shut; hands that have touched should not forget when they take up a pen. Let him allow a few writers from Central and Eastern Europe to discuss problems other than those that haunt him.

When, as my friend suggested, I stand before Zeus (whether I die naturally, or under sentence of History) I will repeat all this that I have written as my defense. Many people spend their entire lives collecting stamps or old coins, or growing tulips. I am sure that Zeus will be merciful toward people who have given themselves entirely to these hobbies, even though they are only amusing and pointless diversions. I shall say to him: "It is not my fault that you made me a poet, and that you gave me the gift of seeing simultaneously what was happening in Omaha and Prague, in the Baltic states and on the shores of the Arctic Ocean. I felt that if I did not use that gift my poetry would be tasteless to me and fame detestable. Forgive me." And perhaps Zeus, who does not call stamp-collectors and tulip-growers silly, will forgive.

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PRINTER'S NOTE

This book is set on the Linotype in GRANJON, *a type named in compliment to Robert Granjon, who in 1523 began his career as type-cutter and printer, working in Antwerp, in Lyon, at the Vatican and Medici presses in Rome, and in Paris, where he died in 1590. Granjon, the boldest and most original designer of his time, was one of the first to practice the trade of type-founder apart from that of printer.*

Linotype GRANJON *was designed by George W. Jones, who based his drawings upon a face used by Claude Garamond (1510–1561) in his beautiful French books.* GRANJON *more closely resembles Garamond's own type than do any of the various modern faces that bear his name.*

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[For information concerning the life histories of four unidentified Polish poets, see category 116, pp. 82-191]

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[For information concerning the life histories of four unidentified Polish poets, see category 116, pp. 82-191]

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FUEL and POWER in Captive Middle Europe

by JAN H. WSZELAKI

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MID-EUROPEAN STUDIES CENTER *of the*

National Committee for a FREE EUROPE *Inc.*

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This report and 3 others concerning the eastern area of Europe are presented in the belief that they will further public knowledge and understanding, and so advance the cause of freedom. Their preparation and publication are made possible by the Mid-European Studies Center of the National Committee for a Free Europe, Inc. The author's views are, of course, his own.

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Foreword

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The Free World knows something about Russia's industrial potential. But the public at large is not well informed about the tremendous industrial revolution taking place in Middle Europe. What was generally thought of in pre-Iron-Curtain days as a primitive economy in a predominantly agricultural area is now in the throes of a brutal and painful but very real industrial revolution.

It has always been a maxim that one should not underestimate the enemy. This article has led me to believe that we may indeed be doing just that in regard to Russia's captive European empire.

President, National Committee for a Free Europe

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Author's Note

114 THE seven countries of Middle Europe now subjected to Russian control have been incorporated into the Soviet bloc against their will, and their Communist governments have been imposed upon them. This being the case, the author has refrained from describing this area of Europe and its component countries and nations as "satellite" and has adopted the term "captive" instead. The term "satellite" will be applied only to the Communist governments of that area.

The statistical data concerning the output of fuel and power in the captive area in the past are quoted — unless stated otherwise — from the United Nations *Statistical Yearbook* for 1948 and for 1949-1950, and from the United Nations *Economic Surveys of Europe* in 1949 and 1950. Data about the planned output and major investments in the captive area have been taken from the six national long-range economic plans and national plans for 1951, printed in several law journals and other official publications. This includes the revised versions of the Czechoslovak and Hungarian long-range plans (February 1951), and that of the Eastern German Five Year Plan (November 1951). Sources available to the reader are indicated in footnotes at the end of the text.

The German names of the cities and rivers in the area between the 1939 Polish-German frontier and the present Oder-Neisse boundary are given in parentheses following the Polish names; *e.g.*, Police (Pölitz).

The author wishes to thank Dr. V. Paulat of New York for certain data concerning Czechoslovakia, and Dr. G. G. Rosu of Washington, D.C., for information concerning oil production in Rumania.

J. H. W.

January 1952

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Introduction

121 SINCE 1948-1949 an industrial revolution has been taking place in the mid-European area now controlled by the satellite governments which in turn are controlled by Soviet Russia. According to the long-range plans adopted by the governments of Eastern Germany, Czechoslovakia, Poland, Hungary, Rumania, Bulgaria and Albania, several thousand new, large and medium-sized industrial plants (including mines and power plants) are being erected all over the captive area, while thousands of existing plants are being modernized, developed and extended. A score or two of the new plants under construction, or still in the blueprint stage, may be described as huge even by American standards. A large part of this program — possibly as much as half of it — had already been implemented by the end of 1951, with the result that the heavy industrial potential of the area has been doubled in comparison with that of 1938. At least, that is what the leading Communist economists of the area are claiming.[1] The other half of the program remains to be fulfilled by the end of 1954 or the beginning of 1955 when the present five or six year plans are expected to terminate in most of the captive area. Under relentless pressure of the Soviet Union, the satellite governments are doing everything in their power to fulfill and overfulfill the prescribed program if possible ahead of schedule. The issue of the armament race between the West and the Soviet Empire depends very largely on the success or failure of the industrial development of captive Europe.

The feasibility of this huge program depends in turn on the fuel and power at the disposal of the satellite governments at present and during the next few years. The captive area cannot count upon any large-scale importation of fuel and power from

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121 outside — though there are small local exceptions to this rule — and must itself produce enough not only to cover all its own present and future requirements but also to export considerable amounts of coal and oil to Russia and Western Europe. As the demand for fuel and power for industry, transportation and domestic use is increasing fast, the captive area must develop its supply of fuel and power at a correspondingly rapid rate. If it does not, the long-range economic plans will not be fulfilled in time.

Theoretically, a large increase in the output of fuel and power is feasible. The mid-European captive area possesses considerable wealth in sources of fuel and power, a great part of which has not yet been fully exploited. Among these resources, the great Silesian coal field, now shared by Poland and Czechoslovakia, with its reserves equal to, if not larger than, those of the Ruhr basin in Germany, is undoubtedly the most important. The area also possesses enormous reserves of lignite in Eastern Germany and Bohemia, petroleum in Rumania, Albania and the Soviet zone of Austria, and considerable water power in the basins of the Danube, the Vistula, and the Balkan rivers. Because of its coal, lignite and water power, the area is already producing much electric power and is capable of producing in the near future twice or even three times as much, thus reaching the Western European level of production.

Practically, however, the implementation of the vast program is meeting with many difficulties, and will meet with more in the near future.

A more detailed analysis of the fuel and power production in the captive area, both actual and planned, follows.

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COAL

All six major countries of the captive area possess their own hard coal, but more than 80 percent of the coal reserves of this entire region are concentrated in the Silesian (also called Silesian-Ostravan) coal basin, where it has been mined since the late eighteenth century in an ever increasing quantity. The Silesian coal basin is one of the four major basins in continental Europe: its prewar production was surpassed by that of the Ruhr basin, but in turn exceeded that of the Donets basin in the Ukraine and of the Franco-Belgian coal basin. /35

For political reasons, a planned exploitation of the Silesian coal basin had for a long time been impossible. Until 1914 it was divided by state boundaries between Germany (which possessed the most valuable part of it in Upper Silesia), Austro-Hungary (the Ostrava-Karvinna coal fields and the so-called Cracow basin), and Russia (the Dombrowa basin in Russian Poland). The interests of the three great powers were, to say the least, not parallel; moreover, ethnic frontiers between the Germans, the Poles and the Czechs crossed the basin and caused serious tension. After the first World War the Silesian basin was redistributed, somewhat more along ethnic lines, among Germany, Poland and Czechoslovakia, and as a result of that division new political difficulties arose among the three powers. The Germans claimed the part of Upper Silesia which became Polish, and the Poles the eastern part of the Karvinna field which was adjudged Czech. In 1938 the latter mines were transferred to Poland, and in 1939 both the Czech and Polish coal fields, including those of Cracow and Dombrowa, were forcibly incorporated into "Greater" Germany. Between 1939 and late 1944 the entire Silesian basin was administered from Berlin and run as one unit. During these years, particularly in 1943, the produc- 316

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316 tivity of the basin achieved a level which has not been equalled since. It must be admitted, however, that during the last war the Nazis wantonly exploited the coal mines under martial law, with little regard for their future maintenance.

The Silesian coal basin, as such, suffered less damage from direct military action in 1944-1945 than from the strain on manpower, machinery, and installations during the years of war. In 1945 the whole of Upper Silesia was reunited with Poland. Its German population fled or was expelled westwards, while one million minority Poles were recognized as "autochthones" and stayed in Silesia. Since most of the coal miners in the formerly German western part of Upper Silesia belonged to that category, the mines could be worked without interruption. In 1945, too, the Kremlin adjudged the disputed eastern Karvinna mines to Czechoslovakia along the 1937 boundary. There are no Germans left either in Polish Silesia or in the Ostrava basin where they used to be numerous, but there are many Polish miners employed in the latter area. It should be stressed that the former German coal mines in Upper Silesia were situated not more than twenty miles from the prewar boundary, and that the Polish and Czech coal fields are not immediately contiguous. As a matter of course, the present division of the Silesian coal basin between the two Slav neighbors has far more justification from the technical point of view and may be regarded as stable.

[648] In 1947 the Warsaw and Prague governments agreed, in principle, to some measure of collaboration in coal mining, but no joint administration of the nationalized coal mines was created. It is possible that one of the difficulties was that the Poles produce in their part of the basin nearly four times as much coal as the Czechs in theirs, while any joint controlling body would have to be based on parity. In the last analysis, the coal policy of both Poland and Czechoslovakia in Silesia and elsewhere has been conducted since 1948 from Moscow, and there are Russian "advisers" with controlling power in Silesia as well as in all secondary coal basins of the captive area.

The level and character of the coal output in Silesia has always

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THE LEVEL AND CHARACTER OF THE COAL OUTPUT IN SILESIA HAS ALWAYS 316 433

been closely linked with political factors, which will continue to be of great importance in the future.

The peak production of the entire Silesian-Ostravan coal basin was reached under the German administration in 1943, when it yielded about 106 million tons of coal.[2] The decline of extraction began in 1944 and in 1945. With military operations being conducted in the basin itself, and the Red occupation gradually extending westward with all its overwhelming legal, administrative, and social consequences, the working of the mines was so disturbed that the basin produced only about 26 million tons. Since early 1946, however, the rise in production has been very rapid, particularly in Polish Silesia. The restoration of the productivity of the basin between 1946 and 1948 almost to its prewar level must be recognized as a remarkable technical and organizational achievement. The efficiency of the coal miners could not be raised to its prewar level (a characteristic feature of Communist economy) and the loss of many skilled miners, in particular those of German nationality, had to be made good by replacing them by scores of thousands of new, inexperienced men. The real difficulties began when the Warsaw and Prague governments were assigned the task of reaching the wartime peak of coal extraction and exceeding it within the frame of the Czech Five Year Plan and the Polish Six Year Plan. Even so the output of the mines kept growing, though at a slower rate, and in 1950 reached about 87 million tons (73 million tons in the Polish and 14 million tons in the Czech part of the basin), an increase over the 1937 figure.[3] Late in 1950 coal mining in the Ostravan part of the basin met with serious difficulties due to the shortage of manpower: the Czechs, like the French, and lately the British, dislike being coal miners. In the middle of 1951 these difficulties spread to the Polish part of the basin in the wake of food shortages. The subject is discussed in more detail later in this study.

According to the long-term plans, the output of the Silesian basin is expected to exceed the 1943 peak and to reach at least about 112 and perhaps as much as 118 million tons: 92 to 95

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316 million tons in Poland by 1955, and 20 to 23 million tons in
433 Czechoslovakia by 1953. It can be assumed in advance that every effort will be made to fulfill the Polish plan ahead of schedule, probably by the end of 1954.

The Silesian coal fields are the basic source of hard fuel for the captive area as such and in particular for the two countries which share the basin. But there are in captive Europe a number of minor coal fields spread over this area outside of Silesia, whose joint output represents about one sixth of captive Europe's total production of coal. Even though their 1950 production did not exceed 14 million tons, the secondary coal basins of captive Europe are of decisive importance for such branches of industrial activity as cannot use lignite profitably as hard fuel, and because of their geographical location. In particular, a dozen or more iron and steel plants in Eastern Germany, Western Bohemia, Hungary, and Rumania, situated outside the Silesian-Ostravan basin or even far from it, largely depend on the supply of local coal in their operations.

Among these minor coal basins the following should be noted:

1. The Lower Silesian coal basin in Poland on the northern slopes of the Sudeten Mountains, also known as the Wałbrzych (Waldenberg) basin, with a present output of about 5 million tons of high grade coking coal;

2. The Zwickau-Oelsnitz basin in Saxony, with a present output of roughly 3 million tons;

3. The four minor coal producing areas in Bohemia (Kladno, Plzeň, Trutnov and Rosice basins) with a present joint output of some 4 million tons;

4. Several minor coal fields in Hungary, Rumania, and Bulgaria, with a total present output of about 2 million tons of hard coal.[4]

Since 1949 great efforts have been made to increase the production of these minor basins up to a joint level of approximately 20 million tons of coal at the end of the current long-range economic plans. Judging by the indices of production published by the satellite governments, the progress in these coal fields

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is uneven. The best performance to date has been that of the Saxon basin; the Hungarian and Rumanian output, though lagging behind the inflated annual plans, is described as growing rapidly; the Lower Silesian basin in Poland, where huge investments in machinery are being made, is apparently working in a satisfactory way; the secondary Czech coal fields were in the fall of 1951 several percent behind the prescribed targets.[5] The food crisis of 1951 is having a pronounced adverse effect upon the productivity of the minor Czech and Hungarian coal basins and may lessen that of the Lower Silesian and Rumanian mines. It may be assumed that if all these minor coal basins are capable of much development and extension, only some of them will be able to fulfill on schedule the very high quotas of production set by Moscow.

To sum up, at the end of the present long-range plans, that is on the average by the end of 1954 or beginning of 1955, the entire extraction of coal in all the basins of the captive area is expected to reach about 133 million tons and possibly a few million more.[6] This global target exceeds the prewar output of the Ruhr basin, and is equal to the output of the Soviet Union in 1938; it would be very much larger than the present output of the Donets basin in the Ukraine, estimated at less than 100 million tons.[7] The target of 133.5 million tons can also be compared to the output of bituminous coal in Pennsylvania in 1942 which reached 143 million tons.

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LIGNITE

135 THE term lignite or brown coal[8] covers a number of class D
433 coals (international classification of 1913) of comparatively low caloric value. This does not mean that all lignites are poor quality coals; on the contrary, some of them, mined in Czechoslovakia, Hungary, Rumania, and Bulgaria, are "rich" lignites whose caloric value often reaches that of the class B semi-bituminous coals. That is why they are so often classified together with hard coal in local statistics. A British authority on coal, Sir Richard Redmayne, says that 2.8 tons of German lignite are equivalent to one ton of hard coal; according to the *Economic Survey of Europe in 1949*,[9] that ratio should be 4.5. The latter source says that 1.7 tons of Czech lignite and 3 tons of that from unspecified "other countries" are equivalent to one ton of hard coal. The last ratio seems to be too general because much of the Danubian-Balkan lignite is as good as the Czech. These discrepancies between qualified authorities are cited here as proof that an exact evaluation in terms of coal of the total caloric value of the lignite produced by the captive part of Europe is very difficult.

It should be borne in mind that lignite is a specifically mid-European type of fuel. In 1947-1949, the last years for which complete statistical data are available, no less than 65 percent of the world production of lignite, except that of the Soviet Union, was concentrated in the present captive area of Europe. This percentage may be even higher today; the extraction of lignite is growing in the captive area while, with a few exceptions (Western Germany, Yugoslavia, Australia) it remains stationary elsewhere.

The bulk of mid-European lignite used to be consumed in the production of electric power or converted into briquettes whose

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caloric value is generally twice that of lignite (the German classification: *Steinkohle*, 7,000 calories; *Braunkohle*, 2,500 calories; *Briquetten*, 5,000 calories). Since the first World War an ever increasing proportion of lignite is being used in Middle Europe as a base for the production of synthetic nitrate and as a cheap raw material for producing semi-coke, various tars, and synthetic oil.[10] Thus lignite has become a basis for the powerful electric plants and chemical industries of Eastern Germany and Czechoslovakia and, on a lesser scale, for similar industries in the Danubian and Balkan countries. The exception is Poland. There, little lignite has been extracted hitherto, though reserves are considerable, because of the abundance of hard coal. Lignite as such or in the form of briquettes has been used thus far instead of coal for domestic purposes, transportation, and in every industrial production but metallurgy. Now the satellite governments are on the verge of discovering a method of converting lignite into metallurgic coke. A great lignite coking plant at Lauchhammer in Eastern Germany and another in Borsod in Hungary, now under construction, are expected to be put in motion in 1952. Should this new method prove practical, Eastern Germany, Hungary, and Rumania would depend in the future much less on the importation of Polish and Soviet coke for steelmaking than they do now.

The deposits of lignite are spread over the captive area south of the Berlin-Warsaw line, and they are particularly rich in Saxon Lusace (Lausitz), Sachsen-Anhalt, Thuringia, and Bohemia. In the peak prewar year of 1929 Bulgaria produced 1.6 million tons of lignite, Czechoslovakia 22.6 million, Hungary 7.0 million and Rumania 2.7 million tons. Germany produced 174.5 million tons of lignite, of which approximately two thirds were extracted in what is now the Soviet zone and Polish Silesia. The total production of lignite in the present captive zone in 1929 reached 150 million tons. In 1943, the peak production year of World War II, the output of Bulgaria rose to 3.8 million tons, that of Czechoslovakia to 27.6 million, and that of Hungary to 11.2 million tons, while the output of Rumania remained stationary. The

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135 total output of Germany, again mainly Eastern, reached 250.7
433 million tons. The total 1943 output of lignite in the present captive area may be estimated as exceeding 200 million tons. In 1948 all these figures were much lower (except in Polish Silesia, which produced about 4 million tons) but had a marked tendency to increase. In 1949 Czechoslovakia produced 26.5 million tons of lignite, Hungary 5.5 million, Poland 4.6 million, and Rumania 2.8 million. The official figure of lignite production in Eastern Germany in 1950 was 137 million tons, and the total output of this fuel in the captive area could be estimated as reaching 185 million tons.

[185] The plans for 1953-1955 are as follows: Bulgaria is expected to produce 6 million tons of lignite in 1953, Czechoslovakia 38.8 million in 1953, Eastern Germany 225.2 million in 1955,[11] Hungary 25 million in 1954, Poland 8.4 million in 1955, and Rumania 7.7 million in 1955. The Czech and Eastern German targets are very high in comparison with their past and present output, and the Hungarian target seems to be unrealistic. Anticipating that the three plans to be terminated in 1955 may in fact be implemented earlier, a tentative figure of some 310 million tons of lignite may be accepted as that of the total output of lignite in the captive area to be achieved by the end of 1954 or the beginning of 1955. According to the ratios accepted by the *Economic Survey of Europe*, these figures would represent the equivalent of about 50.1 million tons of hard coal in Eastern Germany, 22.7 million tons in Czechoslovakia, and 12.1 million tons in the remaining four countries of captive Europe — a total of about 85 million tons. If other ratios were accepted as a basis for this computation, the total would be very much larger.

Together with the 133 million tons of hard coal which is the 1954-1955 target of the captive area, the grand total output of hard fuel for that area anticipated by 1954-1955 comes to 218 million tons of coal or coal equivalent, or more if the higher ratios of conversion are applied. Taken at its minimum, the goal of 218 million tons of coal or coal equivalent exactly coincides with the coal production of the United Kingdom in 1949, which was 218.5 million tons.

Unfortunately it is impossible to compare the present or planned global output of both coal and lignite extracted in the captive area of Europe with the corresponding output of the Soviet Union. The Soviet statistics do not make a distinction between coal and lignite, although there is considerable difference between the caloric value of anthracite extracted in the Donets basin, for instance, and lignite from the so-called Moscow basin or several other basins located in Asiatic Russia. The entire coal and lignite production of the Soviet Union in 1950 was 264 million tons, and that projected for 1960 is 500 million tons.[12] Both these figures include far more coal than lignite, but the exact ratio between the two types of hard fuel is not available. The anticipated production of 133 million tons of hard coal and 310 million tons of lignite in the captive area by 1954-1955, a total of 218 million tons in coal equivalent, can be put side by side with a tentative figure of some 380-390 million tons of coal and lignite which Soviet Russia expects to extract by the same time.[13] The Soviet figure is undoubtedly larger than that of captive Europe, but it would be hard to say what percentage the latter would represent of the former — perhaps 55 or 60 or even 65 percent. The only really valid conclusion is that hard fuel produced in the captive area constitutes an extremely significant addition to that mined in the Soviet empire proper. 135 433

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COKE

135 433 While at least two thirds of the Ruhr coal is of coking quality and thus can be used for steelmaking, this is not the case with the Silesian coal, only one third of which can be converted into coke. Moreover, the deposits of coking coal are concentrated in the western part of the Silesian-Ostravan basin. As a consequence, before World War II the German and Czech Silesias could produce much more coke than Poland in the eastern part of the basin. This situation has changed completely since the incorporation of German Upper Silesia into Poland. Outside the main Silesian-Ostravan basin there is much high grade coking coal in Lower Silesia, now Polish, and some in the secondary coal fields in Eastern Germany, Bohemia, Hungary, and Rumania. All in all, in comparison with Western Europe, the captive area is relatively poor in coking coal.

In 1929 Czechoslovakia produced 3,350,000 tons of coke, Poland 2,123,000 tons, and Rumania 72,500 tons; the output of Eastern Germany, which included German Silesia, was some 6,000,000 tons; that of Hungary was negligible, and Bulgaria produced no coke. The peak of war production in Eastern Germany was achieved in 1943, and in Czechoslovakia in 1944, when production reached almost 5 million tons. The last published figures of postwar coke production in Czechoslovakia date from 1948, when it reached 4,940,000 tons, and in Poland from 1949, when it reached 5,720,00 tons. Little coke was produced by the remaining captive countries, and figures pertaining to their output are not available.

Since 1948-1949, when long-range plans were launched for an extensive development of the steelmaking capacity in the captive area, the problem of its coke supply became more difficult. Eastern Germany, Hungary, and Rumania have to import

coke from Poland and Czechoslovakia in order to cope with the demand of their steel plants, which have been rebuilt and are being extended. The exportation of coke interferes with the heavy requirements of the huge steel plants in the Silesian-Ostravan basin and puts much strain on the overworked railroad system of the captive area. As noted previously, the coal-poor countries of the area have to concentrate upon finding a practical method of converting lignite, of which they have much, into coke. It is probably premature to say that this problem has been successfully solved, or that lignite coke about to be produced on a large scale in Eastern Germany and Hungary will be as satisfactory for steelmaking as "ordinary" coal coke. Still, this minor technical revolution seems to be well on its way. 135 433

Not all satellite governments have disclosed their long-range targets for coke output. Among the large producers of coke, Poland expects to produce 9.9 million tons of coke in 1955 (in fact, earlier) and Czechoslovakia 8 million tons in 1952. This large increase of coke-making capacity cannot be achieved without the erection of many new coke plants. Several such plants of a very large size have already been put into motion in the Silesian-Ostravan basin or are still under construction. Eastern Germany anticipates for 1955 a production of 1.7 million tons of the new lignite coke[14] and of an undisclosed amount of coal coke which, on the strength of indirect indices, could be estimated at about 1.3 million tons. Rumania plans to produce 0.7 million tons of coke in 1955. The Hungarian target has never been disclosed — it cannot be high — and that of Bulgaria is negligible. It can be very tentatively estimated that the entire captive area expects to produce some 23-24 million tons of coke by 1954-1955.[15]

This tentative estimate may be compared with 19.9 million tons of coke produced by the Soviet Union in 1936 (the last known figure), and 44.3 million tons which was the top wartime production of Germany in 1943. France, without the Saar, produced only 8.2 million tons of coke in 1949.

It should be borne in mind that an average of about 1.4 tons

135 of coking coal are required to produce one ton of coke, and
433 somewhat over one ton of coke to make one ton of steel.[16] In the light of these figures, should the captive area of Europe produce, as it plans, 23-24 million tons of coke by 1954-1955 — which depends on the amount of coal it will mine — it would have little difficulty in covering the requirements of its planned production of steel, estimated at about 16.5 million tons by 1954-1955.

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MANUFACTURED GAS

THE term manufactured gas usually covers retort gas made in gasworks, carbureted water gas, and coke-oven gas when offered for public consumption, *i.e.*, not consumed by the plant which produces it. Blast furnace gas is not included in the international statistics of gas production which, incidentally, are generally incomplete. Properly speaking, manufactured gas cannot be regarded as a primary fuel, since coal must be consumed in its production. Many forms of gas used to be regarded as waste, however, and the increasing use of various types of gas is equivalent to the utilization of that waste and consequently to a better utilization of hard fuel. Germany has been the pioneer in that direction, and before the last war it produced some 40 percent of the world output of manufactured gas (in 1937, about 20,400 million cubic meters); by 1943, that output had risen to 27,380 million meters. A very large proportion of that gas was made in the present Soviet zone as a by-product of the synthetic oil plants. Elsewhere in the present captive zone the gas output was insignificant: in 1930 the Czechoslovak production was 112 million and the Polish 120 million cubic meters. But during World War II, faced with a shortage of hard fuel, the Nazi administration introduced new methods of exploiting manufactured gas throughout the occupied countries, and since that time its use has been increasing at a very rapid rate.

The Czechoslovak production of manufactured gas rose from about 960 million meters in 1945 to 2,189 million in 1949 and, according to the first, now obsolete, version of the Five Year Plan, was expected to rise to 2,900 million in 1953. This target was to be realized in 1951; further Czech plans are not known. Poland's output in 1948 — the last known figure — was 287 million meters. No figures concerning the planned production of

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382 manufactured gas have been published by the other satellite governments. It is known, however, that great emphasis is laid by the Eastern German, Hungarian, and Polish governments on an even higher output of gas, and the results obtained may be very high. For instance, gas manufactured by the synthetic oil plant at Most has replaced that produced by the Prague gasworks for use in the capital and its vicinity, allowing a substantial saving of hard coal.[17] Similar measures are being applied or planned elsewhere: for instance, long-distance manufactured gas pipelines were laid in 1951 in Poland.[18] Eastern Germany has made so much progress in the output of manufactured gas that the amount of it at the disposal of industry has been officially described as "more than sufficient" — the only basic commodity which Eastern Germany seems to have produced in abundance. Once the new lignite coking plant (or plants) are in full motion, a number of industrial plants hitherto working on electric power will use gas instead.[19]

Any estimate of the amount of manufactured gas to be produced by the captive area in 1954-1955 would be purely hypothetical. Considering the wealth of coal and lignite processed in that area, however, a tentative total figure of 8 million cubic meters would not be an exaggeration.[20]

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OIL

THE captive area of Europe is much less rich in oil than in hard fuel. At the same time its resources in oil are much larger than those of Western Europe. In the interwar period the principal oil fields of the present captive area were situated in Rumania, and the much less important ones in Southern Poland. The Austrian and Hungarian oil resources were not exploited; in fact, they were not known to exist. Rumanian production rose steadily and reached its peak output of 8.7 million metric tons in 1936; since then, the output has been decreasing. In 1938 Rumania produced 6.6 million tons of oil and Poland 0.5 million; in the same year, oil began to flow from the new fields in Austria and Hungary. In 1939 the eastern and richer part of the Polish oil fields (Drohobycz and Boryslaw) was annexed by Soviet Russia. During World War II the Nazis brought up the Austrian output to 1.2 million tons (1944) and that of Hungary to over 0.8 million (1943), but they were unable to increase or even to maintain the level of Rumanian production, whose war peak was reached in 1942 with 5.7 million tons.

Rumanian oil fields and refineries at Ploesti and its vicinity were heavily bombed by the Allies during the war, but the ensuing damage was on the whole speedily repaired. When the Soviet authorities took over the Rumanian oil fields in the fall of 1944, they began by seizing much of the drilling material and refinery equipment and removing it to Russia. In consequence, the productivity of the Rumanian oil fields was drastically impaired. For the same reason, the productivity of the Hungarian and Austrian oil fields (all Austrian wells are situated in the Soviet zone) also declined sharply. The initial Soviet policy of indiscriminate plundering, however, was soon replaced by one of rebuilding all mid-European oil wells under Russian control

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— including Albania — and exploiting them to the utmost of their capacity. Since then, except for the insignificant Czechoslovak and Polish oil fields which are run by local governments, the really large captive oil fields have been operated by Soviet or mixed semi-Soviet companies. This means that they are managed by Soviet specialists using Soviet machinery and installations, according to the Soviet methods of extraction, which the Russians regard as more progressive than those used in the West. A huge and ever growing amount of money and energy is being invested in the extention of the existing fields and the search for new ones. The Soviet idea seems to be that the foreign companies which operated the oil fields in the captive area in the past were only looking for immediate profits and never did their job properly and that there is bound to be more oil all over Middle Europe. Insofar as Rumania and Hungary are concerned, the results of the Soviet efforts cannot be considered remarkable. The output of Hungary remains stationary, while in Rumania, partly because of Russian haste and the harshness of their methods, there have been until the present time constant difficulties of every kind with machinery, organization, and manpower — perhaps even some sabotage.[21] The best proof of this is the fact that no statistics on oil production in absolute figures have been officially published in Rumania since 1947; had there been good reason for boasting, the figures undoubtedly would have been made known. On the other hand, there is much evidence that the Russians have been more successful in Albania, and even more so in their zone of Austria.

The present rate of oil output in Rumania, and for that matter in most of the other captive or Soviet-controlled countries (there is no oil in the Soviet zone of Germany), is the subject of much speculation.[22] Every authority has its own set of estimates, and there are surprising differences between them. Only a few of these diverging estimates can be quoted here. Thus the *Economic Survey of Europe in 1950*, an official publication of the United Nations — bound as it is to accept the indices occasionally given by the satellite governments and to draw its conclusions from

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them — estimates that in 1950 the Rumanian output of crude oil reached 5.35 million metric tons, that of Hungary (which lagged behind its plan for 1950) 0.55 million, of Poland 0.18 million, and of Czechoslovakia 0.05 million metric tons. Together with the Soviet zone of Austria, whose production the *Survey* estimates at 1.5 million tons, the total 1950 output of the captive area should have reached 7.63 million metric tons — plus that of Albania, for which the *Survey* gives no figure.

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According to the other authoritative sources, the above-quoted figure on the Rumanian output reflects the nonfulfilled plans of the Rumanian government rather than the actual level of production. Competent Rumanian experts residing in the United States claim that the 1950 oil output in Rumania did not exceed 4.2 or perhaps even 4.0 million tons.[23] On the other hand, it is possible that the *Survey* underestimated the output of oil in Austria and Czechoslovakia. Thus, according to accredited American sources with access to much special information, the 1950 output of oil in the Soviet-controlled section of Europe was: Albania, 1,915,000 metric tons; Austria, 2,247,000 tons; Czechoslovakia, 275,000 tons; Hungary, 490,000 tons; Poland, 138,000 tons; and Rumania, 4,360,000 tons — a total of 9,415,000 metric tons. This total is larger than most of the other estimates because of the high figures for Austria and Czechoslovakia, and in particular because of the surprisingly high figure for Albania.[24] It should be noted that the corresponding figure for the Soviet Union in 1950 is presumed to have been 37,600,000 metric tons. If the above-quoted American estimate is exact, it would mean that the output of oil in the captive part of Europe amounts to as much as one fourth of that of Russia proper.

Whatever estimate is accepted for 1950, it may be assumed that the 1951 output of oil in captive Europe will be somewhat larger. It is true that according to official admissions the 1951 oil production in Czechoslovakia and Hungary has been lagging behind the plan, but this does not necessarily mean that it has fallen below the level of the preceding year. On the other hand,

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it is claimed that by the middle of 1951 the Rumanian output was 19 percent larger than by the middle of 1950, and the Polish output in the third quarter of 1951 was 11 percent larger than that of the third quarter of 1950.[25] Moreover, new oil fields were discovered recently in the Soviet zone of Austria at Schwardorf south of the Danube, opening up, it is asserted, "fantastic possibilities" for the future.[26]

It is not easy to have an accurate idea of how much oil should be extracted in the captive part of Europe in the light of the investments and other measures foreseen in the long-range economic plans. The current plans anticipate that in 1955 Rumania should produce 10 million metric tons and Poland about 0.4 million; Czechoslovakia plans to extract 0.15 million tons by 1952. The planned figure for Hungary has never been disclosed, and neither have been those for Austria and Albania, both of which produce oil for the Soviet Union. Yet it is certain that the Soviet authorities operating the oil fields in the three last-mentioned countries *must* have definite targets which they have to reach by the end of 1954, when most of the present long-range economic plans of the captive countries will, in fact, terminate. These targets, together with the three disclosed ones, may add up to any figure between 13 and 16 million metric tons of oil; that is, between about 94 and about 115 million barrels — an output depending on many unpredictable elements. A tentative figure of 13 million metric tons to be reached by 1954 has been adopted in this study as a basis for further computations.[27]

This estimate for 1954 — which may be a low one — should be compared with the 60 million metric tons of crude petroleum the Soviet government expects to extract in 1960.[28]

To the tentative figure for 1954 should be added the growing output of synthetic oil produced in the northern part of the captive area.

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NATURAL GAS

In Europe, even more than in America, most of the natural gas extracted as a by-product of oil refining had been for a long time wasted, and its utilization for lighting, fuel, and extraction of natural gasoline is a comparatively new process. International statistics do not exist for its production but only for its consumption in the given states, which is supposed to be equal to its effective collection within the same boundaries.[29] In 1930 Rumania, with its consumption of 1,206 million cubic meters of natural gas, and Poland, with 487 million, were responsible for nearly one hundred percent of the total European output of this gas. Several long-distance gas pipelines were laid in Rumania. The pipeline connecting Daszawa in the Polish oil fields with Warsaw was still unfinished by September 1939; the Russians redirected that line to Kiev. During World War II the extraction of natural gas was started in the present Russian zone of Austria and in Hungary.

The last known statistics for gas production in absolute figures in Rumania date from 1947, when it reached 1,176 million cubic meters; in Poland (which lost to Russia two thirds of its oil fields) from 1948, when it was 162 million cubic meters; and in Hungary from 1947, when it was 100 million cubic meters; and in Austria from 1949, when it was 59 million cubic meters. The Rumanian output was then small in comparison with its peak in 1936, when it reached 2,130 million cubic meters. Since 1947-1949 no figures for natural gas extraction have been published by any captive or Soviet-controlled country, and some of the percentile indices disclosed by these countries are contradictory. There are reasons to assume, however, that there has been since 1947 a steady though slow increase of that production in Hungary and a much more rapid one in Poland and Rumania.

315 185 433 Thus, the increase of Polish production in 1950 over that in 1949 was officially described as "an enormous jump" and the output of gas in the third quarter of 1951 was alleged to have been 173 percent of that the whole year before. In Rumania the 1950 output increased, according to the official press, by 24 percent in comparison with that of 1949, and the output of the first half of 1951 was alleged to have been larger by one third than that of the first half of 1950.[30] It is not possible to check these assertions, but they may correspond to the truth. Rumania would not be building three plants for the chemical processing of gas unless there were good reasons for expecting an increase in the extraction of gas.

[185] According to their long-range plans, which officially terminate in 1955 but are expected to be fulfilled by 1954, Rumania anticipates extracting 3,900 million cubic meters of natural gas, and Poland 480 million meters. These targets are moderate in comparison with those foreseen for oil extraction. The Hungarian target for 1954 is unknown, and so is the Soviet plan for Austria. The Czech output is negligible. A hypothetical figure of some 5,000 million cubic meters of natural gas, almost entirely dependent on the unpredictable Rumanian output, is the best that can be surmised for the entire captive area in 1954.

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SYNTHETIC FUELS

With its comparative shortage of petroleum and its abundance of hard fuel, the captive area of Europe is capable — at least in part — of replacing natural liquid fuel by a synthetic one. The majority of German synthetic oil plants, not all of them completed before the end of the last war, were situated in the present Soviet-controlled area.[81] Out of thirty-two German-built plants of this kind, eleven were situated in the present Soviet zone of Germany, one in Bohemia, and five in present-day Poland. The first group of these plants utilized lignite or low grade coal according to the Bergius method. The plants in this group were generally built on a large scale and included the famous Leuna plant (one million ton capacity), the Magdeburg plant (600,000 ton capacity), two plants at Lützkendorf, the Zeitz and Böhlen plants in Eastern Germany; the Most (Brüx, one million ton capacity) plant in Bohemia, the Police (Pölitz, 600,000 ton capacity) near Stettin in Pomerania, two large plants under construction near Blachownia (Blechhammer) in Upper Silesia, and another plant under construction at Dwory near Oświęcim (Auschwitz) in Poland. Another group of plants, generally much smaller ones, utilized lignite by the Fischer-Tropsch method. Included were five plants in Saxony near Dresden and Leipzig, and a plant under construction near Blachownia. The three Blachownia plants and that of Dwory, construction of which started only when the Western German plants began to suffer from Allied bombing, were never finished and yielded only a fraction of the oil they were expected to produce.

Synthetic oil-producing in "Greater" Germany during World War II rose to the rank of an enormous industry. In 1939 Germany produced slightly over two million metric tons of

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382 synthetic oil; at the end of 1943, despite increasingly heavy Allied strafing from the air, this output increased to over six million tons, almost 80 percent of which was produced by the Bergius method. More than half, and possibly as much as three quarters of that oil, was produced in the present captive area, mainly by the Leuna, Most, and Pölitz plants. At that time the synthetic oil plants were consuming 16 percent of all electric power produced by "Greater" Germany, and used 10 million tons of coal and 60 million tons of lignite per year.

Nearly all these plants were heavily damaged during the last months of the war and some of them, like Pölitz, practically [727] destroyed from the air.[32] When the Russians moved into the present captive area in 1945, they dismantled all Polish and many German plants and sent their installations to Russia. The Most plant, taken intact, was declared war trophy and subsequently returned to the Czech government in exchange for the Jachymov uranium mines nearby.[33] All remaining German plants were taken over by the Soviet "state trusts." Several of these plants, like Zeitz and Schwarzheide, belong to the Soviet trust, "Synthese," while Leuna and Lützkendorf constitute special units. Though situated in German territory, the synthetic oil plants are operated under Russian management and may be considered for all practical purposes as Soviet property.

It is difficult to appraise the present capacity and production of the synthetic oil plants in the captive area, since information on this type of production is a closely guarded state secret. It is known, however, that the Leuna, Zeitz, Böhlen, and one of the two Lützkendorf plants in Eastern Germany,[34] as well as the Most plant in Bohemia and the Dwory plant in Poland, do produce synthetic oil on a much lesser scale than during the last war. They also produce the innumerable by-products made by plants of this kind. Speaking on the subject in January 1951, the Eastern German minister of heavy industry, Selbmann, said that he was proud of the "balance-sheet" of this type of industry and its performance in 1950: the annual plan was overfulfilled by 16 percent, with particularly good results at Leuna and

Lützkendorf; the former was producing good automobile gasoline with 68 octane rating, and the latter turbine and other oils.[35] 382

According to the Five Year Plan as revised by the law of 1 November 1951, Eastern Germany produced in 1950, in round figures, 455,000 tons of gasoline and 439,000 tons of Diesel fuel, that is, 894,000 tons of synthetic liquid fuel.[36] There are reasons to assume that in practice this output might have been larger. The previously mentioned American source[37] estimates that in 1950 Eastern Germany produced 945,000 tons of oil, Czechoslovakia 350,000 tons, and Poland 135,000 tons, a total of 1,430,000 tons.

The official long-range plans for the two countries anticipate a Czech production of 525,000 tons of synthetic oil in 1953,[38] and an Eastern German production of 927,000 tons of gasoline and 650,000 tons of Diesel fuel by 1955;[39] that is, 2,092,000 tons of synthetic liquid fuel. To these figures must be added the undisclosed output of the Polish plants. The latter will depend largely on the amount of steel the Warsaw government will be able to assign to the construction of Polish plants; it is known that coal hydrogenation installations require a tremendous amount of steel. It may be that the total plan for the production of synthetic oil by 1954-1955 exceeds 2,500,000 tons. In fact, it may well be that the Eastern German plan underestimates the production anticipated by 1955: while it is in the Soviet interest to exaggerate for propaganda purposes the achievements and targets for all naturally produced sources of fuel and power in the captive area, the contrary may be true in respect to synthetic oil, if only for strategic purposes.

The captive area is capable of producing at least twice and perhaps even three times as much synthetic oil as projected in the long-range plans for its three northern countries. Even now, the capacity of several large synthetic oil plants, in particular of Leuna[40] and Most, exceeds by far the actual production. But the production of synthetic oil demands huge quantities of electric power and hard fuel, and until such power and lignite or coal are available for this particular purpose, the extension or

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352 even full utilization of the present plant capacity would be of little practical use. Another factor is that the cost of producing synthetic oil is very high in comparison with the cost of natural petroleum: a gallon of synthetic gasoline produced at the Most plant may cost as much as one dollar. Furthermore, Polish and Czech specialists in this domain are very few. Should the need of increasing the present production arise, however, the German and Czech plants are capable of much extension; the Dwory plant is being enlarged now, and the rebuilding of one of the Blachownia plants will probably be much advanced in the course of the present Polish Six Year Plan.[41]

Apart from synthetic oil, the captive area produces large quantities of benzol and industrial alcohol, both of which may be used as motor propellants. Eastern German, Czech, and Polish benzol producing capacity may at present exceed 200,000 tons per year and is capable of further increase.[42] The northern half of the captive area is the greatest potato producing area of the world, with a total output more than four times as large as that of the United States (in 1948, 49 million tons as against 12 million in the United States), and thus it is the largest potential producer of alcohol.[43] Current statistical data for alcohol production are not available.

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ELECTRIC POWER

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ELECTRIFICATION was Lenin's panacea for poverty and backwardness, and much of this belief has been accepted as gospel by the satellite governments, in particular those of the Balkan states. This theoretical attitude does not differ from that adopted in practice throughout the world. All over the globe, the installed capacity of the generators and the total production of electric energy have been increasing with great rapidity, especially during the last twenty-five years. The captive countries, with the obvious exception of Eastern Germany, have been under-invested in electric energy for a long time and thus have lagged considerably behind Western Europe. As their thermal and water power resources are on the whole no less than those of Western Europe, the extra emphasis on the output of electric energy by the present satellite governments can and should lead, within their current long-range plans, to a striking increase in that production. New hydroelectric plants will of course produce new energy, while the output of the new thermal plants will, as is commonly accepted, represent at least one-fifth more power than that which would be produced by direct combustion of the same amount of hard and liquid fuels. Without a sufficiently high output of electric energy, the huge chemical plants under construction in the captive area, the planned aluminum and special steel plants, and the railroads about to be electrified could not possibly be operated.

Coal and lignite are, and for a long time will be, supplying the great bulk of electric power in the captive area, since water power has not been hitherto sufficiently developed. The potential hydroelectric capacity of the area is very high in the Danube basin. Excluding Germany and Austria, it is evaluated at nearly 17 million kilowatts, *i.e.*, as much as that of the four Pacific coast rivers in the United States. The Vistula, the Oder, the

Elbe, and the lesser Balkan rivers with their affluents within the present captive area are supposed to have a potential capacity of some 3 million kilowatts.[44] A large part of the Danube capacity is located in Yugoslavia, outside the captive area proper, and the great plan for harnessing the Danube at the Iron Gate — almost an equivalent of the Tennessee Valley system — is out of the question as long as Rumania and Yugoslavia, sharing the banks of the Iron Gate, do not cooperate on construction, which can only be a joint one. Yet with water power at the exclusive disposal of the satellite governments much can be done, and has already been done, to raise the percentage of energy produced thus far by hydroelectric plants.

In Eastern Germany the last hydroplants destroyed during the war, such as the regional plants of Niederwartha and Hohenwarte, are expected to be rebuilt soon, and plans are being made for the erection of new ones.[45] In Czechoslovakia, the huge Slapy plant on the Vltava River was completed in 1950, and another at Nošice in Slovakia is being built, in addition to a series of lesser hydroelectric plants at the Vah River; plans are being made for the erection of a huge plant on the Danube near Komárno, with a capacity of 500,000 kilowatts (the capacity of the famous Dnieper Dam is 558,000 kilowatts), and of another large plant on the Vltava River near Prague, supposed to supply power to Central Bohemia;[46] and power has second priority after the Big Ostrava metallurgical plant at Kunčice.[47] In Hungary a large hydroelectric plant is about to be completed at Tiszalök on the Tisza River; it is supposed to supply power to Eastern Hungary.[48] In Poland the Dychów (Deichow) plant on the Bober River, left unfinished by the Nazis, was already in production during the summer of 1951; when finished early in 1952, it will be the largest plant of its kind in Poland, and it will supply current to Lower Silesia and the Stettin area.[49] In Bulgaria two new hydroelectric plants of medium capacity on the Maritsa River were completed in 1950-1951, several more were supposed to be finished before the end of 1951, and thirty more plants of this type are supposed to be built within the

present Five Year Plan.[50] In that country as in Rumania, electrification, based on water power, is regarded as the cornerstone of future industrialization, in accordance with an early Lenin formula for the Soviet Union. A Ten Year 1951-1960 Electrification Plan was recently adopted in Rumania, based in part upon the plans of the prewar Rumanian governments. The only one of its kind in the captive area, this plan anticipates the energy generating capacity of Rumania to reach 2.6 million kilowatts in 1960, *i.e.*, to be almost quadrupled. A hydroelectric plant at Stejar on the Bistritsa River is to be the main plant, with a planned output of 430 million kilowatt hours.[51]

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The erection of hydroelectric plants is a slow business, and that is why a number of large thermal plants with much greater capacity will be constructed before the former are fully completed. It would be tedious to enumerate the projects now in construction or in the blueprint stage, the more so because they are not of comparable size and the available information about them is not sufficient. But some of the new thermal plants will apparently be huge. Among them are the great plants of Bergdorf, Kraftwerke Elbe, and Drattendorf in Eastern Germany, with a capacity of 150,000, 288,000 and 450,000 kilowatts respectively, not to mention the lesser projects. Kraftwerke Elbe has been given highest priority among all heavy industrial plants, the building or extension of which is foreseen in the economic plan for 1951.[52] Eastern Germany will spend 1.5 billion marks on the building of new electric plants in the course of its long-range plan, and the 1950 installed capacity is expected to be increased by 2,782,000 kilowatts by 1955.[53] In Czechoslovakia the Most plant, with a capacity of 350,000 kilowatts; the Ervěnice plant, supposed to cover the requirements of Prague and vicinity; the Třebovice plant for the Big Ostrava steel combine; the Barbara plant serving the Karvinna coal mines; and the Nováky plant for western Slovakia and another supposed to serve the HUKO steel combine now under construction in eastern Slovakia, will all be a very large size.[54] The huge Jaworzno II thermal plant, expected to be put in commission

377 in 1952, will supply power for the new Cracow industrial region in Poland (the Nowa Huta steel combine, etc.); the present plants at Chorzów, Laziska, and Zabrze (Hindenburg), all in Upper Silesia, are being considerably extended; and the Miechowice plant near Bytom (Beuthen) now under construction is supposed to become ultimately one of the largest thermal plants in Europe; another plant of very large capacity is being built at Zeran near Warsaw. The Mátravidéki Erönü and Inóta plants in Hungary, and three plants in Rumania, including the one supposed to supply power to the Hunedoara steel combine, are also large plants under construction or already put in commission. At least fifteen plants are under construction, each of which will have a capacity exceeding 100,000 kilowatts and some as much as 450,000 kilowatts. The Dwory plant in Poland, which is being built jointly by the Poles and the Czechs and is expected to send a part of its output of current across the frontier to Czechoslovakia, will have an initial capacity of 140,000 kilowatts.[55] The Inóta plant in Hungary and the Zabrze plant in Poland are being built by the Czechs and will have Czech machinery. In many other plants, except in Eastern Germany and Czechoslovakia, the generators will allegedly come from Russia and will be installed (or have already been installed) by Russian specialists — at least that is what the local press repeats *ad infinitum*. Some of the largest plants under construction will not reach their full capacity before the termination of the present long-range plans and will apparently be extended further after 1955. All new thermal plants are supposed to work on lignite, low grade coal, and coal waste;[56] a large plant at Wizna in Poland, still in the blueprint stage, is supposed to work directly on peat. Many power plants in Poland are being connected by high tension grid, as they are already in Eastern Germany and the Czech provinces.

The following table illustrates the past, present, and planned output of electric energy in the captive countries:[57]

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Electric Energy In Captive Countries, 1930-1955

	1930	1943	1949	1950	Planned	Planned per capita
	(In millions of kilowatt hours)					*(In kwh)*
Bulgaria	95	340	815		1,800 *(1953)*	225
Czechoslovakia	2,993	6,660	7,514	9,100	16,500 *(1955)*	1,180
Eastern Germany	*c.* 10,000	*c.* 27,000	16,500	18,343	33,414 *(1955)*	1,755
Hungary	715	1,806	2,200		6,000-6,500 *(1954)*	630-680
Poland	2,906		8,146	9,540	19,300 *(1955)*	745
Rumania	550	1,271	2,500	2,766	4,700 *(1955)*	275
Total	*c.* 17,259		*c.* 37,675		81,700-82,200	870

It should be borne in mind that the Bulgarian plan is expected to be fulfilled by the end of 1951 or shortly afterwards,[58] and the Eastern German, Polish, and Rumanian plans, supposed to terminate in 1955, are being speeded up so as to be implemented ahead of schedule. With that correction, which influences the computation of the total, it can be seen that the total production of electric power in the captive area, which in 1930 somewhat exceeded 17 billion kilowatt hours and went up in 1949 to nearly 38 billion, is expected to reach about 82 billion kilowatt hours by the end of 1954 or the beginning of 1955.[59]

The 82 billion kilowatt hours of the planned production may be compared with 74 billion kilowatt hours reached in 1943 by Germany, 58 billion of the British production in 1951, and the estimated 1950 output of the Soviet Union of about 90.5 billion kilowatt hours.[60] The long-range target of power production in the Soviet Union is not known. The planned per capita production, averaging 870 kilowatt hours for the entire area, may be compared with the 1949 per capita production (in round figures) of the following countries: Italy 460, France 730, the United Kingdom 1,030, and the United States 2,300.[61] The per

377 capita production of electric power in the Soviet Union in 1950 did not exceed 430 kilowatt hours.

The satellite governments' plans for increasing the output of electric power are ambitious and farfetched. If they are implemented, the results of their fulfillment would by themselves exert a far-reaching and lasting influence upon the economy of the captive nations. Are they being fulfilled? The official statistics of the captive countries seem to confirm that thus far the planned rate of increase of the output of power in the captive area, with the exception of Czechoslovakia, has been maintained. Even in Czechoslovakia, which by the middle of 1951 had fulfilled only 94 percent of its plan for the first half of the year, the output of power is increasing in absolute figures. Thus in the first half of 1951, in comparison with the same period of 1950, the output of power is claimed to have increased by 6 percent in Poland, by 7 percent in Eastern Germany, by 10.7 percent in Czechoslovakia, by 15 percent in Rumania, by 19 percent in Hungary, and by 28 percent in Bulgaria. An output of far more power is anticipated in 1952, when a number of new large plants now under construction will be put into motion. Power production is one of the few major industries in captive Europe which has not yet suffered from the slowing down of general production since the summer of 1951. Of course, the lag in the output of coal in Czechoslovakia and Hungary and in the heavy electric machine building in Eastern Germany, as well as the present acute shortage of foodstuffs in most of the captive area, may sooner or later also have an adverse influence on the production of power and thus delay the execution of the long-range plans. But total states where the human element is but one factor of production have been known to mobilize all possible resources, regardless of cost in men or material, to fulfill their key targets. Power is undoubtedly one of the key targets.

Even if the present plans are entirely successful, only the western half of the captive area, approximately to the Danzig-Warsaw-Budapest line, will reach the relative saturation level in electric power which is one of the features of the progressive

Western European countries. The possible demand for current 377
in wide areas of Poland and Hungary, as well as all over Rumania
and Bulgaria, will remain very largely unfulfilled. There are
many indications that the satellite governments intend to deal
with this problem in subsequent long-range plans.

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A SUMMARY OF ENERGY RESOURCES

371 A computation is possible — admittedly a tentative and approximate one — of the total sum of energy, *i.e.*, fuel and power, which the captive area of Europe expects to possess at the end of its several long-rang plans — more or less, by the end of 1954 or beginning of 1955. Such a computation can be made in terms of coal, in accordance with the ratios of conversion used in the statistical calculations of the United Nations.[62]

Considering all the secondary sources of energy (coke, manufactured gas, synthetic oil, thermal electric energy) as proceeding from the primary sources of energy (coal, lignite, petroleum, natural gas, hydroelectricity), the tentative table of the total primary energy of the captive area can be represented by the following figures:

Coal	133	million tons
Lignite	85	" " of coal equivalent
Petroleum	17.5	" " " " "
Natural Gas	6	" " " " "
Hydroelectricity	12	" " " " "
	Total: 253.5	million tons of coal equivalent

These figures cannot, of course, be taken literally, since they are based on too many assumptions and arbitrary ratios of conversion, nor can they serve as a basis for any further computations. Their value lies in showing a student of the problem the proportions between the main components of the total sum of energy which the captive countries expect to possess as a basis for their industrial activity. Coal represents somewhat more than one half, lignite one third, and petroleum and natural gas not quite one tenth of that total energy. The table also permits the

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conclusion that more than one fifth of the total primary energy will by 1954-1955 be changed into electric power.[63] 371

Geographically speaking, the table shows that, in the domain of fuel and power, the Silesian-Ostravan coal basin represents about half the primary energy which the captive area expects to possess by 1954-1955, and far more than half the primary and secondary energy taken together. Very roughly speaking, Poland expects to produce by 1954-1955 about 40 percent of the total primary energy of the captive area, Eastern Germany more than 25 percent, Czechoslovakia about 20 percent, Rumania about 8 percent, and Hungary about 4 percent.[64]

It must be stressed once again that all these computations are highly approximate, and that they concern the *production* of fuel and power by the captive area and individual countries. The *consumption* of energy by the captive area and its components would be expressed by a quite different set of figures. Approximately one fourth of the coal produced in Poland and possibly more than half the petroleum produced by the area are being exported to Russia, Western Europe, and in lesser quantities to South America and the Middle East.[65] Some electric energy is sold by Western Germany to the Soviet zone,[66] and the Soviet Union will be supplying coke to Eastern Germany and possibly to Rumania. Also the figures for consumption of energy by the individual captive states would be quite different from the above-quoted national figures of production of energy. The computation of these figures lies outside the scope of the present study.

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AN APPRAISAL

371 FUEL and power are the basis of every industrial activity. Any increase in fuel and power production must of necessity be a rather slow business: new mines and electric plants, in particular those working on water power, cannot be built on short notice, and an increase in existing capacity is generally limited by technical conditions. Consequently, production of the overwhelming proportion of electric power in the captive area depends on the fuel available for the thermic plants producing the current. The Communist planners in the captive countries, constantly prodded by their Russian supervisers to produce more and more heavy industrial goods, have inaugurated very bold long-range economic plans which they themselves probably regard as not quite reachable. Irrespective of other material and human factors which influence and condition industrial production, such targets can be achieved only if sufficient fuel and power is produced by the captive area. If this essential premise fails, ambitious plans for machine building and chemical production will not be fulfilled.

Considered from this angle, the present level of fuel production — particularly of coal — in most of the captive area has not been very satisfactory ever since 1950, *i.e.*, since the initial stage of the several long-range economic plans. Apart from this apparently enduring insufficiency, a new reason for doubting that the fuel plans will be executed has arisen since the summer of 1951. The production of coal in the four central countries of the captive area (Czechoslovakia, Hungary, Poland, and Rumania) is directly threatened by a different sort of crisis, the first of its kind in this part of Europe since its submission to Soviet control. This is the acute shortage of foodstuffs. Both issues will be considered.

"The output of coal increased in 1950 by 5 percent in comparison with that of 1949. Industrial production as such increased by 30.8 percent in comparison with 1949. It follows that industry grows far more rapidly than the production of fuel. At the same time, railroad transportation increases more rapidly than the output of coal. The demand of the market for coal as domestic fuel is also increasing . . . in 1950, the consumption of domestic coal was nearly 3.5 times as large as prewar. . . . At the same time, the demand for coal for exportation remains unchanged. . . . In that situation, the problem of increasing the output of coal, of fulfilling and overfulfilling the plan, must become one of the central issues of our work in 1951." This quotation comes from a speech of Hilary Minc, the economic master of Poland, which he delivered in February 1951, to introduce the economic plan for 1951.[67] There is no doubt that these words apply equally well to Czechoslovakia and all the other captive countries. 371

Probably the best economic brain behind the Iron Curtain, Minc realizes very well the danger of the situation. In his speech he offered a number of remedies: new investments (*i.e.*, new mines), higher mechanization and increased efficiency in organization and labor. There is no doubt, again, that as long as the discrepancy between the supply of coal and the demand for it by industry and transport remains the only reason for worry by the Polish or any other satellite government, these measures, which are already being applied, can improve the performance of the mines and increase the output of coal. Statistics show that output has been increasing in Poland by about 4 million tons per annum (1948: 70 million tons; 1949: 74 million; 1950: 78 million tons). But this rate of increase appears to be insufficient. Unless it can be accelerated, the target of 100 million tons of coal by 1955 (in practice, by 1954) will not be achieved. Moreover, even if this goal should be achieved, the planned output would not cover the demand as described by Minc. [185]

It is a fact that even if the Communist economy functions at an optimum "normal" level the efficiency of labor in coal mining 316

316 and oil extracting cannot be raised above a certain point, lower than that of the prewar period, whatever the achievements in other branches in industry. Polish coal miners were the best in Europe: in 1937 the per capita production of coal was 0.8 tons daily in France and Belgium, 1.2 tons in Great Britain, 1.6 tons in Holland, 1.5 tons in Germany, and 1.8 tons in Poland; that of Polish Silesia was 2.0 tons daily.[68] Since the last war, despite great efforts, moral persuasion and flattery, and the bonuses, uniforms and medals with which the Warsaw government has cajoled the coal miners, at the same time threatening them with police reprisals, the individual productivity of the coal miners has never reached its prewar level. The postwar per capita production in Poland has never exceeded 75 to 80 percent of prewar figures,[69] and until the crisis of 1951 that level could have been regarded as more or less fixed. The performance of the Czech, Hungarian, and Rumanian coal miners has been, if anything, lower.

Even before the present crisis, since human nature cannot be influenced beyond a certain point, the satellite governments knew that they must replace the ineffective men by effective machinery. In this they have followed the experience of the Soviet Union, which for years had been suffering from the fluidity and inefficiency of labor in mining. There is much to be done in this respect. All over the captive area many mines are technically obsolete and not sufficiently mechanized, and production continues to depend in the last analysis on the human element. In these mines new methods of production are being introduced. Underground traction is being electrified, transmission belts installed, and machinery for winding and hoisting, sizing and washing is being introduced. Soviet mechanical coal cutters, the so-called Donbas coal combines, are expected gradually to replace the more antiquated methods of coal cutting.[70]

185 316 The best possibility for the satellite governments to increase the output of coal lies in the expected production of the new "scientific" coal mines which are being built in the course of the present long-range plans. Within its Six Year Plan

Poland alone anticipates the construction of eleven large mines 185
with a total annual output of 9 million tons of coal, and 36 exten- 316
sions of the existing mines with an output of 14 million tons. Of the former, 8 mines are presently under construction, each of them expected to produce 6 to 10 thousand tons of coal daily.[71] More money was invested in Polish coal mining in 1950 than during the years 1945-49 inclusive, and the 1951 investment is far larger than that of 1950.[72] Similar investments in the other captive countries are being made with increasing rapidity.

While the output of coal has been stimulated by all these 316
methods, efforts are being made to restrain the consumption of coal and to insure more efficient utilization. Since the middle of 1950, saving coal, in particular coal of good quality, has become one of the basic aims of the captive area's economy. The daily press eulogizes engineers and technicians who manage to operate factories and run trains on minimum quantities of coal or on low grade coal. All over the captive area, railroads and industrial plants substitute lignite or coal waste for hard coal fuel. In Soviet Berlin alone, the substitution of lignite for coal at the Klingenberg power plant will result in the saving of 500,000 tons of hard coal per annum.[73] At the same time electrification is being speeded up, since it will result in a lesser expenditure of fuel. During the last war, when the Nazis were faced with a grave fuel shortage, the "heat-engineers"[74] charged with this problem by the minister of armaments, Speer, introduced far-reaching improvements in the exploitation of the hydroelectric and thermal plants and saved up to 50 percent of the fuel and current.[75] Many of these men are available behind the Iron Curtain and, together with their colleagues from the other captive countries and with Soviet advisers, they are doing their best to wring the most they can from the local resources. When Selbmann, minister of heavy industry, states that the Eastern German thermal plants have reached the outside limit of load capacity,[76] the statement must be taken at its face value.

This analysis of the situation seems to lead to the conclusion 316
that under "normal" conditions the Communist regimes of cap- 433

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316 tive Middle Europe can gradually increase their output of coal,
433 and thus can assure a constant growth of their basic source of industrial energy. Much progress in that direction can be made through high investments and multiple technical improvements, as well as by better organization of production. But the "normal" conditions presuppose that the targets for coal output remain within the range of feasibility and the miners are assured of a minimum acceptable standard of living. In the course of 1951, either one or both of these conditions were not kept by most of the satellite governments, and the planned output of coal is at present exposed to considerable danger.

In February-March 1951, under relentless pressure from Moscow, the Czechoslovak and Hungarian governments were forced to decree a notable speed-up of their long-range industrial plans, equivalent to boosting their annual quotas of production from the beginning of 1951. The Czech 1953 target for coal has been increased from 20.8 to 25 million tons and that of lignite from 32.2 to 38.6 million; the Hungarian 1954 target for both coal and lignite from 24.2 to 27.5 million tons. *Ipso facto*, the annual targets for 1951, 1952, and future years, have been boosted accordingly. Since the old targets were already high, it is perfectly legitimate to doubt whether these new plans can be fulfilled in time. In the light of recent statistical data, Czech coal mining is fulfilling the old plan but not the inflated new one. The same seems to be true in Hungary.

433 Quite apart from the real or apparent unfeasibility of the
511 two coal plans in question, the recent acute food shortage in
466 most of the captive area (except in Eastern Germany and possibly Bulgaria) has resulted, since the early fall of 1951, in an appreciable lowering of the standard of living of all industrial workers, and of coal miners in particular. The reasons for this food shortage are many: one of them is a long period of drought in most of the captive area and the consequent loss of much of the potato crop, the staple food of the population. Even if the bread grain crops were satisfactory, the shortage of potatoes would be a major calamity for men and animals alike, and by

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itself would lead to a shortage of meat, especially pork. This 433
current emergency caught the satellite governments unprepared, 511
the more so because they had been stripping their countries of 466
foodstuffs by military stockpiling, sending vast amounts of meat, sugar, and other staples to Russia and Red China, and antagonizing the peasant producers of food by ever increasing taxes, supply quotas, and other forms of persecution and chicanery. The net consequence of such policies and practices is that in many industrial areas of captive Middle Europe the people have had very little meat since the summer of 1951. Their supply of sugar, vegetables, and potatoes has also been very short. The Polish, Czech, Hungarian, and Rumanian coal miners were already badly housed, badly clothed, and overworked. Now they are also badly fed, and they may be — or actually are — incapable of working as much as is expected. The lowered efficiency of the miners means less coal and less coal means in turn less electric power, less machinery, and less chemicals. A shortage of fuel may be equivalent to a nonfulfillment of industrial targets all over the four countries in question.

Statistical data naturally lag behind the real situation in industry. At the end of 1951 the available statistical figures were not yet fully reflecting the most serious consequences of the food crisis. However, they were indicative of a trend toward a depression in coal mining.

In Poland the coal target for the third quarter of 1951 was 316
not fulfilled, and the actual production was only 2 percent higher 433
than a year before, instead of the expected 5 to 6 percent. During the first half of 1951 coal extraction in Rumania was nearly 8 percent behind the plan, although it was claimed to be 26 percent above the output during the corresponding period of 1950. In the same period in Hungary coal was 6 percent behind the schedule, although again production was claimed to be 22 percent higher than 1950. In Czechoslovakia the slump in coal production was much more pronounced. It began by a temporary failure of production towards the end of 1950; even though it was overcome, the Czech government found itself unable

316 to supply adequate supplementary manpower to the coal mines.
433 In the third quarter of 1951 the joint coal and lignite plan was fulfilled only by 91 percent. Lignite mining was more or less satisfactory, but coal mining (in particular in the important Ostrava-Karvinna coal basin) was actually on the verge of a possible breakdown; by the end of October 1951, Czech coal production was 1.3 million tons behind schedule. Eastern Germany alone was implementing its coal plan.

[466] Faced with a direct threat to their planning, the satellite governments took, towards the end of 1951, a series of harsh steps. Their object was to assure higher wages and a better diet for the coal miners and to prevent the increasing absenteeism and bad discipline in the mines, as well as the increasing fluidity of manpower (in particular in Czechoslovakia and Hungary). Under the impact of these measures, the production curve in the all-important Silesian-Ostravan coal basin went upwards again in November and December 1951. It is possible that the Polish coal target for 1951 (somewhat above 83 million tons) was reached before the end of the year. It is doubtful, however, that the Czech target was reached. In the first weeks of 1952 it is too early to say whether this new production rise is temporary or permanent. It depends very largely on the supply of foodstuffs. The police states have at their disposal many effective methods of dealing with critical situations, but they cannot produce foodstuffs at will. It took the Soviet government years to overcome a similar situation in the Donets basin coal mining.

316 The production of lignite in the captive area is far less difficult for the satellite governments, in particular for Eastern Germany, which mines several times more lignite than all the other countries of Middle Europe combined. The explanation lies in the technique of extraction. The deposits of lignite generally lie close to the surface of the ground and can be worked by stripping and scraping from open mines, or they are covered by a shallow overburden[77] that must be removed before the mineral can be mined, as is true of some coal deposits in the United States. Only one fortieth of the nearly unlimited reserves of lignite in Eastern

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Germany (in particular in Saxon Lusace, or Lausitz) has to be mined from deep pits; the rest of it, lying on the surface or in shallow strata up to a depth of 165 feet, can be worked from open mines.[78] The main difficulty lies in removing and carrying away the overburden of soil, sand, and gravel; at present this sometimes amounts to as much as 12 to 15 times the volume of lignite extracted. Unlike those of coal, many lignite seams are very thick.

Most of the shallow strata of lignite are gradually being exhausted, and the ratio of overburden to lignite is slowly but surely increasing. However, many difficult technical and social problems of coal mining do not apply to lignite mining in the northern part of the captive area. This is also true, though not to the same extent, in Hungary and Rumania. The extraction of lignite, in particular in Eastern Germany, does not depend so much on an adequate supply of skilled miners as on machinery, and can be speeded up in proportion to the investment in mechanical excavators and transportation.[79] During the last war the Nazis stepped up the output of lignite by machinery and were able to cover huge requirements for electric power as well as for synthetic oil and rubber. Under present circumstances, the planned quotas for lignite in Eastern Germany and possibly Czechoslovakia can be met assumedly without too much difficulty. This may also be true for some deposits in the southern captive countries. Consequently, thermal electric plants in a large part of the captive area seem to be assured of a sufficient amount of fuel. It is true that hitherto lignite could not have been used in smelting, but the huge iron and steel "West-Kombinat" under construction at Calbe-on-the-Saale in Sachsen-Anhalt will be working exclusively on lignite.[80]

The oil production of the captive area depends on factors which are difficult to assess. The reserves of coal in the area are for all practical purposes unlimited, and new investments in coal and lignite mining, together with a propitiatory attitude towards labor, will always result in more coal being extracted. The pro-

315 duction of oil is different: there is no guarantee that new investments will produce oil. On the eve of World War II, the Polish oil fields were regarded as being gradually exhausted: between 1900 and 1938 their annual production fell from some 4 million metric tons to 0.5 million. The production of the much richer Rumanian oil fields fell from a peak of 8.7 million tons in 1936 to 5.2 million tons in 1943, and the prevailing technical opinion was that they had passed their production peak. The point of departure of the current long-range plans is that the new oil fields in Albania, Czechoslovakia, and Hungary (and Austria as well) can be developed almost at will, and that the exhaustion of the oil fields in Rumania and Poland can be halted and that production can be stimulated. The satellite governments and the Soviet experts who manage most of the oil fields take for granted that they contain much untapped oil, and that it can and will be extracted. More effort than ever before is being expended in the search for new sources of oil and in full exploitation of the [185] existing wells. According to the Rumanian Five Year Plan about five million feet of new drilling will be made in 1955, while in the top production year of 1936 new drilling reached only one million feet.[81] According to the same plan Rumania will manufacture most of its own oil mining machinery and make the installations in its plants. Altogether the equivalent of 860 million dollars will be invested in the Rumanian oil industry in the course of the current plan.[82] As noted above, the oil production hitherto obtained does not seem to confirm such optimism, especially in view of the fact that since the summer of 1951 the situation in the Rumanian oil fields as well as in the others, has been much complicated by the food crisis.

371 To sum up: after consideration of all data pertaining to fuel and power production in the captive area of Europe, both actual and planned, the following conclusions can be made. If the satellite governments do not fundamentally revise their attitude towards labor, especially during the present food crisis, and unless rapid technical and organizational progress is attained in hard coal extraction, the coal shortage may develop into a bottle-

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neck which will seriously threaten the plans for other branches of heavy industry. Throughout the captive area, with the exception of Eastern Germany, this is a grave problem. Whether it can be solved is an open question. The prospect for lignite is satisfactory. On the other hand, it seems improbable that oil targets will be achieved, mainly because of the present situation in the Rumanian oil fields. The production of electric power projected in the several long-range plans can be achieved without much difficulty if based on lignite and low grade coal which cannot be used for other purposes; with difficulty if based upon high grade coal, the supply of which may be insufficient. If based on water power, the production of electric power will depend largely on the investment in new hydroelectric plants.

[56 blank]

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FOOTNOTES

[1] Hilary Minc, *A Fruitful Collaboration of Free Peoples*, quoted after *Pravda*, Moscow, by *Zycie Gospodarcze* (Economic Life), Warsaw, 1951, No. 19. Minc states that, in comparison with 1938, the total industrial output in the first half of 1951 reached 165 percent in Czechoslovakia, 208 percent in Rumania, 268 percent in Poland, 273 percent in Hungary and 335 percent in Bulgaria, while that of Albania reached 423 percent in 1950. The 1938 level of the industrial output in the Soviet zone of Germany was exceeded towards the end of 1950, and by the middle of 1951 might have reached 115 percent of the 1938 production. 113 121

[2] Jean Chardonnet, *Les conséquences économiques de la guerre*, Paris, Hachette, 1947. [113]

[3] No detailed exact figures of the coal output in the Silesian-Ostravan basin can be given. It is not easy to distinguish it statistically from the global data of output in Poland and Czechoslovakia, both of which have coal mines outside of that basin. The annual and long-range plans of all captive countries are based only upon such global data and do not make distinction between the production of individual basins. 316 443

[4] Hungarian, Rumanian and Bulgarian statistics do not make sufficient distinction between black and brown coal. Figures concerning the coal output in these three countries are estimated according to the ratio between the output of the two kinds of coal as known from previous statistics. That ratio is supposed to be constant.

[5] During the third quarter of 1951 the plan for coal extraction in Eastern Germany was not entirely fulfilled, yet output increased by 11.5 percent in comparison with the corresponding quarter of 1950 (*Wirtschaft*, Berlin, 1951, No. 43). The minor Czech coal basins were by the end of September 1951, about 150,000 tons, *i.e.*, some 3 or 4 percent behind the prescribed target (speech by Premier Zápotocký, *Rude Pravo*, Prague, 1 November 1951). The Hungarian coal and lignite mines were 6 percent behind the plan for the second quarter of 1951, and 10 percent behind that for the third quarter (*Nepszava*, Budapest, 23 October 1951); yet an official report claimed that in the second quarter of 1951 the output of both black and brown coal exceeded by 22 percent that of the second quarter of 1950 (*Gospodarka Planowa*, Warsaw, 1951, No. 9); the Tatabánya black coal mines were responsible for almost half the coal deficit (speech by Rakosi, *Nepszava*, 23 October 1951). In Rumania the situation was apparently somewhat

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more favorable: although the output of black and brown coal was also lagging behind schedule, its extraction in the second quarter of 1951 was claimed to have exceeded that of the second quarter of 1950 by 26 percent (*Gospodarka Planowa*, 1951, No. 10). No detailed data are known for coal extraction in Bulgaria.

[6] 100 million tons (according to some indirect indices, 103 million) in Poland, 25 million in Czechoslovakia, 3.5 million in Eastern Germany, about 3 million in Hungary, about one million in Rumania, and about 0.5 million in Bulgaria. The Eastern German target, originally set at 4 million tons, was subsequently reduced to 3.5 million tons (the Law of 1 November 1951, *Wirtschaft*, Berlin, 1951, No. 44) — the only known instance of this kind. Yet various utterances of the chief planners in Poland and Rumania, and of Eastern Germany as well, leave little doubt that the long-range economic plans of these countries, supposed to terminate by the end of 1955, will be accelerated by one year, as has already happened with the Czechoslovak and Hungarian plans. In anticipation of that step, the writer assumes throughout his study that the figures of planned output in Eastern Germany, Poland, and Rumania in 1955 in fact pertain to 1954. An arbitrary but plausible figure of one million tons increase in the coal output in Czechoslovakia has been accepted for 1954 in comparison with the output planned for 1953.

[7] London *Economist*, 24 February 1951. According to the Soviet Fourth Five Year Plan, that figure should have been 86 million tons. Since the plan was overfulfilled, it was probably larger.

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[8] Most of the descriptive data on lignite comes from an exhaustive study by Sir Richard Redmayne, *Encyclopædia Britannica*, 1943, Vol. V. p. 878 ff.

[9] United Nations, Geneva, 1950, p. 231.

[10] Redmayne, *op. cit.*

[11] In its original version of 1950 the Eastern German Five Year Plan foresaw a production of 205 million tons of lignite by 1955. The new figure of 225.2 million tons in 1955 comes from the revised version of the plan as adoped in the law of 1 November 1951, (*Wirtschaft*, Berlin, No. 44, 2 November 1951).

[12] The first figure is based on the indices of the coal production in 1951 in comparison with the preceding years, as published by the Soviet press. The second comes from Stalin's speech of 9 February 1946.

[13] In his speech of 7 November 1951, Beria stated that in the course of the past several years the output of coal in the Soviet Union has been growing on the average of 24 million tons per year. (*Pravda*, 7 November 1951).

[14] The vast Lauchhammer lignite coking plant now under construction (and possibly some other new plants) is expected to produce 300,000

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tons of coke in 1952, 1,300,000 tons by 1953 and 1,700,000 tons by 1955 (speech of 31 October 1951, by Heinrich Rau, Eastern German minister of planning, *Wirtschaft*, Berlin, 1951, No. 44). However the rapidly growing requirements of the new Eastern German metallurgic plants cannot be satisfied by the two locally produced types of coke and a large importation of coke from Poland. In its four year trade agreement with the Soviet Union of 27 September 1951, the Eastern German government assured itself the importation of 250,000 tons of coke from Russia annually for the period 1952-1955 (*Wirtschaft*, Berlin, 1951, No. 42).

[16] An estimate of the writer, based on the assumption that most of the hard coal extracted in Eastern Germany and Hungary, as well as in Rumania, will be converted into coke. Thus, the huge steel plant at Dunapentele (Stalinváros) in Hungary, now under construction, is expected to be run on Hungarian produced coke, converted from the local Pécs coal. The demand for coke by that plant alone may exceed one million tons.

[17] *European Steel Trends*, United Nations, Geneva, 1949, p. 40.

[18] An unpublished study on Czechoslovak industry by Dr. V. Paulat of New York.

[19] National Economic Plan for 1951, *Dziennik Ustaw* (Journal of Laws), Warsaw, 31 March 1951.

[20] Heinrich Rau, speech of 31 October 1951, *Wirtschaft*, Berlin, 1951, No. 44.

[21] A conservative estimate of the writer.

[22] See the *Information Bulletin* of the Rumanian National Committee, Washington, for 1950 and 1951, and *La Nation Roumaine*, Paris, *passim*.

[23] Here are some of the non-quoted estimates: the *Review of International Affairs*, Belgrade, 28 March 1951 — 3.5 million tons; *World Today*, London, Royal Institute of International Affairs, April 1951 — 3.8 million; *Etudes et Conjonctures*, Paris, a semi-official publication, January-February 1951 — 4.3 million; *Gospodarka Planowa* (Planned Economy), Warsaw, February 1951 — 5.46 million tons. The Belgrade magazine is biased.

[24] The first figure comes from the Rumanian National Committee, *supra*, the second from Dr. G. G. Rosu.

[25] According to the *Wirtschaftsdienst*, Hamburg, June 1951, Albania planned to extract 306,000 tons of oil in 1950. According to Musil, the Albanian correspondent of *Wirtschaft* (Berlin, No. 48 of 30 November 1951), the Albanian extraction of oil reached 192,000 tons in 1948 and increased to 307,000 tons in 1950.

[26] Figures taken from recent official reports.

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315 [26] United Press from Vienna, quoted after *Anglo-Polish Review*, London,
135 October 1951.

[27] An estimate of the writer, shared by some other researchers.

[28] Stalin's speech of 9 February 1946.

[29] United Nations *Statistical Yearbook*, New York, 1949-50, p. 145. This is no longer true. In 1945 pipelines were laid to convey natural gas from Rumania to the Soviet Union.

[30] Data for Rumania and Poland taken from the official reports on the fulfillment of the annual and quarterly plans.

382 [31] Most of the data which follow are based upon Jean Chardonnet, *Les*
[113] *conséquences économiques de la guerre*, Paris, Hachette, 1947.

[32] J. A. Wilder, *Polish Regained Territories*, London, 1948.

[33] Dr. Paulat's study on the industrial development of Czechoslovakia, 1951.

[34] *Wirtschaft*, Berlin, *passim;* also advertisements in the Eastern German press.

[35] *Wirtschaft*, Berlin, 1951, No. 1.

[36] *Wirtschaft*, Berlin, 1951, No. 44 of November 2.

[37] See page 29.

[38] Speech of minister for planning, Dolanský, introducing the revised plan (end of February 1951).

[39] *Wirtschaft*, Berlin, 1951, No. 44 of November 2.

[40] Leuna plant employs 28,000 people, and is the greatest single plant in Eastern Germany. Karl Kühn (*Wirtschaft*, Berlin, 1951, No. 18) stated that Leuna could produce much more gasoline in 1950, because the installed capacity would permit such production, but that nitrogen-making had priority.

[41] Speech by Hilary Minc, *Trybuna Ludu*, Warsaw, 24 May 1951.

[42] United Nations *Statistical Yearbook*, New York, 1949-50. In 1937 Czechoslovakia produced 42,600 tons of benzol and Poland 31,100 tons; in 1936 Germany, outside the Bizone, produced 131,000 tons.

[43] *Ibidem*, p. 110.

37 [44] Professor H. Herbich, quoted by S. Rotarski, "The Unexploited Resources of Europe," in *Eastern Quarterly*, London, January 1950. The four rivers are the Columbia, Colorado, Sacramento, and San Joaquin.

[45] Speech by Heinrich Rau on 31 October 1951. See footnote 14.

[46] *Trybuna Ludu*, Warsaw, 24 October 1951.

[47] Dr. V. Paulat. See footnote 17.

[48] Exhaustive data on that problem in *Wirtschaft*, Berlin, 1950, No. 51.

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[49] *Trybuna Ludu*, Warsaw, 1951, No. 151. 37

[50] National Five Year Plan, *Drzhaven Vestnik* (Journal of Laws), Sofia, 18 January 1949.

[51] Full data in *Wirtschaft*, Berlin, 1950, No. 46. 377

[52] Speech by Rau. See footnote 14.

[53] *Ibidem.*

[54] Dr. V. Paulat.

[55] *Ibidem.*

[56] Data concerning the plants under construction in Poland, Hungary, and Rumania have been taken from various sources in the current press of these countries.

[57] The figures for 1930 and 1943 are taken from the United Nations *Statistical Yearbooks* and the planned figures from the national long-range plans. Those for 1949 and 1950, if not supplied by the *Statistical Yearbooks*, were gathered from a variety of sources in the press of the six captive nations and, indirectly, from interpretation of the plans, in particular those of Bulgaria and Hungary.

The 1930 and 1943 figures for Eastern Germany are estimates of the writer, based upon indirect indications; these figures include the part of Eastern Germany which became Polish in 1945. The power output of the present Soviet zone of Germany in 1938 reached 17.2 billion *kwh*, according to the United Nations *Economic Survey of Europe* in 1950. The Eastern German Five Year Plan, in its revised version of November 1951, foresees that the power output in 1955, to the extent of 33,414 million *kwh*, will be equal to 182.7 percent of the output of power in 1950; it follows that the latter reached 18,343 million *kwh*.

The planned per capita output was obtained by dividing the planned output in absolute figures by the estimated number for the population of a given country in a given year. The total population of the captive area (without Albania) at the beginning of 1951 was almost exactly 90 million; it is presumed that by 1955 it will exceed 94 million. The margin of error in this computation should not exceed, in the opinion of the writer, three to four percent.

From various indirect indications it can be surmised that, in 1951, Eastern Germany expects to reach a power output of about 21 billion *kwh*, Poland about 10.8 billion, and Hungary almost 3 billion. No such computation could be made for Bulgaria, Czechoslovakia, or Rumania on the basis of the material at the disposal of the writer.

[58] R. Damianov, *Bulgaria*, Sofia, 29 January 1951.

[59] The estimate of 82 billion *kwh* is but the sum of the six targets supposed to be reached on various dates. At the same time, it may be safely assumed that this figure does represent a joint target of the captive area to be reached by the end of 1954 or the beginning of 1955. The following reasons seem to lead to such a conclusion:

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377 1. It may be taken for granted that every effort will be made to fulfill the Eastern German, Polish, and Rumanian plans one year ahead of schedule, that is, by the end of 1954 or beginning of 1955.

2. It may be expected that, having fulfilled its plan for power by the end of 1951, Bulgaria will launch a new plan which may aim at an output of about one billion *kwh* more by the end of 1954 or the beginning of 1955 — an entirely justified supposition.

3. It is true that the output of 16.5 billion *kwh* which Czechoslovakia plans to reach in 1955 cannot be accepted as its target for 1954 or beginning of 1955, and a much lower figure should be taken instead.

4. But the larger Bulgarian and the lower Czechoslovakian figure may compensate one another, especially if a lower figure of the Hungarian output in 1954 (6,000 million *kwh* instead of 6,500 million) is accepted as the basis for the tentative computation.

Under the circumstances the writer regards the mere arithmetic sum of the six national targets, equivalent to more or less 82 billion *kwh*, as an entirely acceptable hypothesis: the margin of error should not exceed one billion *kwh*.

[60] Harry Schwartz, *New York Times*, 23 January 1951.

[61] Estimates of the writer.

371 [62] *Economic Survey of Europe in 1949*, United Nations, Geneva, 1950, p. 231.

[63] 82 billion *kwh* represent the equivalent of somewhat over 50 million tons of coal (1,590 *kwh* equivalent to one ton of coal, see footnote 62). This figure corresponds to a general figure for Europe; see p. 12 of the same *Survey*.

[64] Estimates of the writer.

[65] Silesian coal has been exported for generations, and trade in it flourished between the two World Wars. Industrial production and railroad transportation in the countries named depend to some extent on the specific technical quality of Polish coal.

[66] 800 million *kwh* from Hamburg and West Berlin, according to *Wirtschaftsrevue*, Karlsruhe, 15 December 1950. See also footnote 14.

371 [67] *Trybuna Ludu*, Warsaw, 1951, No. 53.

433 [68] *Statistical Yearbook of Poland*, 1939, p. 239; also *European Steel*
316 *Trends*, United Nations, Geneva, 1949, p. 51.

[69] Evaluation by Alfred Zauberman, *Dziennik Polski*, London, 1951.

[70] The production of the Donbas combines began in 1951 at the Piotrowice plant of heavy mining machinery in Poland (*Wirtschaft*, Berlin, 1951, No. 32) and in at least one of the corresponding plants in Czechoslovakia.

185 [71] *Trybuna Ludu*, Warsaw, 1951, No. 160.

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[72] National Plan for 1951. 185

[73] *Wirtschaft*, Berlin, 1951, No. 21. 316

[74] Chardonnet. The German word is "Wärme-Ingenieure."

[75] *Ibidem.*

[76] *Wirtschaft*, Berlin, 1949, No. 13.

[77] The German technical word is "Abraum."

[78] Max Fritsch in *Wirtschaft*, Berlin, 1951, No. 32.

[79] Redmayne, *op. cit.* 315

[80] *Wirtschaft*, Berlin, 1951, No. 40.

[81] *Rumanian Information Bulletin*, Washington, 25 January 1951. 185

[82] *Ibidem.*

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Satellite Agriculture in Crisis

A Study of Land Policy in the Soviet Sphere

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ERRATA

Page 27, line 23. Correct to read as follows: "For the Serbian and Bulgarian peasantry social emancipation took a different course, since the feudal system in the true sense of the word was never a part of the Ottoman tradition. Peasant liberation followed the progressive limitation of the exactions of Turkish overlords. In Bulgaria the power of the Turkish *spahiii* was broken early in the 16th century."

Page 29, line 6. For *reigns* read *reins*.

Page 35, Chart IV. Add to footnote: "Area distribution for Poland is for 1921. (Moore, p. 82)."

Page 38, Table 3. Column 4: for 12.9 read 11.9.
" 0.2 " 0.002.
" 0.0 " 0.00004.
Column 5: for 12.4 read 13.3.

Add to footnote: "Due to rounding off of figures in source, column 4 totals 99.8 per cent."

Page 39, Table 4: For 1935 read 1931.**
" 1946 " 1949.

Column 4: for 12.6 read 11.6.

Column 5: for 26.6 read 27.1.
" 38.8 " 38.3.

Add footnote: "** Area is for 1921, the only statistics available. 'Since the latter figure represents the situation before the agrarian reform, the [present] concentration of large holdings is . . . . certainly smaller.' (Moore, p. 83)."

Page 66, Chart VIII. For *Slocenia* read *Slovensko*.

Page 76, Table 16. Title reads, *Economic Origins of Collectivized Peasantry*.
For *Farm Unit* read *Category of Former Holdings (in ha.)*
For *Percent of Farms Collectivized* read *Percent of Total Collectivized Families*.

Page 78, Table 17. For 6,908 read 5,908.
" –86 " –1,086.

Page 105, Chart XIV. In Percent of Arable Land (kulaks) for 11 read 11.1.
In Percent of Marketed Grain (State Farms) for 7 read 17.

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PREFACE

N. S. Khrushchev's speech of September 3, 1953, in which the dismal state of Soviet agriculture was first acknowledged by a top Soviet leader, and the splurge of agricultural concessions offered by Soviet and Satellite governments in the ensuing months, have focused widespread attention in the Western World on the question of the viability of the Communist agricultural system. 121

Many Western observers have long been convinced that the nature of Soviet economic growth prohibits the development of a healthy agriculture. The present desperate efforts to create some order in the economic disarray revealed by Khrushchev and others have only confirmed the harshest judgments of these observers. It seemed appropriate, therefore, that at the same time as the Communist leaders were engaged in a revaluation of agricultural policy that a serious effort be made — on this side of the Iron Curtain — to assess the nature of the current crisis and the agricultural system that produced it.

• • •

This study is primarily concerned with the agricultural structure of the East European Satellites of the Soviet Union, and with the efforts those Satellite regimes have made to transplant the developed Soviet agricultural system to new terrain.

The basic characteristics of the land system which the Soviet planners devised and put into practice during the first Five Year Plan are taken up in order to set the background for the Satellite efforts to duplicate the Soviet model in the 1948-53 period. This new type of land structure is treated not merely as the expression of a specific ideology, but as part of a set of economic relations upon which the Communist State and industrial machine rests. In other words, collectivized agriculture is not only a Marxist dogma, but a functioning economic system which in the quarter century of its existence has performed considerable services for its Communist masters. The fact that collectivized agriculture was imposed by force, is held together only by the most vigilant and brutal police

121 action, and is based upon a general decline in living standards for both workers and peasants, should not obscure the fact that the modern Soviet political and economic system would be impossible without it.

The success which the Soviet agricultural apparatus has achieved in increasing the State's share of the total agricultural produce is considered one of the keys to the endurance of this apparatus and the continued Communist reliance upon it.

The study then proceeds to describe the East European agricultural "revolution," and examines particularly those aspects which distinguished it from the Russian Revolution. The attempt to duplicate the Soviet land structure is explored with these important distinguishing characteristics in mind. The same criteria by which the Soviet system was measured are applied to the East European agricultural system – the degree of increased peasant exploitation – and comparisons are made which indicate why Soviet collectivization was so much more successful than its Eastern Europe counterpart.

The study ends with an examination of the present agricultural crisis. The problems involved are no longer merely tactical, but have become increasingly institutional. The agricultural system which the Communists imposed upon the population has now begun to impose itself upon the Communists. Its internal mechanism exercises considerable force of its own, and the New Course which engulfed the Communist world after Joseph Stalin's death in 1953 is analyzed in these terms.

• • •

The antagonism between town and country described in this paper has not been confined to the history of industrialization in the Communist countries. The capacity of dynamic urban forces to manipulate the market to the detriment of the less-organized peasantry is a part of the story of industrialization of nearly every modern nation.

But this study describes an area of the world where this antagonism has been raised to the highest pitch by political regimes of unprecedented authority and brutality. The complete political disenfranchisement of the peasantry has resulted in a degree of exploitation hardly equalled in modern times.

This extraordinary economic feat has been made possible partly by the degree to which the Communist regimes have been able to

exploit the working classes under whose banners they took power, 121
and whose enforced sacrifice of purchasing power has made Communist industrialization programs economically feasible.

The success of the Communist economic program then is largely a reflection of the ability of the Communist dictatorship to exploit *all* of the oppressed classes to a degree hitherto considered impossible. But this success, as Stalin's successors have discovered, is a very fragile thing, requiring constant care and protection from those millions whose forced sacrifices made it possible.

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CHAPTER I

THE HISTORICAL PRECEDENT

829 1. *Marxist-Leninist Theory to the Eve of the Russian Revolution* (1848-1917)

In the little over a century that has passed since the proclamation of *The Communist Manifesto* in 1848, the attitude of Marxists toward the peasant and his role in society has undergone a series of marked shifts, ranging from Engels' caustic assertion that the peasant was the "barbarian of civilization" to Mao Tse-tung's frank reliance on a predominantly peasant army for the conquest of China.[1] Marx's own estimate of the socialist potential of the Russian *obshchina* (the traditional peasant commune) changed considerably in the last years of his life.[2] Lenin's well-known division of the peasantry into distinct and antagonistic segments stemmed from a more optimistic appraisal of the revolutionary role of the peasantry than had hitherto been accepted by Marxist theoreticians, and resulted after 1905 in the advocacy of a "democratic dictatorship of the workers and peasants."[3] And although Lenin was always eloquent after the 1917 Revolution on the "error" of applying force to the middle peasantry, he set in motion the ponderous social machinery whose very life eventually depended upon the most forceful manipulation of the middle peasantry. The traditional Marxist glorification of urban, cosmopolitan values (so especially pronounced in a man like Trotsky) contrasts sharply with the more

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[1] For an excellent discussion of the ideological gymnastics by which Mao justified his turn from a proletarian to a peasant base in the early 1930's, see Benjamin Schwartz, *Chinese Communism and the Rise of Mao* (Cambridge, 1951), pp. 113-125.

[2] Kark Marx and Friedrich Engels, *The Russian Menace to Europe*, (Blackstock and Hozelitz, editors), Glencoe, Illinois, 1952, pp. 218-26.

[3] The classic exposition of Lenin's thesis is contained in his "The Agrarian Question in Russia at the End of the 19th Century," in *Selected Works* (International Publishers, New York, 1943), Vol. 1, pp. 13-94.

[p. 8 is blank]

829 recent Communist policy of deriding "cosmopolitan" culture and cynically glorifying the folk and the land.[4]

This variegated and complex pattern of views indicates some of the pitfalls involved in an effort to generalize on Marxist agricultural theories. The great doctrinal flexibility implied in this pattern makes it imperative that Communist land policy be studied in the context of particular situations, for these variations reflect not merely *tactical* shifts but the changing character of Communism itself. This is not to suggest that Communist agrarian doctrine lacks a thread of historical continuity. It is to be found in the consistent conviction that the land problem is secondary to the basic urban and industrial developments in society. This attitude derives from the fact that the Communist Parties have always been urban in character, concerned with the advancement of urban groups, first the industrial proletariat, and then, in post-revolutionary times, the Party-industrial bureaucracy.[5] Consequently, Marxist solutions to the agrarian problem have been shaped largely by needs of the urban group to which the Communists attached themselves, not by the needs of the peasants or of the land. Within this general social framework the various Marxist formulations on the land question were enunciated over the years.

The Traditional 19th Century Marxist View

When Engels termed the peasant the "barbarian of civilization," Marx himself cited the epithet with approval; and in his own words he was more contemptuous still, terming the peasantry a "sack of potatoes," a class whose very way of life constituted a brake on human progress, and whose lack of social cohesion and drive made them incapable of forceful political action and vulnerable to reactionary ideologies.[6] Marx's greatest scorn was reserved for the East European peasantry (chiefly Slavic) whose half-mystical attachment to the land and folk-directed culture led them to serve the most conservative interests of Europe. He assigned major blame for the failure of the Hungarian revolution of 1848 to the "reactionary" Croatian and Russian peasants who had "betrayed" their own best interests in following their leaders and crush-

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[4] See Leon Trotsky, *Literature and Revolution* (New York, 1926), for a full exposition of the early Marxist identification with urbanism.

[5] The discussion of these trends in David Mitrany's *Marx Against the Peasant* (Chapel Hill, 1951) is excellent.

[6] *Ibid.*, pp. 7-21.

ing Kossuth.[7] In mid-nineteenth century Europe Marx's entire sympathies were with the energetic city bourgeoisie and the rising proletariat.[8] 229

Consequently it was clear to most 19th century Marxists that until radical changes had transformed the land, the peasantry would continue to be an anomaly in the developing industrial society. The prospect of radical change seemed to be offered in the early 19th century trend toward amalgamation of independent farm holdings under capitalist, or *Junker* ownership; and the day was foreseen when the growth of the massive latifundia would have converted the once backward and provincial European peasant into a class-conscious and alert proletarian, capable of being organized along modern political lines. Furthermore, it was imagined that in conjunction with the proletarian revolution the small peasant holding, that "most primitive mode of exploitation," would give way to efficient, modernized production units capable of direct transformation in the crucible of revolution into "vital socialist forms."

The Modified Marxist View

At the close of the 19th century it became increasingly evident that agrarian conditions in Europe had not developed in the Marxist-prescribed manner. On the contrary, land reform and the abolition of serfdom, even in such backward regions as Russia and the Balkans, had created an increasing class of property-conscious peasants. The task of reconciling these facts with the traditional belief in the historical obsolescence of the peasantry was critical for Marxists.[9] In France, Germany, and the Netherlands "reformist"

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[7] Marx wrote: "Except for the Poles, the Russians, and at best the Slavs in Turkey, no Slavic people has a future, for the simple reason that all Slavs lack the most basic historic, geographic, political and industrial prerequisites for independence and vitality." (Blackstock and Hoselitz, p. 72). And Engels on this point: "Now you may ask me whether I have no sympathy whatever for the small Slavic peoples, and remnants of peoples. . . . In fact, I have damned little sympathy for them." (*Ibid.*, p. 119).

[8] Thus Marx rejoiced at the victory of the advanced and enterprising Americans over the Mexicans in the war of the 1840s, identified himself with the North over the South in the American Civil War, favored British imperialism over Russian imperialism in Central Asia, and supported a German victory in the Franco-Prussian War of 1870. In those situations where the "burgeoisie" acted with great boldness in overthrowing antiquated forms and empires Marx celebrated its victories in lavish fashion.

[9] See Mitrany, pp. 13-23, for discussion of the problems facing the Socialist movement in the late 19th century as it attempted to come to grips with land changes.

829 theoreticians sought to revise the traditionally harsh view of the peasant, and contended that the victory of "socialism" did not hinge on complete destruction of the peasant way of life. The rise of peasant political consciousness which accompanied these developments had necessitated revaluation even from Marx and Engels who, for example, came to see a limited capacity for growth in the Russian *obshchina*. Engels went so far as to concede that revolution need not necessarily be accompanied by the expropriation of the property-conscious peasant, but that socialization of the land might follow only when the peasant was convinced of its benefits.[10]

The Leninist Development

It is probably no accident that the single European Socialist party to develop a program which took some account of growing peasant demands was the only one to meet with revolutionary success. That such a program was developed was more than a tribute to Lenin's political genius; equally important was the fact that Russia possessed both a proletariat large and concentrated enough to generate an advanced Socialist party and a peasantry so enormous that revolutionary tactics without its cooperation were, in the long run, unthinkable.

Lenin's initial opinion of the Russian peasantry was based on the classical Marxist conceptions expounded by his mentor Plekhanov.[11] But the swift movement of events in the countryside at the turn of the century made Lenin increasingly aware of the revolutionary potential of the Russian peasantry and he sought to turn the growing peasant hatred of the land-owning class to his own ends. Thus, in *The Development of Capitalism in Russia* (1899), he had propounded the standard Marxist thesis that further pauperization, and so proletarianization, of the peasantry was a necessary condition to revolution in the countryside; but the active participation of sections of the peasantry in the 1905 Revolution changed Lenin's mind. "Our mistake," he observed after the 1905 Revolution, "consisted in underestimating the breadth and depth of the democratic, or rather bourgeois-democratic, movement among the peasantry. It is stupid to persist in this mistake now when the

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[10] See Karl Marx and Friedrich Engels, *Izbranniye Proizvedenila* (Moscow, 1948), Vol. II, p. 415.

[11] A brief discussion of Plekhanov's ideas may be found in N. Popov, *Outline History of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union* (Moscow, 1934), Vol. 1, pp. 18-28.

Revolution has taught us so much."[12] The lessons of 1905 were 829
summarized in *The Agrarian Question* (1908). In this work he postulated two possible courses for Russian agriculture: The "Prussian road" of government-sponsorship of the "predatory" kulak farmers, and the "American road" of the complete destruction of all feudal traces and the creation of a small-holding, independent peasantry. Lenin's readiness to support the "American road" aligned him with peasant demands for increased land and the destruction of all feudal remnants.[13]

However, Lenin cautioned, as a Social Democrat he could not assure the peasants that he would forever support their property-conscious demands, and a "socialist agriculture" remained his final goal. Thus Lenin foresaw the inevitable clash of interests between the peasant and proletarian revolutions which Engels had anticipated when he wrote:

> We say frankly that, given the prejudices flowing from their economic position, education, and isolated way of life . . . we can bring the peasants to our side only by making promises which we know beforehand we shall not be able to keep.[14]

These promises were made and temporarily honored by the first victorious Socialist party. It was not, however, until the eve of the 1917 Revolution, when the vast and spontaneous peasant rebellion convulsed the Russian countryside, that Lenin moved to cement the alliance between the peasant and proletarian revolutions. The working agreement beteween the two forces was based on common opposition to the land-owning classes (allies of the "bourgeois" government which the Bolsheviks sought to destroy) and was made possible by Lenin's temporary acquiescence to the peasant's own land program as formulated by the Social-Revolutionary Party. "These reforms are not our idea," Lenin said, but "we support them because they are demanded by the overwhelming majority of the peasants."[15] The Bolsheviks did not administer, or even attempt to oversee, the expropriation of the Russian landed estates in the revolutionary period; but their seizure of power in November 1917 permitted the militant peasantry to complete the agrarian revolution begun many months before.

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[12] Quoted by Bertram Wolfe, *Three Who Made a Revolution* (New York, 1948), p. 364.
[13] Lenin, *Selected Works* (Moscow, 1934-39), Vol. I, pp. 84-91.
[14] Karl Marx and Friedrich Engels, *Izbranniye Proizvedeniia*, (Moscow, 1948), Vol. II, p. 414.
[15] Lenin, *Selected Works*, Vol. III, p. 200.

5: Free Europe Committee U-4 (no date) 1954 E1 Europe E1

2. *Agrarian Policy Under the Soviets* (1917-1945)

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The jerry-built alliance between proletariat and peasantry was put to severe strain almost immediately after its inception. The peasants parceled out the land and fought to hold their gains in the face of the "white" counter-revolution and foreign intervention. But the harsh, forced food requisitions demand by the Bolsheviks soon alienated the countryside, and the resignation of the Left Social Revolutionaries from the Soviet government soon made it clear that political control was entirely in the hands of the Bolsheviks.

The gulf dividing the peasants from their erstwhile comrades-in-arms was aptly symbolized by the law on nationalization of the land (February 19, 1918), decreeing that all land was the property of the State and was to be used only by those willing to till it. Though the law itself remained for a long time only a paper document, it presaged future conflicts. The Bolshevik experiments with collective forms of agriculture were another ominous sign for the future, although the early collectives, chiefly composed of landless peasants and romantic urban intellectuals, constituted no threat to the established rural order.[16] Indeed, in the first decade of the Revolution there were no suggestions of the full-scale onslaught of collectivization that was to come, and no talk of a "collectivization drive." Lenin's frequently repeated warnings against coercion of the middle peasants (*srednyaki*) were taken to reflect settled policy. "You cannot create anything here by coercion," he said, and added:

> Even in Europe, where [the middle peasantry] nowhere achieves such strength, where technology and culture, city life and railroads are tremendously developed, and where it would be easiest of all to think of such a thing, nobody, not even the most revolutionary of Socialists, has ever proposed adopting measures of coercion towards the middle peasantry.[17]

But events themselves were to force a harsher policy and the revolutionary alliance was soon cracked wide open. Heavy strains

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[16] Three types of communal farming were organized in the early period: 1) The Commune, a form in which all property was owned and all labor performed in common, where living itself was a cooperative venture. 2) The artel, a mixed form in which cooperative ownership and labor was found alongside private ownership and labor. 3) The TOZ, a "primitive" communal form in which cooperation was limited to the joint cultivation of the land. For a fuller description, see Harry Schwartz, *Russia's Soviet Economy* (New York, 1950), p. 259.

[17] Lenin, *Selected Works*, Vol. VIII, pp. 178-79.

were generated by the agricultural crisis and the ensuing famine 471
of 1920-21. To meet the needs of the urban population, the 565
Bolsheviks decreed a forced food levy (December 14, 1920) by which peasants were ordered to deliver their entire surplus to the State. The peasants, retaliating in kind, produced little more than their own needs demanded. Scattered peasant uprisings, together [669]
with the Kronstadt rebellion early in 1921, combined to force a change of policy on the new regime. The strict codes of "War Communism" were abrogated and the New Economic Policy (NEP) was launched. Delivery quotas were introduced (amounting to a tax-in-kind) and peasants were encouraged to produce for a flourishing free market.

Thus, for a time under NEP the peasants, who now controlled almost all the arable land, were permitted to enjoy the fruits of their revolutionary exertions. Agricultural production recovered rapidly and a degree of national prosperity resulted. But the Bolsheviks had paid a price for this prosperity — the restoration of free market relations between town and country.

The Leninist Dilemma

The unstable compromise of NEP postponed the inevitable 578
clash between the "proletarian dictatorship" and the victorious 185
peasant revolution. Two parallel developments were rapidly to hasten the impending struggle: throughout the NEP period (1921-28) the peasants tightened their hold on the land, many of them growing relatively prosperous, and thereby fortifying their gains. At the same time the Bolsheviks were tightening their hold on the political machinery of the State and turning their party into a monolithic organization capable of an outright offensive against the rest of the country. Thus, the stage was set for the gigantic economic struggle of the late twenties.

The issue at stake between the Bolsheviks and the peasantry was only partly ideological. The conflict between the Bolshevik belief in the superior efficacy of large-scale "socialist" farming and the peasants' allegiance to his traditional "way of life" was important, but this conflict was subordinated to another one which was economic in character. The peasants and the Bolshevik regime faced each other across the table on which the grain produce of Russia was negotiated. And it was, in fact, in the realm of economics

578 that the two antagonists met and clashed in the "war" which re-
185 sulted in collectivized agriculture.[18]

The problem which the Bolsheviks had to deal with may be briefly stated. NEP had insured the continued political existence of the regime; but salvation had been achieved at a great price. To obtain a sufficient supply of agricultural produce to feed the rising urban population and, if possible, to permit acceleration of industrial growth, it was necessary to provide increased incentives for the peasantry. But to provide incentives for an increased supply of produce to the cities, it was also necessary to create an industry capable of supplying peasants with the consumer goods and agricultural machinery they demanded in exchange. Without recourse to foreign capital, this, in turn, was impossible, unless a steadily increasing supply of agricultural produce was guaranteed.

The problem of breaking this vicious circle occupied the thoughts of the best Party theoreticians throughout the period of NEP. Some, like Bukharin, suggested a solution bearing some resemblance to the pre-Revolutionary policies of Witte and Stolypin – a "gradualist" approach to industrialization, encouragement of the more efficient middle peasant producers, and limited recourse to foreign capital. Trotsky, as the leader of the radical Left Wing, called for an immediate drive for industrialization in which the peasants would absorb the major shock. The theoretical debate rose to its climax in the late twenties, coinciding with the final victory of the Stalinist faction of the Bolshevik Party and the resurgence of the agricultural crisis in a new form.[19]

The Pre-collectivization Crisis

185 The Stalinist "solution" to the agricultural crisis (collectiviza-
471 tion) did not proceed according to a predetermined plan or theory.
423 Rather, it was developed pragmatically as a response to critical

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[18] Lazar Volin, a foremost American student of Soviet agriculture, also assigned priority to the practical, as opposed to the ideological basis of collectivization. He explained the Communist attachment to the *kolkhoz* in this way: "First, the practical or pragmatic reasons . . . [revolving] around the need for large supplies of cheap agricultural products to feed and clothe the growing industrial population and the army . . . Second, an ideological predilection for agrarian collectivism, rooted in the Marxist-Leninist-Stalinist dogma." Lazar Volin, "Agricultural Organization," *Soviet Economic Growth*, Abraham Bergson (editor), White Plains, N. Y., 1953, p. 286.

[19] A reliable account of the heated Party economic debate may be found in Maurice Dobb, *Soviet Economic Development since 1917* (New York, 1948), pp. 208-229, and of the political implications of the debate in Isaac Deutscher, *Stalin: A Political Biography* (Oxford, 1949), pp. 294-304.

economic conditions and the special requirements of the first Five Year Plan. Indeed, the first collectivization drive was expected to bring only 14 per cent of the land into the "socialist sector". The overwhelming success of the drive was as much a surprise to the Communist leadership as to the peasants themselves. And it was only when the drive turned out to be so phenomenally successful that the Communist planners stepped up the targets and pace of the Five Year Plan itself.

The agricultural crisis which inspired the collectivization drive of the first Five Year Plan had its origins in two situations: First, the acute grain shortage of 1927-28, and second, and more important, the post-Revolutionary structure of the land (see Chart I). As a result of the peasant revolution of 1917-18, the small and medium peasantry occupied almost all the arable land in the Soviet Union. Where they had produced only 50 per cent of nation's grain in pre-war times, they produced 85 per cent in 1926-27. Since the poor and middle peasants marketed a far smaller percentage of the grain they produced than had the great landowners and kulaks of pre-war times, their domination of the land produced a serious drop in marketed commodities.

Thus, while total grain production had declined by only five per cent below pre-Revolutionary levels, marketed grain had declined by *more than 50 per cent* – from 26 per cent of five billion poods in 1913 to 13.3 per cent of 4.749 billion poods in 1926-27.[20] The cities received far less grain than they had received in pre-war times; and due to a number of factors (among them the competition between various State purchasing agencies), the cities were paying a higher price for the grain they could obtain. One of the most serious consequences of this new relationship was the fact that little grain was available for foreign export to pay for desperately needed capital equipment.

The basic problem for the regime was to create an agricultural structure which would enable the State to siphon off a *far greater proportion of the total product*, at a price it wished to pay, than was possible under the conditions of NEP. While it is true that the regime wished to increase total agricultural production, and may have expected to achieve the goal through increased mechanization of the farms, this target was secondary. For achieving the primary goal – extraction of a greater *proportion* of the produce –

[20] A pood equals 36 pounds.

CHART I

241 GRAIN PRODUCED and MARKETED in SOVIET RUSSIA

Pre-World War I and 1926-27*

LANDOWNERS (PRE-WAR) SOVKHOZES AND KOLKHOZES (1926-27) — KULAKS — POOR AND MIDDLE PEASANTS



BILLIONS OF POODS

PRE-WORLD WAR I Russia produced five billion poods of grain

of which the landowners produced 12%, kuloks 38%, and poor and middle peasants 50%.

The landowners marketed 47% of their crop, the kuloks 34%, and the poor and middle peasants 14.7%.

Altogether, 1.3 billion poods of grain were sent to market.

SOVIET RUSSIA IN 1926-27 produced 4.7 billion poods of grain

of which sovkhozes and kolkhozes produced 1.7%, kuloks 13%, and poor and middle peasants 85.3%.

Sov- and kolkhozes marketed 47.2% of their crops, kuloks 20%, and poor and middle peasants only 11.2%.

Altogether, only 0.6 billion poods of grain were sent to market.

* Stalin, Problems of Leninism, (Eng. ed. 1940) p. 205.

p. 18

the vehicle of the large-scale collective farm, heretofore neglected, stood ready at hand.[21] 185 471

The very essence of the *kolkhoz* (collective farm) system lay in the ease with which it facilitated extraction of heavy tribute from the land in the form of extremely cheap supplies of foodstuffs and industrial crops. Thus, the rise of the Stalinist land system was closely connected with the Party's program of break-neck industrialization, massive capital investments, and strategic projects at the expense of consumption. The ever-tightening hold of the regime over the industrial working class made possible implementation of these policies without the development of consumer goods facilities; and therefore the regime could permit a drop in the levels of consumption without jeopardizing its plan. The new agricultural program — designed primarily to *redistribute* agricultural produce rather than to *increase* it — was consistent with this aspect of the plan. Moreover, the political hold collectivization afforded over the peasants assured State control of the rural labor supply and enabled the State to channel manpower into non-agricultural occupation as it deemed necessary. 423

This was the general rationale behind collectivization. The immediate cause for the first collectivization drive lay, however, in the mounting economic tensions of the late 1920s. As early as 1925-26 the regime had sought to reimpose many of the agrarian controls lifted in 1921, at the time of the inauguration of NEP. To implement this policy, agricultural prices were once again restricted and production itself subjected to heavy taxes. Retaliating in kind, the peasants drove production downward, hoarded again, and consumed what they could not hide or sell.[22] As a consequence State grain collections in 1928-29 dropped more than one-third below the level of two years before. Tension in the countryside mounted. The means by which the new monolithic party chose to meet this situation was of a magnitude equal to the challenge.

The Stalinist Solution to the Land Problem

The great offensive against the peasantry was launched late 423 185

[21] The *artel* was considered the best form of collective agriculture since it combined a sufficient number of communal features to guarantee State control with sufficient household autonomy to make it structurally feasible to the peasants. The State-appointed managers, supported by local party administrators, could enforce peasant cooperation with the Plan; and the continued existence of individual households offered the peasant that minimum of private incentive consistent with the cooperation.

[22] This crisis is well described in Dobb, p. 222.

423 in 1928, but it was not until one year later, when Stalin called for
185 "liquidation of the kulaks as a class," that its full weight was felt. Since the actual number of kulaks in post-Revolutionary Russia was not very great, this slogan made it abundantly clear that the frankly military offensive was directed against the peasantry as a whole. The story is well known: the dispatch of Communist shock cadres to the villages, the mass deportations, the herding of peasants into hastily formed collective units, the calculated famine in the Ukraine, the wholesale slaughter of livestock by the desperate peasants, the brief pause ordered by Stalin early in 1930, the renewed offensive in 1931-32, the collapse of the opposition, and the final establishment of a collective farm system in all essential respects resembling that of today. There were many subsequent modifications of the system; but its basic features were firmly established in the "avalanche" of collectivization in the 1928-32 period.

In evaluating the success of the drive and the system it created, it is necessary to reiterate that the primary utility of the collective farm lay in its efficiency as an economic and political *control device*, by which rapid industrialization of the Soviet Union could be facilitated, and not in its efficiency of production. To the extent that it made industrialization possible, it is possible to show that Soviet collectivization "succeeded."

241 So far as production is concerned, the efficiency of the collec-
423 tive farm was, and remains, low. It has been estimated that Soviet grain production in 1939 did not exceed that of 1928 by much more than the increase of sown area over the 11 intervening years.[23] Similarly, the gross production value of Soviet agriculture in 1940 exceeded 1928 by only a small fraction, though in the bumper year of 1937 the harvest may have been as much as 14 per cent higher.[24] Throughout the 1930s the Soviets put forth many claims of increased agricultural productivity which were, however, discounted by most Western experts. Western scepticism was vindicated by the 1953 acknowledgement of agricultural deterioration by N. S. Khrushchev, one of the chief architects of later Soviet agricultural policy.[25]

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[23] Naum Jasny, *Socialized Agriculture of the U.S.S.R.* (Stanford, 1950), p. 548.
[24] *Ibid.*, p. 673.
[25] Jasny's figures, which are cited above, are somewhat lower than official Soviet boasts. He made allowance for statistical falsification involved in such Soviet practices as measuring production in accordance with the "biological yield," a misleading statistical device employed by the Soviets since the early thirties and condemned by Malenkov in his August 8th, 1953 address.

TABLE 1

DIVISION OF AGRICULTURAL PRODUCT IN USSR BEFORE AND AFTER COLLECTIVIZATION †

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Year	Total Yield*	Obligatory Deliveries Million Centners	Obligatory Deliveries Percent of Total Crop	Retained by Farmers Million Centners	Retained by Farmers Percent of Total Crop**
1927/8	605.9	112.2	18.5	493.7	100
1932/3	570.1	185.2	32.5	384.9	77.9
1933/4	677.1	228.7	33.8	448.4	90.8
1934/5	669.5	226.6	33.8	442.9	89.7
1935/6	677.5	249.3	36.8	428.2	86.7
1936/7	612.5	260.0	42.4	353.5	71.4

† Propkopovicz, S. N., *Russlands Volkswirtschaft unter den Sowjets*, (Zurich, 1944), pp. 136, 138.

* Net totals, after seeds deducted from the total yield.

** 100 equals total crop retained by farmer 1927/8. Figures for subsequent years show percentage 1927/8 total retained.

But whatever the failure of collectivization to achieve productive efficiency, and other ostensible goals widely advertised in the propaganda of the time,[26] the Soviet State remained completely loyal to the system, bolstering it by police action and developing its distinctive features over the years. Evidently, the regime considered that for its investment, it was receiving an adequate return. The explanation for this unswerving loyalty to the system, in the face of the massive difficulties encountered, is to be found in the striking change in the pattern of grain collection after collectivization (see Table 1). In 1928 the State collected no more than 18.5 per cent of the total grain crop, while in 1937 an estimated 42.4 per cent was State-collected.[27] That this was a direct result of collectivization may be seen in the fact that, from the start, the collectivized sector

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[26] For example, one of the regime claims was that collectivization wiped out the inequality between the rich kulak and the poor peasant. The hypocrisy of this claim was made evident in the agricultural order that replaced the old one. Thus Jasny writes: "The former *kulaki*, actually the more energetic, harder working peasants, are now replaced by the army of chairmen of the *kolkhozy*, tractor drivers, combine operators, and the like. These workers both number and earn more than the *kulaki* . . ." (Jasny, p. 75).

[27] Harry Schwartz (p. 313) gives the Figure 15 per cent for 1928 and 40 per cent for 1939.

241 produced more for the market per hectare of arable land than did
423 the private sector. In 1932, 60 per cent of all households in the
185 Soviet Union had been collectivized, embracing 66 per cent of the sown area. Yet the collective and State farms (*sovkhozy*) supplied 84 per cent of the marketed grain and 83 per cent of the cotton.[28]

With the reinforcement of the collective farm system the State
241 was in a position where it could force the peasants to serve as a
185 cushion for harvest shocks. In 1937, a bumper year, the peasants
471 received 35.9 per cent of the total grain crop for division among
423 themselves; but in 1938-39, mediocre crop years, the peasants received only 26.9 and 22.9 per cent of the total, despite the fact that a smaller gross volume was to be shared.[29] In each case primary State needs governed the division of the agricultural yield. The Soviet Government had created an administrative apparatus which insured, in the words of one observer, that "if anyone was to starve, [the peasants] would be the first to do so."[30]

The function of the State farms in the Soviet system is similarly linked to the problem of agricultural deliveries. Though accounting for no more than 10 per cent of the arable area in 1937, the *sovkhozy* delivered 30 per cent of the milk, 25 per cent of the wool, and 24 per cent of the meat delivered to the State in that year. Whereas the grain producing collectives delivered only one-third of their total product to the State in the late thirties, the *sovkhozy* contributed three-quarters of their crop.[31] Hence, it may be said that, from the point of view of the Soviet planner, the State farms bore a superiority over the collective farms similar to the superiority of the collectives over the private farms.

471 The case for collectivization was aptly summed up by N. A.
423 Voznesensky when he revealed that the Soviet government in World War II collected three times the annual amount of grain collected by the Czarist regime during World War I when "72 per cent of all marketed grain was concentrated in the hands of estate owners and kulaks." This threefold increase in marketable surplus

[28] Dobb, p. 249. There were, of course, other factors which accounted for the meagre quantity of goods placed on the market by the private sector, in particular, the amount of State discrimination against the private farms.
[29] Harry Schwartz, p. 265. Schwartz writes with regard to this question: "Only the government's complete domination of the peasantry through the collective farm system made this sharp change in the amount of grain collected possible." (p. 313).
[30] Leonard Hubbard, *The Economics of Soviet Agriculture* (London, 1939), p. 123.
[31] Harry Schwartz, p. 285.

became possible, he concluded, "only on the basis of large-scale mechanized Socialist agriculture."[22] 471 423

THE STALINIST SYSTEM DEVELOPED

Since its establishment during the first Five Year Plan the collective farm system has undergone a period of modification (1933-38), a period of intensified exploitation (1938-41), a period of wartime chaos and relaxation (1941-45), and a period of reimposed controls and further tightening (1945-53).

In the early phases of collectivization, deliveries were fixed by arbitrary "contracts" between the *kolkhozy* and the State — the contracts resembling the compulsory requisitions of War Communism. By 1933 peasant opposition, though generally weak and disorganized, forced the regime to grant minor concessions. Foremost among these was a system of fixed quotas to replace the contractual levies. By this device it was hoped to induce the individual *kolkhoznik* to cultivate more intensively, since any surplus beyond the fixed quota was retained by the collective farm and distributed among its members. The concessionary mood of this era was reflected finally in the Artel Statute of 1935 granting the collective farmer a household plot (one-quarter to one-half hectare) and the right to own a limited number of livestock, permission to sell surplus foodstuffs on the urban free market, a more equitable payment system, and a much restricted voice in *kolkhoz* management.

In the years immediately preceding World War II the Soviet regime had again begun to encroach on the rights granted under the Artel Statute. In 1939 the State decreed severe penalties for infractions of collective farm discipline and in 1940 the workday was lengthened. Similarly the method of computing delivery quotas was made stricter. Henceforth norms were computed not on the basis of actual area sown, but on the basis of arable land owned by the collective farm. Since yield estimates computed by State officials were generally arbitrary, the hardship worked by this new departure was severe.

The main direction of the government on the eve of World War II was thus to restrict further the private sector within the collective farms and to redirect attention to the communal land. The result was that an increasing proportion of the peasants' prod-

[22] Nikolai A. Voznesensky, *The Economy of the U.S.S.R. During World War II* (Public Affairs Press, Washington, D. C., 1948), p. 53.

471 act was taken by the State. The regime was still tightening con-
423 trols when the German Army attacked in June of 1941.

World War II subjected the entire collective system to its severest strain and, as Voznesensky observed, the system continued to supply the minimum of foodstuffs necessary for the war, although the regime had to loosen its hold considerably to guarantee the supply. That this achievement was a tribute to the vitality of the State agricultural administration, rather than the morale of the peasants, is suggested by the fact that in those areas invaded by the Germans - particularly Byelorussia and the Ukraine - large masses of peasants greeted them as liberators with the traditional bread and salt. But the Germans, who were as interested as their predecessors in a high "marketable surplus," maintained the kolkhozy intact. This policy and the standard Hitlerian excesses in conquered Slavic territory soon alienated the peasants.

With the defeat of the Nazi invasion and the cessation of hostilities in Europe and Asia, the Soviet regime sought to reimpose the agrarian controls loosened in wartime. In line with this policy,
[66] the government instituted a vast purge of collective farm directors and decreed a monetary reform in 1947 that wiped out at one stroke most of the savings accumulated by peasants during the war.
[65] Taxes on incomes derived from the household plots were raised sharply in 1948, 1950, and 1951; delivery quotas on dairy products and meats produced in the household plots were also raised. The culmination of this development in the kolkhozy was the shift from the zveno (link, or small unit) work system to large-scale labor brigades. Under an amalgamation program the number of collective farms in the Soviet Union was reduced from 252,000 to 97,000. A further effort in this direction was the plan associated with Khrushchev's name to weld the collective farms into vast "agro-towns" (agrogoroda), in which the peasantry would suffer the final transformation into a rural proletarist. Although this effort met with acknowledged failure, the theory behind it was not abandoned. In Stalin's last published work, Economic Problems of Socialism in the U.S.S.R., he called for a program of "gradual" transformation of collective into public property - in short, the eventual conversion of all agricultural units into State farms." [33]

[33] Joseph Stalin, Economic Problems of Socialism in the U.S.S.R. (International Publishers, New York), p. 51. In the same work Stalin called for a "relatively higher rate of expansion of the production of the means of production." The two programs - further statification of the farms and the acceleration of investment - were, in fact, inseparable.

5: Free Europe Committee U-4 (no date) 1954 E1 Europe E1

Stalin's last work represented the apex of the agricultural policies initiated under his leadership during the first Five Year Plan. In the period after his death the Communists lost the offensive for the first time since 1928 and began to restructure the system in terms of new realities.[34] But in all the revaluation of time-honored doctrines which followed Stalin's death, the essential necessity of the *kolkhoz* system to the Soviet way of life has never been disputed. For the Soviet leaders, at least, it had proved its worth. 471/ 423

This, then, was the system which the East European Communist Parties, drawing so heavily upon Soviet experience, attempted to introduce into the newly-conquered regions in the aftermath of World War II.

[34] See below, pp. 118-124.

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CHAPTER II

THE EAST EUROPEAN SETTING

1. *General Factors*

175 In the early spring and summer of 1944 the Soviet armies breached the German defenses on the Dniester and the Bug and, advancing through the territories of pre-war Romania and Poland, entered a region which, for purposes of convenience, may be termed Eastern Europe.[1] By the time World War II had ended a year later Soviet power was established as far as the Elbe river in the west and the borders of Greece in the south. The path was cleared for the Communist reorganization of Eastern Europe.

In the first months the primary lever of political and social change was the Soviet Army itself. But the new imperial apparatus did not long depend solely upon direct military intervention. In the wake of the advancing armies a well-organized political apparatus moved which, though few in numbers, was endowed with much of the militancy and dynamism of the Soviet system.

665 Generally, post-war Communist leadership was Moscow-trained, had served long apprenticeships in the Comintern apparatus, and was familiar with the hierarchal operations of an organization which invested all initiative in the Moscow center.[2] Although some of the leaders had led a furtive underground existence between the wars, they were no longer genuine revolutionaries, but agents of an imperial power designated with imposing the developed Soviet political and economic system on countries whose languages

[1] The term Eastern Europe, as used here, includes what is often referred to as Central and Eastern Europe, but does not include Russia, which is frequently considered part of Eastern Europe. Certain German writers, seeing in the region a mosaic of under-developed and politically weak states, have sometimes used the phrase *Zwischen-Europa* ("Between Europe"). For the purposes of this paper, the term Eastern Europe is taken to be coextensive with the Soviet satellite sphere, excluding East Germany, but including Yugoslavia whose regime broke with Moscow in 1948.

[2] The character of the post-war seizure of power by the Communist Parties of Eastern Europe is treated more fully below, pp. 42-43. For a good general account of these events, see Hugh Seton-Watson, *The East European Revolution* (Oxford, 1950), pp. 187-229.

665 and customs they knew, and of which they were usually natives.[3] As subsequent events were to show, the transplantation of the Soviet system to Eastern Europe proved to be far more complicated than these former Cominternists had perhaps anticipated. Local conditions and traditions of the captive countries were everywhere to balk them, demanding improvisations and flexibilities for which they were unprepared.

The story of land collectivization in the Satellites from 1945 to 1953 is consequently the story of the interaction between a highly developed system of agrarian exploitation torn from its Soviet context, and the indigenous conditions of Eastern Europe which confronted Party political-economic planners at every turn. A brief review of these conditions is in order.

2. *The Rise of the Peasant Proprietor* (1800-1939)

565 423 Although some remnants of an essentially feudal land system survived in areas of Poland and Hungary (particularly the latter) until the eve of World War II, the major features of East European feudalism, contrary to popular belief, died before the beginning of the 20th century.[4] Serfdom was finally abolished by parliamentary legislation or revolutionary action by 1860: in the Austrian "hereditary lands" (including Slovenia, Bohemia and Moravia) as early as 1781; in Croatia in 1848; in Hungary (including Slovakia) in 1849; in Congress Poland in 1861; and in Romania in 1864. Emancipation of the Serbian and Bulgarian peasantry resulted from progressive limitations of the political power of their Turkish overlords, a process which took place throughout the 19th century.

As was the case in Russia, however, emancipation did not solve the basic problems of East European rural society. Indeed, with the growing incorporation of Eastern Europe into the world agricultural market, the problems grew even more severe in the 19th century. Except in Bulgaria and Serbia, where a class of peasant smallholders emerged within the framework of Ottoman society, the abolition of serfdom did not establish a sturdy, independent peasantry such as existed in the West. Even in Bulgaria

[3] "The East European revolution . . . was imposed from outside and from above . . . [and therefore cannot] justly be compared with the revolutions of 1688, 1789, and 1917." (Seton-Watson, p. vii.).

[4] It is necessary, one writer points out, to stress the incorrectness of the widely-held view that "the feudal system, with the characteristic features of the large latifundia, continued to prevail east of the Elbe until the arrival of the Soviet Army." (Ygael Gluckstein, *Stalin's Satellites in Europe*, London, 1952, p. 13).

565 and Serbia the peasants, though not oppressed, were extremely
423 poor. The peasant was no longer tied to the land, but in a great many cases his emancipation meant only that he worked for the same landlord to whom he was once bound. Furthermore, glaring inequalities in the pattern of land ownership developed after emancipation. (Chart IV indicates the inequalities of land distribution surviving the post-World War I reforms).

The root of the problem lay in the fact that emancipation did not lead to a basic improvement in the technological level of farming (with the possible exception of Bohemia) so that with the late 19th century increase in population, the struggle among the peasants was for more land, not for improved technique.[5] In Western Europe the emancipation of the peasantry had been accompanied by the slow certain growth of commerce and industry, but in Eastern Europe no urban society developed to compensate for, and offset, the agrarian dislocations. The rising competition of American grain on the world market further contributed to steady deterioration of the agrarian situation.

565 In the years prior to World War I there developed – both
423 among city intellectuals and peasantry – a growing consciousness of the need for profound reform of the land system. Groups were created to discuss the problems but little concretely was done before the war. The great peasant revolt which shook Romania in 1907, though rapidly suppressed, climaxed this pre-war drive for basic economic change.[6]

World War I, a social as well as a military convulsion, gave the first real impetus to the drive for reform. Stimulated by the success of the peasant revolution in Russia and by local nationalist ferment, the East European peasants organized the first political parties to promulgate demands in the name of the peasants as a distinct class. Their immediate demand was for sweeping land reforms, and their long-range hope was a share in the rule of their countries. "The peasants," in the words of one historian, "were roused and seemingly had learnt that land without liberty, or liberty without land, would be but a half freedom, and that to gain control of power was necessary."[7] In Bulgaria the Agrarian Party, under

[5] The increase in population density in Eastern Europe in recent years is reflected in the fact that, for example, the average Bulgarian farm occupied 7.3 hectares in 1897, and only 4.5 hectares in 1946. Sharp reductions in land per peasant occurred in each of the East European countries.
[6] See Henry Roberts, *Rumania* (New York, 1949), p. 11-21.
[7] David Mitrany, *Marx Against the Peasant* (Chapel Hill, North Carolina, 1951), p. 121.

the leadership of the radical Alexander Stambouliski, took power after the war. Though his regime was overthrown by the reactionary Tsankov-Volkov *coup* of 1923, with every excess and barbarity, Stambouliski's premiership left a lasting social imprint. Elsewhere in Eastern Europe peasant parties were not strong enough to take the reigns of government, but the impact of the "green rising" was reflected everywhere in legislative activity.

In Romania about 50 per cent of the arable land (four million hectares) was transferred to peasant smallholders, reflecting the vigor of the 1907 uprising. In newly-created Czechoslovakia and Yugoslavia the reforms were less spectacular, but followed the same area-wide pattern. In these two countries the land reforms had a national as well as social character, the majority of the expropriated lands having been Hungarian and German properties.[8]

The same forces were at work in Poland where the issue of land reform was uppermost in the public consciousness at the time of the nation's reestablishment. Despite determined opposition from the land owning classes, limited land reforms were decreed in 1919 and 1920. But partly because the principle of total compensation was accepted, only two and a half million hectares were distributed among the peasants by 1938, only enough to satisfy the land hunger of approximately half the natural increase in population.[9]

In the entire region only Hungary resisted peasant demands for land reform. There the movement was effectively blocked, first by Bela Kun's temporary Communist dictatorship, and then by the Horthy reaction. The land structure that emerged from the post-war reforms is described in Chart IV.

As Chart IV indicates, the post-World War I reforms left much to be accomplished in the direction of equalizing the peasant land tenure. But from the Baltic to the Aegean the reforms signified

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[8] In Czechoslovakia 12 per cent of the arable land, or 1.7 million hectares, was distributed under the reform; in Yugoslavia 12.5 per cent of the arable land, or 1.8 million hectares, was distributed. The Yugoslav reforms were largely confined to Croatia and Slovenia, former provinces of the Austro-Hungarian Empire.

[9] Ferdynand Zweig, *Poland Between the Wars* (London, 1944), p. 130. Zweig's analysis of the national discussion of reform in the early 1920s is interesting, partly because so many of the arguments employed by those who opposed breaking up the large estates are those which are today used to justify the modern *kolkhoz*! This is true particularly of the argument that "self-sufficient small holdings are supposed to be unsuitable for compulsory deliveries in wartime." (p. 134).

423 the growing strength of the peasants and a further consolidation of a distinctly peasant culture with its special mores and traditions.[10]

Post-Reform Conditions

423 Despite the undoubted benefits which land reform brought
-24 to many formerly impoverished peasants, the agricultural economy of Eastern Europe remained largely stagnant in the inter-war period. The failure of the reforms to work a radical improvement in the standard of living and to raise total agricultural production may be attributed to the fact that the reforms themselves were primarily *political* rather than *economic* in intent. They were motivated very largely by the "green rising," the panic fear of Bolshevism (which seized power in Bela Kun's Hungary in 1919 and swept to the gates of Warsaw in 1920), the social upheaval of the First World War, and the new nationalism. In no case is there evidence that an overall increase of agricultural production was the primary goal. Like the vast revolution in the Russian countryside of 1917-18, the East European reforms were designed to "distribute wealth, rather than to produce it." [11]

In short, if the reforms narrowed the gap between rich and poor, they failed to create the lasting conditions of agricultural prosperity. Indeed, by reducing the area of the landed estates which traditionally produced large marketable surpluses, the reforms hindered urban-industrial growth and restricted cash exports.[12] As a consequence, the agricultural level of Eastern Europe remained far below that of the more advanced countries of Western Europe (see Table 2). Essentially the same picture emerges from computation of the annual per hectare yield of the East European countries (see Chart II).

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[10] *Agrarian Problems from the Baltic to the Aegean* (Royal Institute of International Affairs, London, 1944), p. 58.

[11] Wilbert E. Moore, *Economic Demography of Eastern and Southern Europe* (Geneva, 1945), p. 100. For a similar view, stressing the *political* rather than the *economic* motivation of the East European land reform, see David Mitrany, *The Land and the Peasant in Rumania* (Oxford, 1930), Chapter 10.

[12] Data on the relative efficiency of small and large-scale farming in Eastern Europe are scanty, but Seton-Watson concluded that it was generally true that "the smaller the holding, the lower the productivity of the soil." (Seton-Watson, p. 86). Similarly, Moore held that "the large holdings tend to yield a greater product per unit of capital by more nearly maximum utilization of work animals." (Moore, p. 101). But whether or not large-scale farming was more *efficient* than small-scale farming, there is no doubt that the large-scale farms produced a higher proportion of the *marketed* produce, although this factor varied from country to country and from region to region.

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CHART II

ANNUAL YIELD per ACRE, AVERAGE 1933-37*

IN CWTS



* Agrarian Problems from the Baltic to the Aegean, Royal Institute of International Affairs, London, 1944, p. 53.

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TABLE 2

611 **ANNUAL CONSUMPTION OF BASIC FOODSTUFFS IN PRE-WAR EASTERN EUROPE**

(in lbs.)

	Wheat & Rye	Maize	Potatoes	Sugar	Meat	Milk	Fats	Eggs (No.)
Poland	392	—	550	27	50	260	21	90
Czechoslovakia	275	25	260	47	68	290	40	169
Hungary	550	—	220	26	57	240	30	95
Romania	245	400	110	15	55	140	25	90
Yugoslavia	265	340	130	12	44	160	18	45
Bulgaria	440	—	35	12	45	150	19	80
Denmark	265	Nil	250	117	124	410	67	115

* *Agrarian Problems from the Baltic to the Aegean*, pp. 44.

241 The land, some of it rich, but most of it poor, was exploited
311 in a backward fashion — in Bulgaria and Yugoslav Macedonia many of the peasants worked with a wooden plow not very different in design from one described by Virgil in the *Georgics* 19 hundred years before. The inevitable subdivision of the land among the peasant's sons made application of modern agricultural techniques virtually impossible, and the accumulation of sufficient capital to purchase such equipment out of question. In addition, growing rural over-population kept farm wages low, and made the use of modern machinery uneconomical from the peasants' point of view.
[435] Above all, the peasantry was oppressed by the traditional "price scissors," or the disparity between the prices received for their crops on the urban market and prices paid for industrial products, a relationship which arose from the "small domestic market for agricultural products and the small supply of manufactured goods produced by domestic industry."[19]

But the trouble lay not merely in the backwardness of the peasant agricultural system. The political structure of the country, either conservative or semi-fascist, tended to favor urban groups. In the allotment of national resources such projects as peasant

[19] Moore, p. 89.



* Wilbert E. Moore, *Economic Demography of Eastern and Southern Europe* (Geneva, 1945), p. 35.

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p. 33

241 banks, agro-technical training schools, agricultural machine indus-
311 tries, and rural communications received only minor allocations. The backward condition of rural transportation made the task of competing with foreign grain — especially American — on the world market that much more difficult and the lack of facilities for the fertilizer production helped maintain the low yield.

The institutional organization of agriculture placed strong impediments to improved efficiency and increased productivity. Thus the small size of peasant holdings, frequently scattered in tiny plots, subdivided through inheritance, in debt to local banks, sometimes still held under tenancy arrangements, all combined to blight the hopes raised by the first post-war reforms.

The means and resources of the various national governments were usually devoted to furthering industrial development and the accumulation of capital for favored projects from which the peasants rarely benefited. While in some countries import duties on motor cars might be reduced, duties on agricultural machinery were gradually raised.[13] The blind pursuit of such policies by the inter-war governments inevitably deepened the rift between town and country, and intensified peasant suspicion of the central regimes. In some cases the response of the regimes to such suspicions was to convert themselves into semi-fascist governments, which were not dependent upon that minimum of popular support which their semi-parliamentary predecessors required for continued existence.[14]

3. *World War II and After*

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If World War I set in motion the process of land reform, World War II brought that process to a close. No doubt the sudden emergence of the Communists as a major political force in the area expedited completion of the reforms begun in the 1920s, but

[13] *Agrarian Problems from the Baltic to the Aegean*, p. 41-2. In Romania prior to 1928 the government imposed export duties on agricultural products. These duties were revoked but the general disregard for the needs of the landed population remained. And while it is true that there were efforts on the part of East European governments to make some administrative services available to the peasants (such as the Hungarian Social Fund, the O.N.Cs.A.) they were halting and generally short-lived.

[14] The process of excluding peasant parties from any kind of representation in the governments "began with Hungary in 1919, continued with Bulgaria in 1923, with Poland in 1926, with Yugoslavia in 1929, and with Rumania in 1931" (Mitrany, p. 122). Only the Czechoslovak Agrarian Party was able to remain in power, and in Bulgaria the Agrarian Party returned briefly between 1930 and 1934.

CHART IV

DISTRIBUTION OF AGRICULTURAL HOLDINGS BY SIZE AND AREA IN EASTERN EUROPE – CIRCA 1930*

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

* Wilbert Moore, Economic Demography of Eastern and Southern Europe (Geneva), 1945, p. 82.

p. 35

423 there were many indigenous forces which played a role as well. The war shook the fragile structure of East European society and made it vulnerable to rapid and drastic change.

Indeed, even in pre-war years the agitation for land reform had begun to take on serious character. By 1939 the rising peasant demands in Poland for further division of the landed estates had posed a critical challenge to the Sanacja regime and there were signs that the Hungarian ruling class were beginning to recognize the inevitability of land redistribution.

423 665 The impact of the war on the consciousness of the people was most dramatically expressed in the political reorientation which accompanied it. Tito's Partisan movement drew important support from the ranks of the impoverished peasantry. The sharp upward surge of the Czechoslovak Communist Party after the war may be taken, at least in part, as an indication of a more radical mood in the population as a whole. In Bulgaria, Romania and Hungary, the ruling classes, which contracted disastrous alliances with Hitler's New Order, had thereby discredited themselves, and gave way to spokesmen for radical action.

These changes were reflected politically in the fact that the main opposition to the Communists in the post-war era came, not from the remnants of the pre-war ruling classes, but from the more progressive peasant, and to a degree, from Social Democratic parties. The general framework of political and social thought had shifted to the left, and parties such as the Smallholders in Hungary and the Peasant Party in Poland assumed the dominant positions denied them in pre-war political life.[15]

423 Under these conditions the rapid conclusion of land reforms was inevitable and the Communists appeared, not as the instigators of reform, but as its overseer. Indeed, the reforms instituted in 1945-46 were not "socialist" in character, even in Hungary and

[15] The history of the non-Communist agrarian reform movements in Eastern Europe, prior to, and during World War II is yet to be written. The task is made somewhat difficult by present Communist efforts to blot out all evidence of the very existence of such movements outside the realm of the Communist Parties. The "Village Explorers" in Hungary, for example, who identified the high standards of peasant culture with an expected national renaissance, helped pave the way for the great reforms of 1945. Other groups, such as the Plowman's Front in Romania and the "Pladne" Agrarians in Bulgaria, also played, or might have played, important roles. The Polish Peasant Party is also worth considering in this respect because its role in the wartime resistance gave it roots among the peasantry sometimes lacking in the inter-war official "peasant" parties.

Poland where they were most extensive. On the contrary, like the 423
reforms of the 1920s, they signified a broadening of the property basis of society, not its limitation, and their aim was redistribution of property and wealth, not the reorganization of production.

Communist participation in the land reforms must be under- 423
stood as a part of their political program, not as a part of their 665
social program of "building socialism." The overriding concern of the East European Communist Parties in the post-war period was not the shape of the future economy, but the assumption of the political power. The Communists offered no opposition to the implementation of the reforms, and, in most cases, expedited them to curry favor with the population. The Communists attuned themselves to the popular mood, carefully concealing the focal point of their operations, which lay in the day-to-day process of consolidating power in the State apparatus, particularly in the Ministries of Interior, Justice, and Agriculture. To this end they worked, often obscurely, in minority positions, in the post-war governing coalitions and supported land programs which actually impeded their own subsequent collectivization drives.

The Communists went so far as to support, on countless occasions, the principle of private property. Thus, in 1945, the Hungarian Communist theoretician, Josef Revai, stated categorically: "There exists a material community of interest between the peasantry and labor: the preservation of the distributed land."[16] And two months later Matyas Rakosi echoed his words, declaring, "We do not want kolkhozes, but strong and prospering small farms."[17] And an organ of the Polish Communists, *Glos Ludu*, expressed itself very clearly in the same year:

> The development of the village economy can not and will not be a copy of the Russian development. Our conditions are different; our national traditions are different as well. The difference is in the psychology of the Pole, and without doubt our Polish way of progress will be different.[18]

The Substance of the Reforms

Assured of full Communist support, the reforms were rapidly 423
implemented throughout the region. The most radical land alterations occurred in Hungary, where the land structure had been least

[16] *Szabad Nep*, August 18, 1945.
[17] *Szabad Nep*, October 16, 1945.
[18] *Glos Ludu*. December 13, 1945.

423 affected by inter-war reforms. The Communist-dominated Ministry of Agriculture administered the land distribution (decreed March 17, 1945, following the Debrecen Conference), by the terms of which all holdings greater than 57 hectares were to be divided and all estates in excess of 570 hectares were to be expropriated outright. The resulting change was drastic: at one stroke the great Hungarian latifundia were destroyed (see Table 3).

TABLE 3

STRUCTURE OF HUNGARIAN LAND HOLDING BEFORE AND AFTER POST-WAR REFORM *

Category (Cadastral Acres)	1935		1946	
	Percent of Landholdings	Percent of Area (total)	Percent of Landholdings	Percent of Area (total)
1–10	85.0	19.3	86.9	39.0
10–50	13.3	26.1	12.9	32.0
50–200	1.2	11.5	1.0	12.5
200–3000	0.4	21.0	0.2	12.4
Over 3000	0.1	22.1	0.0	3.2

* *Magyar Statistikai Zsebkonyv*, XV. Evfolyam, Budapest, 1948.

Under the terms of the reform 34.6 per cent of the total arable land was seized and redistributed. The land in possession of those peasants holding fewer than 10 cadastral acres doubled in size, and the land belonging to those holding more than 200 hectares was reduced by nearly two-thirds. Despite local excesses and Communist zeal, the peasants supported the expropriations enthusiastically.

An ominous sign of the future, hidden from the mass of the population at the time, was the sequestration of some of the seized lands for the creation of future state, model, and collective farms. Those farms listed in Table 3 over 3000 cadastral acres were already largely converted into State Farms by 1947, and by 1950 all those over 200 cadastral acres had been similarly converted.

The post-war land reforms in Poland were second in magnitude only to the Hungarian reforms. Approximately 4.6 million hectares

of agricultural land (18 per cent of the national total) were held 423
by farms of more than 50 hectares. By the decrees of September 6, 1944, and January 17, 1945, these lands were distributed among landless peasants and dwarfholders. But the majority of the lands distributed were seized in the so-called Western Territories, the former German districts of Silesia, Pomerania, and East Prussia (see Table 4).

TABLE 4

STRUCTURE OF POLISH LAND HOLDING BEFORE AND AFTER POST-WAR REFORM *

Category of Holding	1935		1946	
	Percent of Holdings	Percent of Total Area	Percent of Holdings	Percent of Total Area
1–5	64.2	14.8	61.2	26.6
5–10	24.8	17.0	27.1	38.8
10–50	10.5	20.9	12.6	33.2
Over 50	0.5	47.3	0.1	1.4

* Source: Moore, p. 82; *Rocznik Statystyczny, 1949.* (Warsaw, 1950), p. 58.

The specific Communist bias of the land reforms was evident in Poland as well as in Hungary. Forty per cent of the lands expropriated in the Western territories and 36 per cent in the rest of the new country were withheld from general distribution and set aside for the creation of State and communal farms.

In Romania the post-World War II reform was comparatively modest, affecting only one-third as much land as was affected by the 1919 reform. Eleven per cent of the land was still held by farms of over 100 hectares, and the decree of March 22, 1945, fixing the legal maximum at 50 hectares, did away with these larger estates. The Romanian reform paralleled those of Hungary and Poland in that for the time it respected the integrity of church lands. Royal lands were not expropriated until the monarchy was suppressed in 1947.

The land seized for redistribution in Czechoslovakia was

423 largely concentrated in the Sudentenland and southeast Slovakia where large German and Hungarian minorities had dwelt before the war. The expulsion of all German farmers and most Hungarian farmers in the post-war period resulted in the creation of a 2.6 million hectare land fund for distribution among landless peasantry and dwarfholders. It was not until 1947 that a law was passed which expropriated the properties of large Czech and Slovak land owners. A maximum of 50 hectares was decreed for all land holdings, as the result of which an additional 900,000 hectares was made available for general distribution.

Since the structure of rural society in Bulgaria and Yugoslavia was relatively egalitarian, the extent of the post-World War II reforms in both countries was small compared to those of Hungary, Poland and Romania. In Yugoslavia 850,000 hectares (six per cent of the land) was parcelled out among the peasantry, much of it derived from expropriated land held by German farmers in the Vojvodina. In Bulgaria, where no sizeable foreign element existed on the land, only 134,000 hectares (three per cent of the land) was redistributed among the poor peasants.

4. *The Results of the Reforms*

423 There is no doubt that the Communists manipulated the reforms to bolster their own position and prestige. In each country they controlled the Ministry of Agriculture and administered the land redistribution so that recipients of land felt obligated to the Communist Party. Communist popularity in the former Sudentenland in Czechoslovakia and in the Western Territories of Poland was very great after the war as a result. Furthermore, the diversion of a good portion of the expropriated lands to model and State Farms indicated that the Communists had no intention of forever relying upon an independent peasantry for their agricultural produce.

At the same time, however, there is no justification for the oft-heard contention that the land reforms were merely a prelude to collectivization, and that by dividing up the land the Communists hoped to create so many small and economically non-viable farms that private farming would become impossible. The lack of validity of this charge is clear from the fact that the post-World War I reforms had precisely the same impact on rural society and certainly the aim of those reforms was not to prepare the land for

collectivization. On the contrary, land reform deepened peasant 423
attachment to the land by creating a larger class of land holders. Furthermore, careful study reveals that the *average* size of the East European farm *after* the land reforms was not appreciably smaller than the average of non-estate holdings before the reforms.

That the Communists heralded the land reforms as a triumph for their cause only serves to indicate how demagogic and opportunistic was their behavior in Eastern Europe after the war. In fact, they only completed a land reform begun a quarter of a century earlier by non-Communist regimes. But the reform was portrayed in propaganda as a sudden and unprecedented blow to "feudalism" which only the Communists could have administered. In this way the Communists tried to steal the thunder of those parties in Eastern Europe who had for a quarter of a century fought for completion of land reforms. It was part of the cynical and devious route by which the Communist Parties of Eastern Europe were slowly making their way to full state power.

5: Free Europe Committee U-4 (no date) 1954 E1 Europe E1

CHAPTER III

THE TRANSFER OF THE SYSTEM

1. *The Communist Seizure of Power*

668 The assumption of totalitarian power by the Communist Parties of Eastern Europe in the years immediately following the Second World War was characterized throughout by a degree of administrative caution and bureaucratic circumlocution contrasting sharply with the bold tactics of early Leninist Communism. Where Lenin advocated the forthright "smashing" of the old State apparatus, the new generation of Communist tacticians favored its piecemeal suffocation and gradual substitution of a new regime. Where Lenin's Party proudly proclaimed its victory as a sharp historical break with the past,[1] the East European Communists made painstaking efforts to represent themselves as the legitimate heirs of national tradition.[2] And while Lenin's Party seized power on the crest of a giant revolutionary wave—culminating in the "Ten Days that Shook the World"—the East European Parties, operating in a virtual revolutionary vacuum, gingerly infiltrated their way into State power by diplomatic pressures, police intrigues, bureaucratic manipulations, and the implied threat of a foreign army.[3]

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[1] The efforts these regimes made in the post-war years to maintain the fiction of legal and constitutional *continuity* with their predecessors also fit into this pattern. Indeed, with the possible exception of Czechoslovakia, it is impossible to establish a precise year – such as 1917 in Soviet history – when the Communists seized power.

[2] The East European Communist regimes frequently stress their *native* origins, and pose as the culmination of thousand-year-old national strivings. For example: the Czechoslovak Communist, Vaclav Kopecky, proclaimed at an ideological conference on February 27th, 1952, that "we Communists today are fulfilling the wishes of all true patriots of past generations. We are the heirs of the Hussite idea, and we are faithful to the highest traditions of the Czech and Slovak people." The very fact that the East European regimes were founded in the midst of intense Pan-Slavic and anti-Teuton demonstrations offers a key to their political psychology.

[3] The contrast may be put very succinctly: while the East European Communist Parties could not have seized power without the aid of the powerful Red Army, the Russian Bolsheviks retained power despite the intervention of several foreign armies.

Indeed, there is considerable evidence to show that the Communists preferred to take power without the aid of genuinely revolutionary movements. The calculated policy of permitting the Nazis to destroy the powerful non-Communist but leftist Polish underground in Warsaw was one indication of the Communist fear of spontaneous and deeply rooted reform movements. As Mitrany points out, "When the Soviet armies first occupied territory in Eastern peasant countries, they did not attempt to use the peasants against the existing regime";[4] instead they concentrated on seizing the centers of political power through which, in time, they were to introduce land reform by official fiat. 668

This wide divergence in revolutionary tactics between 1917 and 1944-45 arose from two factors. First, the spontaneous revolutionary forces in Eastern Europe were so weak that the Communists, with the aid of onrushing armies, could either defeat them or take them over. Second, the internal bureaucratization of the Communist movement which has occurred since Lenin's day made it imperative that the Communists rely primarily upon their own organization to affect events rather than upon the power of mass human forces. Consequently, they eschewed raising revolutionary slogans and adopted only those slogans which would help ease the path to organizational control.

These differences are of crucial importance in understanding the general course which the "East European Revolution" took, and the particular character of its agricultural policy.

Although Lenin's seizure of political power in 1917 was accompanied by a vast peasant-made reform of the Russian land system, he did not sanctify it with affirmations of his belief in independent peasant farming, as his more cynical East European successors were to do nearly 30 years later. Indeed, by decreeing nationalization of the land immediately after assuming power, Lenin made it clear that he considered individual peasant management of the land a transitional stage.[5] Consequently, Bolshevik policy shifts in the 661 423

[4] Mitrany, p. 179.

[5] Theoretical opposition to the land reform as a serious solution to the agrarian problem remained a part of the international Communist policy throughout the twenties, and was abandoned only after the policy shift to the Popular Front (1934-35). Even in the Far East, where the urban proletariat was very small, Comintern agents adhered to this general line. Only in the early thirties, under Mao Tse-tung's leadership, did the Communists in the Far East begin to appreciate the revolutionary potential in the slogan of land reform. During the Popular Front era, when the Communists allied themselves with a variety of previously prohibited groups in Europe and elsewhere, they accustomed themselves to the demagogic opportunism they practiced with such skill after the Second World War. (See Franz Borkenau, *World Communism*, New York, 1939).

661 423 early years did not require the radical reorientations of the official attitude toward the peasantry and the land so characteristic of later policy in Eastern Europe. The concessionary New Economic Policy itself introduced in 1921, was invariably labeled a "retreat" imposed by circumstances, and Lenin left little doubt that "two steps forward" would follow this "one step backward." However, the post-war Communist Parties of Eastern Europe, empirical and opportunistic, swung with the political tides, professing convenient belief in any economic measures which would increase their political control.

661 These differences are not merely in the *tactics* of revolution, but rather in the changing character of Communism itself. In his volume, Mitrany emphasizes the increasing degree to which contemporary Stalinist Communists were preoccupied with the question of power.[6] Whereas Bela Kun's dictatorship in Hungary in 1919 sacrificed political power partly because it refused to permit or encourage land reforms, Rakosi's post-war dictatorship appealed to popular support by expediting the reform of the land.[7] Indeed, it was Rakosi himself who gave classic elaboration of the new political methods and spirit of Communism in his famous 1952 discussion of "salami tactics." Rather than defeating the Smallholders Party by frontal attack, he explained, they were defeated by ceaseless internal manipulations:

> This gradual, day-by-day 'slicing off' of the reaction lurking within the Smallholders' Party was . . . termed 'salami tactics.' In the course of our incessant struggle against the enemy, its strength was gradually frittered away, and its impact on the working class was waning.[8]

"Salami tactics," then, describe the method by which opposition was suffocated by slow strangulation rather than by outright struggle. This policy demanded a degree of hypocrisy rarely required by Lenin's more forthright methods. Thus, the Bulgarian Communist, Anton Yugov, could declare in 1944 that "this Government, of which I am a member, and on whose behalf I speak, categorically

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[6] Mitrany, p. 170: "Whatever the theoretical pretenses that still surrounded" the Communist movement, he writes, "the issue [had] narrowed down to a question of sheer power."

[7] *Ibid.*, p. 186: "In 1919 the Socialist groups victorious in Munich, Vienna, and Budapest had proclaimed the Marxist agrarian program and, so, quickly lost power; the new regimes controlled by the Communists after 1945 elaborately buried the program so as to retain power."

[8] *Tarsadalmi Szemle* (Budapest), March-April, 1952.

denies that it has any intention of establishing a Communist regime 661
in Bulgaria." And Imre Nagy, the Hungarian Communist, was able to state in 1946 that the main struggle was not between "capitalism and socialism," but between "democracy and reaction *within* capitalism."[9] Within a year or two both Yugov and Nagy were to repudiate these statements completely; but repudiation was impossible until the necessary maneuvers had taken place within the Government which made the Communists no longer dependent upon a minimum of popular acceptance.

This policy of revolution *from above* and *by degrees* influenced every aspect of East European Communist policy, and distinguished it from the earlier Soviet experience. It reflected the degree to which the East European Communist Parties were not indigenous groupings of revolutionary idealists, but agents of an expanding imperial system, bureaucratically organized, and highly regimented. Even in Czechoslovakia, where the Communists had important working class support, the seizure of power was engineered from the Ministry of Interior rather than fought in the streets. Elsewhere, working class support was either non-existent, as in Romania, or minimal, as in Poland, where 1946 shop elections showed the Socialists three times as popular among the workers as the Communists.

This absence of any genuine national support, and the close attachment of these bureaucratized parties to the Soviet military apparatus, made the use of "salami tactics" in the political realm absolutely necessary. The same factors applied to the Communist land policy. The Satellite Parties were no more capable of a Stalinist "offensive on the land," a frontal attack on peasant economy and society, than they had been of a Leninist assault on the centers of governmental power. The same process of "slow suffocation" which had brought the Communists to political power was the only weapon by which the Communists could alter the land structure.

2. *The Pattern and Pace of Collectivization*

The transfer of the Soviet agricultural system to Eastern Europe 423
is a complex and many-sided story, the details of which vary greatly 661
from one country to the next. In Yugoslavia and Bulgaria, for example, efforts to impose the Soviet pattern were begun immediately after the close of the Second World War, while in Poland and

[9] See Gluckstein, pp. 131-142, for a full account of the Communist attempt to pose as defenders of the *status quo* in 1944-45.

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Czechoslovakia no serious attempts were made until four years later. In Bulgaria, Czechoslovakia, and Hungary, collectivization has profoundly altered the structure of agrarian economy, while in Poland the pre-Communist land system still remains substantially intact. In Yugoslavia and Bulgaria the collectivization drive, or at least the major effort, was compressed into a relatively short period of time, though elsewhere in the Satellite sphere the land offensive was diffused over several years. In Hungary, and to a lesser degree in Czechoslovakia, the 1953 agrarian crisis has forced the dissolution of an appreciable number of collective farms; but in Poland and Bulgaria the effects of this area-wide crisis, though real, are scarcely as inclusive. These variations in pattern are a reflection of the degree to which Satellite collectivization is a function, not primarily of Communist doctrinal predilections, but of specific local forces and conditions. The general goal was everywhere the same—subordination of free agriculture to the demand of urban-industrial Communist society—but in practice agrarian policies have never been entirely uniform. Among those forces and conditions affecting the pace and intensity of Satellite collectivization were such variables as the strength of the peasant traditions of independent farming, the position of the individual Satellite in the over-all Soviet economic design, the structure of the prevailing land system, the degree of planned industrialization, and the size and dynamism of the national party.

The intimate connection between Communist agricultural policy and the demands of a totalitarian industrial economy was first elaborated by Stalin himself in 1928, when he acknowledged indirectly that the primary goal of collectivization was the increased State share in agricultural production. The Satellite theoreticians were not as blunt as Stalin and usually clothed their economic designs in elaborate ideological terminology. Perhaps the most direct statement on the subject, however, was made by the Yugoslav economic planner, Boris Kidric, in 1947, at a time when his country was the most orthodox and militant of the Satellite states. "The business of agriculture in a Socialist society," he stated, "is to supply the towns and industrial centers with food."[10]

The variety of policies put forward in the ensuing years were derived from this basic goal. Much as the Communists attempted

[10] Borba, (Belgrade), April 25, 1947.

to demonstrate that their policies were motivated by concern for the peasantry, it was clear that the question of ensuring "supply" of "food" for the cities remained the cornerstone of Communist agrarian policy. And though Kidric argued that to achieve this goal the Party was faced with the "categorical imperative of undertaking urgent measures to raise work productivity in agriculture," the hypocrisy of this statement was revealed by the simultaneous decision to allocate the barest minimum of national funds for the effort. Indeed, as the policy itself unfolded, it became clear that what Kidric meant was that it was the "business of agriculture in a Socialist society" to supply goods to the city at a price which the new urban bureaucracy was willing to pay, and that price was very low. Kidric's superior, Tito, was quite frank with regard to this problem:

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> In the same way as we must do our best to make ourselves independent of weather conditions in agriculture, so we must never allow ourselves the luxury of depending on the good will of private food producers. We must undertake measures to secure the necessary food for our industrial population and for carrying forward our Socialist projects. We must protect our food supply against chaos in production and distribution caused by the existence of tens of thousands of small and independent farms.[11]

It was precisely to this extent that the Communists were interested in agriculture. If, in the process of "protecting" themselves from the "chaos" of "tens of thousands of small and independent farms," the level of argicultural production increased, the Communists would indeed be overjoyed; but such an improvement would be peripheral to the basic goal, which was redistribution of the crop rather than its improvement.

To implement this redistribution two courses were open to the State, only one of which was consistent with power realities in Eastern Europe and Communist industrial plans. 1) By increasing the flow of industrial goods from the city to the country, the Communists could stimulate the peasantry to place a greater share of their produce on the market. 2) By creating an agricultural structure through which the State could exercise direct administrative control, the Communists could force the peasantry to increase the share of goods marketed. It was the latter course which was consistent with the Eastern European political situation; and the Com-

[11] *Ibid.*, November 4, 1952.

423 661 munists, with the Russian experience guiding them closely, followed it. The decision to collectivize was essentially the decision to pursue this path, for the increased exploitation of the peasantry implicit in it was the only path consistent with "carrying forward of our Socialist projects." The basic preparation for collectivization was therefore in the seizure or creation of those organs of repression through which the Communists could exercise the necessary political control.

The groundwork for post-war collectivization was consequently not laid in the countryside, where Communist influence in these early years was small and generally limited to the new State Farms, but in the cities, where the Parties slowly extended their control over the State apparatus. Once the levers of governmental power were secured, the Communists were able to exert relentless pressure on the farms.

The tactics of the East European Parties in this "offensive" phase were never military, except perhaps in Yugoslavia, where political conditions most closely paralleled those of the Soviet Union in the early Stalinist era. And even in Yugoslavia the chief weapon was slow economic strangulation of the peasantry, an erosive process designed to break the will to resist and in the end leave the class disunited, despairing, and helpless. The offensive tactics of the bureaucratically-minded Satellite Parties deserve more detailed exposition.

Economic Pressure

661 471 This was the most direct means by which the Satellite Parties sought to destroy the independent peasant. Everywhere in the sphere compulsory tax and crop delivery schedules were promulgated, discriminating heavily against the independent sector, and particularly against middle and rich peasants. Collecting revenue was never a primary end of the tax decrees, though funds forced from the countryside were often considerable. Confiscatory delivery quotas served the additional and important function of guaranteeing supplies of foodstuffs for the urban-industrial centers. The primary economic end – the eventual bankruptcy of the individual producer, who in the early post-war years was still thriving by selling on the free and black markets–is well illustrated by the 1953 delivery schedules for Czechoslovakia. On the best land in the country a peasant with five hectares had to deliver three times as much grain to the State *per hectare* as a peasant owning two hec-

tares. On the poorest land in the country a peasant with five 661
hectares had to deliver almost twice as much per hectare as a 471
peasant with two hectares.[12] In Romania, a peasant with four hectares of land was required to deliver three-and-a-half times as much produce per hectare as a peasant holding two hectares of land.[13] This pattern was followed throughout the area.

Prices paid for produce were invariably low and insofar as com- 435
parison is possible, lower than pre-war prices, as manifest in the 471
huge discrepancies between free market prices and State prices. Moreover, the discrepancy between the prices paid to the peasantry and prices charged in retail shops for the same commodities far exceeded the cost of transportation and processing incurred by the State. In some cases a "coupon" system, ostensibly designed to compensate the peasant, was instituted. Under these terms, foodstuffs and industrial crops delivered to official collection centers were paid for by small sums in currency and coupons entitling the peasant to buy, at low controlled prices, in State shops. In practice, the system generally proved to be nothing more than a propaganda device. Since consumer goods were in short supply, and usually reserved for the urban market, the villages were frequently without such basic commodities as matches and kerosene.

Nevertheless, the confiscatory tax and delivery schedules were 471
seldom fully enforced. It has, in fact, been demonstrated that literal 661
enforcement was impossible, since in countless cases the State demands *exceeded* the individual peasant's capacity to produce. The quota levels and the severe legal punishments decreed for quota arrears were not, however, entirely unrealistic. The penalties prescribed for under-delivery were invoked only when it suited the regime purposes for a gradual extension of control over the agrarian economy. The effect of cumulative delivery failures was intended to reduce the independent peasant to the status of a tenant at sufferance, since he could be legally expropriated whenever the State chose.

The control the State exercised over industrial and financial sectors of East European economies was similarly an important weapon in the campaign against the peasant. As a result of heavy industrial emphasis, the agricultural sector was generally denied help from nationalized credit institutions. Insofar as credit was ex-

[12] Decree of the Ministry of Bulk Purchasing, January 30, 1953.
[13] *Scanteia*, (Bucharest). May 18, 1950.

471 tended to agriculture at all, the State and collective farms received
661 a disproportionate share. In effect, this policy meant the gradual depreciation of the meager equipment still owned by the peasantry, and further impeded the free peasant's purchase of vitally needed fertilizers and improved seed. This policy, it should be stressed, was an integral part of the general Communist tendency of neglecting agriculture as a whole.[14]

ADMINISTRATIVE FORCE

661 It is impossible to determine exactly the degree to which Satellite collectivization drives depended upon application of administrative or police force. The testimony of escapees, the observations of outside observers, the frequent regime admonitions against administrative divergence from the "voluntary principle," and many statements by Communist leaders on the subject in 1953 New Course speeches, make it clear that the role of force was considerable.[15] At the same time the application of force in Eastern Europe did not approach in scale or intensity the frankly military offensive against the peasantry conducted in the Soviet Union in 1928-32.

Officially the Satellite regimes have always adhered to the "voluntary principle" of collectivization, invoking the principle whenever the regimes decided to decelerate collectivization. For example, when collectivization was halted in Bulgaria in mid-1950, the regime raised the "voluntary principle" to the level of a basic State doctrine.[16] Likewise, the halt in collectivization in Poland in mid-1951 was accompanied by a series of trials of low-echelon Communists alleged to have resorted to the use of violence against the peasantry.[17] In general, application of force—beatings, jailings, and occasional executions of "kulak terrorists"—was an important, but clearly secondary, collectivization method in the Satellites. Undoubtedly the intense scrutiny of international public opinion partly

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[14] See pp. 87-88 for a more extensive discussion of the investment schedules of the Satellite governments, and other issues relative to the balance between industry and agriculture.

[15] For example, Imre Nagy, speaking on July 4th, 1953, acknowledged that in collectivization "too much bullying was used," which "not only offended the peasants' sense of justice but also caused serious economic harm." (*Szabad Nep*, [Budapest], July 5, 1953.)

[16] An editorial in *Rabotnichesko Delo*, (Sofia), October 28th, 1950, stated, for example, that "The Communist Party has always stressed in the most categorical way that it is absolutely necessary to observe strictly the voluntary principle of entering collectives."

[17] See, for example, the reports on the trials held in Gryfice (*Trybuna Ludu*, [Warsaw], May 25th, 1951).

accounts for the reluctance to apply force. Undoubtedly, too, the stern memories of the horrors of Soviet collectivization, which nearly cost the Stalinist regime its life, influenced developments in Eastern Europe and led to the refusal to take such risks once again. 661

But the basic cause lay in the nature of the Communist Parties of Eastern Europe. The East European Communist Parties did not possess the necessary reserves of mass fanaticism to draw upon in a frankly military onslaught; the cadres of experienced and zealous workers upon whom Stalin relied to enforce his campaign in 1928-32 simply did not exist. In addition, a blunt attack would have been entirely inconsistent with the slow and cautious approach embodied in the concept of "salami tactics."

Social Pressure and Propaganda

In the early post-war years the East European Parties sought to identify their own cause with the economic advancement of the peasant masses. Consequently, until 1948, militant propaganda in the countryside was confined to attacks on "Fascist collaborators," estate owners, and the "village rich."

With the consolidation of Communist power, the tenor of Party propaganda changed. The "kulak" was singled out for increasingly bitter treatment foreshadowing an offensive against the peasantry as a whole.

With the consolidation of political power in 1948-49, the tone of Party propaganda changed radically. Under the guise of purging the countryside of the "kulaks", it assumed an essentially anti-peasant tone. Vulko Chervenkov flatly stated that the peasants' "sense of private property" had to be eradicated, betraying the fact that collectivization was aimed at the entire peasantry, not merely at the "kulak."[18] While the statistics indicate that a small class of

[18] The term "kulak" as first applied in the Soviet Union denoted a specific group – those enterprising peasants whose growth the Czarist Minister Stolypin had encouraged before the war. The size of this group was greatly diminished by the egalitarianism of the 1917-18 peasant revolution, so that, even with the resurgence of the kulak in the NEP period of the twenties, the kulaks produced less than a third as much grain as they had produced before the war. Consequently, when Stalin raised the slogan, "the liquidation of the kulaks as a class," he was trying to capitalize on the traditional enmity toward a class whose significance no longer merited such wide attention. Clearly he was attempting to use the "anti-kulakism" of the peasantry as a blind under which a policy directed at a much larger group could be conducted. The term "kulak" no longer designated a specific group, but was directed against any group obstructing Communist land policy. The East European Communist picked up where Stalin had left off, and wielded the term even more demagogically.

661 well-to-do peasants had survived the post-war reforms, the size of this group was minuscule compared to the propaganda concentrated upon it. As the collectivization drive gained momentum, it became increasingly clear that the slogan of the "struggle to liquidate the kulaks" was largely an ideological cover under which a general onslaught against the entire peasantry was being waged.

"The distinguishing feature of this [agricultural] revolution," Stalin once said concerning Soviet collectivization, "is that it was accomplished *from above*, on the initiative of the State, directly supported *from below* by the millions of peasants."[19] His formula was designed to distinguish the "agricultural revolution" from the "socialist revolution" of 1917, which presumably took its initiative *from below*. Therefore, one may assume that the emphasis in his formula is to be placed on its first clause (from above) rather than on the second (from below). The constant state of tension between the peasantry and the State in the years of collectivization is testimony to the reluctance of the peasantry to believe that the drive to "liquidate the kulaks" was being waged in their favor.

[668] The means by which the peasants expressed their antagonism to the agricultural policy were varied and the material on them is voluminous. The Romanian Party organ, *Scanteia*, described the forms which peasant resistance took in this fashion:

> At the present time, the resistance of the capitalist elements [the peasantry] in our country takes various forms: the sabotage of the cultivation and sowing plan, the refusal to complete compulsory delivery quotas and to pay taxes, plotting against the collective farms and peasant partnerships, black market operations and artificially raising prices – going so far as the communication of rumors of the criminal character of arson and murder.[20]

But the most direct evidence of the failure of Communist propaganda to win peasant support for collectivization was the economic apathy of the peasants and the continued impatience and fury of Communist propaganda. Since the regimes did not themselves resort to outright violence, neither did the peasants. But to the policy of slow economic suffocation the peasants countered a policy of passive resistance traditional among the backward peasantry of Eastern Europe.

3. *The Economic Strategy of Collectivization*

423 The effort to transform the East European countryside was

[19] *History of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union (Short Course)*. (International Publishers, New York, 1939), p. 305.
[20] Scanteia (Bucharest), April 12, 1953.

PRIVATE AGRICULTURAL HOLDINGS AND ACREAGE AROUND 1949*

(Percentagewise Distribution)

I. Private Agricultural Holdings According to Size of Property.

Holdings (in ha.)		Czechos.	Poland	Hung.†	Romania‡	Bulgaria	Yugos.§
Midget:	0-2	46.5	28.8	68.6	53.1	29.2	65.0
Small:	2-5	23.5	32.5	18.9	22.9	38.6	
Medium:	5-10	17.1	27.1	8.5	17.9	25.4	21.3
Med. Large:	10-20	10.6	10.4	3.4	5.0	6.8	5.6
Large:	20-50	2.3	1.2	0.6	1.1		4.0
TOTAL		100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	95.9

II. Respective Share in Total Private Farmland Acreage.

Midget:	0-2	7.9	6.0	23.1	—	6.7	34.0
Small:	2-5	17.9	21.5	27.3	—	30.9	
Medium:	5-10	27.2	38.8	22.4	—	41.5	31.3
Med. Large:	10-20	32.1	27.3	18.3	—	20.9	14.6
Large:	20-50	14.9	6.4	8.9	—		19.4
TOTAL		100.0	100.0	100.0	—	100.0	99.3

† Hungary: divisions are from 0-2.8 ha.; 2.8-5.7 ha.; 5.7-11.4 ha.; 11.4-28.7 ha.; 28.7-57.5 ha.
‡ Romania: divisions are from 1-3 ha. (instead of 1-2 ha.) and 3-5 ha.; (instead of 2-5 ha.).
§ Yugoslavia: divisions are from up to 5 ha.; 5-10; 10-15 (instead of 20 ha.) and over 15 ha.
* C: J. Stejskal: Program Sčitani Zemedelskych v.g. 1950 (Programe of the Census of Agricultural Holdings in 1950) in *Statisticky Zpravodaj*, Vol. XIII, No. 2 (Prague), 1950, p. 46.
P: *Rocznik Statist.* 1949 (Statistical Yearbook), (Warsaw), 1950, p. 54.
H: *Gazdasagstatisztikai Tajekoztato* (Econ. & Stat. Bull.) Vol. 1, No. 13 (Budapest), Dec. 1947, p. 696.
R: N.A. Golopentia & P. Onica: *Recensamantul Agricol, Rep. Pop. Romana* (The Agricultural Census) (Bucharest), 1948, p. 7.
B: *Mesechni Izvestia na Glavnata Direktsia na Statistikata*, (Monthly Bull. of the Gen. Direct. of Statist.) (Sofia), July 1947, p. 27.
Y: Milun Ivanovic: Cooperatives and Agricultural Development, *Review of Intern. Affairs*, Vol. IV, No. 13 (Belgrade), July 1953, p. 17 sq.

423 severely limited by the special character of East European Communism. Bureaucratic in spirit and cautious by temperament, it was neither able, nor did it seriously attempt, to destroy the basic configuration of rural society. As late as 1953, the peasant population remained essentially stable, though the regimes had siphoned off surplus rural manpower to the rapidly expanding industrial centers. The land massing of the farms, on the Soviet model, radically altering the peasant social structure, lay far in the future. The problem facing the Communist planner was the much simpler one of altering the social structure sufficiently to destroy the peasants' capacity to sabotage industrial "grandeur" planned for the new cities.

311 The land structure prevailing in Eastern Europe after the
413 reforms—the raw substance from which the Communists were to create collective farms — is described in Table 5. The following pattern emerges:

The number of "producing-consuming" units—agricultural holdings of five hectares and less, producing little surplus for the urban market — represented well over three-quarters of the total in Romania, Yugoslavia, and Hungary, and perhaps two-thirds in Poland, Bulgaria, and Czechoslovakia. In this category, approximately 30 percent of the total holdings in Poland and Bulgaria, 50 percent in Czechoslovakia and Romania, and as much as 65-70 percent in Yugoslavia and Hungary were dwarf farms, barely capable of covering the needs of the family in possession.

The group of medium peasant holdings—peasant farms of approximately 5-10 hectares—were a significant category chiefly in Poland and Hungary where they represented approximately one-quarter of the total. These farms were of lesser importance elsewhere in the region.

The group of medium-large holdings—farms of 10-20 hectares—comprised six percent or less of the total throughout the region, reaching 10 percent only in Czechoslovakia and Poland.

The large peasant holdings, or "kulak" farms—of 15-20 hectares and more—varied throughout the region, ranging from one to four percent of the total.

As for the proportionate share of the total arable land, the structure of private ownership had the following characteristics (see Table 6):

TABLE 6

FARMLAND OWNERSHIP IN OR AROUND 1949*

Number of Private Farms (in thousands)

Holdings (in ha.)		Czechos.	Poland	Hung.†	Romania‡	Bulgaria	Yugos.§
Midget:	0-2	696	962	1,404	1,636	316	1,495
Small:	2-5	351	1,084	387	707	418	
Medium:	5-10	255	906	174	551	276	490
Med. Large:	10-20	159	347	55*	154	74	129
Large:	20-50	35	39	27*	34	–	92
TOTAL		1,496	3,338	2,047	3,082	1,084	2,206

† Hungary: divisions are 0-2.8; 2.8-5.7 ha.; 5.7-11.4 ha.; 11.4-20 ha.; 20-50 ha.

‡ Romania: divisions in the first two groups are: from 0-3 ha.; and from 3-5 ha.

§ Yugoslavia: divisions are: 0-5; 5-10; 10-15; and over 15 ha.

* Source as in Table 5.

423 311 The "producing-consuming" units generally comprised one-quarter to one-third of the farmland throughout the region, but in Hungary almost one-half the total.

The medium units, of five to 10 hectares, occupied between one-quarter and one-third of the farm area.

The medium-large holdings controlled 20 percent, or less, of the farmland in Yugoslavia, Hungary, and Bulgaria, and approximately 25 percent in Poland and Czechoslovakia.

Finally, the large holdings—upwards of 15-20 hectares—totaled 10-15 percent of the private farmlands, except in Bulgaria where they did not exist, and in Yugoslavia where they formed close to 20 percent.

661 423 Since the Communists' primary problem was the extraction of agricultural produce from the countryside, the focus of the contemplated agrarian reorganization had to be those viable, surplus-producing farms which traditionally supplied the cities with the produce necessary to their existence. And because it was precisely these farms which were best able to withstand the slow economic pressures of the State, and least interested in economic reform, the Communists had to prepare for a formidable struggle. In order to impose collective structure on these farms, it was necessary to discriminate against them in favor of the collectives. But this very discrimination—the refusal to supply credits, mechanical equipment, and fertilizers, and the collection of higher taxes and delivery quotas—tended to destroy their vitality and decrease the surplus produce in which the Communists were interested. So long, therefore, as these farms remained outside the collective structure, their value to the Communists was decreased as collectivization progressed. Similarly, the favorable treatment afforded the collective farms tended to decrease their basic value to the State. It was difficult to extract a high surplus of produce from farms with lower delivery quotas. These internal contradictions would inevitably continue so long as the *process* of collectivization itself was not completed, and the use of discriminatory tactics was necessary.

It is not altogether surprising that the Satellite planners never pursued an entirely consistent policy in this regard. In the early years, they tended to concentrate on absorbing the poorer farms into the collectives because they were most vulnerable to Communist pressure and appeal. Later, they tended to concentrate on those larger farms whose collectivization was crucial to the success

of their land policy. But no matter how they proceeded—and the 661
pattern differed from one country to another—they could not re- 423
solve the dilemmas posed by a slow paced collectivization. Had they been able to follow the Soviet model of full collectivization in several rapid and brutal campaigns, they might conceivably have avoided some of these pitfalls.

The chief surplus producing sector—the middle farms between 423
10 and 20 hectares—comprised some 900,000 units (See Table 6). 311
The systematic dissociation of this stratum from the upper stratum of owners holding over 20 hectare holdings, and its methodical "fractionalization" represented one of the essential characteristics of the collectivization drive. It was *this* stratum of the farm population which the regime frequently labeled "kulak," adjusting its definition as it became necessary in each situation. By 1950 it was clear that this stratum represented a challenge to the Communists not—as it was alleged—because its members hired farm labor to help work their lands, but because it constituted the producing backbone of the nation, a source of productive strength which the Communists were determined to turn to their own ends.

4. *The Strategy Unfolded*

The post-war expulsions of the *Volksdeutsche* and other German minority groups from Eastern Europe and the expropriation of their lands, together with those of Nazi collaborators, gave the early Communist-dominated regimes their first hold over the agrarian economy. Particularly in Poland, Czechoslovakia, and Yugoslavia the former German holdings formed the nucleus of the State Farms. Confiscation of the great latifundia in Hungary and of royal lands in Romania similarly created a reserve land fund on which the State could draw. In general, forest lands throughout the region were nationalized and administered by managerial panels created for that purpose. In addition, much pasture and meadowland was expropriated by a variety of legal devices, the over-all total equalling some two million hectares of first quality land. The State share in the combined forests, pasturage, and arable land of Eastern Europe ranged from 17 percent in Yugoslavia to 36 percent in Poland, and to as much as 41 percent in Czechoslovakia. Until 1949, the State farms still continued to play a minor role, except in Poland and Czechoslovakia where experiments along these lines were pushed very early.

During 1949-50 the State sector of agriculture expanded rapidly,

423 either by the simple process of extending existing land reserves, or
311 by acquisition—sometimes outright expropriation—of "kulak" lands or communally-organized "model" farms. By the close of 1949, State farms in Czechoslovakia, for example, had increased by 600 percent. By and large, however, the areas controlled by the State farms—particularly in Hungary—contained a disproportionate share of non-cultivated land (see Chart V).

In Czechoslovakia, Poland, and Hungary, the State sector comprised an area of considerable importance, and it was on the State farms—theoretically, at least, the highest existing form of "Socialist Agriculture"—that the chief Communist hopes rested. It is, in fact, the case that in the East European Satellites, State Farms achieved a higher level of development in general than in the Soviet Union at a comparable stage, since the initiative of the Russian peasantry in 1917-18 prevented the large-scale land seizures on which a State farming system could be based.

423 But in the Satellites, as in the Soviet Union, the primary effort
474 was devoted to the collective farm. In the Satellites, where the land offensive had a thoroughly bureaucratic character, the collective farms offered the additional advantage of *flexibility*. A variety of collectivized farms were created to facilitate the peasants' progress from independent farming to full collectivity. Even the terms used to describe the collective farms—"Agricultural Producers' Cooperatives" in Poland, for example—were designed to blur the true implications and to mask the ultimate purpose of collectivization. Similarly, in Yugoslavia and Bulgaria, the very name for collective farms—*zadrugi*—was a calculated attempt to evoke memories of the ancestral communal traditions of the southern Balkans.

Thus the regimes trod softly in the early years. In Czechoslovakia, for example, four types of "Uniform Agricultural Cooperatives" (UAC) were established from which the peasants—in accordance with the "voluntary" principle—might choose:

Type I Joint tillage of the land, but retention of title in real property contributed, as well as in draft animals, farm equipment, and the harvested crops.

Type II Joint tillage of the land, but title retained in real property, draft animals, and farm equipment; all boundaries plowed over, and plots grouped in "land

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CHART V

GROWTH of STATE FARMS 1949 – 1952*

(percent of arable land)

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

* Rude Pravo, October 28, 1952; Rocznik Statis. 1949 (Warsaw), 1950; For a Lasting Peace, for a People's Democracy! (Bucharest), January 30, 1953; March 17, 1950; September 11, 1953; Agerpres IVth Year (Bucharest), No. 2, January 17, 1953; Pari i Kredit (Sofia), No. 2, 1948, p. 80.

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compounds"; rent received on land, livestock, and equipment contributed.

Type III Joint tillage of the land and joint care of livestock; basic means of production *purchased* by the cooperative; rent still recognized, but limited to 10-20 percent of the total farm income—the remainder of income distributed according to work done.

Type IV Land and means of production common property; land rent abolished as "unearned income," and each member paid according to work units.

Type I is little more than a peasant partnership. Type IV is the true *kolkhoz*, patterned after the Soviet *artel*.

Similarly, in Poland four types were created, in Hungary and Romania three, in Bulgaria only one. The form stressed at any one period might vary from country to country as the needs of the State and the local strategy of collectivization demanded.

The proportion of collectives which are of the most advanced, or kolkhoz, type varied from one country to another. (See Table 7). In Czechoslovakia and Yugoslavia the vast majority of collectives were of an intermediate character as late as 1951; in Romania and Poland, on the other hand, a majority were of the most advanced type.

TABLE 7

DISTRIBUTION OF KOLKHOZES IN COLLECTIVE SECTOR*
1949 - 1952

Countries	Number of Kolkhozy			% of Total Prod. Coop.		
	1950	1951	1952	1950	1951	1952
Czechoslov.	136	259	—	2.6	4.1	—
Poland	1,275	—	2,113	57.9	—	63.0
Romania	1,027	1,089	1,796	100.0	52.1	56.5
Yugoslav.	808	1,049	—	11.6	15.0	—

* *C:* 1950-1951, *Czech. Econ. Bull.*, Feb. 1, 1953, p. 284. 1952, *Rude Pravo* (Prague), Dec. 17, 1952.

* *P:* 1950, *Trybuna Ludu* (Warsaw), Jan. 7, 1951, 1952 (June), *Wies Liczbach. op. cit.*, p. 131.

* *R:* *Probleme Economice* (Econ. Problems), No. 5-6 (Bucharest), May-June 1953. Also: Gh Gh.-Dej in *For a Lasting Peace, etc.* (*Bucharest*), May 29, 1953.

* *Y:* G. J. Konrad, *op. cit.*

Though the multiplicity of collective forms might be taken to indicate a degree of concern for the individual predilections of the peasantry, the erratic course of Satellite collectivization—the fitful starts, jolts, and abrupt halts from year to year—indicates that the initiative always remained with the Bureaucratic Center. (See Chart VI. Had the peasants in fact ever desired collectivization, or had regime propaganda made appreciable headway in the countryside, a steady rise from 1948 through 1953 might have been expected. Instead, even a cursory study reveals a tendency toward "shock" collectivization and land massing in some years, and an equally abrupt levelling of the curve in other years. (See Table 8 and Chart VI). 423 474

BULGARIA

Cooperative farms, in rudimentary forms, existed in Bulgaria even before the First World War. With the advance of Soviet power into the Balkans, collectivization began afresh; with the exception of Yugoslavia, Bulgaria revealed itself as the most vulnerable of the Satellites. Thus, nationalization of basic industries, virtual suffocation of small enterprise, and firm establishment of a one-party regime were achieved by 1947. The political opposition was crushed, the people subjected to an oppressive State apparatus, and mass collectivization begun in earnest before the actual Communist seizure of power in Czechoslovakia had even begun.

Bulgarian collectivization may be characterized by three distinct stages: the first (1945-48) witnessed the rapid organization of the collective farm system and the establishment of at least one kolkhoz in each community; the second (1949-50), a period of "shock" collectivization without parallel elsewhere in the Satellite sphere, saw the expansion of existing collectives and the creation of hundreds of new collectives, and the third (1951-53) was a period of deliberate consolidation in which only slight efforts were made to extend agrarian control.

For Bulgaria the year 1950 was the turning point, the "spinal year" during which the pace of collectivization approached that of Soviet collectivization. More than 60 percent of the entire task of collectivization was completed in that brief 12 month period; the arable area controlled by the collectives rose from 11.3 to 40 percent of the total national land. The most striking feature of the 1950 Bulgarian offensive was not, however, the number of *new* farms added to the existing system, but the increase in *average size* of

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TABLE 8

PERCENT OF ARABLE LAND COLLECTIVIZED*
1945 - 1953

	1945	1946	1947	1948	1949	1950	1951	1952	June 1953	Dec. 1953
Bulgaria	3.0	3.5	3.7	6.0	11.8	43.0	47.5	51.0	51.7	51.7
Romania					0.1	2.7	6.1	7.2	7.5	7.5
Hungary					0.5	2.6	8.1	18.2	24.6	20.0
Czechoslovakia**					5.4	16.5	19.0	37.9	40.0	38.0†
Poland					0.3	2.2	3.5	4.8	6.7	6.7
Yugoslavia**		0.9	1.5	2.3	13.3	16.1	18.8	11.4	9.5†	—

* Sources for these figures are given in Tables 11 to 20.

** Agricultural land, not arable land.

† The exact dimensions of the kolkhoz dissolutions which have taken place in 1953 in Hungary, Czechoslovakia, and Yugoslavia have not been made public; the figures given above are based on scattered evidence and official hints *Szabad Nep* [Budapest], Dec. 30, 1953, *Rude Pravo* [Prague], 19 December 1953, and G. J. Conrad, *Die Wirtschaft Jugoslawiens*, [Berlin, 1952].)

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CHART VI

COLLECTIVIZATION IN EASTERN EUROPE*

(Percent of arable land collectivized)

1945-1953



* Data in tables 9 through 17.

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TABLE 9

COLLECTIVIZATION IN BULGARIA*

1944 - 1953

Year	Number of Collectives	Number Formed Yearly	Number Households	Households per Collective†	Average Size Collective†	Hectares per Household†	Number Hectares Collectivized	Percent of Farms	Percent Arable Land
1944	110								
1945	382	272	34,362	90	383	4.2	146,570	3.1	3.0
1946	480	98	41,027	85	359	4.2	172,498	3.7	3.5
1947	549	69	44,100	80	327	4.1	180,040	4.0	3.7
1948	1,100	551	78,900	72	265	3.7	292,380	6.7	6.0
1949	1,608	508	156,483	97	343	3.5	551,572	14.3	11.3
1950	2,587	979	525,628	203	809	4.0	2,092,215	48.0	43.0
1951	2,739	152						51.0	47.5
1952	2,739	0						52.0	51.0
1953	2,747	8	568,989	207	915	4.4	2,512,500	52.3	51.7**

* *Rabotnichesko Delo* (Sofia), May 29, 1950, January 1, 1951, October 28, 1951, January 6, 1953; *Zemedelsko Zname* (Sofia), December 3, 1952, December 2, 1953.

** The figure given by the regime since 1952 for the percentage of arable land is 60.5, and this figure has gained general acceptance among Communist theoreticians and many Western observers. However, it is clear that the figure 60.5 measures a different arable land area than was used in computing the earlier percentagewise figures. The percentages given for 1949 and 1950 indicate that the arable land at the time was approximately 4.9 million hectares; but the 1952 percentage indicates arable land of only 4.15 million hectares. Since the regime has frequently claimed a steadily expanding area of cultivation, this statistical juggling does not make any sense. Therefore, this chart bases its 1952 and 1953 percentagewise calculations upon the same arable land figure used by the regime prior to 1952.

† Calculated on the basis of official data.

the collectives themselves, a rise of some 200 per cent. In this respect 423
Bulgarian collectivization parallels subsequent events in Hungary, 474
where the creation of new farms was accompanied by the rapid growth in the size of the average unit.

Bulgarian collectivization was largely concentrated in the fertile plains north and south of the Balkan Mountains, particularly in the black-earth region of the Southern Dobrudja acquired from Romania after the Second World War. (See Chart IX). Nevertheless, the average size of the farms incorporated into the collectives appears to be little larger than the average of those poorer farms still free. On the face of it, the facts are difficult to explain since the regime continues to concentrate on the richer farms—those producing effectively for the market, though less vulnerable to economic attack—and these, in turn, might be expected to be the middle-sized farms, and larger, in accordance with the general rule throughout the area.[21] The explanation for this paradox is perhaps to be found in the special conditions of local agriculture. In Bulgaria, the most valuable farmlands are not necessarily the holdings of largest acreage.

Thus, in Bulgaria, variations above or below the average are seldom extreme. The uniform structure of the pre-war agrarian economy has impelled the regime to mass small *rich* units, rather than proceed against holdings of any one class.

Significantly, the country which has had the most success in collectivization was the one which found it unnecessary to resort to a wide range of collective forms. Bulgaria has only one form—approaching the Soviet *kolkhoz*.

Romania

To date collectivization in Romania has proceeded more cautiously than in any other Soviet Satellite, excepting only Poland. The paradox of Romanian collectivization is thus that the nation is geographically and politically subject to the most direct and ponderous of Soviet pressures. Yet the "Socialization" of agriculture is little advanced. It is clear from the Romanian evidence that Sovietization is in no sense a uniform process nor collectivization entirely a doctrinaire program; politically Romania fell to the Communists very early in the post-war struggle, but evidently the nation

[21] According to a Soviet source, "in Bulgaria the majority of the members of the . . . cooperatives are middle peasants." (V. Tikhomirov, *Voprosy Ekonomiki*, Nov. 10, 1953, p. 89).

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CHART VII

[illegible] in YUGOSLAVIA by REPUBLIC*

1950



(Percentage of Agricultural Land)

* [illegible] Statistički Bilten, Poljoprivredno Gospodarstvo, No. 6, 1951, p. 5.

CHART VIII

COLLECTIVIZATION in CZECH REGIONS*

(Percentage of Communities with Collective Farms)

-1953-



* [illegible] March 3, 1953.

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CHART IX
COLLECTIVIZATION IN BULGARIA BY DISTRICT*
[illegible]
(Percentage of Arable Land)



* Statistics from Report on Bulgaria, Institute National d'Etudes et Economiques (Paris), November 1, 1950.

CHART X
COLLECTIVIZATION IN POLAND BY PROVINCE*
1953
(Percentage of Villages with Collective Farms)



* Economists (Warsaw) 3rd quarter, 1953.

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TABLE 10

COLLECTIVIZATION IN ROMANIA*

1949 - 1953

Year	Number of Collectives	Number Formed Yearly	Number Households	Households per Collective§	Average Size Collective§	Hectares per Household§	Number Hectares Collectivized	Percent of Arable Land
1949	56	56	4,058	72	—	—	12,500†	0.1
1950	1,027	971	67,719	66	261†	4.0	268,000	2.7
1951	1,069	42	75,065	70	277†	—	300,000†	3.1
1952	1,796	727	165,411	92	360†	—	700,000†	7.2
1953 (June)	1,980	184	185,000	90	369	4.1	732,000	7.5

* Speech of Minister of the Army Botnaras, *Scanteia* (Bucharest), December 31, 1953; *Scanteia*, April 12, 1953; Speech of Premier Gheorghiu-Dej, *Scanteia*, August 23, 1953; *Scanteia*, March 1, 1953; *Probleme Economice*, (Bucharest), No. 5-6, May-June, 1953; *Voprosy Ekonomiki*, (Moscow), No. 10, 1953.

† These are estimates, calculated on the basis of known ratios between number of collectives, number of hectares collectivized, and number of households.

§ Calculated on the basis of official data.

has presented its rulers with singular economic and organizational problems. 423 474

The two crucial years of Romanian collectivization were 1950 and 1952; these two offensive years alternated with periods of quiescence. In 1952, more than 50 percent of the total area collectivized to date was brought into the "Socialist sector," and in the same year the size of individual collective farms themselves increased rapidly. Though the number of new collectives increased by only 75 percent, the area brought into collectives increased by over 130 percent.

In accordance with the general East European patterns, the Romanian collectives were composed of a high percentage of medium farms, a percentage which increased each year (see Table 11). In 1953, the middle farmers comprised 57.8 percent of the total, the small farmers 35.2 percent, and landless farmers the remaining 7.0 percent. While the average size of all Romanian farms is 3.6 hectares, the average size of farms brought into collectives is 4.0 hectares.

TABLE 11

DISTRIBUTION OF FARMS WITHIN ROMANIAN COLLECTIVE SECTOR*
1949 - 1953

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	1949-50	1951	1952	1953
Medium farmers	32.0	29.4	53.0	57.8
Small farmers	62.4	39.0	37.4	35.2
Landless farmers	5.6	31.6	9.6	7.0

* *Probleme Economice* (Bucharest) No. 5-6, May-June, 1953; *Nova Mysl* (Prague), No. 10, 1953.

A unique feature of Romanian collectivization is the establishment of a very "primitive" type of collective, the "Agricultural Associations." Whereas the other countries issue agricultural decrees with a single standard for the entire collective sector, the Romanian agricultural decrees usually distinguish between "Agricultural Associations" and collectives. Including the "Agricultural

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TABLE 12

COLLECTIVIZATION IN HUNGARY*

Year	Number of Collectives	Number Formed Yearly	Number Households	Households per Collective†	Average Size of Collective†	Hectares per Household†	Hectares Collectivized	Percent of Arable Land
1949	1,520	980	37,000	24	137	5.7	208,000	3.7
1950	2,500	1,233	90,000	36	176	4.1	440,000	8.2
1951	4,652	2,152	236,500	51	187	3.7	865,000	16.0
1952	5,315	663	318,500	59	258	4.3	1,374,000	24.6
1953 (April)	—	—	340,000	—	—	4.4	1,494,000	26.8
1953 (Dec.)	4,677	–638	238,000†	51	250	4.7	1,117,000**	20.0

* *Statisztikai Szemle* (Budapest) – various numbers, 1950; *Szabad Nep*, January 25, 1950, January 21, 1951, October 27, 1950, February 26, 1951, December 2, 1951; December 16, 1952, May 11, 1953; Radio Budapest, December 29, 1953.

** Estimated on the basis of the known arable land.

† Calculated on the basis of official data.

Associations", and the State Farms, the "Socialist sector" in Romania comprises 25 percent of the arable land. 423 474

HUNGARY

Collectivization in Hungary proceeded at a steadier pace than elsewhere. The tempo accelerated in 1952 and 1953, but land policy was not characterized by the abrupt twists and turns so pronounced in Romania and Czechoslovakia. Hungarian collectivization paralleled the Romanian and Bulgarian in that acceleration of the drive was accompanied by rapid expansion of the average size of the collectives themselves. Thus, the average collective organized in 1949 comprised an area of only 135 hectares; in 1952 the average new collective was 770 hectares — an increase of over 500 percent!

Again, in accordance with the general rule, the primary target of Hungarian collectivization was middle-sized farms. The average number of hectares per collectivized household (4.4) surpassed the national pre-collectivization average (2.8). Before the wholesale dissolutions attending the Hungarian New Course, the collectivized sector occupied 26.8 percent of the arable land. Three types of collective farms exist in Hungary; the highest class, however, is not as "advanced" as the Soviet artel.

CZECHOSLOVAKIA

In terms of pace at least, Czechoslovak collectivization represents a remarkable achievement—if East European rather than Soviet standards are applied. Despite a late start, the agricultural offensive proceeded more rapidly in Czechoslovakia than in any other Satellite, excepting only Bulgaria.

The land offensive was mounted in two waves, one in 1950 and the second in 1952. Unfortunately, reliable statistics on Czechoslovak collectivization are extremely sparse so no clear picture emerges. Only 1953 figures are available for the number of households collectivized, and these indicate that the land drive was aimed at absorbing the larger, more productive units. At the end of 1952, more than 56 percent of the middle farmers were in collectives of Types III and IV, while only 40 percent of the small farmers were members. For the actual distribution of farm-types in the collective sector as it changed between 1949 and 1953 see Table 14 and for the geographical distribution of the collectives see Chart VIII.

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TABLE 13

1949 - 1953

COLLECTIVIZATION IN CZECHOSLOVAKIA*

(*Types II, III, and IV*)

Year	Number of Collectives	Number Formed Yearly	Number Households	Households per Collective†	Average Size Collective†	Hectares per Household†	Number Hectares Collectivized	Percent of Agricultural Land
1949	1,700§	1,700	–	–	–	–	375,000	5.4
1950	3,760	2,060§	–	–	302	–	1,134,392	16.5
1951	4,452	682	–	–	293	–	1,305,610	19.0
1952	7,290	2,838	–	–	356	–	2,598,073	37.9
1953**	8,284	994	343,911	41	–	8.4	2,900,000§	40.0

* J. Nepomucky, *Rude Pravo* (Prague), February 15, 1953; *Czechoslovak Economic Bulletin* (Prague), February 1, 1953, pp. 15-16; *Rude Pravo*, December 17, 1952.

** This figure represents the high point in Czechoslovak collectivization; by the end of 1953 the number of collectivised households had fallen off slightly (see speech of Agricultural Minister Uher, printed in *Rude Pravo* (Prague), December 19, 1953).

† Calculated on the basis of official data.

TABLE 14

DISTRIBUTION OF FARMS WITHIN CZECHOSLOVAK COLLECTIVE SECTOR*

— 1953 —

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Farm Unit (in Hectares)	Percent of Total Farms Collectivized
0-0.5	10.8
0.5-2	22.4
2-5	26.9
5-10	23.5
10-15	13.0
Over 15	3.4
	100.0

* *Zemedelske Noviny* (Prague), May 1, 1953.

Poland

For a variety of reasons, the impact of collectivization in Poland has been slight. The State farms, organized immediately after the Second World War, controlled nearly twice as much arable land as all collectives formed by mid-1953. In central Poland—that is to say, in the regions of Poland's pre-war territories still remaining (excluding the formerly German districts in the West)—collectivization has hardly been invoked. The majority of Polish collective farms are situated in the old German regions of Silesia, Pomerania, and East Prussia—where the transfer of populations, confiscation of German properties, and firm Party political control made collectivization far easier. 423 474

Whether the vigorous land drive launched in early 1953 (and since slowed down in accordance with Satellite-wide political and economic policies) would have resulted in the rapid expansion of the collective sector is now impossible to say. In Poland, the average size of farms collectivized far exceeded the early post-war national average—approximately 7.5 hectares per holding as against 5.9. Thus, the weight of the Polish farm offensive was directed

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TABLE 15

COLLECTIVIZATION IN POLAND*
1949 - 1953

Year	Number of Collectives	Number Formed Yearly	Number Households	Households per Collective†	Average Size Collective†	Hectares per Household†	Number Hectares Collectivized	Percent of Farmers	Percent of Agricultural Land
1949	243	243	—	—	226	—	54,830	—	0.8
1950	2,199	1,946	49,500	23	213	9.4	467,611	1.4	2.2
1951	3,054	855	71,000	23	239	10.1	728,561	2.1	3.5
1952	4,900	1,846	100,000	20	204	10.0	1,000,000	3.1	4.8
1953§	7,982	3,082	189,000	24	175	7.4	1,400,000	5.9**	6.7

* Instytut Ekonimiki Rolnej, *Wies w Liczbach* (Warsaw, 1952); *Economista* (Warsaw), III, 1953; *Zycie Gospodarzce* (Warsaw), September 6, 1953.

§ Official collectivization statistics for 1953 are extremely confused and contradictory. The figures presented here are for June, 1953; in subsequent months different figures were released, but they were so inconsistent that the June estimates are employed here. During the summer of 1953 collectivization came to a halt in Poland, and hence the situation remained approximately static throughout the rest of the year.

** Estimate.

† Calculated on the basis of official data.

CHART XI

COMPOSITION of COLLECTIVIZED and NON-COLLECTIVIZED SECTORS in POLAND 1953*

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

* Nowe Drogi, (Warsaw) No. 10, 1953, p. 183.

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423 474 against the efficient, surplus-producing farm units. A comparison of the collectivized and free sectors in 1953 is set out in Table 16. While only 40 percent of the independent farms were larger than five hectares, slightly more than 75 percent of those collectivized were drawn from this category.

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TABLE 16

DISTRIBUTION OF FARMS IN POLISH COLLECTIVE SECTOR*

— 1951 —

Farm Unit	Percent of Farms Collectivized
Landless	5.8
0 - 2	6.1
2 - 5	14.2
5 - 10	62.8
10 - 15	10.2
Over 15	0.9

* *Wieś w Liczbach* (Warsaw, 1951), p. 131.

423 474 In Poland the collective sector controls 6.7 percent of the total arable land, as against almost 12 percent organized into State Farms. Four types of collectives exist in Poland; the most developed type approaches the Soviet artel.

YUGOSLAVIA

Yugoslav collectivization is concentrated in two regions: the rich Vojvodina plain, north of Belgrade, traditionally the source of the greatest farm surpluses, and the poor mountainous regions of Macedonia in the South, where land hunger and poverty were extreme (see Chart VII). The collectivization of the Vojvodina was important precisely because of its capacity to produce a marketable surplus for the expanding cities. The collectivization of Macedonia was possible because peasant resistance was slight. In this two-pronged attack, the Yugoslav Communists adhered to the general lines of agrarian policy throughout the Soviet orbit. 423 474

Collectivization in Yugoslavia presents an interesting picture of paradoxical extremes. Prior to its 1948 expulsion from the Cominform, and for a short time thereafter, the Yugoslav regime was the most "advanced" of the Soviet Satellites, swiftly smashing the political opposition, launching a massive program of heavy industrial development, and nationalizing the major economic facilities at an early date. But in 1951, after an interval of indecision, the regime embarked on a program of concession and retrenchment which, in many significant respects, anticipated the New Course later adopted by the entire Soviet sphere.

In common with Bulgaria, the first organizational basis for collectivization was laid down immediately after the war, and the major offensive launched in 1948-49. Moreover, like Bulgaria, the first break in the offensive occurred in 1950. However, the pause in Bulgarian collectivization represented nothing more than a period of consolidation, while the Yugoslav halt grew into the first slow recognition that political and social conditions in Eastern Europe would not permit repetition of the Soviet experience.

The first reaction of the Yugoslav regime to the break with the Cominform was to accelerate the pace of collectivization. Virtually 60 percent of Yugoslav collectivization was achieved in 1949 alone (See Table 17). And if the tempo of collectivization did not reach the pitch attained in neighboring Bulgaria, the struggle between the regime and the peasantry was, if anything, more intense. But it is clear by now that the stubborn resistance of the Yugoslav peasantry—partly responsible for the catastrophic agricultural failure of 1950—was not the only factor working for revision of agrarian policy. A great deal of the dynamism which animated the East European Communists was derived from its Soviet connection.

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5: Free Europe Committee U-4 (no date) 1954 El Europe El

TABLE 17

COLLECTIVIZATION IN YUGOSLAVIA*
1946 - 1952

Year	Number of Collectives	Number Formed Yearly	Number Households	Households per Collective**	Average Size Collective**	Hectares per Household**	Number Hectares Collectivized	Percent of Agricultural Land
1946	494	494	25,062	51	246	4.8	121,518	0.9
1947	779	285	40,590	52	270	5.2	210,986	1.5
1948	1,318	539	60,158	46	246	5.4	323,98[illegible]	2.3
1949	6,625	5,307	340,739	52	278	5.4	1,839,978	13.3
1950	6,968	343	418,659	60	318	5.8	2,226,166	16.1
1951	6,994	26	429,784	62	371	6.0	2,595,000	18.8
1952	6,908	—86	—	—	267	—	1,580,000	11.4

*Informationi Priruonik, (Belgrade), Vol. I, p. 767; Review of International Affairs, (Belgrade), Sept. 16, 1952, pp. 16-18; October 1, 1952, pp. 17-18; G. F. Conrad, Die Wirschaft Jugoslawiens (Berlin, 1952).

**Calculated on the basis of official figures.

When these ties were severed in 1948, the Yugoslav Party began to lose much of its initial fanaticism and grew more complacent about its "historic tasks." 423 474

The revision of Yugoslav agarian policy in 1951-52 coincided with a relaxation of strenuous efforts to industrialize the country and a slight liberalization of the centralized dictatorship. When Tito stated in 1952 that long-neglected agriculture was to receive increased State assistance, the drive for collectivization inevitably lost much of its original meaning and force. The kolkhoz was primarily an administrative device to insure increased extraction of produce from the land at low State-determined prices, and if the State intended to increase investment in agriculture, the collectives were no longer a prime necessity.

5. *Summary*

A. This paper has made note of many of the important differences between collectivization in Eastern Europe and Soviet Russia —the greater reliance upon persuasion as opposed to force, the reluctance to open a full-scale offensive against the peasantry, the greater variety of collective forms and the greater flexibility of their usage. However, these were deviations from an historical norm to which the East European Communists were obligated for most of their inspiration. The enormous influence which the Soviet experience exercised upon them was evidenced not merely in the internal structure and organization of the emerging collective farms, but in their basic proportions (see Chart XII). With the exception of Bulgaria and Poland, the basic lines of the East European farms adhered to the pattern set by the Soviets. In the USSR the average collective covered 490 hectares of arable land; it was composed of 78 households; and each household tended 6.3 hectares of land.[22] The size of the Soviet collectives, and the area per household, slightly exceeds the average for Eastern Europe, but the proportions are so close to one another that the direct influence of the Soviet model cannot be doubted (except possibly in Bulgaria and Poland).

The peculiarity of the Bulgarian collective structure is explained by the centralization of each collective around one rural community with the subdivisions of control stemming from that community. The extremely small proportions of the Polish collec-

[22] Harry Schwartz, pp. 266-267.

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CHART XII

AVERAGE SIZE of COLLECTIVES 1953†



AVERAGE NUMBER of HOUSEHOLDS in a COLLECTIVE 1953



AVERAGE HECTARES per HOUSEHOLD in a COLLECTIVE 1953



* 1952
** 1951
† Data in tables 9 through 17.

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tives can only be explained by the great difficulties encountered in the whole Polish collectivization effort. 423 474

It should be noted that the countries with the largest average area per collectivized household are Poland and Czechoslovakia, while the countries with the smallest are Bulgaria, Romania, and finally, Hungary. The reason for this wide range does not lie in the original land structure, since the average collectivized property does not correspond to the average household area of the non-collectivized farms in the respective countries. The difference, then, probably reflects the success of the Polish and Czechoslovak regimes in collectivizing the larger, and more productive, holdings.

TABLE 18

SPHERE-WIDE COLLECTIVIZATION*

June, 1953

Country	Hectares of Arable Land	Hectares of Collectivized Land	Percent of Land Collectivized
Bulgaria	4,860,000	2,513,500	51.7
**Czechoslovakia	6,860,000	2,900,000	40.0
Hungary	5,550,000	1,500,000	26.8
**Yugoslavia	13,800,000	1,500,000***	10.9
Romania	9,750,000	732,000	7.5
Poland	20,760,000	1,400,000	6.7
Total	61,520,000	10,545,000	17.2

*Data in Tables 11 through 20.

**For both Czechoslovakia and Yugoslavia the figures are given in hectares of agricultural land, not arable land, because the most consistent and reliable data are given in these terms. The effect on the percentage figures in the right-hand column is slight, if any.

***Estimated on the basis of regime statements. See G. J. Conrad, *Die Wirschaft Jugoslawiens*, (Berlin, 1952).

B. In mid-1953, when collectivization was simultaneously halted throughout the Soviet sphere, approximately 1[illegible] percent of the arable land of Eastern Europe had been brought into the collectivized

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474 sector (see Table 18). Roughly another 10 percent belonged to the State Farms, bringing the total arable land in the "Socialist sector" to approximately 27 percent.

In other words, in over four years of feverish effort the Communist governments of Eastern Europe had not achieved what the Soviet government had accomplished in less than four months of its collectivization drive in 1929. As Table 18 indicates, Bulgaria and Czechoslovakia achieved the most significant results; Romania and Poland lagged far behind. Yugoslavia and Hungary, which had done moderately well at one time, were to see the results of years of labor washed away in the onrushing New Course.

This failure was all the more notable for the fact that the Satellite governments had at their disposal not only the lessons of the Soviet experience but direct Soviet supervision as well. Certainly the bureaucratic methods employed by the Eastern European Communists, both in taking power over a silent people and in the process of collectivization itself, were partly responsible for this failure. In the next chapter some of the economic mechanics of the new agricultural order will be discussed and perhaps additional light will be thrown on the emerging debacle.

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CHAPTER IV

THE BALANCE SHEET OF COLLECTIVIZATION

1. *General Factors*

Earlier in this study[1] it was pointed out that the Stalinist "solution" to the agricultural problem in the Soviet Union, despite its cost in human suffering, satisfied the basic agricultural needs of an expanding heavy industrial machine and the State which rested upon it. The new land structure was no more efficient or productive than the one it had replaced; but it was better suited to guarantee urban food supplies and the rapid accumulation of capital which was the prerequisite for the heavy industrial development upon which the new Soviet State was based. That certain readjustments in that land structure are being called for today, more than a quarter of a century after its initial establishment, does not indicate that, in terms of its original goals, the program was a total failure.[2]

In Eastern Europe, however, the agricultural picture is far more complex. A conclusive assessment of the results of collectivization in terms of the Communists' own goals is therefore more difficult. The extensive agricultural readjustment begun in the middle of 1953 has frequently been interpreted as proof of its failure. However, since the New Course in Eastern Europe was promulgated simultaneously with a similar program in the USSR, its origins may lie as much in the political crisis caused by Stalin's death as in a mounting economic crisis. Indeed, the vast economic disproportions which the New Course was designed to reduce had

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[1] See above pp. 21-2.

[2] These readjustments were announced in September 1953, by the Soviet leader Khrushchev in the same address in which he acknowledged the dismal condition of Soviet agriculture, and in particular the livestock inadequacies (*Pravda*, [Moscow], September 15, 1953).

423 existed for a considerable period before the new measures were introduced.[3]

To assess the results of collectivization in Eastern Europe it is necessary to apply the same measuring rod applied to the Soviet Union: to what degree did collectivization facilitate the task of increasing the State's share of the total agricultural product without a proportionate increase in agricultural investment?

This was, in fact, the exact criterion to which Boris Kidrič, the Yugoslav economic planner, was referring when he declared in 1947 that the "business of agriculture in a Socialist society is to supply the towns and industrial centers with food."[4] If, despite every other failure, collectivization has expedited this "supply," it has justified itself in Communist eyes.

311 As in the USSR, land reorganization in Eastern Europe has not
423 resulted in an appreciable increase in East European farm productivity; in many instances, the reverse has been true. That the pre-war levels of agriculture have not yet been regained in Hungary is now freely admitted by Hungarian Communist spokesmen.[5] The Polish theoretician, Stefan Jedrychowski, in a revealing analysis of post-Stalin policies, acknowledged that "in Romania, as well as in Czechoslovakia, agricultural production as a whole has not yet reached the pre-war level, although, for example, it has in the case of cattle."[6] Polish Premier Bierut confessed that the situation in Poland was not very healthy compared to pre-war standards.[7]

241 Indeed, the conclusions of the United Nations Food and Agricultural Organization (FAO), issued in 1952 long before the New Course policies, and based upon many unofficial sources, seems generous in retrospect: "All countries in the region," the FAO report stated, "with the exception of Poland, were at, or only slightly below, the pre-war level of agricultural production, and for the

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[3] It has been suggested by many that the New Course of 1953 was the consequence of a mounting, ever-deepening economic crisis. However, it is difficult to support such a thesis because, with the possible exception of Hungary, the economic problems which the Communists are now attacking with such vigor have existed for a long time. A more plausible hypothesis is that the political crisis caused by Stalin's death made intolerable the continuation of the vast economic disproportions which had hitherto been mastered.

[4] See above p. 46.

[5] Jozsef Reval, *Tarsadalmi Szemle* (Budapest), October-November, 1953. The crowning indictment of Hungarian agriculture was Reval's declaration that its livestock situation was "worse than it is in the USSR."

[6] Stefan Jedrychowski, *Nowe Drogi* (Warsaw), No. 10, 1953.

[7] Report of Premier Bierut to the 9th Plenum of the Central Committee of the Polish Workers Party, *Trybuna Ludu*, November 6, 1953.

region as a whole production may be tentatively estimated at about five to ten per cent less than before the war."[8] Since the population of the region has declined by about five per cent, the production per capita is probably at pre-war levels. However, because the proportion of total agricultural lands sown with industrial crops has increased, the produce left for food consumption has probably declined. 241

Some harvests were, of course, a great deal better than others; and it is easy to be misled by generalizing on the basis of one particularly good or bad year. Poland had a poor harvest in 1951; and Romania and Hungary suffered badly in 1952. The overall picture of Communist agricultural achievement compared to pre-war patterns is summarized in Table 19.

TABLE 19 *

PRODUCTION OF BASIC CROPS IN EASTERN EUROPE*

(in millions of metric tons)

Commodity	1934-1938	1950	1951
Wheat	14.0	12.8	14.6
Rye	11.8	11.1	11.4
Barley	5.7	4.4	4.9
Oats	6.9	5.1	5.4
Maize	12.2	9.0	12.3
Sugar	2.6	3.2	3.1
Potatoes	67.0	62.9	53.6
TOTAL (In equivalent units of wheat)	62.0	52.6	57.3

* *The State of Food and Agriculture: Review and Outlook*, Food and Agricultural Organization of the United Nations (Rome, 1952), p. 51.

[8] *The State of Food and Agriculture: Review and Outlook* (Food and Agricultural Organization of the United Nations), p. 51 (Rome, October, 1952). The exclusion of Poland may have been justified at the time the FAO report was written, since Polish economic development has been less distorted than in some of its Satellite neighbors. But in 1953 it became apparent that even in Poland agriculture was probably still close to pre-war levels.

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CHART XIII

CROP PRODUCTION in the SATELLITES*

(NOT INCLUDING THE BALTIC COUNTRIES) in MILLIONS of METRIC TONS



TOTAL WHEAT EQUIVALENT UNITS



* Food and Agricultural Organization (FAO) Report on East European Agriculture, (Rome), November, 1952.

** The Wheat Equivalent Unit is determined by comparing the caloric value of a given quantity of wheat with the caloric value of the same quantity of another commodity. By the use of this unit it is possible to speak of the sum total of various grains in numerical terms.

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According to the FAO analysis, per capita consumption of food (measured in wheat equivalent units) declined from 371 kilograms per head in 1934-38 to 339 in 1950 and 335 in 1951.[9]

The momentous failure of East European agriculture cannot be attributed entirely to mistakes in Communist planning, unforeseen circumstances, bad weather, or an exaggerated idea of the efficacy of modern machinery or collectivization. The evidence makes it quite plain that, from the very start, the Communists were embarking upon an economic program which, by its very nature, precluded the possibility of a genuine increase in agricultural production. Considering the degree to which East European Communists modeled their program on Soviet experience, it is unlikely that they were under any illusions on this score. While it is true that in all modern countries, industrial development and investment have exceeded agricultural development,[10] the Communists were undoubt-

TABLE 20 *

PERCENTAGE OF PLANNED INVESTMENT IN AGRICULTURE IN EAST EUROPEAN ECONOMIC PLANS

Country	Period	Percentage to be Invested in Agriculture
Bulgaria	1947-48	6
	1949-53	13
Czechoslovakia	1947-48	7
	1949-53	8
Hungary	1947-49	9
	1950-54	17
Poland	1947-49	13
Romania	1949	9
Yugoslavia	1947-51	8

* *Economic Survey of Europe in 1948*, United Nations, (Geneva, 1949), p. 208.

[9] The Wheat Equivalent Unit is determined by comparing the caloric value of a given quantity of wheat with the caloric value of the same quantity of another commodity. The procedure makes possible the addition of various crops into one numerical total.

[10] In the non-Soviet world industrial growth invariably outpaces agricultural growth on a percentage basis. Industrial production in 1951 in non-Communist Europe was 45 per cent higher than in 1938 while agricultural production was only 10 per cent higher (*Economic Survey of Europe Since the War*, [Geneva], 1953, pp. 167, 239).

241 edly conscious of the fact that the extraordinary rapidity of Soviet industrial growth in the thirties was achieved partly at the cost of a greater disparity between industrial and agricultural development than was characteristic of the major Western nations.

241 185 The extent to which the Communists were prepared to permit a lag in agricultural progress was indicated, first of all, by the small portion of national resources the Plans allocated to agriculture. As shown in Table 20, the planned investment in agriculture averaged around 10 per cent of the total investment schedule. In evaluating the figures in Table 20 it should be remembered that, with the exception of Czechoslovakia, the economies of Eastern Europe were primarily agricultural. Furthermore, in the period of the Plans, an increasingly large share of the land came under the control of the State, whose investment policy is here under scrutiny.

Another indication of the conscious purpose behind Communist agricultural neglect is to be found in the Plan targets set for farm commodities. As Table 21 indicates, the Plans provide for approximately four times as great an increase in the production of producer goods as of agricultural goods. And while a 50 per cent increase in agriculture is not negligible, it represents a goal the Communists, on the basis of Soviet experience, knew they could not possibly fulfill.[11]

TABLE 21

433 PLANNED FIVE YEAR PLAN PRODUCTION INCREASES

(Poland – Six Years)

Country	Producer Goods	Consumer Goods	Agriculture
	(Year preceding Plan = 100)		
Bulgaria (1948-53)	326	273	137
Czechoslovakia (1948-53)	230	170	153
Hungary (1950-54)	380	245	154
Poland (1950-56)	254	211	150

[11] The underfulfillment of agricultural and light industry targets in the USSR had become almost a tradition, and the East European Communists certainly were conscious of this heritage. They must have known, too, that the failure to fulfill the targets set for non-heavy industrial production did not stop the Soviet planners from setting targets far beyond possible attainment in the next plan (see Harry Schwartz, pp. 305-329). This adamant refusal to bring non-heavy industrial targets into the realm of reality was part of the dogma, firmly held up to Stalin's death, that the rapid expansion of heavy industry did not in any way deter the development of light industry, a dogma which was patently false, but one which for reasons of public safety, had to be upheld.

In pre-war Soviet Plans the targets for consumer goods and agricultural products were invariably underfulfilled, despite the fact that the targets were always set much below those for industry. Indeed, so slight was Communist concern for consumer goods and agriculture that the same targets were frequently repeated in successive Plans.[12] Since we have seen that the Eastern European Communists were deeply influenced by the Soviet experience, it can be assumed that they had few real illusions concerning their capacity to fulfill even those relatively modest targets set for consumer goods and agriculture. "While industrial production in 1953 compared with 1948," said the Czechoslovak Premier Viliam Siroky, "will increase two-fold, agricultural production during the same period will increase only one-third, and will still be below pre-war levels."[13] But the frankest admission of this planned economic disproportion was made by the then Premier, Antonin Zapotocky, in 1949.

> We must rid ourselves of any fond illusions that a rise in the standard of living may be regarded as a necessary corollary, or even ought to precede the successful implementation of the Plan. The exact opposite is the truth: In order to make it possible that our material and cultural level be raised, it will first be necessary to fulfill the Plan . . .[14]

Zapotocky's concise formula was carried out to the letter, as the chronic inadequacy of the urban food supply showed. A similarly candid discussion of the alternatives was given by Hilary Minc, Chairman of the Polish State Planning Commission. His effort to speak frankly on these questions was part of a debate among Polish Communist leaders during the winter of 1951-52. Collectivization had been halted some time in mid-1951; and the question of regaining Communist initiative on the land was evidently being discussed. Minc told a meeting of the activists of the Party Central Committee on October 9th, 1951 that the low level of agricultural production was due to the growing discrepancy between agricultural and industrial production, and therefore he concluded that the acceleration of collectivization (and the further widening of the gulf which it implied) would only intensify the difficulties.[15] Minc was answered on January 9th, 1952, by Eugeniusz Szyr, his deputy

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[12] See, for example, Dobb, p. 292.
[13] *Rude Pravo* (Prague), September 16, 1953.
[14] Quoted in *News from Behind the Iron Curtain* (Free Europe Press, New York), December, 1953, p. 6.
[15] Report to the meeting of activists, Central Committee of the Polish Workers Party, October 9, 1951.

433 in the Planning Commission, who said that the discrepancy between
185 agriculture and industry was "legitimate and in accord with the general conditions of the developing productive forces."[16] In a *Nowe Drogi* article published in February 1952, the then President, Bierut, put the final stamp of disapproval on Minc's analysis of the agricultural failure by stating that "the low production in agriculture cannot be explained by conditions and objective reasons." In other words, it was not, he said, the Government's policy which was responsible for the agricultural lag, but the ineptness with which the policy was being implemented by officials.[17]

Bierut answered Minc by denying that an agricultural lag was a necessary corollary of rapid industrial expansion. It is doubtful that he actually believed this to be true, but in order to justify the increased pace of industrialization it was necessary to maintain this dogma. By reiterating the dogma, Bierut ended this brief, but very significant argument; soon full-scale collectivization was resumed in Poland.

Later in 1952, Bierut again complained of lagging agriculture, citing figures to show the widening disproportion (see Table 22). The "rate of increase of agricultural production remains far below the needs of the economy," he said, but he steadfastly refused to acknowledge that the breakneck industrial pace might be responsible.[18] As events turned out, the figures he cited to show agricultural insufficiency decidedly overestimated future agricultural produc-

TABLE 22 *

PRODUCTION IN POLAND – BY SECTOR
(1949 = 100)

	1949	1950	1951	1952	1953 (Planned)
Socialist Industry	100	131	152	192	258
Agriculture as a Whole....	100	111	106	115	150

* B. Bierut, Report at the "Plenum of the Central Committee of the PZPR," June 14-15, 1952.

[16] *Nowe Drogi*, December, 1951, p. 85.
[17] *Nowe Drogi*, February, 1952, pp. 7-8.
[18] *Trybuna Ludu* (Warsaw), November 6, 1953.

tion.[19] Undoubtedly, Bierut was conscious of the fantastic optimism in the planned 50 per cent increase in agricultural production by 1953; but he could not admit it until the 1953 New Course released him from some of the extended industrial targets which had made the agricultural lag necessary. In his speech to the Central Committee Plenum in October 1953, Bierut vindicated Minc's original analysis, and acknowledged that the simultaneous expansion of both agriculture and industry at the planned pace was impossible.

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Since the New Course constituted a partial repudiation of the program of ever-increasing economic disproportion, Communist leaders felt free to admit the gravity of the situation created by their previous policies. Gheorghiu-Dej, the Romanian Premier, for example, declared:

> The rate of industrialization has been forced, especially as regards heavy industry, which led to the establishment of too large a volume of capital investment in comparison with the national revenue, exceeding even the provisions of the Five Year Plan.[20]

In other words, the bureaucratic machine tended to distort the investment schedule even more than called for in the Plan. "As the result of the allocation of too large capital investments for heavy industry," Gheorghiu-Dej continued, "agriculture—surely one of the principal branches of the national economy—and consumer goods have not been supplied with sufficient funds . . ." In Bulgaria, the disproportions were apparently as pronounced as those in Romania but, for a variety of reasons, Bulgarian Premier Vulko Chervenkov did not feel it necessary to criticize them so sharply. But he too, in his September 8, 1953 New Course address, complained of the serious lag in consumer goods and agriculture resulting from the unbalanced investment program.[21] The most dramatic revelation of agricultural neglect in the Satellite area came from Hungary in Premier Imre Nagy's speech of July 4, 1953, in which he condemned in the most severe terms the hitherto-accepted policy of heavy industrial emphasis.[22] Unlike the other Satellite leaders, who tended

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[19] In actual fact the planned targets for 1952 and 1953 were not even partially fulfilled. Instead of 115 per cent in 1952, only 104.9 per cent was reached; and instead of 150 per cent in 1953; only 109.0 per cent was reached (*Gospodarka Planowa* [Warsaw], No. 12, 1953, p. 10).

[20] *Scanteia* (Bucharest), August 23, 1953.

[21] *Rabotnichesko Delo* (Sofia), September 9, 1953. At the 6th Congress of the Bulgarian Communist Party, both Chervenkov and the Chairman of the State Planning Commission, Georgi Chankov, acknowledged that agriculture had seriously lagged behind industry (*Rabotnichesko Delo*, March 2, 1954).

[22] *Szabad Nep* (Budapest), July 5, 1953.

493 to treat the growing economic disproportions as an *aberration* of
185 the Plans, or at least of the intention of the Plans, or an unfortunate and inexplicable oversight, Nagy clearly assigned responsibility for the failure to the leadership itself. Bierut and Gheorghiu-Dej phrased their announcements of the New Course in such a way as to hint that the agricultural failure had been the result of official policy, but they hedged considerably. The extremely critical economic situation in Hungary of 1953 forced Nagy to treat the past policy with a frankness which was not as apparent elsewhere. But despite the reticence elsewhere, it was clear that the growing disproportions were the result of deliberate Communist application, with slight variations, of the formula stated by Zapotocky in 1949.

665 The most striking proof of the secondary role which agricultural development played in Eastern Europe is the general weakness of the Communist political apparatus in the countryside. In this respect East European Communists followed closely in the Soviet footsteps, where approximately 85 per cent of the kolkhozes were without a Party organization in 1949.[23] In Poland, Jacob Berman admitted, 43 per cent of the *villages* were without a Party organization altogether,[24] and elsewhere in the block the situation was no better.[25]

The absence of strong and viable Party units in the countryside reflects the unwillingness of the Communist leadership to assign its best technical and administrative personnel outside heavy industry, as well as the natural gravitation of rising bureaucrats—many of them, after all, drawn from the countryside itself—to the comforts of city life. Throughout the Soviet sphere the composition of the Communist Parties has become increasingly identified with the new managerial bureaucracy and, consequently, the Party units tend to exist in those places where the concentration of technicians is greatest.

This partly explains why implementation of the New Course in 1953-54 has made it imperative that the Party organizations in the countryside be strengthened. The East European regimes have

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[23] Merle Fainsod, *How Russia Is Ruled* (Cambridge, 1953), p. 454. Fainsod also notes that only 17.7 per cent of the Party members in the predominantly agricultural Ukraine were engaged in agricultural pursuits.

[24] *Trybuna Ludu*, November 6, 1953.

[25] See the speeches of the Czechoslovak Minister of Agriculture, Jindrich Uher (*Rude Pravo*, December 19, 1953), and the Hungarian Minister of Agriculture, Andras Hegedus (*Szabad Nep*, December 31, 1953).

THE EAST EUROPEAN REGIMES HAVE

brought great pressure to bear upon the urban technicians to go 665
to the villages to improve the technical facilities available for the 369
farms; and simultaneously, strenuous efforts have been made to 463
strengthen the Party organization in the villages. "The situation cannot be tolerated," complained the Hungarian Party organ, *Szabad Nep* in December 1953, "in which skilled and well-educated agricultural experts work in agriculture only in small numbers, and the greater part is engaged in administrative work."[26]

The administrative weakness of the State in the countryside was also evident from the inferior quality of the personnel employed in rural posts. "Not one of the managers of the Machine and Tractor Stations," the Czechoslovak Minister of Agriculture, Jindrich Uher, revealed, "has a higher-school education and only 3.5 per cent have had a secondary education." Moreover, only 10 per cent of the senior agronomists at the MTS had a higher education, and only three per cent of the State Farm workers had completed work at technical schools.[27] Such were conditions in the most modernized of the Satellite nations; undoubtedly, they were much worse elsewhere.

In Poland, for example, an official analysis, based on "incomplete data," revealed that in its 402 Machine and Tractor Stations there were 76 directors, 72 political leaders, 101 senior agronomists, and 101 senior mechanics who had no qualifications for their jobs whatsoever![28] No doubt it was this wretched situation which explains the recent feverish efforts of the Polish Government to train vast numbers of agricultural experts for immediate service as part of its New Course for Agriculture.

But even if the Communists succeed in increasing the output of farm technicians, two serious problems inherent in the system remain. First of all, there is the tendency of these technicians to attach themselves to the central ministerial apparatus from which so much wealth and prestige is derived in the totalitarian state. Secondly, the technicians who have been dispatched to the countryside are burdened with a host of responsibilities unrelated to the task for which they were trained — that is, the endless paper work of Communist bureaucracy. Resolutions, orders, decrees, receipts, dossiers follow each other in an endless succession, requiring immense expenditure of time and effort, and multiplying as the farm

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[26] *Szabad Nep* (Budapest), December 4, 1953.
[27] *Rude Pravo* (Prague), December 19, 1953.
[28] *Nowe Drogi* (Warsaw), January, 1954, p. 73.

666 apparatus grows. When the introduction of the New Course in 1953
369 made agricultural improvement imperative, the seriousness of this
463 bureaucratic delay and confusion became the subject of frequent attack by Communist orators, confirming the judgment of a prominent American student of Communist agricultural life who wrote:

> When you read . . . of the remarkable increase in the number of agronomists and other agricultural specialists and technicians in the Soviet Union, remember that many of them are not engaged, or do not spend much of their time, in research or extension or other technical work, but are trying to cope with the vast amount of bureaucratic paper work required by the Soviet system.[29]

The recurrent drives to "deflate the ranks of the farm bureaucracy" have not generally, according to this same expert, proved successful.

407 An additional measure of the long-standing Communist reluc-
241 tance to divert national resources to agricultural development is to be found in the relatively lethargic pace of farm mechanization. While it is true (see Table 23) that an increase in the mechanization of the "Socialist sector" did accompany collectivization, the increase was by no means as great as popularly pictured, and was not even as great, proportionally, as the increase which accompanied Soviet collectivization in the early thirties. Since one of the stock justifications of large-scale collectivized farming was, and remains, its alleged capacity to exploit modern farm machinery, the failure of the Communists to supply the farms with adequate machinery indicated the degree to which this Communist argument was a rationalization for a policy of exploitation.

Since the broad Russian plains are more adaptable to use of farm machinery, especially large tractors and combines, comparisons with Eastern Europe and its more broken terrain are not altogether apt. However, it should be noted that the Soviet Union provides a higher proportion of tractors to its farms than do the East European Communist regimes. As indicated in Table 23, there were approximately 107,500 tractors in service in Eastern Europe in 1952-53, compared with approximately 45,000 four years earlier. During the four years of collectivization, then, the tractor park in Eastern Europe was increased by only 62,500. In the USSR, on the other hand, over 100,000 tractors were produced in the year 1936 alone,[30] far fewer than was needed, but far greater proportionately than in Eastern Europe.

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[29] Lazar Volin, "Russia's Agricultural Potential," *Foreign Agriculture*, October, 1953, p. 179.
[30] Harry Schwartz, p. 243.

TABLE 23

GROWTH OF TRACTOR PARK IN EASTERN EUROPE

Countries	Number of MTS 1948/49	Number of MTS 1952/53	(Tractors in 1,000's by Sector) MTS 1948/49	MTS 1952/53	State Farms 1948/49	State Farms 1952/53	Total 1948/49	Total 1952/53
Czechoslovakia	800	256	5.0	–	5.0	–	10.0	25.0
Poland	30	376	0.2	15.0	14.3	20.0	14.5	35.0
Hungary	220	400*	8.0	18.5	–	1.5*	–	20.0*
Romania	135	218	5.0*	9.6	8.5	4.4	8.5	15.0
Bulgaria	71	140	3.6	12.3	0.2	0.5	3.8	12.5

Sources:

C: 1949: J. Dolansky, *op. cit.*, 1952: J. Dolansky in *For a Lasting Peace*, July 8, 1953.

P: H. Minc: Le Plan Sexennual (The Six Year Plan), *Notes et Etud. Doc.*, No. 1377, Paris, 1950; tractors: MTS-1953, E. Pszczolkowski, in *For a Lasting Peace*, June 12, 1953. Stat. 1948: *Rocznik Stat.* (Statist. Year), p. 60. 1952 estimated.

H: 1949 in *Hungary Today*. 1952 estimated on the basis of planned figures.

R: 1948: *Problems Economics* (Econ. Problems), No. 1, 1948. Ch.-Dej. in *For a Lasting Peace*, May 29, 1953.

B: Vulko Chervenkov in *For a Lasting Peace*, Sept. 11, 1953.

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241 407 As in the USSR, mere numerical increase in farm machinery creates an exaggerated view of the increased efficiency achieved. Though the tractor emphasis of the Soviet planners of the early thirties was avoided in Eastern Europe, the capacity of farm machinery to solve agricultural problems continued to be overrated. The production record of those farms — many of them the vast State Farms in Czechoslovakia and Poland in which the available machinery was largely concentrated — barely exceeds that of the non-mechanized farms. The official press has frequently complained about the inefficiency of Machine and Tractor Stations and the personnel assigned to them, but these complaints reached a particularly high pitch when the New Course directed official attention to agriculture. "We could have . . . better results in the field of farm machinery," the Polish planner, Jacob Berman, complained at the Ninth Party Plenum in October 1953. "Is it normal," he asked, "that of 6,000 engineers in the Ministry of Machine Industry, only 72 work in factories for agricultural machinery?"[21] Other Communists have complained of the number of idle tractors, the rapid turnover of personnel in the MTS, and the long delays caused by lack of adequate repair facilities.

241 These oft-repeated complaints and the slow pace of agricultural development itself reinforce the impression that Communist claims of extensive mechanization of farms are exaggerated. In Poland, for instance, less than 10 per cent of farming is mechanized.[22] In Czechoslovakia, the most advanced country in the region, agricultural work was mechanized, according to Premier Siroky, up to 28 per cent in 1951 and 30 per cent in 1952. These figures hardly square with those given by Siroky for individual components of mechanized operation: plowing, 20 per cent; sowing, 13 per cent; and tending of crops, 0.08 per cent. Siroky himself expressed great dissatisfaction with the progress of farm mechanization:

> Especially here in Czechoslovakia we had all the prerequisites for ensuring that Socialist industry would effectively contribute to the development of agricultural production, both in the State farms and cooperatives, and in the private sector. However, the aid on the

[21] *Trybuna Ludu*, (Warsaw) November 6, 1953.

[22] At the end of the Six Year Plan (1956) 18.8 per cent of Polish agriculture is to be mechanized (*Nowe Drogi*, July-August, 1950, p. 212). This is to include 80,000 tractors. Since by the end of 1953 approximately 40,000 tractors were in operation, it can be assumed that approximately half of the projected 18.8 per cent mechanization had been achieved, although it is probably much less.

part of the State and Socialist industry was, and remains, inadequate.[23] 241

Judging by this statement, various claims of rapid mechanization advanced by other East European countries must be taken with great scepticism. For example, the Bulgarian regime claimed "overall mechanization" in agriculture of 34.7 per cent in 1952. Actually, the available figures on surface plowed with tractors in 1947-49 reveal that it was 5.1 per cent in 1947, 6.4 per cent in 1948, and 8.3 per cent in 1949.[24] A leap in three years' time to 34.7 per cent "*over-all* mechanization," considering the pace between 1947 and

TABLE 24

COMPARISON OF GROWTH OF COLLECTIVIZED SECTOR WITH DEVELOPMENT OF TRACTOR PARK IN MTS *
(In percent)

Country	Percentage Increase in Land Collectivized	Percentage Increase in Tractors in MTS (15 Hp. units)
Hungary (Summer 1951 - Summer 1953)	218	40.7
Bulgaria (April 1950 - December 1953)	319	67
Romania (April 1951 - Summer 1953)	144	32
Poland (December 1950 - December 1952)	91.5	126

*H: Zoltan Vas, *Szikra*, 1951, p. 15; *Gazdaszgpolitikai Tajekoztato*, January, 1952; *Szabad Nep*, March 13, 1954.

B: *News from Behind the Iron Curtain* (Free Europe Press; New York), March, 1954, p. 17; *Agitator's Handbook* (Sofia), No. 36.

R: *News from Behind the Iron Curtain* (Free Europe Press: New York), March, 1954, p. 10; *Viata Sindicala* (Bucharest), August 19, 1951; *Scanteia* (Bucharest), July 4, 1953.

P: *News from Behind the Iron Curtain* (Free Europe Press: New York), February, 1953, p. 17; *Trybuna Ludu* (Warsaw), January 18, 1951, January 29, 1953.

[23] *For a Lasting Peace*, (Bucharest), September 18, 1953.
[24] *Bulgarie Nouvelle* (Sofia), No. 22 (89), December 24, 1949.

241 1949, is hardly feasible. Analysis of similar claims advanced in other captive countries reveals similar discrepancies and exaggerations.

There are two areas of agricultural production which require special comment. In one the Communists have achieved a very modest success; in the other their failure has been conspicuous. In both instances the results shed light on the general character of Communist agrarian policy, for the success was in industrial crops, the failure in livestock.

131 Livestock production—both dairy products and meat—is rightly regarded as one of the basic indices of agricultural prosperity and health. This is so because the cost, in terms of grain produce siphoned off for fodder, is usually high, and only an economy which has a sufficiently high productivity level can afford it. In other words, the caloric value of a given quantity of meat is far lower than that of the grain used in producing it. Only those countries producing a sufficient grain surplus can therefore consider expanding the livestock population. In pre-war Eastern Europe, the general practice was to export surplus grain. On the other hand, a more richly endowed land such as Denmark converted its surplus grain into dairy products before exporting it, and thereby further enriched itself. In Communist Eastern Europe, where grain produc-

TABLE 25

NUMBER OF CATTLE IN EASTERN EUROPE*

Country	1938	1953	Percent of Pre-War
	(millions of head)		
Czechoslovakia	4.4	4.3	98
Poland	9.9	7.4	75
Hungary	2.3	1.8	78
Romania	3.5	3.5	100
Bulgaria	1.5	—**	—**
Yugoslavia	4.3	4.8	112

* All countries except Romania: *Economic Survey of Europe Since the War*, (Geneva, 1953). Romania: Gh. Gh-Dej, in *For a Lasting Peace*, August 28, 1953.

** No figures for Bulgaria are available. However, Chervenkov, speaking December 16, 1953, admitted that livestock were still below pre-war levels.

tion had hardly reached pre-war levels by 1951, and the demands 231
of the urban population were rapidly increasing, the possibilities of increased livestock production were small. Indeed, the fodder supply was below the level necessary for maintaining *existing* livestock population. Therefore (see Table 25), the number of cattle in Eastern Europe had not, by 1952, quite achieved the pre-war levels.

But livestock failure is not recorded merely in terms of quantity, but in quality as well. Czechoslovak Premier Siroky furnished an interesting comment on this point:

> In the sphere of animal husbandry we must proceed from the fact that of late the head of cattle has increased without a corresponding extension of the fodder base. Consequently, the head of cattle has grown to the detriment of the quality of the stock and its productivity. Without a serious extension of the fodder base it will be impossible to ensure improvement of the productivity of the stock which, from the point of view of supplying the people with high-grade meat and other high-grade products of animal husbandry, is a most urgent matter.[35]

One of the chief causes of livestock deterioration is the reliance of 231
East European regimes upon the increasingly impoverished non- 471
collectivized sector for most livestock produce. As Table 28 makes clear, in each country the livestock in the socialist sector is proportionately less than the amount of land "socialized." Moreover, the major portion of the stock in the collectivized sector is not collective property, but belongs to the peasant households. In Poland, for example, 71 per cent of the cattle, 75.5 per cent of the sheep, and 75.8 per cent of the hogs in the collectivized land belongs to private household plots.[36]

Thus while the "Socialist sector" concentrates upon marketing 241
grain and industrial crops, the private sector and the collectivized households emphasize livestock products. However, as the private sector has been deprived of credits and resources with which to purchase fodder and other necessities, the quality of the livestock has inevitably deteriorated. In spite of the introduction of new "zootechnical methods" on certain model farms, most livestock con-

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[35] *For a Lasting Peace*, September 18, 1953. Remarks of a very similar character cropped up in the August 22nd address of the Romanian Premier, Gheorghiu-Dej, and in the September 8th address of the Bulgarian Premier Chervenkov.
[36] *Ekonomista* (Warsaw), III, 1953, p. 48.

231 tinues to be bred and raised by the traditionally backward East European methods.

TABLE 26

PERCENTAGE OF TOTAL LIVESTOCK IN SOCIALIST SECTOR IN 1952*

Country	Percent of Land in Socialist Sector	Cattle	Sheep	Hogs	Horses
Czechoslovakia	48.0	33.0	39.7	38.0	—
Poland	17.0	7.8	—	9.2	7.1
Bulgaria	53.0	25.2	29.9	17.6	43.5

* Sources: Czechoslovakia, Nepomucky, *Rude Pravo*, February 5, 1953; Poland, *Wies w Liczbach*, p. 25 (Warsaw, 1951); Bulgaria, Chervenkov, *For a Lasting Peace*, September 11, 1953.

241 While animal husbandry lagged, industrial crops crept ahead. Even in this realm, despite increased investments, results have not been spectacular. Few reliable production statistics are available. Table 27 shows only the increase in area given over to industrial crops.[37]

2. *The Return on the Investment*

423 In its basic features the picture thus far drawn of East European agriculture resembles the one drawn earlier of Soviet agri-
658 culture: a strenuous effort to force the peasantry into a farm system
475 over which the State could exercise direct administrative control; a feverish effort to build modernized industry at a pace which precluded much investment in agriculture; a resultant stagnation of and, in some instances, a deterioration of, agricultural production; and a constant tension between State and the peasants arising from their unending struggle over the fruits of the peasants' labors.

In the USSR, however, the victory of the State over the peasantry was concluded with far greater finality than in Satellite Eastern Europe; the system held together over a quarter of a century which included the most severe war-time trials. Collectivization in the USSR possesses stability because it has managed to provide the State with the minimum of foodstuffs necessary for its economic

[37] It is significant that among the many steps taken to implement the New Course in several East European countries was the reduction of the area sown with industrial crops.

TABLE 27

AREA UNDER INDUSTRIAL CROPS 1949 - 1951/52*

(1000 hectares)

	1949						1951/52					
	C	P	H	R	B	Y	C	P	H	R	B	Y
Cotton	—	—	37	60	—	42	—	—	40	150	—	18
Flax	28	109	22	—	—	14	—	—	—	—	—	10
Hemp	5	13	28	—	—	108	—	19	—	—	—	50
Sugar beets	194	250	113	62	31	89	219	275	115	81	32	100
Tobacco	6	14	22	9	30	35	—	20	—	—	—	37

* Data from unpublished manuscript of Dr. Nicholas Spulber (Massachusetts Institute of Technology).

program. The question with respect to Eastern Europe is whether collectivization has provided the same agricultural cushion as it did for the USSR. Specifically, does the collectivized sector in the Satellites provide the State with a higher proportion of the total produce marketed per hectare than the private sector? As was shown, the capacity of the Soviet collectivized sector to produce for the market was its very reason for existence.

The evidence available from Eastern Europe is too scattered and unreliable to justify the type of definite conclusion drawn from the Soviet materials.[38] However, on the basis of an examination of each country in Eastern Europe, some tentative conclusions can be reached.

Throughout the following comparison of the "Socialist" and private sectors, the variety of advantages which the "Socialist sector" enjoys should be kept in mind. First, on the whole the "Socialist sector" comprises better and more fertile land. It is composed of larger farms, capable of supporting more people. In particular, State Farms are frequently, though not always, located on the prosperous lands once belonging to nobles, aristocrats, or German landholders. Second, the "Socialist sector" has at its dis-

[38] The transformation of statistics from an objective science into an arm of State propaganda occurred in the USSR in 1930-31, but several years were necessary for the completion of the task. As a result, there is a great deal more information available concerning the first and second Five Year Plans in the USSR than concerning the Satellite economic developments after 1947. The Satellite Communists, after all, borrowed their techniques of falsification when they had been thoroughly developed in the USSR.

423 posal most of the available farm machinery, either confiscated or
658 purchased after the Second World War and also what has since been manufactured. In Poland in 1951, for example, the "Socialist sector," comprising some 17 per cent of the arable land, had at its disposal 98 per cent of the nation's tractor supply.[39] In Bulgaria in 1948 the "Socialist sector," then comprising only eight per cent of the arable land, already had at its disposal 81 per cent of the tractors and threshing machines.[40] Third, the "Socialist sector" received a high portion of the meager State credits extended to the farm population for constructing new buildings, purchasing fertilizers, seed, and fodder. And fourth, the "Socialist sector" generally received more favorable trade terms from government agencies, and benefited from official tax and delivery quota discrimination against the private sector. The agricultural structure of each country will be analyzed in terms of the above-stated criteria.

BULGARIA

241 As everywhere, pertinent information is sparse and only sug-
475 gestive. The State Farms, occupying 2.5 per cent of the arable land,
423 market 1.5 per cent of the nation's grain crop. The "Socialist sector," occupying 52.0 per cent of the arable land, markets 65 per cent of the grain; and the private farms, composing 45.5 per cent of the arable land, market 33.5 per cent of the grain crop.[41] In the light of the aforementioned advantages accruing to the "Socialist sector," and considering the fact that in Bulgaria the "Socialist sector" is concentrated in the fertile valleys (See Chart IX), this division is not altogether surprising. The proportion of marketed grain derived from the "Socialist sector" is greater than its arable land, and almost as much greater as that which the USSR achieved when approximately half of its arable land was collectivized.[42] It should be noted, however, that, as in the USSR, the modest success of the "Socialist sector" as a grain producer was achieved at the cost of neglecting animal husbandry, since a high percentage of the nation's livestock remained in the private sector. But if the "Socialist sector" neglected animal husbandry, it emphasized a few semi-

[39] *Wieś w Liczbach* (Warsaw, 1951), p. 25.
[40] *Pari i Kredit* (Sofia), No. 2, 1948, p. 8.
[41] *Rabotnichesko Delo*, (Sofia) February 26, 1953.
[42] In the Soviet Union in 1932, 66 per cent of the arable land was in the "Socialist sector"; and it supplied 84 per cent of the marketed grain. (Maurice Dobb, *Soviet Economic Development Since 1917*, New York, 1948, p. 249).

industrial crops. In 1953, 75 per cent of the nation's cotton and 84 per cent of its sugar beets were produced in the "Socialist sector."[43] 241 475 423

POLAND

Communist authorities in Poland have frequently asserted the superior productivity of the "Socialist sector" of agriculture. But since the claims so frequently contradict each other and contradict general claims concerning the productive capacity of the entire sector, they must be treated cautiously. For example, although the Communists have, at various times, claimed from 15 to 20 per cent greater yield per hectare for collective farms, they do not claim a higher proportionate yield for the sector as a whole.[44]

On the central question of the deliveries made by the two sectors, statistics are equally uncertain. In the year 1950, the Communists seemed confident of the superior capacity of the "Socialist sector" to market its grain. The statistics in Table 28 seem to bear out this confidence.

TABLE 28

PROPORTION OF GRAIN MARKETED IN POLAND IN 1950*

	Winter Wheat	Spring Wheat	Rye
Production Cooperatives	67.0	49.0	31.4
Private Farms	34.3	34.3	28.7

* *Wieś w Liczbach* (Warsaw, 1952), p. 132.

And in 1951 the regime claimed that the "Socialist sector," comprising only 15 per cent of the land, accounted for 23.2 per cent of the marketed grain, while the private sector, comprising 85 per cent of the land, accounted for only 76.8 per cent of the marketed grain. According to these reports, both State Farms and collectives contributed far more than their proportionate share to the market.[45]

However, there is reason to doubt the validity of these statistics. The marketing report in 1953 shows the "Socialist sector" in a

[43] *Zemedelsko Znamo* (Sofia), December 2, 1953.
[44] For example, according to *Wieś w Liczbach* (1952), the productive cooperatives have an approximately 20 per cent higher yield than the individual holdings. But other regime statistics indicate that the total produce of the productive cooperatives is no greater — per hectare — than the individual holdings.
[45] *Wieś w Liczbach* (1952).

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TABLE 29

PROPORTION OF GRAIN MARKETED IN POLAND BY SECTOR IN 1953*

Sector	Percent of Marketed Grain	Percent of Arable Land
State Farms	17.0	11.9
Production Cooperatives	6.5	6.5
Small Peasants	7.5	11.5
Middle Peasants	50.0	59.0
Kulaks	19.0	11.1
	100.0	100.0

* *Trybuna Ludu* (Warsaw), December 31, 1953.

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much less flattering light (see Table 29). However, even in 1953 the "Socialist sector" contributed more than its share to the market, and thus economically justified itself. Holding 18.4 per cent of the arable land, the "Socialist sector" contributed 23.5 per cent of the marketed grain. It should be noted, however, that the superiority was confined solely to State Farms. The collective farms, which comprised six per cent of the countryside, marketed no more than six per cent of the total grain.

The important role the State Farms play is made clear in Table 30, where it is demonstrated that, despite the low productivity per hectare, the State Farms outdid others in marketed production.

TABLE 30

PRODUCTION AND MARKETING OF POLISH STATE FARMS 1949 – 1952*

	1949	1950	1951	1952 *(Planned)*
Percent of Total Production (in current prices)	5.4	6.1	7.5	9.6
Percent of Total Marketing	—	6.8	10.5	15.1

* *Wieś w Liczbach*, (Warsaw, 1952), p. 116.

5: Free Europe Committee U-4 (no date) 1954 E1 Europe E1

FARM PRODUCTION and MARKETING IN POLAND – BY SECTOR*

– 1952 –

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



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But if the State Farms exceed independent farms in grain marketing, the so-called kulaks exceed even the State Farms. With only 11.1 per cent of the arable land, they account for 19 per cent of the marketed grain. Precisely for this reason the Polish economist, Jerzy Tepicht, in an article published in December 1953, warned against the "irresponsible policy of destroying the productive capacity" of the kulaks.[46] If the kulaks cannot be broken, the regime must cooperate with them or risk an agricultural crisis such as occurred in Hungary in 1953.

The same Tepicht, in an article on the general problem of marketing, tried to establish the thesis that State Farms had come to play the same role in marketing that had formerly been held by large landowners.[47] In pre-war times the large landowners, holding 18.1 per cent of the land, contributed 29.9 per cent of the total marketed grain. Today, the State Farms, holding 12 per cent of the arable land, deliver 21.2 per cent of the marketed grain. Tepicht concludes that the marketing ability of the State Farms equals that of the pre-war landed estates, and thereby justifies the existence of the State Farms. The only flaw in his argument – aside from the peculiarity of such a justification on the part of a Communist! – lies in the fact that the majority of the State Farms (73.7 per cent) are in the Western territories where private farms also deliver high grain surpluses to the market. Holding only 31.1 per cent of the arable land, private farmers in the Western territories market 65.4 per cent of the grain delivered by the private sector in all Poland.[48] It seems likely, therefore, that the superior marketing power of the State Farms is due as much to their geographical location as to their internal structure.

In addition, it should be noted that the State Farms have established their grain marketing record at the cost of a very poorly developed livestock, a condition which they have in common with the collectives. Whereas the small farmers, with 11.5 per cent of the arable land, possess 20 per cent of the pigs and cows, and all the independent farms, with 76.5 per cent of the arable land, raise 93.1 per cent of the cattle and 90.1 per cent of the pigs, the State Farms, with 12 per cent of the land, raise only 9.2 per cent of the

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[46] *Trybuna Ludu*, (Warsaw) December 31, 1953.
[47] *Ekonomista*, III, 1953, pp. 31-2.
[48] *Ibid*, p. 35. Tepicht's figures differ from those given above (Table 29) but the difference is slight, and either set would support his argument.

pigs and six per cent of the cows. The kolkozes, with over six per cent of the land, raise less than one per cent of the cattle, pigs, and sheep.[49] The neglect of livestock is evidently characteristic of large-scale farming in Poland since the kulaks, who also produce a high marketable surplus, have also had negligible success in animal husbandry.

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Despite these modifications, the State Farms have played a sizeable role in establishing the Communist-desired relationship between the town and country. It is also clear that, up to this point, the collectivized sector has played a very limited role.

Czechoslovakia

The data relating to sector-by-sector marketing in Czechoslovakia is, unfortunately, even more scattered than in Poland, and permits less conclusive inferences. For example, it is known that in 1950 the State purchased 46 per cent of the grain production of both sectors, collective and private. It is also known that in 1949 the farms of less than 10 hectares—virtually all the private sector—contributed only 33 per cent of their production to the State.[50] Therefore, it can be assumed that the "Socialist sector"—mostly State Farms in 1949, but including a large number of collectives in 1950—contributed a higher portion of its produce than did the private farms. Furthermore, in 1951 farms of under 10 hectares accounted for only 39 per cent of grain deliveries, so that presumably the larger farms contributed more than their proportionate share of the market.[51]

In 1953, according to official Czechoslovak statistics, the "Socialist sector," comprising over 50 per cent of the land, accounted for 51 per cent of the marketed grain, 46 per cent of the marketed cattle, 57 per cent of the marketed pigs, and 43 per cent of the marketed milk.[52] These figures suggest that the market benefits gained by the Czechoslovak State are quite modest, and frequent claims that the collectives fulfill quotas more fully than the private

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[49] *Trybuna Ludu*, December 31, 1953; Jan Wyrozebski, Radio Warsaw, January 22, 1954.

[50] *Rude Pravo*, (Prague) February 22, 1951.

[51] *Nova Mysl* (Prague), November, 1953. The farms under 10 hectares, comprising 51 per cent of the arable land, contributed only 39 per cent of the marketed grain while the collective farms in 1951, holding 19 per cent of the land, contributed 20.7 per cent of the marketed grain.

[52] *Zpravy Statniho Uradu Statistickeho* (Prague), January 31, 1954.

433 farms are not altogether true.[53] At the same time, the greater con-
231 fidence the regime has in the capacity of the collectives to fulfill
475 quotas is not altogether unjustified.

[131] Although the bulk of livestock in Poland is in the private sector, a sizeable portion of the livestock in Czechoslovakia is in the "Socialist sector." In 1952, 33.8 per cent of the cattle, 37.7 per cent of the hogs, and 38.7 per cent of the sheep were in the "Socialist sector."[54]

Although the Czechoslovak regime may have gained some market advantages from collectivization, its victory remains quite inconclusive. With the New Course, the regime, in turning to the private sector for agricultural reinforcement, acknowledged that the advantage gained was insufficient for its purposes.[55]

Hungary

423 The transformation of the agricultural structure in Hungary in
433 1945-46 was the most drastic of the post-war land reforms; and there is unquestionably a connection between the semi-revolutionary character of that agrarian reform and the special gravity of the Hungarian farm crisis in mid-1953. Whether this crisis had its roots in peasant hyper-sensitivity to the imposition of an overlordship resembling former conditions, or to the destruction of traditional trade relationships between town and country is not altogether clear; but that a close connection exists between the 1945-46 reform and the 1953 crisis is difficult to doubt.[56]

The impact of the 1945-46 reforms on the traditional trade

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[53] For example, *Rude Pravo* (December 4, 1953), asserted that the collective farms had fulfilled their quotas for grain by 103 per cent while the private farms had fulfilled their quota by only 77 per cent. A similar differential held for the fulfillment of meat, pork, and milk quotas.

[54] Cited in *Zycie Gospodarcze* (Warsaw), April 19, 1953, p. 484.

[55] As in Poland, the Czechoslovak New Course placed special emphasis upon protecting the productive capacity of the kulaks while at the same time, of course, limiting his alleged urge to engage in speculation and exploitation. "It would harm our agricultural economy," said Minister of Agriculture Uher, if the land which the kulaks occupied was not "fully utilized by them" (*Rude Pravo*, November 10, 1953).

[56] A subjective factor such as the peasants' degree of class consciousness is difficult to incorporate into an analysis of this type. However, without some recourse to this factor, it is difficult to explain the special depth of the 1953 Hungarian crisis, so much more pronounced was it than similar crises in the sphere. The series of articles in the Hungarian press during the fall and summer of 1953 portraying the countryside during the period of kolkhoz dissolutions certainly suggested that the Hungarian peasantry felt a hatred for their oppressors of an intensity hardly rivaled in the Sphere. It should not be forgotten that the strongest of the post-World War II peasant parties in the sphere was the Smallholders' Party of Hungary, which received 57 per cent of the vote in 1947 elections.

relationship between town and country has received little attention, but evidence suggests that its effect was much the same as that caused by the peasant upheaval of Russia in 1917-18.[87] Pre-war Hungary's agricultural sectors participated in the market as outlined in Table 31. As in pre-revolutionary Russia, the large landowners accounted for a share of the market in excess of their share of total arable land. This superior capacity to market goods reflected, as in Russia, not greater production, but the ability to sell a greater proportion of what they produced. While the peasants marketed 47 per cent of their crop, the large landowners marketed 67 per cent.[88]

By dividing the land more equitably, the 1945-46 reforms upset the equilibrium of the pre-war system. As a result, a larger portion of the total product was consumed by the peasants, and a smaller portion sent to the cities. To rectify this situation, and to restore the cities to the dominant position they had once enjoyed, first the compulsory deliveries system, and then collectivization, were imposed by the Communists.[89] The rapid development of industry and growth of urban population made it imperative that a greater proportion of the produce be siphoned off the land than before the war.

But the Hungarian Communists have acknowledged that they were unable even to restore the pre-war level of land exploitation. The collective farm structure could not compensate for the loss of the large landholdings; and with the bad harvest of 1952, the agricultural situation grew desperate.

This failure was the subject of an extremely interesting analysis by the Communist theoretician, Mrs. Aladar Mod, published some two months prior to the official introduction of the New Course

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[87] It is perhaps significant that the two European countries which experienced a successful Bolshevik seizure of power at the time of World War I were Russia and Hungary.

[88] Mrs. Aladar Mod, *Tarsadalmi Szemle*, April-May, 1953. Most of the material concerning Hungarian market relations is taken from Mod's extremely interesting study published on the eve of the New Course explosion.

[89] In some countries (Czechoslovakia and Poland) the system of compulsory deliveries was taken over directly from the German administration after the war. It is interesting that the totalitarian regimes, faced by the same problems, so frequently work out similar solutions. Just as the Communists in Eastern Europe incorporated Nazi techniques into their apparatus, so the Nazis, when occupying Communist Russia, kept the kolkhozes intact and exploited them as the Communists had done. Like the Soviet planners, the Germans found the collectives to be eminently suited to the economic demands of a totalitarian state.

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TABLE 31

PRE-WAR AGRARIAN TRADE PATTERNS IN HUNGARY*

Sector	Percent of Holdings	Percent of Arable Land	Percent of Total Crop	Percent of Own Crop Marketed	Percent of Total Marketed
Small Holdings (Under 25 cad. acres)	94.0	48	51.6	47.2	43.6
Medium Holdings (25-200 cad. acres)	5.5	28	24.2	63.6	27.4
Large Holdings (Over 200 cad. acres)	0.5	24	24.2	67.0	29.0
TOTAL	100.0	100.0	100.0	55.9	100.0

* *Magyar Statisztikai Zsebkonyv*, (Budapest, 1948), p. 103; *Tarsadalmi Szemle*, April-May, 1953; *Hungarian State Yearbook*, Special Agricultural Issue (Budapest, 1935).

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into Hungary in July 1953. In it she pointed out that the "Socialist sector" produced approximately 10 per cent less for the market than the former landholdings of 200 cadastral acres. "The percentage of grain production for the market," she flatly concluded, after lengthy analysis, "is much lower than it was prior to liberation." As a result, grain exports had been drastically curtailed; yet even after this, the cities were still poorly supplied. Taking 1938 agricultural production as 100, current production has reached the following levels sector-by-sector:

	1938	1951	1952
Working Peasantry	100	130	109
Kulaks	100	46.7	23.4
Large-scale farms	100	73	74.3

The working peasants had increased their total yield because the land under their control had grown by 25 per cent. But theirs was the one sector incapable of substantially contributing to the market. The two sectors capable of supplying the market with a large surplus had declined seriously—the kulak sector in amount of land under its control, and the large landowners (now "Socialist") in general efficiency. The resulting trade relations are described in Table 32.

In each year the percent of the crop delivered by the kulaks excelled that of the "Socialist sector;" but in each year the kulak share of the total crop declined as the result of State encroachment on his land. Inevitably the total amount of grain delivered to the State declined because the "Socialist sector" was unable to make up the loss. Mrs. Mod herself summed up the crisis implicit in the situation these statistics describe:

> The number of small producers is now much larger than it used to be. The producer who used to produce for the market, produces doubly less today; and today they consume much more, and market much less than in the past. Our Socialist large-scale farms, partly for the same reasons and partly on account of their still-existing infantile disorders (inadequate management, lax labor discipline) are for the time being unable to make up for the shortage.

Mrs. Mod refrained from mentioning a third factor in the curtailment of marketed production: the stern refusal of the Communist industrial order to provide incentives for greater production and

TABLE 32

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POST-WAR AGRARIAN TRADE PATTERNS IN HUNGARY*
1949 - 1952

Sector	Percent of Arable Land	Percent of Total Grain Crop Produced	Percent of Crop Delivered to State	Percent of Total Grain Delivery
1949				
Working peasants' farms	75.5	82.1	38.3	75.3
Kulak farms	17.0	16.4	59.9	23.5
Socialist sector	7.5	1.5	81.7	1.2
TOTAL	100.0	100.0	41.7	100.0
1951				
Working peasants' farms	**	72.5	46.9	66.9
Kulak farms	**	10.1	66.2	13.2
Socialist sector	26.0	17.4	58.2	19.9
TOTAL	100.0	100.0	50.8	100.0
1952				
Working peasants' farms	**	69.6	41.7	61.4
Kulak farms	**	5.5	61.0	7.2
Socialist sector	34.5	24.9	59.6	31.4
TOTAL	100.0	100.0	47.4	100.0

* *Tarsadalmi Szemle*, April-May, 1953.
** Data unavailable.

greater trade with the cities. The drastic economic reforms initiated during the summer of 1953 were part of a frantic effort to correct this imbalance, an imbalance pronounced in Hungary and terribly aggravated by the disastrous 1952 harvest.

ROMANIA

The Romanian Government has been more secretive about internal market relations than any other Satellite, making conclusions even more difficult to draw. The "Socialist sector," including the "primitive" agricultural associations, comprise 25 per cent of the arable land. According to Premier Gheorghiu-Dej, this sector produces no more than 25 per cent of the total crop,** no more than its proportionate share of the arable land. This suggests that the

** Gheorghiu-Dej, *Scanteia*, August 23, 1953.

"Socialist sector," despite its advantages, has given little benefit to the State in terms of marketed produce. The Romanian Council of Ministers frequently complains, as it did on January 28, 1952, that "in spite of all the important benefits given to the peasantry by the State . . . the market was not sufficiently supplied with agricultural products necessary to consumers and to industrial production."[21] 475 423 433

YUGOSLAVIA

The history of collectivization in Yugoslavia is so complex, and differs in so many respects from the course followed elsewhere in Eastern Europe, that comparisons are difficult. However, in certain fundamental respects, the initial collectivization drive (1948-1950) had the same goals as those guiding the Cominform bloc. No data on produce marketed are available; but production data indicate that in the years of collectivizing, the Government was successful at least in obtaining higher yields on its State and collective farms than from the private sector, and presumably was able to extract a large portion of that yield from the farms. Undoubtedly, this result was due in part to the ability of the Yugoslav regime to collectivize the fertile Vojvodina region (see Chart VII), where yield per hectare was traditionally high. But the "Socialist sector" also included a good deal of the poor and relatively unproductive land of Macedonia, and therefore Table 33, in which the proportion of grain produced by each sector is compared with the proportion of land held, is significant.

OVERALL MARKET PERSPECTIVE

Despite the sparseness and frequent unreliability of the statistical data employed in this analysis, some conclusions may be drawn.

1. In varying degrees, depending upon the country, collectivization in Eastern Europe has actually expedited extraction of agricultural produce from the countryside at the low price consistent with Communist industrial designs. While the system of compulsory deliveries at State-regulated prices was effective to this end, it left enough initiative and power in the hands of the peasantry to hamper the development of industry.

In Bulgaria collectivization results are the most impressive; in Czechoslovakia the gains are less impressive, but still significant. In Poland the regime has had to rely a great deal upon the surplus

[21] *Scanteia*, January 29, 1952.

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TABLE 33

GRAIN PRODUCTION IN YUGOSLAVIA – 1948 - 1951*
BY ECONOMIC SECTOR

(In percent of total production)

Year	Sector	Wheat	Rye	Barley	Oats	Total**	Percent of Arable Land***
1948/49	State	2.3	1.8	7.4	8.5	3.4	3.0
	Cooperative	14.2	11.6	15.1	16.4	14.4	10.0
	Private	83.5	86.6	77.5	75.1	82.2	87.0
1949/50	State	3.2	2.0	14.5	12.4	5.0	4.0
	Cooperative	23.2	24.0	25.4	28.7	23.9	16.0
	Private	73.6	74.0	60.1	58.9	71.1	80.0
1950/51	State	2.8	2.4	17.4	14.5	5.5	4.0
	Cooperative	25.3	28.4	28.3	30.0	26.3	19.0
	Private	71.9	69.2	54.3	55.5	68.2	77.0

* *Bulletin of Information and Documents*, (Belgrade), Vol. 1, No. 4, 1952, pp. 21-26.

** The total is derived from the combined tonnage of the wheat, rye, barley, and oats. Since the caloric value of a ton of wheat is greater than a ton of barley or oats, combining them all in one sum is deceptive. However, for the purposes of the above comparison the rough approximation of the "total" given, based entirely on tonnage, is sufficient. If potato production had been included in this table, then a caloric measurement such as the FAO used in establishing its "Wheat Equivalent Unit" (See Chart XIII) might have been employed, since the caloric content of a given weight of potatoes is only one-fifth that of an equivalent weight of wheat, whereas barley and oats are three-fifths.

*** The figures given for arable land in this table are estimates. Since grain production is given according to the agricultural year and the progress of collectivization according to the calendar year, it was necessary to interpolate the latter figures to accord with the former.

production of State Farms rather than the collectives, and, as in Hungary, kulaks and middle farmers continue to constitute a major source of marketable produce. In Romania the positive results of collectivization appear to be negligible, and, consistently enough, its industrial expansion has been quite modest. And in Hungary collectivization seems to have aggravated an already critical town-country relationship. But even in Hungary, and to a lesser extent Romania, the degree of peasant exploitation was sufficient to insure considerable urban development.

2. At the same time, it must be stressed, the evidence indicates that collectivization was by no means as successful as it was in the Soviet Union. This seems to be true both quantitatively (in terms of percentage of arable land absorbed) and qualitatively (in terms of reorientation of the market). It was not sufficiently comprehensive or intensive to facilitate the rapid increase in peasant exploitation which, from the regimes' viewpoint, justified the bloodshed and brutality of Communist agrarian policy.

CHAPTER V

OLD FAILURE AND NEW COURSE (1953)

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1. *The System in Crisis*

The year 1953 constituted a major turning point in the development of agricultural policy throughout the Soviet sphere. Repercussions were felt from the most remote *kolkhoz* in Siberia to the most backward mountain farm in Albania. For the first time since 1928, when the initial Communist collectivization drive was launched, the powerful Communist mechanism for intensifying exploitation of the peasantry was halted and a period of concession, retrenchment, and cautious retreat was ushered in.

Unlike previous pauses in the Communist offensive against the peasantry — in 1930, 1935, and 1941-5 — the 1953 "readjustment" was acompanied by a revaluation of the entire relationship between agrarian policy and industrial expansion. The 1930 Stalin "Dizziness With Success" speech signified only a temporary pause in the first Five Year Plan; the 1935 decree enlarging private household plots represented only a slight reorganization of the still fluid *kolkhoz* structure; and the relaxation of 1941-45 was due largely to the special exigencies of World War II. None of the concessions made during these periods (with the possible exception of the wartime years) were as broad in scope as those of 1953; and none were offered as an integral part of a concern for mounting disproportions afflicting the entire economic life.

The elaboration of post-Stalin agricultural policies serves not merely as a climax to the indictment of the Communist land program, but as a sharp cleavage in the history of collectivization through which its inner character might be most acutely analyzed. This study has therefore, drawn heavily upon the flood of frank speeches made by Communist leaders in the second half of 1953. Their candor, like the correspondence which attended the Tito-Stalin

dispute in 1948, illumine areas of conflict and difficulty hitherto only guessed at. 185 178

The causes of argicultural retrenchment were various and a full exploration of them is not appropriate here. But from the multiplicity of probable causes, two basic facts may be singled out: First, the poltical readjustment which took place following Stalin's death brought about a number of organic changes in the Communist movement. The precise nature of the changes generated by the sudden loss of Stalin is little known, and even less understood; but clearly they had very important social and economic implications. Some of the most oppressive and aggressive features of Communism, feasible when Stalin was at the helm, were evidently not feasible when in the hands of a "collective leadership." Stalinist policies had resulted in the growing economic disproportions described above: the hysterical drive for industrialization, the steady decline of the standard of living, and the stagnation of agriculture, conditions which may be considered the secondary causes of the New Course, insofar as the death of Stalin made it imperative that drastic steps be taken to alter them. 656

To the very eve of the New Course in 1953, the traditional Stalinist agricultural offensive was in full swing. Indeed, in Czechoslovakia, Hungary, and especially in Poland, collectivization drives were reaching their greatest pitch in the spring of 1953. The slogan, "liquidation of the kulaks," was generally accepted, and the entire peasantry subjected to ceaseless harassment. In the Soviet Union the decline of livestock population between 1950 and 1953 reflected the harsh spirit of the last years of Stalin's life. The basic measure of success was heavy industrial production; the keynote was the increasing obedience and discipline demanded at the 19th Party Congress; and the tone was set by the Slansky trial in Prague at the end of 1952, and the arrest of the Kremlin doctors in Moscow at the beginning of 1953.

The New Course therefore represented a sudden break in the rising curve revealed by these events. Between Stalin's death in March and Imre Nagy's astounding New Course address in Hungary in July, the governments of almost every Communist country made various minor concessions which presaged the more drastic

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[1] For a detailed exposition of the events of 1953 leading up to promulgation of the New Course, together with an analysis of current trends, see "New Policies in the Soviet Sphere" (Free Europe Press: New York, November 1953).

185 reforms to come. Amnesties were declared in Soviet Russia and
178 Romania, the imprisoned American correspondent, William Oatis,
656 was released in Czechoslovakia, the aggressive anti-Tito line of the preceding years was modified everywhere, and in East Germany reforms were announced which, because they communicated regime indecision to the people, touched off the famous June 17th revolt. This revolt, and an earlier, perhaps more significant one in Czechoslovakia, seem only to have accelerated the pace of change in the sphere. By October 1953 New Course policies had been announced by all of the Communist countries (with the exception, of course, of China). "We must note, and we must state frankly before the whole country," said the new Hungarian Premier Imre Nagy, "that the objectives of the augmented Five Year Plan are beyond our strength"[2] "We must adopt . . . a considerably reduced tempo of industrialization which will enable us to step up output of consumer goods and ensure a still greater development of agriculture," the Bulgarian Premier Vulko Chervenkov said on September 8th.[3] "It has become clear," said Czechoslovak Premier Viliam Siroky on September 15th, "that certain targets of the extended Five-Year Plan for heavy industry were too high."[4]

The agricultural policy pattern that emerged in the middle of 1953 varied from one country of the Soviet sphere to the next. Yet everywhere, with the possible exception of Hungary, where the crisis assumed a special severity, the new policies were essentially the same. Polish Premier Bierut explained in his New Course address in October that it was:

> . . . no mere coincidence that the . . . problem of what the emphasis of our future economic development should be . . . has appeared today with equal force and timeliness in all countries of the Socialist camp.

These similarities in pace and timing, he explained, arise,

> not only from the identical character of social changes taking place in these countries but also from the basic similarity — in spite of certain differences — in the class structure of the countries which are engaged in Socialist construction.[5]

The "social changes" of which Bierut spoke were the growing economic disproportions, the vast expansion of an industrial plant at the expense of living standards and agricultural prosperity. The

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[2] *Szabad Nep* (Budapest), July 5, 1953.
[3] *Rabotnicheско Delo* (Sofia), September 9, 1953.
[4] *Rude Pravo* (Prague), September 16, 1953.
[5] Quoted by S. Jedrychowski, *Nowe Drogi* (Warsaw), No. 10, 1953.

"problem" the New Course had to grapple with, as Bierut stated it, was to determine "what the emphasis of our future economic development should be." Clearly the "problem" could only be solved by modifying past emphases, and this meant, first of all, a new policy toward agriculture. 178 185 656

In Bulgaria, where over half the land is in the "Socialist sector," the New Course has had the least impact; in East Germany, on the other hand, where capitalist elements are still plentiful, the post-Stalin reorientation had its most pronounced effect. In Poland, where collectivization had proceeded very slowly and cautiously up to 1953, the New Course signified only an abrupt halt in the land offensive, but little retreat. In Romania, where collectivization had also been modest in scope, the reforms were broader, producing a plethora of decrees and resolutions. In Czechoslovakia and Hungary, where the pace of collectivization had been rapid and stormy, the New Course brought about a reversal of the aggressive policies, a sharp reversal in Hungary, a slighter one in Czechoslovakia.

The national variations were great; but the basic features of the New Course were areawide:

1. An attempt is being made to increase the proportion of national resources alloted to agriculture. "We must teach our people," said Polish theoretician Jacob Berman, "after this long period of concentration on heavy industry, to achieve a balance between heavy and light industry."[6] The State budgets for the year 1954 announced in Bulgaria, Czechoslovakia and Hungary reflected this shift in emphasis.[7]

2. The effort to increase the agricultural produce available to the cities by further peasant exploitation has been halted. Greater emphasis is to be placed upon the use of material incentives, rather than on administrative pressure, in increasing total agricultural yield. "We must," said Berman, "put on the market goods which the peasant is interested in purchasing," since, as he explained, the increased supply of goods for the cities was to be partially the result of an "increased supply of consumer goods to the countryside."[8]

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[6] *Trybuna Ludu* (Warsaw), November 6, 1953.
[7] In Hungary, for example, the 1954 State budget plans for doubling the proportion of total investment allocated to agriculture (Report of Bela Szalai to the Hungarian National Assembly, January 22, 1954). Elsewhere, the increase is more modest but nevertheless significant.
[8] *Trybuna Ludu* (Warsaw), November 6, 1953.

CHART XV

WORK TIME IN HOURS NEEDED TO PURCHASE*

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1	POTATOES	1 Kg.	5	MILK	1 L.
2	CABBAGE	1 Kg.	6	SUGAR	1 Kg.
3	EGG	1 Dz.	7	PORK	1 Kg.
4	BREAD	1 Kg.	8	BUTTER	1 Kg.

1 Kg = 2.2046 lbs. 1 L = 1.06 Qt.



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

* Official U. S. Government statistics.

** Post Currency Reform — Black Rye Bread (White Bread = 1.09)

p. 121

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3. Consequently, the policy of collectivization, designed to insure a steady supply of goods to the cities without much payment in return, loses a large part of its meaning, and the collectivization drive itself is halted. While it is true that collectivized farming is still officially considered the highest form of agrarian organization,[9] the revised economic plans of the Satellite regimes do not intend appreciable extension of the "Socialist sector." Indeed, the goal of increasing the standard of living precludes, for some time, the resumption of any Communist land offensive.

4. Similarly, the New Course has made something of an anomaly of the traditional practices of the Communist land offensive: the division of the peasantry into antagonistic groups, the discrimination against the independent peasantry as a whole, the compilation of "kulak lists." These techniques, which were so well adapted to the collectivization campaign, lose much of their meaning in the new atmosphere. Again and again Communist leaders admonish their bureaucracy to cease treating the peasant as an "enemy" and everywhere but in Bulgaria it is now openly declared that the independent peasantry must be relied upon for the major portion of the agricultural produce.[10] Violent anti-kulak campaigns must also be relinquished as long as the regimes are interested in agricultural production and not merely in agricultural redistribution. Therefore, the post-Stalin regimes call for "limitation" of the "kulak" rather than his "elimination."[11]

5. Since increased agricultural production is the urgent and immediate necessity, and since increased administrative force cannot be used to obtain it, incentives for the peasant must be broadened. Delivery quotas are reduced; delivery prices are increased; taxes and fees of all sorts are lowered; and arrears in many categories are canceled. The pattern is nowhere identical; but in each country most of the same devices were employed.

"We must understand," said Berman, [that the new policy] "is going to cost a large sum of money. If the peasant gets this money but doesn't get any goods for it, including those which he

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[9] See, for example, the Bierut speech at the 2nd Congress of the Polish Workers Party (PZPR), March 10, 1954.

[10] "We shall not and must not force anybody to join agricultural cooperatives, and we also do not think that the private farmer represents our enemy, we consider him our ally" (Czechoslovak President Antonin Zapotocky, *Rude Pravo*, February 23, 1954).

[11] See, for example, Gheorghiu-Dej., *For a Lasting Peace*, November 6, 1953.

really wants . . . there will be no increase in [agricultural] production." Therefore, a dual policy of increased payment for agricultural goods and increased production of vitally needed farmers' commodities is instituted. 656 178 185 423

6. An attempt is being made to redress the balance so far as the concentration of techniques is concerned. A vigorous effort to detach technicians from cities and urban industries and to send them to farms for whose direction and assistance they were ostensibly trained, is being made in conjunction with the new plan.[12] This is true everywhere in the Soviet sphere, especially in Poland the USSR, and Romania.

7. If the New Course is designed partly to consolidate the existing agricultural structure, it must be revaluated in terms of long-range perspectives. Hence, those collective farms which have the least social stability and economic viability are permitted to return to the private sector. In Czechoslovakia, where some 40 per cent of the farms were not paying their own way, according to Premier Siroky, a small percentage of the farms were permitted to disband in the fall of 1953.[13] In Yugoslavia, where hundreds of collectives in mountainous areas produced very little and served only as a drain on the State treasury, almost half of these farms have been dissolved since 1951.[14] And in Hungary, where peasant dissatisfaction was so great that, even with a police-State normally equipped to handle discontent, it constituted an element of such basic instability that almost half of the collectivized households have left the "Socialist sector."[15]

Above all, the New Course represents an effort to stabilize and consolidate the system of relationships carved out by the East European regimes. The next few years are likely to witness a concentrated Communist effort to make a smoothly-functioning economic order out of the conquests already gained, rather than sweeping away present problems by posing future challenges, as they have done in the past.

The New Course does not, by any stretch of the imagination,

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[12] The program of reinforcing the technical assistance to the countryside has encountered considerable resistance from the technicians themselves, and, indeed, in the USSR, the government complains that many technicians who go to the countryside refuse to take their families with them, so convinced are they that the new assignments are temporary (*Pravda*, November 27, 1953).
[13] *Rude Pravo* (Prague), November 10, 1953.
[14] *Borba* (Belgrade), February 29, 1953.
[15] *Szabad Nep* (Budapest), December 31, 1953.

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represent a repudiation of the agricultural organization pioneered by the Soviet planners in the early 1930s and brought to Eastern Europe in the late 1940s. The basic characteristics of this organization cannot be abandoned without the most thoroughgoing reorientation of the whole economy. The New Course cannot therefore be compared with the New Economic Policy of early Soviet history. The NEP was declared before the Soviet industrial and bureaucratic system had been built, and a retreat to a relatively free market system was possible. The New Course, on the other hand, has been promulgated within the framework of an already fully-elaborated industrial and bureaucratic system, and the regimes can no longer rely upon the free market for agricultural produce.

Having built this social system and enclosed themselves within it, the East European Communists have lost much of the freedom of choice and flexibility which aided them so greatly in their postwar assumption of power. Therefore, they are subject to the internal laws of the system, and it is doubtful whether they can make a success of their efforts to reorient its basic relationships. The authoritarian order is well adapted to the leadership of a rapidly expanding heavy industrial, semi-military economy, but it is badly equipped to handle the problems of small-scale agriculture and consumer demand. In nine months of operation, the New Course has already made it clear that the greatest obstacle to stabilization of the Stalinist social order comes from the social order itself, and its voracious demands.[16]

Prior to the introduction of the New Course, it was widely assumed that the East European Communist drive to emulate Soviet achievements was inexorable, and required only time for completion. In particular, it was assumed that the Satellite regimes could not rest until collectivization was completed, as if the Communists could not face themselves ideologically with one independent farm remaining. But the events of 1953 have highlighted the degree to which Communist agricultural policy has been, from the start, conditioned by the bedrock economic needs of a developing social structure, rather than by the abstract demands of rigid doctrine. Indeed, even the Soviets, whose collectivized agriculture had attained the state of "near-perfection" and completion toward which

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[16] For an extensive discussion of internal bureaucratic resistance to the New Course see "The Bureaucracy Wavers," *News from Behind the Iron Curtain* (Free Europe Press, New York), January, 1953.

the East European Communists were striving, are in the process of readjusting the structure in line with the new political relationships. 658 178 185

No doubt the present *modus vivendi* between the peasantry and the Communist regimes is precarious and unstable, at best an uneasy truce between essentially antagonistic social forces. But there is good reason to believe that the Communists are determined to keep this mid-way course for some time to come, with only minor wavering within the ranks. 423

3. *"Salami Tactics" and the New Course* 423

The development of East European Communism since World War II has been dominated by the pragmatic methods of "salami tactics," the theory expounded by Hungarian ex-Premier Rakosi, which justified pursuit of any social or economic program that reinforces Communist political power. The advocacy of land reform facilitated Communist absorption of the State machine in 1945-46, and therefore became approved Communist "agrarian policy." Similarly, since advocacy of a productive middle peasantry may help to facilitate Communist retention of power in 1953-54, it has become approved Communist "agrarian policy." At each stage, the Communists speak as if no other policy had ever been considered, and as if no other policy could possibly be.[17] As always, however, their primary concern is with power, and their ideological pronouncements tailored to suit it. The New Course is a development very much within the spirit of the "salami tactics" philosophy.

The success and failure of Communist agriculture policy in Eastern Europe may be attributable to these same "salami tactics." This strategem of slow suffocation made possible the seizure of power under circumstances unsuited to "classic" revolutionary forms; and it was well suited to a political apparatus incapable of a frontal revolutionary attack. The policy of slow, piecemeal land collectivization made possible the extension of the "Socialist sector" at a pace which did not arouse the united antagonism of the peasantry at any one time, thus avoiding the type of militant resist-

[17] See above 91-2 for a brief discussion of official explanations of change in policy. Considering the importance of changes in policy emphasis in 1953, it is remarkable that the Communists have made so few attempts to analyze their past performances. The official definition of "Socialism" itself was altered during 1953 (see Fogarasi, *Tarsadalmi Szemle* (Budapest), September-October, 1953), and to this date not a single Communist theoretician has acknowledged the fact.

423 ance to collectivization which only a party of the strong Soviet type could have withstood.

However, those factors which made "salami tactics" suitable for the seizure of power and the beginning of collectivization made them inappropriate for completion of the task and the final subjugation of the independent peasantry. These disadvantages may be summarized as follows:

423 668 1. Piecemeal collectivization encouraged a type of peasant resistance which, it turned out, was more effective than Soviet peasant resistance. In the USSR collectivization took place so rapidly, and with such tremendous force, that the vast majority of peasants were already well enclosed within the "Socialist sector" by the time a full-scale counter-attack could be prepared. Leonard Hubbard, the English authority, described the Soviet victory in this way:

> The struggle over collectivization ended distinctly in favour of the Soviet Government, unlike the confiict [between the Government and the peasantry] that brought War Communism to a close. The peasants were no longer able to starve the Government into yielding, because the Government had now created an efficient organisation for obtaining the foodstuffs necessary for subsistence of the urban and industrial population.[18]

While it is true that the Soviet peasantry, in retaliation, destroyed a good portion of the nation's livestock, their bargaining power was not improved as a result. The vital shipments of surplus grain were insured, and all means of resistance had been thoroughly destroyed. The famine of 1932-33, mainly affecting the grain-growing regions of Ukraine and South Russia, demonstrated beyond doubt that, in Hubbard's words, "if anybody was to starve, [the peasants] would be the first to do so."

423 661 In Eastern Europe, however, the slow, cautious collectivization precluded the possibility of so calculated and brutal a policy. A sufficient proportion of the peasantry remained outside of the "Socialist sector" to wreak havoc with the Government's general economic plan. The East European regimes could not gain a strong enough position in relation to the peasantry to withstand the tremendous pressures which would be generated by rapid collectivization or a disastrous drought such as 1933. One poor harvest was, consequently, a sufficient jolt to destroy the entire rhythm of the

[18] Leonard Hubbard, *The Economics of Soviet Agriculture*, London, 1939, p. 123.

Satellite industrial program. The oustanding case in point is, of course, Hungary, whose extremely poor harvest of 1952 provided the impetus which paved the way for the crisis of 1953.[19] 423 668

2. The reliance upon slow economic strangulation rather than direct administrative force in collectivization inevitably meant greater reliance on the voluntary will of the peasantry than was necessary in the Soviet collectivization drive. Therefore, the regimes had to take some account of the individual tastes of the peasantry. The variety of intermediate types of collective, the special privileges granted kolkhoz members, reflect the Communist desire to soften the impact of collectivization.[20] The strenuous efforts made to demonstrate to the peasant the economic superiority of collectivism were also part of this effort.

This policy made collectivization possible but at the same time detracted from the very usefulness originally intended for the collectivized farms; that is, the effort to render the collectives attractive to the independent peasant (limited as they were) did not facilitate exploitation of the peasants which was their major economic justification. As was evident from the analysis presented in Chapted IV, the degree of exploitation of the "Socialist sector" was not much greater than the exploitation of the private sector. The difference was, in any case, smaller than that achieved in the Soviet Union, where a prolonged period of persuasion and intra-peasantry discrimination had been unnecessary.

4. *The East European Peasant*

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Peasant resistance is a social force extremely difficult to measure either quantitatively or qualitatively. It expresses itself in many forms and guises, both in open revolt and passive resistance. This is partly because peasant sentiment rarely expresses itself in organizational form but more commonly in individual economic acts. In modern history, governments have found it difficult to elicit fanatical loyalty from the peasant; at best he is obedient. For the same reasons, the peasant has rarely been drawn into the organized revolutionary movements of the time. He has succumbed to few

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[19] There was, of course, other factors involved in the Hungarian agricultural crisis of 1953 (see above pp. 109-10).

[20] Mention should be made here of Communist efforts throughout the sphere to flatter the peasant by a superficial glorification of his traditional dance, costumes, handiwork, and other expressions of the peasant culture which once graced the covers of pre-World War II East European tourist guides.

565 of the sophisticated slogans of modern politics and tends to judge
829 governments in terms of provincial and pragmatic considerations
668 which cannot be encompassed in the romantic slogans of either the State or the Revolution. For a fleeting moment in 1917, the peasants of Russia involved themselves in the maelstrom of a proletarian revolution. Between the wars they gave occasional support to genuinely peasant parties, but invariably their interest lagged or the parties betrayed them. Otherwise, the peasants have in general been passive rather than active participants in 20th Century political history.

The vast uprising of the Russian peasants in 1917-18 was probably their greatest show of strength in the 20th century, and certainly absorbed more peasant energies and resentments than either the 1907 Romanian rebellion or the Bulgarian peasant victories of the early 1920s. But their victory was short-lived, and was achieved at a tremendous price. The cataclysmic forces of the Russian Revolution so shattered the old structure of both countryside and city that the gains the peasant made remained at the mercy of terrible forces. The destruction of traditional institutions which occurred in 1917-21 in defense of the Revolution prepared the land for the collectivization onslaught 10 years later.

The peasants of Eastern Europe have not participated in such a revolution, and their institutions knew no such cataclysmic overturn. Furthermore, East European peasants have had a longer tradition of private property and as a result were less capable of revolutionary opposition to their oppressors but more capable of that type of passive resistance which in the long run is most effective. Russian peasants might destroy the livestock in defiance of the Bolshevik cadres but East European peasants could more easily sabotage the plan by day-to-day non-cooperation. The revolutionary traditions of the Russian peasantry made possible greater heroism, but no greater improvement of their economic situation. The less militant traditions of the East European peasantry (in part the consequence of more humane governments) guaranteed that there would be no repetition of the victories of 1917-18, nor any exact repetition of the terrible defeats of 1929-32.

There are many national factors affecting the total picture: the proximity of peasant victory in Hungary of 1945-46; the power of the Catholic Church in rural Poland; the relative prosperity of the Czech farmers; the communal traditions of the Bulgarian and

Yugoslav peasants; the special position which Romania occupies in the Soviet empire. These differences are important, and explain many of the variations within the framework of agricultural policy. But these variations fall into that historical experience which distinguishes East European peasantry from its Russian counterpart. These historical differences are of the utmost importance in explaining the failure of the East European Communists to emulate successfully the Soviet example. 565 829 668

5. *The Communist Role in Eastern Europe*

The Communist Parties of Eastern Europe consider themselves progressive forces of the area. In agriculture, they assert that by lifting the backward peasantry out of its traditional lethargy and provincialism, they are performing a service for the peasants and the entire society. The opposition of the peasantry to Communist plans for the rationalization of the land stems from stubborn allegiance to outmoded customs and habits. Vulko Chervenkov, the Bulgarian Premier, gave the classical formulations on this point: 829 668

> The Bulgarian peasant has two souls. One is the love of work and the other is the sense of private ownership. His spirit of private ownership brings him close to the capitalist. His spirit of work brings him close to the working class. Therefore the peasant is hesitant. We Communists, through our tactics and by the collective method, should kill their spirit of private ownership and build our socialist world.[19]

It is precisely this conception of the Communist role in Eastern Europe which the material gathered together here calls into question.

No doubt it is partly true that peasant resistance to collectivization is based on their passionate attachment to the land they till and own. But as has been pointed out, the major issue in the struggle between the Communists and the peasants was the question of the *distribution* of the fruits of the land, rather than the more abstract question of conflicting ideologies. 423 829

The peasants fight not only to protect their ancient traditions but even more to protect their economic rights, and they frequently employ the ancient traditions in defense of their own economic interests. The Communists, for their part, struggle against these traditions not merely out of doctrinaire antagonism but because these customs stand in the way of further exploitation of the

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[19] *Rabotnichesko Delo* (Sofia) September 9, 1953.

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829 peasants and their full incorporation into the state-industrial machinery.[20]

423 Like the great land reforms which followed the First and Second World Wars, the Communist "solution" to the land problem of Eastern Europe is no real solution at all, and since it does not attack the problem at its roots, is not intended to be one. Rather, like the great reforms, the Communist agricultural program is only a means of redistributing the products of the land to suit new political realities. The chief difference between the two movements lies in the fact that while the reforms redistributed the wealth among the peasants themselves, collectivization was designed to redistribute a portion of the national wealth in favor of the new urban Communist bureaucratic class.

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[22] The working class has been already incorporated into that structure. But that does not mean that, despite the absence of traditional ties, they are any less opposed to the Communist regimes than the peasants. On the contrary, as the East German and Czechoslovak revolts of mid-1953 demonstrated, the workers are likely to play the leading role in anti-Communist agitation and revolt.

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RELIGION BEHIND THE IRON CURTAIN

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George N. Shuster

RELIGION BEHIND THE IRON CURTAIN

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FOREWORD

THIS IS NOT a pleasant book. It is not a book anybody would write with a feeling that his next chapter was sure to keep people on the edge of their chairs. There are murders in it, to be sure, but no District Attorney demonstrates that crime does not pay. The difficulty it confronts is not that it is about persecution, loss of liberty, propaganda no one can talk back to, torture and death. Men and women are never nobler or more significant than when they suffer for justice's sake, or when like the Netherlanders Motley so well portrays they pay the heaviest price human beings can pay for freedom. No. The trouble with this book is that it deals with a social machine which grinds souls and bodies into a kind of depersonalized, stinking flour one cannot think about without nausea. Nathan Hale, regretting that he had only one life to lose for his country, emerges clear against the setting of history. You can see him, hear him, share his decision and the bloody glory of what he paid for it. But ten million, thirty million, in a sense a hundred million mortals silent in a chain gang from which no one can possibly rescue them, a chain gang in which one figure is just like the rest and all are countless, voiceless, hopeless, to borrow a phrase from

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000 Chesterton—what shall we do with them, how on earth can anyone write about them?

114 It so happens that I have known most of the countries now governed by those who say they are building the "People's Democracies." They were not paradises. There was poverty of the worst kind in many of them. There was injustice. There was hatred. But there was also humanity. One day, driving through Poland, we had a flat tire on the main street of what in our own Middle West would be a rather small county-seat town. We were always having flats because square iron nails lay along the highways, traveled for the most part by teamsters and their horses, thicker than locusts in the Middle East. Our spares were flat, too. I had stupidly forgotten to bring a hand pump, and we could not move unless we somehow got hold of one. There was no pump in the town for the simple reason that there was no automobile in the town. One of the two-thousand-odd citizens who gathered round the stricken car volunteered (for these people were innately kind) to ride on his bicycle to the manor of an estate owner some five miles away and see whether he could borrow the precious device. He returned in due time, escorting one of the most muscular human beings I have ever seen. Under his arm he carried the inflationary instrument. He rolled up his sleeves, bowed majestically to me and to the crowd, and went to work with a vengeance. The faster he pumped, the more vigorous were the salvos of applause. Finally we were on our way, with urchins scampering behind for a couple of hundred yards, leaving in the wake of us a town agog at having seen an American millionaire seated in his limousine. What did it matter that the car was really a well used Pontiac, and the driver poorer than he would like to admit!

Yet for all the elemental peasant squalor and need, and despite the vital unsolved social problems presented by the dif-

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ference between affluent squire and penniless peasant, there was a great human stir in Poland. It felt good, being there and talking to people, even if I had only forty words of Polish, carefully memorized from a piece of paper, and supplemented with German when there was somebody present who could understand that language, as there usually was. Everybody had a share in at least three great ideas. There was the dream of economic improvement, no longer wholly a dream. Then there was the ideal of nationhood, unfortunately too irrationally cherished, as was very natural in view of the people's past. And finally there was the mystical solidarity of the Christian (or the Jewish) community, real and vital though encrusted no doubt with what some would call poetry and others superstition. One could see a good deal of the ugly passions of the illiterate and the prejudiced. But there were also the great loves which Ladislas Reymont has described: love of the tiller for the soil, of the boys for the girls, of a people for the Virgin Mary, full of grace and goodness.

And now? I repeat. It is not tragedy that has thrown a black blanket over all this. It is just that the iron heel has come down behind the iron curtain. Here are the unadorned population statistics of the "People's Democracies" as they were available prior to World War II:

Bulgaria	6,106,000	Poland	31,000,000
Czechoslovakia	14,726,000	Rumania	18,025,277
Hungary	8,683,000	East Germany	17,313,734
			(census of 1946)

In addition, here are the statistics for the Baltic States absorbed by Russia:

Estonia	1,114,900
Latvia	1,900,045
Lithuania	2,361,142

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161 These figures are subject to correction, but are adequate for the present purpose. They indicate that the population of Stamford, Connecticut, could be multiplied into this total subjected European population about fourteen hundred times. That is, every man, woman, and child in such a community has fourteen hundred counterparts over there. Fourteen hundred Stamfords with its schools and churches, its jails and railroad station, its doctors and lawyers, its butchers and bakers, its little children and its grandfathers—all of them, every day and every night, first under the heel of Hitler and then under the heel of Stalin.
668 And every living soul has been steeped in a bath of propaganda for twelve years, one version being that there exists a master race, and another that "Anglo-American imperialism" does an endless series of misdeeds, such as sending potato bugs to Eastern Germany and disease-spreading insects to Korea. He may not believe all this, but he must not say so even to himself.

For the nerve center of this propaganda is terror. The Communist always begins with the devices of infiltration. These he is taught to handle adroitly. He can take over a labor union almost before its members suspect that he has any desire to do so. In the presence of liberals he can be a boon companion, and discreetly assent to his neighbor's views about Whitehead or St. Thomas Aquinas. But when the Russian Army is on hand to support him he is camouflaged only moderately. Everyone knows that his bosses have arrived from Moscow after a period of intensive training. But so long as "imperialist powers" are in relative control he appreciates each and every opportunity to pretend that he is some one else.

668 697 He uses the radio and the newspaper, the friendly gathering of citizens, and the picture magazine. But the instrumentalities upon which he really relies are the secret police and the concentration camp. The police are not primarily there to ferret out plots. It is their business to cajole a vast army of informers

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into thinking that if they report the conversations and the past histories of others they themselves will be able to keep their skins relatively intact. The concentration camp is, however, the Communists' trump card. Anyone who causes trouble can be sent to one, and the supply is unlimited. The existence of such camps is, to be sure, so well known to the average person outside the Russian orbit that mention of them arouses relatively little interest. How many remember any longer the names of Dachau and Auschwitz?

Nevertheless the concentration camps operated by the Russians are very serious matters even to Americans, and may the Lord forbid that we ever get into them. But if we suppose that Thomas Murphy of Dubuque, Iowa, proprietor of a stationery store, were suddenly put into one before his wife could get much more than his toothbrush into his briefcase, we shall have a fairly good idea of what has been happening to hundreds of thousands of poor people in Eastern Europe for a long time and to all Central Europeans since 1945.

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We know rather less about Russia's slave-labor camps than, perhaps, we should; but even so the information is considerable. Some of what is known comes from sources which cannot be divulged. A good deal has also been supplied by persons who once resided in such camps. The system as such is thirty years old, though it has probably never been so extensive and well organized as it now is. Two purposes are served by it, which we may assume are those which the Nazis also posited as goals, even if their social objectives and methods were in some respects different from those of the Communists. Human beings can be used as beasts of burden in carrying out enterprises sponsored by the government. Secondly, if anyone is suspected of disloyalty, "sabotage," or difference of opinion, he can be removed from normal social life. Soviet society is a Gargantuan feat of human engineering. In the present state of tech-

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000 nological advancement it is possible for its masters to compute the development of industry and transportation in terms of the work hours men and women can perform. Similarly the "planners" can estimate quite precisely what each such hour is worth. Farms are collectivized not merely because the individual landowner is likely to retain ideas of freedom, but because it is possible to acquire a surplus rural population which can then be put to work on projects which will bring about a more rapid industrialization. And what Communism terms the "bourgeoisie"—that is, the urban group which makes a living by buying and selling—can be transformed into a "vagrant" and therefore usable population by nationalizing trade and confining it to the smallest possible number of stores and commercial agencies.

I have tried to form an over-all impression of this system by imagining that the United States set out to create the largest conceivable WPA. To this would be assigned all older people, all gentlemen of leisure, and all unemployed housewives. It would be announced that every person so employed would be paid just what his collective work produced in terms of immediate economic value, and no more. If no such value could be perceived, the government would furnish a food ration calculated to keep the worker alive, and barely alive. Let us assume that one project was to nationalize a group of abandoned farms in upstate New York and combine them into a single collectively operated estate. Workers could then be paid in produce. Granted that Americans as a nation could even conceive of doing something of the sort, we should still have a long way to go before establishing anything like the Soviet system. For example, in our passion to get hold of every possible man hour we should cut down the amount of time during which pregnant women could remain away from work. This the Communists have done no doubt everywhere, but demonstrably in Eastern

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Germany, where the time was cut recently by nearly five 000
months. We should also have to develop a fanatical pleasure in devising ways and means for putting everybody who disapproved of our WPA projects to work on them.

Yet it must be conceded that such a system has one very great advantage. Instead of mortgaging the future by piling up a huge collective debt in order to maintain a vast and costly military organization (as we in the United States are doing), it takes from the poor humankind which falls into its clutches literally everything. And so no doubt there is in this dour and cruel Soviet experiment a lesson which every American ought to take to heart—the lesson that we shall be able to compete in the long run only by voluntarily making sacrifices, of labor and of money, of pleasures and rewards.

At any rate, the concentration camps in Russia are roughly 697
of three kinds: the stockades in industrial areas where there are 466
housed men and women who are the unskilled slave labor of local industry or of the *kolkhozes* (collective farms); the penal districts properly so called, in the far North and East of the Soviet Union; and the colonization projects—for example, that [166]
in Takistan—which involve the compulsory resettlement of whole folk groups such as the Tartars of the Crimea. While the system operates in accordance with a scale of prison strictness, not one place of confinement has been reported in which the minimum standards of penal practice observed anywhere in the United States are in force. Indeed, sources which appear to be reliable indicate that Buchenwald and Dachau have been duplicated many times. The same methods of camp rule through the enlistment of criminals and rowdies as trusties, the same lack of food and clothing, the same abominably bad medical attention, have been described over and over again by survivors. The average inmate of such a camp lives five years. [165]
He is hounded and starved, vilified and dehumanized.

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697 466 But what most astonishes everyone who studies the evidence about the situation is the total dimension of the slave-labor population. German ex-prisoners have reported that in some areas one in every seven Russians is systematically sent to a concentration camp. The camps seem to be taken for granted, just as are disease and death. Even if one discounts heavily the available estimates, it seems highly probable that at least 20,000,000 Russians have been among the victims. Thus forced labor has become one of the most virulent plagues in history. For, if one adds together those who were enslaved by the Nazis and those corralled by the Communists, the total figures far outdistance the number of those who died as a result of World Wars I and II.

697 Here is a description of slave-camp life, based on a great variety of accounts by eyewitnesses:

Existence is subhuman. This word tells everything. Hunger, toil, illness, theft, murder, corruption, bribery, and mental suffering are dominant. The prisoners are corralled by the thousands in isolated zones of the camp. The barracks have beds of wooden slabs arranged in tiers of two, with occasional tables and stools. Very few have either straw sacks or covers. There is not a book or a newspaper in the camp. Possession of a lead pencil is a punishable offense. During winter the barracks are warmed a little by the presence of so many human beings. Heating is sporadic, because the coal supply is never adequate. There is no opportunity to wash. The prisoners are in tatters and covered with lice. All good articles of clothing are taken away and sold. The camp is ruled with an iron fist. The criminals in control make the camp, in accordance with a kind of unwritten law, into a place where they have a chance to give vent to their urges and exercise bloody dominion with knives and clubs. Persons who are not liked or are deemed undesirable competitors for power are placed on a death list. The killers are

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chosen by lot. Then at the appointed hour in the night they pounce on their victim and hack him to pieces in a bestial fashion. 697

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Such is the situation in Russia. There are also concentration camps in the satellite countries, called in Communist language "People's Democracies." It has been estimated that more than 1,000,000 persons have been sent to such camps, and the number may be far greater. Not included in this figure, for example, are Eastern Germany and the former Baltic States. The existence of concentration camps has been widely advertised, and decrees establishing them are on the statute books of all the People's Democracies. The decrees merely apply to the country in question the provisions of Article 59 of the Criminal Code of U.S.S.R. The first Article of the Criminal Code of Rumania, for example, as reported by Albert K. Herling, reads as follows: 699 466 E 199. 69 671 687

> Criminal law has for its purpose defending the Rumanian People's Republic and its legal order against actions dangerous to society by enforcing legal measures of social defense against persons who commit such actions. In the meaning of the preceding paragraph any action and omission that brings harm to the economic, social and political structure, or to the security of the Rumanian People's Republic, or which disturbs the legal order established by the people under the leadership of the working class is to be considered dangerous to society. The actions which are considered dangerous for society can be punished even when they are not expressly prohibited by law. In such cases the extent and limit of criminal responsibility is to be determined in accordance with the legal provisions in force for similar crimes.*

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The number of camps in the area reported by persons who assert that they were present in them is so vast that the names by 466 697

* Statement issued on June 18, 1952, in behalf of the International League for the Rights of Man.

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466 which they go and the places where they are situated would fill
697 a small directory. Thus 179 have been reported from Czechoslovakia alone. If the information gathered is correct, there are at least six hundred slave-labor institutions in the People's Democracies. The use to which this labor is put, according to reports, is significant. In Rumania slave laborers, for example, work on farms, at power plants, on the construction of railroads and bridges, on the digging of canals, and in factories. Of interest also is the manner in which the system has been developed. Both Poland and Czechoslovakia witnessed the deportation to Russia, during the early stages of the occupation, of hundreds of thousands of people deemed hostile to Communism. Popular resentment of this brought about a temporary lull. What happened next, if one can judge by the experience of the Czechs and Slovaks, is that the government was authorized to compel workers to remain on jobs deemed to be in the national interest. This action was described as an emergency measure. The net result, however, was that young workers suspected of being hostile to the Communist regime were disciplined.

466 After the seizure of power by the Communists in 1948, several decrees were issued authorizing the government of Czechoslovakia to establish commissions of three to determine whether citizens should be sentenced to forced labor. Liability was very broadly defined. Thus one decree stipulated that "persons who are not less than eighteen and not more than sixty years of age, and are physically and mentally capable of working but evade work or threaten the establishment of the people's democratic order," might be sent to work camps for periods not less than three months and not longer than two years. In addition very stringent regulations were laid down concerning the supply of labor. No one was any longer to change his place of employment unless the responsible au-

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thorities had received the request and acceded to it. Perhaps the most stringent regulation was that which held the trade unions responsible for the production outlined in the Five-Year Plan but deprived them of every right to defend workers against the state. Boiled down to its essentials, the system compels every laboring man to expend the last ounce of his energy regardless of whether he is employed normally or under duress. In the circumstances, it is rather strange that while the forced laborer's dinner normally consists of coffee and three potatoes, it is followed by a lecture on the blessings of Marxism.

A social system of this character cannot tolerate sabotage, even if that is mere opposition to the aims and purposes of the rulers; for any thought, word, or deed which deprives the masters of even so much as an hour of a worker's time, or which places upon them the burden of defending any action they have taken, represents a loss of precious human energy. Sins are committed against the highest authority on earth (and of course there is no power beyond the world of appearance and matter), Stalin or his successors, by those who feel that the traditional forms of European living offer the greatest hope of human happiness. Therefore the Church was from the outset doomed, not only because it professed a spiritual view of life at odds with dialectical materialism but also because it was an obstacle to the full and unrestricted use of human beings. An American may find it hard to understand fanaticism of this sort, but every thoughtful churchman doomed to live under Communist domination knows the truth full well.

But how can a compact religious body be infiltrated? The answer is of course that, if the churches were not human but representative of every ideal which they purport to profess, the high tide of Communism would break at their doorsteps. So profoundly spiritual, however, they are not. Some of the clergy

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000 will succumb to blandishments, to fear, and to the no doubt inevitable despair resulting from a feeling that things will never change anyway. At first. in nearly all the People's Democracies, peasant congregations attempted to defend their pastors, and there are numberless stories of clashes with Communist police in which the congregations emerged temporarily victorious. Gradually, however, even these forms of hastily improvised self-defense became impossible. Today life goes wearily on. The heroes remain, as did the brave Protestant Confessional Church in Hitler's Germany, but the others compromise. We may as well admit that there is a good supply of these others. Religious faith loses for many its strength and savor when the mind is assailed by that semantic confusion which is the primary objective sought by Communist propaganda.

I cannot speak with any measure of authority on what appears to be Soviet use of Pavlov's theory of the conditioned reflex. Yet there would seem to be little doubt that commitment by propagandists to such a conception of human psychology brings about a reliance on a repetitive, symbolistic impact on the subconscious (if one concedes that for materialists there exists anything akin to what we familiarly term "consciousness") which people outside the Russian orbit find bizarre but which one long exposed to it may well find a pattern of suggestion difficult if not impossible to escape. Thus the British Broadcasting Corporation reports that a young Russian escapee answered an inquiry about its broadcasts by saying that he was disappointed to hear so many references to democracy. This, he thought, was what existed in Russia, and was therefore precisely what he was anxious to get away from. From a religious point of view, constant reiteration of the statement that miracles do not occur, and that reports concerning them are based on delusions, conflict with the traditional Christian view

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that God will answer prayer. And when no direct and tangible Divine response is received, men and women whose faith is not firmly anchored in contemplation may well begin to doubt. It is upon this doubt, however embryonic, that Communism pounces. The victim whose psyche is thus devoured may not even be aware of what is happening. But he will become spiritually listless and anemic. He will no longer see essential things clearly.

It follows that those who are most nearly immune are either the very intelligent who have acquired mastery of the inner life, or the simple and clean of heart who cling to deeply embedded ideas of right and wrong. The former are successful because they have a highly conscious awareness of what alone is permanent and so deserving of the full commitment of personality. The latter remain uncontaminated because the verbal impact of propaganda merely rolls off the granite walls of the decisions by which their consciences abide. Therefore, it has often been said by churchmen that from a Christian point of view nothing could be more important than continuous prayer by the free world for the Russian and the satellite peoples. For (it is alleged) if we disregard entirely our, alas, necessarily inconclusive and anthropomorphic views of what this prayer may be able to obtain from the Maker of us all, it will still be profoundly true that only in this wise can we ourselves acquire the spiritual habits certain to render us immune to Communist enticements, and the gift of insight into the day-by-day situation in which the conquered peoples find themselves. And in all truth we must, despite a legitimate aversion from the Communist view of life, never forget that we are the brothers even of those who have, it may well be, winced or flinched under the scourging. We and they alike must hope for compassion.

The Russian people, if one can form an impression of them on the basis of innumerable accounts, were at least as guilty of

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000 collusion with the powers of evil as any other nation. By and large they rejoiced in the opportunity to disposses fellow citizens who had somewhat more of this world's goods than they. It has now become quite as impossible to chant a hymn of praise in their honor as it is to laud unreservedly their fellow human beings. But that many have remained loyal to faith, hope, and love in the sense in which St. Paul described them is supported by so much evidence that we can both credit and reverence it. The passion for holiness—oldest, deepest, and most beautiful of human desires—may, indeed, be stronger among them than it is in our midst. But there is no medium through which it can find expression; and perhaps, were one provided, there would not be a man who would know how to use it and could speak other than tritely, in words lacking the halo of joy. It is not easy to sing after heartbreak. Nevertheless we know that the faithful ones are there. We must make every effort to reach out to them, as unfortunately we failed to do to the Germans who stood against Hitler. Nor may we judge too hastily people who no longer struggle or who even mouth phrases of betrayal. It is, for example, very true that, although only the Sovereign Pontiff himself can lift the ban of excommunication from Catholic traitors, he must do so if they ask it some time.

And so I pray that the pages I have written about our brethren under Communist bondage may always reflect an underlying humility and that there may be no pride based on the assumption that we are better or quite different men. There is a legitimate debt of gratitude to be paid always for our birthright in the West, and we must be strong and brave enough to keep this intact. Our goal, however, is always the liberation of the others not through war, which would doom countless millions and perhaps even obliterate the present and the past of man, but through some profound change of the spirit and a great uprising for freedom. Nothing has been more impressive

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to me, speaking with men and women who have escaped to us, than their obvious quest for such a change. How it is to be brought about, no one knows at present. The time is very dark. But one must believe and hope that so much agony of body and spirit will constitute the great tribulation from out of whose womb humanity will be reborn through the mercy of God.

I should like to add just a few words of gratitude to all who have helped me gather the information on which this book is based. The several chapters have profited from memoranda prepared by a number of refugee scholars, who will be mentioned wherever possible in subsequent bibliographical notes. Here I should like to thank particularly John B. Woodall and Levering Tyson of the Mid-European Studies Center, who have done everything they possibly could to help; Professor Adolf Berger, who has patiently read through *Osservatore Romano* for me; the librarian of the Council on Foreign Relations; and Paul Fabry, Director of the Hungarian Section of the Mid-European Studies Center. Those refugees or persons having to do with refugees with whom I talked while I was in Germany must be nameless here. But I hope they will somehow know how deeply indebted to them I am.

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1 HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVE

114 FOR A YEAR AND a half I had some concern with the Iron Curtain as United States Land Commissioner for Bavaria.
127 It took seven days of hard driving to inspect all of it that was of interest to our side. Across one part of it, that contiguous to East Germany, you could move rather freely if you were not an American. The other part, bordering on Czechoslovakia, was quite different. For here the Curtain on the Czech side was a strip of evacuated terrain, normally about four miles wide, inside which houses were falling into ruin and grass was growing up through the pavement. This was patrolled by young men in nondescript uniforms carrying tommy guns. Sometimes strange things happened, as when a group of Czechs commandeered a train and simply steamed across the border into the land of at least relative freedom. Or there was the afternoon when a coachful of aged and sick nuns was suddenly dumped on the platform of the German frontier station. Some of them died right there, and others were driven off by the Bavarians to friendly convents where they could pass their last days. One never knew what was coming—bullet or straggler or escapee

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114 seeking asylum. There was a campful of escapees, mostly
727 Czechs and Slovaks, at Valka near Nuremberg.

We Americans used before the war to roam freely in the countries on the other side. Many of us either came from there or are descended from people who did. It is strange not to be able to cross the border now, and of course the fact makes it only too easy to consign the whole region to a sort of monochrome limbo. We need to remind ourselves constantly that here are some of the oldest, most cultivated, most individualistic, and most heroic of the nations of the West. Were one merely to list all the deeds of great valor which have been wrought here in more than two thousand years, or all the notable works of art, music, and literature which were created by men at home in these regions, the summary would be a brilliant one, indeed. Yet it is no doubt primarily dedication to religion that gave these cultures their individuality and vitality.

181

121 For convenience's sake we may follow Julius Caesar's example and divide the whole area into three parts. The first embraces the lands which were once portions of the Austro-Hungarian Empire, which collapsed in 1918 but, despite its faults, must in retrospect be termed one of the most coherent and civilized states known to modern history. Once I compared notes with Arnold Toynbee about the singular fact that wherever one crossed those vanished boundaries, whether to the north of Cracow or to the east of Budapest, the sense of coming into the familiar world of the West was immediate and unmistakable. There was a manifest ease and gracefulness of the art of living, reflected in all the many buildings, humble or ornate, in which that art found expression. Vienna, Prague, Budapest, Cracow, Zagreb, Bratislava—these cities were built by the collective genius which Austria somehow managed to evoke and nurture, even though the people who lived in them might more often than not talk of tyranny.

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The second part used to be called the Balkans, because these /21/
lands, north of the Greek seas, were identified with the mountains which traversed them. Ancient Rome had established its power on their slopes, and later the peoples who settled there after the Slovenian invasions of the Dark Ages accepted the faith of the Eastern Church. To this they clung with fidelity during centuries of subjection to the Turks; and as soon as their freedom had been regained this faith was everywhere restored in cities and rural communes alike. It is unfortunate that so little about this aspect of Rumanian and Bulgarian history has been known to us generally. Recalled recently with philosophic nostalgia in such books as Gheorghiu's *Twenty-fifth Hour*, some awareness of it is an indispensable prerequisite for judging what has happened during the last terrible years.

The third part consists of Poland outside the old Austrian /21/
border, the small Baltic States to the north (Latvia, Estonia, 927
and Lithuania) given back to bondage by Hitler in an hour of mad bargaining for power, and those territories taken from Germany in the aftermath of the Yalta and Potsdam conferences. The tragedy which has befallen these peoples is heartrending. It is believed, for example, that one-fourth of the population of Estonia has been deported to Siberia by the Russians. Whatever the blunders of all governments concerned may have been, it is difficult to read the chronicles of horror inflicted on their erstwhile subjects without shuddering. There is little even in the history of Nazi savagery which can outdo, for example, the conquest of German Silesia. Consider, by way of illustration, the fate of Neisse, center of Silesian Catholic activity, which was entered by the Russian army on Palm Sunday, 1945. After scenes of rape, murder, and violence almost unparalleled even in the long history of war, the little city with its priceless churches was put to the torch, so that the thousand inmates of the great home for the aged burned to death in their

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121 beds. All these lands will never again become what they once
727 were—regions of constant struggle and short-lived serenity, of poverty and its exploitation, of poetry, fervor, and sadness. Those of us who have, for example, seen peasant women trudging for many miles through the omnipresent dust to kneel for an hour at the shrines of Silesia will never forget either the fact or its meaning.

781 There is not a foot of the old soil of Central Europe which
156 has not been consecrated by endurance for the sake of the things of the spirit and the mind. Indeed, I have sometimes wondered, reading the Polish and Silesian poets and novelists, why the longing to hold out should have persisted during many difficult centuries—why, for instance, Polish forests in thrall to the Czars should have hidden priest and ritual with such fidelity. Perhaps the explanation, in so far as it is of this world, can be found in the deep human urge for the preservation of identity. Custom and language were vital symbols of the self, and without them men felt they could not live. But stronger than all else was the deep, primitive, mystical desire for identification with Eternal Righteousness, manifest to the believer in the life of the Redeemer. To give up the faith was to surrender not merely one's self but the world as well.

798 To be sure these men and women were very human, often
563 poverty-stricken and untutored, sometimes intolerant and oppressive. The effort to conserve themselves and their identity spilled over into moments of vengeful outrage inflicted upon others because they were different. Thus anti-Semitism has a long history in Eastern Europe studded with bloody pogroms. Although curbed in Austro-Hungarian regions it was latent there, too, as the shameful events of 1938 proved, but manifest elsewhere continuously with varying intensity. Or who can forget the repression of the Ukrainians in Poland under the Pilsudski government, the conflict between Czechs and Slovaks,

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or the expulsion of the Sudeten Germans from their homes during 1945, an action flagrantly in violation of the principles for which the war against Nazism had been fought? 798 563

Against this background one must set the figures of those who, whether of the clergy or of the laity, lived and preached the law of charity. Nowhere more than amongst such men—Princes of the Church, professors, men of affairs, labor leaders, simple religious, and common people—was this law manifest. It is imperative that their memory be not obscured, now that so mighty an army of the mean and servile has arisen. Let us note what we shall have mournful occasion to repeat again and again. Marxism, which had its rise in the concern of intellectuals for the worker, and which formulated that concern in terms of a materialist version of the Hegelian dialectic, has come round with Stalin to the view that the laboring man must have no intellectuals on his side. To suppress élites has become the cornerstone of the totalitarian theory of practical politics. That is why the peoples in chains retain their passions and their weaknesses, their hatreds and their greed, while those who might give them counsel or reasons for constraint are dead or silent. 829

Then, too, there was the presence and also the example of the Ghetto. Place of reputed ignominy, of poverty, of rasping and grasping humanity, it was nevertheless awesomely, breathtakingly beautiful when the Sabbath eve descended upon it. Prayer became not so much what was engaged in but rather that which swept the world aside and created a wonderland of peace and holiness. One knew that in all the shabby little rooms which sheltered human beings in their wretchedness a fire had been lighted which had gleamed for thousands of years—the same leaping flame which had set the bush ablaze for Moses and had kindled the light that danced before the Ark of the Covenant. And though the vision of sanctification which now 000

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000 held this poor, often stricken community in thrall was differ
ent from that which the Christian peasant nursed at his fireside
with his children and his beasts about him, the words wit
which it was conjured up were very often the same for both
Love the Lord, thy God; love thy neighbor as thou dost thysel
—the affection so hard to find in the daily street, but longe
for even more earnestly, desperately than a dear woman is de
sired, seemed for the moment to have been ushered in over th
sagging thresholds. . . . And then, of course, the Sabbat
would end and the bitterness would return, and Leah woul
stand in the street to see the Gentile curse her children. Yet eve
so there was a bond between the spurner and the spurned. The
knew in their hearts that they were all God's children, dirt
and dissolute children, but they were certain they had a plac
to go home to, come the eve of the Lord's Day.

346 In any event, the general character of the Church and it
794 activities in Central and Eastern Europe was formed histori
cally by the dramatic tension between mass tendencies an
leadership. In Austria-Hungary religious institutions gre
rich and powerful, sometimes paying for their prosperity wit
a measure of undue dependence on the Habsburg state. Eve
now, in a drab time, the traveler through Austria will look wit
admiration on the great monasteries—St. Peter in Salzburg
Melk on the Danube, St. Florian, Klosterneuburg on a hil
above Vienna, and many others—which outdo in splendor ma
norial castles and are surrounded by rich lands. These were
centers of humanistic education, and numerous merited trib
utes have been paid to them. And in many another place, urba
or rural, the Church owned important properties amassed
through the generosity of the faithful or received through royal
donation. In every part of the Empire, church bells rang rich
and deep, even when the piety to which they appealed was woe
fully superficial.

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But in the end these possessions stirred the envy not merely 794
of ambitious and worldly men but also of the land-hungry 471
poor. To be sure the Abbot of a flourishing monastery might 578
correctly point out that the revenues did not enrich the monks, who normally lived under his guidance by an austere religious rule. These religious in their bare cells did not taste the fine vintages pressed from monastery grapes carefully tended by brothers who rose at four for Matins and then expended themselves zealously for the cause of God. Nevertheless the critics were not by any means only emancipated spirits who found moral discipline irksome and the Church old-fashioned. They were also earnest, weather-beaten peasants, with no soil to till, and often desperately poor, who understandably looked upon Church estates with a covetous eye. And of course everywhere the well applauded and sharp-tongued ideologies of the time—Marxism, Nationalism, Nihilism—were allied against the Church, often looked upon by the seemingly more enlightened folk of those days as the heritor of a creed outworn. And it must be admitted that sometimes a segment of the clergy, grown comfortable and worldly, acted as if they thought so, too.

Protestantism inside the old Empire clung to the enclaves 795
which had been established during the era of the Reformation
and the Counter-Reformation. Despite the strife incident to the [162]
Thirty Years' War both Lutheranism and Calvinism maintained themselves resolutely in Hungary, for example, so that prior to the outbreak of World War II Catholics in that country constituted about 67 per cent of the population, while Protestants numbered nearly 27 per cent and adhered to both the Lutheran and the Calvinist tradition. In Czechoslovakia the situation was relatively the same, though the number of Protestant groups was greater. A considerable part of the population —6 per cent in 1932—professed no religion of any kind. Another characteristic of the old Empire was the presence of the

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795 Greek Orthodox Church, which though united in its Uniate form with Rome, preserved its old language and customs. This Church became the target of special Russian propagandistic and repressive efforts as soon as the Iron Curtain was established.

565 Elsewhere outside the former realm of the Habsburgs the
795 situation was comparable. In Poland a Catholic peasantry
369 whose loyalty was deeply moving lived confidently though primitively in the light of a mystical faith, while worldliness and skepticism were prevalent among the upper classes. It was commonly said there, after World War I, that the most religious of peoples was governed by the most morally lax of bureaucrats; and that may well have been the case. Nor could the coming of industrialism to such mushroom cities as Lodz, so bitterly lamented by Ladislas Reymont, bring about the immediate solution of any grave social problem. Nevertheless, as we shall see, there existed in Poland religious elites of extraordinary quality and dedication. In eastern Germany, overwhelmingly Protestant despite certain vigorous centers of Catholic activity such as the Ermland in East Prussia and the border districts west of Poznan (Silesia was a province apart, its culture having been developed under the Habsburgs), one could go from the old conservative, rural Church communities of the landed estates along the Baltic Sea to the liberal atmosphere of Saxony, where the social problems inherent in modern industrial society dominated thought and action. Concerning the Balkans one need say here only that, though they suffered from the normal diseases of feudalism, they offered much of vital and absorbing interest to the student of religious life.

175 These observations will help to explain the situation which
186 followed the First World War. The old Austro-Hungarian Empire was dissolved, and dissident nationalist sentiment, supported by the will of the victorious Allies, demanded the crea-

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tion of separate states. Therewith a tide of Liberalism merged 175
with the currents of upsurging tribal nationalism to create the 186
pattern of conflict which was later to prove so advantageous to the totalitarians. Czech nationalism, having in Thomas Masaryk a brilliantly effective standard-bearer, seemed at first blush to usher in a new era of democratic and progressive social thought. It soon became obvious, however, that the autonomism of the Czechs—which led at the outset even to the establishment of a National Church—would of necessity engender comparable feelings in the breasts of the other peoples in the Czechoslovak Republic. The Slovaks rallied round their own traditions of language and culture, and swiftly but surely became committed to a quest for autonomy which found a temporary though unsatisfactory haven under Hitler. Among Sudeten Germans feeling was almost as strong and led ultimately to the fateful formation of a political party which advocated union with Germany. Nor was the situation different elsewhere. Yugoslavia was plagued from the beginning by deep and bitter conflict among the Serbs, the Croats, and the Slovenes.

In Hungary a violent Communist revolution, spearheaded in 175
late 1918 by Béla Kun, ruled for a time by bloodshed. But ere 669
long this uprising, which had very little popular support, was 794
put down; reaction set in, and a dictatorial government was established after it had compiled its own catalogue of excesses. Here was made manifest, probably for the first time, how significant the stability of religious groups could prove to be. Not only did they temper noticeably the excesses of extremists, but under the leadership of great churchmen they began to build organizations dedicated to social improvement. It is also true [829]
that bitter experience under the Béla Kun regime made Hungary one of the most anti-Communist countries of Europe.

And so, as the turbulence engendered by the war apparently 795
subsided, it seemed probable that a period of relative security

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795 and peace would ensue. In so far as Catholics were concerned, tactful Papal diplomacy insured the continuance of the work of the Church, under altered conditions. But the position of all religions in Eastern Europe was considerably improved. New currents of thought and new forms of group action strengthened Protestantism. Anticlericalism gave way in many quarters to [793] a desire for cordial relationships with the churches. To a very considerable extent Eastern Europe profited by the extraordinary effectiveness and freshness of Christian theological and philosophical writing in France and Germany. But the strongest impetus came from the younger clergy, many of them veterans, who devised and directed new agencies to cope with social problems. It could no longer be said that Catholics, for example, were all bedfellows of special privilege. Confidence was nearly everywhere greater than it had been for generations. It is scarcely extravagant to say that if Hitler had not arisen to inflict doom and agony on countless millions, the great effort of Christian reconstruction in Eastern Europe might have succeeded.

798 The strangely magnetic and mentally diseased Austrian artist who became the dictator of Germany was the spokesman for a derouted, unhappy, and unsettled following. As his power was extended over Eastern Europe the Christian churches suffered only less horribly than Judaism. Priests were shot, sent to concentration camps, exiled from their parishes. Religious communities were suppressed, and their property and their schools were removed from under the jurisdiction of the Church; journals of religious opinion were silenced. The long catalogue of acts of oppression contains almost every kind of persecution save those spectacular mass executions by which the Jewish people were decimated. But at least it was made apparent that there was only one kind of opposition which the Nazis needed to fear—the refusal of faithful Christians, both

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Catholic and Protestant, to accept one of the most flagrant here- 798
sies of all time.

There can be no doubt that Nazism dealt a crippling blow to religion, not only by reason of the attack on elites—men and women of intellectual status and forceful character, able to lead the people—but also because of the widespread perversion of youth which resulted from the activities of the Hitlerjugend and similar organizations. It is true that Hitler's attack on the Church lacked both the decisiveness and the skill which we have since come to identify with Communism. The Nazi intention was, however, to launch such an attack as soon as victory had been gained. Himmler's plans, as we study them in retrospect, bear the stamp of his diseased romantic imagination; but it may well be that in an hour of world-shattering victory he could have put them into effect. Fortunately there was no such triumph. Even so the scars left on the spirit of Europe by years of unrestrained and vicious Nazism will not be healed over for a long time to come. Thus, the Communist advance 829
westward after the close of the war was aided on the one hand by the corrosion of spirit which was a bequest of Hitler, and on the other hand by the belief, prevalent in many quarters, that Sovietism was the opposite of German tyranny and was friendly to democratic institutions. This was unfortunately accepted as something close to self-evident truth in our own United States, so that there is little reason why we should wonder at the illusions of Europeans.

Stalin's road into one of the heartlands of the Christian faith was at all events open. The second stage in the passion of sorely tried peoples was to begin. How feeble the surviving elements of Liberalism, counted upon sometimes to impede the Russian dictator's progress, had become, is amply demonstrated by the fate of Eduard Beneš. Less imaginative and resourceful, less courageous or determined, few statesmen have seemed to be,

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though the verdict is not wholly just. There remained no intellectual obstacle save the stark Christian faith to one of the most ruthless powers humanity has known.

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Accordingly we shall glance briefly at the historical relations between Church and State in Russia in order to gain insight into the formation of Soviet policy on the religious question. It is not easy to do so. Russia, which possesses a great literature, has had no school of cultural historians; and, though many noble refugee scholars—Berdyaev, Timasheff, Stepan, von Eckardt, Gurian among them—have written significantly on cultural topics, persons who do not know Russia are hard put to follow the convolutions of a history very different from that of our own peoples. There is, however, a line of development which one can observe with reasonable ease if one asks a few questions. What were the relations between Western Christianity and Russia? When and how did the Russian Church become subservient to the Czars? How did that Church confront the rising strength of Bolshevism? Did it make its peace with Stalin?

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Christianity came to Kiev from Byzantium in the year 988. This does not, however, mean that the Russians were deeply committed to the Eastern Church in contradistinction to Rome. Missionaries came from both centers of Christendom, and there seems to have been little difference in the welcome accorded them; but at the time of the occupation of Constantinople by the Crusaders in 1204 a change had set in. Excesses committed by uproarious defenders of the Cross deeply embittered the Greeks, and some of this feeling was communicated to the Russians. The charge that Rome was the seat of an archheretical Papacy, prevalent in Greek writing of the time, found an echo in Kiev. Then came the Mongol invasion of Russia, followed by a period of occupation lasting two hundred and fifty years. Autocratic rule by the Mongolian masters deepened

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the trend to absolutism among the Russian princes—a trend 175
already implicit in Byzantine social and political practice. 779
During the same time Russia was also obliged to fend off invasion from the West. An alliance between the Swedes and the Teutonic Knights loomed up as a dire threat, but the victory was won in battle by Prince Alexander, perhaps the most glamorous figure in Russian history. This victory was followed by a significant deepening of the rift between East and West.

Then at the beginning of the fifteenth century the hope of 195
reuniting the Churches of the East and West burned bright. 795
The Council of Ferrara, which convened in 1437 and then removed to Florence, brought distinguished Churchmen together. It was the last great conference of ecclesiastics that might conceivably have merged differences in a new unity. Russia was represented by Isidor, Metropolitan and monk, famed for his learning and zeal; but, although he and very probably the Russian Church generally favored reunion, Prince Basil II disapproved. Isidor could continue his journey to the Council only after he had escaped from prison. Some years later Basil appointed another Metropolitan and meted out heavy punishment on all that opposed him. It should also be noted that in the interim the Metropolitan See had been transferred from Kiev to Moscow.

Byzantium fell to the Turks in 1453, and this calamity was 648
interpreted by Russia's rulers as a punishment inflicted by the
Lord on the Eastern Church for having sought union with 195
Rome.* When Ivan the Terrible ascended the Russian throne 659

* The siege of Constantinople, resulting from the desire of Sultan Mohammed II for possession of the city, was conducted by a huge army of Turks, supported by a navy of 150 vessels. The defending garrison at no time numbered more than 7,500 men—about one to every four of the Turks. Nevertheless the attackers were beaten off again and again, the city falling as the result of a curious mishap. An old gate, traditionally blocked up, had been opened to permit a sortie but was forgotten and not blocked up again. Fifty Turks managed to enter through it. They were discovered and dealt with, but a cry went up

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175 in 1547, he declared that the Russian Church was dependent
659 neither on Greece nor Rome. Relying on the sentiment of the people, freed at last from Mongol bondage, the Russian ruler proclaimed the religious autonomy of Russia. Moscow was now become the "Third Rome," to which spiritual dominion over the world had been transferred. The Edler Philatheus ("God lover") declared in a letter to Basil III, that "this third Rome, the Holy Church of the Apostles, is more resplendent under thy mighty rule than is the sun . . . All Christian states will be united by you . . . Two Romes have fallen, but the third is firmly established. No fourth can ever come to be." This concept Ivan imposed upon the Russian Church.

659 After this ruler's death, the influence of one who may no
771 doubt be termed the greatest of Russian churchmen made itself
793 felt. The Patriarch Nikhon deplored the subjection of the Church to the secular authority and the consequent loss both of independence and of influence. He sought to sever religion from blind national ambitions and to recover an international ecclesiastical outlook. But seldom has a man had to reckon with more determined opposition. A large number of Russian clergymen had become satisfied with their lot, and they preferred custom and inherited practice to fundamental religious values. They accused the Patriarch of favoring the West. He was deposed by the Czar, but not before he had introduced important reforms. His last action was a vain appeal to the Pope for unity. Now there was dominant in ecclesiastical circles a "zoological nationalism" (one of blood and soil, in Hitler's words) of which the great philosopher Vladimir Soloviëv wrote in anxious criticism.

ooo The princes and czars of whom we have spoken were reli-

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that the enemy had entered the city. The garrison gave way to panic, the walls were left undefended, and Mohammed had his victory. These strange events could therefore easily enough be attributed to supernatural intervention.

[E. Ivan the Terrible. — Analyst]

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The princes and czars of whom we have spoken were religious men. There now arose two monarchs whom the Church interested very little. Peter the Great scoffed at an independent clergy, and Catherine the Great followed in his footsteps. While Peter not only deposed the Patriarch and appointed in his stead an official responsible to the Crown, Catherine confiscated the properties of the Church and conferred upon the clergy the status of civil servants with appropriate salaries. It seems wholly probable that for both monarchs religion was merely a nuisance which interfered with the authority of the civil ruler; but commitment to Christianity was the most signal characteristic of the Russian people, and nothing could be done to obliterate the "superstition" entirely. Nevertheless the period during which these autocrats ruled brought about a considerable loss of confidence in the Church. Visionary mystical sects arose on the soil of Russia, undermining irretrievably the solidarity of religious institutions. 175 659

Then came the great war against Napoleon. This not only deepened the spiritual convictions of the Russian people but also renewed their associations with the West. In Germany particularly, soldiers of the Czar gained a knowledge of idealistic movements then afoot; German culture was then perhaps at its height as an exponent of universal ethical principles, and many Russians returned home determined to revitalize the intellectual and spiritual life of their country. They failed in large measure. Suppression fell heavily upon them, but in spite of this there ensued a great ferment which remained vigorous throughout the century. On the one hand this took the form of criticizing the Russian Church for its subservience to the Russian rulers. On the other, it gave rise to a movement for the reunion of the religious forces of East and West. Soloviëv became the protagonist of union with Rome. Others strove to deepen the theology of the East. 175 177 185 795

Czarism perished in the aftermath of the bloody battles of 000

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Czarism perished in the aftermath of the bloody battles of
175 World War I, for reasons not the least of which was the obses-
659 sion of the ruling house for a morbid spiritualistic cult. The revolutionary government organized by Kerenski proclaimed freedom of religion, and won applause throughout the world for this reason among others. The Patriarchate was restored. These noble ambitions were rudely ended by Lenin, who had been transported to the Russian scene through the courtesy of General Ludendorff, then all-powerful in Germany. For Lenin, the dialectical materialist,* the Russian Church was as old-fashioned as the Ptolemaic theory and as corrupt as a rotten apricot. It was expected that a single order would demolish the moribund institution once for all. But instead the resistance of the faithful was moving and breath-taking. The Russian people, for all its weaknesses and sins, its subservience to the czars, and its dissatisfaction with a clergy too often supinely dependent upon the state, proved itself to be a profoundly religious folk.
798 The Communists attacked with blind fury. Church property was taken away, the priests were left without any means of subsistence. Houses of worship were profaned. A few excerpts from the Pastoral Letter issued by Patriarch Tikhon on January 18, 1918, summarize the situation at that time: "Daily we are in receipt of letters reporting the horrible, bestial murders of quite innocent and bedridden people . . . All these things are done not at nighttime only, but in the light of day. There are no hearings, all rights and laws have been abrogated. The holy edifices are targets for gunfire, or are subject to looting, ridicule, and degradation. Venerable persons residing in monasteries and honored by the faithful are seized by the dark, ungodly powers of this age. Schools supported by the Orthodox Church for the education of priests are turned into institutions

* Dialectical materialism, the doctrine of Marx and his followers, changed the idealistic religious pantheism of Hegel into a form of materialism, but retained Hegel's theory of "dialectic."

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of nonbelievers or are made into houses of prostitution."798

Rigorously the Communists continued their efforts. The Metropolitan of St. Petersburg, the Metropolitan of Kiev, and the chief representative of the Roman Catholic Church in Russia were tried and executed. How many others suffered a like fate, no one knows. Many were exiled to Siberia, and not a few fled to other lands. Then there took place an incident which was indicative of the future. During June, 1923, the Communist newspaper *Izvestia* published the "confession" of Patriarch Tikhon. The case against him was dropped. How many times subsequently were we to read of trials and "confessions," and led to wonder through what horrible means these words of renegation were extracted!

Up and down went the tide of Russian persecution, reaching a climax of vehemence after the purges of 1936 and 1937, through which Stalin conferred absolute power upon himself. All, whether of the clergy or of the laity, who had attracted attention as devout Christians were dealt with as accomplices of the "Old Bolsheviks" and of army officers upon whom the full fury of the repression descended. Whole throngs were arrested. The resistance, however, was far more vigorous than had been anticipated. Elderly men and women took upon themselves the duties of the imprisoned priests, and services were held in private homes, in ruined buildings, and in the forests.

Then in 1939 the government altered its policy and eased 659
considerably the restrictions upon the Church. The outbreak 175
of the war brought further improvement. Both government and army looked benevolently on religion as a source of consolation and hope for the average soldier. Churchmen responded by supporting resistance to Hitler, though to be sure they had been decimated since the previous clash at arms between Russians and Germans. According to official Russian sources the

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658 churches were fewer than one-tenth of the number which had
175 served the faithful in 1917, and the Orthodox clergy had dwindled comparably. On September 3, 1943, Stalin had a conference with the Metropolitans Sergius and Nicholas; and it was thereupon announced that Sergius had been elected Patriarch of Moscow and of all Russia. Many have criticized the Orthodox Church for agreeing to collaborate with the dictator, but it is clear that any other course was impossible. How could the Russian faithful have understood an action which would have been interpreted as a departure from age-old patriotic tradition?

659 But one must admit that the subsequent subservience of the
648 Orthodox Church cannot easily be condoned. After 1945 the Patriarch broke off all ties with the West, repudiating the Vatican and the Protestant Ecumenical Movement alike, both of which had not only opposed Nazism but used every available resource to mitigate the persecution of the Russian Church. The Ecclesiastical Assembly which convened in Moscow during July, 1948, did little except to subscribe without a quaver to Stalin's peace propaganda. The resolutions adopted accused Western Catholicism and Protestantism of fomenting war, and called upon them to emulate the conduct of the Moscow Patriarch.

795 The trend thus inaugurated has continued. A "Peace Con-
648 ference" of the Russian churches, held in a seminary near Moscow during May, 1952, strove to mobilize ecclesiastical opinion both in Russia and abroad for the "peace" objectives dear to Stalin. The Metropolitan Nicholas described the world as being divided into two camps—one bent on war and the other seraphically concerned with peace. This time the onus did not rest solely on the Orthodox Church. For example, Canon Strode of the Roman Catholic clergy of Riga assailed the "gold-greedy multimillionaires of the United States" as the abettors

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of "the bacteriological weapon of warfare." And Zhidhov, 795
chief Baptist minister in Russia, called upon his fellow Baptists 648
in other countries to "become active fighters for peace." This "Peace Conference" opened with the singing of the Russian national anthem, and a huge portrait of Stalin loomed behind the speakers' table.

Meanwhile, however, the Communist Party has by no means 653
abandoned its militant advocacy of the godless view of life. 823
Official speakers and writers in dense array continue to express the view that "the Communist education of the working people is inconceivable without a vigorous struggle against all remnants of the old society, including religious superstition and prejudice." Nevertheless there is insistence upon the freedom of all to practice religion. For example, on April 25, 1951, an article in *Komsomolskaya Pravda*, organ of the Communist youth movement, stated: "In our country the Church is disestablished from the state. For a Soviet citizen religion is a private affair. But it is not a private affair for the Bolshevist Party, which continues to educate the worker in the spirit of the only true scientific, materialistic world outlook." It would be pointless to multiply this quotation here. Official Soviet publications, in the U.S.S.R. and outside, duplicate it with a regularity which may be dialectical materialism's substitute for infinity. Conclusions are difficult to draw when they can be no more than inferences from sources only partly subject to control. There are, however, observers who think that dialectical materialism may be maintaining its position in the Russian scheme of things with some difficulty. Religion has become its rival, because religion has agreed to serve as an instrument of foreign policy. Who can say? For though it is conceivable that the Orthodox Church, were it able to find many abroad ready to credit its version of the "peace" propaganda, might supplant Leninism, such a Church would be the abject slave

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of the State, to an extent undreamed of in Czarist Russia. We were wont, many of us, to make uncomplimentary references to the clergy of the old regime. Some of the strictures were too sweeping. But, alas, what we must be prepared to say about the Russian Church under the Soviets is far more devastating. It has become an institution which all but blesses the concentration camp system, and escorts slave labor to its doom with a kind of liturgical brass band.

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The Soviet objective is to reduce religious organizations outside Russia to the status of the Orthodox Church at home. The formula is always and everywhere the same, though it may be applied with greater or lesser rigor. Therefore inevitably the Vatican becomes the great antagonist, to be fought with every means. The Holy See, pledged to the profession of the Christian Gospels without dilution of the ethical obligations which they impose upon everyone who accepts them in the Catholic sense, cannot agree that the Church is to be an instrument of the State —even, indeed, a benign and merciful instrument. The Vatican is therefore the ignoble Fascist Beast of the Bolshevik Apocalypse. Upon the heads of persons who remain loyal to the ancient See of Catholic Christendom, blows have rained in constant succession. This is the direst persecution the Church has suffered since the days of the Caesars.

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Because most of what may be reported concerns the Catholic Church, a brief review of its history and endeavors in Eastern Europe will help to bring events into perspective. The cleavage of the Roman Empire, establishing the rivalry between the emperors of Rome and Byzantium, begot two Churches also, each claiming for itself the charisma of Apostolic Christianity. With the passing of time, profound differences of a dogmatic, moral, and canonical kind developed. The organizational character of religion was also modified radically, so that, while in the East the ties binding the religious nations to the historic pa-

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triarchal See of Constantinople were either broken completely 175
or allowed to become loose and tenuous, in the West the struc- 795
ture of the Roman Catholic Church became more monolithic 779
in fact, if not in theory. No doubt this divergence was rooted partly in theology, but one cause was the decline of Constantinople as an important Christian center and its subjection to Turkish rule.

Yet there could never be any doubt that both Churches were [793]
intensely and ardently Catholic. They kept the tradition of the
priesthood as a sacramental ordination administered by bish- [796]
ops whose authority had been handed down in direct line of succession from the Apostles. Both retained the Mass as that in which the Sacrifice of Christ was reenacted so that His body and blood might be with the Church always. Devotion to the Virgin Mary, so long a thorn in the flesh of Western Protestantism, was a common heritage and treasure, however different the conceptions of Mary's personality and presence or the liturgies in which her praise was spelled out in prayer. Therefore efforts to effect reunion have never flagged since the Middle Ages. The fact that they have failed may well be, as many writers have thought, one of the great tragedies of history.

For every thoughtful Western Catholic the virtues and atti- 000
tudes cherished in the East are precious because they reflect mystical prayer and thought and often the vital, profound humility of the human sinner who does not lose himself in "personalism": the personalism which in the West has so often favored the delusion that the rights and righteousness of man are pearls grown within himself through the practice of religion or morality, independent of the sacred order which is in God and which, when he is sometimes devout and submissive, he may possess in the deepest core of his being. On the other hand the West, unlike the East, has an illustrious tradition of endeavor to permeate the speculative and practical intelligence by holi-

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000 ness, so that the other human being, the brother, with his needs, fears, and failings as well as his innate good qualities, may be brought into a community of charity and justice. The great Saints of Roman Catholicism are not seldom found among men who, like Francis, Dominic, Benedict, and Ignatius, were builders of communities that sought the fullest possible human expression of man's sense of union with God and with his fellows upon the earth.

S.U. 659 Yet it is over the question of authority that the contest between East and West has been most keen. In Western eyes the great failure of the Orthodox Church has been its inability to disassociate itself from the control of the secular state. We see, for example, in Communist Russia today as well as we seem to see in czarist history, a religion which does what it is told to do, which lulls the consciences of men into obedience to tyranny. But if I understand such writers as Berdyaev correctly, freedom to find Christ in the Church is all that matters to the Russian Christian, and any authoritatively formulated faith is in his eyes a serious denial of a cardinal rule by which the soul must live. This philosophical restatement of the remarks concerning the Grand Inquisitor which are familiar to readers of Dostoievski's *Brothers Karamazov* is, of course, a valid critique of those moments in the history of Western Catholicism when E force was used to insure men's allegiance to the Church; but it does not deal at all with the central and abiding doctrines of 795 Western Catholicism on authority. The Papacy is not, in the 779 view of those who recognize it, an institution with the purpose of driving people into the Church and holding them there, but is rather the sublime instrumentality through which Divine Grace wards off from the Catholic communion all that, whatever its source, was not present from the beginning in Christ's teaching, literally or implicitly. For this reason Western Catholics have loved it, died for it, borne persecution for its sake.

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and reverenced those who, however worthily or unworthily, represented it to the world. The Western Catholic is as free as anyone else to come to his insight into the fullness of the meaning of Christianity but he has a certainty held with profound gratitude that when he is in his Church he will not unwittingly find strange gods upon the altars.

In any event, the quest for reunion continued and reached, as has been indicated, an initial nadir during the period of the Crusades and a moment of optimistic hopefulness at the Councils of Ferrara and Florence during the fifteenth century. Only a brief reference to either is possible here. The Crusaders, who were roused by eloquent preachers like St. Bernard to take up arms and make the long journey eastward to wrest the Holy Places associated with the life and death of Our Lord from the Turks, served a consecrated cause; but many of them were very human, indeed. Some historians conclude from the sermons of St. Bernard and other preachers of the time that the purely mundane benefits which accrued to the men who took up the Cross were so great that many ruffians (contrary to romantic historians, the Middle Ages had their share of them) embarked on the adventure. It is also evident that although the Crusades owed their origin to an appeal for help from the Byzantine Emperor, to which the monks of Cluny responded as best they could, the net cultural result was that the East was not only disappointed in what the West could achieve but disgusted with the conduct of the armies, even as since that time many another occupied country has been with foreign soldiers who have been billeted on its soil. On the other hand, the West heard many a report about the corruption and venality of the East, even as the home people in this our day have listened to shocking stories of lands which their soldier sons have seen. It must be added that the subsequent continued dominion of the Turks likewise dampened the ardor of friendship.

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175 795 648 The great Councils[1] to which we have referred opened in a spirit of optimism, despite the nationalistic bickering to which Europe was then subject. The Greeks were in a conciliatory mood, due largely to their need of Western allies against the followers of Mohammed, but they arrived in Europe at a time of bitter conflict over whether a Council took precedence over the Pope. The Decree of Union did not satisfy the great mass of the Greeks, even though the overwhelming majority of their ecclesiastical representatives assented to it in accordance with the wishes of the Emperor. The only positive result was the formation of the Greek Churches in union with Rome, usually called the Uniate Churches. In Russia, as we have seen, the Czar vetoed any plan of reunion.

But the great dream of reunion did not die, and after World War I it was revived especially by Pope Pius XI, who had intimate personal knowledge of conditions in Eastern Europe from the high vantage point of the Holy See. Institutions under the auspices of the Papacy were established to promote the achievement of One Fold and One Shepherd. At the same time the Protestant Ecumenical Council likewise began to search for ways in which to draw the Eastern Churches into union, with the Churches bound together under its roof. These efforts were not wholly useless, but it was again obvious that the disunity of the Christian West had puzzled and confused rather than attracted the East.

175 829 795 Meanwhile great changes had taken place. The Papacy was compelled to reckon with the rise of secularism, which swept across Eastern Europe from the West during the nineteenth century. Medieval ecclesiastical institutions were widely identified with feudalism; and in addition new intellectual and scientific movements gave rise to a widespread conviction that religion was in itself a barrier to the development of the good, or at least the prosperous, society. The attack on feudalism

[1. Councils of Ferrara and Florence, 15th cent. - Analyst.]

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which became the great French Revolution of 1789 was also a 175
rebellion against the privileged Church; and after the rise of 829
a capitalistic society the estrangement of the poor from religion 795
became the dominant fact in the cultural history of Western Europe. Hegelian philosophy—combining a doctrine of the constantly mobile and shifting Mind with a theory of the State as the sole primordially ordained center of permanence in an otherwise impermanent world—came to prominence at a time when dissatisfaction with Liberalism (in the continental sense) was breeding myths of political utopianism among the masses. Of these myths the strongest, temporarily at least, was the Marxist faith, rooted in a class-conscious usurpation of Hegelian thought. Yet observers who looked deeply into the wellsprings from which the intellectual behavior of the time was fed could see that a creed drastically counter to Marxism was arising in many different places, almost spontaneously. This might be termed dynamic traditionalism—that is, investing the past of man with sacredness and subsequently selecting from it forces and figures that could be made objects of the cult, in which the concept of human sacrality might receive a quasi-liturgical form. Perhaps such a force might be race, or classical antiquity, or one of the urges which some historians read into the Renaissance. To the exponents of dynamic traditionalism, the Catholic Church often seemed to be one great force among many others. For did it not have discipline, as Charles Maurras observed, and a heritage of beauty ranging all the way from the austerity of Cluny to the gorgeous splendor of St. Peter's?

This traditionalism tempted many Catholics—was indeed a 829
far greater peril to orthodoxy than even the antecedent, all- 795
pervading Liberalism. That no doubt had led not a few to believe that the Christian creed was outmoded and so could be made serviceable only by adapting it, more or less subtly, to the assumptions of modern scientific and philosophical

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829 thought; but dynamic traditionalism transformed the Church
795 of the Master into a genteel and eminently historical institution, with the role of conferring the august dignity of an assumed other world upon the power politics of the here-and-now. The robes of prelates fitted very well into the pageantry of the State, and so there were not a few who thought that a benediction might well be expended upon Nazis and Fascists, to the accompaniment of incense and carefully selected items of Gregorian chant, if only their grandiose parades would include a section devoted exclusively to the clergy. It may be said parenthetically that today no one knows whether the Russia of Stalin was a devotee of Marxism or of dynamic traditionalism. Had Stalin donned the robes of Ivan, who could have told which heresy he was espousing?

175 A succession of great Popes, possibly the most remarkable
793 in the long annals of the Church, accepted the challenge. Leo
795 XIII, intellectual and aristocratic, recognized the necessity for demonstrating to the workers that they were not at present inside the realms of a Christian civilization that doomed them to a condition of perennial peonage. His successor, Pope Pius X, left to the world the conviction that the Church is the servant of peace; and Benedict XV committed all Catholics to the support of an international order. In 1922 began the vigorous pontificate of Pius XI, distinguished for the world-wide scope of his interests and sympathies. Whereas during several centuries the See of Rome had worn an air of Roman provincialism, the tireless leadership of this learned, mountain-climbing North Italian imparted to it a new tinge of contemporaneousness and cosmopolitanism. The Vatican ended its old quarrel with the Italian State over the Papal territories, even though at some risk of seeming to assent to the dictatorship of Mussolini. It acquired a radio station, an Americanized library system, and even a scientific academy. Through adroit and concilia-

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tory diplomatic activity agreements were reached with the new states of Europe as well as with many countries overseas concerning relationships between Church and State. In ways which were often startlingly new, the laity was associated with the clergy in the work of the Church; and social reform was advocated, in the spirit of a great Encyclical letter restating and re-forming the principles of the moral teaching concerning society which are implicit in the Catholic tradition. All these things were then kept alive under the next Pope, Pius XII.

It is part of the universal tragedy of our time that so very much of what seemed so promising should have been engulfed by the fearful upheavals which, originating in Europe, for a time threatened to shatter the foundations of human society everywhere. In Adolf Hitler appeared the demagogic voluntarist who gave the heresy of dynamic traditionalism its most drastic and frightening formulation. Meanwhile, in nearly every other country Marxism became the gospel of the dissident intellectuals, who often were able to commit to their view sections of the working population, indeed not infrequently unwilling sections. Yet Pius XI had felt, almost from the moment he assumed Pontificate, that a great and shattering storm was brewing in Europe. That is why he labored so vigorously for the development of the Church in other parts of the world, including Africa and Asia. He took steps to forestall the disaster, opposing the mighty heresies whenever he could even though sometimes the infection had spread so far among Catholics themselves that—as in the case of the *Action française*—Princes of the Church did not concur with him.

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In Eastern Europe the position of the Church was inevitably and critically affected by inability to arrive at a *modus vivendi* with the Bolshevik government. The lengthy story of efforts to reach an agreement cannot be told here; but it may be recalled that until the summer of 1924 a Papal Relief Mission was ac-

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797 tive in Russia at the request of the government, bringing food,
659 clothing, and medicine to many tens of thousands. Yet even while this work of charity was in progress, priests and prelates
798 were sentenced to death and executed, churches were looted
648 and closed, and many of the faithful were exiled. The Bolsheviks insisted that, until the Vatican recognized the regime as a lawfully constituted government, clergymen professing allegiance to Rome must be regarded as enemies; Russian émigré circles were just as vehement in demanding that no such recognition be accorded; and circles representative of the Orthodox Church opposed even the Papal Relief Mission, on the ground that its directors were in reality proselytizers. In the circumstances, the Vatican tried to carry on its relief work as long as possible, and to use whatever influence it could muster to save the persecuted bishops and priests. In the end, however, the isolated remnants of Roman Catholicism in Russia lost even
E the remotest hope that Rome could do anything for them.

659 The countries west of Russia, most of them newly estab-
186 lished, presented less formidable obstacles to the mission of
795 the Church; but in not a few of them conditions were turbulent enough. In Czechoslovakia, for example, insurgent nationalism combined with anticlericalism to create within the Catholic clergy a sizable group who not only wished to rid the Church of every vestige of association with the Habsburgs but also strove to "reform" the ecclesiastical organization itself and to do away with such constraints as celibacy. However, the secession and subsequent excommunication of this group led to a great strengthening of the loyal majority. Catholics were collectively more resolute, and by 1925 the fever had abated, and relations between Church and State were established on a solid foundation. Elsewhere the story was similar, though perhaps less stormy and tawdry.

000 In attempting to visualize the complex continuous effort by

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In attempting to visualize the complex continuous effort by the Church in these lands to educate the people and to meet their 794
physical and spiritual needs we deal not with an island in the stream of modern life—as we should if, for example, we set out to evaluate the influence of religion on the art, music, and architecture of present-day America—but verily with that stream itself. For example, the press that appeared under Catholic auspices in Poland, Hungary, and Czechoslovakia was a mighty force, in all its ramifications from the daily newspaper to the monthly periodical, for the shaping of public opinion. On the other hand, hospitals and refuges, schools and day nurseries, conducted for the most part under the supervision of religious orders, were almost the only institutions of such character to be found in some countries. Therefore the Communist [798]
onslaught upon this manifold activity was not merely against tradition but verily against action. It could not have succeeded unless its directors were safely established behind a dense array of Russian machine guns. It was an invasion resembling in some respects the earlier inroads from the East under which all these lands had suffered not once but many times. Assuredly the men in the Vatican, pondering the news each day, must often have let their thought return to times when Turk and Tartar bombarded the ancient citadels of once Christian Europe.

We shall now summarize, though of necessity far too briefly, 795
Protestant efforts to establish ecumenical union with the Russian Orthodox Church. On the one hand they resulted to some 659
extent from the failure during the Pontificate of Pope Leo XIII to prepare the way for the union of the Anglican Church with Rome. This failure, it will be recalled, was in large measure due to Rome's decision that Anglican Orders were not valid. On the other hand, Protestant Churches in Eastern Europe often felt that the attitude of Russian Orthodoxy toward the State was more compatible with the traditional views of

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795 Protestantism than were those of Roman Catholicism. Luther-
659 ans, for example, were not averse to identifying their Church with a political power; but their belief that the Kingdom of God and the kingdoms of this world are radically different also led to the conclusion that the Church could accept responsibility for approving or opposing actions by the State only when these controverted directly the moral and religious truths which had been made explicit in the teachings of the Lord Jesus. Thus a section of the German Lutheran Church opposed Nazism with sublime courage because Hitler had repudiated in principle such central teachings as that of the validity of Christian baptism when administered to persons of Jewish origin.

795 But Protestants viewed with uneasiness the Catholic practice
668 of creating organizations of the faithful for political and social action—which led in Germany to the creation of the Center Party on the basis of organizational efforts that had their origin in 1840. This was by no means merely an opportunistic reaction, even though upon occasion ecclesiastical rivalry may have played a part. While some loyal Protestants cooperated with and even voted for the Center Party, even as did a number of Jews, the great majority felt—no doubt, upon occasion, quite properly—that partisan activity brought the Church into realms where religious teaching was compromised for the sake of political expediency. This cleavage was intensified after Karl Barth and his associates formulated a neo-orthodox theology whose profound influence extended beyond Germany to Calvinism and Lutheranism in the whole of Eastern Europe. How strongly this criticism affected Catholic practice cannot be discussed here; but it may be pointed out that, during much of the Pontificate of Pius XI, Rome contemplated withdrawing the faithful completely from organizations of a political and social character, and building up instead the groups which received the generic name Catholic Action. Only toward the close of his

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Pontificate did Pius XI reaffirm the desirability of the more 795
secular associations. And in Germany after World War II 668
Catholics elected to create an interconfessional party, the Christian Democratic Union, instead of resurrecting the old Center Party (which emerged as a small minority movement only).

In any event, wide circles of the clergy and the laity looked 795
upon the Russian Church with deep if sometimes nostalgic re- 779
spect, particularly when the yearning for the reunion of Christendom was spiritually motivated and sincere. Despite many efforts, the outlook for an eventual peace with the Roman See which would obliterate the divisive past seemed to be unpromising. And on the other hand the "Social Christianity" to which American Protestantism appeared to be irretrievably committed impressed the more traditional European theologians as being thin and relatively mundane. There remained the hope that by forging a bond with the Orthodox East a new Christian community, transcending national boundaries, could be established. The writings of Russian exiles were read with avidity; and the authors were of such talent, insight, and sometimes genius that they exerted a great influence. There can be no doubt that, if after victory in 1945 Stalin had adopted a conciliatory policy and had conceded genuine religious and social freedom, Central and Eastern Europe would have become strongly, even ardently pro-Russian. The response in Protestant communities would have been particularly sincere.

The hope for such a policy was at times as fervent as a 000
messianic dream, and it died hard. Pastor Martin Niemoeller has perhaps been its most eloquent exponent, but there have been many others. It is not possible to understand fully the situation that developed unless one bears these things in mind. Only with great difficulty could Europe resign itself to accepting the intellectual and cultural leadership of the United States. This sobering thought may also be a healing one.

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2 THE SITUATION IN EASTERN GERMANY

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THE PROVINCES OF Eastern Germany which at present constitute the Russian Zone of Occupation no doubt afford the most advantageous point of departure for an inquiry into religious life behind the Iron Curtain. Not a little is known about conditions prevailing there; and for a variety of reasons the Soviet authorities have on the whole laid down policies which are in some respects more moderate than are those in force elsewhere. The beleaguered island of Berlin remains, to an even greater extent than Vienna, a point of exodus and ingress between West and East. It should be borne in mind that the Zone is merely the torso of prewar eastern Germany. The great agricultural regions of East Prussia, Pomerania, and Silesia were detached from Germany in 1945. Of the five remaining states, Brandenburg, Saxony, and Thuringia are the most important, and are in part highly industrialized.

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When the Russian armies first marched in, ruthless violence was the order of the day. Some idea of the lawlessness which prevailed is given by the fact that more than half the Catholic

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clergy in the area were put to death in varying ways, and that 798
the losses suffered by the Protestant clergy were also great.
Gradually order was restored under a puppet German govern- 642
ment to which at first all political parties were contributors. 665
Soon, however, the Unity Party in which Socialists and Communists were merged gained complete control. Sizable police forces were created, and recruits were sought in both the East and the West. Economic conditions have on the whole remained 433
primitive. Food resources have never been adequate, and in 731
years of poor harvests (for example, 1952, when early frosts spoiled a large part of the potato crop) the plight of the population has been dire indeed. As a matter of fact, widespread famine would have decimated the population had it not been for relief shipments of foodstuffs from the West. The great religious eleemosynary organizations have siphoned more than a third of all supplies from outside Germany into the Eastern Zone; and in addition giving by West Germans has continued on a notable scale. Industrial production by nationalized mines and factories has, however, steadily increased, though wages are low and the working groups disgruntled.

The Constitution under which the East German government 659
presumably functions is so similar to the basic written law 177
elsewhere in the Russian sphere of influence that the provisions .64
which govern religious activity will serve to illustrate rather 642
well what the over-all juridical framework is. The exercise of religious beliefs shall not (we read) be curtailed. This is in accordance with the Soviet contention that full religious liberty is guaranteed by the Soviet Constitution. Church and State are declared wholly separate, so that the independence of religious organizations is formally recognized. To be sure, this recognition is subject to the whimsical impulses as well as to the over-all political strategy of the Communists. When parents give their consent, religious instruction may be imparted to chil-

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dren under fourteen years of age. After that age they are presumed to be their own masters, so that they themselves must decide whether they desire any additional religious indoctrination. The Constitution further provides that anyone who wishes to withdraw from the Church shall be able to do so without incurring any social stigma. A number of specific prohibitions are also included in the fundamental law; but these are quite like the caveats established by the Nazis. Thus any action by a religious association which is deemed to be in violation of the principles of the Constitution, or which may be interpreted as having a partisan political character, is subject to censure and punishment.* It is likewise unlawful to impose an obligation to attend religious services—an obligation which the German *Wehrmacht* had traditionally made a part of military training. Private or parochial schools were forbidden, although until recently it was possible to send children residing in East Berlin to religious schools situated in the Western part of the city. Finally, no one can be made subject to a demand that he manifest a religious faith in public.

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So much for the law. The pro-Soviet Unity Party has, however, its own code of conduct in so far as religion is concerned, resembling in this respect Communist parties in power elsewhere. A good deal of experience with this code has been accumulated, and religious leaders have commented on various aspects of it. The cardinal principle is that while open, full-scale onslaughts on religion are to be avoided, Communists must do everything in their power to spread the Gospel of dialectical materialism. A highly significant practical corollary is that since service to the Russian state is the major business of Communist parties, everything possible must be done to

* Under Hitler, action was based not on the Constitution but on the decree against pro-Communist activities which had been signed by President von Hindenburg. This decree was made applicable to statements by the Protestant Confessional Church, the Catholic Bishops, etc.

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form a group of "democratic" or "patriotic" clergymen, so 665
that after they have been wholly won over they can be ap- 177
pointed to positions of power and influence within the Church, .67
thus curbing or if need be liquidating the "reactionary" and 671
"imperialistic" clergy. This is the standard method of infiltrat- 626
ing religious organizations. Lay people, too, are subjected to [793]
the same pressures. If a number of them can be found who are willing to form a "progressive movement" designed to demonstrate that true religion is wholly in favor of the Communist system, the seeds of disunion can be planted. Some who join such groups are dupes, others are subject to intimidation for reasons ranging all the way from fear of public exposure of some weakness to dread of losing a position. In Eastern Ger- 829
many there are also quite a number of truly religious persons who feel that the Church should disassociate itself from all worldly affairs, and avoid either support of or opposition to the civil government. For all such governments are, in their view, purely mundane and therefore evil—or at least necessary evils. The "neutralists," as they are familiarly called, are above all anxious to avoid any commitment which would align the Church with military effort and therefore with potential war. Such persons are not pro-Russian, but they are likely to be anti-Western.

Two statements by Communists prominent in the Unity 665
Party may be cited as typical of the views prevailing in such circles. During January, 1950, a prominent Thuringian leader, speaking for internal Party consumption, stated frankly:

> We Marxists-Leninists are aware of the fact that religion is merely the opium of the people. We will always maintain this Communist principle, but the situation requires that we deal with the problem as such as diplomatically as possible. It may sound strange, but it is true that we must protect religion even while we are keeping a close watch on the clergy. Should any one among them become dangerous

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665 to us, he must be removed. Every district chairman must report priests to us who seem to be reactionary, so that the necessary further steps can be taken by the Land Board.

659 During June, 1949, the same policy had been formulated
798 more bluntly at a meeting of officials responsible for the security of the East German State:

> Since the Church in the Greater German Republic [the official Communist label for the government of the Russian Zone] is beginning to allow itself to be exploited as a trumpet by the Western Imperialists, we must see to it that these comedians of Heaven lose all interest in such activities. Enough room is still available in our camps for additional labor companies composed of these black brethren. Physical work will persuade them once and for all to quit inciting against us the people who are still gullible enough to listen to them.

795 To date, however, neither the Lutheran Church, to which the
659 great majority of Germans in the Russian Zone of Occupation
626 belong, nor the Catholic Church * has felt the full impact of the threats implied in such utterances. It may be added that, although the whole of Eastern Germany north of Silesia has long been strongly Protestant, displaced persons from the territories taken over by Poland have for the first time raised the number of Catholics in Thuringia, Anhalt, and Mecklenburg to more than 10 per cent. The initial step taken by the Communist-dominated government was to establish an Office for Religious Affairs. This is a part of standard Russian procedure, but in East Germany the agency, strikingly like the bureaus created by the Nazis for the regulation of religious affairs, ostensibly

* There are four major Churches in Eastern Europe to which the word "Catholic" is applied. Roman Catholics—that is, Catholics who acknowledge the Pope as their Supreme Head—follow either the Latin or the Greek rite. Those who follow the second are usually referred to as Uniates. Orthodox Catholicism does not assent to the primacy of the See of Rome. It may be either Greek Orthodoxy, which implies affiliation with the Patriarchate of Constantinople, or Russian Orthodoxy, presided over by the Patriarch of Moscow.

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had for its primary purpose the consideration of complaints voiced by responsible ecclesiastical leaders. Some such protests were formulated in a letter addressed, on April 23, 1950, by Bishop Otto Dibelius to the Lutheran clergy and faithful. He listed as the principal objects of concern: the teaching of a materialistic philosophy of life as a substitute for religion in the schools and youth organizations; the pressure methods used to weaken the consciences of Church members; and the refusal of legal counsel to persons brought to trial on charges of opposition to the government. It soon became obvious, however, that the real task assigned to the Office for Religious Affairs was to recruit clergymen willing to serve the Communist State and to support any propagandistic efforts which it considered particularly worth while. The recruits were approvingly labeled "national," "patriotic," or "democratic," in accordance with the estimated local popularity of any such adjective. Those who remained aloof or critical were of course called "reactionary" or "imperialist." Wherever and whenever the number of recruits became sizable, the fortunes of the "reactionaries" declined. These were attacked in the official press, and their views were grossly misrepresented. Eventually some of them were brought to trial on charges of having succumbed to the lures of Wall Street, and upon occasion sentenced for espionage activities.

Still another phenomenon is worthy of note. Normally the Communists will treat with special consideration the representatives of a religious minority, particularly one which has suffered at the hands of the majority group. The purpose is to elicit a statement that all is well with the minority, which can be used propagandistically as evidence that only the larger "reactionary" Church is indulging in unwarranted criticism and opposition. Fortunately relations between Lutherans and Catholics in eastern Germany had improved very remarkably during

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661 the Nazi period, as a result of hardship and persecution both
563 groups suffered. The younger clergy in particular had shared moving and harrowing experiences. Accordingly the Catholic minority was proof against party blandishments.

795 Oddly enough, therefore, the full weight of Communist op-
778 position fell on Jehovah's Witnesses, a sect which has long had a following in Eastern Europe and so was well known in some sections of the expellee population. The Witnesses had also been a target for Nazi hostility, and many hundreds of them perished in Dachau and other concentration camps. During 1950, the Communists banned the sect in eastern Germany, on the ground that it was a branch of the American "espionage system," even though specially favorable treatment had been accorded to it in Poland. It is believed that by the close of the year nearly eight hundred Witnesses were serving terms in prisons and labor camps, and that life sentences had been imposed on thirteen of its principal advocates.

795 It has been surmised that all this happened because some
823 prominent German Communists profess to be masters of "astro-
779 logical science," and indeed several had been initiated into the recondite subject by no less a master than Rudolf Hess. Jehovah's Witnesses believe that the end of the world is rapidly approaching, on the basis of their deductions from Holy Writ, and therefore indulge in prophecies concerning the impending demise of our world, due to human sin and frailty. Communism believes in prophecy, too, but holds that the sole reliable form of soothsaying is that outlined by Marxist philosophy as a corollary of "natural science." This "science" enabled Stalin to predict the future of human society with complete accuracy. Communist literature is therefore rich in attacks on "bourgeois" and "mystical" soothsayers, and in equally savory eulogies of Stalin as a social-scientific fortune teller. But Je-

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hovah's Witnesses, confident that the Word of God had been 795
vouchsafed to them, are incorrigible. No "patriots" or "demo- 829
crats" have been reported from their ranks. 999

Thus far the major denominations have fared less badly; but 871
heavy blows have been struck at their influence. Many of them 795
have fallen in the field of education. All private schools have 794
been closed; only the unified educational system survives, and religious instruction is no longer a part of the normal academic curriculum. Recently most of the kindergartens have been placed under the control of the state. In order to understand how revolutionary these various actions are, one must call to mind certain interesting facts about German social history. Traditionally German schools provided for religious instruction, regardless of whether they were organized in accordance with the denominational affiliations of the pupils or were attended jointly by Catholic, Protestant, and other children. Even Socialist and Communist parents, who themselves seldom if ever entered a church, often insisted that their children receive religious instruction, either because they deemed it ethically beneficial or because they wanted their youngsters to profit by whatever modicum of prestige might later result from Church membership. In Germany prior to 1933, it was hardly possible to persuade even Communist parents to leave their young children in nurseries not supervised by Catholic or Protestant religious. I myself have seen workingmen in the "red" districts of Berlin greet the nuns to whom they entrusted their little ones with a clenched fist and a hearty smile. More- 871
over, Eastern Germany had a number of excellent private 794
schools which were conducted under Protestant auspices; and one or another of them was held in as high esteem as Eton or Andover. I think that it is not an exaggeration to say that Count Schwerin von Krosigk remained in Hitler's Cabinet, to which

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the Conservatives named him in 1933, solely because membership in it enabled him to save the school of which he was a director.

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Today education is exclusively the business of the state, and the materialistic philosophy is taught—even as the tenets of Nazism were a few years ago—in all courses bearing on contemporary life. Marxist indoctrination is insisted upon at all levels, from the elementary school to the university. There is a great wealth of evidence on the subject, all indicating that (as one would expect) efforts to counteract it are out of the question. Yet it does not follow that the results are by any means what the Communist leaders desire. There is, to be sure, a complex and sometimes fantastically lavish plan for winning over youth. It involves on the one hand setting up at regular intervals grandiose youth rallies, such as the one staged annually in Berlin during the Pentecostal season, and on the other appointing very young people to important offices—so that boys of eighteen have served as mayors of cities. Literature of all kinds is made available in the quantity desired. A German can buy for the equivalent of about one dollar two fat volumes of the works of Lenin bound in full morocco. All this does unquestionably generate a great deal of intellectual and emotional fog, but no one of my acquaintance who knows eastern Germany thinks that the Communists have as yet succeeded in winning over German youth. If one bears in mind how many Communists have long lived there the reports are all the more astonishing.

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Just as 1953 was drawing to a close Marianne and Egon Erwin Mueller, in behalf of the students of the Free University of Berlin and of West German student organizations generally, published an absorbing if harrowing analysis of the academic situation in the Russian Zone, on the basis of reports supplied by all the major universities and technical institutes in East

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Germany. This indicated how thoroughly the subordination of 871
instruction to political purpose has been fostered. The right to 658
determine the methods and the content of instruction has been 626
taken from the professorate; the election of students to office [665]
in student councils and similar organizations is under rigid
Party control; the admission of students is now almost everywhere determined by examinations given in political orthodoxy; and the academic institutions themselves have taken on the character of strictly regulated barracks, in which even recreational activities are decreed. The book (". . . *stürmt die Festung Wissenschaft*") reveals also how courageous and tenacious the opposition has been. A roster of hundreds of names of persons arrested, tried, and often imprisoned for activities looked upon with disfavor by the regime will give even the casual reader some insight into how costly and bitter the struggle was.

It may be observed at this point that a vital part of the Com- 648
munist propaganda effort in this region is currying favor with 626
former Nazis. Much of the effort is of long standing; but it was 901
the Soviet note of March 10, 1952, to the Western Powers on German unification, that gave official confirmation of its existence. The note proposed that Germany be evacuated by all the
Powers within a year, that the State then created be permitted 729
to create a national army of its own, and that all former German soldiers and all erstwhile members of the Nazi Party receive full rights and privileges. The pertinent section of this document reads:

> All former members of the German Army, including officers and generals, except those who are serving sentences imposed by the courts for the commission of crimes, shall be accorded civil and political rights on a par with all other German citizens so that they may participate in the building of a peace-loving, democratic Germany.

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729 Apparently the practice of welcoming them into the police forces and other branches of the East German civil service is already well established.

733 At any rate, the lot of the Christian clergy is a difficult one,
661 exacting exemplary heroism. Intellectually they are isolated, because more and more of East Germany's well trained professional men have sought refuge in the West. They are under constant pressure to sponsor causes in which their Communist masters are particularly interested—the Stockholm peace petition, the abolition of the atom bomb, the return to the United States of every American soldier. On the other hand, they and the Christian Church they serve are continuously and vigorously attacked for indulging in "political activities," which include criticism of the wholly secularist educational system and of the materialistic philosophy. Their financial resources have been curtailed, though not so drastically as elsewhere. They may receive financial gifts from the West, even if the rate of exchange offered by the banks is so catastrophically bad that the money is virtually wasted. After 1949 clergymen were dropped from the category of intellectuals, and so could not claim the somewhat ameliorated rations made available to this group. Moreover, the number of pastors and curates is far smaller than that needed; and many now stationed in the Russian Zone have been overworked to the point of exhaustion. Hundreds of thousands of expellees have come from regions which were once German, and it is only too obvious that many believers of both confessions are not ministered unto. Inevitably there have also been some unavoidable transfers of specially endangered clerics to the West; but such shifts are fewer
[163] than might have been anticipated. In summary, one may end with an estimate made during the year 1950 that some nine hundred Lutheran parishes were without pastors, and that there was dire need of at least two hundred fifty Catholic priests.

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Theoretically there is no dearth of theological faculties serving the Protestant churches, because formal action to close them in the six major universities of the Zone has not been taken. However, the requirement of political indoctrination is now rigidly enforced, so that it is out of the question to expect the training of a well instructed or devoted clergy in such institutions. The aim has been therefore to educate young men and women in the West and then somehow to arrange for their admission into the Russian Zone. This has grown steadily more difficult, not merely because of opposition from the Communist Government but also because of the candidates' need for unusual heroism and ability to adapt themselves to a course of training which alone will equip them for their almost superhuman tasks. Most of these young people come from escapee backgrounds, and are therefore in a sense preparing to go back to their places of origin. One cannot talk with them without feeling almost overawed in their presence. Yet they are usually quite simple and matter-of-fact. If there was a cloud of glory somewhere about them, they concealed it admirably. The Lutheran Church is permitting trained deacons to act temporarily as pastors, and has permitted laymen to preach while exercising their normal callings. One may say without hesitation that many of these lay people are devoted and exemplary. Both Lutherans and Catholics have also found it necessary to recruit catechists in order to provide religious instruction for children after school hours. The training given is hard and modern in every sense of the term. 793 626

Catholic and Protestant welfare agencies have not been suppressed, though there exists an official Government welfare agency. The Inner Mission and the Evangelisches Hilfswerk are Protestant; Caritas is Catholic. Through these are channeled most of the donations received from the West. This freedom is in marked contrast with the situation in Czechoslovakia 794

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794 and Hungary, not to mention Albania and the Balkan countries. Hospitals, homes for orphaned or sick children, and refuges for the aged and the crippled are still conducted under religious auspices, though there has been some curtailment of the training afforded to nurses and social workers at such institutions. No doubt this relative freedom has been strengthened by the poverty and dissatisfaction of the German worker in the Zone, who must contend not only with deteriorating standards of living but also with the abolition of all the freedoms implicit in collective bargaining, which his trade unions had won for him over a period of generations.

659 204 794 It has also proved possible to conserve some religious youth organizations, even if these may now be only local in character. Government-sponsored activities alone are sanctioned on a Zone-wide basis. Societies formed to rally university students still carry on their work. In so far as the press is concerned, Protestants are considerably better off than Catholics. There are a Lutheran press service, a newspaper (*Die Kirche*), and a number of local weeklies published in small editions. Catholics, however, have not been able to secure permission to set up a publishing house or to import printed matter from the West.* Such reading materials as they distribute are more or less covertly smuggled into the Zone. Some cultural activities are likewise carried on under religious auspices, but these are overshadowed by the program of the government-sponsored Kulturbund, which at times receives lavish support.

794 795 Very noteworthy is the fact that the Lutheran Church has managed to arrange for periodic synodal conferences, attended by leaders from every part of the Eastern Zone. That which convened in East Berlin during April, 1950, was inspiring and impressive, but was overshadowed by the Kirchentag in the

* Early in 1954 it was announced that permission to publish one Catholic journal had been granted.

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same place a year later. This was undoubtedly one of the most 794
significant events in recent German spiritual history. More 795
than a hundred thousand persons attended; and the wise, frank, and deeply Christian discussion profoundly moved persons from the West who were fortunate enough to participate. In all probability, no event of the postwar era has been more indicative of what religious faith can mean to sorely tried men and women. Some observers believe that it is in Eastern Germany, under constant threat of persecution, that the Christian Church has grown genuinely strong. It is unquestionably true that contact with the elite fashioned there on the anvil of ordeal is a humbling and strangely strengthening experience that makes one wonder whether the mantle of Western prosperity hides comparable religious treasure.

Nevertheless it is realistic to conclude that organized reli- 771
gion has lost some ground in the Eastern Zone even though the 626
core may be sounder. The fact that so much influence was recovered, despite prewar weakness and the inroads of Nazism, is truly extraordinary; but the young had received very little sound training, and so, when the Communists insulated many of them against even conventional religious instruction, it was only natural that many should at least pay lip service to the Communist cause. Nor have efforts to recruit "patriotic" and "democratic" clergymen been wholly unavailing. Some Catholic priests and Protestant pastors alike have professed to see no reason why an agreement could not be reached between a socially oriented Christianity and Communism. The official propaganda, stressing peace and anti-imperialism, also made at least a temporary impression; and of course it has not been too difficult for some who once were Nazis, despite their clerical garb, to persuade themselves that Stalin is only a *Führer* in a somewhat unusual disguise.

What is the greatest impediment to the open profession of 000

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What is the greatest impediment to the open profession of
692 religious principles in Eastern Germany? No doubt it is the
641 Communist system of justice. Whereas one can only tentatively evaluate the practice of the courts in the satellite countries proper, the relative freedom in Eastern Germany makes it possible to observe rather closely the course of legal procedure there. Basically the system is not very different from that established by the Nazis. Once it has been laid down as a principle that "the healthy feelings of the people" have priority over codified legislation, and once it has been made self-evident that the welfare of the community takes precedence over the rights of the individual, it is easy for a judge to hand down any decision which his political superiors desire. And while the Communists pay less attention than the Nazis to "healthy feelings" their addiction to the welfare of the State is no less ardent and complete. One case may be adduced here
687 by way of illustration. On January 5, 1950, three young men were arrested because they had painted the word *Freiheit* (freedom) on house walls. Two of them had also passed round some pamphlets of Western origin, picked up during a trip to Berlin. The lower court found all three guilty and imposed sentences of three months in jail. But when the prosecutor appealed the case to a higher court the verdicts were revised to read ten years, five years, and two years respectively.

It was argued, and the court agreed, that these young men sought to create in the minds of East Germans the impression that they were not free. "This," said the court, "is gossip which in the most serious possible manner endangers the peace of the German people." For was it not true that the laboring masses of Eastern Germany had freed themselves from the enslaving chains of the lords of finance and industry? Indeed, the court went on to declare, one of the pamphlets which the defendants had circulated urged the population to resist the Communist occupation authorities. Because the ultimate consequence of

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taking such hate-mongering documents at their face value could 687
only be a new war, the principal defendant, a boy of eighteen—was clearly guilty of having attempted to incite the nation to armed conflict. Of special interest is the sentence imposed upon the third defendant, aged twenty-two. He had not wished to distribute the pamphlets but had permitted himself to be talked into doing so once only. After that he had refused. Nevertheless he was sentenced to two years in prison because in the court's opinion he, as a member of the FDJ (the Communist youth organization, Freie deutsche Jugend), should have known better.

Under such a system of justice, which considers even the mildest form of propaganda against the government to be an action "inciting to war" or "undermining the peace," it is extremely dangerous to indulge in any form of criticism. On May 9, 1951, the Minister of Justice of the Eastern Zone issued a proclamation which reads in part as follows:

> The fascist tyrants who ruled over Germany threw tens of thousands of honest anti-fascists into prisons, houses of correction, and concentration camps. It was enough to have been a member of or an official in the labor movement to make one a victim of persecution, maltreatment and loss of freedom. We refer to these victims of Fascism with the term "political prisoners."
>
> Today no one is arrested because of his opinions. Anyone who attacks our anti-fascist democratic order, or who hampers the building up of our peace industry, commits a punishable offense and is penalized because of his criminal actions. Prisoners of this character are therefore to be called not "political prisoners" but just plain criminals. It is as a consequence forbidden to refer to them as "political prisoners." If in an individual case some more accurate description is desired, one should employ a concrete term, such as for example "criminal in accordance with Article 8 of the Constitution," "criminal in accordance with Article 6," etc.

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693 Add to all this the characters of many persons entrusted with
661 the administration of justice, and the maintenance of national security. The Investigati- Committee of Freedom-Loving Lawyers in the Soviet Zone (Untersuchungsausschuss der freiheitlichen Juristen der Sowjetzone) has published a series of short biographies, in many cases fully documented, which reveal with startling clarity what kind of person has been recruited for the bench in the Russian Zone. Thus Bernhard Bechler, a Nazi who was for some time Minister of the Interior in the State of Brandenburg and was later Chief Inspector of the People's Police, had been assigned to the Eastern Front during the war, and was captured by the Russians. Soon thereafter he joined the Moscow-sponsored National Committee for a Free Germany, and was utilized in broadcasts to Germany. His wife, also an ardent Nazi, was thereupon visited by a stranger who told her of having listened to her husband's speeches. She took this as an insult, denounced the man to the police, and refused to ask clemency for him. As a result she was interned first by the Americans and then by the Russians. Meanwhile Bechler decided to marry his secretary, and persuaded the court to declare his wife dead, even though it was well known in which camp she was being detained. She was released unexpectedly during 1948 and returned home to see her children. Bechler managed to have her arrested once more, and this time the death sentence was imposed. To his great annoyance, however, the penalty was commuted to life imprisonment. Evidently some one higher up was playing grim jokes on the Chief Inspector!

167 It is no wonder that under such a system of jurisprudence security and freedom should seem very frail and unpredictable. Countless thousands of refugees have come into the Western Zone through the "open door" of Berlin, and others have

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crossed the frontiers to the south and west, taxing all the re- 167
sources of the reception agencies.

Conditions in the Russian Zone have been relatively so tol- 771
erable, despite all that has been or could be adduced to make 829
evident the callous tyranny which prevails,* that many people, churchmen as well as men of affairs, argue that everything possible must be done to dissuade the Communists from adopting more ruthless policies and thus duplicating the situation which exists in Czechoslovakia. This point of view is not restricted to the "neutralists." It is held that the Church should scrupulously refrain from taking sides in the great debate between East and West, and even avoid being drawn into the discussion of Germany's own future. The exponents of this policy would do everything, even at the constant risk of martyrdom, to preach the Gospel of Christ. Some may dismiss the reasoning as fatuous, but it seems to me that it is tenable, at least for the very few who can live in the spirit of pre-Apocalyptic Christianity even during Apocalyptic times.

Would it be possible for the great majority of both the clergy 000
and the laity to preach and practice the Christian faith without at the same time making concessions to the Communist philosophy? Nowhere else under the Russian tyranny has it been possible to do so. If it is difficult enough in the Western world to live as a Christian without making concessions to the all-pervading secularism, what must happen when the dictator is able to curb the apologist for the Scriptures by suppressing his independence? Nevertheless, if one responds to these questions

* Thus *Osservatore Romano*, March 2, 1950, reported Cardinal Frings, Archbishop of Cologne and Primate of Germany, as saying: The goal of education in the Russian Zone "is atheism. It is taught in the schools that Jesus Christ did not exist. There is no possibility to establish a Catholic press. Catholic newspapers, even ecclesiastical bulletins, are not permitted. . . . There is no Catholic Youth Movement in the Soviet Zone, which is very dangerous. Youth is admitted only to the organization of 'Young Pioneers,' which exercises a baneful influence."

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OOOpessimistically, the practical course to be taken by the Church is far from clear. Were the impression given that the Christian conscience favored the use of force in order to end the terror of Communist rule, the enemy would pillory it for having fomented war with all its unspeakable consequences. On the other hand, supine and hopeless conformity with the decrees of the Kremlin and its henchmen could result only in the gradual desiccation of orthodoxy. Of course it is true that Christianity can always survive in the Catacombs; but as it does so it will cry out in anguish, and sometimes (as we know from history) it will be anguish that those who hearken cannot distinguish from despair.

It is at this point that the great decision as to whether only the remaining free areas of the world can be protected only by effecting a coalition between the NATO Powers and Western Germany can be seen in the right perspective. Would such an alliance automatically seal the fate of Eastern Germany and at the same time render hopeless the situation of West Berlin, so brave and imperiled an island in the sea of Communism? Anyone who has seen with his own eyes the infinitely moving antitotalitarian crowds of that drab but still pulsing city, or who knows how many of them bear on their bodies and their souls not merely the scars of Hitlerism gone mad but also the deep and bitter wounds inflicted by the Cromwellian fanaticism of the East, knows that West Berlin has become the vital symbol of all the values for which men and women have lived and died on the soil of Europe; and the loss of it cannot for an instant be contemplated because the darkness which would ensue after the putting out of that fire would be contagious. It is not easy to refute the reasoning of persons who on such grounds have opposed the entry of Western Germany into a military alliance, for they have on their side all who plead in the East that the little of liberty they still possess be not taken away from

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them. Nevertheless I think that it was incumbent upon us, in 000
view of the extremely ominous threat which lies upon our time —in which mighty and insignificant events alike are pushing us all forward to ultimate dramatic decisions the results of which only Infinite Wisdom can foresee—to make the choice for weal or woe in favor of bastions that can be defended, even as in battle outposts are endangered reluctantly. I say these things with a heavy heart, not knowing whether they be right or wrong, merely hoping that they may be right.

At any rate, the drawing up of an agreement between the 648
NATO Powers and Western Germany and its discussion in the 665
Bonn Parliament aroused fears that Communist policy would 626
be altered. To some extent it was. A "strip of no man's land" was created along the borders of the Zone, and in various ways freedom of movement was curtailed. At the same time efforts were redoubled to make the youth organizations effective instruments of Communist propaganda. Loyalty tests for admission to the institutions of higher learning were administered with increased rigor, and forms of military drill were introduced for both boys and girls. Target practice in particular was ordained. But it appeared that Russia still hoped that a settlement of the crucial German problem that served its own best interests could be reached, and therefore preferred diplomatic and propagandistic maneuvers to drastic suppression. Open conflict over religious matters was therefore avoided, even though the noose around the throat of the Church was tightened.

This period of waiting with bated breath was marked by 795
three assemblies of dramatic interest and importance. The world watched anxiously to see how the Russians would react to them. The first was the Lutheran World Federation meeting in Hanover, the See of Bishop Lilje, no doubt one of the ablest theologians and churchmen of our time. Many thousands of clerics and laymen, young and old, gathered in the heavily

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795 bombed city to discuss the challenge to the Christian conscience presented by the time in which we all live. There was not much allusion to political questions, although Bishop Berggrav of Norway, once a doughty antagonist of Nazism, declared firmly that it was the Church's duty to condemn vigorously the injustices of which governments are guilty. The Soviet Zone authorities had withdrawn their offer to make interzonal passes available in number, but did finally permit eight persons to attend.

Subsequently another great Protestant conference met in Berlin. And finally, during August, the Catholic Day brought together in the same city a crowd estimated at more than 200,000 persons, half of whom came from the East. The government did not hamper the travel of this mighty throng, although an earlier offer to make excursion tickets available was canceled. Here again, political topics were avoided, even if the newly appointed and very able Bishop of Berlin, Monsignor Wilhelm Weiskamm, assured the audience that "God also lives in a land where there are said to be no more crosses"—an allusion to government orders which had removed crucifixes from classrooms. These gatherings were major topics of conversation in all parts of Germany.

659 More controversial was an exchange of views between Bishop
793 Otto Dibelius and the East German government. The Bishop addressed a Pastoral Letter to the faithful after permission to travel in the eastern part of his diocese had been refused to him. This document was an eloquent plea for pastoral unity, far more outspoken than anything he had previously uttered. It urged the clergy to remain in close association with the bishops, and made some acrid comparisons between Nazi and Communist attitudes toward the Church; and it declared any pastor influenced by a political power rather than by the leadership of the Church was a disloyal shepherd of his flock. His

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criticism evoked a response, but one more moderate than had been foreseen. Communist spokesmen declared that there was no conflict between Church and State in the Eastern Zone, and that none was desired. They added that the Bishop had permitted himself to become a mouthpiece for Western Imperialism.

That is the story to 1953. What are the outlines of the perceptible future? I shall try to reflect the spirit of answers to this query that have come from a number of people who are very close to the situation, and to refrain from expressing any opinion of my own. Negatively, many speak with foreboding about youth. Education, which teaches Marxism according to Lenin and Stalin at every available opportunity, and the endless waves of propaganda that inundate in particular members of youth organizations which are transmission belts for Communist doctrine, unquestionably have had a considerable influence. Many of these young people have no personal knowledge of a social order devoted to political and cultural freedom. How could they have any? They went from Nazism to Communism; and for many the difference is scarcely perceptible save in the fact that the influences to which they are now subjected are alien. Nevertheless this foreign character of the Russian control is at the same time for not a few the only bridge that connects them with the outside world. Communism sells its own brand of internationalism. Life that is steeped in dour poverty can acquire a vestige of glamour if one follows the brass bands and the parades. To be sure there are not a few who believe that the impression left on German youth is only skin-deep. They point to the rapidity with which the Nazi veneer could be rubbed off. They think that the Communist variety is even less adhesive. If only, they say, the dominion of this dictatorship does not last too long!

And what of religious faith, hearth from which the fire of

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000 devotion to inner freedom (which alone can insure the perma-
829 nence of outer liberty) is lighted? These are the words of an
771 East German storekeeper, a Lutheran from Thuringia, who came West to attend a conference:

> When one lives where I do, one comes to believe that Europe can be saved only by the power of prayer and the rediscovery of prayer. This I believe because only so can man renew the bonds which link him to the Source of Goodness, moral courage, and holiness. Perhaps the requests for aid which are on the lips of so many who have suffered under tyranny, and suffered so long, will help to regenerate society. One can only hope so. One can only pray that it may be so!

The man cited is neither a simpleton nor what is termed a mystic. You would find him a little chary of speech. He received a good education. He got no thanks from anybody for having refused to shout for Hitler. He expects none from anyone for now remaining loyal to his creed. His is the kind of bravery which would rather not be applauded.

The burden of his remarks is repeated over and over again by persons in every walk of life. There is no doubt, they say, that Europe and indeed the whole world of the West suffers from a deep-seated spiritual malady, perhaps the ultimate spiritual malady: loss of belief that God, even if He be as-
000 sumed to exist, answers the petitions of men. Even as the exploration of the mighty forces of nature proceeds apace, and men grow able to behold with their eyes the rhythmic swimming in space of almost innumerable great stars, to alter verily at will the life processes of animals and plants, and to break apart with instruments the secret embrace which makes the atom the creature of elemental union, there is no feeling among them that the nearing forge of the Creator puts forth any warmth for human beings, or that the spiritual friendship, intimate and personal, which the saints have always contended was possible with God, is either practicable or potentially in-

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teresting, heart-warming for us. Europe has moved out of a time which unfortunately spawned various forms of pseudo-Christian magic, through a sort of competition with paganism, into an era when large multitudes of people can no longer distinguish between wholly illicit and banal echoes of totemism and the sublime, life-illuminating words of Jesus: "Seek, and you shall find." For what was thus said is a mystery, but a verifiable truth as well. Alas (I heard it repeated often), what many of us now call religion has become something like the patina on old pewter bequeathed by our ancestors. Or it has become a syrup, very sweet still but not life-sustaining, which flavors many a man's longing for the past when he is no longer transiently young enough to feel a craving for the future.

On the other hand there are everywhere about us remnants of organized materialistic naïveté, bred like Nazism by the first vulgar shock produced during the nineteenth century by Darwinism—a simplified though cumbersome and therefore curiously imposing dialectic claiming for itself all the discoveries and achievements of natural science, as if these were not the products of meditation and intellectual experience. "When Soviet propaganda tells us," some one remarked, "that nearly every great contribution to the exploration of the laws of nature was made by a Russian we may well think it preposterous; but we must bear in mind that what we are listening to is only a consequence of Communist logic. For, if bourgeois society is responsible for all evil, how can it have produced any sizable amount of that which is good—namely, scientific and technological knowledge?" And it can be asked also, supposing that religion is the implacable foe of all science and so merely a chain of vague imaginings generated by vitalistic anxiety, how shall one account for Pascal, Mendel, and Pasteur? These questions suggest their own answers. But when Communism uncompromisingly proclaims that all truth is scientific and all

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000 science materialistic it lames the will of the working masses, who have no deep personal reason for not agreeing, and are in addition the heritors of Marxism. In Germany, as elsewhere, some naturalists are among the most vigorous opponents of Communism; but it may be feared that their deepest reason is ineradicably professorial—bound up with their own strong desire constantly to be heard—and can appeal very little to the great majority of men who do not covet the privilege of oratory or the lesser delights of literary composition, but who wonder how much they can crowd into a week end, including young men whose thoughts are on girls, bicycles, automobile races, and fresh air.

793 661 At any rate, during the final months of Stalin's lifetime the pressure mounted. After all propaganda and counterpropaganda had been discounted, two facts remained: religious leadership became more and more difficult to provide; and readiness to follow such leadership increased notably. Catholic authorities estimate that death, imprisonment, and exile have reduced the number of priests, secular or monastic, stationed in the European territories now occupied by Russia at least one-half from the thirty thousand who were there before the war. Apostasy, too, has taken its toll. Even if in most satellite countries Bishops can be found who will ordain young men trained in seminaries which are virtually institutions for the inculcation of Communism, the Orders they receive will be mere mockeries of Catholic dedication to the sacred ministry. Accordingly it is not hard to predict the date on which there will be no more priests in Eastern Europe. Granted that tyranny should through some unforeseeable development cease at that time, whence would the Church derive its clerical leadership? West German Catholics have been trying to find the answer to this question. Young men, culled from refugee and escapee groups, are being trained for the mission.

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Meanwhile the major spokesman for the Protestant cause, 883
Bishop Dibelius, was being equally realistic and resourceful. 661
This imperturbable prelate, for all the world like a theological 771
counterpart of General von Seeckt, went on predicting that faith in God would not merely enable its protagonists to endure but guarantee their triumph. Therewith was ushered in evidence that the followers are ready. As part of a general attack on all remnants of the bourgeois order, the Communists loosed an assault on the Junge Gemeinde, the organization of Lutheran youth which was not so much an organization as a sort of outcropping, everywhere spontaneous, of boys and girls who wanted religious tradition rather than the Leninist utopia. It held no meetings, staged no rallies. The members gathered for the study of religion. Now suddenly it was called a "terroristic group" dedicated to the advocacy of the political goals of the West. Every device known to totalitarianism was applied to break the fidelity of these young people to their religious faith. Often in the gymnasia, which are equivalent to advanced high schools, pupils were assembled and asked to sign a pledge that they would resign from the Junge Gemeinde. Failure to comply meant immediate expulsion from school; and yet hundreds of young people did not hesitate. It has been reported that during weeks the headmistress of a school in the Russian Zone said at a general assembly of her charges: "Present today are x many pupils and one saboteur." This horrendous individual was a girl of fifteen who refused to resign from the Junge Gemeinde. At least equally harassed was the organization of Christian university students.

As a matter of course the heavy hand of suppression fell on 793
the clergy who were closely identified with the activities of the 667
Junge Gemeinde. More than fifty Protestant ministers and their co-workers were arrested and imprisoned during the first five months of 1953. Heavy sentences, comparable to those handed

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down in the satellite countries proper, were meted out. The Reverend Werner Gestrich of Heinersdorf was condemned to twelve years in prison for hostile remarks about the State. The Reverend Karl A. Brandt of Lohmen received six years on a similar charge. A court ruled that Pastor Albin Drechsler of Chemnitz was a "Fascist provocateur" and sentenced him to ten years in prison. In all these instances the real crime was identification with the Junge Gemeinde.

Equally ruthless was the action taken against religious institutions. Dramatic in a terrifying way was the closing of the old Lutheran school at Schloss Mansfeld in Saxony. Pupils were sent home, the headmaster was clapped into jail. The leader of Protestant youth in the province went to remonstrate. He has disappeared without a trace. A home for boys in Neinstedt, where some four hundred persons were lodged, was charged with the heinous crime of ignoring Soviet educational methods. Everywhere the story was the same. Meanwhile the tramp of countless thousands westward to liberty continued, despite all hardships and sacrifices. Refugees assembled in West Berlin in such numbers that international relief action became unavoidable. Every day and night peasant and intellectual, civil servant and even politician, sought refuge. It certainly looked as if the Russians had decided to carry out the Sovietization of Eastern Germany as uncompromisingly as they had destroyed their opponents in the satellite States. The Church remained steadfast. Bishop Dibelius, preaching in East Berlin, declared: "We shall not answer with counterpropaganda. We shall simply stick to the truth. The truth may be buried for some time, but in the end it always wins."

A word about the fate of Catholics is now in order. Priests have been imprisoned, and institutions have been closed. Father Friedrich Hildebrandt, pastor of a parish near Magdeburg, received a prison sentence of more than four years.

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Father Franz Busch of Kelten was doomed to five years of confinement. The Bishop of Berlin engaged in debate with East German authorities concerning the fate of religious institutions. Though relatively few, Catholics were resolute. Bishop Wilhelm Weiskamm proved himself a worthy confrère of the unwavering prelate who guided the Lutheran Church. 798

Then on June 10, 1953, in a startling moment of deviation from previous commitments, the East German government announced that the attack on the Churches had been abrogated. This declaration was part of a general statement to the effect that "a series of mistakes" had been made by those in authority. In the interest of "German unity" concessions were offered to private industry and the peasantry. Keenest of the severance swords employed was undoubtedly that which now professedly distanced the rulers of East Germany from any desire to hamper the teaching and the exercise of religion. The reasons why it was resorted to are of course impossible to fathom. We can only guess that the barometer of public opinion had fallen so sharply that for the moment at least the Kremlin was in no need of martyrs.

Almost immediately thereafter came the uprising of workers in East Berlin and other parts of East Germany: a heartrending and yet stirring manifestation of popular sentiment. It was almost entirely spontaneous. On the lips of poor people coming out of hovels and cellars there was an awesome request for the rights of man, for liberty, for human dignity. Driven these masses may have been by hunger, despair, and a detestation of perfidy and injustice. For the first time since the war, a people behind the Iron Curtain held out its hands to the people of the United States; for the first time there was uttered a new demand for the great declaration. We can never forget that men and women died with words about these things spilling from their hearts. 668

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ooo There was little the people of America could do in response. Perhaps through their official representatives they did too little. It was feared that, in the nebulous period after the death of Stalin, any overt expression of support and sympathy might usher in forces bent on Armageddon. Was not the West still too weak to court any such danger? At all events, we showed no mighty resolution in those days. The uprising died as so much that is comparable has died under tyranny. But in the West Konrad Adenauer mustered an overwhelming vote for liberty.

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3 THE FATE OF CZECHOSLOVAKIA

WHILE CZECHOSLOVAKIA WAS SUBJECTED to Communism more recently than some other countries we shall consider, it is in several respects the most dramatic and (in a sinister sense) instructive example. A great deal of what happened there could also be observed, day in and day out, by representatives of foreign governments, so that we have at least some reliable information on nearly every aspect of the transformation of what was once no doubt the most democratic of East European states into an exploited Russian colony. Noteworthy also is the high level of culture which once flourished here, not merely as a legacy from the past but as a continuous creative movement in literature, the arts, and productive scholarship. The Charles University was one of the great European seats of higher learning; and the level of popular education was high.

In all probability historians will some day be impressed—if perchance they are still allowed to arrive at independent conclusions—by certain lessons of great importance which are implicit in the tragedy of the Czechoslovak state:

First, as Ivo Duchacek has observed, the aftereffects of a

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First, as Ivo Duchacek has observed, the aftereffects of a
648 diplomatic disaster are long-lived. The Republic was established, under Czech leadership, primarily because of the adroit and persistent appeal by Thomas G. Masaryk to the sentiment of the Allied Powers during World War I. Mr. Wilson and M. Clemenceau in particular manifested a maximum of good will, by incorporating into the new state territories which had traditionally belonged to Poland, Hungary, and Germany. And so when, at the climax of Hitler's gamble for world power, the successors to these statesmen concluded not only that the claim of the German-speaking minority to secession should be recognized, but also that a "war over Czechoslovakia" was not worth while, the diplomatic edifice so elaborately constructed by Masaryk and Beneš began to totter. From this collapse, as we shall see, was derived the later temptation to preserve freedom in the future by relying on Russia rather than on the Western Powers.

186 Second, it has been clearly shown that President Wilson's
563 plan to reorganize Central Europe according to the principle that the old Austro-Hungarian imperial organization was evil because it ignored the peoples' right to self-determination was itself subject to revision; for the extent to which further efforts to effect tribal independence could be fanned into being was unlimited unless one placed in the foreground of discussion regional traditions of cooperation and the economic and political realities of the Danube Basin as a whole. By 1938 Czechoslovakia had become an ironical caricature of the old Empire. Some 3,000,000 Sudeten Germans, living in the western areas, had waged a ceaseless struggle for autonomy. In Slovakia and Ruthenia, the territories annexed from Hungary, the sense of group solidarity also grew stronger year by year. Most Slovaks in particular insisted on what they termed equal rights, and on complete cultural independence. After the establishment of Nazi rule in Germany, and in particular after Hitler seized

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Austria during March of 1938, a strong Sudeten German political party began to demand incorporation of the German-speaking area into the Third Reich. An international commission headed by Lord Runciman supported the demand. Then Slovak separatism intensified, and the Czechs were isolated. 186 563

Third, the lack of cultural cohesion which characterized Czechoslovak democracy became increasingly manifest. The liberalism of Masaryk and his associates had derived a measure of strength from the hostility to the Catholic Church of some Czech nationalists and idealists, who held that it had been favored during centuries of subservience to the Habsburgs. Their view was not unsupported by evidence. There were many reasons why the Church and the Empire were intertwined, for good and evil, and they cannot be discussed here. It will suffice to note that the Czechs, who numbered John Huss among their national heroes and had in part espoused the Protestant cause during the era of the Reformation, made an attempt to establish a dissident National Catholic Church at the close of World War I. While the attempt mustered some strength from the clergy and the laity alike, the great majority of the people supported union with the Holy See, at least nominally. We may conclude that the Church was far weaker than the statistics indicated, and that strong secularistic tendencies made Czechoslovakia seem upon occasion to be a center of organized agnosticism and a breeding ground for various sorts of neo-Communist fellow travelers. The fact that this was far less true in Slovakia, where the people were neither sophisticated nor "emancipated," was another source of tension. 795 771

The situation which existed in 1945, when Nazism was battered into submission, mirrored all the facts and trends which have been indicated. The Czechoslovak government-in-exile, seated in London under the presidency of Dr. Beneš, was preparing for the peace which would follow the defeat of Hitler. 642

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642 I participated in discussion with this government, and can say that at least until the close of 1941 it was primarily concerned, apart from the restoration of its own sovereignty, with how a federation of liberated East European states could be formed. [563] In so far as the Sudeten German problem entered into the discussion, the official view was: "In some cases local transfers of population may be desirable, but such transfers should never mean expelling total populations from their ancestral homeland. Czechoslovakia seeks a truly humane solution of the Sudeten problem, a solution which can be acceptable to the majority of the Sudeten Germans." But as the war progressed President Beneš evidently came to feel that only the expulsion of the Sudeten population and an alliance with Russia could 648 insure the solidarity and independence of his country. When it seemed likely that the Soviet armies would march into Prague, a secret treaty was signed which gave expression to his skepticism concerning the West and his fear of a possible German recovery. Indeed, on his own responsibility he indicated to the Kremlin that Ruthenia could be ceded to Russia with the approval of his government. No acknowledgment of this offer is known to have been received; but as a matter of fact the Russians proceeded unilaterally with the annexation during 1944, despite vigorous Czech protests. When all this then became known, and a Russian army of occupation began to terrorize the country almost more than Nazi rule had oppressed it, the average citizen decided to resign himself to possum playing.

648 Meanwhile American army units under the command of 167 General George Patton had occupied southwestern Czechoslovakia and could without difficulty have taken Prague. But the ratification of the Potsdam Agreement, and ill-fated haste to bring the troops home, caused the withdrawal of the United States Army from the strategic key to Central Europe after it had witnessed the expulsion of vast numbers of Sudeten Ger-

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mans. In all some 2,500,000 men, women, and children were 648
driven from their homes; and many of them were compelled 167
to walk without food, drink, or shelter over countless miles of hot and dusty roads to the Austrian and German frontiers, where no provision had been made to receive them. The shocking and brutal spectacle aroused the pity and indignation of many Czechs; but when it was followed by the withdrawal of American troops under what could only be interpreted to be Russian pressure it was bound to mean to them that the West had once more decided that Czechoslovakia lay outside the sphere of its vital interest. Approval of such a policy by the government of the United States, in violation of every canon of historical reflection, of political acumen and simple humanitarianism, was unquestionably due to ignorance in the men to whom the destiny of our country, and indeed of the world, was entrusted.*

In any event, the reorganization of political life in Czecho- 642
slovakia was inaugurated. Answering a desire entertained by 668
many pro-democrats, the government decided that local autonomy should be fostered, and so a series of new units of local government, called "National Committees," were established. But no sooner did these "committees" emerge from their chrysalises, than it became apparent that Communists who had been in the resistance movement or had been trained in Russian indoctrination centers stood ready to take them over. These Communists were knitted into a solid organization subject to orders from Moscow, whereas the opposition was pathetically

* It is fair to say that the judgments expressed here are not *ex post facto*. Prior to the close of the war, I made as many speeches as I could stressing the imperative necessity of maintaining the freedom of Czechoslovakia; and after victory I pointed out how in this respect particularly the Yalta and Potsdam agreements imperiled the security of Europe and of the United States. The sole consequence was to attract to myself all the barbs which all the sellers-out of American sagacity and honor, from Gerhard Eisler to the littlest Communist on Park Avenue, were able to fling.

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642 inchoate. Naturally the Communists accentuated cleavages and
648 took advantage of every democratic inability to arrive at a decision.

727 After the era of Nazi occupation, the question of "war
668 crimes" and "collaborationism" was very much in the fore-
687 ground. Czech Communists were able, as their counterparts in
698 France were not, to stage a reign of terror under which anybody who had not actually been in a concentration camp was hard pressed to demonstrate his innocence. Some of the trials —for example, that which resulted in the imposition of a death sentence on Monsignor Josef Tiso, head of the government of Slovakia while it was a republic under Nazi domination—were spectacular, but most were drab little partisan courts-martial manifesting not a trace of impartiality.

698 Because of the great role such trials played in the drama of
687 Czechoslovak subjugation, a word must be said here about war-crimes trials in general. Necessarily criminals of such barbaric magnitude as the Nazi leaders were had to be brought to book. But the association of the free world with Russia in the trials conducted at Nuremberg and elsewhere unwittingly but none the less really placed a stamp of approval on an integral part of the Communist judicial system.

For while, in courts established in accordance with the traditions of the West, it has always been essential that the allegedly guilty shall be tried only by impartial judges on the basis of previously established laws, the Russian tribunal—like the Nazi tribunal—is by its very nature a board of inquiry bound by the objective to be reached, and not by law either written or unwritten.

Under a totalitarian system like that established by the Nazis, actions involving a measure of conformity are inevitable. Only the very heroic and, perhaps, the very intellectual will become martyrs. And so the war-crimes procedure could

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be used and was widely used to bring to the dock a variety of 698
"reactionaries" and "collaborators" objectionable for one 687
reason or another to Communists and their friends. Nowhere, probably, was it employed more effectively and arbitrarily than in Czechoslovakia. That the war-crimes trial is an integral part of the Russian juridical system is demonstrated anew each day, and finds its present affirmation in the widely propagandized statement that in the event of a new war Western leaders and military men will be tried in Moscow for "their crimes against peace."

All this does not mean that the heinous offenses committed by a number of Nazi leaders should have gone unpunished. It was possible to mete out justice either through quick and effective courts-martial or through the establishment of neutral courts. Nor can we in any manner infer that those who were servants of the legal procedures followed at Nuremberg and elsewhere wished in the slightest way to aid the Communist cause. Most of them were men of probity and righteous indignation. But it must always be remembered that the line of demarcation between the Free World and the Enslaved World is not miles wide but as keen and narrow as a razor's edge. When we said that it was meet and just for the victor to sit in judgment over the vanquished *in accordance with the long tradition of the West,* and when we agreed to sit side by side with the Russian victor despite the multitudinous crimes he had committed and concerning which we had full knowledge, we assented without being aware of what we were doing to a cardinal principle of Soviet justice. It is true that we mean by justice something entirely different from what Moscow means. We should have made that clear.

At any rate, matters went from bad to worse. A hastily re- 665
cruited militia was soon dominated by Communists, who enlisted hundreds of young men in quest of careers of lawlessness

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and banditry. Moreover, after the nationalization of industry the Central Labor Union, dominated by Communists, became the strongest single body in the country. Nevertheless in the elections of 1946 the Communists mustered only 38 per cent of the vote. This was to be sure a great victory, in the light of the traditions and the real sentiment of the nation—achieved through pressure on the individual citizen by the Ministry of the Interior, which controlled the police power, and the Ministry of Agriculture, to which was entrusted a "land reform" consisting primarily in the transfer of properties once owned by Sudeten Germans to worthy souls who professed to gaze upon the hammer and sickle with ecstasy, and in the distribution to equally unexceptionable mortals of tractors, other machines, and fertilizers. In the circumstances, granted so large a multitude of timeservers and profiteers, it is almost a miracle that the pro-democratic forces reacted with any spirit and success. Duchacek says that the eclipse of the old Social Democratic Party by its traditional Leftist rival made the surviving remnants of this party the principal political target, with the result that when a move to the Right was discernible in these groups the Communists had to fear the defection of large numbers of workers and so to abandon every pretense of fidelity to democratic principles; and his opinion is reiterated by others.

Slovak writers interpret the course of events in their area somewhat differently, on the whole. The established Catholic Party in Slovakia, vigorously led by Monsignor Hlinka, who died in 1938, less than a year after Masaryk, was committed to an autonomist policy likely to please an observer who is influenced by Slovak opinion and to displease one who is not. It will suffice to say that the establishment of a Slovak Republic by Hitler, and the at least alleged collaboration of Monsignor Tiso, Hlinka's successor, caused this Party to be considered as

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Fascist when the war ended. Therefore its followers rallied to 665
the support of the newly established Democratic Party, only to find that the Protestant population of the region, a strong minority, did not join forces with them. Even so the manifest survival of a large and disciplined voting public in Slovakia seriously interfered with the Communist timetable, although confessional differences helped to create a paralyzing disunity in the pro-Democratic camp.

The Communist decision to stage the *coup d'état* of Febru- 669
ary, 1948, was carefully planned during the late summer of 1947. Orders had previously come from Moscow that Czechoslovakia was to withdraw from the list of countries to which assistance under the Marshall Plan would be given; and they implied that, regardless of how the majority of the Czechoslovak people might feel, there was no way out of bowing to the threat of the Red Army. On February 20, President Beneš took official cognizance of a crisis in the government. Almost immediately thereafter, the Central Labor Union was mobilized, and a general strike for the period of one hour was ordered. Then bands of workers' militia, armed with weapons seized from the depots of the nationalized armament industry, took over the streets of Prague. They were opposed only by some few thousands of university students who staged a counterdemonstration. These were set upon and suffered severe casualties. A few hours later, the Communist Minister of the Interior dispatched to the capital city several regiments of well organized and thoroughly indoctrinated police. On February 25, President Beneš, old, ill, and utterly bewildered, assented to the formation of a new government formed and controlled by the Communists. "It has not been an easy decision for me to make," he wrote to their leader Gottwald. "It has, indeed, been very difficult for me to make. I have given long and earnest thought to the crisis, and have come to the con-

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669 clusion that your proposal ought to be accepted." That was the end of freedom in Czechoslovakia.

It is vain to inquire what would have happened if Beneš had decided to resist the demands of the Communists. Well informed observers who were in Prague at the time answer in conflicting ways the question whether an appeal to the army, then not yet completely infiltrated, would have been obeyed. The weight of the evidence seems to favor the view that the President could have evoked at best a token resistance. In short, the pattern of the coup followed almost to the letter that of the Anschluss of Austria in 1938, with a difference of dramatic effect. Then the battalions were all on the side of Hitler; now they all marched according to the bidding of Stalin. But in Austria the last pre-Hitler Chancellor, Dr. Kurt von Schuschnigg, acting on a heroic though wholly quixotic resolve, ordered a free election and therewith compelled the Nazi dictator to march in.

669 The coup meant that the leaders of the Christian Churches,
648 now the sole potential spokesmen for decency and freedom,
795 had to confront alone the menace to their integrity, their mission, and their existence. We shall review their history summarily on the basis of such a prodigal wealth of data that only a small part of it can be adduced here. The confusion which followed the First World War and which involved efforts to establish a Czech national church has already been described. Relative calm followed that storm. A *modus vivendi,* dated February 2, 1928, led to the stabilization of relations between the Vatican and the Czechoslovak State; there was an exchange of diplomatic representatives, and Catholics not only participated in the life of the country but sponsored a vigorous pro-
795 gram of religious and social action. Although the trend toward
648 secularism and away from religious commitment was more
162 pronounced, the Catholic population in the country as a whole

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was large: 76.85 per cent in 1930. Protestant minorities were 795
specially important in Slovakia; and though the Jews consti- 648
tuted only about 2 per cent of the population they enjoyed every 162
right and privilege.

When the Nazis occupied the country after Hitler's flagrant 798
breach of his promises to Chamberlain, the clergymen of all 793
denominations were (if one excepts Slovakia) among the foremost sufferers from a persecution which was primarily an attack on the intellectual leadership of the Czech people. Hundreds were arrested, held in prison, sent to concentration camps, and many died in captivity. When the United States Army liberated Dachau in 1945, only a remnant of the Czech priests interned there remained alive. These survivors were enthusiastically welcomed upon their return to Czechoslovakia, and it seemed for a time as if these words of cheer indicated that Moscow would welcome the cooperation of the Church. But few were under any illusion that this glistering was truly gold.

The government-in-exile returned from London via Moscow 642
early in 1945 and convened in Košice, a Slovakian town. It 185
then took office in accordance with a Program of Action proclaimed on April 5, 1945. The program began with a declaration that punishment would be meted out to all who had collaborated with the Nazis. It went on to decree the nationalization of the "monetary and credit system," of key industries, and of "natural and power resources." Czechoslovakia therewith became a socialist state.

From London the government had approached the Vatican 648
with a view to resuming diplomatic relations once the war was 793
over. However, when the time came for a Papal Nuncio to be appointed, the Communist members of the Cabinet objected on the ground that the Russians would protest if the representative of the Vatican were dean of the diplomatic corps. Rome

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648 solved the problem by sending an "internuncio," with the rank
793 of minister. Various important bishoprics had become vacant during the war. Very able new prelates were named to these sees. Archbishop Josef Beran brought prestige to the See of Prague as a courageous priest who had survived the ordeal of Dachau. One of the foremost theologians of Czechoslovakia, he had been rector of the major seminary and professor in the Charles University. The new Bishop of Brno, Dr. Karel Skoupý, also had been a professor of theology. Unquestionably one of the ablest, most farsighted priests in the province of Moravia, he enjoyed a wide following among both the clergy and the people. A third bishop, Joseph Hlouch, had taught in the University of Olomouc and was a pulpit orator of renown.

The attitude of the Church toward the trend of events was at first one of anxious waiting. Conflicts arose, it is true, over ecclesiastical properties and the conduct of schools. Yet these were minor, compared with the plight of the Greek Catholic or Uniate, Church, in union with Rome but observant of the rites of the East. After the annexation of the Ruthenian district of Czechoslovakia, unceasing pressure was applied to the Greek Catholic Church with a view to subjecting it to Russian Orthodoxy. A tense and unequal struggle followed; priests were imprisoned or exiled, and churches were closed. Greek Catholics, however, had a doughty and imperturbable leader in the aged Bishop Paul Gojdič, who was of the stuff out of which martyrs are hewn. His resistance was ended only by his imprisonment during 1951. The Greek Catholics, though few, proved to be extraordinarily stanch in the defense of their traditions and beliefs.

659 In Slovakia tension between the pro-Communist government
795 and the Catholics (as distinguished from Protestants, for the time being) was strong almost from the beginning. The National Council, in whose hands authority over the region had

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been placed, issued a decree on May 16, 1946, transferring 659 from the jurisdiction of the Church to the State nearly 1,900 795 schools—70 per cent of the Church total. Additional regulations curbed the activities of religious organizations and the religious press. Meanwhile the war-crimes trials took their grim toll in a land deemed to have cooperated with National Socialism. The Slovakian Hierarchy, led by Archbishop Karol Kmetko, appealed to the President of the Republic in a memorandum dated January 10, 1946, that set forth the major aspects of the situation. The Bishops stated that nearly three-fourths of the Slovak people were stanchly Catholic, and protested against the arbitrary steps taken by a tiny minority of pro-Communists against the clearly expressed will of the people. They pleaded for the restoration of the schools to their Catholic owners, and urged that the crucifix be suffered to remain in schools wherever the parents and the children so requested. They asked further that the confiscated property of the Catholic Youth Organization be restored, and that expropriated charitable institutions, many of them erected with the help of benefactions from Catholics in the United States, be given back to their rightful owners.

When none of the desired results was obtained, efforts were [661] made to rally popular support for the Slovak Democratic Party. The government countered by denouncing what it termed "a huge Fascist plot" and arresting on October 16, 1947, more than 200 persons, among them many of the most prominent Catholic intellectuals in Slovakia. A month later the Minister of the Interior published a commentary on the "plot," entitled "Conspiracy Against the Government." Some days after this the whole Catholic Episcopate of Czechoslovakia met for the first time after the war. It decided to send a delegation to see the President. To this Dr. Beneš reiterated his desire to preserve religious freedom and amity, and observed that the prac-

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tice of religion was clearly growing more fervent and widespread. But he was powerless to alter the situation, which was of course soon affected radically by the coup of 1948.

Immediately after the seizure of power, the Central Action Committee of the National Front—the central organ of the Communist Party—sent Dr. Čepička, then Minister of Justice, to the Archbishop of Prague in order to assure him that Catholics had nothing to fear from the new regime. In acknowledgment of this visit the Bishops once more addressed the government, professing indifference to the form of the State or to its political tinge but insisting anew on what they held to be the rights of the Church. The reply came in a letter inviting every priest in the country to join the Communist Party, and containing a compliment for Archbishop Beran. He responded in a lengthy epistle to the Minister of the Interior, two paragraphs of which are quoted here in order to indicate the state of affairs during the tense days of April:

> It has been stated that the Catholic Church has not clearly defined its attitude toward the program of the government now in power. But, Mr. Minister, the letter which was directed to you bearing the date of March 4th of this year, as a result of the conference of all Catholic ordinaries at Brno, made the attitude of the Catholic Church quite clear. I can assure you that none of us who are Catholic bishops and priests will betray his State and Nation. None of us, however, can endorse a political program which at many points is adverse to the rights of God and the precepts of the Canon Law. These divergencies cannot be approved either by the Catholic Church or by any Church which believes in the God we worship.
>
> We shall never betray the State or the Nation. But on the other hand we shall also not be traitorous to God and the Church. The new Education Bill violates the natural right of parents to decide freely what kind of education their children are to receive. It prescribes an education subservient to one ideology. Thereby it nullifies the right of the Church to provide religious education for the faithful, in the spirit

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659 795 871 of a supernatural religion. Religious training dominated by an ideology which denies the existence of God and the fact of human survival after death is not a religious education in any sense. The proposed two hours of religious instruction are therefore only a mask behind which the annihilation of all religious freedom in education is to be carried out.

642 The new Czechoslovak Constitution was presented to the National Assembly which convened in Hradčany Castle, shrine of the nation's traditions, on May 9, 1948. It conforms closely with the pattern of Communist basic law already discussed in the chapter on Eastern Germany. Defining the freedom conferred on the individual citizen, it ordains that education is the exclusive prerogative of the State, that liberty of conscience is guaranteed, that while freedom to practice a religion is assured it is not "advisable to misuse this right for non-religious purposes," that the press is free although further legislation will determine who is "authorized to edit and print newspapers and periodicals," and that the "right to hold meetings and establish associations is guaranteed in so far as these are not a menace to the people's democratic institutions and to the public order." It would be impossible to devise a Constitution which more effectively gives and takes at the same time.

643 The President of the Republic, before he died, sent to some of his friends abroad a parting message which shows clearly what was happening behind this façade of words:

> The Ministers are accusing me of failure, and I am accusing them of failing to help me at the critical moment. Without their intervention, which was promised to me, I was helpless. When Gottwald gathered hordes of bloodthirsty militia in the old Town Square, I expected that other crowds would gather in Wenceslaus Square. I could not have imagined that readiness and organization were lacking to such an extent when action was imperative. I believed that the demonstration of unarmed students would prove a summons to a general

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643 uprising. But when nobody made a move, I could not permit Gottwald's belligerent mob to inflict wholesale massacre on the defenseless people of Prague. There were no limits to the threats they uttered.

642 793 659 666 There was no one to sound the alarm, and few were ready to respond. Czechoslovakia was prepared to lay its head on the block. The general election on the 30th of May presented a single list of candidates and resulted in an overwhelming Communist victory. Nearly nine-tenths of a cowed population voted as they were told to vote, thus reiterating the standard procedure under totalitarian regimes. In so far as religion was concerned, the shadow of things to come could be discerned some days earlier when, in violation of an order given to all the clergy by the whole Hierarchy, three priests were listed among the candidates recommended for election. The most impressive and ever since the most notorious of these disobedient clerics was the Reverend Josef Plojhar, who was immediately suspended from his priestly office by Archbishop Beran. The government protested to the Vatican about this disciplinary action. "The Constitution guarantees not only the right to vote, but also the right to be elected to public office," said the newly elected Prime Minister, Antonín Zápotocký. "No one, not even a Church, is entitled to render impossible what has been assured by the Constitution. Therefore we are determined to defend the right to vote and the right to be elected against all efforts to undermine these rights or to make their exercise impossible." Thus there was begun the process of dividing the clergy from the bishops, and as a consequence subordinating the Church to the State.

659 425 Soon after the adoption of the Constitution, steps were taken to secularize Church property, the effective agency being the Ministry of Agriculture. All the estates belonging to the Archbishopric of Prague were sequestrated, and expropriations of properties owned by monastic orders followed. Thus there

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came into the foreground of the struggle a highly controversial issue. The Church in Czechoslovakia, resembling in this respect its sister Churches in States carved out of the old Austro-Hungarian Empire, owned considerable property. Its holdings amounted to somewhat more than 400,000 acres, and in addition there were many utility buildings. It has frequently been contended, by Catholic students of the question as well as by others, that the Church should of its own initiative have dispossessed itself of landed properties. It must, however, be borne in mind that by far the largest number of such properties were to be found in Slovakia, where the income was reasonably well expended for religious and caritative purposes, and where there was relatively little demand for a change.

Confiscation continued, so that by the close of the year 1950 the Church was almost denuded of its financial resources. Despite a measure of vandalism, which now and then recalled the mood of the French Revolution, the actual expropriation was carried out with the implacable, and indeed inexplicable, calm which seems to characterize Communist rule. Consider, for example, the fate of the Home for the Crippled in Prague, which was from time immemorial supported with the profits accruing from the sale of rosary beads. The structure was taken over by the government, which offered instead a dilapidated house on the western border of the Republic. This the religious were invited to repair at their own expense. In all such matters, chivalry and benevolence are outmoded. The very Communist government which has so far not permitted the expatriation to Germany of able-bodied nursing sisters of Sudeten German origin has nevertheless taken from the communities to which they belong everything they possess. But the loss of Church property could be relegated to the periphery of religious interest, were the question merely one of the loss

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659 of material possessions. Indeed, it may well be that some of the
425 clergy of Central Europe needed a lesson in the nature and meaning of poverty. But whether an established faith can carry out its mission if all the physical and financial instrumentalities upon which it must rely are owned by a hostile state is another question; and precisely this was being raised in all its stark simplicity in Czechoslovakia.

659 The dawn of the year 1949 found the Communists in com-
793 plete possession of all the powers of the State. A network of
664 "Action Committees" had been formed throughout the country. Every organ of propaganda was in the hands of the government, and the only channel through which protests could be made was the reading from the pulpits of the Pastoral Letters of the Hierarchy. It is against this background that the financial dependence of the clergy on the government must be considered. During October, 1948, decrees had been issued "to provide for the economic security of the Churches and Religious Associations." They established a salary scale according to which the clergy were to be paid—an arrangement wholly without precedent in Czechoslovakia, where previously clerical salaries had been supplemented with subsidies from state funds. Now the confiscation of property made the ecclesiastical organization totally dependent upon the government, and subject to conditions which one need only to cite in order to perceive their ominousness. One condition was that only such persons might function as ministers of religion as had obtained the consent of the government in advance; another was that such persons might be appointed to posts only after the government had approved both the person and the post. To enforce these conditions, a rather elaborate bureaucratic apparatus was created.

659 During January, 1949, representatives of Church and State
203 conferred, with a view to resolving the most vital differences.

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By the beginning of March it was apparent that the negotiations had been fruitless, and Archbishop Beran said as much in an interview. The Bishops met again, only to discover that a secret listening device had been installed in the conference room; and the courageous Archbishop made the fact public. By this time, however, it had become exceedingly difficult for even so widely known and respected a prelate to obtain a public hearing for what he had to say. Meanwhile the government, through the Ministry of Culture, announced that it would commence publishing a Bulletin to furnish priests and religious with information of interest to them. The Archbishop protested anew. He observed that while the official publications of the Church had been suspended by reason of a "dearth of paper," there appeared to be an ample supply for the Bulletin.

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This publication, when it appeared, manifestly had for its purpose widening the breach between the Bishops and the lower clergy which had been opened by the defection of the Reverend Josef Plojhar. It professed to be the organ of a "Catholic Action Movement" sponsored by the State and organized without the sanction of the Hierarchy. It should be borne in mind that while Papal Encyclicals leave Catholics entirely free to join and work for political parties of their choosing, provided these are not professionally antichristian, Catholic Action is by definition an organization of laymen interested in the defense of Catholic doctrine and the development of Catholic religious activity *under the direction of the Bishops*. Therefore the government's Catholic Action Movement could only be organized secession from the Church's authority. Following the receipt of directives from Moscow, the first meeting of the Catholic Action Movement was held in Prague on June 17. It was addressed by Father Plojhar and others. The results of the conference were announced with a great flurry of newspaper articles and radio commentaries. Yet

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659 hardly more than a dozen of the 6,600 priests who lived in
668 Czechoslovakia at the time attended; and not all these were aware of what the objective really was. What difference did this make? On June 20, the head of the legitimate Catholic Action, the Reverend Antonín Mandl, was arrested and jailed.
[687] Meanwhile the police had occupied the Archbishop's palace. He countered valiantly by preaching in the Abbey of Strahov a sermon which was reported in part throughout the free world. "No doubt," he said, "you will soon hear all sorts of things about me over the radio. You may hear that I have confessed . . . And if some day you learn that an agreement has been concluded between Church and State, you will know that I would never underwrite an agreement which curtailed the rights of the Church and of the Bishops." Shortly after the sermon was reported, the Abbot of the monastery in which it was preached was arrested.

The most important endeavor of the Catholic Action Movement was to collect signatures endorsing the resolutions passed at the Prague convention. The most significant of them contained a veiled allusion to the Vatican as an "outside power" which sought to interfere in the affairs of the Czechoslovak people, and absolved the government from all responsibility for the tension which now marked Church-State relations. An exiled priest who was an eyewitness described the signature collection as follows:

> All the automobiles at the disposition of the Communist secretariats, the labor councils and the factories were made available to the "Church." A whole army of officials drove through the country, speeding to one rectory after another, announcing that they were good Catholics who had only the interests of religion at heart. The petition was presented to the clergy as a quite innocent expression of a desire to bring about harmonious cooperation between the Church and the government. Some older priests, poorly informed and perhaps intimi-

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dated by the thought of being sent to a concentration camp if they re- 658
fused to sign, succumbed to the lure. The laity also were importuned, 668
but the great majority of them did not waver.

Meanwhile Father Plojhar was described in the government 659
press as a veteran of Dachau who had discovered the pro- 793
Fascist sentiments of the Vatican when he reluctantly had to admit that nothing whatever was done by Rome to aid the unfortunate victims of Hitler. The disciplinary action taken against him by Archbishop Beran was therefore an indication that Rome had not abjured its diabolical tactics. The Archbishop replied in a letter which, though it was not given to the press, is of great interest because it sets forth the career of an unfortunate priest.

[Father] Plojhar was suspended solely because he had refused to obey the authority of the Church. As a priest he must have known the law of the Church, and he had taken an oath of loyalty to his bishop. When he was warned in advance of the danger of suspension, he merely replied that he would not withdraw his candidacy and that he merely took note of his suspension.

To the criticism that the Vatican did nothing to ease his lot while he was in a concentration camp, I can only state that Plojhar was ordained in České Budějovice as a priest of German nationality, and that when he arrived in Dachau he was assigned to Block 26, a barracks for German priests.

The Vatican did everything it could for all the incarcerated priests and sent them all needed supplies. Himmler, however, permitted only German priests to receive these parcels. The priests in Block 26 also enjoyed this privilege, although the rest of the camp protested this unjust treatment. Plojhar entered this block in 1942, when these privileges were being granted. Those who were in Dachau can testify to these facts.

On June 14, 1949, the Archbishop was back in Prague to officiate in the Cathedral of St. Vitus on the occasion of the

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Feast of Corpus Christi. To understand the significance of the occasion, one must remember that this Feast and the processions which accompany it are among the most hallowed religious observances in many parts of Europe. The Archbishop, seeing the vast crowd, preached a sermon denouncing the Catholic Action Movement and all its works and pomps. A thousand catcalls interrupted him, rising from the throats of secret police and militiamen who had been planted in the Cathedral. The Archbishop left the pulpit, and the observance of the Feast of Corpus Christi came to an abrupt halt.

When Catholics arrived for Mass on the following Sunday, they listened to a Pastoral Letter signed in the name of all the Hierarchy by Archbishop Beran. In it he denounced the Catholic Action Movement sponsored by the government, and insisted upon the right of the Church to name its own representatives and spokesmen. This letter was followed by an announcement which made the deepest possible impression on the Catholic world. On June 20, 1949, the Sacred Congregation of the Holy Office issued a decree declaring the Catholic Action Movement schismatic and excommunicating in the most formal manner all those who continued to participate in it. Lifting of the ban was reserved to the Pope. Seldom in modern history had Rome issued so stern a decree. The Prime Minister of Czechoslovakia responded for the government. He declared that the State "would protect all those who conduct themselves in accordance with the principles of the people's democracy," and would not allow anyone "to violate the freedom of opinion of patriotic priests or to terrorize them."

There followed another Pastoral Letter, signed by the most prominent members of the Hierarchy, which was a lengthy recital of the ills which had befallen the Church. It asked questions and answered them. The following passages will indicate the tenor of the whole:

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Could we, your bishops, accede to demands which are in defiance of the laws of God and man?

Could we approve, in the presence of our people and of the whole world, everything that has happened, even when it has not been in conformity with the teachings of Jesus Christ?

We shall, with cheerfulness, render unto Caesar the things which are Caesar's. But it is quite impossible to sacrifice unto him the things which are God's. For it behooves us to obey God rather than man.

It is not a question of favoring capitalism, for we know that not even a liberal capitalistic society fulfills all the ideals of Christianity. Indeed, capitalism has more than once been denounced by the Church.

You all know that the bishops who serve you are not capitalists. They assuredly would be better off than they are now if they came out for the cause of Judas.

The government reacted violently to this Pastoral Letter. After days of agitated demonstrations, the Archbishop was informed that a police guard was being assigned to insure his safety and protect his residence, and that the guard would accompany him wherever he went, to ward off likely attacks on his person. Archbishop Beran replied that under such conditions he would not leave his home. A similar guard was forced upon the Bishop of Hradec Králové, senior member of the Hierarchy. Archbishop Beran was also expelled from the Union of Warriors for Freedom, the official association of those who had been deported to concentration camps, or who had gone into exile during the period of Nazi rule. An intensive drive to recruit members of the Catholic Action Movement accompanied this personal campaign against the Archbishop.

Without ample or even limited opportunity to discover what was really going on, good priests and worthy laymen often came to the conclusion that Archbishop Beran was being unnecessarily belligerent and that, perhaps, this was due to unwise prodding from Monsignori in a far-distant Vatican. From

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this point of view the address delivered on May 18, 1949, by the Reverend Dr. Josef Fiala, then chairman of the Catholic Action Movement, is very illuminating. After expressing the hope that there would be no duplication of the *Kulturkampf* Bismarck had waged against the Catholic Church, he presented the views of St. Thomas Aquinas on the value of harmonious cooperation between Church and State, and compared the situation which had existed in his native country after 1918 with that which had obtained since 1945. Was it not true that the present government had assured full religious liberty, that members of the Cabinet had been present when the Archbishop was enthroned in 1946, and that Gottwald, after his election to the presidency of the Republic, had done what no other head of the Republic had thought of doing—repaired to the Cathedral, where a "Te Deum" was sung and solemn Benediction given? Why then, asked the somewhat naïve but still thoroughly good and honest Dr. Fiala, was harmony so difficult to arrive at? "The faithful," he said, "cannot understand why harmonious relations have not been established, and they are interested in knowing who is at fault."

Dr. Fiala subsequently saw the error of his ways and went into exile. His address, which at the time created a considerable sensation, indicates clearly how tangled and beclouded the situation then was. First, the Czechs were so conscious of the suppression which they had endured under the Nazis and so accustomed to considering Germany as the great menace to their well-being that Dr. Fiala cited the *Kulturkampf* of Bismarck as the most striking illustration of religious persecution he could call to mind. Second, the various overt acts by which the Archbishop had given expression to his readiness to cooperate if the government manifested a measure of good will had a far greater symbolic value for the people than he had intended they should have; and conversely the acts of

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religious worship which Gottwald and others added to their chores—even as Henry IV of France had invested in a Mass—deluded the innocent who had had no previous experience with Communism. In the circumstances, one must respect the discipline which maintained to such a notable extent at least the outward unity of the clergy.

Then on July 1 a stern challenge came from the Vatican. A decree issued by the Sacred Congregation of the Holy Office excommunicated "the Christian faithful who profess the materialistic and anti-Christian doctrine of the Communists, and especially those who defend or propagate it . . . incur by that very fact, as apostates from the Catholic faith, excommunication reserved in a special manner to the Holy See." The decree likewise rendered it unlawful to support the Communist Party or to publish or read its literature. This solemn ban had, however, the result that a number of members of the government delivered addresses indicating that all those who obeyed the Vatican, a foreign power long since allied with Fascism, would be held guilty of high treason. All this meant that, on the one hand, all clergymen who had aligned themselves with the Catholic Action Movement and would not now retract were under sentence of excommunication and so unable to exercise lawfully their priestly offices, and that, on the other hand, the government had assured them of protection.

The Vatican did not withdraw its diplomatic representative, though both he and his co-workers were subjected to a number of indignities. On July 9 the Internuncio returned to Rome; and his successor was not permitted to enter Czechoslovakia. Simultaneously the government took steps to bring the clergy under complete control. But the action taken by the Vatican had made an impression, and many statements were read from parish pulpits during the summer, pledging loyalty to the Hierarchy and the Holy See. The Catholic Action Movement

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659 none the less made progress, even proceeding to organize
793 pilgrimages to favorite shrines. Members of the Cabinet par-
647 ticipated in some of these.

659 The government now played its trump card. It announced
793 that a Bureau for Ecclesiastical Affairs would be established in
647 the Ministry of Culture, to regulate all matters affecting the Church. A delegate from the Bureau was to be assigned to each Catholic consistory. Moreover, the State would henceforth guarantee the "economic security" of the clergy as a sort of generous reimbursement for the expropriated Church properties. Thus the chains of enslavement were forged. During the summer Alexej Čepička, Minister of Culture, delivered several addresses that made clear what was planned. He stated: "Anyone who executes on our territory the orders of an enemy of our State [that is, of the Pope] must realize that he therewith loses the right to call himself a good Czech or Slovak."

The Bureau for Ecclesiastical Affairs was established on October 14, but the definitive laws regulating it and fixing the salaries of the clergy were dated October 17 and November 4 respectively. What was it to accomplish? According to the text of the law the new bureau was to "see to it that church life and religious life develop in accordance with the constitution and the principles of the people's democratic order, and thus secure to everyone the right of freedom of religion based on the principle of religious tolerance and equal rights for all denominations, as guaranteed by the constitution." More specifically, it was to exercise supervision over such matters as "personnel and budgets relating to clergymen, teachers and members of the staffs of university theological schools, other theological schools and seminaries, and teachers of religion; the ecclesiastical press and the publications issued by it; the publication of an official journal for clergymen; and the charitable activities of the churches and the religious associations."

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Salaries were to be paid "only to ministers of religion who are Czechoslovak citizens, are politically reliable, are of irreproachable conduct, and otherwise meet the general requirements of the civil service." Clergymen were also required, when assuming the obligation of teaching, to give religious instruction free of charge, "unless another arrangement has been made for the teaching of religion." No one was permitted to officiate as a clergyman unless he had obtained the consent of the government and had taken an oath of office. Concerning Church property, the legislation stipulated that "representatives of Churches . . . shall take inventory of all personal property, real property, and property rights of the Churches and religious associations," and that any disposition of or encumbrance upon such property should have the consent of the government.

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A convention to which the majority of the Catholic dioceses sent delegates met in Prague on October 11 to discuss the restrictions thus placed upon religious activity; and a resolution was passed which stated in part that the measures taken signified "the complete subjugation of the Church and its misuse for political ends." There followed an appeal to the clergy which merits quotation in full:

> We leave the final decision concerning the matter of increased salary and the oath which is to be demanded to the Very Reverend Ordinaries themselves. But it is clear from the manner in which the two issues are conjoined—that is, the compulsory acceptance of the salaries and the simultaneous taking of the oath—that the question is not merely whether the salary is to be accepted and the oath taken, but also whether the laws concerning the Church are to be approved. It is clear that no priest can reach a decision salutary to his conscience or avoid betraying the Church unless he follows exact directives given by his Ordinary.
>
> We and His Excellency, the Archbishop of Prague, Josef Beran,

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wish to remind our brethren that they did not take orders so that they could enrich themselves or insure a good livelihood in this world, but so that they might minister unto souls and insure their eternal salvation. That is the basis on which the faithful will judge you; and in accordance with how you fulfill your duty Almighty God will reward or punish you. Giving priority to temporal rather than to spiritual interests in such a critical hour means sullying your priestly honor and confessing to the faithful that you are without a genuine calling to the priesthood and are a hireling rather than a shepherd.

Do not forget that hundreds of your brethren are in prisons and labor camps. If you accept material advantages at a time when so many of them are in duress you will sin grossly against brotherly love. Do not forget that every day there knock at your door many poor people who in spite of all the vaunted progress of Socialism are suffering horribly and cannot scrape together enough to keep themselves alive. If you permit yourself to gain advantages when so many of those entrusted to your care are suffering and are in spiritual as well as material need, you will bring down upon yourself the contempt and hatred of those who long to find in you a shining example, a source of moral support, and a reason for hope.

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Among the hundreds "in prisons and labor camps" were the majority of Czechoslovakia's best known and most highly respected priests. They had been arrested for reading from their pulpits letters issued by the Hierarchy, insinuating that not all was well for the Church in the people's democracy, and for sundry other reasons. Thus, quite typically, *Osservatore Romano* of September 22, 1949, reported that all the Capuchins of the Monastery of Fulnek, Moravia, had been arrested; that priests in various towns of Slovakia had been sent to labor camps, regardless of whether or not their innocence had been upheld by the local tribunals; that Professor Čulík, the Counselor of the Archdiocese of Prague, had been arrested; and that a number of members of the staff of the Prague Seminary had been jailed. Similar actions had been taken throughout

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the summer, and other penal measures had been resorted to. 659
Fines were levied; automobiles and motorcycles were con- 793
fiscated. 687

The Bishops then indicated that they would not adopt an uncompromising attitude. A formula was devised in accordance with which the clergy might take the oath and accept the salaries, while making a mental reservation that the oath pledged them to no action contrary to the laws of God and the Church. The language of the oath as prepared by the government read as follows:

> I promise on my honor and on my conscience to be faithful to the Czechoslovak Republic and to its People's Democratic Order. I will not undertake anything contrary to its interests, security and integrity. As a citizen of the Popular Democratic State, I shall perform conscientiously the duties associated with my office and will to the best of my ability support the constructive efforts which are directed to the advancement of the people's welfare.

As soon as the Bishops had agreed to permit the taking of this oath, President Gottwald declared that the struggle between Church and State had been resolved. An amnesty was declared, and many priests were liberated from prison. No official cognizance was taken of the reservations which the Bishops had instructed the clergy to keep in mind.

On December 6 the government published a volume entitled 659
The Conspiracy Against the Republic which levelled a num- 687
ber of accusations at the Hierarchy. Archbishop Beran was 664
declared guilty of high treason, and some of his fellow Bishops 793
were described as accomplices. For all that the Archbishop had suffered in a German concentration camp, said the authors, he had nevertheless permitted himself to be carried down the path of treason by the Vatican. As a representative of the ecclesiastical aristocracy, he had forced the Bishops into a

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659 traitorous counterrevolution and compelled them to bid their
687 priests to betray their fatherland. The Papal Internuncio, Mgr.
664 Gennarro Verolino, was termed the Vatican's most astute spy.
793 The incidents of the Corpus Christi observance of June 14 were used to expound the theory that the Archbishop had been anxious to buttress the cause of Rome by posing as a martyr. Publicity efforts to create a market for this book were on a vast scale, reminding the observer of the propaganda in Nazi Germany in behalf of Herr Rosenberg's *Mythus des zwanzigsten Jahrhunderts.*

659 The year 1950 hewed to the line adopted in the Conspiracy.
793 During January one of the Slovak Bishops died. A successor was designated by the Cathedral Chapter; but the government refused to endorse the choice, and itself appointed the Reverend John Dechet administrator of the diocese. Though the Vatican promptly excommunicated this priest, he remained in office. Shortly thereafter the Communist press announced that a Father Horák, pastor in Bylnice, had agreed to make a thorough study of Marxist-Leninist teaching and would report the results of his research at a number of educational conferences. There followed an exchange of letters between the Hierarchy and the government on these matters. The most signal event of all was that toward the close of January the Auxiliary Bishop of Prague, Antonín Eltschkner, took the oath of allegiance in company with the Vicar General of the Diocese. A high churchman in Moravia followed their example. For all that Bishop Eltschkner was described as a weak and elderly man, government propagandists took into account his defection from the hitherto unbroken ranks of the Hierarchy. Obviously the defenses of the Church were crumbling.

659 During April the government seized monasteries throughout
425 the country, on the ground that the "religious Orders have become instruments of the foreign enemies of the Republic." So

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that a halt might be called to these treasonable activities, the official report continued, "measures have been taken to restore such Orders to their original and genuinely religious purpose." Because it was evident that the larger monasteries housed only a few persons, "who did no work and spent their time primarily in arousing the people," the government was concentrating their inmates in a number of monasteries where they would be able "to concern themselves with the purely religious mission prescribed by the rules of their Orders." "The vacated buildings," said the report, "will serve the needs of Catholic charities, or general social and health purposes. Some will be converted into apartments, badly needed by the people of the country." 659 435

Thus there came into being the "concentration monasteries" of Pezinok, Jasov, and other places concerning which one can find no appreciable amount of information. Nor did the government fail to pounce upon the institutions for the training of the clergy. All Catholic seminaries were closed, and two new ones were created—one in Prague and the other in Bratislava. The training of clergymen for the Protestant and the Orthodox Churches was restricted in like manner. The Catholic Bishops were now confronted with the difficult problem of deciding whether it was proper to ordain young priests in the circumstances. They were of divided views on the matter. Meanwhile a considerable number of seminarians, unable to reconcile the nature of the training given with their consciences, withdrew. They were promptly drafted for duty with infantry regiments stationed in various parts of the country. 653 793

Late in the summer of 1950 Zdeněk Fierlinger was appointed Minister of Culture. He was destined to inaugurate the final stage in the liquidation of the Church. Every priest who had demonstrated his willingness to cooperate with the Catholic Action Movement as sponsored by the government was now

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659 appointed to a high ecclesiastical post. On August 1 a new
793 penal code made it possible to try Christian clergymen loyal to their Churches for a number of crimes. None of the offenses was carefully defined. The code stipulated: "Whoever does not discharge his duties in the manner prescribed by the legal regulations pertaining to Churches and religious associations, and whoever, in particular, endangers or interferes with the exercise of supervision over the properties of Churches or religious associations, shall be punished by a fine not to exceed 100,000 crowns, or by confinement not to exceed three
687 months." The arrests soon began. Priests beloved by their
793 parishioners were the first to feel the impact of the law. Then
659 it was the turn of vicars general and monsignori. Finally, a number of Bishops were taken into custody.

During December many who had been arrested were brought to trial. In most instances accusations were made of attempting to overthrow the people's democratic regime, of endeavoring to betray state secrets to foreign powers, and of collaborating with the Nazis. Heavy sentences were imposed. Thus Bishop Stanislav Zela was fined a huge sum and sentenced to a prison term of twenty-five years; a life sentence was imposed upon Abbot John Opasek; and a number of other priests and prelates (how reluctantly one uses the word "number" when each person merits a biographical sketch) received sentences ranging from ten to twenty years. Gestapo-like, the police meanwhile proceeded to file a detailed questionnaire about every cleric in the land.

The month of January, 1951, witnessed the arrest of more than 3,000 priests. Of these, 2,000 were placed in the "concentration monasteries." Many others were removed from their posts. As a consequence, nearly three-fourths of all parishes were bereft of pastors. The Bureau for Ecclesiastical Affairs proceeded to appoint "patriotic" priests to important positions

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in diocesan offices. New cathedral canons, for example, were 658
installed in Prague and Brno. Bishop Eltschkner remained in 793
office, but the courageous Archbishop was banished from 687
Prague on March 10. It was reported that he was put under arrest in the Castle of Rozmital, and subsequently transferred to another place of detention. Elsewhere members of the Hierarchy began to capitulate. Bishop Štěpan Trochta, of the diocese of Litoměřice, installed a canon who was a notorious "patriotic" priest. Once more the Sacred Congregation acted to excommunicate all who had in any manner been responsible for these various assaults upon the integrity of the Catholic Church. Yet by the end of the month the shocking news came that the most prominent members of the Czechoslovak Hierarchy still at liberty had taken the oath of allegiance. Shortly thereafter it was reported that Father Plojhar had been reinstated by his Ordinary, despite the ban of excommunication which had been issued against him.

Again the Vatican acted. The Bishops who had betrayed their trust were excommunicated, even though it was taken for granted in Rome that the concessions had been obtained through force. The situation was all the more painful because some of those involved had previously acted with great bravery. The Vatican Radio commented:

> Men of faith will remain loyal to their duly chosen ecclesiastical superiors, as is shown by Archbishop Beran who, having been exiled from his Archdiocese by reason of his fidelity to his Church, must now languish in prison. Beran belongs to the company of the illustrious in the history of the Church; and good priests will follow his heroic example.

Pope Pius XII spoke twice to the people of Czechoslovakia 000
toward the close of 1951—on October 28, and on Christmas Eve. He said in part on the second occasion:

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000 As the experiences of men indicate, the State and the association of States are necessary and appropriate forms of union and order among men, in view of the fact that human beings are by nature social. Only with them can humanity live. They help to make it more nearly perfect than it could otherwise be. No one can think of them without at the same time being conscious of the tranquillity of order, the *tranquillitas ordinis*, which according to St. Augustine is the definition of peace. These social ties exist by their very nature so that peace may be assured.

Since these things are so, Jesus Christ, the Prince of Peace, and His Church in which He continues to dwell, have entered into a new and intimate relationship with them, as being societies which exist for the maintenance of peace, so that human society may be lifted up and strengthened. This is the basis for the unique contribution which the Church by her very nature makes to the cause of peace—makes, that is, when her life and actions among men occupy the place that is their due.

And how will all this come about, save through the continuous enlightening and invigorating action of the Grace of God on the minds and hearts of citizens and statesmen, so that in every human relationship they perceive and conform with the purposes of the Creator, strive to enlist the common effort of individuals and nations for realizing those purposes, and practice social justice and charity within the nation as well as among the nations.

659 The 1951 message to the Czechoslovak people in honor of their Independence Day, October 28, reads in part as follows:

Even so, Venerable Brethren and beloved children, let no one lose heart because the difficulties of this kind are so extremely great. Above all consecrated pastors must not lose heart, they whose duty it is by reason of a special Divine appointment to nourish the faith of their flocks, to uphold their courage, and to strengthen the bond of union between them and this Holy See. Already over the course of centuries your people has overcome other and most dire ills. More than once in times past your ancestors have had to choose between

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martyrdom endured with fortitude, and treachery to the faith of their fathers. With unconquerable spirits they clung to their Catholic religion and sometimes professed it by shedding their very blood. 659

But neither the shame nor the glory of the Church in Czechoslovakia diminished, as the months passed. On November 1, Josef Plojhar, now become Minister of Health in the Cabinet, stated in a radio address: 659 793

> In their anxiety, the Western imperialists do not shrink from laying hands on things which are sacred to everyone. They do not hesitate to abuse the religious convictions of the people. Capitalism recognizes the great moral strength of religious ties and therefore attempts to use the Christian and non-Christian faiths for its own ends. It wishes to employ the vast and intricate machinery at the disposal of churchmen for propaganda purposes and for the encouragement of espionage. We behold a truly un-Christian phenomenon in the association of the Vatican with the policies of the warmongers.

Therewith he disassociated himself as completely as possible from allegiance to his Church.

An official survey of the situation was issued by the government at the close of 1951. It declared that the Czechoslovak clergy had "clarified" its position in so far as the Vatican was concerned and went on to say:

> The clergy, as they unanimously declared at the National Congress of September, 1951, recognize the Pope as their Head in religious matters, but repudiate the policies of the Vatican, which is our enemy. All the Bishops recognize the validity of the ecclesiastical laws and of all other measures taken to date; and they have solemnly sworn to contribute to the building of Socialism in Czechoslovakia, to support the peace movement, and to refuse to recognize or execute religious sanctions inflicted for political reasons.

Despite these words and their deceptive inlay of benevolence, the effort to eradicate religion from the hearts of the 659 793 798 689

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659 people was carried on relentlessly. It was not merely that the
793 press and the radio ridiculed belief and practice incessantly
798 and without rebuke. The faithful among the clergy were hunted
687 down one by one. The following typical report is cited from ČTK, the Government News Service, of September 1, 1952:

> Josef Maršálek, Catholic Priest and teacher of religion in Velké-Meziříci, confessed his illegal activities to the Senate of the District Court of Iglau. The accused was brought to trial because of the hatred he had shown towards the peace efforts of the progressive populations of the world, and because of his faithful service to the war efforts of the Imperialistic Powers and the Vatican. . . . Maršálek approved of imperialist aggression in Korea and spread the war propaganda contained in foreign broadcasts. In conversations with his pupils and in his religion classes he systematically spread hatred against the people's democracy and chief personalities of our state. . . . He also tried to hamper the constructive efforts of the workers, and forbade his pupils to cooperate with working brigades on Sundays and Holydays. By his subtly clever inventiveness he sullied our economic and cultural expansion effort. Indeed, the evidence indicates that this reactionary slave of the Vatican strictly forbade his pupils to see the progressive films. . . . The accused Josef Maršálek was condemned to fifteen years in jail and to financial penalties. All his property was confiscated. The Court also deprived him of his civil rights and exiled him from County Iglau forever.

687 Two months later, Czechoslovakia was the scene of the sensational trials of Rudolf Slánský and his associates in the government. And perhaps no document in the history of the unfortunate country is more harrowing than the following, translated from the official Communist newspaper, *Rudé Právo*, of November 25, 1952. It is addressed by the son of one of the doomed men, Ludwig Frejka, to his judge:

> Esteemed Comrade:
>
> I ask that there be inflicted on my father the heaviest penalty—the

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penalty of death. I see only belatedly that this creature, who cannot be called a human being, did not possess a jot or tittle of feeling or human dignity. He was my greatest and most bitter enemy. 687

I pledge that wherever I may work I shall always work as a devoted Communist. And I know that the hatred I feel towards all our enemies, especially those who deliberately sought to destroy our life which grows steadily wealthier and happier, and especially also towards my father, will always strengthen my fight for the Communist future of our people.

I am asking that this letter be given to my father. If possible I desire to give it to him personally.

THOMAS FREJKA

No comment is required.

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4 IN TITO'S LAND

182 YUGOSLAVIA, HAVING ACHIEVED nationhood at the close of the First World War, was at one and the same time a fulfillment of ardent though varied aspirations to political and cultural independence and a creature of social and strategic necessity. It conjoined parts of the former Austro-Hungarian Empire with the territory of that Empire's archfoe, the Kingdom of Serbia, responsible for the death of the Archduke Ferdinand at Sarajevo. In terms of religious affiliation, the [162] disparity was equally marked. In the western areas of Croatia and Slovenia, there were approximately 5,900,000 Catholics in union with the See of Rome. Serbia, on the other hand, was almost completely Greek Orthodox, 6,700,000 persons being members of that Church. That a new nation culturally so heterogeneous should find it easy to establish real unity was not to be expected; and the deep, persistent cleavages engendered constant friction. A strong group of Croats in particular worked and, indeed, plotted unceasingly for independence.

795 The Croats could look back upon a long period of duress as 175 a result of service rendered to the Catholic faith and the Holy 186

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See. During the early Middle Ages their ancestors had fought /175
against the Mongols; and their steadfastness had earned the 735
admiration of Dante Alighieri. Later they battled against the /186
Turks during four hundred years. Chronicles relate that hundreds of thousands died in the struggle or were sold into slavery; and the cities of Western Europe at the time absorbed no end of refugees. The brave Croats could not ward off the Moslem attack fully, but they did manage unaided to hold Zagreb and the regions northwest of that city. Numerous are the praises which the Popes bestowed on their valor. This tradition of stubborn defense of their individuality made the Croats self-reliant, but it also enkindled an insatiable desire for cultural freedom.

The Slovenes, who were far less numerous than the Croats, also endured much at the hands of the Turks. Their country was devastated, and thousands were enslaved. During subsequent history Slovenia was under Bavarian or Austrian suzerainty most of the time, and so was drawn into the religious conflicts of Reformation times. But the Counter Reform prevailed, so that the people today are almost exclusively Catholic. During the nineteenth century, a Romantic movement greatly intensified interest in the Slovenian language and literature. A strong Catholic political party was formed after 1907, and gave rise to some talk of alleged clerical domination. After the First World War, clashes first with Austria and then with the Yugoslav monarchy manifested the strong nationalist feelings of the Slovene people.

The Serbs, a nation of great charm, tenacity, and ability, clung resolutely to their Greek Orthodox traditions during the period of Ottoman rule from 1389 to 1878, when independence was achieved. The strength of Serbia lay in its sturdy peasantry and in competent, though ardently, sometimes fanatically, nationalist leadership, and, as the most populous part of the new

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175 Yugoslavia, it dominated the political scene after the new
795 state was formed. Despite stormy periods of conflict with the
186 Croats and Slovenes, the Serb monarchy must be credited with slow progress towards national solidarity. Poor and to some extent backward though the Yugoslavia of pre-Nazi days was, it is one of the most interesting and virile parts of Europe
181 as seen in nostalgic retrospect. Culturally it combined an irritating staidness of bureaucratic procedure with a passionate zest for personal liberty. And what was ever more charming than any town in Dalmatia?

721 On April 6, 1941, the Germans and Italians invaded Yu-
648 goslavia. Later they were joined by Hungarian and Bulgarian troops. Within ten days the attacking forces won an overwhelming victory, and British armies moving up through Greece were thrown back to the sea. Units of the regular Yugoslav army continued to fight in some areas, and the struggle
725 was grim. On the other hand, scattered bands of "partisans" were reenforced by Communist sympathizers, under a variety of disguises, after Hitler attacked Russia. Retaliation by the invaders was swift and brutal. Slovenia in particular was terrorized, no doubt because Hitler had vowed to incorporate it in the "East County" which was so vital to his dream of conquest. Many thousands of priests and people were executed or carted off to concentration camps.

725 To add to the sufferings of the population, warfare now
578 broke out between antagonistic groups of resistance forces. For temporary advantage, each side would effect transitory alliances with the occupying armies, and sanguinary battles were then fought to a bloody finish. It has been estimated that as many as a million persons were slain during this weird and wavering struggle. Inevitably all religious and caritative institutions suffered grievously. Churches were destroyed, clergymen were slain, and all forms of normal living disappeared.

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Among the more sombre events of the time was the formation 668
in Croatia of Ustaša, an extreme nationalist movement formed by Dr. Anton Pavelić according to the model of Fascism. As soon as the Italian occupying armies designated Croatia an independent country Pavelić attempted to rule it with his "élite." He enlisted an odd array of extremists including two Franciscan friars, one of whom even became the commandant of a notorious Fascist concentration camp; but he could not win the allegiance of the masses.

While these tragic events were occurring, the Catholic 793
Church in Yugoslavia had for its principal leader a man of unusual ability and courage: Monsignor Aloysius Stepinac. He had served during the First World War as an ordinary soldier in the Austro-Hungarian army. Returning to civilian life, he studied agriculture for a while and then decided to prepare for the priesthood. After a period of training in Rome, where he earned his doctorate in theology, he was ordained. Soon he was consecrated a bishop; and subsequently he became Archbishop of Zagreb*—the largest and most opulent diocese in Croatia, with 2,000,000 souls before Hitler's invasion. The new Archbishop was a man of warm sympathies and great intelligence. When Austria and Czechoslovakia were overrun by the Nazis, Zagreb became a haven for refugees. I was there in 1938 and saw a little of what was happening. The generosity of the Archbishop was notable.

Naturally the occupation and the political activities of Pavelić brought the faithful of Archbishop Stepinac's diocese face to face with momentous and troubling moral issues. He himself was fully aware that Pavelić was the leader of a pro-Fascist and therefore also a pro-Nazi political action group,

* It should be noted that as a Yugoslav patriot and an opponent of the Habsburgs, Monsignor Stepinac's elevation to a bishopric had the approval of the Yugoslav Monarchy. His predecessor in the See of Zagreb had been loyal to Austria and all else than friendly to the Serbs.

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793 and he immediately opposed it with determination. During 1943 he said, on the anniversary of the coronation of Pope Pius XII:

> It would be erroneous to suppose that the Catholic Church can ever approve of methods of action directed against the fundamental rights of man. The Christian way of life does not concede that the rights of any people may be violated, no matter how vast the territory of the aggressor or the size of his population.

He was especially outspoken on Nazi race theories. These he discussed frankly and frequently even while the Germans were patrolling the streets of the city and apprehending Jews and others deemed to be opponents of the Nazi regime. He said, for instance:

> All people have their origins in God. There is only one race, which is His. The members of this human race may have an advanced culture or a retarded one. They may be white or black of color, they may dwell at the North Pole or the South Pole. All of them are nevertheless members of the same race, which has its origin in God. The nations and races of men share the right to life, to dignity and to the treatment which befits dignity. Europeans and Negroes, Jews and Aryans, have the same right to say, "Our Father, Who art in Heaven."

793 These utterances reflected, as a matter of course, the resolute
798 stand which the Holy See had taken on the issues during the years which followed Hitler's rise to power. It was therefore one of Archbishop Stepinac's most important tasks to defend the Papacy against Nazi propaganda, in which the Pavelić group obediently reiterated whatever their masters in Berlin and Rome instructed them to say. The Archbishop dispatched note after note to them. Among his many tasks was that of opposing the persecution in Croatia of members of the Greek Orthodox Church on the ground that they had been abettors of Serbia. Thus when a number of Serbs residing in the town of

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Glina were executed, the pretext being the proclamation of 793
the independence of the Croat state, the Archbishop issued a 798
stern rebuke:

> It is my duty as your Archbishop to declare that such measures are forbidden by Catholic moral teaching. I demand that you take steps immediately to insure that not a single Serb will be executed until he has been tried and found guilty of a crime which deserves capital punishment.

Pavelić, to be sure, did not take kindly to this archiepiscopal advice. He accused the prelate of favoring Communism and of having acquired only a modicum of political experience. He also attempted to reach his goal with blandishments. But Dr. Stepinac, in all probability the only person in the country who could speak freely, was not to be assuaged. He forbade priests to join the Ustaša and excommunicated those who did. He refused to accompany Pavelić to Rome for the purpose of inducing Mussolini to make the Duke of Spoleto king of Croatia, and he was ostentatiously "not at home" when Pavelić called to pay his respects on the occasion of the burial of the Duke of Aosta. The pro-Fascist leader, understandably annoyed, then approached the Vatican in the hope of effecting the removal of the Archbishop from his see. This démarche naturally failed, because Dr. Stepinac was merely carrying out the firm wishes of his Roman superiors. The Croat people in their overwhelming majority remained loyal to the moderate antitotalitarian political movement headed by Dr. Vladimir Maček.

Meanwhile storm clouds of varying hues rose over Yugo- 665
slavia. The Communist Party, repressed and camouflaged during the period when the Stalin-Hitler Pact was in force, quickly emerged after the Nazi victory. It had a hard and disciplined core, made up in part of veterans of the Spanish Civil War. In

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665 Josip Broz (known as Tito) the Communists had a sturdy, self-willed, and unflinching leader. Born in a small village near the Austrian border, of mixed Croatian and Slovenian ancestry, Tito had served with gusto and loyalty in the cavalry of the Habsburg armies. Captured by the Russians, apparently as early as 1915, he was imprisoned in Siberia. When the war ended, he joined the Red army and soon became an officer. This change in his rank and station persuaded Tito to throw in his lot with the Communists. He finished a course of indoctrination in Moscow, and returned to his native country as an agent of the Party.

725 668 648 There, after the German conquest of Yugoslavia, General Draža Mihajlović rallied the traditional guerrilla forces of the nation against the conquerors. He was a hard-fisted Serb officer who knew every mountain pass and counted on every device for rallying the peasantry. But he was as devoid of political and diplomatic skill as could well be imagined. Despite feats of heroism he and his men were soon isolated from the only foreign contact which mattered; namely, Great Britain and the Yugoslav government-in-exile which it harbored. He tried in vain to arrive at a *modus vivendi* with Tito, who had begun to assemble followers under the Communist banner. Fatefully the British decided to support the vigorous and talkative Communist leader rather than the difficult, indeed sometimes recalcitrant, Serb commander.

668 Tito, for his part, was a wolf clad in several varieties of sheep's clothing. The partisans under his command vociferously denied that they were affiliated with the Kremlin. He himself declared on December 29, 1943, to the Anti-Fascist Council at Jajce, Bosnia:

> Slanders have been spread about us on all sides. Even now it is being said that our struggle for the liberation of Yugoslavia is Communist-inspired. We are accused of plotting to bolshevize the country,

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of wishing to place all power in Communist hands, of planning the abolition of private property and the destruction of the Church, religion and culture. These are old and badly battered tales. Few believe such lies, and the people of Yugoslavia certainly do not. 668

Although there were gruesome incidents—such as the slaying of priests and laymen by partisans—much was done towards proving the veracity of Tito. Partisan banners often bore as a legend the ancient Croatian motto, "Jesus and Mary be praised"; and it was not at all unusual to hear a soldier piously repeat those words. Partisan troops were sometimes detailed to keep watch at the replica of the Holy Sepulcher during Passion Week, and they often volunteered to act as escorts for Corpus Christi processions. Once partisan troops raided the farms of the Archbishop and took away twelve horses. But their leader was careful to explain that the theft was due to urgent necessity, and that compensation in full would be made later.

Nevertheless the Archbishop was much too realistic and well informed to become a victim of illusions. He wrote early in 1943, in a letter adduced afterwards as testimony against him: "Today the people believe that the 'partisans' are the least of the dangers we confront. They use shrewd tactics until the time when they take over has arrived." And a year later he wrote in the same vein: "The partisans are destroying all buildings in which state offices are housed. Until now they have nowhere touched churches, but of course we have no illusions about the future." It was not difficult to secure a good deal of information about the kind of discipline to which the partisans were subjected or about the ease with which the life of a dissenter in their ranks could be snuffed out.

The future towards which Dr. Stepinac looked with foreboding came to Zagreb on May 11, 1945, when the city was liberated. Immediately the war-crimes trials got under way, 727 793

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793 and a few days later a Communist speaker branded him a war
727 criminal. One week later he was confined to his residence by the OZNA (Department for the Defense of the People). Shortly
643 thereafter Marshal Tito arrived in the city, and expressed a desire to confer with the clergy. The published text of his remarks included the following reflections on policy:

> As far as I am concerned, I would say that our Church should be a national institution, since this would be best suited to the needs of the people. Perhaps you will be surprised to hear me stress nationality, but I am moved by the fact that we have shed so much blood for our country. I have seen too much suffering not to wish that the Catholic clergy were more closely linked to the people than is the case today. I should like to state publicly that I am not claiming the privilege of judging Rome, your supreme authority. I do not do so, but I must say that my attitude is critical because this authority has already been more favorable to Italy than to our people. I should like the Catholic Church in Croatia to become more independent now, when all the necessary conditions are present. That is my desire. That is the basic question—the one we must solve. All other questions are of minor importance and can easily be dealt with.

648 At this point a brief review of the political situation is in
642 order. According to Marshal Tito the meeting of the Anti-Fascist Council at Jajce in 1943 was the prelude to a bid for international recognition. The Yugoslav government-in-exile in London had supported Mihajlović, leader of the irregular army known as the Chetniks; but Tito had persuaded first the British and then the Americans that his own was the genuinely popular movement, as indeed it undoubtedly was. The point at issue was the restoration of the Yugoslav monarchy. During June, 1944, Ivan Subašić, prime minister of the government-in-exile, was flown into partisan-held territory, to work out a *modus vivendi* with Tito. This led to an agreement that Mihajlović was to be dropped, and that the question of restor-

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648 ing the monarchy was to be decided by free plebiscite once the
642 war was over. It was further stipulated that a provisional government would be formed to rule until the result of the plebiscite were known, and that, in order to establish such a government, elections would be held to form a Constituent Assembly. These elections were to be conducted on a basis of freedom of assembly, speech, and balloting.

666 On March 5, 1945, Marshal Tito formed the provisional
642 government, and it was announced that elections would be held on November 11. But there was no freedom of any kind whatever, and only candidates for the pro-government parties appeared on the ballot. It was announced on November 24 that 90 per cent of the voters had declared in favor of the government slate. The Constituent Assembly convened five days later and unanimously approved the Marshal's proclamation that a Federal People's Republic of Yugoslavia had been formed.
[648] On December 25, Great Britain and the United States informed Marshal Tito that they were according recognition to his government. This was done despite the fact that it had not been established in accordance with the pledges given.

659 On September 20 and 21, prior to the elections, the Catholic Hierarchy of Croatia had issued two Pastoral Letters, addressed respectively to the laity and to the clergy. The first of the letters is a document of great importance because it throws light on the situation at the time. After reviewing the grievous losses suffered by the nation during the war and the fratricidal struggles between Yugoslavs themselves, it welcomes the coming of peace and observes that wholly new conditions now prevail, and continues:

> It does not appertain to the Catholic Church to prescribe to its faithful in what manner they shall resolve their political problems, provided that such solutions are in accordance with universally binding moral principles. . . . Prior to the cessation of hostilities, the

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653 Federal Government in Belgrade pledged its solemn word to respect freedom of worship and of conscience, as well as private property. These principles were, from the outset, accepted by the Government of Croatia, but with the additional remark that the character of the Catholic Church here was not deemed satisfactory. In the very first days when we were able to contact the new Government we attempted to expound to its officials the needs and points of view of the Catholic Church. As many things in the State Administration created in the new spirit were at variance with the position and acquired rights of the Church, and as a consequence were detrimental to your spiritual good, our beloved brethren, we pointed out to and admonished those in power that questions bearing on the relationship between Church and State should be settled in an atmosphere of mutual understanding.

The Bishops then turn to the war-crimes procedures:

798 When the war operations were over, the infliction of capital pun-
793 ishment on Catholic priests did not cease. The number of priest victims is, as far as we know, this: 243 are dead, 169 are imprisoned in jails or concentration camps, 89 are missing. . . . To that number there must be added 19 seminarists, 3 lay brothers, and 4 nuns. For many a century Balkan history has witnessed no comparable slaughter. What is most especially and grievously painful is that all these, like hundreds and thousands of other Catholic faithful, are denied the Sacraments in their last hours, though all civilized nations permit them to be administered even to the most depraved criminals. Capital punishment was decreed by the courts summarily and quickly. The accused generally had no inkling of what crime they were charged with until the trial began, and then they were oftentimes deprived of the right of defense. . . .

Who can prove that so many priests upon whom the death penalty was inflicted were actually criminals deserving such punishment? For example, all Franciscans who were at their Monastery at Siroki Brijeg —28 all together—were put to death without judicial procedure. Not one of them took up arms, much less fought against the National Army of Liberation, as the Communists calumniously charged. Fur-

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thermore all of them were well known for their opposition to the Fascist ideology. 798 793

The Pastoral Letter goes on to deplore the suppression of the Catholic press, ostensibly due to the lack of paper; the closing and confiscation of the seminaries; the curtailment or suppression of religious instruction in the schools; the campaign of calumny waged in the Communist press; the closing of Catholic private schools, many of them famous; the encouragement given to looseness of morals among young people; and the placing of marriage under civilian control. In addition, it points out that the unjust manner in which land reform has been carried out has not only deprived the Church of property legitimately held, but will render the upkeep of the ecclesiastical establishment impossible. 798 659 [725]

Then come some very frank words of attack on the spirit and principles of the Communist Party: 795 829

> There is something more which especially grieves us. It is the materialistic and godless spirit which is today being openly and secretly, officially and unofficially, propagated throughout our country. We, the Catholic Bishops of Yugoslavia . . . unreservedly condemn this materialistic spirit, from which no good can be hoped for for mankind. Likewise we condemn all ideologies and all social systems which are based not on eternal principles of Revelation and Christianity but on shallow foundations called materialistic and therefore philosophically atheistic.
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> All we have said has been pondered very carefully. And from all that has been said it is abundantly evident that the Catholic Church in Federal Democratic Yugoslavia is in a different situation and is faced with other difficulties than it has known until now. The present situation of the Catholic Church in Yugoslavia is separated only in name from open persecution.

As could have been expected, Communist reaction to this Pastoral Letter was violent. Marshal Tito dealt with it in a 659

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659 public address. He accused the Bishops of having remained silent while Pavelič and his Ustaša were committing depredations, and said that the schools conducted by Franciscans and other monks incited hatred against other groups than Catholics, and were therefore the breeding grounds on which Fascism was born in its various forms. Then followed a very characteristic declaration:

> I do not believe that the lower part of the clergy will follow the appeal to oppose the Government in power. I know that there are many priests in Croatia, Bosnia, Herzegovina, Slovenia, etc., who do not think in terms of this letter. I know they are conscious of the horrible mistakes committed in the past and believe that the Church should now more than ever before become the bearer of peace and brotherhood among the peoples. I know that many priests and monks are deeply moved by the tragedy which has befallen our nation and that they now desire to go forward with the people. The declaration by Mister Archbishop Stepinac and some other Church dignitaries that they are ready to endure the struggle regardless of personal sacrifices leads me to conclude that they reached an agreement with the State under Pavelič not because of fear but for political reasons, and that they are now taking up the struggle against the new Federal Democratic Yugoslavia because they have a common plan with the rest of the reactionary groups in Yugoslavia.

661 In evaluating this exchange of views, one must bear in mind that the "liberation" was probably more sanguinary and repressive in Yugoslavia than elsewhere, for the reason that the old scores which were settled were so numerous and varied. [578] It was not merely that Communist was pitted against Monarchist and collaborator. Earlier differences, such as that between Serb and Croat, also came to the fore, and political alignments which had been kept relatively intact during the occupation period were now summarily curbed. From the beginning, no one had the slightest chance to express an opinion

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other than that declared official by the Titoists. So abrupt and 661
summary a seizure of power had not been possible in Hungary, Poland, and Czechoslovakia. From the outset Tito permitted neither political campaigning nor propaganda. And justice was whatever Communist courts decreed.

The Constitution of the Federal People's Republic of Yu- 642
goslavia, as adopted and then proclaimed on January 31, 1946, does not differ materially from the constitutions of the other satellite states, though there are divergencies. Thus "private property and private incentive in economic matters are guaranteed," and "citizens are guaranteed freedom of the press, of speech, of association, of meeting, of public assembly and manifestations." Nothing could sound freer or more democratic. The Constitution was, perhaps, a bit frank on marital relations, pointing out that all matrimonial disputes fall within the jurisdiction of the civil courts, and that parents are as responsible for children born outside wedlock as for children born in it.

However, before proclaiming the Constitution, the govern- 733
ment began to consider ways and means of bringing Arch- 687
bishop Stepinac to trial. It must be conceded that he did nothing 798
to make the idea less attractive to them. On November 1, 1945, the Feast of All Saints, OZNA agents approached him as he was robing for Mass and warned him that if he did not desist from critical references to the government in his sermon a tumult would break out in the congregation. The Archbishop nevertheless delivered the sermon and closed with an account of the threat. Three days later, partisans ambushed him while he was on his way to the little town of Zaprešić to officiate at the dedication of a church; but he managed to escape. As might have been anticipated, attacks on him in the press and on the radio increased in violence. However, the government was far from anxious to proceed with the trial, because it was bound to raise

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733 an international furore. Efforts were made to secure the Arch-
687 bishop's removal from his See by the Vatican. Marshal Tito
798 himself said to Monsignor Hurley, the Papal Nuncio: "Take him away and relieve him of his duties. Otherwise we shall arrest him."

[668] The immediate occasion for the trial was government action against the Križari (Crusaders), a diehard anti-Communist group who fought guerrilla-wise in the hills. Some priests were indicted as having been members, and one of them was alleged to have confessed that the Archbishop had given the movement his blessing. On the night of September 17, 1946, agents of the OZNA surrounded the archiepiscopal residence; and on the following morning Dr. Stepinac was arrested and indicted. Much has been said and written about the trial which followed, but some aspects of it still merit attention—much more, indeed, than can be given them here.

632 Since the liberation, the People's Courts had functioned as they usually do in crass revolutionary times. Presiding judges as well as juries were without legal training, being for the most part workingmen, sometimes waitresses and housemaids, whose sole qualification was membership in the Party. There was no legal code by which their actions could be circumscribed, the sole recognized principle being, "Whatever is against the People's Democracy is wrong." The decrees governing the protection of the State, nationalization of property, and taxation were grants of power to the authorities and not legislation on which anyone could base an appeal. Gradually some semblance of order was brought in; but the order was almost worse than the preceding chaos, for now the Public Prosecutor possessed unlimited power: he determined what crime had been committed, and then decided whether the sentence handed down by the court was sufficiently heavy. Woe betide a judge who erred on the side of mercy! He was simply fired

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from his job. And of course the Prosecutor had the right not 692
only to select the jurors but to determine the desirability of the defense attorney, if indeed he permitted one to function.

Many appalling illustrations of these methods of securing [691]
justice have been reported. Thus the County Court of Zagreb heard the case of a well known specialist in nervous diseases, Dr. Vranešić, who was accused of collaborating with the enemy and of favoring racist theories. Dr. Znidaršić, a Communist intellectual, presided over the court, which acquitted the physician on the basis of a unanimous vote of the jury. But the Public Prosecutor took the case to the "Supreme Court" and compelled that Court to pass a death sentence. The physician was shot. The Zagreb "judge" was then tried in turn for having sinned against the People's liberation movement and sentenced to a year of forced labor. Hundreds of similar cases have been described in detail by witnesses.

Add that the Public Prosecutor had an espionage system which he could use as he wished. Every citizen was bound to "exercise vigilance" in the defense of the People, and could be called upon to serve as a witness whether or not he desired to do so. Evidence secured through wire tapping and similar means was naturally admissible, and it was rarely necessary for the Prosecutor to indicate how the evidence had been secured. In short everything which constitutes legal justice in the Western world was discarded in favor of a form of police rule which none could question or gainsay.

The trial of the Archbishop was preceded by a popular 793
emotional struggle of great and moving interest. On the one 687
hand, Communist meetings and demonstrations were organized to demand dire punishment. On the other, so many people crowded into the churches to pray for the Archbishop—despite the police ban of the Auxiliary Bishop's appeal for such prayers—that a command was issued limiting to five the num-

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ber of persons allowed to congregate in front of a church. Throngs went in and out, none the less. The repercussions in the free countries of the world were naturally great. Nor was there lacking in American liberal circles a tendency to rejoice that a "reactionary" Archbishop had been brought to book by "progressive" justice.

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Archbishop Stepinac was ably defended by two good and courageous attorneys. To be sure, they had little opportunity to confer with their client, only one hour being permitted. The Prosecutor presented the lengthy indictment in an address lasting forty-eight hours. It consisted of three groups of charges: first, that Dr. Stepinac had collaborated with the enemies of the people and had fomented divisive actions which undermined the unity of the resistance; second, that he had invited Western imperialists to occupy the country when the war was over; and third, that he had conspired against the People's authorities, leading "the whole Church and all the clergy in a struggle against the people and their State." These allegations were presented in an atmosphere of intense hostility, before a courtroom audience consisting for the most part of Communists.

The accusation of collaborating with the enemy could be refuted easily. So widely known and illustrious a record did the Archbishop have as a patriot, a repudiator of totalitarian theories, and a friend of the oppressed, that the Prosecutor could do nothing more than charge him with responsibility for every aberration of which scattered clerics, most of whom had never been under his jurisdiction, were guilty. His luminously clear and strikingly heroic behavior during the occupation will remain for all time an example of what the conduct of a priest in high station should be in such tragic circumstances. The charge of divisive endeavors, based upon an action taken by Ustaša fanatics against Orthodox Serbs, was so remote

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from anything Dr. Stepinac could conceive of as desirable that it, too, could be dismissed as a figment of the imagination. The second group of charges, having to do with Western imperialist powers, is ironic in view of what has happened to Marshal Tito himself; but it was intended as an assault upon the Vatican, which the Prosecutor was indicting through the Archbishop as its utterly loyal representative. The third group was undoubtedly well founded, and here Dr. Stepinac could have said, had he so desired, that it was necessary for a priest to preach the word of God, no matter what the cost to him personally might be; but his opponents did not recognize God, and there could be no doubt that he was guilty of opposition to the only power which had being in their eyes—namely, the Communist State they had created.

I think that one passage from the brief of Dr. Ivo Politoe, who at great risk to himself volunteered to defend the Archbishop, deserves remembrance as a tribute to the eminent Christian lawyers of his native Croatia, beautiful and unhappy land:

> Sixteen years ago, at a time when Fascism was at the height of its power, and our Rijeka [Fiume] belonged to Italy, the Italian police there arrested a young Croat engineer on the suspicion that he had committed a political offense. After his arrest, he was conducted to the Regina Coeli prison in Rome. His old father, also a Croat from Rijeka, came to me and requested that I go to Rome and make such inquiries as a foreign lawyer might be able to do, and help in every way I could. Accordingly I went as a foreign lawyer, not knowing the local conditions prevailing in Rome, and requested an attorney there to help me and to associate himself with me as counsel for this particular case. This Italian attorney replied, "Dear colleague, I am a Fascist, and according to Fascist principles I am not allowed to assist anyone who is suspected of a crime against the state and the Fascist Government." Such were the conditions in Italy at that time. But the like does not exist and must not exist in Yugoslavia today. If we

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000 make daily use of the slogan, "Death to Fascism," then we must mean also death to all Fascist actions and to such attitudes as that of the Italian attorney to whom I have referred.

Surely, braver and truer words no man had spoken in Yugoslavia.

733 During the trial the Archbishop refused to reply to any of
635 the questions and taunts of the Prosecutor, because he was
687 convinced that sentence had been passed in advance of the hearings. The Court was incensed, and once said to the prisoner, "You are taking the attitude here that you are Jesus before the Court of Pilate." Sentence was passed on October 11, 1946. The prisoner was condemned to sixteen years at forced labor and to the loss of civil rights for five years. He did not appeal the verdict.

Thus, in a somber drama played on a stage which had the world as its audience, the Archbishop joined hands with all those humbler priests and laymen who had to bear the full brunt of fanaticism. It is nauseating to read report after report of torture and injustice, of barbarity and illiterate suffocation of evidence, which comes from survivors of Yugoslav justice. And it must be confessed that, since the rise of Communism, Nazism, and Fascism, we have become so accustomed to the scornful, utterly irrational degradation of human dignity that few have the stomach to wallow further in this morass of infamy. Let it merely be said that a great deal is known about the interrogation prisons which have existed in Tito's country and still exist there: prisons in which Catholic priests and laymen have been beaten, tortured, starved, and reviled for days until, reduced to utter exhaustion, they could be brought to trial and made to confess the "crimes" for which they were sentenced to concentration camps. Hundreds upon hundreds, thousands upon thousands, of these phantoms of the iron heel of Communism parade unseen before the conscience of the world.

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The trial of Archbishop Stepinac was so spectacular that 793
few people have even heard of the trial of Bishop Gregor Roz- 687
man, of Ljubljana, Slovenia, who was sentenced to prison *in absentia* for eighteen years on charges very similar to those preferred against Dr. Stepinac. Bishop Rozman was accused of collaboration with the Italians, and of having favored groups hostile to the "People's Democracy." These he was able to refute. But to the allegation that he as a Bishop had defended the rights of the Church and spoken in criticism of the atheistic doctrines of the Communist Party he had of course no response to make, other than this:

> I publicly recognize that I saw in atheistic Communism, in the sense of the Encyclical *Divini Redemptoris*, the greatest menace to the Christian religion and to the Christian way of life of my people. Accordingly I considered it my pastoral duty to warn the faithful of this danger. . . . I did my duty notwithstanding the possibility that many of my actions would be wrongly interpreted by the Communists as implying collaboration with the Occupying Powers. When I reflect upon all these things now, in the presence of God, the only conclusion I can reach is, in the main I would do the same again.

Then on June 28, 1948, the U.S.S.R. and Marshal Tito came 648
to a parting of the ways. Henceforth Yugoslavia would continue to be a Communist-dominated country but would become increasingly dependent upon what the Marshal had often referred to as the "Western Imperialist Powers."

We shall therefore briefly review the religious situation 938
prior to and after those days. During 1946 and 1947 the Com- 642
munists were omnipotent. Any opposition at all was designated high treason. Perhaps the greatest fire-eater among them was the President of the "Croatian Republic," Vladimir Bakarić. The Croats, a spirited and lovable people, have the misfortune of producing extremists of varied hues. On September 29, 1946, Bakarić addressed the students of Zagreb University.

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798 He declared that the attitude of the government towards reli-
642 gion was that of Marx and Lenin. The Church must therefore be annihilated, but in a calm and peaceful way. Bakarić's most extreme displeasure was occasioned by reports that the Blessed Virgin had appeared in Fatima, Portugal. He spoke as if he were about to issue a decree forbidding any such apparitions in the future. Bakarić, however, was only a symbol. Books, pamphlets, broadsides ridiculed and denounced the clergy. They were molested if they ventured in public; and if they remained at home grammar-school children would march past their windows, singing insulting songs.

626 During 1947 a well informed observer described very graph-
798 ically in *Civilta Catolica* the existing situation. Freedom of worship? Yes, but, as in Nazi Germany, every subterfuge was used to prevent the faithful from attending divine services. Persons coming in and out of church were noted by the secret police; and any man in the uniform of the civil service was liable to suspension if he was reported. The young were summoned to work duty or to meetings on Sunday morning. The content of sermons was reported by appointed observers, and a priest who sinned against what the regime considered decorum was summoned for a hearing. The dying could have a priest only if they specially requested that he come; and even then, in the case of State employees, the favor might not be granted.

871 As for the schools, the illusory character of the freedom
798 guaranteed by the Constitution became increasingly evident.
661 Every possible form of chicanery was resorted to in order to prevent the limited amount of religious instruction which was permitted under the law. Young Communists were sent into religion classes to provoke a tumult; and very often, especially in smaller towns, the rooms in which such classes were to be held proved to be non-existent. The poor priest who had sur-

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vived the drive to decimate the clergy, and who had good 738
reason to fear that he might be dispatched to a concentration 871
camp the week following, had to face organized jeers and 661
taunts if he put in an appearance. Even parents who attempted to give at home the instruction which was no longer possible in the school, had to reckon with the fact that denunciation by their children would mean the loss of the family livelihood. Catholic schools as such had of course been taken over by the government.

Textbooks were rewritten from the Marxist-Leninist point of view. Christ was presented as a myth, and the Church as an outmoded institution unaware of the onward march of science. Songs were taught to the children so that, as they passed the churches where their parents worshiped, they could vent on them the spleen of the Communist ballad writers. Old Catholic boarding schools were transformed into institutions for the training of a Party élite, forbidden to visit a house of worship or to see a priest. Discrimination against students because their parents were "reactionaries" was routine practice. And of course teachers or professors who did not elect to praise the new order wholeheartedly were dismissed from their posts, to be replaced by persons who often lacked rudimentary academic qualifications. Youth organizations took on more and more an outright propagandistic character. They were mere instrumentalities for indoctrination into the Communist view of life.

Catholic publishing houses ceased to exist. In 1947 it was 798
not possible to print anywhere in Yugoslavia a Bible, a cat- 626
echism, or a prayer book. The few surviving religious period- 794
icals were stifled by censorship. Catholic charities virtually disappeared. Nursing sisters still worked in hospitals prior to Tito's rupture with Moscow, but they were subject to a myriad of forms of control and interference. They were menaced with deportation to Siberia if they clung to their vows. They were

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738 compelled to become members of the nurses' union. Orphan-
626 ages and old people's homes were taken from the Church, to
794 the tune of slanderous accusations against the priests and religious who conducted them. In the orphanages prayer was forbidden, and indeed the children were taught to repeat phrases which in Christian ears are sacrilegious.

There is no purpose to be served by continuing the revolting report. By the middle of 1947, it could be conservatively estimated that Tito's followers had executed 400,000 persons. Hundreds of priests had died; nuns and other religious languished in the prisons. Pillage of religiously held properties was the rule rather than the exception. And yet, breath-takingly enough, everybody who came out of Yugoslavia reported that the people showed devotion and fidelity to an extent never known before. Anyone who recalls Sunday morning in Croatia with crowds of peasants in colorful costumes moving across the fields to church while the bells rang from old churches, as I do, has sometimes wondered whether the spectacle was not a result of surviving convention rather than of firm spiritual purpose. It may well be that there was vastly more of the second than one fancied.

Thus ends the chronicle of the Roman Catholic Church in Yugoslavia, prior to 1948.

795 In so far as the Orthodox Church is concerned, observers
659 generally conclude on the basis of reports received that it has proved far more resolute in Serbia than elsewhere. Patriarch Gabriel, who was noted as a vigorous opponent of Communism, had issued a strong Pastoral Letter from exile against Tito's persecution of the Church. He returned unexpectedly to Belgrade in 1946, and it is believed that the restoration of the Patriarch was due to the persistent endeavors of his friends in Czechoslovakia. Upon his arrival he received a delegation of priests belonging to the pro-Communist group in the clergy

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and expressed the hope that it would be possible to make a 785
mutually satisfactory settlement of the relations between 659
Church and State. Some time later, speaking at the Pan-Slavic Congress in the capital city, he deposited a small amount of complimentary oratory at the shrine of Stalin, "Russia's extraordinarily gifted leader."

These actions were preludes to the discussions which were begun in 1947, in the hope of arriving at an agreement satisfactory to the Orthodox Church. Reports indicate that Tito made many promises, and that the Patriarch was chagrined to see how few were fulfilled. Cooperation between the Church and the regime was approved in principle, but under the condition that the good name of the Church and the clergy must not be tarnished. The priests were authorized to follow their own consciences in the matter. At all events, the Patriarch had by no means merely subordinated the Church to the policy of the State.

On the whole the attitude of the Holy Synod of the Orthodox Church and of the remaining bishops was even more steadfast. A Pastoral Letter issued during the Easter season of 1946—protesting against the curtailment of religious instruction, the secularization of marriage, and the materialistic propaganda of the Communist Party—reads in retrospect very much like what the Hierarchy of the Roman Catholic Church told the faithful in that time of dire stress. It is known that the Bishops demanded the Patriarch's assurance that he would stand firm in the struggle for the rights and the freedom of the Church.

The Orthodox Church can thankfully assert also that one of 798
its bishops was just as courageous as Archbishop Stepinac. 687
Barnabas, Bishop of Saravejo, was brought to trial during February, 1948, for saying in his sermons that the enemies of God would perish. His answer was unhesitating and unequivocal: that he had only said what all the people felt and desired.

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A Roman Catholic observer, William de Vries, thus summarizes the position in which the Orthodox Church now finds itself:

> Only a minority of so-called "national" priests is on the side of the Government. This minority is, however, very active. It is organized in trade unions of priests and seeks to compel all priests to join these. These unions are conceived of by the Government as counterbalances to the Hierarchy. They are organized according to regions and there is a central organization for the whole of the Yugoslav Republic. In addition they are incorporated into the Communist national front and are subject to the authority of the Communist Party. The objective is to revamp the whole structure of the Church in accordance with democratic principles. . . . The Hierarchy is justly disturbed by the efforts of this "democratic" union of priests. But one may nevertheless conclude that the Serbian Orthodox Church as a whole has not yet capitulated.

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No one should fancy that the break with Moscow—perhaps more difficult to comprehend than any other episode in the long history of Sovietism—meant the end then and there of religious intolerance. Marshal Tito continued to preach and practice Communist doctrine, tinted colorfully with Yugoslav nationalism. All the Party tricks were still in his repertory. The Society of Sts. Cyril and Methodius was the standard version of clerical organizations professing a pro-Communist platform. Addressing it, Marshal Tito asked why its members did not break with Rome, and so emulate his own rupture with Moscow. Nor did open and violent persecution of priests and laymen cease. As late as September 25, 1949, the Reverend Josef Vedrina of Labor was set upon by a group of Communists as he was returning from a burial service and slain. At the close of 1951, *Politika,* Yugoslav Communist organ, interviewed the prime ministers of the several Yugoslav republics. The prime minister of Slovenia denounced the Vatican as one

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of the "bulwarks of reaction," and as a "persistent meddler" 653
in the affairs of all nations. He denounced the "persecution" 793
inflicted upon priests who cooperated with the government and 648
found themselves excommunicated. Bakarić, reviewing the situation in Croatia, noted with gratification that the membership in the Society of Sts. Cyril and Methodius had increased somewhat.

Nevertheless the consequence of the break with Moscow and of the attempt to arrive at an understanding with the West which inevitably followed slowly became manifest. Whereas the attitude towards the United States in particular had been unfriendly, Marshal Tito himself now sought out its diplomatic representatives. Interviews were freely accorded foreign journalists, and in April and May, 1952, *Life* published an autobiographical sketch "in Marshal Tito's own words." * Yugoslavia itself, suffering intensely both from drought and from faulty industrial reconstruction, was not pushed further into an all-out collectivist economy. The peasants had seemingly won a decisive victory against expropriation. Great stress was laid on modernizing the military establishment, and to accomplish this the good will of the American people had to be cultivated.

During April, 1951, Alex Singleton, correspondent for the 659
Associated Press, was permitted to interview Archbishop Stepinac in Lepoglava Prison, where he had been confined during more than four years. The Archbishop seemed to be well informed concerning the trend of events, and expressed the opinion that relations between Church and State had improved since 1948, because the Communist Party had adopted a "more realistic approach to democracy." The Archbishop

* Interestingly and significantly enough, the official Yugoslav version of the Marshal's career differs in important respects from that prepared for the world at large.

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The Archbishop
659 declared that while a Concordat could be negotiated only with
648 the Holy See, it was no doubt true that from the Catholic point of view what really mattered was the right to give religious instruction to children, to administer the Sacrament of Matrimony, to maintain a religious press, and to engage in charitable activities. When the news was received in Rome, the Vatican informally endorsed these views.

793 Eight months later, Archbishop Stepinac was released from
798 prison and was "conditionally" permitted to exercise the duties of a priest in his native village of Krasic. The government's communiqué referred to him as the "former archbishop." Interviewed as he was returning from morning Mass, he refused to comment on any political issue but said firmly: "I was not released under any conditions. They released me of their own free will. . . . The reason I did not ask to be released is that I do not feel guilty." The comment in *Osservatore Romano* said in part: "Another Bishop, His Excellency, Monsignor Peter Cule of Mostar, is still held in prison unjustly." It then alluded to the two hundred priests and religious who were even then in custody, and to the "forms of discrimination against religion" practiced in Yugoslavia.

659 Yet there could be no doubt, and there is none now, that the situation had greatly changed. The official illusion that the masses of the people endorsed the Communist ideology had been dispelled. Every visitor reports that once the reign of terror visited upon the Churches had abated, the people flocked as always to the houses of worship. Much has been written about this in the press of France, Italy, Germany, and Great Britain. In the *New York Herald Tribune* of August 5, 1952, John K. Cooley reported *:

The Yugoslav Constitution of 1946 separates Church and State and scrupulously guarantees, on paper, the "freedom of exercise of all

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religions" to the Roman Catholics, various sects of the Greek, Serbian 659
and Macedonian Orthodox Churches, Moslems and the tiny fraction of Protestants in the six Yugoslav republics. Piety is open and general in Zagreb, where there seems to be a church in every block, many members of monastic orders appear on the streets, and bells announce frequent masses during the day.

But a closer glance reveals the change. Church bulletin boards list only services and sparse items of parish news; no other activities exist. Gone are the Church schools which once, especially here in Croatia, exercised a guiding hand in the instruction of young people. Gone too are all traces of religious organizations for young people, women, veterans. The Party's present official attitude on the Church is perhaps best summed up by a quotation from Engels I saw beside a magnificently arranged collection of Croatian and German Gothic religious art in a Zagreb museum. "Every great religion is only a fantastic picture in men's heads, of such supernatural forces as make humdrum life easier; an earthly force which clothes itself in the guise of supra-earthly powers."

Whatever the case, a great many people in Yugoslavia today still cling to their "earthly forces."

This description is well corroborated and can be accepted 000
as correct. There has recently been little overt persecution of the Church; but religious agencies are not free to develop any part of the many-sided program in which they normally engage. Party leaders continue to express their "new Yugoslav conception" of the Marxist gospel, but they cannot rid themselves of either the onus of heretical deviation from the teaching and leadership of Moscow, or reliance upon the credits and other assistance which the West provides. Daily, the official radio exchanges blows with Moscow; but everybody knows that if the country stood alone the Russian Army would end the debate in twenty-four hours. Whether this unstable stability can be maintained is a fateful question. Yugoslavia is desperately poor, ravaged by war, revolution, massacre, and

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000 collectivistic experimentation. The strength of Marshal Tito derives from his title and not at all from his ideology. He has proved himself to be a brave and able soldier. We should realize and respect this fact, just as we should never tire of asking why a man with so much native ability became a Communist in the first place. Nobody should indulge in idle fancies that the core of Communism, in Europe, is intellectual as it is in England and the United States. Every one of its important personages was once an embittered workman or peasant, or an opportunist to whom Communism was a gateway to power.

If Tito and his people should ever come to a parting of the ways—what then? Unless the men who took over were fully prepared and had the resolute support of the vast majority of the people, its armed forces, and its surviving intellectual leaders, the result would be still another period of upheaval fraught with the gravest national and international danger. This, all of us should reckon with in terms of the given international situation when we think of the "soft underbelly of Europe." It is not so soft any longer. Fleets and air forces of great power and mobility are stationed in the Mediterranean area. These provide, to be sure, no absolute guarantee that a reconciliation between Russian and Yugoslav versions of Communist doctrine will never be achieved.

659 Towards the close of 1952, Pope Pius XII announced that
648 among the Cardinals Designate was Aloysius Stepinac. Official Yugoslavia professed to receive the news with great indignation. Diplomatic relations with the Holy See were broken off. Some days later, it was reported that Marshal Tito had invited the Yugoslav Bishops to confer with him about a possible settlement of the issues on which Church and State were divided. Reports indicate that those who responded said that, while a definitive settlement was reserved to the Holy See, they were prepared to discuss the situation with representatives of

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659 the government. Viewed realistically, this seemed to be a
648 notable step forward. Some have contended, as a result, that if Cardinal Stepinac were appointed to an important post in Rome the way might be clear for a settlement of major difficulties, because Tito would not be required to lose face. Would such a move have been approved by the Society of Jesus, in the days of the high tide of its influence on the affairs of men? This query cannot be resolved.

Returning from a visit to the British Isles, where he had perforce to take notice of pointed public inquiries into the status of religion under his regime, the Marshal ordered a religious census of the population. This was widely looked upon as a device for exposing the secret creedal ties of persons in any way associated with the government, and as a spur to professed
000 apostasy. If that was the intention, some of the results must have seemed a bit strange. On July 9, 1953, *Die Zeit*, of Hamburg, reprinted a letter which the Sarajevo Communist organ *Oslobojenje* had published on June 30, reading in part as follows:

> In connection with a census of the population, I entered my name and the names of my children, and indicated the religious associations in which I hold membership by saying that I am an atheist. . . . The community secretary, Ljubo Zelenovic, who was in charge of the census, went through the whole village after he had left my house proclaiming that I was the only woman in the whole place who did not believe in God and who made infidels of her innocent children. At the same time he delivered a harangue about atheists, saying among other things that they approved of sisters and brothers living as husbands and wives. The women of the village made the sign of the Cross and refused to believe their ears. "God protect us!" they cried. "She ought to be driven out of town so that the people may not be corrupted." "God will punish her," said my aunt's husband. She urged him to throw me out of the house. . . . This mob was regrettably joined by several members of the Communist League. One of them,

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000 Rajko Tadic, told my husband to his face that he ought to kick me out, because women who do not believe in God are immoral. Let me give you a still more deplorable example. The secretary of the Communist League, Petko Vukasinovic, gave my husband the same advice and added, "Women are in a class by themselves. We men can be accorded the right not to go to Church or to pray. But don't you realize, my friend, that my wife never misses Mass and that she goes to Confession regularly? Remember, such practices ought to be kept up for the children's welfare, if for no other reason. . . . Your wife, my friend, is a white crow in this town. If you want to get along with the people here, throw her out!" All this talk has been so widespread that my husband and I are seriously considering moving away from here. I am not a member of the Communist Party. The conditions I have described are responsible for the fact that only a very few women in the District of Zvornik are Communists. Are they not beyond the pale of democratic activity?

The town described is only a few miles from Belgrade. *Die Zeit* noted that such were the results of ten years of official Communist propaganda for atheism. While it would be very unwise to generalize on the basis of a report of this nature, it may be assumed that there are many similar villages in Yugoslavia.

648 Since this chapter was written the death of Stalin and the rise to power of Malenkov have apparently altered somewhat Tito's program for his government. First of all, the new Russian "peace offensive," directed primarily toward the Near East and the Balkans, met with some success; and a by-product was an increase of pro-Kremlin activity in Trieste, over which the Yugoslavs and the Italians were at odds. Communists there, many of whom had been ousted and exiled by Tito as pro-Stalin stooges, were now in a position to foment more trouble than their numbers warranted, particularly for the Allied Occupying Powers—a fact which incidentally leads to the con-

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648 clusion that these agents should have been forced to move on when they sought asylum.

While Tito and the responsible Italian statesmen responded to nationalistic emotions aroused on both sides of the disputed city, Yugoslav interest in the Pact which bound the country together with Greece, Turkey, and Italy in a military alliance with the West waned. The Marshal himself did not formally withdraw from his commitments to this alliance, but organs of public opinion over which his Party has complete control ostentatiously did, giving rise to considerable speculation and some fear. United States diplomats thus inherited another conundrum from the immediate postwar period. On the one hand, it was not possible to deed Trieste over to Italy. On the other, the arrangements with the Yugoslav dictator, made at the cost of almost infinite pains, were in some jeopardy.

798 Acts reflecting hostility to the Church and its clergy increased. American observers reported a number of incidents troublingly reminiscent of the days prior to the Marshal's "conversion." Priests were attacked, and churches were pillaged. The motivation is impossible to determine. The hoodlums involved may have been venting their spleen on the Vatican, adjudged to be an ally of Italy; or they may have been carrying out orders of the Party, the nature and intent of which are veiled from view. One thing was made certain: the lot of a Church and its faithful under a dictatorship like Tito's is highly precarious, indeed.

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5 POLAND AND RELIGION

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POLAND, LARGEST AND MOST populous of the satellite countries, was also by all odds the most difficult morsel the Russians were to swallow and attempt to digest. This can best be realized if the problem is seen in its historical setting. The Polish State after its establishment at the close of the First World War was, as might easily have been anticipated, a product of strong nationalistic and irredentist emotions and a victim of grave economic and political weaknesses. Polish patriots, freed at long last from bondage, were eager to annex any territory which at some time had been under Polish sovereigns. Because a great part of the Ukraine, including Kiev, had been under such dominion, Polish forces battled against Bolshevik troops, who drove them back and were defeated only with great difficulty at the gates of Warsaw; and in the West sanguinary fighting took place between Polish "insurgents" and German veterans illegally mustered in to defend eastern Silesia. In like manner the Poles overran the southern part of the newly constituted Lithuanian State and took possession of the historic city of Vilna. It mattered little that the Victorious Powers had assigned to Poland boundaries which

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conformed in most essentials with those fixed at the time of the Second Partition of 1793, or had decreed that there should be a Polish Corridor separating East Prussia from the rest of Germany. Polish nationalists remained dissatisfied, and the rights of minorities in the new State were seldom assured. As a result it was embroiled in open or smoldering disputes with all its neighbors; and during the twenty years after 1918 only the might and prestige of the French army shielded it from pressure or even attack. 186 175 648

At the same time the dire economic plight of large sections of a predominatingly peasant population and a dearth of experience with democratic political institutions created widespread domestic unrest and conflict. With the assistance of experts provided by the United States, the currency was stabilized after 1920 and banking institutions were put on a firm foundation. The newly established port of Gdynia enabled the country to establish a moderately profitable foreign trade. Upper Silesian mines, taken from Germany by decree of the Allies, were also sources of wealth. Nevertheless the masses remained desperately poor. Meanwhile the form of government became more and more authoritarian, and Marshal Pilsudski assumed the role of dictator. After his death the nation was ruled by a "government of colonels," who viewed the troubled international scene with shallow optimism, signed nonaggression pacts with Russia and Nazi Germany, and sought to take advantage of Hitler's attack on Czechoslovakia by forcibly seizing the area of Teschen. The Polish army, pride of the nation with some of the best infantry divisions in Europe, remained antiquated in leadership, organization, and equipment. 175 511 642 648 [701]

The outcome was that one of the most romantic, appealing, courageous, and gifted of peoples was plunged into pitiless and awful tragedy such as history has seldom witnessed. After the Stalin-Hitler Pact was signed, the German dictator struck 175 648

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175 swiftly and savagely, while the Russians occupied the territory
648 east of the Bug River, where the beaten Polish armies might conceivably have been redeployed. Subsequently another Russo-German agreement all but wiped Poland from the political map. The districts to the west came under German rule, while all territory east of the so-called Curzon Line were given to Russia in perpetuity. Lithuania also was ceded to Russia. Under Nazism the Poles suffered excruciatingly.
721 Countless numbers were slain or deported. Major blows were
798 also struck at religion. When the Second World War ended, Jewry in Poland had been almost completely destroyed, the few survivors having managed to hide in out-of-the-way places or miraculously survived the extermination camps. The Lutheran Church, which had served primarily Germans resident in Poland and was deemed by Hitler to have favored that country, was decimated. Scarcely less appalling was the persecution of the Catholic Church. Nearly two-fifths of all its clergy were imprisoned, and half of this number may well have died on the block or in concentration camps. The Russian occupation of eastern Poland was followed by almost equally barbarous treatment. Captured Polish officers were murdered in Katyn Forest. The Polish Catholic population which professed the Latin rite was ruthlessly deported and exterminated. Greek Catholics were the victims of unmitigated tyranny. Propagandists proclaimed the incompatibility of religion with the Communist view of life. By the close of the first brief period of Soviet occupation, more than 100,000 persons had disappeared, no one knows where. Then, as the tide of war moved to and fro across the stricken land, resistance forces battled first one side and then the other. The grimmest of these stories concerns the destruction of the Warsaw Ghetto; but there are many tales, and each is heartrending.

000 The Second World War ended, and the nation groped about

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The Second World War ended and the nation groped about
in its ruins. The loss of life, the destruction of public buildings 728
and of private housing, the elemental plight of the population, 175
all are beyond imagining. The Russians moved to take over control with mingled skill and brutality. By securing at Potsdam an agreement which took from Poland the district east of the Curzon Line and compensated it with territory traditionally and unmistakably German—Silesia in particular—they maneuvered the West into a position from which it cannot, seemingly, extricate itself by peaceful means. Thus the way was prepared for an irredentist *rapprochement* between Russia and Germany, should it prove desirable to the Kremlin; and no doubt this possibility today haunts the dreams of every chancellery in the free world. Stalin acceded, to be sure, to the principle that the government of Poland must be democratic, fashioned in accordance with the will of the people as ascertained in free and open elections. But the Russians soon snuffed out any hope that anti-Communist political groups would retain independence of action; indeed, they liquidated Social Democratic and other opponents with the utmost callousness when it seemed expedient. Far more quickly than had been anticipated, the pattern was traced in broad outline. All the freedoms existed on paper; but in bare and bald reality the Communist Party had acquired absolute mastery. A tragic by-product was that Polish soldiers abroad, who had fought hard and courageously for victory at Monte Cassino and elsewhere, could not return to their native land.

We shall begin our review of the implications for religion 795
with some data concerning religious affiliations in Poland. [162]
When Hitler declared war, Catholics worshiping according to the Latin rite constituted approximately three-fourths of the population. A tenth professed the Greek Orthodox faith, and the percentage of Jews was comparable. Protestants were a small minority, numbering about 842,000 in 1940. The Roman 000

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795 659 Catholic Churches, of the Latin and Greek rites, sponsored a large number of activities and organizations. The Constitution recognized religion as an integral part of the educational curriculum and assigned a position of special privilege to the Roman Catholic Church as that of the vast majority, identified in a most intimate way with Poland's national history. The Concordat signed by the Holy See and the Polish government in February, 1925, accorded to the Church a measure of independence from the State which was, I think, not paralleled elsewhere in Europe. After it was ratified Pope Pius XI, who as Monsignor Achille Ratti had been Papal Nuncio to Poland, issued a Papal Bull entitled *Vixdum Poloniae Unitas* which gave formal expression to the Church's satisfaction and called attention to the close ties which had traditionally bound this imperiled country to the See of Rome.

[771] The grant of so many notable privileges and the establishment of a large number of monastic institutions (for example, there were more than 18,000 professed nuns in Poland) aroused, to be sure, some opposition among the more discontented and anticlerical elements of the population. Prior to the Nazi invasion a not inconsiderable literature assailed the Church with varying degrees of bitterness and skill; much of it was of Leftist derivation, though there existed also a morally emancipated bourgeois anticlericalism. Accordingly the hostility which Catholicism encountered when the Russians assumed control was by no means wholly imported from the east.

794 To offset diverse forms of animosity, there grew up in Poland after 1927 a powerful and effectively led Catholic Action Movement, specially suited to meet the conditions which obtained after the establishment of Marshal Pilsudski's quasi-dictatorship. It enlisted in the crusade for Catholic solidarity all groups of the population, young and old, peasant and worker, professional man and scholar.

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Religious life in Poland had a special character. An intellectual élite, often marked by unusual insight into the values of humanism, was soundly trained in theology; but the poverty of the country outside the relatively few centers of commerce and culture was dire indeed, and left little leisure for intellectual pursuits. The vast throngs of peasants were just beginning to stir out of the passivity into which centuries of hopeless thralldom had plunged them. Nor was the lot of the average industrial worker much better. The quality of the wares offered to him for purchase was often so bad that I wondered why he bothered to buy them. Even the clergy were not infrequently uncultivated, caste-conscious, and bureaucratic. As a consequence there lay over much of the Polish landscape a recognizable, sometimes quite tangible sadness: the melancholy of the human being with a great and real endowment for poetry—as its writers and musicians bear witness—whose outer life was stark, unredeemed reality. Yet this mood was combined with a deep and imaginative introspection, so that religious mysticism, whether it was the Sabbath-day brooding of the Jewish Ghetto or the ecstasy of the Catholic pilgrimage, was deeper and stronger than it probably was elsewhere in the Western world.

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No doubt hearts and minds are more easily kindled by ideas when they are not so cluttered up with extraneous concerns that no path to the hearth of the soul can be found. The oldest preserved fragment of Polish literature is a "Hymn to the Blessed Virgin." The great Russian philosopher Vladimir Soloviëv was wont to say that his own country and Poland would eventually arrive at concord through a common dedication to Mary. At any rate, a profound and no doubt Eastern concern with what is peculiarly dear and mystical alike in Catholic theology (which can to be sure also be conceived of purely emotionally, and indeed merely credulously) is the

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781 treasure garnered from the innermost core of religious experience for the preservation of which a struggle is now in progress in Poland. All else is of secondary significance. And it must always be borne in mind that what relatively uneducated men term "science"—the lightening of burdens as a result of the harnessing of nature to technological tasks—may prove to be the inspiration of mystical beliefs which can tease almost to the verge of delirium the feelings of those who have lived so long in a world in which the tyrant State merely mirrors the tyrant Nature.

We should never deal lightly or superficially with the ideology of the Communists. Observing the attitude of people not previously acquainted with machines towards these incredibly beneficent behemoths wearing seven-league boots and able to do in an hour what the arms and hands of many men could not accomplish in a day, one knows that initial feelings of fear, resentment, and an odd kind of envy soon give way to moods of deliverance and of enjoyment of fancied freedom which can induce a violent intoxication of the spirit. In this pseudo trance, people are likely to accept the conclusion that the human intelligence expended on creating these things, earthly though it be, is as near to Divinity as man can hope to come. Not until human beings rediscover the cruelty which is inherent in this intelligence when it is left alone to deal with the power urges implicit in its very nature, do they begin to realize once again that unless there be another Power, sempiternal, immutable, and inexhaustibly good, life cannot be loved or even endured.

578 We should remember also that rabid, uncompromising na-
186 tionalist sentiment can corrode a society almost to the verge of
798 spiritual extinction. Such sentiment was the grievous, if from some points of view explicable, sin of modern Poland. It was nowhere more manifest than in religious relations. Tension

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between Christian and Jew was constant, resembling that which existed between whites and Negroes in the United States at the close of the First World War. But it was often to be discerned in the relations among Christians as well. A distinguished Polish scholar writes: 578 186 798

> Due to the steady increase of nationalist feeling, the area of cooperation between Latin and Eastern Catholics grew progressively smaller. Nationalists living in the southeastern territories of the country, where animosity between Poles and Ukrainians had increased considerably during the nineteenth century, did not hesitate to make use of religion as an instrument of political machination. Even some of the clergy who were active in nationalist movements misused the Church and organizations associated with it for purposes alien to the Church's mission. The successes of Hitler and Mussolini then made such nationalists feel surer of themselves and more persuaded of the correctness of their ideas. Though not very numerous, the followers of such leaders were unusually active and so able to poison relationships between the two groups in the population. They were ordinarily young people who yearned to act as strong men opposed to every form of compromise and to the pacific influence of the Church. The following remarks made by a Ukrainian priest describe the situation very aptly: "We Ukrainians and Poles may be compared, in our contemporary political and religious antagonisms, to two lions that attack and mangle each other. Thereby we provide a spectacle for Europe and in particular for the states which are our neighbors and which watch our tussle and turmoil with satisfaction."

To the pertinence of these remarks I can myself attest.

That is the background against which the second Russian occupation, extended to the whole of Poland, must be visualized.

In so far as religion is concerned, this occupation, though attended by many cruelties and outrages, differed notably from the first, reflecting a change inside Russia itself. At the outset there was no overt attack on religion. Thus the Russians 928 175 798

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728 175 798 not only paid the expenses of the funeral in 1944 of the deceased Metropolitan of the Greek Catholic Church, Archbishop Szeptitski, but were officially represented at the obsequies. In the following December efforts were made to persuade this Church that its rightful place was inside the pale of Russian Orthodoxy. The Patriarch of Moscow sent a delegation to Lwów for the purpose. It was announced in the government press that the Greek Catholic clergy had been abettors of the evil policies of the Vatican, and that they were therefore to be considered as enemies of the Soviet Union. As has been indicated, there was some truth in the charge, because a few ardent Ukrainian patriots among the clergy had for a time expected great things of what they assumed would be Nazi policy towards the Ukraine. Secret police raided the residences of the Uniate bishops and prelates, confiscating all records. The successor to Archbishop Szeptitski, Dr. Joseph Slipyj, was arrested, tried, and deported to a concentration camp at Workuta. He is known to have been there as late as 1949. A similar fate was meted out to other bishops. A letter addressed to the "Pastors and Faithful of the Greek-Catholic Church" by the Patriarch of Moscow pointed out that, whereas the Russian Orthodox Church had supported peace, freedom, and the Russian cause, the Vatican had given aid and comfort to Hitler, "the greatest scoundrel the history of the world has ever seen." On April 29, 1945, some five hundred Greek Catholic clergymen met for a conference in the Cathedral of Lwów. This was surrounded by the secret police. The priests were arrested, and some of them were shot. Orders were thereupon issued that no Greek Catholic priest should conduct services without a special permit from the Soviet authorities.

795 661 798 The liquidation of the Greek Catholic Church and its enforced apostasy to Moscow was in process, even as it would soon be in Rumania. One cannot say definitely that this was a

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maneuver inspired by Communistic hatred of religion, for it 795
resembles closely in conception and execution similar meas- 661
ures taken under the Tsars. Indeed, we might well confess that 798
historians will find it extremely difficult to determine which of the steps to suppress the Church in the satellite states were suggested by Communist doctrine, and which were solely reflections of the traditional Russian colonization policies revived by Stalin in imitation of the Tsars Peter and Ivan. At any rate, [797]
announcement was made of the formation of a "Committee of Initiative for the Transfer of Greek Catholics to the Orthodox [793]
Church," headed by the Reverend Havril Kostelnyk, a theologian of some repute who had deeply resented the contempt visited upon his Church for nationalistic reasons by some of the Polish clergy. The committee issued two letters, one addressed to their fellow priests and the other to the Council of the People's Commissars of the Ukrainian Soviets. On June 18, 1945, the committee, which in the interim had been joined by twoscore more of the clergy, received a reply from the Ukrainian capital, recognizing it as the only "juridico-ecclesiastical body having unrestricted right to control Greek Catholic parishes in the western Ukraine," in order to promote the union of these parishes with the Orthodox Church. As a consequence it was instructed to report to the Council of People's Commissars the names of "deans, clergy, and superiors of religious houses who refuse to submit to the authority of the Committee of Initiative." The neck of every recalcitrant was now in the noose.

Representatives of the committee then made two trips—one to Kiev and the other to Moscow—to discuss the problems associated with reunion. Dr. Kostelnyk, who had meanwhile been ordained a priest in the Russian Orthodox Church, reported that 997 Uniate priests had recognized the authority of the Committee on Initiative. The total number of clergymen was

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778 more than 2,200, and it is not difficult to surmise the fate of the
661 others. Meanwhile the two remaining bishops of the Greek
795 Catholic Church were arrested and deported.* For all practical purposes, Greek Catholicism had been liquidated even though the tenacity with which deep religious convictions are held makes all reports of such overt actions misleading. There can be no doubt that this branch of the Catholic Church manifested great and memorable heroism, as in the time of the Nazi occupation. Archbishop Szeptitski in particular had issued a Pastoral Letter condemning the treatment meted out to the Jews, and had denounced the conscription of men and women for labor in Germany.

795 When Russian Communism came face to face with Roman
798 Catholicism according to the Latin rite in those parts of Poland which had not been annexed, but which were nevertheless under Party control, it confronted one of its most doughty antagonists. This territory was now more strongly Catholic than it had previously been, owing to the liquidation of the

795 * *Osservatore Romano* of Dec. 12, 1946, described the arrest of the two bishops
661 in the following terms: "The larger part of the Ruthenian diocese of Przemyśl was transferred to Russia, while the city itself and a small amount of adjacent territory remained with Poland. On May 14, 1946, Bishop Jiosofat Kocylowskyj was summoned by a Russian colonel of the Secret Police, a Polish major of the same arm, and Tiszezenko, the Ukrainian chief of the Russian Office of Transportation, and told to leave 'voluntarily' for Russia. The Bishop refused to do so, saying that he could comply only if the order came from the Pope. He was informed that in this case he would be deported by force. And so at 9 A.M., on the morning of June 20, the local commander of the Security Police, accompanied by a soldier, appeared at the Bishop's residence and declared he was under orders to transport him and the members of the Cathedral Chapter to Russia. The Bishop answered that he would not resign his See, and that in any event he would have to pack his luggage. At 6 P.M. soldiers dragged him out of his house, beating him severely. He was placed in an automobile, and this left immediately for the Russian border. On June 27, Bishop Lakota as well as Canons Resztyl, Kusyra and Hycelak were taken to the railroad station and asked to sign a declaration to the effect that they were leaving 'voluntarily' for Russia. All refused to do so. The train then took them across the frontier. The residences of the Bishops and Canons were plundered, and their property and personal effects were sold on the streets and in the market place."

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Jews by the Nazis. The percentage, populationwise, may well have been higher than 93 in 1945. Despite all the grievous losses suffered, it was possible to reestablish within a short time a smoothly functioning ecclesiastical organization. Charitable institutions, educational establishments, and even the press were made ready for action. A notable revival of religious practice was reported from all parts of the country. Thus more than 2,000,000 persons went on pilgrimage to the popular shrine of Częstochowa during 1946. Against such an adversary, the Communists proceeded with great wariness. No earnest attempt was made immediately to alter the character of education, or to raise the issue of confiscation of properties belonging to the Church.

Nevertheless a mighty wave of propaganda, directed against the Hierarchy but primarily against the Vatican, descended upon the nation. It strove to prove that the Pope had aided the cause of Hitler and Fascism, and was therefore to be considered as an enemy of the Polish people. Two arguments in particular were employed. The first was that after the dismissal of the Polish Hierarchy in regions incorporated into Germany by the Nazis, the Church had recognized the jurisdiction of the German bishops. The second allegation, difficult to controvert, was that the Vatican favored the restoration to Germany of those territories which the Potsdam Conference of 1945 had ceded to Poland. The Holy See had manifested so often its detestation of Nazism, and had testified upon so many occasions to its affection for the Poles—for example, by according asylum to Cardinal Hlond and giving him almost unlimited opportunity to speak over the Vatican radio—that the accusation of sympathy with Hitler was likely to seem jocose. In addition Pope Pius XII had so promptly speeded up relief activities when it became possible to do so that no one in his right mind would believe that he had ever deviated from the

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735 policy of his predecessor expressed in the Concordat and in
653 the Bull *Vixdum Poloniae Unitas*. It was, however, obviously
648 impossible for the Vatican to foresee the treaty of peace and condone the expulsion of millions of Silesians whose loyalty to the Holy See was just as genuine as that of Poland itself. It could do so as little as it could have approved the German attack on Poland.

But on the basis of such arguments the pro-Communist government abrogated the Concordat on September 12, 1945, without previous notice to the Holy See. Surprisingly enough, the Polish courts were still in a position to rule that the government's action was invalid; and for a time relations between the Polish State and the Vatican remained nebulous. During the
[793] following spring the Primate of Poland, Cardinal August Hlond, returned from the exile into which he had been forced by the fact that he was in Rome when the war broke out. He had a long record of service to Polish national interests. Although conditions were still turbulent, his arrival attracted widespread attention, and popular demonstrations of respect and affection contrasted vividly with the criticism and de-
659 nunciation meted out in the Communist press. He himself refrained from discussing relations between Church and State; but they formed the theme of Pastoral Letters issued by the Polish Hierarchy during April and June, which pointed out to the faithful that the materialistic view of life, as propounded by spokesmen for Communism, was incompatible with the traditions and the historic mission of Poland. The Letter of June 19 also criticized forcefully the administration of justice throughout the land, and observed that personal freedom and security were not safeguarded. It adduced cases of shooting of men, women, and even children without the formality of a trial and denounced conditions prevailing in prisons and concentration camps. This letter was confiscated,

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only twenty words of it having been approved by the official censor. 659

To be sure, terrorism was not halted by these protests. The Communists skillfully solidified their position in the period prior to the first postwar general election. Their methods, in so far as Catholics were concerned, deviated very little from the standard pattern. The government promptly discovered the Polish National Church, a quite insignificant movement of a schismatic character established by a handful of Polish priests who had returned from the United States after stormy passages at arms with certain American bishops of non-Polish extraction. This Church was now cast for the role of center around which "patriotic priests" could rally. In like manner, the two traditional Catholic political parties were revamped when a few members of both, having announced their readiness to cooperate with the government, were summarily installed as a joint "Board of Directors." The Hierarchy flayed these actions vigorously, urging the faithful to vote only for candidates who were not avowed enemies of the Church; and the Catholic press published pointed commentaries on the situation. Nevertheless the provisional government clenched its teeth and rammed through an election edict prepared in advance. The majority of the candidates standing against the government's list were clapped into jail; and the voters were terrorized by large contingents of Communist police, who had the assignment of seeing to it that "free elections" should turn out the right way. Foreign newsmen scrutinized the balloting carefully, so that some semblance of the truth about Soviet-sponsored democracy began to trickle through to the still far too optimistic countries of the West. 659 798 626

By the close of 1948 the Communists had managed to get the power into their hands. They redoubled their efforts to eradicate "religious prejudice" from the schools and to form 665 983 668

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youth organizations willing to imbibe the teachings of Marx, Lenin, and Stalin; and slowly and craftily they infiltrated the associations of teachers. Demands that textbooks and all other aids to teaching be revised in accordance with the "modern scientific outlook" began to be as common and similar as peas. A "Union of Militant Youth," similar to the German Freie deutsche Jugend, was strongly supported; and this began to build cells in the Polish Boy and Girl Scout organizations, which had been popular prior to Hitler's victory and were revived immediately after the liberation. The familiar motto, "A Scout Serves God and Country," was revised to read, "A Scout Serves Democratic Poland." Shopworn methods of infiltration were resorted to even in professedly religious schools and youth groups. Perhaps the most effective Communist recipe for the indoctrination of young people was the summer camp, which in Poland was combined with a free trip to the Soviet Union. The camps, often organized on a grandiose scale, offered "political education" to boys and girls by carefully trained Party instructors.

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It may be observed for general edification that, although the methods of indoctrination in all youth organizations sponsored by totalitarian regimes are pretty much alike, the Russian Communist system differs in one important characteristic from the Fascist Balilla and the German Hitlerjugend: its brand of internationalism. It does not teach the young Pole, for example—as a Polish Hitler Youth organization might have done—that all good things without exception are found in his country, which, by reason of heredity or tradition, has a divine right to conquer other peoples. It tells him that the "true democracy" is to be found in the Soviet Union alone, and that his country will also become great when it in turn acquires "true democracy" through practice and imitation. Undoubtedly this doctrine appeals strongly to many youngsters; and

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in addition "true democracy" can be defined as the sole 668
guarantor of "peace." In a sense, this system of youth forma- 883
tion resembles the system in the Catholic Church, which stresses [771]
the international solidarity implicit in the teachings of Christ, and holds that the nations will become noble and great when they have realized fully the ideals of Christian civilization. To be sure, the abyss between the two is deep and wide, unbridgeably deep and wide. While freedom of thought and decision, bounded only by a sense of obligation to the recognizable ordinances of God, are cardinal principles of the Christian order, there stands behind every youngster brought up under the Communist rule the man with the knout whose business it is to fit every human cog into the Soviet machine. Yet in some ways this man has an easy time of it. The law of God as taught by the Church is a law of love. And love is (let us remember) far more difficult, endlessly more challenging, than anything the Communist has to offer. Alas, it is so onerous that perilously few Christians fashion their lives in accordance with it.

At any rate, a preliminary climax in the Polish cultural and 653
religious struggle was reached in March, 1949, with the issuance of a government declaration on matters affecting the relations between Church and State. The author was Wladyslaw Wolski, Minister of Public Administration. He mingled charges against some of the bishops of collaboration with the Nazis with charges that the clergy was harboring in its midst many "agents of Anglo-American imperialism." The government, he emphasized anew, did not intend to place any limitations on religious freedom; but on the other hand it would not "tolerate the abuse of freedom involved in inciting people against the state." Minister Wolski's declaration did, however, contain the assurance that religious institutions would "be free to perform their duties after they had become subject to

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proper government control and inspection." On March 25, the Bishops replied, demanding that the government recognize the right of parents to determine the kind of school their children should attend, and so end the subjection of children of Catholic parents to an anti-Christian training. They also asked that young Catholics be permitted to join associations conducted under the auspices of the Church. In the following September, Archbishop Stefan Wyszński, who had become Primate of Poland in January, appealed in the same vein to all who were giving religious instruction to young people. He urged that youth be led to believe "that justice is possible in this world, without recourse to violence, to prisons and to concentration camps, without the enslavement and exploitation of labor, and without the shedding of blood."

During the summer of 1949 a rumor spread that tears of blood had appeared on the face of the image of the Blessed Virgin in Lublin Cathedral. Huge throngs hurried to the city, despite the Bishop's official statement that there was no evidence that a miracle had occurred. Some mob hysteria followed, and a girl died of suffocation in the milling crowd. These events, which testified to the presence in the people of a deep undercurrent of religious emotion, caused violent outbursts of anti-Catholic comment in the Communist press. Just as the furore was at its height, the news came that the Vatican had excommunicated all who abetted and aided Communism. This action was followed in Poland by some days of awestruck silence, for it meant that supporters of the regime would cut themselves off from the historic Church, part of the very lifeblood of Polish history. After a time the government saw fit to retaliate with a bitter attack on the Holy See; then it convened by order all the Catholic clergy in every district of the country to hear the reading of a decree of August 5. Those

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attending were asked to sign a statement that they supported 781
the government against the Holy See, and that "the imposition 789
of excommunication on persons helping to build the People's 653
Poland is a horrendous act." Two priests were reported to have 648
complied.

This decree was the first important legislation affecting the 659
relations between Church and State. For the "constitutional 642
act" passed by the Polish National Assembly on February 19, 1947—usually referred to as the "Small Constitution"—did not alter or abrogate the provisions of the Polish Constitution of 1921, which had conferred upon the Church most of its privileges and rights. It is true that a law of January 1, 1946, [582] established civil marriage as the only kind recognizable by the State; but this also stated specifically that the parties concerned were not deprived "of the possibility of also adding the performance of ceremonies resulting from their membership in a religious association." It was not until June 27, 1950, [582] that divorce was legalized in Poland; all annulment and separation proceedings previously had been matters for the ecclesiastic courts.

The decree of August 5, 1949, follows closely Article 124 671
of the Constitution of the U.S.S.R., not only in seeming to 653
guarantee freedom of religion but also in providing a series of 179, 67
penalties for violation of such freedom. For example, Articles 798
4 and 5 of the decree read as follows:

> Anyone who abuses freedom of religion by refusing to permit a person to participate in a religious activity or ceremony because of his political, social, or scientific affiliations or beliefs is liable to a penalty of up to five years in prison.
>
> Anyone who offends religious susceptibilities by publicly insulting an object of religious veneration or a place set aside for the performance of religious ceremonies is liable to a penalty of up to five years in prison.

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671 659 177. 69 798 The fourth article obviously made it a punishable offense for a Catholic priest to refuse to administer the Sacraments to any person desiring to receive them, even though he had fallen under the Vatican's edict of excommunication.* The fifth, on the other hand, prohibits any godless person from making an offensive remark at a shrine, or from in any manner desecrating a church.

Article 8 is no doubt the most significant portion of the decree. It reads:

> Anyone who abuses freedom of conscience and religion for purposes inimical to the existence of the Polish Republic is liable to a penalty of imprisonment for not less than three years. Anyone who makes preparations to commit an offense so defined is subject to a penalty of imprisonment.

[687] Manifestly this Article could be and was interpreted in ways the government deemed useful or expedient. That it has been so used is clear from the record. More than 500 Polish priests have been held in prisons or concentration camps. The charges, in so far as they are known, have veered from accusations of friendliness to remnants of the old Polish Army, which for a long while carried on a form of guerrilla opposition, to charges that they had served as spies for the "Anglo-American imperialists." Up to this time, however, no bishop of the Catholic Church of the Latin rite had been tried or imprisoned.

795 659 998 Meanwhile the historic See of Cracow, where the patron saint of Poland lies buried, was presided over by an Archbishop of very considerable ability and fortitude, Cardinal Adam Sapieha. On the tenth anniversary of the invasion of Poland by the Nazi armies, he received a letter from Pope

* By special indult the Vatican ruled that, because Matrimony is a Sacrament conferred on the two contracting parties, priests might officiate even if bride or bridegroom were a Communist.

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Pius which recapitulated the efforts of the Holy See to avert war and expressed regret that the stricken country had been invaded from both the east and the west. The Holy Father proceeded to say: 795 659 798

> The hour of trial has not yet passed. Catholic associations have to all intents and purposes been dissolved, the teaching of religion in the schools is interfered with. Many obstacles are placed in the way of the free development of institutions which have been entrusted to the care of the nuns or the clergy. The calumnies published by the press against the Catholic religion, against Ourselves, and against the bishops and priests; the stifling censorship imposed upon every Catholic publication; the denial of spiritual ministration to prisoners and those who are ill; the lack of free and secure communication between the Holy See, the bishops and the reverend clergy—all these things make more difficult the practice of religion amongst you.

The government reaction to this message was revealed primarily in the use of the old and trusted Communist device—seeking to set one Christian communion against another. Whereas in numerous instances the Communists had resembled the Nazis in their antipathy to religious sects—which Hitler referred to as *Sektenwesen*—they began in Poland to show favor towards each and every religious body which was in some way hostile to the Catholic Church. For example, Jehovah's Witnesses, at the time the favorite butt of ridicule and oppression in Eastern Germany, seemed in 1949 to be the very apples of the Polish Communist's eye. The government also, by using representatives of the Russian Orthodox Church as spokesmen, elicited approval of the new decree from the Protestant Ecumenical Council in Poland, and an expression of confidence in and support of the new state.

The year 1950 witnessed the first momentous blows against the independence and indeed the very life of the Church. First, a statute dated March 20 provided for nationalization 659 425

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659 of land held by religious orders, for retention by parish priests
425 of parish lands of limited extent, and for a Church Fund to be administered by the government. This was more liberal than comparable statutes in other satellite states, but the intent was the same. Thus it stipulated not only that the government should hold all nationalized Church property in trusteeship, all income derived therefrom to be transferred to the Church Fund, but also that the government should determine the use of the fund. In other words, if a dissident Catholic Church could be created nothing would prevent the government from deeding over to it all the assets of those faithful to the Holy See. In addition the permission to parish priests to retain parish lands patently implies a line of distinction between them and their religious superiors. Here was a wedge that could be driven between bishops and clergy; and since 1950 persistent use has been made of it.

794 More important was the propaganda against Caritas, the
661 central association of Catholic welfare agencies, which reached a new peak of efficiency. Its management was accused of graft, embezzlement, reactionary tendencies, close contact with Anglo-American imperialism, hostility to the "People's Poland," and many other crimes. Hundreds of workers for Caritas were promptly arrested. The whole organization was placed under government trusteeship, and a thorough investigation was ordered. It should be borne in mind that Caritas was an organization of central importance in the life of Poland. It functioned in twenty-five dioceses and in more than four thousand parishes. It maintained kindergartens, nurseries, recreation rooms, homes for the aged, dispensaries, and a variety of other welfare services. After the war it was financed to a considerable extent out of benefactions received from the Bishops of the United States and from Polish-American groups, and its activities were admired greatly throughout Poland.

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The Hierarchy responded vigorously to the attack upon Caritas, first in a letter from Cardinal Sapieha to President Bierut. On January 30, 1950, the Polish Bishops, having met in conference to discuss the matter, issued a statement which the parish priests read in the churches of Poland wherever security police did not interfere. On February 16 the Primate (Archbishop Wyszyński) and Cardinal Sapieha addressed a longer and more explicit statement to the President of the Republic. Their letter indicates that the principal accusations against Caritas in the pro-Communist press were that it had received aid from the United States and was therefore allied with the machinations of that imperialist power: specifically, that "American elements, with Cardinal Spellman at their head . . . have seen in this institution a handy weapon aimed at the People's Poland. Caritas was to be a kind of Bishops' Marshall Plan." And it describes familiar Communist procedures graphically:

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> Diverse columns in the press and in radio communiqués are devoted to listing categories of alleged abuses designed primarily to put to shame in the eyes of the community the Catholic Church. Thus it is charged that allegedly the clergy and the religious orders obtained grants-in-aid from Caritas, though it should have been easy for the investigating authorities to determine that any such grants did not come out of supplies designated by Caritas for the poor. The Catholic League and other donors had stipulated that certain gifts were intended for the clergy and the religious orders, and these were distributed in accordance with the will of the donors. . . .
>
> Caritas is often accused of having aided prisoners. Such assistance would indeed conform with the spirit of Christianity, but it should be noted also that the gifts were disbursed with the approval of the prison authorities. Quite apart from this propaganda campaign, so prejudicial to the Church and to Catholics, the Hierarchy condemns the steps taken by State authorities to mobilize the Catholic clergy, Religious Sisters and the faithful against Catholic charity—steps which are

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794 frequently violations of the freedom of conscience. Priests, nuns, and
661 members of the laity are brought to conferences directed against the Church and to other gatherings and meetings in ways which may well involve terror and deceit. . . .

Abnormal moral pressure is brought not only by the heads of district and provincial administrations and by the mayors of towns, but also by members of the Party and officials of the security police. In some instances, organized hunts of priests have taken place. They have been pulled out of bed in the early morning by armed militiamen, who sometimes either did not permit the priest to celebrate Mass or forced him to interrupt Divine service and leave still clad in his liturgical garments.

Priests have often had to go into hiding. In order to influence people to fight against the charities of the Church, the authorities have arranged costly receptions replete with alcoholic beverages. We know of instances where warrants have been issued against priests who were invited to such functions and did not attend. The names of clerics long since dead have been published as among those who came to such receptions. Furthermore, the clergy is being drawn in also through the appointment of priests as members of the trusteeship body of Caritas, even though this is often done without their knowledge and consent.

All this will seem familiar to anyone who has studied the Party's procedures in other lands.

659 As the statement of the two leaders of the Hierarchy in-
793 dicates, the government had staged an all-out effort to set up an organization of "patriotic priests" which would repudiate their bishops and thus lead to the signing of a "concordat" ending the Church-State struggle on such terms as the Government desired to offer. Some few priests did as a matter of fact swallow the bait. The statement refers to them as "men demoralized by war and prison camps." It says further that they "are in conflict with canon law or are blackmailed by the police authorities because they are subject to punishment."

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Still there is no doubt that, subjected to threats and other means 653
of terrorization, a considerable body of the clergy were 793
frightened and even temporarily demoralized. Meanwhile an 665
organization of laymen, who called themselves "Progressive Catholics," had been formed under the leadership of B. Piasecki, who in prewar Poland had been the head of a pro-Fascist organization known as Falanga. It calls to mind the Kreuz und Adler group, formed by Franz von Papen during the first year of Hitler's rule over Germany. The "Progressive Catholics" still enjoy a great deal of government support and are represented in the Polish parliament.

Russia now sent a "proconsul" to Poland in the person of 177,
Marshal Rokossowski. Vigorous measures were adopted to 64
complete the sovietizing of the country. The Polish civil ad- 647
ministration was reorganized to conform with the Russian 423
pattern. Collective farming was stressed. But at the same time it became apparent that popular sentiment, especially among the peasants, was responding to this pressure in terms of more determined opposition. Suddenly it began to be whispered 653
about that an agreement between Church and State was im- 648
minent. Cardinal Sapieha had left for Rome for an *ad limina* visit to the Pope. The Communist press surprised him, the Vatican, and everyone else by publishing an announcement that an agreement had been reached. And it was true that such a document had been assented to. The Polish Hierarchy issued a carefully worded comment indicating that the agreement was not to be looked upon as a Concordat, which only the Holy See was empowered to underwrite, but as a declaration of policy establishing a *modus vivendi* for the time being.

Before reviewing what look like major concessions by the 701
government to religion, we may glance at Marshal Rokossowski's task and the extent to which he had fulfilled it. This was to reestablish the armed forces of Poland and to insure their

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701 political reliability. In the opinion of competent observers he
[625] has since succeeded to an ominous extent. Poland today has armed forces which, if one includes the 60,000 men enlisted in the security police, may well add up to 400,000. It is said to have a far better air force than was available when Hitler attacked; and there are indications that the navy has been reorganized under Russian command in several ports along the Baltic Sea. While a succession of purges and trials seems to indicate that the political dependability of the military establishment is open to question, it would be foolhardy to doubt that the Soviets have obtained a formidable military auxiliary, on the whole. This build-up has been accompanied by a ruthless, all-out effort to stamp out every conceivable threat to the security of the government. Russian officials supervise the operation of propaganda activities and the functions of the far-flung espionage system.

659 In the circumstances an effort to avoid religious conflict was
994 obviously prudent. What is to be said concerning the agreement? The *New York Times* of May 4, 1950, reported that the published text did not include secret annexes dealing with bishoprics established in territories annexed by Russia. At any rate, it incorporated concessions made by the Communist government, at a heavy price to the Church. The concessions were promises to refrain from interference with existing standards of religious instruction in the schools and to confer with representatives of the Bishops about a course of study, assurance that an adequate supply of appropriate textbooks would be made available, and agreement to bestow on teachers of religion the status enjoyed by other members of the academic fraternity. The University of Lublin, under Catholic auspices, was authorized to continue its activities. Catholic associations were to have "the same rights as heretofore, after satisfying all requirements set forth in the decree concerning associa-

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tions." The Catholic press received a certain amount of latitude, military chaplains were permitted to serve, and even the right of priests to minister unto prisoners was conceded. The right of the Church to engage in welfare activities was also recognized. 659 794

On the other hand, the Bishops accepted a number of important limitations on their authority. The most important are these: 659 793

The principle that the Pope is the competent and supreme authority of the Church refers to matters of faith, morals and canon law. In all other matters, however, the Episcopate will be guided by the interests of the Polish State.

Recognizing the premise that the mission of the Church can be fulfilled under differing social and economic systems, established by secular authority, the Episcopate will explain to the clergy that it should not oppose the development of cooperatives in rural areas, since the cooperative movement is based primarily on the ethical element in human nature which feels an urge to move towards social solidarity, the objective of which is the common welfare.

In accordance with its principles, which approve the condemnation of all criminal actions, the Church will combat the unlawful enterprises of underground bands and will denounce and punish under canon law those clergymen who are guilty of participation in underground actions directed against the Polish State.

In accordance with the teachings of the Church, the Episcopate will support every effort to strengthen the peace, and oppose, to the full extent of its ability, every attempt to provoke war.

These were very significant concessions. They meant that in order that the Church might continue to function as a religious institution, the Bishops would abstain from criticism of what was done by the Communist Party in economic, political, and social organization. Indeed, the Hierarchy pledged itself to support the government's plans. How well has this agreement 659

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659 worked out in practice? Light is thrown on the problem in an interview given by Archbishop Wyszński to the Catholic paper of the Cracow archdiocese, *Tygodnik Powszechny*, and in a critique of this interview in *Trybuna Ludu*, organ of the Communist Party. The interview is dated April 27, 1952, and reads as follows:

Question: How does the agreement stand up in the light of the experiences of the two past years?

Answer: You are well aware that all forms of agreement between Church and State constitute an expression of the basic attitude of the Church, deriving from its social philosophy and theology. They are the expression of the Church's constant striving for agreement on the basis of co-existence or cooperation, so that the good of the Church and of the State may be fully achieved. Of course the basis of the agreements, thus understood, is so broad that difficulties could arise on both sides. Thus also the realization of the agreement signed two years ago is encountering various difficulties and is not proceeding without friction. But these matters are a topic of conversation between the Episcopate and the Government, and for that reason I shall not speak about them.

Question: Which points in the agreement do you consider particularly important?

Answer: From the Church's point of view, it is of immeasurable importance that the agreement recognizes the fact that the Apostolic See and the Holy Father are for the Church in Poland the final authority in matters of faith, morality, and jurisdiction. It ensues therefrom that the organizational character and the internal discipline of the Church cannot be interfered with. Such a declaration on the part of the government constitutes a basis for mutually loyal relations between the Church and the State.

In so far as the interests of the State are concerned, I am of the opinion that the readiness expressed by the Episcopate to support the struggle waged by the Polish Government and people in defense of the Western territories, and the obligation undertaken by the Episcopate to appeal to the clergy to support the economic expansion of Po-

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land and to warn the faithful against pernicious acts of subversion are of great importance. I spoke at length on these matters in November, 1951, and shall not revert to the subject again. Internal peace is also of great concern to the Church. 659

Question: How should the outlook for the future be judged?

Answer: The situation is not easy . . . but the experiences of the past two years have shown us that an agreement could be reached on many matters. We are making every effort to insure that the agreement will keep its binding character and that it shall be carried out in every possible way.

The critique in *Trybuna Ludu*, May 7, 1952, may be summarized as follows:

Public opinion cannot ignore the passive attitude of the Episcopate towards the campaign against the Oder-Neisse frontier, which campaign is being conducted by West-German politicians and is patronized and inspired by the Vatican. It must be remembered that the Agreement pledged the Episcopate to oppose every form of revisionist campaigns hostile to Poland. Polish public opinion cannot be satisfied with the Primate's statements made last year on this subject, general in character as they were and unsupported by an expression of the attitude of the Hierarchy as a whole.

Most of the clergy have adopted a loyal attitude towards the People's Government, but at the same time words of hatred for it can be overheard from many pulpits. The faithful are incited to act against the People's Government, and attempts are being made to create unrest in the country. The Episcopate has done nothing to curb this hostile propaganda, and quite often has acted as if it supported it. And although under the Agreement the Episcopate undertook to condemn and punish clerics responsible for activities against the State, it still tolerates the presence of priests who have cooperated with diversionary bandit gangs and taken part in murders and robberies.

In view of all these things, the Primate's statement that "we are doing everything to carry out the Agreement as fully as possible" is in striking contrast to the facts.

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659 648 Behind the façade of these words, a tense struggle has been in progress. Perhaps the storm has centered on Article 3 of the Agreement:

> The Polish Episcopate states that economic, historic, cultural, and religious reasons as well as historic justice shall demand that the Recovered Territories should belong to Poland forever. Basing itself on the premise that the Recovered Territories form an inseparable part of the Republic, the Episcopate shall address a request to the Holy See that those units of the administration of the Church now holding the rights of residential bishoprics shall be converted into permanent dioceses.

659 793 This article has placed the Polish Hierarchy in a very difficult situation. They are accused of failing to carry out one part of the bargain when, as a matter of fact, both Cardinal Sapieha and Archbishop Wyszyński have approached the Vatican more than once with a request that the permanent rule of Poland over the "Recovered Territories" be recognized. They have been supported by the Polish government-in-exile, which still enjoys diplomatic representation at the Holy See. The response was negative. However, it was reported recently that the Primate himself had appointed a Cathedral Chapter for Breslau, in Silesia, and had installed it. He has been quoted as saying that this action had the approval of the Vatican; but Rome has officially denied such an authorization, and has pointed out that until a treaty of peace with Germany has been signed no change such as that requested by the Polish Hierarchy can be sanctioned. According to Polish sources, the action of the Primate resulted from the fact that the government had forcibly removed from office the previous incumbents of the Chapter.

659 793 626 Meanwhile both sides followed with breathless interest the discussion antecedent to the adoption of a new Polish Constitution. The government induced a considerable number of

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clergymen to join the "Fighters for Freedom," perhaps as many as a thousand. If this figure is correct, one priest out of every twenty has become a more or less active propagandist for the Communist-dominated state. Such priests harangue their flocks whenever support is needed for some economic measure the government deems vital, such as compulsory deliveries of grain and other produce. Some of them are also eloquent organizers of public opinion for the retention of the occupied territories. As a whole, the group does not as yet constitute a substantial threat to the authority of the Episcopate; and it may also be conceded that some probably resort to Athanasius-like reservations in the face of the coercive power of the State. On the basis of what little can be gleaned from accounts furnished by escaped persons, the number enrolled is about the same as the number of those who utilize every possible opportunity to oppose the regime. The great majority of priests apparently follow steadfastly in the footsteps of their bishops. Nevertheless, in view of what was hoped for, the courage of the clergy seemingly leaves much to be desired.

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Fidelity to religious practices appears not to have decreased, and there are the usual reports—usual in the sense that one nearly always encounters them in countries under totalitarian tyranny—that even the lax have taken to attending Church services regularly. However, the crucial struggle is being fought out for the minds and allegiances of the children, and the Communist Party seems to be winning slowly but surely, even as the Nazis did in the Third Reich. It has been predicted that, granted another generation of school control and camp indoctrination, of ceaseless propaganda and exciting appeal to the emotions, a large part of Poland's youth will take the Communist view of life for granted. The apostolate to them in terms of religious ideals and concepts of personal liberty is

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861 659 hemmed in on every side. There are reports to the effect that nursery schools in various parts of the country have been expropriated and transformed into "State Homes for Children." Such homes are, of course, centers of Communist indoctrination.

Against this background one must judge the debates recently in progress about the published provisional draft of a new Constitution. During March the Catholic press expressed concern lest it be considered as an abrogation or a watering down of the agreement of April 14, 1950, and it was immediately upbraided by its Communist counterparts. Yet during the year and a half that followed there was little to indicate that the Soviets planned to make a radical change of policy. It seemed that if the Church maintained silence concerning "Anglo-American Imperialists," and gave at least lip service to such central pillars of Communist propaganda as the "cause of peace," it could probably reckon with the termites within its structure rather than with the trampling and voracious bears outside.

687 793 659 But events in rapid succession towards the close of 1952 gave support to the belief that a major assault upon the Church was planned. Earlier, to be sure, it was reported that Bishop Czeslaw Kaczmarek of the See of Kielce, halfway between Warsaw and Cracow, had been arrested. At all events, towards the close of 1952 Bishop Adamski and his coadjutors, Bishops Bienick and Dennorz, were arrested in Katowice, populous diocese in the coal-mining region of the southwestern part of the country. Bishop Adamski had been an ardent Polish patriot. But he had urged the parents of the diocese to demand that religious instruction be reintroduced into the schools; and the Government viewed this as an unfriendly act. These three members of the Polish Hierarchy were subsequently removed to a village in the Carpathians, where they live under guard.

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The Communists thereupon declared that a clergyman be- 659
longing to the "Union of Patriotic Priests" would be entrusted 793
with the rule of the See of Katowice. His personal conduct ap- 687
pears to have been notorious, and his fidelity to the Church unstable. Because Katowice is from the ecclesiastical point of view a dependency of Cracow, Archbishop Eugenius Baziak, formerly Metropolitan of Lwów and until recently Vicar Capitular of the See of Cracow, refused to recognize the government appointment. He was thereupon arrested and brought to trial, together with a number of the clergy and laity of Cracow, for a variety of crimes. He and his alleged accomplices had concealed works of art, failed to convert foreign exchange in their possession, and established contact with a nest of "Anglo-American Imperialist spies" residing in the neighborhood of Munich. As is customary, the trial established the guilt of all concerned. At about the same time the Vatican announced that Archbishop Wyszyński was among the prelates designated to be elevated to the Cardinalate. Immediately a virulent campaign of denunciation and opposition began; and the press of the world reported that the Primate had decided not to leave for Rome, lest it prove impossible to return to his See.

No one could of course tell what was the portent of these 661
events. Polish reality was grim. The Communist industrializa- [369]
tion program had uprooted countless thousands of persons; and the countryside as one had known it was strangely changed and depopulated. Reports indicate that no fewer than 100,000 persons were incarcerated in slave-labor camps, most of them no doubt dissidents from Communism for intellectual, economic, or religious reasons. The desperately heroic escapades to which not a few resorted in order to flee the country testified to the state of affairs within this "People's Republic."

On September 14, 1953, Bishop Kaczmarek was brought to 000

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On September 14, 1953, Bishop Kaczmarek was brought to
793 trial in Warsaw. This was, so far as one knows, the second
694 action of a punitive kind against a member of the Hierarchy according to the Latin rite. Arraigned with the Bishop in this spectacular trial were three priests and a nun. All were charged with crimes oddly reminiscent of those leveled against Slánský and his associates in Prague. They were said to have engaged in "espionage, anti-state propaganda, and diversionary activities." The name of Cardinal Spellman was adduced, even as the same prelate had earlier been defined as the infamous personage through whom Cardinal Mindszenty had dealt. As could have been anticipated, Bishop Kaczmarek dutifully appeared before the court in order to plead for leniency. He stated that he had been seriously misled, and that he would appreciate an opportunity to atone what perhaps were not so much evil deeds as aberrations. He was sentenced to twelve years in prison for espionage in behalf of the United States. His "accomplices" likewise drew heavy sentences.

659 Thus ended the latest recorded act in the drama of Soviet
793 justice. While this trial was in progress, the text of the letter
794 of protest delivered to President Bierut by the Polish Episcopate on May 8, 1953, was received in the United States. The letter indicates that the situation has greatly deteriorated. It comments primarily on a decree issued February 9 of the same year on the creation and filling of positions in the Church. Resembling similar legislation enacted in other satellite countries, the decree empowers the government to determine what posts are to be maintained or created, and who is to be assigned to them. The Bishops point out that therewith the independence of the Church inside the ecclesiastical sphere proper is abrogated. They go on to say that peculiarly enough the rights conferred by the decree upon the Government have been used chiefly in the Recovered Territories for refusing to recognize appointments by the Episcopate and substituting others.

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The letter makes clear also that in every other respect hostility to the Church had acquired a momentum never known in Poland "save in tsarist times." Unions of dissident clergy were fostered by the government with every means at its command; religious instruction was curtailed in all the schools; the Faculty of the University of Lublin had been decimated, and most of its schools closed; the majority of Catholic publications had been "suspended," and instead those issued by dissident priests were liberally subsidized; and even Nursing Sisters were removed from hospitals. The Bishops said clearly that they had known that entering into an agreement with the Government involved "risks"; that these had been taken in the hope of improving relationships; and that the conclusion at which they had regrettably arrived was that hatred of the Church was the principal characteristic of the regime. Evidently the time was rapidly approaching in which there would be little difference between the treatment meted out to the Catholics of Poland and that which their confrères elsewhere under Russian rule had been compelled to endure. Meanwhile, however, signs of unrest in the nation as a whole patently increased. Defections by several who were able to go into exile exposed to the world the true situation in the Polish lands.

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105 162 PRIOR TO THE WAR unleashed by Hitler, Hungary comprised somewhat fewer than nine million persons. Except Austria, it was the most famous of the countries of Central Europe, primarily because of the romantic beauty of its capital city, the charms of its music and its cuisine, and the exotic appeal of its history. In religion Hungary was predominatingly Roman Catholic (Catholics constituted more than 65 per cent of the population); but there were important Jewish and Protestant minorities. The largest consisted of Calvinists, more than one-fifth of the population. In so far as religious affiliations were concerned, Hungary was no doubt also the most tolerant country in this part of Europe.

000 Today, without having suffered so much during the war as Yugoslavia or Poland, this unfortunate country has become a show place of Communist exploitation. The fate of Hungary is a poignant demonstration of the often forgotten truth that neither the mistakes of individual statesmen nor the Communist affiliations of persons in high places account for the success of postwar Russian policy. Every government official blunders. It was inevitable, the situation being what it was,

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that Moscow should attempt with every possible means to 000
extend its sphere of influence westward. The true source of the debacle was the collective stupidity which all of us who should have been conscious heritors of Western civilization manifested in an hour of desperate crisis, and for which we do not even yet feel responsible. Our failure was rooted in prejudices and conventions, in outmoded though often reasonable assumptions, in shibboleths expounded wherever an audience could be assembled to listen, and, over and above all these, in the cultural history of the Western World.

Moderately liberal Americans often thought of Hungary as /105
"an outpost of reaction." No doubt they were right from many points of view. The Hungarian people, one of the most gifted of Europe and also one of the most civilized, was in large part so galvanized by its role in history that it could not decide as to what it desired to be in the modern time. The soil of the country was very fertile, nurturing a sturdy and tenacious peasantry; but despite sporadic essays in land reform a landowning aristocracy, often devoid of interest in anything save the revenues upon which its standard of living depended, continued to maintain a swarm of virtual serfs who lived on meat fat and onions. The failure to solve any major problem in- [369]
cident to industrialization caused many Hungarian workers after 1918 to move politically far to the Left, while the wily Regent for a monarchy that no one was willing or able to establish waited for something to happen which would restore to the nation territories deemed to have been taken away unjustly by the Treaty of the Trianon. As a result Hungary, despite the ability of its citizenry and all the advances secured by determined advocates of social reform, remained to a striking extent a feudal country and therefore an absurd anachronism. Yet it was by no means alone at fault. Hungary suffered from the fact that the dissolution of the Austro-

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105 Hungarian Empire had failed to bring about the establishment of a sound Danubian Federalism; instead, a veritable riot of competing national ir' rests had come into being.

CC9 Other sources of social disorder can be found in the events
175 which followed the close of the First World War. The fall of
727 the monarchy denuded the country of strong leadership. Democratic forces under the direction of intellectuals of integrity rallied to form a government; but many of them may not unfairly be said to have lacked experience in distinguishing between obtainable objectives and ideals beyond reach. Their government quickly succumbed to a bold experiment in Bolshevist tactics which was tried at the same time in Berlin and Bavaria. Under Béla Kun, an erstwhile insurance agent who had been a prisoner in Russia and was now the power behind the Hungarian scene, a program of ruthless repression and enforced socialization was inaugurated. Troops and police raided the opposition, and "revolutionary tribunals" imposed death sentences which, although they reached an acknowledged total of 585, were only a sample of what was to ensue twenty-five years later. However, Kun's endeavors fell short of success—in large measure because occupation troops, primarily French, were present and in control. That fact enabled a counterrevolutionary movement to get under way; and by 1920 its army, commanded by Admiral Nicholas Horthy, had
[642] gained the upper hand. The Allies refused to permit the return of a Habsburg to the throne, and so a new government was formed as a Regency. It had to deal almost immediately with excesses by armed bands seeking revenge who, before they were curbed, tried and executed more than 300 persons. They were also virulently anti-Semitic, alleging that a disproportionately large number of Jews had been associated with Kun's regime.

000 As a result of the Regency's efforts to effect a measure of

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As a result of the Regency's efforts to effect a measure of "land reform" by purchasing large estates and parceling them out to small farmers, the Catholic Church became the principal landowner in the country. It held one-eighteenth of all the arable soil, and a great variety of other tangible assets. As a rule the Church treated its tenants well—so well, indeed, that many of them viewed the possibility of "land reform" with misgiving. One could, indeed, argue that such a "reform" might well prove to be an enterprise of questionable value. Perhaps a peasant could live better by working on a large estate managed in accordance with the principles of just labor legislation than on a small plot left to his own devices. The fact remained that there was a strong demand for ownership of the soil by those who tilled it. At any rate, a thoughtful, forward-looking churchman could not view the situation with equanimity. Although the Church estates produced revenue which was needed for the upkeep of numerous religious, cultural, and charitable institutions, a strong Catholic social reform movement insisted upon a wider distribution of property. A solution was not found. Either there ought to have been "land reform" in the sense indicated, or laws should have been enacted to insure a decent livelihood to the farm worker. Nevertheless one must note that Kalot, the organization of Catholic peasant youth founded by an indefatigable Jesuit, was one of the strongest associations of the kind in Europe. It had more than 200,000 members when Hitler marched into Hungary, and its educational program was directed with intelligence and moral fervor.

771 795 [883]

Perhaps the major reason for the Church's loss of appeal to poorer citizens in many parts of Europe was not Karl Marx or Charles Darwin, not Voltaire or Hegel, though they and others undoubtedly had a good deal to do with it. Something far more tragic was the matter. The poor man drifted away because of the Church's natural but too exclusive concern

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771 with its own rights and progress. It forgot that, although saving souls may ultimately prove to be the one thing necessary, people will not strive for spiritual redemption unless the ecclesiastical societies to which they belong accept them as they are, with a frank recognition of their needs, their aspirations, and their fears for the welfare of their children. Priests—the vast majority of them exemplary men—were tempted to think too exclusively about the great endeavor in which they were engaged. Prior to the First World War, Hungarian Catholics had an extraordinarily competent, farsighted, and saintly leader, Bishop Ottokar Prohaszka, whose services to all good causes, including social reform, were notable. He was succeeded in his influence over the nation by Cardinal Justinian Serédi, one of the most distinguished churchmen of the time; but, despite the numerous and often exemplary activities fostered by such leaders, the general situation was far from what could have been desired.

000 On the other hand, it must be pointed out that public opinion in the United States and elsewhere was far too prone to identify the Church in Hungary with "reaction." Few people took the trouble to familiarize themselves with the Christian Democratic Movement which had arisen in response to the appeal of Pope Leo XIII for social justice. Largely by reason of age-old antipathy to the Papacy, which lived on in countless minds that had forgotten both the Beast of Revelation and the doctrinal disputes of yore, there was little room in the Anglo-Saxon conception of what the postwar world was to be for any Christian social movement or organization. The term "conservative" engendered visions of mitered autocrats going about in clouds of incense to grind down the poor. This undertow of prejudice combined with general Catholic persistence in demanding that the interests of the Church be served, when other people could not possibly conceive of them as conformable

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with their own objectives, to set the stage for the tragedy of the postwar years. 000

Certain it should have been that what had happened once could happen again. Even supposing that Stalin had reformed and become a true democrat, one should have arranged a safeguard or two against the possibility of a relapse. A quick glance at history should have been enough to remind one that Béla Kun had failed after 1918 because Western forces insured the maintenance of democratic institutions. And as a matter of fact Hungary was ruled from 1945 to 1947 by the Allied Control Commission, on which the United States, Great Britain, and the Soviet Union were represented. Whether it was inevitable that the Western Powers would concede one position after the other cannot at present be determined. However, even after President Truman decided that Greece was not to be abandoned to the Russians, it was fashionable to believe that he had pledged the West to the support of "reaction." Not many critics stopped to think that the peoples affected were less interested at that time in "progress" or its opposite—there would be time to discuss such matters later on—than in the simple, stark fact that they were about to have the Russians at their throats.

Out of this somber complex of weakness and bad judgment and gullible interpretation of Stalinism the Communist Party in Hungary emerged as a claimant for absolute power. It came forth almost precisely as it had come in 1919. There had been very few Communists in Hungary. But once again a group of Party agents who had lived in the Soviet capital during the war and had been thoroughly indoctrinated arrived by plane at Russian Army headquarters.* They proceeded to recruit 665

* The following Communists who had been active supporters of Béla Kun and had subsequently lived in Moscow returned during 1945 to resume their beneficent activities: Mátyás Rákosi, Kun's director of economic production, who was Chief of the Hungarian Section of the Moscow Commissariat for Foreign Affairs

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665 whomsoever they could. Violent anti-Semites and pro-Nazis, many with criminal records, were, as Hal Lehrman reported at the time, signed on the dotted line. Espionage and denunciation agencies were established. Nevertheless the anti-Communist population stood its ground well, though it was left unsteady by the sudden disappearance of the Regency, frightened by the brute impact of crimes against person and property by Russian soldiers, and cowed by shootings and arrests. It waited to see whether the Western Powers would give any indication that steps to protect Hungarian freedom would be taken.

648 175 Certainly the nation deserved a far better fate than would soon be meted out to it. To be sure, Admiral Horthy, who for years had waited like a cat for the mouse of opportunity to recovery Hungary's "lost territories," had welcomed the opportunity to do business with Hitler on this issue. Thereby he demonstrated anew the folly of Central European nationalism, which gobbled down small successes in the worst style of old-time autocratic dynastic imperialism, only to prepare itself for its own hour on the block. But on the other hand the Hungarian Prime Minister Count Teleki, alone among the European statesmen doomed to stand in Hitler's way, found the perfect symbol of opposition. He fought as long as he could against the alliance with Hitler and entry into the war. Then he took his life in protest. Cardinal Serédi,

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665 from 1940 to 1945; Zoltán Vas, Chairman of the Planning Bureau and one of Rákosi's most intimate associates, who served during the war as a colonel in the Red Army with responsibility for indoctrinating prisoners; Erno Gerö, Chairman of the People's Economic Council, who had gone to Moscow at the close of the Spanish Civil War; Karoly Kiss, Minister for External Affairs, captured by the Russians, who gave him further training in Party matters; Mihály Farkas, Minister for Defense, who had worked with the Communist underground in Czechoslovakia; and József Révai, Minister for Public Education, secretary to Kun in 1919, who had gone to Moscow prior to the outbreak of war between Stalin and Hitler.

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648 when he went to pay his respects at the bier of one who in the
175 eyes of the Catholic Church had sinned grievously by committing suicide, provided one of the most dramatic moments in the history of opposition to Nazism. The Hungarian Army did what it was ordered to do. It fought with valor on the Eastern front and suffered heavy losses. We should not fail to respect its bravery and its sacrifices. One of the erroneous assumptions in recent historical writing is that good soldiers should pause on the eve of battle to decide by caucus whether what they are about to do is above reproach from every moral point of view. That is surely the proper business of the government that orders them to take the field.

798 During the period of Nazi domination, the Catholic Church
795 fought with energy and charity to mitigate the persecution of the Jews. Numerous tributes have been paid to it for that reason. Cardinal Serédi stated the position of the Papacy on this question with eloquent courage. He was followed in office by Joseph, Cardinal Mindszenty, destined to become one whom the world would look upon as a martyr. The Church saved thousands of Jews from deportation to concentration camps, frequently hiding them in the rooms of convents and monasteries or spiriting them across the border, so that a substantial Hungarian Jewish minority survived. The pro-Nazi Party, known as Arrow and Cross, was shunned by every faithful Christian. In like manner the Church had assisted Polish soldiers who had been forced to flee after the defeat of the armies in which they served.*

000 When in 1944 the defeat of Hitler was foreshadowed by

* I shall not forget the Polish officer to whom, one fall afternoon in 1945, I gave a lift. As we drove from the outskirts of Naples to Rome, past the ruins of Monte Cassino, he told about the cemetery on the battle-scarred heights above the town, in which rest 1,200 soldiers of the Polish brigade who died in the attack. He was doomed not to return to his homeland. Gratefully he recalled the hospitality which had been accorded to him in a Hungarian convent.

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795 When in 1944 the defeat of Hitler was foreshadowed by
601 the reign of terror which found in the Jew its major victim,
793 the Papal Nuncio in Budapest issued countless "letters of protection" to Jews, enabling them to live in buildings which were the property of the Vatican and therefore entitled to diplomatic immunity. Nor did the Church itself escape paying a heavy price. Although Hungarians suffered less drastically than the Poles or Czechs at the hands of the Nazis many of their priests took the bitter road to Dachau. Others, including two bishops, were incarcerated in Hungarian prisons. During the winter of 1944 the Nazis executed the senior chaplain of the Hungarian Army. When defeat came the priests of Hungary did not flee. Only 12 out of more than 1,200 abandoned their rectories. Witness the death of William Apor, Bishop of Győr. Drunken Soviet soldiers entered his residence and tried to force their way into the cellar, where a number of women were hiding. The Bishop calmly met them face to face, in an effort to pacify them. He died in a fusillade of bullets, but the women were spared.

668 Yet this heroism was destined to earn no earthly reward.
642 After 1945 there ensued instead one of the heaviest-handed enslavements of a people, and one of the direst persecutions of the Christian faith, of which history has record. Though we shall be concerned with the second, let us not forget the first. For the Communist Party the sole important question was how quickly and completely the opposition could be liquidated, regardless of the means or the cost to the population. The Hungarian people struggled to elect a non-Communist government and, despite great difficulties, succeeded. The November, 1945, election resulted in the triumph of the "conservative" opposition. Even after Communist intrigue and machinations forced out of office the government thus chosen, the Communist Party was defeated in the election of August, 1947, obtaining less than 23 per cent of the vote.

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Nevertheless, with the help of the Russian Army and the 668
Communist-infiltrated police force, all parties professing op- 642
position to Communism were disbanded, the Independent People's Front was created, and it was announced that the People's Republic had been established. A single slate of candidates was presented to the voters in the election of May 15, 1948, and naturally the Communist candidates were chosen by an overwhelming majority.

We shall now review the developments which affected rela- 423
tions between Church and State and culminated in violent 651
persecution.

The Catholic Church was a target first of all by reason of its material possessions. The Land Reform Law decreed during 1945 was drastic but could be defended in principle. It affected the holdings of wealthy owners and their buildings and livestock. Estates of more than a thousand acres were to be broken up completely. Owners of smaller properties were permitted to retain one hundred acres. However, the reform proved to be a poorly camouflaged prelude to the creation of collective farms—agricultural properties owned and exploited by the State. Communists, regardless of aptitude for farming or the validity of their claims, received virtually all the land which was redistributed. The State fared even better. By July 1, 1946, it was owner and manager of fully one-eighth of all the landed property in Hungary. None of the former owners received compensation. The new peasant proprietors were, it is true, compelled to make payments at regular intervals to amortize the cost of the land assigned to them. However, the moneys thus collected went into the State Treasury. By the beginning of 1948, the owners of one-hundred-acre estates, who had previously been affluent, were being pushed to the wall; for all farms larger than fifteen acres were taxed so heavily in grain and produce that it was utterly impossible

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651 to meet the levies. When a farmer succeeded in doing so, he
423 found that he was forced to sell his surplus at prices fixed by the government; and these were so low that he was unable to make both ends meet and was forced into bankruptcy. Foreclosures became the rule.

659 By the close of 1948, the Catholic Church in Hungary had
794 lost its wealth and material independence. To its other losses of this character must be added the elimination of revenues from the system of advowson, an economic survival from the Middle Ages. This arrangement made it legally incumbent upon stipulated wealthy patrons, and upon cities and towns, abbeys and foundations, to contribute to the support of the Church. Budapest, for example, was partly responsible for
[423] the upkeep of parishes within its boundaries. The 1945 Land Reform Law abolished all rich patrons as a matter of course; but cities and towns kept up the practice of advowson, often with ironical results. Thus in Budapest the patronage committee of the City Council, whose members traditionally had been clerical, very soon took on a Communist hue. This was, however, the committee entrusted under the law with reviewing the list of priests nominated by the Archbishop for appointment to pastorates. The responsibility, therefore, was now transferred to the Communist Party. It took persistent delight in vetoing all nominations of persons it looked upon with disfavor. Slowly, such committees also withdrew financial support. All that then remained to the Church were direct subsidies from the State, so that a relationship of complete financial dependence was established.

659 Meanwhile the fate of religious education was likewise being debated. Prior to 1948 Communist efforts to ban instruction in the tenets of the recognized faiths met with so much resistance that the traditional practices—namely, compulsory religion classes in the public schools and the maintenance of

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private schools under Catholic, Protestant, or Jewish auspices 659
—were continued. But after the seizure of power the Minister of Education, Julius Ortutay, presented a four-point program dealing with religious influence in the training of youth. The principal provision was that the private educational system was to be nationalized, though a relatively small number of institutions were suffered to remain under the aegis of Church and Synagogue. Elementary schooling was the main target, but the secondary schools also were grievously affected. The government took over nearly three thousand Catholic grammar schools, and more than a thousand that had been under Calvinist supervision. Church authorities opposed these actions resolutely, but the Ortutay program was adopted by vote of Parliament on June 16, 1948. Therewith Communism won the first round in the struggle for the mind of youth. The advantage was exploited with measures designed to curb and suppress religiously motivated organizations, to curtail the freedom of the press, and to subject to rigorous censorship all that was said in the name of the Church. The charitable institutions, too, were nationalized. Hospitals, orphanages, homes for the aged, nurseries—all became the property of the government, which went on to demand that spokesmen for religion sing the praises of the "People's Democratic State."

As usual, a State Office for Ecclesiastical Affairs was estab- 659
lished, with full responsibility for regulating the endeavors 794
of the Churches. These sought to mitigate their impoverishment by voluntary contributions from the faithful, and their appeal met with a heartening response during the early years after the war; but inflation, the confiscation and nationalization of private property, and the imposition of crushing taxes on the peasantry so drained the resources of the faithful that only a few religious orders and the higher clergy could carry on with what was voluntarily given. It should also be noted that

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G59 libraries, art treasures, and furnishings belonging to the
794 Churches were nationalized by a decree of November 16, 1948, so that none of these could be sold. The Constitution of the People's Democracy, which had been ratified on August 20, proclaimed the separation of Church and State. This meant not only that all the ancient privileges of the Catholic Church were abrogated (for example, the Archbishop of Esztergom had been a member of the Regent's Council), but that in all truth two hostile powers had been established in Hungary: atheistic Communism, able to rely on the full might of the civil authority; and organized religion, able to exist only if it were subsidized by the State and if it remained content not to resist any propagandistic attack to which it was subjected. The sole unanswered question was whether under such conditions the Churches could survive and maintain their integrity. The prostitution of the intellectual had been woeful enough, as everyone knows who has studied the history of professors and clergymen cowed by Hitler. Would spokesmen for Christ now become the docile puppets of a ruthless and irreligious regime?

793 In a setting thus compounded of frustration and terror
687 there emerged Joseph, Cardinal Mindszenty, and the drama of his opposition and torment, surely the most moving and widely known episode in the Catholic resistance to Communism. It has, however, perhaps not always been understood. When his name first drew notice outside his own country it was besmirched with the propaganda which laid low so much of the world, in that hour grim in its repudiation of Nazism and unwilling to face the dire possibility that Stalinism might conceivably prove to be still more mighty and no less evil. The Cardinal was widely reputed to be a reactionary busybody, a zealous friend and supporter of the Magyars (all of them of course disreputable), a devotee of Hitler, an arch-clerical

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schemer, and above all an anti-Semite. When Béla Fabian 793
published his warmly human biography of the Cardinal in 687
1949, commemorating the friendship between the Jews of Hungary and the Prince of the Church, one could almost feel the surprise which was enkindled in many minds. Therewith the Communist Party slowly began to lose one of its most vigorously fought propaganda battles. It had every means at its disposal, including an official account of the trial of the Cardinal and his confession, which was translated into many languages. In the end, however, the testimony which the Party itself had provided about the methods of justice employed by its minions was subjected to careful examination in all free countries, and the results of that scrutiny were so conclusive that ever since no one who is not committed body and soul to the Party has believed any accusation levied by a Communist regime against its opponents.

The literature on the Cardinal is extensive, and much of it 793
is very good. It presents a churchman who, despite a measure 159
of physical frailty, had an extraordinarily dynamic and sanguine temperament. He could be relied upon to speak his mind, but the edge was taken off his candor by a sense of humor and a deep and readily communicated interest in the welfare of other human beings. The Cardinal was perhaps not of the intellectual stature of his great predecessor, Cardinal Serédi; but he had literary talent, considerable learning, and energy of mind. His name as we now know it was conferred upon him when he became Bishop of Hungary's most distinguished See and therewith, under the laws of the Regency, a nobleman. Born Joseph Pehm on March 29, 1892, he was of peasant stock, anchored for generations in the soil of western Hungary. He knew the simple people of the villages, their virtues and their weaknesses; and this insight stood him in good stead throughout his trying and absorbing career as a

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793 priest. Under the influence of a mother whose memory he
159 would cherish and honor in a book, he proved himself a studious lad. Eventually he prepared for the priesthood, was ordained, and quickly earned a wide reputation as one who combined an ardent concern for the spiritual welfare of his people with a quite personal interest in their earthly well-being. The times through which he had lived as a boy and as a priest were stormy, but he weathered them. He was made an Archbishop of Esztergom and Prince Primate of Hungary on October 2, 1945.

793 A catalogue of the events which tried the soul of this spirited
659 and zealous Prince of the Church would be a lengthy one, indeed. First there appeared, as might have been anticipated, a Communist-inspired "National Church" entrusted with persuading Catholics to sever their ties with Rome and the Vatican. The priests who served this "Church" were a fairly queer lot, who made their first collective public appearance after the Cardinal delivered, on January 20, 1946, an address in honor of St. Margaret, one of the patrons of Hungary. He said in his usual forthright way:

> After a year of bitter suffering, Hungary finally saw the Tartars depart. They did not leave lightheartedly, for they had never enjoyed so much freedom or enjoyed so pleasant a life. Their experiences in Caracorum had been far more trying. There, in accordance with a rule laid down by Genghis Khan, they could neither bathe nor change their clothes. But they went back, because the Great Khan had died. . . . History teaches us that all things on this earth are transitory, even as were the achievements of Genghis Khan, Napoleon and Hitler. Through such men God sends the scourge of many sufferings to the world. When the bony hand of death touches such men, the peoples and the nations breathe once more.

These remarks alluded to St. Margaret's time, but their application to the Russian masters of Hungary was obvious. The

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Communists staged a mammoth parade through the streets of Budapest, demanding the Cardinal's head. The priests of the "National Church" marched in the procession. 733 659

There followed the discovery of a series of alleged conspiracies against the government and the Red Army, each attributed to the instigation of the Cardinal. Both he and his fellow churchmen were kept busy issuing denials. The major import of the charges was that Catholic schools under the tutelage of the religious orders were responsible for the widespread sabotage of the regime. Among the discoverers of plots were divers alumni of such schools who for a variety of reasons, primarily no doubt financial, found it expedient to collaborate with the Communists, even as some of them had previously fished in Nazi waters. On May 20, 1946, Cardinal Mindszenty issued a Pastoral Letter in defense of Catholic and, more generally, of religious education. It was a very frank message, which contained such patently challenging statements as this: "There are some who like to describe the Church as a 'hotbed of reaction.' But those who consider everything Catholic reactionary ought really to look for reaction in places where all liberty is suppressed."

In order to account adequately for the complete candor of such remarks, one must bear in mind that the peace treaty with Hungary was not signed until 1947. It was therefore still possible to hope that the Western Powers would maintain their missions in the country and take steps to insure a modicum of freedom. Unfortunately they would not do so. Meanwhile the Cardinal, who was always a Hungarian patriot, had appealed to the ranking Catholic prelates of the United States and Great Britain for assistance in preventing the expulsion of Hungarian minorities from Czechoslovakia. These unfortunate people were driven out under conditions comparable to those which had attended the casting out of the Sudeten 733 [648]

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793 Germans. Later he denounced quite as vigorously the expulsion of German-speaking minority groups from Hungary. However, as soon as the treaty went into effect, the Cardinal and the Church were left to face the enemy unaided. It had been argued that he should have anticipated the development and adopted a more conciliatory tone; but the evidence garnered in other satellite countries shows that he would merely have made his own lot easier without changing in the least the direction in which the Communist Party was implacably moving.

659 The first effect of the treaty on religious activities was the
798 subjugation of the Calvinist and Lutheran churches. Lutheran
795 ranks had been seriously depleted by the expulsion of German "ethnic" groups. During the autumn of 1948 Bishop Lajos Ordass, undoubtedly the ablest and most courageous Lutheran leader, was brought to trial and sentenced to two years in prison. The Calvinists, on the other hand, were led intellectually by Dr. Albert Bereczky, who seemingly assented to every demand made by the State. Soon this Hungarian Protestant church heard Bishop Imre Ravecz say that "the most important and significant ordinances of the Hungarian form of society are in complete accord with Holy Writ." These developments were interpreted in some quarters as meaning that whereas the Protestant churches enjoyed complete freedom under Communist rule, the recalcitrant Catholic Church was having a difficult time because of the bigotry and lust for power which characterized its Hierarchy.

795 As a matter of fact, the Calvinist Church in particular was
578 feeling the knout, not merely in outward persecution but also
771 in inner conflict. Prior to the signing of the treaty and the Communist seizure of the government the dominant group in it was the one that had opposed the Nazis. These men, notably Bereczky, were persuaded that the traditional interdependence

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of Church and State had been evil, and that only separation 795
could advance the cause of the Gospel. The coming of the 578
Communists was interpreted as being in part a punishment 771
visited upon the Church for sin. Drastic reform was therefore needed, and above all missionary effort to bring the masses to a realization of the true meaning of Christian teaching. Yet at the same time the gifted and realistic Bishop László Ravasz pointed out firmly that freedom was possible to the Church only if society recognized the value of freedom and insisted that religious education was a duty no parent could shirk if he hoped to remain a Christian. An ultimatum by the government to the Church, presented during the early months of 1948, resulted in the resignation of Bishop Ravasz as President of the General Synod and as a member of the Hierarchy. The Synod protested against this high-handed action, but in the end Bereczky gained the position of greatest prominence in the Church.

Passing over, for the moment, the situation thus created, we 793
resume the chronicle of the Cardinal. Every new day brought 659
disappointments. The government laid its heavy hand on the schools, the press, and Catholic Action. It induced a group of Catholics, in the name of progress, to promulgate criticism of the Primate. Outwardly it was still possible to pretend that Church and State were seeking agreement. Monsignor Zsigmond Mihalovics, director of Catholic Action in Hungary and later an exile, relates in *Mindszenty, Ungarn, Europa* that he went with a companion to attend a reception in honor of the President of the Republic late in 1947, only to find that Mátyás Rákosi, Secretary-General of the Hungarian Communist Party, was anxious to chat and have his picture taken in the company of Church dignitaries. The Party was still interested in camouflage and, as usual, was proficient in the art.

Events moved swiftly towards a climax during the summer 793

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of 1947, when the government sponsored a year of commemoration of the Revolution of 1848, which had produced an outburst of heroic liberalism in Hungary. The Cardinal undertook a fateful counteraction. He dedicated the year to Mary, Mother of Christ, and solemnly inaugurated the observance on the Feast of the Assumption. Surrounded by all the country's bishops, he preached a sermon which blended deep anxiety over political and social trends with daring. Asking, "What is our purpose in observing this Year of Our Blessed Lady?" he answered, "We seek only what the deported Hungarians sought in Carlsbad." Three thousand had come together for a Mass on which the Gospel account of Jesus weeping at the sight of Jerusalem was read. He continued:

> We all, every one of us, are deported Hungarians! Even if they have not yet driven us from our homes in the area between the Danube and the Garam, they have nevertheless deported us spiritually. For they have uprooted us from the traditions of a thousand years. Let us go back—back! Not back to Nature, but to That which is above Nature, to those things that are higher which under the banner of dialectical materialism are to be destroyed. Let us return to the world of the Transcendent, the highest peak in which, after God, is God's Mother.

During the weeks that followed, the Cardinal manifested an activity which seemed almost superhuman. Early in September he knelt with 100,000 pilgrims to pray at the ancient shrine of Szombathely. A week later he walked at the head of 100,000 men to the shrine of Maria Remete, some ten miles from Budapest. On September 22 he addressed a vast throng in the Cathedral Square of Eger. In October 100,000 working people assembled in the ruins on the heights above the Capital City. In the subsequent Eucharistic Procession 600,000 people participated. Thus did religious leadership evoke fervor in all corners of the land. It was magnificent, it was moving;

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but the end was bound to be failure, unless, indeed, a miracle occurred. We may well believe that the Cardinal hoped in those days for such a marvel—not one which would summon down a legion of angels from Heaven, but one based on the impact of a united Catholic people, if not on the consciences, then at least on the political calculations of their rulers. But the Russians now entered the scene and grimly ordered the liquidation of the Cardinal. 793

To be sure, nothing was done precipitously. On January 10, 1948, Rákosi spoke for the Communist Party. He declared that nothing could be more desirable than an agreement between Church and State, but that the conduct and attitude of the Church made it impossible. That had, he said, become the cloak under which reaction plied its subversive trade. Its leaders were openly hostile to the new order. They had repudiated the noble traditions of 1848 by organizing a rival observance. They were opposed to land reform, to the Three Year Plan, and to peace. On February 15, Cardinal Mindszenty addressed an assembly at St. Stephen's Academy in Budapest, citing a number of Papal Encyclicals on peace to make the Church's position clear.* However, some of the quotations made could be easily interpreted as comments on the mentality and methods of the Communist Party. They were so understood. The Ministry of the Interior forbade the publication of the text of this address. Measures were taken in rapid succession to curb the Catholic press, to undermine Catholic charities, and to prepare the way for the transfer of all schools to the State. 793 659

Then occurred what is usually known as the tragedy of Pocspetri. On June 1 the pastor of this little town of 2,000 souls in eastern Hungary, acting on a request from the As- 659 793 661

* Texts of this and other addresses are conveniently assembled in *Cardinal Mindszenty Speaks: Authorized White Book* (New York, 1949).

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659 sociation of Teachers, called the parents of his congregation
793 together to vote on whether the schools should be removed
661 from the jurisdiction of the Church. Two pads of paper were placed on the table, one for affirmative and the other for negative votes. All four hundred parents voted No. Two days later, the village council met to consider the same question. Rumors coursed through the town to the effect that the vote cast by the parents was to be nullified, and quickly an excited crowd gathered round the town hall, demanding that the will of the people be respected. The police were sent for, and they ordered the crowd to disperse. One officer drew his revolver and threatened to shoot. Thereupon a citizen named Kiralyfalvi entered the fray; there was a scuffle, and the policeman lay dead.

793 The pastor, Father Aszalos, seems not to have been present
657 when the shooting occurred. Nevertheless he became the central figure in a highly theatrical trial designed to prove that he and the "reactionary Hierarchy" were responsible for the incident. First the poor priest was taken, together with Kiralyfalvi and other villagers to the notorious prison maintained by the secret police at Andrássy ut 60, Budapest. The trial was then conducted without benefit of defense counsel. To the great surprise of nearly everyone—including, it is said, the officials of the Ministry of the Interior—Father Aszalos pleaded guilty. Indeed he went on to say that the real culprits were his religious superiors, who were always stirring up opposition to the government. Left to himself, he added, he would never have argued against the secularization of education. Nevertheless he was guilty because he had failed to heed his own conscience. The sentence of death imposed by the court was changed later to life imprisonment.

659 The observance of the Holy Year continued, despite stead-
796 ily mounting obstacles, into the summer of 1948. It had be-

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come necessary to secure the approval of the government 659
for each pilgrimage, and most gatherings were surrounded by 796
cordons of police. On June 13 many tens of thousands gathered in Budapest to participate in devotions honoring Our Lady of Fatima. Someone called for a cheer in honor of the absent Cardinal. The crowd responded. Police cars thereupon appeared, and the throng was attacked and dispersed. Many persons were arrested; some were deported to labor camps. This pattern was followed thenceforth, so that the year of devotion petered out in fear, dispersal, and helplessness. It was obvious that the Communists had been neither impressed nor cowed.

Cardinal Mindszenty had every reason to suppose that action would soon be taken against him. On November 18 he 793
issued his last Pastoral Letter, defending the celebrations in honor of the Blessed Virgin and making a profession of faith. It stated:

> Two of my predecessors were killed in action, two were robbed of all their possessions, one was taken prisoner and deported, one was assassinated. The greatest of them all went into exile. Karoly Ambrus visited and nursed the plague-stricken and himself died of their disease.
>
> Of all my predecessors, however, none was as devoid of all means as I am. So systematic and so adroit a net of propaganda untruths—lies disproved a hundred times and yet repeated a hundred times—was never spun round any of my seventy-eight precursors in office. I stand for God, the Church, and Hungary. This responsibility has been placed on me as a result of the fate which has been meted out to our nation, standing now alone, an orphan in the world. When what happens to me is compared with the sufferings of my people, it is seen to be of trifling consequence.

A brave man, sometimes impetuous but always zealously mindful of duty and of love, was going by reason of the might of evil into his own Gethsemane.

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On the day after Christmas, 1948, a van of police cars moved from Andrássy ut 60 to Esztergom to arrest the Cardinal. The sixteen officers armed with light automatic rifles carried out the mission assigned to them. The Cardinal took leave of his aged mother, having scribbled on the back of an envelope the now famous words: "I have taken no part in any conspiracy of any kind. I shall not resign from my episcopal See. I shall not make a confession. But if despite what I now say you should read that I have confessed or resigned, and even see it authenticated by my signature, bear in mind that it will have been only the result of human frailty. In advance, I declare all such actions null and void." On the following day it was announced to the world that the Cardinal was in prison.

Stephen K. Swift has made a careful study of available reports concerning the treatment meted out to the Cardinal while he was in the hands of his jailers, and this can be followed in detail in his memorable book, *The Cardinal's Story*. Because certain of the officers who witnessed the events managed to escape from Hungary and relate what they had observed of interrogation methods learned in Moscow, there is no reason to doubt the authenticity of the reports. These also corroborate what has been learned of Russian methods through victims who have escaped from other parts of the Russian-controlled world. It is therefore no matter for wonder that the Cardinal signed a confession. Indeed, as we shall see, he could proudly have attested to many things of which he stood accused. But the captors managed to break his spirit and make him say that he regretted what he had done. This ominous success gained by the interrogators, even if we had no other reason for opposing the Communist system with all the strength and ingenuity we can muster, would suffice to rouse the conscience of the world as it once did against Nazism: the successful employment of science to crush the soul of a human being and make him gain-

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say everything that has been dearest to the core of his heart during all his life. 793 687

The Cardinal was tried in the company of men deemed to have been his accomplices in a great conspiracy against the government. All pleaded guilty. Witnesses to the trial beheld a spectacle oddly reminiscent of the Reichstag Fire trials in Berlin during 1933, with the sinister difference that then even Göring could not intimidate the Court. Béla Fabian has pointed out the curious fact that those who conducted the trial of the Cardinal were former Nazis. The President, Dr. Vilmos Olti, had served the Hungarian Hitlerites even as he now served the Communists; and the leader of the prison interrogators, Dr. Martin Bodonyi, had worked for Nazi military tribunals under another name. The defense counsel assigned to the case had, however, been a member of the Communist Party since the days of Béla Kun. 793 687 695 [633]

Questions and answers succeeded each other much as they must have in the fearful prison. On the morning of February 8, 1949, the verdict was read:

"Joseph Mindszenty, the first accused, is sentenced herewith . . . to the cumulative penalty of penal servitude for life as the main penalty, to ten years' loss of office and ten years' suspension of political rights; further, the confiscation of all his property as supplementary punishment."

The charges against the Cardinal were circulated prior to the trial itself in an official *Yellow Book*, and the government subsequently issued a *Black Book* giving its version of the proceedings. The more carefully one reads these volumes, the greater one's astonishment is likely to be. We may discount in advance all the allegations which are known to have no foundation in fact. What is to be said of those which are probably true? A relatively minor charge is that certain sums of money obtained from abroad for Church purposes were not trans-

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793 ferred at the official rate. For these derelictions the Cardinal
696 accepted full responsibility and offered to make restitution,
687 though he personally could have had nothing to do with them. At best they would have merited a small fine levied against the Archiepiscopal treasury. The second charge, and no doubt the most important, was that prior to the signing of the treaty of peace the Cardinal had endeavored to win the support of the Western Powers. This he was clearly entitled to do, in the legal sense; and morally he was under the obligation to make every effort to maintain civil and religious rights as he understood them. It was true that he had clung desperately to his belief that the United States would not permit the Russians to acquire unilateral rule over Hungary—a hope he shared with millions of other Hungarian citizens, and indeed with foreigners of every creed and persuasion who happened to be in Hungary at that time. In declaring that such beliefs constituted conspiracy against the State, the Prosecutor argued and the Court upheld the view that desiring anything short of complete Russian control was incompatible with the Constitutional provision that full liberty of opinion, speech, and assembly was assured.

648 One special charge was that the Cardinal had indirectly approached American authorities handling restitution claims in order to urge that the Crown of St. Stephen be sent to the Vatican to be held in trust there. Here he was daring but still prudent. Undoubtedly he had very good reason to fear that the Crown, most illustrious symbol of Hungary's past, would be shipped to Russia as soon as it was returned to Budapest. His maneuver was certainly not complimentary to the Communists; but they were bound by the Occupation Statute and later by the treaty of peace, which went into effect on September 15, 1947. The Cardinal's correspondence concerning the Crown antedates the treaty. Yet even this obliges the Hungarian government to respect Article 2, which reads:

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1. Hungary shall take all measures necessary to secure to all persons 648
under Hungarian jurisdiction, without distinction as to race, sex, 563
language, or religion, the enjoyment of human rights and of the fundamental freedoms, including freedom of expression, of press and publication, of religious worship, of political opinion, and of public meeting.

2. Hungary further undertakes that the laws in force in Hungary shall not, either in their content or in their application, discriminate or entail any discrimination between persons of Hungarian nationality on the ground of their race, sex, language, or religion, whether in reference to their persons, property, business, professional or financial interests, status, political or civil rights, or any other matter.

Never has a peace treaty contained fairer pledges. Unfortunately there exists no sanction against their violation save a rebuke before the forum of the United Nations. Such a rebuke was of course administered.

The charge which laid the Cardinal most seriously open 793
to criticism was that as a Monarchist he had conspired to 635
bring about a Restoration, had conferred with the Pretender 687
to the Throne, and had relied upon American intervention to achieve his aims. The testimony on these matters presented at the trial and outlined in the *Black Book* is confused; nor did the Cardinal receive an opportunity to comment on the accusations in any adequate or sustained way. He admitted that he was a Legitimist, that he had hoped the Regency would be succeeded by a Monarchy, and that at the request of Otto of Habsburg he had conferred with him while visiting the United States during 1947. These things did not constitute conspiracy against the State, and would indeed be permissible within the framework of a relatively democratic society. Whether reestablishing the Monarchy was in any sense practicable, whether it was the form of government best suited to Hungary, and whether the population of the country would

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793 have voted in favor of a Restoration are, to be sure, matters
695 one could debate at length. But that discussion has no bearing
687 on the issue that the Cardinal had conspired to plunge the nation into civil war and thus impose a solution by force.

A number of able jurists of varied confessional and political points of view have carefully reviewed the trial procedures. There is none of repute in the free world who has not held that the trial was a farcical travesty of justice.*

793 And so the Cardinal, indefatigable leader of his Church
687 and of his people, entered through a narrow gate of infamy and pain the desert of penitential tribute to the power of iniquity. The ancient secret, that of the *mysterium iniquitatis*, the mystery of evil, was his to meditate upon even as hermits and martyrs, sages and great sufferers, the wise and the humble since the dawn of time had pondered it in times past. No doubt all he had to uproot from his heart were some vestiges of pride in his natural abilities and in his holy office—the pride he had sloughed off, surely, in the bitter days when he may well have asked the question which was on the lips of his Master, why God had forsaken him, and why he had been so grievously scourged for the sins of his time. They had humiliated him far beyond any boundaries which are set for humility to traverse. They had proved that theirs were the battalions and the torturers, the makers of decrees and the profiteers of power. The Archbishop of Esztergom, Prince of the Church and member of the Regent's Council, had become

[693] * The trial of the Cardinal was directed by László Rajk, Minister of the Interior, who during September, 1949, was accused not only of having attempted to overthrow the Hungarian government and assassinate its principal officials but of espionage in behalf of the governments of the United States, Great Britain, and Yugoslavia. In short, Rajk was on trial for emulating Marshal Tito. Seven others were indicted as his accomplices. All were placed in confinement for some time previous to the convening of the Court. Testimony was introduced purporting to prove association with divers representatives of foreign powers. Nearly all of these have vehemently denied the allegations. Three death sentences were handed down and carried out. One victim was Rajk himself.

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a convict devoid of honor or name, uncertain even whether 793
he was looked upon throughout the world as a man who had 687
betrayed his trust. No one could tell him that in his worst hour simple people were praying that the Lord God might have mercy on him—praying throughout Hungary, which he may have loved too well even as some other men love their wives unduly. The world into which he went from his trial was a world without prayer or peace. God had departed from it. One cannot avoid saying that. It was become a world in which endless shifts of prisoners move out of the gray dawn into the even grayer dusk, and it was necessary that it have in its midst a man stripped naked. It needed Job in the red hat of a Cardinal.*

After the condemnation of its most resourceful and coura- 793
geous Christian leader, Hungary could no longer muster any- 659
one to lead the resistance. During August, 1950, the Catholic Bishops signed an agreement with the government similar in every significant respect to that which the Bishops of Czechoslovakia had signed. Despite it Cardinal Mindszenty's successor was arrested and haled before a court. A "Peace Movement" was formed among the clergy; and though at first only a few elected to join it, these gave it enthusiastic support. On October 23, 1951, for example, the Budapest Radio announced that a meeting of the "reconstituted Board" of the movement had been held, at which Bishop Beresztocsky, the

* The fate of the Cardinal in imprisonment has been described by eyewitnesses who may be assumed to be reliable. Congenital frailty, and not mistreatment in prison, is responsible for his poor health. He has been permitted to celebrate the Holy Sacrifice of the Mass, although in complete isolation. Two visits from his mother have been permitted, and he has seen the Archbishop of Eger and the Bishop entrusted with the care of Catholics according to the Greek rite. Hungarian sources indicate that he has not been deported but is at Hüvösvölgy Prison in Budapest. There is no information as to views which the Cardinal may have expressed to his visitors, but all sources agree that he has been treated without undue harshness, and that the principal rigors of prison life are self-imposed.

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793 chairman, reviewed the progress of the peace movement
659 throughout the world, and lauded Stalin as the foremost enemy of war. Meanwhile the clergy of Hungary had also been called upon to sign an oath of allegiance to the Constitution. The great majority of priests complied during January, 1950, making the usual reservation that they pledged themselves to nothing that was antithetical to the Catholic faith.

793 Archbishop Jozsef Grõcz, successor to the Cardinal, at-
658 tempted as best he could to guide the ship of the Church
661 through the waters of persecution. Nevertheless during the summer of 1951 he and several other members of the Hierarchy—Bishops Andreas Hamvas, Joseph Petery, and Luigi Shvoy—were arrested. The subsequent trial, in which a number of less prominent clergymen also were the accused, offered a new version of the ordeal of the Cardinal. No doubt the major reason for this spectacle was the declaration of the Bishops that any service they rendered to the cause of "peace" was of a moral and religious character only, with no political significance. Archbishop Grõcz was sentenced to imprisonment on June 28, and a new series of assaults upon the Church ensued. A few days later, the remnant of the Hierarchy signed a profession of loyalty to the government. This in turn decreed that no one could validly hold office as a bishop, abbot, or provincial unless the State had approved his appointment. Indeed, even those who had assumed their offices after January, 1946, were declared subject to the same regulation. Religious orders were dissolved, and priests who had incurred excommunication by membership in the "Peace Movement" were appointed to important pastorates. Many priests and monks were deported to slave-labor camps. Under the pressure thus exerted, the bishops who still had freedom and the Abbot of Hungary's largest monas-
000 tery took the oath of allegiance. Some of them even went

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further and issued statements praising the government for its zeal in promoting religious liberty.

Protestants also viewed the condemnation of the Cardinal with profound alarm. Who was to carry on the struggle? Pastor Albert Bereczky, now well past fifty, had ministered during most of his service in the Church to a congregation of working people. He had made a conscientious study of the writings of Professor Karl Barth, renowned Swiss theologian. This intellectual relationship gave rise to a strange and revealing episode. During April of 1948, Barth accepted an invitation to come to Hungary. But to the astonishment in particular of his Swiss and American admirers, who respected him both for his vigorous reformulation of Protestant theology and for the manner in which he had exposed the errors of Nazism, Barth continued to refrain from criticism of the principles on which the Communists based their bid for political power. It is difficult to do justice to his argument in a few words. Perhaps, however, it can without gross unfairness be interpreted as follows. Hitler, said Barth, was an incarnation of evil because he misled many, not the least among whom were those German churchmen who thought that the Nazi cause was noble and invigorating. Stalin, on the other hand, was the exponent of a view of life which every follower of Christ knows full well is contrary to the Gospel. Accordingly (he went on) there is virtually no reason to suppose that Christians will be led into temptation by the Stalinist-Leninist doctrine. Indeed, it might rather be that they would be led astray by the materialistic West, notably the United States. Barth's conclusion therefore was that a Christian ought to refrain from committing himself to either side in the debate between East and West.

This teaching deeply shocked many persons on both fringes of the Iron Curtain. When Barth appeared in Hungary, his

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opinions were challenged by large numbers in the audiences which he addressed. More than once his reply to a query was difficult to fathom. For example, he professed to believe that a Christian faced with the problem of living in a State which did not respect the law should above all "not lose his sense of humor." For, he said, while no government will prove to be worthy of Christ, it is unlikely also that any will be of the Devil. It seemed to him that Evangelical Protestantism was called upon to take up a position "far more spiritual" in character than that adopted by Roman Catholicism. For had not the Papacy succumbed to the "anxiety" which had become the existentialist quality of the West? The true follower of Christ can entertain no fear save that for the salvation of his soul.

It is against this background of Barthian theory that the collaborationism of Bereczky and his associates must be seen. What from one point of view seems to be abject servility becomes in another perspective an abstruse, highly problematical, but possibly by no means dishonorably entertained desire to imitate St. Paul by accepting whatever government has been willed by Heaven. At any rate the Bereczky group began by lauding the Russian peace offensive, but soon went so far towards complete acceptance of the Communist position that fellow churchmen entertained grave doubts as to his fitness for the important post of Bishop of Budapest. Nevertheless Barth, in a letter from Switzerland on May 23, 1948, contended that these doubts should be put aside because the Church, fearing no one save the Lord, should not be afraid to accept as Bishop a clergyman who was a favorite of the government. He added: "It will be manifest in the fact that you rid yourselves of this minor anxiety that you have no anxiety whatsoever." But as time went on Barth must have begun to question whether Bereczky was not proving his own orig-

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inal assumption—namely, that every Christian will realize 000
that Stalinism is incompatible with Christianity—to be false. At any rate, in a private letter to Bereczky dated September 16, 1951, he wrote, "It seems to me that you are on the way toward making your affirmation of Communism a part of the Christian message." This would, of course, be the same error of which the German Christian Movement had been guilty under Hitler.

At any rate, the Protestant Churches in their turn were 659
compelled to negotiate an agreement with the government, 793
accepting the whole of the Communist program dealing with 661
finances, education, and the appointment of clergymen and other Church dignitaries. When Bishop Ravasz resigned in protest, the Calvinist Synod attempted to elect a worthy man to be his successor. The government refused to endorse the choice, and finally succeeded in gaining acceptance for Pastor Roland Kiss, well known as friendly to the Communist position. Only a few indications of the extent to which infamy and outrage prevailed thereafter can be adduced here. The grossest kind of interference in the work of the pastorate was resorted to, so that in the end notorious and criminal Communists were installed in ecclesiastical offices, while worthy churchmen were dismissed, deported, and imprisoned. Only eight Church schools survived the drive for the nationalization of education. Relief and welfare organizations were forbidden; and the press was reduced to impotence by censorship and suppression. Toward the close of 1951, two theological seminaries were closed. Even more dire, if that be possible, was the fate of the small Lutheran minority. Its leaders were hounded, ousted from office and imprisoned.

By the close of 1951, civil and religious liberties were ex- 178
tinguished in Hungary to an extent which the Cardinal himself 661
could hardly have foreseen. Virtually everyone who had oc-

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178 cupied a position of trust or responsibility in the country prior
661 to 1945 was now impoverished and ostracized. The number of distinguished exiles was legion. Economic conditions had deteriorated so completely that even food, product of the rich plains, was lacking. Tens of thousands who could find no employment in the industries which were being created by fiat, by reason of age or of earlier religious and political affiliations, were marked for deportation. These wholesale shipments of human cattle aroused the indignation of the outside world. Lord Vansittart reported to the House of Lords that 100,000 persons had been earmarked for slave-labor camps. For a time this ghastly business was halted; but seemingly reliable information indicates that the shipments were resumed during 1952.

626 As elsewhere in the Russian orbit, the emphasis was on
461 production and organization for war. Russian military and
186 economic officials virtually took over the country. Criticism of the workers and particularly youth was everywhere part of the order of the day. Young Hungarians, the government declared again and again, had been inoculated with the diseases of pacifism and pro-Imperialism. Even the official Youth Organization, DISZ, was accused of "cosmopolitanism" and "adoration of the Anglo-American imperialist monster." On June 28, 1952, Matron Horváth, speaking for the Communist Party, reemphasized the need for continued intensive opposition to "clerical reaction." He expressed shocked surprise that some members of the Party still participated in religious functions and, indeed, permitted the Church to influence their children.

668 This would be as pertinent a note as any on which to end our account of the Hungarian tragedy were it not for the breath-taking events which have followed the death of Stalin. Years of draining away the substance of the people and of

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endeavoring to clamp the peasants into the vise of collective 668
farming had created a movement of resistance which could no longer be curbed. Demands for return of the land that had been collectivized, together with farm animals, rose spontaneously from the farm folk everywhere in Hungary. Rákosi was removed from office, and Imre Nagy, a non-Communist, was restored to the office he had once held. On July 11 Nagy declared in a startling address that the collective farms would be dissolved if the majority of the peasants banded together on them so desired, and that their lands would thereupon be given back to them. It is true that men who took this proclamation literally often found themselves denounced as "kulaks" and enemies of the people. But a careful review of reports from those who have daily monitored official Hungarian broadcasts indicates clearly that the government, wedged in between the peasants' demand for liberation and the desperate need of the population for food, is far weaker than anyone would have deemed it to be a short time ago.

In the circumstances, it is safe to say that the average Hun- 643
garian recalls with grim irony the final speech delivered by Rákosi on May 10, during the "political campaign":

> Let us be vigilant in all fields . . . and ruthlessly take action against all who sabotage the building of our happier future. Our People's Democracy must incessantly watch for conspiracies, sabotage, and espionage activities which, without exception, are initiated, organized, and financed by the United States. Even now the United States is making so-called liberation promises which mean nothing save that it seeks to restore the rule of reactionary lords over the liberated Hungarian people.

Not even the United States could have so stirred the people of Hungary to reaffirm, despite terror and need, its traditional belief in freedom as the bulwark of life, liberty, and the pursuit of happiness.

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7 ALBANIAN INTERLUDE AND BALTIC VISTA

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LITTLE ALBANIA, where mountains rise in serried ranks behind a marshy, malaria-infested coast, was perhaps the first satellite to reveal the nature of Communist rule fully and unreservedly. Living uneasily under Turkish domination well past the nineteenth century in a country not unlike the Great Smokies, the Albanians have been the least known and the most handicapped nation in Europe. Like many a mountain folk in the United States—whether in Tennessee or in Vermont—they have been influenced culturally by the inaccessibility of their villages, the primitive state of their agriculture, and the dearth of modern means of transportation. Even proximity to the sea has been of limited value because delta silt has impeded navigation throughout history. Outside the cities, family and tribal solidarity remains stronger than national sentiment. But, while the Albanians have been dependent on foreign powers for security and prosperity, they are a patriotic folk and a martial one.

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Communism came to this land not because of the abuses of capitalism or because of a yearning of workers to unite, but through a political movement which developed against the background of the World War. The independence of the country and the inviolability of its boundaries were guaranteed by the peace treaties after the defeat of the Austro-Hungarian Empire in 1918. At the same time the Great Powers held that Italy had a special diplomatic and strategic stake in the welfare of her neighbor across the Adriatic Sea. As a result Italian interests in Albania expanded greatly after 1920, and to every intent and purpose the foreign trade of the two countries was pooled. But Yugoslavia naturally sought to challenge the primacy of Italy in the Adriatic area, and its support is held to have largely made it possible for Ahmed Zogu, Prime Minister in a government constituted as a Regency, to take over the rule of the country during 1924. Shortly thereafter, a Republic was proclaimed, and Zogu was elected President for a term of seven years. A skillful diplomat and political leader, he improved relations with both Greece and Yugoslavia, and signed the Treaty of Tirana in 1926 with Italy. This, accompanied by a sizable grant of financial assistance from Italian banks, gave recognition to the common interest of both countries in maintaining the independence of Albania. A year later they entered a defensive alliance. When it was alleged that these developments conceded to Mussolini rights which he exploited unduly, Zogu curbed the opposition with dramatic swiftness. He proclaimed himself King, on September 1, 1928, and was responsible for a constitution which recognized no political liberties but insured freedom of religion. Zogu, a benevolent dictator, made an honest effort to improve the cultural and economic life of the country, building roads, fostering health and hygiene, erecting schools, fighting a vigorous battle against illiteracy,

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648 and modernizing the banking system. Albania even acquired
643 a radio station, and air travel became a reality. The King
175 brought in foreign experts, particularly Austrians. Some of them I have known; and while they had the usual reservations about the political institutions of Albania, they respected his energy and sincerity of social purpose.

648 At this point Mussolini was unfortunately smitten with
175 irrational imperialist ambition: if Hitler could have his empire of the master race, he himself was called upon to reconstruct the dominions of ancient Rome. Italian troops landed in Albania on April 7, 1939, shortly after the fall of France. They quickly overpowered the small defense army, and Zogu had to seek refuge abroad. The crown was thereupon offered to King Victor Emmanuel III, of Italy, who docilely accepted it. It is worth noting that the reception accorded the Italians was not too unfriendly, because some sections of the population expected to profit from the political change. Using Albania as an advance base, the Duce attacked Greece on October 28, 1940; but the valiant Greeks put his armies to rout and occupied nearly half of Albania. The Germans, defeating Yugoslavia, took over the rest of Albania, but confined themselves to routine control. Two resistance movements were formed, the one pro-Zogu and primarily against Italy, and the other Communist with the Germans as its principal target. The second, the National Liberation Front, was the stronger, primarily because it boldly drafted men into its partisan forces and because it maintained ruthless discipline. British commandos in the Adriatic therefore quite naturally aided it. As a result, the Front was able to assume control of
175 the country as soon as the Germans retreated.

648 The provisional government formed by General Enver
642 Hoxha, commander in chief of the National Liberation Front, was recognized by the United States, Great Britain, and Rus-

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sia in 1945. A republic was established during the following year. General Hoxha and his followers meanwhile made no secret of their devotion to the Communist cause, although their utterances took on the usual protective coloring. At a Congress in the little town of Permeti, on May 24, 1944, the Front had "guaranteed freedom of religion and of conscience, and equality of rights for all religions." Hoxha's partisans, like Tito's, were frequently seen at religious services. Albania, a turbulent and weapon-toting country addicted to blood feuds and similar practices, was one of the most tolerant of nations from the religious point of view. In 1930 nearly three-fifths of the total population of 1,003,000 were Mohammedans, while the members of the Greek Orthodox Church constituted another fifth. Catholics in union with Rome were noticeably in the minority, scarcely more than one-tenth of the professedly religious reported in the census, and were concentrated in the extreme north of the country. Their major religious, charitable, and educational institutions were in Scutari, an ancient town on a beautiful mountain-surrounded lake, afflicted with mosquitoes and malarial fever. Ancient ties with Italy, which Mussolini so wantonly divested of moral and diplomatic import, had led to the existence of a considerable number of religious of Italian origin in Albania, and also to the settlement of many Albanians in Italy. This fact would no doubt have given rise to some antipathy even under normal conditions. Yet on the whole few in Albania were apprehensive when the war ended. The age-old tradition of religious peace seemed to preclude violent change.

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Albania had a rude awakening. General Hoxha was interested in nothing less than freedom of religion. Information concerning the fate of the Moslem majority is meager and difficult to come by. But laborious piecing together of news items from Albanian radio broadcasts and newspapers makes

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798 one surmise that the Communists have tried to neutralize the Moslem population by breaking it up into mutually hostile factions. It is known that purges of Mohammedan leaders who were insufficiently cooperative have occurred. Islam is today divided into several sects. Hoxha's aides sought first to play one of these against another, and selected the strongest, the *Bektashi*, for the role of principal collaborator; but there ensued a weird series of assassinations, or purges, impossible to interpret. All we really know is that government broadcasts beamed to the Near East stress that Albania demonstrates the ability of Communism to carry out its program successfully while granting complete freedom of faith to Mohammedans. The names of some Moslem leaders who have perished are known, as is that of Hafiz Musa Hashi Alija, who is currently cast in the precarious role of chief adviser to the government on Islamic matters.

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658 News concerning the fate of the Orthodox Church is also much more fragmentary than one could desire. Historically, in Albania, this Church was free of strong confessional ties with Constantinople and Athens, and from time to time some of its leaders took under serious advisement the possibility of reunion with Rome. Accordingly Communist efforts after 1945 to "nationalize" Orthodoxy and to foster its allegiance to Moscow met with resistance. It was not until January, 1948, that a small delegation of the clergy visited Moscow, Kiev, and Leningrad. The official press reported that the head of this group had expressed, in behalf of his colleagues, the view that the "strength of the Russian Church" would insure protection against "all the other Churches, and particularly the Vatican," which might seek to "absorb and destroy the Albanian Church." During the same year, a Russian bishop visited Tirana, Albania's capital city; and the Orthodox Church Conference of that year convened in Moscow. This

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conference, it will be remembered, condemned both the 795
Protestant Ecumenical Movement and the Vatican, "center of 659
Fascism and of plots against the Slavic peoples."

The fact that the Primate, Archbishop Christopher Kissi, 793
did not attend any of these assemblies was strongly indicative 661
of a lack of appreciation for Communist conceptions of the
role and functions of the Church. Indeed, it would have been
strange if he had attended. The Orthodox Church, like all [423]
other religious bodies in Albania, had suffered from the Land
Reform Law promulgated during August, 1945, which gave
the Party the right to confiscate and nationalize property it
has claimed elsewhere. By the close of 1948, Moslem and
Orthodox ecclesiastics were completely dependent financially
on the state. During the next year, the Archbishop was deposed
and arrested. The government's published contention was that
he "had worked against our interests and the interests of the
people by collaborating with the Unitarian Church during the
period of Fascist occupation." Two other prelates, Bishop
Ireneo and Bishop Agathangjeli, were arrested. How many
other members of the clergy have been taken into custody,
deported to labor camps, or executed, no one knows. There is
a report that Bishop Irenaeus Banushi was put to death during
1947.

However, the full fury of Hoxha's enmity fell upon the Ro- 795
man Catholic Church. The Germans had withdrawn in No- 661
vember, 1944. A month later the government seized all print-
ing establishments, and the Catholic press was abolished. At
the same time a number of ecclesiastical offices were searched,
and some members of the clergy were taken into custody.
Religious youth organizations were banned, and only the Anti- [883]
fascist Youth Front, avowedly pro-Communist, was permitted
to function. In February, 1945, the first "People's Court"
to convene in Scutari sentenced one of the best known Al-

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795 banian writers, the Reverend Lazarus Shanjoha, to death. He
661 had favored close ties of friendship with Italy for many years, and so the sentence was ascribed to the National Liberation Front's fanatical detestation of all things Italian, and not to antireligious prejudice.

659 Ilya Ehrenburg, major Soviet propagandist, visited Al-
668 bania during the November of 1945. Upon his return to Mos-
687 cow he described Scutari, more than half the population of which was Roman Catholic, as a vicious hotbed of reaction. At the time of his visit the city was preparing for its first postwar elections. A handful of students at the diocesan seminary for the training of priests circulated mimeographed sheets urging that the recipients vote against the National Front. These sheets bore the signature of the "Albanian Union." Spurred on by Ehrenburg's denunciation, the government jailed and tortured some of the distributors. They revealed the names of the seminarians, who as a matter of fact constituted the complete membership of the Albanian Union. A spectacular trial of those held guilty of having plotted to overthrow the State with the help of "Anglo-American imperialists" became in reality a forum before which the Catholic Church was indicted for high treason. The Rector of the seminary and one of his fellow Jesuits were accused of responsibility for the conspiracy, found guilty, and executed. Others received heavy prison sentences. Nowhere else had a court acted more grimly.

659 The liquidation of virtually all Catholic activities followed
798 swiftly, with more cruel and vengeful treatment of the clergy
661 than has been witnessed even in Hungary and Yugoslavia. The Papal Nuncio was expelled, as were all priests and religious born in Italy. Education was reserved to the State, even nursery schools being taken from the Church. Catholic Action was suppressed. The seminaries were closed. Ecclesias-

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tical property was deeded over to "the people," and the priests who were permitted to remain in office were restricted to one room in their rectories. The only Catholic bishop who is thought to have survived lives in an isolated mountain village. By the close of 1948, virtually every widely respected and well educated priest had been executed or imprisoned. Francis Gjini, Bishop, Abbot, and Albanian representative of the Papal Nuncio; George Volaj, Bishop of Sappa; Matthias Prennushi, Provincial of the Franciscans—all were put to death. Vincent Prennushi, Archbishop of Durazzo, died in prison.

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Under this reign of terror, the Catholic population of approximately 100,000 was reduced to dire poverty, impotence, and silence. The laity suffered almost as grievously as the clergy. Catholics holding positions of public trust were ousted. Priests were forbidden to minister to the sick in hospitals or prisons. To consort in any way with a priest meant probable imprisonment or worse. By the middle of August, 1951, Catholics who still ventured to practice their religion openly were served by not more than sixty-two priests. On the third day of that month, the government published a decree concerning the status of the Roman Catholic Church. This document, having announced that the Church no longer "has any kind of organizational, economic, or political ties with the Pope," went on to ordain that the clergy must accompany religious teaching with the inculcation of sentiments of loyalty to the "people's power of the Albanian People's Republic," and that appointments to ecclesiastical positions must have the approval of the government. This decree was approved at a convention of Catholics meeting in Scutari in 1951. At the same time the government announced that Catholicism in Albania had repudiated all forms of allegiance to the Papacy, "enemy of the people."

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659 The legal status of religious establishments was clarified
671 by a law dated November 26, 1949. The principal stipulations were these:

All clergymen or lay officials must be approved by the State; and any who act illegally "must be dismissed from their posts immediately."

Any communication addressed to the public by a Church official—speech, message, or pastoral letter—must be submitted in advance for censorship.

The education of youth is conducted by the State, and "religious institutions have nothing to do with it."

Religious orders were not to assume management of any hospital or other charitable institution, or to possess real property.

795 Measures taken against the Catholic minority were so bru-
661 tal that even Communist functionaries protested. At a Congress of the People's Party, held on March 31, 1952, General Hoxha sternly upbraided Tuk Jakova, one of the principal Communist Party leaders, for questioning the wisdom of the persecution. Hoxha's words, as reprinted, read in part:

> Comrade Tuk Jakova, disassociating himself from the political program of the Party and of the State in so far as religion and in particular the Catholic clergy are concerned, has not evinced the right attitude toward this clergy or acted against it vigorously. Not seeing the very grave danger which is present in the reactionary clergy, Comrade Jakova has not hated them in an adequate way.

It would therefore appear that while Mohammedanism has been spared the full rigors of the antireligious crusade in Albania, the Christian Churches have suffered as perhaps nowhere else in satellite Europe. Bereft of leadership and of education, depleted through violent death, deportation to labor camps, and escape to other countries, they have been reduced to a status almost as primitive as that of the Churches

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in the Soviet Union itself prior to the War against Hitler. They are almost wholly isolated. Information concerning the cultural life of the Albanian people is limited to what can be obtained from broadcasts over the government radio station.

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Hoxha did not join forces with Marshal Tito when that leader broke with the Kremlin, but was soon made aware that Albania was wholly isolated and that his Yugoslav neighbor gave asylum to dissidents who plotted a *coup d'état*. That such an undertaking might well meet with success seems probable. But Italy retains its interest in the strategic and economic advantages of the Albanian area, and its assent would be required; and currently, with the struggle for Trieste in the foreground, no entente is conceivable. The Russians apparently maintain a small body of troops in the vicinity of Tirana, but have in no other wise manifested great concern. Apparently they consider Hoxha a negligible problem child. It is apparent, however, that the Russian garrison makes impossible any attempt to overthrow the dictatorship from within the country.

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The fate of the three erstwhile Baltic Republics—Lithuania, Latvia, and Estonia—illustrates the sad truth that in troubled and imperialistic parts of the world it does not pay to be a small nation. Each of the three had a solid folk or tribal core round which language, mores, and religious tradition had developed. For brief periods each managed to acquire a precarious independence. But they lay along the great Baltic seacoast route from Western Europe. German colonization efforts, spearheaded by the Teutonic Knights, went this way, and later came solidly entrenched land barons. There were periods of Swedish and Polish domination. Finally, as a result of the Treaty of Nystad, which in 1721 ended the Swedish

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648 wars, and of the Third Partition of Poland, all three coun-
175 tries were ceded to Russia. At first the Czars governed rather benevolently, but by the middle of the nineteenth century the three had been absorbed into the "Northwest Territory"; and stern measures of Russification were resorted to. In Lithuania, for example, only Russian might be spoken. Monastic schools were closed. The Polish and Lithuanian languages were forbidden. Many thousands of persons were deported.

648 After World War I broke out, the three suffered by reason
726 of the wavering fortunes of the belligerents. In 1918 they
175 were the scene of sanguinary fighting between remnants of the German army, invading Bolshevik troops, and hastily formed armies of national liberation. The Poles also intervened. Finally, however, all three states were declared independent, and governments were formed. A period of uneasy tranquillity followed, but the predominatingly peasant population achieved a measure of prosperity. Then the Pact of August, 1939, between Stalin and Hitler and the subsequent erasure of Poland from the map of Europe inaugurated intense tribulation along the Baltic. Germans were evacuated from Latvia and Estonia. All three Republics were compelled to sign agreements with Russia permitting the establishment of military bases. Thousands fled, and countless other thousands were deported. Next came the aftermath of the Nazi declaration of war on Russia. In a very short time Hitler had the Baltic coasts under his heel, and the expulsion and liquidation of Jews began. Finally the German armies retreated, the Russians entered, and the status of the "Northwest Territory" was restored.

642 Elections followed, and as a matter of course pro-Com-
79f munist governments were established. It should be noted that only in Estonia had a native minority of any size favored the Communist cause. Moreover, the religious affiliations of the

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populations were deeply rooted in tradition. Estonia, with a prewar population of 1,250,000, had about 900,000 Lutherans and approximately 215,000 Greek Orthodox. There was only a small group of Roman Catholics. Lithuania, on the other hand, with 3,000,000, was predominatingly Roman Catholic. Minorities of Lutherans, Jews, and Greek Orthodox constituted about one-fifth of the population. More than half of the population of Latvia belonged to the Lutheran Church, but there were substantial Catholic and Greek Orthodox minorities. The organizational activities of the Churches were varied and rich. In Lithuania, for example, with two archdioceses and four dioceses, more than 800,000 persons were enrolled in various lay organizations. The largest daily newspaper was in Catholic hands, and the total circulation achieved by the religious press was impressive. In Latvia likewise, publications under religious auspices numbered more than a fifth of those printed.

The first Communist occupation, dating from June 15, 1940, engulfed all three nations in tragedy. The Russians decreed that every organization established before their seizure of control "jeopardized public security," and religious institutions and organizations were suppressed. Their property was confiscated, and they were forbidden to maintain any contact with the outside world. Religious instruction was curtailed drastically, the clergy being called upon to sign a pledge that they would desist from teaching religion either in public or in private. Waves of Communist propaganda, much of it directed against religion, passed over the country, burying every attempt at counteraction. Within a year the Russians had destroyed every overt vestige of the autonomous culture which these small countries had fostered during the limited time of their independence.

It was done ruthlessly, brutally, barbarously. More than

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661 60,000 Lithuanians were deported to Siberia. A number of
793 priests were murdered, and some are said to have been cruci-
798 fied. In Latvia and Estonia the numbers deported appear to have been smaller; but the clergy of all denominations were hounded, slain, and shipped to labor camps. It is no doubt correct to say that no year in the history of predatory imperialism since the dawn of time has been characterized by so complete a lack of restraint. The individuality of the peoples was rooted out with implacable determination.

661 The Nazis drove the Russians out again, but in turn re-
798 sorted to suppressions of their own. It was a time of dire dis-
697 tress for the Jewish minority, and of course also for anyone deemed to be opposed to their theories of race superiority. Deeply religious folk from the Baltic States were shipped to concentration camps. The Russians returned during the summer of 1944. This time large numbers of Lithuanians in particular fled to the West, the total being estimated at 80,000. Of the remaining inhabitants of the three countries, it is believed that more than 500,000 have been seized and sent off to Russian labor camps. There have been at least six round-ups of slaves. The first was in Estonia at the close of 1948, and it is believed that 50,000 persons were taken from their homes. The others have been carried out with the same irrational callousness. The deportations have stripped the countries affected of virtually all religious leadership which might have opposed Russian domination. Only 30 of Estonia's 250 Lutheran clergymen are still at work there, and comparable figures have been computed for Latvia. One Catholic priest out of five remains in Lithuania.

177 It is hardly necessary to state that the economies of the
461 countries affected are exploited for the benefit of Russia. But
861 one can grasp only with extreme difficulty the extent to which agents of Moscow dominate political and cultural activity.

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Even Nazism was by comparison liberal. Officials assigned the task, direct the government, the press, and education. The Russian language is of course taught in the schools. A relatively recent report from Estonia reads: 177 461 861

> Teachers of the Russian language must explain to their pupils the universal importance of this great tongue. It is the language used by Lenin, the greatest genius of the human race. It is the tongue in which Stalin addresses the toiling masses of the world. The Russian language will enable the student to understand Russian culture . . . and to acquire a knowledge of the world's most notable scientific achievements.

Training in the Russian language is accompanied by the dissemination of Communist classics, notably the works of Lenin, made available in cheap editions and foisted off on workers regardless of their wishes. Young people in particular are targets for Communist indoctrination, and nowhere have they been bombarded with greater vigor than in the Baltic area. There can be little doubt that in twenty years virtually all awareness of Christian thought and feeling will have disappeared, save among the rare survivors of an older generation.

All the usual devices—nationalization of Church property, suppression of religious education—have of course been resorted to here. The kolkhoz system has been widely introduced into Lithuania, largely in order to restore the efficiency of an agricultural system depleted of usable labor by the deportations. Although nearly all of these are reported to be under direct Russian control, the results appear to have been disappointing. A report assumed to be reliable has this to say: 423

> The names of Estonian kolkhozes provide a most interesting commentary on Communist propaganda and on the strict hierarchical sys-

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423 tem which prevails in the Soviet Union. Stalin has 26 or 27 kolkhozes dedicated to him; Lenin has 25; Marx, 6; and Engels, only 2. The kolkhozes named after Stalin are larger than the others and are situated in the most fertile regions. Whereas ordinary kolkhozes have some 120 cows, Stalin's have from 450 to 700. Workers on Stalin kolkhozes receive higher wages than are paid on others. Stalin kolkhozes are never criticized in the press and are invariably run by well known, active Communists. Other living Soviet leaders also have kolkhozes dedicated to them: Molotov has 9 named after him; Voroshilov, 7. Zhandov, who in 1940 accomplished the Sovietization of Estonia, has 6. Other kolkhozes with Russian names are Stalingrad, Volga, Ukraine, Gorki, Pushkin, and Lysenko. Not a single one, however, has been named for a living Estonian except that adorned with the cognomen of the Soviet Union's wrestling champion, Johannes Kotkas.

793 About the only notable action against a prelate of standing
687 which has been adequately reported is the trial of the Bishop of Danzig, Carl Maria Splett, who was brought to the dock for assisting the Nazi oppressors. The Bishop, a stanch and zealous man, protested his innocence; and there was no evidence whatsoever that he had in any way aided the infamous cause of the Nazis. He had, indeed, contended bravely against the depredations of Hitler's minions on the freedom and mission of the Church. Nevertheless *Osservatore Romano* reported, on February 3, 1946, that he had been sentenced to prison for eight years because he had "assisted the German occupants to the detriment of the Polish people." Bishop Splett is still in duress.

725 What we do know about the fate of these people rests upon an infinitely painstaking, imaginative piecing together of very small bits of information. Thus it is possible to say that there was considerable guerrilla resistance, particularly by peasants; that the armed bands were surrounded in the forest and mowed down; that villages were thereupon razed, as Lidice

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in Czechoslovakia had been by the Nazis; and that of heroism 725
there is even yet no end. We are also able to say that Russians were brought westward to take the places of the dead and the deported. But it requires a creative writer rather than a historian 000
to draw out of the drably reported facts their full significance; and this has been done by the Polish poet Czeslaw Milosz in a remarkable article in the Berlin *Monat*, from which I quote:

> The letter I held in my hand stabbed me in the heart. It came from a family which had been deported to Siberia from one of the Baltic States during March, 1949, and was addressed to relatives in Poland. This family consisted of a mother and two daughters. The letter described in terse and arid words the labor they were called upon to perform on a kolkhoz somewhere on the other side of the Urals. The last letters in the several lines were written more heavily than the others; and when one read them from top to bottom they formed these words: "SLAVES FOREVER." This missive, addressed to somebody else, fell into my hands by accident. How many similar cries of despair expressed through a comparable code may have been received by others who, unlike my confidant, kept an anxious silence!

Milosz goes on to wonder whether this peasant woman, gone into a dour exile from which virtually none return, be not a symbol of a moral disaster of which the world of the West is hardly aware. To be sure, the West knows there are slave-labor camps, and realizes what goes on in them. But it cannot rouse itself to a united, flaming moral protest which not only would have meaning for the victims of Communism but would clean out many of the breeding places, in our society, of infection that in turn produces more Communism. I have seen no letter so dramatically pathetic, though I have read many written under Russian bondage, filled with heartache and despair. Nor can one have talked with refugees, be they simple folk or intellectuals, without gaining some insight into the

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000 ultimate human meaning of the catastrophe which has befallen a country like Lithuania.

795 Lithuania, a Catholic land, lived by the precepts of the Church with the fidelity that is characteristic of Ireland. During 1939, more than 1,600 priests served a communion of nearly 3,000,000. Jesuits, Franciscans, and other religious were firmly established. There were nine bishops. One-fifth of all the books published in Lithuanian dealt with religious subjects. There was a vigorous Catholic press. Education was not divorced from religious teaching. All the things that are characteristic of Catholic countries—shrines, pilgrimages, seminaries, hospitals, organizations for the furtherance of Catholic social action—were amply in evidence.

The shock of finding all this irretrievably wiped out (or so it had to seem) must have been staggering indeed, even for the more parochially minded. In the eyes of so many deportees and escapees, I have seen utter bewilderment as if they had witnessed the unimaginable transformation of everything familiar into a jumbled amalgam each minute part of which was become terrifyingly strange. Human beings can survive great catastrophes intact, sometimes even strengthened, provided the basic communities in which their lives are merged—family, church, civil society—preserve their normal outlines. Otherwise they cannot do so.

793 Very little news comes from Lithuania. What does come indicates that the people have clung with moving fidelity to their faith. Only one member of the Lithuanian Hierarchy not in exile survives. He was recently compelled to attend a Peace Congress in Moscow, but was not asked to address the assembly. Fewer than one-third of the parishes still have pastors. It is reported that the Seminary at Kaunas still trains young men for the priesthood, though the number has become small. No new church may be erected, nor has any which was

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destroyed during the war been rebuilt. Nevertheless people gather for prayer and worship even when there is no priest to minister unto them. How implacably the wheels of oppression grind may be deduced from the following comment: 793

> Priests are obliged to pay income taxes in accordance with their rank. Thus a pastor must pay up to the amount of 100,000 rubles annually, and a curate up to half that amount. This means, in the case of a pastor, a sum as large as several of the salaries earned by the most highly paid civil servants. Of course it is impossible for the priests to meet these levies because the faithful, normally earning only a tenth of what it costs them to live, must slowly dispose of everything they own in order to exist. Ultimately the priests must pawn or sell not only everything they possess but also the property of the Church. [E52]

Thus broken fane and hunted priest and cowering faithful are symbols of Christianity in our day. What shall we say is the answer that comes from the heart of the West? Is Milosz right when he says that we not only forget about the 500,000 Lithuanians who have been deported to the slave-labor regions of Russia, but fail dismally as well to give our own industrial society dignity and richness? A peasant woman like the writer of the letter he cites must indeed have lived a narrowly circumscribed life. Yet somehow it had a rhythm which, regulated by the seasons, kept the sacredness of the seasons. Who does not occasionally think of the desiccated culture of the West, afflicted with a dry rot which must be in the bones of our education as well as in our social goals? An American, for example, who has observed the lives of so many of his countrymen abroad, veering from reading designed for minds unintelligent and smug alike to entertainment whose sole purpose is to provide a stylized commentary on raw passions, cannot but wonder whether the resources of pseudo-Christianity we fancy we have conserved will suffice for the long and bitter ordeal which lies ahead for us. 000

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8 SOVIETIZING THE BALKAN REGION

I

648 RUMANIA AND BULGARIA, both allied with Hitler during World War II, were of necessity doomed to Soviet rule once the fighting was ended. Yet it should be remembered that neither country had been an enthusiastic partner of the German dictator. Rumania in particular had suffered during the thirties from constant bloody clashes between the moderate supporters of the Monarchy and a fascist movement known as the Iron Guard. Many thousands of persons were executed or slain, and the civil liberties of the nation almost disappeared. In the end, the Germans gained control, and the Rumanian Army became part of their war machine. Bulgaria, too, had lived under virtual dictatorship; and when the Nazis found it possible to satisfy at least partially the expansionist desires of the regime, there came into being an uneasy alliance which the majority of the people undoubtedly opposed. This sullen and strong opposition made it unwise to involve the Bulgarian Army in Nazi military adven-

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tures, and the Russians could legitimately conclude that the warm friendship suddenly manifested in both countries when Red troops marched in was not wholly sincere. 648

The United States made a serious effort to insure effective democratic government in the Balkan region. For example, with Great Britain, it protested against the manner in which the Bulgarian elections of November, 1945, were conducted. The voting had led to a scarcely contested triumph for the pro-Communist Fatherland Front. The matter was debated at the Moscow Conference which convened in the next month, and the Russians indicated that possession was just about the whole of the law, although they did agree to include representatives of other parties in the government. From that time on, Soviet domination of the two countries slowly and implacably became more complete, and any likelihood that Western intervention could alter the course of events evaporated like a morning mist.

Except Greece, Bulgaria was the country in which the Greek Orthodox Church was strongest. Moslems were the only minority of notable size, Jews and Roman Catholics and Protestants being negligible in number.* Accordingly, as soon as the Russians had taken over and begun to establish a collectivist economy, the Orthodox Church was an object of immediate attention. There was a maneuver which has been a topic for speculative comment ever since. For many years the hostility between Bulgaria and Greece which had its roots in the struggle for Bulgarian independence had manifested itself also in the 648 [62] 795

* Prewar population statistics for Bulgaria reveal that 83.5 per cent were Greek Orthodox; 14.3, Mohammedan; 0.9, Jewish; and 0.8, Roman Catholic. Postwar (1948) estimates for Rumania indicate that 72 per cent of the population were Orthodox; 10, Roman Catholics according to the Greek rite; 7, Roman Catholics; 4.6, Calvinists; 2.3, Jews; and 1.6, Lutherans. Other Protestant groups, including Unitarians and Baptists, constituted about 1 per cent. Most Rumanian Catholics and Protestants belonged to German or Hungarian minority groups.

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religious organization. Faithful to its Byzantine origins, the Greek Orthodox Church recognized (as we have previously noted) the Patriarch of Constantinople as its head, but accepted the Hierarchy of Greece as the center of ecclesiastical power. This Hierarchy had, however, ruled that the Bulgarian Orthodox Church was a schismatic body, and all pleas that its decision be altered fell on deaf ears. When the war ended, the Bulgarian Holy Synod met and elected the Metropolitan of Sofia president and head of the Church with the title Exarch Stephan I. He had long fished in the troubled waters of Bulgarian politics and was widely known as an anti-Communist, but now he began to manifest a zealous ardor in support of Communism which virtually knew no bounds. When he made representations to the Constantinople Patriarch that the curse of schism be lifted from the Bulgarian Church, an affirmative answer was received, owing no doubt to the weakness of the Greeks and the peril in which they at that time found themselves.

Much going and coming ensued. Stephan journeyed to Kiev, Moscow, and Leningrad. In turn the Patriarch of Moscow, despite his eighty years, made an official visit to Bulgaria. Not a few students of the situation reason that a plan had been concocted to make the Patriarch of Moscow head of all the Eastern Orthodox Churches, conferring a new and signal distinction upon the Russian capital, which would thus become not only the world center of Communism but also the "Third Rome," and manifestly rival the Vatican in importance as a seat of ecclesiastical authority. The plan—if it actually existed—soon ceased to bear any relation to reality; but it is interesting to conjecture as to what might have happened if the Greeks had been absorbed into the Russian orbit.

All this had a complex and sometimes confusing historical background. The services rendered by the Orthodox clergy

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to the cause of Bulgarian independence, and to the resurrection of the Bulgarian language as a medium of literary expression, gave the Church universally recognized prestige. After 1878, when national freedom was gained, the Orthodox Church was a State institution, and the members of its Hierarchy were public officials. A portion of the national budget was set aside to support the Church, which in addition owned considerable property largely derived from bequests. The case was comparable with that of a large state university in the United States. Salaries of professors in such a university are paid out of the state treasury; but it may own not inconsiderable wealth in its own right, is permitted to collect fees from students and to charge for other services rendered. When one considers the rural character of Bulgaria and the poverty of most of its 6,000,000-odd people, the financial strength of Orthodoxy reflected in such magnificent structures as the Archiepiscopal Palace in Sofia is genuinely impressive. Clergymen of all ranks officiated on public occasions; and, though the spirituality of the Bulgarian people may well have been far from deep, they prized the Church as the primary agency of the national culture.

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Bulgarian education enjoyed a well merited repute, and the theological schools established after 1878 ranked high among the country's institutions of higher learning. The training given consisted in the main of what we should call "general education," theology being taught as a field of specialization. The result was that many leading citizens were graduates of these schools. Religious instruction, normally by laymen, was likewise included in the curricula of elementary and secondary schools. About 4,000 churches served the people, under the direction of the Holy Synod. This body also fostered breadth of view, and held membership in the World Council of Churches prior to the war. On the whole, the religious situation

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871 794 was idyllic, in spite of a rather constant exchange of uncomplimentary remarks with the Greeks.

659 The first approach to the Church by the Communists was made rather gingerly and was not unfriendly. They seemed, indeed, to regard this venerable institution as a political instrument worth keeping in repair. True enough, religious instruction was banned from the public schools, and the control of marriage legislation was reserved to the State. Previously the Church not only had married aspirants to wedlock, but had maintained an elaborate system of marriage counseling and of divorce courts—courts with rules far more lenient than those recognized by either Catholic or conservative Protestant Churches in Western Europe. But the State budget continued to provide for the support of the clergy, and the prosecution of priests and prelates for alleged subversive activities was minimal.

[642] A drastic change took place when the Communist Party assumed complete control during December, 1947, following the return of Georgi Dimitrov from Russia. The Constitution signed on the fourth day of that month dealt with religion in the customary Soviet manner: guaranteeing freedom of conscience and religion, and specifically endorsing freedom of worship; on the other hand, decreeing separation of Church and State, and prohibiting political organizations based on re-
659 ligious belief and political activities by the Churches. During
671 February, 1949, statutes were decreed which outlined in detail the relationship of the Churches to the government. Control over ecclesiastical matters was lodged in the Ministry for Foreign Affairs, which could hold the recognized authorities of each Church responsible. All such authorities had to be Bulgarian citizens, and to register with the Ministry, which might insist upon the removal from office of any clergyman it deemed undesirable. These laws, which subjected the Church to the

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domination of the State, clearly implied that Orthodoxy was to have an opportunity to qualify as the "people's religion." Note, for example, the language of Section 12: C59 C71

> Clergymen and other officials guilty of violating the laws, public order, or good morals, or of acting in a manner hostile to the democratic institutions of the State, may, over and above other applicable penalties, be provisionally suspended or removed from office on the request of the Minister for Foreign Affairs. Upon receipt of such a request from the Minister for Foreign Affairs, suspension or removal from office shall be effected immediately by the leadership of the respective religious denomination. If the clergyman is not removed by the responsible leadership, he shall be removed by administrative order.

We shall now see how the legislation described was put into effect. C59 793

In so far as the Orthodox Church is concerned, the story opens with the removal from office of Exarch Stephan I, who was said to be an overly ambitious prelate bent on skillfully juggling the disparate objects of Communist ideology and Christian tradition. Apparently Church and State agreed on his removal to the small town of Karlovo, the former because it deemed him too dictatorial and the latter because it no longer had any use for him. Ecclesiastical authority was lodged anew in the Holy Synod, which had already learned that the Communists took seriously ordinances abolishing religious marriage, prohibiting the teaching of religion in the schools, banning religious observances from military establishments, and subjecting the public to barrages of irreligious propaganda. Absolute dependence upon the State was associated with absolute surrender of traditional privileges.

It must be noted that the Exarch, during his tenure of office, had sounded almost every note in the scale which Dimitrov may have dreamed of as the ideal music for an ideal Church.

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Here is a brief report written by one who was an unhappy eyewitness of the events described:

> On the occasion of the anniversary of the October Revolution in Russia, the Exarch addressed a letter to all the Metropolitans in which he glorified the achievements of the Soviet Union. He also spoke glowingly of the role of the Slavic peoples in history. Finally he lauded Czechoslovakia and emphasized the need for very close relationships between Church and State. At about the same time, Marshal Tito visited Bulgaria, and the Exarch sent a telegram to Dimitrov in which he paid homage to the alliance between Bulgaria and Yugoslavia and expressed the hope that these two great peoples would continue to foster mutual assistance. But the message also stressed the role which the Church had played in the history of the two countries. During the summer of 1947 the Exarch paid a visit to Carlsbad as the guest of the Czechoslovak Government, and took the cure there. During his stay he delivered an address in which he praised the Government of the country; and when the time came for him to enter his name in the Golden Book of the City of Prague he expressed gratitude for the honor and paid his respects to the "Slavic ideal and to the contributions it had made to the triumph of peace and justice in the world." He hailed the formation of the Cominform as a step towards the safeguarding of Slavic solidarity.

The Synod which succeeded to the authority of the Exarch was scarcely less supine. Despite the fact that the Communist Party had ordered that courses in dialectical materialism be offered in the seminaries which trained young men for the priesthood, it commemorated the twenty-fifth anniversary of the death of Lenin. It likewise instructed the clergy to accept membership in the Fatherland Front. The situation is illustrated by an émigré from Sofia, who relates that the editor of the principal Orthodox theological journal had approved an article in which the author expounded the thesis that natural science alone could not answer all questions. He was summoned to the Ministry and made to apologize profusely for the aber-

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ration. At any rate, the Holy Synod was soon reechoing every banal attack on Anglo-American imperialism and applauding every appeal for the Moscow version of "peace." In the summer of 1949, its official journal expressed regret that the center of Roman Catholicism (the Vatican) and the heartland of Protestantism (the United States) had of their own free will blessed a new war and sung the praises of the atomic bomb. 659 783

These various attitudes received final binding expression in the series of resolutions on relations between Church and State which the Holy Synod adopted on September 20, 1948: the clergy were authorized to join pro-Communist organizations and to support the collective farm system; government decrees prohibiting the teaching of religion in the schools were endorsed; all priests were warned not to make any statement from their pulpits which might be considered to be political. The Synod assured the government that it stood ready to cooperate in any measure "for the reform of society in accordance with the principles of liberty, equality, and fraternity." For the seventieth birthday of Stalin it addressed a letter, dated December 12, 1949, to all pastors urging them to conduct Divine services for the welfare of the great Russian leader. It also formally endorsed the peace plea with all its might and main. 659 793 626

Yet all this does not mean that the rank and file of the Bulgarian Orthodox clergy betrayed their faith without a struggle. It took the pro-Communist Union of Orthodox Priests a long while to recruit members. Watched constantly by the security police, removed from office for dissident attitudes, often sent to slave-labor camps, the clergy witnessed with foreboding the working out of policies designed to seduce youth, secularize all welfare activity, and subject all preaching, whether oral or written, to censorship by an uncompromisingly Marxist ideological authority. Eventually only one theological school, at Plovdiv, was permitted to remain open. Two theological jour-

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659 nals, one of them the organ of the Communist-dominated
793 Synod, made propaganda at the government's behest. Every-
626 one who gave any indication of fidelity to the Christian creed in its true significance and glory had to reckon with the possibility that he would speedily be sentenced to one of the dreaded prisons—Kolarovgrad, for example—which were always crammed with the unfortunate victims of tyranny.

659 The Orthodox Church having been transformed into an ab-
798 ject lackey of the State, Communist wrath descended on the religious minorities. Protestants were the first victims. Missionaries had come to Bulgaria from Turkey, and had established schools which, despite wars and upheavals, gave a good education to boys and girls. An exemplary woman introduced the kindergarten system and trained native teachers. By the close of World War I, hostility to Protestants had pretty largely died down; and although the small congregations did not grow rapidly they successfully maintained their identities. Their pride and joy was the American College, situated near Sofia. It was closed by the Nazis in 1942 and has not been reopened. The work of the Y.M.C.A. and the Y.W.C.A. was suppressed at the same time, and the Communist regime has not lifted the prohibition.

691 The legislation adopted during February, 1949 (often re-
687 ferred to as the Canonical Purity Laws) contained a number
648 of provisions designed to render impossible any religious activity under the auspices of a Church or institution with headquarters outside Bulgaria. It stipulated, for example, that any Church or any clergyman desiring "canonical relations with or aid or gifts from" institutions, organizations, or official personages abroad must secure permission in advance from the Ministry for Foreign Affairs. It was presumably under this legislation that fifteen Protestant pastors were brought to trial for high treason during 1949. It was the first large-scale action

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against Protestants in any satellite country, though to be sure Protestant Churches had suffered grievously in Czechoslovakia, Hungary, and Poland. The pastors, none of whom had occupied a position of eminence, were confronted with a lengthy list of charges. In particular they had, the Public Prosecutor contended, given military, economic, and political information to representatives of hostile foreign powers. They were also accused of having "spread malicious rumors about Russia." Those indicted—the Reverend Basil Ziapkov, for example—made confessions of the length desired and pleaded for mercy. The Court pronounced sentences of varying severity.

Manifestly this trial was also a blow struck at the prestige of the United States, from which most of the support for the Protestant congregations had come. Its primary effect was, no doubt, that the curtain was rung down on any hopes Bulgarian citizens might have that diplomatic intervention by the West would blunt the edge of the Soviet sickle, or that Washington could defend the interests of Americans in regions under Russian domination. How complete the resulting loss of morale was can be deduced from the official statements issued by the other Churches on the subject of the ordeal to which Protestantism had been subjected. The Holy Synod of the Orthodox Church declared, for example:

> In accordance with our Church's traditional solicitude for fostering the aspirations of the people and maintaining loyalty to the State, the Holy Synod has always exhorted its clergy to look upon themselves as preachers of the Divine Word and as guardians of the Holy Spirit, and to remain aloof from all political influences hostile to the country and its people. We must add that the pastors of the Holy Orthodox Church have consistently obeyed our admonition. Not one of them has been prosecuted by the authorities on account of religious activities.
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> The Holy Synod strongly condemns all subversive activities carried

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735 on by the faithful, all actions detrimental to our People's Republic,
658 and anything which may threaten the independence and liberty of our people. And we condemn such things even more strongly when they are carried on by those who profess other creeds.

The statements made by the Catholic bishops, both of the Latin and of the Greek rite, contained professions of loyalty to the government but did not comment on the trial of their Protestant brethren.

653 The Catholic Church wielded an influence in Bulgaria which
687 was wholly disproportionate to its size. Fewer than ten persons
793 in a thousand professed to belong to this Church, which of course was also hampered by the division according to the two rites. But Catholics had played a stirring part in the struggle for liberation from Turkish rule, and so their heroes were eminent in the nation's song and story. Educational institutions created and developed by members of religious orders were likewise held in high esteem, and many of the graduates were prominent in the civil service and the professions. These institutions have been nationalized, and the Church itself is circumscribed by the laws affecting religion. During 1949, the Catholic Bishops acceded to the government's request and sent a message to the United Nations affirming the existence of religious freedom in Bulgaria. Subsequently the lot of both clergy and laity grew steadily worse; but the first spectacular and drastic action taken against the Church was the arrest of a bishop, more than a score of priests, and a number of laymen, on the usual charge of conspiring with a hostile foreign power. The Bishop and three priests were sentenced to death for high treason, and twenty-four priests and twelve laymen received prison sentences. Therewith an almost mortal blow was struck at the life and organized activity of the Church.*

000 * Most of the more than half a million Mohammedans in Bulgaria were of Turkish descent. During 1950 the government began deporting them to Turkey,

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One may therefore summarize by saying that there has been virtually no religious struggle in Bulgaria, even though the victims are not few in number. This does not mean that all has been tranquil and serene. Georgi Dimitrov was not a man to give that sort of content to the word "peace." Nowhere have the Russians shown greater ruthlessness in carrying out the policies to which Leninism-Stalinism is committed. Marxist theorists consider the independent farmer as the greatest obstacle to social progress. They think it inevitable that industry should spawn the proletarian worker, and hold this worker to be at one and the same time a carrier of the Marxist virus and a member of the class majority in whose hands collective power over productive properties collectively owned and managed properly belongs. Accordingly there is only one way in which to speed arrival at the Communist goal, defined by Marx in the first volume of *Das Kapital*. The agricultural operation must be collectivized, so that eventually all tillers of the soil will cease to be owners of property and will work instead for the State. On this belief has been based the otherwise curious and paradoxical procedure of the Communists in Eastern Europe. In countries containing large estates, the Land Reform method is used to break them up and to parcel out small holdings; but as soon as this has been done the process is reversed, and the peasant owners are squeezed until they can only surrender their land for the organization of a "cooperative."

Therefore Bulgaria was almost made to order for Communist experimentation. Nearly four-fifths of the population earned a living by the soil; and, though after the First World

and now the number of Mohammedans expelled is in excess of 150,000. Moslem religious activities are, as a matter of course, subject to the existing laws concerning religion. Turkey has therewith been faced with a grave problem of refugee resettlement, and reliable reports indicate that she has dealt with it skillfully. Refugees are receiving farm lands in Anatolia, which has been sparsely populated. Naturally there need be no fear of Communist infiltration.

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185 War a program of cooperative farming was inaugurated on a
829 voluntary membership basis, the vast majority of farmers were small landowners of the type which once was so characteristic of the Ukraine. As early as August, 1945, the first of a series of decrees was promulgated, to liquidate the hated kulak and incorporate him into the kolkhoz, or State farm, system. At the same time a blueprint of industrialization was drawn, on the
[466] basis of the familiar Two- and Five-Year Plans. The blueprint required first of all cheap compulsory labor in quantity. The published legislation outlines the methods by which that labor force was to be obtained. The police received authority "to commit to communities for educational labor, or to a new place of residence, persons guilty of fascist or antidemocratic manifestations." It was also decreed, soon after the seizure of power, that many hundreds of thousands of persons should be "sent to the factories or shifted to industry." On none of these matters was any effort made to maintain secrecy.

[371] Soon dams and electric power plants were being constructed
697 in various parts of the country. The exploitation of Bulgaria's
466 very modest coal deposits was greatly intensified. In order to supply the needed labor force, concentration camps were erected in a surprising variety of places. One of the better known is that at Belene, the inmates of which work at digging canals. Here are cooped up many prominent Bulgarian intellectuals, businessmen, and officers of divers political organizations once opposed to Communism. The Communists themselves have advertised widely this camp, where, it is estimated, 9,000 persons are interned under the most primitive penal conditions. If the accounts of prisoners who have escaped from it are to be credited (and there is no reason why they should not be), it is in all truth an infamous place. The methods of committing people to it have been spelled out in carefully devised legislation, which makes no provision for haling anyone before

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a court for trial and sentence. The Law on Labor Mobilization of Idlers and Vagrants, originally enacted on April 30, 1946, and subsequently amended announced: 697 466 [671]

Section 1. All Bulgarian nationals of both sexes, between 16 and 50 years of age [45 for women], fit for work but who have taken to idling and vagrancy or who spend most of their time in saloons, coffee shops, bars, pastry shops, and the like, shall be mobilized for compulsory labor.

Section 2. The purpose of the labor mobilization shall be to make the draftees accustomed to useful work, to develop in them a love of socially useful labor, to eradicate their bad habits, and at the same time to utilize their physical energies and their intellectual endowments for the increase of the population and the welfare of the country.

Section 3. The labor of the draftees shall be used on projects of general usefulness, such as road construction, railroad tracks, canals, dams, buildings, levees, river constructions, tillage of government or public farms, work in mines, quarries, factories, workshops and the like, according to the sex and age of the draftees.

The lot of the "draftees" in such camps as those in the Dobrudja, Bulgaria's most fertile area, has been described by persons who have escaped. A typical camp is that for women near the city of Tutrakan. It is a network of primitive barracks in each of which are to be found two rows of wooden bunks, each row in three tiers. The prisoners work on a large State-owned farm. The camp director gives the assignments. For example, the prisoner may be told to dig up such and such an acreage of sugar beets, or to spade a specified amount of soil in preparation for the planting of paprika. The daily wage is 900 grams of black bread. Failure to complete the task causes the ration to be diminished. As a rule each inmate works eleven hours a day. At ten P.M. there is a roll call, after which each prisoner solemnly promises to do everything she possibly can "for the building up of the People's Republic of Bulgaria."

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There is an austere puritanical fanaticism about the regulations which is difficult for an American, inured to doing what he pleases, to comprehend.

Virtually all potential foes of the Communist regime in Bulgaria have been sent to such camps, which means that any person who deviates in the slightest degree from the established Communist norm invites the public prosecutor to get on with incarcerating him. It is difficult to believe that the system is as far-flung and well established as it is; but the Communist authorities themselves have made available a substantial amount of information on its extent. There are at least thirty slave-labor camps in Bulgaria, and it has been estimated that at least 500,000 persons have been confined in them during the seven years of Communist rule. Among the inmates have been whole families—men, women, and children. Before we condemn the Bulgarian Churches for cowardly behavior it may be well to ask what we ourselves might have done in the circumstances.

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Rumania was not fully subordinated to the Communist Party until the close of 1947. On the eve of the invasion of the country, which had been the only one to lend full support to the Nazi cause, young King Michael overthrew the Iron Front government and its strong man, General Antonescu, by a *coup d'état*. The new Government, in which a general also served as Premier, accepted the terms of armistice. Nevertheless by March 6, 1945, the Communists were unmistakably in control, although a fellow traveler, Dr. Petru Groza, was selected to head a government in which they had the upper hand. At the Potsdam Conference the United States, Great Britain, and Russia agreed to sign a treaty of peace with Rumania as soon as a government should be formed which was "broadly repre-

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sentative of all democratic elements of the population." Later, 648
at the Moscow Conference, the Western powers declared that 642
they would believe such a government existed as soon as representatives of two political parties other than the Rumanian 666
Workers' Party had been named to ministerial posts, and as soon as satisfactory guarantees had been given that freedom of speech and assembly as well as the right to vote without constraint had been assured. Dr. Groza complied by appointing the two desired ministers to the Cabinet without portfolio and by announcing that free elections would be held soon; but, as was to be anticipated in view of the fact that the Russian Army held the country in an iron grip, the Rumanian Workers' Party received 90-odd per cent of the vote. The ministers without portfolio promptly resigned, and there was nothing the Western powers could do about it save to register an emphatic protest. This they did in language suitably designed for the occasion.

The elections referred to were held on November 19, 1946. [687]
Almost precisely a year later the leader of the principal opposition party, Dr. Juliu Maniu, was sentenced to life imprisonment for high treason. Unquestionably this able and farsighted man, who had served the government and the people of Rumania well over many years and had been identified with every movement for reform and justice, was the foremost of the nation's citizens. King Michael abdicated on December 30 of [642]
the same year and fled from his native land. Thereupon the "People's Republic" was proclaimed, and every source of potential opposition to it was ferreted out and suppressed. A Constitution of the usual kind was adopted on April 13, 1948.
Now no obstacle barred the way for putting the Soviet paradise [491]
plan into effect. The principal productive enterprises were declared the property of the State, and this likewise became the sole arbiter of the educational system. Collective farming was introduced. A novelty was that new elections were held during

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666 December, 1950. As a matter of course, only one party appeared on the ballot. Some 80,000 persons appointed to local soviets were duly elected.

181 One of the distinguishing characteristics of this "uprising of the proletariat" was the extreme paucity of Communists. Another was the fact that the population had no democratic tradition to fall back upon. The country had lived under a fascist type of dictatorship without sensing that it had been very differently treated than it would no doubt have been under a liberal regime. When the war was over, most of Antonescu's Iron Men simply transformed themselves into a different metal. We may say without hesitation that opportunism and not conviction made Rumania's transition to Sovietism so absurdly simple. Nobody had believed it possible that a man like Dr. Maniu could be clapped into jail, brought before the courts on a trumped-up charge, and sentenced. But the People's Democracy managed even that, and it was small wonder that the average citizen began to think earnestly about his own throat.

795 As we ponder the evil fortunes which lay ahead for religious confessions in Rumania, it is helpful to bear in mind that this country, the easternmost colony of the Roman Empire, learned to know Christianity as early as the second century of the present era. Congregations formed there were represented at some of the earliest councils of the Church. Subsequently, after wars and invasions had run their course, the Rumanian ecclesiastical establishment was affiliated with the Eastern, or Byzantine, Patriarchate. As a result Greek Orthodoxy became the confession to which the great majority of the people subscribed after the independence of the nation had been achieved in 1878. The Church thus established occupied a position in the life of the country which was not unlike that of the Orthodox Church in Bulgaria. The clergy participated in the official affairs of the nation. In general, exception having been duly

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made for the Jews, the Orthodox Church dealt with other confessions in an irenic manner. 795

Rumania profited greatly if temporarily from its sponsorship of the Allied cause during World War I. Territories were assigned to it which had traditionally belonged to Bulgaria, Hungary, and Russia, presenting the government with a number of problems with which it had not previously been concerned. Transylvania, taken from Hungary, had a population divided almost equally between Roman Catholics and Protestants. The Russian Orthodox Church was predominant in Bessarabia, once deeded to the Czar by the West. The Rumanians dealt with the situation in a manner both intelligent and conciliatory. After the favored status of the Greek Orthodox Church had been defined, laws regulating the Confessions were passed during April, 1928. They carefully safeguarded the rights of the State and specifically forbade clergymen to embark on seas of foreign policy of their own charting, but acknowledged the right of the Churches to give religious instruction in public and private schools, and to conduct charitable enterprises. The government also signed a Concordat with the Holy See in 1927, with which the Vatican had no reason to be dissatisfied. 659 795 648

The Concordat conceded to the Catholic Church in all its branches, regular and secular, a large measure of legal protection. Stipulating that ecclesiastical properties must be used for the benefit of Rumanian citizens, and that the income therefrom was subject to audit by the government, it authorized the Church to create a "Sacred Diocesan Fund" to be administered by the Hierarchy. It also promised to add to the Fund if this proved to be inadequate to meet the expenses of necessity incurred by religious foundations. The Catholic clergy were asked to take an oath of allegiance to the King, to the Constitution, and to the laws of the nation. The government agreed not 659 648 794 793

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to intervene to secure the appointment of clergymen, but requested that it be informed in each instance. These laws were modified under the rule of the Iron Front, in order to make possible the persecution of the Jews. Christian communions appear, however, not to have been affected.

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When a pro-Communist government was formed in Rumania, the situation changed immediately and radically. The laws adopted in 1928 were repealed by a decree of August 4, 1948. As usual in Soviet-inspired constitutions, freedom of conscience, of religion, and of worship was assured. Freedom was conceded to all creeds to organize and conduct their own ecclesiastical endeavors so long as they did nothing to jeopardize "public security and public order." The last proviso was, as always, the Trojan horse by means of which the conquerors would enter the citadel. For what were public security and order? The government reserved the right to determine; and in this case the "government" was and could only be the local soviet under which a poor cleric was to live and move and have his being. As a matter of fact, the system under which the Rumanian Communist Party functioned was simplicity itself. The list of electors registered in 1946 was kept up to date by striking off the names of all who had in some manner or other manifested hostility to the "people." The possessor of a name thus purged might retain the right to worship wherever he pleased, but was of course deprived of any opportunity to draw a salary from the State or to hold a position of public trust.

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Indeed, the law went much further. Article 25 provided that

> the Ministry of Religious Affairs shall suspend any decision, instruction, or directive, as well as any order having an ecclesiastical character, whether administrative, cultural, educational, or caritative, or pertaining to endowments, if it is not in keeping with the status of the denomination in the act by which it has been established, or is inimical to public security, public order or morals. Pastoral and circular letters

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shall be communicated in advance of publication to the Ministry of Religious Affairs. 671 793 659

While thus making apparent that the Church was deprived of all liberty of action in areas of moral judgment concerning actions taken by the public authority, the law further stipulated that the salaries of "clergymen and officers of the religious denominations" would be paid in accordance with the regulations governing the civil service. In this fashion it was determined that all clergymen, on the one hand, had the rights accorded to the civil service but, on the other, assumed corresponding obligations—among them an oath of allegiance to the national Constitution.

Subsequently, on August 12, 1950, a decree dealing with the [687] security of the State imposed the death penalty for the following offenses: treason to the nation; rendering "service to the enemy, or causing prejudice to the power of the state"; and procuring or transmitting state secrets to a foreign or an enemy power. The decree was directed primarily against the dignitaries of the Roman Catholic Church, because they were in communion with Rome. On July 6, 1950, another decree had provided a basis for expelling from Rumania the Papal Nuncio, Archbiship O'Hara, and his two assistants, Monsignor Kirk and Monsignor Del Mesti. Most of the Rumanian members of the Nuncio's staff were sentenced to imprisonment. Therewith an initial climax was reached in two years of fierce attack on the Churches and on the Roman Catholic Church in particular.

At this point a more detailed review of the religious situa- 735 tion in Rumania may help to clarify what has happened. Prior 162 to the outbreak of the Second World War, the 70 per cent of Rumanians adhering to the Orthodox Church were affiliated with the Patriarchate of Constantinople but enjoyed ecclesiastical autonomy. This Church, directed by a Holy Synod pre-

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795 162 sided over by a Patriarch, had 7,833 parishes, fifty-seven religious foundations for men, and twenty-six similar foundations for women. The two Churches in union with Rome served some 3,000,000 persons, slightly more than half of whom practiced according to the Greek rite. Catholics following the Latin rite had fifty-seven religious foundations for men, and eighty-one for women. Those of the Greek rite (usually termed, as we have seen, Uniates) had seven foundations for men, and five for women. Such statistics indicate that the Latin branch, in which the clergy are bound by the law of celibacy, manifested far more interest in monasticism, though the number of parishes available to them (638 in number) was much smaller than the number of those which served Catholics professing the Greek rite. It is therefore evident that any attempt to suppress the religious orders would strike at a vital nerve of Catholic life. Protestants were somewhat fewer than 6 per cent of the population, and the Jews were about the same. One may also note that Protestants were almost equally divided between Lutherans and Calvinists, the first being ethnic Germans and the second ethnic Hungarians residing in territories taken from Hungary at the close of the First World War.

653 795 In outward appearances, the position of the Orthodox Church was not greatly affected by the Communist seizure of power. It is true that changes in the pertinent legislation gave the government, and therewith of course the Communist Party, control over all nominations and elections to Church offices. This meant that all those who exercised authority would come to be snugly tucked under the thumb of the Party. The most notable illustration in Rumania is the Patriarch Justinian, who has not hesitated to declare that the Christian Gospel has much in common with the doctrines of Marx and Lenin. It is hardly necessary to inquire how and why a prelate of his character acquired rank and station. The Orthodox Church was by no

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means abject or corrupt; but the tradition of ecclesiastical elections to which it subscribed provided the Communists with a golden opportunity of which they took full advantage. 659 795

To make clear the situation in which the clergy of the Orthodox Church have found themselves, a report by an eyewitness who has escaped from Rumania may be cited. On October 30, 1950, the clergy met in conference. A huge portrait of Dimitrov adorned the assembly room. No symbol of religion was anywhere to be seen. The Minister of Culture spoke concerning the relations between Church and State. He attacked the spirit of opposition which, he contended, still flourished in some sections of the clergy. A priest, he said, had reported that obedience to Georgi Dimitrov was out of the question because he might very well command that the cross be removed from the tower of the cathedral in order to make room for the half-moon. Thereupon the assembled clergymen were called upon to give a rousing cheer for Dimitrov. Later, the question rose whether the editor of the principal Church journal should be elected or appointed. Some one objected that if election were abandoned the editor might conceivably prove to be a man wholly without faith. When the matter was put to a vote only twenty clergymen expressed a preference for appointment. Nevertheless the chairman announced that a substantial majority favored this method. One priest arose and said, "It is obvious that dictatorial methods are being employed here." No one else ventured to interpose an objection. 659 793

Having taken the Orthodox Church in tow in this manner, the Communists began to bring pressure on Catholics professing the Greek rite to secede from the Holy See and to embrace Orthodoxy. Short shrift, indeed, was made of sundry legal scruples. The heavy hand of suppression was felt almost immediately. Bishops were arrested and sent to labor camps. A 659 793 798

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659 decree of December 2, 1948, stated tersely and bluntly: "Sub-
733 sequent to the reverting of the Greek Catholic parishes to the
798 Rumanian Orthodox Church, and in conformity with Article 13 of Decree 177/1948, its central organization . . . shall cease to exist." All properties belonging to this Church were transferred either to the State or to the Orthodox Synod. The subsequent martyrdom of the Greek clergy rivaled the witnessing of early Christian days. All the bishops were arrested for deportation, and two, Monsignor Vasile Aftenie and Monsignor Valeriu Frentiu, are known to have died in prison. Courageous members of the lower clergy are reported to have gone into hiding in order to minister secretly to the faithful. According to persons who fled the country, such priests were hunted down as ruthlessly as the clergy of southern France in the days of Danton and Robespierre.

659 Therewith the time had also come to attempt the liquidation
798 of Catholics who worshiped according to the Latin rite. Their Church was the only one which had not expressed complete satisfaction with the state of religious freedom in Rumania on June 24, 1949. The first important and ominous debate between the government and the Catholic Bishops had begun in the summer of 1948, when they stated in answer to an inquiry that it would not be possible for them to repudiate the Primacy of the Holy See. The Minister of Culture replied that he entertained no objection to an understanding with Rome on dogma, although such discussions were necessarily subject to the scrutiny of the Ministries of Culture and Foreign Affairs, but that any other kind of dependence on the Papacy was illegal. When the Hierarchy failed to concur, the government launched against it a press campaign of the greatest vehemence, which made it very evident that the goal set was the absorption into a "National Church" of Catholics who worshiped according to the Latin rite. Such a goal has always been envisaged whenever

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Communists gained control of a satellite country; but in Rumania it could be attained with relative ease. 659 798

The first blow was struck in July, 1948, when the Concordat with the Holy See was revoked. Other decrees subordinating the Church to the State were passed soon thereafter. The Catholic Bishops manifested heroic valor and steadfastness. When their schools were expropriated, their caritative enterprises forbidden, their press closed down, and their religious orders suppressed, they protested. It did not seem meet and just to them that children should be prevented from coming to church, faithful men and women carted off to labor camps on trumped-up charges, or that loud-speakers should blare from one end of the day to the other accusatory comments which were in essence monstrous blasphemies. Our time has grown accustomed to thinking that only patriotic feeling, only the sense of solidarity with the nation to which we belong, can engender the resolution to make every sacrifice that becomes necessary. Therefore the spectacle of a few elderly men who accept every scourge of tyranny with patience because the Lord Jesus has willed that they do so has for us a quality which transcends fortitude—a quality which is the ultimate secret aura of what men for thousands of years have called freedom of conscience. This freedom, perhaps more than any other, is the counterpart of obedience—*usque ad mortem*, even to the death, as the Catholic liturgy says over and over. [648]

Here is just one quotation, from a letter addressed by the Bishops to the President of the People's Republic: 659 793

> We believe, Your Excellency, that the moment has come when we should no longer keep silence by reason of patriotic considerations, but should rather give expression to our sorrow. The measures which have been taken by the Government are extremely injurious to the welfare of the citizens of the Rumanian People's Republic. Nor should we abstain from making an emphatic protest against what has taken place

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659 in so far as the Catholic Church in Rumania is concerned. We must
793 rather manifest our profound indignation. Millions of citizens have been deliberately wounded in the innermost core of their human feeling by the very authority to which there has been entrusted, in the presence of the nation and of the whole world, the defense of the interests of the people. Internecine strife is being fostered, the country is in tears over rampant injustice, and a wound gapes which cannot be healed over except by doing away with laws and measures which have struck and are now striking at the Catholic Church in the Rumanian People's Republic.

[687] All the Bishops who signed this and similar fruitless appeals have since been sentenced. The initial blow was struck at all dioceses save those of Alba Iulia and Iasi. In June, 1949, the Bishops of these sees also were arrested on charges of high treason. There remained only Bishop Augustin Pacha, more than eighty years old, who in turn was found guilty and sentenced to forced labor. Some of the prelates are said to have been deported to Russia; and of the whereabouts of nearly all of them nothing definite is known. Thus the Roman Catholic Church was stripped of leadership, the government recognizing only the Vicars-general of two dioceses in Transylvania. These likewise refused to conform with Communist directives. Thereupon a ruthless assault on the lower clergy was inaugurated. On the basis of reports received by the Vatican, it is estimated that at least six hundred priests and religious have been arrested, tried, and sentenced. Thus there was made manifest exemplary and moving fidelity.

793 That some would prove less steadfast was to be anticipated,
659 and in due time the government found a man willing to be the
795 leader of a "National Church"—Andreas Agotha, an unfortunate priest whom the Holy See promptly excommunicated. Under him a congress was convened at Targul-Mures, on April 27, 1950, which created the "National Catholic Church,"

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urged the clergy to support the Stockholm Peace Resolution, 793
and endorsed the formation of a "Catholic Committee of Ac- 659
tion" to support the policies of the "People's Republic." The 795
participants were few, and one of the Vicars-general still in office ordered the clergy of the diocese of Iasi to read a declaration denouncing the congress. He was promptly arrested and has died in prison. A second congress convened at Gherghani five months later, after an appeal by Agotha to all "peace-loving" priests and faithful. Months of open persecution and of [798]
strenuous pro-government campaigning followed. Under the protection of the government, the "Rumanian National Catholic Church" convened at Cluj on March 14, 1951, and took over the administration of all Roman Catholic establishments. Some 225 clerical and lay delegates attended and set up a "Council" of 27 members which declared its readiness to cooperate with the government in every manner desired. Delegates who approved of this capitulation received salaries and other benefits. Those who resisted were hounded down and imprisoned.

Meanwhile, under a decree of August 1, 1949, action was 792
taken against religious orders and communities. Five convents 659
and monasteries were designated as the places in which all monks and nuns doing educational or welfare work should live in accordance with rules laid down by the Minister of Culture. Once there were as many as 1,800 nuns in Rumania. Virtually all have returned to their families or are active as isolated
parish workers. The majority of the monks are in prison. It is 798
safe to say that by the close of 1950 the Roman Catholic Church 659
was a flock dispersed, without shepherds, harried by the secret police and exposed to the constant threat of enslavement in forced-labor camps. Sometimes the actions taken against the surviving faithful have a flavor which is not only bitter but melodramatic and grimly ludicrous. Thus a priest was sentenced to a prison term for referring in a sermon to the destruc-

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798 tion of Jerusalem by the Emperor Titus—which was deemed
659 to be a cryptic reference to Marshal Tito. More generally every device of propaganda and repression is used to curtail the influence of religion. Popular religious festivals are forbidden, electric power failures interfere with the work of well frequented parishes, and frequenting the Sacraments makes a man subject to investigation.

659 The chronicle of the Church which worships according to
798 the Greek rite is quite as harrowing. On October 1, 1948, the
733 government announced that the 1,500,000 persons loyal to this Church had been summarily turned over to Orthodoxy. This action followed a campaign of vilification and suppression rare even in the annals of Communism. It is described in part in a letter signed jointly by the Greek Catholic Bishops at the time:

> During this campaign [i.e., during the week following September 26, 1948] Iuliu Hossu, Bishop of Cluj, was confined to his residence, so that he could not communicate with the Uniate clergy or in any way protest against the actions to which our Church was subjected. In Cluj all priests and layfolk who ventured to disregard the measures taken against the Bishop, and who came to call on him, were arrested. In like manner all those who witnessed his arrest were taken into custody. Moreover Bishop Suciu of Blajm was arrested by the Security Police just as he was leaving the Church at Copacel, which he had just consecrated. He was taken to an unknown destination and kept in a cave during two days, so that he could be prevented from getting in touch with the clergy and the faithful. . . .
>
> We think that prudence suggests that we do not at this time enumerate all the abuses and acts of violence of which the clergy, the priests and archpriests, have been made the victims in an endeavor to obtain their signatures. They were warned and threatened, as Bishop Suciu also was, to remain silent concerning everything that had happened.

These appeals were naturally of no avail. The government prepared to convene a "Congress" at Cluj which would ratify

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union with the Orthodox establishment. The meeting was held on October 1, 1948, and the thirty-eight canons, prelates, and priests who had been "elected" to represent the Church did as they were ordered to do. The government press reported that they had approved "unanimously and with great enthusiasm" union with the Orthodox Church and "the definitive severance of ties with Papal Rome." On December 2, 1948, still another decree transferred all the property of the Uniate Church to the Rumanian State without compensation. Much of it was subsequently turned over to the Orthodox Church. All the Bishops have been jailed or have disappeared. It is known that two, Vasile Aftenie and Valeriu Frentiu, have died in prison. The Pastoral Letter signed by the Episcopacy on June 29, 1948 (The Feast of Saints Peter and Paul), is surely one of the most touching and spiritually stirring of the documents which chronicle the persecution of the Church by the Communists. After summarizing the reasons why the Uniates had acknowledged the supremacy of the See of Peter, recalling the sufferings which had been borne by past generations for the sake of unity with Rome, and dealing with the present controversies, the Letter said:

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> We must suffer for the Gospels of our Redemption in order to possess the merit of having for our part met the test, just as our fathers did as, looking upon the Rood of the Lord, they heard in their hearts these words: *Dico enim vobis: Omnis quicumque confessus fuerit me coram hominibus, et Filius hominis confitebitur illum coram angelis Dei; Qui autem negaverit me coram hominibus, negabitur coram angelis Dei.**
>
> The ties which bind us to the Pope, the Bishop of Rome, are not of human making but are of Divine origin; and it is our duty to bear

* The passage cited is from the twelfth chapter of the Gospel according to St. Luke and reads in translation: "And I say to you, whosoever shall confess me before men, him shall the Son of man also confess before the angels of God. But he that shall deny me before men, shall be denied before the angels of God."

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C69 by reason of them outrage and blows and threats and imprisonment
788 and, it may be, destitution. These things truly mean glorifying the Lord
793 Jesus. They will prove that we desire to insure for ourselves, even in this day of passing suffering, an eternal meed of renown which will be beyond weight or measure.

[697] The men who signed this Letter all have witnessed to the faith they thus professed. And in their company stand devoid
466 of eloquence but not of holiness and fidelity, the many, many thousands, chosen from amidst the humble and the poor, who have suffered persecution and enslavement in Vhalitza or in the region between the Danube and the Black Sea. In order that we may understand their ordeal, let me quote from eyewitness accounts of the camps built to house those who toil at digging a canal in the Dobrouja:

> Approximately 30,000 prisoners are stationed there. The majority of them are intellectuals. They are digging a canal between the Danube and the Black Sea, or are building roads, bridges, and so forth. Practically all the work is done by hand in the same manner and with the same methods as those which were employed for the erection of the Egyptian pyramids. The food is very poor. As a rule, the daily menu consists of corn meal with a soup made of onions or beans. The sanitary conditions are indescribable, and for this reason the death toll is extremely high. Prisoners work more than twelve hours a day. Some of them were sentenced by the courts. Others were not. But this makes no difference, for even those who did receive sentences are not released when their terms are over.

000 The Uniate Churches are not among the great religious bodies of the world. But we might well pause in reverence while passing their temples of worship to commemorate those who in far-off countries have so nobly and sacrificially clung to their faith. Such a tribute would by no means preclude one from bearing in mind that others, too, have felt the crushing weight of Ru-

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manian tyranny—Lutherans, Armenians, and Moslems among 000
them.

All the news which has trickled out of Rumania during re- 659
cent years merely indicates that the trends thus established continue. The Patriarch Justinian and the Holy Synod subservient to him tirelessly echo Soviet propaganda in every form. Thus they released, on April 3, 1952, a violent attack on the use of biological warfare in Korea, which reads in part as follows:

> After the savage destruction of towns and villages, hospitals and schools, monuments of art and places of worship, the enemies of mankind, greedy for world domination, dropped huge quantities of insects, bearers of death by plague, cholera, typhus and other frightful diseases on the territory of the Korean Democratic People's Republic and a part of Northern China.
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> The indignation of the faithful is all the greater because recourse to this weapon, which not even the Fascists dared to employ, is the most odious infringement of the rules of international law, and the most criminal assault upon humanity. . . .
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> As worshipers of the Creator of life and not of death, the servants of the Lord of Peace and not of enmity, we demand the immediate prohibition of bacteriological warfare, which we condemn with all our vigor as a weapon which devastates the earth.

This same Patriarch has supported every Communist maneuver with the most abject servility since early in 1950. Then, at his behest, the Orthodox Church officially joined the National Rumanian Committee for the Defense of Peace, and organized more than 8,000 local committees "to explain to the faithful the problems of the partisan peace movement." He did everything possible to drum up support for the Stockholm Peace Plea, and his attacks on the Anglo-American warmongers and imperialists are legion.

Meanwhile the effort to promote the Communist view of 000

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Meanwhile the effort to promote the Communist view of
829 life through the schools and the youth organizations continues
861 unabated. It has often been pointed out that this program of indoctrination has three aspects. The first is a compendium of all the arguments against religious belief which have been formulated by psychologists, sociologists, and anthropologists in many countries. On the one hand, the compendium joins forces with Marx by viewing religions as derivatives from the class struggles of the past. On the other hand, it reflects a pseudo-Nietzschean quest for a new morality. The second aspect is the identification of religion with "capitalism," the most detested of all enemies, and the contention that the Churches are mere pious instrumentalities through which the "warmongers" rouse the masses to hatred of "democracy." On this level the Communists seek to identify their view of life with "peace," and thus to confuse persons who have been taught to consider Christianity as the Gospel of Love. The third aspect is one which also characterized Nazism. The Christian Churches, the Roman Catholic in particular, are described as sappers of the virility of mankind, prevented by yearning for eternal bliss from getting the necessary work done on this earth. By comparison the Stalinist-Leninist doctrines are described as the sole ideological foundations on which society can rest.

There is nothing anyone resident there can do about this tidal wave of propaganda save to endure it in silence.

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9 JEWRY UNDER SOVIET RULE

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WHAT HAS BEEN THE fate of the Jew under Soviet rule? It is not easy to answer. Not a few gullible souls, influenced by the *Protocols of the Fathers of Zion* and similar products of a riotous imagination, have believed that Communism is the creation of conspiratorial Jews. On the other hand the legend that the Soviets had suppressed anti-Semitism and were, in fact, the supreme advocates of racial tolerance persisted during more than twenty years. This fiction was specially attractive during the period of Nazi rule, when Stalin the foe of race prejudice could be opposed to Hitler the instigator of the greatest pogrom in history. Spokesmen for the Communist Party, often at a loss for arguments to support praise of any other aspect of the Soviet system, could always elicit approval of this achievement. The consequences were curious and pernicious. Perhaps no group in the Western World has been as vigorous and persistent in its hostility to Communism as the band of survivors of the Russian Jewish *Bund*, who carried their memories of brutality and stupidity into exile. Yet they could not prevail against one of the most deeply rooted of Western illusions.

It is true that the anti-Semitism of Czarist times was banned

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from official Soviet literature, and that Lenin in particular condemned it. But the underlying causes remained and were indeed intensified by the social phenomena which attended the Revolution. In the older Russia the overwhelming majority of Jewish communities sprang up in the West, notably in the Ukraine and White Russia; but the First World War brought German invasion to these provinces, so that many Jews appear to have migrated eastward together with other segments of the population. This migration was primarily one of artisans, traders, and white-collar workers. Considerably more literate than their neighbors and for obvious reasons far less attached to the Imperial regime, Jews frequently displaced Czarist civil servants and so helped to tide over many an anxious moment in the early history of Bolshevism. Less frequently they rose to positions of power within the Party. Coreligionists who were not so fortunate suffered as a result, because the rigors, deprivations, and cruelties of the new government were often attributed to them. Serious waves of anti-Semitism were set in motion, even while the economic and religious dislocations caused by the new order of things meant ruin and death to large numbers who clung to the traditional beliefs and ways of life. Exception having duly been made for the small number who were snugly cabined on the Soviet ship, the lot of the Jews in Russia during the twenties was perhaps even worse than that of the rest of the population.

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One reason why this was so happens to be the Zionist Movement, which at the outbreak of the First World War probably had more followers in Russia than in any other country. This movement gave the Jewish minority, poverty-stricken, despised, and beset with pogroms, a goal towards which to work in solidarity.* But to both Lenin and Stalin a "Jewish national

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* Dr. Carl Dienstmann, former German diplomat, reported in the *Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung*, March 19, 1953, that notions still prevalent that Soviet

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consciousness" was as unthinkable a mirage as eternal salvation is to a modern naturalistic philosopher. For what was, in their view, the Jewish nation? The answer given by the foremost devisers of Bolshevist theory was that it could only be an escape mechanism resorted to by "bourgeois" elements who resisted being absorbed into the working proletariat. Zionism was therefore curbed in every manner which suggested itself to the Communist hierarchy. The study of Hebrew in particular was frowned upon, and as early as 1919 schools teaching this counterrevolutionary language were closed. It was asserted that Hebrew was an obstacle to assimilation. Later in the twenties, the establishment of a Jewish State in Palestine was looked upon as a major goal of British imperialism, and therefore a product of despicable reaction.

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A later writer, Alfred A. Skerpan, has reported the discovery of a "small book" by M. Shakhnovich, entitled *Komu Sluzhit "Religiya Izrailya"?* (Whom Does the "Religion of Israel" Serve?), issued at Leningrad in two editions in 1929 and 1930.* This brochure, I may add, incorporates declarations

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Russia had not instigated persecutions of Jews were erroneous: "During the years between 1926 and 1928 I was Consul in Odessa. This was the time in which the concept of the protection of the rights of minorities was fostered in the Soviet Union too, and gave rise to the foundation of minority enclaves in the form of autonomous republics and areas. The numerically strong Jewish population indulged in the hope that the District of Odessa could become such an enclave and made propaganda to that end. These wishes were ended as if by lightning when the GPU undertook arrests on a vast scale. Several hundred Jews were taken into custody during a single night, and by administrative decision were deported to Siberia. It was believed that the Odessa movement had its origins in Zionism, which sought to make Odessa an outpost of Jerusalem. The local leaders of Zionism were without exception included among those arrested. The idea of a Jewish enclave was therewith made politically dangerous and was not alluded to again. Somewhat later the government established Birobidjan as a substitute enclave for Odessa."

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* See Skerpan's article "Aspects of Soviet Antisemitism," *Antioch Review*, Vol. XII, pp. 287–328 (Fall, 1952). This is one of the most fully documented essays on the subject which have appeared to date. Skerpan also says (p. 301): "The enemy of the workers, Lenin had stressed, was not the Jewish *worker*, but rich Jews, like the rich Russians and the rich of all countries; 'the Jewish worker

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that were reported at the time to the *Commonweal* by Jewish observers who had studied developments in Russia. The religion of the Old Testament, according to Shakhnovich, was primarily a series of recipes for accumulating wealth on earth. He held common people, especially workers, in contempt and regarded the rabbis as spokesmen for the predatory bourgeoisie. Indeed, it would be difficult to find in the armory of Nazism any shafts capable of direction against the Jews which are more virulent than those poisoned by Shakhnovich. Perhaps Hitlerites like Rosenberg had read and utilized this little book. Synagogues were called hotbeds of reaction. We may note that while the Russian Government termed anti-Semitism a crime in the Penal Code adopted in 1926, it had outlawed Zionism six years earlier.

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During the Second World War, the attack on Judaism subsided as did the expression of hostility toward the Orthodox Church. Yet this era of good will was preceded, it should be recalled, by the purges which cloaked with somber drama both the two years after 1936. A number of prominent Jews were brought to trial, and at the same time others were ousted from employment on the staff of the Secret Police and from the cooperatives of several cities, notably Moscow. Yet it cannot be demonstrated that Stalin was indulging in overt anti-Semitism. The wholesale removal from office of persons deemed unreliable may well have been undertaken with an eye on the civil service as a whole rather than on a particular group. On the other hand, the outburst which followed the signing of the Stalin-Hitler Pact in 1939 cannot be so interpreted. The domi-

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is our brother,' he said, but the Jewish bourgeois is an enemy, not as a Jew but as a bourgeois. In view of the fact that before the revolution only about one-third of the Jews in Russia were classified as workers, peasants or craftsmen, the distinctions made by Lenin actually left almost two-thirds of the Jews open to attack on 'class' grounds. This loophole, like the loophole of 'anti-Zionism,' was to be utilized in the future as an instrument of Communist Party activity, within the Soviet Union and abroad."

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nant Russians found in their ill-fated agreement with the German dictator an excuse for giving free rein to their fear, dislike, and suspicion of the Jew. Maxim Litvinov was doubtless the most eminent target, but he was by no means the only one. Of course it can be maintained that the decree which at this time dismissed three-fourths of Jews employed by the State and even curtailed the number of Jewish members of the Communist Party accordingly was a quite typical Stalin ruse, expressing no point of view and reflecting no philosophy but bidding for popular support, particularly in the Ukraine, where Jews had traditionally been unpopular.

At any rate, the policy was continued during the war, at least to the extent that no official steps were taken to curb widespread overt attacks upon Jews. In the West, anti-Semitic moods were of course fostered by Nazi propagandists. In the unoccupied parts of the country feeling rose against Jewish évacués. The story of the plight of this minority, pieced together by Solomon N. Schwarz after extensive and careful research, is a tangled and tragic one.* It is probably correct to say that the Jews had never suffered more in Russia, or borne it with so little realization on the part of others of what they were compelled to endure. Suffice it to conclude that the facts, once they became known to a still incredulous world, forever dispelled the fancy that Communism was the best protector of minorities.

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With the coming of the peace, two new factors emerged to affect the position of Jewry. The first was the return westward of many thousands of Polish Jews who had been deported to, or had escaped to, the Soviet Union. A not inconsiderable number of native Russian Jews managed to join this exodus; and with them came innumerable authentic reports of what was really happening in the land of Stalin. These narratives

* Solomon N. Schwarz, *The Jews in the Soviet Union* (Syracuse, N.Y., 1951).

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filtered down to the public through pro-Zionist organizations in various countries. When, as a result of the establishment of the United Nations and the emergence of Russia as a world power, political alignments in the Near East became a matter of major concern to the Kremlin, Zionism was for still another and major reason an issue with which it was not disposed to deal lightly. The official Russian attitude towards Israel was at first guardedly friendly, but soon grew very hostile.

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On October 21, 1948, Ilya Ehrenburg published in *Pravda* an article which was read with mingled interest and consternation throughout the world. In essence Ehrenburg said that Jews living in Russia or in countries over which it held dominion must stop thinking of Israel as a "homeland" or a "Jewish state," and must instead make up their minds that only a worldwide triumph of Communism would bring to an end Jewish suffering and distress. For after such a victory, he contended, there would be no more Jews. Israel could not be viewed as a country which had achieved nationhood, for "the toilers" were not in control. Indeed, they languished under bourgeois rule, which in turn was dependent on "Anglo-American capital." And what after all was the state thus created? It reminded one, he said, "of a ship, an ark, a raft, bearing people who have been caught in the bloody deluge of racism and fascism."

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As we have seen, Soviet antipathy to Zionism was by no means new; but this declaration of open hostility was nevertheless unexpected. Some of the hypotheses which have been advanced to account for it are: that the Russians looked upon attempts by Jews to emigrate to Palestine as expressions of dissatisfaction with the glorious achievements of the Communist heartland; that they professed enmity to Israel because the support it had received from the United States was bound to make it an integral part of the community of Western states; that for political and strategic reasons an appeal for Arab ap-

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proval was far more advantageous than manifestations of friendship, however tepidly worded, towards a Jewish state which the Arabs necessarily looked upon with disfavor; and, finally, that since Germany had become the key to the solution of the European problem it would serve the purposes of Russia better to relegate Jews to the ash can and woo former Nazis with effective but camouflaged friendliness. Every one of these theories can be supported on the basis of evidence that has been accumulated since the appearance of Ehrenburg's article.[2]

At any rate, the ideas he expressed were quickly disseminated through every medium of expression at the disposition of the Communist Party. Why, it was asked, should any Jew desire to go to a "Jewish homeland" when he could stay where he was and enjoy all the advantages of the "most progressive society in the world"? In Poland, Czechoslovakia, and Hungary, Zionism was identified with "reaction," and all Jews who responded to its appeal were flayed as weak-kneed and socially illiterate betrayers of the working class. The campaign was conducted with special vigor in Rumania, where many Jews desired to migrate. On December 15, 1948, an article in *Unirea*, organ of the Rumanian Democratic Jewish Committee, stated:

> . . . the process of re-enrollment of the Jewish working masses for constructive democratic work was hampered by Zionist nationalistic activities which have misled parts of the Jewish population by false propaganda. In that action, the Zionists were assisted by other imperialist American agencies in different ways.
>
> Zionism in all its forms is a nationalist, reactionary political movement sponsored by the Jewish bourgeoisie, which tries to isolate the Jewish working population from the peoples among which it lives, to keep it back from the ranks of the progressive forces which fight national and international capitalism.

[2. Published in Pravda, October 21, 1948. -- Analyst]

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The stage was now set for the liquidation of Jewry in so far as its religious and cultural solidarity were concerned. In view of the fact that information is sporadic and has come in driblets from a great variety of sources dependent upon localized experiences, it is extremely difficult to visualize the conditions under which Jewish groups have lived and carried on. Even such a question as "How many Jews are there in the Soviet orbit?" must be answered tentatively. It is estimated that approximately 1,800,000 persons of Jewish origin, many of them deportees from the satellite countries, now live in the Soviet Union. Of these some 300,000 live in Moscow. There is another heavy concentration in Central Asia, where Tashkent, the capital of Uzbekistan, has acquired a large Jewish population. Among the satellite countries, Rumania has the largest Jewish population despite a considerable emigration to Israel: the present total is believed to be about 250,000. In 1951, Hungary had 143,000 professing Jews, the great majority of them in Budapest. Of the once vast Jewish population of Poland, hardly more than a fragment remains, the estimated total being 45,000. There are probably fewer than 15,000 Jews in Czechoslovakia, and fewer than half as many in Bulgaria. Statistics from Yugoslavia profess to be more precise. The figure for December, 1950, was reported as 6,244. In short, the total Jewish population in Communist-dominated Central Europe, including dissident Yugoslavia, is less than half a million. In 1930 it numbered in round figures 5,000,000. Such was the toll of Nazism and war.

We shall now attempt to lift the veil, in so far as possible.

000 In February, 1951, Hayim Greenberg, editor of the *Jewish Frontier*, published a letter he had addressed to the Soviet Ambassador to the United States, and to which he had re-

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ceived no reply. One paragraph in his very interesting epistle reads:

> Not a word has been heard about Birobidzhan for a long time. We do not know how large is its population, whether its Jewish community is growing or not. Are there Jewish schools in Birobidzhan? A Jewish newspaper? Do Jews come to settle there? If not, what is the cause? What has become of this project for a Soviet Israel? Has the Soviet Government changed its mind about the plan? Have the Jews disappointed? We have no answers to these riddles. Local Communist propagandists know more about Tibet than they do about Birobidzhan.

I read this part of Mr. Greenberg's letter with particular interest because of personal experiences, after the war, with members of the American committee which advertised the wonders of this Soviet version of Zion and raised money for its support. There seemed, if one listened to the promoters, to be literally no opportunity for social or cultural advancement which could not be found in this paradise, made available to Jewry by a benevolent Stalin. But if one asked how many people lived there, or what they did, no information was obtainable. But many young and eager persons seemed anxious to believe in the idea, regardless of whether it could or could not be put into effect.

Nothing even remotely resembling a progress report about Birobidjan could be obtained, even though it was known that large numbers of Jews resident in western provinces—perhaps as many as 300,000—had been removed to Siberia during the years after 1947. Neither the United States Embassy in Moscow nor interested newspaper correspondents could secure permission to enter the region. The Russian newspapers referred occasionally to Birobidjan, but only in connection with routine reports as to whether the quotas for agricultural produce had been met. To all intents and purposes, the famed paradise was as remote from reality as a

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000 skyscraper in Capri. It was not until March 29, 1951, that *Naaretz*, a newspaper published in Tel Aviv, Israel, was able to present some scanty information gleaned from professional Russian journals. The population was reported to be 140,000, of whom fewer than a third were Jews. It was further indicated that during 1949 and 1950 only a few hundred Jews arrived in the province, the majority of whom were relatives of persons already residing there. Meanwhile many thousands of Jews were settled elsewhere in Siberia. During the same years, Jewish Communist leaders were removed from their posts to make room for non-Jews brought in from various parts of Russia. There was no mention of specifically Jewish cultural activities, nor could it be ascertained whether Yiddish was still taught in the schools. All propaganda concerning the province abruptly ceased, and there were indications that it had been absorbed into the larger district of Khabarovsk.

SU-EJ 798 All this fitted into the pattern of events throughout Russia. The campaign inaugurated by Ehrenburg was extended to cover every aspect of Jewish life. After 1950, only a handful of Jews (the name being applied not to those who retained any semblance of fealty to the religious traditions of Judaism, but to those of Jewish origin) held positions of trust in the Communist Party. There were numerous indications that anti-Semitism had become fashionable. All Jewish publications were suppressed, and the best known among their editors or contributors disappeared. Every cultural, welfare, or fraternal organization round which even a vestige of Jewish community life might be formed was systematically liquidated. Some synagogues still remained open in Moscow; but it was doubtful that any existed outside the capital city. The rabbi in charge of the synagogue on Spasoglinichevsky Pereoluk, Moscow, reported that he served a community of some 10,000 persons. If there actually are two other synagogues

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in Moscow which are used for worship, the conclusion must nevertheless be drawn that the vast majority of the city's Jews no longer have any communal religious life.*

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Reports of mass deportations of Jews from western Russia do not include dependable information about the numbers detained in slave-labor camps. Rumors persist that the percentage is sizable.† Beyond any question is the intensity of the propagandistic attack on Jewish "nationalism" and "cosmopolitanism." Anyone suspected of these crimes against the State was liquidated without hesitation. Indeed, it is said that only five persons have been permitted to leave Russia for Israel. A relatively spectacular incident dramatized the atti-

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* Birobidjan was the theme of an article in the New York *Herald Tribune* of Nov. 9, 1949, by Joseph Newman, its correspondent in Moscow. Newman reported his conversations with Carlos Melman, an Australian carpenter who had migrated to the Soviet Union during 1947 in quest of paradise, and who, because he had Australian citizenship, was able to leave Russia again. He stated that the Jews constituted approximately one-fourth of the urban population but were less numerous in the villages. Most of the people were engaged in collective farming and worked an average of twelve hours a day. The wage was just about enough food to keep them alive. The capital city had neither a sewage system nor a water supply. Most of the inhabitants lived in dilapidated wooden houses.

† Perhaps the most dramatic account of what happened to the Jews under Soviet rule is provided in an article by Julius Margolin, "When the Red Army Liberated Pinsk," in *Commentary*, Vol. XIV, pp. 517–528 (Dec., 1952). The author, a citizen of Palestine, happened to be visiting relatives in Poland when the war broke out between Germany and Russia. He was in Pinsk when that city was unexpectedly subordinated to Soviet rule. All the residents fancied that the coming of the Red Army would mean liberation from tyranny. Instead he was obliged to ask the question: "How could the Soviet government, in the space of one winter, have made an enemy of everyone in the territory it occupied, regardless of class, national, or political differences?" Mr. Margolin describes the steps which were taken with meticulous care. Perhaps no more graphic or harrowing account has been set down. He reports, for example: "The liquidation of the Jewish political bodies and organs of Jewish social life in Pinsk was completed by the spring of 1940. The heads of the Bund had been arrested and deported; in April the Zionists were singled out and each of them condemned to eight years in concentration camps. Systematically and unpityingly, every active element that might conceivably have offered resistance to the 'reeducation of the masses' was rooted out. All independent thought, all potential opposition was outlawed."

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S.U. 648 798 E.J. 798 186 A relatively spectacular incident dramatized the attitude of the Kremlin towards the Zionist State. The first ambassador from Israel to the Soviet Union, Mrs. Golda Myerson, arrived in Moscow to assume her duties just at the time when the Jewish community was preparing to observe the New Year and the Feast of the Atonement. Thinking that the establishment of diplomatic relations with the new Zionist State warranted some jubilation, a sizable crowd poured into the synagogue and gave vent to its feelings. Then the government came down with a heavy hand. Those who were held to be the "instigators" of the "demonstration" were imprisoned. The sole surviving Yiddish newspaper was suppressed, and the Jewish Anti-Fascist Committee was abolished. The price paid was a heavy one, but there could now be no doubt that a sense of Jewish solidarity did exist in Moscow, and that the Zionist success had kindled its imagination.

S.U. 563 E.J. 798 So absolute had tyranny become in Russia by the close of 1951 that Jewish citizens resident in that unfortunate country no longer had any association with the outside world, unless perchance they had a way of listening to foreign radio broadcasts. Nor could they let anyone have news of themselves save possibly through one who managed to escape. Nearly all the Russians who have come over to the West are army officers stationed in the satellite countries, particularly Germany; and though conversations with them were illuminating in so far as life under Soviet rule is concerned, I found none who had any first-hand knowledge of Jews or of their special problems. Some, indeed, still believed that Communism was the 000 handiwork of Jewry. So we are left to surmise that there has been created in the minds of persons who still cling to Jewish traditions a feeling of absolute isolation and complete hopelessness in so far as this world is concerned. It may very well be that a comparable mood blending resignation with despair has spread to all the satellite countries also, now that, as of

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1953, the various offices of the Joint Distribution Committee have been closed. During centuries of persecution and tribulation, Jews had managed to help one another across national boundaries. They had developed methods of mutual aid and comfort which were perhaps unique in the annals of mankind. The fact that these methods have now been abrogated illustrates as well as anything possibly could the character and power of the Communist dictatorship. One must also assume that there are many who as a consequence of the propaganda to which they are perennially exposed believe that the Western World is a place where ruthless capitalists enslave and starve the poor. How stark and grim the picture of human destiny thereby painted on the wall of the imagination must be, we can only surmise.

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One of the most significant reports bearing on recent Russian attitudes towards Jews has to do with the removal of Jewish officers and soldiers from the Red Army stationed in Germany. These reports are fragmentary and, coming from men who have escaped to the West, must be received with due caution. Nevertheless it is reasonably certain that the purge of Jews began in 1946, when the Russian forces in Eastern Germany were commanded by General Vassily Chuikov, and that it has continued ever since. We do not know whether comparable purges have been carried out elsewhere. It may well be that the measure was adopted in Germany only, on the ground that the presence of Jewish soldiers was distasteful to the former Nazi officers whom the Russians have persistently sought to recruit.

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The pattern of policy towards the Jews in satellite countries has conformed to the Russian original, but with important deviations: Jewish charitable and cultural institutions have been nationalized; the schools of Talmudic teaching have been closed; and the surviving Jewish press consists of a handful

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798 of pro-Communist sheets, all strongly opposed to Zionism. Nevertheless official attitudes towards Jewry are formed in accordance with the requirements of Soviet policy at any given time and in any place. Thus Communists in East Germany, where there are only 2,600 Jews, have maintained a barrage of propaganda against the West German Federal Republic on the ground that their own treatment of Jews has been vastly better. They have accused Chancellor Adenauer of settling the problems of restitution not for humanitarian or ethical reasons but for the profit of both German and Jewish "capitalists." More recently German Communist journals have introduced some rather veiled criticisms of Israel and Zionism; but no cases of overt anti-Semitism have been reported. Indeed, measures of such a character would be utterly pointless, in view of the fact that East German Jews are so pitifully few and so completely without influence. Yet there have been indications that all Jews will be purged from the Communist Party. On January 14, 1953, Julius Mayer, head of the League of Jewish Communities in East Germany, and seven other persons who had been chairmen of local Jewish communities, sought asylum in West Berlin. Most of these were at least nominally affiliated with the Socialist Unity Party, so that it may be assumed that some warning was given them. Most observers feel that nevertheless East Germany will be forced to adopt a policy of anti-Semitism, if the process of incorporating it fully into the Russian orbit is speeded up.

It was in Czechoslovakia that the most spectacular events [734] took place. Virtually every form of Jewish communal activity had been suppressed shortly after the Communist seizure of power. In the summer of 1950, only one of Prague's old synagogues was open on weekdays as well as Saturdays. No young men were being trained for the Rabbinate, and the

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Chief Rabbi of the capital city reported that there was no demand for the religious instruction of youth. But all this paled into insignificance as the world learned of the arrest and trial of fourteen prominent Communists. The arrests, made on charges of treason and Titoism, were followed by wide-scale man hunts in which lesser folk were the victims. Death and life imprisonment were meted out to persons found guilty of listening to the Voice of America or of comparable crimes against the State. These things were done against the backdrop of economic depression of the most virulent kind. Nationalization, collective farming, loss of trade with the West, and heavy demands by Russia for its war machine, had gravely impoverished the people. Nor did the creation of a no man's land along the country's western border halt the flight of refugees. Representatives of foreign governments and interests were dealt with in heavy-handed fashion. Thus William N. Oatis, Prague correspondent of the Associated Press, was tried and sentenced for espionage. And Israel was startled when Mordecai Oren, leader of the extreme left of its Pamam Party, disappeared. A man who had clung to the Communist Party line with the tenacity of a leech, Oren had gone to East Berlin during the winter of 1951 to attend a meeting of the pro-Stalinist World Federation of Trade Unions. Hearing that one of his friends was being purged in Czechoslovakia, he journeyed to Prague. He called at the Israeli Legation to say that he was leaving for Vienna on New Year's Eve. Yet nothing was heard of him there or elsewhere for three months. An official inquiry elicited the information that he had been jailed for mysterious and terrifying crimes against the security of the State.

The Slánský trial of November, 1952, is surely one of the most shocking and surprising episodes in Communist jurispru-

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000 dence.* Each detail of the proceedings was made public with every means at the government's disposal, with the result that the full transcript was available throughout the world. Two questions present themselves: Why was it deemed desirable to proceed against these men, and why was the advertising considered advantageous? In response to the first query, we can only adduce what was said in behalf of the Czechoslovak State. The defendants had associated in varying ways with persons and groups outside the country. Most of them were Jews. And as Jews they had aided and abetted the people of Israel at great cost to the Czechoslovak people. All three charges were constantly reiterated, but it was the second that gave the trial its macabre novelty. Indeed, not even the Nazis, for all their psychotic anti-Semitism, had staged any comparable drama prior to the slaying of Herr Von Rath in 1938. No doubt the principal reason for recourse to this method of pillorying previously trusted members of the Party was that an excuse was needed for the abysmal failure of the Communist economic policy.

But why was the grim business so profligately advertised? We can only guess. During the struggle for Jewish victory in Palestine, arms and supplies had been purchased in Czecho-

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* The Library of Jewish Information (American Jewish Committee), in its bulletin "Jews Behind the Iron Curtain" dated April, 1952, printed a partial list of Jewish Communists who had been removed from their posts. The list contains 24 names, including: Rudolf Slánský, Secretary General of the Communist Party and later on Vice Premier; Otto Sling, member of the Central Committee of the Communist Party and its District Secretary in Brno; Bedrich Rejcin, Major General and Chief of Army Intelligence; Vavro Hajdu, Deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs and Chief of the West European section of that ministry; Gustav Bares-Breitenfeld, Deputy Secretary General of the Communist Party and chief of its propaganda section; and Bedrich Geminder, representative of the Czechoslovak Communist Party in the Cominform. Other prominent Jews disappeared in strange ways. Thus Eduard Goldstücker, once Czechoslovak Minister to Israel, was transferred to Stockholm in 1951 but never arrived there. There were also a number employed at diplomatic posts abroad who at this time elected to seek political asylum.

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slovakia. But after 1950 Moscow was courting the Arabs; 000
and it may well be that it was primarily for their benefit that the spotlight was turned on. One cannot be certain of the impact of these disclosures on the Arab world, but certainly the effect elsewhere was woefully disappointing from the Communist point of view. In the United States and Great Britain it removed the last vestiges of belief that the system created by Lenin and Stalin was the antithesis of Nazism. Even in Czechoslovakia itself, the men condemned to death had scarcely been hanged when it became necessary for the government to embark on a long series of explanations and exhortations. People were asking, Why did all the accused confess their guilt so readily, and for what reason was an attack on the Jews deemed necessary? President Gottwald, speaking over the Prague Radio on December 17, declared, "Zionism has become a dangerous and vicious enemy." It was subject to "American bosses" who were shamelessly exploiting the sufferings of the Jews under Hitler; and the collusion of the condemned men with these "bosses" had led to their treasonable guilt. Will Herberg has observed, "As far back as the spring of 1949, American Communists were denouncing the government of Israel as a 'tool of American imperialism,' and of course they were merely echoing Moscow's instructions." * It is as ironical as anything could well be that Jews who had long since renounced any ties which bound them to their tradition and the faith it enshrines should have died because they were ordered to implement what at one fleeting moment was Moscow's policy towards Palestine—a policy designed to weaken the position of Great Britain, a country with which the defendants were at their trial found guilty of "collaborating."

* Cf. Herberg, "Anti-Semitism and the Left," *Commonweal*, Vol. LVII, p. 372 (Jan. 16, 1953).

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186 In Hungary the Jews found themselves in a specially tragic
798 situation. A considerable number of them held government
554 positions, owing to the fact that former associates of Béla Kun had returned to the country in 1945. As a result large sections of the embittered peasant population were once more violently anti-Semitic. Yet in all truth the plight of the surviving Jewish community was desperate. Virtually the whole of it was affected by the nationalization of trade and industry, a Communist fetish which to all intents and purposes wiped out small business. By the close of 1950 hardly a Jew in Budapest could have existed if it had not been possible for him to sell some item of personal property. A campaign against the "nationalists" and "cosmopolites" who favored the establishment of Israel added to the misery and confusion. One of the charges levied against the several defendants in the trial of Laszlo Rajk was that they had favored "reactionary, chauvinistic Zionism." These strangely submissive "criminals" confessed that persons who favored Israel were traitorous advocates of American imperialism and treacherous indulgers in espionage.

[167] It was possible for the government of Israel to negotiate
648 an agreement permitting the emigration of 3,000 persons as
798 late as 1950; but the quota was not filled, even though more than 30,000 applied. In 1951, the Hungarian government announced that a large-scale deportation of "vagrants" had been authorized, so that the "unemployed" of Budapest might find work and sustenance on kolkhozes and in cooperative industries. As has been said, this news attracted so much attention that the shipments of human merchandise to a laborious utopia were delayed. Even so, sizable numbers of poor victims were deported. On January 17, 1953, Lajos Stoeckler, president of the Hungarian Jewish Community, was arrested on the ground that "substantial amounts of American dollars

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and Swiss francs" had been found in his home, which, it was contended, had been made available to him by the Joint Distribution Committee; and since that time the "Joint" has served as a primary target for propagandistic abuse. On the other hand, Hungarian Communist organs have so far tried to distinguish between anti-Semitism and anti-Zionism far more circumspectly than was done at the Slánský trial. It was contended during 1952 and part of 1953, for example, that the United States had launched a vicious anti-Semitic campaign in connection with the Rosenberg case, whereas Hungary had been concerned only with the "lackeys" of a "foreign espionage agency." This thesis was oddly enough credited in various parts of Europe.

As a matter of fact the deterioration of the Hungarian economy and the increasing bleakness of the cultural scene led to bitter popular outbursts of feeling for which the surviving Jews were convenient scapegoats. These the government was unable to curb or suppress. Thus during February, 1950, the head of the Jewish community in Tokaj and his wife were beaten to death. The murderers were not brought to book, nor were Jews residing in this area permitted to go elsewhere. Thus the pathetic survivors of Hitler's efforts to wipe out the Jews of the countries he conquered are now subjected to the spleen of their frantic neighbors. It is reported that 75,000 of the 125,000 Jews probably still in Hungary have applied for emigration visas.

The situation in Poland, where the forty-odd thousand surviving Jews for the most part eke out an existence in certain industrial cities, is not clear. Community life has not been fully suppressed. But what survives, in the form of libraries, theaters, and sport organizations, serves virtually no purpose other than to provide sounding boards for Communist propaganda. Thus there still is a Jewish newspaper, but

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798 it is a Party organ. Institutions for the training of rabbis have
664 been closed, and religious holidays are no longer observed. Emigration to Israel was permitted during a brief period during 1949, and it is estimated that more than half the total Jewish population applied for visas. They had previously been subjected to a violent barrage of anti-Zionist propaganda, flavored with choice morsels of news about the ties which bound Israel to the United States, monster of imperialism.

Jewish groups in the Balkans seem to have managed despite incredible difficulties to conserve a measure of their solidarity, and have no doubt also been heartened by their relative proximity to Palestine, which has made emigration somewhat easier. Religious worship is sanctioned under the supervision of the Committee of Democratic Jews, which is charged with seeing to it that the causes in which the government happens to be interested are served. Rabbis have thus been compelled to refrain from supporting "Zionism" and "imperialism" as well as to express their whole-hearted ap-
[794] proval of "peace." Every obstacle has been placed in the way of religious instruction for young people. Rumania's traditional system of Yiddish education operated 69 elementary and 23 secondary schools until June, 1948, when all these establishments were closed. A year later two schools were permitted to reopen, and assurances were given that two others would be licensed later. The Ministry of Education announced that the instruction in these schools would be inspired by lofty patriotism and would "wipe out the bourgeois mentality of Zionism which is unfortunately widespread among Jewish youth."

798 The purge of Government officials which began in March,
[661] 1952, led to the dismissal of Aurel Vijoil, Minister of Finance, and of the notorious Anna Pauker; but, though other Jews were arrested and sentenced, anti-Semitism does not appear to

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have been a factor. Indeed, reports coming out of the country 798
indicate that the Jewish community felt "indescribable relief at the disappearance of vicious and brutal individuals whose deeds engendered hostility to the Jews among the population." And indeed this was some cause for rejoicing despite the bleakness of the general outlook. The great majority of Jews who were economically productive belonged to the fraternity of small businessmen, so that the nationalization program and the inflation which accompanied it reduced them, their children, and their aged dependents to the direst poverty. Except for a small handful of veteran Communists, Jews are dubbed "capitalists" and made to suffer also for support given by them in the past to liberal causes. Accordingly they became "unproductive elements"—in the language of the Party—and consequently subject to deportation. It is believed that most of them who have been sent to labor camps are toiling in the regions bordering on the Black Sea. Tracing the fortune of any individual through that morass of misery has become impossible.

Until 1951, emigration from Rumania to Israel was relatively easy. It should be noted, of course, that each such emigrant was a profitable business venture for the government, which exacted payments both from the individual and from the international agencies which assisted him. But a campaign against Zionism was in full swing by the beginning of 1952, and prominent spokesmen for the movement were arrested on charges of "cosmopolitanism" and "nationalism." Since March of that year no visas have been granted for Palestine.

The small remaining Jewish community in Bulgaria has 798
been completely subordinated. Reports in the Party press re- 664
veal that cultural life, traditionally organized around a core of libraries and reading rooms, has been transformed into a vehicle of Communist propaganda. The *American Jewish Year*

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798 *Book, 1951,* carried a detailed account of the fortunes of one
664 library in Sofia, which sponsored a series of lectures and concerts as well as meetings. The persons in charge complained, however, of poor attendance and a dearth of public interest. Closer scrutiny revealed that although the library had been made the recipient of many "Marxist-Leninist classics" and of books in the Russian language, the total number of volumes remained the same. Why? Because all publications reflecting a "nationalist Jewish tendency" had been removed. Lecture topics included: "The Great Stalin Pact for the Reconstruction of Nature," "The Celebration of the Anniversary of Lenin's Death," and "The Leading Role of the Soviet Union in the Anti-imperialist Camp and Its Fight for Peace and the People's Democracy." This literary and cultural fare appears to be standard for all such organizations.

798 During January, 1953, a climax was reached in the history
661 of Communist-Jewish relations when fifteen doctors were arrested in Moscow on charges of plotting to assassinate prominent Russian leaders. In the group were nearly all the prominent Jewish physicians of the Russian capital. Shortly thereafter Josef Stalin died, giving rise once more to a multitude of international rumors. Then very suddenly, on April 4, the dramatic news was given to the world that the accusations levied against the doctors had been false, and that all had been released from prison. The action was accompanied by a series of steps described as "peace feelers," and the world was left to wonder whether vast and portentous changes were in the offing.

000 Certain it is that, after the dropping of charges against the doctors, the Kremlin took steps to establish a new and more conciliatory policy towards Jewry and in particular towards Israel. We do not know what this portends, or to what steps it will lead; but the tragedy of the Jew in Russia and the Cen-

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tral Europe which Communism controls is heartrending. To have been ground between the two millstones of totalitarian oppression; to have hoped that escape from one might mean salvation, and then discovered that the other was almost equally implacable; to have been sealed off from virtually all association with World Jewry, and left to find that the treason of dissenters from Jewish tradition everywhere bred new armies of the hostile and the venomously critical; and to have stood by helpless while all vestiges of hallowed religious and community living were systematically destroyed—these are some of the evils, apart from the blighted hopes for emigration, dire poverty, and the constant threat of forced labor, from which the Jew has suffered in a dark time.*

* Since this chapter was written, a new book—*The Jews in the Soviet Satellites*, by Peter Meyer and others (Syracuse, 1953)—has appeared. It adds many harrowing details to what was previously known about the plight of the Jews under Soviet rule, and the reader of this volume is referred to it. In particular it reinforces the view that the year 1950 marked the point at which the position of Jewry began to deteriorate abysmally.

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CONCLUSION

000 WHAT OF THE FUTURE? We must, I believe, make any attempt at prophecy depend on a resolute distinction between predictable weaknesses in the structure of the Russian dictatorship and our estimates of how noticeably the appeal of Marxist-Leninist doctrine may wane. Whether internal dissension will sap much of the strength of the Kremlin is anybody's guess. I do not profess to know the answer. But concerning the impact of the Communist doctrine there are some things to be said. I shall limit myself to a brief discussion of two: First, there is no indication that a Christian view of how to make modern industrial society function to the advantage of the majority of men has gained in popularity—indeed, the number who ardently support such a view may be smaller than was the case some years ago. Secondly, although the Marxist community is rent by schisms of an unusually virulent character, the fact remains that, in many parts of the world, some version of Marxism is all that the dominant intellectual caste is willing or able to peddle to the masses.

While the reasons for all this are complex, one can without difficulty note that, even as the intellectual lost faith, the com-

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mon man lost hope. God departed from the room in which the professors, the research workers, the improvers, and the artists were talking—departed silently and ominously. And the worker, doomed to the treadmill of proletarianism, felt that only those spokesmen for the contemporary mind could do anything to bring about his liberation who talked aggressively in terms of the here and now. The result is that in many troubled areas religious leadership has simply been shoved aside. Churches are there, liturgies are the same, sermons are preached on modern variations of old themes; but not many of the people who come to worship really know why they do so. Perhaps the majority feel they are clinging for dear life to an heirloom. They do not believe that their daily bread will come because they pray for it. This skepticism is, of course, a disease. But it is a universal plague, and in all probability no remedy will be easily found. The "daily bread" to be earned under the auspices of industry is not the peasant's wheat, harvested in the sun. But that it depends upon the foresight, honesty, and social conscience of industry's leaders—and therewith upon fundamental natural virtues—is generally forgotten.

On the other hand, Marxism. There can be no doubt that, although it has lost followers in some parts of the world, it has recruited other devotees elsewhere. The primary source of strength is the paradoxical fact that, whereas the struggle of several backward populations for independence finds the democratic powers in the role of "capitalistic exploiters," the simultaneous drying-up of colonial opportunity creates population problems that in turn produce grist for the Communist mill. Wherever people have had experience with the Russian system, however, they have repudiated it as soon as any opportunity presented itself. This does not, of course, mean that Marxism has been discarded. Various kinds of "revisionism" became popular, as is currently the case in Western Germany.

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000 Looking into the darkness of Russia, one might well bear in mind that its dictators have never dissented from the view expressed by Marx in his commentary on the Gotha Socialist Congress of 1875. As soon as the proletariat has "taken over" the means of production, he declared, it must consolidate its gains and protect them against its enemies. Therefore freedom must temporarily be postponed. Only when "the fountain sources of communal wealth gush freely" will it be possible to declare that the "revolution" has ended, and that every citizen is "free to act in accordance with his abilities and needs." There are still many people in the world who believe that the horrors witnessed since Lenin brought his Party to power are interim manifestations of dictatorship, to be followed by the dawn of the communal millennium.

Nevertheless it may not be too venturesome to suggest by way of conclusion that while Marxism is still being purveyed, its salesmen may be acquiring a universal reputation not as prophets but as medicine men. In so far as Europe and the United States are concerned, at least, the laws of economic society are demonstrably other dicta than those enunciated in *Das Kapital*. Very few working men any longer believe that Lenin and his followers have ushered in the proletarian millennium. To be sure, this waning of Marxist faith has not been followed by a reinvigoration of other social gospels; and the observer may indeed sometimes wonder whether the present hour may not be one of an intellectual and spiritual vacuum. As for Russia, if students of its present politico-economic structure are to be credited, it may well be that the brutal utopianism of Stalin has been superseded by a new gregariousness of the profit-takers of the Revolution. Gradually a new caste has been formed—that of a prevailingly bureaucratic and military aristocracy, as well prepared as any feudal society in history has been. Granted that there now exist some few millions

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of successful Russians, who have finally liquidated the uprising of 1917, and granted also that they are ready as well as willing to defend their heritage, it will be a heroic optimist who will assert that any mass protest against the existing tyranny would have a chance for success. Only a slow and radical spiritual reorientation might eventually put back into the bloodstream of Russian life carriers of justice and mercy. It is difficult to put faith in predictions that such a reorientation can be effected from within Russia itself. The old order is too distant and outmoded; no new one seems in the making. Perhaps the signs of the times are correct, and the redemption of Russia will once more come from the West. We do not know how it can come. Yet anyone who can visualize the possibility must also know that reckoning with it implies a profound and searching examination of current cultural and religious strategy. For him the mandate of the hour would not be the closing of gates and the erection of more barriers. It would be rather the brave going down every road which leads to the heart of the East. Such a prospect is too momentous and problematical to be discussed here at any length.

I shall, however, venture to reiterate what must by this time surely have become fairly obvious. It is probable that, unless total and all-destructive war should be unleashed as a consequence of what would be the most calamitous accident in history, there will be no major change in the political and social alignments now existing in the world. There may, of course, well be border dislocations. Thus the Russians may relinquish their grip on East Germany. Or a Communist Party subservient to them could conceivably triumph in India. At any rate, the core of the non-Soviet area is Anglo-Saxon—is, from an ideological point of view, the tradition of Magna Carta and the Common Law. This tradition can be extended to peoples at present subjugated only if it proves possible to

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000 create, through the agencies entrusted with the establishment of international order, a code of minority rights which will be respected. Such a code (already adumbrated in the proposed Covenant of Human Rights and the stillborn Genocide Convention), the Russians would of course not immediately respect. But I am sanguine enough to believe that if it were adopted and vigorously advocated it would, as an idea, generate so much radiant force that it would in the long run cease to be merely evolutionary and would become truly revolutionary. We have said often enough that the ultimate victory for justice is not to be had merely through giving away material things, however necessary these may be. Why not, therefore, when a new concept of human relations is in our possession, develop and use the resources which are latent in it?

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STALIN'S SATELLITES IN EUROPE

by

YGAEL GLUCKSTEIN

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PREFACE

In the course of the Second World War the Soviet Armies entered a number of countries in Europe and stayed in them some months or years. These are Poland, Czechoslovakia, Hungary, Rumania, Bulgaria, Yugoslavia, the Soviet Zones of Germany and Austria. A study of the conditions of the hundred million people inhabiting this region is of great interest in itself; it gains even more from the fact that such a study throws light, from a new vantage point, on the Russian reality. Napoleon said: 'Une armée dehors, c'est l'État qui voyage', and the study of the influence of the Soviet 'armée dehors' teaches us about the essence of the Soviet State itself. The fact that there are more chinks in the 'Iron Curtain' between the Russian satellites and the rest of the world than between the older and better preserved curtain shutting out Russia, facilitates the study of the nature of Stalin's regime through the prism of conditions in the satellite countries. These conditions must be comprehended in the dynamics of their change, the dynamics of the rise and consolidation of the rule of the Communist Parties.

Although the same Party rules in the Soviet Zone of Germany, I have not thought it advisable to cover this area in the present study, as it is impossible to survey this Zone without covering Germany as a whole, which is in itself a wide and complicated question. Another Communist-dominated State I have omitted is Albania, the reason being the scarcity and poverty of information regarding this tiny country.

A study of current history is always fraught with the risk that the absence of distance tends to endanger accuracy of knowledge and scientific detachment; the risk exists that a more unified impression is given than knowledge of the subject warrants, and that conclusions are coloured by personal values. The only counter to this is scientific scrupulousness. While the difficulties in the way of the study of current history must be borne in mind, the study itself is not to be avoided, as it is part of history itself, and the effort to understand and

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000 criticize historical phenomena is, however imperfect, an agent of its very transformation.

In the preparation of the book I have used mainly official sources—the Governmental and Communist Party publications of the Eastern European countries—and in this regard the diplomatic representatives and information services of these countries have been of great assistance to me.

I am greatly obliged to the librarians of the British Museum and Chatham House for their ready assistance. I owe a big debt to a number of exiles from Eastern Europe, who gave me books, pamphlets and papers on the subject, many of them otherwise unobtainable, and who read and advised me on the whole or part of the typescript, particularly Mr. A. Ciolkosz, Mr. L. Slutsky and Mr. S. Vaslev. I wish to make it clear that while they have assisted me very much with their advice and criticism they are in no way responsible for any error of judgment or fact which may be found in the book. I also wish to thank Dr. O. Sheehy-Skeffington of Trinity College, Dublin, for thoroughly revising the style of the book, and my wife for preparing the manuscript for print and arranging the Index.

London
February, 1951

YGAEL GLUCKSTEIN

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PART ONE

THE ECONOMY OF THE RUSSIAN SATELLITES

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CHAPTER I

CHANGES IN PROPERTY: THE LAND REFORM

★

423 A DESCRIPTION of the economic condition of Stalin's satellites must begin with a consideration of the changes brought about in property relations after the overthrow of the rule of Hitler and his vassals in the countries of Eastern and South-Eastern Europe. As most of the population in these countries earn their living in agriculture* it is convenient to begin with an examination of the changes in land ownership.

There is a widely held belief that the feudal system, with the characteristic feature of the large latifundia, continued to prevail east of the Elbe until the arrival of the Soviet army. The prevalence of this idea is due partly to ignorance, but also to the propaganda spread since the war by the governments of this region, who try to paint as black a picture as possible of the property relations which previously prevailed there in order to magnify the importance of the land reforms they have carried out. This view is incorrect, since before World War II, and in some areas even before World War I, a series of land reforms had already to a large extent changed the system of land-holding in the countryside. On the other hand it would not be correct to minimise the extent of the land reforms carried out since the war.

000 To arrive at a balanced estimate of the extent of land reforms each country will have to be dealt with separately, even though for lack of space only a brief statement of the facts can be given. The countries will be dealt with in order, beginning with those in which the changes in the ownership of land after World

162 *Of the total population those engaged in agriculture, fishing and forestry made up: in Bulgaria (1934) 80 per cent; Yugoslavia (1931) 79 per cent; Rumania (1930) 78 per cent; Poland (1931) 65 per cent; Hungary (1930) 53 per cent; Czechoslovakia (1930) 38 per cent.

(13)

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000 War II were the least, and ending with those in which the changes were the greatest. This order illustrates the course of historical development, since the countries in which the changes were very small after World War II were those in which the greatest changes had been wrought in the past, and those where big changes took place had known but few before.

Bulgaria

423 The national uprising of the Bulgarians in 1878 destroyed feudalism. The Turkish beys fled for their lives and left the Bulgarian serfs in full and free ownership of the land they tilled.
[656] The few feudal remnants that were not eliminated in 1878 were swept away by the Agrarian Union Government of Alexander Stamboliisky (1920–23). This government fixed a maximum of 30 hectares of land for any one household (i.e., an area smaller than that fixed as a maximum by the land reforms in any country except Bulgaria herself after World War II). The political instability of this government, ending in its overthrow by a military *coup d'etat* and the murder of its leader as well as of tens of thousands of peasants and workers, resulted in the law of the maximum not being fully applied, so that a certain concentration of ownership took place after 1923. Nevertheless, Bulgaria remained a country with very few 'estates' of more than 30 hectares, a country of small peasant ownership par excellence:

LAND OWNERSHIP IN BULGARIA BEFORE THE 1944 REFORM
(IN PERCENTAGES)

	*Below 5 ha.**	*5-10 ha.*	*10-30 ha.*	*30-50 ha.*	*50 ha. and over*
Number of Owners	63.1	26.2	10.3	0.3	0.1
Area	30.0	36.9	29.5	2.0	1.6

(L. Bojkoff, *Bulgaria is not the Land of Roses Only*, Sofia, 1946, p. 69.)

Wilbert E. Moore, in *Economic Demography of Eastern and Southern Europe* (League of Nations, Geneva, 1945), gives an even lower percentage for the big properties: in 1934 only 2.7 per cent of the land was in the hands of people owning more than 30 hectares each (p. 251).

There were very few tenants in Bulgaria. According to an official report of 31st December, 1926, the cultivated rented

*ha. = hectare = 2.4711 acres.

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land comprised only 1 per cent of all privately owned land. 423
(O. S. Morgan, editor, *Agricultural Systems of Middle Europe. A Symposium*, New York, 1933, p. 50). The number of agricultural workers was also negligible.

After World War II the Communist government fixed a new [666]
maximum of 20 ha. for all parts of the country except Dobrudja where the maximum fixed by Stamboliisky was in force. But although the government hoped to increase its influence among the peasants, the real results of this land reform were not considerable. In his Report to the Second Fatherland Front Congress (Feb. 2-3, 1948) Premier Georgi Dimitrov said that '127,000 families received 1,258,000 decares of land (1 decare = 1/10 hectare—Y.G.) in compliance with the agrarian reform, while 7,863 families were housed and given about 12,000 decares of land. 71,000 decares of land were distributed among 381 State farms, establishments and institutions'. (*Second Fatherland Front Congress*, Sofia, 1948, p.42). Thus altogether 1,341,000 decares, or 134,100 hectares, were distributed. Since the total arable land in 1947 was 7.8 million hectares, the redistribution was relatively small. The land reform affected only about three per cent of the agricultural land.

The limited extent of the last land reform in Bulgaria is shown by the statistics of land ownership before and after it:

	Cultivated Land (in Percentage)		
	1926	1934	1946
Small farms	28.62	28.90	30.70
Medium "	41.63	41.13	40.60
Large "	29.75	29.97	28.70

Professor Petko Spirkov, who cites this table, draws the obvious conclusion from it: '. . . during the period 1926-1946 there are practically no changes in the distribution of land'. ('Class Structure of our Village,' *Free Bulgaria*, Sofia, March 15, 1949).

Yugoslavia

Serbia achieved virtual national independence in 1830 and full sovereignty in 1877. Then the Turkish feudal lords fled from the country and as in Bulgaria the land remained the property of the former serfs, so that many years before World

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423 War I, Old Serbia was a country of small peasants with very few tenants or agricultural workers. A similar situation was created in Montenegro and Dalmatia by their union with Serbia (1918). Only in Croatia and Slovenia, which were torn from the Hungarian part of the Habsburg Empire and added to Yugoslavia in 1918, did there remain big estates to be divided in the inter-war years. There, as a result of the agrarian reform law of 1919 and a number of subsidiary laws which followed, 1,805,000 hectares were distributed among 497,000 peasant families. (O.S. Morgan, op. cit. p. 361). This area made up about a quarter of the total area of Croatia and Slovenia, and about 12.5 per cent of the total agricultural area of Yugoslavia.

The agricultural area of Yugoslavia, prior to World War II, was distributed thus:

	Up to 2 ha.	*2-5 ha.*	*5-10 ha.*	*10-20 ha.*	*20-50 ha.*	*50 and over*
Area ..	6.5%	21.5%	27.0%	22.3%	13%	9.6%

423 A series of laws was passed by the Federated Republic of Yugoslavia in August 1945 by which the maximum land allowed to any individual was 45 hectares, of which either 30-35 hectares were to be arable and 10-15 hectares forest, or 45 hectares arable. All the German settlers and quislings were expropriated and the land owned by the banks, joint stock companies and the Church* taken over by the state.

The final result of the reform was not very great. About 850 thousand hectares changed hands, i.e., about 6 per cent. of the agricultural land of Yugoslavia (of which about half was the property of German peasants who were expelled although they had lived in Yugoslavia for hundreds of years).

Rumania

In the Old Kingdom of Rumania as well as in the territories added to it as a result of the first World War (Transylvania, taken from Hungary, and Bessarabia from Russia), a land reform on a very large scale was carried out after the first World War. Altogether 20,976 large estates with an area of 6,008,098 hectares were expropriated and handed over to 1,368,978 peasants. The agricultural area was distributed thus:

*except that each congregation was allowed to keep 10 hectares.

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423

	Before the Reform		After the Reform	
	Less than 100 ha.	*More than 100 ha.*	*Less than 100 ha.*	*More than 100 ha.*
Ancient Kingdom	4,595,148	3,397,851	7,569,549	621,450
Bessarabia ..	2,337,811	1,844,539	2,829,731	352,619
Transylvania ..	4,689,855	2,751,457	6,363,664	1,087,648
Bucovina ..	405,000	115,000	480,967	39,033
Total ..	12,025,814	8,108,847	18,053,911	2,100,750
In %	59·77	40·23	89·56	10·44

(O.S. Morgan, Ibid. p. 323).

In the provinces annexed to Rumania after the first World War, social and national differences were largely identical, since the landlords were Hungarians and most of the peasants Rumanians. The peasants belonging to the national minorities were not excluded from the land distribution carried out by the Rumanian governments, even though these governments were far from internationalist in outlook. In Transylvania, Bessarabia and Bucovina 206,165 peasant families belonging to national minorities received land in the redistribution side by side with 532,700 Rumanians. 668 423

After the first world war a considerable amount of land again changed hands: the poor peasants lost a lot of their land to the rich peasants. But even so landownership was much less concentrated than before 1918. 423

The second World War resulted in the loss of Bessarabia and Bucovina to Russia. Within the new boundaries of Rumania, estates of more than 100 hectares (calculated from the table given above) comprised an area of 1,709,098 hectares, or 11.07 per cent of all the land. Properties of more than 50 hectares, (about 1,970,300 hectares in all) comprised 17.5 per cent of all the agricultural land. (Rumania, Ministère de l'Information, *La Réforme Agraire en Roumanie*, 1946, p.16).

The land reform law of 22 March, 1945, fixed the maximum land holding allowed at 50 hectares. People owning more than 50 hectares had to give up all land over this amount. Church property, state property and the royal estates were excluded, but the last-named, an area of 132,112 hectares, was expropriated after the abdication of King Michael (December, 1947). All German owners (the German peasant colonies of Transylvania) were expropriated, as well as all 'traitors and war criminals'. [663]

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423 Up to September, 1947, land reform affected about 1.4 million hectares, and afterwards, with the distribution of the royal estates, etc., altogether 1.6 million hectares, i.e., about 10 per cent of the agricultural area of Rumania, or a third of the relative extent of the land reform after World War I.

Czechoslovakia

423 563 656 As a result of the Battle of the White Mountain (1620) the Czech nobility was almost completely wiped out and replaced by German Catholic landlords. Thus, when the Czechoslovak Republic was established, there were German landlords and Czech peasants in the Czech areas, and in the Sudetenland—the Border area — mainly German peasants and German landlords. In Slovakia (taken from the Hungarian part of the Hapsburg Empire) there were Magyar landlords and Slovak peasants, and, in the region bordering on Hungary, Hungarian peasants and Hungarian landlords. So that here, the land question and the national question were one, as in other parts of the former Austro-Hungarian Empire: Magyar landlords exploited Slovak, Rumanian, Croat and Ruthenian peasants; German landlords exploited Czech, Ruthenian, Slovene and Polish peasants.

In 1919 the Land Reform Act was passed. It provided for the dividing up of all large estates of more than 100 hectares. But this law was only partially and half-heartedly carried out. Yet, as a result of the land reform, 1.7 million hectares, or 12 per cent of the area of Czechoslovakia, were expropriated, and by 1 January, 1937, 1,272,934 hectares had been redistributed. At the same time in 1930, 13.8 per cent of the agricultural area still remained in properties of over 100 hectares. It was mainly Hungarian and German landlords who were expropriated, but the German and Hungarian peasants, tenants and agricultural workers not only were not excluded, but even benefited from the redistribution. As Miss L. E. Texter writes: 'The German farmer received land even from a Czech landowner'. (*Land Reform in Czechoslovakia*, London, 1923, quoted by E. Wiskemann, *Czechs and Germans*, London, 1938, p. 152).

In 1945 (as a result of the decrees of 19.5.45, 21.6.45, 20.7.45 and 3.9.45) an area of 2.6 million hectares was taken from Germans, landlords and peasants alike. Practically no

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land belonging to non-Germans was touched in Bohemia and Moravia. As a result of the agrarian reform in Slovakia, three hundred thousand hectares were expropriated, of which two-thirds belonged to Hungarians and Germans. 423 563 656

For two years the property of Czech and Slovak landowners was left untouched by the government. Land reform was identified with the national struggle of all the Slavs—Czechs and Slovaks alike—against all the Germans and Hungarians.

Later on it was necessary to reduce the maximum holding in order to pave the way for the total annihilation of the bourgeoisie in Czechoslovakia, and the integration of Czechoslovakia in the Russian Empire. On July 11, 1947, the maximum of 100 hectares fixed in 1919 was reduced to 50 hectares, and as a result another 919 thousand hectares were redistributed.

Thus until July, 1947, land redistribution was aimed at achieving an internal colonisation by the expropriation of 'foreign' proprietors, and the extent of the second wave of land redistribution was only about a quarter of the first.

Poland

After the First World War, Polish governments carried out, if somewhat timidly, certain land reforms. A maximum holding of 180 hectares of arable land was fixed with two exceptions—in suburbs the area allowed to a household was 60 hectares and in the Eastern districts it was 300 hectares. The landlords in the Eastern districts were treated gently because their peasants belonged to the national minorities—Ukrainians and White Russians. The administration was empowered to decide annually what estates should be divided. In fact, Polish landlords were able, by pulling strings, to escape the land reform, and in general only the estates of Russian landlords in Eastern Poland were redistributed. Altogether between 1919 and 1938, 2,654,000 hectares were divided up. (F. Zweig, *Poland between Two Wars*, London, 1944, p. 133). 423 [563]

In spite of this measure of land reform, a not inconsiderable proportion of land remained in the hands of big landowners. In 1931, about 4.6 million hectares, 18.0 per cent of all agricultural land, belonged to farms of more than 50 hectares. But as a single owner might own several farms, each of less than 50 hectares but totalling more than 50 hectares, the area

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423 comprised by properties over 50 hectares after the land reform was even greater than 4.6 million hectares. The lack of statistics on the subject (resulting from the Polish government's attempt to gloss over the reactionary and half-hearted way in which the land distribution was carried out) makes it impossible to estimate more exactly what area was covered by properties of more than 50 hectares. It is, however, evident that the redistribution of land carried out between the two world wars affected 2.6 million hectares, and left about twice that area untouched.

The frontier alterations resulting from World War II fundamentally changed property relations. Eastern Poland, an area of big estates, was lost to Poland, and a new area was gained in the west which—after the expulsion of 8.5 million Germans—was only very sparsely populated.

656 By the decrees of 6 September, 1944, and 17 January, 1945,
423 all Germans and traitors were expropriated, and 50 hectares of arable land was fixed as a maximum individual holding in Old Poland and 100 hectares in the 'Regained Territories'. The Church land was not affected. Polish landlords who had more than 50 hectares received very little compensation for the area they ceded—the equivalent of one year's yield of grain. According to the terms of these decrees, in Old Poland the area to be redistributed was more than 3 million hectares, of which agricultural land (excluding forests) made up 2,131,285 hectares. About 1,256,000 hectares of this belonged to Polish landlords, and 875,000 hectares belonged to Germans. In the Western Territories more than 5 million hectares of agricultural land was taken from Germans and either distributed to Polish peasants (4.5 million) or converted into state farms, agricultural schools, etc.

Thus internal colonization, or expropriation on a nationalist basis, is the key to the change in land ownership in Poland, even more than in Czecholslovakia.

423 *Hungary*

Unlike her neighbours, Hungary did not undergo any land reform after World War I. The communist government of Béla Kun (1919) did not divide the large estates among the peasants —one of their serious mistakes which made the victory of the

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White Terror easier. If the land had been divided, it would have remained peasant property even after Béla Kun had been overthrown. No power on earth could have changed this. But by a paradox of history, the only country of Eastern and South Eastern Europe that had a Communist government at that period was the only one in which the feudal land structure remained intact. 423

The pattern of land distribution in Hungary is revealed by the following table:

DISTRIBUTION OF HOLDINGS ACCORDING TO AREA, 1930

Groups of holdings according to area	*Number of Farms*		*Total Area*		*Average area of holdings: yokes*
	Thousands	*% of total*	*Thousands of yokes**	*% of total*	
Up to 1 yoke	552	34.5	287	1.8	0.52
1-2 yokes	278	17.4	428	2.7	1.54
2-5 "	313	19.6	1,034	6.5	3.30
5-10 "	200	12.5	1,460	9.2	7.30
10-20 "	157	9.8	2,241	14.0	14.27
20-100 "	84	5.3	3,093	19.4	36.82
100 and more yokes	14	0.9	7,390	46.4	527.88
Total	1,598	100	15,933	100	10.00

(International Agrarian Institute, *Six Years of the Agrarian Crisis*, Moscow, 1935, p. 109)

Thus, on the one hand there were 1,143,000 lilliputian holdings (71.5 per cent of all the farms), each less than 5 yokes, making up 11.0 per cent of the total area, and on the other hand, 14,000 large estates (0.9 per cent of all the farms), making up 46.4 per cent of the area.

After World War II the time was overripe for the abolition of large estates oppressing the mass of agricultural workers and tenants.

On 17th March, 1945, the Hungarian government passed a law confiscating the land of gentry with estates of more than 50 hectares, as well as the estates of the Church bodies of more than 50 hectares, and of peasant land over 100 hectares. The maximum individual land holding was fixed at 100 hectares, except for those who distinguished themselves in the war against Germany, in which case the maximum was 150 hectares. The so-called 'model farms', that is, vineyards, orchards and other intensive cultures, were exempt from redistribution. As a result, an area of 5.7 million yokes,† i.e., 423 656

*yoke = 0.575 hectares = 1.422 acres

†Of this area, only 456 thousand yokes were expropriated from Germans who were expelled from the country. The rest was the property of big Hungarian landlords.

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423 more than a third of all the cultivated land of Hungary, was
656 distributed among 640,000 families. Thus in Hungary there was a real revolution in agricultural property relations.

To sum up the changes in land ownership brought about
423 since the end of World War II: in Hungary the transformation of property relations in land by the elimination of large estates was tremendous, and a progressive step; the land reform in Rumania, which was the completion of a much wider land reform after World War I, was less extensive but of the same character; in Czechoslovakia and Poland the changes constituted in the main an act of internal colonisation and of the expropriation of millions of Germans and Hungarians; in Yugoslavia and Bulgaria the changes were very small indeed.

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CHAPTER II

CHANGES IN PROPERTY RELATIONS IN INDUSTRY, TRANSPORT, BANKING INSURANCE AND TRADE

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THE CHANGES in land ownership dealt with above had a relatively simple result—the predominance of small peasant ownership. By contrast, the property relations in industry, transport, etc., are much more complicated. In order to understand the present situation, it is necessary briefly to survey the property relations before the war, the influence of the Nazi occupation, and the immediate effects of the Red Army's victory. 000

State Ownership before World War II

In Eastern Europe the bourgeoisie developed late and, in comparison with its Western competitors, was weak and poorly equipped with capital. Thus there arose two antagonistic, but complementary, phenomena. On the one hand foreign capital infiltrated into the region, and on the other hand, in an attempt to avoid relying too much on foreign capital which tended to undermine national independence, the state became the owner of certain means of production, and not, as in the West, mainly a watchman or regulator of the activities of private capitalists. And between and under the pressure of the two—powerful foreign and state capital—private "national" capital managed somehow to keep alive. 471

The part played by the state in industry was greater in Poland than in any other Eastern European country: 471 655

GOVERNMENT-OWNED ENTERPRISES IN PRE-WAR POLAND (1938) AND THEIR PARTICIPATION IN INDUSTRIES

Per Cent	
100	production of potassium salts, alcohol; tobacco; aircraft; automobiles; air transportation; post; telegraph; radio.
97	maritime transportation

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95	production of dyestuff
93-3	railroads
91	fire insurance
84	production of common salt
73	telephones
70	smelting
52	insurance other than fire
50	spas and health resorts
45-8	financial institutions
30 (approx.)	production of tool-making machinery*
32	quarries, export of lumber†
25	production of natural gas, coal and chemicals‡
10 to 20	production of plywood, cotton goods, electrical implements, lumber, processed oil
7-9	production of electric power

(S.L. Sharp, *Nationalisation of Key Industries in Eastern Europe*, Washington, 1946, pp. 4-5)

There were many mixed enterprises owned partly by the state and partly by local authorities, private companies and individuals.

The value of state enterprises in Poland in 1930-31 was about 12½ milliard zloty, or 22.5 per cent of all the industrial-commercial wealth of Poland, and in the most important undertakings (heavy industry, metal, chemicals, transport), its share was even bigger, as the table shows.

In Yugoslavia the state owned the railways and the telephone and telegraph system. Public utilities were owned by the city authorities. In the very important timber and lumber industry, the state played a considerable part, owning 37.8 per cent of the forest area. A further 27.9 per cent was in the hands of the local authorities. The state owned thirteen coal mines and two iron mines yielding about 25 per cent and 90 per cent respectively of the country's total output of coal and iron. Tobacco, salt and raw silk were all state monopolies. The production of iron and steel (through the Yugoslav Steel Company), and of armaments, was state controlled and the state had a very large share in the cellulose and sugar industries.

State ownership in the other Eastern European countries was far less extensive, nevertheless it cannot be ignored. For instance, in Czechoslovakia, practically the whole railway system was state owned. Trams, electricity, gas and water,

*Another source gives the percentage of state ownership of the metal industry, as a whole, as 50 per cent (F. Zweig, *op. cit.* p.109).

†Zweig gives the following figure for the state ownership of forests: three-eighths (Ibid).

‡According to Zweig the larger part of the chemical industry was state owned (Ibid).

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were owned by the local authorities. State capital was of major importance in the powerful Zivnostenska Bank and in the Skoda Works. In industry as a whole, the state owned at least a tenth of all capital invested.

Similar conditions obtained, to a greater or less extent, in the other countries.

Foreign Capital before World War II

Before the War in all the countries nearly all the key positions in industry, transport and banking were controlled by foreign capital. Thus Zweig writes: 471

'The share of foreign capital in the total capital funds owned by all joint-stock companies in Poland amounted to 33 per cent. The share in the total capital of all active joint-stock companies is given as 44.8 per cent in 1935 and 40.1 in 1937' but '. . . the controlling power of this capital covered a much wider range than 40.1 per cent of productive capacity'. (Ibid. p. 121). This was because foreign capital, being concentrated in certain key positions, could control a much larger volume of capital. Companies in which foreign capital predominated constituted 63.1 per cent of the capital of all joint-stock companies. The preponderance of foreign capital was particularly great in certain branches of industry—in mining and foundries foreign capital controlled 63.6 of all joint-stock industry; in petroleum extraction, 89.9 per cent; in the chemical industry, about 80 per cent; in the electro-technical industry, about 90 per cent; in electricity and water-supply, about 95 per cent; in the textile industry, about 40 per cent (ibid. pp. 121-2); in insurance, 85.1 per cent; communication and transport, 68.9 per cent (L. Wellisz, *Foreign Capital in Poland*, London, 1938, p. 145). Only in light industries (foodstuffs, paper, glass, ceramics, etc.) and trade was foreign capital of small importance.

The other countries of Eastern Europe were in a similar position. Boris Kidrić, Chairman of the Planning Commision, at the Fifth Congress of the Communist Party of Yugoslavia, said of his country that foreign capital 'participated in the mining industry of the old Yugoslavia and in the building materials industry with 77.9%, in the metallurgical industry with 90.9%, in the processing of metals with 55.8 %, in the

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471 ceramics and glass industry with 28.3%, in the timber industry with 51.4%, in the paper industry with 15.1%, in the chemical industry with 73.6%, in the food and agricultural industry with 27.1%, in the textile industry with 61.4%, in the leather and fur industry with 40.9%, in the electric power industry with 43.5%, in the remaining industries with 32.3%, giving an average of 49.51%'. (B. Kidrić, *On the Construction of Socialist Economy in the FPRY*, Belgrade, 1948, p. 31).

The publication of the Royal Institute of International Affairs, *Agrarian Problems from the Baltic to the Aegean* (London, 1944), states: 'Only from 15 to 20 per cent of the capital in Roumanian industry was in Roumanian hands' (p. 81).

'In 1936 paid-up foreign capital in Bulgarian companies amounted to . . . 42.6 per cent of the total paid-up capital of companies'. (Royal Institute of International Affairs, *South-Eastern Europe. A Political and Economical Survey*, London, 1939, p. 173). The share of foreign capital in large manufacturing industry was 48.03 per cent, in wholesale trade 38 per cent, in insurance 24 per cent, in banking 22 per cent, and in transport 63 per cent. (According to Dobri Terpeshev's Report to the Fifth Congress of the Bulgarian Communist Party, Sofia, 1948).

Similar conditions prevailed in Hungary.

Czechoslovakia was the only country in which foreign capital in banking and industry was of relatively small importance.

The Influence of the German Occupation on Property Relations

So great was the influence of the German occupation that, in the words of S. Perlman: 'European capitalism was finally killed by Nazism', which 'so churned up all existing property rights that their restoration even approximately . . . is unthinkable.' ('Some Reflections on Russia', in *Problems of the Post-War World*, Symposium, New York and London, 1945, p. 334). That these words are no exaggeration is proved by the following passage in Mr. Sharp's book:

'The extent of the upheaval in property relations caused by the Germans in the Eastern European countries may be seen from a few examples of the acquisitions made by German capital since the Munich Agreement and the establishment of the Protectorate of Bohemia-Moravia.

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'In addition to the outright confiscation of Jewish property and the acquisition of important Czechoslovak financial claims and capital assets in southeastern Europe, the Germans assumed control and ownership of the main financial and industrial establishments in Bohemia-Moravia. 471

'Czech banks were forced to merge,[1] so that finally only four banks remained. German capital (Creditanstalt, Dresdner Bank and Deutsche Bank) owned roughly 18 billion of the total capital of 33.6 billion crowns (Koruny) invested in the banks. [463]

'Most of the industrial property and interests came under control of the Hermann Goering Werke (Vitkobice Works, Mining and Foundry Company, the Podbrezova foundry in Slovakia, the armament factories of Skoda and Brno, the steel mills and coal mines of the Poldihuette A.G.). I.G. Farben took over the chemical works of the former Aussiger Verein and the Bratislava plants of Dynamit Nobel.

'In the Sudetenland, which was incorporated into the Reich, a specially-created firm, Sudetenlaendischer Bergbau, controlled by the Hermann Goering Werke, took over the former property of the Czech state, of the Zivnostenska Banca and of the Petschek family interests.' (op. cit. pp. 6-7).

At the same time the Germans developed certain industries for war purposes, because Czechoslovakia was relatively immune from air attack. For instance, the aircraft industry which before the war employed about 5,000 workers, in 1944 employed more than 100,000. This increased the proportion of industry in Czechoslovakia controlled by Germans. [463]

Since even before Munich, 40 per cent of the industry of Czechoslovakia was owned by German citizens, it is clear that the proportion of German capital at the end of the war was not less than 60 per cent of industry and almost 100 per cent of financial institutions (banks, insurance, etc.).

Of Poland, Mr. Sharp writes: 'Polish banks in the incorporated areas were swallowed by the Ostbank A.G., a subsidiary of the Dresdner Bank. A special organization was set up to take over industrial property, either outright or in the form of compulsory administration by the Haupttreuhandstelle Ost. Coal mines were taken over by the Hermann Goering Werke in Silesia and by the Pruessische Bergwerks- und Huetten A.G. in the Dombrowa basin. The Schlesische [453]

[1] [In early 1940's -- Analyst]

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471 A.G. fuer Bergbau and Huettenbetriebe concentrated in its hands the zinc industry (with the exception of some interests left with the Giesche works). By April 1942 not less than 230,000 Polish industrial and commercial enterprises of all sizes were reported Germanized in the annexed part of Poland (this includes very small businesses and presumably also Jewish-owned undertakings).

'In the General Government, a state-managed organization, the Werke des Generalgouvernment, took over the largest industrial plants. Two artificial silk factories came under the control of Vereinigte Glanzstoff Fabriken of Wuppertal. Oil was exploited by Karpathen-Oel A.G. and electric power plants by Ost-Energie A.G.' (Ibid. pp. 7-8).

By taking possession of French, Belgian and Austrian capital (which in 1937 amounted to 56.9 per cent of all foreign capital), as well as Jewish-owned enterprises (constituting about 10 per cent of all industrial-commercial wealth) and the enterprises owned by the state before the war, the Germans gained control of more than half of all industrial and banking capital and nearly all industry, transport and banks of real importance.

Of Yugoslavia Mr. Sharp writes: 'Yugoslavia was dismembered after the German attack in 1941 and public and private property grabbed by the successor states in the detached provinces. In puppet Serbia the Germans controlled the state-owned railways and mines. Through possession of French interests they acquired the Bor copper mines. German capital infiltration in Serbia was estimated at about 45 million dollars and in Croatia at approximately 35 million'. (Ibid. p.9)

German capital also invaded the economy of the German allies, Hungary and Rumania. 'In Hungary, for instance, German investments were estimated in February, 1944, officially at about 692 million dollars and unofficially at more than twice the amount'. (Ibid. p. 8). Thus about a third of all Hungarian industry was controlled by German capital: six very large metal enterprises, nine mines, three transport companies, three food industries, ten textile enterprises, and thirteen miscellaneous industries. (N. Clarion, *Le Glacis Soviétique*, Paris, 1948, p. 89). German capital was especially active in the expansion of the aluminium and oil industries,

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which were practically new industries for Hungary. The extent to which German capital gained control of the Hungarian economy is revealed by the fact that while German capital was estimated at more than a milliard dollars, the total national wealth of Hungary, excluding land and buildings, was estimated in 1943 at 4.4 milliard dollars. 471

'In Rumania the Hermann Goering Werke came into possession of large shares in a number of industrial enterprises through the seizure of the Czech-owned stock. Similarly in banking and mining the Germans "bought" French and Belgian interests and some Dutch oil interests. One sixth of the capital invested in Rumanian banks and industries was German-owned or controlled, according to an estimate early in 1944. In the oil industry German interests rose from less than 0.5 per cent before the war to 38 per cent (1942). Jewish property was "Rumanized".' (Sharp, op. cit. pp. 8-9).

Before the war more than half the foreign capital invested in Rumania was invested in her oil industry, and foreign capital as a whole made up nearly 85 per cent of the capital of all Rumanian industry. Therefore German capital in the oil industry alone made up in 1942 nearly a fifth of all the capital in Rumanian industry, or a quarter of the foreign capital. Moreover, it controlled a few other, not unimportant, enterprises, such as the Malaxa metal enterprise and the mines of Resitza and Copsa Mica-Cugir companies, as well as another two hundred new medium-sized enterprises. (Clarion, op. cit. pp. 90-91).

Two countries practically escaped any large-scale infiltration of German capital during the war—Bulgaria and Finland, the former because it lacked the heavy industry needed for the German war effort, the latter because the foreign capital invested in it was not French or Belgian but English and American, and it was impossible for the Germans to buy British and American shares during the war.

The Effect of the Military Victory of Russia: Russian-Owned Enterprises

The military defeat of Germany left a very great part of industry, transport and banks of the East European countries ownerless. The larger part of German property in Czecho-

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471 slovakia, Poland and Yugoslavia passed into the hands of the national states, while in the countries which were formerly allies of Germany as well as in the Soviet Zone of Germany and Austria it was mostly taken over by the Russian government. Even Czechoslovakia and Poland did not escape having to contribute German booty to Russia. Yugoslavia was the only exception, because the Russian army never occupied the whole of the country, but merely a small part of it and for a few months only. Of the industries formerly owned by Germans and now claimed by Russia, some were dismantled and the rest left intact under Russian control.

The question of dismantling will be dealt with later. Here it is proposed to deal only with the ownership by Russia of certain industrial, transport and banking interests.

Rumania

Since during the war German capital had controlled 38 per cent of all investments in Rumanian oil (as well as a number of industries and banks), Russia was able to obtain almost complete control over a third of the Rumanian oil industry. She also became the owner of much of the metal industry and the banks. For various reasons, Russia found it preferable to build up in Rumania (and Hungary) enterprises in which she owned half, while the other half was in the hands of Rumanian (or Hungarian) private capitalists or the state (the latter from the nationalisation laws of 1948). This enables the Russian state to control a much greater sector of industry than if she had relied on companies with 100 per cent Russian capital. Thus in May, 1945, Russia and Rumania came to an agreement about the establishment of mixed companies in certain branches of industry, first of all the petroleum industry. Sovrompetrol was established which owns the lion's share of the oil fields and refineries of Rumania. The far-reaching law of nationalization passed on 11 June, 1948, did not apply to the mixed companies. In the significant words of *The World Today* (January, 1949) the monthly journal of the Royal Institute of International Affairs:

'. . . the only capitalist in Rumanian industry is Communist Russia. Only the Russian Government has the right to own private shares, and only the company in which Soviet Russia

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has private shares is allowed to make profits and distribute them to the shareholders. Sovrompetrol has now the best fields and concessions and the right to export in free currency areas. It is also officially subsidized by the Rumanian Government in the event of loss. Thus it can be seen that Sovrompetrol has the best of the bargain. The second sector belongs in principle to the Rumanian State. Its task will be to prospect for, and explore, new fields as well as to exploit the exhausted wells left by the expropriated companies. Its personnel is untrained. Its trade will be limited to the adverse one with Soviet Russia and the other satellites. Therefore, while both sectors are working for the benefit of Soviet Russia, it is not difficult to guess which has the best chance of successful working, which is doomed to failure'.

Although oil is the main industry of Rumania, and Russia directed her main attention to it, she did not overlook other industries. Because of the close fusion of industrial and banking capital in Rumania, the Sovrom Banco was established, as the best means of controlling industry—besides oil—as a whole. Fifty per cent of the shares of the bank are held directly by Russia, and fifty per cent by Rumanian companies. But since Russia, as the heir of the German owners, had part ownership of a number of the latter companies, she has, even formally, the majority of the shares.

In addition there were established Sovrom companies for shipping, air communications, timber, coal, steel, chemicals, gas, building materials, glass, and a few other industries. In all these enterprises the share of Russia has been paid solely by surrendering the claim to German assets in each industry.

Hungary

Under the Potsdam Agreement Russia was entitled to take over all German-owned property in Hungary, officially estimated in February, 1944, at 692 million dollars, and unofficially at double this sum, out of an estimated total wealth in 1943 of 4.4 milliard dollars. Russia exercised her rights partly by dismantlement and partly by taking control of industries which continued to operate in Hungary. By an economic agreement between Hungary and Russia in September, 1945, mixed Russian-Hungarian companies were to be established

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471 in fourteen branches of industry and transport: oil, bauxite-aluminium, coal, chemicals, the large metal industries Weiss-Manfred, Ganz and Rimamurany, electricity, railways, Danubian shipping, air transport. While their importance in the economy was great, it was considerably less than that of their counterparts in Rumania.

As a political weapon for the subjugation of Hungary to Russia, the mixed companies are of first-rate importance.

Bulgaria

471 In Bulgaria there are Soviet companies and mixed companies
651 in certain mines and transport undertakings. When the U.S.S.R. took over the assets of the German companies, they did not take over their liabilities, the biggest of which were their debts to the state. Thus while a large part of the assets which were transferred to Russia of the German companies came from open robbery of the Bulgarian people in the past, the liabilities were borne by the Bulgarian taxpayer. This was revealed in the Kostov Trial (December, 1949) during which Prof. Stefanov, former Minister of Finance, was accused of opposition to this state of affairs. He was accused further of wishing to impose the same taxes on the Soviet enterprises as the Bulgarian enterprises had to pay. The Prosecutor took it for granted that Russian enterprises in Bulgaria should enjoy special privileges in taxation.

Yugoslavia

471 In Yugoslavia there were two mixed Soviet-Yugoslav transport companies, 'Juspad' and 'Justa', formed on February 4, 1947, with the alleged intention of 'contributing to the recovery and development of productive possibilities of Yugoslavia'. They were liquidated after the rupture with Moscow. After this some light was thrown on the working of the companies. Joze Vilfan, Yugoslav delegate to the United Nations Economic and Social Council, referred to the two mixed companies in a speech before the Council. The participation of the two Governments in the companies was to have been equal, but in practice the companies did not do what they were intended to do. Thus, for example, although by May, 1948, the U.S.S.R. had paid up only 9.83 per cent of its participation

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in Juspad while Yugoslavia had paid up 76.25 per cent, only 40 per cent of the services of both companies went to Yugoslavia, the remainder going to other countries. Whereas Juspad charged Yugoslav industry 0.40 dinars per kilometre-ton, the U.S.S.R. was charged only 0.19 dinars, and other countries 0.28 dinars. With the liquidation of both companies, Yugoslavia took over all the liabilities, though the U.S.S.R. drew its share of the capital, as far as it was paid up, in full. (*Tanjug*, 11 October, 1949). 471

No Rent Paid for Natural Resources

This is an important aspect of the exploitation exercised by the Russian Government through the mixed companies. The prices of certain commodities whose production is dependent on natural resources which exist only in limited quantities and which are the property of individuals (or states)—such as grain, cotton, timber, coal, oil—always include not only wages for the workers, and profit for the owners of the capital, but also rent for the owners of the natural resources. When the Russian state takes from Sovrompetrol, for instance, half of what remains after the cost of production (wages, depreciation of machinery, etc.) is covered, it actually gets not only half the profit, properly so-called, but also half the rent of the oilfields. Thus it becomes part-owner of the natural wealth of Rumania. The enormous rent accruing from oilfields is well known. One example will be sufficient to show this. In 1946 the U.S.S.R. concluded an agreement with Iran to build a mixed Iran-Soviet oil company. It was agreed that the share that Iran would contribute to the company would be that of providing the oil-bearing soil, and for this alone she would get 49 per cent of all the shares of the company, i.e., 49 per cent of the profit and rent. In the case of the Sovrompetrol Company, Rumania had to supply half the capital and in addition to give the oil-bearing soil gratis. It would not be difficult to calculate what portion of the shares Rumania would have received had she had the same conditions as were granted Iran. She would have had 49 per cent of the profit as rent for the oilfields and half of the rest—i.e., 25½ per cent—for ownership of half the capital, making altogether 74½ per cent. Instead she gets 50 per cent. And the portion the U.S.S.R.

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471 would have received would have been 25½ per cent instead of 50 per cent. This would have been the case if the mixed companies were established on the principle of legal equality usually prevailing between capitalist partners. The extra profit the U.S.S.R. gets from the Sovrompetrol Co. and from a number of other mixed companies is the result of political pressure.

Nationalisation in the Russian Satellite States

The appropriation of industries, transport and banks by the Russian state has been described. Now it is necessary to deal with the transfer of industries to the 'national' states, states which are, at least formally, distinguished from the Russian state. This transfer is usually described as 'nationalisation', although the term is far from appropriate as it assumes that the state enjoys national independence and that it is identified with the nation, or the majority of it. But if these reservations are borne in mind, there is no danger in using this rather loose term.

As the national states of the satellites are subordinated to the Russian state, one would expect to find that the progress of the nationalisation of industry is subordinated to the needs of Russian infiltration into the national economies. And so in fact it is. In all Eastern Europe only three countries, Poland, Czechoslovakia and Yugoslavia, were allies of Russia during the war. Because of this, Russia could not exact any reparations from them or claim control over German assets in them. They were therefore encouraged to nationalise their industries, and as early as 1945 the majority of their industries were nationalised. (In two of these countries—Czechoslovakia and Poland—the nationalisation was accompanied by a wide-scale and chauvinistic expropriation of the 'Teutons' by the 'Slavs'.)

In the four countries which had been allied to Germany—Rumania, Hungary, Bulgaria, Finland—the course of events was different. There was no nationalisation in Finland, which was never occupied, nor was there much propaganda by the Communist Party for it. In Rumania and Hungary, Russia's interests in exacting reparations as well as in building up mixed companies (together with a number of socio-political factors which will be dealt with later) led to the postponement of nationalisation on a large scale until 1948, more than three

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years after the beginning of the Russian occupation. The fear that the revolutionary enthusiasm of the Bulgarian masses (which, except in Yugoslavia, was unparalleled in this region after the war) would lead to too much independence of Russia, and the Russian bureaucracy's confidence that nationalisation could be carried out whenever they wished, caused them to postpone it until the revolutionary wave had ebbed at the end of 1947. 471

The timing of nationalisation in Rumania, Hungary and Bulgaria was determined by another very important factor— the Marshall Plan. The urge to trade with Western Europe, as expressed in the unanimous decision of the Czechoslovak government on 4 July, 1947, to take part in the Marshall Conference (a decision revoked when Gottwald and Masaryk visited Moscow on 10th July) made it necessary for Russia to strengthen her control over the economy of Eastern Europe, and this could be done only through state ownership of industries in all these countries. Hence the nationalisations in Bulgaria, Rumania and Hungary. 471 439

Poland

It is impossible to understand the process of nationalisation in Poland without taking into account two factors, namely, in the area of pre-war Poland, the existence of many industries previously controlled by German capital now remaining ownerless, and, what is even more important, the changes in Polish industry brought about by the annexation of the German area east of the Oder-Neisse and the expulsion of the German population from it. This area will be referred to as the Western territories of Poland, and the area of pre-war Poland as Old Poland. 471

The importance of the industry of the Western territories compared with the industry of Old Poland is shown by the following table: 483 471

ACTUAL PRODUCTION IN 1937 (IN THOUSAND TONS)

	Pre-War Poland	*Western Territories*
Coal	36,218.0	29,793.0
Coke	2,326.0	3,229.0
Briquettes ..	17.4	368.6
Brown coal ..	18.4	7,694.0
Zinc and lead ..	200.0	722.1
Iron ore	791.6	73.1

(*The World Today*, March, 1947)

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471 The production of pig-iron in the Western territories was about 50 per cent of the production of Old Poland, and of steel 70 per cent. An important chemical industry, with a wide range of products, came to Poland through the annexation of the Western Territories. The sugar refining capacity of the Western Territories was the same as that of Old Poland. In fact, 'The total capacity of this industrial belt (i.e., of the Western Territories—Y.G.) is equal to that of the whole of pre-war Poland'. (*The World Today*, May, 1948).

471 [463] Out of the two million people employed in 1937 in all the mines, industry and handicrafts of Poland, the majority, 1,177,858 people, worked in small-scale industry and handicrafts (employing fewer than 15 workers), while large and medium-sized industry (which includes all enterprises with more than 15 people) employed only 830,000 people. By contrast, the industries of the Western territories employed before the war over 1,000,000 workers, the great majority of them in large enterprises, hundreds of which employed more than a thousand workers each.

It is therefore clear that when, after the expulsion of the German population (the great majority of them workers and their families), the industry of the Western territories was declared state property, an important—if not the major—part of the industry of new Poland was by that act removed from private ownership. If this had been the only nationalisation undertaken, state ownership in industry proper, i.e., excluding handicrafts and industries employing less than fifteen people, would already have far outstripped private ownership. This was not immediately clear because a certain time-lag was inevitable before enough Polish workers could be found to man the industries of the Western territories. Thus, for some time after the war the nationalised industry of the Western Territories played a less important role in the total industry of the new Poland than would have been expected.

Of the territory of Old Poland Clarion writes: 'When we take into account the fact that large and medium industry in Old Poland mean medium and small industry in the West, the nationalisation measures left outside state property 45 per cent of the total number of industries, or at the very least 60

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per cent of the total number of workers employed in industry'. 471
(op. cit. p. 94).*

Clarion would seem to exaggerate the part played by private industry in Old Poland. Even there at least half of all the workers in mining, industry and transport, are working in state enterprises, and so the *overwhelming majority* of all the industry of present-day Poland is state-owned.

Bolesław Bierut, the President of the Polish Republic, emphasized in a speech on New Year's Eve, 1946, that the expropriation of the Germans was a key factor in making the Polish state the owner of the majority of the industry. He said: '. . . the war completely overturned the system of our pre-war production relations . . .' 'After the expulsion of the occupant a huge majority of the industrial plants, even the smallest, had to be classified as abandoned property, taken over by the state, and reopened through the efforts of the state, territorial self-government, co-operatives and new private firms. After investing public money in the plants, the state feels compelled to regulate their judicial form and title of ownership. The only way out of the situation, especially in the case of large enterprises, is nationalisation'. Thus nationalisation is 'a legal act sanctioning already existing facts and procedures. It is an adaptation of the law to realities'. This was the situation in 1945 and the nationalisation law of 3 January, 1946, gave it legal sanction. First, all German property, both in the Western territories and in Old Poland, in industry, mines, transport, banking, insurance and trade was declared the property of the Polish state. Further, a number of other enterprises belonging to Polish citizens was taken over by the state: all firms with more than 50 workers were affected. The situation was summed up by Roman Zambrowski, Secretary of the Central Committee of the Polish Workers' Party (Communist Party) in a speech he made on July 12th, 1948, when he stated that 85 per cent of the total industrial output is produced by state and co-operatively owned enterprises (the latter not more than 5 per cent), the same proportion in communication and finance, and 100 per cent in banking. Only small-scale industry and

*Probably the ground for Clarion's estimate was the declaration of the Polish Minister of Industry, Hilary Minc, on January 2nd, 1946, that after the nationalisation bill, only 40 per cent of all industrial workers would be employed by the state, while 60 per cent would continue to work for private employers.

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471 handicrafts were in the hands of private owners. (*Glos Ludu*, 13th July, 1948).

Czechoslovakia

As a result of the defeat of the German army and the expulsion of the Sudeten Germans, the major part of industry, transport and banking was left without an owner. As President Beneš wrote in an article in the *Manchester Guardian* of 15th December, 1945: '. . . the Germans simply took control of all main industries, and of all banks . . . If they did not nationalise them directly, they at least put them in the hands of big German concerns . . . In this way they automatically prepared the economic and financial capital in our country for nationalisation . . . To return this property and the banks into the hands of Czech individuals or to consildidate them without considerable State assistance and without new financial guarantees was simply impossible. The State had to step in . . .'

Three decrees of October 24th, 1945, made all banks, insurance companies, joint stock companies, key industries and large-scale enterprises the property of the state. All the enterprises in the key industries (mines, iron and steel, electricity, etc.), whatever their size, were nationalised. In other industries, all the enterprises employing a certain number of workers, or with certain technical capacities, were nationalised.

The ownership of industry on November 1, 1946, in terms of percentage of total employment, was as follows:

	Czech Lands				Slovakia
	State owned (including communes)	*State administered*	*Co-operatives*	*Private*	*Nationalised industries*
Industries producing means of production	79.2	10.3	0.2	10.3	83.1
Industries producing means of consumption	44.2	14.3	1.0	39.5	52.9
Food processing industries	31.9	10.8	20.7	36.6	28.6
Industries not directly affected by nationalisation	11.9	13.2	2.0	72.9	18.9
Total industry ..	61.6	11.6	2.4	24.4	57.7

Between 24th October, 1945, and February, 1948, no new nationalisation laws were passed, so that it can be assumed that throughout this period not more than a quarter of industry

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(reckoned by the number employed) was privately owned. 471
Since private enterprises were small compared with state enterprises (on the average every industrial enterprise owned by the state employed eight times as many people as the private enterprises), their economic importance in the total industry of the country was even less.

After the establishment of the new government in February, 1948, further nationalisation took place, and the proportion of private industry decreased from about 25 per cent to 7 per cent of all industry, according to the number employed.

Thus the really large-scale state acquisitions took place in 1945 and were directed almost entirely against ownerless enterprises, i.e., formerly German-owned enterprises.

The 1945 nationalisation hardly touched the Czechoslovak bourgeoisie and did not affect the Czechoslovak owners of middle and small industry at all. After it the Communist leaders declared that no more nationalisation measures would be taken. Thus on March 27th, 1947, 'In an interview the Prime Minister of Czechoslovakia, Klement Gottwald, declared that from the programme of the present Government it is clear that it considers *the statification* in the field of production closed' (*Neue Zürcher Zeitung*, 29th March, 1947). A few weeks later, at a general meeting of the Central Trade Union Council, Antonin Zapotocky, the President, said: 'We agree that medium-sized, and even some big enterprises should remain in private hands, and we see no reason why we should change these views'.

But in February, 1948, Gottwald and Zapotocky 'forgot' all this, and for the first time the Czechoslovak bourgeoisie, including the owners of middle and small industry, was seriously affected by nationalisation. This second nationalisation was a relatively small operation after the big one of 1945.

Yugoslavia

No nationalisation law was published in Yugoslavia, until 5th December, 1946, when the two Houses of the National Assembly adopted a bill for the nationalisation of private enterprises which applied to 42 branches of industry, transport and banking, and wholesale trade. But it would be wrong to conclude that until then these sectors of the economy were in

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471 private hands. In practice, nationalisation was carried out without legal sanction and under cover of a law passed on 24th November, 1944, for the expropriation of the property of the national enemy and his collaborators. On 19th January, 1946, *The Economist* estimated that the proportion of state and co-operative industry in Yugoslavia was 70-80 per cent, and the Moscow journal *New Times* of 15th March, 1946, wrote: 'The Government is in possession of 82 per cent of all industry, while private establishments account for only 18%'.

474 After this survey of the ownership of industry in Poland,
655 Czechoslovakia and Yugoslovia, a brief examination is
443 necessary of the control of trade. In all three countries private property lingers on to a large extent in one sphere besides agriculture, that of retail trade. In his speech mentioned above, Roman Zambrowski pointed out that in Poland the state and the co-operatives handle only 25-30 per cent of retail trade (in wholesale trade private ownership is negligible, the state taking 59 per cent of the turnover, the co-operatives 36.6 per cent, a total of 95.6 per cent). A similar situation exists in Czechoslovakia. Of the situation in Yugoslavia, B. Kidrić, said: 'Whereas in 1945, 85% of trade was still carried on through private shops, 12% through co-operatives and only 3% through state shops, in 1946 state shops already participated in trade with 19.2%, cooperative with 32% and the private shops dropped to 48.8%' (B. Kidrić, op. cit. p. 29).

'. . . on March 31st, 1948, private shops still participated with only 1.78%, the state shops with 39.91% and the co-operative with 58.31%'. (Ibid. p. 31).

In May, 1948, a new law nationalised all the remaining private trade in Yugoslavia.

In these three countries, the proportion of the economy in private hands was no greater than in Soviet Russia during the N.E.P.*

Hungary and Rumania

In Hungary and Rumania, Russia's demand for reparations and her schemes for the building of mixed companies which

*According to the Comintern weekly, *International Press Correspondence*, of 26th November, 1927, the percentage of private industry in the total industrial production of Russia in 1925/6 was 18.7 per cent. The proportion of wholesale trade in private hands was 9.4 per cent of the turnover and of retail trade 38.8 per cent (In 1927/8 the figures were respectively 1.5 and 27.0).

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would give her direct control of certain key positions in their economies, resulted in the postponement of any nationalisation until requisitions, dismantling, etc., had been terminated, the reparations payments were nearly completed, and the mixed companies were already established. Then, in the first half of 1948, nationalisation was carried out on a large scale.

For the Russian government nationalisation is only a *means* to the end of the extraction of surplus value and the accumulation of capital, and the purpose of nationalisation is fundamentally no different from that of the mixed companies, whose function is openly that of the extraction of 'reparations'. This is illustrated by the following incident.

After the big defeat of the Hungarian Communist Party in the general elections (November, 1945) when it polled only 17 per cent of the votes, the Hungarian bourgeoisie felt self-confident, and the government, headed by the Smallholders' Party, tried to delay agreement to the Mixed Companies. Suddenly, the Communist Party began an intensive campaign for the nationalisation of industry on a large scale. The General Secretary of the Party, and Vice-Premier, Mátyas Rákosi, in a speech over Radio Budapest, on 4th March, 1946, demanded the nationalisation of exactly the *same* industries in which Russia demanded the establishment of Mixed Companies. To the demand for nationalisation was added a demand for the removal of reactionary elements from the Smallholders' Party. As a result the Hungarian Government gave way, the Mixed Companies were established, and the Communist Party forgot about the nationalisation (for the time being).

Nationalisation was introduced piecemeal into Hungary. The coal mines were nationalised in January, 1946, the power stations a little later in the year. Five big heavy industrial firms were brought under state control as a temporary measure, 'until the end of reparations', in November, 1946. In September, 1947, all the banks were nationalised. Even so, until the nationalisation law of March 25th, 1948, a quarter of heavy industry and four-fifths of the rest of industry remained private property. According to this law, all industrial enterprises employing more than 100 persons became state property. The state now owned 78 per cent of industry, according to the

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471 number employed. On December 28th, 1949, the Government decided to take over all enterprises employing more than ten workers and all those owned by foreign capital. Of course the nationalisation laws did not affect the property of the Mixed Companies.

The way the nationalisation was carried out in Hungary illustrates the tactical methods of the Hungarian Communist Party leaders and their view that the active participation of the workers in the nationalisation is unnecessary. Easter Monday, 1948, was declared a holiday, and when the workers were not in the factories, state officials came down and took them over. The next day the workers arrived to find a new master. (*Continental News Service*, April 16th, 1948).

In Rumania the first step towards the nationalisation of industry was the creation in the summer of 1947 of a number of industrial boards which grouped together the factories of different branches, controlled the allocation of raw materials and framed the production plans of the various factories. This prepared the ground for the first nationalisation law for industry of 11th June, 1948. On that date, without prior warning, the government introduced a bill in parliament which became law after only three hours discussion, providing for the nationalisation of the overwhelming majority of industries. A few months earlier at the Congress of the Rumanian Workers' Party (Communists) on February 21-23, 1948, which had to decide on the policy of Rumania for the immediate future, no mention was made of early nationalisation on a large scale. All oil companies, including those in which foreign capital was invested (except the Sovrompetrol Company) were nationalised, as well as all metallurigical factories employing more than 100 workers, textile factories using more than 100 horse power, timber plants using more than 20 horse power, all the shipping companies (except the Sovrom Shipping Company) and railroads, radio and telephone companies, and all the banks (except the Sovrombank).

Bulgaria

The Bulgarian State owned only 6 per cent of the total industry of the country until December 23rd, 1947, when, at one stroke, practically all industry was nationalised. 93 per

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cent of industry was taken over by the state (2 per cent owned by cooperatives and 5 per cent was in private hands), 100 per cent of the banks and insurance companies and 100 per cent of foreign trade. (*For a Lasting Peace, For a People's Democracy!* the Cominform organ, 15th December, 1948). Cyril Lazarov in *Rabotnichesko Delo* of October 31st, 1948, estimates the state share of wholesale trade at 64 per cent and of retail trade at 22.3 per cent.

Austria and Finland, although they are outside the region under review, throw valuable light on the motives determining the attitude of the Communist Parties to nationalisation.

In Austria Russia is the main impediment to nationalisation, while the Austrian bourgeoisie and the Western Powers appear as its enthusiastic supporters.

The Austrian parliament hoped, by a large-scale nationalisation of industry, to stop the dismantling of factories and the taking over of industries by Russia. In July, 1946, therefore, a bill was passed, which was based on the election programme of the three parties of the Coalition Government (including the Communist Party) and provided for the nationalisation of 71 major enterprises. The Soviet High Command protested against the law on the grounds that it would affect Russian reparation rights, and the Soviet vote prevented the law from coming into effect. Thereupon the Communist Party changed its policy to opposition to nationalisation.

In Finland, the Popular Democratic Party (Communist Party) was in a better tactical position, as the Russian Control Commission informed the Finnish Government at an early stage that 'nationalisation is contrary to Soviet interests', and the Popular Democratic Party was therefore warned in time to oppose nationalisation.

The difference between the nationalisation policies in the various countries shows how this policy has in every case been determined by the interests of the rulers of Russia. It is clear, therefore, that for Russia nationalisation is only a device for the transfer of industry into the hands of the state, which means the appropriation of the industry by the owners of that state —the Russian ruling class.

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CHAPTER III

SCARCITY OF CAPITAL

Problems of Agricultural Development

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AN EXAMINATION of the economic situation of the countries of Eastern and South-Eastern Europe will make it obvious that no redistribution of the national income and wealth will by itself radically improve the condition of the people. For example, if the total agricultural land of the countries (and not, as has been the case, merely the large estates) were distributed equally among the peasants ('Black Distribution' in the phrase of the Russian revolutionaries under the Tsar), the main result would be the equalisation of poverty. As long as the majority of the people are engaged in agriculture and the producivity of labour in agriculture is as low as it is today, no real improvement of their condition is possible.

The level of output of agriculture per head of the agricultural population in Eastern Europe is very low, as can be illustrated by comparing it with other regions. It is, of course, difficult to compare the agricultural productivity of different countries, which produce various products in differing proportions. Fortunately Wilbert E. Moore has undertaken an important statistical work, attempting to fulfil this task for different European countries (op. cit.). He weighs the quantities of agricultural goods produced according to a uniform set of value rations which he calls the Crop Unit (C.U.). For the years 1931-5 on the average, the results were as follows (see top of page 45) (the index calculation has been made from Moore's absolute figures).

Although there are differences in the productivity of agriculture as between the different countries of Eastern Europe, there is a much greater *inequality* between Western Europe as a whole and Eastern Europe as a whole, the latter's productivity being 4-5 times lower than the former's.

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AGRICULTURAL PRODUCTION PER PERSON DEPENDENT ON AGRICULTURE AND PER MALE ENGAGED IN AGRICULTURE

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	Per Person Dependent on Agriculture		Per Male Engaged in Agriculture	
	Crop Units	Index Denmark=100	Crop Units	Index Denmark=100
Denmark	152	100	411	100
England and Wales	137	90	306	74
Netherlands ..	114	75	302	73
Switzerland	84	55	213	52
Belgium	95	62	230	56
France	75	49	204	50
Germany	84	55	244	59
Czechoslovakia ..	45	30	146	36
Hungary	33	22	96	23
Poland	21	14	72	17
Rumania	21	14	67	16
Bulgaria	20	13	70	17
Yugoslavia ..	17	11	55	13
Albania	10	7	32	8

(p. 35).

The large extent to which this is the *direct* result of the greater density of the agricultural population in Eastern than Western Europe becomes clear if the number of hectares of agricultural land per person dependent on agriculture in the different countries is compared. Taking the number in Denmark as 100, the comparative figures are:

Denmark	100	Czechoslovakia ..	54
England and Wales ..	112	Hungary	59
Netherlands	47	Poland	44
Switzerland	35	Rumania	46
Belgium	57	Bulgaria	20
France	108	Yugoslavia	37
Germany	71	Albania	22

It is clear that there is no exact correlation between countries arranged according to productivity per person dependent on agriculture and according to the quantity of agricultural land per person dependent on agriculture. But that there is a certain correlation can be seen by comparing the countries of Western Europe as a group and the countries of Eastern Europe as a group. In the first group there is twice as much agricultural land per person dependent on agriculture as in the second.

The great density of the agricultural population in Eastern Europe compared with Western Europe goes some way to explaining the low productivity per head of the agricultural population in the former compared with the latter. There is another factor that must be mentioned if the explanation is to be complete, namely, that the agricultural output per unit of

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241 area is much smaller in Eastern Europe than in Western
511 Europe. This is shown clearly in the following table:
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AGRICULTURAL PRODUCTION PER HECTARE OF AGRICULTURAL LAND

	Crop Units	Index		Crop Units	Index
Denmark	57	100	Czechoslovakia	31	54
England and Wales	46	81	Hungary ..	21	37
Netherlands ..	91	160	Bulgaria ..	19	33
Switzerland ..	89	156	Poland.. ..	18	32
Belgium	63	111	Rumania ..	17	30
France	26	46	Yugoslavia ..	17	30
Germany	44	79	Albania ..	17	30

If the agricultural population of Eastern Europe is to have the same quantity of agricultural products per head as in Western Europe, not only must half of them be removed, but the agricultural output must be doubled.

The low productivity in Eastern Europe is not the result of
[134] infertility of the soil. On the contrary, the soil of Eastern Europe, and especially the excellent black soil of the Danube Plain, is on the whole much richer than the naturally poor soil of Western Europe. The low productivity is due to three main causes, the scarcity of livestock, the scanty use of fertilizers and the lack of agricultural implements and machinery.

LIVESTOCK DENSITY (1938)

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	Cattle per 100 ha. Agricultural Area	Pigs per 100 ha. Arable Land
Czechoslovakia ..	59.1	65.3
Hungary	24.9	55.3
Poland	41.3	40.6
Rumania	23.5	23.5
Bulgaria	41.0	22.1
Yugoslavia	29.8	46.0
Germany	69.8	122.5
France	45.2	34.4
Denmark	103.1	106.1

(PEP—Political and Economic Planning-*Economic Development in S.E. Europe*, 1945, p. 34).

In this table the figures for the countries of Eastern Europe include a large number of oxen and buffaloes which are used mainly as draught animals. In the quality of its livestock Eastern Europe compares even more unfavourably with Western Europe than in the quantity.

407 On the question of agricultural implements and machinery,
241 the PEP study states :

The value of all agricultural equipment used per hectare of arable land was estimated by a Roumanian source at Lei 1,000

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(about £1) for Roumania, Lei 2,000 for Bulgaria, Lei 3,000 for 407
Poland; as against Lei 15,000 for Germany and Lei 42,000 for 241
Switzerland. So far as mechanical equipment is concerned, the disparity was even greater. According to a German source, taking the mechancial equipment per hectare of farm land (in terms of weight) as 100 for Germany, the figure for Bulgaria would be 14, for Yugoslavia 5, for Roumania 3.' (Ibid. p. 32).

A comparison of the extent to which fertilizers are used is 241
equally unfavourable, as can be seen from the following table :

USE OF ARTIFICIAL FERTILIZERS, 1930-1940
(KILOS PER HECTARE OF ARABLE LAND)

	Nitrates	*Phosphates*	*Potash*
Czechoslovakia ..	4.4	8.9	5.0
Poland	1.1	2.3	1.4
Hungary	0.1	0.9	0.1
Yugoslavia ..	0.1	0.4	0.1
Roumania ..	0.02	0.06	0.01
Bulgaria	0.01	0.00	0.00
Germany	18.0	21.4	31.3
France	7.0	17.6	8.7
Denmark	10.7	24.1	7.9

(Ibid. p. 31)

There are a number of other factors which influence the 511
welfare of the agricultural population. The Eastern European 435
peasants suffered from the bad organisation of the marketing of their produce. Two examples will suffice. In Zürich 63 per cent of the retail price of milk went to the milk producer (the rest was divided between wholesale trade, retail and transport), and in Copenhagen 65 per cent; even in the United States where milk is delivered over very great distances the farmer got 46.8 per cent. As against this in Warsaw he got only 30 per cent, and in Belgrade 37.5 per cent (Ibid. pp. 94-5). The Survey of the Royal Institute of International Affairs, *World Agriculture* (1932), tells of a typical Rumanian barley farm, from which barley to the value of Lei 1,006 was sold. But the middlemen's profits and transport charges before the grain left Rumania amounted to Lei 1,202 (p.106).

The high prices of essential industrial goods further militated against the prosperity of the peasants.

The expensiveness of industrial compared with agricultural products in the period before the second world war is revealed by the following index figures of the variation of agricultural and industrial prices in Hungary (July figures):

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	1913	1925	1929	1933	1936	1937
Agricultural ..	100	125	114	57	71	80
Industrial ..	100	138	133	107	117	125

(E. Hertz, *The Economic Problem of the Danubian States*, London, 1947, p. 194)

The same phenomenon was expressed some time before World War II by a Croatian peasant speaking thus to an English investigator:

'Life is getting more and more difficult. The prices we can obtain are so very low. Look, before 1914 I could get two pair of boots for a hundredweight of wheat. Today I must give two hundredweights of wheat in exchange for one pair of boots. For one kilogram of nails, I must give one kilogram of wool. When I sold a sheep before 1914, I could buy fifty metres of cottons in exchange. Now I cannot get fifty metres of cotton-stuff even for four sheep.

'Things are no better on the coast of Dalmatia either. Before 1914 they could get a suit of clothes for a hectolitre of wine. Today they must give three hectolitres of wine for a suit. Before 1914 they could get ten boxes of matches for a litre of wine, today they must give a litre of wine for every single box.' (P. Lamartine Yates and D. Warriner, *Food and Farming in Post-War Europe*, London, 1943, p. 28).

High taxation added to the difficulties of the mass of peasants in Eastern Europe.

Last but not least, there was the burden of debts, a result of the poverty of the peasants and a very important contribution to it.

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There are two main groups of countries today whose agricultural populations enjoy a relatively high standard of living—on the one hand the corn and meat producing countries with large, highly mechanized farms (U.S.A., Canada and Australia), and on the other hand, countries like Denmark, Switzerland, Holland and Belgium which go in for intensive production of dairy products, meat and vegetables. In both cases only 20-30 per cent of the whole population is engaged in agriculture, the well-organised and highly developed agriculture being the accompaniment of an advanced industrial organization. The highly mechanized, extensive producers are dependent on a huge, world-wide market, the intensive producers are dependent on the existence of an urban population

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with a high standard of living which is able to pay good prices 511
for the dairy products, meat, eggs, etc. (Thus the prosperity of 438
Holland and Denmark depends on the prosperity of the urban population in Britain). In Eastern Europe the growth of grass and root crops is made difficult by the dry climate, and so, intensive production of meat, as in Denmark, Holland, Eire, England, etc., is impossible. But this does not preclude the production of milk and the raising of pigs. In some areas, there are excellent natural conditions for specialised crops, e.g., in Bulgaria and Serbia for tobacco and grapes. Other areas—and these form the greater part of Eastern Europe—are more suitable for growing corn, which could be done on the American model with tractors and combine harvesters, instead of with draught animals whose feeding takes up a lot of the arable land. In many places the best results could be achieved by mixed farming, combining mechanized corn growing with intensive production of milk, pigs, vegetables and fruits. But however agriculture develops in this area, experience has shown that the decisive factor in raising the standard of living in the countryside is the accessibility of expanding urban markets. No raising of the rate of agricultural production, no improvement in the standard of living is possible without rapid industrialisation, which will enable the surplus agricultural population to be absorbed, will provide a market for agricultural products and will supply agricultural implements and machinery as well as industrial consumption goods for the peasants. In addition the peasants need 'cheap government' and a cheap marketing system.

Problems of Industrial Development

If Eastern Europe is to be industrialised, large amounts of 162
capital will be needed, which can be estimated by considering the number of people to be absorbed into industry. Obviously any such calculation can be only approximate and be put forward by way of illustration.

First there is the surplus population in agriculture. W. E. Moore calculated this by estimating what was a 'reasonable' European standard of agricultural population. The result was as follows :

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'STANDARD' AND 'SURPLUS' AGRICULTURAL POPULATIONS, EASTERN EUROPE, AROUND 1930

	Population Dependent on Agriculture 000's omitted	*'Standard' Population* 000's omitted	*'Surplus' Population* *Number* 000's omitted	*Per cent*
Czechoslovakia ..	4,812	5,038	—226	—4.7
Hungary	4,472	3,471	1,001	22.4
Poland	19,347	9,425	9,922	51.3
Rumania	13,069	6,348	6,721	51.4
Bulgaria	4,088	1,921	2,167	53.0
Yugoslavia ..	10,629	4,097	6,532	61.5
Albania	800	178	622	77.7
Total	57,217	30,478	26,739	46.7

(op. cit. pp. 63-4).

46.7 per cent, nearly half the agricultural population of Eastern Europe, is 'surplus' population.

Out of its active population, employable in industry and services, agriculture can dispense with about 12 million people.

This calculation of W. E. Moore is based on the assumption that if the average level of production of agricultural goods for Europe as a whole were to prevail in Eastern Europe, there would be a surplus population of 26.7 million, of whom 12 million would be employable. But if it is assumed that the level of output remains unaltered, then the resulting calculation of surplus employable population will be different. Such a calculation was made by PEP which estimates that in 1937 the agricultural overpopulation in the Eastern European countries was 14-15 million (i.e., about half W. E. Moore's figure) of which about 6 million were employable in industry and services.

161 The war led to a considerable change as regards the 'surplus' agricultural population in Poland. The population of Poland dropped from an estimated 35,090,000 in 1938 to an estimated 23,800,000 in 1948, as a result of the killing of 6 million inhabitants by the Nazis and changes in the eastern frontiers which transferred 6 million Ukrainians and White Russians to the U.S.S.R. About 32,100,000 people lived within the present frontiers before the war. It seems, therefore, that Poland has 'solved' the problem and may be excluded from the list of countries with an agricultural overpopulation. Even so the overpopulation in the countries of Eastern Europe as a whole remains a vast problem: according to W. E. Moore there is a

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'surplus' agricultural population of 17 million, according to PEP, 9 million. 161

Another factor is the natural increase of population. Eastern Europe is undergoing the so-called 'vital revolution'—more precisely its first half. During this stage (through which Western Europe passed during the nineteenth century) the death rate declines steeply (as a result of better hygienic conditions, etc.), while the birth rate does not fall. The natural increase of population is therefore very high. In the second half of the 'vital revolution' the birth rate falls quickly (the stage which Western Europe has reached). Today the annual increase of population is three times higher in the East than in the West of Europe. Only after the majority of the population has been urbanised (with the resulting increase in the use of birth control) will Eastern Europe get over the first half of the vital revolution. Meanwhile, according to the PEP study, 000 there is in Eastern Europe an annual increase of 610 thousand people of working age, employable in industry and services (free professions, etc.). They will have to be absorbed in the course of industrial development, as well as the present 6 or so million surplus agricultural propulation. The dimensions of the problem will be appreciated when it is realised that the estimated annual intake into mining and manufacturing industry in the years 1935-7 in these countries was only 270 thousand. If there were an annual intake of 700 thousand into mining and manufacturing industry and services, it would take two generations merely to absorb the surplus agricultural population, without lowering the density of the agricultural population to the level prevailing in Western Europe.

Even this modest industrialistion would require vast capital expenditure. K. Mandelbaum in his book *The Industrialisation of Backward Areas*, Oxford, 1945, estimated the capital requirement per newly employed worker in modern large scale industry in Eastern Europe at £450. In calculating the total cost of the industrialisation of East Europe, account must also be taken of investments needed in public utilities connected with industrialisation (houses, roads, electricity, gas and water supply, etc.), which would, at least, double the amount. On this basis the employment of 700 thousand additional people per year would require about £600-650 million (in pre-war

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000 prices) or 2,400-2,600 million dollars. This is a huge sum in relation to the national income of the East European countries, which Colin Clark estimates at:

Country	*National Income in International Units** (000,000)
Poland	3,428
Czechoslovakia	2,680
Hungary	1,205
Rumania	1,471
Yugoslavia	1,352
Bulgaria	524
Total	10,660

The 2,400-2,600 million dollars which would have to be invested in order to provide employment for 700,000 additional people per annum in industry and services makes up 22-24 per cent of the real national income.† Before the war, the average yearly investments in Eastern Europe equalled only 4 per cent of the (real) national income.

Obviously industrialisation on this scale without help from abroad would require an investment of far greater sums than the inhabitants of the region would be prepared to save voluntarily. The process of capital accumulation would appear to the majority of the people as a coercive driving force alien to their interests. Forced industrialisation on a large enough scale to absorb in two generations the yearly natural increase of the employable population and the agricultural overpopulation can be carried out only by forcing people to save. It will have a fundamental influence on all economic relations between people—between the workers and peasants on the one hand and the state on the other, between the rulers and the ruled—as well as on the economic and therefore political relations between different states, and between the satellites and the 'mother' country. But before considering all these problems, it is necessary to examine the influence of Russia on the accumulation of capital in Eastern Europe.

*'International Unit' is defined as the amount of goods and services that could be purchased for 1 dollar in the U.S. over the average of the decade 1925-34. (Colin Clark, *The Conditions of Economic Progress*, London, 1940, p. 40).

†K. Mandelbaum, who dealt specifically and in great detail with the industrialisation of Bulgaria, Hungary, Poland, Rumania, Yugoslavia and Greece, calculated that the absorption of 700,000 annually into industry and services would require 'rather more than 15 per cent of the combined national income'. (The substitution of Czechoslovakia for Greece would not fundamentally alter the calculation as the national income per head would be only 9 per cent higher on the basis of Colin Clark's figures.)

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CHAPTER IV

RUSSIA AND THE ECONOMY OF THE SATELLITE STATES

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Lack of Capital in U.S.S.R.

The extent to which Russia can assist in the industrialisation of Eastern Europe is determined primarily by the level of her national income compared with that of her satellites. On this point Colin Clark has given an unequivocal reply: 434

Country	*Period*	*Real Income per Head of Working Population in International Units*
Czechoslovakia	1925-27	455
Hungary	1925-34	359
Poland	"	352
Yugoslavia	"	330
Bulgaria	"	284
Rumania	1925-39	243
Average		344
U.S.S.R.	1937	379

(Ibid, pp. 40, 86).

The average real income per head of occupied population was lower in U.S.S.R. than in Czechoslovakia but higher than in the other Eastern European countries. The average figure in these countries was about 10 per cent lower than in U.S.S.R. For the sake of comparison it is important to remember that the real income per head of occupied population over the period 1925-34 (i.e., including the 1929-33 slump) was in Britain 1,069 and in U.S.A. 1,381, 182 per cent and 264 per cent higher respectively than in U.S.S.R. in 1937.

Another consideration must be taken into account. The accumulation of capital is dependent not only on an income level which makes it possible to save by abstaining from immediate consumption, but equally necessarily requires that there should be available to the saver (directly or indirectly) the capital goods which he needs. If peasants abstain from consuming half their products, they cannot invest the surplus

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434 in railway construction, unless there is somebody ready to supply, in exchange for their agricultural products, the rails, locomotives, etc. In this connection, the supply of capital goods, the ability of Russia to help the countries of Eastern Europe, is even more limited. Russia's income is not big enough for part of it to be devoted to investments in Eastern Europe. Her heavy industries producing capital goods—the main constituent of any new investment—are much too weak to spare much for her satellites. This would have been absolutely clear had we been able to compare the amount of capital goods produced per capita in the U.S.S.R. with that produced in the countries of the West, but the necessary statistics for such a comparison are not available, and we shall have to resort to a less exact means of comparison to throw light on the subject. We shall compare the production in different countries of steel, the chief material from which capital goods are made. In the U.S.S.R. in 1937 105 kgs. of steel per capita were produced, as against 397 in the U.S.A. (1929), 291 in Germany (1929), 279 in England (1929), and 188 in France (1929).

439 The *Manchester Guardian* of 19 May, 1949, dealt with the need of the satellite states for capital goods and Russia's inability to satisfy it:

'. . . Russia's satellites do genuinely want more trade across the Iron Curtain. They badly need both machinery from Western Europe itself and raw materials from the British Commonwealth. Trade with Russia has quite failed to take the part in their economy that the West, and Germany especially, used to do. The Russians cannot make enough capital goods both for their own needs and for the industrialisation of Eastern Europe; it is, of course, the satellites who go without.'

This explains why at least two of the satellites, Czechoslovakia and Poland, showed clearly that they wished to take part in the Marshall Plan. On 4th July, 1947, the Czechoslovak Government decided *unanimously* to accept the invitation to the Paris Conference convened to discuss the Marshall Plan. A few days later Gottwald and Masaryk left for Moscow and three days later Prague declared that the Government declined to take part in the Conference. Even when, under Moscow's orders, the satellites fell into line on this question, the

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incapacity of Russia to supply their needs made it more and more pressing for them to try to get equipment from Western Europe. This need expressed itself in the case of Yugoslavia in a revolt against the Moscow ukase (see Part III, *The Rebellious Satellite*) and in the case of the other satellites in an appeal to the West to supply the goods—an appeal that, because of its expediency, was not vetoed by Moscow. At the Conference of the Economic Commission for Europe of the United Nations, the Polish and Czech delegates asked for trade with Western Europe, by which they could obtain capital goods. The Bulgarian delegate stated that his country could not improve her economic position to any extent without increasing her imports, especially of machines, from the West. (United Nations Documents, E/ECE/SR4/1-25).

Russia, with the majority of her population engaged in agriculture, is faced with the same problem as her satellites (apart from the Czech lands of Czechoslovakia and the Soviet Zones of Germany and Austria)—large-scale industrialisation. The terrible destruction suffered by the U.S.S.R. in World War II, as well as the preparations for World War III, which require the same materials as industrialisation—steel, coal, machinery, etc.—render Russia even less able to help the countries of Eastern Europe.

Dismantling, Looting, Requisitioning

When the populations of Eastern Europe, mainly of the ex-enemy countries, first met the Russian Army and State officials, they did not see them bringing gifts, supplying machinery, locomotives, etc., but looting their country.

Stalin forgot that the Communist International had preached for years against the reparation articles of the Versailles Treaty, and had reiterated that the German workers bore the real burden of reparations, although they did not profit in any way from the war. In World War II the crimes of the Nazi Army were incomparably worse than those of the Kaiser Army in World War I, yet the German people drew no benefit at all from this. On the contrary, the first victim of the Hitler terror was the German people itself. The 800 thousand German Communists, Socialists, trade unionists, Catholics, etc. (not including the German Jews) who passed through prisons and

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648 concentration camps in the twelve years of Hitler's rule are
728 testimony to this. What magnificent heroism on the part of unarmed and helpless people to challenge the brutal state machine with its all-seeing eye and unlimited terror!

The Communist Parties knew all this very well. Immediately after June 1941 they emphasised that this time, because of Russia's part in the war, no new Versailles Treaty with reparations clauses would be imposed and that the German people would not be made to pay for the crimes of their rulers. The German proletariat, they said, was not more responsible for the war than the English or the French, and they repeated the same views on the question of reparations as the Communist International had after World War I. At that time the leaders of the French Communist Party explained why the French workers should oppose the exaction of reparations from Germany. Thus Gabriel Peri wrote in an article entitled 'On the Eve of the Reparations Conference': '. . . the workers of France and Germany have only *one* interest, viz., that of forming a revolutionary front against financial capital and the heavy industries in both countries. For the enormous sums at stake (the reparations—YG) will naturally be squeezed out of the working masses'. (*International Press Correspondence*, February 1st, 1929).

But all this changed with the hope of Russian victory. With Russia becoming the Power able to extract reparations, her opposition in principle to reparations vanished. Instead she decided to take reparations on a far larger scale than ever the French Government had dared after World War I.

648 Edward Charles in his article 'Reparations, 1919-31', in
728 *The Banker* of April, 1945, writes on the reparations that
434 Germany paid after the first world war: 'Reparations before the Dawes Plan brought in some 8 milliard gold marks. From September, 1924, to the end they yielded a further 10 milliards'. There is no reliable calculation of the national income of Germany between the end of the first world war and the introduction of the Dawes Plan. It is therefore impossible to calculate what proportion of the national income reparations made up. But for the years 1924-32 this figure is available. The total national income of Germany for these 9 years was calculated at 564.3 milliard marks, and in the same period

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Germany paid reparations to the extent of 9.8 milliard marks, or 1.7 per cent of the national income. In no year after the first world war did the reparations paid by Germany exceed 4 per cent of the national income. To calculate the burden of these reparations, other criteria besides the national income, such as budget revenue or exports, can be applied. The reparations Germany paid rose from 12.9 per cent of the budget revenue of Germany or 9.9 per cent of the value of its exports in 1924-5, to 25.7 per cent and 18.4 per cent respectively in 1928-9. 648 728 434

With regard to Germany's looting of Europe during the second world war, German official statistics admit that up to 1943 the Reich got from the occupied countries 'special incomes' amounting to 50 milliard marks. British official estimates give a figure of 12.8 milliard dollars for the same period. The two figures thus nearly tally. Nearly all the German robbery took place immediately after the occupation. If we, therefore, assume that the annual looting of the occupied countries by Germany after 1943 was the same as the annual average of 1939 to 1943, we shall certainly not underestimate it: on this basis the total German looting amounted to 20-25 milliard dollars.

A comparison between the reparations paid by Germany after the first world war—about 18 milliard marks or 3.6 milliard dollars—with the 'reparations' that Germany took from Europe in the second world war—20-25 milliard dollars—reveals the increasingly plunderous character of declining capitalism, as exemplified by the Hitler regime.

Russia's attitude to the question of reparations after the second world war was expressed clearly by Prof. Varga in an article published in *War and the Working Class*, 15th October, 1943. He concluded that Germany must pay reparations to the tune of 90 milliard marks or about 22 milliard dollars, and he stated that the Russian government asked in addition for ten million German workers to be sent to Russia for reconstruction work. 468 728

A claim for such large reparations, coupled with a demand for ten million workers, i.e., nearly a third of the total German working class, was incompatible with the existence of Germany as an important industrial country. At Yalta, consequently,

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648 Stalin had to demand that 80 per cent of German industry
728 should be dismantled within two years of the cease-fire. (James F. Byrnes, *Speaking Frankly*, London, 1948, pp. 26-7).

In view of the division of Germany between East and West, Russia did not want to exclude the possibility of the Communist Party's influencing the German people, and so she did not press her claim for ten million slave labourers or the dismantling of 80 per cent of German industry. Nevertheless the total sum lost by Germany directly and indirectly under the post-war arrangements in the East exceeded the total sum for which Varga asked.

It is difficult to get a full picture of this looting, as it was carried out in many guises, and those responsible for it were of course extremely anxious to conceal what was happening. But the following facts are incontestable.

First, millions of Germans were expelled from their homes and lost their property. The President of Poland, Bierut, estimated that Poland's gains in the West, i.e., from Germany, have an investment value of 9½ milliard dollars. The property of the Sudeten Germans of Czechoslovakia was estimated at 4 milliard dollars. If we assume that the rest of the Germans who inhabited the former territory of Poland, Hungary, Rumania, etc., were on the average as wealthy as the inhabitants of the portion of Eastern Germany that was annexed to Poland and the Sudetan region, their property must be evaluated at about 6 milliard dollars. Therefore the expulsion of the Germans alone brought in 'reparations' amounting to about 20 milliard dollars.

The Yalta Agreement decided in principle that Germany would pay reparations amounting to 20 milliard dollars, half of which would go to Russia.

Unlike what happened after the first world war, after this war no figures were published of the quantity of reparations taken or the form in which they were taken.

Reparations from Rumania

648 The armistice imposed on Rumania required payment to
728 Russia of reparations in the form of goods amounting in value
434 to 300 million dollars in 1938 world market prices, or 700-800 million dollars today. The reparations were made up as

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follows :—petroleum products, 50 per cent; ships, barges, locomotives and industrial equipment, 32 per cent; agricultural goods and timber 18 per cent. The second group did not make up even as much as 10 per cent of Rumanian exports before the war. 648 728 434

There are no estimates of the proportion of the national income which these reparations represent. The only clue is that given in June 1947 by the vice-Premier, Tatarescu, who gave the proportion as 50 per cent of the total production of Rumanian industry. It would be very unwise to accept this figure uncritically, as it was given on the eve of Tătărescu's conflict with the Communist Party which ended in his expulsion from the Government. Even if it were accurate, this figure would not be very useful as it relates only to industrial production, and not to the whole national product.

In addition to the reparations, Rumania had to give as restitution for goods looted from Russia 100,000 wagon loads of cereals, 260,000 head of cattle, 5,500 wagon loads of sugar, 250 tractors. (Of course, most of the loot taken from Russia by the Rumanians when they occupied it had already been destroyed and lost, and 'restitution' meant taking new products or those in good condition.) 648 728

The most important machinery of the Ploesti Oil Refineries was dismantled by the Russian military authorities, and the Rumanians also had to hand over a fifth of the machinery of the textile and metallurgical industries. It must also be remembered that the Russian army lived off the land. There are no statistics of the total cost thus incurred by the country, but it was certainly very great. According to the estimate made in February, 1946, by La Guardia, who was the head of U.N.R.R.A. at the time, the four occupation armies in Austria cost the country 200 million dollars a year. For three years the Russian army in Rumania was not smaller than all the four occupation armies in Austria put together at the beginning of 1946. In view of the complete silence of the Russian authorities about the amount of reparations they took from Rumania, it is impossible to ignore the estimate given by the U.S. delegate to the Paris Peace Conference, Willard L. Thorp, who said on September 23rd, 1946, that Rumania paid in reparations of all kinds 1,050 million dollars and that he estimated that

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648 950 million dollars remained to be paid. E. D. Tappe wrote:
728 'It has been estimated that in fact Roumania, from the armistice to 1 June 1948, paid the U.S.S.R. $1,785 million in goods, etc.; a figure which would represent 84 per cent of Roumania's national income for that period.' (R. R. Betts, editor, *Central and South East Europe, 1945-1948*, London, 1950, pp. 20-21).

Reparations from Hungary

Hungary had to pay reparations in goods amounting to 300 million dollars at 1938 prices, 200 million to U.S.S.R., 50 million to Czechoslovakia and 50 million to Yugoslavia. Industrial goods constituted 83 per cent and agricultural goods 17 per cent of this total. Yet in 1936-7, the proportion of agricultural goods in the total exports of Hungary was 62 per cent, while industrial goods did not make up even a third of all the exports. From this it is clear that Hungarian industry had to make a tremendous effort to supply the reparation goods, especially in view of the terrible devastation her industry suffered in the war, and her own great needs.

An U.N.R.R.A. estimate shows that in 1945, 94 per cent of
648 the working capacity of the metal and engineering industries in
728 Hungary was being used for reparation-goods for Russia. The
434 British parliamentary delegation which visited Hungary in the spring of 1946 estimated that reparation demands amounted to 18 per cent of the national income.

The Hungarian budget for the year 1946-7 set aside for reparations a sum eight times bigger than that allocated to reconstruction (and we must not forget that a large part of the Russian loot is not even included in the budget as it was taken from industries officially in Russian hands). On 23 July, 1946, in a note to the Soviet Government, the U.S. Ambassador in Moscow pointed out that half the current industrial production of Hungary was absorbed in meeting Russia's demands. In some industries, including coal, iron and machine production the proportion was 80-90 per cent. At the Peace Conference in Paris in October, 1946, the U.S. representatives claimed that in the year since the armistice about 35 per cent of the national income of Hungary was spent on the costs of Soviet reparations, occupation and requisitions. The British parliamentary delega-

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tion mentioned above estimated the occupation costs at 12 per cent of the national income of Hungary, making with reparations a total of 30 per cent. Now that the Russian Army has been very much reduced and production has passed the pre-war level, the importance of reparations, acquisitions, etc., in the national income has very much declined. According to T. Mende, who was not unsympathetic to the post-war regime in Hungary, they amounted to 7-11 per cent of the national income (*Fortnightly Review*, July, 1948). When Ernö Gerö, the Minister of Finance, introduced the budget for 1949 in the Hungarian parliament on December 15th, 1948, he said that in 1948, 25.4 per cent of the total expenditure went to pay the reparations, while in 1949, 9.8 per cent of the budget would be allocated for this purpose. This reduction is due largely to the fact that Russia cancelled 50 per cent of the remainder of the reparations from July, 1948. 648 728 434

The value of dismantled machinery, locomotives, wagons, etc., taken by the Russian army in Hungary was estimated at 124 million dollars, and the requisitions of the Russian army that lived on the country were very great. According to the American note of 23rd July, 1946, the Soviet forces had up to June, 1945, taken out of Hungary four million tons of wheat, rye, barley, maize and oats (the total pre-war annual production of these grains was a little over 7 million tons). Of the foodstuffs available for the urban population in the second half of 1945 the Soviet army had appropriated nearly all the meat, one-sixth of the wheat and rye, one-quarter of the legumes, nearly three-quarters of the lard, a tenth of the vegetable oils and a fifth of the milk and dairy products. The note added that extensive requisitioning of food was going on as late as April, 1946. And we must not forget that at the same time the food shortage in Hungary was so serious that not more than 850 calories a day per person were provided, which was even fewer than in Germany and Austria. The death rate, especially among babies, reached alarming proportions. 648 728 [262]

Even countries which were not allies of Germany during the war did not escape the Russian appetite for loot. 60 big industrial enterprises in the Sudeten region and a number of enterprises in other parts of Czechoslovakia were dismantled by the Russian army. In the part of Germany annexed to

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648 Poland the Russian army dismantled, according to the estimates
728 of the Communist Minister of Industry, Hilary Minc, 25-30 per cent of all the industrial equipment of the area. (Speech delivered in Warsaw on 20th October, 1945). In Old Poland too, the Russian army dismantled machinery, notably in the Lodz and Bialystok textile works.*

Trade Between Russia and her Satellites

439 An important feature of the foreign trade policy of Russia and her satellites is the tendency towards self-sufficiency or autarchy. The following table illustrates this as far as Russia herself is concerned:

U.S.S.R. FOREIGN TRADE (IN MILLION PRE-1914 GOLD RUBLES)

Year	*Export*	*Import*
1913†	1520.1	1375.0
1924/5..	577.8	723.4
1927/8..	791.6	945.5
1932	574.9	704.0
1937	377.2	294.2
1938	287.8	300.4

The tendency towards economic isolation from the West on the part of the satellites is shown by the following table dealing with the foreign trade of Czechoslovakia, Hungary, Poland, Rumania, Yugoslavia and Bulgaria: (see top of page 63).

As Yugoslavia did not publish figures of foreign trade for the years 1947 and 1948 it was not possible to take them into consideration in drawing up this table. Otherwise the tendency of these countries to trade mainly among themselves and with Russia and to restrict trade relations with countries independent of Russia would have been even more pronounced.

It would of course be one-sided to conclude that this tendency is entirely the result of the choice of these countries them-

000 *Incidentally, even backward China was not left untouched by the greed of the Russian bureaucracy. In June, 1946, Edwin Pauley, U.S. Reparations Commissioner, visited Manchuria and inspected 80 per cent of the Japanese war industry. In his report he stated that the Russian removal of equipment was on such a scale as to retard Manchuria's development by a generation and reduce the country to an agricultural economy. The principal items of equipment removed were machine tools and electrical equipment, although in some cases whole plants were completely stripped. Steel production was reduced by more than 50 per cent. Pauley estimated that altogether the machinery dismantled by the Russians was worth 850 million dollars. (*The World Today*, August, 1946). That this was a very heavy burden for Manchuria is clear from the fact that in 1932-1943 the total Japanese investments in Manchuria were evaluated at 5,393 million yen (about 1,200 million dollars).

†In the pre-1914 boundaries.

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EAST EUROPEAN COUNTRIES' FOREIGN TRADE
(MILLIONS OF DOLLARS IN 1938 PRICES)

	Import			Export		
	1938	1947	1948	1938	1947	1948
Trade among themselves and with U.S.S.R. ..	154	184*	355*	161	162*	314*
Trade with other countries ..	750	458†	411†	920	276†	384†
Total	904	642	766	1,081	438	698
And in percentages:						
Trade among themselves and with U.S.S.R. ..	17.0	28.6	46.3	14.9	37.0	45.0
Trade with other countries ..	83.0	71.4	53.7	85.1	63.0	55.0
Total	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0

(Calculated from the table on pp. 66-7 of United Nations *Economic Survey of Europe in 1948*, Geneva, 1949).

selves. To a very considerable extent it was imposed on them by impediments to East-West trade, for which the U.S.A. is responsible. She herself and all the countries who get Marshall Aid enforced an embargo on the export to Eastern Europe of strategic goods, as defined by the secret list of the State Department which covers, apparently, nearly all capital equipment.‡ This has been denounced on many occasions by the governments of Eastern Europe. (See, for instance, the speeches of the representatives of the Russian bloc of countries in the United Nations Economic Commission for Europe).

But equally certainly the 'Iron Curtain' created by the United States is not the only, or even the chief, cause of the tendency of members of the Russian bloc to trade mainly among themselves. This becomes clear from an examination of the trend of Russian foreign trade since 1929, when it was not faced by conditions of economic blockade. During the world depression it was very easy for any country willing to *buy* to come to bilateral trade agreements with other countries. This is illustrated by Germany's trade with the countries of Eastern

*excluding Yugoslavia.

†excluding trade between Germany and Yugoslavia.

‡According to Poland's Foreign Minister, Modzelewski, this term is interpreted to include 'cotton linters, synthetic resin, condenser tubes, radio valves, measuring apparatus, gramophone recording discs, needles for the textile industry, ball bearings, etc.'. (Speech in the second committee of the United Nations General Assembly, 2nd November, 1948).

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439 Europe since 1936. Yet Russia took advantage of this to only a small extent. (See table above).*

In 1938, U.S.S.R. and the countries of Eastern Europe bought 17 per cent of their imports from each other (in this case including Yugoslavia), in 1948 they bought 46.3 per cent (in this case excluding Yugoslavia), while the corresponding percentages for exports were 14.9 per cent and 45 per cent.

An analysis of the item 'Trade among themselves and with U.S.S.R.' reveals a very illuminating fact. The trade between the Eastern European countries themselves is not much larger today than it was before the war, but their trade with U.S.S.R. has increased tremendously:

	Imports (millions of dollars in 1938 prices)			Exports (millions of dollars in 1938 prices)		
	1938	*1947*	*1948*	*1938*	*1947*	*1948*
Trade among Eastern European countries themselves ..	147	87	186	147	87	186
Trade between Eastern European countries and U.S.S.R.	7	97*	169*	14	75*	128*

*excluding Yugoslavia.

While the foreign trade of the countries of Eastern Europe with each other was 27 per cent higher in 1948 than in 1938, their imports from U.S.S.R. rose by 2,314 per cent, and their exports to U.S.S.R. by 814 per cent. It must be remembered that 'reparations' to Russia are not included in these figures and that while Yugoslavia's trade with the other countries of Eastern Europe is included, her trade with U.S.S.R. in 1948 is not. Otherwise the rise would have been even bigger.

The long-term trade agreements between U.S.S.R. and the Eastern European countries stipulated a continuation of the expansion of their mutual trade in 1949 over 1948. Thus the trade of the U.S.S.R. with Poland was due to rise by some 35 per cent, with Czechoslovakia by more than 45 per cent, while trade with Rumania was to be more than doubled and that with Hungary to be trebled. U.S.S.R. trade with Yugo-

*This shows how demagogic is the slogan of the Communist Party in Britain today—'Trade with U.S.S.R. and the People's Democracies!'—which assumes that these countries, in contradistinction to the U.S.A., indulge in trade with no political strings attached, that they are ready to trade on a large scale with Britain or any other country that is not under the same political system. Yet U.S.S.R. and her satellites broke nearly all trade relations with Yugoslavia after the Stalin-Tito clash. See pp. 238-9.

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slavia on the other hand was to be curtailed in 1949 to a bare eighth of the 1948 value.

The economic needs of these countries will tend to lead in time to increasing integration of their economies and increasing trade among themselves (already today there is a considerable increase in the trade of Czechoslovakia with Poland and a number of other satellites). But so long as their policitical systems remain unchanged, trade between the satellites will remain subordinated to the trade of each of them with Russia. The pattern of the trade is moulded within the framework of an increasingly autarchic Empire. The establishment of the Council for Mutual Economic Aid (or 'Comecon') in January, 1949, to co-ordinate the trade of the 'People's Democracies' with each other and the U.S.S.R. came to fortify Russian *Grossraumwirtschaft*.

Let us now pass from the quantities of goods exchanged to their quality. The commodity composition of the present trade between Russia and her satellites is very different from that between an industrial imperialist power and her agrarian colonies. Thus while Britain is a great importer of raw materials and foodstuffs from her colonies and supplies them with manufactured goods, and while a similar relationship existed between Germany and the countries of Eastern Europe before the second world war, Russia both exports and imports primary products and manufactured goods to and from her satellites. She supplies them with tractors and industrial machinery as well as raw materials such as cotton, iron ore, manganese, chemicals and grain. She also imports from them machinery (Czechoslovakia, Hungary) and manufactured consumer goods. Russia supplies raw materials and gets a portion of the manufactured goods produced from the raw materials, e.g., she gives cotton and gets cotton goods, gives leather (especially to Czechoslovakia) and gets shoes, etc. This composition of Russia's trade with her satellites shows that she is faced with a problem similar to theirs—the industrialisation of the country.*

The prices Russia pays for the commodities she buys from her satellites and the prices she takes for what she sells to them

*In the future, it seems, it will be impossible to find out how the foreign trade of the Russian satellites is divided among different countries, as instead of the foreign trade being evaluated in dollars it will be evaluated in rubles (as is already being done in Poland).

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439 are, for some reason, kept secret. While it is easy to find out, for example, how many yards of cotton goods Britain sold in 1948 to various countries, and at what prices, information about the quantity of cotton goods supplied to Russia by Hungary and their price is as jealously guarded as a military secret. Tito, after the rift with the Cominform, could say that there was 'capitalist trade among socialist countries'. No official of the Cominform has denied that capitalist principles of trade prevail among the 'People's Democracies' and between them and Russia, far less attempted to show what other principles prevail. One of the essential characteristics of capitalist trade is that when one side is in a monopolistic position it can generally buy more cheaply and sell more dearly than the other. The tendency towards autarchy of Russia and her satellites and the political power of the Kremlin over the governments of the satellites—which are, of course, connected phenomena—put each of the satellites into a position of utter dependence *on* the monopolist trader. This explains both the scarcity of information on prices and the deleterious character for Russia of the information which did leak out and which would otherwise have been inexplicable.

The Polish-Soviet agreement dated August 16th, 1945, stipulated that from 1946 onwards, Poland was to deliver to U.S.S.R. at a special price the following quantities of coal: 1946, 8 million tons; from 1947 to 1950, 13 million tons each year; and subsequently 12 million tons annually as long as the occupation of Germany continued. This coal, however cheap it was, was not to be paid for by Russian products but by reparations taken from Germany by Russia and transferred to Poland. According to Prof. W. J. Rose, the price agreed on was said to be 2 dollars per ton (*Poland Old and New*, London, 1948, p. 290). Stanislaw Mikolajczyk, who was Vice-Premier of Poland at the time, reports that the agreement was for an even lower price, 1.25 dollars a ton (*The Pattern of Soviet Domination*, London, 1948, pp. 158-9). As far as is known, Poland did not get anything on this account. Russia's excuse could be very simple: the Western Powers did not carry out their obligations to supply Russia with reparations from Western Germany. Anyhow, 12-13 million tons of coal at 2 or 1.25 dollars a ton, was extremely cheap. At the time of the

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signing of the Polish-Soviet agreement Denmark and Sweden were offering Poland 12 dollars a ton, subsequently to be raised to 16 dollars. The robbery of Poland through this transaction alone amounted to over 100 million dollars a year*. In 1948, Russia cut her demands for Polish coal to 7 million tons a year; even so this is a heavy commitment for Poland.

Another example of these sharp trade practices is given by Felix Belair in the *New York Herald Tribune* (quoted by E. Germain, 'L'Europe orientale depuis deux ans', *Quatrième Internationale*, Paris, March-April, 1949). He quotes the case of the agreement of U.S.S.R. with Czechoslovakia by which shoes manufactured from leather supplied by U.S.S.R. to the former Bata Plants were sold to Russia at a price fixed at 170 Crowns although the actual cost price per pair was 300 Crowns. At the same time, when Czechoslovakia was forced by the severe drought of 1947-8 to buy 600 thousand tons of grain from Russia, she was made to pay more than 4 dollars a bushel, while the United States sold a bushel of grain for 2.5 dollars. The price charged was thus over 50 per cent higher than that prevailing in the world market. Another example is that of Bulgarian tobacco. Russia bought four-fifths of Bulgaria's 1948 tobacco crop so cheaply that she could afford to sell it to Italy for dollars at a price which undercut by 35 per cent the Bulgarians who were also trying to secure dollars with the remainder of their tobacco. "Borba" of 31 March, 1949, remainder of their tobacco. 'Borba' of 31 March, 1949, printed the following fact: while it cost Yugoslavia 500,000 dinars to produce one ton of molybdenum—the essential ingredient of steel—Russia before the Stalin-Tito rift, paid only 45,000 dinars a ton.

The 'Advantage' of being a Colony of an Industrially Backward Imperialist Power

The industrial backwardness of the imperialist country can have one good result for the colonies which is not usually offered by a highly industrialized imperialist country. *Because* of her backwardness the imperialist country looks upon the colonies as an *additional source of industrial strength*, supporting

*To get some idea of this amount, it is worth mentioning that British capitalists never got such a large annual profit out of their investments in India.

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her in world competition. She is therefore more kindly disposed towards industrial development in her colonies than a highly industrialized imperialist country.

The best example of this is Japan's policy in Manchuria. F. Sternberg in his book *The Coming Crisis*, London, 1947, writes: 'When Great Britian and France founded their empires they were both leading industrial countries. Their empires were never intended to strengthen their own industrial position. Japan was in a very different situation. Her aim was to achieve a rate of development which would reduce the industrial gap between her and the other capitalist countries, and to become at least as strong and if possible still stronger than they were'. (p.73).

The result was an unparalleled export of Japanese capital to Manchuria :

JAPANESE INVESTMENTS IN MANCHURIA
(MILLION YEN)

1932	97.2
1933	151.2
1934	271.7
1935	378.6
1936	263.0
1937	348.3
1938	439.5
1939	1,103.7
1940-43	2,340.0

(For 1932-9, G. C. Allen, M. S. Gordon, E. F. Penrose, E. B. Schumpeter, *The Industrialisation of Japan and Manchukuo, 1930-1940*, New York, 1940, p. 399; for 1940-43, A. J. Grajdanzev, 'Manchuria: An Industrial Survey,' *Pacific Affairs*, December, 1945).

The Manchurian Five-Year Plan (1937-41) provided for an investment of 2,800 million yen, which was subsequently raised to 4,800 million in the revised plan, and then, in September, 1938, to 6,000 million yen. This could not be achieved because of Japan's lack of equipment, and her scarcity of labour in general and of skilled labour in particular. Investments reached only about 3,000 million yen in the period laid down by the Plan. But even this expressed a very big rise in production, as the following table shows:

OUTPUT OF SOME PRODUCTS OF MANCHURIA

Year	*Coal* (*million tons*)	*Iron Ore* (*million tons*)	*Pig-iron* (*thousand tons*)	*Electricity* (*million kwh.*)
1932	7.1	0.7	368.2	593
1936	13.6	1.3	633.4	1,351
1940	21.0	—	1,061.2	3,250
1944	30.0	5.3 (1943)	1,174.9	

(K. L. Mitchell *Industrialization of the Western Pacific*, New York, 1942, pp. 75-78; Allan Rodgers, 'The Manchurian Iron and Steel Industry and its Resource Base', *Geographical Review*, New York, January, 1948; A. J. Grajdanzev, op. cit.)

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The steel industry, established in 1935, was after a few years producing more than a million tons per annum. Machinery factories were established, which supplied the majority of equipment for Manchurian industry; in 1939 a car industry was established which planned to employ 100,000 workers; a large aeroplane factory was begun; the railways of Manchuria increased from 5,570 kilometers in 1932 to 15,000 kms. in 1943—more than the whole railway system of China proper.

In view of this development, it is clear why one writer could say: 'Manchuria . . . was to be developed as an extension of the homeland'. (Allan Rodgers, *op. cit.*) Sternberg remarked:

'The given historical conditions in which Japanese imperialism developed caused it to encourage and force the development of industrialisation in its empire, whilst different historical conditions caused the European imperialists to prevent or retard industrial development in their empires.' (op. cit. p. 74).

'In the ten years between Japan's invasion of Manchuria and her entry into the Second World War (1931-41) she so accelerated the industrialisation of Manchuria that although Manchuria's population is only about 10 per cent of British India's, as much, if not more, industry was created there in one decade as was created in India in a century of imperialist rule.' (Ibid. p. 73).

The industrialisation of Manchuria was not left to the blind, unorganised activity of the different Japanese companies, but was carried out by mixed companies of the state and the trusts according to a plan. Such organisation was necessary for rapid industrialisation. (At the same time, while Japanese imperialism encouraged the industrial development—mainly of heavy industries—in Manchuria, it hampered and even ruined the industries of other regions of China: thus in Shanghai, after the textile industries were bombed, the machinery that remained intact was looted and taken to Japan proper. Thus the policy of industrialisation was not all-sided, but distorted and limited to the interests of Japanese capitalism).

Two examples nearer home may be cited—the great development and importance of Ukrainian industry and that of Polish light industry in backward Tsarist Russia; the part of Poland which fell into the hands of industrially advanced Prussia remained very backward, lagging far behind Russian Poland.

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000 Russia's need 'to reduce the industrial gap between her and the other countries' will compel her to look upon the satellites as 'an extension of the homeland', to try to develop them industrially, even if because of her poverty, bureaucratic mismanagement, and various other factors, she can do so only in a very unsatisfactory way. All the time she will of course reserve for herself the first fruits of their industrial development.

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CHAPTER V

THE ECONOMIC PLANS OF THE SATELLITES

ALL THE satellite countries have introduced economic Plans. These plans are of two kinds: the short-term plans, which ran from 1947 to 1948-9, whose aim was recovery, and the long-term plans, which began in 1949 or 1950, whose aim is to raise production considerably above the pre-war level. Yugoslavia alone did not undertake the two kinds of plans but started with a Five Year Plan (1947-51), while Rumania has not yet gone beyond the scope of one-year plans (she intends to introduce a Five Year Plan in 1951). Let us examine the main features of the plans.

The long-term plans have very ambitious targets of output. They fix an annual increase in the gross national product of 8 per cent in Czechoslovakia, 10 per cent in Hungary and Poland, 12 per cent in Bulgaria and 14 per cent in Yugoslavia. As regards the annual increase in manufactured products, it is 9 per cent in Czechoslovakia, 11 per cent in Poland, 13 per cent in Hungary, 17 per cent in Bulgaria and 37 per cent in Yugoslavia.

To arrive at a correct conception of what these percentages mean, it is necessary to know on what basis these percentual calculations have been made. For instance, the industrial production in the U.S. and British Zones of Germany rose between December, 1946, and December, 1948, by 137 per cent, or on a yearly average by 68.5 per cent, but this in itself does not signify any really spectacular achievement for Germany, since in December, 1946, the level of production was exceptionally low, and even after the increase of 137 per cent, it did not reach the pre-war level. It is difficult to discover what is the exact starting point from which the plans of the Eastern European countries set out, as there is very little

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information available on the subject. It is known that the agricultural output in the basic year was, in percentage of pre-war output, in Bulgaria, 70 per cent; in Czechoslovakia, 80 per cent; in Hungary, 85 per cent; in Poland, 70 per cent; in Yugoslavia, 69 per cent. As regards the industrial output in the basic year, it was, in comparison with the pre-war level, in Czechoslovakia, 102 per cent; in Poland, 133 per cent; in Bulgaria, 170 per cent. As far as Poland is concerned, it must be borne in mind that the addition of the 'Regained Territories' doubles her industrial capacity. It is not known how much weight is given in the plans to industrial as compared with agricultural output in the total national output. The rise of the total national production would have been considerably less proportionately if any year *before* and not *after* the war had been chosen as the basic year, since agricultural output in the 'basic year' was in each country below the pre-war level of output and industrial output was above while only a small minority of the population was engaged in industry.

In addition, it is obvious that in general any calculation in percentages of the rise of output that does not take into consideration the absolute magnitude of the basis will paint a rosier picture the more backward the country is. Thus if Yugoslavia's Five Year Plan envisages an increase in the output of crude steel of 223 per cent in 1951 above the level of 1939, it might leave the impression that the achievements of Yugoslavia's steel industry will be four times greater than that of the United States between 1937 and 1948, when she increased her output by 56 per cent. But if the achievement of the industries of the two countries is described in absolute magnitudes, a totally different impression is given. The production of Yugoslavia's steel industry will rise, if the Plan is fulfilled, from 240 thousand tons to 760 thousand tons, i.e., by a little more than half a million tons; while that of the U.S.A. rose from 51.4 million tons to 80.3 million, i.e., by 28.9 million tons. André Philip, French delegate to the Economic Commission for Europe, illustrated this point by saying that his grandson had recently cut a second tooth, thus increasing his dental production by 100 per cent—but he still had less teeth than most people.

There is another aspect to the question. Figures of the rise in output, when the amount of investment or disinvestment is

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not taken into account, can be misleading. If the owner of a factory does not renew its machinery, buildings, and so forth, but instead builds a new factory which is equal in value to the depreciation of the old, then the *immediate* result is that two factories are producing instead of one, and the output rises, although the amount of his capital remains unchanged, and after the total depreciation of his old factory, output will decline to the level of only one factory. The same principle holds good for the countries of Eastern Europe, where the rise in output over the past few years has not been accompanied by a parallel increase in the investment of capital. In some cases, it has even been accompanied by disinvestment, as the following table, dealing with agriculture, shows:

	Level of Agricultural Production			Estimated Net Investment in Fixed Capital in Agriculture and Fisheries
	Index numbers. 1934-8 = 100			(in million dollars, 1938 prices)
	1946/7	1947/8	1948/9	1947	1948
Bulgaria ..	67	71	—	−13	−11
Czechoslovakia	80	62	80	−21	−19
Hungary ..	57	67	85	−11	−5
Poland ..	46	59	70	−5	11

(U.N. *Economic Survey of Europe in 1948*, Geneva, 1949, pp. 17, 51)

(In order not to get a false picture one should bear in mind that the negative balance of investments in agriculture in fixed capital may have been offset by an increase in livestock, which is not included in the figures).

Another example of the same phenomenon is the textile and clothing industry of Poland. This showed a big rise in output in 1947, and at the same time a net disinvestment of 10 million dollars in 1938 prices (Ibid. p. 53).

Another factor must be taken into account. In the backward conditions of Eastern Europe, even a small addition to the net investment may bring about a disproportionately large addition to the output, the more so—in the short run—if certain whole new industries are built while other plants or branches of industry are starved of capital.

Even with these reservations, the investment plans of the countries of Eastern Europe should not be underestimated, though the statistics are really related to gross new investments (without depreciation being taken into account). In absolute figures the targets were:

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CAPITAL EXPENDITURE
(MILLION DOLLARS 1948 PRICES)

Country	*Period*	*Total*	*Yearly*
Poland	1947-9	1,950	650
	1950-5	—	—
Czechoslovakia	1947-8	1,340	670
	1949-53	5,800	1,160
Hungary ..	1947-9	570	190
	1950-4	2,200	440
Rumania ..	1949	450	450
Yugoslavia ..	1947-51	2,900	580
Bulgaria	1947-8	221	111
	1949-53	850	170

(Ibid. p. 203)

Thus every year a gross investment is planned of about 4 thousand million dollars in 1948 prices. This is a tremendous figure, making up about 20-25 per cent of the national incomes of these countries. Such a large investment, of course, places a heavy burden on the shoulders of the population.

How do these investment targets compare with actual investments in other countries? The gross annual investment, according to the Plans, will be about 45 dollars (at 1948 prices) per head of population. As against this in 1948 the *net* investment *at 1938 prices* (which are about half of 1948 prices) in the countries of Western Europe was: Norway 55 dollars, Sweden 42, United Kingdom 36, Denmark 32, Netherlands 27, France 16, Belgium (1947) 16, Italy 10. (Ibid. p. 48). Thus compared with investments in Western Europe the investments planned in Eastern Europe are not very spectacular.* To realise them will require great sacrifices on the part of the populations and yet are far too small to help, in the foreseeable future, to bridge the gap between the levels of development of Western and Eastern Europe.

The magnitude of the investments planned fall short of these countries' needs of rapid industrialisation. This is clearly revealed by considering the question of how many people will be absorbed in industry in proportion with the agricultural over-population and the natural increase of population. The Polish Plan fixes a total increase of 300,000 in the number of people

*This was reflected most clearly in a comparison of the actual net investments in fixed capital per head of population in 1949 (dollars in 1938 prices): Norway 59, U.K. 41, Sweden 36, Denmark 32, Netherlands 31, France 24; the corresponding figures for the countries of Eastern Europe were: Yugoslavia 12, Hungary 12, Poland 9, Czechoslovakia 8. (United Nations, *Economic Survey of Europe in 1949*, Geneva, 1950, p. 39).

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in manufacturing industry, the Czechoslovak Plan an increase of 250,000, the Bulgarian Plan an increase of 90,000 and the Hungarian Plan an increase of 300,000 (including industries other than manufacturing). The U.N. Survey that gives these facts, remarks: 'These figures, if related to present employment in manufacturing, indicate a substantial increase. If, however, the figures are related to the total populations of the countries, they are less striking. In the four countries mentioned, additional employment in industry over the plan period accounts for only 1 to 2 per cent of the total population, which in itself is expected to rise by some 5 per cent in the same period' (p. 206).

On many points the plans are silent. Unlike Russia's first Five Year Plan or the plans of the Organisation for European Economic Co-operation for Western Europe, the Plans of the 'People's Democracies' contain no information about foreign trade either among themselves or between each of them and Russia, or the West. They also blur over the question of how the total national income will be divided between consumption and accumulation (investment), but contain only some scattered information about the planned consumption of some particular goods. This silence speaks volumes. The non-publication of information about foreign trade is intended to cover up the exploitation of these countries by Russia; the non-publication of information about the division of the national income between consumption and accumulation is intended to cover up the exploitation of the masses under the banner of industrialisation.

This last point about the division of the national income between consumption and accumulation is of vital importance when we attempt to discover the factors determining the living conditions of the masses. Burdened with a terrible backwardness, an autocratic bureaucracy and the yoke of Russian imperialism, industrialisation will inevitably be carried out in such a way that compulsory savings will far surpass what the people themselves would be ready to save of their own free will. In such circumstances, consumption must be subordinated to accumulation, as the experience of Eastern Europe over the past few years (and of twenty years' planning in Russia) has clearly shown. The following table illustrates the 'capital

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434 starvation' of the industries producing consumption goods, while the new capital investment is directed into the capital goods industries:

ESTIMATED NET INVESTMENT IN FIXED CAPITAL IN INDUSTRY IN 1947
(MILLIONS OF DOLLARS IN 1938 PRICES)

	Hungary		Poland	
Food processing, etc. ..	−1.7	−1.5	−1.4	−11.7
Textiles and clothing ..	0.5		−10.0	
Leather and rubber ..	0.1		0.2	
Paper and printing	−0.4		−0.5	
Timber and timber products	−0.1		0.2	
Building materials, etc. ..	−0.7		−1.0	
Metals and engineering ..	5.3	5.8	7.4	13.6
Chemicals	0.5		6.2	
Total manufacturing ..	3.5		1.1	

(Ibid. p. 53)

This is a foretaste of the future.*

185 As regards agriculture the Plans for all the countries, except
433 Poland, provide that the output shall exceed the pre-war level, by about a sixth in Czechoslovakia and Hungary, and a third to a half in Yugoslavia and Bulgaria. In Poland it may not exceed its pre-war level in present territory. (Ibid. p. 206).

*In U.S.S.R. the relatively great lag in industries producing means of consumption behind those producing means of production is shown by the following official data of the division of the gross output of industry:

DIVISION OF GROSS OUTPUT OF INDUSTRY INTO MEANS OF PRODUCTION AND MEANS OF CONSUMPTION (IN PERCENTAGES)

	1913	1928	1932	1937	1940	1942 (Planned)
Means of production	33.3	32.8	53.3	57.8	61.0	62.2
Means of consumption	66.7	67.2	46.7	42.2	39.0	37.8

It is very difficult to check the *absolute* change in the production of different means of consumption. In Russian statistics a number of simple tricks are used to describe the situation in more glowing terms than is true. The output of a number of consumption industries is given only in monetary terms; the production of the small factories which, till 1928, made an important contribution to the production of means of consumption, is not included.

Official statistics can therefore show a tremendous rise in the output of shoes, which, however, cannot be squared with the facts. The number of animals slaughtered annually after the big 'collectivisation' drive never reached the number slaughtered previously, as it was not until 1938 that the total number of livestock reached the 1929 figure (in 1929 cattle numbered 68.1 million, in 1938. 63.2; sheep and goats numbered 147.2 and 102.1 million respectively). At the same time the surplus of imported hides, skins and leather over exported was 54.3 thousand tons in 1928 as against only 15.6 thousand tons in 1938. Only Stalinist statisticians can produce the 'miracle' of tripling the number of leather shoes out of a decreasing quantity of leather. The Russian government, relying on the 'short memory' of the people, or more correctly on the oppressive machinery which ensures that past memories remain unuttered, adds insult to injury. While promising a tremendous rise in the production of means of con-

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A technical revolution in agriculture is also planned for the coming few years (except in Yugoslavia). This is shown by the tremendous rise in the number of tractors:

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ACTUAL AND PLANNED NUMBER OF TRACTORS IN RELATION TO ARABLE LAND

Country	*Year*	*Number (thousands)*	*Arable land per Tractor (hectares)*
Poland	1946	5.5	3,000
	1955	76.5	220
Czechoslovakia	1946	11.8	460
	1953	45.0	120
Hungary	1947	11.9	490
	1954	21.0†	280
Rumania	1948	11.0	850
	1949	12.5	740
Bulgaria	1946	4.6	920
	1953	10.0	430
Yugoslavia	1946	4.0	1,800
	1951	4.5	1,710
Total	1946	44.9	1,100
	Last year of plan	169.5	290

(Ibid. p. 208). †state tractors only.

Agriculture will be reorganised on the new technical basis, state and co-operative farms replacing the small peasant farms.

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sumption with every Five-Year Plan, it fixes the actual target of the Plan at a volume of production which does not exceed the target of former Plans. This is shown clearly by the following table:

TARGETS OF PRODUCTION FOR THE END OF THE FIVE-YEAR PLANS

	First 1932-3	*Second 1937*	*Third 1942*	*Fourth 1950*
Some Means of Consumption				
Cotton goods (milliard metres) ..	4.7	5.1	4.9	4.7
Woollen goods (million „) ..	270	220	177	159
Linen (million metres)	500	600	385	—
Vegetable oil (thousand tons) ..	1,100	750	850	880
Sugar (million tons)	2.6	2.5	3.5	2.4
Some Means of Production				
Electric Current (million kwh.) ..	22	38	75	82
Coal (million tons)	75	152.5	243	250
Pig iron (million tons)	10	16.0	22	19.5
Steel (million tons)	10.4	17	28	25.4
Oil and gas (million tons) ..	21.7	46.8	54	35.4

(Actually in the territory of the U.S.S.R., in 1913, 2,854 million metres of cotton goods and 95-110 million metres of woollen goods were produced; in 1937 the corresponding figures were 3,181 and 98).

Therefore, when the Russian government boasts that 'in 1950 we will reach the level of 4.7 thousand milliard metres of cotton goods' it does not prevent them from having made the same promise twenty years ago, when the population of U.S.S.R. was about fifty millions less than now.

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CHAPTER VI

SOCIO-ECONOMIC RELATIONS IN THE SATELLITES

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State Ownership and Public Ownership

471 Article 6 of the Soviet Constitution states: 'The land, its deposits, waters, forests, mills, factories, mines, railways, water and air transport, means of communication, large state-organized farm enterprises (state farms, machine-tractor stations, etc.) and also the basic housing facilities in cities and industrial localities are state property, that is, the wealth of the whole people'.

The Constitutions of the People's Democracies all contain similar clauses with one difference, that the land is not, or rather, *not yet* included in the state-owned properties.

Part of the article quoted is self-evident—that the land, factories, railways, etc. are state-owned. Part of the clause, however, is not self-evident although it is proclaimed as if it were—'state property, that is, the wealth of the whole people'. The words 'that is' signify that state ownership can be nothing other than people's ownership. But this does not stand the test of logic or of history. From the standpoint of logic, the middle term is missing. The factories, railways, etc., are state owned; the people (or the workers and peasants and intellectuals) own the state; therefore the people own the factories, railways, etc.

000 From the standpoint of history, the article stands the test no better. There are numerous examples in the history of the East of economic systems with deep class differentiations, based not on private property but on state property. Such systems existed in Pharaonic Egypt, Moslem Egypt, Iraq, Persia and India. That the state owned the land was, it seems, mainly due to the fact that agriculture depended entirely on the irrigation system, which in turn was dependent on the activity of the state. The example of Arab feudalism under the Mamelukes (1250-1517) is sufficiently instructive to warrant the apparent digression.

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Arab Feudalism—An Example of Class Society Based on State Property

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In this society the subjugation of the peasants to the strong feudal state was much harsher than in medieval Europe, but the individual member of the ruling class had no individual property rights whatsoever. The Sultan was the only landowner and he used to divide the right to collect the rent in the various regions among the different nobles (called Multazims). While in Europe every feudal lord was the owner of a certain domain, which was handed down from father to son, in the Arab East the feudal lord had no permanent domain of his own, but was a member of a class which collectively controlled the land and had the right to appropriate rent. In Syria and Palestine the area from which these feudal lords collected rent was changed from year to year. In Egypt they received the right to collect the rent in a certain area for their whole lives, and their heirs had a prior right in the appointment of the deceased's successor. While in Europe the feudal lord was relatively an independent power as against the king, who was no more than the 'first among his equals,' in the Arab East only the feudal collective was a factor of any consequence; as individuals the Arab nobles were weak, because they were dependent on the state for their positions. The weakness of the feudal lord as against the state was clearly indicated by the way in which the fiefs were allocated: the Sultan distributed them by lot among the emirs and knights, each getting a portion of land differing in size and quality according to his rank. The Arab nobles were thus divided into different groups with different incomes, the distinction between them being very great (for instance, the 'emirs of the hundred' got 80,000 to 200,000 dinar jayshi a year, 'emir-al-tabl' 23,000 to 30,000, 'emirs of the ten' 9,000 and below, 'emirs of the five' 3,000 and so on). The form of appropriation was much more like that of a state official than that of the European feudal lord. As a result of this dependence of the nobles on the state, an unusual phenomenon recurred in the Arab East. From time to time whole feudal strata were 'purged' and annihilated, others arising in their place. The Arab lords were replaced by the Sultan's freed slaves—the Mamelukes—who were not of Arab origin and did not speak Arabic but Turkish. In the thirteenth and fourteenth centuries

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000 they mostly originated from the Mongolian state, the Golden Horde, whose centre was on the banks of the Lower Volga; in the fifteenth and sixteenth centuries they were mainly Caucasian. With the Tsar's increasing resistance to conscription in the Caucasus for the Sultan, the Balkan element (Albanians, Bosnians, etc.) predominated.

The ownership of the land by the state not only prevented the rise of feudalism based on private property, but also of any social group with any individualist tendencies whatsoever. The town was a military camp; the majority of the artisans were not independent. Even when the guilds (Hirfeh) did arise, they did not attain any importance at all in the towns and did not become an independent force of any importance. The government subordinated them to itself by appointing many of the heads of the guilds, making them its officials and turning the guilds into government organisations.

The fact that the chief means of production—the land—belonged not to individuals, but to the state, and that the Arab nobles did not own property and therefore did not have the right to inherit, did not improve the position of the peasant masses. Nor did the plebeian origin of the Mamelukes make any difference. The concentration of the ruling class of the Arab East in the towns afforded them great military power over the peasants, and furthermore, increased their appetite for wealth and power. In this too, they differed from the European feudal lords in the Middle Ages. The produce which the European serfs gave to their feudal lords as rent was in general not sent out to be sold; the serfs therefore did not need to give their feudal lord more than he and his household needed for their daily use. Marx says of the European feudal lord: 'The walls of his stomach set the limits to his exploitation of the peasants'. The Arab feudal lords had different tastes, as they traded extensively in their agricultural produce, and their point of view might best be summed up in the words used by Khalif Suliman to his emissary about the peasants: 'Milk till the udder be dry, and let blood to the last drop'.

The mode of production, the form of exploitation, the relation of the toilers to the means of production in the Arab East, was the same as in medieval Europe. The source of income of the ruling class was also the same; the only difference

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was in the mode of appropriation, in the legal expression of the right to exploit.* 000

Another example of class exploitation based not on private but on 'public' ownership is the Church of the Middle Ages. The Church acquired about a third of all the land of Europe as a whole, and in some countries even the majority of the land (e.g. Hungary, Bohemia). Formally, this was public property, the property of the Christian community, and it bore the official name of 'patrimonium pauperum'—the inheritance of the poor. This, however, did not make the conditions of the serfs on Church land fundamentally different from those of the serfs on the private feudal estates. For even though the clergy did not have the right of inheritance (not being allowed to raise families) and were often of plebeian origin, they were not less harsh exploiters than the feudal nobility. Thus 'public' property by itself does not exclude the exploitation of man by man.

The first part of this book attempts to show that the chief means of production and exchange in the Russian satellites are in the hands of the state (in part the Russian state), and that they will be more and more so concentrated. The second part attempts to show that these countries have undemocratic, totalitarian police regimes, which means that they are not 'owned' by the people—workers, peasants and intellectuals—but by the self-appointing and self-perpetuating bureaucracy itself. From these two propositions, if they can be proved, the 121

*Sources used on feudalism in the Arab East:

A. N. Poliak—*Feudalism in Egypt, Syria, Palestine and Lebanon*, London, 1939

A. N. Poliak—*Les Révoltes Populaires en Egypte a l'Epoque des Mamelukes et leurs causes économiques*. Appeared in *Revue des Etudes Islamiques*, Paris, 1934.

A. N. Poliak—Various articles that appeared in the Hebrew periodical *Hameshek Hashituf*, Tel Aviv.

A. Kremer —*Geschichte der herrschenden Ideen des Islam*, Leipzig, 1868.

A. Kremer —*Culturgeschichte des Orients unter den Chalifen*, Wien, 1875-7.

C. H. Becker —*Beiträge zur geschichte Aegyptens unter dem Islam*, Strassbourg, 1902-3.

†There have even been cases of state-ownership of the means of production with *equality* between the different 'owners' of the state, equality in the right collectively to exploit those whom the state owned. Spartan society was a case of 'communism' in slave ownership. Kautsky characterized this regime in the following terms: 'The Spartans made up the minority, perhaps a tenth of the population. Their state was based on real War Communism, the barrack communism of the ruling class. Plato drew his ideal of the state from it. The ideal differed from real Sparta only in that it was not the military chiefs, but the 'philosophers', that is, the intellectuals, who directed the war communism'. (*Die Materialistische Geschichtsauffassung*, Zweiten Band, Berlin, 1927, pp. 132-3).

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only conclusion possible would be that the Bureaucracy is the owner of the wealth of these countries, that as well as being the ruling class politically, it is the ruling class economically.

The Abolition of all Elements of Democracy in the Factory

The relations between the state-bureaucracy and the people in the economy as a whole permeate each sector of it down to the individual enterprise. The macrocosm and the microcosms are governed by the same rules.

In Russia from 1917 to 1928 the running of the industries was, formally at least, in the hands of what was called the Troika (that is, trio)—the workers' factory committee, the Party cell and the manager. With the disappearance of all democracy in the Party and trade unions, the Troika gradually lost its functions till it became a mere label. Nevertheless it did not cease to stand officially at the head of the plant, nominally running it, and even to show signs of life by acting as something of a brake on the high-handedness of the plant manager, until 1929. Thus Dr. A. Baykov, in *The Development of the Soviet Economic System* (London, 1946), states:

'*De facto*, during that period (before the Five Year Plan—Y.G.) the director was largely dependent on the works' trade union organ, the "Zavkom" (the factory trade union committee) and on the Party cell, the organ of the Communist Party at the enterprise. Representatives of these organizations considered it their duty to supervise the director's activities, and usually interfered with his decisions'. (p. 115).

But even the remnants of workers' democracy in the plants disappeared with the Five Year Plans, which were called . . . 'The Victory of Socialism'. A resolution of the Central Committee of the Party decided that the workers' committee of the factory 'may not intervene directly in the running of the plant or endeavour in any way to replace plant management. They shall by all means help to secure one-man control, increased production, plant development, and, thereby, improvement of the material conditions of the working class'. (*Pravda*, 7th September, 1929).

The manager is in full and sole charge of the plant. All his economic orders are unconditionally binding on all the workers. He alone shall select, promote and remove personnel

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'taking into consideration' 'the opinion of the Party and the trade union organizations', but he is not bound by them. (Quoted by A. Feiler and J. Marschak, editors, *Management in Russian Industry and Agriculture*, New York, 1944, p. 36). 471/466

The Troika was officially buried in 1937. At the Plenum of the Central Committee, Stalin's second-in-command at that time, Zhdanov, declared: '. . . the Troika is something quite impermissible . . . The Troika is a sort of administrative board, but our economic administration is constructed along totally different lines'. (*Pravda*, 11th March, 1937, Ibid. p. 44).

The new management of industry was very clearly defined by an official manual thus: 'Each plant has a leader endowed with full power of decision, hence fully responsible for everything: the plant manager' (Economic Institute of the Academy of Sciences, *Economics of Socialist Industry*, Moscow, 1940, p. 579, ibid. pp. 12-13). Further, 'one-man control implies strict demarcation between the administration, on the one hand, and Party and trade-union organisations on the other. This strict demarcation must be applied on all levels of industrial management. Current operations in fulfilment of Plan are the task of the administration. The chief of a workshop, the manager of the plant, the head of the Glavk, have full powers, each within his field, and the Party and trade-union organisations may not interfere with their orders'. (*Economics of Socialist Industry*, p. 563, Ibid. p. 19).

In the 'People's Democracies' the workers' committees never acquired the authority they had in Russia, and the Troika never existed at all. The tendency against *any* element of workers' democracy in the factory was more pronounced and its progress much quicker than in the 'vanguard' country.

In all the countries of Eastern Europe the overthrow of Hitler inspired many workers to strive to participate in the management of industry, and in many places they achieved their aim of having the plant management democratically elected by the employees. Thus, for instance, *The Economist* of February 9th, 1946, writes of Czechoslovakia: 'The Employees' Committees tried, in the first fine careless rapture of revolutionary enthusiasm, to dictate how the factories should be managed . . .'

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471 466 This could not be tolerated by the Communist Party leaders in the government and trade unions. The following process took place:

'. . . the Workers Councils were . . . in control of management for some months, indeed almost until the end of 1945.' 'The situation was transformed by the Government's Nationalisation Decree of 24th October, (1945), which provided for the appointment of National Managers of the public enterprises'. 'So at one step the management of the industries was taken out of the hands of the Works Councils, nor did they retain any semblance of control over the Manager. This was a radical change and brought with it the undisguised hostility of a number of Works Councils'. (*Czechoslovakia. Six Studies in Reconstruction*, The Fabian Society, London, 1947, p. 49).

To reduce still further any remaining efficacy of the Works Committees, every element of democracy in them was abolished. At the general meeting of the Central Trade Union Council of Czechoslovakia at the beginning of April, 1947, the General Secretary complained that in the first round of the elections 32 per cent of the official candidates (no other candidates were allowed) were voted down in the Czech lands and 26 per cent in Slovakia. The Social Democratic Party now came forward openly with a proposal that more than one list be allowed in the Works Council elections, and that each party be free to put forward its own list of candidates. Antonin Zapotocky, the Communist Chairman of the Trade Unions (today the Prime Minister of Czechoslovakia) decided on another tactic as a result of the elections. He proposed to prolong the term of office of the Works Councils from one to two years.

Having established one list of candidates for Works Council elections, the Communist Party not only increased the use of terror in the elections, but also employed various devices for falsifying their results. The Social Democratic daily *Pravo Lidu* of 9th January, 1948, carried across the front page the Party protest against the Communist Party's methods in the factories: 'It is impossible to be silent. Fanatics are breaking up the unity of labour unions. New wave of political oppression in factories'. Of the recent Works Council elections the paper said: 'As developments in the elections are reported to us,

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especially in the large industrial concerns, it is evident that all the questionable practices were used, which were calculated to upset the democratic form of election and to force on the voters a selection (of candidates-Y.G.) that is not free. The meetings are usually called after working hours when the majority of workers are leaving or have left. 471 466

'Furthermore, the methods of voting are controlled, which is practically equivalent to direct intimidation'. (Quoted by *The New York Times*, 10th January, 1948).

After the February coup the mouths of the Socialists were closed. The secret ballot too was abolished at that time, and elections to Works Committees were carried out by acclamation, candidates in many cases being trade union officials. Small wonder that at the May 1949 session of the Central Council of the Czechoslovak Trade Unions, Josef Kolský, Deputy General Secretary, could say that in recent Works Council elections 97.3 per cent of the official lists of candidates were accepted (the official *Czechoslovak News Letter*, 19th May, 1949).

After these steps were taken, nothing more stood in the way of complete one-man management in the plant. In place of the workers' management that had arisen in the first months after the liberation of Czechosovakia from the German occupation, came the Production Board (set up by the Decree of October 24th, 1945), only a third of whose members were elected by the workers. After the 'Democractic Victory of February', the Minister of Industry, A. Kliment, announced a new plan: 'We are abandoning the system of collective management and we are going to abolish the Production Boards, instead of which we are going to introduce the system of personal responsibility of the works director, the technicians, the foremen and the workers'. This harks right back to unadulterated capitalism.

In Hungary the 'iron' Minister Ernö Gerö declared in his report to the Central Committee of the Party (June, 1950): 'A factory . . . can only have one manager who in his own person is responsible for everything that happens in the factory.' In all the other satellites too one-man management is the rule.

Democracy having duly been stamped out, the governments could without further ado follow this up by imposing on the

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471 466 workers all the known methods of exploitation, old and new. First of these was the introduction on an unprecedented scale of piece work in place of time work.

Piece Work

Marx once said that piece work is 'the most suitable to capitalist methods of production.' The leaders of the 'People's Democracies', however, teach otherwise. Thus *Scanteia*, the Rumanian Communist Party daily, of January 13th, 1949, says: 'Piece-work is a revolutionary (!) system that eliminates inertia and makes the labourer hustle. Under the capitalist system loafing and laziness are fostered. But now everyone has a chance to work harder and earn more' (Quoted by R. H. Markham in *Christian Science Monitor*, 31st January, 1949). 'Socialism', then, is superior to capitalism in that it uses the piece-work system!

The volume of work done at piece-work rates is continually increasing all the time.

In Czechoslovakia in February, 1946, 30.2 per cent of the total number of working hours came under the piece-work system, in January, 1947, 41.7 per cent, in June, 1947, 48 per cent, and the Two-Year Plan (1947-8) provided for the extension of piece-work so as to include 70 per cent of all working hours in industry. The aim is not 100 per cent only because in certain processes it is not possible to implement it. That this emphasis on piece-work was not welcomed by the workers is clear from the following attack made on 18 January, 1949, by the Minister of Justice, Alexej Čepička, on workers who show 'false solidarity' and a striving for 'equalisation of incomes' by opposing the piece-work system. 'Equalisation in wages hampers higher productivity. The piece-work system must be extended so as to give every worker an incentive. It is now used in only 58 per cent of our factories. To extend it to all is our task'. This was not all, for the workers were going slow to keep the norm low: 'Our workers have got to quit stalling and fight against equalitarianism in pay'. (*Christian Science Monitor*, 31st January, 1949).

The piece-workers par excellence, the Stakhanovites, are not loved by the workers. In his report to the 9th Congress of the Party (May, 1949), the General Secretary, Rudolf Slansky,

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revealed that out of 900,000 members of the Party's factory organisation only 65,000 were listed as Stakhanovites. Their unpopularity becomes manifest from a perusal of *Rude Pravo*, the Communist Party daily, which finds it necessary constantly to repeat that Stakhanovites should be placed in more responsible positions and that they should be protected against attacks made on them by 'politically immature' workers. 'There are officials and directors who, being snugly ensconced in their jobs or afraid for their popularity among politically undeveloped elements, fail to defend Stakhanovites as they ought to'. In letters from Stakhanovites published in the press, a frequent complaint is the hostile attitude of the workers towards them. When a reporter of *Lidové Noviny* went to interview Marie Zemancová, a young Stakhanovite in the Prague radio factory 'Tesla' who had been included in the Czech delegation to the Paris 'Peace Congress' as a reward for her work, it turned out that she was completely unknown in her factory. 'This proves', comments the paper, 'that we have been unable to popularise our Stakhanovites and pioneer workers'. (Quoted by *News from Czechoslovakia*, No. 6, April, 1949, published by the Czechoslovak Social Democratic Party in Exile, London). In view of these facts, it is no wonder that at the 9th Congress of the Communist Party open war was declared on people 'who run down the work of Stakhanovites and who even try to put a spoke in their wheel'.

In Poland the piece-work system reached a stage at which the basic wage almost entirely disappeared. As Clarion describes it: 'It should be emphasized incidentally, that with regard to salaries the whole system rests upon the maintenance of basic salaries at an abnormally low level and upon a huge inequality in the bonuses both of money and in kind. The periodical *Études et Conjoncture* in this regard pointed out, in a study of the economic situation in Poland, published in November, 1946, that 'on the average for the whole of industry in May, 1946, the total benefits granted (to the workers) in Poland represented from 6.8 to 14.6 times the basic salary, which thus became a mere supplementary item instead of being the main element of the total remuneration'. (op. cit. pp. 106-7).

The hatred felt by the Polish workers for these extreme forms of piece-work was displayed openly in the spring of 1946 and

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471 in September, 1947, when tens of thousands of workers went
466 on strike in Lodz, the biggest industrial city in Poland, in spite of the police terror, the mass arrests, the beatings, etc.

In Hungary, when the workers did not show sufficient enthusiasm for the piece-work system, they were accused by Rákosi of being 'lazy' (*N.Y. Herald Tribune*, Nov. 30th, 1948, reporting a speech delivered on November 27th); the factory directors were 'capitulating' to the lazy workers; the production quotas were too low. 'We cannot eat up the future of the nation', he declared. That Rákosi's speech was not effective enough can be seen from the continual harping on the theme of piece-work and its norms by the Hungarian leaders. Thus in the above-mentioned report to the Central Committee of June, 1950, Minister Ernö Gerö said: 'The enemy succeeded in opening a new front against the 'People's Democracy; that of wage and norm swindling'. 'That wage and norm swindling has spread among the masses can be attributed to a great degree to the underground work of right-wing social-democratic elements and to thei rallies, the clerical reactionaries . . .' It appears that Party members are also in league with 'right-wing social-democratic elements' who 'swindle' the norms: 'That such an unsavoury situation in the field of norms could arise is partly because in many cases the economic leaders of the factories, party functionaries and trade union members are among those who slacken the norms.' ' . . . in more than one case they go as far as to protect and support the wage swindlers'. This vituperation was followed by a considerable increase in the basic norm.

000 It is interesting to note that Stalinism is not the only system having extreme recourse to piece-work, Nazi Germany had too. Franz Neumann in his book *Behemoth* (London, 1942) writes: 'The class wage of the Socialist trade unions has been replaced by the "performance wage" (Leistungslohn) defined in Section 29 of the (Nazi-Y.G.) Charter of Labour. "It has been the iron principle of the National Socialist leadership", said Hitler at the Party Congress of Honour, "not to permit any rise in the hourly wage rates but to raise income solely by an increase in performance". The rule of the wage policy is a marked preference for piece-work and bonuses, even for juvenile workers. Such a policy is completely demoralizing,

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for it appeals to the most egoistic instincts and sharply increases industrial accidents'. (pp. 352-3). 000

Neumann explains why the Nazis went to such extremes in using the piece-work system (no more, however, than are resorted to in the Stakhanovite system): 'The preponderance of the performance wage brings the problem of wage differentials into the forefront of social policy. It is essential that this problem be understood not as an economic question but as the *crucial political problem of mass control* (my emphasis—Y.G.) . . . Wage differentiation is the very essence of National Socialist wage policy . . . the wage policy is consciously aimed at mass manipulation'. (p. 353).

The piece-work system 'is completely demoralising', 'it appeals to the most egoistic instincts,' it is a most important means of 'mass control', of 'mass manipulation', of atomization of the working class, of the creation of elite above elite even within the oppressed class. That is why the Nazis were so keen on its extension, and there is no other explanation of the enthusiasm of the Stalinist rulers for it.*

The Increasing Limitation of the Workers' Legal Freedom 466

In Russia, until the First Five-Year Plan every worker could freely change his place of work and could migrate unhindered from one part of the country to another.

On the right to change the place of work at that time, the Labour Code (1922) stated:

'The transfer of a hired person from one enterprise to another or his shipment from one locality to another, even when the enterprise or institution moves, can take place only with the

*As an indication of the purpose for which piece-work was so widely introduced, it is interesting to note that it was introduced even before the nationalisation of industry. It would be good, the Communist Party leaders thought, to discipline the workers in advance, in 'the interests of the nation'. In Rumania and Bulgaria, at the beginning of 1945, before the nationalisation decrees, production competitions were introduced, and 'labour heroes' were honoured with medals and money grants conferred by the heads of the governments. The 1st of May, 1946, was celebrated in Hungary as a production competition in the private industries. In these measures the Communist Party leaders got the whole-hearted support of the bourgeoisie. Then, after harassing them in this way, they used the same workers as their support in their onslaught on the bourgeoisie, which resulted in its expropriation. This shows the united attitude of the bourgeoisie and the Communist Party bureaucracy towards the exploitation of the masses (piece-work) and the united attitude of the bureaucracy and the working class towards private property (see Part II of the book). 466 471

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466 consent of the worker or employee concerned'. (Article 37, *Labour Code.*)*

On freedom of movement, the *Small Soviet Encyclopaedia* (1930 edition) wrote:

'. . . the custom of internal passports, instituted by the autocracy as an instrument of police oppression of the toiling masses, was suppressed by the October Revolution'.

But already in 1931 no worker was allowed to leave Leningrad without special permission, and in 1932 this system was adopted in all parts of Russia. An internal passport system much more oppressive than the Tsar's was introduced. Now no one could change his place of residence without permission.

As early as September, 1930, all industrial enterprises were prohibited from employing people who left their former place of work without permission. In 1932 Labour Books were introduced which every worker must give to the Director when he is taken on, and in which the director can write whatever remarks he likes when the worker leaves the job. No worker can be taken on at another job without showing his Labour Book. Victor Serge, who lived in Russia for many years as a prominent Communist and then was arrested, and who was finally allowed to leave Russia, writes:

'The passport is visaed at the place of work. With each change of employ, the reason for the change is entered into the passport. I have known of workers discharged for not having come on the day of rest to contribute a "voluntary" (and, naturally, gratuitous) day of work, in whose passports is written: "discharged for sabotage of the production plan" '. (*Russia Twenty Years After*, New York, 1937, p. 68).

On 4th December, 1932, the Government issued another decree designed to subjugate the workers. The factory's supplies of food and other necessities were put under the sole control of the Director 'in order to strengthen the powers of Directors of enterprises' (*Pravda*, 5th December, 1932).

Under a law of 26th June, 1940, a worker is prohibited from leaving his job, unless he is physically unfit to work, is accepted into an educational institution or is given special permission by higher authorities. Any absence without a satisfactory excuse,

*This article was abolished on 1 June, 1932. (Collection of Laws, "Labour Code," Moscow, 1937, p. 20.)

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even for a day, makes the culprit liable to six months' corrective labour—which means a cut of 25 per cent in his earnings during that time. It is symptomatic that a few months after the promulgation of this law a few women wrote a letter to *Izvestia* suggesting that domestic servants also be subject to this law. *Izvestia*, in its comment on this question (December 30th, 1940), although disagreeing with this suggestion, showed no astonishment as to its content in this period of the 'transition from Socialism to Communism'. 466

Not only are workers prohibited from calling strikes, but strikers are liable, according to law, to be sentenced to death for such an offence. (Item 14 of Article 58 of the Criminal Code. As capital punishment has now been abolished, twenty years penal servitude is given instead).* [681]

The Russian model is now being copied in the 'People's Democracies'. This time it will not take so many years to reach perfection. Until 1928, strikes in Russia were legal and were conducted without police intervention, even though the bureaucratic rulers opposed them more and more as their power grew.†

The 'People's Democracies', however, from the beginning avoided the mistake of allowing strikes. Not one of the new Constitutions includes the right to strike. The explanation is simple, and was put in a nutshell by the spokesman of the Yugoslav Government when he was replying to a proposal to include 'freedom to strike' in the Constitution: 'Now when our

*The following article is the only item in the "Collection of Laws" which touches on or covers any cases that can be interpreted by the courts as strikes: "Counter revolutionary sabotage, i.e., knowingly *omitting to discharge a given duty* or discharging it with deliberate carelessness, with the specific object of weakening the authority of the government or the operation of the government machine, entails—deprivations of liberty for a period of not less than one year, and confiscation of property in whole or in part, provided that where there are aggravating circumstances of a particularly serious nature the penalty shall be increased to the supreme measure of social defence: death by shooting, with confiscation of property". (My emphasis—Y.G. Criminal Code, Article 58 (14), June 6, 1927, "Collection of Laws", No. 49, Article 330, Moscow, 1937, p. 31).

†In 1922-3 there were 500 strikes with 150,000 participants in 1925, 196 strikes with 37,600 participants; in 1926, 337 strikes with 43,200 participants; in 1927, 396 strikes with 25,400 participants. More than 90 per cent of the participants in these strikes were workers employed by the State. Not only were strikes allowed, but at that time the Bolshevik leaders insisted on the active support of Party members for strikes whenever the majority of the workers of an enterprise took this step. (See, for instance, the speeches of Losovsky and Tomsky to the 11th Congress of the Russian Communist Party, 1922).

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466 constitution fully guarantees the rights of the working class, such a proposal is outright reactionary and anti-national'. (20th January, 1946). In opposing strikes the Communist Party leaders showed themselves very willing to use the help of the bourgeois politicians, and these, on their side, did not hesitate to use the authority of the Communist Party leaders in opposing strikes. For instance, the Czechoslovak Minister of Justice, Dr. Drtina ('purged' in the coup of February, 1948) said on 17th March, 1947, about recent unofficial strikes: 'They were . . . in effect strikes against the Government and Premier Gottwald . . . What is more serious is the fact that these strikes against the legal order occurred after the Revolution. Therefore, they are of a terroristic and anarchic character'. (*East Europe*, 26th March, 1947). Of course, from the suppression of the 'anarchic' strikes, the real benefactors were not [687] Dr. Drtina and his friends, but Gottwald and his. In Rumania Decree No. 183 bans strikes, defining them as 'an economic offence'. Participation in strikes is punishable by imprisonment of 1 to 12 years and by fines of Lei 10,000 to 100,000. A member of the Communist Party of any of the Western countries, making use of the double thinking so common to him, will find it quite consistent to support the banning of strikes in Russia and the People's Democracies (except of course, Yugoslavia after 28 June, 1948—the day of the excommunication of Tito by the Cominform) and at the same time oppose any limitation of the right to strike in any enterprise owned by a democratically elected public body in his own country.

The first steps have also been taken to abolish the right of workers to change their place of work. On April 16th, 1948, a law was passed in Yugoslavia prohibiting any state employee from leaving his place of work without permission from a special government commission. On August 19th Sofia Radio reported that the Labour Directorate had decided that the workers 'have no longer the right to leave their working places without permission' of the factory administration. Permission to employ or to dismiss will be granted only in accordance with the needs of production. Workers who leave their employment without permission of the Labour Directorate must be sent back to their original jobs, in accordance with Cabinet Decree No. 7.

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If they do not return voluntarily, they can be called up by the branch labour office (that is, assigned to compulsory labour groups). In Hungary the government published a decree on January 9th, 1950, laying down severe penalties for workers who leave their place of employment without permission. In all the 'People's Democracies' the labour book was copied from Russia. In Yugoslavia an 'improvement' was introduced: every citizen has a *karakteristika*, a record of his political reliability which has to be shown every time he takes a new job. As it is sealed, he does not know its contents, and is not even able to appeal against what is written in it. 466

Slave Labour

An institution which is of paramount importance in Russia, which is beginning to appear in the satellites and is bound to increase in importance as time goes on, is slave labour.

Some figures regarding the number of slave labourers in Russia are given by D. J. Dallin in a book that he wrote with B. I. Nicolaevsky, *Forced Labor in Soviet Russia*. (London, 1948). 'Kiseliev-Gromov, himself a former G. P. U. official in the northern labor camps, states that in 1928 only 30,000 men were detained in the camps . . . The total number of prisoners in the entire network of camps in 1930 he gives as 662,257 . . . " (p. 52). Dallin comes to the conclusion on the basis of available evidence that the number of people in labour camps in 1931 was nearly 2 million, in 1933-35 about 5 million. He says that in 1942 there were from eight to fifteen million (pp. 53-62). The former Yugoslav Communist leader, Anton Ciliga, who was for many years in a Russian concentration camp, estimates that the number of prisoners was about 10 million (*The Russian Enigma*, London, 1940, p. 249).

A conclusive proof of the existence of slave labour on a big scale in Russia can be gained from the following quotations from *Pravda*. On June 4, 1947, the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of the U.S.S.R. passed a decree on 'Protection of Citizens' Private Property' the first article of which reads: 'Theft—that is, covert or open appropriation of the private property of citizens—is punishable by confinement in a reformatory labour camp for a period of five to six years. Theft committed by a gang of thieves or for a second time is punishable 685 466

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685 by confinement at a reformatory labour camp for a period of
466 six to ten years.' (*Pravda*, 5th June, 1947).

On the same day another decree was passed on 'Embezzlement of State and Public Property' which includes the following articles:

'(1) Theft, appropriation, defalcation or other embezzlement of state property is punishable by confinement in a reformatory labour camp for 7 to 10 years, with or without confiscation of property.

'(2) Embezzlement of state property for a second time, as well as when committed by an organized group or on a large scale, is punishable by confinement in a reformatory labour camp for 10 to 25 years, with confiscation of property.

'(3) Theft, appropriation, defalcation or other embezzlement of collective farm, cooperative or other public property is punishable by confinement in a reformatory labour camp for 5 to 8 years, with or without confiscation of property.

'(4) Embezzlement of collective farm, cooperative or other public property for a second time, as well as that committed by an organised group or gang or on a large scale, is punishable by confinement in a reformatory labour camp for 8 to 20 years, with confiscation of property.' (Ibid.).

A month after these decrees were passed the U.S.S.R. Public Prosecutor's Office gave ten examples showing how the decrees were carried out in practice (*Pravda* July 9th, 1947):

'(1) In the city of Saratov, V. F. Yudin, who had been previously convicted for theft . . . stole fish from a smoke factory. On June 24th, 1947, . . . Yudin was sentenced to fifteen years' imprisonment in corrective-labour camps . . .

'(2) On June 11th, 1947, an electrician on the power lines of the Moscow-Ryazan railroad, D. A. Kiselev, stole fur goods from a railroad car . . . On June 24th, 1947, the war tribunal of the Moscow-Ryazan railroad sentenced D. A. Kiselev to ten years' imprisonment in the corrective-labour camps.

'(3) In the town of Pavlov-Posad in the Moscow region, L. N. Markelov . . . stole clothing from the Pavlov-Posad textile factory. On June 20th, 1947 . . . Markelov was sentenced to eight years' imprisonment in corrective-labour camps.

'(4) In the Rodnikov district of the Ivanov region, Y. V. Smirnov and V. V. Smirnov . . . stole 375 pounds of oats from

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a collective farm. On June 26th, 1947 . . . both were sentenced to eight years' imprisonment in corrective-labour camps. 685 466

'(5) In the Kirov district of Moscow, E. K. Smirnov, a chauffeur, was arrested for stealing 22 pounds of bread from a bakery. The people's court . . . sentenced E. K. Smirnov to seven years' imprisonment in corrective-labour camps.

'(6) In Saratov, E. I. Gordeyev . . . stole various products from a warehouse. On June 21st, 1947 . . . Gordeyev was sentenced to seven years' imprisonment in corrective-labour camps.

'(7) In Kuibyshev, E. T. Poluboyarov stole a wallet from a train traveller . . . On 4th July he was sentenced to 5 years' imprisonment in corrective-labour camps.

'(8) On June 7th, 1947, in Kazan at the collective farm market, V. E. Bukin snatched money from the hand of Citizeness Pustinsky . . . On June 20th, 1947 . . . Bukin was sentenced to eight years' imprisonment in corrective-labour camps.

'(9) On June 6th, 1947, in the village of Subovka in the Kutuzovsk district of the Kuibyshev region, A. A. Chubarkin and V. G. Morozov stole from a cellar 88 pounds of potatoes belonging to Citizeness Presnyakov. On June 17th, 1947 . . . both were sentenced to five years' imprisonment in corrective-labour camps.

'(10) On June 5th, 1947, in Moscow . . . K. V. Greenwald, who had been previously convicted for theft, took advantage of the absence of his neighbour, entered the room of Citizeness Kovalev and stole various household articles . . . Greenwald was sentenced . . . to ten years' imprisonment in corrective-labour camps.'

That people steal bread and other elementary necessities of life under the cruel threat of a minimum of five years' slave labour if caught, shows what dire provery they are suffering.[1] [735]

That slave labour in U.S.S.R. is very widespread is clear not only from the large amount of evidence given by former inmates of these camps (collected in the above-mentioned book of D. J. Dallin and B. I. Nicolaevsky) and from the facts published in the Russian Press of heavy punishments for the most elementary crimes—if the theft of bread can be so called. There is further evidence which is conclusive even if indirect. Soviet

1 [See examples, category 116, pp. 94-95 --Analyst]

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466 law grants the franchise to everyone above the age of 18 with the exception of the inmates of forced labour camps. In the 1946 elections 101.7 million people had the franchise. The population of U.S.S.R. was 193 million in the same year. The census of 1939 says that 58.4 per cent of the population were 18 and over. In 1946 the percentage of people above 18 was higher, as, firstly, the age distribution of the population in the new areas added to U.S.S.R. (Lithuania, Latvia, Estonia, etc.) was such that the percentage of children was lower than in the population of U.S.S.R. in its 1939 boundaries, and, secondly, the war caused a relatively greater decline in the birth rate and increase in the death rate of children as compared with the death rate of the adult population. If we assume that the proportion of people aged 18 and over was the same in 1946 as in 1939, there were altogether 112.7 million people in this category. Seeing that only 101.7 millian had the franchise, it is clear that at least 11 million were inmates of slave labour camps.

Up to now news from official sources of slave labour camps in the satellite countries has been very scarce. The Czechoslovak news agency reported on October 5th, 1948, that forced labour camps were to be set up under a Bill approved at the same day's meeting of the Cabinet.

In the debate on the new Penal Code, passed by Parliament on June 27th, 1950, the deputy Dr. Patchova said: 'The Law expressly states that convicts must be given useful employment which will, after their release, make it possible for them to join the ranks of the workers. On the other hand, a prisoner sentenced as an enemy of the People's Democracy, who, by his work and behaviour while serving his sentence, does not show improvement justifying the hope that he will lead the life of a decent working man, *can be sent to a forced labour camp after he has served his sentence*'. This speech alone proves the existence of the forced labour camps in Czechoslovakia. The best-known camps are at Joachimov and Kladno.

In Rumania a law of 14th January, 1949, fixes very severe sentences—as much as the death penalty—for negligence in fulfilling service obligations in industry. Many of those who are arrested under this law will of course not suffer the supreme penalty, but will supply recruits for the slave labour camps. That other 'crimes' besides economic negligence are paid for

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by forced labour, is illustrated by the fact that several thousand Jews, including some Zionist leaders, have been sent to forced labour camps in Rumania. (London *Jewish Chronicle*, 4th August, 1950). 466

Of forced labour in Yugoslavia *The Times* of 13 June, 1950, wrote: 'To root out Cominformist opposition within the Communist Party and to enforce the collection from the peasants of produce quotas the Government has made numerous arrests, which, although no doubt dwarfed by comparable figures in Russia, make the prison population far greater than anything found in the west. In Britain, with a population about three times as great as in Yugoslavia, the prison population is now about 20,000. Most observers estimate the number of persons now in prison in Yugoslavia at anything from 100,000 to 200,000.' 'Most of the prisoners are employed as a useful reserve of labour on public works . . .'

Indirect official confirmation appears from time to time of the existence of forced labour camps in Hungary, as well as of the pettiness of the 'crimes' that open the gates to them. Thus on 21st August, 1950, Radio Budapest announced that in the wagon factory of Györ, a worker, I. Olajos, had been sentenced to six years' compulsory labour for a wage swindle.

In Bulgaria the most notorious forced labour camps are at Kuznian near Pernik, and at Belene.

In Poland the camp at Milecin is the most well-known.

The fact that so little is known of slave labour in the 'People's Democracies' is primarily because the governments are doing their very best to hide the ugly truth which is such an outrage to the concept of 'Socialism' and 'Democracy' which the Communist Parties claim to have established. Another two factors must also be taken into account. To quote Juvenal, 'No one reached the climax of vice at one step'. It took Russia many years to establish camps with millions of inmates. If it is assumed that the proportion of prisoners in the population in all the 'People's Democracies' is about the same as in Yugoslavia, there must be ½-1 million prisoners altogether. The U.S.S.R. with a population double that of the 'People's Democracies' had less than a million slaves in 1930, and two million in 1931. Secondly, it is very probable that although slave labour will be more widespread in Eastern Europe than at

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466 present, it will not reach the Russian dimensions. It is, as Adam Smith clearly showed, very unproductive, being suitable mainly for manual labour which does not require modern industrial equipment, such as lumber work, road and rail construction, large-scale industrial construction, irrigation works, or canals. The more abundant the machinery and the supply of cultured and skilled workers, the less profitable the use of slave labour. Hence in all probability Czechoslovakia will have less slave labour than Bulgaria or Rumania, and the 'People's Democracies' as a whole less than Russia.

It is very difficult, if not impossible, to distinguish between voluntary and forced labour in a totalitarian regime. If it is not obvious in itself, the following declaration of Tito (to the Joint Congress of the Union of Communist Youth and the People's Youth, December, 1948) will make it plain: 'There are, of course, also such students who are not very keen on voluntary work, or who refuse to take part in voluntary work activities . . . Such was the case of a small number of students whom we had to expel from Belgrade University and other universities . . . '

The Distribution of the Social Product

471 Many Communists admit that the bureaucracy in Russia and the satellites have complete control of the state machine and thus of the running of the economy. But they claim that they act entirely in the interests of the people.

To assume that a group of people who are in absolute control of the means of production will not take as much as they can out of the national product for themselves, is tantamount to explaining man's economic conduct by his intentions—a strange method of argument for those who claim to hold the materialist conception of history. The more so when from the same lips we hear that in America and elsewhere, under capitalism based on private property, mere crumbs from the table of the bourgeoisie are a sufficient inducement to bribe and currupt the 'aristocracy of labour'—the trade union bureaucracy, and so forth—and alienate them from the working class. Stalin and his associates have all the food on the table within their reach, and their reach alone, but apparently they are incorruptible, and will remain forever loyal to the working

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people. This double vision sees the molehill as a mountain, and 471
the mountain as a molehill!

All the experience of history in this connection points to the inescapable conclusion that if a group of people are in absolute control and ownership of the means of production they will inevitably take for themselves all the benefits they possibly can out of production.

The division of the national income among different income 465
groups is kept strictly secret in the 'People's Democracies', although if the British Government did not publish such statistics the Communist Party would certainly, and justifiably, criticize it for keeping the truth from the people. Nevertheless from fragments of news in the press it is possible to get some idea of the great differentiation of incomes.

The official *Free Bulgaria* of 15th March, 1947, states that in Bulgaria the ratio between minimum and maximum salaries in Government employment is 1:5. 'New Yugoslavia, which had adopted a ratio of 1:3.2, is gradually introducing a greater differentiation. France has a ratio of 1:6, the United States—1:10, U.S.S.R.—1:11'. The U.S.S.R. leads all the rest, and is praised for it by the Bulgarian Communists!

Departmental chiefs in Bulgaria got 17,000 leva a year, counsellor-reporters 19,500, counsellor-specialists 21,000 and general secretaries 25,000. This was increased in many cases by a 'supplementary salary' of 13,200-22,800 a year, which raised their salaries to 30,000-47,000 leva a year. As against this the average worker's wage was 357.7 leva a month or 4,292.4 leva a year (*Free Bulgaria*, October 1st, 1947) and many unskilled workers earned 150-200 leva a month, or 1,800-2,400 leva a year (*Free Bulgaria*, April 1st, 1948), i.e., twenty times less than the *parvenu* rulers. There is, of course, no record of the value of the benefits the high bureaucrats get not in money but in kind, such as houses, cars and servants.

In Rumania the minimum salary of a civil servant is Lei 3,328 a month, the maximum Lei 42,600 (*Rumanian News*, 6th February, 1949). Many workers earn as little as Lei 2,000-2,500 a month.

Some information about income differentiation in Poland 465
can be gained indirectly from the table giving the rate of 651
income tax payable by people falling within the different

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465 income groups. This gives an insight into the difference
651 between maximum and minimum incomes, but does not reveal the number of people falling within each group. Incomes of persons or enterprises up to 72,000 zlotys are tax-free (there are many who earn even less than 36,000 zlotys). The rate of tax goes on :

72,000—	80,000 zlotys—	2	per cent income tax	
100,000—	110,000	„ — 3·5	„	„
150,000—	170,000	„ — 7	„	„
190,000—	210,000	„ — 9	„	„
250,000—	300,000	„ —13	„	„
500,000—	600,000	„ —23	„	„
1,000,000—	1,200,000	„ —33	„	„
1,400,000—	1,600,000	„ —37	„	„
2,400,000—	3,000,000	„ —43	„	„
3,600,000—	4,200,000	„ —47	„	„
over 4,200,000		„ —50	„	„

(H. W. Robinson, Chief, Division of Operational Analysis, U.N.R.R.A. European Regional Office, London, *Finance in Poland*, p. 21).

To paraphrase Orwell: all men are equal, but some men are more equal than others!*

465 In Czechoslovakia, as has already been mentioned, it was
511 not uncommon (in 1948) to find factory managers earning 40
565 thousand crowns a month, while two-thirds of the workers in 1948 got less than 2,900 crowns a month gross (i.e. before payment of taxes, dues, etc.). In addition, those earning 40,000 crowns were given the free use of a villa, a car with a chauffeur and other perquisites.

Beneš's bourgeois liberal paper, *Svobodné Slovo,* stated, not unjustifiably, that the bureaucracy were 'living in the style of millionaires . . . enjoy every comfort and luxury, thanks to the villas and limousines which they have been allocated by the authorities and to their high incomes'. These people, the paper continued, are 'propertyless—in form only . . . ' (6th September, 1947). The standard of living of the masses, on the other hand, is very low, as even the official statisticians have to admit. As early as June, 1946, the monthly average wage of an industrial worker was 2,540 while the *food ration alone* of a family of three cost 2,721 crowns. And many earned less than the average of 2,540 crowns! Since June, 1946, the condition of the masses has deteriorated. The correspondent of *Associated Press* in Prague, did not exaggerate when he said on 15 July,

*In Russia the scale of income-tax starts with taxes on less than 1,800 roubles a year and ends with taxes on more than 300,000 roubles. (*Izvestia*, 6th April, 1940).

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1948: 'Czechoslovakia today can fairly claim to be the hungriest country in Europe—hungrier than even Austria'. The Viennese Socialist paper *Arbeiter Zeitung* wrote on 23rd June, 1948: 'Travellers who often come from Prague to Vienna report that in the last few weeks, for the first time, they have not taken goods from Prague to Vienna, but on their return from Vienna to Prague'. The paper adds particulars of prices on the black market in Prague. It is possible to cite innumerable facts to the same effect. 465 511 565

There can be no doubt about who suffered from the shortages, which were the result partly, but only partly, of the drought of the winter of 1947-8. The drought fails to explain either the acute shortage of textiles, shoes (in the country of Bata!) and other consumer goods, or the duration of the shortages.

It is clear from official data that the portion of the social product going to the workers is decreasing. In January, 1946, the total product of Czechoslovakian industry was sold for 9.09 milliard crowns; wages and salaries in industry itself came to 2.83 milliard crowns, i.e. 31.6 per cent of the turnover. A year later, in January, 1947, the total sales amounted to 15.66 milliard crowns; wages and salaries came to 4.03 milliard or 25.7 per cent of the turnover. This decline in the portion of wages and salaries was accompanied by an increase in the turnover per hour of work from 50 crowns to 78 crowns, a rise of 56 per cent (*Statistical Bulletin of Czechoslovakia*, published by the State Statistical Office, Prague, July, 1947). If the statistics had included only wages and not salaries as well, the decline would have been even bigger. 465 511 434 565

The journal *Účetnictví a Kontrola*, issued by the trade union publishing house, Práce, submitted the state budget to a detailed analysis in order to get an approximate estimate of the cost of the bureaucracy. This reveals that the travelling expenses of the administration proper—that is, the ministries, not including the administration of the nationalised industries—amounted to not less than 780 million crowns, the maintenance of automobiles to 180 million. How large these amounts are is clear from the fact that the expenditure on travelling of these bureaucrats would cover the difference between the meagre wages of about 300,000 families and a minimum living

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465 standard. In summing up, the article states: 'The public
511 administration swallows 48 per cent of the national income.
434 How will it be possible to raise the standard of living of the
656 whole people, how will the wide layers of the toilers be satisfied, how will it be possible to pay proper salaries to government clerks?' (From an article, 'Let us think about the Figures', quoted by V. Salus in the theoretical paper of the Czech Social Democracy, *Cil*, August 15th, 1947, under the interesting heading, 'Economic Democracy and the New Nobility').*

511 The division of the national income in Yugoslavia is not less
565 unequal than in the other 'People's Democracies.' Vernon
434 Bartlett, when in Belgrade, described the situation in the

*For a time the Communist Party leaders tried to cushion the conflict between the workers and the 'new nobility' by directing the hostility of the masses exclusively against the bourgeoisie. For example in October, 1947, in connection with the relief to the peasants who were suffering from the drought, the Communist Party raised the slogan 'Let the millionaires pay', and proposed as a solution the imposition of a property levy. Of course the bureaucracy, being 'propertyless—in form' would not have to pay anything. The Communist Party tried to overlook the fact that the portion of the national income of Czechoslovakia in the hands of the bourgeoisie was so small, only a quarter of industry being left in their hands, that the only possibility of seriously improving the conditions of the masses was by 1. cutting into the income of the bureaucracy; 2. raising the general national income; 3. preventing Russia from taking her cut from the national income.

The Communist Party claimed that there were 35,000 millionaires in Czechoslovakia. This is a large number, but it is much less impressive when it is realised that they were not pound sterling or dollar millionaires, but crown millionaires. A million crowns in July, 1947, was equal to five thousand pounds sterling. Even according to the Communist Party estimate the wealth of these 35,000 'millionaires' was only 50 milliard (According to the bourgeois paper *Svobodné Slovo* there were only 12,000 millionaires with a property of 22 milliard crowns). 50 milliard crowns is only about a quarter of the *annual national income* of Czechoslovakia.

The conditions of the masses could not therefore be substantially improved at the expense of the bourgeoisie, but only by improvements in the nationalised sectors of the economy and at the expense of the bureaucracy. This is proved by the distribution of the national income:

PERSONAL INCOME AT FACTOR COST (THOUSAND MILLION OF CROWNS.) 1947

1. Entrepreneural profits in industry, trade and professions and private income from capital	22.0
2. Rentals and sub-rentals (including net rental value of owner-occupied dewllings	5.2
3. Independent agriculturists	25.4
4. Wages and salaries	125.9
5. Pensions of Government employees	5.7
6. Unfreezing of blocked accounts to people of limited means	6.3

In addition there were a number of other small items.

(Statistical Office of the United Nations, *National Income Statistics of Various Countries, 1938-1948*, Lake Success, New York, 1950, p. 59).

The figures speak for themselves. The possibility of increasing item 4 at the expense of item 1 is very limited indeed.

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following terms: 'Here, as in Moscow during the war, I am shocked that leaders who boast so much of the dictatorship of the proletariat should enjoy privileges that are relatively far greater than those enjoyed by any privileged class in Britain or in most of the other countries condemned by Moscow as Fascist and imperialist'. (*News Chronicle*, 26th April, 1949). 511 565 434

The situation was described sixteen months later by the correspondent of the *Neue Zürcher Zeitung* in the following terms: 'The social revolution in the eastern countries, which pretended to have the abolition of exploitation and inequality as its aim, leads in actuality to the erection of a *hierarchically ranked social order* with a whole number of privileged layers. This can be observed daily in Yugoslavia in the same way as in the Cominform countries and one will always be astonished at the way in which the bearers of the system take the privileges they enjoy for granted. The proletarians who stand in the queues near the bus stops look with greedy eyes at the lit-up American cars of the state leaders, resplendent in chrome and coloured varnish, which pass swiftly by them. The higher-ups of the State and Party travel in the latest model cabriolets, the great ones of second rank travel in limousines. Skoda and Opeldienst cars are at the disposal of high officers and officials.

'In the entrance to the People's Front Street in Marshal Tito Boulevard stands a big warehouse. Men in khaki or white uniforms with gold epaulettes go in and out. The *warehouse* is reserved *for officers* and their families. There they can buy clothes, shoes, furniture, carpets and other goods of better quality and cheaper price than the common mortal can buy. The officers get their food rations there too—far larger rations than those of workers and clerks. So large are these rations, that in the spring, at the time of the great food scarcity, peasants came to town in order to buy from the officers their surplus fat and flour at black market prices.

'It is obvious that the police and high officials also have their own store. The *warehouse of the political police* is even better supplied than that of the officers. Naturally these categories of the population also have their special rations. It is the same here as in the other Eastern countries: one who has a higher post and a higher salary also gets larger food rations and is less directed to the expensive free market than the poorly-salaried

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small man. Reductions in prices for the higher-paid instead of for those with smaller means . . . (*Neue Zürcher Zeitung*, 30th August, 1950)*

One aspect of the problem of the mode of distribution of the social product is this: to what extent is the differentiation between different income groups concomitant with national differences? How much of the cream of the milk produced in the satellites is in the form of higher personal incomes for Soviet officials? These facts are unfortunately covered by a veil of secrecy. Some facts, however, have emerged. A letter of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of Yugoslavia to the Central Committee of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union (dated 13th April, 1948) stated: 'The wages of the Soviet experts (working as advisers in Yugoslavia—Y.G.) were four times as high as the wages of the commanders of our armies and three times as high as the wages of our Federal Ministers. The commander of one of our armies, a lieutenant-general or a colonel-general, then had 9,000 to 11,000 dinars a month, and a Soviet military expert, lieutenant-colonel, colonel and general had from 30,000 to 40,000 dinars. At the same time our Federal Ministers had a salary of 12,000 dinars a month.' The reply of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union (dated 4th May, 1948) did not deny the correctness of these figures, but claimed as an extenuating circumstance the fact that the Yugoslav generals also got 'apartments, servants, food, etc.'

The paper *Glas*, the organ of the People's Front of Serbia, in its issue of 16th December, 1949, gave another example of the same thing. Near Sofia an automobile factory employing Russian, Czech and Bulgarian specialists was being built. The salary of the Russian specialists was 2,000 levas an hour, of the Czechs 2,000-3,000 levas a day, and of the Bulgarian 250-300 levas a day. These differences were certainly not due mainly to differences in skill.

*Since then a big change has taken place. On 14th October, 1950, Marshal Tito signed a decree abolishing special privileges in the supply and distribution of rations and consumer goods, doing away with the special shops of the upper bureaucracy, and transferring all villas and rest homes hitherto reserved for the privileged to the tourist industry. Whether this is a temporary measure resulting from the terrible drought and famine of the 1950-51 winter, it is too early to say.

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It might yet be claimed that even these differences in income 000
are smaller than those prevailing in the countries of capitalism based on private property. There is not sufficient statistical information about income distribution in the 'People's Democracies' accurately to check this contention, but some general remarks may be made. To compare the ratio between the income of an American capitalist and his workers on the one hand, with the ratio between the incomes of a manager in the 'People's Democracies' and his workers is to compare two qualitatively different things. Let us assume that the American capitalist gets a million dollars' profit, of which he ploughs back into the enterprise 700 thousand dollars. For his personal consumption he thus takes 300,000 dollars. The boss in the enterprise in the 'People's Democracies', on the other hand, would claim that as he does not own the factory the profits ploughed back into the enterprise must not come out of what he gets, but out of the profit made by the whole of society. If the American capitalist argued that the 700,000 he ploughed back was in the interests of society, the communists would reply that he gets the main benefit from it. But it appears that the same argument must not be applied to bureaucratic state capitalism.

Since a group of people in control of the means of production will take for itself the biggest possible share of the national cake, and as under the rule of the Communist Parties the workers are faced with the most concentrated capital, while they lack the right to defend themselves through democratic organisations independent of their rulers or by strike action, the inequality in incomes will inevitably reach its most extreme forms.

The Workers' Resistance

Reference has already been made to the way in which the 468
workers of Czechoslovakia expressed their rising dissatisfaction 475
with the Communist Party leaders by rejecting the official list of candidates to Works Committees in 1947, thus driving the Party to abolish the secret ballot.[1] But the workers found other ways of expressing their dissatisfaction, the most important being greatly increased absenteeism, which reached the proportions of an epidemic in Czechoslovakian industry. At

[1] [See category 116, pp 84-85 -- Analyst]

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468 the 9th Congress of the Communist Party of Czechoslovakia,
475 Slansky, the General Secretary, disclosed that whereas before the war absenteeism in the foundries totalled 2.4-3.5 per cent, it had risen in January, 1949, to 12 per cent and in March to 15 per cent. The position was even more critical in the building industry: in the four principal building undertakings in the Morawská Ostrawa district alone 53,420 working-shifts had been lost, while another building enterprise at Tábor registered 50 per cent of absentees. (Quoted by *News from Czechoslovakia*, May, 1949). On September 21st, 1949, Premier Zapotocky told the Czechoslovak Trade Union Council that absenteeism among the workers so far that year was already more than 37 per cent higher than in 1947. (*Lidové Noviny*, 22nd September, 1949). Even the National Assembly's decision of 24th March, 1950 to deduct from the holiday days missed without good reason would probably not altogether stop this expression of the increasing 'enthusiasm' of the workers for the regime.

It is not only the Czechoslovak workers who put up some resistance, however limited it must be by the totalitarian character of the regime. *The Times* of 5th September, 1949, gave a report from its correspondent in Budapest of a conference of the Communist Party of Greater Budapest—in which more than 60 per cent of Hungary's industry is concentrated—which was attended by all the foremost leaders of the Party. 'The report (of the Conference) says that productivity is stagnant in most industries and declining in some. Between February and July it fell throughout the manufacturing industry by 17 per cent . . .' 'Far too many workers were applying for sick relief—in a recent week in one factory 11 per cent, in another 12 per cent. Instances are given of self-inflicted wounds'. Rákosi in his speech claimed that in many factories the number of days missed for sick leave was two to three times higher than before the war. (*Neue Zürcher Zeitung*, 6th September, 1949). On August 31st, 1949, he said that in the previous few months productivity had fallen by 10-15 per cent.

In Poland an epidemic of absenteeism drove the government to adopt harsh measures. On April 19th, 1950, the Sejm passed a law concerning the 'Socialist discipline of labour.' Extremely heavy punishments are imposed on absentees. A worker who

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has been absent from his work for four or more days in a year 468
without a satisfactory excuse suffers a wage cut of 10-25 per 475
cent which may last for three months.

The Yugoslav workers also use the weapon of absenteeism in their struggle against their bad conditions. *The Times* of 1st November, 1950, quoting the Belgrade trade union paper *Rad*, said: '. . . absenteeism in the coal mines in Serbia reached 19%; Croatia—17½%; Slovenia—15%; and Bosnia-Herzegovina—14%. The plan allowed for a maximum absenteeism of 11%.' In his speech to the Federal Assembly on 17th April, 1950, Tito said:' In 1949, there was a 26.26% loss in working time. In Croatia, this percentage reached 33%, of which 21% was spent in holiday-taking and absenteeism. This proves the weak struggle for discipline . . . ' The workers also frequently change their place of work. In a speech to the Serbian parliament, Jovan Veselinov, Vice-Premier of Serbia, reported that during ten months of 1949 state enterprises in Serbia took on 628,064 persons but lost 430,050 workers who had left their jobs. (*The New York Times*, 29th January, 1950). *Borba* of 21st August, 1950, stated that in the Trepcha lead mines and refinery—one of the largest in the world—some 11,000 workers were taken on in 1949, of whom 10,500 left before the end of the year because of very bad conditions, irregular pay 'usually between the fifteenth and twentieth of the month, often between the twenty-fifth and the thirtieth', and the irregular distribution of the rations (in August the rations were distributed ten days late, and in the meantime the workers had to do without bread).

The Government took strong measures to fight against absenteeism and the frequent changes in the place of work. On 26 January, 1950, it passed a decree stating that food ration cards would be withdrawn from persons leaving their place of employment without permission, and no new cards would be issued them. The decree further stated that a clause might be included in labour contracts obliging a worker to reimburse the enterprise for any loss in production resulting from his unjustifiable absenteeism.

Another symptom of the increasing dissatisfaction of the workers is the decline in the *quality* of what they produce. For example, in the speech quoted above, Rákosi stated that the

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468 percentage of waste in the Manfred Weiss iron foundry, the
475 second biggest metal factory in Hungary, had risen from 10.4 to 23.5 per cent. In Poland, in 1948, of 67 million tons of coal, 1,100,000 tons were stones; in 1949 the percentage of stones in the coal reached 5 per cent. In 1948 and 1949 a sizeable proportion of the exports of Czechoslovakia—the country with the reputation for products of good quality—was returned as below standard.

The admonitions of the leaders to the workers are often of such a character as to leave no doubt about their indocility. Istvan Kossa, Hungarian Minister of Industry, said in a speech at Debrecen on December 6th, 1948, that 'The workers have assumed a terrorist attitude to the directors of the nationalised industries', and he threatened them with forced labour.

Chivu Stoica, Rumanian Minister of Industry, addressing the workers of the Resita plant, the largest metallurgical establishment in the country, on December 25th, 1948, accused them of not having fulfilled the plan and of being 'capitalist agents'.

In Yugoslavia, Vice-Premier Edvard Kardelj, in his report to the Fifth Congress of the Communist Party (July, 1948), attacked those workers who showed 'resistance to realistic norms, against competition, and on the other hand—in exaggerated demands in regard to pay'. 'It is clear that the consequences of such a stand are a decrease in work discipline, insufficient aid to rationalisers and innovators in the realization and application of their proposals, an incorrect and unfriendly attitude toward the heads of the enterprise, an incorrect attitude toward competitions'. (*The Communist Party of Yugoslavia in the Struggle for New Yugoslavia, for People's Authority and for Socialism*, Belgrade, 1948, pp. 87-8).

466 That the workers nevertheless remain members of the Communist Parties—as the official statistics show—is not because of their enthusiasm for them, but because it is too dangerous to leave. Anyone who leaves the Party faces the threat of economic sanctions (at least). This is shown clearly by some figures issued in October, 1948, by József Révai, editor of *Szabad Nép*, the Hungarian Communist Party daily. He says that the paper is read by only 12 per cent of the Party members. At the big M.A.U.A.G. factories, for example, where 6,000

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out of the 8,000 workers are Party members, only 780 read the Party newspaper. (*For a Lasting Peace, For a People's Democracy*! 15th October, 1948). Thus a large number of workers are merely nominal members of the Party. 466

The large-scale 'purges' in the Parties also express the increasing hostility between the leaders and their 'supporters'. In the 'purge' in Hungary nearly half a million members were expelled from the Party. In Czechoslovakia, there was a 'purge' of a quarter of a million members in 1948 and the first half of 1949. In Rumania, 'over 192,000 hostile elements', that is, over a fifth of the total membership of the Party, were 'purged' between November, 1948, and May, 1950. In Bulgaria, 92,500 members and candidates, out of a total of 442,183, were expelled from the Party between June, 1949 and June, 1950. 468

While the workers within the 'People's Democracies' cannot express their dissatisfaction through the police-controlled plebiscites, miscalled general elections, those on the other side of the frontier, who are close enough to know the reality of the regime inside the 'People's Democracies', and free enough to express their opinion of it—as in Austria and Berlin—have decisively shown their disapproval.

The Expropriation of the Peasantry

The parvenu ruling class in Eastern Europe, in order to add to its wealth and comfort, devotes all its energy to increasing the number of workers employed in state industries. Hence it comes into conflict with the masses of the peasantry. 369

As has been pointed out, the progress of agriculture in the Eastern European countries depends on their industrialisation. Their inherited backwardness, their separation from Western Europe by the division of the Continent into two spheres of influence, Russian imperialist exploitation, the greed of the local bureaucracy—all these factors impede the accumulation of capital, necessary for industrialisation. Had industry already existed on a big scale, the countryside would voluntarily have supplied agricultural products to the urban population in exchange for industrial products, and would also have supplied the necessary labour power for industry, as the surplus population would have been attracted to the towns by their higher

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369 standard of life and culture. Conversely, if the village supplied the agricultural products and labour necessary for the towns, industrialisation would have been much accelerated. These two conditions are mutually dependent. But the bureaucracy cannot tolerate a gradual development of agriculture and industry, and prefers to try to escape from the vicious circle by forced 'collectivisation'.

423 All previous land reforms had, for a number of years at
474 least, the effect not only of not increasing the agricultural surpluses available for the towns, but actually of reducing them. This is because large estates, based either on tenants' or workers' labour, obviously have relatively larger surpluses than the small peasant farms, even if both have the same productivity. Land reform, by dividing the large estates into many small peasant farms has, as an immediate consequence, a decline in the marketable agricultural surpluses. The surpluses necessary for industrialisation could be obtained by the encouragement of *kulak* farming, but this would be unwise from the standpoint of the bureaucracy, as socially and politically it would raise a new ruling class clinging tenaciously to private property, and economically it would lead to a demand by the kulaks for industrial goods in exchange for their surpluses. The bureaucracy needs a cheaper way of getting this surplus. It might have recourse to taxation and requisitions. But this too can hardly be relied on to provide large enough quantities of agricultural products for quick industrialisation, for the disgruntled peasant can 'go on strike' and decrease his sowing area, or neglect his fields, so that the surplus available for requisition decreases, or he can hide part of his yield, for it is impossible to supervise millions of small peasants scattered in thousands of villages. These drawbacks are virtually eliminated and the obligatory deliveries much more easily secured if millions of peasants are concentrated in some tens of thousands of large farms. The peasants, it is true, may react to their expropriation and herding in semi-serf camps by slaughtering their livestock. This may reduce the total agricultural production for a number of years and famine may stalk the land bringing death in its train, but no matter. If the quantity of agricultural goods in the hands of the state increases, everything is satisfactory. 'Collectivisation' also enables the state

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to supervise the labour power in the countryside, and, if the wages in the towns are not high enough to attract people from the countryside, they will be drawn there by the mechanisation of agriculture and the elimination of superfluous mouths in the 'collective farms'. Further, if capital construction is being undertaken, which demands very little skill and can be done by a large number of workers with very little or no machinery (for the bureaucracy likes to 'waste' as little of the expensive machinary needed for industrialisation and militarisation as possible) the 'collective farms' can provide an ample supply of this cheap labour from the 'kulaks,' i.e. all who dare to show any resistance to the bureaucracy. As yet it is scarcely possible to prove from experience that this will be the fate of agriculture in the satellites, because the process is only in its early stages. That this is the tendency, however, is clear enough, from the developments so far and from the history of agriculture in Russia since 1928.

423 474

The Example of 'Collectivisation' in Russia

The influence of the collectivisation of agriculture on the agricultural output in Russia is clear from the following table:

423 474 241

Year	*Sown Area*			*Gross Output of Grain*	*Cattle*
	Total	*Grain*	*Technical Crops*		
	million hectares			million centners	million heads
1928	113.0	92.2	8.6	733.2	70.5
1929 ..	118.0	95.9	8.8	717.4	67.1
1930	127.2	101.8	10.5	835.4	53.9
1931	136.3	104.4	14.0	694.8	47.9
1932	134.4	99.7	14.9	698.7	40.7
1933	129.7	101.6	11.9	808.2	38.4
1934	131.4	104.7	10.7	804.6	42.4
1935	132.8	103.4	10.6	810.9	49.2
1936	133.8	102.4	10.8	744.6	56.7
1937	135.3	104.4	11.2	1,082.6	57.0
1938	136.9	102.4	11.0	854.9	63.2

(S. N. Prokopovicz, *Russlands Volkswirtschaft unter den Sowjets*, Zurich, 1944, p. 133).

This shows that, ten years after the drive towards 'collectivisation' began, the number of cattle was 10 per cent lower than before, while gross grain output was 16 per cent higher. The main reason for the rise was the cultivation of new steppe lands which required agricultural machinery. The total

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423 sown area rose by 21 per cent and the grain area by 11 per
474 cent.

241 That the productivity of labour in Russian agriculture, despite the mechanisation, was not higher in 1931-5 than in the countries of Eastern Europe is confirmed by the following calculation made by W. E. Moore:

AGRICULTURAL PRODUCTION PER PERSON DEPENDENT ON AGRICULTURE AND PER MALE ENGAGED IN AGRICULTURE, 1931-5 AVERAGE

	Per Person Dependent on Agriculture Crop Units	*Per Male Engaged in Agriculture* Crop Units
Czechoslovakia	45	146
Hungary	33	96
Poland	21	72
Rumania	21	67
Bulgaria	20	70
Yugoslavia	17	55
Albania	10	32
U.S.S.R.	17	53

(op. cit. p. 35)

Even if the improvement in Russian agricultural production after 1931-5 is taken into account, it is clear that her output per male engaged in agriculture was not more than that of Rumania, Bulgaria or Poland, and must have been far short of that of Hungary or Czechoslovakia.

Does this mean that the rulers of Russia failed to achieve what they aimed at by 'collectivisation'? This question can be answered by examining the proportion of the agricultural output taken by the state in the form of obligatory deliveries:

Year	*Total Yield*		*Obligatory Deliveries*			*Retained by Agriculturists after obligatory deliveries*	
			Quantity	*% of Total*	*% of Total*		
	gross	net*	million centners	gross	net	million centners	Index
1927/8	728.0	605.9	112.2	15.4	18.5	493.7	100
1932/3	698.7	570.1	185.2	26.5	32.5	384.9	77.9
1933/4	808.2	677.1	228.7	28.3	33.8	448.4	90.8
1934/5	804.6	669.5	226.6	28.1	33.8	442.9	89.7
1935/6	810.9	677.5	249.3	30.7	36.8	428.2	86.7
1936/7	744.6	612.5	260.0	34.9	42.4	352.5	71.4

*After deduction of seeds from gross yield.
(Prokopovicz, op. cit. pp. 136, 138).

From 1927/8 to 1936/7 these obligatory deliveries taken by the state from agriculture increased from 112.2 million centners to 260 million (i.e., by 131.8 per cent) and the proportion in the gross yield of agriculture which they represented from

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15.4 per cent to 34.9 per cent, and of the net yield from 18.5 per cent to 42.4 per cent. 423 474

The obligatory deliveries are virtually direct taxes, as the prices paid by the government for the products delivered is only a small percentage (not even 5 per cent) of the price which the government charges the consumer. 241

It is interesting to note that Lenin writes in his book, *The Agrarian Question in Russia at the End of the Nineteenth Century* (1908): 'The horseless and one-horse peasants (i.e., the very poor peasants—Y.G.) pay in the form of taxes *one-seventh and one-tenth* respectively of their *gross* expenditure. It is doubtful whether serf dues were as high as that . . . ' The agricultural toilers in the 'Socialist Fatherland' pay much more than that!* [651]

Collectivisation not only transformed into proletarians those who came into industry, but also those who remained in agriculture. The overwhelming majority of agriculturists are in reality, if not in theory, people who do not own any of the means of production: they are compelled to work an ever-increasing number of days on the kolkhozes for very low payment, below even that of the unskilled worker in the towns. The constant rise in the number of days that every household works in the kolkhoz compared with the quantity of grain per household remaining to it after the obligatory deliveries is shown in the following table : [461]

Year	Average Number of 'Labour Days'† per Household		Grain Retained per Household after Obligatory Deliveries	
	Number	Index	Centners	Index
1932 ..	257	100	15.8	100
1933 ..	315	122.5	19.3	122.1
1934 ..	354	133.4	20.1	127.2
1935 ..	378	147.1	20.5	129.7
1936 ..	393	152.8	17.3	109.5

†A 'Labour Day' is equivalent to the physical labour day of an unskilled kolkhoznik. The physical labour day of a skilled worker is equivalent to two, three or more 'Labour Days'.

(*Prokopowicz*, op. cit. pp. 136, 138, 164).

*Although the total quantity of products retained by the agriculturists in 1936/7 was lower than in 1927/8 (352.5 million centners and 493.7 million centners respectively) the quantity per household did not decline, and per capita of the agricultural population even rose. This happened because the number of households declined from 25.0 million in 1927/8 to 20.4 million in 1936/7, i.e., by 24 per cent, and the agricultural population decreased from 122.4 million to 78.6 million, i.e., a decline of 35.8 per cent. The fact that the per capita quantity of agricultural products retained by the peasants after making obligatory deliveries rose, does not mean that the conditions of the majority of agriculturists improved, because it was distributed more unevenly to the disadvantage of the masses. This cannot be dealt with here.

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461 To add to the difficulties of the poor agriculturists, not every-
241 one has to give the same number of labour days. The higher
423 strata of kolkhozniki give far fewer labour days than the poor
474 kolkhozniki. The reward for their labours, however, is in inverse proportion to the time contributed.

There is less justification in calling the Russian agriculturists of today owners of the means of production than the serfs of the nineteenth century.

Miss D. Warriner in 1940 noted as regards the productivity of Russian agriculture: 'Russia both before and after collectivisation had a lower productivity than Eastern Europe . . . Russian collectivisation has not really achieved much increase in productivity through reforming the peasant system. Yields are still lower in Russia than in every part of Eastern Europe, cattle density is still much lower . . . ' (*Eastern Europe after Hitler*, London, 1940, p. 4). In another place Miss Warriner writes: ' . . . the physical output per man in corn is slightly higher in Russia than in the very poorest regions of Eastern Europe, and the value in terms of industrial products certainly lower'.
511 (*Economics of Peasant Farming*, London, 1939, p. 188). As
423 regards the standard of living of the Russian agriculturists in
474 relation to those of Europe Miss Warriner says: 'As things are
241 at present, on the basis of purchasing power, the Russian farmer is certainly not so well off as the peasants in Poland'. 'On the Russian farms meat consumption must be much lower than in Poland, and milk consumption must be lower also'. (Ibid. pp. 188, 189).* To gain a rough idea of what the standard of living of the Polish peasant was before the war, we quote the following passage: The Polish peasants' 'poverty was proverbial. It was said that during the depression the peasant would split a match four or five times, and would boil potatoes over and over again in the same water to save the salt . . . According to the Polish Minister of Finance the average cash income of the peasant in 1934-5 was eleven groszy (about one penny) a day . . .' (Henryk Frankel, *Poland, The Struggle for Power 1772-1939*, London, 1946, p. 134).

Miss Warriner's analysis, based on Soviet statistics, conforms

*It is regrettable that Miss Warriner in her new book *Revolution in Eastern Europe* (London, 1950) in the chapter 'Collective Farming' overlooks what she herself wrote on the question of collectivisation in Russia in *Economics of Peasant Farming* and also in *Eastern Europe After Hitler*.

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with the conclusion Victor Serge reached from his direct [511] contact with Russian toilers: 'The vast majority of the peasants 241 live more poorly than before the collectivisation, that is, on 423 the whole, at a level lower than pre-war' (i.e., pre-World War I) 474 (op. cit. p. 37).

The peasants did not gain anything out of the 'collectivisation', but that does not detract one iota from the success of 'collectivisation' from the standpoint of bureaucratic state capitalism.

Miss D. Warriner was quite right when she said of the results of 'collectivisation' in Russia: 'Apparently, then, most of the increase in output could have been achieved by extending the State farms in the sparsely settled and uncultivated regions, without collectivizing the peasant villages in the already settled parts; had there been no collectivization, then all the loss of capital through livestock slaughter would have been avoided and corn production in 1931 and 1932 would have been maintained'. (*Economics of Peasant Farming*, op. cit. p. 174). This is true. But then the state would not have got such a large part of the agricultural output for nothing!

The Satellites Follow in the Footsteps of Russia

Undoubtedly the circumstances in which the collectiviza- 423 tion of agriculture is being and will be carried out in the 474 satellites are to some extent different from those in which it was carried out in Russia. In part they will moderate its results, and in part will render them more severe. The moderating influence will be the lesson learnt from the experience of Russia, which will prevent the Communist Party from making similar mistakes in the satellites; namely, rushing through 'collectivisation' at a feverish pace, far outstripping the development of the necessary technical basis for large-scale farming, and then hastily retreating;* and secondly taking all the livestock—cows, sheep, poultry—away from the peasants and putting them into the kolkhozes, and then reversing their policy after half the livestock had already been slaughtered.

*In October, 1929, 4.1 per cent of all the peasants were included in kolkhozes. Five months later, on 10th March, 1930, 58.0 per cent were. There followed a hasty retreat, and in September of the same year only 21 per cent of the peasants were in kolkhozes. Only after this mismanagement did the tempo of collectivization begin to be less erratic, even though the compulsion to enter the kolkhozes remained very strict for the peasants.

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423 474 [185] The Eastern European governments will avoid such damaging twists and turns.[1] According to the Plans, the technical basis for collectivisation will be much better prepared than it was in Russia. In 1933 in Russia, when 65.6 per cent of the peasants were in kolkhozes, there was one tractor per 615 hectares of arable land. When the current Plans are completed, the *minority* of peasants in the satellite countries will be in co-operative farms while there will be one tractor per 290 hectares. The co-operative farms in the 'People's Democracies' are leaving the majority of the livestock to the peasants as their private property, and are even compromising with the private interests of the peasants on the question of co-operative cultivation of the land, as can be seen from an examination of the types of co-operative farms in these countries.

In Hungary there are three types of co-operative farms:

1. The lowest, in which ploughing and sowing alone are done collectively while further cultivation and harvesting are done by the individual peasants. Draught animals or machines for the ploughing and sowing are obtained from the members or from the nearest State Tractor Station. In the former case, the members who own the draught animals or machines are paid a customary rent for them. Each member pays the cost of ploughing and sowing according to the quantity and quality of land he owns.

2. The intermediary type is similar to the lowest type except for the fact that harvesting and threshing are also done collectively.

3. In the highest type all the land is pooled for common cultivation, except for about two acres which are kept by each member as his private plot. Members are paid wages according to the amount and quality of work they do and rent according to the quantity and quality of land they contributed. No more than 25 per cent of the profit may be set aside for rent.

In Russia the peasant belonging to the lowest form of 'co-operative farm'—the kolkhoz—is allowed less private property than members of the highest form in Hungary. In many districts no kolkhoznik is allowed to own more than 0.6 acres, in others 1.2 acres and, in a small number of districts,

[1] [See category 116, p. 115 -- Analyst]

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2.4 acres, and no rent is paid for the land contributed to the kolkhoz. 423 474

In Yugoslavia there are four types of co-operative farms. In the first and second types, the land remains the private property of the co-operative member, and rent is paid for it. In the third type the land remains private property but no rent is paid for it. The fourth type is like the Russian kolkhoz. At present the overwhelming majority of co-operatives belong to the first two types.

In the Bulgarian co-operative farms the net income is generally divided thus: 60 per cent is distributed among the members according to the number of working days they contribute, 30 per cent is paid out in rent in proportion to the quality and quantity of land brought by each peasant into the collective farm. The 'Model Statute of the Co-operative Farms' (adopted by the Second National Conference of Co-operative Farm Representatives, held on April 5–7, 1950) describes another mode of distribution of the income: '. . . a number of working days, from 1 to 5 per decare (1 decare= 1/10 hectare—Y.G.) of land, depending on the quality of the land, fixed by the General Meeting as rent is given as a bonus to every co-operative member. In this way the working days given to every co-operative member for his pooled land are added to the working days contributed by him with his labour, and for the sum of these working days he receives agricultural and animal products and cash'. (Article 17b). For a hectare the owner gets a rent of 10 to 50 days. Since the maximum amount of land permitted a person is 20 hectares (except for Dobrudja where it is 30 hectares), a peasant who gives 20 hectares to the co-operative farm will receive a rent equal to the wages of 200 to 1,000 working days. The co-operative farm thus does not equalise the peasants and abolish exploitation (even if we discount the exploitation of the co-operative as a collective by the state bureaucracy through obligatory deliveries, the fixing of prices for agricultural goods, etc.).

There is another important difference between the agricultural working co-operatives in Eastern Europe and the kolkhozes in Russia. When a peasant leaves the kolkhoz or is expelled from it he loses all rights to the kolkhoz's property;

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423 when a peasant leaves the agricultural co-operative, he is
474 allowed, at least according to the law, to detach or sell the property he contributed or the plot he received in exchange.

On the other hand there are two factors which will render the results of 'collectivisation' in the satellites more severe than in Russia: 1. As we have seen, the increase in the grain output which followed upon 'collectivisation' in Russia was due in the main to the great extension of the area cultivated; but such an extension is out of the question in the countries of Eastern Europe. 2. Although Eastern Europe is not as suitable for meat and milk production as Western Europe, but, like Russia, is much better for growing corn, it already has many more branches than Russia of intensive farming (milk, pork, vegetables, wines, tobacco, etc.) whose prosperity is dependent on the existence of an urban population with a high and rising standard of living. The present regimes do not augur well for such a development.

Peasant Resistance

423 Although 'collectivisation' has hardly begun in the 'People's
474 Democracies', the agricultural policy of the governments has
668 already met with a peasant resistance which is on the increase. It is partly resistance to requisitioning and a protest against the lack of industrial goods and partly resistance to 'collectivisation' (of course these two reasons cannot be separated in practice).

Just as it was natural that the resistance of the working class to the industrial policy of the governments of Eastern Europe appeared earliest and was strongest in Czechoslovakia, the most industrialised country in the region (except for the Soviet Zone of Germany and Austria), so is it natural that the peasant resistance to their agricultural policy is boldest in Bulgaria. The reasons for this are: first, Bulgaria is the country least affected by the land reform, so that the peasants have not much to thank the Government for on this score; secondly, Bulgaria has the highest percentage of peasants engaged in small-scale intensive farming—tobacco, grapes, roses—so that the inducement needed to break their opposition to

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'collectivisation' is the greatest; thirdly, the basis upon which the 423
industrialisation of the country is taking place is the weakest 474
(except for Albania), and the industrialisation plan is the most 668
ambitious (except for Yugoslavia), so that the need to squeeze the peasant is the most desperate.* This last point is clearly illustrated by the targets of the various Plans, all of which aim at the 'collectivisation' of only a minority of the peasants—except the Bulgarian plan, which by 1953 aims to have 60 per cent of the peasants in co-operative farms.

The peasant resistance took the characteristic form of non-delivery of their quota of products. Despite the good harvest in 1948, by October 10th only one district had delivered its quota, 13 districts had delivered between 80 and 90 per cent, but many more had not even fulfilled half the quota. (*Rabotnichesko Delo*, organ of the Communist Party, October 15th and 17th, 1948). 1948 was bad enough, but 1949 was much worse. The sowing quotas were nowhere near completion on the final date, March 15th. Only 56 per cent of the wheat quota was completed, 45 per cent of the rye, 55 per cent of the barley, 51 per cent of the oat, and 14 per cent of the sunflower quotas. (*Otechestven Front*, 25th March, 1949). The Ministry of Agriculture reported that many villages met great obstacles in collecting grain. In the village of Dimitrievo, for instance, the Village Council showed no effort to fulfil its duty and barely 1,200 kilos of grain were turned in. The co-operative of Yaborovo village refused to give up its allocation. Many villages had very inadequate granaries, etc., etc. (*Otechestven Front*, 31st July, 1949).

That even members of the Communist Party were taking part in the resistance of the peasantry to the Government's agricultural policy was made clear in Dimitrov's speech at the Fifth Congress of the Bulgarian Communist Party (December 19th, 1948): 'In some villages there were "Party members" and even Party leaderships who did not head the campaign for ensuring food to the people and even de facto sabotaged the delivery of cereals. The same holds true for some village Communists who do not help and sometimes impede the creation

*Yugoslavia, too, did not undergo an extensive land reform, and its very ambitious plan for industrialisation is also based on a very low technical level. But there the peasants are much more tolerant towards the government, because of the threat of Moscow to it.

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423 of co-operative farms'. (G. Dimitrov, *Political Report to Fifth*
474 *Congress of the Bulgarian Communist Party*, Sofia, 1948, p. 80).*
668 The extent of the peasant resistance and its causes were admitted to at the Plenum of the Central Committee of the Bulgarian Communist Party on June 11th and 12th, 1949, where in an excess of 'Bold Self-Criticism', the Party laid bare its 'mistakes' and promised to relax its stringent policy towards the peasantry.

Shortly before the Plenum the Acting-Premier had said that 'no progress was registered since September 9th, 1944, in the output of cereals despite the import of tractors and other agricultural machinery and considerable agro-technical improvements'.

One of the reports to the Plenum says:

'We must admit that we have fastened the screw too tightly in our relations with the medium farmer . . . We must unloosen the screw and switch over to methods which will induce the farmer and especially the medium peasant, by an appeal to his self-interest, to improve and increase his production.'

The Plenum Resolution says:

'Excesses have occurred in the system of quota purchases, which have led to the requisitioning of practically the entire

*Two years later, in his report to the Plenum of the Central Committee (7th and 8th October, 1950) the new General Secretary, Vulko Chervenkov, gave many more details about the sabotage of the agricultural deliveries by Communist Party members and organisations. He said: ' . . . the former Minister of Home Trade last year, under pressure of various appeals from local organs, arbitrarily, quite irresponsibly, without the permission of the Central Committee of the Party and the Government, reduced three and a half times the plan for state grain deliveries. He was unable to grasp the fact that the appeals of the local organs reflected the pressure of private landowners and kulaks against the interests of the state.' ' . . . the party organisations in the districts of Bourgas, Gorna Oryakhovitsa, Rousse and Kolarovgrad . . . yielded to the pressure of a number of primary organisations which expressed private and kulak interests and attempted to wreck the plan for collecting the deliveries . . . ' The same crimes are attributed by Chervenkov to the first secretary of the Stalin District Party Committee, the vice-chairman of its People's Council and the representative of the Central Committee of the Party and Government whose special task was to inspect the collection of the state grain deliveries in the district. 'The District Party Committee and the District People's Council' of the Pleven district 'fell into the hands of the kulaks'; 'the inspector of the Central Committee of the Party attached to the Pleven district played an unenviable role'. In every possible way he supported the local leadership in its 'attempt to attain a reduction of the plan . . . ' The same crimes are attributed to the leadership of the Party and People's Council in Vratsa district and the representative of the Central Committee there, Dimiter Dimov, who was at the same time a secretary of the Central Committee of the Party and a member of the Political Bureau. And this happened after the big 'purge' of 'Kostovists' in 1949!

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marketable part of the produce at fixed low prices. This applies especially to grain farmers, who constitute the huge majority of our peasantry. In this way agricultural producers have been to a large extent deprived of their personal interest in developing and increasing production, improving its quality and generally raising the productivity of agricultural labour . . .' 423 474 668

'In the formation of the co-operative farms, instead of strict compliance with the laws, Government directives and Party instructions, throughout almost the whole country there have been irresponsbile requisitionings of the best and most favourably located land, which is incorporated in the co-operative areas, while the private farmers are given in exchange distant and barren plots. Farmers are not being compensated in accordance with the quantity and real value of the land.' '. . . peasants are forced to join co-operative farms while they are still unconvinced of their advantages . . .

'To this end the Plenum decides:

'1. That fundamental changes be made in the system of quota purchases so that, while preserving the principle of progressive quotas, agricultural producers shall be left the greater quantity of their excess stocks to sell them freely to the state, cooperatives and consumers at free prices.

'2. That a real and fair correlation be established between the price of cereals and the price of other agricultural products, industrial goods and artisan services; that the prices of cereals be raised . . .

'5. That producers be guaranteed the freedom to sell their surpluses directly to consumers, after delivering their quota to the state . . .

'8. That the supply of the village with staple industrial products, both from local industry and from abroad, be improved . . .

'10 . . . . returning in certain places fields wrongly requisitioned from private farmers who received in exchange land of less value'. (Quoted by *Free Bulgaria*, 1st July, 1949).

The extent to which the Government overdid the exploitation of the peasantry was revealed even more clearly both by the evidence given during the Kostov Trial about the position of the agricultural population, and from the rise in the official prices for agricultural products after the June Plenum.

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423 In the Trial the defendant Nikola Pavlov stated that for
474 some years up to the end of 1948 there had been 'a strict quota system which oppressed the peasants'. '. . . the quota system attained such proportions, that almost everything produced by the peasants was taken away from them, according to this order, and only such a part was left to them, which could only cover the current needs of their families. The quota system included almost all rural produce which served for direct consumption by the population, such as wool, eggs, meat, milk, potatoes, even including apples, chestnuts and peanuts . . .' This produced a sharp reaction. 'The peasants not only did not sow all areas that they had sown till then, but began to diminish them'. The deposition of Kostov showed very clearly that the poor peasants suffered no less from the quota system than the rich and medium peasants, and were no less discontented. 'The discontent of the poor peasants was also caused by the decree for the collection of wool . . . according to which even peasants owning 1 or 2 sheep were not exempted from the delivery of wool'.*

435 The extreme hardship the quota deliveries imposed on the[1]
474 peasants is illustrated by the fact that in 1948 they totalled
423 about 11 milliard leva, while free market sales totalled only 715 million.

How low had been the prices paid for the products taken from the peasants is revealed by the extent to which they were raised after the June Plenum: hard wheat was raised from 19 leva per kilogram to 25 (31.6 per cent); ordinary wheat from 17 to 23 leva (35.3 per cent); rye and oats from 15 to 20 leva (33.3 per cent); barley, millet seed and corn from 13 to 18 leva (38.5 per cent); sunflower seed from 25 to 30 leva (20 per cent); dried beans from 30 to 60 leva (100 per cent); lentils from 44 to 55 leva (25 per cent). (*Otechestven Front*, 2nd July, 1949).

*The question arises why we accept this part of the evidence when we consider the Trial as a whole to be a frame-up. (See pp. 301-2). It is one thing to believe in the reality of the meat shortage, the obnoxious character of the quota system and so on—which are known to everyone who lives in the country—and another to believe that only Kostov and his co-defendants were responsible for it, while the rest of the leadership saw nothing of it for three or four years. If we look back at the 'trials' of 'witches' in the middle ages, we may disagree with the 'prosecutor' when he accused the 'witch' of causing the outbreak of a plague, but still accept the accusation as evidence of the existence of a plague at the time.

1 [Bulgarian --- Analyst]

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The resistance of the peasantry has also compelled the 474
government to slow down its drive for 'collectivisation'. On 423
November 15th, 1949, *Otechestven Front* said that eighty-six government commissions had been set up to remedy mistakes in connection with the collective farms. They had to inquire into the activities of 1,264 co-operative farms (two-thirds of all the co-operative farms in the country) and examine 61,854 complaints of illegal requisition of land from peasants who had not joined the co-operatives. In 35,311 cases the land had been restored to its previous owners and those responsible for the mistakes punished.

The Bulgarian government is, it seems, compelled to go gently with the collectivisation drive, but it nevertheless does not renounce its aim. While on January 1st, 1950 there were 1,600 co-operative farms with 156,500 families and 1,377,050 acres, on October 1st, the number of co-operative farms reached 2,249, with 474,800 families and 4,707,700 acres. Thus 43.4 per cent of the agricultural population is in co-operative farms. (Vulko Chervenkov's Report to the Central Committee of the Communist Party, October 7th and 8th, 1950).

Bulgaria is not the only country to experience peasant 423
resistence to government policy. There is a food shortage in 474
Czechoslovakia. The Russians are not responsible for this, as 668
they buy scarcely any agricultural products from Czechoslovakia. Nor does Czechoslovakia export much food to other countries. There was a drought, it is true, but that was two years ago, and even at that time the number of livestock compared with pre-war was better than in any of the other satellites. Moreover the population was much below its pre-war number owing to the expulsion of the Sudeten Germans. The reason for the shortage must therefore be ascribed, at least partly, to the resistance of the peasants to delivering their products to the Government. The peasant resistance also expresses itself in the slowness of the progress of collectivisation. The Minister of Agriculture, Julius Duriš, said at the 9th Congress of the Communist Party, that in only 208 villages out of 13,000 were farm co-operatives operating (*Lidové Noviny*, 28th May, 1949). There had been many cases of almost open revolt at village meetings convened by the Communist Party to launch

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423 cooperatives, while other meetings had been boycotted by the
474 peasants. The General Secretary of the Party, Rudolf Slansky,
668 went as far as to say: 'The Party has failed to organise an explanatory campaign within its own rank and file, with the result that some Party members, not having been made to understand the significance of the co-operatives and not having been persuaded of their usefulness, have begun to waver and to fall under reactionary influences.'

Poland has had its troubles too. The Government was obliged to supply the wheat growers with far more industrial products than it had planned to do, and at lower prices than were prevailing on the free market. (*Glos Ludu*, May 4th, 1948). Other manifestations of peasant resistance disturbed the countryside. According to *The Times* of 25 January, 1949: 'During the last few weeks of 1948 at least 20 cases were published in the Government-controlled newspapers of Communist organizers killed while on duty in country districts. Most people think the figure much higher'. The Government in alarm retreated, and instead of carrying out its ambitious plan of organising 7,400 co-operative farms in 1949, reduced its target to a mere 200. (*The World Today*, August, 1949). The peasant resistance, although strong enough to slow down the collectivisation drive, did not divert the Communist leaders from their aim. On April 1st, 1949, there were 40 producer co-operatives in Poland; by October 1st, 145; by February 1st, 1950, 332, and by March 5th, 590. Of these 590 co-operative farms, 345 have been founded on a statute similar to that of the Russian kolkhozes, 192 are of what is called the second lowest type: 30-40 per cent of their net income is distributed as rent for land and implements pooled in the co-operatives and 60-70 per cent as wages for labour. 53 were of the lowest type: common cultivation of privately-owned land. (Roman Zambrowski, Secretary of the Central Committee of the P.P.R., in *For a Lasting Peace, For a People's Democracy!* March 10th, 1950). We may assume that the tempo of 'collectivisation' will be accelerated after the first experiments have been completed. An important step in hastening the 'collectivisation' was the decree that put the zloty at par with the Russian rouble: every peasant had until 13th November, 1950 to give up 100 old zloty for one new one, while as regards workers'

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wages and prices three new zloty were changed for 100 old 423
zloty. With their meagre savings swept away, the peasants' 474
resistance to collectivisation will be weakened. 668

Rumania has also experienced great peasant resistance to 'collectivisation'. In June, 1949, the government had to take strong measures against a partisan movement in the countryside, strongest in the Banat region. The government called the resisting peasants 'kulak hooligans', but a mere glance at its extortionate demands from the peasants belies this accusation. Every farm, down to the very smallest, must deliver large amounts of grain for low prices. For example, a peasant who has a farm of only 3 hectares must deliver 22 per cent of the yield for less than 20 per cent of the free market price. (*Neue Zürcher Zeitung*, 7th April, 1949). No wonder the peasants rebel. The 'collectivisation' of Rumanian agriculture is still at its beginning: in September, 1949, the number of co-operative farms was only 55.

In Hungary the government was very careful in approaching 423
the problem of 'collectivisation' and for a long time denied any 474
intention of proceeding with it. Thus, for instance, in a speech before a peasant meeting in Debreczen on June 29th, 1947, Premier Lájos Dinnyes said: '. . . . if the Government had any intention of creating kolkhozy it would not have carried out the land reform. What is good in one country is no use in another. A Hungarian Government which aimed to give up the principle of private property would be digging its own grave and the nation's. We aim to fortify the new peasantry'. (*The Times*, 30th June, 1947). After a certain amount of manoeuvring, nevertheless, the Hungarian Government did proceed to 'collectivise' agriculture, but it did so carefully and slowly. Up to November 1st, 1949, co-operative farms made up only 3.5 per cent of all the arable land of the country, and state farms another 3.5 per cent. Since then it has advanced considerably. In May, 1950, co-operative and state farms made up 17.8 per cent of all the land under cultivation.

In general it can be said that the process of 'collectivisation' is full of contradictions. Its aim is to secure food supplies and agricultural raw materials for the towns and for export, in order to facilitate industrialisation, as well as to get the necessary supply of labour power for industry and public work.

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423 The greater the speed of industrialisation, and the smaller the
474 existing amount of capital relatively to labour, the greater the speed of 'collectivisation'. Hence Bulgaria and Yugoslavia have gone much further along this road than the other 'People's Democracies'. At the same time, the greater the tempo of industrialisation, and the greater the subordination of the people's consumption to the needs of capital accumulation, the less the readiness to wait for the establishment of 'collectives' until the technical conditions for large-scale agricultural production (sufficient tractors, combines, etc.) exist, and until the peasants are convinced that large-scale agricultural production is superior, a conviction which depends largely on the readiness or otherwise of the government to supply the peasantry with industrial consumption goods. Social-political factors—the fear of the government, first of all, that it will be isolated or strongly opposed by the peasants—can modify the extent, the speed and the ruthlessness of the 'collectivisation' process.*

The Primitive Accumulation of Capital

000 When the British bourgeoisie first arose it had to drive the peasants off the land in order to get the surplus agricultural produce for the towns as well as the reserves of labour it needed for its growing enterprises. Britain went through this phase of development mainly in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries, of which Marx wrote: 'The history of this . . . is written in the annals of mankind in letters of blood and fire'. (*Capital*, Vol I, p. 786). In its rise the Stalinist bureaucracy must repeat the same process so as to get the wealth of the country under its control.

But much more blood flowed in Russia during this 'primitive accumulation' than in Britain. Stalin accomplished in a few hundred days what it took Britain a few hundred years to accomplish. The scale on which he did it and the success with which he carried it out completely dwarf the actions of the English landlords who let the 'sheep devour man'. They bear grim witness to the superiority of modern industrial economy concentrated in the hands of the state, under the direction of a ruthless bureaucracy.

*See pp. 246-8

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Engels made a prognosis about the future of primitive accumulation in Russia which has been completely realised, although in different circumstances from those which he ever imagined. In a letter to Danielson dated 24th February, 1893, he wrote: 000

'. . . the circumstance of Russia being the *last* country seized upon by the capitalist *grande industrie*, and at the same time the country with by far the *largest peasant population*, are such as must render the *bouleversement* caused by this economic change more acute than it has been anywhere else. The process of replacing some 500,000 pomeshchiki (landowners) and some eighty million peasants by a new class of *bourgeois* landed proprietors cannot be carried out but under fearful sufferings and convulsions. But history is about the most cruel of all goddesses, and she leads her triumphal car over heaps of corpses, not only in war, but also in "peaceful" economic development'. (*Marx-Engels Selected Correspondence*, London, 1941, pp. 509-10).

Marx and Engels were not describing the historical transition from class society to socialism, but the development of class society, of which Bureaucratic State Capitalism is another stage.

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PART II

POLITICAL LIFE IN THE RUSSIAN SATELLITES

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CHAPTER I

THE INITIAL SOVIET INTERVENTION: BULGARIA, RUMANIA, HUNGARY

★

648 NAPOLEON'S WORDS, 'Une armée dehors c'est l'État qui
661 voyage', apply very well to the Russian armies which overran the countries of Eastern Europe as a result of the Second World War. If the Russian state had been a liberating democracy where power was in the hands of the people, the entry of the Red Army into the Eastern Europen countries would have inspired their populations to take their fate into their own hands, put an end to the military police dictatorships that terrorized them and establish the full sovereignty of the people. But the policy of the Russian occupation authorities was entirely different. For the first two or three years their primary objective was to preserve as strong an army and police force as possible under the control of the Communist Parties. With this task in mind the Communist leaders skilfully manipulated the pressure of the masses to introduce 'loyal' elements into the army and police and at the same time allied themselves with reactionary, even ex-fascist, heads of the old army and police. The second aim of the Kremlin was to call a halt to any action of the peoples which bore a really democratic and spontaneous character and which might therefore impede the Gleichshaltung of all public life. To achieve this, the same method was adopted of making alliances with the most right-wing, reactionary elements against the authentic Socialist Parties, Peasant Parties and, above all, against the peoples themselves.

A study of political life in the satellite states must begin with an analysis of this policy.

642 *Pre-War Political Regime in Eastern Europe*

661 Before the war, all the countries dealt with (except Czecho-
728 slovakia) had lived under a military dictatorship camouflaged

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642 by a parlimentary facade. Workers' parties, peasant parties
661 and trade unions were all persecuted or forbidden, strikes were
728 suppressed in blood, and brutal mass executions were not unknown. To give only one example, 20-30 thousand workers and peasants lost their lives after the overthrow of the Peasant Government of Alexander Stamboliisky in Bulgaria in 1923. The secret police of Rumania, Yugoslavia and Bulgaria could boast of rivalling the Gestapo in all the refinements of torture. The press was gagged. Parliamentary elections were a farce, as votes were bought, electors were terrorized, and voting was open, although the counting of the votes was secret. It was no accident that in only one out of the many national elections held in Rumania between the two world wars, did the government that was called upon by the king to arrange the elections fail to get the expected majority! The corruption and depravity of the public administration was immense. Symbolical of this corruption was King Carol's notorious mistress, Magda Lupescu, who appointed and dismissed Ministers and high officials, distributed government contracts, etc. National minorities in general, and the Jews in particular, suffered from official oppression and from 'spontaneous' outbursts of hooliganism organised by government agents. The alliance with Hitlerite Germany of Rumania, Hungary, Bulgaria and many of the rulers of Yugoslavia seemed natural.

In view of these facts, it is not surprising that the collapse of the German military machine was greeted with joy by the overwhelming majority of the peoples of Eastern Europe, who hoped to get rid of the previous shameful political and social order. The breakdown of the Gestapo unleashed a tremendous. independent upsurge of the people. The first task of the Russian occupation authorities was to grapple with this mass activity.

Bulgaria

669 In Sofia and other towns armed workers arrested fascists
642 *en masse*, held mass demonstrations, set up elected people's
728 tribunals, disarmed the police and established a workers' militia. Local committees took over the administration and the red flag was hoisted over all public buildings. The ferment was equally great in the Bulgarian army. Thus *The Economist* of October 7th, 1944, could write:

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'Reports on the Bulgarian forces of occupation in Western Thrace and Macedonia vividly recall the picture of the Russian army in 1917. Soldiers' councils have been set up, officers have been degraded, red flags hoisted, and normal saluting has been abolished.'

But the Russian and Bulgarian Communist leaders did not welcome the initiative of the masses. On the contrary, they did everything to stop 'anarchy' and restore 'order'. When Molotov met the Bulgarian armistice delegation, he made the following declaration: 'If certain Communists continue their present conduct, we will bring them to reason. Bulgaria will remain with her democractic Government and her present order . . . You must retain all valuable army officers from before the *coup d'etat*. You should reinstate in service all officers who have been dismissed for various reasons'. (*The New York Times*, January 16th, 1945). And earlier, on September 21st, 1944, *The New York Times* correspondent in Sofia reported that 'Communist leaders are doing everything they can to prevent extremists in the party from agitating for sovietization of the country'. Of the Red Army he said: 'On several occasions when local Communists in the provinces tried to displace city officials and take matters into their own hands they were ordered by the Russian military authorities to return the jobs to the old officials until orders were received from the Fatherland Front Government in Sofia'. The Fatherland Front government hastened to establish order.

As regards the restoration of 'order' in the Bulgarian Army, the same article in *The Economist* states: 'M. Velchev (Minister of War in the Fatherland Front Government—Y.G.) has issued a stern order to the troops to return immediately to normal discipline, to abolish Soldiers' Councils and to hoist no more red flags. Now Sofia reports that the Bulgarian army has been placed under the supreme command of Marshal Tolbukhin. Apparently, the Soviet commander has no patience with Balkan repetitions of 1917 . . . The Bulgarian Left seems to be ready to accept this policy, but it may be questioned whether it would have agreed to it so easily if its author had been Colonel Velchev and not Marshal Tolbukhin.'

In its programme, the Fatherland Front Government was careful to emphasize that it stood for the social *status quo* and

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728 for the maintenance of private property. Immediately after its
642 establishment, the Communist leader, Anton Yugov, the
669 Minister of the Interior, declared: 'This government, of which I am a member and on whose behalf I speak, categorically denies that it has any intention of establishing a Communist regime in Bulgaria. There is no truth in rumours that the government intends to nationalise any private enterprise in the country.' (*The New York Times*, 22nd September, 1944).

642 A few months later, at the national congress of the Father-
471 land Front in March, 1945, another Communist leader declared: 'We are building a democractic country based on private property and private initiative. Consequently the Government by its very nature is reformist.' He severely attacked those members of the Communist Party who opposed the Fatherland Front Government and wanted 'to establish a completely Communist government.' An article in the official paper of the Fatherland Front, *Otechestven Front* (9th March, 1945) described the programme of the Front in these words: 'It is the programme of the Bulgarian workers, peasants, craftsmen and women, honest, intellectual, patriotic individuals, industrialists, merchants and patriotic soldiers.' In a congress of the industrialists of Bulgaria on September 27th, 1945, a Communist Minister, Dobri Terpeshev, said on behalf of the Supreme Economic Council: 'Private initiative will not be handicapped but supported. The Communists intend to revive it because our economy needs your initiative . . . Let us all work without being led on by thought of gain alone.' A year later the Communist Prime Minister, Georgi Dimitrov, declared: 'The immediate task is neither the realisation of Socialism nor the introduction of the Soviet system but the consolidation of a truly democratic and Parliamentarian system.'

642 From September, 1944, to October, 1946, the Fatherland
661 Front Government was headed by General Kimon Georgiev who not only played a leading part in the military, semi-fascist *coup d'etat* of Tsankov in 1923, as a result of which tens of thousands of workers and peasants were massacred, but was also the author of the military coup of 1934 which led to the immediate dismissal of Parliament, the terrible persecution of Communists, Agrarians and others, and, for the first time in

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Bulgarian history, the dissolution of the trade unions and their illegalisation.* Georgiev's supporters wielded such power in the Fatherland Front Government that *The Observer* of 10th September, 1944, could remark: 'The composition of the Government suggests that the group that has now taken over in Sofia is the famous Military League which took power by a *coup d'etat* in 1934.' But *The Observer* did not mention one very important exception. The Minister of the Interior, who controls the police, was the Communist leader, Anton Yugov. The Communist leaders joined hands with the old Military League in order to keep 'order', the first victims of which were any workers who demanded an improvement in their condition, or—even worse—dared to press for immediate steps in the direction of socialism. Thus Constantine Poulos, writing from Sofia on June 2nd, 1945, said: 'Bulgarian Socialists (are) far to the left of the Communists . . . The Greek workers who demanded "bread and work" last fall are now dead, in jail or terrorized into silence. The Bulgarian workers who recently made similar demands were publicly denounced by the Communists as diversionists and enemies of the state; a handful of coal miners who struck for higher wages in March were castigated as "anarchists" and rushed off to jail by the Communist-controlled militia.' (*The Nation*, June 23rd, 1945).

In spite of these precautions, the transfer of Bulgaria from the German side to the Russian was not carried out as smoothly as the transfer of Finland, Rumania and Hungary, because Bulgaria does not belong geographically to the Russian sphere proper, but is on the border between the Russian and Anglo-American zones. Hence when the Germans retreated, many members of the ruling strata of Bulgaria hoped to switch over from the side of Germany, not to Russia, but to England and the United States. Russia therefore could not rely implicitly on the Bulgarian state machine, and between September, 1944, and March, 1945, a large-scale purge was carried out by

*This is what *Imprecor*, the official Comintern paper, wrote about the 1934 coup: 'A new military-fascist *coup d'etat* has been carried out in Bulgaria. In the night prior to May 19th the Muchanov-Gitchev government was overthrown and a military-fascist dictatorship established under the leadership of *Kimon Georgiev*, a Lieutenant-Colonel of the Reserve'. 'The leading elements in the present coup also played a leading role in the 1923 coup'. (*Imprecor*, 1st June, 1934). Now the official *Free Bulgaria* describes Georgiev's role in the 1934 coup in these words: 'In 1934 he took the post of Prime Minister and re-established diplomatic relations between Bulgaria and the Soviet Union.' (August 1st, 1949).

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661 the law courts. As a result, two thousand people were con-
728 demned to death and executed and another few thousands sentenced to very long terms of imprisonment.

That the Bulgarian people were successfully 'kept quiet' is illustrated by the fact that until April, 1948, the Communists did not find it necessary to hold even sham elections to local authorities; heads of villages and members of local councils were officially appointed by the Minister of the Interior!

Rumania

728 Rumania was the first of the Eastern European countries
642 reached by the Red Army, and Russia hastened to declare its intention of non-intervention in her internal regime. On April 2nd, 1944, Molotov declared: 'The Soviet Government declares that it does not pursue the aim of acquiring any part of Rumanian territory or of changing the existing social order in Rumania. It equally declares that the entry into Rumania of Soviet troops is solely the consequence of military necessities and of the continuation of resistance by the enemy forces.'

Russia's intention of keeping 'order' was reciprocated by the willingness of the Rumanian King and governing circles to collaborate with her. With scarcely a ripple Rumania changed her allegiance from Germany to Russia, the whole state apparatus—army, police and administration—going over to the Russian side when King Michael on 23rd August, 1944, arrested the Prime Minister, Marshal Ion Antonescu and appointed General Sănătescu in his place.

In March, 1945, after a number of changes in the Rumanian government, brought about by direct threats and pressure from the Russian army of occupation numbering a million men, Petru Groza became Premier, supported by Vice-Premier Gheorghe Tătărescu and four of his friends from the so-called 'Liberal Party', an equal number of Communists, and a number of individuals representing nobody.

728 Of Tătărescu, the Comintern paper, *Imprecor*, of December
642 8th, 1933, had said: 'In 1907 the Liberal Party, at that time led
661 by Sturdza, caused no less than 11,000 peasants to be murdered. The bloody suppression of the peasant insurrection in Tatar-Bunar was also the work of the Liberals, under the leadership of *Tătărescu*, who is now the Minister for Trade and

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Industry. The Liberal Party is also responsible for the volleys fired on the 13th of December against striking workers, as a result of which over 100 were killed. 728 661 642

'In December, 1927, it was the Liberal Party which organised the bloody anti-Jewish pogroms. Bands of students roamed through the streets beating up passers-by. The Minister of the Interior at the time was Duca, and the Secretary of State, Tătărescu. Under Liberal government corruption and jobbery reached their culminating point. The same Liberal Party exercised a brutal repressive terror against the revolutionary organisations; it suppressed all revolutionary newspapers and caused numerous workers to be murdered. Under Liberal government the class courts of the Rumanian bourgeoisie have sentenced many of the best leaders of the working class to long years of hard labour or to long terms of banishment in the salt mines.'

Tătărescu represented the extreme authoritarian wing of the Liberal Party and helped King Carol to establish his dictatorship. His foreign policy was oriented towards Hitler Germany. The British Communist weekly *World News and Views* of November 19th, 1938, described him thus: 'Tătărescu, the leader of the Right pro-Hitler wing of the National Liberal Party.' 728 642

Mihail Ralea, Minister of Culture in the March, 1945, Cabinet, was formerly a Minister under King Carol and an open admirer of the Hitler regime. Today he is Rumanian Ambassador to Washington. Father Burducea, the Minister of Cults in the March, 1945, Government, was one of the most notorious Iron Guardists (he had the decoration of the Buna Vestire, which was awarded to only thirty-two Guardists). Lotar Radaceanu, the Minister of Labour, was in Carol's totalitarian 'Renaissance Front.' One of the chiefs of the Propaganda Ministry, responsible for controlling the press, was Gheorghe Macovescu. Under Antonescu's fascist regime he held the same position, writing articles hailing the German-Rumanian alliance against Russia. Groza himself, the Premier since March, 1945, was before the war a very rich man, an owner of a big estate, factories and large hotels, and with big banking interests. He had been a Minister in two extremely right-wing governments under General Averescu (1920-1, 1926-7).

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642 Groza[1] repeatedly stated that his government was against
471 any socialisation and stood for the defence of private property. For instance, in an interview with the correspondent of *The New York Times* on 26th September, 1945, 'Premier Groza said his Government did not intend to apply either collectivization of land or nationalisation of banks or industries and that the mere question showed an ignorance of its program. Claiming to represent all social strata, he said, the program was to "concentrate all the forces of the nation for the reconstruction of the country and to consolidate a democratic regime" and "in the Government's program there is no nationalization of banks or industries and no collectivization of land"' (*The New York Times*, 30th September, 1945).

Radio Bucharest reported that in a description of his recent talks with Stalin, Premier Groza had said that it was Stalin who had advised him to 'keep the system of private enterprise and private property.'

Nearly three years after the advance of the Russian army into Rumania, Groza still openly opposed the nationalisation of any property belonging to either Rumanian or foreign capitalists, even though the nationalisation of foreign property is part of the program not only of socialists but even of many nationalist movements in countries in which a great deal of foreign capital is invested, such as Mexico, Argentine, India, etc. In a statement to the Bucharest paper *Timpul* he said: '. . . the Government and the Parliament will make every effort possible in order to realize a fruitful field of collaboration for foreign capital . . . (There will be—Y.G.) conditions intended to secure to this foreign capital a guarantee of investment and a just rentability.' (*International News*, Bucharest, 8th January, 1947).

642 Even capitalists who collaborated wholeheartedly with
661 Germany were left untouched for more than three years, and the Communist Minister of Justice, Lucreţiu Pătrăşcanu went so far as to point out that Nazi collaborators were far more leniently dealt with in Rumania than, for instance, in France. *The New York Times* correspondent reported on 17th March, 1945: 'Industrialists, business men and bankers will escape punishment as war criminals, under a law being drawn up by Lucreţiu Pătrăşcanu, Minister of Justice, and Communist

1 [Premier of Rumania since March, 1945 -- Analyst]

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member of the Government, it was learned today. Rumania could not afford to lose the services of merchants and industrialists, M. Pătrăscanu said. He expressed the opinion that the country would pursue a more liberal policy toward this class than the French have.' What an outcry there would have been in the Communist press if a similar announcement had been made by a non-Communist Minister in the West! 642 661

Tătărescu did not hestitate to attack 'anarchists' (i.e., workers). In an interview with *The New York Times* correspondent in Bucharest on 21st October, 1945, he declared that a strenuous discipline must be introduced in industry and an end brought to the 'excesses' of the workers' committees.

It was hardly surprising that the capitalists faced the future with perhaps a little anxiety even if they were satisfied with the existing state of affairs. There was great optimism among businessmen, as the serious Swiss paper *Neue Zürcher Zeitung* pointed out (10th February, 1947) giving this illustration: 'As the Bucharest economic journal *Finantze si Industrie* reports, in the last year (1946—Y.G.) in Rumania there were established 355 new stock companies with a total capital of 20.3 milliard Lei.'

For years business continued to be good and speculation in the free market active, although the conditions of the working people were appalling and, after the drought of 1946-7, starvation stared them in the face. Some idea of the conditions of the people at this time can be got from '*A Survey of the Health of the People in Several European Countries affected by the War* published on November 19th, 1948, by *La Documentation Francaise* and consisting of reports of the International Committee of the Red Cross which describes the dreadful tragedy which overtook Rumania, the country most affected by the drought: 'It is difficult to convey the misery of the Rumanian population in 1947: famine prevailed in whole sections of the country, in some regions people were eating grass and the bark of trees and even clay. It is estimated that 6,000,000 persons were dependent on the government in 1947-48. Here are some of the consequences of the famine and misery which prevailed in this country: 1. The complete disappearance of little children in some districts . . . infant mortality actually reached a rate of 80% . . . 2. An increase of 511 262 165

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511 all kinds of diseases and a steep rise of the mortality rate;
262 corpses were thrown into sewers adjacent to the houses.
165 3. Universal poverty conducive to the spread of venereal diseases . . . one out of twelve persons is syphilitic according to recent reports furnished by the Minister of Health . . .'

All this time the fortunes of the capitalists were not touched as they were working for reparations for Russia. They and the new state bureaucracy flourished, while the lion's share of the surplus value produced in Rumania was taken, of course, by the Kremlin.*

642 The bureaucratic and militarist character of the Rumanian
693 state was not altered and many of the former officials remained in office. Of the legal system, Pătrăşcanu could say: 'The
645 procedures, methods, traditions and structure of Rumanian jurisprudence have remained unchanged since a Communist became Minister of Justice. No more than 20 new judges out of 2,000 have been appointed. About a quarter of the old staff have been purged or pensioned'. (*Christian Science Monitor*, 12th December, 1945). This policy is symbolised by the fact that 'Just two weeks before the start of the trial of Iuliu Maniu . . . a discreet announcement was published in Bucharest newspapers recording the appointment of a new chief of the military tribunal of the second army corps district (the one to preside over Maniu's trial—Y.G.) . . . the wartime director general of all prisons and concentration camps in Rumania'. (*New York Herald Tribune*, 7th November, 1947).

701 The structure of the army remained hierarchical, with the
645 complete subordination of the soldiers to their officers, and with no soldiers' committees. For three years even the composition of its personnel showed a marked continuity with the past. For instance, Lieutenant-Colonel Nicolae Cambrea, commander of the Rumanian units fighting against Russia at Stalingrad, was promoted by the Groza government to the rank of General, and appointed Assistant Chief of Staff. Major Popescu-Argetoia, an active Fascist in the past, was put at the head of the secret police. General Vasiliu Rascanu, Chief of Military Police during the war against Russia, was appointed Minister of War. Another old general, Pretorian, was appointed Chief of Staff at the same time. General Lascar,

*See above pp.

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Brigadier-General on the anti-Soviet Front in 1941, who 701
received the Knight Cross of the Iron Cross from Hitler, was, 645
after joining the Communist Party, considered 'loyal' enough to be appointed Minister of War!

The enthusiasm of the Communist Party for 'law and order' 642
is illustrated by their ardour for the monarchy. On November 662
3rd, 1946, Premier Groza declared: 'The King, the Church, 665
the Army, the People and the Government are one'. A few days later, at a meeting of the Communist-controlled Front organisation, the National Democratic Bloc, Vice-Premier Tătărescu said: 'From Gheorghiu Dej (leader of the Communist Party—Y.G.) to myself we shall all fight together for the consolidation of the Monarchy, because we are convinced that the King is the strongest factor that rallies all Rumanians. We shall fight for the consolidation of the National Church and of private property, the source of all creative enterprise'. (*East Europe*, an informative London weekly, 13th November, 1946). On November 8th, King Michael's birthday, the Communist daily *Era Noua* said: 'The people of Rumania have faith in their King.' (*East Europe*, 20th November, 1946). In the election demonstrations of the National Democratic Bloc, a constantly repeated slogan was 'Trăiască Regele!'—'Long live the King!' On 17th November, 1946, at an army electoral meeting in Bucharest, Gheorghiu Dej concluded his speech appealing for a vote for the 'King's Government': 'Long live the King!' 'Long live his commanders and soldiers! Long live the Army which is his and the people's!' The monarchist enthusiasm of the Communist Party reached such heights that they attacked the Peasant Party leader, Maniu as . . . anti-monarchist. Thus *Era Noua* of December 3rd, 1946, referring to the withdrawal of Maniu and his followers from parliament, suggested that 'in fact, Maniu's unparliamentary attitude is only a guise for his anti-dynastic policy. Maniu has already tried his first obstructive move in King Michael's reign. . . Neither Ferdinand nor King Carol were exempt from Maniu's political tactics'! (*East Europe*, 18th December, 1946). To crown the hypocrisy of the leaders of the Communist Party, on November 8th, 1947, their paper, *Scanteia*, wrote: 'The people wish to His Majesty the King a long life, good health, and a reign rich in democratic achievements' (*The New York Times*, November 9th,

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642 1947). A few weeks later the Communist leaders compelled
662 Michael to abdicate (30th December).
665

Hungary

642 The policy of the Communist Party in Hungary in the first
728 stage of Russian intervention was similar to their policy in
471 Rumania and it is therefore unnecessary to describe it in detail.[1] The following quotation from the report of Nagy Imre, a member of the Political Bureau of the Party, to its congress in September, 1946, is typical of many declarations: 'While the war was still being fought, we have determined, and this is one of the basic principles, that in Hungary this is not the time for transition from capitalism to socialism, for struggle between the two social systems, but for uprooting the powerful remants of feudalism. It is not a question then of struggle between the two social systems but of the struggle between democracy and reaction within capitalism.'

The connection between this policy and Russia's interest in gaining control of the Hungarian economy (through mixed companies) and in extorting reparations from her, has already been described.[2] Here it is only necessary to repeat that for three years the Communist Party leaders continued to harp upon the same theme, that they were against abandoning the capitalist structure of the country.

[1] [See category 116, pp. 136-141 -- Analyst]

[2] [See category 116, pp. 60-62 -- Analyst]

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CHAPTER II

POLAND: THE WARSAW UPRISING

THE OPPOSITION of Russia and its agents to any spontaneous, independent and democratic action by the masses was revealed in the most damning way when the people of Warsaw, organised and led in the main by the Polish Socialist Party (P.P.S.), rose in arms against the German Army of Occupation. Russia's attitude towards the heroic uprising shows up the sinister and anti-democratic character of her policy during the critical stages of the process by which the Communists took control of the state machine. 669

In July, 1944, the Soviet Army advanced towards Warsaw, and in the second half of the month, German troops began to be evacuated *en masse* from the city and its environs. On 29th July the Soviet Army under the command of Marshal Rokossovsky entered Otwock, 20 kilometres from Warsaw. The next day they reached Miłosna, 10 kilometres from Warsaw. On 31st July, mobile patrols of the Soviet Army had advanced as far as Praga, a suburb of Warsaw on the east bank of the Vistula. Every night military targets in Warsaw were bombed by the Soviet air force. The Germans continued to withdraw their exhausted troops, but held on to the eastern end of the bridges in Praga. Then the Russian artillery began to bombard Praga. The Vistula was crossed near its confluence with the Pilica and this threatened the German garrison from the south, while on 1st and 2nd August the Vistula was crossed higher up near Sandomierz.

The situation in Warsaw itself was described thus: 'The Germans were evacuating Warsaw at high speed. Railway installations and industrial plants were dismantled and removed . . . All the German offices in the city, including the Post Office, closed down. Newspapers published by the Germans ceased. The Gestapo burned documents in the

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669 greatest haste and prepared to decamp . . . German civilians besieged the railway stations. On account of the inadequate number of trains, they fled by all possible means of transport, offering sky-high prices for the hire of a horse and cart'. (T. Bor-Komorowski, *The Secret Army*, London, 1950, p. 206).

The Germans ordered the mobilization of 100,000 Poles for the fortification of the suburbs of Warsaw, but not a single Pole presented himself. A Soviet broadcast reported later that prior to the last week in July 'a tense atmosphere could be felt in Warsaw. The Germans, it was said, were obviously preparing a new massacre of the population'. (Statement by Colonel Tarnawa, a Polish officer, who was in Warsaw at that time, Soviet Home Service, September 2nd, 1944. Quoted by the Duchess of Atholl, *The Tragedy of Warsaw and its Documentation*, London, 1945).

During this period the Polish organisation which acted as the mouthpiece of the Kremlin—the Union of Polish Patriots—issued increasingly urgent appeals to the population of Warsaw to rise and fight the Germans. On July 29th, Radio Moscow broadcast an appeal of the Union: 'Appeal to Warsaw. Fight the Germans. No doubt Warsaw already hears the guns of the battle which is soon to bring her liberation. Those who have never bowed their heads to Hitlerite power will again, as in 1939, join battle with the Germans, this time for the decisive action.

'. . . For Warsaw, which did not yield but fought on, the hour of action has already arrived.

'The Germans will no doubt try to defend themselves in Warsaw. . . It is therefore a hundred times more necessary than ever to remember that in the flood of Hitlerite destruction all is lost that is not saved by active effort, that by direct active struggle in the streets of Warsaw, in its houses, factories, and stores we not only hasten the moment of final liberation but also save a nation's property and the lives of our brothers.'

On July, 30th, the radio station of the Union of Polish Patriots, Radio Kościuszko, declared: 'Warsaw trembles from the roar of guns. The Soviet armies are pushing forward and are near Praga. They come to us to bring us liberation. The Germans, when pushed out from Praga, will attempt to hold

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Warsaw and will try to destroy everything. In Bialystok they sacked everything for six days. They murdered thousands of our brothers. We must do everything to avoid a repetition of these horrors in Warsaw. People of Warsaw, to arms!' 'Attack the Germans . . . Assist the Red Army in crossing the Vistula'. (*Manchester Guardian*, 22nd August, 1944). 669

On 1st August, Warsaw rose against the Germans. Women and children took their place among the fighters. Although poorly armed with only home-made mortars and hand grenades, the people of Warsaw fought heroically, and by the 3rd the insurgents had control of the greater part of Warsaw.

On 2nd August, the Germans launched a counter-attack against the Soviet Army and on the eastern and north-eastern fronts drove it back to a distance of 50 miles from Warsaw (where the Soviet Army remained until 28th August). But on the south-east of Warsaw the Soviet Army maintained its position at a distance of some 15 miles from the city. The retreat of the Soviet Army made it impossible for it to give immediate direct support to the Warsaw insurgents. But it was in a position to do a great deal to help them. The Luftwaffe had been bombing the town incessantly since August 4th, and Soviet fighters could have intercepted the German bombers, and Soviet bombers could have bombed both the airfields from which the German bombers took off and the gun sites from which the Germans bombarded the city. Moreover, the U.S.S.R. could have supplied the insurgents with the arms they needed so desperately.

On 5th August, a Soviet officer of the Intelligence Service, Captain Constantin Kalugin, was sent to the insurgents' headquarters in Warsaw. He despatched the following telegram to Moscow (via the British authorities in London, reaching Moscow on 8th August):

'Comrade Marshal Stalin, Moscow. On 5th August, 1944, established personal contact with the commander of the Warsaw garrison who is leading the heroic struggle of the Polish nation against the Hitlerite bandits. After acquainting myself with the general military situation, have come to the conclusion that in spite of the heroism of the army and entire population, there are certain difficulties to be overcome if we are to hasten on the victory over our common foe. The needs

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669 are as follows: motorised weapons, ammunition, grenades and anti-tank guns.

'Places for dropping arms by parachute: Wilson Square, Invalids' Square, the Ghetto, Krasinskis' Square, Iron Gate Square, Napoleon Square, the Mokotow Field, the Light Cavalry barracks, Bielany.

'Recognition signals: white and red sheets.

'German aircraft are causing destruction in the town and among the civilian population. Bomb from the air the bridges over the Vistula in the Warsaw area, the Saxony Park and Jerusalem Avenue, Wolska Road, where the enemy troops are concentrated. Bomb the aerodromes of Okecie and of Bielany. The population of Warsaw hopes that you will come to their help within the next few hours. Help me to come in touch with Marshal Rokossovsky. Captain [Constantin Kalugin of the Czarny Group, Warsaw, 66.804'. (Z. Zaremba, *Powstanie Sierpniowe*, London, 1946, pp. 30–32).

All the appeals of the insurgents to Moscow for arms, for fighter aircraft to be sent to defend Warsaw from the terrible bombardment, and for the German airfields and gun sites to be bombed were in vain. The Soviet Air Force which throughout August and September occupied airfields only a few minutes' flight from the city and which, until the insurrection, regularly bombed military targets in Warsaw, now completely ceased activity in and around Warsaw.

Moscow's very lame excuse for not sending arms to the insurgents was the danger that the arms dropped would fall into the hands of the Germans. At a foreign press conference in Lublin on August 28th, General Michal Rola-Zymierski, Commander of the Polish forces under the high command of the Red Army, said: 'If the insurgents had one entire district, it would be possible to help them, but when they held only isolated buildings, everything must fall into German hands'. (*The Daily Worker*, August 30th). This explanation is proved to be specious by Captain Kalugin's telegram cited above, by *The Times* statement that it was the Germans who held only 'widely scattered islands' and above all by the fact that in the middle of September, when the area in the hands of the insurgents was much smaller, Russian arms were dropped in Warsaw.

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Another excuse for the Kremlin's policy was put forward by Anna Louise Strong (for twenty-three years an apologist for Russian policy, but since 'purged' as an 'American spy') in an article in *The Nation* of September 2nd, 1944: 'The Red Army thus far has taken many cities, some by storm and more by outflanking, but the Red Army never took a city by the correlation of a frontal attack with an uprising within the city. The Red Army always discouraged such tactics'. That is the revolutionary Red Army! 669

From 4th August, British and American planes based in Italy began to reach Warsaw—a flight there and back of 1,300 miles. Such a distance was beyond the range of fighter cover, so that the flights had to take place at night, thus increasing the number of casualties and detracting from their effectiveness. For only three days did the R.A.F. supply Warsaw adequately. After that only single planes reached the city from time to time. It was evident that 'if the (Allied) planes, after dropping their loads, could fly on the short distances to behind the Russian lines and "shuttle" back, the operation would be far easier, and the casualties far lighter'. (*Daily Herald*, 30th August, 1944). Such a 'shuttle' service already existed elsewhere. British and American planes bombing the Rumanian oilfields, Koenigsberg, Gdynia and other German centres, used to come down in Russian-held territory. But *forty days* elapsed before Moscow agreed to allow these planes to carry supplies to besieged Warsaw or to bomb German bases in the city and its surroundings, and then to fly behind the Russian lines and 'shuttle' back, or even to allow damaged British and American planes to land on Russian-held airfields.

On 14th September, the Soviet Army occupied Praga and in the next three days they forced the Germans back a number of miles to the north-west. Soviet planes cleared the sky above Warsaw of German planes, and began to drop arms and food. But after a few days there was another sudden change in Russian policy. The Soviet Army holding Praga halted, its artillery ceased fire, its aeroplanes disappeared almost entirely and the Luftwaffe reopened its murderous attacks. Occasional consignments of arms and food were the only help given by the Russians. The Soviet Army which occupied the eastern quarters

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669 of Warsaw for another month stood by while the German army murdered the Warsaw rebels.

After a heroic and unequal struggle lasting 63 days Warsaw fell. 240,000 of its inhabitants were killed and 630,000 deported by the Germans. The city was destroyed systematically, house by house and street by street.

During the period of the uprising, any Polish partisans who tried to reach besieged Warsaw were stopped by the Soviet Army, disarmed and arrested. (Altogether the Russian army arrested 50,000 of the Polish partisans fighting the German army and deported them to Siberia).

The Communists use two main arguments to justify Russian policy towards the uprising: first, that it was ill-timed, and secondly, that it had a reactionary character.

The first argument is belied by the appeals, quoted above, sent out by Radio Moscow to the population of Warsaw to rise, and by the fact that the Soviet liaison officers who were sent to Warsaw at the beginning of the uprising (of whom Captain Kalugin was one) supported the rising unreservedly. Further, the small group of Communists in Warsaw itself declared in favour of the uprising. The official Communist organ *Armia Ludowa* stated on 15th August: 'The armed uprising has found the support of the broadest masses of Warsaw's people, quite independently of who started it and for what purpose, and that is its strength.' (This, incidentally, is in sharp contrast to the ridicule which the Communist papers in Moscow, London and New York heaped on the uprising). Seventeen days after the beginning of the uprising the Kościuszko radio station declared its support: 'Our camp, the camp of fighting democracy, has always welcomed any sign of fighting against the German invader. We have always called you to arms and have seen in an active struggle the surest means of saving men and national property. We see in the present rising in Warsaw a manifestation of the fighting spirit of the democratic camp and the Warsaw fighting is to us as sacred as any act of combat against the enemy'. Two days later the Lublin radio of the Union of Polish Patriots proclaimed: 'The Warsaw uprising proves the fighting spirit of the democratic camp. Our (Polish—Y.G.) infantry burns with the desire to help Warsaw. Also the soldiers of the Red Army are hurrying to assist the capital.

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Warsaw will be liberated . . . Polish soldiers and the Red Army are coming to assist you.' (Quoted by L. M. Oak in the American *New Leader*, November, 13th, 1944). 669

Even more monstrous than the description of the rising as untimely is its condemnation as reactionary and fascist in character. If the Warsaw uprising had really been reactionary the Kremlin's attitude to it would have been very different. It is enough to recall the goodwill manifested to General Béla Miklós of Hungary and King Michael of Rumania. Russia was hostile to the Warsaw uprising precisely because it was quite independent of Communist influence, was dominated by the P.P.S. and was a socially progressive movement.

After the military defeat of September, 1939, which marked the disintegration of the dictatorial semi-fascist regime of the 'Colonels', the workers and peasants, organised in the P.P.S. and in the Peasant Party, became the backbone of the underground army, called Armia Krajowa (A.K.), the Home Army. The extreme right did not belong to the A.K. but to the National Armed Forces (Narodowe Sily Zbrojne). Military units of the P.P.S. and the Polish Peasant Party joined the A.K. and retained their identity as autonomous units. The clandestine parliament—the Council of National Unity—relied mainly on the workers and peasants.

The programme of the Home Army was described in its underground organ, *Biuletyn Informacyjny* of 9th September, 1943, in an article entitled 'What Kind of Poland are we Fighting for?' This clearly stated that the future Poland must have 'freedom of speech, freedom of opinion, freedom of association; it will be a Poland of social justice and welfare for the wide masses, liberated from capitalistic chaos; a Poland which will nationalise its great factories and plants; a Poland which will fundamentally transform its agrarian regime, modernize its system of distributing goods, expand its network of co-operatives and industrialize the country'. 185 669

On 15th August, 1944, after the Warsaw Commune's 15 days' existence, the Council of National Unity issued a manifesto to the people which included the following statement:

'In this war, Poland is not only fighting for her existence and political independence, but also for loftier aims. The Atlantic Charter, which defined the military aims of the United Nations,

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185 assures to Poland its legitimate aspirations and its historic
669 needs. Threatened by repeated aggression of imperialist Powers, she must be certain of security and the possibility of working in peace for generations. She wants to be able to govern herself according to her own principles and laws. These principles have already been published in the declaration of 26th July, 1944. They guarantee the regime of the future Republic based on political liberty and social justice.

'The principles of the Polish democratic Republic are as follows:

'1. A constitution guaranteeing governments in accordance with the will of the people.

'2. A democratic electoral law faithfully reflecting public opinion through general and municipal elections.

'3. Agrarian reform covering all estates of over 50 hectares as well as German landed property determined by a preliminary decree; the surplus population being directed towards industry and handicrafts.

'4. Socialisation of key industries.

'5. Participation of the workers in the management of enterprise and control by the workers of industrial production.

'6. All citizens have the right to work and to a decent standard of living.

'7. A just redistribution of the social income.

'8. All citizens have the right to education and culture.' (Zaremba, *La Commune de Varsovie* (Fel.) Paris, 1947, pp. 39-40).

Although the Warsaw uprising had basically a national-liberatory and social revolutionary character, it nevertheless had many negative, reactionary elements in its leadership. The P.P.S. leaders, with their inclination to compromise, and in the name of 'national unity', agreed to keep the military leadership in the hands of army experts headed by General Bor-Komorowski. The Russian Government let Hitler murder the rebels of Warsaw, not because their commander came from the old Polish Army, but because the rebellion was an expression of new forces, nationally and socially independent of the Kremlin.

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CHAPTER III

YUGOSLAVIA— THE EXCEPTIONAL CASE

UNLIKE THE Communist Parties in the rest of Eastern Europe, the Yugoslav Communist Party took power not through the agency of the Russian army of occupation, but through the support of the masses who had rallied round it during the years of struggle against the German and Italian invaders and their collaborators. 668

The invasion of Yugoslavia by the Axis armies led to the complete collapse of the old state structure. Croatia and Bosnia split off and formed an 'independent' Croat state headed by Ante Pavelić; Slovenia was absorbed into the German Reich; Dalmatia was occupied by the Italians; south-eastern Serbia and eastern Macedonia were annexed by Bulgaria; Baranya, Bačka and Medjumurje were taken over by Hungary; and the province of Banat and Serbia proper were ruled by a quisling government under General Milan Nedić.

It was obvious that there had not been much love lost between the non-Serbs of Yugoslavia and the old chauvinistic Serbian rulers. The fascist elements among the non-Serbs used this hostility to divert the hatred felt for the Belgrade administration into a general national hatred of the Serbs, and one of the most sordid incidents in Yugoslav history ensued. The Ustashe—the Croat fascists—began a pogrom on a huge scale against the Serbs, during which 810 thousand Serbs, men, women and children, were callously murdered and whole villages razed to the ground. Moslem fascists in Bosnia also took part in the carnage. Some villages saved themselves from annihilation at the hands of the Croats by renouncing the Greek Orthodox Church and embracing Catholicism. The Catholic hierarchy of Croatia and Bosnia undertook an 563 668 661

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563 energetic crusade against Serb 'infidels.' Serb fascists retaliated
668 by murdering Croats and Moslems *en masse* in Bosnia, Herze-
661 govina, Dalmatia and elsewhere. While engaged in this communal slaughter, the quislings of each nation—Croats, Slovenes, Moslems and Serbs—collaborated with Berlin or Rome or with both.

642 Unlike them General Draža Mihailović, the military com-
668 mander of King Peter and his government in exile, stood for a united Yugoslavia including all the nations, but united under the rule of Serbia. His Chetniks were ready to take an active part in the massacre of Croats and Moslems, and Mihailović himself called upon the Allies to bomb Zagreb, the Croat capital, in revenge for their treachery. He even circulated propaganda maps of a future Yugoslavia in which Croatia was reduced to a small strip of land. To the Croatian, Montenegrin, Slovenian and also Serbian peasants and workers the old centralised administration symbolised by Mihailović represented the tax-collector, the gendarme and the corrupt local official. Mihailović's policy condemned him to increasing isolation and so to impotency, and finally to collaboration with the Germans and Italians against Tito's Partisans.

668 The only Party which fought for the unity of Yugoslavia on
186 the basis of the equality of all its component nations was the
563 Communist Party. The refugees from the pogroms constituted the first Partisan units, and the communal conflicts faced Tito's movement squarely with the problem whose solution proved to be decisive for its successes in the struggle for the liberation of the country from Axis occupation.

By a policy of national equality and of opposition to all communal conflicts, whether led by Ustashe and Moslem pogromists or Nedić and the Chetnik 'avengers', the Communist Party of Yugoslavia succeeded in welding the different peoples together. As Lieutenant-General Svetozar Vukmanović (better known as 'Tempo') said in his speech on the occasion of the celebration of 'Yugoslav Army Day' on 22nd December, 1947: 'The fighting of the Serbian and Montenegrin proletarian and shock brigades in Bosnia and Croatia; the fighting of Bosnian, Croatian and Montenegrin units in Serbia; the fighting of Serbian, Croatian, Bosnian, Macedonian, Montenegrin and Slovene units on the Srem front and beyond, for

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the ultimate liberation of Croatia, Bosnia, Slovenia, etc.—all this was an enormous contribution of the Yugoslav Army in the struggle for the establishment of unity among the peoples of Yugoslavia.' The unity of the peoples and their equality was symbolised in the fact that a Croat (Tito) led the revolt in Serbia, a Serbian Jew (Moše Pijade) led the rising in Montenegro, and a Montenegrin (Vukmanović) led the partisans in Macedonia.

This policy explains the phenomenon that military units of Italians, Hungarians and even German partisans fought in Tito's army. A large number of Italian soldiers joined the Partisans after the fall of Mussolini and formed the Garibaldi Volunteer units which were large enough to consist of a number of divisions. In the Slovene littoral, where Slovenes and Italians live side by side, Italian and Slovene Partisans formed common units, and Italians took an active and equal part in the work of the People's Committees, the embryonic administration of the new state. In spite of the cruelty displayed by the Hungarian occupation armies in the zone which they annexed, a cruelty greater even than that of the German armies, Tito succeeded in recruiting a battalion of Hungarian volunteers, the Petöfi Sandor battalion. There was also a Czech battalion in the Partisan Army. In July, 1943, a campaign was launched to enlist members of the German minority living in Yugoslavia in the Partisan army and this campaign met with some success, a Volksdeutsche battalion being organized to fight with the Partisans.

The social programme of Tito's Partisans was conservative. The Anti-Fascist Council of National Liberation (A.V.N.O.J.) —the Partisans' parliament—at its first meeting in Bihać on 26th November, 1942, proclaimed a programme, two of whose points were:

'The inviolability of private property and the providing of every possibility for individual initiative in industry, trade and agriculture.

'No radical changes whatsoever in the social life and activities of the people except for the replacement of reactionary village authorities and gendarmes who may have gone over to the service of the invaders by popularly elected representatives truly democratic and popular in character. All the most

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668 important questions of social life and State organisation will be
185 settled by the people themselves through representatives who will be properly elected by the people after the end of the war.'

These aims were constantly reiterated by the Partisan press and radio during the remaining three years of the war.

To illustrate the conservative character of the Partisans' social programme, it is only necessary to quote the oath taken by the new Croat volunteers: 'I swear by God Almighty and by all I hold dear that on my word of honour I shall always be true to the traditions of my ancestors. I will always fulfil trust towards the Croat people and will defend with my blood my national home from the German, Italian and Hungarian oppressors, and the traitors of my people. So help me God'. (Radio Free Yugoslavia, 13th June, 1943).

To reinforce this appeal to tradition a confessor or chaplain (vjerski referent) was attached to all the large military units.

668 This policy met with opposition from some members of the Communist Party of Yugoslavia. An uprising in July, 1941, in Montenegro raised the banner of 'Soviet Montenegro', and in Herzegovina, deviations from the Party line by the Party organisation called forth harsh criticism from Aleksandar Ranković, one of the foremost leaders of the Party and today Minister of the Interior. (*Proleter*, December, 1942). In spite of some leftist deviations, however, the Bihać programme was consistently implemented until the liberation of all Yugoslavia.

668 Until the end of 1944, no social changes or changes in
471 property ownership were introduced. On 14th February, 1945, Vice-Premier Kardelj insisted in a broadcast that in her economic structure Yugoslavia had not abandoned and would not abandon the general framework of capitalism.

The Bihać programme could be adhered to with comparative ease because the areas in the hands of the Partisans were those to which social conservatism was most acceptable. Both the most industrialised parts of Yugoslavia, Slovenia and Northern Croatia, came into the Partisans' hands only at the end of 1944 or beginning of 1945. The area in which there was a considerable number of rich peasants and German settlers, whose land would have been suitable for redistribution among the poorer peasantry, was also in the North. Thus until the end of 1944 or beginning of 1945 there were not many capitalists

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or rich peasants under their control and therefore no obvious targets for social discontent. 668 471

After that the industrial bourgeoisie was expropriated, without a formal renunciation of the Bihać programme, by the legal confiscation of the property of traitors. It was not until 5th December, 1946, that a nationalisation law was passed and this simply registered what was already an accomplished fact.

Because the Partisans operated far from the industrial centres, they consisted almost entirely of peasants. Although the workers of Yugoslavia supported the Communist Party almost to a man, they played a very small part in the movement. In the words of Bogdan Raditsa, a former press service director of the Tito government: '. . . the working class was far from being a vital factor in the resistance, as the Communists allege in their propaganda. For the workers remained in the big-city factories or were sent into Hitler's labor camps'. (*New Republic*, September 16th, 1946). The peasant character of the Partisan movement explains its original plebeian and democratic character. It also explains why the Communist Party of Yugoslavia could easily impose its conservative programme upon it during 1941-44 and why the Partisan Army was easily transformed into a stratified army, a development common to many peasant guerillas, for instance, the Spanish guerillas fighting Napoleon. 668 701

In the beginning there was real democracy in the army. There were no ranks and no medals and after each operation meetings were held at which each partisan had the opportunity of making a public criticism of any aspect of the operation. For two years during the first four Offensives which put the Partisans to their severest test, this procedure was followed. But on May Day, 1943, the ranks of officers and N.C.O.'s were introduced, and in the next four months about 5,000 officers and 11 generals were created; Tito was raised to the rank of Marshal in November, 1943. In the state administration, the principle of electing People's Committees was rigorously adhered to in the countryside until the Partisans advanced from the mountainous and backward areas to the large towns, when they were no longer elected but *appointed*. When, as sometimes happened, elections were held, they were only a formality, as there was only one list of candidates. The

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668 701 471 The generals, colonels and other officers of the[1] army became the backbone of the new state administration and monopolised all political power. It was this new bureaucratic caste which carried out the nationalisation of industry, transferring all the industrial wealth of the country into its own hands.

Thus the Partisan movement passed from being a plebeian democracy with a progressive policy on the national question and a conservative social programme, to bureaucratic state capitalism.

[1] [Partisan army of Yugoslavia -- Analyst]

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CHAPTER IV

THE COMMUNISTS TAKE CONTROL OF POLICE AND ARMY

AT THE END of the war, the Communist Parties were participating in governments with bourgeois parties not only in the 'Peoples Democracies,' but in France, Italy, Belgium, Austria and Finland. For about two years the Communist leaders called for 'national unity' and 'order' against strikes and workers' struggles in general. In France, Italy, Belgium, Austria and Finland, at the end of the honeymoon period, the Communist Party representatives left the governments or were thrown out of them and went over to the opposition, while in the 'Peoples Democracies' they took full control into their hands. This difference was due to the fact that the Communist Party did not take control of the police and army in any of the Western European countries as they did in the East. In none of the first group of countries did the Communists succeed in getting control of the Ministry of War and only in Austria and Finland did they for a time hold the portfolio of Minister of the Interior and hence control of the police. Even in Finland they did not completely succeed in 'purging' the police of 'unreliable' elements and introducing their agents, so that when the Communist Minister of the Interior—Leino—lost his position in the government, his power to use the police as a means of resistance was very limited.

The situation in all the satellite states was very different. Almost from the beginning, the Ministers of the Interior were Communists. They used their positions to recruit the old police officers into the Communist Party, or to replace them by new Communist Party members. As there are, of course, no statistics to show the changes in the party composition of the police in these countries, one can only rely for information on fragments of news in the press. However, in the case of Czechoslovakia there is the evidence of Hubert Ripka, who was the

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Minister of Foreign Trade in Czechoslovakia until February, 1948, and who is now in exile. He states that on the eve of the Communist coup of February 'All the important posts in the Ministry of the Interior were occupied by Communists; in the division of the security police, of nine departmental heads, five were Communists. At the head of the three branches of the Corps of National Security Police (S.N.B.) there were only militant Communists: Colonel Krystof, Dr. Hora and Dr. Goerner. In one of the particularly important sections of the security police (Section III–2), of nineteen officers, fourteen were Communists. In the directing office of the Corps of the National Security Police, of thirteen officers, nine were Communists. At Central headquarters of the political police, the three chief posts were in Communist hands. In the intelligence services the Communists dominated, even in the lower ranks. In the Prague headquarters of the provincial S.N.B., of five high officers, four were members of the Communist Party. Of seventeen regional directors of the S.N.B. in Bohemia, twelve were Communists. Of a total of seventy high officers of the S.N.B., about sixty were members of the Communist Party'. (*Czechoslovakia Enslaved*, London, 1950, p. 195). In the other satellites, there is no doubt that the Communist infiltration into key positions in the police was even more thorough. It is an apt comment that Andrássy Ut in Budapest, in which the dreaded headquarters of the Special Security Police is found, now bears instead the name of Stalin!

A similar situation existed in the army. A symbol of the complete control of the Kremlin over the armies of the satellite countries was the appointment of the Soviet Army Marshal, Constantin Rokossovsky, as Polish Minister of National Defence (7th November, 1949) in place of Marshal Michal Rola-Zymierski.* Rokossovsky was born in Warsaw when it was part of Russian Poland, but has had as much to do with Poland as the Irish-born Field-Marshal Montgomery with his native country. He became famous, or more exactly notorious, in Poland, at the time of the Warsaw uprising, as the commander

*Rola-Zymierski was one of the few of Pilsudski's Legionnaires who took an oath of allegiance to the Germans in World War I. He was a commander of the Polish Army in the war against Russia in 1920. In 1927 he was tried and convicted on a charge of bribery, degraded, cashiered and sentenced to five years' imprisonment. The Kremlin raised him to the position of Commander-in-Chief of the Polish forces and Minister of National Defence.

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of the Russian armies which passively looked on while the Nazis massacred the rebels. After the war he was groomed for command of the Polish Army by being kept in Poland as Commander-in-Chief of the Soviet troops guarding Russia's lines of communication with the Soviet Zone of Germany. 661 701

The Chief of Staff of the Polish Army, General Korczyc, and the Vice-Minister of Defence, General Poplawski, are also former commanders of the Soviet Army. On April 24th, 1950, the emigre Hungarian Communist monthly *Magyar Kommunista* reported that Soviet Commander General Mensikov, had been appointed 'Supervisor of the Hungarian Army.'

Besides controlling the 'national' armies the Kremlin keeps troops in four of the satellite countries, officially to protect the lines of communication leading to the Soviet Zones of Germany and Austria. These are Rumania, Hungary, Bulgaria and Poland. The only two countries with no Russian army are Czechoslovakia and Yugoslavia. The former, bordering on the U.S.S.R. and squeezed between Poland, Hungary, the Soviet Zone of Germany and the Soviet Zone of Austria (with a short frontier with the American Zone of Germany) is from the military point of view well 'looked after'. In Yugoslavia, the non-existence of a Russian army and the fact that there is no frontier with the U.S.S.R. were of no small importance in the daring revolt of Tito against the Kremlin.

Secure in their control over army and police, the Communists could proceed to the elimination of all other parties. 1/1

1/1 [See category 116, pp. 160 - 182 -- Analyst]

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CHAPTER V

LIQUIDATION OF THE PEASANT PARTIES

665 A VERY SEVERE and prolonged struggle took place between the Communist Parties and the Peasant Parties. The latter were neither as black as the Communist leaders painted them, nor as white as the majority of the western capitalist press tried to represent them. The peasant parties were of very diverse character and each of them was far from being homogeneous. Progressive and reactionary, democratic and totalitarian elements were mingled in the same parties. To follow the Communist Party policy towards them it is necessary first to understand the complex character of the peasant parties.

665 565 471 Since the economic, cultural and political leadership of a country rests with the towns, and since the peasants of Eastern Europe were dispersed in small, isolated villages, the leadership of the peasant parties mainly came from the towns. The urban population was divided into conflicting social and political groups, and so the question always arose of which class the peasantry would make its ally—the urban bourgeoisie or the workers' parties. The peasantry is divided amongst itself, the rich peasants naturally looking to one camp, and the poor, semi-proletarian majority, to the other. A whole series of socio-political problems is bound up with this. So long as the big estates were not divided up, the peasantry as a whole remained united in the fight for land reform. and their party had a more or less revolutionary character. But with the carrying out of large-scale land reforms after World War I in Rumania, Yugoslavia and Bulgaria (see pages 13-8), there was very little to hold the peasantry together and no common political platform. Another factor must be taken into account. For centuries, the peasants in many countries, as for instance in France at the time of the Great Revolution, wanted to get rid of

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their feudal overlords, take possession of their lands and thus gain the freedom to produce for themselves and sell their products in the towns. Such a programme would have been quite inadequate for the East European countries in the period between the two wars, because of the catastrophic fall in agricultural prices as a result of the world crisis and of the great agricultural over-population. The solution of the problems of the peasantry today is not in land distribution alone, but also in industrialisation which will absorb the surplus agricultural population and open up wide markets for agricultural products. There is a contradiction, at least temporarily, between these two factors and different layers of the peasantry have different attitudes towards industrialisation as well as towards the policy of keeping agricultural prices high (by tariffs).

The poor peasants who need to work at least partly for wages and do not produce enough food even for their own needs, have an interest in industrialisation and low prices for agricultural goods, while the rich peasants who want cheap labour do not care about industrialisation and support any policy which results in a rise in the cost of food. Large scale industrialisation is impossible under present conditions in Eastern Europe without State planning, so that the poor peasant naturally tends to support the socialist forces of the towns while the rich peasant looks in quite a different direction for leadership. After the land reform and in face of widespread unemployment, open and hidden, the rich peasants could not propose any positive programme to rally the mass of the peasantry to their side. Another factor contributed to the bankruptcy of the Peasant Parties of Eastern Europe. While on the whole they favoured democracy, the market for the agricultural products of Eastern Europe in the thirties was mainly fascist Germany. Hence the attitude of many of the leaders of the peasant parties to the pro-German policy of their governments was ambiguous, to say the least. To add to the contradictions in which many of the peasant parties found themselves, was the national question which the conservatism and narrow outlook of the peasantry, especially of its rich and well-satisfied section, precluded them from tackling. In Yugoslavia, Rumania and Czechoslovakia this factor was of the utmost importance in leading the official peasant parties into a blind

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665 alley. If any of the peasant parties succeeded at all in escaping
565 control by the wealthy townsmen or by the rich peasants,
471 capitulation to their semi-fascist government, entanglement in a hopeless and reactionary fight against other nations, as the peasant parties of Poland and Bulgaria did to a large extent, and the terrorism of the government rendered them powerless. Unlike the workers' parties, the peasant parties were loose organisations of widely scattered individuals with the control of the organisation concentrated in a few hands (in the towns) and so they were an easy target for the police.

665 Some facts about the peasant parties in East Europe before the end of World War II will illustrate these generalisations.

The Rumanian National Peasant Party came into being in 1926 by the fusion of the chauvinist, anti-Hungarian National Party of Transylvania led by Maniu, and the Peasant Party of the Old Kingdom of Rumania led by Ion Mihalache. The Party was led entirely by lawyers, journalists, etc.,and a small group of rich peasants. For years it was sharply opposed to the dictatorial King, and there were frequent and bloody clashes with the fascist organisations and the police. But a party under the leadership of rich peasants and their urban allies in a country where eighty per cent of the population was poverty-stricken could never consistently pursue a democratic policy. During his short periods of office between the two world wars, Maniu ruthlessly suppressed the strikes of the miners and railway workers in 1929 and 1933. Although he had been for years one of the leaders of the democratic opposition to King Carol and his agents, yet at a time when there were armed conflicts between the peasant members of his own party and the Iron Guard fascists, Maniu suddenly in 1937 declared an election pact with the Iron Guard, simply as a tactical manoeuvre against his old opponent Tătărescu and after the assassination of the Iron Guard leader, Codreanu, by the King, Maniu offered a refuge in his party to the Iron Guardists. The Peasant Party behaved with extreme brutality towards the Hungarian minority in Transylvania. During the 1930's when democracy in Rumania was reduced to a sham and when the dictatorship became increasingly open and brutal and millions were looking to Maniu for a call to rebel, he went no further than to writing some articles of protest in the press.

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During the German-Soviet war, he supported the alliance of Marshal Antonescu with Germany. It was only after the Rumanian army reached the Dniester (the pre-war border of Rumania which Russia had violated by annexing Bessarabia—in which Rumanians constituted the majority—in 1940 and which many Rumanians still claimed as the boundary of Rumania) that Maniu called on Antonescu to stop the war. But he was content with publishing 'open letters' to Antonescu and made no appeal to the people for action. 665

The Croat Peasant Party under the leadership of Stepan Radić, and after his assassination, of Vladko Maček, had mass support, but the national question proved to be its Achilles heel. After the land reform in Croatia, the leadership of the Party was in the hands of rich people who were generally nationalistic and opposed to Belgrade. Most of the nationalist bourgeoisie of Croatia also joined the Party. Hence in the words of H. Seton-Watson: 'Originally a social revolutionary movement, the party became a nationalist organisation directed by the urban middle class'. (*Eastern Europe Between the Wars, 1918–1941*, Cambridge University Press, 1945, p. 227).* The Party became more and more chauvinistic and anti-Serbian in its propaganda, and when in 1941 the quisling Croat Pavelić massacred the Serbs, many of the leaders of the Croat Peasant Party collaborated with him. The Party as a whole, if not collaborationist, was at least a passive spectator of the German occupation.

The record of the Serbian Peasant Party was no better, but as it never had such a mass influence and revolutionary character it had a lower level from which to decline. H. Seton-Watson describes it in these words: 'It had its full complement of business men, small-town traders, urban intellectuals and public officials. It was a party of the peasantry only in the sense that it relied on peasant votes, and that its leaders possessed proficiency in a style of tavern oratory which commended itself to some, but increasingly few, peasants'. (Ibid. p. 241).

The Smallholders' Party of Hungary, headed by Tibor Eckhardt in the days of Horthy and later by Ferenc Nagy, had

*H. Seton-Watson's is by far the most objective and profound study of the politics of Eastern Europe between the two world wars that has been written, and I am very much indebted to it.

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665 an even worse record than the National Peasant Party of Rumania. Eckhardt himself took an active part in the White Terror against workers, peasants, communists, socialists and liberals, after the downfall of Béla Kun's Government (1919). For years he and his supporters clamoured for a revision of Hungary's frontiers at the expense of Rumania, Czechoslovakia and Yugoslavia. During the war, Eckhardt appeared in America and led an agitation for the restoration of the Austro-Hungarian Empire ruled by the Hapsburg dynasty. The Smallholders' Party was a rich peasants' party par excellence, not concerned to defend the poor and oppressed amongst the peasantry. On the contrary, it willingly collaborated with the Horthy regime in stifling any peasant resistance.

Between the wars the Czechoslovak Agrarian Party was so completely controlled by the rural and urban rich that it became the most important party of the ruling bourgeoisie which directed the state.

The two mass peasant parties in Poland and Bulgaria were of a somewhat different character. The peasant movement in Poland was split into three groups: on the right there was the conservative wing, Piast, and on the left there were the two organisations Wyzwolenie and Stronnictwo Chłopskie. In face of the strengthening dictatorship of Pilsudski the three organisations united in 1931 into one called Stronnictwo Ludowe (S.L.) The world economic crisis drove the members of the Stronnictwo Ludowe to more and more radical demands: the partition of all the large estates, the strengthening of the peasant co-operatives, drastic cuts in taxation and improvement of social services. The party co-operated with the Polish Socialist Party, which at that time was leading struggles with wide popular support against the Government of the Colonels and against the ruling classes generally. The co-operation between the Stronnictwo Ludowe and the P.P.S. reached its climax in the mass ten days' peasant strike of August, 1937, against the government, a strike in which the workers in many big towns joined as an expression of their solidarity. The police suppressed the strikes, killing many strikers (officially the casualties were 42 but actually they were much greater), and wounding an even greater number. There can be

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little doubt that if war had not threatened, the stuggles of the peasants and workers would have resulted in the overthrow of the dictatorial regime. 665

In Bulgaria the peasant party—the Agrarian Union—took many years to recover from the overthrow of Stamboliisky in 1923. The majority of its leaders were either assassinated or forced into exile and it was not until 1933 that the government, in response to popular pressure, allowed the uncompromising Agrarian leaders to return. Opposition developed between the right wing Agrarian leaders such as Dimiter Gitchev and Alexander Obbov who were ready to collaborate with the Government, and the left wing Agrarians, the most important of whom were G. M. Dimitrov and Nikola Petkov. Because of their radicalism, these two were called 'fellow-travellers' of the Communist Party. The *Central European Observer* of 12th January, 1945, wrote of their party that it 'has always made friendship with Russia and Yugoslavia its chief aim.' (See also *International Press Correspondence* of November 13th, 1937, praising G. M. Dimitrov as the leader of the left wing of the Agrarian League, the 'Pladne' group, called after its paper).*

There were two other very small radical peasant groups, the Hugarian 'village explorers' (now united in the National Peasant Party) and the Rumanian Ploughmen's Front.

Without taking into account the internal contradiction in the peasant parties between their progressive, democratic and reactionary chauvinistic elements and the consequent splits, it is impossible to understand how the Communist Parties destroyed such big movements so easily and quickly.

An important feature of the Communist Party policy towards the peasant parties was that of 'divide and rule.' They split each peasant party into different wings, so that they could play one off against the other. The Communists did not necessarily co-operate with the more progressive and democratic group against the other. Their policy was determined solely by expediency and not principle. For instance, in Bulgaria, 661

*Ten years later the Communist-controlled Agrarian Union paper, *Zemedelsko Zname* wrote: Nikola Petkov 'In 1931 belonged to the agrarian "Pladne" group, whose connections with foreign reactionary circles were all too well known.' (Quoted in *Free Bulgaria*, 1st October, 1947). It seems it was only to *International Press Correspondence* that this was not well known.

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66/ Nikola Petkov* was very popular, and so could be more independent than the Communist Party liked. This objection did not apply to Kimon Georgiev, who, as stated above, was one of the leaders of the 1923 and 1934 *coups* and, after 9th September, 1944, was an influential member of the Bulgarian Government. Similarly Obbov, the leader of the right wing of the Agrarian Union, was so unpopular as a reactionary that the Communist Party felt safe in establishing around him a National Agrarian Union. To have some idea of how restricted was the popularity of Obbov and Co. compared with that of Petkov, we need but compare the circulation of the official paper of the Agrarian Union *Zemedelsko Zname* with the paper of the Opposition Agrarian Union *Narodno Zemedelsko Zname*: on November 1st, 1945, the circulation of the former in Sofia was 1,900 copies, and of the latter 35,250 copies. To 'ally' with the publishers of *Zemedelsko Zname* rather than with those of *Narodno Zemedelsko Zname* was therefore more convenient for the Communist leaders. (Of course, when this 'coalition' ceased to be necessary for Moscow's agents, it could easily be dismissed; and since December, 1947, Obbov has disappeared from public life and according to repeated rumours is under house arrest).

Black as his record was, Maniu was a progressive and consistent democrat compared with Tătărescu. To prove this, Maniu had only to quote some of the declarations of the Rumanian Communist Party before the war, such as that of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of Rumania, on November 18th, 1937:

'The Tătărescu Government is a Government hostile to the people and hated not only by the masses of the workers and peasants but also by great sections of the middle class. Its domestic policy, consisting in a fascist transformation of the country coupled with the starvation of the masses and its foreign policy, consisting in preparation for war and for a gradual steering of Rumania into the wake of Hitler Germany, have given rise to considerable discontent among the broad masses of all sections of the population.'

'In consideration of the growing menace of fascism and war, the *Communist Party of Rumania* again appeals to all democratic

*Nikola Petkov's brother, Petko Petkov, a minister in Stamboliisky's government and after the latter's assassination the general secretary of the Agrarian League, was murdered in 1924 by Georgiev's supporters.

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parties and organisations to concentrate all forces for the mobilisation of the masses. The Party appeals to the Social Democratic Party, the trade unions and all other working-class organisations to bring about immediately unity of action and trade union unity. The Party appeals to all democratic forces of Rumania to act in concert for the immediate mobilisation of the workers, peasants and all other sections of the labouring masses of the Rumanian people and of all other nations living in Rumania in order to prevent the interference of Nazi Germany in the internal affairs of Rumania, in order to achieve the dissolution of all Nazi agencies in Rumania (the fascist and Trotskyist parties and organisations), the prohibition of their propaganda and the arrest of their leaders, and in order to set up in place of the pro-fascist Tătărescu Government a government which would adopt the slogan "for peace, liberty, bread and land" and would unite all democratic parties and organisations with the national Zaranist Party (Maniu's Party—Y.G.) in the lead.' (*International Press Correspondence*, 27th November, 1937).

In defending himself against the Communist Party's attack, Maniu tried to quote such statements as this, but of course the Communist-controlled censorship and police were on the alert. On January, 1946, the censor of the Russian Occupation Authorities struck out an item in the Opposition paper *Ardealul* which gave a verbatim quotation from the 1938 edition of the *Small Soviet Encyclopaedia* in which Maniu's party was described as anti-Fascist, democratic and pro-Soviet. (*Manchester Guardian*, 14th January, 1946). The Communists obviously could not allow Maniu to quote what they had repeatedly said about him in the years 1936-39. Now the slogan of their alliance with Tătărescu in the General Elections of 1946 (which allotted 75 seats in the new Parliament to Tătărescu's party as against 68 to the Communists) was: 'Do not vote for Maniu, who shot the workers in 1933.'

When the Russian Army entered Poland, a group headed by Andrzej Witos, Wladyslaw Kowalski, Wincenty Baranowski, Antoni Korzycki, Jozef Putek, Bronislaw Drzewiecki and Stanislaw Banczyk proclaimed themselves the leaders of Stronnictwo Ludowe, (S.L.), the Peasant Party. Some of them, like Kowalski, Korzycki, or Baranowski were simply Communists in

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661 disguise. Banczyk left the group at the end of 1945 when Mikolajczyk, the genuine leader of the S.L., came to Poland, and he joined Mikolajczyk's new Party. The choice of Andrzej Witos to be the Chairman of the S.L. was a clever step from the Kremlin's point of view. He was the brother of the old popular Peasant Party leader Wincenty Witos. He had been a member of the Peasant Party 'Piast'. When he was expelled from the party in 1928 he joined the 'Colonels', who suppressed the movement of the workers and peasants and condemned Wincenty Witos to a long period of exile. After a time, when it became clear that the peasants did not fall for the trick, and recognized the difference between the two brothers, Andrzej Witos was dropped from the S.L. leadership. To assure success to Kowalski and his friends, the authentic leadership of the old S.L. had to be removed from any political activity. Consequently the Soviet Army arrested the General Secretary of the real Peasant Party, Kazimierz Baginski, and two members of its Central Council, Stanislaw Mierzwa and Adam Bien; Baginski and Mierzwa belonged to the left wing of the Party. They were later released after having obviously been ill-treated in prison. But the threat of arrest still hung over the heads of the real leaders of the Peasant Party. When Mikolajczyk was allowed to come back to Poland (the Kremlin had to keep up an appearance of 'democracy'), he organised the old Peasant Party under the name 'Polish Peasant Party' —P.S.L. In a short time, the Party had hundreds of thousands of members and its strength was revealed in the general elections of January, 1947. In preparation for the election, the Polish security police (Urzad Bezpieczenstwa, headed by the Communist official, Stanislaw Radkiewicz) arrested tens of thousands of P.S.L. supporters. In Cracow alone, for instance 15,000 P.S.L. supporters were arrested on January 18th and released on January 19th, too late to vote. Of 864 P.S.L. candidates only 428 were allowed to stand. At 97 per cent of all the polling stations—6,430 out of 6,726—the P.S.L. was not allowed any representatives. Of the 296 polling stations which admitted scrutineers from the P.S.L., in only 35 were they allowed to be present at the count itself; at these 35 the official results gave the P.S.L. 62 per cent of the votes and the Government bloc 38 per cent.* When

*For a full report on the elections see L. M. Oak's articles in the American weekly *New Leader* of February 15th and 22nd, 1947.

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this failed to break the morale of the P.S.L., the security police began to arrest more and more regional leaders of the Party. Mikolajczyk had to flee the country, and the P.S.L. offices and papers were transferred to the subservient S.L. which could thus declare, without fear of opposition, that there was a 'unanimous' will in the two parties for fusion.* 661

The liquidation of the P.S.L. was not a difficult task for the Kremlin's agents, as the P.S.L. had the characteristics of the other peasant parties mentioned above which made it an easy prey for anyone seeking its destruction—the atomisation of the peasantry, its dispersal in small villages, its lack of a positive programme after the land reform was instituted, the influence of the division of the peasantry into different and antagonistic layers, etc. In its hopelessness the P.S.L. resorted to opportunism. This was illustrated by the position it took in a referendum held on 28th July, 1946. The Communist leaders decided to put three issues before the country aiming at a demonstration of unity: the abolition of the Second Chamber (Senate), the land reform and nationalisation and the new western frontier. Mikolajczyk called upon his supporters to approve the second and third issues, but to vote against the first. The peasant movement had always been against a Second Chamber, and it was the sheer opportunism of 'Realpolitik' which made Mikolajczyk flout the tradition of the movement. The same opportunism revealed itself in another, much more dangerous tendency, a readiness to accept the support of fascists and semi-fascists who opposed the Communists and looked for a legal framework for their activity. The P.S.L. was not very much strengthened by this, and it lost many of its more progressive supporters among the peasantry, the intellectuals, and of course the workers, because of it. Its disintegration was facilitated by such policies.

In Hungary the once powerful Smallholders' Party which in the general elections of November, 1945, won 59 per cent of all the votes, was transformed by 'purges', arrests and suppression of free speech at meetings and in the press, into a mere sham of a party. The spurious character of the present Smallholders' Party is most clearly revealed by the fact that

*For very detailed reports on the regimentation of the Polish Peasant Party see the series of articles of A. Rudzienski in the American weekly *Labor Action*.

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661 although the present Prime Minister is a member of this party, he is rarely mentioned in the Hungarian press and his name, István Dóbi, is hardly known to the people.

The peasant parties of Yugoslavia, which in the past were very strong, apparently exist officially even today, but none of them has a daily, weekly, or any other paper and none of them is represented in Parliament. Their last representative was Dragoljub Jovanović, whose record included years of imprisonment under King Alexander's dictatorship. He was a secretary of the People's Front and a Minister in Tito's Government. But how could Tito forgive him when he declared in Parliament: 'The Communists are wonderful. They liberated us from the King and the Church; it only remains for them to liberate us from the Communist Party'? He was immediately expelled from the Government, from the People's Front, from his own Serbian Peasant Party and from his position as a professor at the University of Belgrade. Thus he became the one-man opposition to the Government in Parliament. But Tito could not tolerate any dissentient voice and steps were taken to close his mouth. In February, 1947, he was beaten up and severely wounded by hooligans. (The Yugoslav press did not mention this incident). Immediately afterwards he was tried and sentenced to nine years' imprisonment.

The fate of Stalin's quislings in the sham peasant parties was often grim. Thus, for instance, Romulus Zăroni, Minister of Agriculture in the first Groza Government, and Moga and Belea, the people who had led the Ploughman's Front since its foundation in 1934 in South Transylvania, when it was a small organisation with genuine peasant suppport at least locally, were removed from any positions they held after Moscow found they had served their purpose. The two most prominent leaders of the Hungarian 'village explorers' (after the war renamed the National Peasant Party) were Imre Kovács and Péter Veres: the former resigned his post as General Secretary and succeeded in escaping abroad; the latter was driven out of public life.

687 The important part played by the Communist-controlled
625 police in the liquidation of the peasant parties not only in Yugoslavia but also in the other 'People's Democracies' is clear from the following testimony of Peter Koev, an M.P. and a

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close friend of Petkov's. As Koev himself was too weak after his 'interrogation' to read his own statement in Parliament, Petkov read it for him: 687 625

'I shall first describe to you how the interrogation at the Militia Prison was carried out, so that you may have an idea of how "confessions" are produced, and of how Communist charges are built up. You reach a state of utter physical and moral collapse. You become completely indifferent towards your own life and fate, and you long only for an end, any end, which will bring a reprieve from suffering. But the complete collapse comes only at the moment when you realize that you are defenceless, that there is no law and no authority to protect you, and that you are in the hands of your interrogators for ever. This is actually what they try to make you believe right from the very beginning.

'The procedure is different from the one we have known so far. Now they first explain your guilt and then they ask confessions to prove it. The methods to obtain the confessions are mainly three: physiological—hunger, thirst, and lack of sleep; physical—torture; psychological—hints that your family have been arrested, will be tortured, etc.

'But let me tell you exactly what happened to me. For two days after my arrest I was confined to a small dark cell and given no food whatever. On the third day I was taken to the office of the chief of the Department of State Security. There I met Ganev, the chief of the Department "A" and the militia inspector, Zeev. They told me that I had been found guilty of an act of sabotage—the burning of Russian cotton stocks at the port of Burgas, in 1945, and that I had also taken part in the organization of a planned *coup d'etat* against the Government by Generals Velchev and Stanchev. They told me that I was the link between General Velchev and General Stanchev. Then they read confessions written by several officers giving details of their own guilt as well as of my own "participation" in the conspiracy.

'Immediately after that I was sent back to my cell and was not bothered with any interrogations for twenty-one days. I was left to "ripen". The first method used to achieve this was hunger—I was given only a little bread and water every day On the twenty-second day, a Saturday, at eight o'clock in the

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687 morning, I was taken up to the fourth floor for the second
625 interrogation. It lasted without a break until eleven o'clock of the following Thursday morning. The interrogation went on, day and night, for twenty-four hours round the clock, without a stop, the interrogators themselves being changed every three hours. During all this time I was left standing, without any sleep, without any bread and, what is worse, without any water. I was handcuffed and I was not allowed to lean either on the wall or on the table. Every three hours the new interrogators asked the same identical questions, so that in the end I knew every question by heart. After the first twenty-four hours I did not feel any hunger. The lack of sleep makes your head feel hollow, and then it starts making funny noises. The interrogators insist that you repeat the same dates, the same names, the same hours, etc. On the fifth day I collapsed and was taken back to my cell, where I immediately fell asleep and slept for twelve hours.

'Waking up I thought the interrogation was over, but the same night, at eleven o'clock, they took me upstairs again into a bigger room. The Inspector Zeev, who was in charge of my interrogation said my obstinacy had obliged him to change his methods to something really tough. At his orders I was put on the floor. My hands were tied behind my back, and I was gagged. Then, for about two hours, I was beaten on the feet with a thick rubber whip. During the beating Inspector Zeev asked the same questions. The interrogations and the beatings were repeated four nights in succession. During the last night, besides many inspectors and militiamen, the Chief of the Sofia Militia, Veselin Georgiev, was also present. I was then thrown back into my cell, and I was not disturbed until 4th November, at half-past ten in the evening, when I was set free. After ninety days under arrest I was not asked any more questions, nor have I been given notice of any official charge against me.

(Signed) PETER KOEV.

Sofia, 29th November, 1946, National Assembly.'

(Michael Padev, *Dimitrov Wastes no Bullets*, London, 1948, pp. 93–4).

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CHAPTER VI

THE LIQUIDATION OF THE SOCIALIST PARTIES

BEFORE THEIR LIQUIDATION by the Communist Parties, the different Socialist Parties of Eastern Europe varied greatly in strength, both absolutely and relatively to the national Communist Parties. The Polish Socialist Party was incomparably stronger than its Communist rival; the Hungarian Socialist Party was much stronger than the Communist Party; in Rumania they were of about equal strength; in Czechoslovakia the Socialist Party was much weaker than the Communist Party and in Bulgaria it was weaker still; in Yugoslavia a Socialist Party scarcely existed. It is, therefore, most instructive to examine in detail the fight of Moscow against the Polish Socialist Party, while referring only briefly to the fate of the Socialist Parties in the other countries. 665

For various reasons the Communist Party of Poland (K.P.P.) was never as strong as the Socialist Party (P.P.S.) The forerunner of the K.P.P. was the Social Democracy of the Kingdom of Poland and Lithuania (S.D.K.P.i.L.) whose founder and teacher was Rosa Luxemburg. This great Marxist thinker had one very mistaken conception which proved to be a serious impediment to the Polish Party; this was her opposition to any fight for Poland's independence from Russia, Germany and Austria. The ill-fated invasion of the Red Army in 1920 further convinced the masses that the K.P.P. was indifferent to Poland's independence. Karl Radek, who knew Poland well, told the Bolshevik leaders that the Red Army's advance on Warsaw would only isolate the K.P.P. and advised against it. Although he was supported by Trotsky, his warning was ignored by the Bolshevik Party leadership. This was an important cause of the failure of the K.P.P. to gain the support of the majority of the Polish workers. Since the S.D.K.P.i.L. 661 665

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was older than the Russian Social Democracy, and hence older than the Bolshevik Party which was originally a faction of the Russian Social Democracy, it had traditions of independent thought that inevitably clashed with the rising absolutist bureaucracy in Russia. In 1923 the majority of the Central Committee of the K.P.P. supported Trotsky against Stalin in the internal Party fight, and after his triumph, Stalin liquidated the Luxemburgist-Trotskyist leadership. Later he had to liquidate the supporters of Bukharin, the President of the Comintern. Later still even the new leadership of the K.P.P. appointed in 1930, did not conform to the 'Line' and had to be liquidated. As Poland lay on the Russian border and the K.P.P. was illegal, the most important leaders of the Party were usually in U.S.S.R., and were thus involved in the big purges of the thirties. Many of them were executed or perished in forced labour camps—Domski, Sofia Unschlicht, Warski-Warszawski, Kostrzewa-Koszutska, Prochniak, Huberman (brother of the violinist), Winiarski, Sochacki, Lenski, Rval, Zarski, Wandurski and Jasienski. (For full details of the fate of the Polish Communist leaders in Russia see the article of P. Olchovski in *Narodnaya Pravda,* Paris, September, 1950). Apparently the purge so decimated the K.P.P. leadership that the Russians found it necessary officially to dissolve the Party (1938). (Their excuse that a large number of police spies had infiltrated into the Party would have been a reason for reorganising, not abolishing it). Shortly after the liquidation of the K.P.P. an event occurred which made any Kremlin supporter hateful to the Poles—the Stalin-Hitler Pact which laid Poland open to invasion. No Pole could forget Molotov's glee when he said before the Supreme Soviet on October 31st, 1939: 'Instead of the enmity that was fostered in every way by certain European powers, we now have a rapprochement and the establishment of friendly relations between the U.S.S.R. and Germany . . . One swift blow to Poland, first by the German Army and then by the Red Army, and nothing was left of the ugly offspring of the Versailles Treaty . . . ' Nor could any Pole forget or forgive Molotov's message to the German ambassador in Moscow at the end of the invasion of Poland by Germany and Russia: 'I have received your communication regarding the entry of German troops into Warsaw. Please convey my congratulations

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and greetings to the German Reich Government. Molotov.' (R. J. Sontag and J. S. Beddie, editors, *Nazi-Soviet Relations, 1939-41*. Documents from the Archives of the German Foreign Office, U.S. Department of State, Washington, 1948, p. 89). Or: 'Today our relations with the German State are based on friendly relations, on our readiness to support Germany's efforts for peace . . .' (Speech by Molotov on October 31st, 1939, *Soviet Peace Policy*, London, 1941, p. 33). Nor could any Pole forget how the responsibility for starting the German-Polish war was put on Poland. The *Small Soviet Encyclopaedia* (1941 edition) wrote: ' . . . in autumn 1939, the unwise leaders of a landlord *Poland*, ordered by Anglo-French imperialists, *started the war against Germany*.' (My emphasis). 000

Looking ahead to the time when Poland would be a Russian province the Kremlin decided in 1942 to establish a party for Poland, but in order to conceal its connections with the past, it was called the Polish Workers' Party (P.P.R.) instead of the Communist Party of Poland. 665

As we have seen, Russia allowed the Warsaw uprising to be crushed by the Nazis, because of the weakness of the Party among the insurgents. This, of course, further weakened it.

The position of the P.P.S.[1] was very different. Between the two world wars it enjoyed the support of the overwhelming majority of the Polish workers. On the eve of the war it led the general strikes in Cracow, Tarnow and other towns and supported the peasants' strike (August, 1937). The municipal elections of 1938 and 1939 resulted in a crushing defeat for the Government and victory for the P.P.S. There can be no disagreement with the evaluation of the election results by the P.P.S. leader Adam Ciolkosz, that 'were it not for the threat of the German invasion they would have a far-reaching result, similar to that of the municipal elections in Spain in 1931.' (Introduction to C. Poznanski, *The Flaming Border*, London, 1944). The left wing of the P.P.S. was so strengthened in the thirties that the Party included in its new official programme adopted at the Radom Congress, February, 1937) the slogan of social revolution and dictatorship of the toiling masses. Unlike the Kremlin, the P.P.S. did not identify the rule of the proletariat with a one-party system, but with consistent democracy.

1 [The Socialist Party -- Analyst]

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668 The war was a great test of strength, moral and physical, for the P.P.S. The Party was mainly responsible for the decision to defend encircled Warsaw in September, 1939. The 'Colonels' recognised this and their spokesman said: 'The workers' defence smacks of socialist revolution'. Having had long experience in illegal work since the time of Tsarism, the P.P.S. quickly accommodated itself to the new conditions of struggle under the German heel. For conspiratorial purposes, the Party adopted the name 'The Movement of the Working Masses of Poland', and was generally called the W.R.N. from the initial letters of its slogan: 'Freedom (Wolność) Equality (Równość) Independence (Niepodległość).' The following quotation describes the activity of the W.R.N. under the German occupation: ' . . . a large secret organisational network of the W.R.N. comprised, already at the end of 1940, over 2,000 units. The underground Socialist Press and pamphlets reached, in the course of the war, the amazing figure of 2 million copies. A Socialist military organisation was created under the name of O.W.P.P.S. (Socialist Insurgent Military Detachments), which was included, as a separate and distinct organisation, in the national scheme of the Underground Home Army (A.K.). There was, besides, a Socialist Militia, organised both on a territorial and on a factory basis. All these organisations played an outstanding role, *inter alia* in the Warsaw Uprising of 1944.' (A. Ciolkosz, *The Expropriation of a Socialist Party*, New York, September-October, 1946, p.3). The price paid by the P.P.S. for this resistance to the German occupation was high. 'Notwithstanding the strict observance of all conspiratorial rules—in which the P.P.S., owing to her old revolutionary tradition excelled anyone else—heavy losses could not be avoided. Three members of the Central Executive Committee of the Party (Niedziałkowski, Czapiński, Topinek) and 28 other members of the Supreme Council of the Party, perished at the hands of the invaders. Altogether about 700 prominent leaders of the Party met their death under the occupation. From these figures the losses amongst the rank and file can be imagined.' (Ibid. p. 4).

661 When the Soviet Army entered Poland in 1944, one of the main objectives of the Russians was to destroy the P.P.S.[1] and, to achieve this, they used the same technique as they used

[1] [The Socialist Party -- Analyst]

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against the Peasant Party. While the major part of Poland was still under German occupation, a congress was held at Lublin, in the Russian Zone of Occupation on 10–11th September, 1944, which called itself the 25th Congress of the P.P.S. A new Party executive was elected. Edward Osubka-Morawski was elected chairman of the Central Executive Committee, Boleslaw Drobner Chairman of the Supreme Council of the Party, and Stefan Matuszewski, Secretary of the Central Executive Committee. Their friends filled the other places in the leading committees. Osubka-Morawski became Chairman of the Lublin Committee and afterwards of the Provisional Polish Government in the name of the P.P.S. 661

But the credentials of Osubka-Morawski and his friends were forged. Before the war Osubka-Morawski was a minor co-operative official and a member of the P.P.S. but by no means one of its leaders. During the war, he left the P.P.S. and joined a tiny new group called Polish Socialist Workers' Party (R.P.P.S.). Drobner joined the P.P.S.—after having been excluded from it in 1936—on the same day as he was appointed Chairman of the Supreme Council of the Party. In the so-called 25th Congress of the P.P.S. there was not one member of the authentic Central Executive Committee or the Supreme Council of the Party and not one Socialist member of the former Polish Parliaments.

The leaders of the authentic P.P.S. were prevented from claiming their right to reconstitute the Party or from building a new party. Instead they were cruelly persecuted. The General Secretary of the old P.P.S., Kazimierz Puzak, had given a lifetime of service to the Party. He joined it in 1903. In 1911 a Tsarist court condemned him to eight years' hard labour to be followed by lifelong exile in Siberia; he spent six years in irons and in solitary confinement in the fortress of Schlüsselburg, the most notorious of all the Tsarist prisons. He was released in March, 1917, by the Russian Revolution and became General Secretary of the P.P.S. in 1921. During the war he was chairman of the Underground Parliament, and thus one of the main leaders of the Resistance. Later he was arrested by the Russian Army, released, and then re-arrested; he died in prison in April, 1950. Antoni Zdanowski was a prominent leader of the P.P.S. between the wars, was Assistant

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661 General Secretary of the Polish T.U.C. and editor of its paper. He too was a leader of the resistance movement during the war, and in spite of Osubka-Morawski and the P.P.R. was elected chairman of the Warsaw official P.P.S. Council in 1945 by the members of the Warsaw branch of the official P.P.S. After leaving the official P.P.S., he was arrested and was eventually murdered in prison. Cohn, another leader of the P.P.S., who was for six years in a German prisoner-of-war camp, was once more imprisoned. The same fate has befallen Antoni Pajdak, Tadeusz Szturm de Sztrem, Josef Dziegielewski, Wiktor Krawczyk, Wladyslaw Wilczynski, Stanislaw Sobolewski, Adam Obarski, Boleslaw Galaj and others. One of the most popular P.P.S. leaders was Zygmunt Zulawski, leader of the Party for forty years, for many years the chairman of its Supreme Council and General Secretary of the T.U.C. To keep up the appearance of democracy, the P.P.R. leaders allowed him to become a member of Parliament while preventing all his friends from standing for election as Independent Socialists. Single handed he fought a bitter struggle till his death in September 1949.

665 But even after the elimination of the real P.P.S., the official P.P.S. was a threat to the P.P.R., since of the two, the Polish workers preferred the former. For example, in 63 elections to shop committees held at the end of 1945 in the largest industrial district of Poland, out of a total of 928 seats the P.P.R. gained only 193 (21 per cent) while the Socialists gained 556 (64 per cent); the rest were divided thus: official trade union common lists of P.P.S. and P.P.R., 117 (12.6 per cent); Democratic Party, 14; Christian Labour Party, 10; Polish Peasant Party, 2; others (non-party), 36.* In many cases even members of the P.P.R. did not vote for their Party lists in the shop committee elections. This is clear from the complaint made on December 8th, 1945, by Gomulka, then General Secretary of the P.P.R.: 'There were elections to the Shop Committee of the "Fablok" factory (in Cracow). Our Party cell in that factory comprises 250—270 people. And in these elections we have not gained a single seat'. If people join a party from fear of being victimised, they will take the first opportunity of showing their real attitude to it.

*For particulars see *Robotnik Polski*, London, January, 1946.

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In spite of the pressure exerted at the November, 1945, 665
Congress of the T.U.C., the P.P.S. had the support of two
thirds of all the delegates, and Kazimierz Rusinek of the pre- [467]
war P.P.S. was elected General Secretary of the new Central
Committee of the Trade Unions.

The workers' support for the official P.P.S. had its effect on the Party's leaders. When at the regional conferences of the P.P.S. in Cracow, Katowice and other towns there was almost unanimous opposition to fusion with the P.P.R. or even to a united front at the elections against Mikolajczyk's party (P.S.L.), even Osubka-Morawski had to support this policy, although of course with reservations. On August 6th, 1946, he wrote in *Robotnik*: 'It seems to me that the greatest difficulties (in the maintenance of a united front—Y.G.) arise from the fact that one partner operates too much under the slogan of "the leading party" . . . A united front may not be based on the principle that the one rules, while the other subordinates himself, that the one lays down the conditions while the other submissively nods his head . . .' Two days later the P.P.R. daily *Glos Ludu* countered this by implying that the 'difficulties' to which Osubka referred were, at least in part, due to 'elements inimical to democracy' in the P.P.S. (Quoted in the article 'The fate of Polish Socialism,' by R. in *Foreign Affairs*, October, 1949). A few weeks later, on August 29th, the P.P.S. and P.P.R. leaders were called to Moscow to discuss the question of the United Front. This meeting was followed by another, and at last on November 28th, 1946, the P.P.S. leadership yielded to the pressure of the Kremlin. It seems that the fate of Puzak, Pajdak and the others impressed Osubka even more than the pressure from the rank and file of his own party.

But the P.P.R. leaders nevertheless did not forget Osubka's 665
temerity in writing as he did on 6th August, 1946, and im- 661
mediately after the victory of the 'united front' in the sham elections of 19th January, 1947, he was removed from the Prime Ministership and from being Chairman of the P.P.S. Central Executive and replaced by Jozef Cyrankiewicz.

But the pressure of the rank and file members of the P.P.S. against capitulation to the P.P.R. continued unceasingly. On May Day, in 1947, the P.P.R. strongly urged a fusion of the

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665 two parties. It also acted; in all factories, members of the
661 P.P.S. who opposed fusion began to be 'purged'. On 7th May, Adam Kurylowicz, a member of the P.P.S. who had been General Secretary of the Trade Unions since 1947, and previously, from 1918 to 1939, President of the All-Polish Railway Workers' Union, wrote an article in *Robotnik* called 'The Defence of the Workers against Abuses and Arbitrary Measures', in which he accused the P.P.R. of setting up a regime of terror in the factories. 'From all parts of the country, he wrote, 'fresh reports keep coming of injustices suffered by the workers. The elements alien to the working class behave in arbitrary fashion, and act "like bosses". They fire and hire workers without taking into account the opinion of the workers of the plant, scorning the laws, conquests, and social rights of the workers. A clique of self-seeking politicians is being formed. These new dignitaries have discovered that a party book is more important than technical qualifications'.

The reply to the impertinence of the P.P.S. was a political trial staged by the security police. One of the defendants, accused of membership of W.R.N., 'confessed' that there were 'no actual differences between the W.R.N. and the (official) Socialist Party'. The threat to the official P.P.S. was all too clear, and although the Party Congress of 14–17 December, 1947, did not welcome the P.P.R. call for a merger, the P.P.S. leadership knew that the game was up and on March 17th, 1948, Cyrankiewicz declared that the merger would be carried out. 82,000 members of the P.P.S. out of the total of 800,000 were expelled from the Party and many of the recalcitrant leaders were removed. Kurylowicz was removed from his post as General Secretary of the trade unions and replaced by Tadeusz Cwik, an old Communist Party agent. Rusinek, Osubka-Morawski, Stanislaw Piaskowski, Drobner and another eight members were removed from the Central Executive Committee of the Party and Szwalbe and another eleven members were removed from the Supreme Council (meeting of the P.P.S. National Council, Warsaw, September 18–22, 1948). The whole executive committee of the P.P.S. in Lodz was removed and other local committees followed suit. The heresy-hunting of Gomulka* occurred at the same time, and

* See pp. 281-3.

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this increased the opposition of the rank and file members of the P.P.S. to unity with the dictatorial P.P.R. and also led to more stringent measures against oppositionists. But by December, 1948, the fusion was an accomplished fact and the 'United Polish Workers' Party' (Z.P.P.R.) was born. The quisling Cyrankiewicz said of the Unity Congress: 'This congress is the greatest event in Poland since Kościuszko's rising'. Cyrankiewicz is probably thus aspiring to get from Stalin the Order of Suvorov—the hangman of Kościuszko's rising!

The liquidation of the Socialist Parties in the other satellites followed a roughly similar course. But because these Socialist Parties were relatively weaker than the Polish Socialist Party, their collapse was due not only to police pressure and the presence in some of them of Russian armies, but to the feeling of many of the rank and file members that the parties were not strong enough to stand up to the pressure of the Communist Parties without allying with the bourgeoisie, and yet that such an alliance would be too dangerous, because a victory of the bourgeoisie over the Communist Parties which had the support of the majority of the workers, would lead to a defeat of the workers themselves and a bourgeois terroristic dictatorship, in short to fascism. The members of the P.P.S. felt confident that if it were not for the Russian army of occupation, they could get rid of the Communist Party dictatorship, and suppress any fascist elements. But many socialists in the other satellite countries thought it would be impossible to oppose at one and the same time the Communist Party dictatorship and a nascent fascist dictatorship. Hence there were different tendencies within the Socialist Parties of Czechoslovakia, Hungary, Rumania and Bulgaria—on the one hand, the followers of right wing conservative leaders like Károly Peyer, Kosta Lulchev or C. Titel Petrescu, who collaborated with the bourgeois parties, on the other, those who worked with the Communist Party under such leaders as Zdeněk Fierlinger, Árpád Szakasits and Dimitri Neikov.* The third tendency,

*The fate of these 'fellow-travellers' in Czechoslovakia, Hungary and Bulgaria was not better than that of Osubka-Morawski and Co. in Poland. After they had served their purpose they were pushed aside. Fierlinger, who had been given the post of Vice-Premier as a reward for his services in the February coup, was on April 25th, 1950, relegated to the Ministry of Church Affairs. Szakasits on April 24th, resigned his post as President of the Hungarian Republic on the

(cont. overleaf)

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661 favouring an independent socialist policy, which predominated
665 in the P.P.S., was very weak in the other Socialist Parties. The greater the feeling of impotence, the weaker was this wing.

661 The Communist Party leaders did their best to identify every opposition to themselves with resurgent fascism. This was not difficult, as remnants of the fascist bourgeoisie existed and it was always possible either to reveal or invent a fascist plot. The secret police can always keep in reserve some of the 'lunatic' fringe of fascists in order to use them at a suitable moment.

The knowledge that the Kremlin would not abdicate its authority without using all the forces at its disposal, the belief that the people of the satellites themselves could not put up a successful opposition, the conviction that their 'liberation' in a Third World War would mean in reality the destruction of the population and civilization, all these factors contributed to produce a feeling of hopelessness, and hence capitulation.

This was particularly true of the serious and thoughtful workers in the Socialist Parties. The Communist leaders are well aware of this and not only rely on the demonstration of the military strength of the U.S.S.R. but play on the real fear of war.

665 After years of pressure on all sides from Moscow agents of the Kremlin, there is not one Socialist Party today in the whole of Eastern Europe. All of them have been merged with the Communist Parties.

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grounds of ill-health; this looks very much like an excuse as a fortnight later his son-in-law, Deputy Paul Schiffer, was expelled from Parliament. Neikov had better luck; he died on February 16th, 1948. (At the time of his death he held a relatively unimportant position, that of Vice-President of the Presidium of the National Assembly). The fate of other 'fellow-travellers' was also grim. Thus for instance in Hungary György Marosan, Deputy Secretary of the united Party and Minister of Light Industry, disappeared during a visit to Russia (his resignation was announced on August 5, 1950); Istvan Riesz, a former Social Democrat and Minister of Justice, was arrested in June, 1950, and died in prison; Pál Justus, a former Social Democrat and member of the Central Committee of the united Party, was condemned to imprisonment for life at the Rajk Trial. Similar cases from the other 'People's Democracies' can be quoted by the dozen.

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CHAPTER VII

SLAV AGAINST TEUTON

ONE OF THE MOST appalling deeds of the Communist Parties of Eastern Europe—especially in Czechoslovakia and Poland—was the brutal expulsion of millions of people, both men and women, young and old, from their homes, for no reason but that they were Germans and not Slavs. As V. Gollancz says, the expulsion of the Germans is 'among the greatest crimes since Genghis Khan.'

The Kremlin hoped to derive many advantages from this expulsion. The Slavs of Eastern Europe would naturally look for leadership to the greatest Slav nation, Russia. Moreover, the threat of the return of the millions of Germans who had been expelled would create a barrier of suspicion and hatred between Eastern Europe and the Western Powers who control Western Germany where the majority of those expelled found refuge. As a result of the expropriation of the Germans, most of the industry of Czechoslovakia and Poland—the two most industrialised countries of Eastern Europe—could be transferred to the state (i.e., to the control of the Communist Party) while 'national unity' and 'order' were maintained. The inhuman explusion of the Germans would inevitably demoralise the Slavs, both morally and intellectually, as it would accustom them to the most brutal crimes and would involve them as accomplices in these crimes. (Of course, with its usual unscrupulousness, the Kremlin now appeals to German nationalism. Instead of Slavs against Teutons, the Russians and Germans, the two greatest peoples, as Stalin said in his message of October 13th, 1949, must stand together against the imperialist West.)

Let us begin with a description of the persecution and expulsion of the Germans in Eastern Europe after the war.

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Number of Germans Expelled

167 R. H. M. Worsley, in an article called 'Mass Expulsion', in
563 *Nineteenth Century* (December, 1945) gives the following sum-
661 mary of the expulsion of Germans:

Country of Permanent Residence	*Number Involved*	*Statistical Source*
East Prussia	2,333,301	*Statistisches Jahrbuch fuer das Deutches Reich*, census for 1933.
Pomerania	1,920,897	
West Prussia	337,578	
Lower Silesia	3,204,004	
Upper Silesia	1,482,765	
Total	9,278,545	
German minorites in the Baltic States	200,000	Estonian, Latvian, Lithuanian data.
War-time German immigration to:—		
Poland	800,000	I.L.O., *Displacement of Population in Europe* p. 38
Occupied Eastern Territories ..	300,000	
German minority in Poland ..	1,059,000	Polish census, 1921.
War-time immigration to Czechoslovakia	480,000	I.L.O., *Displacement of Population in Europe*, p. 38
Sudeten	3,231,688	Czechoslovakian census, 1930.
German minorities in:—		
Hungary	520,000	Hungarian census, 1920.
Rumania	740,000	Royal Inst. of International Affairs, *South-Eastern Europe*. p. 8.
Yugoslavia	513,472	
Grand Total	17,062,716	

This table somewhat exaggerates the extent of the expulsions, for it is based on pre-war statistics, and during the war a considerable proportion of the populations of these areas was killed, and before the end of the war many had fled from the areas. In addition a number of Germans remain in Eastern Europe: 500 thousand in Rumania, 250–300 thousand in Hungary, 200 thousand in Czechoslovakia—altogether about a million. E. M. Kulischer, in his book *Europe on the Move* (New York, 1949) says that the total number of Germans expelled after the war was 11,200,000 (p. 302). (This does not include the 4 million Germans who fled in 1945–6 from the Soviet zone of Germany to the Western zone, nor those who fled after this date). Whichever figure is taken of the number of Germans who were expelled or who fled from the East, it exceeded even the number expelled and recruited for labour by Hitler during the war. On this point Kulischer writes: 'The

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total number of foreign workers in Germany, including prisoners of war and foreign civilian workers officially recognized as foreigners, but excluding workers from Alsace-Lorraine and Sudetenland, exceeded six million in 1943. In 1944 the high mark of eight million was reached (of whom nearly 2 million were p.o.w.'s—Y.G.)' (p. 264). He adds: 'Altogether, it can be estimated that the displacement of 30 million or more people during Hitler's rule over Europe has resulted in the permanent shifting of 2–3 million. The final redistribution of Europe's population was due to Germany's defeat, which opened the way for a new and in this case permanent migration of another twenty-five million*, probably the greatest in European history' (p. 305).

Considerations of space make it necessary to choose between alternative methods of describing the character of the expulsions, either by relating more or less in detail the fate of the Germans in one of the East European countries, or briefly surveying the fate of the Germans in them all. The former method is preferable, and the treatment of the Germans in Czechoslovakia will be taken as the example.

The Sudeten Germans

The Sudeten Germans were not new inhabitants of Sudetenland. They came there about 700 years ago, when Spain was still in the hands of the Arabs, and some centuries before America was discovered. They were as numerous as the populations of some of Europe's small states. The 1930 census put their number at 3.2 million, as compared with Norway's 2.8 million, Finland's 3.6 million, Denmark's 3.7 million and Switzerland's 4.1 million.

The social structure of the Sudeten German community was not very different from that of the Czechs or Slovaks except that the percentage of workers was higher (a little higher than among the Czechs, and much higher than among the Slovaks). According to the 1930 census, the national communities comprised different social groups in the following proportions:—

*In this is included some millions of non-Germans: Poles who had migrated from the area annexed by Russia (about 4 million) to the Western territories taken from Germany, Czechs and Slovaks who migrated to Sudetenland, displaced persons who returned to their countries, Jewish refugees who migrated to Palestine and other countries, etc.

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	Germans (%)	Czechs and Slovaks (%)
Independent	21.89	25.81
Tenants	0.40	0.28
Officials and clerks ..	16.60	18.24
Workers	61.11	55.67

467 In 1930 there were 476 thousand Sudeten Germans organised in trade unions. The Executive Committee of the Sudeten German Social Democratic Party stated: 'In their worst plight, on the eve of the Munich decision, our Trade Unions could still compare their strength with those of Switzerland, a country with four million inhabitants and with a functioning democracy.' (Introduction to W. Jaksch, *Sudeten Labour and the Sudeten Problem*, London, 1945).

665 The Sudeten Germans had a long socialist tradition, for Sudetenland was one of the first and strongest socialist centres in the Austro-Hungarian empire. It produced a number of the most prominent leaders of the Socialist International, among them Karl Kautsky, Viktor Adler, Otto Bauer and Karl Renner. As early as 1907, in the general elections, the Social Democratic Party polled 39.4 per cent of the votes in German Bohemia. In the general elections of 1911, it polled more than 40 per cent. In the elections of 1920 it polled 44 per cent of the Sudeten votes. Together with the Communist Party,* for more than a decade it had about half the votes in Sudetenland, which is a much higher proportion than the Social Democrats and Communists could claim among the Czechs, let alone among the Slovaks.

563 The world economic crisis which began in 1929 changed the
464 situation. The industry of Sudetenland, depending as it did mainly on exports, was affected much more severely by the crisis than industry in the rest of the country. The bourgeois government of Czechoslovakia discriminated against German workers when giving employment, and this aggravated an already grave situation. The result was that 'unemployment in the Sudeten districts was at least twice as high as in the Czech interior.' (Jaksch, ibid. p. 17).

464 The great suffering caused by unemployment in Sudeten-
668 land and the existence of full employment just over the border

*An exact calculation of the strength of the Communist Party among the Sudetens is impossible, as the Party was not divided into different national groups.

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in Nazi Germany (even though this was the result of war preparation) brought the Sudeten Germans to flock to the banner of Henlein, the leader of the Sudeten Nazis. In the elections of 19th May, 1935, he polled 1,249,530 votes, that is, 62–3 per cent of the total, while the Social Democratic Party polled 299,942 votes (as against 506,761 in 1929), that is, about 15 per cent of the total. The Communist Party vote is estimated at about 120,000, or about 6 per cent of the total (Wiskemann, op. cit. p. 206).

At that time the Communist Party leaders had not yet adopted the idea that the Sudeten Germans were inherent Nazis, and explained the victory of Henlein as the result of the social and national circumstances in which they were placed. *Imprecor* of 1st June, 1935, wrote: 'In a manifesto of the Central Committee the Party states the reasons for the election victory of the Henlein faction. The reason for this victory is the policy of the Czech bourgeoisie which has led to terrible misery and poverty and to the national oppression in the German districts . . . The Henlein fascists can be beaten only by a policy which gives the working masses of the German districts work and bread and liberates them from the yoke of national oppression.'

What was the fate of the Sudeten Germans who opposed Henlein to the end? 400,000 voted against him, and these with their families made up 700–800 thousand people. When the Munich Agreement which gave Sudetenland to Germany was signed, the most active Sudeten anti-Nazis were compelled to flee from Sudetenland to the interior of Czechoslovakia. But more than 20,000 of them were handed over to the Gestapo by the Czechoslovak Government of the time, which collaborated with Hitler, and an additional 10,000 had to return to Nazi-controlled territory because they were refused asylum. Only 4,000 Sudetens were admitted to other countries. Altogether some 40,000 Sudetens were interned in Nazi concentration camps, and about 20,000 died there. This figure bears honourable comparison with the number of victims in other countries which came under the Nazi yoke.

In 1940, Fierlinger, the Social Democratic 'fellow-traveller', who was later to head the Government which expelled the Germans from Czechoslovakia, said: 'Henlein in his struggle

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000 for power in the Sudeten German areas used the same methods (as Hitler in the Reich). He promised the big German landowners the return of their lands which were taken from them after the land reform; to the church he promised the return of the church property. But at the same time he promised the German peasants a just land distribution. To the factory owners Henlein guaranteed the smashing of the labour organisations and at the same time he lured the workers with higher wages and better employment.

'The Sudeten German Movement (of Henlein) cleverly exploited for its political ends the selfish urge which the capitalist order breeds in people. Where promises were not sufficient, terror helped. But what mainly influenced the fellow citizens, of Henlein was the feeling that the world did nothing about these methods, that it felt a secret sympathy for Hitler and his accomplices, that the Republic remains alone in an unequal fight against deceit and superior force. *And nevertheless there were to be found among the Sudetan Germans many brave defenders of the Republic and democracy who, for their faithfulness, received no reward: indeed on the contrary, they were horribly punished.* The picture of the desperate struggle of the Sudeten German democracy is at least from this moral aspect, for democrats today, not an unhappy thing, as it mistakenly appears to many.' (*Dnešní Válka jako Sociální Krise* Foreword, dated December, 1940, pp. 87–8, quoted by *Der Sozialdemokrat*, Halbmonatschrift der Sudetendeutschen Sozialdemokratie, London, June, 1945).

Three years later Bruno Köhler, a Sudeten Communist leader, said over Radio Moscow: 'Hitler came to the Sudeten area and he will go. But Sudentenland and *the Sudeten Germans will remain* . . . The Fascists will disappear but the Sudeten Germans and the Czechs will remain and live as good neighbours, whatever state system is established after the war in Europe. *Hitler's defeat*, which is unavoidable, *does not mean our end.* It means the liberation of the Sudeten Germans from the bloody Hitler reign. The liberation from Hitler will give us Sudeten Germans the opportunity *to determine our own fate and to order our life according to the will of freedom-loving people.*' (Ibid. January, 1944).

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Hysterical Chauvinism

The war ended, the tune changed. The Communist Party discovered two advantages to be gained from the expulsion of the Germans, first the awakened political consciousness of the masses could be diverted into a reactionary, chauvinist channel, secondly, the majority of the industries (previously owned by Germans) could be transferred to the state without any need for the active intervention of the working class and without the bourgeoisie being able to oppose such a transference. Gottwald declared on 12th May, 1945: 'The new Republic will be a Slav state, a Republic of the Czechs and the Slovaks. We will deprive the Germans and the Hungarians, who have so heavily sinned against our peoples and the Republic of their citizenship and severely punish them.' The Communist Minister of Information, Václav Kopecky, speaking over Radio Prague on 25th May, 1945, said: 'The Czechoslovak army is already prepared for the purification of the border area of the Republic from Germans and Hungarians, and for the restoration of the wealth of these old Slav areas into the hands of the Czechs and the Slovaks.' In a speech at Liberec (Reichenberg) he said: 'We will clear Liberec of the German enemies, and we will do it so thoroughly that there will remain not the smallest place where the German seed could grow once more. We shall expel all the Germans, we shall confiscate their property, we shall de-Germanize not only the town but the whole area . . . so that the victorious spirit of Slavdom shall permeate the country from the frontier ranges to the interior.'

The Communist Minister of Education, Zdeněk Nejedly, said on 29th May, 1945: 'We do not know any progressive Germans, nor are there any.' 'Germany, once the most feared power in Europe, does not exist any more; for us it means that the German question is once and for all solved. We will continue the work of our predecessors; we will *purify Prague and the border districts*, and we are in the position to do so *because we have a great helper in doing this—the Red Army*. Not every army would have helped us in doing this. . . Now is no time for vacillation. We cannot say we will look neither to the West nor to the East, but will wait. We must today say "Yes" or "No". We must decide *either for the East or for the West. I do not believe that it is a problem for the Czech people*. We belong to the great

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186 Slav bloc at the head of which the great Russian people stands
661 with its chief, Stalin.' With a rising fervour of chauvinism he
563 goes on: 'Consider Middle Europe—there are Hungarians. What can they do? Then the Rumanians—what can they do? And what can the Germans do? They have no future anywhere. *We are greater than all of them*; with our culture we can stand up to all of them. And they will see that they in their hopeless situation will be happy only to follow our leadership. How many composers are there in Europe who are the equal of Smetana? How many painters of the rank of Mánes and Aleš? How many historians the equal of Palacký? How many scientists of the greatness of Purkyně? . . . Our culture must be national . . . Nothing but cultural ruins surround us . . . We will first of all carry our civilization to the border regions, and there will plant our national cultural ideal.' (Quoted by *Der Sozialdemokrat*, June, 1945).

The Communist Party outdid the Czechoslovak bourgeoisie in chauvinist ardour, but the latter did its best to prove that it was not less anti-German and chauvinistic than the Communists. Thus, for instance, Dr. Ivo Ducháček of the People's Party (Catholics) said in the Provisional National Assembly, March, 1946: 'We want to exclude nobody from this success, though it is true that, for instance, the Communist Party had in the years 1939, 1940 and 1941 no such clear and uncompromisingly Slavic conceptions in this matter as it has today. However, I regard it as a downright falsification of history and as a building up of legends, which I do not hesitate to call pre-election legends, if the Communists, of all parties, assert that the credit for the transfer of the Germans from our country is due mainly to them or almost alone to them' (*Lidova Demokracie*, March 9th, 1946, quoted in *Der Sozialdemokrat*, London, May, 1946).

In this nationalistic competition, the Communist Party had certain advantages. First, it could point to the fact that nowhere, except in the Russian-controlled territories, were Germans evicted *en masse*. Secondly, and of greater importance, the expulsion was organised and German property redistributed by a Communist Minister of the Interior, Václav Nosek. The Security Corps which carried out the physical expulsion was headed by members of the Communist Party. (In Poland, too,

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the Communist Party was in charge of the expulsion of the Germans from the Western territories, and the settlement of Poles in their place. There Gomulka, then General Secretary of the Party, was responsible). 186 661 563

Because in the popular view the Communist Party bore the greatest responsibility for the expulsion, there was a much higher percentage of Communist supporters among the new Czech settlers in the Sudeten areas than in any other part of the country, even than in the big towns where large numbers of workers were concentrated. In the 1946 general elections, in the districts of Jablonec and Turnov the Communist Party polled 70 per cent of the votes, in Kadaň 62 per cent, Falknov 59 per cent, in Aš over 50 per cent, and so on. (The situation in the Western Territories of Poland was similar, hence the Communist leaders insisted on giving highly disproportionate representation to these areas in the general elections of January, 1947).

The whole of the Sudeten population, except some tens of thousands of indispensable skilled workers, was expelled from the country. Those who remained had to do compulsory labour for a minimum of twelve hours a day, and, if the employer thought it necessary, fifteen hours. The National Committees organised this compulsory labour. According to their decrees, the German workers in Czechoslovakia were forbidden to belong to trade unions, were excluded from social benefits, had to give a quarter of their wages as reparations to the state, were not entitled to holidays, and their children were not allowed to attend school. 466 611 563

In the first few days after the defeat of the German army in Czechoslovakia, some cracks were made in the wall of national animosity by open fraternisation between Czech and German workers. For instance, a number of rank and file communists in Bodenbach began to publish a daily paper in Czech and German; it was called *Rudý Prapor—Rote Fahne*. It was short-lived, for Nosek immediately prohibited the publication of any German paper or of any paper in two languages one of which was German. 563 661

It is ironical to note that the excesses against the Germans in Czechoslovakia were taking place at the same time—with the Red Army's entry into Germany—as the Russian

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563 661 authorities, trying now to win the ear of the German people, attacked Ilya Ehrenburg for his extremely vicious propaganda against the Germans (*Pravda*, April 14th, 1945). A contradiction? It is easy enough to wriggle out of contradictions by singing different songs in different languages and in different countries. For those Germans who were interested in the fate of their brethren in Czechoslovakia, there was a ready answer: all the Sudeten Germans were responsible for the Henlein movement! Thus, for instance, P. Reimann wrote on 2nd June, 1945: 'A German anti-fascist movement in Czechoslovakia does not exist. There were in the best case in Czechoslovakia individual people of German origin who, separated from any movement in the German population, as individuals supported the Czech national liberatory movement.' 'That also earlier layers of the working class organised by the Socialists were intoxicated by the Nazis *proves* the news in the British press of the mass flight of the German miners from Brüx region. The conception that the German working class were not an exception to the general development of the German minority under the Nazi regime is by this and similar news to our sorrow confirmed.' (Quoted by *Der Sozialdemokrat*, June, 1945). This appeared in *Einheit*, whose sub-title is 'Sudeten German anti-Fascist Fortnightly', and which for years gave out that the Communist Party had considerable influence in the anti-Nazi movement in Sudetenland. As late as 22nd May, 1945, *Einheit* published a letter from a Czech soldier who visited a German glass factory near Pilsen, saying: '. . . we can be proud. Our people and those who were before Social Democratic functionaries—all of them, notwithstanding the terror, have held through and followed our thoughts, and all of them said to me that they waited for our return with gladness. What we built they defended and will continue to defend.' *Einheit* soon forgot this. The Communist Party policy in Czechoslovakia was now unequivocal: there was no place for Germans there. From now on any mention of the speeches given over Radio Moscow to the Sudeten Germans is betrayal of the Party line.

After the war, the Communist Party made out not only that all the Sudeten Germans—except for a few isolated individuals—were Nazis, but that they became Nazis despite the fact that

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in the Czechoslovak Republic they enjoyed full equality with other citizens. Gustav Beuer, a former Communist Party Deputy from Sudetenland, wrote: '. . . the treatment of the German minority by the Republic (of 1918-1938—Y.G.) as a whole was such as to make it possible for the Germans to adapt themselves to the new conditions and to become part and parcel of the Slav country had it not been for their deeply-rooted hostility toward everything Slav.' (*New Czechosovakia and her Historical Background*, London, 1947, pp.190–1). This is directly contrary to all the Communist Party had been saying for more than fifteen years about the injustice meted out to the Germans in Czechoslovakia.*

The expulsion of the Germans from Czechoslovakia cannot be explained as the result of the people's spontaneous hatred. The majority of the Slovaks, who are not Teutons but Slavs, supported Tiso, Nazi puppet ruler of Slovakia, no less readily than the majority of the Germans supported Henlein. The number of Slovak political prisoners who died in Nazi concentration camps was smaller than that of the Sudeten Germans, and there were relatively fewer victims even among the Czechs.†

The Czechs suffered much less than the Yugoslavs under the Nazi occupation. 1,700,000 of the inhabitants of Yugoslavia died under the German occupation, while 200 thousand (of whom more than 100,000 were Jews) died in Czechoslovakia. The crimes of the Sudetan fascists against the Czechs and Slovaks reveal far less savagery than the crimes of the Croat Ustashe who murdered hundreds of thousands of Serbs, men, women and children. Yet, in Yugoslavia, as we have seen,

*See the quotation from *International Press Correspondence* of 1st June, 1935, quoted above. Or to take another example, on 13th November, 1933, the Communist Party group in the French parliament refused to associate itself with the tributes paid by the French Government on the occasion of the 15th anniversary of the establishment of the Czechoslovak Republic: 'No, we do not associate ourselves with your manifestation of sympathy addressed to the Government of Czechoslovakia . . . We do not forget that at present the masters of this country hold national minorities under a yoke . . . All our sympathy goes to the labouring masses of Czechoslovakia, to the national minorities, Slovak, Jewish, German, Hungarian, oppressed by the central power of Prague.' (Quoted by Maurice Ceyrat, *La Trahison Permanente*, Paris, 1948, p. 25).

†By the way, it must not be forgotten that after the German annexation of Bohemia-Moravia and the creation of Tiso's 'Independent Slovakia', the Kremlin closed the Czechoslovakian Legation in Moscow and appointed a Soviet delegate to Tiso's government.

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national hatred and persecution of Germans was never a general feature of Communist Party policy, and for a period Tito's army even contained a unit of German anti-fascists.

Nor can the anti-German policy in Czechoslovakia be explained as the by-product of a resistance movement against the Nazis. A week before the occupation of Prague by the Russian Army there was no armed resistance among the Czechs (unlike the Slovaks) to the German occupation, and up to two or three days before the occupation Radio Prague, which was under German control, could boast of the fact that 'many Czechs are working for the defence of the Homeland' (i.e., working for the Germans). The conflict with the local German population did not occur until after the defeat of Germany. For many months, indeed for over a year, the Czech press repeatedly attacked the many Czechs in Sudetenland who were friendly to the Germans. All the evidence shows that the expulsion was imposed by the organised pressure of the Czech Communist Party and the bourgeoisie on a disoriented people.

In all two and a half million Germans whose ancestors had lived in the country for hundreds of years, were expelled from Czechoslovakia. Five hundred years after the popular democratic movement of Hus which united peasants, artisans and workers both Czech and German, more than twenty-five years after Lenin praised the Communist Party of Czechoslovakia, at one time the third biggest Communist Party (after the Russian and German Parties), which united the revolutionary workers, Czech and German, Slovak and Hungarian, there took place a terrible persecution of the Germans which can be compared in severity only to the persecution of the Jews by Hitler. Hundreds of pages could be written to describe the horrors of this persecution, which constitutes a vital part of the reactionary policy of the Communist Parties in Czechoslovakia and Poland. The following quotation from '*A Petition to the Secretary General of the United Nations and the Foreign Secretaries of the Signatory Powers of the Potsdam Agreement from the Parliamentary Delegation of Sudeten Labour in Great Britain, 1st March, 1947*'; gives a few examples of the sufferings inflicted on the Germans. The events in one small town—Saaz (Žatec) will be described. The population of Saaz in 1930 was 18,061.

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Atrocities Committed Against the Sudeten Germans

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'Arno Behrisch, a former Secretary of the German Social Democratic Party in Saxony, collected the following facts from the famous hop-growing centre of Saaz in North-Western Bohemia. Behrisch was a refugee in Sweden during the war. He was imprisoned by the Swedish authorities for his part in pro-Allied activities. He now lives at Hof in Bavaria as socialist party secretary and is vice-chairman of the Bavarian Social Democratic Party. In 1945 and 1946, he and his wife, Hildegard Behrisch, interviewed many Sudeten refugees and the following report is the result of their investigations.

'On Sunday, June 3rd, 1945, the Czech authorities ordered all male Germans of Saaz between 13 and 63 years of age to appear in the market place at 6 a.m. Those who were late were terribly beaten up with whips, clubs and planks. Two men were shot at once because they ventured a protest. 5,000 men and boys were marched off to the neighbouring town of Postelberg, about 11 miles away. They had to march at a quick pace in the glowing sun and those who lagged behind were shot on the road. At Postelberg, the men were interned in an old cavalry barracks. They had to spend the night in the barrack-yard, lying flat on the ground. The Czech guards threatened to shoot anybody who would get up. Every hour the guards fired volleys over the rows of prostrate men. Czech guards walked among the men and beat those who stirred a little. At dawn a command in Czech was heard; it was not clearly understood, it could have meant zůstat, stay put, or vstát, get up. Some of the men got up, others remained on the ground. At once the guards opened fire and whole rows of the victims were mown down with tommy-guns. Those who were only wounded were finished off by a shot in the neck from behind.

'The next night, the men were herded into the stables. 400 men were locked up in a stable for 28 horses. Hundreds of men had to spend further nights in the barrack-yard. No food was given to the prisoners for the first three days; later they received a piece of bread and some potato soup. Again the guards shot men during the night and also in daylight. A German engineer was shot by a Czech soldier who shouted or all to hear: "This is the *coup de grace*, this will happen to all of

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563 you!" Other Czechs shouted: "Our doctor, our hospital, our
661 medicine is the shot in the neck!"

'On June 5th, the men were sorted out according to their political antecedents. Communists and former inmates of German concentration camps were sent back to Saaz. S.S.-men and Nazi political leaders, former policemen, etc. were driven back into the stables, some into a pig stye. Former German soldiers remained in the barrack-yard. The men locked up in the stables suffered from lack of fresh air. 10 men became hysterical, 50 fainted. When others shouted to the guards outside that there were some who had gone mad, the guards answered: "Kill them!" There were only two small openings in the wall for ventilation. When the prisoners asked to leave the door open for a while, the Czechs answered by shots through the holes in the wall. Several men died, some more were shot in the morning. In the stables, the troughs were filled with water. The prisoners had to dip their heads into them. When they could no longer stay with their faces under water and raised their heads, they were beaten on the neck.

'Day and night Czechs came to fetch some of the men out and beat them up. This happened practically every two hours. In this the soldiers were helped by civilians who brought sticks, clubs, whips and cables for the beatings. Several men were beaten to death.

'*June 6th.* A lorryload of Czechs with rubber truncheons and whips arrived and started an orgy of beatings in the worst S.S.-fashion. The German victims had to undress completely and were beaten terribly for a whole hour. The maltreatment lasted until they collapsed and fainted. Then they were revived with showers of cold water and the whipping of the bleeding men went on. Czechs smashed the genitals of some men by stamping on them with their boots. The cries of the tortured were frightful. Five boys, aged 13 to 16, were beaten murderously because they had moved a few steps from their place. The children groaned and yelled for their mothers. Then the five children were stood up against the wall and the Czechs raised their rifles. The boys cried: "Don't fire, let us live!" A volley was fired and the five boys fell to the ground. This was witnessed by thousands in the barrack-yard. What could have been the crime of these children?

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'Then the Czechs started another sport, well-known in Nazi concentration camps, that of making the prisoners maltreat each other. They were made to box and beat each other and when they did it not thoroughly enough, they were beaten by the Czechs. Some were tortured by wooden splints being driven under the finger-nails, others again by treading on the genitals. One man was whipped on the genitals, to those of others the torturers tied a rope and pulled heavily. Tormentors also pressed with their hands the testicles of some victims until the men fainted from pain. A German chemist was shot in the evening. 563 661

'Of 300 ex-soldiers, driven into a small stable at night and ill-treated as already described, five men died the same night. Among them was a well-known anti-Nazi. The guards amused themselves by firing shots into the room. The crime of the men was that they had been drafted into the German army.

'Gradually groups of prisoners were taken away. Some were sent to concentration camps, others to forced labour. The latter included well-known anti-Nazis and even half-Jews. A number of men were taken to nearby woods and shot. Finally, a number of men, among them Herr Krüttner, one of the witnesses, were marched back to Saaz on June 12th. On their way they were beaten without interruption. A Catholic priest was shot because he could not march fast enough.

'*June 12th.* The first transport of transferred people left Saaz. They were selected for their inability to work. Among them was a number of invalids who were not allowed to take their artificial limbs with them. The transport consisted of 200 men and 800 women and children. All their belongings had been taken away from them. At the station of Komotau a girl was fetched out from one carriage, taken to the compartment of the escorting soldiers and raped. At Ober-Georgenthal near the Saxon frontier the train stopped and the people had to march across the mountains. One woman died on the road. The marching people were beaten, especially the disabled soldiers who could not keep pace. After covering nearly 30 miles, the deported were handed over to the Germans at the frontier. They had refused to work, the Czechs said.

'*June 13th.* All women were summoned to a barracks at Saaz. There, altogether 14,000 women and children were kept during

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563 661 the night, herded together in the barracks, in stables, in garages, and also in the yard. At nightfall, hordes of Czech guards entered the room where the women were, and mass rape started. By flashing torches the victims were selected and raped on the spot. There were terrible cries. Women who tried to resist were beaten unconscious and then raped. Women and girls were also taken away and never seen again. These mean acts were repeated night after night. There was no sanitation and soon diseases started. There was no food for the first three days, and very little afterwards. The women had been ordered to bring their house keys along with them; they were taken away and given to Czechs for looting the houses. Within two days 40 babies had died in their mothers' arms in the barracks. The women were kept there for many weeks and the number of deaths increased. Babies died every day, up to 15 a day. From June 25th to 30th not less than 76 children lost their lives. The mothers themselves had to carry or cart the little corpses to the cemetery. There were 32 persons in a room of 5 square yards. The mothers were constantly told that their children would be taken away from them. 70 women sent to forced labour outside had to leave their children in the barracks.

'A Catholic priest who had ministered at the interment of a Czech soldier, was approached by a sobbing old woman when he left the cemetery. She whispered: "There are prams with dead babies in the park near the cemetery. Oh, please, ask the supervisor to give them a Christian burial!" The priest induced the supervisor of the cemetery, a Czech, to do so, but the supervisor disapproved strongly of what was going on.

'The women sent away to forced labour on farms and elsewhere received no pay and were locked up in barns and stables.

'*July 1st.* At 4 a.m. women and children were awakened by shouts and pistol shots. They were taken in groups of fifty into a room where Czech soldiers were sitting on chairs. The women were made to undress and in front of the children searched in the most shameless manner. Purporting to search for hidden valuables, the soldiers searched the women's genitals as well. There were new outrages: when the soldiers came to a menstruating woman they smeared the secretions into her face.

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Only young women were searched, the older ones were only sneered at. Afterwards, the victims had to stand for hours in the sun and did not get any food that day. 563 661

'The commandant of this women's camp was a Czech named Marek, known as "blood-dog" and as "the executioner of Postelberg." He kept thinking up new tortures. He selected 40 women and girls for weeding the railway track. In the evening they were driven into an empty truck and raped by Czech soldiers.

'On the 28th July, 150 women were sent to a warehouse to sort out German army stores. Afterwards they were taken to a school and beaten up. The Czechs alleged that the women had intended to steal the stores for "werewolves". A group of 50 women returning from farm work was later attacked by the same soldiers, also beaten up and raped.

'It was not before November that the last survivors left the S.S. barracks in the Trnovaner Strasse in Saaz. All the time the food consisted of a little black coffee, less than half a pound of bread per day, and nothing else. Children were given 3 ounces of bread a day. The death-rate among children increased. Finally, the women with their children were distributed among Czech farmers to do slave work.

'The head of all the camps in Saaz was a Czech named Haas, a criminal with 15 previous convictions. Now he was made Chief of Police at Saaz . . .

'The total number of Saazers definitely murdered by the Czechs exceeds 2,000.

'The events described in the foregoing report represent only a fraction of what happened in the stricken town . . . The outrages were not individual cases but part of a system which may well boast of having attained the fullest Nazi standard.' (pp. 36-41).

The suffering of the Sudeten Germans did not cease after their expulsion. What they endured while being transported to Germany can be gauged from the following two testimonies:

'By the end of August (1945—Y.G.) a transport of Sudeten Germans arrived in Berlin. It came from Troppau in Czech Silesia, and was 18 days on the way. Four thousand two hundred women, children and aged people were counted before the transport departed from Troppau. One thousand

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563 three hundred and fifty were left when the transport arrived in
661 Berlin.—A Sudeten clergyman now in Berlin.

'I have seen a large proportion of these people (Sudeten deportees), numbering nearly a million, who are literally starving on the road. I saw children and babies lying dead in the ditch by the roadside, dead of hunger and disease, their arms and legs often not thicker than a man's thumb.—A Dutch observer writing from Saxony.' (American Friends of Democratic Sudetens, *Tragedy of a People—Racialism in Czechoslovakia*, New York, 1946).*

*A description of the brutal methods of expelling the Germans from Eastern Europe with particular reference to the territories annexed to Poland is given with many quotations from the press in V. Gollancz's book, *Our Threatened Values*, London, 1946, pp. 96-105.

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CHAPTER VIII

OTHER NATIONALISTIC CONFLICTS

The Hungarians in Czechoslovakia

THE FATE of the Hungarians who had lived in Czechoslovakia for a thousand years was better than that of the Germans, but it was nevertheless unenviable. On 27th September, 1945, Gottwald declared: 'We are trying to establish the principle that we cannot live side by side with the Hungarians in one state.' (*East Europe*, 3rd October, 1945). The Czech Communist Party daily, *Zemedelsko Noviny* said on 3rd December, 1946: 'The presence of that minority is a threat to the integrity of our State, and thus to the peace of Europe.' (*East Europe*, 11th December, 1946). The plan for their expulsion, said Gottwald, 'met with the full understanding and approval of Generalissimo Stalin and Minister Molotov.' (*East Europe*, 28th August, 1946).

These words were translated into deeds. At the Paris Peace Conference on 14th August, 1946, the Hungarian Foreign Minister made the following declaration which the representative of Czechoslovakia did not deny: '650,000 Hungarians who live in Slovakia were deprived of their citizenship and even of their most elementary rights. Their property has been confiscated. No Hungarian may undertake any manual or intellectual work. He may not claim justice, he may not become a member of a trade union, he may not exercise his civic rights. The use of Hungarian in offices and even in churches and in public places is prohibited and subject to penalties. No newspaper or periodical in Hungarian may be published in Czechoslovakia, nor is it allowed to speak over the telephone or send wires in Hungarian. Hungarians may not own radio receivers. All Hungarian schools are closed, and even tuition in Hungarian is subject to penalties. The Czecho-Slovak authorities have dismissed all civil servants and private employees of

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563 Hungarian descent, and they have suspended payment of
661 their pensions. Disabled servicemen, war-widows, and orphans do not receive their relief allocations.'

At the same time, the Czechoslovak government, according to the Hungarian press, was employing compulsory Hungarian labour in the mines of Kladno (Compulsory Labour Bill for 'Germans, Hungarians, traitors and collaborators', signed on February 21st, 1946).

The Hungarian press, in particular the Communist Party papers, pointed out that many of the Hungarians expelled from Czechoslovakia had been sent by the Nazis to Dachau and had been awarded high Czech decorations for this. Many were members of the Hungarian Communist Party, József Révai, editor of the Communist Party daily, *Szabad Nép*, criticising the treatment of Hungarians by the Czechs 'whose war time record is very different from that of the Yugoslavs—yet Marshal Tito grants the Hungarians full equality', asks: 'Does it make no difference to the Czecho-Slovaks whether they establish a democratic or a reactionary state, as long as it is a national state?' (15th July, 1945). On the same day Rákosi, General Secretary of the Hungarian Communist Party, condemned the expulsion of Hungarians from Czechoslovakia and the 'excesses resembling the old fascist methods.' (*East Europe*, August 1st, 1945). (He was tactful enough to put the blame on the local officials). On another occasion, May 26th, 1946, Rákosi attacked *all* the parties of Czechoslovakia, including the Communist Party, when he said: 'We had a feeling that every Czecho-Slovak Party wanted to bake its own electoral cake by the fire of its treatment of the Hungarians. Let us hope that now the elections are over, the Hungarians in Slovakia will at last be treated in a way becoming a democratic country'. (*East Europe*, 5th June, 1946).

The brutal treatment of the Hungarians, however, contined. Even in the days of the *coup d'etat* of February, 1948, the Czechoslovak Government did not omit to issue instructions prohibiting Hungarians, even if they were citizens of Czechoslovakia, and had excellent records in the anti-Nazi struggle, from being members of the Action Committees.

Altogether a hundred thousand Hungarians were expelled from Czechoslovakia.

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Only after the events of spring 1947 in Hungary which consolidated the power of the Communist Party, and the February, 1948, coup in Czechoslovakia did Moscow consider nationalistic conflicts between Hungarians on the one hand and Slovaks and Czechs on the other superfluous. And duly in autumn 1948, an agreement was concluded between Czechoslovakia and Hungary regularising the status of the Hungarian minority in Slovakia. In January, 1949, the Czechoslovak parliament decided to restore full civil rights to the Hungarians, and to allow them to remain permanently in the country. 563 661

Conflicts Between Rumanians and Hungarians

The bone of contention between Rumania and Hungary was Transylvania in which nearly 2 million Hungarians live. Within 24 hours of the time that the Groza government was established, northern Transylvania, taken from Rumania by Hitler and given to Hungary, was given back to Rumania, even though the majority of its population is Hungarian. Vishinsky openly admitted that this was a reward for the establishment of the Groza Government. Pătrăscanu, then leader of the Rumanian Communist Party, gratefully acknowledged the fact that Russia was responsible for the transfer. Strange as it may seem, Rákosi also used the conflict to pay a tribute to Russia, stating on 1st June, that at the Paris Conference Britain and the U.S.A. decided on the transfer because of their interests in Rumanian oil. 'Rumania's oil production is 10 times that of Hungary and naturally those countries which are interested in oil, share out their sympathy or antipathy according to whether 100,000 or 1,000,000 tons of oil are at stake. Naturally this fact has an important bearing on their political judgment. Thus when the Hungarian-Rumanian frontier issue was raised at the Paris Conference, the U.S.A. suggested that Rumania should regain her 1940 frontiers without change. Britain immediately agreed to this proposal and the matter was settled.' (*East Europe*, 12th June, 1946). 563 728 [382]

The Hungarian Communist Party demanded on 12th August, 1946, that the Peace Settlement be changed to allow at least that part of Transylvania inhabited by Hungarians to be given back to Hungary. At the same time the Rumanian

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563 Communist Party declared their opposition to any changes in
728 the Peace Settlement.

But once it became absolutely clear that Russia supported the pre-1940 frontiers of Hungary and Rumania the quarrel between the two governments ceased and on the whole a very liberal attitude was taken by the Rumanian government towards the large Hungarian minority.

Poles and Czechs in Teschen

563 As soon as the war ended a sharp conflict broke out between
728 Poland and Czechoslovakia over the fixing of the border between them. There were Slovaks and Czechs in Polish Špiš, in the Orava district which was divided between Czechoslovakia and Poland and in Silesian Ratibor and Hlubčice which were in the hands of Poland. In all these areas Czechoslovakia wanted to change the border in her favour. But the most serious conflict broke out over the possession of the rich area of Teschen. After World War I Teschen was divided between Poland and Czechoslovakia; in 1938, during the Munich crisis Poland walked into the part of Teschen occupied by Czechoslovakia. At the end of the war, the Polish army, commanded by Marshal Rola-Zymierski, again occupied all Teschen. The Poles and Czechs were called upon next day to send representatives to Moscow to discuss the question. It was decided to give back to Czechoslovakia the area they had held prior to Munich, as compensation for the loss of Western Ukraine (Ruthenia) to Russia. But the chauvinistic fury did not abate, and the national minority of Czechoslovaks in the Polish area and Poles in the Czechoslovakian area were the victims of it. The *Central European Observer* of October 19th, 1945, wrote: 'In Hlubčice and Ratibor, Czech people are suffering injustices: their harvest is taken away, their property confiscated. They are being arrested and taken into the interior of the country. Church services in the Czech language or in the local dialect have been forbidden. Czechs are fleeing across the frontier. There are already several thousands of refugees.' On 27th December, 1945, Radio Prague complained that the Poles had dissolved the National Committees in the part of Teschen inhabited by Czechs, had replaced them with Polish mayors appointed by themselves, and had closed all schools except the

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Polish ones. On 27th March, 1946, the Czech National Council in Morawska-Ostrawa in retaliation forbade the use of the Polish language in Teschen schools which had Polish pupils. (*East Europe*, 3rd April, 1946). 563 728

In Conclusion

The policy of keeping national antagonisms alive, especially between Slavs and Teutons, was a liability for the Kremlin after its agents took full control of the satellite countries and after the main pivot of its policy became the struggle against the Western Powers over Germany. Hence since about the end of 1947, when the Cominform was established, the former policy on the national question was dropped, and was replaced by 'internationalism', which is in reality equally the instrument of Russian imperialist national policy. In June, 1948, a conference of the Foreign Ministers of the U.S.S.R. and the 'People's Democracies' held in Warsaw, declared its friendship to the German people. In January, 1949, Fierlinger congratulated the German Stalinists (the Socialist Unity Party) on the fact that they were 'proudly professing the old and unadulterated internationalism.' The same theme was repeated time and again by other leaders in Czechoslovakia, Poland, Rumania and the other 'People's Democracies.' Stalin himself wrote in a letter to Pieck, president of the 'German Democratic Republic', on October 13th, 1949, that the German and Russians were 'the two peoples possessing the greatest potentialities in Europe to complete great actions of world significance.' Woe betide anyone who should now mention the unity of the 'Slavs' against the 'Teutons.' 648

The new policy was mainly directed against the satellites who dared to strive for national independence and against the transformation of their countries into Russian gubernias.

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CHAPTER IX

GLEICHSCHALTUNG OF THE CHURCHES

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Religion and Democracy

ONE OF THE BASIC tenets of nearly all progressive movements, from the rise of the democratic anti-feudal bourgeoisie to the Marxist workers' movement, has been the separation of religion from the state and of education from religion. It is not accidental that this was accomplished most completely in the United States, which was free of any feudal inheritance, and where under conditions of free economic development many religious denominations existed. While Marx, as a consistent democrat, insisted on the separation of religion from the state, as a materialist philosopher he was equally strongly opposed to religion itself as 'the people's opium,' a soothing illusion which prevents men from acting for themselves, in the belief that some supernatural force watches over them. Whether one agrees with Marx's conception of religion or not, it is clear that there is no contradiction between these two elements in Marx's approach to religion. Freedom of conscience, that is, the freedom to hold any religious belief without fear of state intervention, logically implies freedom to propagate atheism. This dual policy is possible only in a democracy, where the state itself is not identical with a party. In a totalitarian society there is no autonomy and the only alternatives offered to the Church are complete annihilation, or regimentation, or a combination of elements of both; in any case, religious freedom is impossible.

This explains the fight of the Nazis, who were by no means atheists, against Catholicism, and their great efforts to subordinate the Evangelical Church to themselves. With the establishment of the Ministry for Ecclesiastical Affairs (July 16th, 1935), it was emphasised that 'Adolf Hitler's Government does not fight against Churches or religious denominations.

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It rather *gathers them under its wings for protection, whenever they have mental tasks to perform*'. A. Brady, who quotes these words, adds: '"Protection" here has the same meaning as in "protective" custody, or as in ordinary gangster terminology. It means, be protected or arrested; be protected or dissolved' (*The Spirit and Structure of German Fascism*, London, 1937, p. 104). In an exchange of greetings with the new Catholic Bishop of Berlin, Konrad Graf von Preysing, the Minister for Ecclesiastical Affairs, made clear the basis upon which the Catholic Church was to be tolerated: 'If you, Sir, in an unbiased appreciation of the requirements of the present, *cultivate among your clergy and diocesans loyalty to the new State and its Führer* and respect for its authorities, you may rest assured that the German and Prussian Governments will assume full guarantee for freedom of religious exercises and will show complete understanding for the necessities of the Church.' (Ibid. p. 105). 000

Religion in U.S.S.R.

Marx saw in religion an 'illusory happiness', the inverse reflection of the 'real misery' of mankind. There are two sources of this misery, first dependence on and weakness before Nature and secondly impotence against oppressive social forces. The stupendous technical advances under capitalism which gives man ever-increasing power over nature has undermined and continues to undermine the former basis of religion. But these very advances, within the framework of capitalism, tend not to abolish, but to strengthen the latter. Poverty in the midst of plenty, insecurity and fear, lead men to seek a secure point of support, to believe in the supernatural. 771

When the Russian Government inaugurated the Five Year Plans which tremendously increased the power of man over nature, they believed that they were inaugurating the abolition of poverty; the establishment of socialism in Russia would thus undermine both sources of religion. When the Government announced the Second Five Year Plan (1933–37), which was to establish a fully-fledged socialist society, the League of Militant Atheists declared a parallel 'Five Year Plan of Atheism' whose aim was to increase the number of members of the League from 5½ to 15 million in 1937 and to see that 'not a

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77/ single house of prayer shall remain in the territory of the U.S.S.R., and the very concept of God must be banished from the Soviet Union as a survival of the Middle Ages and an instrument for the oppression of the working masses.'

This plan of frontal attack failed miserably. The persecution of religion did not uproot religion at all. Instead of 15 million members of the League in 1937, there were only two million, and even though after much effort the number increased to 3½ million in 1941, it never reached the level of 1932. Prof. N. S. Timasheff, in his book *Religion in Soviet Russia, 1917–1942* (London, 1943), gives many quotations from the Russian press to show the widespread influence of religion: 'During one of the few anti-religious conferences held in recent years, the chairman said that he had been appointed by mistake, that he did not see any progress and that actually the members of the League accomplished nothing. (*Antireligioznik*, 1939, No. 2). In the Petrograd (Leningrad) province, an attempt was made to revive the local organization of the League, but the provincial conference stated three months later that the attempt was futile. At the conference, the secretary of the provincial organization exclaimed bitterly that all the anti-religious work in the province was in his pocket, that is, that it consisted of a few trifling papers. (*Krasnaya Gazeta*, Nov. 15th, 1938; *Antireligioznik*, 1939 No. 1) . . .

'Early in 1940, one could read that "the enemies of anti-religious work had obtained that, in the majority of provinces, there is no anti-religious work at all. Local cells have ceased to exist, lecturers are unavailable". (*Bezbozhnik*, 1939, No. 5, *Antireligioznik*, 1939 No. 11). In September, 1940, the Central Committee of the League convoked a special conference. The report delivered to the conference acknowledged that anti-religious propaganda was dying; the Party and the Young Communist League no longer co-operated. Members of the Conference could not say anything that might mitigate the pessimistic findings of the Central Committee. (*Pravda*, Sept. 22nd, 1940)'. (pp. 99–101).

In 1937, Yaroslavski, Chairman of the League, declared that the number of religious people in Russia was 80 million. In 1940 another leader of the League gave the figure as 90 million, i.e., about half the population. In the same year,

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Antireligioznik declared that half the industrial proletariat 771
believed in God and it was almost impossible to find atheists in the villages.

According to Timasheff: 'In 1938, the official paper of the Militant Atheists League acknowledged that churches in rural districts were well attended and that young people often observed religious holidays. According to the same journal, a large number of children were seen in the churches of Moscow at the Easter service in 1939; and at Christmas, in the Tambov and Voronezh provinces, many children took part during school hours in processions in honour of the Nativity. In the Tambov province, seven tenths of the children were absent from school on Christmas day and celebrated the Feast in their homes. In Moscow and Tiflis, children with candles in their hands prayed in the churches. In Kursk many children were absent from school during Lent, and attended church and received Holy Communion. In the province of Riazan, many received Holy Communion at the Easter mass, and in the Smolensk province, they took an active part in ceremonies linked with Easter'. (Ibid. p. 67).

It is very natural that Yaroslavski met the situation with a despairing cry: 'It is impossible to build up Communism in a society half of which believes in God and the other half fears the devil.' (*Bezbozhnik*, 1939, No. 14).

The defeat of the 'Five Year Plan of Atheism' cannot be explained only, or even mainly, by opposition of the pre-revolutionary generation, as four-fifths of the present population of U.S.S.R. was either born after the October Revolution or were not yet adult when it broke out, so that they were educated in the schools of the new regime; moreover, the Communist Party had limitless means of propaganda, while the priests did not publish a single paper or book.

The 'Five Year Plan of Atheism' failed because the 'real 659
misery' of the people did not abate. The logic of reality was stronger than all the ukazes of the Kremlin and, confronted with this, Stalin made a complete *volte face*, from the persecution of religion to its regimentation.

By 1935 it had already become clear to the Government that the policy of suppression had failed and the turn began then. At Easter, 1935, religious tokens began to be sold in both state

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659 and co-operative shops, and at Christmas of the same year Christmas trees were to be found even in the trade union clubs. Such a thing could not happen in Russia unless a special government order were made to that effect. Such an order contradicts the principle of the separation of Church and State no less than the persecution of religion.

The war greatly accelerated the process of the regimentation of the Church. On August 21st, 1941, Radio Moscow appealed to 'all God-loving inhabitants of the occupied countries' to rise in defence of religious freedom. It charged the Nazi regime with menacing 'the very existence of Christianity and seeking the overthrow of Christ the King, to instal instead the myth of the twentieth century of Alfred Rosenberg'. On November 18th, 1941, at a banquet in honour of American and British guests, Stalin said: 'May God help President Roosevelt in his task'. The papers of the Militant Atheists League, *Bezbozhnik* and *Antireligioznik*, were closed because of 'paper shortage' (September 30th and October 6th, 1941) and at the same time, from the same press which formerly printed these papers, religious literature began to pour out. It is, incidentally, an example of the 'democracy' prevailing in Russia that although there were over three million members of the League, not one letter of protest or of doubt about the wisdom of the decision to stop the publication of their paper, appeared in the press. Who knows but that the very same officials who wrote *Bezbozhnik* and *Antireligioznik* may then have been the authors of the religious literature?

On October 8th, 1943, the Russian Government established a Soviet Council on Orthodox Affairs, which, by August 1st, 1945, had opened ten theological seminaries. Its chairman, Karpov, a Party bureaucrat, who had no previous connection with the Church, stated that there were now more churches and more priests in Russia than before the war. He declared that the Orthodox Church might 'print whatever it wishes', and stated that his Council had given 'explicit permission for the Church to order any quantity of Testaments, prayer books and liturgical books, and are ready to facilitate this step in every way.' (R. P. Casey, *Religion in Russia*, New York, 1946, p. 187).

After this it is hardly to be wondered at that the calendar of the Russian Orthodox Church includes among the saints no

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other than Lenin, who wrote of that very Church: 'That shameful and accursed past when the Church was in feudal dependence on the State and Russian citizens were in feudal dependence on the established Church'. The Church, however, conveniently forgets Lenin's words and rewrites its past. Thus Karpov said: 'The Russian Orthodox Church in the days of hard trial, which our Fatherland repeatedly underwent in the past, did not break its link with the people, it lived with their needs, their hopes, their wishes and contributed its mite to the common struggle . . .' 659

Religious Denominations in Eastern Europe

The experience of Russia has served the Kremlin as a pattern for its handling of the religious question in the satellite countries. 162 779

In these countries there are two main religious denominations, the Roman Catholic and the Greek Orthodox.

The available statistics on the distribution of population according to religion are pre-war censuses. Since then changes in boundaries, the migration of populations, and the annihilation of many people during the war, including nearly the whole of the Jewish population of these countries (of nearly 5 million Jews only 700 thousand remained) have made these statistics obsolete. But for lack of more recent data they will have to be used, and if care is taken the margin of error need not be too big.

There are big Roman Catholic communities in all the satellite countries except Bulgaria. In Poland, Roman Catholics comprise more than 90 per cent of the population, in Czechoslovakia 73 per cent, in Hungary 64 per cent, in Yugoslavia 37 per cent and in Rumania 6 per cent. In three of these countries there are considerable Greek Orthodox communities: in Bulgaria, 86 per cent of the population, in Rumania 70 per cent and in Yugoslavia 49 per cent. In Hungary and Czechoslovakia there are important Protestant minorities (26 per cent and 8 per cent of the population respectively). In Bulgaria, Moslems form 13 per cent of the population and in Yugoslavia 11 per cent.

The Communists' Attitude to the Orthodox Church

From the beginning the Communist Parties and Governments showed entirely different attitudes towards the Greek Orthodox 659

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659 and the Roman Catholic Churches. The Greek Orthodox Church was regimented, but at the same time it was supported as a loyal upholder of the Government. Numerous delegations came from the Greek Orthodox Church of Russia to the Greek Orthodox Churches of Bulgaria, Rumania and Yugoslavia.

In April, 1945, the Archbishop of Moscow, Gregory, who visited Bulgaria as a representative of the Russian Orthodox Church said (April 16th): 'The Bulgarian people are under the mighty protection of the Soviet Union . . . With the Orthodox religion and Slav feeling we must strengthen the friendship and unity between our peoples.' (*East Europe*, April 24th, 1945).

Dimitrov made an equally unambiguous pronouncement. On 28th May, 1946, he said: 'The Fatherland Front and the Communists in particular pay tribute to the patriots of our national Church. They are proud of a Church which gave to the people such faithful and honourable servants as Ivan Rilski . . . Today we have the right to demand that our Church shall continue to follow the traditions of a thousand years and that it shall indeed be a republican Church . . . Let them follow the example of the present heads of the Russian Church . . . ' (*East Europe*, 5th June, 1946).

A few days earlier the Central Committee of the Bulgarian Trade Unions ordered all branches to take an active part in the celebrations in honour of the Slav apostles, Cyril and Methodius on 24th May, 'to demonstrate the unbreakable unity between all Slav peoples in their fight against reaction and for the strengthening of democracy.'

After this it was not surprising that the Bulgarian Orthodox Church called upon the public in every election to vote for the Fatherland Front lists, nor that a special trade union (Orthodox Priests' Union) was formed, nor that the Fatherland Front Government introduced the following oath for a couple of years into the Bulgarian army: 'I swear before God, my conscience and my people . . . '

The Church in Rumania followed a similar course. On 17th March, 1945, Patriarch Nicodim gave the blessing of the Rumanian Orthodox Church to the Kremlin-appointed government of Groza. In a pastoral letter he urged the clergy and the faithful to give unreserved support to the King and the Government: 'Obey your superiors for the good of all

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concerned . . . cease domestic quarrels.' (*The New York Times*, 659
20th March, 1945).

The same Patriarch visited Russia and according to Premier Groza 'returned radiant with Christian joy at what he had seen in Russia.' (From a speech on November 10th, 1945, at the consecration of a Church in Brasov).

From then on the Rumanian Orthodox Church paid allegiance to the Moscow Patriarchate and supported the Government in every election, in every propaganda campaign.

In Yugoslavia, as many of the Orthodox Church hierarchy during the war supported General Nedić, the Serb quisling, Tito could not but punish a number of them severely. Thus, for instance, the Orthodox Bishop Nastić of Bosnia, was condemned to 11 years' imprisonment. Tito was even more severe towards the Catholic hierarchy who collaborated with the German and Italian Occupation Forces. Archbishop Stepinac, who openly collaborated with the quisling Pavelić, blessed his soldiers who murdered 800 thousand Serbs and received a high medal for his services, was condemned to 16 years' imprisonment. Another Archbishop and two Bishops were imprisoned. Because the religious division of Yugoslavia is almost identical with the national (the Croats and Slovenes being Catholics and the Serbs Orthodox) Tito could not show favouritism to the Orthodox Church without endangering the newly-won unity of the different peoples. Tito's government was the only one in Eastern Europe which passed an educational law abolishing *all* church schools and a land reform law confiscating nearly all the Church lands.

The Orthodox Church of Czechoslovakia, although incomparably weaker than in Bulgaria, Rumania or Yugoslavia, is not less vociferous in its enthusiasm for the Communist Government. Thus on New Year's Day, 1946, it gave its blessing to the establishment of socialism, Slav solidarity and the 'full eviction of all Germans without reservation'. A first-class Stalinist amalgam! After the February coup, on March 3rd, 1948, the Czech Orthodox Church issued a proclamation, welcoming the formation of the new Government as implying 'the return of the Czech nation to the Slav idea and the strengthening of our people's democracy, which is a guarantee of a happy future both for the State and the Church'.

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659 The policy of mutual support of the Orthodox Church and the state in Bulgaria and Rumania, does not mean that the two are coming together as equal and free agents, for the state subordinates the Church to itself. This is clearly shown by the new, reactionary and totalitarian Religious Laws of Bulgaria and Rumania.

Vassil Kolarov, the Foreign Minister at the time, introduced the Religious Law into the Bulgarian Parliament on 17th February, 1949. It asserts as a basic tenet that 'The Bulgarian Orthodox Church is the traditional church of the Bulgarian people and being inseparable from their history, is in form, substance and spirit a People's Democratic Church'. (Article 3). This cuts across the concept of the equality of all denominations (as well as of agnostics and atheists) before the law. There follows a whole series of regulations whose purport is to turn the Churches into state departments. *The Economist* of May 28th, 1949, sums up these regulations very well: 'The aim of the law is briefly to hand over the governance of the church to the state—through "a governing board responsible to the state"—and ensure the complete allegiance of pastors and priests (Article 9); to give the state power to remove all ministers who "work against the democratic regulations of the state" (Article 13); to stop all church appeals and addresses contrary to state regulations (Article 16); to forbid the mention of all state authorities or leaders in church services except in forms permitted by the Minister for Religion (Article 19); to transfer all hospitals, welfare centres, kindergartens or other charitable properties to the state (Article 22); to forbid all communications with lay or religious officials and institutions outside the country except by permission of the Minister (Article 24); to prevent any religious body with its centre outside the country from maintaining missions or churches in the country (Article 25); to impose penal servitude on all who use churches for political propaganda (of course, calling for support of the Communist Party is not political propaganda—Y.G.) (Article 30); and to submit all church statutes and regulations to the Minister (Article 32).'

The Orthodox Church is totally dependent financially on its benefactor, the State. In 1948, of its total expenses of 418 million leva, 370 million were met by state subsidies.

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The religious law in Rumania, enacted on 5th August, 1948, is similar to the Bulgarian law. 659

While the Orthodox Church is regimented as the *national Church*, as an agency of the state, the churches whose religious allegiance is not to Moscow, but to the West, inevitably become pariahs. Regimentation and persecution appear side by side.

The Communists' Attitude to the non-Orthodox Churches

The most glaring example of persecution is undoubtedly the treatment meted out to the Protestant priests by the Bulgarian Government. It is not necessary to enter into the details of the accusation made against the Protestant priests at their trial in Sofia in February, 1949, to be convinced that the whole trial was a political move by the State in its campaign to regiment religion. The Protestant Churches in Bulgaria had not the tarnished record of the Orthodox Church, which supported the monarchy in its alliance with Germany in the first and second world wars, blessed the militarists who carried out the *coups d'etat* of 1923 and 1934 and slaughtered tens of thousands of workers and peasants, abetted the semi-fascist dictatorships, and so on. The Protestant community is so small and uninfluential, constituting little more than 0,2 per cent of the whole population (15,744 out of 7,022,000) that it is inconceivable that it could cause serious harm to the people. Yet the Bulgarian Government put fourteen Protestant priests on trial and punished them severely, while it left the Orthodox Church hierarchy untouched.

The Catholic Church in Eastern Europe differs from both the Orthodox Church and the weak Protestant Church in Bulgaria. When Tsar Peter the Great was considering whether to ally the Russian Church with Rome, one factor finally decided him against doing so. This was, as one writer put it, that 'The Pope was a patriarch who would be unamenable to the Tsar and could not be deposed'. (R. P. Casey, op. cit. p. 13). Today this consideration is no less important in determining Stalin's attitude to the Vatican.

For a number of reasons the country in which the conflict between Moscow and Rome broke out in its most dramatic form was Hungary. The Achilles heel of the Catholic Church, 659 471

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659 which appeared to be so strong, lay in the fact that it was a
471 big landowner connected by many ties with the big landlords. This seriously weakened it at a time when the peasants were in revolt against this medieval heritage. In such circumstances the use of religious sanctions to defend secular vested interests is sure to recoil on the Church hierarchy. History has provided ample evidence of this from the time of the Great French Revolution to that of the Spanish Civil War. In the fight against parasitic feudalism during the French Revolution, the resistance of the Church was no stronger than that of the lay nobility. Where the peasants did rally around the priests against revolutionary France, as in the Vendée, it was not because their religious feeling was outraged by the revolutionaries, but because of their attachment to their feudal masters. Where the peasants fought the nobility they also fought openly against the priests. This does not mean that the peasants were not religious. The belief that God watches over man and that there is another life after death, had much deeper roots than attachment to the priests and to the Church which was a big feudal landowning institution. This explains why the same peasants who fought so consistently against the priests between 1789 and 1794 were quite happy to accept the restoration of the Church in 1795 and the Concordat with the Vatican in 1801. When the Kremlin decided to destroy the strongholds of the Catholic Church in Eastern Europe, commonsense, if not a study of the French Revolution, showed them that the priests would be least powerful where they were most completely identified with big land ownership. This was particularly the case in Hungary. When Cardinal Mindszenty, the head of the Hungarian Catholic hierarchy, preached against the land reform and the peasants nevertheless went forward unhesitatingly to take the land which they had worked for centuries without getting all its yield, it was clear that he had lost not only this single battle but the whole war. Cardinal Mindszenty's opposition to the abolition of all titles of nobility, his insistence on being called 'Prince', went against the grain of the poor, downtrodden and suffering peasants. He could not save the day by his appeals to 'democracy' against 'communist tyranny', and so forth, for such words rang false when uttered by a man who for more than two

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decades had supported the White Terror and Horthy's 659
dictatorship, who had preached the extermination of Com- 471
munists and Socialists, had fulminated as a Magyar nationalist against the Slovaks, Rumanians and other Danubian nations who acquired territory from Hungary after 1918, and had welcomed the extermination of millions of Jews by the Nazis. When the Hungarian Parliament in June, 1948, passed a bill nationalising all Church-sponsored schools, Cardinal Mindszenty, in excommunicating all the Catholic deputies who supported the bill, certainly did not stand on democratic ground. The educational systems in the United States and Britain go much farther in secularisation than this bill, which still maintained compulsory religious instruction in schools to be given by monks and nuns.

In Poland and Czechoslovakia, where the Church was not a large landowner or an ally of the feudal opposition to land reform,* the Communist Parties were much more cautious.

In Poland, where the main church is the Roman Catholic Church, the Communist leaders were forced to find a *modus vivendi* with it. In a completely opportunistic manner they pandered to the wishes of the Church to an extent which would horrify bourgeois liberals, particularly the French Radicals, to say nothing of atheists.

Polish Facts and Figures, issued by the Polish Embassy in London, reports (December 11th, 1948): 'In contrast to most countries where land reform starts with the division of church lands, Polish land reform left the large church estates amounting to 841,300 acres untouched. In addition to leaving the church's lands untouched, the government also returned lands and goods taken away from the church by the Germans.'

'Religious instruction by priests is provided in each school 659
as part of the school curriculum (government directive of 872
December, 1926). The only children who may be exempted from religious instruction in schools are those whose parents

*This does not mean that the heads of the Catholic Church, especially Poland, were progressive. We need but mention one of them, the late Primate Cardinal Hlond. He found the time after the Kielce pogrom of 4th July, 1946, in which 41 Jews were killed, to accuse the Jews of backing the present regime and implied that the absurd medieval tales of Jewish ritual murder of Christian children—which had played their part in the pogrom—may not have been without foundation. This was but one incident in the career of this politician-clergyman, an enthusiastic supporter of the rule of the 'Colonels'.

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659 or guardians forward a written statement to the school that
872 they do not wish their children to participate.

'The programme and text-books for teaching religion are prepared by church organs and submitted to the Ministry of Education. The text-books for all grades of elementary schools were prepared by a special commission attached to the Metropolitan Curia of Cracow.

'Children who attend religious classes participate in the following religious practices:—(a) On Sundays, holidays, and the beginning and end of the school year, they attend church services; (b) They participate in "recollections"; (c) A prayer is recited at the beginning and end of each school day.'

'A network of Catholic theological seminaries which prepare for priesthood and missionary work is spread throughout Poland.'

659 Another issue of *Polish Facts and Figures*, dated August
873 6th, 1949, gives the following facts about religion in Poland: 'Catholic clergymen enjoy many personal privileges which have long ago been abolished or restricted in other countries . . .

'Ecclesiastical seminaries have nearly 18,000 students. Three hundred children's homes, 15,000 pupils, 600 kindergartens with 22,000 children and 40 secondary schools with 9,000 students are under monastic management. The Catholic school system is crowned by the Lublin Catholic University.

659 'Poland is one of those few countries where religious teaching
793 exists in schools. The 6,300 priests teaching religion are paid by the State.

'The number of religious orders has grown during the existence of the People's Poland. While in 1939 there were 1,742 monasteries and convents in Poland, there are now 2,010. The number of nuns has grown from 17,000 to nearly 19,000. Despite the housing shortage, nuns enjoy such privileges as enable them to live in comfortable, big houses.

'Poland holds first place in Europe for the number of Catholic periodicals. Their circulation amounts to 6,387,000.

' . . . 62 Catholic journals were published in Poland as compared with 20 such journals in France.'

659 In all the Army and police units of Poland there are official chaplains.

To demonstrate the devotion of the Communists to Catholicism, General Karol Swierczewski, commander of the

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International Brigade in Spain and an old Communist leader, was buried on 1st April, 1947, according to Roman Catholic rite and his coffin lowered to the sound of *De Profundis* chanted by Catholic clergy! (*Glos Ludu* 2nd April, 1947). 659

In Czechoslovakia the Government passed a bill by which all pastors were to become salaried officials of the State. The Church hierarchy, headed by Archbishop Beran, could not prevent nearly all the priests from accepting this, for lack of any large estates or other source of income made them financially dependent on the state. (The same fact—that the poverty of the Church secures its dependence on the state—led Catherine II, who was certainly not an atheist, to confiscate most of the lands of the Russian Orthodox Church). To facilitate the transference of the clergy's allegiance from the Pope in Rome to the Government in Prague, the Communist leaders pretended to behave like devout Catholics. Thus, for instance, Gottwald, immediately after being elected President, with his wife attended 'a special *Te Deum* service in the Cathedral at St. Vitus at which Archbishop Beran officiated. Neither President Masaryk nor President Beneš did this' (*The Times*, 15th June, 1948).

In Rumania, the Government used yet another method to subordinate the Catholic Church to itself. There were two Catholic Churches in the country, the Roman Catholic Church embracing about 1,200,000 people, and the Uniate Catholic Church embracing about 1,426,000 people. The Uniates are Christians of the Byzantine rite—which is almost identical with the Orthodox rite—who owe allegiance to the Pope. The Uniate Church was founded in Poland at the end of the sixteenth century and was introduced into Transylvania about a century later. It became a focal point for Ukrainian and Rumanian nationalism; hence it was a constant thorn in the Tsar's side. In the seventies of last century Tsar Alexander II, on the advice of the arch-reactionary Count Dimitri Tolstoy, suppressed the Uniate Church in the western provinces of the Russian empire. In 1945 the Uniates of Eastern Galicia (taken from Poland by Russia) were forced to join the Orthodox Church. Three years later the Uniates in Rumania suffered the same fate. The Rumanian Government arrested all the Bishops and many of the priests of the Uniate Church, as a

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659 result of which some priests convened a conference and decided to join the Orthodox Church. The property of the Uniate Church was also transferred to the Orthodox Church and the Uniate Church ceased to exist. The Roman Catholic Church, being very weak in Rumania (embracing not more than 6 per cent of the population) had to agree to the Government's Religious Law of August, 1948, making all priests state officials. The higher ranks of the Orthodox Church can only be filled 'after approval by the Presidium of the Grand National Assembly, given by decree, at the proposal of the government, following the recommendation of the Minister of Religion.'

The following extract from a broadcast by Radio Rumania on December 14th, 1948, symbolizes the limitation of 'religious freedom' in Rumania by police control: 'The Bucharest Police informs those whom it may concern in connection with carol singing at Christmas and the New Year that children under 12 can sing carols without authorization. Choirs and all other associations which sing carols must obtain authorization from the Bucharest Police Adminstrative Department. Applications must state, on the responsibility of the association's head, the name, age and occupation of each member and the part he takes in the choir. All members must carry identity cards.' (Quoted by *The Economist*, 25th December, 1948).

In Conclusion

From the review given above it is clear that while the regimentation of the Orthodox Churches in the satellites by the State was a simple and straightforward undertaking that has already been completed, the regimentation of the Catholic Church has been much more complicated, demanding undermining tactics instead of frontal attack, and it is not yet finished. To complete it, it will be necessary, it seems, either to include the Vatican in the Great Russian Empire, or to make the Catholics of Eastern Europe pay allegiance to another Pope (and thus repeat the case of the Popes of Avignon) or to turn the Churches into National Churches.

So far two inter-related reasons have been given for the policy of regimentation of religion in the satellites: 1. the impossibility of uprooting religious feeling in the people as long

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as the 'real misery' of poverty and oppression continues unmitigated; this became clear to the Kremlin, if not from a reading of Marx, from their own experience in trying to carry out the 'Five Year Plan of Atheism'; 2. The necessity under a totalitarian regime of leaving no field of social life free of State control. A third possible reason suggests itself. 659

Until the French Revolution the French bourgeoisie, on the whole, supported a materialistic philosophy, it was atheistic. Here and there were some deists among them, but there were hardly any supporters of the Church. After the victory of the Revolution they changed. The Church lost its feudal property, and the priests, convinced that the old regime had gone for good, were ready to accommodate themselves to the new rulers of France. At the same time the bourgeoisie began to fear its allies of yesterday, the sansculottes, even more than its enemies, the nobility, and it began to look upon the materialist philosophy as a danger and upon religion as a shield. Thus the bourgeoisie went over very quickly from materialism to deism (1793 to 1795) and then embraced the Catholic Church (the Concordat of 1801). Napoleon Bonaparte, the exponent *par excellence* of the desires of the *nouveaux riches* explained this new devotion to religion very succinctly: 'As far as I am concerned, I do not see in religion the mystery of the incarnation, but the mystery of the social order; it attaches to heaven an idea of equality which prevents the rich from being massacred by the poor.'

It is possible that this consideration accounts to some extent for the attitude to religion of the 'new aristocracy' of Stalin's empire also.

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CHAPTER X

'PEOPLE'S DEMOCRACIES'—DICTATORSHIP OVER THE PEOPLE

★

642 ALL THE COUNTRIES of 'People's Democracy' have very fine constitutions. Article 2, of the 'Constitution of the People's Republic of Bulgaria' (approved by the Grand National Assembly on December 4th, 1947) states:

'In the People's Republic of Bulgaria all power emanates from the people and belongs to the people.

'This power is exercised through freely elected representative organs and through referenda.

'All representative organs of the State power are elected by the citizens, by a general, direct, and secret ballot.'

Article 88 states: 'The citizens of the People's Republic are guaranteed freedom of the press, of speech, of assembly, of meetings and demonstrations'. Articles similar to these two appear in all the constitutions of the 'People's Democracies.'*

How do these fine institutions work in practice? What is the actual interpretation of 'free elections' or 'freedom of the press, speech, of assembly, of meetings and demonstrations'?

'Free Elections'

666 Formally all the governments of Eastern Europe are responsible to parliaments, which are made up of representatives of the people democratically elected. In all elections the overwhelming majority of the electorate is stated to have voted and an overwhelming majority of the votes to have been given for the existing M.P's. In the Rumanian general elections of March 28th, 1948, 91 per cent of the electorate voted, of whom 90.8 per cent voted for the list of candidates supporting the present government. In the Czechoslovakian elections of May 30th, 1948, the corresponding figures were 90 per cent

*For a comparative analysis of the Constitutions of the 'People's Democracies' see Samuel L. Sharp, *New Constitutions in the Soviet Sphere*, Washington, 1948, and A. Gyorgy, *Governments of Danubian Europe*, New York, 1949.

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and 89.2 per cent; in the Hungarian elections of May 15th, 1949, 94.6 per cent and 95.6 per cent; in Bulgaria (December 18th, 1949) 98.89 per cent and 97.66 per cent; and in Yugoslavia (March 26th, 1950) 93.23 per cent and 94.2 per cent.* 666

But the impression of such solid support for the governments is very much weakened by the fact that in all the elections there was only one list of candidates.

The Communist leaders tried to hide their intention of establishing such a system of 'elections,' which is a manifest negation of democratic procedure. For instance, Marshal Tito, the first to establish this system, said in an interview with *The Times* correspondent on November 13th, 1945: 'I should like to see our opposition leading a full political life. I certainly expect an opposition to crystallize out of the many parties which go to form the National Front in Parliament, for we shall have to settle many controversial issues.' At that time Tito insisted on the right to put up a number of electoral lists. The Communist leaders in the last country to adopt the system—Czechoslovakia—were also vehement in denying their intentions. Thus the *Daily Worker* of 24th March, 1948—two months before the one-list elections—said: 'It was confirmed yesterday that the Communists will go to the polls as an independent party. There will be lists of candidates from the four Czech and three Slovak parties.'

Lest the existence of only one list of candidates should be insufficient guarantee of the desired electoral victory, other precautions were taken. In some countries the secret ballot was abolished. In Czechoslovakia, for instance, where the secret ballot had previously obtained, it was announced before the elections of May, 1948, that no voter was to be compelled to observe secrecy when casting his vote. Nosek, the Communist Minister of the Interior, declared a few days before the elections: 'There can be no grounds for disapporoval if a voter of his own free will does not exercise the right to a secret vote

*As far as we know no candidate in any of the 'People's Democracies' polled more than 100 per cent. Stalin is the only one who can record such a 'miracle'. In the elections to the local Soviets that took place on 21st December, 1947, the constituency that 'elected' Stalin to the Moscow Soviet had 1,617 voters, but Stalin polled 2,122 votes. *Pravda* next day explained this extraordinary phenomenon thus: 'The extra ballot papers were put into the urns by citizens of neighbouring constituencies anxious to seize the opportunity to express their gratitude to their leader.'

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666 but votes openly'. The Communist Party followed this up by declaring that only reactionaries were ashamed of their policy and would vote secretly. At the polling booths a voter had to show his identification papers and state whether he wished to cast his ballot paper into the ballot boxes exposed to public view or into boxes in a secret booth. Even if he was bold enough to choose the latter course his ordeal was still not at an end. Two ballot papers, one with the government list of candidates *printed on both sides*, the other a blank slip, were issued to him, and after throwing one of them into the secret ballot box, he had to throw the discarded one into a waste paper basket more or less in full view of the election officers.

If the elector wished to show his disapproval of the govern-
[687] ment not by voting against it—a path fraught with dangers—but simply by abstaining, he could do so only if he were prepared to pay the penalty the law demands of all who do not vote—imprisonment for a month and a fine of 10 thousand crowns (£50).

Even if the elector was bold enough to vote against the government list, what assurance had he that his vote would be counted, as the only people on the electoral commissions are those who support the official list? When there is only one list of candidates, and when voting is open and counting secret instead of the other way about, the official list cannot possibly lose. Indeed in all the general elections that have taken place since 1948 in the 'People's Democracies' there has not been a *single* case of an official candidate not being elected.

Indirect testimony to the faking of the elections is given by the following fact. In all the Constitutions of the 'People's Democracies', the electoral laws declare the right of a very small group of electors to put up a list of candidates, or a single candidate, if they wish. In Bulgaria every group of *ten* citizens is allowed to do so, in Yugoslavia every group of a hundred, and so on. But although this fine democratic law exists, and although it was stated that thousands voted against the Government (for example, in Bulgaria, in the elections of December, 1949, 109,983 blank or invalid votes were cast and in Yugoslavia in March, 1950, 613,125 voted against the Government) not one case is recorded of a group of ten or a hundred citizens putting up any candidate against the official one.

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'Freedom of Press, Speech, Assembly, Meetings and Demonstrations'

Like the provisions for 'free elections', these rights exist only 641
on paper. A comparison of the papers published in the different 'People's Democracies', the contents of the speeches made and so on, proves this. The extent to which the 'freedoms' exist is particularly obvious when there is any abrupt change of policy. For instance, up to the day on which Rajk was arrested, all the papers in Hungary competed in singing his praises, at meetings his name was mentioned side by side with Rákosi's and at demonstrations—the last, that of 1st May, 1949—his picture was very prominent and, according to the Hungarian press, the cheers he drew from the crowd were second only to Rákosi. When on 15th June, 1949, it was announced that Rajk had been arrested as a 'Titoist-fascist', all the press, without exception, attacked him in a most vicious manner. Within a week, the press was full of telegrams from meetings all over the country demanding 'punishment without mercy' for Rajk, and workers demanded 'A rope for traitors like Rajk', even before the date of his trial was announced. Not *one* of the thousands who had voted for him a month earlier when he headed the list of candidates in the Parliamentary elections made use of their 'freedom of the press and speech' (Article 55 of the Constitution) to propose to withhold judgment until the trial, far less to defend him. Furthermore, the people knew exactly what punishment would be meted out months before the trial. The rope was repeatedly demanded and he was indeed hanged. The mass meetings before Mindszenty's trial never demanded the death sentence but severe punishment; Mindszenty received a long prison sentence. Freedom of the press, speech, assembly, meetings and demonstrations amounts to the 'freedom' of the people to say exactly what the Government wants them to say.

To enhance 'freedom' of the press, the sale of books dating 642
from before the rule of the 'People's Democracies' is prohibited by Government decree. The Czechoslovak Government on January 10th, 1950, banned the sale of all books published in Czechoslovakia before May 5th, 1945, with the exception of certain specified text-books for schools and scientific journals, ordered all booksellers to clear their shelves of them within

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642 10 days, and required them to make a return of such books to the Minister of Education, and to keep them in a place 'inaccessible to the public'. Previously (November 22nd, 1949) all booksellers had had to make a list of all second-hand books in stock and not to sell them until they got permission from the Ministry of Information.

Even private correspondence is not immune from government interference. The Czechoslovak Government declared that from February 1st, 1950, anyone corresponding with persons abroad must deliver his letters personally to the post office, produce an identity card when handing it to the postal official and write his name and address on the envelope.

A very good description of 'freedom of demonstration' in Yugoslavia was given in the Royal Institute of International Affairs monthly journal *The World Today* (November, 1946). 'On the eve of the day fixed for the demonstration, instructions are given to the workers and civil servants, the trade unions, the ward committees, and the anti-Fascist organizations to get ready for action. They receive orders to report to fixed assembly points in the city at a stated time. Mimeographed lists of the slogans to be used are produced, and reliable persons appointed to direct the marching columns . . . The route and timing of the mass procession is carefully planned, and the school-children get busy painting the banners inscribed with the appropriate words, and decking the giant pictures of Stalin and Tito with flowers and wreaths of greenery'.

Democracy—The Only Way to Socialism

The leaders of the Communist Parties declare that the 600 'People's Democracies' are a stage on the path towards Socialism. To evaluate the correctness or otherwise of this assertion it is necessary to make clear the relation between the economic supremacy of the working class, its political rule and democracy.

In all previous history the class struggle has reached its climax in a fight for political power as the decisive weapon for the defence of the economic interests of the ruling class. This was the case in the bourgeois revolutions of the 16–18 centuries in Holland, England and France, and in the War of Independence in the United States. The bourgeoisie, which once

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overthrew the old nobility, is now confronted with the working class, whose aim is also to win state power. In this respect, there is no difference between the character of the struggle of the rising bourgeoisie in the past and that of the proletariat in the present. But there is a vital difference in the relation between the political ascendancy and the class ownership of social wealth in the two movements. The bourgeoisie owned a large part of the means of production *before* the bourgeois revolution. The French capitalists, for example, owned manufactories, factories, land, ships, shops, etc., before the Great French Revolution. Inside feudal economy and society there existed for centuries an alien growth—capitalist economy—and the greater its wealth, the more self-confident became those who owned it. To them revolution meant the accommodation of the state power to the needs of the already dominant class. By contrast, autonomous cells of socialism do not arise inside capitalist economy and the working class remains propertyless until it gains political power and uses it to transfer wealth from the bourgeoisie to society. Whereas the bourgeoisie could be the ruling class economically but not politically the working class can not. Its economic supremacy and freedom is dependent on its political supremacy.

There is a very important corollary to this. The capitalist could maintain his ownership of property even under a hostile political regime, such as the rule of the nobility, although, because of high taxation, royal and feudal despotism, etc., he may not have gained the maximum possible benefit from it. He could maintain his ownership under widely different governments—under Louis XVI and Robespierre, the Empire of Napoleon and the Republic, Liberal and Conservative governments, Fascist and Labour governments. This is possible because these changes in government, however thoroughgoing, do not affect the link between the capitalist and his wealth, private ownership. So long, therefore, as the governments do not expropriate him economically, even if they expropriate him politically—as, for instance, under Fascism, where the capitalist gets many a hard knock from the political dictator for the benefit of the dictator's praetorian guard—the capitalist continues to be the owner of wealth. Unlike the capitalists, the feudal lords and the slave owners, the workers cannot

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000 become the owners of the means of production as individuals, but only as a collective. It is true that a number of workers in capitalist society succeed in raising themselves in the social scale and becoming individual owners of a certain wealth. But these exceptions prove the rule; the workers who 'get on', by so doing get out of the working class. The workers as a class can achieve economic supremacy only after they take political power and this supremacy can only take the form of collective ownership of the social wealth: the workers own the state, the state owns the wealth, and thus the workers own the wealth.

Social ownership implies that the will of society is decisive in determining the general policy of production and distribution. But what is the collective will? There are those who see in the 'will of the nation' or the 'will of the class' something different from and independent of the desires of the individuals who make up the nation or the class. But this idea is untenable if one assumes that there is no will nor thought without a brain to think it.

In personifying the collective, one accepts the 'voice of the nation' or of 'the working class', however that is interpreted, but rejects the voices of the actual members of the nation or of the working class, and therefore negates the will of the collective. A collective of people can only express its will by aggregating the wills of the different individuals who constitute it. Hence the form of rule of the working class must necessarily be democracy.

The idea of political supremacy as a *prerequisite* of the economic supremacy of the working class and of democracy as a necessary form of its rule, was clearly expressed in *The Communist Manifesto*: '. . . the first step in the revolution by the working class is to raise the proletariat to the position of ruling class, to win the battle of democracy.

'The proletariat will use its political supremacy to wrest, by degrees, all capital from the bourgeoisie, to centralise all instruments of production in the hands of the state, i.e., the proletariat organised as the ruling class. . . .'

More than forty years later, Engels wrote: 'If anything is certain it is that our party and the working class can only come to power under the form of a democratic republic. Precisely this is the specific form for the dictatorship of the proletariat, as

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the Great French Revolution has already shown.' Another great socialist, Rosa Luxemburg, writing about the Russian revolution, said: '. . . socialist democracy is not something which begins only in the promised land after the foundations of socialist economy are created; it does not come as some sort of Christmas present for the worthy people who, in the interim, have loyally supported a handful of socialist dictators. Socialist democracy begins simultaneously with the beginnings of the destruction of class rule and of the construction of socialism.'

Just as the ownership by a group of shareholders of a certain capitalist enterprise is accompanied by the right to vote on its management and decide on the hiring and firing of its managers, so the social ownership of the wealth of a country must be expressed in the power of society to decide upon its management and the power to hire or fire its managers. The 'People's Democracies' are based on a different conception. A bureaucratic police dictatorship has raised itself above the people, and is independent of its will, while claiming to govern in its interests.

In Part II of Goethe's Faust, Faust decides to reclaim a strip of land from the sea in order to settle it with 'many millions' of people of 'free toil', and thus would 'a free people stand on a free soil'. But during the construction itself Faust deals with the builders as though they were dull-witted slaves.

> 'To speed the greatest enterprises
> One mind for thousand hands suffices.'

With carrot and knout the workers are driven on to accomplish the mightiest achievements. Mephistopheles, the foreman, is encouraged by Faust:

> 'Workmen throng on throng address
> Thyself to get. Put forth all vigour.
> Now with indulgence, now with rigour
> Encourage. Pay, entice, impress!
> Let every day bring news of our successes,
> How this new trench, this mighty groove progresses.'

Thus the future community of 'free people' is the Faustian aim, while the serfdom of the toilers is the Mephistophelean means. The link between them is Faust's belief in enlightened despotism—

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"One mind for thousand hands suffices."

000 Will the means not swallow up the aim, the 'groove' become a 'grave'? Why should the despot not hold on to his knout as long as he can, why should he not use it to perpetuate the tyranny over the 'thousand hands'? And, the most important question for the fate of humanity, how long will the 'thousand hands' submit to this tyranny?

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PART III

THE REBELLIOUS SATELLITE

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CHAPTER I

THE COMINFORM COUNTRIES LAUNCH AN ATTACK ON YUGOSLAVIA

The Excommunication Resolution of the Cominform

548 ON 28TH JUNE, 1948, like a bolt from the blue, came the news, first announced in the Prague daily, *Rude Pravo*, that the Yugoslav Communist Party had been expelled from the Cominform.

The Resolution of expulsion is about as clear as the prophecies of the Oracle of Delphi, for almost anything may be read into it; it is outstanding for its demagogic jumbling together of mutually exclusive accusations. The Yugoslav leaders are accused of nationalism and Trotskyism, Bukharinism and Menshevism. They are accused of giving a free hand to the 'growth of capitalist elements in their country' and also of 'hastily decreed . . . nationalisation of medium industry and trade'. They are accused of 'glossing over the class struggle' in the countryside, thus in effect supporting the rich peasants, the kulaks, and at the same time of being carried away by 'adventuristic' plans of putting an end to all elements of capitalism in the countryside. More and more kulak elements, according to the Resolution, lay down the law in the villages, and at the same time the kulak elements sabotage the government plan for the collection of grain and other government undertakings; in short, the Yugoslav leaders are tools in the hands of the kulaks, but pass 'adventuristic' decrees against them which they sabotage. This logic has been approached in soundness in recent years probably only by the Nazis who blame the Jews for Capitalism and for Marxism.

If all the trivialities included in the Resolution and in the correspondence between the leaders of the Soviet and Yugoslav

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648 governments* are put aside, the issue boils down to three accusations: first, the Yugoslav government had been 'pursuing an unfriendly policy towards the Soviet Union'; secondly, the collectivisation of agriculture was not being pursued, and, thirdly, the Communist Party of Yugoslavia had no identity of its own but was dissolved in the non-party People's Front, contrary to the Marxist conception of the leading role of the Party.

The first accusation is the most severe, and many instances are cited to support it. 'The Yugoslav security organs controlled and supervised the Soviet representatives in Yugoslavia.' (Letter of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union to the Central Committee of the Communist Party of Yugoslavia, 27th March, 1948). Milovan Djilas, one of the four leaders of the Communist Party of Yugoslavia mentioned in the Resolution, is alleged to have stated at a session of the Central Committee of the Party in 1945 'that the Soviet officers were, from a moral standpoint, inferior to the officers of the British army'; 'this anti-Soviet statement by Djilas met with no opposition from the other members of the C.C. of the C.P.Y.' (Ibid.) The Yugoslavs 'began to abuse our (Soviet) military advisers, to call them loafers, and to discredit the Soviet army', and the government decided to ask for the withdrawal of a number of Soviet military advisers. (C.C. of C.P.S.U. to C.C. of C.P.Y., 4th May, 1948). The Yugoslav government passed a decree forbidding the state organs to give economic information to any Soviet representative without government permission. (C.C. of C.P.S.U. to C.C. of C.P.Y., op. cit, 27th March, 1948).

It will be shown elsewhere what connection the second and third accusations have with the basic one of unfriendliness, or more correctly, refusal to submit to Russia.

The Cominform Resolution was only the first shot in a barrage of sharp attacks on the Yugoslav government.

The Short Memory of the Cominformites

Amnesia is the greatest blessing granted the Cominform leaders. Hardly had the ink on the Cominform communique excommunicating Yugoslavia dried, before the unlimited

* This correspondence together with the Cominform Resolution has been printed in English in *The Soviet-Yugoslav Dispute* (Royal Institute of International Affairs, London, 1948).

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praise previously showered on Tito's head evaporated. The Church of Stalin knows only of saints and devils, and St. Tito was now Lucifer.

Every member of the Communist Party conscientiously forgets what his leaders wrote just prior to the rupture. For instance, the editor of the *Daily Worker* had written on 13th September, 1947: 'Yugoslavia is the most advanced of the new democracies in Europe . . . It is a real democracy where the people rule and build a new life'. Two days later he wrote: 'Yugoslavia is showing the whole world the miracle that a free people can accomplish when power is in their hands'. Rákosi stated on 10th September, 1946: 'During this great world war we saw with tremendous enthusiasm that there were two peoples who justified the hopes of mankind—the Soviet people and the Yugoslav people'. *Soviet News* said on 20th August, 1947: 'A complete democratic transformation has taken place in Yugoslavia'. All these statements and thousands of similar ones have been blissfully forgotten by the Communist Parties.

One of the first to give the new version of Tito's past was Vittorio Vidalli, leader of the pro-Cominform Communist Party in the Free Territory of Trieste. Already on 15th September, 1948, he was ready with stories of the sins committed by Tito's agents in Trieste over a number of years: 'For a number of years any disagreements with the directives of the Babić-Jursić group (Tito's agents in Trieste—Y.G.) were qualified as "slander", as intrigues by the agents of "Anglo-Saxon imperialism", as expressions of "Factionalism", and so on. On the orders of the Slovenian Ranković, Boris Kreiger, nationalist Minister of Police in Lubljana, honest Communists who differed from Tito's policy, were brutally persecuted'.

'In "A" zone and in Trieste at that time there were attempted assassinations of Italian and Slovene Party functionaires.

'Here Tito's puppets tried to use as "propagandists" Slovenes—civil servants in the Yugoslav State institutions. Students of the so-called "school for cadres" were used for subversive work. This school had been secretly established by Babić and Jursić under the leadership of Sedmak and Srechko who had been expelled from the Party as Trotskyites and who were linked up with the British Intelligence Service.'

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648 This had been going on 'for a number of years'! Why had no member, in the democratic Party of Trieste, proclaimed these terrible facts before June 28th, 1948?

The Albanian Communist Party leaders were also quick to find out the dark past of the Yugoslav leaders. In *For a Lasting Peace, For a People's Democracy!* of 15th August, 1949, Bedri Spahi, Secretary of the Central Committee of the Workers' Party of Albania, tells of the policy that the 'third-rate Belgrade tsar' Tito carried out during the war in Albania: '. . . as far back as the spring of 1943 the aims of the traitor Tito, with regard to the Albanian people, fully coincided with the plans of Mussolini'. On the eve of the liberation of Albania from the Italian occupation Tito insisted on 'placing rabid fascists . . . in the country's leading organs'. Afterwards the Tito agent 'Kochi Xoxe, then organisational secretary of the Central Committee and Minister of Home Affairs,' by a 'systematic campaign of slander and threats' 'drove Nako Spiru to commit suicide. A leading member of the Party, Nako Spiru had boldly exposed the colonising, imperialist policy pursued by Tito in relation to Albania'. 'Many Communists and functionaires of local Party committees were thrown into prison or shot on the basis of false information fabricated on his (Xoxe's—Y.G.) instructions'. These are terrible accusations, but all the years that these crimes were being committed not one in democratic Albania uttered a word that might expose the sinners!

Jacques Duclos finds another proof that Tito in the past was a reactionary agent of Western imperialism—the fact that Tito's partisans got arms during the war from the Western Powers. He writes:

'We know, for example, how Churchill refused to send arms to the French Francs-Tireurs and Partisans.

'But on the other hand we know that Churchill's attitude to Tito was quite different. And since the old British reactionary never lost sight of the interests of reaction for one moment, the question arises: what guarantee was Tito able to give him at that time? We have the right to assume that during the war the Intelligence Service had its agents among those who were closest to Tito'. (*For a Lasting Peace, For a People's Democracy!* 1st July, 1949).

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The crudeness of this argument is astonishing! Russia during the war received many times more arms from the West than Yugoslavia. (Actually the West started giving serious help to Tito's partisans only in the spring of 1944). Does this not prove that 'the Intelligence Service had its agents among those who were closest to' Stalin? 648

N. Zachariades, the General Secretary of the Communist Party of Greece, blames Tito's agents for the defeat of the Greek Partisans. Their machinations against them go back as far as 1943:

'Since 1943, the Greek Communist Party and revolutionary movement have been between two fires: on the one side the foreign imperialists and monarcho-fascists, on the other—the Tito clique . . . ' Tito worked hand in hand with General Zervas, the Axis quisling in Greece, and together, among other deeds they organized the murder of a member of the Political Bureau of the Greek Communist Party (*For a Lasting Peace, For a People's Democracy!* 1st August, 1949).

The Rajk trial brought 'proof' after 'proof' of Tito's past crimes. It 'proved' that he was an agent of British imperialism during the war, that he tried to come to terms with Hitler but was prevented from doing so by the Yugoslav people, that even in the Spanish Civil War his followers, members of the International Brigade, were agents of Franco, Mussolini and Hitler. Immediately after the trial, the Cominform agent, Pero Popivoda, 'remembered' a few other significant facts. During the war, on Djilas' and Pijade's orders, many partisan units in Montenegro were split into small groups, the intended and inevitable result of which was that many were caught by the Germans; Tito's escape from the German encirclement in Sutesca—previously acclaimed by the Communists as an act of heroism and claimed by the Russian press at the time to have been achieved by a Russian aircraft's saving him—was the result of Tito's agreement with the Germans; proof: 'Over 10,000 partisans died there, but Tito escaped'. Tito all the time had relations with the Gestapo and the Italian Ovra; proof: three General Staffs of the partisan army, one after the other, were wiped out. (*Rumanian News*, 9th October, 1949).

It appears that Tito commanded the National Liberation

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648 Army, keeping more German and Italian divisions engaged than the Allies in North Africa (according to Radio Moscow at the time), killing 477,000 German and Italian soldiers and taking 559,434 prisoners—all in the interests of . . . Hitler and Mussolini!

Measures Taken Against Tito

439 Moscow did not stop at verbal attacks on Yugoslavia.
648 She also carried out an economic boycott. Prior to the rift, Yugoslavia was to a large extent dependent on the Russian bloc of countries for its supply of goods and as a market for its products. In 1947 Russia and the 'People's Democracies' supplied 51.8 per cent of Yugoslavia's imports and took 49.1 per cent of her exports. In 1948 the corresponding figures were 43.3 and 49.6. A disruption of these economic relations would be bound to cause great harm to Yugoslavia. Russia was well aware of this, and after long and tedious negotiations concluded a trade agreement with Yugoslavia for 1949 which reduced the amount of goods to be exchanged to an eighth of the 1948 trade. The satellites followed suit, going even further. The Polish government denounced its trade agreement with Yugoslavia on 7th June, 1949, and declared its intention of stopping all deliveries to her; Czechoslovakia actually stopped all deliveries from 12th June, 1949, and Hungary denounced the trade agreement with her on 18th June, 1949. Trade between Yugoslavia and the Russian bloc declined steeply in the first three quarters of 1949. In the first quarter of 1949 Yugoslavia got 26.1 per cent of her imports from the Russian bloc; in the second quarter 14.8 per cent, and in the third quarter only 3.2 per cent. The Russian bloc accounted for 23.8 per cent of her exports in the first quarter, 22.2 per cent in the second quarter and 7.7 per cent in the third. Since then trade relations have almost entirely ceased. (Figures quoted by Tito in a speech to the Federal Assembly, 27th April, 1950).

This policy exactly fits the definition of 'economic blockade' given by the *Soviet Political Encyclopaedia:* ' . . . blockade in peace time is the dearly-loved means of pressure used by imperialist countries towards weaker countries.'

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Yugoslavia was forced to expand her trade with the West.* 439
Nevertheless the boycott caused her some harm. Her exports 648
in 1948 amounted to 14.3 billion dinars, while in 1949, at the same prices, they amounted to only 11 billion (Tito's speech of 27th April, 1950, op. cit.), and in 1950 to even less. (It is difficult to know, of course, how much of the decline in 1950 the severe drought accounted for).

Yugoslavia is also threatened with military action. Russian, 648
Hungarian, Rumanian, Bulgarian and Albanian troops are concentrated on her borders, they stage large-scale manoeuvres and even more frequently cause 'border incidents'. From July, 1948, to December, 1949, there were 1,397 incidents on Yugoslavia's borders with Hungary, Rumania, Bulgaria and Albania. (Tito's speech to Federal Assembly, 28th December, 1950).

In addition special broadcasts in the languages of the 648
nationalities of Yugoslavia are transmitted from the capitals of 208
all the countries in the Russian bloc. Day and night they call upon the people of Yugoslavia to 'turn Yugoslavia into a Second Korea', to sabotage the Yugoslav economy and take up arms against the 'fascist beasts who have run amuck.'†

*FOREIGN TRADE OF YUGOSLAVIA (VALUE IN MILLION U.S. DOLLARS)

	EXPORTS			IMPORTS		
	1948	*1949*	*1950 (Jan.-June)*	*1948*	*1949*	*1950 (Jan.-June)*
U.S.A. ..	50	148	79	80	209	194
United Kingdom	183	448	173	120	159	74
Germany ..	1	88	102	11	153	214
Italy	175	158	73	218	252	138
Austria ..	122	167	55	96	203	74
Netherlands	197	137	27	101	108	22
Switzerland ..	78	60	15	88	95	26
France ..	37	26	27	51	63	34
Total	843	1,232	551	765	1,242	776

(U.N. Statistical Office, *Direction of International Trade*, 1950 issues).

†According to *Tanjug* of 26th January, 1951, broadcasts to Yugoslavia from these countries were taking up 162 hours and 40 minutes weekly, as against 37 hours and 35 minutes weekly in 1948, before the publication of the Cominform Resolution. During the first six months of 1950 these countries gave 6,731 broadcasts lasting 3,055 hours in Yugoslav languages, which amounts to 4 months 8 days and 3 hours of anti-Yugoslav propaganda.

Foreign radio broadcasts from the Russian bloc of countries in Europe were being given in 26 languages, and amounted to 644 hours and 51 minutes weekly. Of these, nearly a quarter were given in three Yugoslav languages alone (Serbo-Croat, Slovene and Macedonian).

Russian radio broadcasts in English, French and Spanish—that is, in languages spoken by 460 million people—were in length almost equal to broadcasts in Yugoslav languages spoken by 16 million people. In Bulgaria broadcasts in 13 foreign languages lasted only half an hour per week less than broadcasts in Yugoslav languages.

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CHAPTER II

ON THE MOTIVES OF THE TITO-STALIN CONFLICT

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Tito Against the National Oppression of Yugoslavia

000 DIFFERENT explanations of the conflict between Russia and Yugoslavia have been given by political commentators. Some see in it only, or mainly, a personal conflict between two dictators, but this explanation is much too simple and far from convincing. In view of the bitterness of the conflict, the outcome of which may well mean life or death not only for Tito and his immediate circle, but for tens or hundreds of thousands of Titoists in Yugoslavia, it is clear that the stakes are much higher than the antipathy of two dictators suggests. On the other hand, the Russian Government would not have taken such big risks as this wrangle involves, such as the explosion of many of the Stalinist legends and the 'bad example' to other would-be Titos, had there not been some issue of paramount importance to both sides and not just a question of the personal whims of the Generalissimo and the Marshal to disrupt relations between the two countries. The explanation of the rift to which the majority of commentators now incline is that it is a national struggle of the rulers of Yugoslavia against the subjugation of the country by Russia. As far as it goes this explanation is satisfactory and is borne out by the facts, as well as by the declarations of the Yugoslav leaders.

186 Unlike the other leaders of the 'People's Democracies', Tito and his friends came to power without the support of the Russian Army. Moše Pijade, the *eminent grise* of the Communist Party of Yugoslavia, stated: '. . . certain heads of other parties . . . arrived in their free countries in planes with pipes in their mouths, and . . . for four years, four times daily, vainly called on the masses to struggle, via radio, while we won our freedom with arms in our hands'. (*Borba*, 10th July,

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1948). The Yugoslav leaders therefore felt superior to the Rákosis, Paukers and other governors of the Russian gubernias, and on an almost equal footing with the Communist Party of the Soviet Union. This feeling was given expression from the beginning of the open conflict with Moscow. '. . . our party succeeded in . . . achieving in practice the greatest results after the All-Union Communist Party'. (Tito's Report to the Fifth Congress of the C.P.Y., July, 1948). '(Our) Communist Party has made the greatest advance toward socialism, after the All-Union Party'. (M. Pijade, op. cit.). 'Every other party, with the exception, of course, of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union, would have collapsed in a struggle such as the one that has been imposed upon us'. (Milovan Djilas in *Borba*, 5th July, 1948). 'No other Communist Party, except the All-Union Communist Party, could withstand such blows without falling to pieces like a house of cards'. (Ibid.). All the speeches in the Fifth Congress, convened three weeks after the Cominform Resolution, conveyed the same thought. 186

The bitter and courageous war of national liberation against the German and Italian Occupation forces and their quislings gave the Yugoslav leaders much more self-confidence and independence than could be achieved by Bierut, Pauker or Rákosi, who came to power on the bayonets of the Russian Army and never succeeded in gaining strong mass support. Other than in Yugoslavia, the Communist Party leaders had mass support only in Czechoslovakia and Bulgaria, and even in these countries, where the support had not been forged through years of heroic struggle in a war of national liberation, it was much weaker than in Yugoslavia.

The Communist-controlled administration of Yugoslavia was built in the war years, with no direct intervention of the Russian Army, and it had no Rokossovsky or Radkiewicz in command. Ranković had organised his Secret Political Police, the U.D.Ba. (formerly called O.Z.N.A.) on the pattern of the N.K.V.D., but independently of it. The regime in Yugoslavia appears not as an extension of the Russian regime, but as a relatively independent replica of it. 648 186

Under such conditions it is natural that the Yugoslav leaders should demand the full equality of their country with Russia, and its independence.

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'Russia Wants to Keep Yugoslavia a Backward Colonial Country, a Source of Cheap Raw Materials'

648 With the relative independence of the Yugoslav Government from the Kremlin it was natural that its industrial ambitions should be greater than those of the other 'People's Democracies'* and it could not but revolt against any impediments to the industrial development of the country.

000 Simply to say that Yugoslavia is fighting for national independence, does not explain the social content of the struggle. An old national form in a new social setting is not quite the same national form. National struggles have different characters as, for instance, when Abyssinia fights against Italy, when France fights against Germany, or Yugoslavia against Russia. The character of the struggle and the *real* motives behind it are dependent in every case on the stage of development of the nation concerned. A national struggle between the big landlords of two nations is necessarily concentrated primarily on the question of who is to own the big estates of a certain territory. The national struggle between the Croat peasants and the Hungarian landlords was fought on the question of land reform. The struggle between the rising class of Indian industrialists and British imperialism was fought over hegemony in the Indian market. Of course there is no Chinese wall separating the various classes of the different nations, and as long as a certain class rules it has a social, political and cultural influence over the lower classes of its nation, and carries them with it into the national struggle, even, in many cases, when this struggle bears no relation to their particular needs. Further, to avoid over-simplification, it must be remembered that there is no Chinese wall separating the different aspects of human life, economic, social, and cultural. For instance, when the Croat peasants fought against Hungarian landownership, they fought at the same time for democratic rights, and in the cultural field against the Magyarisation of the schools, the press, etc.

In Yugoslavia the national struggle against Russia is led by the ruling class—the bureaucracy. Therefore the character, the motivation, the driving force in the national struggle derive from the character of this class and from its place in the economic system.

*See Part I, Chapter V.

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The material basis of a bureaucracy ruling in a state capitalist economy is the state enterprise, primarily in industry, and the only historical explanation, if not jusification, for its existence is the pursuit of industrialisation and of the accumulation of capital. Any serious national fight between two groups of bureaucrats ruling in state capitalist countries is inevitably concentrated on this key problem, their be all and end all. The facts given above about the economic relations between Russia and her satellites (the reparations, the mixed Sovrom and Soviet-Hungarian companies, the sharp trade practices) lend weight to the contention that the main reason for the Tito-Stalin conflict is the question of industrialisation and the accumulation of capital. Tito and other Yugoslav leaders themselves stated this to be the case when, after the first period of self-justification and self-defence, they went over to the attack and accused their accusers. 471

Less than a month after the Cominform Resolution, Vlajko Begović, one of the leaders of the Communist Party of Yugoslavia, in attacking Hebrang and Žujović, formerly leaders of the Party and supporters of the Cominform who served for some months as whipping-boys for the Cominform, said: 'Until recently there was (referring to Hebrang and Žujović—Y.G.) and there still can be found, the opinion that Yugoslavia is an agrarian country and would remain such; and that it should deliver to industrially developed countries raw materials and food, and they to Yugoslavia finished industrial consumer goods. This for us would mean renouncing industrialisation of the country'. (*Borba*, 20th July, 1948). 185

At the Party Congress convened as a counter-demonstration to the Cominform Resolution, all the speakers attacked Hebrang and Žujović chiefly for their opposition to the quick industrialisation of the country. In the main report on the country's economic problems given by Boris Kidrić, Chairman of the Planning Commission, a whole section was devoted to Hebrang and Žujović. His formulation of their crime makes the issue plain: 'Their struggle against the increase of the productive forces of our country, against the abolition of contradictions between our inherited wealth and the backwardness of our techniques inherited from pre-war semi-colonial Yugoslavia—this struggle of theirs could be reduced to

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185 a policy of dependence of our country on abroad—that is, on imperialism'. (*On the Construction of Socialist Economy in the Federative People's Republic of Yugoslavia,* op. cit. p.53).

185 648 There is no doubt, of course, that Kidrić was not accusing those ardent supporters of the Kremlin of striving for Yugoslavia's dependence on *Western* imperialism.

In a speech to the Federal Assembly in the debate on the Budget (27th December, 1948), Tito spoke of the 'difficulties from outside placed in our path from many sources designed to prevent us from fulfilling our Five Year Plan and from building socialism in our country. It would be wrong to think that these obstacles had arisen only during the last months of 1948. No, these obstacles began earlier, and grew more acute during the last six months when they assumed such proportions that they acquired a hostile character.' Why this opposition to the development of Yugoslavia? Tito answers: ' . . . so far we did not want to speak about the real reasons lying behind all this (the hostile attitude of the Cominform countries to Yugoslavia—Y.G.). But today matters have come to such a point that we must say a little more, although for comprehensible reasons, we cannot say all.

'One only needs to read various papers and to listen to various broadcasts, not only from Western Europe but also from Budapest, Bucharest, Prague, Warsaw, Sofia, etc. to be able to grasp immediately without much perspicacity what it is all about . . . Our country . . . cannot continue to remain only a source of raw materials for those countries which already possess a strong industry. It cannot keep on buying industrial products from them at high prices as this is being done today and as was the case in the past, while our peoples continue to remain poor and backward . . . No, so long as a capitalist form of trade, namely exchange of goods, continues to exist among socialist countries (by 'socialist countries' he means the U.S.S.R. and the 'People's Democracies'—Y.G.) where everybody tries to sell at as high a price as possible and to buy as cheaply as possible, no one has the right to ask the other not to use their own possibilities to the maximum to improve the living standards in backward countries such as our country was, despite the great mineral and other wealth which it possessed.'

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The same theme is repeated more sharply in the Yugoslav press. The following quotation from *Borba* about the Cominform propaganda against Yugoslavia is one of many possible examples: 'It is quite clear to everybody in this country that the robes of revolutionary phraseology conceal counter-revolutionary attempts to prevent industrialisation of our country . . .' 185 648

'Capitalist Exploitation Among Socialist States'

Joze Vilfan, Yugoslav delegate to the United Nations Economic and Social Council, said in a speech before the Council: 'The application of the principle of the world market and world prices in relations between industrial countries and insufficiently developed countries constitutes exploitation of the latter. There exists above all an enormous difference in the productivity of labour between developed and insufficiently developed countries; furthermore, the big economically developed countries act like monopolies in trade with the insufficiently developed countries; finally, through their domination over the world market they give a one-sided structure to the export of undeveloped countries. In this way, through this entire mechanism, the world market becomes an instrument for exploiting insufficiently developed countries . . . *Experience shows us that the exploiting character of trade on the basis of the principle of the world market does not change, even when it is used in economic relations between socialist countries.*' (*Tanjug*, 11th October, 1949). 439 648

Milentije Popović, Deputy Finance Minister of Yugoslavia, in his booklet *On Economic Relations Among Socialist States* writes: ' . . . socialist states (i.e., U.S.S.R. and the 'People's Democracies'—Y.G.) under the now prevalent circumstances are divided in their mutual exchange into those which are exploiting and those which are being exploited.'

In this very important work, Popović explains, with the help of Marx's Theory of Value, how industries with a high 'organic composition of capital'—i.e., with a great deal of capital compared to labour—get part of the 'surplus value' which industries with a low 'organic composition of capital' produce. This applies also to international trade between more developed and less developed countries, i.e., countries which have

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439 relatively more capital and those which have less. He quotes
648 Marx to support this argument: the 'favoured country obtains in such an exchange more labour in return for less labour.' Thus, under conditions of free competition, poor countries are exploited by rich. Popović argues that this exploitation increases when the latter, for one reason or another, are in a monopoly position in relation to the former. The backward countries are then charged even higher prices than other buyers.

In conclusion Popović argues that 'capitalist relations do not unite—they divide. Countries under these relations are split apart into two contradictory categories, into those that are exploited and those that are exploiting. Among them there is neither equality nor unity, but only contradiction'. The rich, he says, try to become richer at the expense of the poor, whom they try to preserve in poverty and backwardness, while the poor are justified in waging a fight against exploitation and oppression. The U.S.S.R. belongs to the former category, Yugoslavia to the latter.

The Conflict Between Tito and Stalin over Yugoslavia's Agricultural Policy

648 Nearly all the commentators on the Tito-Stalin conflict
423 name as the main, if not only, economic issue in dispute not the rate of Yugoslavia's industrialisation, but her agricultural policy. This is because, as regards the economic issues, the only important accusation the Cominform Resolution makes against the Yugoslav Government is that it is not carrying out a sufficiently vigorous policy of collectivisation. At first glance it seems that an insoluble contradiction exists between the over-ambitious plans for state industry and indifference to the existence of private property in agriculture. Before seeing whether the contradiction really is insoluble, the true facts of Tito's agricultural policy should be investigated. Is he really tardy in the 'sharpening of the class struggle in the countryside', in the substitution of collective farms for peasant farms?

474 The 'Law on the Five Year Plan of Yugoslavia' (1947-51)
185 devotes fourteen pages to agriculture but only five lines of it deal with 'peasant working co-operatives' and no definite targets are set. The only sector of so-called 'Socialist agriculture' for which a target is set is the state farms: to increase

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from 202,000 hectares in 1946 to 300,000 in 1951, constituting less than 4 per cent of the agricultural area—and this is indeed a very modest target. The Five Year Plan consequently set a very low target for the mechanisation of agriculture which is the technical basis of collectivisation: it was aimed to raise the number of tractors from 3,790 in 1946, to 4,500 in 1951, a rise of only 13 per cent. It is true that prior to the rift the Communist leaders in the other 'People's Democracies' had also not mentioned a rapid 'collectivisation', but the plans of all of them aimed at a very quick mechanisation, which clearly reveals their intention of carrying out 'collectivisation' as quickly as possible. Bulgaria's current plan aims to raise the number of tractors from 4,600 to 10,000; Hungary's from 11,900 to 21,000; Czechoslovakia's from 11,800 to 45,000; Poland's from 5,500 to 76,500. (U.N., *Economic Survey of Europe in 1948*, op. cit. p. 208).

The disinclination of the Yugoslav leaders to undertake mass 'collectivisation' was expressed clearly in the long treatise written by Vice-Premier Edvard Kardelj, 'Peasant Co-operatives in a Planned Economy' (*Komunist*, organ of the Communist Party of Yugoslavia, September, 1947). He says that in the next few years their energies must be directed towards the building *not* of working co-operatives, but of co-operatives for selling the products of the agriculturists and for supplying them with industrial goods, for the processing of agricultural products, for credit, etc. (i.e., co-operatives like those in Holland and Denmark).

Tito's cautious attitude towards the 'collectivisation' of agriculture in the present and immediate future is determined by economic-political considerations. He knows that in Russia 'collectivisation' so isolated and weakened the state that its very existence was in the balance. He cannot conduct a war on two fronts, externally against Russia and internally against the peasantry, and any attempt at large-scale and compulsory 'collectivisation' would have put him at the mercy of Stalin.

But life is more complex than any scheme, and Tito's will is not powerful enough to overcome this complexity. The Stalin-Tito rift itself, by a wayward turn of events, forced the Yugoslav government to depart from its original plan of going slow

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648 and to accelerate the collectivisation of agriculture a little, as
474 can be seen from the following table:
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Date	Number of co-operative farms	Households Number	Index	Area Hectares	Index
Dec. 31st, 1947	779	40,590	100	210,986	100
Dec. 31st, 1948	1,318	60,157	148	323,984	153
July 1st, 1949	4,535	226,087	558	1,241,065	588
Nov. 10th, 1949	6,003	290,000	714	1,580,000	744

Nevertheless the Yugoslav Government's agricultural policy remains very different from that of the Soviet Government at the time of its 'collectivisation.' The big majority of the working co-operatives differ from the kolkhozes in that more private property is allowed in them, and they are therefore based less on coercion and more on the voluntary adhesion of the peasants than the kolkhozes. Working co-operatives cover about 14 per cent of the area of Yugoslavia and the kolkhoz type of co-operative not more than 4 per cent, or, including the state farms, 9 per cent.

The rift with Moscow not only compels Tito, in the interests of getting food and raw materials for industrialisation, to proceed with collectivization of agriculture faster than he intended, but makes the step less fraught with dangers for him. Faced with the threat from Moscow, and as long as it can choose only between Stalin and Tito, the peasantry will be impelled by its national consciousness to give critical support to Tito, and grumble less bitterly at any harshness he shows them.

In passing, it is worth noting that the Tito-Stalin conflict is slowing down 'collectivisation' in the other 'People's Democracies', because of the fear that a strong peasant opposition would strengthen Titoist tendencies. By a dialectical process, 'collectivisation', even in its highest forms, may be completed earlier in Yugoslavia than in the other 'People's Democracies.'

'The Yugoslav Communist Party is Dissolved in the People's Front'

665 One of the accusations made against the Yugoslav leadership in the Cominform Resolution is that 'The Yugoslav leaders belittle the role of the Communist Party and actually dissolve the Party in the non-party People's Front . . . it is only the People's Front which figures in the political arena, while the

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Party and its organizations do not appear openly before the people in its own name . . .' The accusation was repeated by the Central Committee of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union. This seemingly inexplicable criticism becomes clearer when it is considered in connection with the policy of the Yugoslav leadership for national independence and their indulgence towards the peasantry. 665

The accusation itself is not without foundation. Independent observers had already remarked upon the fact that the Communist Party of Yugoslavia had not proclaimed its predominant position. Two years before the Cominform Resolution, Hal Lehrman could write: 'While Grol's opposition Democrats, who boycotted the elections and are now practically invisible, are a legally recognized party, Yugoslavia is the only country in Eastern Europe, or for all I know in the world, where the Communist Party is still illegal . . . Yugoslav parties were required to file their by-laws with the minister of the interior. The Democrats complied, and the Communists refused. Indeed, the only public admission of the Communists' existence is their official newspaper, *Borba* (Struggle), which confesses it in the masthead. Not even the number or identity of Communist deputies is formally known; they all registered themselves in the parliamentary lists after election as People's Front or Independent. Notwithstanding this mummery, the Communists are in full control of the country, and other partie. which once had meaning in the Front have become cipherss' (*The Nation*, 22nd June, 1946). Lehrman explains this as due to 'the renowned Communist weakness for secrecy.'

The concealment of the Communist Party in Yugoslavia did not mean that it was 'dissolved in the non-party People's Front', or that its influence was not decisive. A glance at the figures given in Aleksandar Ranković's Report to the 5th Congress of the Communist Party of Yugoslavia leaves one in no doubt about this: 'Of the total number of officers in the Yugoslav Army 89.9% are members of the C.P., 1.3% are candidates, 1.2% are members of the Union of Communist Youth of Yugoslavia, and 7.7% are not organised'. Other important branches of the administration have a similar proportion of Communist Party members. Dr. Dragoljub Jovanović, the leader of the Serbian Peasant Party (now in

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665 prison for opposing Tito's regime) made this clear when he said in May, 1946: 'The C.P. has monopolized the People's Front, the factories and public offices. In every ministry, in every public enterprise and institution, there is a confidential man from the C.P. who takes care of every individual, follows everything and decides his destiny.'

Just as in every other country of Eastern Europe, the Communist Party in Yugoslavia holds the reins of power. But while the Party is the machine which runs the state, it is the People's Front which appears before the public. When the Communist Party was conducting the national war of liberation it made good use of this front organisation. In view of the threat from Moscow to the national independence of the Yugoslav people, with 80 per cent of the adult population (the majority of whom are peasants) organised in the People's Front, it is even more natural for Tito to push this front organisation, and not the Communist Party, to the fore.

After the Resolution the Communist Party took a more prominent place in public life: the national Congress was convened and this was followed by Republican conferences, etc. In this way Tito tried to cut across any appeal the Cominform criticism might have made to members of the Communist Party. He could do this, sure in the knowledge that his appeal to national unity around the government would receive a favourable response even if the Communist Party were to reveal its true power, without the masquerade of the People's Front.

The Problem of Balkan Federation

648 Another bone of contention between Stalin and Tito, which is not unconnected with the economic factors already mentioned, is the vexed question of a Balkan Federation.

The slogan of a Balkan Federation has for decades been of primary importance in the programme of the Communist, as well as the Socialist, Parties in the Balkan countries. So long as it was directed against the national bourgeoisie and monarchies of these countries, Stalin looked favourably upon it. But when it was Russia which became the 'mother' country, she feared that a Balkan Federation might be used as a weapon against her. Hence her opposition to this slogan after World

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War II, at first covert and then open. Tito, on the other hand, conscious that single-handed Yugoslavia could never stand up to the Russian giant, adopted the slogan eagerly. 648

Already during the war he dreamt of it, and he even took steps to lay its foundations by opening negotiations with Bulgaria. In December, 1944, he met a special envoy of the Bulgarian Cabinet, Petar Todorov. The Bulgarian proposed that a Joint Regency Council be formed, with Tito as Prime Minister of the Bulgarian-Yugoslav Federation. But two hours before the special Bulgarian delegation was scheduled to leave for Belgrade, the Russians requested it to remain in Sofia. They later explained that they vetoed the Federation project because of British and American objections. (*The World Today*, September, 1948). But this explanation must be taken with a pinch of salt, as Russia could be adamant against her Allies' demands when it suited her.

After the war fresh approaches were made. On 27th July, 1947, Dimitrov and the Bulgarian Minister of Foreign Affairs, Georgiev, met Tito in Belgrade, a meeting which was widely publicised in both countries. On 2nd August, at a meeting in Bled, a treaty was signed, and contrary to former practice, its text was published immediately with a loud fanfare of publicity. Article 2 of the treaty provided for the economic co-operation of both countries, including a fixed rate of exchange, the preparation of a customs union, and the co-ordination of economic measures covering electric power, mining, agriculture, transport, and foreign trade. Article 3 provided for the abolition of visas. Under Article 7 Yugoslavia renounced the 25 million dollars still outstanding on her reparations account.

On the same occasion a *secret* agreement was made between the two countries. It ceased to be secret with the Cominform-Tito rift, when Tito hastened to publish it and the Bulgarians were compelled to do the same. This agreement was for the establishment of a common Yugoslav-Bulgarian State under the name of 'Union of South Slav People's Republics.'

Dimitrov went even further. On January 17th, 1948, he said: 'If and when this problem becomes ripe for discussion, the democratic countries—Bulgaria, Yugoslavia, Albania, Rumania, Hungary, Czechoslovakia, Poland, and perhaps

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648 Greece—will decide how and when such a federation should come about. What the people are doing now is, in fact, to prepare for such a federation in the future'. As an immediate step he proposed a customs union: '. . . we are convinced that only a Customs union can really contribute to the development of our peoples, and therefore we conscientiously and courageously go ahead, preparing this Customs union with all countries who wish to join it.' Thus a federation not only of Bulgaria and Yugoslavia was envisaged but a federation of the Balkan and Danubian countries.

This went too far for Moscow's liking, and *Pravda* on 28th January, 1948, published an *open* attack on Dimitrov, claiming that 'these countries do not need a problematic and artificial federation, or confederation or a Customs union'. It seems that the only 'federation' which is not 'problematic and artificial' is that of the Eastern European countries in the Russian empire.

Immediately after the *Pravda* attack on Dimitrov the leadership of the Bulgarian Communist Party, including Dimitrov, instituted a campaign against any idea of Balkan Federation.* Thus, in an interview in Budapest on 18th March, 1949, the Bulgarian Foreign Minister, Kolarov, denied 'Western press reports' that Bulgaria wished to create a Balkan Federation. He said: 'We have many times declared and declare again that for us the slogan "Balkan Federation" does not exist . . .' He added that it had existed twenty years ago among 'the Social Democratic Parties of the separate Balkan States', 'but we have outgrown this'. Elizabeth Barker who quotes these words of Kolarov, says in parentheses: 'This was, of course, a curious reference to Kolarov's own role as leading member of the Balkan Communist Federation in the nineteen-twenties, when it had most ardently sponsored Balkan Federation.' (*Macedonia. Its Place in Balkan Power Politics*, London, 1950 p. 124).

The fact that Dimitrov, Kolarov and the rest, of the Bulgarian leaders were ready on the warning of Moscow to withdraw from the plan of building a Balkan Federation was for the Yugoslav leaders another wrong to be added to their list of grievances against Moscow. Pijade since reminded

*See Dimitrov's speech to the Second Congress of the Fatherland Front, 2-3 February, six days after *Pravda's* attack on Dimitrov (*Second Fatherland Front Congress*, Sofia, 1948, op. cit. p. 36).

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himself that the Soviet Union was responsible for the shelving not only of the project of South Slav Federation but also of every treaty of alliance between Yugoslavia and Bulgaria, and disputed all efforts made towards these objectives between November, 1944, and February, 1945. As regards the *Pravda* attack on Dimitrov, Pijade said: 'The meaning of this outlawing of the idea of federation, by proclaiming all federation, confederation, and even customs union as "doubtful and artificial" lies simply in preventing the grouping of small socialist states, stopping them from safeguarding their independence and sovereignty, so that they might be kept apart, isolated from one another, without mutual support, and so that each of them separately might place its sovereignty and independence in the hands of the Soviet Government and under its protectorate' (*Tanjug*, 5th January, 1950, report of Pijade's speech in the National Assembly).

Previously Pijade had said: 'The old eastern question is again reviving. No wonder, therefore, that the imperialist policy of Russian terrorism in the Balkans is today presented in Soviet textbooks as unselfish protection of Balkan nations.' (Quoted by *The Times*, 27th September, 1949).*

The Macedonian Question

Another bone of contention between Moscow and Belgrade is the policy regarding Macedonia.

This conflict arose only after it became clear to Moscow that 'the healthy elements' in the Yugoslav Communist Party were not strong enough to remove the Tito leadership.

Macedonia is divided among Yugoslavia, Bulgaria and Greece. The three divisions are known as Vardar Macedonia—the Yugoslav portion, much the largest; Pirin Macedonia—the Bulgarian portion; and Aegean Macedonia—the Greek

*The opposition of Moscow to Balkan federation stands in apparent contradiction to the following fact mentioned by Tito (Federal Assembly, April 26, 1950): In February and March 1948, when Kardelj and Djilas were in Moscow and the relations were already strained between them and Stalin, 'Stalin himself imperatively demanded the immediate conclusion of an act of federation bewteen Yugoslavia and Bulgaria, while on the other hand the Soviet was against a federation with Albania.' But in face of the impending break with Moscow, such a step, with the changes connected with it, would have impaired the homogeneity of the Tito administration, and could have played into the hands of Moscow (especially as Russian troops were stationed in Bulgaria). As Tito said: 'We came to the conclusion that the demand was put forward to facilitate the overthrow and subjugation of Yugoslavia.'

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000 portion including the sea coast. A glance at the map shows what a strategic advantage Russia would have gained by the unity of the whole of Macedonia under a government vassal to it: she would have had access to the Aegean Sea; Albania, a Russian satellite with no land connections with any of the other satellites, would have become the direct opening to the Adriatic; Yugoslavia would not only have lost part of her territory and population, but would have found herself hemmed in on north-east, east and south by Russia's satellites. He who rules Macedonia rules the whole Balkan peninsula.

Seeing that in the Pirin district there are only about 200,000 Macedonians as against a million in Vardar Macedonia, it seems very improbable that the former should draw the latter under its aegis; the opposite seems much more possible. Aegean Macedonia, with a population of 1½ million is thus a necessary factor in uniting Macedonia under the hegemony of Russia. Hence there is the collaboration of the Bulgarian and Greek Communist Parties in the struggle for the 'unity of Macedonia.'

What zigzags, what hypocrisy, what acrobatics, this policy demands of the Kremlin agents!

In 1924 the Fifth Congress of the Comintern put forward the slogan of 'united and independent Macedonia' as well as 'united and independent Thrace'. The latter slogan is quite baseless, as Thrace is a geographical term, not a national one, a Thracian nation not existing. The former is not much better. After the Greek-Turkish war (1921–3) the Turks expelled the whole Greek population from Asia Minor and some 700,000 of them settled in Aegean Macedonia, so that nine-tenths of the population of this area today is not Macedonian but Greek. The slogan of the unity of Aegean Macedonia with the other parts of Macedonia is therefore quite inappropriate. This was made clear by Maximos, the Greek delegate to the Congress, who said: 'After the Treaty of Lausanne, all the Turkish inhabitants of Macedonia were obliged to leave, and the Greek bourgeoisie installed 700,000 refugees in their place. The Greek Communist Party opposed and will continue to oppose this violation of the Treaty of Lausanne. We would be glad if the Turkish comrades did so also. But the fact remains that there are 700,000 Greek refugees in Macedonia. The

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workers and peasants of Greece were therefore not prepared to accept the slogan of the autonomy of Macedonia'. The Congress did not heed these words but stuck to the slogan of 'united and independent Macedonia.' It imposed it on the 7th Conference of the Balkan Communist Parties and the Extraordinary Congress of the Greek Communist Party notwithstanding the opposition of the Greek leadership headed by the General Secretary Professor Pouliopoulos.

The main reason for the obstinacy of the Comintern on this point was that the defeats of the Communist movement in Germany and in Bulgaria in 1923 made it necessary to find some new 'explosive' adventure to bolster up the prestige of the Moscow leadership: unity with the Macedonian Nationalist Committee of Alexandrov and Protegerov (who were ready to collaborate at that time with the Communist leaders, then with the Bulgarian militarists, then with Mussolini's and Horthy's agents) seemed to provide a good means of doing so.

After a year or two, when the policy of alliance with Alexandrov and Protegerov proved to be bankrupt, the Greek Communist Party abandoned the slogan of 'united and independent Macedonia' as a central plank in its policy. If it turned up on occasion in one form or another (the resolution of the 3rd and 4th Congresses of the Greek Communist Party and the Plenum of the Central Committee of December, 1931) this was as a defence of its prestige in the face of the Left Opposition (Trotskyists) led by Pouliopoulos.

When Hitler came to power, the Comintern dropped the slogan. 'National unity', 'defence of the existing state boundaries' were incompatible with it. Accordingly the policy was officially reversed in the programme of the Central Committee of the Greek Communist Party in January, 1935. The resolutions of the 6th Congress (December, 1936) proclaimed that the Macedonian national question *did not exist* because of the changes brought about in the ethnic composition of the population of Aegean Macedonia. With this proclamation, the Communist Members of Parliament ceased to defend the smallest Macedonian demands in Parliament. The same policy continued for more than a decade. During his trial in Athens in 1945, Zachariades declared: 'Since 1931, when I became its leader, the Greek Communist Party has rejected

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000 that watchword (the watchword of an autonomous Macedonia —Y.G.) and hereby declares that Macedonia is Greek . . . Macedonia is and shall be Greek'. The Resolution of the Second Plenum of the Central Committee of the Greek Communist Party which was held in 1946 stated: 'The Communist Party of Greece, pioneer fighters in the struggle for national independence and integrity, once again proclaims the present frontiers of Greece holy and sacred. The Communist Party of Greece declares that it will not agree to fighting for recognition of any rights or equality of the Slavs domiciled in Greek Macedonia except in the framework of the Greek State'. (Quoted by Svetozar Vukmanović, *How and Why the People's Liberation Struggle of Greece met with Defeat*, London, 1950, p. 51). In an interview with a British correspondent in May, 1946, Zachariades said that the population of Greek Macedonia was 90 per cent Greek and only 10 per cent Slav, and that E.A.M. stood for the territorial integrity of Greece.

With Tito's revolt against Stalin, all this changed. Who should bother now about the ethnic composition of the population? Who should bother if the people of Aegean Macedonia do not wish to be in a united Macedonia? The 5th Plenum of the Central Committee of the Greek Communist Party held in January, 1949, raised the slogan of 'united and independent Macedonia' from anew: 'There should be no doubt that one consequence of a victory of the Democratic Army of Greece and the People's Revolution would be that the Macedonian people would acquire the full possibility of national self-determination, as it in fact wishes'. A month later the leadership of the Greek Party declared that the desire for 'one single independent Macedonia' was the 'centuries-old aim' of the people of Aegean Macedonia.

We need have little doubt that this turn will not meet with success: the people of Aegean Macedonia do not consider it their highest ambition to fulfil Stalin's ukazes, changing with his foreign policy.

Tito need not fear that Salonica will take Skopije from him.

It is much more likely that Pirin Macedonia will gravitate towards Vardar Macedonia than vice versa. Hence, at the same time that Moscow demagogically put forward the slogan of 'united and independent Macedonia' the Bulgarian

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Communist leaders took measures to limit the national rights of the Macedonians of the Pirin district: immediately after the excommunication of Tito by the Cominform, the Central Committee of the Bulgarian Communist Party met (Plenum of July 12th and 13th, 1948), passed a resolution that in the Pirin District the 'study of the Macedonian literary language in the schools' be 'optional', and decided 'to abolish the practice of compulsory study of the official Macedonian language by government employees and of compulsory subscription to Macedonian papers by the population in the Pirin District'. Bulgarian was to be taught instead. (It was only in 1945 that Macedonian became a literary language with an alphabet and grammar).*

Russia's policy on the Macedonian question reveals her big imperialist appetite, but also the limitations of her potency. Tito does not come worst out of it.

*It is interesting to note that while there are statistics on schooling among the Turkish, Armenian, Gipsy and Jewish minorities, 'There is no data available concerning Macedonians in the Pirin region'. (*Bulgarian Bulletin* issued by the London Office of the Bulgarian Telegraph Agency, 15th December, 1950).

CHAPTER III

THE TITOISTS EXPOSE STALINISM

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648 THE TITOISTS' evaluation of the internal and foreign policies of the U.S.S.R., of Stalin's role as leader of the working class, of the moral attributes of Stalinism, etc., have undergone a complete metamorphosis since the fatal day of 28th June, 1948. Although nothing is more recalcitrant to logical systematisation than empirically evolved conceptions, there is no doubt about the direction of the thoughts of the Yugoslav leaders. Every sharpening of their differences with Moscow compels them to tear down another stone of the edifice of Stalinism. They began with acceptance of all the basic tenets of Stalinism, and ended with undermining them all. They did so not after a systematic, theoretical study, but because of the unity of all the facets of Stalinism. This is proved empirically by the development of the Titoist criticism of Stalinism. There is such a discrepancy between Stalinism and real communism or socialism, that to criticise any facet of Stalinism from the standpoint of socialism leads to its total exposure.

Praise for Russia and Stalin

At the Fifth Congress of the Communist Party of Yugoslavia, convened after the rift, the pictures of Tito and Stalin dominated the assembly. The delegates repeated such phrases as 'Our great teachers Marx, Engels, Lenin and Stalin', 'the leader and teacher of the international proletariat -- the great Stalin'. Stalin was frequently quoted as a guide by the main speakers. 'Stalin -- Tito -- Party !' was shouted over and over again. The U.S.S.R. was repeatedly declared 'The country of Socialism', the only country whose socialist achievements were greater than Yugoslavia's. Russia's foreign policy was also extolled; Russian imperialism, national exploitation, etc., were condemnations unheard of at that time. Criticism of the Cominform -- if indeed criticism it may be termed -- was

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limited to a denunciation of 'certain leaders' of the Cominform for deviating from internationalism in their attack on Yugoslavia. Stalin is not once accused of being the instigator of all the trouble. 648

The solidarity of the Yugoslav leaders with Stalinism in the first year or so after the rupture is illustrated by their completely uncritical attitude to Russia's foreign policy, even though the Belgrade-Moscow rift was an outcome of this very policy. The 'Programme of the Communist Party of Yugoslavia' adopted at its Fifth Congress states: '. . . two camps were formed after the Second World War, on the one hand the imperialist, anti-democratic and warmongering camp led by American imperialism and on the other hand, the anti-imperialist, democratic and peace-loving camp headed by the Soviet Union'. The same theme is repeated time and time again in the speeches of Foreign Minister Kardelj. For instance, in his address on Yugoslavia's foreign policy to the Federal Assembly on 29th December, 1948, he said: 'The foreign policy of our Government will continue to serve the struggle for peace and peaceable international co-operation, and for the closest unity of the anti-imperialist forces led by the Soviet Union.' In a speech he delivered at the General Assembly of U.N.O. (29th September, 1948) he stated that the United States was the arch-imperialist power and was alone responsible for the war danger. It is of particular interest to note that Kardelj made a point of praising the policy of U.S.S.R. in Korea, which he described as a policy of peace and national independence. And he unconditionally supported the Russian-inspired Peace Campaign, saying: 'Millions of working people, who, days on end, are being intimidated by the noise raised by the war-mongers, should be given vivid proof that they need not fear the morrow. The only realistic road which in the present conditions in the world is leading towards that aim is the prohibition of atomic weapons, destruction of atomic bombs, control of atomic energy and in general reduction of armaments. It is precisely for this reason that the proposal brought forward by Mr. Vishinsky on behalf of the Soviet government and concerning the question of reduction of armed forces by one third, represents a serious and important contribution to the strengthening of peace and peaceful international

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648 collaboration and thus the United Nations Organization itself. To accept this proposal would mean to contribute essentially towards freeing the masses from the fear of war, towards abolishing the threat of war as a method of international politics and towards creating such an atmosphere in which the burning international questions can really be solved by mutual agreement.'

At the same time as Russia came in for praise, a note of criticism was heard, directed mainly against the Cominform. In view of the Russian blockade, Yugoslavia's consequent turn to trade with the West—a big and sharp change which was bound to cause her difficulties—and the burdens imposed by the over-ambitious Five-Year Plan, Tito found it absolutely necessary to refute the legend that Russia had given Yugoslavia unselfish, altruistic economic help, and from the beginning of the rift he insisted that their economic relations had been based on capitalist principles. The necessity to solidify his mass support compelled Tito from the beginning not to limit himself to generalities about the threat to Yugoslavia's national independence, but to attack the Cominform countries on more immediate, day to day issues, namely, that their policy was to keep Yugoslavia a backward country, a source of cheap raw materials, with a low standard of living, etc. Russia or Stalin were never held responsible for the Cominform policy; and the Cominform countries were accused of conducting a reactionary policy only towards Yugoslavia, this being an aberration without any general causes and for which no attempt at explanation was made.

'U.S.S.R.'s Foreign Policy is Hegemonistic'

The second stage in the evolution of Yugoslavia's attitude to Stalinism after the rift was characterized by a general criticism of Russia's foreign policy as expansionist, but her internal regime was still called socialist and Stalin was still praised as one of the greatest Marxist teachers.

When the Rajk 'Trial' took place, which attempted to prove that Yugoslavia had imperialist designs on her neighbours, and that she was 'the agency of Anglo-American Imperialism', the Yugoslav leaders, in self-defence, had to refute Russia's claim of leading the peace-loving, anti-imperialist forces. Consequently,

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since September, 1949, the Yugoslav press has been full of news of what it calls the 'hegemonistic policy of Russia'. They had to expose her imperialist character and the 'internationalist' phraseology she used to cover it, her exploitation and subjugation of other countries, and her desire to transform Yugoslavia into a dependent colony. As a defence against the Stalinist stock-in-trade that anyone not unconditionally supporting Russia must become an agent of the United States, they also had to expose the 'Peace' campaign. 648

They were very vehement in their exposures of Stalinism, as the following random selection of quotations from their declarations shows.

On 7th July, 1949, Pijade stated: 'During this one year, the peoples of Yugoslavia have learned much. We have learned that the great principles of Socialism and international solidarity can become commercial phrases in the mouths of socialist statesmen and diplomats. We have learned that phrases about socialist internationalism can conceal simply the interests of big states against small. We have learned that rightness of subjugating the interests of certain peoples to the general interests of Socialism conceals a selfish policy which considers its own State interests, and them alone, as general interests to which all those individual interests should be sacrificed.'

'The howling dervishes in the Informburo predicted that, by resisting their resolution, we would in two months lose our independence and become a colony of the imperialists. The result of our resistance is exactly the opposite! We have saved our freedom and independence, and our country will become neither a colony nor a "gubernia". Their prediction, from a theoretical point of view also, was not at all farseeing, and historically it was unjustified.

'Incidentally, this is the height of hypocrisy, because this prophecy only means that small peoples should leap into the mouth of one shark lest they be swallowed by another. However, there is no justification for small peoples jumping into the mouth of one shark or another.' (*Tanjug*).

Of the 'Peace' campaign, the Belgrade fortnightly *Review of International Affairs* (30th August, 1950) said that it was 'planned war-inciting propaganda which the Cominform propagandists so cleverly camouflage, imputing to others the

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648 practice and intentions of their employers'. An editorial in a former issue (16th August, 1950) carries the apt heading 'War Psychosis Spreads Under the Slogan of Struggle for Peace'. It says among other things: 'Such a struggle (in the Russian satellites—Y.G.) "for peace" or rather the dissemination of fear of war under the cloak of that struggle has a special purpose. In this way the U.S.S.R. manages to hold its satellites tightly on its leash, making it possible to exploit them in greater measure and more brutally. On the other hand, such propaganda directed at provoking a feeling of insecurity and fear of war, attracts the attention of the peoples in the east European countries from their internal economic and political situation and from the difficulties into which the U.S.S.R. has plunged them with its policy of "elder brother" who in exchange for economic and political independence of which he has deprived them, gives his "younger brother" empty promises and extends his "brotherly aid" in the form of struggle for peace which camouflages war-incitement propaganda'.

When Yugoslavia is accused of chauvinistic intentions on her neighbours, what is more natural than that the Yugoslav leaders should expose Great Russian chauvinism? In an article in *Komunist*, organ of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of Yugoslavia (September, 1949) Djilas accuses the Russian leaders of 'nationalsim in its most vulgar form': 'Their propagandists speak about the exceptional ability of the Russian people (e.g. in the message from the Academy of Sciences of the U.S.S.R. to Molotov), about the superiority of Russian culture (great as it indeed is) over the cultures of other nations. The leaders of the U.S.S.R. do practically nothing to acquaint their peoples with the revolutionary, socialist, and cultural achievements of other peoples, not even of those who have already embarked upon the road of socialist progress. They have invented the anti-Marxist theory of the exceptional importance of discovery "firsts" in the field of science (viz. that Russian scientists have been the first to discover one thing or another)*, and on the basis of this

*The Russian press informs the world that the inventor of the steam engine was not, as was universally thought, the famous Englishman Watt, but was the Russian Polzunov. The steam turbine, electric telegraphy, the electric motor, electric lighting, radio, the aeroplane, jet propulsion, rocket propulsion, the helicopter and penicillin—all these were Russian inventions. (*Soviet Monitor*, 24th September, 1947, 10th April, 1948, 6th May, 1948; *Izvestia*, 16th March, 1948; *Pravda*, 17th March, 1948).

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"idea" they have appropriated innumerable inventions made 648
by nationals of many other nations.

'There is hardly any need to stress that all that is new about this "theory" (also the "theory" of an exceptional ability of a given nation) is that it has now appeared in the U.S.S.R., but otherwise it was advanced long ago, in a somewhat different form, by all sorts of racists and nationalists.'

This Russian chauvinism has become a laughing-stock in Yugoslavia. In a window display in Belgrade devoted to satirising the Cominform countries a rusty piece of iron was exhibited with the explanation: 'According to the Academy of Sciences of the U.S.S.R., this rusty bit of iron formed part of the first locomotive in the world—a Russian locomotive—which ran between the Siberian cities of Irkutsk and Verkhoyansk in the sixth century A.D.' (Alexander Werth in *The Manchester Guardian*, 16th June, 1950).

Mijalko Todorović, Minister of Agriculture, stated on 6th November, 1950: 'As an expression of this policy of domination, has appeared a "theory" about a leading nation, about an "elder brother", which in essence is indistinguishable from the racial theory, familiar to everyone in the near past, concerning a *Herrenvolk*, the only difference being that the counter-revolutionary essence of this is hidden behind the October Revolution. (*Tanjug*).

Naturally, if the Russian leaders are chauvinists and imperialists, they cannot be opponents of the Tsarist tradition, but upholders of it. Djilas made this point when he said: 'It is . . . not at all coincidental that in Soviet propaganda today there is almost a complete disappearance of any criticism of Tsarism and Tsarist imperialistic policies in general, and vis-a-vis the down-trodden and weak nations in particular*. (*Komunist*, September, 1949, op. cit.).

*An example of this is the tribute paid to Suvorov, whose name graces the highest medal in Russia today, and also schools and other institutions. At the time of the French Revolution Suvorov wrote to the Tsarina: 'Oh, Little Mother! Order me to go against the French!' he later led his army into Switzerland to fight against the French Revolutionary Army; he appealed to the leader of the Royalist counter-revolution of Vendée in the following terms: 'Great hero of the Vendée! Defender of thy fathers and of the throne of thy kings . . . may the evil one (the French Revolutionaries—Y.G.) perish and their race disappear'; he bloodily suppressed the national uprising of the Poles in 1793 and was invested with the title of Field-Marshal for this by Catherine, who assured him: 'You yourself have promoted yourself Field-Marshal, for you have subdued Poland.' If not for this he would have merited the order of Field-Marshal for his 'progressive' deeds in Russia itself, among other the suppression of the peasant revolt led by Pugachev.

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Exposure of the 'Trials'

648 The criticism could not stop here. When the Rajk 'trial' was used against the Yugoslav leaders, they were compelled to expose the whole system of the Vishinsky 'trials', not only the 'exported' articles, but also the originals, the Moscow 'trials' of the thirties. In dealing with the Rajk 'trial', Pijade stated: 'The Budapest trial is reminiscent of the trials in the Soviet Union in 1936, the organizers of which could have helped in staging the Budapest trial with their abundant experience. Still, the trials in Moscow, although they were of significance for all Communist parties, were the internal affairs of the Soviet Union, the indictment was charged and the trial conducted against Soviet citizens accused of various crimes, among which was also of having linked up with German and Japanese fascism. But Hitler was not charged nor mentioned. A non-aggression pact was concluded with him a few years later, on which occasion even toasts to his health were exchanged. And now when the Public Prosecutor is Minister of Foreign Affairs, this type of trial is transferred to the international scene, it is becoming an article of export'. He concludes in strong terms: 'It has proved that the counter-revolutionary attitude of these Bolshevik leaders towards Yugoslavia cannot be an exceptional or partial deviation from the general line, that it cannot progress parallel with a general correct revolutionary attitude; but that it is a component part of a new policy, a new ideological line which is a deviation from the basis of Marxism-Leninism itself, a work of revision which has encompassed all fields of theory and practice.' (*Borba*, 22nd September, 1949).

In order to defend themselves against the lies spread by the Kremlin about them, the Titoists found it necessary also to tackle the moral assumption implicit in Stalin's policy, that the end justifies the means. In a New Year's message Tito declared: 'Those who keep on saying, in order to appease their consciences, that the ends justify the means should know that this particular slogan was well known by the Jesuits in the days of the Inquisition. Great things can never be built by foul means and in a dishonest way'. (*The New York Times*, 2nd January, 1949).

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The Messianic Role of Russia

In destroying the legend of Moscow's internationalism, the Titoists are driven to destroy some other ideas that have become semi-axioms in the world Communist movement. There was the conception that Moscow was the infallible authority in deciding who is a socialist and who is a fascist, who is a democrat and who is not.* Now that they themselves are the target of Moscow's denunciation, they are mindful of the fact 'that no-one today has a right to distribute diplomas concerning Socialist regimes as old Rome's Popes used to hand out imperial titles'. (Pijade in *Borba*, 22nd August, 1949). 648

Another legend destroyed is that Russia plays a messianic role in liberating the whole world. In a speech to a group of miners on 12th September, 1949, Tito said: 'They (the Cominform countries—Y.G.) make a mistake in putting forth the idea of the exclusive revolutionary role of the Red Army, which, in fact, means the demobilization of the revolutionary forces latent in every people, and in every working class'. 'Every working class is capable of fighting and winning the new social order. Bayonets have never correctly spread a progressive idea and brought social transformation but only enslavement.'

On another occasion Tito said: 'Were the path they (the Cominform countries—Y.G.) have taken to be followed, that is, bringing liberation on the bayonets of the Red Army, which would really be but enslavement of peoples in another form, the science of Marxism-Leninism would perish, while the so-called new social relationships which would be created would not differ greatly from those which preceded them.' (*Yugoslav Fortnightly*, 2nd November, 1949).

Vukmanović tried to explain the reasons for the Stalinist theory that only when the Soviet Army was present could a revolutionary movement be victorious: '. . . the Soviet Government is not at all interested in the victory of Socialism in any

*For instance, when Zilliacus, who had for many years been highly praised by the Communist leaders, did not accept their line on Yugoslavia after the rift, the Cominform paper *For a Lasting Peace, For a People's Democracy!* called him an 'attorney of fascism,' a 'shady gentleman,' and declared: 'Democratic public opinion was indignant at the behaviour of Zilliacus . . .' (30th December, 1949). The term 'democratic public opinion', apparently denotes for the Cominform only its supporters, even if these constitute less than a half per cent of the population of Britain. 'When *I* use a word', Humpty Dumpty said, 'it means just what I choose it to mean—neither more nor less.'

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648 other country, unless it at the same time has guarantees of that country becoming dependent and subordinate, just as it is not in the least interested in any revolutionary movement which it cannot control and subordinate to its own hegemonistic plans, but even considers it an obstacle. In practice these guarantees of any revolutionary movement submitting to the hegemonistic plans of the Soviet Government have in the last resort boiled down to the brute force of the Soviet Army. For that matter, it could not be otherwise!' 'To realise its hegemonistic policy, the leadership of the Soviet Union has shown itself completely hostile to the revolutionary movements and the revolutionary struggle of any country in which its control was not assured (whether through geographical distance, the "unreliability" of the leadership, or any other cause), or which may have been fated to be the subject of bargaining with the imperialists (on the principle of spheres of interest). For these reasons, the leadership of the Soviet Union maintained that the French and Italian Communists should disarm the people, once the Second World War hostilities were over, that they should disband any people's committees which might have sprung up during the war as preliminary or even in part real organs of a revolutionary regime, that they should participate in bourgeois coalitions (which in actuality meant liquidation of all results of the revolutionary struggle, and renunciation of further revolutionary struggle). And so on and so forth. Now what are we to conclude from these facts? Clearly, that the leadership of the Soviet Union was interested in developing the movement only in those countries which were in the "sphere of interest" of the Soviet Union, and where there was some possibility of submitting them to the control of the Soviet Government. As for the revolutionary movements of other countries, in practice the Soviet Government strove to prevent them winning and to compel them to collaborate with the reactionary bourgeoisie, with all its consequences.' (Vukmanović, op. cit. pp. 2, 3).

Exposure of Russia's Internal Regime

000 So far only Russia's foreign policy has been criticised. Up to 1950 there was no suggestion by the Yugoslav leaders that this

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foreign policy implied the existence of a certain economic, social and political regime in Russia herself. But this could not be avoided for too long. To anyone claiming to be a Marxist—and Tito claims to be—the foreign policy of a country is a continuation of its internal policy. For instance, the foreign policy of feudal estates or groups of estates is quite different to the foreign policy of a country in the stage of commercial capitalism; the latter, again, is different from the foreign policy of a highly industrialised capitalist country, and so forth. No state, a socialist state included, can isolate itself from this law of history. The Marxist teachers assumed that a socialist state would have a foreign policy of peace, national freedom and equality: if within the country, they said, there is no place for the exploitation of man by man, there is no place in its foreign policy either for national oppression and exploitation. It is axiomatic for Socialists that just as a merchant-capitalist foreign policy—let us say the encouragement of commercial expansion, the establishment of trade colonies, and so forth—cannot be combined with a feudal internal policy, so is it impossible for a capitalist foreign policy to be grafted on to a socialist internal policy.

Therefore if Tito is correct in saying that the foreign policy of Russia is imperialist, its internal policy can not be socialist, but must be exploitative, oppressive. As a concrete instance of this we may take the thesis of Tito—never referred to by the Cominform, even for denial—that in trade between the U.S.S.R. and the 'People's Democracies' the capitalist principle is predominant. If it prevails in trade among these countries, it raises the question: will not each of them try to sell its products as dearly as possible, not only to other countries, but also to its own people, and try to buy their goods—mainly labour-power—as cheaply as possible? Furthermore, since the sellers can sell their labour-power to nobody but the state-employer, and the buyers buy their goods from nobody but the state-seller, it is clear that if the workers have no control over the state-employer, they suffer much more than even a backward country trading with this state. If a country which has more capital exploits one with less capital, especially if the former is in a monopolistic position (strengthened by political devices), the bureaucracy which owns the state and the means

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000 of production is certain to exploit very harshly the toilers who own no wealth and lack all political rights.

648 In 1950 the Yugoslav leaders began to expose and attack the social set-up of Stalin's regime. The ice was broken by Djilas, who in his important pre-election speech to Belgrade students (18th March, 1950) catalogued Russia's chief sins: '. . . introduction of unequal relations and exploitation of other socialist countries; un-Marxist treatment of the role of the leader which often takes the shape of even vulgar, historical falsifications and idolatries similar to those in absolute monarchies; differences in pay which are greater than in bourgeois bureaucracies themselves, ranging from 400 to 15,000 rubles; ideological promotion of Great Russian nationalism and under-estimation and subordination of the role, culture and history of other peoples; a policy of division of spheres of influence with the capitalist states; monopolization of the interpretation of Marxist ideology and the tactics of the international working class movement; introduction of lying and slandering methods into the working class movement; . . . . underestimation of the role of consciousness—especially the consciousness of the masses—in the struggle for a new society; tendencies toward actual liquidation of socialist democracy and transforming it into a mere form; rendering impossible a struggle of opinions and putting brakes on the initiative of the masses, that is, the basic productive forces, and by that very fact productive forces in general . . . ' (*On New Roads of Socialism*, Belgrade, 1950, pp. 11–12). These sins are the result of the existence of a bureaucracy separated from the people and ruling them; the bureaucracy has become an impediment to the development of the productive forces of Russian society. Djilas says: 'The development of production forces in the Soviet Union has reached a point where social relations no longer correspond to it. Neither does the method of management of the process of production itself or the method of distribution of the goods produced'. (Ibid. p. 10). Djilas then poses the question: 'Is what is taking place in the Soviet some new kind of class society, is it state capitalism, or "deviations" within socialism itself?' He says that Russia is 'deviated' socialism. The bureaucracy which distorts Russian socialism is also responsible for the the imperialist foreign policy. 'The

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Cominform Resolution . . . shows . . . that bureaucratic 648
elements in the U.S.S.R. who have frozen their privileged position, are attempting to find the solution to the internal crisis in the outside world, that is, to hush it temporarily by foreign successes, by exploitation and subordination of other socialist countries.' 'Thus have the internal contradictions between bureaucratic centralism and the direct producers, that is, the people, inevitably developed . . . into external contradictions—into a conflict between bureaucratic imperialism and the aspirations of the people for a free and equal life.' (Ibid. pp. 17, 18).

Three months after Djilas's speech, Tito himself sharply criticized Stalin's regime. It is possible that the sharpness of his attack was dictated by the fact that it was made a day after the outbreak of the Korean war, after Yugoslavia had supported the Western Powers in U.N.O., when her collaboration with them in foreign affairs, trade, etc. was becoming closer. He said: 'The October Revolution made it possible for the state to take the means of production into its hands. But these means are still, after 31 years, in the hands of the state. Has the slogan "the factories for the workers" been put into practice? Of course not. The workers still do not have any say in the management of the factories. They are managed by directors who are appointed by the state, that is, by civil service employees. The workers only have the possibility and the right to work but this is not very different from the role of the workers in capitalist countries. The only difference for workers is that there is no unemployment in the Soviet Union, and that is all.' (Tito, *Workers Manage Factories in Yugoslavia*, Belgrade, 1950, p. 24). Tito points out that while Marx, Engels and Lenin taught that the state would wither away under socialism, in the Soviet Union the state was raising itself further and further above society, and becoming more and more bureaucratized. 'Are there any tendencies in that country (the Soviet Union—Y.G.) to turn over the state functions, either economic or political, to the lower organs? Are there any signs of decentralization? So far there have been none. On the contrary, there is increasingly inflexible centralism which is a feature of the most outspoken bourgeois, bureaucratic, centralistic state. The most obvious signs of such centralization are: (a) concentration of all

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648 economic, political, cultural and other functions in one centre; (b) a tremendous bureaucratic apparatus; (c) increase instead of decrease of the militia, Ministry of Internal Affairs, N.K.V.D., etc.' (Ibid. p. 26). He then quotes what Stalin said in 1939: 'The function of military suppression inside the country ceased, died away; for exploitation had been abolished, there were no more exploiters left, and so there was no one to suppress . . . As for our army, punitive organs, and intelligence service, their edge is no longer turned to the inside of the country but to the outside, against external enemies'. Tito refutes these statements with the following argument: 'To say that the functions of the state as an armed force, not only of the army but also the so-called punitive organs, are directed only outwards means talking with no connection with reality, just as it has no connection with the present situation in the Soviet Union. What is the tremendous bureaucratic, centralistic apparatus doing? Are its functions directed outwards? What are the N.K.V.D. and the militia doing? Are their functions directed outwards? Who deports millions of citizens of various nationalities to Siberia and the Far North? Can anyone claim that these are measures against the class enemy, can anyone say that whole nations are a class to be destroyed? Who is obstructing the struggle of opinions in the Soviet Union? Is not all this being done by one of the most centralized, most bureaucratic state apparatuses which bears no resemblance whatsoever to a state machine that is withering away? Stalin is right in one thing here if it is applied to the present period, and that is that this state machine really has functions regarding the outside world. But this must be added, too—that these functions are aimed where they are necessary and where they are not. They are directed at interfering in the internal affairs of other countries, and against the will of the people of those countries. Therefore, these are least of all the functions of a socialist state that is withering away but rather resemble the functions of an imperialist state machine which is fighting for spheres of influence and the subjugation of other peoples'. (Ibid. pp. 29–30).

In all these arguments the socialist character of U.S.S.R., however much it had 'deviated', was never denied. In due course this too was done. If Russia's foreign policy was

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characterised by capitalist-imperialist exploitation, her internal 648
policy by slave camps, and the position of the workers in Russia, as Tito stated, 'is not very different from the role of the workers in capitalist countries', what is it that differentiates her from capitalism?

A step was taken towards the conclusion that Russia is a state capitalist country by Todorović in his speech quoted above: '. . . though . . . the factories are State property, yet, if the workers play no part in the management of those factories, if nobody ever asks the workers what is to be done with the surplus of their labour, if the surplus labour is decided on and a good part of it seized by the bureaucratic caste for themselves, and for the maintenance of various services which ensure the privileged, ruling position of that caste, if this is all the case, and it certainly is today in the U.S.S.R., in what then substantially does the position of the Soviet worker differ from the position of the capitalist worker? The tribute paid by the working class for the maintenance of a highly paid and privileged bureaucracy, the policy of this, its "poets" and other hangers-on and protectors, that tribute is nothing more—precisely since it is expressed in terms of commodity production—than a masked capitalist surplus value. The fact that private property does not exist in what we might term the classical form does not essentially affect the character of the exploitation. Such private ownership has long ceased to exist even under monopolistic capitalism. For example, as early as 1891, Engels wrote:

'"If from share-capital companies we pass to trusts, which subordinate to themselves and monopolise whole branches of industry, not merely does private production there cease, but also absence of plan."' (*Tanjug*, 7th November, 1950).

Finally it was openly stated that Russia is a state capitalist society.

In an article entitled "The Soviet Union, Appearance and Reality" (*Borba*, 20 November, 1950), Djilas wrote that 'not only to any marxist, but even to any bourgeois politician, or even to an ordinary man who is no politician' is it clear what the Soviet Union stands for. 'In place of internationalism, or the fraternity and equality of peoples, in place of efforts to settle disputes between them peaceably, we have nationalistic

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648 obscurantism, the holding of six civilised European countries under a masked occupation force, an export of capital and the extraction from these—by the methods of primitive accumulation—of super-profit, preparations for a war of conquest, allegedly against capitalism, though in fact—unless a temporary deal with them is feasible—for the insurance of booty and the acquisition of new territory. . . . In place of the joyous and free forms of spiritual and social life of working men and women who have shaken off the "concern" on their account of capitalist masters or feudal lords, we have thought which is grey and standardised, the frenzied, dehumanised gushing of drunkards of a patented form of happiness, the savage, total oppression of an iron heel—a spy system of which has permeated the smallest unit of society, crept into the relations between husband and wife, parents and children, artists and their inspiration and work—such as human history has never before known . . . Uniforms, dusty and forgotten, have come forth from the museums of Tsardom, and not even those of the "glorious" days of Catherine, but those of Nicholas I, and with the glitter of "new" epaulettes, and have draped the backs of "socialist" marshals, generals and policemen. Shallow, trivial falsehood and demagogy and cooked-up trials, after the fashion of those of heretics and witches, intended to deceive plain, simple working folk—which in itself is revelation of inhuman scorn of ordinary folk and of their intelligence and strength—in place of passionate, unquenchable seeking of truth, lies and slander everywhere and in everything, even in their description of capitalism and of certain capitalist countries. . . .'

He said further that 'it is the U.S.S.R. which strives to protect itself and shut itself away from the capitalist world' and, asks, 'What do these men hide, and what do they fear? They hide their own social order and their own shape, which are monstrous even in comparison with bourgeois democracy'. 'State capitalist monopoly in the U.S.S.R. has acquired monstrous, despotic forms in all spheres of life.' 'And when they accuse us of anything, we know that in actuality it refers to them. So even when they speak of fascism, or such like, experience with other accusations teaches us that we can confidently say: *De te fabula narratur.*'

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CHAPTER IV

TITOISM IS NOT A BASIC NEGATION OF STALINISM

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Efforts to Overcome Some Traits of Stalinism in Yugoslavia

THE LOGIC of the struggle against the domination of Moscow, which compels the Yugoslav leaders more and more openly to expose the real character of Stalin's regime, forces them themselves to renounce, or at least to pretend to renounce, its more obnoxious features. The struggle, by making it a question of life and death for the Yugoslav Government to enlarge its mass support, forces it to 'liberalise' the dictatorship. The economic difficulties connected with the isolation of Yugoslavia from the Russian bloc of countries, and even more, the very severe drought of 1950, push the government in the same direction. Whether it is possible for a regime like Tito's (or Stalin's) to be really liberalised, or whether on the contrary, it must become more and more dictatorial, is another question.

As a counter to Stalin's 'bureaucratic centralism' Tito has attempted to implement 'Socialist Democracy'. The administration was decentralised, beginning with the economy. The Federal Ministries of Electricity and Mines were abolished by a decree of 7th February, 1950, and responsibility for the management of these branches of the economy handed over to the governments of the component Republics of Yugoslavia. On 11th April, another six ministries of the Central Government were abolished—agriculture, forestry, light industries, commerce and supply, and state supplies. At the federal level the departments are headed by Councils, and the decrees grant wide autonomy to the governments of the republics.

On 26th June, 1950, the Yugoslav Federal Assembly passed the 'Basic Law on Management of State Economic Enterprises and Higher Economic Associations by the Workers'

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425 Collectives'. Tito declared this to be the fulfilment of the slogan 'the factories to the workers', and another big step towards the complete establishment of socialism. The law stipulates that a Workers' Council of enterprises, as well as of the higher economic Associations, amalgamating several economic units, is to be elected by the workers of the enterprise or association (Article 2). This Council is to be elected for one year (Article 3). It is to elect the management board (Article 4). The management board is to run the business and be responsible to the Workers' Council and to the competent state organ (Article 5). The management board is to be elected for a term of one year. Only one third of the members of the management board holding office during the previous year may be elected to the new management board. No one can be a member of a management board for more than two successive years. The members of the management board receive no payment for their work (Article 6). 'The production and business of an enterprise is under the charge of the director of that enterprise, or the working and business of a higher industrial association in the charge of the director of that association'. 'The director of the enterprise will be appointed by the management board of the higher economic association, or competent state organ, if the enterprise is not amalgamated, while the director of a higher economic association will be appointed by the competent state organ'. (Article 8). 'The director of an enterprise is responsible to the management board and director of the higher economic association, as well as to the competent state body, while the director of a higher economic association is responsible to the management board and the competent state organ' (Article 9). 'The Workers' Council of an enterprise is chosen by general, equal and direct suffrage, and by secret vote' (Article 11). 'Workers' councils of the enterprises: approve the basic plans and final accounts of the enterprise; make decisions on the management of the enterprise and fulfilment of the economic plan; elect, recall and change the management boards of the enterprise or its individual members; make the rules of the enterprise, with the approval of the management board of the higher economic association, or of the competent state organ; discuss reports on the work of the management board and make decisions on,

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and approve of, its work; discuss the various measures of the management board and make decisions on them; distribute that part of the accumulation remaining at the disposal of the enterprise, that is, of the working collective.' (Article 23). 'The director and other members of the management board are bound to be present at sittings of the workers' council. Any member of the workers' council has the right to put questions to the management board or to the director concerning their work. The management board and director are bound to give an answer at the session of the workers' council' (Article 24). 'The director of an enterprise allocates the workers and employees of the enterprise to their particular work and determines their duties. Workers and employees of an enterprise are responsible for their work in the enterprise to the director. The director of an enterprise ensures discipline in the work and other activity of the enterprise.' (Article 39). 475

Another measure towards 'liberalising' the regime was the decision of the People's Front (September, 1950) that citizens would no longer be compelled to give 'voluntary' labour, the police measures hitherto adopted to get this labour having been due to the influence of the Russian example. 466

With the famine of the latter months of 1950, even more drastic 'measures against bureaucratism' were taken. On 14th October, Tito signed a decree abolishing the special shops and lower prices for senior Government and Communist Party officials and industrial managers. Villas and rest homes reserved for these privileged people were handed over to the tourist industry. 'Persons who fulfil specially responsible State and social functions' are, however, exempted from these provisions, and the government will decide who belongs to this special category. 656

In the cultural and educational spheres, the leitmotif has become freedom for the creative powers of the individual. To quote the directive of the Central Committee of the Party on the reorganisation of the educational system (2nd January, 1950), the function of education is to be: 'To educate a new, free and bold Socialist man whose conception should be broad in many respects and to whom bureaucratic and standardized ideas will be foreign. 658

'To develop a fight for thought, the all-round development of initiative through the exchange of practical experience and

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comprehension of the struggle to build socialism in our country'. (*The New York Times*, 3rd January, 1950).

No concrete measures, however, have been taken to ensure this development.

Squaring the Circle

The decentralisation of the administration, the establishment of so-called 'workers' management' in the economy, the measures in favour of equality, the ideological liberty and the free development of the individual, all appear to contradict the practice of the Stalinist regime. But can the aim set be achieved? Unfortunately, however much one may wish it could be, the testimony of Yugoslav practice, and, as relevant, an analysis of the historical circumstances in which Tito's experiment takes place, make the reply negative: a bureaucratic state capitalist government threatened from outside, may make concessions to the people, but it will never give up its independence of them, nor cease to rise above them.

The Yugoslav leaders do not try to explain how decentralisation of the administration can be compatible with the existence of a monolithic, highly centralised, one-party system, managed by the Political Bureau; nor how workers' management of an enterprise can be compatible with a central economic plan determined by the same nine people in the centre of political power. What autonomy can a workers' council have that is elected from a list of candidates put forward by the trade union, which is centralistic and controlled by the Party? Again, what autonomy can it have when the economy is planned and the vital decisions on production, such as real wages (the amount of consumers' goods to be produced and distributed nationally) are made by a central government independent of the people? How can there be genuine local self-government in a situation where everything, from factories to papers, from people to machines is in the hands of the centralised, bureaucratic state?

Above all, the Yugoslav leaders do not explain the historical causes for the rise of what they call 'bureaucratic centralism' in Russia, nor whether these causes can be counteracted in Yugoslavia. Bureaucratic state capitalism in Russia is not an accident, but is the result of rapid industrialisation in a country

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with very low productive forces; this caused the subordination of the consumption of the people to the needs of accumulation, and so the separation of the toilers from the means of production, which led to poverty increasing side by side with wealth. The bureaucracy appears as the embodiment of this process, as the incarnation of the accumulation of capital at the expense of the people and as the beneficiary from the accumulation. If this was the case in Russia, in small, backward and isolated Yugoslavia the similar objective circumstances must give fundamentally the same unhappy results.

The experience of the last two years or so has supplied evidence to support the contention that Tito and his friends cannot break away from the basic features of Stalin's regime. To illustrate the limited rights the Yugoslav worker has in 'his' factory, it need but be mentioned that not a single strike took place either before or after the law on workers' management of 26th June, 1950; that the labour-book (the karakteristika*) continues to exist, and that the most severe punishments are meted out to workers who break discipline or pilfer, even if they do so only to ease their hunger. This last point shows clearly the contradiction between the outward form—that 'the workers own the factories'—and the real social content, and it will therefore be relevant to give an instance. *The Manchester Guardian* of 19th August, 1950, gives the following report under the heading 'Death Sentence in Workshop for Stealing': 'The novel procedure of trying offenders in their place of work instead of a courtroom was introduced in Belgrade a few days ago. Seventeen workers were tried in a big workshop of an engineering works for having committed numerous thefts. One man was sentenced to death and 16 to penal servitude ranging from two months to twenty years. The whole staff of the works had to attend the trial that was designed to serve as a warning.

'It is small wonder that Yugoslav workers resort to stealing and have to be warned off by spectacular methods. Rations are small and the Government finds it hard to honour them. Prices on the free market are extremely high . . .'

On the political arena the one-party system continues to exist. 'Elections' are still the pseudo-democratic masquerades

*See p. 93

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666 they always were. That only one list of candidates be allowed in the general elections, and that only the official candidates will be elected seems so evident to the Yugoslav leaders, that one of them—Djilas—could say at a pre-election meeting (18th March, 1950): '. . . it is obvious that the question of the candidates being elected is a secondary one, since in such conditions and in such a system (as prevails in Yugoslavia—Y.G.) they will in any case be elected'. Inside the party itself no factions are allowed, and up to now there has not been any open discussion between different leaders on any question. The press too, is always unanimous in its praise and condemnation.

661 The term 'free ideological development' does not, of course, mean freedom for any Cominform supporters. They are arrested. It does not mean freedom for Socialists and Peasant Parties to publish papers or hold public meetings. It also does not do for anyone to take advantage of the 'cultural freedom' the leaders encourage. When Branko Copić, one of the best-known Communist writers, wrote three articles criticising the extravagant style of living and snobbishness of the high officials (October, 1950), no less a person than Tito himself immediately took up the issue and sharply censured him.

When it comes to the moral aspects of democracy, to the choice of weapons in the struggle against his opponents, Tito is no more reluctant to slander and lie than his Cominform opponents. This aspect in itself and as a general barometer of the real essence of the regime, is very important and merits illustration. In a speech on 1st September, 1948, Djilas described all the supporters of the Cominform in Yugoslavia 'who have fled to the other People's Democracies and to the U.S.S.R.' as 'traitors to socialism, opportunists, Trotskyites, malcontents with unlimited ambitions'. What an amalgam: Trotskyist agents of Stalin find refuge in Russia and her satellite countries!

Soon after the publication of the Cominform Resolution, 233 students were expelled from the Univeristy of Belgrade and technical institutes on charges ranging from criticism of the authorities to spy work, collaboration with the enemy during the war, stealing public property, speculation, and so on.

The Yugoslav leaders declared that Hebrang, the main

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pro-Stalin agent in Yugoslavia, was an agent of the Ustashe, the quisling Croat fascists, as early as 1942. The fact that after that time he occupied one of the highest positions in the Partisan Army and the government and that his whole political life was devoted to fighting against the Ustashe and their ilk (for which he spent 12½ years in prison) is apparently forgotten. 661

In his report to the Third Congress of the People's Front (9th April, 1949), Tito described the Yugoslav supporters of the Cominform Resolution. One, he says, 'was Nedić's district police officer during the occupation and . . . tortured patriots. He succeeded in covering up his past and smuggling himself into our Party'. Another was 'Pavelić's district chief of police', another a 'Gestapo agent', and so forth. To sum up: 'In the case of at least 95% of them you will find that either they have a marked record (i.e., have been police spies—Y.G.) or that they are people of ambition, cowards and weaklings, class enemies, kulaks' sons or Chetniks and Ustashe elements, White Guards, etc.' in short, 'human rubbish'. To complete the amalgam Tito says in the same speech that in Prague a 'well-known Trotskyist' was attacking Yugoslavia on behalf of the Cominform.

On another occasion he accused the Cominform supporters in Trieste of collaborating with the Italian fascists, and of having 'the whole-hearted support of the Anglo-American occupation authorites'. This was in protest against a 'calumnious article' published in the Polish daily *Trybuna Ludu* (13th February, 1949) entitled 'The Anglo-American Forces of Occupation Support Tito's Clique in Trieste!'

Borba stated: 'The Bulgarian Communist regime is rife with civilians and officers who committed war crimes in Yugoslavia during the Bulgarian occupation of parts of Serbia and Macedonia. Some of the officers received promotions, others got pensions and some of the civilians hold important posts in the Bulgarian Communist Party . . .

'The Budapest Communist regime is employing Hungarian war criminals and former spies of the pro-German Hungarian Army . . . ' 'Former Gestapo members are active in the Rumanian Communist police', etc. (Quoted by *New York Herald Tribune*, 22nd January, 1949).

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If all this is true, why was no mention made of it in the years between the establishment of the 'People's Democracies' and the Stalin-Tito rift?

Tito, it seems, does not repudiate in practice the immoral Jesuitic principles he condemns so roundly in words.

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CHAPTER V

THE EPIDEMIC OF TITOISM IN EASTERN EUROPE

SINCE TITO's excommunication his ghost has haunted Eastern Europe, and a large number of leaders of the Communist Parties have been accused of being bewitched by it, and have been 'purged.'

Poland

In September, 1948, Warsaw announced the 'unanimous resolution of the Central Committee of the Polish Workers' Party' and the 'unanimous approval' of this resolution by the All-Polish Conference of the active members of the Party to remove from office Wladislaw Gomulka, the General Secretary of the Party. Gomulka was vice-Premier and the real head of the administration (the Premier, a member of the P.P.S., being merely a figurehead). He was also Minister of the Regained Territories, the industrial heart of the country. Within the space of a few months Gomulka was removed from all these positions, as well as from membership of the Political Bureau, and even of the Central Committee. Some light was thrown on the technique of the 'purge' in the speech of Boleslaw Bierut, who replaced Gomulka as General Secretary of the Party. The main—if not the only—proof of Gomulka's 'deviation' which was cited, was an article which appeared in the *Trybuna Wolnosti*, the central organ of the P.P.R. on . . . 1st July, 1944. It might be thought that this criticism appeared four years too late, or that the article was criticized previously. No. But at least one would assume that the article was written by Gomulka. No. It was written by another leader of the Party, Benkowski. But it is a warning to Gomulka and the other leaders of the Party that if they do not toe the line, their deviations will be ante-dated

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66/ to 1944, or even earlier, and the 'mistakes' of one leader will be used to implicate others.

Gomulka was perhaps singled out for attack because he was not one of the P.P.R. leaders who came to Poland from Moscow at the end of the war—in Pijade's phrase—'in planes with pipes in their mouths.'

A few days after the disgrace of Gomulka, Warsaw announced that nearly all the leaders of the P.P.S. (which was on the verge of merging with the P.P.R.) were also removed: Kazimierz Rusinek 'resigned' the chairmanship of the Central Executive Committee—the highest body—of the P.P.S.; Edward Osubka-Morawski, Prime Minister for the years 1945-6, Stanislaw Piaskowski, Drobner and another eight members, were removed from the Central Executive Committee. The Chairman, Stanislaw Szwalbe and eleven members 'resigned' from the National Council of the P.P.S. The new leadership, in true Machiavellian style, allotted the task of denouncing Gomulka, who did not recant abjectly enough for his 'nationalism' to his closest collaborator, Zenon Kliszko, a member of the Political Bureau, Secretary of the Party, and the man in charge of the Party cadres from 1944 until September, 1948. His attack was loudly applauded by the Congress. Later Kliszko himself was disgraced for 'nationalist deviations.'

On 7th September, 1949, after a silence of more than a year, the Warsaw daily, *Trybuna Ludu* published an article by Gomulka attacking Tito. One might have thought this the end of the 'Gomulka affair'; but far from it. With the political degradation of being attacked by his former collaborator and being made to denounce the 'nationalist' Tito, the stage was set for physical liquidation as a warning to anyone else who might dare to deviate. The attack of Kliszko on Gomulka, and of Gomulka on Tito follow the same pattern as the letters of Radek and other future victims of the Moscow Trials to *Pravda* at the time of the Zinoviev-Kamenev Trial, in which they called their former friends in the leadership of the Party 'mad dogs', a 'counter-revolutionary Fascist Band', and appealed to 'our beloved leader, Stalin' to have 'no mercy' on 'the contemptible murderers and traitors.'

A few weeks after his attack on Tito, the *coup de grace* was administered to Gomulka. This happened four days after the

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announcement of the appointment of the Soviet Marshal Rokossovsky as Poland's Minister of Defence. At a plenary meeting of the Central Committee of the Polish United Workers' Party, held on 11–13th November, 1949, Bierut accused many members of the Dombrowski Brigade—the Polish unit of the International Brigade in Spain—of being fascist police spies who had taken leading positions in the new administration of Poland. Those responsible for this situation were Gomulka, Kliszko and General Marian Spychalski. The last-named had been commander of the Dombrowski Brigade, head of the Information Department (i.e., the Political Department) of the P.P.R. military organization under the Nazis, and then of the Armia Ludowa, the P.P.R.-controlled Polish army, and was, until recently, Deputy Minister of Defence and a member of the Political Bureau. In the report of the Unity Congress at which Gomulka was the only object of attack and Kliszko his main denouncer, Spychalski's speech and a photograph of him take a prominent place, second only to those of Bierut and Berman. Now the three, Gomulka, Kliszko and Spychalski, are in prison for 'aiding and shielding fascists'. At the same time Lechowitz, former Minister of Food Supply, Dr. Stanislaw Kowalewski, former Vice-Minister of Agriculture, Ryszard Borowy, Vice-Minister of Forestry, and Tadeusz Kachanowitz, Vice-Minister of Labour and Social Welfare, were arrested.

This is by no means the end of the 'purge' of 'Titoists' in Poland, and Bierut, in an article published just after the Plenum, indicated that the net would be spread more widely still. He said: 'It is sufficient to analyse a little more deeply our specific conditions in Poland to conclude that the dangers of subversive work in the form of espionage, sabotage, conspiracy and terror, has, in our country, both objectively and subjectively, a wider basis than anywhere else'. (*For a Lasting Peace, For a People's Democracy!* 9th December, 1949).

Bulgaria

In Bulgaria the 'Titoists' were led by Traicho Kostov, who was not a friend of Tito, having come into conflict with him on the question of Balkan Federation, but was also not a completely obedient lackey of Stalin.

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661 Before his dismissal (and later arrest, trial and execution), Kostov was the Political Secretary of the Central Committee of the Party, Acting Prime Minister and President of the Government Committee of Economic and Financial Affairs. The Bulgarian Communist press, on Kostov's fiftieth birthday, described his long struggle for the Party and the high posts he held in it, having been a foundation member in 1919, a member of the Central Committee in 1924, leader of the Communist Parliamentary Group (officially called 'Workers' Party' at the time), and editor of its paper in 1931-2, a member of the Balkan Secretariat of the Comintern in 1932-4, a member of the Political bureau of the Party since 1935, its secretary since 1940, and General Secretary since 1944. He spent more than ten years in prison, and was one of the most prominent martyrs of the Bulgarian working class between the world wars; in 1924, he was tortured so badly that, fearing he might betray his comrades, he tried to commit suicide by throwing himself from the fourth floor of the Police Headquarters in Sofia; he remained alive but with both legs broken and a hunchback. The Central Committee of the Party addressed him with these words: 'Great are your achievements, Comrade Kostov, as the builder of the party, as the teacher and instructor of the party members. Under your leadership and inspired by your heroic life, thousands of Communists were educated into unquestionable loyalty to the party. Your deep Marxist-Leninist theoretical knowledge, your great culture, your famous industry and steadfastness, your modesty, your iron will, your unquestionable loyalty towards the party and the working class are those Bolshevik characteristics which beautify your whole fighting life, for ever united with the struggle of the party. A loyal colleague of Comrade Dimitrov and his first assistant, you are today one of the most loved and respected leaders of the party, a great statesman and builder of new Bulgaria.' (Quoted by *The World Today*, April, 1950).

It was generally expected that when Dimitrov died, his mantle would naturally fall on Kostov's shoulders.

When, on 5th April, 1949, he was removed from his post as Acting Prime Minister and member of the Political Bureau, the official explanation was: 'Traicho Kostov has pursued an insincere and unfriendly policy toward the U.S.S.R. during

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the trade negotiations and on the question of furnishing economic information to Soviet representatives. He has tolerated nationalistic tendencies within the state apparatus and, in fact, has encouraged them . . .' A few months later he was indicted and executed for having been a spy of the Bulgarian police since 1942 and of the British, American and Yugoslav Intelligence services since 1944. 661

Many other high officials were 'purged' together with Kostov. Actually the 'purge' was so extensive as to suggest that the whole state and Party administration was in a critical position. The large majority of the senior officials 'purged' were declared to be 'fascist spies'. Some idea of the extent of the 'purge' may be gained by a scrutiny of the list of their names. To avoid the possible error of including anyone removed simply as part of administrative routine, those officially declared fascist spies will be marked with *.

*Prof. Ivan Stefanov, Minister of Finance.

*Nikola Pavlov, Deputy Minister of Construction, Cadre Secretary of the Central Committee and Chairman of the Central Commission of the Party.

*Prof. Petko Kunin, Member of the Political Bureau up to 8th January, 1948, and since an alternate member; Minister of Industry (also Minister of Finance for two months after the arrest of Stefanov).

*M. Sakelarov, Minister of Public Works.

*S. Tonchev, Minister of Transport and former Secretary of the Fatherland Front.

General Dobri Terpeshev, Vice-Premier and President of the State Planning Commission. (He was in prison for fourteen years, and was twice condemned to death; during the war he was Commander in Chief of the Bulgarian Partisans), expelled from all his posts 'for failure to cope with work and blunted vigilance.'

*Yordan Bozhilov, formerly Minister of Foreign Trade.

*Ljubomir Kairakov, formerly Minister of Electrification.

M. Gochev, formerly Minister of Industry, member of the Central Committee of the Party, expelled from the Central Committee.

*Nikola Nachev, Assistant President of the Government Committee for Economic and Financial Affairs.

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661 *Lulcho Chervenkov, Deputy Minister of Transport.
*Vasil Markov, Deputy Minister of Transport.
*Georgi Petrov, Deputy Minister of Finance.
*Boris Simov, Deputy Minister of Industry.
*Nikola Govedarsky, Deputy Minister of Internal Trade.
*Dimiter Kochemidov, Deputy Minister of Internal Trade.
*Bonyu Petrovsky, Deputy Minister of Foreign Trade.
*Ivan Tutev, Director of the Ministry of Foreign Trade.
*Georgi Andreichin, Foreign Under-Secretary.

Popencharov, Deputy Foreign Minister and Director of Communist Propaganda Services.

General Ivan Kinov, Chief of the General Staff, 'relieved of his post' and expelled from the Central Committee of the Party. He was a commander in the International Brigade during the Spanish Civil War.

General Boyan Balgaranov, Chief of the Army Political Department, 'relieved of his post' and expelled from the Central Committee of the Party.

*Peter Vranchev, Head of Army Intelligence.

*Lev Glavinchev, Deputy Commander of the Frontier Guards.

*Stefan Bogdanov, Director of the State Security Police.

*Georgi Ganev, Director of the State Security Police and Member of the Political Bureau.

*Nikolai Zadgorsky, Director of the State Security Police.

*Tsanyu Tsonchev, Governor of the Bulgarian National Bank, head of the Government Office of Statistics.

Grosev, former General Secretary of the Fatherland Front, expelled from the Central Committee of the Party.

B. Kopchev, K. Dobrev, I. Bacharov, K. Stoychev, expelled from the Central Committee of the Party.

It is yet difficult to judge what is the significance of the removal of Anton Yugov from his key position as Minister of the Interior after he had held it for five years. He was also removed from his position as vice-Premier. His removal may be the prelude to his complete disappearance.

Of the sixteen Ministers who were members of the Communist Party before the 'purge', only six (including Anton Yugov) have retained their positions. Of the nine members of the Political Bureau, the highest body of the Party, only

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Vulko Chervenkov and Vladimir Poptomov (and possibly 661
Georgi Chankov) are left.

But the axe did not stop here, for in the Kostov trial alone, another 55 Bulgarian 'Kostov agents' besides the defendants, were mentioned, the majority of them high officials of the Party and state; these too were 'purged'. After the trial another few dozen high officials were removed, and thousands of smaller officials followed suit. On 16th June, 1950, a government spokesman announced that in the previous twelve months 92,500 members and candidates had been expelled from the Communist Party (in June, 1950, there were 428,876 members and 13,307 candidates). And even after this mass purge, G. Grozev, the Chairman of the Central Committee of the Dimitrov Union of People's Youth declared that the Party was still suffering from 'nationalism, cosmopolitanism, Kostovism and Titoism'. (*East Europe*, 29th June, 1950).*

Hungary

The 'purge' in Hungary was extensive, but incomparably smaller than in Bulgaria. The first and most important person to be 'purged' was László Rajk.

Rajk, like so many of the others who were liquidated, had a fine record. He joined the Hungarian Communist Party in 1931 at the age of twenty-two, and was arrested a year later. After a year's imprisonment he continued his work under the very difficult illegal conditions then prevailing. In 1936 he went to Spain and became the secretary of the Hungarian unit of the International Brigade (the Rákosi Battalion), a position which he kept until the disbandment of the Brigade. He was badly wounded in Spain and retreated with the other members of the Brigade to France, where he was interned for more than two years. In February, 1941, he was released from the internment camp, and went back to Hungary. In October of the same year he was arrested again, and this time spent three years in prison, whence he continued to direct the activities of the Communist Party. With the retreat of the German army from

*It is interesting to compare these facts with the attack of the *Daily Worker* of 7th May, 1949, on the Western press, for reporting such 'lies' as the removal from the Central Committee and arrest of Kostov. Unable at that time to stomach such a 'calumny', now it cannot understand why such a fuss is made about the liquidation of the majority of the leaders of the Government and Party.

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661 Hungary in October, 1944, he, with other political prisoners, was taken to Germany, where he was interned in a concentration camp. Hitler's fall gained him his release. Back in Hungary he soon became prominent, being acclaimed by the Party as 'the organiser of the Hungarian Resistance'. He became the Secretary of the Budapest organisation which included the great majority of the members of the Hungarian Communist Party (after fusion with the Social Democrats called the Hungarian Working People's Party), a member of its Central Committee and Political Bureau, the Secretary of the Party and the General Secretary of the Independent Front (the mass front organisation of the Communist Party). During the two years 1946–8, when the Communist Party was striving to take full control of the state apparatus, Rajk held the key position in the Government, that of the Minister of the Interior. He later became Minister of Foreign Affairs. According to *Szabad Nép*, the Communist daily, he drew rousing cheers on May Day, 1949, from the Budapest crowd who acclaimed only Rákosi more vociferously. An official edition of Rákosi's speeches which appeared a few days later referred to Rajk as one of the most popular of Hungary's leaders and an uncompromising fighter for People's Democratic Hungary. In the General Elections of 15th May, he stood at the head of the list of candidates in his constituency and was elected to Parliament.

Barely a month later, with no previous warning, Rajk was once more imprisoned, and the whole press, recently so lavish in its praise, was clamouring against this 'fascist spy,' nor could one person be found who protested against this treatment in the press, or even proposed that judgment be withheld till the trial!

There were other important defendants at the trial. Dr. Tibor Szönyi was, until his arrest, secretary of the Hungarian Communist Party (and of its successor the Hungarian Working People's Party), a member of the Central Committee of the Party and of its Central Control Commission, and an M.P. Szönyi's deputy, András Szalai, was a member of the Central Committee of the Party. Dr. Pál Justus was a member of the Executive of the Social Democratic Party and then a member of the Central Committee of the Hungarian Working People's

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Party, an M.P. and Vice-President of the Hungarian Radio Corporation. General György Pálffy was Chief of Staff of the Army, Deputy Minister of Defence, the head of the Party Organisation in the Army, a member of the Central Committee, and an M.P.* 661

Czechoslovakia

The last country to consolidate the 'People's Democracy', Czechoslovakia, was also the last in which the epidemic of Titoism rose to the surface.

At a meeting of the Central Committee of the Communist Party on 24–26th February, 1950, Vilém Novy, the Editor-in-Chief of the Communist Party's most important paper, the daily *Rude Pravo* was 'exposed as an agent of imperialism', then removed from the Central Committee, expelled from the Party, and arrested. At the same meeting, Milan Reiman, the Department Chief in the Prime Minister's Office, was also accused of being an 'imperialist spy' and it was announced that he committed suicide while his case was under investigation. On 14th March, it was announced that Dr. Vládo Clementis had resigned his post as Foreign Minister. On 24th May, at the 9th Congress of the Communist Party of Slovakia, Vilém Široký, who replaced Clementis as the Foreign Minister of Czechoslovakia said: 'Comrade Clementis emigrated after the occupation of the republic in 1939. After the conclusion of the Soviet-German pact, which had such great importance for progressive humanity because it crossed the low and treacherous plans of the Anglo-American Imperialists, he stood up against the Soviet Union and adopted the attitude of a class enemy.

'He maintained this attitude of a class enemy during the Soviet-Finnish conflict and during the liberation of the

*Since this book has been at the printers, new 'purges' have taken place in Hungary. Kádár, who replaced Rajk as Minister of the Interior, was arrested a few months after the trial of his predecessor. On 21st April, 1951, Radio Budapest announced that Dr. Sandor Zold, who replaced Kádár, was removed, no reason for this being given. Kádár and Zold had both been leaders of the Communist Party. On 18th July, 1950, Dr. Istvan Riesz, Minister of Justice, resigned. On 5th August, Marosan, Minister of Light Industry, resigned. Both of them had been members of the Social Democratic party that fused with the Communist Party. On 29th August they were both arrested. The Chief of Staff of the Army, General László Solyom, was arrested. On 27th May, 1951, it was reported from Budapest that the Kremlin had sent General Cvetaiev, the war-time commander of Moscow, to take over the command of the Hungarian Army.

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661 Western Ukraine and Western White Russia by the Soviet Armies.

'In London, Comrade Clementis was associated with the bourgeois emigrants surrounding President Beneš, and his activities and his broadcasts were all on the bourgeois line. He also maintained this attitude as Under-Secretary and as Minister of Foreign Affairs. This deviationist did not consider future developments after the war in terms of class warfare'. The accusation repeatedly hurled against him at the Congress was that of the 'Titoist' evil of nationalism.

At the same Congress Široký attacked a number of other very high Communist leaders. First of all there was Dr. Gustav Husak. He had remained in Czechoslovakia throughout the German occupation, and was the chief Communist leader of the Slovak uprising against Germany in 1944. He was the chairman of the Slovak Board of Commissioners—that is, head of the Slovak local Government—up to 5th May, 1950. Now he is attacked as a 'nationalist' and a 'follower of Clementis'. With him another member of the Slovak Board of Commissioners, Dr. Ladislav Novomésky, and Dr. Karol Smidke, President of the Slovak National Assembly and of the Slovak Association of Partisans, were attacked.

In addition, the following people were arrested: Dr. Evžen Loebl, Deputy Minister for Foreign Trade, and a group of high officials of the Ministry who 'oriented Czechoslovak foreign trade towards the West to the detriment of extended trade with the U.S.S.R. and the People's Democracies'; Dr. Klinger, head of the Information Department of the Foreign Ministry; Bohdan Benda, former military secretary of the Prague regional committee of the Communist Party, an 'agent of the fascist Tito clique'; Josef Stavinoha, secretary of the Olomouc regional committee of the Communist Party, 'a Gestapo agent'; and three M.P.'s, Andrew Roba, Jan Lorko and Dr. Josef Bruha.

There is a hint of the possible removal of the Minister of the Interior, Vaclav Nosek, a close friend of Clementis and Novy, with whom he was in London during the war, and the only survivor of the emigrant Communist group in London who still holds an important position. On 23rd May, the establishment of a special Ministry of Public Security was announced;

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up to then the Security Department was part of the Ministry of the Interior under Nosek. The head of the new Ministry is Ladislav Kopriva, one of the three or four most important people in Czechoslovakia and a reliable Kremlin agent, who is more vocal than anybody else in denunciation of the 'Titoists'. 661

It is not clear what is the significance of the removal of General Ludvik Svoboda from his position as Minister of Defence (25th April, 1950), and General Drgac from his position as Chief of Staff (5th May, 1950).

That the end of 'Titoism' in Czechoslovakia is not yet in sight, is clear from a recent criticism of *Rude Pravo* published in the Cominform paper: '*Rude Pravo*, in particular, shows a falling-off on the questions of the struggle against the fascist Tito clique'. (*For a Lasting Peace, For a People's Democracy!* 8th December, 1950).*

Rumania

In Rumania the attack against 'bourgeois nationalism' in the leadership of the Party began four months before the Cominform-Tito rift. There the victim was Lucretiu Pătrăscanu, who for more than three years was Minister of Justice, and for many years Chairman of the Central Committee of the Party. He, too, has an impressive past, to which *International Press Correspondence*, the official organ of the Comintern, on

*Since the book has been at the printers, a new anti-Titoist "purge" has taken place in Czechoslovakia. On 22 February, 1951, Gottwald, in a speech to the Central Committee of the Party, named Otto Sling and Mrs. Marie Svermova as the leaders of a conspiracy of "traitors and plotters" which had planned to seize power and follow in the footsteps of Tito. Otto Sling had been the secretary of the Czechoslovakian Communist Party unit of the International Brigade in Spain, an M.P. and the Secretary of the regional Party Committee of Brno, the second biggest city in the country. Mrs. Svermova, the widow of Jan Sverma, a war-time Resistance martyr, was a member of the Presidium of the Central Committee of the Communist Party, head of the Organisational Department of the Secretariat of the Central Committee and Deputy General Secretary of the Party. On 27th February it was announced that Clementis, Novotnaky, Husak and Mrs. Svermova were arrested. On 9 March, Dr. Čepička, the Minister of Defence, declared that Dr. Clementis had many accomplices in the army ranging from 'generals to privates' and included General Rejcin, deputy Minister of Defence and General Kopold of the General Staff.

The wide compass of the "purges" is shown by the fact that up to 9 February, when the *third* wave of "purges" in the Party since it has been in power was taking place, of 1,846,957 members and candidate members examined, 143,590 had been struck off the membership lists and 25,954 had been expelled, which is tantamount to being handed over to the police. Of the 19 regional committees of the Party, the Chairmen or senior officials of six had been arrested for complicity in the Clementis "plot". One cannot but agree with what "Borba" said of the "purges" on 1 March, 1951: 'Hundreds of thousands of expelled members cannot all be labelled "spies, traitors, bourgeois nationalists".'

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661 14th November, 1936, paid tribute, speaking of his 'eighteen years of active struggle in the Rumanian working-class movement', and paying homage to him as the 'leader of the first Communist group in the Rumanian parliament'. He was the editor of the Party paper *Scanteia* and the recognised theoretician of the Party, was one of the leaders of the Party as early as 1921, and continued so for the following twenty-eight years. But he had one great fault in the eyes of Moscow—he did not live there for a long time. Anna Pauker, the Foreign Minister, was there during the 'purges' of the thirties, and showed her mettle by not flinching when her husband was executed as a 'Trotskyist', so she is a more trustworthy leader in the eyes of the Kremlin.

After the Tito-Stalin rift, the only prominent Rumanian leader to be 'purged' was the Vice-Mayor of Bucharest, Constantin Doncea. Doncea had been a comrade-in-arms of the General Secretary of the Party, Gheorghiu-Dej, in the great railway strike of 1933, and had been his principal defender in court. Now he is accused of 'bourgeois deviations.'

Albania

Here five members of the Central Committee were removed from their positions for pro-Tito tendencies. Koçi Xoxe, who was Vice-Premier, Minister of the Interior and General Secretary of the Central Committee of the Party was executed. Pandi Kristo, President of the State Control Commission, member of the Politbureau and Minister without Portfolio; Nosti Kerentyi, President of the State Planning Commission and member of the Political Bureau; Vaske Koletzki, Deputy Minister of the Interior; Vargo Mitrojorji, one of the Chiefs of the State Security Police, and Huri Nota, a member of the propaganda section of the Central Committee, were all tried and condemned to long terms of imprisonment (May, 1949). A year later another group of leaders of the Party was 'purged', led by another secretary of the Party and member of the Political Bureau, Abedin Shehu.

'Free Greece'

000 An early victim was Markos Vafiades, the head of the Government of 'Free Greece', and the Commander-in-Chief of

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its army. A tiny news item, hidden away in a corner of the Communist Party press in different countries, announced 'the serious illness of General Markos', and his resignation from 'political and military responsibilities.' In view of the disappearance with him of his entire staff of military and political leaders—Petros Roussos (Minister of Foreign Affairs), Chryssa Hadjivassiliou and Militades Porphyrogenis (Minister of Justice)—this explanation is not very convincing. Additional light is thrown on the circumstances of Markos's 'resignation' by the fact that the Fifth Plenum of the Central Committee of the Greek Communist Party which met on 30-31st January, 1949, on Mont Grammos, at which Markos's resignation was announced, also discussed, according to the radio of 'Free Greece', the following four points:

1. Greece in the path of victory (report by Zachariades).
2. The opportunist right deviation in the Greek Party.
3. Changes in the composition of the Central Committee and the Political Bureau.
4. Election of a new Political Bureau.

Only the report of Zachariades was broadcast by the radio of 'Free Greece'. The Political Bureau decided that the resolution adopted on 15th November, 1948, against the opportunist deviation in the Party, be approved but 'for the moment' not published.

Then, out of the blue, just a year after the Resolution against Tito, the Russian press (19th June, 1949) published a letter attributed to Markos attacking Tito. Whether it took a year of 'preparation' to get such a letter out of him, or whether it is only attributed to him while he is either in prison or the grave, it is impossible to know.

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CHAPTER VI

ANTI-TITOIST SHOW TRIALS

661 EAST EUROPE has had two important show trials with the aim of vilifying Titoism: the Rajk trial in Budapest and the Kostov trial in Sofia. The technique of all such trials is basically the same, so that a description of the main lines of one illustrates the general character of them all. The course of the Rajk trial will be described, and the Kostov trial touched on briefly.*

During the whole interrogation of the eight defendants and the nineteen witnesses in the Rajk trial, the Counsels for the Defence did not ask a single question, and spoke altogether only three times: once the Counsel for the Defence of Pálffy requested that the accused be given 'permission to use his notes when making his statement'; once the Counsel for the Defence of Brankov requested the same for his client; and once Korondy's lawyer remarked, after the interrogation of his client, that he did not wish to ask a question, but reserved the right to do so when the witnesses were interrogated. (He forgot this afterwards, and asked the witnesses no questions.) The explanation that the defendants were so exposed as to make any effort at defending them hopeless hardly holds water; it may be remembered that at the Nuremberg trials of the Nazi leaders, where the guilt of the defendants was never for a moment in doubt, the Counsel for the Defence behaved quite differently.

Of the nineteen witnesses, twelve are mentioned in the Indictment or in the trial as 'fascist-Titoist' collaborators of Rajk and Co., and five as ex-officials of the Horthy police, that is, people who are dependent for life or death on the authorities. What value can the testimonies of such witnesses have? Vishinsky, himself a jurist, gave his answer in a similar case.

*Full verbatim reports of the Trials exist in English: *Laszlo Rajk and his Accomplices before the People's Court*, Budapest, 1949; and *The Trial of Traicho Kostov and his Group*, Sofia, 1949.

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When the Balkan Commission of U.N.O. reported that Yugoslavia, Bulgaria and Albania were helping the partisans against the Royalist Greek Government, Vishinsky denied the validity of the report, as it was based on the testimony of 'men condemned to capital punishment, or were under the threat of capital punishment during their interrogation'. This criterion, it seems, holds good when others sit in judgment, but not when Vishinsky himself or any of his disciples does. 661

This in itself is enough to expose the real character of the trial. But an examination of some of the confessions of the defendants and the testimony of the witnesses, which contained absurd contradictions and pure fabrications, condemns it utterly.

Rajk confessed that he had been a spy of the Horthy police since 1931. In the International Brigade, he said, it became known that he was a 'Trotskyist spy', and so he was expelled from the Communist Party in June, 1938. This date was cleverly chosen: at the beginning of July, 1938, the International Brigade was officially dissolved, so that it is difficult to check exactly what happened in the Rákosi Battalion at the time.* The French 'Deuxieme Bureau' knew that he was a fascist spy at least since 1939, the Gestapo since 1941. It became known to the American and Yugoslav Intelligence Services in 1945. Rajk collaborated with all these. Thus while he was known to the intelligence services of five countries as well as to the International Brigade as a spy, the Communists responsible for the International Brigade, who expelled Rajk as a 'Trotskyist spy' omitted, it seems, to mention the fact to Moscow, so that the N.K.V.D. knew nothing of it. This is supposed to explain how he was permitted to gain so important a position in Hungary. In his own words: 'When I came home to Budapest the Hungarian Communist Party was then, of course, working legally in the liberated country. My activities were not

*The same care as regards dates was shown by the organisers of the trial in another case. A number of witnesses described an alleged secret meeting in Hungary between Rajk and the Yugoslav Miniser of the Interior, Rankovič. Many particulars of this meeting were given, but no exact date—the danger of a *faux pas* was too great. If a date were given it might have been proved that Rankovič could not possibly just then have been at the place mentioned. There had been just such an instance at the Trial of Mensheviks (1931) in Moscow, where it had been alleged that R. Abrainovich, the Menshevik leader, had been on a secret visit to Russia on a certain date. It was, however, proved that he took part on the very *same day* in a conference in Brussels, and his picture was shown in the Belgian press.

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661 known to the leadership of the Communist Party. They knew me as the best member of the Communist Party. That is why immediately upon my return home I was given an important position in the Party . . .'*

Further, the Hungarian, French and German intelligence services knew, so he said, that he was a spy. Why did his defence counsel not ask how this is compatible with the fact that between 1932 and 1945 he spent nearly four years in Hungarian prisons, two years in a French concentration camp and nearly a year in a German concentration camp? Surely an odd way of paying a spy or using his services.

Another absurd fabrication concerned a certain Ljubitsa Hribar who testified that the Yugoslav and the British intelligence services co-operate in Hungary. Her story was that the Yugoslav Legation in Budapest tried to recruit her as a spy for Yugoslavia. When she refused, some of the Legation officials kidnapped her and smuggled her over the border into Yugoslav territory. She 'was kept there from about 15th December, 1947, until 5th January, 1948'. Then these Government agents 'instructed me that I must do intelligence work in Hungary against the Hungarian government and at the same time they wanted me to act as liaison between the Yugoslav and British intelligence agents. When I did not want to give my consent, they threatened that I, too, would be liquidated. After this they made me sign a statement in which I bound myself to work for the Yugoslav U.D.B.'. A person who does not want to be a spy for Yugoslavia and is only newly recruited, becomes the liaison between the 'Yugoslav and British intelligence agents'! What was hidden for years from the N.K.V.D.—that Tito was linked with the British Intelligence Service—is told to Ljubitsa Hribar. So simple!

The connection between Tito's Intelligence Service and that of the United States is testified to by Szönyi and a number of witnesses, who tell a story as ingenuous as Hribar's. In order to get from Switzerland to the part of Hungary which was occupied by the Russian Army in November, 1944, Szönyi and

* It is interesting to note that this blatant absurdity is very difficult to 'sell', and the British Communist, Derek Kartun, in *Tito's Plot Against Europe* (London, 1949), a 'thriller' of the Rajk Trial, which claims to be based on the official Report of the Trial, omits altogether the fact that Rajk was expelled from the Rákosi Battalion or the Communist Party in Spain, or that anybody in the Communist movement suspected him of being a 'Trotskyist' prior to 1948.

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five other leading Hungarian Communist Party members were introduced to a large number of Yugoslav and American intelligence officers—all in order to get one aeroplane to fly them! The Russian authorities alone could not help them. An aeroplane could be acquired only by implicating Tito and the F.B.I. 661

Stories about the people chiefly accused—Tito and his friends—are of the same type. The present intentions of the Tito clique were told to Rajk by Ranković, the Yugoslav Minister of the Interior: 'We have to strive to overthrow the peoples' democratic regimes of the peoples' democratic countries which came into being after the Liberation, to prevent their socialist development, partly to win over the democratic revolutionary forces, to separate them from the side of the Soviet Union and partly, where there is no other way, to annihilate them. Instead of the peoples' democratic regimes in all these countries, that is, in the peoples' democracies, bourgeois democratic regimes must be set up; that is, instead of development towards socialism, capitalism must be restored. These bourgeois democratic governments would turn towards the United States instead of towards the Soviet Union . . . '

Long ago sinister plots were already being hatched in Yugoslavia. Most, if not all, of the volunteers to the International Brigade were Gestapo agents; in the internment camp of the International Brigade in France where Rajk was there were alone 150 Yugoslav Gestapo agents.

Here the *regiseur* of the Trial made a grave mistake. Five days before it began, Radio Budapest read the indictment (also printed in *Szabad Nép* and in the official report of the Trial) which mentioned that the following Yugoslavs were in the International Brigade, were in reality fascists, and were together with Rajk in a French detention camp: Bebler, Kosta-Nadj, Gošnjak, Maslarić, Mrazović. When, immediately after the publication of the indictment, a meeting of Yugoslav volunteers to the International Brigade made it clear that neither Bebler, Maslarić nor Mrazović had been in a detention camp in France, the *regiseur* of the Trial arranged it so that during the hearing Rajk should not mention the above three names. Instead Rajk spoke about Vukmanović (called Tempo)

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66/ as one of the volunteers to Spain he met in a French camp. Bad luck again! Vukmanović was not a volunteer in Spain and therefore could also not be in a French camp!*

As regards Tito himself Rajk says during the Trial: '. . . probably the Americans were in possession of some compromising evidence against Tito dating from the fascist era in Yugoslavia by which they hold in their power both him and the other Yugoslav statesmen now in leading positions'—a gentle hint that Tito and Co. were police spies even before the war. Why, then, did Tito lead the Partisan movement and expel the Nazi enemy and King Peter, the bankers and the industrialists? Actually he was devoted to them, but the pressure of the masses compelled him to eliminate them. (By the same logic Hitler might have loved the Jews, and been compelled only by anti-semitic mass pressure to murder six million of their number). Even so, Tito tried to wriggle out of this compulsion to his own advantage. Brankov searches his memory: '. . . there was much talk during the war that in 1941, '42 and at the beginning of '43, Tito had carried on negotiations with the Germans to discontinue the fight, provided the Germans would consent that he set up a government in Yugoslavia'. According to Brankov, this was known at the time to many in Yugoslavia, but apparently neither Hebrang nor Žujović, the Moscow agents then in the leadership of the Communist Party of Yugoslavia, nor the Soviet Ambassador, consuls, military advisers and so forth had any inkling of this treachery, till 28th June, 1948, the date of the Tito-Stalin rift.

Rajk also said that Tito was an ally of the Vatican and 'counted most' on Cardinal Mindszenty—Tito, who condemned Archibishop Stepinac to 16 years' imprisonment and expropriated nearly all the land of the Catholic Church (which the Polish, Hungarian, Czech and Rumanian governments did not do).

Two confessions, those of Pálffy, the Chief of Staff of the Army, and Korondy, the Colonel of Police, throw light on the

*An interesting event in the aftermath of the Rajk Trial showed clearly what little conviction it carried for all except the religious believers in the Kremlin About two months after the trial a large number of Yugoslav members of the International Brigade, who were mentioned in the trial as Nazi spies, received high decorations from the Spanish Republican Government for services in the cause of the Spanish Civil War. What a moral defeat for those who organised the frame-up!

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character of the army and police in the 'People's Democracies'. 661
These statements doubtless contain more truth than most of the other confessions, as they are based not on hearsay, but on the actual developments in Hungary, which can be checked by many Hungarians and by students. They show the continuity of the army and police institutions from the time of Horthy, and so give the lie to the Communist propaganda that since the 'revolution of 1944' they have an altogether new, democratic character. Pálffy stated: 'I sabotaged the drawing of working class cadres into the army, and I not only did not support the few workers who were nevertheless already there, or managed to get in, but pushed them back, relegating them to a secondary position. I was the chief of the military political department for three years and during these years not a single worker managed to get into a leading position even of a lower grade. On the contrary, in the interests of the aim previously mentioned, I brought back former officers of the Horthy army who were partly of pro-western convictions, partly of fascist, chauvinist sympathies, in great numbers; I promoted and supported them to high posts . . . My further destructive activities I carried out within the military political department where, in my capacity as president of the Party organisation, I consciously introduced such a dictatorial system'.

And Korondy[7] said: 'To build up this anti-democratic spirit 661
we even published text-books for the police, copying the text- 625
books of the old gendarmerie and police and at the beginning of 1948 compiling the material of the basic examination which was compulsory for all police officers from the old text-books, so that the new police officers could not pass the examination and could be removed from the police force. Through our activities we succeeded in making the training units of the police into an important armed force and because of their convictions they could at any time be utilised against the democracy and the democratic regime'.

It is obvious that Rákosi, Gerö and the other leaders must have known that for nearly five years workers were prevented from gaining high positions in the army and police and that the new text-books for police officers were copies of those used in the old gendarmerie. Pálffy and Korondy, and of course Rajk, merely took upon themselves to be the scapegoats, but in so

[7] [Colonel of Police in testimony at Rajk trial in Budapest--Analyst]

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[625] doing they revealed the real situation in the army and police.
661 The Rajk trial shows once again that no man or movement can stray from blind obedience to Moscow without being branded as a 'fascist spy'. Two particularly glaring instances were brought out in the trial. One concerned Earl Browder, who for sixteen years was General Secretary of the American Communist Party and was 'unanimously' supported and applauded by all the Communist Parties in the world. Suddenly, without ceremony, when Moscow's line changed, he was removed from the leadership (July, 1945), then expelled from the Party (February, 1946). Szönyi blamed his influence for his own degeneration into an American and Yugoslav spy. He said: 'In this influence the theory of Browder, then leader of the Communist Party of the U.S.A., played a great part. Printed copies of Browder's books in French and German were distributed in great number by Lompar and Field both in Switzerland and in France, on behalf of the American secret service'. And later: 'In 1944 I openly professed views serving the interests of American imperialism. The treacherous theory of Browder played a great part in this.'

The second instance concerns the Zionist movement. This too comes very badly out of the trial, as an agent of American imperialism. The People's Prosecutor, with no relevance to the course of the trial, asks Szönyi: 'You were a member of the Zionist movement?' Szönyi replies: 'As far as I know, Ferenc Vági and György Demeter were members of the Zionist movement. In this connection it is known to me, and I also experienced it in Switzerland, that in general the Zionist movement maintained very close co-operation with the American secret sevrice'.

The defendent Szalai makes an odd amalgam that implicates the Zionist movement. He says: 'I was connected with the Horthy police. Detective Inspector Réti, the head of the political section of the Pécs police, enrolled me in 1933. Since 1930 I had participated in a Trotskyist Zionist movement, in which I received the sort of anti-working-class education that helped Réti's attempt to enroll me'.

The President asks the accused Pál Justus if he was a Zionist; and in case someone should forget that Szalai had been a Zionist, the question is repeated to him.

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Szabad Nép, the Hungarian Workers' Party daily, wrote: 661
'The familiar surroundings and ideological morass out of which grew Rajk and his accomplices consisted of Trotskyism, Fascism, Zionism and anti-Semitism'. (19th June, 1949). The crowning amalgam was made by a writer in *Pravda* (20th September, 1949) who spoke of the collective from which Tito and American imperialism drew their agents as 'professional traitors, mean spies, murderers, gendarmes, Trotskyists and Zionists'.

The Kostov trial was conducted in the same way as the Rajk trial. But the unexpected happened. At the beginning of the trial Kostov withdrew his written confession. After a 'rest' of half an hour to 'refresh his memory', he repeated the same plea of 'not guilty'. He did so again at the end of the trial even though his very 'counsel of defence' argued his guilt in an angry attack, saying that 'in a Socialist country it is the duty of the defence counsel to aid the Public Prosecutor'. Not once did any of the defendants, witnesses or counsel refer to the fact that Kostov had withdrawn his 'confession', and they made extensive use of the statements made in the 'confession'. Seeing that he remained obdurate, he was interrogated for only a few minutes, while far less important defendants were interrogated for ten or more times as long. When he spoke his 'last words' he was booed and hissed by the spectators, who acted spontaneously, of course.

The official commentators in Bulgaria as well as the Communist commentators elsewhere did not know what to make of Kostov's denial of his 'written confession'. (There had been one precedent to this, when, in the Moscow trials of the thirties, the defendant, Krestinsky, denied his 'confession'. Next day, however, he repented his stubbornness and affirmed everything Vishinsky desired). For two days no paper or radio station in Russia or the 'People's Democracies' dared to comment upon it. On the third day *Pravda* gave the 'line', describing Kostov as 'a shrewd, experienced and determined enemy' with a 'soft and oily voice' and 'the cunning eyes of a thief'. The paper poked fun at his 'bent back', which he had received in 1924, when, as an organiser of the Party, he had jumped from the top floor of the Sofia police headquarters, where he had been tortured.

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66/ A few hours after he was hanged, the Communist press published a 'confession' written by him, in which he praised his death sentence, saying that it was 'absolutely correct and corresponding to the interests and peaceful development of Bulgaria in its struggle against Anglo-American imperialists and their agent, Tito'. The machine is working more quickly in the 'People's Democracies' now, for after the Petkov trial it took three weeks before a similar 'posthumous confession' was published.*

*By the way, it is interesting to note that one of the gravest accusations brought against Kostov was that he was a friend of Béla Kun, the head of the Communist Government of Hungary in 1919; since it was 'proved' that Béla Kun was a 'Trotskyist-fascist'.

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CHAPTER VII

'TITOISTS' BEFORE TITO

TITOISM expresses the struggle of a small nation led by its bureaucracy against oppression by the Great Russian bureaucracy. The Tito-Stalin conflict throws light not only on the Rajk-Stalin, Gomulka-Stalin or Kostov-Stalin conflicts, where the issue is the national oppression of the peoples of Stalin's new vassal states, but also on the national question in the U.S.S.R. herself. It is instructive to survey this little-known aspect of Russian policy.

The most numerous non-Russian people in the U.S.S.R. are the Ukrainians. Their national aspirations have constantly been suppressed by a series of purges. In 1930 the Ukrainian Academy of Sciences was dissolved and members of it arrested for 'national deviations'. In 1933, Skrypnik, the most prominent leader of the Ukrainian Communist Party and a member of its Central Committee and Political Bureau, committed suicide in order to avoid arrest. At the same time Kostubinsky, the Vice-President of the Council of People's Commissars of the Ukraine (the Ukrainian Government), Kovnar, the Commissar of Agriculture, and a few score of high officials were shot as nationalists. To prevent further deviations, Postyshev was sent to Ukraine from Moscow in 1933 to reorganise the party and the state administration. He was given dictatorial powers. At the 12th Congress of the Ukrainian Communist Party in 1933, he said: 'In Ukraine our leading Party members and Comrade Stalin himself are specially hated. The class enemy has been to a good school in this country and has learned how to struggle against Soviet rule. In Ukraine have settled the remnants of many counter-revolutionary parties and organizations. Kharkov has gradually become the centre of attraction for all sorts of nationalistic and other counter-revolutionary organizations. They have all been drawn to this centre and they have spread their webs all over the Ukraine, making use of our Party system for their own ends. You remember, Comrades,

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661 186 687 when twenty Secretaries of Party Regional Committees dared to declare that it was impossible to fulfil the Harvest Plan' (Nos. 15–21 of *Proletarian*, Kharkov, 1934, quoted by W. E. D. Allen, *The Ukraine*, Cambridge, 1940, p. 326). Postyshev expelled more than a quarter of the members of the Ukrainian Communist Party. Three years later he himself suffered a similar fate, being expelled and arrested. In his place came Kosior, from Moscow. He, in due course, was also arrested. In 1937, Lyubchenko, Chairman of the Council of People's Commissars of Ukraine, committed suicide in order to avoid arrest. The Commissars Petrovski and Eiche were liquidated.

Other republics have a similar history. In the Republic of White Russia, Goloded, who for ten years was Chairman of the Council of People's Commissars, was in 1937 arrested as a Trotskyist. Some months later his successor as chairman, Cherviakov, committed suicide to avoid arrest He had been Chairman of the Central Executive Committee of White Russia (i.e., President of the Republic) for seventeen years.

In Tadjikistan, the Chairman of the Executive Committee was purged as a nationalist in 1934. His successor held the position for three years and then suffered a similar fate. Walter Padley, in his article 'Empire or Free Union?' in *Politics*, New York, Spring, 1948, gives the following list of some of the foremost people in the national republics who were purged in 1937:

Presidents	*Republic*
Cherviakov	White Russia
Rahkhimbayev	Tadjikistan
Arkupov	Karelian
Shotemur	Tadjikistan
Lordkipanide	Adjar
Dolgat	Daghestan
Kunz	Volga-German
Prime-Ministers	*Republic*
Goloded	White Russia
Mgalobishvili	Georgia
Khodjaev	Uzbekistan
Rakhinov	Tadjikistan
Bondarenko	Ukraine
Ovakabelashvili	Transcaucasia.

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661 These are just a few of the victims. Altogether in the big purge of 1937 the whole or the majority of thirty national governments were liquidated. The main accusation against them was their desire for secession from the U.S.S.R.

The fact that the N.K.V.D. directed from Moscow can arrest heads of governments, Commissars (now called Ministers), first secretaries of the Party in the national republics and a host of lesser figures, shows that the much-vaunted independence of the national republics is purely formal. Nothing remains of the right of secession, even though this is recognised in the Stalin Constitution (Article 17). As early as the twelfth Congress of the C.P.S.U. (1923) Ukrainian communists who demanded that control over the G.P.U. in the different republics be vested in the national governments, were severely rebuked.

661 656 563 The most important element of the administration of the state besides the police is the army, but the national republics have no separate armies of their own. They are not even allowed to keep their own soldiers within their own borders, but armies composed mostly of other nationals camp on their territories. The story of the Ukrainian army is typical. This army won its laurels during the Civil War in 1918-21, when, almost single-handed, it liberated Ukraine from the Whites. It continued to camp in Ukraine until 1929. But the Great Russian bureaucracy, becoming afraid of the strength of this peasant army, decided to cripple it permanently. The army was broken up, its separate units moved from the Ukraine and dispersed all over the U.S.S.R. It was replaced in Ukraine by a Great Russian army commanded from Moscow, to ensure the complete dependence of Ukraine on Moscow. The same fate befell the other national republics.

The Communist Parties in the republics are not only directed from Moscow, but even the majority of those they appoint to the State or Party apparatus are Great Russians. Nearly all the First Secretaries of the Ukrainian Communist Party came from Moscow: Kaganovich, Postyshev, Kosior, Khrushchev, and Kaganovich once more. Of the five First Secretaries of the Communist Parties of the Central Asiatic Republics today, four are Russians, and the position in the other republics is similar. Even where the secretaries are drawn from the local

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661 population, they are so dependent on the centralised Party
652 machine and the N.K.V.D. that they are nothing but local
523 quislings.

646 A study of the national composition of the Supreme Soviet
661 of the U.S.S.R. gives a clear picture of the subordination of the non-Russian peoples. Vs. Felix and Ju. Snov made an interesting analysis in the Ukrainian Socialist review, *Vpered* (Munich, 1950, No. 3), using as their basis the list of M.P.'s published in *Pravda* on 15th March, 1950. Of the 25 deputies every republic sent to the Soviet of Nationalities, 5 from Ukraine S.S.R. were Russians, 4 from Uzbek S.S.R., 6 from Kazakh S.S.R., 5 from Lithuanian S.S.R., 6 from Latvian S.S.R., 5 from Tadjik S.S.R. and 6 from Kirghiz S.S.R. Actually, these Russians hold the key positions in the administration of the republics. For instance, of the 5 Russian deputies from the Tadjik S.S.R., two were D. K. Vishnevski, who is the Minister of State Security (M.G.B.) for Tadjikistan, and A. V. Kharchenko, who is the Minister of the Interior (M.V.D.) for Tadjikistan.

661 The overriding control of Moscow over the administration
652 of the national republics explains the complete defeat of all the
523 national resistance movements hitherto. It also explains the defeat of the 'Titoists' in Poland, Bulgaria, Hungary and Rumania. Tito has been successful so far because Moscow never controlled the state apparatus of Yugoslavia. She was 'liberated' not by the Soviet Army but by her own National Liberation Army, organised and led by Yugoslavs.

197 The cultural life of the various nations is also subjected to
652 Russification. When the Bolsheviks came to power, they
523 introduced the Latin alphabet for the many nations in Russia which had no written language at all, and 71 written languages in this form were introduced. This was considered the simplest and most progressive means of promoting the cultural development of these people, and it underlined the fact that there was no intention of Russification. Stalin reversed this progressive policy. In 1936, the Latin alphabet was replaced by the Cyrillic, which is much more complicated, and in 1938 Russian was made a compulsory language in all Secondary schools of the U.S.S.R.

Even more important than the language people speak or write is what they speak or write.

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The direction of people's minds along the groove required by Moscow begins at school. Pupils in Ukraine are made to pay tribute to Kutuzov, known as the hangman of the Ukrainians. Chmelnitzki, who massacred the Jews and betrayed the Ukrainian peasants into Russian serfdom must be acclaimed a national hero. Pupils in Azerbaidjan must be taught that the Russian occupation of their country in 1806 was not symbolic of the superiority of Russian arms alone, but shows the long attachment of Azerbaidjan to Russian culture. It is often very difficult for the non-Russian scholars to explain their history in the way required, and they are frequently accused of nationalism. In the summer of 1944, the Central Committee of the C.P.S.U. severely criticized the cultural work of the Tartar Republic, its main defalcation being nationalist falsifications in the teaching of its national history. The Tartars were instructed to emphasize the elements in their history which united them with Russia (*Propagandist*, 15th June, 1944). The journal *Kultura i Zhizn* of 30th November, 1945, is devoted mainly to criticisms of 'nationalist deviations' in the teaching of history. The institutes of history in the Ukrainian, Tartar, Bashkir, Armenian, Georgian, Latvian and White Russian Republics all come in for their measure of stern criticism. 876 652 563

The war proved a great test for Stalin's national policy. The fact that the soldiers of the U.S.S.R. fought with great courage proves nothing by itself. Russia's greatest military victories in the eighteenth century were won by Suvorov in Catherine the Great's reign, the worst period of serfdom. The serfs who were so cruelly exploited showed immense heroism and self-sacrifice in the army. In the Second World War the German and Japanese soldiers doggedly persisted in their struggle even when all hope of military victory was lost, but this fact does not prove that there were harmonious social relations within these countries. 000

It is extremely difficult to discover the whole truth about the number of quislings in Russia. The case of General Vlassov is well known. He received the highest orders of the Red Army at the beginning of the war, but on being taken prisoner by the Germans, organised an army of between 100,000 and 1,000,000 prisoners of war from the U.S.S.R. to fight by the side of the Germans. This by itself, however, indicated very little. Hitler, 186 668

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186 for instance, was more successful in finding quislings in France
668 than in Russia, but much less successful in Poland, where he could not get one general or military unit to fight on his side. Nevertheless, Vlassov's defaulting was disquieting to the Russian authorities, and they took care never to mention it in the press or over the radio.

At the end of the war, repeated attacks in the press on fascist influence in the areas of occupation—Ukraine, White Russia, Crimea and the Caucasus—serve as clear testimony to the apathy or even enmity of the populations to the Russian authorities. For instance, *Bolshevik* of 17th August, 1944, stated: '. . . the population of White Russia was for three years deprived of real Soviet information, and was under the influence of lying fascist propaganda. This applied also to other now freed areas. The Soviet people remained true to their Fatherland. (Examples follow—Y.G.) . . . This does not give us the right to quiescence. The treacherous enemy, with his lying propaganda, with his bloody terror, hitherto unparalleled in history, demoralised more than a few people, brought more than a little confusion in their consciousness. He strengthens his agency which conducts skilled undermining work . . .' In another issue of *Bolshevik* there occurs this statement: 'The existence and the vitality of vestiges of capitalism in the mind of people in our country is explained not only by the fact that people's minds are lagging behind economic conditions, but also by the influence of an alien ideology . . . The German fascist occupants endeavoured to implant the ideology of private property and of nationalism . . . (The enemy) did his utmost to demoralise them, to poison their consciousness and to sap their belief in the rightness of our great cause.' (Quoted by *The Economist*, 16th March, 1946).

The explanation is not convincing. The Nazi reign of terror would not sow doubts and breed hatred against the Russian regime, but on the contrary, would put it in a much better light in the eyes of the oppressed. This quotation reveals that, in spite of the German terror and oppression, anti-Russian 'nationalist deviations' occurred. To one who knows how to read the Communist Party press, such an admission, repeated in numerous articles, is a sure sign that an important fact is being touched on.

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The strongest proof that Russia's national policy does not create harmonious and fraternal relations between the different peoples is the dissolution of a number of national republics. A year before the war, when there was tension between Russia and Japan on the Manchurian border, the *entire* Korean population on the Russian side of the border was transferred to Kazakstan and Uzbekistan.

On 28th August, 1941, the entire population of the Volga German Republic was transferred East of the Urals. The German Republic was one of the oldest national republics of Russia. As early as 19th October, 1918, the Workers' Commune of Volga Germans was constituted, and on 19th December, 1923, it was reconstituted as the Autonomous Soviet Socialist Republic of Volga Germans. It was one of the first republics to achieve almost complete collectivisation. *International Press Correspondence* of 18th April, 1936, said: 'The German Soviet Republic on the Volga is a living proof of the cultural and national progress which follows on the victory of socialism and a living disproof of the lies and slanders spread by the fascist enemies of the proletariat'. Just two years before their expulsion, an article appeared in *Moscow News* called: 'Volga German Republic, a Vivid Illustration of Soviet National Policy in Practice'. Then, after the Volga Germans had for so many years been commended for the unanimous support of the regime, came the decree of the dissolution of their republic, with the following explanation: 'According to reliable information received by military authorities, there are thousands and tens of thousands of diversionists and spies among the German population of the Volga region who are prepared to cause explosions in these regions at a signal from Germany. No Germans (living in the Volga districts—Y.G.) ever reported to Soviet authorities the presence of such great numbers of diversionists and spies. Therefore, the German population of the Volga regions are covering up enemies of the Soviet people and the Soviet power.'

In the areas of the U.S.S.R. formerly occupied by the Germans a number of republics were dissolved. These dissolutions were not even mentioned in the press, and it was only when *Pravda* on 17th October, 1945, gave a list of the constituencies for the coming general elections, that it was

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166 discovered that a number of republics had disappeared, since
563 when one cannot know: the autonomous Crimean Tartar,
652 Kalmyk and Checheno-Ingush Soviet Republics and the autonomous Karachev region were abolished and the non-Russian populations deported.

In Ukraine, Khrushchev, head of the government, declared in August, 1946, that half the leading personalities of the Ukrainian Party had been expelled in the previous eighteen months. It would be too much even for the Great Russian bureaucracy to expel 30 million Ukrainians and dissolve their 'republic'.

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CHAPTER VIII

STALIN'S EMPIRE HAS NO FUTURE

An Empire with a Backward 'Mother' Country

HARDLY HAD STALIN'S empire extended into central Europe than cracks began to appear in its structure. The Titoist rebellion, whatever its future development, had the effect of transferring the problem of the internal contradictions of Stalinism to the plane of popular discussion, revealing all their ramifications. It raised the question of whether an empire with a materially and culturally backward 'mother' country can exist. The further the Stalinist empire advances westwards, the larger will be its population whose standards of living and culture are higher than those of the Russian peoples, who have a national history, culture and consciousness of their own, and who do not expect to be moulded by foreign forces. In the present epoch, when the peoples of Asia and Africa are awaken- to the fight for their national liberation, it cannot be expected that the peoples of Europe, which was the cradle of the national movement and the national state, would succumb for any length of time to an imperialist power.

In all fairly stable empires hitherto, the ruling nation has had a higher material and cultural level than the ruled nations. No artificial means used in an attempt to enhance the importance of the culture of the Russians, such as the attribution of all inventions, scientific discoveries, etc. to them, can raise them above the Czechs, Poles and other peoples, especially when culture is diffused internationally and no nation can lay claim to superiority in all spheres. No 'iron curtain', even if it is as thick as the one between Russia and the 'People's Democracies' which is even thicker than the curtain between the 'People's Democracies' and the West, can successfully hide the fact that the Russian people as a whole is much poorer than the Czech, Polish or Hungarian. Even the backward peasants, who are now taught to look upon Moscow as the Mecca of

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000 agricultural achievement, and upon Lysenko as the prophet, will be convinced through their own experience that the level of productivity in Russian agriculture is actually not higher than in Rumania or Bulgaria, and much lower than in Hungary or Czechoslovakia, and that the conditions of the kolkhozniki are much worse than their own. When Britain was the 'workshop of the world', she could easily subjugate the large Indian subcontinent, which had no industrial centres of any size, no railway network uniting the country, and no national literature and press. Russia could rule Uzbeks or Tadjiks, or even the more developed Ukrainians and Poles, as long as they were at a low level of development. To transform the countries of Europe into colonies for any length of time is out of the question.

The epoch of stable empires has gone for good.

The Inquisition is a Symptom of Decline

The extent of terror used by a ruling class is a criterion of its stability. The deeper the contradictions in which a ruling class finds itself, when it is conscious that it is a brake on progress, and is isolated from and antagonistic to the majority of the people, the more does it have to resort to the weapon of mass terror. This was revealed previously in the attitude of the Roman Catholic Church to heretics. For a long period the Medieval Church played a necessary and progressive role, being the organisation possessing the greatest wealth and concentration of free and learned people in society, and for many centuries was the citadel of culture; the monasteries were relatively developed centres of agriculture and artisanship; the Church stimulated commerce and kept the permanent warfare between the feudal lords within bounds; she was the great and only institution of charity; she alone maintained schools and acted as a 'publishing house', and she alone was able to organise the Christian peoples against the threat of Arab expansion. From the fourth century onwards, the Catholic Church accorded perfectly with the material and cultural level of the period. Therefore even when social conflicts produced rebels who claimed to speak in the name of primitive Christianity, they remained small sects and were easily defeated by the mighty Church. As long as the Church fulfilled a necessary role in

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society which could be fulfilled by no alternative institution, 000 she was so self-confident that she could afford to be (in comparison with other feudal lords) a generous and kind overlord. The Jews did not fare too badly under the Church at this time; even the few heretics were treated reasonably well. In the words of the article in *Encyclopaedia Britannica* on the Inquisition: 'During the first three centuries of the Church there is no trace of any official persecution and the earlier Fathers . . . rejected the idea of it.' In the next few centuries assemblies of heretics were prohibited, but there were hardly any cases of execution. From the tenth to the twelfth centuries a growing number of heretics in France, Italy, the Holy Roman Empire and England were burned or strangled. In the thirteenth century, for the first time, the Inquisition became a regular institution. This was the result of the reactionary character of feudalism, and therefore of the Medieval Church which was part and parcel of it. The rise of new social forces so undermined the moral fibre of the old, that the latter, for self-preservation, had to resort to fanatical persecution.

A rising class also uses terror, but with a difference. The strength and nature of the methods used by the opponents of revolution determined those used by the revolutionaries. If we look back at the struggle of the towns of Europe in 11th-13th centuries for civil and political rights, we see that they achieved a democarcy which was the mother of all modern democracies only after a long series of bloody insurrections waged by the town dwellers against the feudal lords both secular and clerical. A German proverb says, 'Town air makes a man free', but this freedom was achieved by civil wars. The peaceful, industrious Dutch, Swiss and Tyrolean peasantries, which have a high material and cultural level, achieved the prerequisites for their development by sanguinary struggles which put an end to serfdom some centuries prior to struggles elsewhere. The Puritan Revolution in England which overthrew absolute monarchical autocracy and established the unchallenged rule of Parliament and the new middle class, paving the way for modern democratic parliamentarism, also used terror. So did the Great French Revolution, which swept aside all remnants of feudalism, and so did Lincoln in his struggle for the abolition of slavery.

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000 A consideration of the terror used in the French Revolution clearly shows that violence, when used by revolutionaries, is a measure of self-defence (see, for instance, Gérard Walter's *Histoire de la Terreur, 1793–1794*, Paris, 1937).

Until the great military victories of the Republic in the summer of 1794 which made all revolutionary terrorism superfluous, violence was used as a defence against the counter-revolutionary terror. Thus, the first wave of terror on 1–3rd September, 1792, was a spontaneous reaction to the news that General Longway, the Commander of the Army, had turned traitor and gone over to the Austrians, that the Girondist Ministry had decided to evacuate Paris and withdraw to the south and that the Royalists were openly attacking the people in Paris itself. With their backs to the wall, the sansculottes resorted to anti-Royalist terror. The second wave, in September, 1793, came immediately after the fall of Toulon to the English, after Lyons, Marseilles, Toulouse, Nîmes and Grenoble rose against the Convention and after the Vendées in the North won great military victories and behaved with a cruelty far surpassing anything France had hitherto seen. Only for a few weeks was the Jacobin terror superfluous, a blind force serving no useful purpose. This was between 11th June and 27th July, 1794, after the big military victories of the Republic, when the liberatory, progressive role of the revolutionaries had come to its end; 1,285 people were condemned to death in this time.

The Russian Revolution followed a similar course. In its anti-feudal, anti-capitalist liberatory stage, the Red Terror was a measure of self-defence, and was on a much smaller scale than the White Terror. This is illustrated by the following statements. The Lord Emmett Committee, appointed by Lloyd George on 17th May, 1920, to 'collect information on Russia', reported to Parliament on six months of Bolshevik rule, 'that liberty was restricted only after two members of the Government had been assassinated, civil war and Allied intervention had started, and the air was thick with plots and rumours of plots'. Sir Bruce Lockhart stated in his memoirs that at the outset the Bolshevik regime was comparatively tolerant. 'The cruelties which followed later were the result of the intensification of the civil war. For the intensification of that bloody struggle Allied intervention with the false hopes

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it raised was largely responsible. I do not say that a policy of abstention from interference in the internal affairs of Russia would have altered the course of the Bolshevik revolution. I do suggest that our intervention intensified the terror and increased the bloodshed'. General William S. Graves, Commander of the U.S. troops in Siberia during the intervention, wrote: 'There were horrible murders committed, but they were not committed by the Bolsheviks as the world believes. I am well on the side of safety when I say that the anti-Bolsheviks killed one hundred people in Eastern Siberia to every one killed by the Bolsheviks'. (The last three quotations are from K. Zilliacus, *I Choose Peace*, London, 1949, pp. 39–40).

Stalin's terror—the slave camps with millions of inmates, the execution of hundreds of thousands of people, the spy net covering all aspects of life—cannot be compared with the terror in the Puritan or French Revolutions, the American Civil War or the Russian February and October Revolutions. In its extent, in its bureaucratic, police method of execution, in its unscrupulousness in breaking the morale of its opponents, it can not but be compared with the Inquisition of the declining Middle Ages, the Brown Terror of declining German capitalism, or, to go back, the bloody orgies of the Amphitheatre in declining Roman society. It is not the sign of a rising, healthy class, but of a reactionary, doomed society.

The Titoists for the first time show in practice the limitations of Stalin's terror and thus undermine the one necessary element of its success—the belief of its victims in its omnipotence.

The Communist Parties and the Kremlin—Latent Antagonisms

The successful revolt of Tito against the Kremlin, as well as the liquidation by the Kremlin of Communist leaders like Gomulka, Kostov, Rajk, Pătrăşcanu and Clementis, raises another important problem of world Stalinism—the relation between the Communist leaders and Moscow.

It is usual to speak of the Communist Parties as blind followers of the Kremlin, and to a large extent this is true. When there is any zigzag in Russian foreign policy the Communist Parties follow suit: they called the war a 'war of

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000 Democracy against Fascism' up to 1st September, 1939, and then condemned it and called for peace until 21st June, 1941, on which date it once more became a 'war of Democracy against Fascism'. But in following the lead of Moscow, the Communist Parties are liable to enter certain deep contradictions. As long as economic and political power is in the hands of the bourgeoisie, the Communist Parties stand for the right to strike, for freedom of the press, assembly, etc. This policy attracts many honest, really democratic militants. If the Party comes to power, its bureaucracy will try to limit the fruits of victory to itself and the new henchmen it will attract—the police and army officers who will join the Party in power, the technicians, etc. Entirely different people are needed to run a state capitalist regime than to organise a union or a strike. For administering the former, self-sacrificing, honest, self-confident people are not needed, but careerists, 'yes'-men, cowards. The principle governing the selection of the Party cadres after it has come to power is the opposite of that governing the Party in opposition. The transition from one stage to the other necessarily passes through a crisis, which is bound to be much deeper than the crisis in the Nazi Party after Hitler took power. Hitler came into conflict with the plebeian, petty bourgeois wing of the Nazi Party (led by Röhm and Strasser) which had taken his promise to establish socialism, nationalise the banks, the trusts and the big department stores seriously. Relying on the old Reichswehr and police he succeeded, without great difficulty, in overcoming this crisis, in June, 1934. The factors which would cause a crisis in the Communist Parties if they came to power are much deeper. The rank and file of the Nazi Party were petty bourgeois people, dispersed in small shops, offices, etc. with weak ties among them and little experience of organisation; the rank and file of the Communist Parties, however, are mainly workers, who are much more capable of putting up organised opposition to the leaders who promise much before coming to power, and promptly forget on achieving it. A number of misguided rank and file Nazis desired socialism, but their conception of it was not only polluted with reactionary ideas of race, etc., but in practice was not ingrained with the basic elements of socialism —social, collective activity in the process of production, as the

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foundation of democratic activities. The Communist Party rank and file participates in collective production, and, however factory or trade union elections may be deformed by bureaucratic machinations, they have the last word, especially in times of crisis, such as during strikes. The workers' struggle is basically, essentially democratic. If Thorez or Pollitt want to get through the 'transformation' unscathed, they will need even greater support from the police and army to take action against the workers if need be, than Hitler needed. A big abyss has to be crossed before the Communist Parties will be transformed from working class parties, however subservient they may be to the state capitalist rulers of Moscow, into totalitarian ruling parties which are the open weapon of the state capitalist bureaucracy. The more the Communist Party is merged with the people and the more developed the country and the working class, the wider is the abyss, and the greater the need for the Communist leaders to bridge it with the help of a strong army and police force. If the Russian army were not present in a France ruled by Thorez, it is very doubtful if Thorez would succeed in bridging the abyss; he might be compelled by the French workers to resign were he to fail to carry out his avowed programme.

In addition to the social factor there is the national factor which deepens the crisis of transition of the Communist Parties from opposition to power. The French Communist Party is an agency of Moscow, and to this extent, is not a national French party at all. But this dependence appears to the majority of the Party members not as an externally imposed relation, but as the result of free conviction: the Soviet Union is the citadel of world socialism; the interests of the French workers are the victory of socialism, hence, the French workers must consider their first duty the victory of the Soviet Union. This argument would fall to pieces if Thorez were to come to power, and France were still subordinated to poverty-stricken, grasping, chauvinistic Russia. To fulfil the role assigned to it by Stalin, the Party, after coming to power, would be transformed into an openly quisling organisation. The deeper the roots of the Party, the more difficult this is to achieve. What assurance has Stalin that Mao Tse Tung will not be another Tito tomorrow? He has even less guarantee

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000 that Thorez or Togliatti, in advanced France or Italy, will not be new Titos. From this flows the emphasis of the Cominform on the messianic role of the Soviet Army, and the auxiliary role of the Communist Parties to the 'Soviet Army of Liberation' in a third World War.

No amount of indoctrination can be an absolutely safe guarantee against Titoism. The fact that Thorez swears morning, noon and night by Stalin is not sufficient. Tito did the same for two decades. The ease with which he discarded a number of the incontrovertible 'truths' of Stalinism, for instance, the Moscow Trials, shows that in the heart of many a Communist Party member there must be doubts about the absolute dogmas taught them: indeed the fanaticism may simply be Dutch courage, an effort to still the gnawing doubts.

Titoism reveals that when the institutions of the bourgeoisie —private property, fascist or semi-fascist political regimes, etc.—are abolished, Stalinism loses its power of appeal. While the Mindszenty or Maniu opposition to the Stalinist regime is a reflection of the past, the Titoist opposition is a phenomenon connected intimately with the Stalinist regime itself. Titoism reveals the dual character of the Communist Parties from the social and national standpoints, and shows how dark is the future of a regime whose expansion demands Parties that call for self-sacrifice, a fight against social and national oppression, but which at the same time carries out the most extreme and obnoxious social and national oppression.

The Leader Cult is a Symptom of Decline

The leader cult in the Russian empire takes the most extreme, Byzantine forms. Cities and towns are called after Stalin: in 1937 there were one Stalingrad, 10 Stalinos, 4 Stalinskis, 2 Stalinskoes, 2 Stalinsks, 1 Stalinogorsk, 1 Stalin, 1 Stalinstadt, 1 Stalinabad, 1 Stalinissi, 1 Stalinir, and others. Since 1937 many more have been added in Russia itself and in the 'People's Democracies'. His name figures everywhere, even in the national anthem; he is not mentioned unless the most extravagant praise accompanies his name; he is called 'our father', 'our infallible one', 'our sun', 'our soul'.

At the Congress of the Soviets in 1935, a writer, A. Avdeyenko, delivered a speech entitled, 'Why I Applauded Stalin'.

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It was one of the highlights of the Congress. So profound an impression did it make that Molotov himself paused in his summary to take note of it. He said: 'I do not intend to dwell upon the speeches of individual comrades . . . I shall refer only to the speech of writer Avdeyenko who . . . brilliantly under, scored the great significance of our struggle for socialism, as well as the devotion to Soviet power and the love for our party and for Comrade Stalin which permeates the toilers in their millioned masses'. The issue of *Pravda*, 1st February, 1935, that carried Molotov's summary also carried Avdeyenko's photograph and his speech. These are a few of his remarks: 'Centuries shall elapse and the communist generations of the future will deem us the happiest of all mortals that have inhabited this planet throughout the ages, because it is we who have seen Stalin, the leader genius, Stalin the sage, the smiling, the kindly, the supremely simple . . .

'When I met Stalin, even at a distance, I throbbed with his forcefulness, his magnetism and his greatness. I wanted to sing, to shriek, to howl from happiness and exaltation'.

And so Avdeyenko sang, shrieked and howled. He said in conclusion: 'Our love, our devotion, our strength, our heart-our heroism, our life—all these are thine, great Stalin! Here, take them, all this is thine, chief of the great fatherland. Dispose of thy sons, capable of heroic feats in the air, under the earth, on the waters, and in the stratosphere . . .

'Men of all time and of all nations shall call by thy name all that is beautiful, strong, wise, and pretty. Thy name is and shall remain on every factory, every machine, every bit of land, and in the hearts of every man . . .

'When my beloved will bear me my child, the first word I shall teach him will be—STALIN!' (Frenzied applause).

'I am not infected with any disease, I am strong, I cherish in my bosom the very finest human feelings: love, devotion, honesty, self-sacrifice, heroism, disinterestedness—all thanks to thee, great educator Stalin! I write books, I am a writer, I dream of creating a work which will never be forgotten, I love a girl in a new way, I procreate my kind, and it shall be a happy one—all thanks to thee, great educator Stalin . . .

'I am happy, full of joy of living, I am unshakably bold, I go to sleep with greatest sorrow, I wake up happy, I will live to

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000 be 100 years old, my hair will turn white, but I will remain eternally happy and radiant—all thanks to thee, great educator Stalin . . .

'I can fly to the moon, travel to the Arctic, invent a new machine, for my creative energy is not trampled by anybody—all thanks to thee, great educator Stalin . . . '

Songs like the following are written about him:

'O great Stalin, O leader of the peoples,
Thou who broughtest man to birth,
Thou who fructifiest the earth,
Thou who restorest the centuries,
Thou who makest bloom the spring,
Thou who makest vibrate the musical cords.

* * * *

Thou, splendour of my spring, O Thou,
Sun reflected by millions of hearts . . . '

(*Pravda*, 28th August, 1936).

'I would have compared him to a white mountain—but the mountain has a summit.
I would have compared him to the depths of the sea—but the sea has a bottom.
I would have compared him to the shining moon—but the moon shines at midnight, not at noon.
I would have compared him to the brilliant sun—but the sun radiates at noon, not at midnight'.

(*Znamya*, Soviet Authors' Union monthly, October, 1946).

This bears a strong resemblance to the deification of the Roman Emperors during the decline of Rome. The omnipotence of the emperor was limitless: Nero got first prize for everything in the Olympic games; the legend that he burnt Rome as a background to his music may not have a basis in fact, but is symptomatic of his megalomania; Caius Caligula could appoint his horse Consul of Rome. What then, could the emperor not do?*

*It is a point of interest that the adulation of the Führer was similar to that of the Vozhd. For instance, "Das Schwarze Korps", the official organ of the S.S., said on Hitler's birthday: 'On this day I draw near to your image. It is hard, magnificent and sublime. It is simple, benevolent and warm. It is, in one person, our father, our mother and our brother; it is more still. Thus you stand in the basilica of the love of millions of human beings, a basilica whose luminous cupola rises towards Heaven'. (Quoted by W. Deuel, *People under Hitler*, London, 1942, p. 46).

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It must be borne in mind, however, that the relations that existed between the Roman emperor and the so-called proletariat were quite different from those existing in an industrial society. The population of Rome, producing nothing and therefore entirely dependent on the Emperor who supplied them with 'bread and circuses', felt impotent. In modern industrial society every machine produced inspires in the worker a feeling of importance, of significance, of independence. Economic power in our epoch has too collective a character to allow for the existence of one figure among ciphers.

In Lilliput, Gulliver finds that the Emperor 'is taller by almost the breadth of my nail than any of his court, which alone is enough to strike an awe into the beholders'. If another grew as tall as the Emperor, the awe would quickly disappear. This is exactly the effect of Tito. Two authorities have risen in the world Communist movement, undermining the concept of the High Authority, the leader, as such. The appearance side by side between 1378 and 1417 of numbers of Catholic Popes, each attached to a national manarchy, did great damage to Catholicism. When Henry VIII quarrelled with Rome and decided to cut the connection between the Church in England and the Pope without greatly modifying the religious rites and dogmas, he opened the door to non-conformism. If every secular power imposes its truth as the absolute and only one, conformism as such is exposed.

To undermine the leader cult is to undermine the foundation of the bureaucratic state capitalist regime. This regime, which is based on the maximum concentration of capital, on the complete divorcement of the workers from the means of production, on extreme poverty in the midst of increasing wealth, could not exist without the denial of all democratic rights—starting with the right of the people to think and decide for themselves—and without making the people ciphers before the only omnipotent Man-God. To ridicule the pretensions of the semi-ignorant Vozhd in science, literature, music, etc., is to make a laughing-stock of the regime. Titoism encourages this.

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CHALLENGE in Eastern Europe

II

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CHALLENGE in Eastern Europe

12 Essays edited by

C. E. BLACK

Prepared under the auspices of the
MID-EUROPEAN STUDIES CENTER
of the National Committee
for a Free Europe, Inc.

Foreword by Joseph C. Grew

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Foreword

It was after his return home to England that John Donne wrote: "No man is an island, intire of itselfe; every man is a peece of the Continent, a part of the maine; if a Clod bee washed away by the Sea, Europe is the lesse, . . . any man's death diminishes me, because I am involved in Mankinde."

In the three centuries since Donne, the world has begun to learn the simple lesson that nations, like men, are their brothers' keepers. In today's world, where the distance from Boston to Berlin is shorter in time than was that from Donne's London to Liverpool—where men, or ideas, or total destruction can cross a continent or an ocean in a day—American interest encompasses the world.

The Monroe Doctrine, Wilson's Fourteen Points, the Truman Doctrine, Korea, and the forthright declarations of President Eisenhower all illustrate how United States foreign policy, in the nation's self-interest, has become progressively committed to a greater geographical periphery in a shrinking world.

From the economic, political, and strategic aspects, Eastern Europe is of vital importance to the Free World. The economic health of Western Europe ultimately depends upon a free intercourse among all the countries of Europe, and until that situation once again prevails, America must, to

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000 some degree, help the West European economy. Meanwhile, the economy of captive Eastern Europe is being systematically and ruthlessly exploited for the benefit of Soviet Russia.

Politically and strategically, a permanently Communist Eastern Europe would be an American disaster. The Soviet power monopoly in the area has transposed Russian armed forces and communist ideology hundreds of miles nearer to the production and population centers of the West, affording the Soviet Union a strategic zone of hundreds of thousands of square miles and millions of human beings.

The United States has a moral obligation to help restore to the captive countries of Europe and their unhappy peoples our common cultural, religious, and political heritage. For it must always be remembered that these peoples are captives —that they did not freely choose Communism, but had it brutally or deviously thrust upon them.

Millions of American citizens or their forefathers came to this country before the First World War in the pursuit of some aspect of freedom that was denied them in the Eastern Europe of their time. But the current Communist oppression is absolute. Today, the people are subject to a new and universal tyranny which dims the minor past injustices of Old World empires to insignificance.

In the larger view, America cannot willingly accept a world, or a Europe, half slave and half free. The slave half of Europe must someday be free, or the free half of Europe too may be enslaved.

In the past, a large segment of the American public has seemed to be almost willfully ignorant of the peoples comprising Eastern Europe, and it may be held that this lack of knowledge contributed to the postwar Communist tragedy. More recently, the study of the area has been greatly developed in the United States and at long last is tending to assume its rightful place in American thinking. That knowledge is

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power has held good for two thousand years. Knowledge remains one of freedom's major weapons. 000

America has assumed the leadership of the Free World in taking up the Communist challenge to individual liberty and national independence.

To sustain the hope of freedom in half a continent; to learn and to contribute to truth and knowledge; in enlightened self-interest to dedicate ourselves and our country to freedom's cause and restitution—

This is the *Challenge in Eastern Europe*.

JOSEPH C. GREW

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Preface

101 Eastern Europe—the region embracing Albania, Bulgaria, Czechoslovakia, Hungary, Poland, Rumania, and Yugoslavia, and for certain limited purposes the Soviet zones of Germany and Austria as well—has long been familiar to students of European history. To Western public opinion in general, however, this region has become known chiefly as a result of the two world wars, for which it provided some of the major diplomatic problems and military battlefields.

000 Despite the significant role of Eastern Europe, the Western democracies have tended to regard it primarily as a region of inherent economic poverty and political instability. They have failed either to recognize the extent to which its problems reflected their own policies, or to see it as an area vital to their security. This lack of understanding of the problems and significance of Eastern Europe was most conspicuous at the end of the Second World War. At that time decisions were reached and concessions made by the West on the basis of assumptions that were not firmly grounded in the realities of this region. Important lessons were eventually learned, but not until great harm had been done to the peoples of Eastern Europe and consequently also to the welfare of the Western democracies.

121 The purpose of the essays in this volume is to review the record of the recent past in order to interpret the many-sided

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121 challenge presented by Eastern Europe. They describe this region in its transition from agrarian underdevelopment and political strife toward a more complex society, a more productive economy, and a more stable political system. The end of this process of transition is not yet in sight, and it has in most respects been set back by the policies of the Communist regimes since the Second World War. At the same time Eastern Europe remains a region of dynamic developments that have remained in many ways beyond the range of Western understanding.

These essays reflect the considerable diversity in experience and points of view of the authors. Some have wrestled with the problems of Eastern Europe as responsible members of governments both before and since the Second World War. Although they are acquainted at first hand with the policies of the Communist regimes, they write less from bitterness than from a desire to interpret for the West the lessons of their experience. Others bring to their subjects such objectivity as is afforded by academic study, and view Eastern Europe with a degree of abstraction difficult for those whose families and careers are directly involved. Still others combine academic study with some measure of personal experience that has permitted them to test the values that printed volumes do not always convey.

These diversities of background and viewpoint are merged in the common desire to interpret the challenge offered by Eastern Europe to the leaders of the Western democracies. Underlying these essays is the belief that a careful survey of the problems of this region is a first and essential step in the search for solutions in a democratic spirit. Although no blueprint for meeting the challenge of Eastern Europe is here attempted, an understanding of this region essential to the drafting of such a blueprint is offered.

000 With one exception, these essays were presented in a somewhat different form as lectures at the Institute of Public Af-

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fairs and Regional Studies of the Graduate School of Arts and Science at New York University in the summer of 1953. They were prepared under the auspices of the Mid-European Studies Center of the National Committee for a Free Europe, Inc. The assistance provided by the Center, both material and editorial, was vital to the completion of this volume. The editor is responsible in matters of planning and organization, but the views expressed herein are those of the several authors.

C. E. BLACK

Princeton, New Jersey
November, 1953

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PART ONE

THE POLITICS OF EASTERN EUROPE

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1 Eastern Europe in Historical Perspective

C. E. BLACK

000 The study of Eastern Europe is a recent development in the Western Hemisphere and represents a long delayed recognition of the significance of this region in world affairs. Although the peoples of this area have participated for many centuries in the varied problems of European politics, it is only in recent years that their importance as distinct national entities has been brought into the focus of the American world outlook.

It should, of course, be recalled that in the eighteenth century, under very different circumstances, the Western Hemisphere had good reason to be aware of Eastern Europe. In the persons of a Kosciuszko and a Pulaski this region participated in the liberation of the American colonies, and in the early years of the republic a Thomas Jefferson followed with well-informed interest the republican movement in Eastern Europe. Yet for the greater part of the nineteenth century the peoples of this area were dominated to one degree or another by the governments of the Habsburg, Hohenzollern, Romanov, and Ottoman dynasties, and the relationship of their destiny to that of the Western Hemisphere was in large measure lost to sight.

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000 It was nevertheless not entirely by chance that President Wilson took the initiative during the First World War in proclaiming that a just settlement in Eastern Europe was a prerequisite to world peace. Not only were Americans in many walks of life becoming aware of the importance of this region, but Wilson himself had at one time given some attention to its problems. As early as 1877, as an undergraduate at the College of New Jersey (now known as Princeton University), Wilson wrote a paper on "Prince Bismarck," which reflected his interest in the role of Eastern Europe in the international relations of that period; but this was only a student's essay, and it touched on Eastern Europe no more than peripherally. It was as an international statesman that Wilson came forward in 1918 to proclaim in his Fourteen Points three principles, among others, that he considered fundamental to a peaceful settlement. These principles were: national self-determination for the peoples of Eastern Europe (Points X-XIII), free and equal trade (Point III), and a general association of nations (Point XIV).

This image of a just settlement was only partially achieved in the peace treaties for, although the new frontiers followed reasonably closely the national principles, the equally vital requirements of free trade and collective security were in large measure neglected. What is significant about Wilson's program is not the ultimate failure of the peace settlement, since his own program was implemented only in part, but the fact that he correctly stressed the three central issues affecting the destiny of Eastern Europe. Throughout modern history, the peoples of this region have struggled with the problems of national liberation, modernization, and regional organization, and in reviewing their history these three categories provide a useful framework of analysis.

186 563 Of these three problems, that of national liberation is certainly the one that has concerned the peoples of this area

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most continuously. As minority groups, the peoples of Eastern Europe tended to suffer from discrimination at the hands of the governments whose territory they inhabited and, once they were infected with the spirit of the enlightenment, national liberation came to be regarded as the solution to all their problems. Significant reforms were indeed carried out in the nineteenth century within the existing political framework, but the road to reform was obstructed by many obstacles. Although national liberation almost inevitably means revolution and war, it appeared to many Eastern European leaders to be preferable to the available alternatives. The diplomatic history of Europe was, in fact, punctuated by great crises as one province after another broke loose from the Ottoman empire, and when this process culminated in the First World War and the liberation of the remaining peoples of this region, it was widely regarded as a logical step in human progress.

The leaders of Eastern European opinion did not regard national liberation as an end in itself, but rather as the best means for promoting the modernization of their peoples. This aim was stated in many different ways, some speaking of education, others of freedom, and many more of economic welfare. This is certainly a much broader objective than the principle of free and equal trade enunciated by Wilson, but that principle was an essential prerequisite to modernization in the view of the American president. In general terms it would not be unfair to say that the goal of Eastern European leaders in the last two centuries has been to raise the spiritual and material level of their peoples to the European standard established by England, France, Germany, and their smaller neighbors. This interpretation of their goal is certainly very generalized, yet it represents more accurately the aspirations of this region than do the specific programs of individual leaders or schools of thought. The fact that this objective has not yet been attained is fundamen-

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185 tal to an understanding of the problems of Eastern Europe, and much of the political extremism of this region can be traced to the frustrations resulting from this failure.

The most obvious reason for the failure to achieve a European standard, and probably also the most important, has been the persistent necessity of giving priority to national security over human welfare. This problem has, of course, been faced by all modern states, but it has affected the peoples of Eastern Europe to an unusual degree. It would not be too much to say that the insecurity of these states, due more to regional factors than to size, has been the source of [648] most of their difficulties. Of the various solutions that have been attempted, including national opportunism, alliances with great powers, regional pacts, and participation in the League of Nations, none has met the special needs of the situation.

I

186 175 The European wars resulting from the French Revolution and the Napoleonic conquests infected the leaders of the Eastern European peoples with the modern spirit of nationalism and liberalism, but the peace settlement concluded in 1815 did little to satisfy the hopes that had been aroused. The peoples of this region remained under the firm rule of the Romanov, Habsburg, Hohenzollern, and Ottoman dynasties, and before long the process of national liberation came to occupy their principal energies. Of the many national groups in this region, only the Serbians and the Montenegrins achieved any measure of independence before 1815, although the Magyars occupied within the Austrian monarchy a position of special influence. The remaining nationalities in this region had not yet taken the first steps towards independence. The struggle for freedom lasted for a full century, and was a complex process in which the

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rivalries among the nationalities frequently occupied as much 186
energy as the struggle against the dynastic governments.

The development of nationalism and liberation in East- 186
ern Europe was the product of many influences. Within the 668
larger framework of the enlightenment, the peoples of this region were stimulated by the philosophy of nationalism developed by Herder and his school and by the ideas of the French Revolution disseminated through cultural channels and by Napoleon's armies. The Poles, Czechs, and Magyars were most strongly influenced by this new spirit at first, and until the middle of the nineteenth century liberalism took precedence over nationalism. In this period a Czartoryski, a Palacky, and a Széchenyi worked for reforms within the political framework established in 1815, and their policies produced significant results. It was only after the defeat of liberalism in the abortive revolutions of 1848 that nationalism came to predominate, and this nationalism was rapidly hardened by the opposition that it encountered. By the end of the century only the Magyars had achieved the substance of their national aims, and this at the expense of becoming among the most rigorous oppressors of their own non-Magyar minorities. The peoples of Southeastern Europe achieved independence only to a limited degree before the First World War, while the Poles and Czechs remained under firm imperial rule. The approximate distribution of these nationalities at the turn of the century is illustrated by the table on page 8.

Of all the oppressed peoples of Eastern Europe, the Poles 563
were the most numerous and their situation in 1815 the 175
most acute. Possessors of a proud tradition of government dating back to the later middle ages, and at one time the third in area and fourth in population among the European powers, they had suffered domestic disintegration and territorial partition in the eighteenth century. In the peace settlement of 1815 the largest segment of Poland was in-

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Principal Eastern European Nationalities Before the First World War *

(APPROXIMATE FIGURES IN THOUSANDS)

	Austria Hungary [a]	Russia [b]	Germany [c]	Rumania [d]	Serbia [e]	Monte-negro [f]	Bulgaria [g]	Albania [h]
POLES	5,000	7,931	3,086	—	—	—	—	—
MAGYARS	10,100	—	—	—	—	—	—	—
CZECHS	6,550	—	—	—	—	—	—	—
SLOVAKS	1,950	—	—	—	—	—	—	—
SLOVENES	1,300	—	—	—	—	—	—	—
CROATIANS	2,625	—	—	—	—	—	—	—
SERBIANS	1,925	—	—	—	4,048	—	—	—
MOHAMMEDAN SERBO-CROATIANS IN BOSNIA	650	—	—	—	—	—	—	—
MACEDONIAN SLAVS	—	—	—	—	500	—	100	—
MONTENEGRINS	—	—	—	—	—	516	—	—
RUMANIANS	3,200	1,122	—	7,136	—	—	—	—
BULGARIANS	—	173	—	200	—	—	4,153	—
ALBANIANS	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	800

* Fully satisfactory statistics on the nationalities of Eastern Europe for this period are not available, owing to inadequate census data as well as the imprecision of the concept of "nationality." The above figures refer only to the nationalities that emerged as independent states, or dominant members thereof, after the First World War. They omit the Germans, Ukrainians (Ruthenians), Turks, Italians, and others who formed a significant part of the population of this region in 1914. The following are the sources used:

[a] Robert A. Kann, *The Multinational Empire*, Vol. II, p. 305; based on census of 1910.

[b] Brokgauz-Efron, *Entsiklopedicheskii Slovar*, Suppl. Vol. II, App., p. xii; based on census of 1897.

[c] *Statesman's Yearbook*, 1914, p. 890; based on census of 1900.

[d] *Ibid.*, p. 1213, estimates of 1913.

[e] *Ibid.*, p. 1282, estimate for 1913, author's estimate of Macedonian Slavs.

[f] *Ibid.*, p. 1090, estimate for 1913.

[g] *Ibid.*, p. 727, estimate for 1914; author's estimate of Macedonian Slavs.

[h] *Ibid.*, p. 621, estimate for 1913.

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corporated in Russia as a nominal "Kingdom." Cracow became a free city under the joint protection of Russia, Prussia, and Austria, while western Poland became the Prussian province of Posen (Poznan), and the province of Galicia was ceded to Austria. For a brief period it seemed that the Kingdom of Poland might develop a degree of autonomy under Russian rule, but the firm suppression of the insurrection of 1830 brought an end to this hope. The mid-century revolutions were echoed in all four parts of Poland, and in each section ended with a further tightening of the imperial regime. In German and Russian Poland minority rights were increasingly disregarded in the latter half of the nineteenth century, and the city of Cracow lost its freedom through Austrian annexation. Only in the Austrian province of Galicia did the Poles develop a significant degree of self-government in this period, and in this atmosphere the Polish national movement was able to develop.

The Czechs and the Slovaks almost lost their identity after the annexation of the Kingdom of Bohemia by the Habsburgs in the seventeenth century, but in the revolutionary era they regained interest in their national culture. In the first half of the nineteenth century they were infected by the new spirit of nationalism and contributed such leaders as Dobrovsky, Šafařik, Palacky, and Havliček. However, here as elsewhere, the revolutions of 1848 brought defeat and retrenchment. As the Austrian government became more decentralized, the Czechs won increasing rights of local self-government, and by 1900 the questions of Czech autonomy and the Czech language had been raised by such leaders as Masaryk and Kramař to issues of European importance. The Slovaks, under the harsher rule of the Magyars, did not fare so well. Small in number and living in the underdeveloped reaches of the Carpathian mountains, the Slovaks lacked the cultural heritage of the Czechs. Nevertheless, under Štúr, Šafařik, and Kollar a Slovak national renaissance

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175 took place, and in the generation before the First World
186 War a bitter struggle was waged against Magyar rule.
563 The exceptional character of Hungary's position was derived both from its traditions of provincial administrative autonomy, which can be traced to the thirteenth century, and from the fact that it had within its boundaries substantial Slavic and Rumanian minorities. Although the Hungarians, or Magyars, were less a minority than a member of the ruling group, they were by no means satisfied with the somewhat ambiguously defined rights of self-government granted when the Austrian Empire was created in 1804. The Hungarian nobility became an important force for reform within the empire and contributed many leaders to the liberal movement. Under the moderate guidance of Széchenyi important reforms were accomplished, but the more radical nationalist program of Kossuth was defeated in 1848-49 by the combined efforts of Austrian and Russian troops. Both the Magyar and the non-Magyar peoples were discriminated against in the period of Austrian centralism that followed, but with the military decline of Austria
[64] the privileges of Hungary were reasserted. The Austro-Hungarian compromise of 1867, negotiated under the wise statesmanship of Déak, gave Hungary a constitutional position equal to that of Austria within the empire and a political influence that was frequently greater despite certain economic disabilities.

Although Croatia enjoyed a degree of autonomy in Hungary after 1868, having in fact occupied the position of a dependency of Hungary intermittently since the eleventh century, it still suffered many limitations. The experience of Napoleonic rule in 1809-13 and the growth of Gaj's nationalist movement under the name of Illyrianism brought Croatian national feeling to the point where it could no longer suffer with equanimity the cultural and political restrictions imposed by the Magyars. The neighboring

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Slovenes, under Austrian rule, developed a national program under the leadership of Kopitar. The government of the German Austrians was certainly milder than that of the Magyars, but in the years before the First World War the Slovenes, like their Croatian cousins, had reasons to feel that their political development was being unjustifiably restricted by Habsburg policies. 175 186 563

The temper and direction of Croatian and Slovene nationalism was increasingly influenced by the successful efforts of the Serbians and the Montenegrins, who were also Serbian in language. Before 1815 both peoples had struck their first blows for independence from Turkish rule. Within the Habsburg empire, an important minority of Serbians was divided between Austrian, Hungarian, and Croatian rule, and was augmented in 1878 when Bosnia-Herzegovina came under the joint administration of Austria and Hungary. This province had a mixed population of Croatians, Serbians, and Mohammedans who were largely of Serbo-Croatian origin. In the eighteenth century significant concessions had been made to the Serbian minority in Hungary, but subsequent events led to a decline in their position and after the compromise of 1867 the situation was ripe for a national protest.

It was nevertheless in the Ottoman empire that the Serbian national movement, inspired by Obradović and Karadžić, found its most active rallying point. The Montenegrins gained recognition of their independence from Turkish rule in 1799, and the Serbians, starting with their first uprising in 1804, took advantage of every weakness in the Ottoman system to wrest increasing political independence and territorial aggrandizement. The years 1817, 1829, 1856, 1878, and 1913 mark the important stages of Serbian growth, and these developments were watched with warm interest by the South Slavs within the Habsburg empire. The question of South Slav national rights now be-

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came linked with the struggle of Austria-Hungary and Russia for hegemony in the Balkans, and the annexation of the Slav-inhabited Ottoman province of Bosnia-Herzegovina by the Habsburgs in 1908 was as important an event in South Slav politics as it was in European diplomacy. In view of Serbian indignation at this Habsburg stroke, it is not surprising that Sarajevo, the capital of Bosnia-Herzegovina, became the site of the incident that detonated the First World War.

In the Turkish territories south of Serbia, the Macedonian Slavs inhabiting the valleys of the Vardar and Struma rivers spoke a language closely related to both Serbian and Bulgarian. During the greater part of the nineteenth century, Serbian efforts were concentrated on the national struggle, and within Turkish territory Macedonia became tied to Bulgaria by administrative and political bonds. The absence of a clearcut Macedonian nationality made this province a source of a bitter rivalry between Serbia and Bulgaria that greatly hampered the national movements of the two contestants in the generation before the First World War.

To the east of Serbia, the Bulgarian national renaissance was somewhat delayed by the greater tenacity of Ottoman rule. By the middle of the century the national movement was nevertheless fully developed in its literary and religious aspects, and in 1878 the Russian-Turkish war brought political independence. Unlike the Serbians, whose territory was expanded gradually through the century, the Bulgarians were given immediate hope of a full realization of their territorial aims when the Russians appeared able in the spring of 1878 to impose their will on Turkey. The revision of these initial peace terms a few months later, as a result of British and Austrian pressure, resulted in a greatly reduced Bulgaria and in a nationalist movement that was stimulated to an unusual degree by this frustration. Despite its preoccupation with territorial aggrandizement, the

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Bulgarian government nevertheless made significant social and political progress in the years before the First World War. 175 186 563

The situation of the Rumanians was similar to that of the Serbians in that one part of their people lived under severe limitations within the Habsburg empire, while across the border in Turkey their co-nationals gained the substance of national independence by the middle of the century. The Rumanians in the Habsburg empire lived primarily under Hungarian rule after the compromise of 1867, and despite certain political concessions they never gained full national recognition. The vigorous struggle led by Vaida-Voevod and Maniu against political and cultural discrimination had a significant impact on the balance of forces within the empire but failed to achieve any concrete success before the First World War. The Rumanians in the Turkish provinces of Moldavia and Wallachia, adjacent to the Russian frontier and overlapping into the neighboring Russian province of Bessarabia, were able, because of this strategic position, to extract important concessions from the Ottoman government. By 1829 they attained autonomy under a Russian protectorate, and the Treaty of Paris in 1856 created the conditions under which they were to gain full independence within a generation. Like Serbia, this free Rumanian state was to exert a powerful attraction upon the discontented Rumanian minority within Austria-Hungary and eventually contributed to the disruption of the empire.

The Albanians fell under Turkish rule in the fifteenth century after the brief but heroic resistance of Skanderbeg, and during the period of Turkish rule they contributed many distinguished personalities to the Ottoman civil service as well as a dynasty to the Turkish province of Egypt. It was not until the neighboring Greeks and Serbians gained their independence and began to covet the lands of the Albanians that an active movement for national liberation developed

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175 among the latter. At the same time the strategic position of
186 Albania with respect to the Adriatic made it an object of
563 imperial interest on the part of Austria-Hungary and Italy. When the Albanian liberation movement got under way, it thus had to guard against a variety of dangers, and finally in 1912 during the Balkan wars it became the last state in Europe to proclaim its independence from Turkish rule.

000 This rapid glance at the national movements in Eastern Europe in the century before the First World War gives particular attention to those peoples that achieved their independence as a result of that conflict. At the same time, important issues of political and religious rights that were associated with the national movements but did not play an equally important role in the political outcome of the First World War have not been discussed. The Germans also had significant national minorities in this region, but their national movement took a different direction. The same may be said of the Jewish minorities that played an important role in the lands inhabited by the Poles, Magyars, and Rumanians. Their position, especially in Russian Poland, was frequently worse than that of other minorities, and their liberation movement took the form of Zionism. It is important to recognize that there were many influential groups in Eastern Europe that for one reason or another preferred increased autonomy within the existing political framework to complete liberation. Indeed, the peoples of this region made important social and economic progress in the century before the First World War, and when independence was won it soon became apparent that some of the nations with the highest level of attainment were those that had remained longest under alien rule.

Much has been said in criticism of the peace settlement in Eastern Europe at the end of the First World War, but it must be allowed that the principle of national self-determination was applied with considerable consistency.

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With certain notable exceptions involving injustice to new German, Magyar, and Ruthenian minorities, the boundaries were drawn about as close to linguistic frontiers as economic and geographic viability permitted. The trouble lay less with the peacemakers than with the principle of national self-determination, especially when applied without the two compensating factors stipulated in Wilson's program: free trade and international organization. The shortcomings of this un-Wilsonian settlement were serious, and cast a long shadow over the next generation. Central among these shortcomings was the exaggerated emphasis on the spirit of exclusive state nationalism, a natural but in the end disastrous consequence of the prolonged concern with national liberation. This spirit, in its postwar manifestations, became an obstacle to the solution of the many boundary disputes, raised protective trade barriers around the new states to the point of self-strangulation, and prevented the organization of a sound system of collective security.

II

Although the hope of the Eastern European leaders for the spiritual and material development of their peoples was placed increasingly in national liberation, it should not be forgotten that in the century after 1815 the peoples of this region made significant gains in the process of modernization. This process, considered as the expansion of human rights within a framework of increasing productivity and distribution in all branches of the economy, developed at an uneven rate in the different parts of Eastern Europe. In the broadest sense, modernization may be considered as the transition from a feudal and agrarian to a democratic and industrialized society, and in this region it involved certain characteristic steps. The most important of these steps were: the growth in human rights, of which the political

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185 were by far the most important; the increase of educational
641 opportunities and general culture; and the development of the economy through agricultural improvement and the expansion of industry and trade.

177 Political freedom in Eastern Europe before the First
642 World War ranged in degree from negligible rights, as those of the Slovaks in Hungary or of the Poles in Russia, to independent states with constitutions of strongly democratic tendencies, as in certain countries of Southeastern Europe. The latter had been influenced by Western models, and made provision for parliamentary government based on wide suffrage. The constitutions of Serbia, Rumania, and Bulgaria, drafted in the latter half of the nineteenth century by native statesmen experienced in the ways of Western constitutionalism, were founded on a genuine faith in democracy. It is true that royal or ministerial authoritarianism and resort to rough methods were not uncommon in these countries, yet the social egalitarianism already prevailing in Serbia and Bulgaria was a strong force for democracy in these coun-
[66] tries. Although illiteracy and political inexperience remained a serious obstacle to orderly government, the generation before the First World War offers significant examples of governments being changed by orderly democratic procedures. Illustrative of the difficulties under which popular elections with universal male suffrage were conducted is the fact that in the Bulgarian election of 1880 only 32 per cent of those eligible to vote cast their ballots, in contrast to about 80 per cent in France and Belgium and 60 per cent in Germany and Italy in the period 1875-80.

177 Hungary had a longer tradition of constitutional govern-
642 ment than did the Balkan states and after 1867 was in most
563 respects an independent state, but its social structure was more conservative and its desire for political democracy less evident. Moreover, the Magyar achievement of political autonomy was marred by the oppressive treatment of the

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non-Magyar minorities. Thus in a parliament that as late as 1910 represented scarcely more than one quarter of the adult male population, the Magyars who numbered just over one half the population, apart from Croatia, had 405 seats to 8 for the Slovak and Rumanian minorities. The Croatians were represented by 40 deputies when mutual Croatian-Hungarian affairs were under discussion. The Czechs and the Poles in the Austrian provinces developed an aristocratic form of local self-government in the latter half of the nineteenth century and contributed distinguished statesmen to the Austrian government, and at least the Czechs gained experience in the techniques and responsibilities of democracy in local government and in unofficial organizations. Similarly in the Polish-inhabited lands of the German and Russian empires, little opportunity was available for gaining experience in electoral and parliamentary procedures.

Educational opportunities in Eastern Europe were steadily improved in the century after 1815 despite frequently hostile government attitudes. The greatest progress in this field was made in the Czech-inhabited provinces of the Habsburg monarchy, where general compulsory education was introduced in 1869. In Hungary popular education was started somewhat later, and illiteracy among the Magyars declined rapidly. The schools, however, were used as a vehicle for the Magyarization of the non-Magyar minorities of Hungary and, as a consequence, the great majority of Slovak and Rumanian children were compelled to get their education in the Magyar language. In Hungary, discounting Croatia, there were four times as many Magyar-language schools as non-Magyar and five times as many Magyar schoolteachers. The Slovenes under Austrian rule and the autonomous Croatians fared a great deal better, while in independent Montenegro, Serbia, Bulgaria, and Rumania, national school systems were developed insofar as meager resources permitted. The Poles fared differently in their three parts. In

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871 Austrian Galicia they underwent a great cultural revival in
563 the latter part of the nineteenth century, and this was the only area in which schools and universities using the Polish language could develop freely. The Polish population in Prussia lived under better educational conditions than did their co-nationals in Russia, but in both countries they were subjected to vigorous programs of denationalization.

871 The state of popular education in Eastern Europe is re-
212 vealed by illiteracy figures for the years 1920-21, before the new independent states had exerted an influence on education. The rate of illiteracy for males and females of school age and over was 7 per cent for Czechoslovakia, 15 per cent for Hungary, and between 30 and 40 per cent for Poland and Yugoslavia. The rate was between 40 and 50 per cent for Rumania and Bulgaria, and in Albania it was much higher. These figures may be compared with illiteracy rates of under 1 per cent for Great Britain and Germany, 6 per cent for the United States, and about 50 per cent for Russia.

[873] It is worth noting that the low level of literacy in most of Eastern Europe did not prevent the development of a high level of culture among educated persons. The universities of Prague, Cracow, and Budapest were the most distinguished among many of high level, and very significant contributions to European culture in the arts and sciences came from this region. The "intelligentsia," as those with higher education and professional skills were referred to, provided both the leadership of the national movements and the statesmen of the nations born at the end of the First World War. As individuals they were the equals of the political leaders of the great powers and included in their number many great Europeans.

566 Agricultural improvement, or the increase in produc-
423 tivity and in the welfare of the population dependent on
178 agriculture, is a complex process. In Eastern Europe, it involved in particular the release of the peasants from feudal

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servitude, the adoption of improved techniques of agricultural production and marketing, and the improvement of the lot of the individual peasant through land reform and the combined efforts of the landlords and the state. Most of European Turkey had never known feudalism in the Western sense, and the peasants of Serbia and Bulgaria emerged early as independent landowners with a sound understanding of their own interests. In many areas of Rumania, Austria-Hungary, and the Polish sections of Germany and Russia, however, the peasants were freed from feudal restrictions only to sink into a deeper misery, sometimes called "neo-serfdom," that stemmed from lack of capital and the resultant economic dependency on the landlords. As a consequence, while independent peasant political parties began to develop among the Czechs and southern Slavs shortly after the turn of the century, the peasants in Russia in 1905 and in Rumania in 1907 resorted to the desperate method of revolution.

The agrarian backwardness that characterized the greater part of Eastern Europe was a great challenge to social and political philosophers, and it was not surprising that the First World War left in its wake attempts at radical solutions by leaders acting in the name of the proletariat or the peasantry. The recommendation of the economists, in the presence of this agrarian poverty and overpopulation, was that agricultural improvement be accompanied by the extension of industry and trade. In the areas where large landowners exercised full political control, this recommendation was not welcomed as the landowners tended to favor fiscal policies that kept the price of grain high and the peasant poor. In other areas, however, important industrial development took place. Thus, the Austrian provinces of Bohemia and Moravia, with their preponderant Czech population, accounted for a little over one half the entire industrial output of Austria-Hungary. This production included coal and

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178 iron as well as consumer goods and benefited by the large
433 market that the empire provided. Significant industrial development also took place in Hungary and in other parts of the empire. Similarly, in Russian Poland important industries were developed, but these suffered from the discriminatory policy of the Russian government and from the lack of communications.

457 Capital for the economic development of this region came
471 chiefly from France until the 1890's, when German and Austrian capital became increasingly active. In Eastern Europe in general, and particularly in the Balkans, loans had as much a political as an economic incentive. Since the credit of Serbia, Bulgaria, and Rumania was poor, the bondholders were able to insist on a variety of controls to assure payment. Although a substantial amount of this capital was used to finance armament and eventually wars, investments of permanent value were also made. Notable among these was the railroad from Vienna to Constantinople, completed in 1888, which with its branches formed the backbone of the transportation system of Southeastern Europe.

III

186 Collective security and economic interdependence, as
631 these terms are understood today, were certainly among the motives of the various plans for regional organization proposed for Eastern Europe in the century before the First World War. Yet the nineteenth century was for Europe an age in which war was the exception rather than the rule and national frontiers were not the barriers to trade and to the movements of peoples that they have since become. Although motives of power politics in the modern sense were always present, regionalism in this era was also concerned

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with the reconciliation of national differences through federal arrangements and with the broader cultural relationships of peoples with a common linguistic heritage. The most readily identifiable of these proposals are those associated with the Panslav movement, the plans for the reorganization of the Habsburg empire, and the federation schemes of the independent Danubian states. None of these projects embraced the entire region of Eastern Europe as it is understood today, but all were inspired by ideas relevant to the problems faced by this region in the twentieth century. /186 631

The many-sided Panslav movement in its modern form can be traced to the new interest in Slavic history and languages shown by German scholars at the end of the eighteenth century. A realization of their cultural heritage was soon aroused among Slavic intellectual leaders, and it exerted a powerful stimulus to nationalism among the Poles, Czechs, and Croatians. Certain Polish thinkers in the first hopeful years after the settlement of 1815 favored Polish-Russian cooperation as a basis for Slavic unity, but in a few decades the Poles were seeking the aid of their fellow Slavs in the West against Russian oppression. The map and statistics of Slavic peoples published by the Slovak scholar, Šafařik, in 1842 were widely greeted as a revelation of Slavic strength, and in the revolutionary year of 1848 a congress was held in Prague to rally the peoples of the Slavic world. This rather haphazard gathering revealed the political weakness of Panslavism, but it produced some noble statements of individual and national rights and strengthened the self-confidence of the Slavic peoples as to their contribution to European civilization. In publicizing the views of the non-Russian Slavic leaders at the height of their liberal phase, the congress thus served a purpose. Although Slavic nationalism took precedence over liberalism in the latter half of the century, the ideas expounded at Prague in 1848 were never entirely forgotten. /186 648

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186 668 648 Much more was heard about Panslavism between 1848 and 1914, but during this period it was used primarily as a weapon of Russian expansionism. The Slavic movement evolved in Russia early in the century under the name of Slavophilism and, with the founding of a Slavic committee in Moscow in 1857, it entered a Panslav phase. In 1867 non-Russian Slavs were summoned to a congress in Moscow in connection with a Slav ethnographic exhibition, and at this meeting it was not difficult to discern the expansionist tendencies of Russian Panslavism. During the Russian-Turkish war of 1876-78, this movement developed into an outburst of emotional imperialism, and much was said of bringing all Slavs together under Russian rule. European power politics prevented an undue extension of Russian influence in 1878, but Panslavism came to serve Russian policy and was directed increasingly against the Habsburg empire. This trend was particularly evident at the third Panslav Congress held in Prague in 1908. Although the Russian constitutional reforms of 1905-06 made a favorable impression on non-Russian Slavs and brought about some real concessions to the Polish minority, Russian foreign policy never gave up the idea of pushing the Russian frontier to the West. Had the Tsarist regime survived the First World War it would certainly have demanded that large parts of Eastern Europe be annexed or brought into a satellite relationship, and a liberal Russian government might also have favored the Westward expansion of Russian influence.

631 642 The multinational empire of the Habsburgs offered the most challenging problem to the federalists, and the proposals for its constitutional reorganization were varied and ingenious. Of the many ideas arising out of the revolution of 1848, the most comprehensive was the constitution drafted by the freely elected Austrian assembly. After this assembly

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was transferred from revolutionary Vienna in October 1848, 631
it met for four months in the Moravian town of Kremsier and 642
drafted a federal constitution that had the twin virtues of coming from a free assembly and of granting equality to all national groups in the empire. Under this scheme thirty-nine nationally homogeneous districts (*Kreise*) were to be created within the existing crownlands of Austria. The lower chamber of a bicameral parliament was to be elected by universal male suffrage, thus guaranteeing to the different nationalities a voice in national affairs, and the individual districts were to have extensive rights or local self-government. The Kremsier assembly was dissolved before the draft constitution was formally adopted, but many students believe it plotted a course that might have saved the empire had the Germans become reconciled to the fact of their numerical minority.

Two decades of experimentation with various forms of 642
centralism failed to strengthen the empire and, with the 563
Austro-Hungarian compromise of 1867 and the agreement between Hungary and Croatia in the following year, a new era of federalism was inaugurated. The balance established within the empire in 1867, though modified by concessions to the Poles and Czechs in Austria, favored the Magyars to a point that the Slav and Rumanian minorities could not tolerate permanently. In the face of Magyar resistance, constitutional amendment was not practicable before the defeat of the empire in 1918, but many proposals for reform were put forward. The Austrian Social Democrats, for instance, adopted a program in 1899 that called for creation within the empire of autonomous and nationally homogeneous territories with extensive rights of self-government. Nevertheless, their own party split into its several national components before 1914. Other proposals called for the division of the empire into as few as three and as

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642 many as fifteen federated states, and many hoped that re-
563 organization along such lines would draw towards the empire the Slav and Rumanian peoples on its periphery and thus strengthen its international position. None of these proposals had a serious chance of success, however, and when the empire was finally defeated it disintegrated into its national units.

631 The independent states of Southeastern Europe faced
186 problems that were different from those of the Habsburg
648 lands, and their alliance and federation schemes were designed to meet the realities of power politics. Once the grandiose plans of the 1848er's had been forgotten, one of these being a proposal for a federation stretching from Poland to Serbia, new schemes were developed around the vigorous Serbian ruler Prince Michael Obrenović. Several agreements were concluded in the 1860's among the Serbian, Montenegrin, Rumanian, Bulgarian, and Greek national leaders with the aid of Russian diplomacy, but these efforts were soon overshadowed by the Russian-Turkish conflict. In the long run, the territorial rivalries among the Balkan states proved to be the principal obstacle to their cooperation, and even the successful Balkan Alliance that defeated Turkey in 1912 disintegrated within a year into interallied war. What is significant is that the initiative throughout this period lay with the great powers, and the federation and alliance plans that got beyond the drafting stage were in general those backed by Russia or Austria-Hungary. The principal reality in international relations was the search for security on the part of these two powers that drove them to regard expansion into Southeastern Europe as a guarantee against political humiliation and military defeat. However, the balance was too close for either to succeed in this game, and it was left to a world conflict to clear the stage for a new order.

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IV

This brief review of certain key problems of Eastern Europe in the century before the First World War raises many issues familiar to students of current history. If the problem of national liberation was substantially solved by 1920, the solution created about as many difficulties as it settled. The development of events since the First World War demonstrates clearly that nationalism in itself, despite the liberal and idealistic intentions that originally inspired it, has offered only a limited solution to the problems of this region. Much of what it contributed in culture, education, and self-confidence, it took away in international distrust and in self-defeating particularism.

After the First World War economic nationalism, which existed in considerable measure, offset such gains as had resulted from the casting off of the old restrictions. It may be asked whether a good many of the countries of this region could not have prospered better under the old political framework and, in some cases, even whether they have been as well off as they were before the war. Moreover, if one compares the decades of strife since the war with the century of relative peace that preceded it, one is tempted to ask whether the great effort to reorganize Eastern Europe on a national basis did not in fact retard the process of modernization and jeopardize the regional security of these peoples.

Yet it would be a mistake to conclude from these difficulties that a solution attempted along entirely different lines would have met with success. Since the ruling dynasties refused to grant political rights to their minorities, the struggle for national self-determination was an essential step in the process of transition from a relatively simple agrarian society to one that offered the great opportunities and high

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000 standards of European civilization. The program suggested by Wilson in 1918 provided for national self-determination together with free trade and international organization. The program that was actually implemented ignored the latter two provisions and must indeed be considered a failure of liberal leadership.

This failure, so apparent when the Nazis overran Eastern Europe after 1938, led many persons to believe that Communism offered a simpler and sounder solution to the problems of this region. They envisaged an agricultural system organized in collective farms, an industry stimulated annually by large state investments wisely allocated, a distribution of commodities justly administered on the basis of work and need, and a regional organization of states based on the good will of brotherly comrades and administered by the wisdom of the big brother in the East. This program has now been implemented, and it has exhibited many shortcomings. It may indeed have succeeded in increasing industrial production, especially in products required for the Soviet economy, but the costs of this accomplishment in living standards and in political freedom have been exorbitant. The Communist regimes have returned the peoples of this region to a system of imperial exploitation much harsher than anything they knew before the First World War, and have brought them regional security only at the price of slavery.

The challenge faced by Eastern European leaders today is to reconstruct for this region a liberal and democratic program that will avoid the mistakes of the past and place emphasis on the freedom and opportunities of the individual rather than on the exclusive security of the national state. It is a sad fact that today consideration of such a program plays so small a part in the work of the national committees formed by exiled statesmen from Eastern Europe and in the official and unofficial broadcasts beamed to the peoples of this region. The reorganization of land tenure

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and the improvement of agricultural methods; the development of industry along lines best suited to available raw materials and markets; the reduction of the barriers that now exist to the movement of trade, peoples, and ideas; the recasting of political institutions along lines as democratic as is justified by the political maturity of the various countries; and, perhaps most important of all, the creation of supranational organs of government within the region or within Europe as a whole—these and related problems are given little consideration today by those who claim to be interested in the welfare of this region. The future of Eastern Europe lies not with the strong and vociferous but with those, whether at home or abroad, who can formulate the wisest answers to the complex challenge of this region.

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2 The Liberal Tradition

HUBERT RIPKA

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This essay will endeavor to show that liberalism has its own tradition in the countries of Eastern Europe and that the liberal regimes set up in this area succumbed not so much to internal factors as to the unfavorable international situation. In other words, the development of liberalism in this region between the two world wars was a part of the course of liberal democracy in Europe as a whole.

I

829

It is necessary first to define liberalism. This force will not be interpreted here as a political ideology of certain political parties or social classes. Although, historically speaking, liberalism has been identified most often with the so-called middle classes, its ideology has a far wider basis. It aims above and beyond the demands of one social class to a political and social order of all society which is based on liberty, equality, and the reign of law. It is in this sense that liberalism will be dealt with in this essay.

It would be impossible to understand the liberalism of any one country if it were discussed only in terms of the

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political parties which profess liberalism or which, more precisely, adopt only those elements of liberalism which further their own political aims. Regarded in this light, England, where the Liberal Party is the weakest among the principal political parties, would not be a liberal country. Similarly, in France, Italy, and Belgium, liberalism has not been limited to the so-called liberal parties. The situation was the same in the countries of Eastern Europe. 829

In Czechoslovakia there were only two liberal parties (the National Democrats and the National Socialists), but liberal ideology greatly influenced the Agrarian Party, the Social Democrats and, to a large extent, the Czech Catholics. In Poland, the National Democratic Party was, at first, the only party to accept any of the liberal principles (it endorsed particularly economic liberalism), but the Polish Agrarian and Socialist parties were influenced strongly by liberalism. In Hungary, the Liberal Party was small and without any influence. A similar situation prevailed in Bulgaria, but liberal aspirations for greater freedom and for more civil rights were not limited to members of the Liberal Party. In Rumania, the Liberal Party was very strong, but it was hardly more "liberal" than Maniu's National Peasant Party. In Yugoslavia, the Radicals and the Democrats who found their support chiefly among the Serbians and the Slovene liberals stood for certain principles of political and economic liberalism, but it is a recognized fact that the Croatian and Serbian Agrarians, as well as the Radicals and the Democrats, fought in the name of liberal democracy against dictatorship. In Bulgaria, the Agrarians of Stambolisky represented a party devoted to democratic principles. 665 829

The position and influence of liberalism in Eastern Europe is best illustrated by T. G. Masaryk. His own political party was numerically insignificant but Masaryk, as the most prominent liberal in this region, influenced not only the

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665 Czechs and the Slovaks, but also neighboring peoples, par-
829 ticularly the Yugoslavs. A large proportion of the Croatian, Serbian, and Slovene politicians from the Yugoslav provinces that had formerly formed a part of Austria-Hungary were educated before the First World War in the school of Masaryk's liberal thought. Among these men was Stjepan Radić, who later was to become leader of the Croatian Peasant Party.

829 Liberalism in Eastern Europe, and this is true for other
565 countries as well, cannot be identified only with the so-called middle classes or with supporters of the free enterprise system. The middle classes, with the exception of those in Czechoslovakia and Austria, were not numerically or economically strong or influential. The capitalistic economic order was strongly defended, not only by the liberals, but by pronounced conservatives among whom were those who began to support authoritarian regimes in the 'thirties. The peasants, insofar as they did not adhere politically to parties of the conservative right, were usually very devoted and often even radical supporters of democracy. Similarly, a great number of socialistically oriented workers and intelligentsia, in supporting political democracy, were influenced by ideas of liberalism. Many liberals, usually those belonging to the intelligentsia, were sympathetic to socialistic tendencies. This socialistically-minded liberalism, which had its counterpart in France among the Radical Socialists or the so-called "Independent" Socialists, and in Britain among the British Fabians, was best represented in Czechoslovakia by T. G. Masaryk and his disciple, Eduard Beneš. Both men, although they rejected Marxism, accepted many ideas of the socialistic school of thought. This liberal socialistic orientation was the basis of the Czechoslovakian party of National Socialists whose adherents were chiefly recruited from the small bourgeoisie, the intelligentsia, and the workers. The National Socialists endeavored to combine liberal-

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ism with socialism, in the belief that political democracy should be accompanied by "economic democracy." 829 565

The importance and influence of liberalism in this region did not, therefore, rest with any particular political parties or social groupings which gave themselves the liberal label or which explicitly professed liberal principles. The influence of liberalism lay in the force of the liberal ideology which exercised influence on the whole national community.

It is often held today, due to the conception of liberalism held in Anglo-Saxon countries and, to some extent, in other countries of Western Europe, that the influence of liberalism in the Eastern European countries was not of great importance. This is accounted for by a theory that the so-called middle classes were weak and that the popular masses, predominantly peasant, had a low social and cultural standing. Czechoslovakia is cited as an example to support this analysis. It is said that Czechoslovakia was able to maintain her democracy because she had an influential and prosperous middle class and because the cultural level of her population was approximately the same as the cultural level of the West. There is no doubt that a weak middle class and a low social standard among the popular masses were serious handicaps to the development of liberal democracy in the agricultural countries of this region. Liberal democracy required, from the social and economic points of view, not uniformity and equalization, but a diversified and well-balanced social structure and an economy with a fair degree of balance between industry and agriculture. Above all, liberal democracy required the "liberal spirit," a combination of a desire for freedom, a devotion to political and social rights, and an eagerness for justice. The existence of liberal democracy, therefore, cannot be defined in terms of social and economic requirements alone. 829 565 511

In support of this premise, several examples can be cited. Before the First World War, in the small Serbia of King 829 511

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829 Peter I, there was much more freedom, in spite of the social
571 and cultural backwardness of the people, than there had been under the dictatorship of the Crown in the '30's when the economic and social level of the country was much higher than in prewar years. It is sufficient to compare the liberal Radical, Nikola Pašić, with the unprincipled opportunist Milan Stojadinović (whom Ciano praised as a "true fascist") to realize that the betterment of economic conditions did not prevent the disintegration of democracy in Yugoslavia. Between the two world wars, Poland progressed economically and made great strides in industrialization, yet from 1926 on she was subjected to the semidictatorship of Pilsudski.

[433] In Hungary, after the First World War, the economic situation was not much better than it was in Austria. Yet, in spite of both this and the reactionary regime of Admiral Horthy in Budapest, some vestiges of liberalism survived even the Second World War. In Austria, in spite of the substantial influence exercised in Vienna by the Social Democrats and by the liberal bourgeoisie, a semidictatorial regime was installed in 1934. Germany's economic and social structure was more advanced than that of Czechoslovakia. The grave economic crisis of the '30's caused wide unemployment in both these countries, yet the small Czechoslovakian Republic remained faithful to liberal democracy until she fell before Nazi aggression, while in Germany Hitler was already in power in 1933.

829 These examples are surely sufficient to show that the strength or weakness of liberalism in Eastern Europe did not depend solely, or even mostly, upon economic and social conditions. These were certainly very important factors, but of more importance were the psychological climate and the political tradition within each individual nation. Czechoslovakia remained democratic until her fall because, ever since the Hussite revolution in the fifteenth century, the substantial majority of both Czechs and Slovaks had been

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"liberal-minded" even if they had not expressed this through formal Liberal parties. In Hungary, there was a long tradition of liberalism which had been inspired by the Golden Bull of 1222 and which, in the penetrating words of the British historian, Hugh Seton-Watson, maintained "within the Hungarian ruling class . . . a kind of Whiggish liberalism which permitted a measure of intellectual freedom." This explains why Hungary was able to preserve some, if not all, of her parliamentary formalities. On the other hand, in Poland and, to a great extent, in the Balkan countries, the tradition of nationalism pushed liberal tendencies into the background. Austria, whose desire for independence was not sufficiently strong, became a victim of strong pressures exercised by both her fascist neighbors.

In addition to special political conditions in the individual Eastern European countries, international influences and a combination of outside forces greatly affected the development of liberalism in this region. It should be remembered that the prospects for liberalism were favorable only as long as Western democracies exercised leadership in Europe and that the decline of liberalism was in direct proportion to the rise of fascism in certain important European countries. The decline of liberal democracy in Eastern Europe was, therefore, a reflection of the general crisis of liberalism in the whole of Europe.

II

Liberalism in Eastern Europe was related, historically and ideologically, to liberalism in the West, although each had developed certain distinctive features.

The liberals of Eastern Europe, like those of the West, saw as the fulfillment of the political ideals of liberalism a democratic regime based on free elections and on the principle of checks and balances whose purpose is to keep the

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829 government under the control of parliament and of the free electorate. They hoped for a regime which would guarantee all the classical civil rights and which would preserve the independence of the courts. To achieve this, these liberals, regardless of political party, fought against authoritarian tendencies and dictatorial regimes.

829 471 Liberals in Eastern Europe, unlike those in the West, were not ardent supporters of the type of economic liberalism that is based on competition in a free market and admits only the least degree of state control. These liberals had in common with the supporters of the capitalist system a belief in the economic and social advantages of the principle of private ownership, but only a few among them had a clear-cut conception of the free enterprise system with its economic and social consequences, as it is accepted in the United States or in other Western countries. This difference of conception between Western and Eastern European liberals can be explained easily. In Eastern Europe, modern capitalistic enterprises (in this area predominantly agricultural), and particularly large-sized enterprises, were in an early stage of development. They were somewhat further developed in Czechoslovakia and Austria, and in the '30's began to attain some stature in Poland and Hungary. Under these circumstances and in the face of the limited resources of individual private entrepreneurs, it is understandable that the Eastern European liberals, desiring the industrialization of their countries, sought state support. They asked protection from the state in the form of high customs tariffs, financial subsidies, and currency, credit, and other protective measures. Thus, from an economic point of view, they were influenced far more by the German than by the Western European attitude. German liberalism, guided by the protectionist theories of G. F. List and by Bismarckian power politics, definitely favored building capitalism with the direct and permanent assistance of the state.

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Contrary to many Germans, Eastern European liberals remained true to political democracy but, in the field of economic policy, they were in accord with German views, giving preference to state interference and support rather than to free competition and individual initiative. 829 471

Differences in the economic development of Western Europe and the United States, on the one hand, and of Germany and Eastern Europe, on the other hand, influenced the thinking of socialists in these countries and account for the differences in their outlook and their method of political action. While Western socialists sought to realize their aims by their own concerted self-help action (in Anglo-Saxon countries and Scandinavia particularly through trade unionism and political influence exercised in parliaments, in Latin countries either through revolution or political infiltration of public institutions), German and Eastern European socialists tended more and more towards economic and political statism. Moreover, the agrarians of Eastern Europe, like the liberals, socialists, and Christian (Catholic) Democrats, also asked for state action to further their economic and social aims. This tendency to look towards the state for aid in economic matters explains why many liberals, particularly in Czechoslovakia, favored vast social reforms benefiting the working class. It is also worth mentioning that the representatives of the liberal-minded bourgeoisie in Czechoslovakia were always in favor of the highly progressive social legislation enacted in that country.

The tendency to ask the state for support in economic matters was a characteristic of the nationalism of Eastern European liberals. On the whole, however, the nationalism of liberals and of many others in this region was no more intense than the nationalism of similar groups in any of the Western countries, and among the liberals themselves there were great differences in interpreting liberalism. 186

In Eastern Europe, liberalism was more closely connected

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186 with nationalism than it was in the West. This can be attributed chiefly to the fact that beginning with the nineteenth century national liberation found most of its protagonists and representatives among the liberal-minded intellectuals and statesmen. Consequently, almost all the liberals of this region appear as "national liberals." The fusing of liberalism and nationalism continued even after the First World War, chiefly because the Eastern European nations felt that they were endangered by the imperialistic designs of Germany, Italy, and Russia. The nations of this region, faced with such a danger, sought the protection of one or another of the European powers.

The historical development of these nations from the nineteenth century on, their geographic location, their special interests and dissimilar historical traditions—all these factors were instrumental in the growth of nationalism, an intense power which greatly influenced all the contemporary political trends (liberal, socialistic, agrarian, Catholic, etc.). Although nationalism impeded efforts for closer cooperation between the Eastern European nations, it proved to be a powerful force against both Nazi and Soviet imperialism.

It would be a mistake to assume that all Eastern European nationalism was chauvinistic. In this region, as elsewhere, there were two schools of nationalism: one of liberal, tolerant, internationally-minded patriotism; the other, of overbearing, aggressive chauvinism, or provincially limited nationalism. Western influence was predominant in the first trend; German and, to some extent, Russian in the second.

The Eastern European liberals, like the other political groups, were divided between these two trends. As a striking example, one can cite the ideological and political differences between two Czechoslovakian liberals: Thomas G. Masaryk and Karel Kramář. Masaryk, who of all the Eastern Europeans was the most deeply imbued with Western

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liberalism, was opposed from the start to chauvinistic nationalism. All his life he advocated and pursued, to use his own expression, "European and world politics." He attempted to reach an agreement with Germany as to the problem of the German minority within Czechoslovakia and to solve other nationality problems to the satisfaction of all. He hoped that Czechoslovakia would become another Switzerland. 186

Kramář, on the other hand, linked Czechoslovakian national interests with Tsarist Russia. He persistently defended the concept of Czechoslovakia as a "national state" in which the Czechoslovakians would be the leading people and minorities would be delegated to a secondary position. His policy was openly anti-German. He envisaged, in the terms of romantic Pan-Slavism, a great Slav federation headed by a "democratic Russia." Viewing the League of Nations and all international institutions with skepticism, he warned the nation to rely on its own strength. Basically, Kramář's theories were defensive. In practice, they would have served as protection against German imperialism.

A similar difference existed in Rumania between the Bratianu brothers, the leaders of the Liberal Party, and Titulescu, the famous Rumanian Minister of Foreign Affairs. Titulescu did not belong to any political party, but his philosophy was definitely liberal. Politically, the Bratianu brothers were liberals in the sense that they defended parliamentary freedom against constitutional monarchy and opposed autocratic ambitions of the prince, later King Carol. Economically, they linked liberalism with the interests of the commercial and banking class. They strove to industrialize the country but, at the same time, they barred foreign capital. In this regard, their economic nationalism was most apparent. 648 186 665

Titulescu, unlike the Bratianu brothers, combined his

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648 genuine patriotism with sincere internationalism. He was
186 an ardent supporter of the League of Nations. He advocated
665 the principle of collective security. He tried to establish better relations with Soviet Russia. It was he who coined the phrase, "the spiritualization of boundaries." However, he was unable to win sufficient following in the ruling circles, and King Carol, who opposed his broad-minded policy, forced him to resign in 1936.

186 Poland serves as a clear example of the dominance of
665 nationalism over other political and social trends. In the nineteenth century liberalism attracted many of the Poles who were living in exile, especially those in France. Polish liberals worked enthusiastically with Mazzini in the "Young Europe" movement, and many of them took part unselfishly in the revolution of 1848. However, the great national struggle for the liberation and unification of Poland came to assume first place in the interests of all Polish patriots. Roman Dmowski, a prominent Polish statesman, had been devoted to the principles of liberalism in his youth but, during the national political struggle, he became a passionate nationalist of very conservative leanings. After the re-establishment of Polish independence, liberalism strongly influenced certain small Polish groups, for instance the Democratic and Labor Parties. In the latter, the Catholic influence was strongly felt. Ignace Paderewski, the famous pianist, who contributed greatly to the liberation of Poland in the First World War, belonged to the liberals.

The absence of a pronounced liberal trend and tradition in Poland was undoubtedly one of the reasons why Polish democracy, despite the liberal constitution of 1921, succumbed to the nationalistic pressure of Marshal Pilsudski, who established a semidictatorial regime in 1926 which lasted until the fall of Poland in 1939. The principal defenders of Polish democracy were the Agrarian Party, the Socialists, and the Christian Democrats. Naturally, nation-

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alism was strong even in these parties. It must be remembered that even the ardor of Polish Catholicism had its roots in Polish nationalism: Catholicism was a defense against the Eastern Orthodox Russians as well as against the Protestant Prussians. 186 665

The Polish National Democratic Party, which represented the middle class and the intelligentsia, became chauvinistic and violently antisemitic in spite of its original liberal aspirations. It fought against Pilsudski's dictatorship more for reasons of power politics than for ideological reasons. From 1930 on, this party inclined, and especially its younger members, more and more towards fascism. Nationalism suppressed the liberal elements of this party almost entirely.

In Poland, where nationalism was more extreme than in the other Eastern European countries, liberalism was limited mostly to certain intellectual groups. One important group had its headquarters at the University of Cracow, with Professor Estreicher as its leader. Liberalism influenced the agrarians and socialists of Poland inasmuch as these groups much preferred democracy to dictatorship.

The case of Poland brings to mind very forcibly a factor which as a rule is not given its due: that is, the dependence of the nations of Eastern Europe upon the other nations of Europe and the rest of the world. The freedom of these nations is dependent on the freedom of all other European nations, including Russia.

It can be said, therefore, that liberalism can prosper in these countries only if the climate of Europe is favorable. As soon as a regime of any of the big powers on the European continent tends towards aggressive expansionism or becomes totalitarian, by definition imperialistic, the liberty of all European nations, great and small, is threatened, and liberalism finds itself in mortal danger.

History clearly proves the accuracy of this analysis. In 000

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829 History clearly proves the accuracy of this analysis. In the second half of the nineteenth century, a "liberal" climate prevailed in Europe. At that time liberalism penetrated even into Tsarist Russia. The belief that Russia has an inherent tendency toward despotism and slavery leads one to forget that liberal ideas found excellent propagandists and defenders there; to mention but a few: Radishchev, Pestel, Herzen, Soloviev, Milyukov, Chernov, and the Decembrists. In the nineteenth century, liberal tendencies were growing in strength and influence in Eastern Europe and contributed considerably to the struggle for national liberation. The victory of the liberal Western democracies in 1918 led to the liberal democratization of almost all Eastern Europe.

III

668 The obstacles faced by liberalism in Eastern Europe in-
642 cluded both the threat of Communist, and later of fascist and Nazi, interference and the efforts of domestic authoritarian groups that saw in dictatorship the answer to the problems of this region. In spite of these highly unfavorable circumstances, democratic liberalism maintained itself even when dictatorial governments were formed. A courageous opposition fought these regimes without fearing the persecution to which it was exposed. It is easy to prove that Pilsudski and, later, Beck in Poland, Horthy in Hungary, Carol in Rumania, Boris in Bulgaria, Alexander and Paul in Yugoslavia, and Dolfuss and Schuschnigg in Austria, were opposed by democratic forces stronger than, or at least as strong as, the forces which Hitler, Mussolini, and Stalin were meeting in their respective countries. In Germany and Russia and, to a large extent, in Italy, the dictatorial regimes were totalitarian and therefore opposition was almost impossible. But the fact that in Eastern Europe only limited dictatorships were established shows that antiliberal, antidemocratic trends were hampered by the opposition of democratic forces. In

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this great struggle, many liberals, especially in Yugoslavia, 668
Rumania, and Austria, were lured into the services of dic- 642
tatorial regimes, and thus doomed themselves to failure.

It would be unjust to discount the actions of either Constantin Bratianu or Titulescu because of the opportunist Tatarescu who placed himself at the disposal of King Carol, or to forget the courageous Ion Duca who, for his uncompromising liberal principles, was assassinated in 1933 by the fascist terrorists of the Iron Guard. In Yugoslavia, there were a number of radicals and democrats enlisted in the service of the royal dictatorship. They thus distinctly deviated from the radical democratic tradition which, especially before the First World War, was represented by Nikola Pašić, famous for his revolutionary struggle against the dictatorial desires of the Obrenović rulers. Pašić was influenced not only by Western liberalism, in which the democratic Serbian King Peter I was educated, but by the revolutionism of the Russian Populists. The influence of the Russian revolutionaries was also strong in Bulgaria, especially in her agrarian movement. For some of those who associated with King Alexander's dictatorship, Foreign Minister Marinković for instance, there may have been extenuating circumstances, for those men were led by fear of the decomposition of Yugoslavia.

Nevertheless, as in Rumania, some earnest liberals in Yugoslavia courageously opposed the royal dictatorship. Because of Stoyadinović, who put a shame on the liberal tradition of the Radical Party, one must not forget Aca Stanojević, a friend of Pašić, or Miša Trifunović who did not fear imprisonment and refused any collaboration with the dictatorship. In the opposition remained also Slobodan Jovanović, an influential professor of Belgrade University, who in the Second World War became the Premier of the Yugoslavian government in London. Against the royal dictatorship were also leaders of the Democratic Party: Ljuba

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668 Davidović and Božidar Vlajić among the Serbians, Večeslav
642 Vilder, a disciple of Masaryk, among the Croatians, and Milan Grol among the Slovenes. The famous Svetozar Pribičević distinguished himself for his courageous opposition to the Alexander dictatorship; he may be counted justly among the founders of Yugoslavia. He also was under Masaryk's influence, and it was through Masaryk's personal intervention with King Alexander that the interned Pribičević was allowed to go into exile. Pribičević gave an example to many others by repudiating his devotion to the Karadjordjević dynasty and becoming a radical republican. The royal dictatorship was opposed also by the Croatian Peasant Party, headed by Vladko Maček, and by the Serbian Agrarian Party, headed by Dragoljub Jovanović. The democratic opposition to the royal dictatorship has been cited in order to point out that when Titoist communism calls itself an "organic" result of the Yugoslav internal development, it does not make any allowance for the strong liberal tradition of Yugoslavia. In Hungary, C. Rassay was the most distinguished defender of liberalism.

The Bulgarian liberals played a prominent role in their country before the First World War but, in compromising with King Ferdinand, they were partly responsible for the unfortunate policies that led to the defeat of 1918. In the period between the two wars they were pushed into the background by nationalists and reactionaries such as Tsankov. Nevertheless, some Bulgarian liberals tried to preserve their own tradition. In 1924 Genadiev paid for his courageous devotion to liberal ideas with his life. Through the efforts of Malinov and Mušanov, the democratic regime was resumed at the beginning of the 'thirties, but the military *coup d'état* in 1934 installed a "progressive dictatorship." King Boris took advantage of this in order to establish his own dictatorship. The opposition of the liberals to this dictatorship was

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weak in comparison with that of the Agrarian Party which still followed Stambolisky's tradition. 668 642

The Agrarian and the Socialist parties and some Catholics, as well as the liberals, carried on the struggle against dictatorship in Bulgaria, Rumania, Poland, and Hungary. They fought for real democracy in the sense of the best liberal tradition. In Austria the Social Democrats were the main force opposing clerical fascism. It is interesting that in Hungary the conservative aristocrats opposed fascist trends. Szálasi, who led the important Arrow-Cross movement, was the most conspicuous of these men. Count Bethlen and Count Teleki also opposed the Nazi pressure, and the latter's efforts were climaxed by his symbolic suicide in 1941.

The opposition to dictatorship and to fascism or Nazism was motivated differently in the individual Eastern European countries and was carried on by different political parties. Notwithstanding these differences, the original inspiration to opposition lay in two main ideas: a longing for freedom and a patriotic devotion to national independence. Pure democratic liberalism is the expression of these two ideas, both of which prove convincingly that the love of freedom was deeply rooted in these countries. Internal antiliberal forces alone would not have been able to crush democratic aspirations. Whenever the elections were more liberal than usual, for instance, in Rumania in 1928 or in Bulgaria in 1931, the democratic parties won. In Poland, Pilsudski's followers, who represented only a small minority of the nation, were well aware that the only means by which they could maintain their regime was political terror. In spite of the pressure of the reactionaries and the influence of fascists and Nazis, the remnants of liberalism in Hungary survived until nearly the end of the Second World War. In view of these facts, it is clear that the liberal democratic forces could have mastered internal difficulties successfully 186 668 829

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186 668 829 had they not been broken or dangerously weakened by the foreign forces of fascism and Communism.

Czechoslovakia bears witness to this thesis. In Czechoslovakia, as in the other countries, there existed antiliberal, reactionary, nationalist, and fascist trends which attracted certain of the bourgeoisie and rich farmers. These forces were held in check by the democratic thought and genuine patriotism of a great majority of the nation, including the so-called middle classes and the intelligentsia. Nearly everybody followed the principles of the great democrat, Masaryk. Conditions were more favorable to democratic liberalism in Czechoslovakia than in the other Eastern European countries, because this nation was highly industrialized, even in agriculture, because her social structure was happily balanced between industry, agriculture, and bureaucracy, or intelligentsia, and because the cultural level of her people was high. The middle classes, strong in numbers and in social value, and the progressive farmers, who owned middle-sized farms, were reliable support for the liberal democratic regime. The Social Democratic Party, headed by Hampl, Bechyně, Meissner, and Dérer, was influenced spiritually far more by Masaryk than by Marx. The Agrarian Party had liberal-minded leaders among whom Antonín Švehla and Milan Hodža proved to have statesmen's abilities. The Catholic Party, under the wise leadership of the great patriot Jan Šrámek, was progressive in social matters. In Slovakia the process of democratization met with greater difficulties. Slovakia, because of its agrarian structure, resembled the other Eastern European countries more than it did the industrialized Bohemia. However, the transformation of Slovakia into a democratically functioning part of Czechoslovakia proves that other Eastern European countries could have developed in a similar way had democracy been given enough time to exercise its influence upon them.

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It is certainly to the credit of Czechoslovakia that she

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continually improved her democratic regime during the 829
twenty years of her existence and that her democracy was 178
destroyed only by an attack from without by Nazi Germany. Nevertheless, the other countries of Eastern Europe, economically, socially, and culturally less progressive, cannot be blamed if, in the antiliberal climate of the '30's, they were unable to develop into genuine democracies. The people in these countries did not long less for freedom and for social progress than did the people in other parts of Europe or on other continents. If the unremitting struggle for freedom of the Eastern European countries and their difficult geographic position were kept in mind, the liberal striving of these countries and their aptitude for democratic development would be judged more favorably than is sometimes the case.

In Germany, which was probably economically and technically the most highly developed country on the European continent and which had a high cultural and social level, liberalism was no more influential than in the agrarian countries of Eastern Europe. It was certainly infinitely weaker than in Czechoslovakia. In Germany and in Italy, democracy did not succumb to foreign, but to internal, antiliberal forces. In Russia, liberalism undoubtedly was far weaker than in Eastern Europe.

IV

The development of liberalism in Eastern Europe in the 829
period between the two wars shows clearly that this force was far stronger there than in Germany, Italy, or Russia, and that it attained real success in Czechoslovakia. There were conditions in Eastern Europe that favored the development of liberalism into an influential spiritual, political, and social movement. The most promising forces in this regard were the striving of these nations for freedom

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829 and social progress and their genuine patriotism. The success of Czechoslovakian democracy gave substance to the hope that other countries in Eastern Europe would gradually become democratized. Development in this direction, however, was suddenly halted by the European crisis and by the rise of totalitarian dictatorships in the three great neighbors of the small nations of Eastern Europe. In 1938 the expansion of aggressive Nazism destroyed the Czechoslovakian democracy which, until then, had been an isolated island of liberalism east of the Rhine.

This essay has demonstrated that liberalism has its own tradition in Eastern Europe and that, after the liberation of these countries, it will surely play an even more important role than it did before. Liberalism is not a thing of the past. It is the most dynamic force in the present struggle for the liberation of man and for a community of nations based on the reign of law and mutual service. The greatness of liberalism, as Masaryk maintained, lies in its effort to make Jesus, and not Caesar, rule the world.

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3 Authoritarian Forms of Government Between the Wars

ARNOLD J. ZURCHER

I

Leading political philosophers of the mid-nineteenth century occasionally looked askance at representative government and at what appeared to be the inevitability of its development into the prevailing form of political expression. Its association with the democratic franchise gave thinkers like John Stuart Mill an occasional qualm; that association caused him, and others like him, to cast about for such qualifications of the franchise and of representative parliaments as would insure the integrity of the intellectual minority both in the institutional expression of the public voice and in the treatment accorded to nonconformist opinion. Others cast an apprehensive eye toward the growth of representative institutions because of the stimulus they allegedly gave to the use of the ballot by men without property or other permanent stake in the community or without civic responsibility or intellectual attainment that might qualify them to be a part of the policy-forming tribunals of the community.

By and large, however, the advance of representative institutions and the concomitant of universal suffrage were regarded with equanimity and were usually hailed with en-

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thusiasm. For most observers such institutions heralded an advance in civilization; they were an indication of the general increase in civic capacity and in knowledge. These advances represented one step in the inevitable progress toward the betterment of mankind which some of the more optimistic philosophers of the French Revolutionary period—men like Condorcet—had suggested would prevail; once liberty, equality, and fraternity had become the triple pillars of social morality. Even Mill, hesitant as he was to accept full manhood suffrage and the quantitative implications of majority rule, considered the growing acceptance of universal suffrage and of democratic representative institutions as an eventual gain for mankind. Their challenge to civic responsibility, so he felt, would raise the level of education and citizenship and would improve the moral capacity of the average citizen. Such views were shared by those of Mill's nineteenth-century predecessors who were apologists for representative institutions, by Jefferson, Paine, and many of their equally illustrious contemporaries who inaugurated the nineteenth-century political enlightenment. Intrinsically, and because of their effect upon human capacity and moral stature, representative institutions seemed a necessary corollary of the law of progress with which these thinkers premised their interpretation of history.

But events of the past four decades have hardly sustained the optimism inherent in such views of man's political future. Belief in civic perfectability, thought to inhere in representative institutions, has suffered rude jolts as one state after another has revealed a fatal weakness in its representative bastions. Regimes have arisen, over a large portion of the earth, which deny the need of their own legitimation by the uncoerced consent of the governed. The dictatorial usurpers have not merely monopolized power and authority but, with a degree of cynicism unmatched even in the chronicles of Machiavelli, they either have flaunted every symbol

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and institution of representative democracy or have deliberately perverted these symbols and institutions. Aided by the centripetal implications of modern technology, they have monopolized all avenues of information and communication and conscripted every form of cultural, educational, or economic organization; hence, these contemporary dictatorial regimes, in contrast to those of former times or to the regimes established by Napoleon, are all-embracing in form and their dictatorship can best be described by the adjective, "total."

Since the First World War, totalitarian dictatorships have reared their unlovely forms so frequently that it might well be asked if they are this century's peculiar contribution to the art of government. Such a suggestion may be unduly pessimistic; at the same time, it can hardly be denied that the cancerous growth of totalitarian dictatorship in the twentieth century appears to have made an illusion out of the previous century's belief in progress. Our experience seems to be a reaffirmation of the cyclical interpretation of political development which was the philosophical premise of Polybius and of the apologists of republican Rome. In our generation, at least, such a premise seems somewhat more realistic than the concept of the onward march of history towards ever more moral and more scientific forms of political society. Somewhere in our thinking, it seems, we must allow for the possibility of reaction.

II

Historians, philosophers, and perhaps even statisticians, may eventually supply definitive explanations of this century's rude rejection of the ideas of progress associated with representative institutions and of its relative tolerance of totalitarianism. At this stage, however, any explanation of this phenomenon can be only tentative. One current explana-

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000tion attributes the decline of free institutions and the rise of dictatorships to causes which are largely impersonal in nature. This is the rather popular thesis that the total state is the logical culmination of economic collectivism and the consequent decay of the free-market economy. Applying a somewhat Marxian-like corollary, this thesis suggests that economic freedom, meaning essentially a *laissez faire* economy, is the basic determinant of every other freedom; hence, as governmental interventionism has grown, we have moved, so it is contended, toward the conscription of every other freedom and the denial of free government itself.

Such a thesis, however, is only superficially plausible. Whatever affinity collectivism may have for totalitarian dictatorship—and there can be no doubt that there is an affinity and a dangerous one—there is little evidence to support the view that our contemporary total dictatorships came into being because of the decline of a free-market economy. The record appears to show that fascist and Communist dictatorships alike came into existence because of the overt action of a monopolistically-minded minority who carried out a *coup d'état* and, having thereby gained control of the traditional sources and institutions of political power, proceeded to oust all other groups. To be sure, economic freedom disappeared in each of these dictatorial regimes, and rather promptly too; but it disappeared after the reins of government had been seized and the ensuing monopoly of political power could be used as means for overcoming the free economy. The idea that an established economy, regulated and operated by the government, makes the destruction of political freedom inevitable and leads directly to a public monopoly of all forms of organized social life finds no substantiation in the history of contemporary dictatorship. In other words, *no* country, formerly free, has become a total dictatorship as a result of what is popularly known as "creeping socialism."

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In the case of Eastern Europe, authoritarian forms of 642
government were generally established as a result of a *coup d'état* carried out by groups already possessing power. In some cases, royal authority provided the basis for the seizure of power. Thus in the modified authoritarian regime set up in Hungary in 1920, Admiral Horthy served as regent on the vacant Habsburg throne, while in Yugoslavia and Rumania, royal authority was implemented by the existing bureaucracy and military establishment. In Bulgaria, on the other hand, the *coups* of 1923 and 1934 were carried out by military and civilian leaders without royal authority and only in 1935 was King Boris able to gain control of the government. The regimes of Zogu in Albania and Pilsudski in Poland were likewise the result of civil-military collaboration, and the former did not proclaim himself king as Zog I until he had held power for three years.

Thus the *coups* in these nations were largely the actions of court camarilla or military cliques. They reflected relative inexperience with the techniques of parliamentary government and weak social structures. In part, they may also be attributed to the immense difficulties experienced by political leaders in their attempts to solve the complex domestic and international problems which existed in these states after the First World War. In any case, the resulting authoritarian regimes were essentially of the limited type; they did not, at least at the outset, approximate the totalitarian thoroughness of the succeeding dictatorships which came with the advance of fascist or Communist power.

In the expansion of totalitarian control, war and external aggrandizement have also played their parts; that is, whenever a dictatorial system managed to entrench itself in a major center of national power, it immediately sought to create an area of satellite states. Upon these the dictatorial system was imposed in order that they might be the more effectively controlled. Such was the history of Italian Fascist

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642 and German Nazi imperialism; such, also, is the story of Russian Communist totalitarianism. A whole ring of states in Europe and Asia have lost their independence and have been added to the totalitarian area because Soviet Russia and its instruments have so willed it, and because they have used force and sabotage to achieve it.

III

000 The immediate origins of contemporary dictatorships are thus clearly traditional. Like most tyrannies of the past, our twentieth-century tyrannies are the product of usurpation and conquest, of the *coup d'état*, and of military aggrandizement. But in reminding ourselves of this rather obvious fact, questions arise as to why the usurper and the tyrant have been so successful in our age and why free institutions have proven so vulnerable to their attack. That question can probably never be answered satisfactorily; nevertheless, it is possible to point to various unique circumstances and conditions which weakened or discredited free institutions or otherwise aided the would-be usurpers.

Of these the most obvious has been the fondness of this century for global war. In almost all belligerent countries, and especially in those that were defeated or unprepared to wage war, the economic and social disruption wrought by war produced social tensions and political extremism for which the normal integrative processes of free government often proved inadequate. War, moreover, eroded the integrity of the popular institutions of government. Constant emergencies, the need for decisive action at any cost, and the emphasis upon secrecy, caused men to discount the legislative and normal deliberative functions of such government if, indeed, it did not cause them to hold such functions in contempt; as a consequence, it was an easy step from

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government by discussion to government by decree, or to what has come to be known popularly as "crisis government." [1] This was the case among the most advanced continental European democracies such as the United Kingdom, France, and Italy. Even in these relatively stable homes of representative institutions, the summary procedures of wartime brought about a decline of confidence in the processes of representative institutions and a lack of faith in the symbols and methods of popular government. That one of these states went the way of fascism, at least temporarily, should not, therefore, be a surprise.

Finally, both global conflicts opened the floodgates of revolution in countries whose social systems were unstable and thereby provided a golden opportunity for any power-hungry minority to impose its will. The Soviet dictatorship is an obvious example of the political effect which war and its occasional aftermath of revolution have had upon our times.

The depression of the '30's also contributed to the weakening of representative institutions. In almost every country, remedies and palliatives for this economic phenomenon called for unorthodox policies and demanded state intervention to relieve social distress. These requirements created situations which were beyond the normal scope of governmental power; the debate thus engendered, the hesitation to put remedies into operation, and the ineffectiveness of many that were placed in operation, combined to raise suspicions about the capacity of democratic government to cope with such emergencies. Coupled with the Communist canard that the free economic institutions of democracy inevitably bring on depressions, the fumblings of those who were taking countermeasures, understandable though these

[1] Lindsay Rogers, *Crisis Government* (New York, 1933); Clinton Rossiter, *Constitutional Dictatorship* (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1948).

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000 might have been, aggravated the popular suspicion that democracy and representative institutions were inadequate to deal with the elementary problem of economic security, if, indeed, these institutions did not themselves bring on this problem.

The talking point most used by the Communist and other total dictatorships today is the wholly unjustified assertion that representative democracy cannot cope with the problem of guaranteeing elementary economic security, and that, if this problem is to be solved, mankind must suffer the harsh tyranny and arbitrary discretion of dictatorship. Until we succeed in extirpating from the minds of men the association of dictatorship and security, born largely of the depression and the aftermath of war and appealing especially to countries with little technological development, the future of representative institutions will be none too bright.

What has just been said does not apply directly to the earlier authoritarian regimes of Eastern Europe since these, as already pointed out, came into being for the most part in the 1920's and hence antedated the depression. Nevertheless, this economic debacle aggravated the trend toward authoritarianism in these parts. In the cases of the second Bulgarian *coup d'état* in 1934 and King Carol's assumption of power in Rumania in 1938, economic influences can be discerned. The decline in trade and employment in the early '30's bore a distinct relationship to the weakening of the democratic regime in Bulgaria, and the incoming authoritarian regime adopted statist methods to meet these problems. Moreover, the depression weakened the resistance of the region as a whole to Nazi economic penetration, and the influence of the Western democracies declined as the world markets for the exports of Eastern Europe disappeared.

642 186 Another factor that paralyzed the democratic will and advanced the cause of reaction, especially in Eastern Europe,

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was the extreme nationalism that characterized many political and military leaders. In this region, diversion of state expenditures from armaments to social welfare and gestures of friendship to neighboring countries were regarded by many as a form of treason. The schools and the press preached incessantly that the vindication of a nation's territorial aspirations was a value of the highest order, and authoritarian leaders, acting in the name of such doctrines, generally met with little resistance. It was frequently only a small group of liberal-minded professional men, and in some cases the peasant parties, that placed a high value on social and economic improvement and resisted the authoritarian trend. Thus nationalism, which a century earlier had formed the vanguard of liberalism, now became its most treacherous enemy.

Any account of the vulnerability of free institutions must also comment on the peculiar and often fatal tolerance which democratic governments have exhibited during the past two or three decades towards those who have overtly threatened its existence. Those who governed free states hesitated to deny traditional rights to Communists, fascists, and others even though these groups clearly intended to use such rights to facilitate their own seizure of power. Many pages of recent history have chronicled this dismal story, especially those which tell of the success of German and Italian fascism and of Lenin's bid for power in Russia. Not until 1930 did the political leadership of the Weimar Republic muster the courage to ban street demonstrations, uniforms, vigilantism, and other abuses of the traditional rights of association and expression. By that time, however, Hitler had already sealed the fate of the Republic. He triumphed, even as Mussolini and Lenin had done before him, because the legal regime failed to deny him the opportunity of perverting the privileges of a free state. Among the narrower and more tangible causes of the great reaction, the paralysis

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000 of the democratic will and its failure to protect itself from the abuse of its own freedoms is quite likely to acquire more, rather than less, stature among historians.

Another factor which contributed to the vulnerability of representative institutions was the tendency toward what Mirkine-Guetzevitch has called "the rationalization of power." By this term is meant the efforts of constitution makers in certain continental European democracies to shape parliamentary institutions in accordance with too logical formulas. In so doing, they repressed the influence of historical and local forces, thereby slowing down or preventing the adjustment of model institutions to the precise needs and traditions of a particular country. The net effect of this "rationalization of power" was to make representative regimes more vulnerable to the forces of reaction.

Evidence of this trend towards rationalization existed in many areas of government—in the choice and composition of cabinets, in the rules governing ministerial responsibility, and in the procedure of legislatures. It was particularly apparent, however, in the proportional electoral systems which were adopted all over continental Europe after the First World War. So conscientious were the artificers of the proportional representation systems that they sought to represent every facet of opinion with mathematical exactitude. The effect, demonstrated in country after country, was to encourage the fractionizing and splintering of organized political opinion. This occurred to such an extent that the problem of forming governing majorities and providing clear and authoritative mandates for political leadership was greatly complicated.

It is possible that the damaging effects of proportional representation upon parliamentarianism have been unduly magnified. Nevertheless, even a cursory glance at almost any continental representative system between the two world wars will suffice to show that proportional representation

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encouraged the growth of minor parties and of personal followings and that it stimulated the creation of political groups with militant, uncompromising ideological programs; because this system was in part responsible for such developments, it may also be held responsible for discouraging normal integrative processes among the parties at the polls and in the chambers and for complicating the problem of securing constitutional governing majorities.[2] Indirectly, therefore, proportional representation, the most obvious institutional expression of the trend towards the "rationalization of power" in the interbellum period, bears some of the responsibility for parliamentary weakness and totalitarian success.

It must be conceded at once that, in complicating the problem of integrating political opinion in representative democracies, proportional representation merely supplemented other more fundamental causes. Chief of these was the fact that just after the First World War representative democracy, especially in Europe, had to accommodate itself to the coming of age of powerful new forces on the left of the political firmament. This new left was composed of the forces of Marxian socialism, often in alliance with organized labor. The growth of this element was formidable because of recently enacted ultra-democratic franchise laws and the generous electoral laws of the proportional representation variety.

Historical evidence of this phenomenon is quite clear. The German government which expelled the Kaiser in 1918 was a coalition of Majority and Independent Social Democrats, and the Majority Social Democrats subsequently became the most important party unit in the coalition which

[2] Ferdinand A. Hermans, *Europe Between Democracy and Anarchy* (Notre Dame, Indiana: University of Notre Dame Press, 1951), pp. 52-53, and 66 ff.; same authority in Arnold J. Zurcher, ed., *Constitutions and Constitutional Trends Since World War II* (New York: New York University Press, 1951), pp. 132-133.

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000 created the Weimar Constitution. In England, Labor struck out alone in 1918 with the definite intention of capturing the government, a goal which was first realized under Ramsay MacDonald in 1924. The Socialist Party of Italy became the largest political aggregation on the peninsula in the first postwar elections of 1919. Comparable developments took place contemporaneously in almost every European country, large or small. The Marxian and labor left ceased to form minority elements which architects of cabinets could afford to relegate to the opposition; after 1920, because of its growing electoral and parliamentary power and the corresponding attenuation of the forces of the historic left and center, this new left became a desirable, if not necessary, component of governing majorities.

It was the rise of this new left that further complicated the problem of security majority coalitions in Europe's parliaments just after the First World War. It is possible that, as the claims of the new political force became adjusted and the leadership became accustomed to responsibility, the normal process of compromise and conciliation among parties might have reasserted themselves and the authority of government might have been restored. Such a theory is at least a plausible one.

Unfortunately, the new left was largely the product of the militant, uncompromising Marxist ideology. As late as the First World War, large elements of international Marxism still held their traditional loyalty to the concept of a class monopoly of political power. They rejected sincere collaboration with so-called "bourgeois" parties and often closed their ranks to any of their own number who defied this precept. In short, they looked askance at coalition and compromise, the two indispensable institutions of representative government in a plural society.

The monopolistic temper and tactics of the Marxian left have persisted, nor are they confined to the Communists.

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They continue to inspire radical elements among the moderate socialist groups who have long since formally renounced their intransigence. Occasionally, as in the case of contemporary Italy, this monopolistic temper pervades the whole organization of what passes for moderate socialism and makes this group nothing more than a wing of the Communist Party. However expressed, this persistence of Marxian intransigence has contributed significantly to the decline of the integrative faculty in contemporary parliaments and to the relative absence of political consensus. The resulting uncertainty or occasional paralysis of political democracy will have opened the door more than once to reaction and to the *coup d'état*. It was the paralysis of the cabinet in liberal Italy in 1921, brought about in part by the defection of the Marxist left, that opened the door to Mussolini; in Germany likewise, the uncertainty and intransigence of Marxian groups contributed appreciably to Hitler's rise to power.

Democratic weakness, of which the above-mentioned causes provide a partial explanation, is but one factor contributing to the recent advance of totalitarianism; the other cause is the dynamism and inherent strength of totalitarianism itself. The totalitarian dictatorships of our age possess all the advantages of traditional dictatorships, the most important being a political discretion largely unimpeded by public opinion or by standing law; contemporary dictatorships have the additional advantages of power and control that result from the permeation by the state apparatus of all the organized productive and moral forces of society. The result is a behemoth that defies, with almost no risk to itself, anyone who dares resist; those whom it does not defy successfully it can usually corrupt. Indeed, once successfully established, it is virtually immune to internal threat.

Moreover, once either a fascist or a Communist totalitarian system has come into being, it has invariably been successful in corrupting or destroying peripheral free states

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000 and in introducing dangerous fifth columns into almost all free governments. As noted earlier, this has been one of the principal factors contributing to the spread of totalitarianism. Poland is a Communist totalitarian state today not because the majority of Poles or even a sizable minority are Communist but because Soviet Russia has dragooned Poland into becoming a totalitarian satellite. Italy has the largest Communist party among the free states because the nourishment and perpetuation of such a party in Italy is an objective of Soviet foreign policy. If totalitarian Communism disappears in Soviet Russia, it is a safe assumption that totalitarian Communism will disappear or become a negligible factor in the rest of the world.

IV

Three decades of experience with authoritarian systems have made the free world somewhat pessimistic. As suggested in the first pages of this essay, our faith in the persistence of free representative institutions, so strongly held in the nineteenth century, has been badly shaken by this experience. So badly has that faith been shaken that some observers doubt that free political institutions can survive. Certainly there are millions today whose loyalty is at least ostensibly given to dictatorship and authoritarian institutions and not to the free institutions of a representative democracy.

Nevertheless, the outlook for the stability of representative institutions is perhaps not as dismal in this first decade of the second half of the twentieth century as it was at certain times during the earlier half. For one thing, we have learned how to make the free world less susceptible to the threat of reaction. Thus, in the constitutional reconstruction which has been taking place since the Second World War, democratic states have undertaken various steps to

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overcome some of the structural and related weaknesses that 000
previously made them vulnerable to totalitarian attack. France, Italy, and other states have made efforts recently to reward the moderate parties by modifying electoral laws and to penalize the extremist, and especially the totalitarian, parties. This is an important step forward even though states like France and Italy continue to experience difficulty in mobilizing governing majorities.

Contemporary democracies indicate also an increased awareness of the need to protect themselves from those who use freedom for purposes of subversion. Their actions indicate that they have learned how to deal with the menace of internal subversion. There is little chance, for example, that any nation will ever again submit to the abuse of its democratic freedoms as did Germany or Czechoslovakia in the prefascist period. The new wisdom is well expressed in Article 18 of the present Bonn Charter which declares that whoever abuses the various freedoms of the representative state "in order to attack the libertarian democratic basic order, forfeits these basic rights."

But the constructive developments required to overcome the great reaction do not lie wholly, or even chiefly, in the area of constitutional and administrative reform. Of even greater significance are the measures which have developed in the diplomatic and military fields. Here, too, there is much on the credit side of the ledger. Whatever the Second World War may have contributed to the advance of the totalitarianism of the left, it did do away with the two abominable tyrannies of the right, those of Mussolini and of Hitler. This was a great gain for freedom and has caused large areas to be reclaimed for representative institutions even if in Germany and Italy the none too pleasant odor of fascism lingers on.

There remain the tasks of producing effective resistance the Communist tyranny and of finally subjugating it.

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000 How effective the politico-military struggle directed against that tyranny has been up to now is open to question. Since Sir Winston Churchill's speech at Fulton, Missouri, and the announcement of the Truman Doctrine in 1947, both of which were seminal events in mankind's recognition of the true face of communism, numerous measures to counteract and contain the Soviet menace have been taken, and, as the Korean War will testify, those measures have not stopped short of the use of overt force. The free world at last has come to understand the lengths to which it must go if it sincerely wishes to prevail over totalitarianism of the left. This is progress.

The endeavors to bring about a truce in Korea (1953) and to neutralize other Communist acts of aggression indicate that the free world still believes that negotiation and compromise may bring about a peaceful communism and ultimately a decaying communism. It must be admitted that this is a hope arising from fear of the awful destruction of atomic war rather than from confidence that the totalitarianism of the left will really agree to co-exist with the free world. Moreover, the lesson taught by our experience with fascism also runs counter to such a hope; this lesson seems to say that only military defeat in major war can really destroy totalitarian dictatorship when such has become established as the government of a first-class power. It is to be fondly hoped that the Soviet reaction can be controlled and ultimately destroyed by measures short of war—that Poland, Czechoslovakia, and all the nations now in thrall can be freed and that free institutions can be restored in them without a third world war. It remains to be seen, however, whether this will be possible.

In this discussion of efforts to prevent Communist expansion, mention must be made of another development in the international arena favorable to the future of free political institutions. This is the effort being made, especially in Eu-

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rope, to promote various forms of economic and political integration among the nations. The growing unification of Western Europe, symbolized by the Council of Europe and especially by the European Coal and Steel Community, is potentially the most important contribution of this generation to the future of free political institutions; such integration promises for free political institutions a greater chance of being able to fill the demands made upon them. It promises, among other things, greater military security at less cost and offers the hope of expanding markets and production, and hence, greater economic prosperity; to the extent that greater integration can achieve these ends, it ameliorates the difficulties of representative institutions and promotes confidence in them.

In the long run, however, even the most favorable developments in the international arena are of less importance to the future of free political institutions than the restoring and holding of man's loyalty to the democratic ideal. In other words, the battle for free institutions, like all battles, is one for men's minds. It is on that battleground that the struggle for free institutions with totalitarianism must finally be fought and won.

In this struggle, the forces of freedom have made great gains; but they have not done so well as they eventually must if they are to prevail. If the battle is to be won, men must be brought to see how hollow and devoid of truth is the claim of Communist totalitarianism that it represents the cause of the masses. Men must be made to understand that the Communists' claim that their system is indispensable to raising the material level of the rank and file and to gaining national independence for colonial people is a cruel hoax. At the same time, the historic ideals associated with representative government, or with what we call democracy, must regain their place among the beliefs of men. To achieve that end, the free institutions of representative democracy must be re-identified

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with conceptions of progress and with the hope that man may be delivered from conditions which he deems unjust—from poverty, bigotry, discrimination, and national subjugation. Only if the symbols of democratic institutions are once again associated in the minds of men with the conceptions of justice and progress, can those same institutions regain their dynamism and resume the march which Hitler, Stalin, and their minions interrupted in the first half of this century.

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4 "People's Democracy" in Theory and Practice

STANISLAW MIKOLAJCZYK

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After the Second World War, Communist dictatorships were imposed by the Soviet Union on a number of European countries that had been under German occupation. This form of dictatorial government was called "People's Democracy." The reasons for this arose out of the political foundations and tactics of the Soviet Union, out of the internal situation of the Soviet Union as well as out of the situation in the occupied countries.

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The Ribbentrop-Molotov pact of 1939 not only encouraged Hitler to start the Second World War by an armed invasion of Poland, but assured him of both an armed ally in the invasion and partition of Poland and an important supplier of food, raw materials, and gasoline. At the time of the pact, Stalin intended to await a more favorable situation in order to assure himself of the fruits of the final victory.

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At the end of First World War, the Bolsheviks had counted on successful Communist revolutions in the countries of Europe, but none occurred. The Communist regime of Béla Kun in Hungary fell within a few months, and the Bolshevik hordes who marched upon the West met their defeat at Warsaw in August 1920. In the interwar period, several at-

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669 648 tempts to provoke Communist revolutions also failed and Communist hopes faded. Not until the Second World War was an opportunity furnished for the Kremlin to establish Communist regimes in Europe.

648 Hitler's unexpected invasion of Soviet Russia in 1941 made it impossible for the Kremlin to expand its influence at leisure and compelled the Soviet Union to join the camp of the Allies. As an ally of the West in this war and fighting Hitler for its very existence, Soviet Russia gained credit for the heroic qualities of its soldiers. At the same time, under the influence of pro-Soviet propaganda, public opinion in the West came to believe that Soviet Russia had been converted into a state that respected democracy and civil liberties. It is nevertheless clear that during the war the Soviets never renounced their designs regarding Europe and always put their political objectives above war strategy. For example, in Teheran Stalin resisted all war plans not based on the invasion of France.

Stalin believed then that the Western Allies would shed much of their own blood on Hitler's Atlantic Wall, and that even if they landed successfully their march to the East would be so delayed that in the meantime he would be able to extend the Soviet sphere of influence far into Europe. In Teheran and later in Yalta, Stalin took advantage of the atmosphere and of the inexperience of the West with Communist tactics and achieved conditions which favored the implementation of his far-reaching plans concerning Eastern Europe. The policies favored by the Western Allies in the interest of the common cause and in the hopes of speedy victory and better international cooperation were cynically exploited by the Kremlin and used as a basis for the expansion of influence and for the establishment of communism in many other countries.

Apart from the Teheran and Yalta conferences, there are countless examples concerning every one of the coun-

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tries at present behind the Iron Curtain which prove that 648 the Soviets were preparing themselves systematically in various sectors of life for the domination and communization of these countries. Nevertheless, in order to prolong the period of appeasement immediately after the Second World War, the Soviets attempted to maintain the pretense that they were observing international agreements. They were anxious for a speedy disarmament of the large Allied armies standing in Europe and for the rapid conversion of the war industry of their allies to peace-time production.

The aid of UNRRA, war surpluses, and other credits from the West were at that time indispensable to the countries of Eastern Europe because Soviet aid—apart from noisy propaganda—expressed itself in these countries only in a systematic destitution of industrial equipment and stocks of raw materials. This was carried out under the pretext of confiscation of German assets which belonged as "war booty" to Russia. The Soviet Union hoped for the cancellation of the Lend-Lease obligations and calculated that it had the opportunity of obtaining from the United States a loan for its internal needs in the amount of ten billion dollars.

II

Under these circumstances, in order to lull public opin- 208 ion in the West, Communist propaganda preferred to call the regimes imposed on the occupied countries People's Democracies instead of frankly calling them "socialist states based on the dictatorship of the proletariat." This gave them a basis for maintaining that the "system of people's democracy" was not a Communist system but a new type of democracy which did not yet have all the characteristics of Western democracies only because these nations were backward and because, except for Czechoslovakia, they had

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208 lived before the Second World War under totalitarian or semi-totalitarian regimes and were not sufficiently mature for a Western democratic system. This kind of explanation was not only accepted by fellow travelers but also helped to appease the conscience of the Western leaders co-responsible for international agreements with Soviet Russia and for leaving these nations to Russia's mercy.

208 The West was not well acquainted with the social and po-
177. litical changes which had taken place in these countries
64 within the last fifty years and which had made themselves
642 apparent in the struggle for freedom and democracy before the war, in the fight against Nazism and fascism during the war, and in the struggle against communism since the war. This continual struggle not only proves the political maturity of these nations but also demonstrates such great self-sacrifice and determination that the question arises whether, despite the setbacks caused by violence and terror, their zeal for the cause of democracy does not surpass that of many who enjoy the blessings of true democracy in the West. The propagation of People's Democracies in the countries of Eastern Europe helped the Communists to stifle the echoes of the struggle of these nations who were defending their freedom and independence under very difficult and heretofore unexperienced conditions. The theme of People's Democracies also enabled the Soviets to stifle the protests of these nations where the Red Army and the NKVD were murdering, arresting, and deporting democratic political leaders and the officers and soldiers of the underground armies which, during the Second World War, had fought against the occupations of Nazism and fascism.

208 The façade of People's Democracy did most service to
511 the Communists by masking both the imposed regimes of Communist dictatorship and the lack of popular support. In not one of these countries, however, did the Communist parties give evidence of any extensive influence upon the

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people. All over Eastern Europe the land hunger of the peasants, the low wages of the workers, the great disproportion between the prices of industrial and agricultural products, the periods of unemployment, the practices of totalitarian regimes, the remnants of feudalism, tension between national groups, and intolerance played an important role. Knowing the skill with which the Communists usually exploit economic difficulties, social injustice, and national differences, it would seem that in these countries they would have found much greater support. However, despite conditions favorable to Communist propaganda, both in the countries that had always known Russia as an imperialistic conqueror and in Southeastern Europe where Russia had been considered an ally since the struggle for liberation from Turkey and where religious factors aroused no antagonism, the Communist parties did not attract a very large following before the war.

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Various circumstances explain this fact. Countries at a distance from Russia could not contrast Communist propaganda to Communist reality; they learned of Russia from tours organized by the Intourist or from the study of Communist writings. The peoples of Eastern Europe, on the other hand, caught glimpses of their neighbor even through a tightly closed frontier and observed the immensity of the misery, oppression, and terror that existed in the U.S.S.R. The sudden tactical maneuvers of Lenin and Stalin which often obliged the Communist parties to act against the vital interests of their respective countries further disillusioned Russia's immediate neighbors.

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It is difficult to cite exact figures concerning the Communist parties in Eastern Europe, because they operated under different names at different times and because they sometimes existed legally and sometimes illegally. Let us take for example the Communist Party of Poland. Before the First World War the Communists acted through the So-

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665 cial Democratic Party of the Kingdom of Poland and Lithuania, which party opposed the idea of an independent Poland. During the Bolshevik invasion of Poland in 1920, a Communist government of Poland was created at the rear of the Red Army at a time when the whole Polish nation, united under the leadership of Premier Witos of the Peasant Party and Vice-Premier Daszynski of the Socialist Party, was fighting against the Bolsheviks. In independent Poland after 1921 the Communist Party declared itself in opposition to the independence of Poland and advocated the incorporation of the Republic of Poland into the Soviet Union.

In 1926 the Communists supported Pilsudski's *coup d'état* against the democratic president and government. Only later did they announce that this had been a "mistake of the leadership of the party." When the Comintern attempted to provoke a Communist revolution in Germany in 1932, the Polish Communist Party declared that they favored granting to Germany both Silesia, which had been ceded to Poland after the First World War, and complete control over the Free City of Gdansk (Danzig).

The weakness of the Communist Party of Poland on the eve of the Second World War is proved by the fact that in 1938 it was dissolved by the Comintern on the pretext that it was completely infiltrated by the secret police of the Polish government. After the conclusion of the Molotov-Ribbentrop pact the Polish and German Communists considered the line of division between the German and Soviet spheres of influence to be the future frontier between the Communist Republic of Germany and the Soviet Union. Under these circumstances, Poland, of course, would be completely erased from the map.

648 The Soviet invasion of Poland, undertaken in agreement with Nazi Germany, the incorporation into the Soviet Union of almost half of the eastern territory of Poland, and the deportation of a million and half Poles to Russia were pre-

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sented by the Communists as the liberation of the Ukrainian, 648
Byelorussian, and Lithuanian peoples from the yoke of the Polish landlords; Hitler's war against France and England were presented as a battle against Anglo-Saxon imperialism. After the fall of France the Polish Communists, together with those sent from France, assumed a neutral attitude toward the Nazi occupation and terror in Poland. They did not take part in the underground struggle of the Polish nation. They were tolerated by the Gestapo and moved about freely. Only after Hitler's attack on Russia in 1941 did they regain the "spirit of patriotism" and join the Polish underground struggle against Hitler.

Various events greatly discredited the reputation of the 665
Polish Workers' Party (one of the guises under which the 661
Polish Communists masqueraded during the war years). 208
Such events were the massacre of the Polish war prisoners at Katyn, the death of hundreds of thousands of people deported to Soviet forced labor camps in the years 1939-1941, the deportation in 1944 of over 40,000 members of the underground Home Army who had been fighting against the Germans and aiding the entering Red Army, and the return to Poland of a number of Poles who had experienced the Soviet reality. Further discredit was brought to the Polish Workers' Party by the presence of the Communist Lublin Committee. The Committee seized power in Poland with the aid of the Soviet army and the NKVD and nominated as ministers of the government persons who had been in the German concentration camps and had served the Gestapo faithfully.

According to its reports in 1937, the Communist Party 665
of Poland had 6,000 regular members and 12,000 members in the Communist Association of Polish Youth. Experts are of the opinion, however, that these figures were exaggerated by the leadership of the party which was afraid of presenting to Moscow a true report of the extent of its influence. *New*

665 *Roads*, the Communist organ published after the war in Warsaw, reported that before the Second World War the Communist Party of Poland never had more than 20,000 [66] members. In the elections for the Seym (the Polish parliament) in 1922, the Communists netted 130,000 votes or 1 per cent of the votes cast. In 1926 the Communists together with their various affiliates had 23 deputies. At the peak of the economic crisis in 1928 the Communists received 829,000 out of 11,758,000 votes, or about 7 per cent of the total number of votes cast. The Communist bloc, by 1946, consisted of the Polish Workers' Party (Communists), the Polish Socialist Party, the Democratic Party, and the Labor Party. This bloc, it was secretly reported to Stalin, did not receive more than 16 per cent of the votes either in the referendum of 1946 or in the elections of 1947, despite the presence of the Red Army in Poland and the use of terror and violence. These few samplings from the history of the Communist Party of Poland show how Communist tactics which required actions against the interests of the country and its various social classes and which contradicted the ideological theories of communism prevented a wider development of the Communist Party.

Czechoslovakia had a genuine democratic system before the war and gave the Communist Party full freedom of action. In the parliamentary election of 1925 the Communists gained 41 seats and in the elections of 1934 and 1935 they received only 30 seats out of the total number of 300 in the parliament. After the war, in May 1946, the Czech Communist Party won 31 per cent of the total Czechoslovakian vote and elected 93 deputies out of the total number of 300. In the same election the Slovak Communist Party, in a region that had already experienced the "blessing" of liberation by the Red Army, won a much smaller percentage of the total vote in proportion to the population.

In Bulgaria, before the Second World War, the number of

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Communist deputies ranged from 15 to 48 out of a total 665
number of 274 members of parliament. The highest Communist representation was gained directly after the First World War and the lowest, consisting of only 15 deputies, occurred under Stambolisky; in 1927 the Communists had 33 deputies. The phenomenon of the political opportunism of all Communist parties during the war, that is, their sudden switch to the support of Hitler, was particularly pronounced in Bulgaria. The political report of the Fifth Congress of the Bulgarian Communist Party of December 1948 shows that in August of 1944, that is, at the moment of the change of government toward the end of the Second World War, the Communist Party had only 25,000 members.

In Hungary, since the experience with Béla Kun in 1919, [666]
the influence of communism has been very weak. It is significant that after the Second World War in the elections of 1945 the Hungarian Communists received only 17 per cent of the vote, despite the Russian methods of persuasion. Even in the elections of 1947 the Communists won only 18 per cent of the vote for their own party.

According to the reports of Anna Pauker and other Communist leaders, the Rumanian Communist Party had less than 2,000 members in the years 1944-45.

The Communists could never expect to assume power in any of the above mentioned countries by parliamentary and democratic methods because the Communist parties, even in the most favorable periods, had the support of only 5 to 15 per cent of the people. Neither were the Communists able to establish police systems in these countries in the period immediately following the Second World War. Therefore, they promulgated "People's Democracies." They organized within the individual countries by stealing the traditional names of prewar political parties, by filling the top posts in these parties with their own agents, and by creating fictitious coalitions of parties. The Communists had in their

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665 actions a triple objective: to mislead the people, to prevent the postwar restoration of political parties by their original leaders and members or to break them up if they had been restored already, and to beguile foreign opinion into believing that multiparty systems still existed in the Eastern European countries.

The lack of popular support of the Communist parties is visible even today in the countries behind the Iron Curtain. For this reason, in the last elections in Poland and in Rumania in 1952, and in Hungary in 1953, the lists of candidates, made out completely by the Communists, were presented to the people under the disguise of a "National Front." The National Front is represented as a coalition of political parties, trade unions, youth organizations, scientific societies and so forth, and is highlighted by the names of "patriot-priests" and "progressive Catholics." The Communist press in Poland admits that the institution of the National Front was necessary in the elections of 1952 because in 60 per cent of the voting localities, especially in the villages, there were "white spots," that is, areas where there did not exist a single cell of the Communist Party.

665 In summary, it can be said that the Communist dictator-
177 ship was imposed upon the countries behind the Iron Cur-
642 tain under the name of People's Democracy through the following means: Moscow's strategic and political machinations during the war; the direct intervention of the Red Army and the NKVD in the internal affairs of these countries both at the end of and after the war; either the falsification of the will of these nations in the elections or the *coup d'état*, as in Hungary in 1947, and in Czechoslovakia in 1948.

665 An analysis of Communist strength clearly shows that the Communists could not have expected in a single case to assume power in a democratic and parliamentary manner. And, it must be added, the peoples of the Eastern Euro-

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higher phase. In this higher phase of communism the state will wither away, and with the increase in production the law of society will be "from each according to his ability, to each according to his needs." That the Soviet Union still has some way to go before reaching this stage was emphasized by Stalin in October 1952, in his widely publicized treatise issued on the eve of the Nineteenth Congress of the Communist Party. Stalin described the complexity of this process of transition to the higher phase and asserted that before it could be accomplished it would be necessary, among other things, to ensure "a continuous expansion of all social production" and "to raise collective farm property to the level of public property, and . . . to replace commodity circulation by a system of products exchange." [3]

It is important to keep in mind the framework of Soviet political theory in examining the constitutional documents and legislation of the captive countries because the latter are now being cast in the Soviet mold. The term "Communist dictatorship" is used here to describe both systems—the Soviet system and the so-called People's Democracy—because in actuality there does not exist any basic difference between them. Certain differences which have existed or which still exist either concern only the name and not the substance or are dependent upon the conditions and time needed by the Soviets for establishment and consolidation of communism in these countries.

Can it be said, therefore, that from the point of view of communist theory People's Democracy, so strongly emphasized in the propaganda and in the constitutions of the captive countries, represents the first phase of communism as it existed during the period of the New Economic Policy in Soviet Russia? No, this would not be accurate. Such a comparison might apply in some measure to the years 1945-

[3] *Economic Problems of Socialism in the U.S.S.R.* (New York, International Publishers, 1952), pp. 51-52.

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1947 but not to the years following. The period of the New Economic Policy in Russia was called "the period of a certain revival of capitalism"; in reality, it was a kind of retreat of communism from economic difficulties. 656

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In the captive countries there was no "period of revival of capitalism." Since the very inception of communism, there has been a systematic liquidation of all private property, carried out in premeditated fashion within the limits of existing conditions and possibilities. In the beginning, the question of private property arose only in regard to small trade, dwelling houses, building, crafts, and, in a larger degree to peasant farming. Hence, the Communists advocated the principle of a three-sector economy, composed of state economy—after an immediate nationalization of medium and heavy industries, landlords' estates, and forests—of cooperative economy, and of private economy. 656 185 423

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The fact that this period, the traces of which we still find in the constitutions of the captive countries, was planned from above as no more than a transitional period, is best proved by the accusation leveled against the former Communist Vice-Premier of Poland, Gomulka, at the meeting of the Central Committee of the Communist Party in Warsaw, in 1948. Gomulka was told then that his main guilt was not that he agreed to the principles of the three-sector economy but that he acted according to these principles. It was explained to him then that he had proceeded as though he wanted to keep the system although he knew that it was transitional. 665 661

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In 1947, after the falsification of the elections and the destruction of the opposition of the independent peasant parties in Bulgaria, Rumania, Hungary, Yugoslavia, and Poland, the Cominform was established and Communist policy abandoned its nationalist line and adopted the line of internationalism. A special declaration of the differences between Communist internationalism and the "cosmopoli- 665

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665 tanism" of the West was introduced, and the Communists vigorously went about the destruction of the remaining private property, the collectivization of agriculture, and the transformation of the remaining independent cooperatives into a sector of the Communist state economy. It was therefore, in theory and practice a period of the establishment of socialist states, ruled by the dictatorship of the proletariat and disguised by the name of People's Democracy. This period was marked by the accelerated tempo of the communization of all spheres of national life, by the integration of the economies of the People's Democracy into the Soviet economy, and by political and legislative preparations for the incorporation of these countries into the Soviet Union.

177 642 Analysis of the constitutions imposed upon the captive countries shows that the People's Democracies are dictatorships of the proletariat different in form but not in substance from the Soviet system. No matter when the constitutions of the People's Democracies were imposed or whether there were differences in their wording, the most important provisions are the same in each constitution. More light can be cast on these constitutions by the political circumstances in which they were imposed and by their preambles than by a dry analysis of their provisions.

[643] In Bulgaria in 1946 the Communists falsified the elections, and in 1947 they introduced in the Parliament the draft of a new constitution. According to this draft, the president was still to be the head of the state and not the Chairman of the Presidium of the Parliament as in Soviet Russia. On September 23, 1947, the leader of the opposition, Petkov, was hanged by the Communists, and on December 4, 1947, a revised constitution was imposed upon Bulgaria. This new constitution went further in its provisions than the constitutions imposed several years later in the other captive countries. The office of the president

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pean countries have declared themselves in overwhelming majority to be opposed to the Communist system despite the pressure of the Red Army and of the NKVD. Violence and fraud were the only means by which the Communists were able to seize power in these countries.

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III

In the Soviet Union strict ideological discipline became the order of the day after the wave of patriotic feeling that arose and was encouraged during the Second World War. It was during the period of the revival of this communist ideology that the Communist dictatorships in the captive countries were given the name of People's Democracy. The relation of this new doctrine to the theoretical foundations of the Soviet state should therefore be examined.

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In the Constitution of 1936 the U.S.S.R. is clearly defined as a "socialist state based on the dictatorship of the proletariat" (Articles 1 and 2), and the exclusive role of the Communist Party is explicitly stressed (Articles 3 and 126). Moreover, Stalin himself wrote that "The proletariat needs the Party for the purpose of achieving and maintaining the dictatorship. The Party is an instrument of the dictatorship of the proletariat." [1] Speaking on the draft of the new constitution in November 1936, he further said: "I must admit that the draft of the new Constitution does preserve the regime of the dictatorship of the working class, just as it also preserves unchanged the present leading position of the Communist Party of the U.S.S.R." [2]

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Soviet political theory assumes that socialist states must evolve from a phase in which the state continues to be used as an instrument of the dictatorship of the proletariat to a

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[1] Joseph Stalin, *Problems of Leninism*, 11th ed. (Moscow, Foreign Languages Publishing House, 1940), p. 80.
[2] *Ibid.*, p. 578.

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was abolished and the office of the President of the National Assembly was established. Article 1 does not speak of a "socialist state governed by the dictatorship of the proletariat" but neither does it mention "People's Democracy." It only proclaims that Bulgaria is a "People's Republic with a representative Government . . . where all power derives from the people and belongs to the people."

The Albanian Constitution of March 15, 1946, also proclaims that "Albania is a People's Republic in which all powers are derived from and belong to the people." It provides also that the "President of the Presidium of the People's Convention is the head of the State." The constitutions of these countries faithfully reflect the Soviet system and, in the event of the incorporation of these countries into the U.S.S.R., no significant constitutional changes would be necessary.

In Hungary on August 31, 1947, after the *coup d'état* of May 1947 against the government of Premier Nagy, new elections were held, and in August 1949 a new constitution was introduced. One section of the preamble to this constitution states the following:

> Our people under the leadership of the working class, steeled in the battles during the last decades, enriched by the experience of the revolution of 1919, and relying on the USSR laid the foundation of socialism and our country now is going forward by means of the people's democracy, toward socialism.

Hungary became a People's Republic (Article 1) and was proclaimed "a state of the workers and of the working peasantry" (Article 2). The constitution further stated that "The close union of the workers and working peasantry shall be accomplished in the Hungarian People's Republic under the leadership of the workers" (Article 3), and that "The working people shall gradually oust the capitalist elements and consistently build the socialist economic order" (Ar-

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642 177 ticle 4). The Presidium of the People's Republic with its President was established and the post of the President abolished.

In Czechoslovakia on May 9, 1948, following the *coup d'état* of February 1948, a new constitution was enacted. The preamble reads: "We, the Czechoslovakian People, declare that we are firmly resolved to build up our liberated State as a People's democracy which will ensure to us a [643] peaceful road to socialism." Article 1 states that "The Czechoslovakian State is a People's democratic Republic. The people are the sole source of all power in the State." According to this constitution, the President of the Republic remained the head of the state and Czechoslovakia still differs from the other captive countries in this respect.

In Yugoslavia, Tito introduced at the very beginning the most advanced form of a Soviet-style system; he recently reassumed the title of President of the Republic in place of the title of President of the National Assembly.

In Poland, after the falsification of the elections in 1947, a so-called Little Constitution, based on the Soviet system of councils, was introduced. It established a Council of State whose "chairman" was also the President of the Republic. On July 22, 1952, a new constitution was imposed upon Poland. The preamble to this constitution states:

> The Polish People's Republic is a republic of the working people. . . .
>
> As a result of the revolutionary struggles and changes, the power of the capitalists and landlords has been overthrown and the state of People's democracy has been established. The basis of the present people's power constitutes the alliance of the working class with the working peasantry. In this alliance the leading role belongs to the working class, the leading class of the society, basing itself on the revolutionary achievements of the Polish and international working movement, on the historical experiences of the victorious building of socialism in the USSR, the first state of workers and peasants. . . .

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> The Polish People's Republic is a state of People's democracy. In the Polish People's Republic power belongs to the working people of town and country. (Article 1)

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The office of the President of the Republic was abolished and the office of the Chairman of the Council of State became the highest post in the state. Poland is no longer the Republic of Poland. It is now called the Polish People's Republic. [643]

In Rumania, the constitution of 1948 was replaced by a new constitution forced upon Rumania on July 18, 1952. The preamble to the new constitution declares that "The Rumanian People's Republic is a state of working people of town and countryside," and that "The present Constitution of the Rumanian People's Republic embodies the results so far obtained by the working people headed by the working class, in building a socialist society in our country." The highest organ of state power is the General National Assembly and its Presidium, while the highest executive and administrative organ of state power is the Council of Ministers. The organs of state power in regions, districts, towns, and rural localities are the people's councils of the working people of town and country.

The examples cited from the texts and preambles of the constitutions of the captive countries show clearly that, although the Communist dictatorship in the Soviet Union has achieved the first phase in the development of communism —"the socialist state based on the dictatorship of the proletariat"—and is now on the way to the higher phase, the People's Democracies, according to communist theory, are still on the road to the first phase. This theoretical distinction made by the Communists has no great importance in practice particularly inasmuch as constitutional changes in all these People's Republics have made complete political and legal preparations for incorporation into the U.S.S.R.

As far as Yugoslavia is concerned, in the period of friendly

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642 Stalin-Tito relations her communist system was much fur-
177 ther advanced than that of any other Iron Curtain country, and since the break with Stalin only insignificant changes have been made in the structure of the highest organs of government. Tito still declares clearly and without any reservation that he intends to maintain the communist system in that country at any price.

IV

208 When communist propaganda speaks of the liberation of
661 the oppressed masses from the slavery of the privileged and the rich, it stresses the term, People's Democracy. But does this term really signify freedom? Does it respect human dignity? Does it recognize equality among the people? Does it abolish undue privileges and the exploitation of the working people? It does not. In practice, it does not even provide personal freedom or personal security.

697 The overcrowded prisons and the many thousands of peo-
661 ple in the forced labor camps bear witness to this. The Soviet Union and all the countries occupied by it are a large prison from which the majority of the people would escape if they only could. They would flee from the "Communist paradise" partly because of the difficult economic conditions, but mostly because of the unbearable atmosphere created by the insecurity and complete lack of freedom which are part of this system.

The majority of the people escaping today are average people—workers, peasants, craftsmen, small merchants, and others who have never belonged to any privileged or exploiting class. I have read a number of books on the living conditions in the Soviet forced labor camps; I have studied thousands of reports of Poles who have passed through Soviet camps and prisons; I have had hundreds of talks with the victims of the Soviet regime. And I have come

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to the belief that human language is unable to express the whole truth about the greatest disgrace to mankind that the twentieth century will know—the Soviet forced labor camps. 697 661

A sentence to a forced labor camp amounts to a sentence of death because the enormous majority of the inmates in these camps cannot exist under the conditions prevailing there and die before they are released. The inmate of such a camp works beyond his strength, knowing that if his productivity falls his starvation-level food ration will be cut. The instinct for self-preservation urges him to defend himself from death, and his reactions become those of a hungry animal. All his human feelings disappear, even his attitude toward his fellow inmates. Degraded and humiliated as a human being, the prisoner works like an animal for his enemies only to prolong his life by a year or two and then inevitably to perish. [466]

Political freedom does not exist in the Communist countries either under law or in practice. Let us take for example Article 72 of the Polish constitution of July 1952. Similar provisions will be found in all other Communist constitutions. The first lines of Article 72 say that the citizens have the right of political organization, but the third paragraph of the same article says that organization of assemblies and participation in an organization which opposes the political and social system of People's Poland are forbidden. In other words, any party which does not recognize the Communist political system is forbidden, and membership in it is punishable. 641 665

Since membership in a political party presupposes some right to influence that party, the question arises whether the Communists find it advisable to allow every citizen to belong to his country's Communist Party. The answer is no. The official statistics of the Communist parties in the occupied countries as well as in the Soviet Union show that the number of members of these parties ranges from 5 to 10 per cent

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641 665 of the population of the given country. Finally, even the internal structure of the Communist Party is dictatorial. The delegates of the local organizations accept only the projects and decisions of the party elite or of the chief dictator.

641 The Rumanian constitution, just like the others, appears to guarantee freedom of speech, freedom of the press, freedom of assembly, freedom of public processions and manifestations. Article 85 states that "These rights are ensured by placing at the disposal of the working masses and their organizations printing presses, stocks of paper, public buildings, the streets, communications facilities and other material requisites." In practice, the printing presses, paper mills, public buildings, radio, and so forth are owned by the state and are completely controlled by the leadership of the Communist Party. Even religious processions and manifestations require the consent of the state.

641 666 In theory, under the Communist system, every citizen over eighteen years of age has the right to vote. In practice, the elections are a tragic farce. They do not mean the right to select a candidate, to participate in the adoption of a party program, or even to defend social or national interests. They signify a compulsion to vote for one's hated enemies. The elector is forced to march to the polls to the accompaniment of music played by his foes while pain wrenches his heart and his fists clench in hatred and anger. The official results of the elections always show that the candidates of the Communist Party have received 99 per cent of the votes.

692 641 Does the administration of justice stand guard over civil liberties? No, it definitely does not, either in practice or in theory. The constitutions of the People's Republics have clear provisions in this respect. Article 41 of the Hungarian constitution states: "The courts shall punish the enemies of the people, defend and secure the political, economic and social order of the People's Democracy . . . they shall edu-

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cate the workers to respect the rule of socialist communal 692
life." The Polish and Rumanian constitutions of 1952 pro- 641
vide that "The courts defend the system of People's Democracy and the gains of the working people, and ensure the people's law, social property and citizens' rights."

In practice it is always the duty of the judge and the 692
prosecutor to take the side of the Communist State—that 661
is, of the Communist Party. It is always the duty of the defense to help the state prosecute the accused and to help him to accuse himself. The defendant's duty is to prove his guilt. The courts are a tool of the Communist regimes and are not independent institutions for the administration of justice. Communism introduces not only the judicial murder of innocent people but a debasement of man unparalleled in the history of mankind. The innocent defendant is forced to accuse himself of crimes which he has never committed, to accuse other innocent people, to trample upon his own dignity, to humiliate himself in the eyes of his friends and family, to spit upon the ideals in which he has believed, and to praise the loathsome practices of his enemy and prosecutor as he awaits death by the hands of his oppressor or by slow agony in a prison or forced labor camp.

V

Although it proclaims the liberation of the masses, the 641
communist system has created unprecedented privilege for 565
the ruling Communist elite. Everyone who has seen the living conditions of the highest Communist dignitaries in Russia as well as in the captive countries knows that these men enjoy a very high standard of living. They have privileges in all spheres of life—political, economic, social, and cultural. The life of the Communist elite is, however, not to be envied. Generally, the members of this group are hated. They are constantly threatened, even by the members of

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641 their own party. They live a life of fear in a golden cage,
565 from which they cannot withdraw, even if they wish to do so.

In a democratic state a president elected to office lives like any free and private citizen. Under the Communist system this is unthinkable. The system of privileges finds support even in Communist theory. "It is time it was understood that Marxism is an enemy of equalization," Stalin stated in his report to the Seventeenth Communist Congress in January of 1934. "By equality Marxism means, not equalization of individual requirements and individual life, but abolition of classes. . . ." In the same connection he quoted Lenin's statement that "the claim that we want to make all men equal to one another is an empty phrase and a stupid invention of intellectuals."[4]

641 Freedom of religion and of faith under the Communist system does not exist, either in theory or in practice. The first articles of Communist constitutions always proclaim many civil liberties. But, when we analyze more closely the following passages of these articles, we see that as a rule they contradict and abolish the provisions contained in the first lines. Let us take for example, Article 70 of the constitution of the Polish People's Republic, which appears to guarantee the citizens freedom of conscience and of faith. It also says, however, that abuse of freedom of faith for purposes detrimental to the interest of the Polish People's Republic is punishable. In practice, of course, this means that every pronouncement against the atheistic and materialistic principles of the Communist system is detrimental to the People's Republic and is therefore punishable.

641 But that is not all. The Communists who proclaim the
793 division between the church and the state do not intend to leave any freedom to the church. They demand the clergy's help in the building of socialism and consider any refusal to be detrimental to the interests of the People's State. In

[4] Joseph Stalin, *Problems of Leninism*, pp. 521-522.

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practice, church organizations and the clergy are meant to have no function but that of a helpful tool in the communization of the nation. 641 793

The function of education is the same. The Communists do not even pretend to support freedom of knowledge and bluntly state in their legislation that the duty of higher schools is to educate the younger generation in the spirit of socialist dialectics and materialistic doctrines. Theoretically, the Communist system assures the youth of education. In practice, an individual's right to education is not determined by intellectual ability and progress but by membership in the Young Communist League (Komsomol), by informing on "unorthodox" professors, and by success in examinations on Communist politics and doctrines. 641 871

The articles of the Communist constitutions that deal with the rights of the citizens stress above all the rights to work, rest, and medical treatment. The Communist attitude toward the individual is like that of the horse-owner when he thinks that the main duty of his animal is to work and believes that it must be assured of rest and medical treatment only to insure the fulfillment of this duty. Actually, most farmers in the free countries treat their animals better than the Communists treat the people. Out of hatred, the Communists destroy whole social groups and even perpetrate the genocide of whole nations. 641

The Communists claimed that when they had freed the working man from capitalist exploitation they would not allow the exploitation of one man by another. Is this claim realized in practice? Again, the answer is no. The Communist state created the worst kind of exploitation by giving the rule of the people to the Communist elite and by providing this elite with the formidable weapons of both police and army. In a democratic state, even where large industries and sources of raw materials are nationalized, the interests of the people are guarded by trade unions, politi- 661 565

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661 cal parties, legislation, courts, and the police who protect
565 the security of the citizens. The state authority is the mediator in the last resort in disagreements between labor and business.

661 The Moloch, which is the Communist state, has on its side the party, the police, and the courts. Special laws con-
466 stantly increase the penalties for the plunder and destruc-
641 tion of the nationalized public property. Because the state is a "people's state" and "does not do injustice to the people," the trade unions act as a tool of the state in raising the productivity and quality of production and fixing the norms of work. The Stakhanovite work system, based on high norms of production and granting starvation-level wages with no means of protection against these, destroys the strength and health of the worker. Strikes are punishable because they are crimes against the interests of the state, and special laws provide discipline of work, penalties for failure to fulfill norms, and forced labor camps for "idlers" and "loafers."

661 Communism deprives the peasant of his beloved land,
641 turns him into a Communist serf, and chains him to the
423 state or collective farm in which the Communist bureaucracy demands of him ever-increasing physical efforts to produce for the insatiable state. After the liquidation of the remnants of private initiative in small business and crafts, the *kulak* peasant, the biggest "capitalist blood-sucker," is dealt with. He is destroyed by tax levies and forced deliveries of agricultural products and is finally evicted from his own farm.

642 Thus, behind the façade of People's Democracy, Communism practices dictatorship in every sphere of life—personal, political, economic, religious, and social. The Communist system creates privileges for the party and makes the citizen economically dependent upon the state. It debases human dignity, wrests faith out of human hearts, kills

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one's father, mother, brother, and sister in prisons and in forced labor camps, poisons the hearts of the young, and prepares them for participation in an imperialistic war against the interests of their own countries. 642

Moscow-controlled Communism also serves Soviet imperialism. It is the Soviets that occupied and imposed the Communist dictatorships upon the countries of Eastern Europe. If there had been no Soviet aggression or interference, not one of these countries would have a Communist dictatorship today. The basis for the exploitation of these countries and their systematic economic integration into the framework of the Soviet Union consists of secret trade agreements, so-called technical advisers, and economic plans for each country carefully adjusted to the plans for the Soviet economy. These Moscow-directed devices also determine the quantity of production and trade exchange in accordance with the political and economic objectives of the dictators in the Kremlin. In these countries Soviet generals and lower-ranking officers hold the posts of commanders, and prepare the younger generation for the betrayal of their own national interests and for service to their enemies. 648

For these reasons Communism, manifested as a dictatorship of the proletariat or as People's Democracy, constitutes, in theory and practice, a mortal danger to the existence of freedom, democracy, and peace in the world.

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PART TWO

THE DEVELOPMENT OF AN AGRARIAN SOCIETY

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5 Land Reform and Agricultural Improvement

LADISLAV FEIERABEND

I

162 Eastern Europe was overwhelmingly peasant be-
167 tween the two world wars. The peasantry, for whom land
369 was not merely a means of production or of income, but the established basis of family life, formed the majority of the population. The main problem of this region was rural overpopulation. In the period before the First World War, the surplus young people emigrated in considerable numbers to the United States and to other overseas countries. After 1918 this outlet was closed, and everybody had to remain on his home soil. There was too little land for too many people: roughly twice as many people were living off the land as was the case in Western Europe.

423 Everybody wanted land and therefore the price was
241 enormously high. After money was spent to buy the land, there was not enough left to buy the numbers of cattle that the holding could support or to improve farming techniques. Lack of capital was responsible for the fact that farming methods remained the same as they had been for fifty or more years. The yields were very low, and there was no possibility of increasing them. In fact, yields decreased be-

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423 cause the land was becoming exhausted. This was due to a
241 lack of manure and fertilizer and to the peasants' ignorance of land preservation techniques.

[464] Labor remained so cheap that the introduction of labor-saving devices did not pay. Overpopulation meant that there were more people living on holdings than were needed for the farm work. This situation caused underemployment. Since overpopulation decreased the output per man and with it the earnings per man, a very low standard of living resulted.

423 The size of the farms, which on the average was barely
656 ten acres, was a problem in itself, and the custom of dividing
185 land after the death of a peasant made the situation even more acute. The holdings consisted of many small and scattered strips so that it was impossible for the peasant to use machines, even when they were available. However, the land reforms, carried out after the First World War by the different governments, did have some success in equalizing the amounts of land held by the different peasants.

The land reforms grew out of political and national considerations rather than out of social and economic policy. The first and main objective of the agrarian parties was to expropriate the big landowners and to transfer their land to the peasants. The usual procedure was to fix a maximum acreage, usually about five hundred acres, and to decree that all land in excess of this amount should be sold to peasants, either to create new farms or to add to the area of peasant farms already in existence. Under these reforms, about twenty-five million acres were distributed, for the most part in quite small plots, averaging one hectare, or 2.4 acres. The smaller farms were given more land than the large, so that there was some leveling of the incomes derived from farming.

162 These reforms did not remedy the unhappy condition of
464 the peasantry, since they were unable to remove the main
51 causes for distress. If all the agricultural land of this region

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had been distributed equally among the peasants, the main result would have been the equalization of poverty. It was obvious that redistribution of the national income and wealth could not, by itself, greatly improve the condition of the people. The surplus agricultural population which was estimated, on the basis of the system of cultivation prevailing in that area, to be about fifteen million persons had to be absorbed, and that was an insoluble problem. This problem was heightened by the fact that between 1919 and 1939 the natural increase of population in this area remained almost three times as high as that in the West.

Some alleviation of the situation was sought in the development of industries. However, industrialization was a long-term measure, and the expense only added to the peasants' burden. The fiscal policy of the Eastern European states was to accumulate the national capital necessary for industrialization by taxes, tariffs, and prices. No money, or very little, was left for the peasants.

II

It would be unjust, however, to say that nothing was done to improve the lot of the peasantry. The governments were well aware that the land reforms should be supplemented by economic measures such as agrarian credits, modern cooperatives, development of transport, cheaper farm machinery, technical education and training. A great deal was accomplished by these measures.

The supply of credit was particularly important to the peasants. The need for capital to begin operations and to finance certain family needs, especially the weddings of daughters, made borrowing necessary. As banks would not make advances, money had to come from moneylenders who charged very high rates of interest. Often, the moneylender was the middleman who bought the peasant's produce

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452 and supplied him with goods. Frequently he had a strong
185 and pernicious hold on the peasant.

Therefore, the cooperative movement began with the
474 foundation of credit societies which formed a very large
668 proportion of all cooperatives. Besides these, there were co-
656 operative societies which supplied agricultural needs such as tools and seeds, traded agricultural products, and processed all sorts of produce. In Bulgaria, Hungary, and Rumania the cooperative movements were state-controlled. In Czechoslovakia the movement was independent but favored by the state; in Poland, beginning with the economic depression of the 1930's it was state-supported and therefore dependent.

The cooperative problem was a difficult one. On the one hand, cooperation among economically weak peasants could not succeed unless there was some collaboration with, or help from, the central authorities. On the other hand, such a relationship between strong and weak tended to develop into state domination of the cooperative movement.

474 The administrators of the cooperatives sometimes abused
452 their prerogatives. They would occasionally grant government loans, not in response to genuine needs or because of commercial considerations, but with a view to the substantial number of votes which one cooperative society could guarantee at election time. In some instances, cooperatives served only well-to-do peasants because some governments were opposed to the social revolutionary ideology of the smaller peasants. In Rumania the cooperative societies were forced to assume the function of the tax collector. In Hungary the cooperatives belonged to the peasants in appearance only. In reality, they were capitalist enterprises and were not in peasant hands.

Except in Czechoslovakia, agricultural cooperation did not play any decisive role in the economic life of the peasantry, nor was it able to alleviate the existing adverse

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conditions. Credit was no real help unless the peasant had 474
a reasonable expectation of being able to pay back what 452
he had borrowed. In many cases this hope was negligible. A large proportion of the money which the peasants, particularly the small peasants, borrowed went to buy consumer goods. Thus, greater indebtedness did not point to a higher degree of investment, but to the extreme poverty of the small farm.

There was some state help for this situation, especially 474
during the world-wide depression of the 1930's. In Bulgaria 452
and Rumania agricultural debts were converted by govern- 241
ment action. In 1934 some two hundred thousand Bulgarian 656
peasants benefited by reductions in their debts and in the rate of interest and by a prolongation of the time allowed for settlement. In Rumania some two and one-half million peasants were assisted by similar legislation. Other measures, although not so far-reaching, were put into practice elsewhere in Eastern Europe to alleviate peasant indebtedness. But the credit problem was only mitigated, and not solved. The peasants' need for cash remained, and the lack of capital still prevented them from improving their farming techniques or increasing their earning capacity.

The governments promoted intensive cultivation of non-cereals. Grain production was not appropriate to an overpopulated region, and a change to the production of livestock, livestock products, fruit, and vegetables was necessary. In Bulgaria and in some parts of Yugoslavia, intensive cultivation of garden crops, such as tobacco, tomatoes, wine, fruit, and roses was introduced. In Rumania, the cultivation of soya and other oil plants was introduced. These measures were, of course, just a beginning, and could not bring any substantial remedy.

Agriculture played the most important role of any single 241
factor in all the Eastern European countries except Czecho- 434
slovakia. The largest part of the national incomes was de-

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241 rived from agriculture. National prosperity was dependent
434 on the outcome of harvests and on the possibility of agricultural exports.

439 In the interwar period, these countries were victims of the fluctuations of the world market and of the policy of autarky which resulted from them. The countries of Western Europe from 1930 to 1932 imposed high tariffs on food imports in order to ward off the effects of the international slump in agriculture. In doing so, they ruined the Eastern European peasant. Export of agricultural products from all Eastern European countries was reduced to a minimum and prevented these countries from balancing their trade. Thus, it was impossible for them to buy the industrial goods and manufactures on which they depended to maintain industrial employment and the standard of living of the peasants themselves.

This crisis further reduced the possibilities of export because the Eastern European states were unable to compete in prices with the overseas agricultural exporting countries that had technical aid at their disposal and because they could not afford the enormous sums necessary for subsidizing exports of agricultural products. Many attempts were made by agrarian conferences to alleviate the distress by asking a preferential tariff system for this region, which would have meant the almost complete abolition of the most-favored-nation clause in bilateral commercial agreements. Another remedy was seen in the creation of an interstate grain purchasing commission that would buy up the chief surpluses from the Eastern European countries and distribute them among the different European importing countries. These proposed methods arose from the primary need of Eastern Europe, which was to acquire some form of economic security in the world market in order to provide a stable basis for peasant society.

Everything was in vain. It was impossible to achieve

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stable, fair prices for agricultural products and to secure 439
them a market. The Czechoslovakian Grain State Monopoly, established in 1934, was the only institution to bring any real benefit to the farming population. In other Eastern European countries, the situation reduced even further both the internal market and the income per head of the rural population. Less money than ever was available for improvements or for educating the peasants in new methods and techniques.

The alleviation of this situation came from Nazi Germany. Since 1935 Germany had been buying the greatest proportion of this region's agricultural surpluses and, in return, had been sending its own industrial goods into that area. Eastern Europe, and the Balkan states especially, became so dependent upon Germany's buying that the term "economic conquest" became a reality. This conquest, which was later political and military, of course did not bring any remedy to the agricultural problem of this region.

III

The Second World War devastated whole countries. No- 728
where did the four horsemen of the Apocalypse reap a 167
greater harvest than in Poland and Yugoslavia. In their wake came a troubled period which brought with it all the miseries and hardships that have always attended political and social revolutions. Vast numbers of the population were killed during the war. In Poland alone these numbered six million. The unbalance which this caused was greatly aggravated by enormous shifts of population in many of the Eastern European countries. The Germans were expelled from Poland and Czechoslovakia in millions, and from Hungary, Yugoslavia, and Rumania in hundreds of thousands. The total number of Germans expelled from this region was estimated at over eleven million. Changes in state

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728 frontiers were another cause for great migrations. Four mil-
167 lion Poles moved from the territory which was incorporated into the U.S.S.R., and millions of Poles, Czechs, and Slovaks moved into districts formerly inhabited by the Germans. Although these changes alleviated the problem of rural overpopulation in Eastern Europe, there was still, at the end of the Second World War, a surplus population estimated at nine million.

665 The Communist parties in various Eastern European
423 states knew very well how to exploit this situation. They
656 knew that it was vital to the success of revolution that the peasantry should not be opposed to it. They knew that the Russian Revolution had been achieved only because Lenin was fully aware of the desire of the peasant for more land.

471 Orthodox Marxist theory required that the land be nation-
423 alized and that it be administered by the state. Land was
662 considered the most important means of production, and it
656 had to be treated as such. This dogma was abandoned by Lenin for tactical reasons. He nationalized land in the Soviet Union during the revolution of 1917, but distributed it under ninety-nine-year leases to small and medium peasants for private exploitation. It was the political pressure of the peasants which forced Lenin to change his political doctrine and implement the agrarian program of the Populists, his political opponents. Lenin and his followers did not approve of the peasant who, according to them, was a relic of the precapitalistic society. It was Lenin's view that "small, individual farming gives birth to capitalism and the bourgeoisie daily, hourly, spontaneously and on a mass scale," and that in the future classless society the peasant was to assume the status of a worker on the land as his fellow in town was a worker in industry.

Political expediency determined Lenin's change in tactics. He supported small agrarian property holders only because

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he regarded the peasant as indispensable to the success of his 471
revolution and to the consolidation of his dictatorship. This 423
policy was reversed by Stalin after 1928 when forced col- 662
lectivization of land in the form of pseudo-cooperatives (col- 656
lective farms) was introduced in the Soviet Union.

Lenin's agricultural policy was adopted by all Eastern European Communist parties after the end of the Second World War. Being minorities in power, they knew that this was the only attitude they could take to the peasantry, the largest social group in this region. Therefore, they supported small agrarian property holders in the first stage of the development of their agricultural policy. There was only one difference between the Communist agricultural policies of Eastern Europe and Russia. Nationalization of land was not a part of the Eastern European policy, as it had not proved expedient in the Soviet Union and therefore was not contained in the agrarian policy of the Comintern for Eastern Europe in the inter-war period.

The Comintern had taken much interest in the Eastern 668
European agrarian question. In 1923 a Red Peasants Inter- 656
national was formed in Moscow as an effort to rally the 427
peasantry to the Communist ideal and to combat the influence of the peasant parties united in the Green International in Prague. The Soviet move to collectivization within the U.S.S.R. in 1929 was not followed by any shift in the agrarian policy of the Comintern. Any mention of collective farming was frowned upon and the whole emphasis was upon attracting or neutralizing the middle peasant by assisting the individual and by supporting with new land reforms the peasant's struggle for more land. This policy was not changed when the Cominform took over the role of the Comintern after the Second World War.

"The land to those who till it personally," was the slogan 471
of all Eastern European Communist parties, and land re- 423
forms were carried out in all countries. In Hungary, Albania, 656

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471 and in parts of Poland, land reforms were overdue, while in
423 other Eastern European states expropriation and expulsion
656 of the Germans formed the main basis of land reforms. Some forty-eight million acres, including forest land, were expropriated by the governments of which thirty million acres were distributed to some three million peasant families. The remainder was retained by the state.

To dispel any doubts as to the ultimate outcome of these reforms, the distributed land was declared the private property of the new owners, and in most countries it was laid down in the constitutions that "the land belongs to those who till it." The price to be paid by the beneficiaries was low, usually the equivalent of one year's harvest payable in ten to twenty installments. No compensation was paid to the old owners for the expropriated land.

The attitude toward the church and its landed property was less uniform than toward the secular owners. However, after some hesitation, most of the church estates exceeding the maximum size laid down in the land reform laws were also expropriated. In this way the church was deprived of its financial independence and of its economic influence on the rural population.

Even in the Baltic States which were incorporated into the Soviet Union, Stalin's methods were not followed. All the land and its resources, as in Russia, were declared public property and nationalized, and all the land in excess of seventy-five acres was expropriated for distribution, but no collectives were formed. However, through a system of differential delivery and farm taxes, the way was paved for ultimate collectivization.

423 All these land reforms had done nothing to solve the old
656 agricultural problem of Eastern Europe. On the contrary, they aggravated the situation. The land became more split up than ever, as larger farms were abolished. The reforms did not solve the problem of technical progress, and made the

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reorganization of agriculture even more necessary than it had been before. 423 56

Land reform was a political measure. Its aim was not the reorganization of production, but the redistribution of income. Its aim was to win the small peasant for the Communists, and to weaken the political influence of the agrarian parties. Therefore, the Communists stole the programs of the agrarian parties and publicized them as their own. Beside private ownership, these programs called for mechanization, consolidation of scattered strips, good and guaranteed prices for agricultural products, expansion of credit, reduction of taxes, and social insurance for all peasants. 661

The smallholders felt quite happy, generally speaking, on their new land. It may have produced less than it had in the hands of its former owners, but the smallholders' income was larger than it had been when they were employed as agricultural laborers. Many of them started believing the Communists and joined the Communist parties. One of the Communist aims was fulfilled.

IV

It should have been obvious to all that the Communists were preparing a program of land collectivization, and that the second stage of their agricultural policy would be similar to what it had been in the Soviet Union. But sufficient attention was not paid to these trends. Practically all forests and large stretches of arable land and pastures became state property and were organized as Communist state farms. District cooperative or state stations were established and equipped with heavy agricultural machinery, which was not practical for use on small fields. The Communists favored the allocation of equipment to cooperatives rather than to private persons. The cooperatives, which performed many public functions such as bulk purchasing of food and supplies, began to 474 423

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474 be controlled by the state machine and not by their mem-
423 bers, the peasants. At the same time, the independence of the church and its economic influence on the rural population was broken.

Once the Communists were established safely in power, they shifted their agricultural policy. Except in the Baltic States where the Communists resorted to deportations and in Rumania where they evicted some seventeen thousand Rumanian families from their homes, collectivization was started smoothly and was not recognized as such. The Communists did not speak about collectivization, but about transforming uneconomical small-scale enterprise to large-scale cooperative farming. They are still making great efforts to convince the small peasants that as members of production cooperatives they till their own land and manage their own affairs.

Collectivization is being instituted by a clever transformation of the cooperatives. This process begins with a number of peasants being instructed to form some such organization as a communal laundry, a chick hatchery, or a calf station. Then, usually before sowing or harvest time, the members are persuaded to share their labor, teams, and farm machinery, which sounds like nothing more than neighborly cooperation. The farms continue to be made up of separate private parcels. The next type of cooperative eliminates boundaries and plows out border strips. The expanded fields are worked by the cooperative, with systematic planning for crops, fodder, and hay. Thus, collective mass production is introduced, but the land still belongs to the members.

Collective management is a function of the third type of cooperative. In this type the crops belong to the cooperative, not to its members. The owners of the land give up all their rights of disposal and of management. The members contribute their livestock and most of their agricultural equipment to the organization. Cattle are kept in common barns,

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but a member may retain one cow and a calf, some pigs, 474
sheep, goats, and poultry. He also retains a garden plot of one 423
and one-fourth acres which he can cultivate according to his own wishes. Ten to 20 per cent of a season's profit is deducted from the whole profit and distributed as separate compensation to those members who contributed land for the use of the cooperative.

In the fourth type, no percentage is paid for use of land although the fields still belong to the farmers in the title registers. All profits are divided according to the labor units of the members. This is the real Soviet collective farm, in which private property has become a fiction. Members receive advances in money or supplies during the year for their work. At the end of the year their accounts are balanced on the basis of production and sales.

Collectivization is proceeding at a rapid pace in all the countries of this region. According to the latest news, over 40 per cent of the agricultural land has been collectivized or, in other words, is in the hands either of state farms or of production cooperatives.

Production cooperatives are not genuine cooperatives according to the Western definition of the term. The communist philosophy of subservience rather than freedom, class hatred rather than understanding, aggression rather than tolerance, coercion rather than mutuality, is against all genuine, fundamental cooperative principles. True cooperatives can be founded only on the initiative of their members. Those instigated by authority cannot be considered true cooperatives, nor can those which are under the domination of outside influences. There can be no true cooperatives in Communist countries, because the will of the members cannot be expressed.

Production cooperatives are excellent examples of the Communist pseudo-cooperative. They are created by the government and are dependent upon it. They must accept a

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474 423 government-dictated constitution. Cooperative members, instead of being the masters of their cooperatives, are their servants. They have to perform tasks which have been fixed without their knowledge or consent. In higher type Communist cooperatives, the members assume the status of landless laborers.

If the complete dependency of the cooperatives on the State Tractor and Machine Stations and on the Communist Party is taken into consideration, it is clear that production cooperatives are no more than state enterprises under the disguise of cooperatives. There is only one difference between a state farm and a production cooperative: the members of a cooperative have to bear all production risks. It is true that *de jure* they remain owners of their land, but *de facto* they cease to be owners as they cannot be sure of getting their fields back when they leave the cooperative. According to the constitution of these cooperatives, a member must accept other fields, if return of his own fields would disrupt the cooperative.

474 661 565 The Communists declare they prefer that peasants join cooperatives voluntarily. However, they are not above persuading private farmers to join by such methods as higher taxes and higher delivery quotas, less fertilizers and other production means at higher prices, and charges for all services higher than those paid by cooperative members. At the same time, they give private farmers no credit, no field hands, and no opportunity to use agricultural machines, while collectives enjoy almost unlimited credit and other facilities. Members of production cooperatives are rewarded by the government with free vacations in the best hotels at winter resorts and with free group travel to the Soviet Union; they are a privileged class in every respect.

In contrast, well-to-do peasants who used hired labor in free times are denounced as being "village rich," a term which is used in Eastern Europe to describe the equivalent of the

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Russian *kulak*. The village rich are not allowed to enter a collective or are expelled if they become members. A merciless battle is being waged to ruin them. They are being liquidated as peasants, removed from villages, and sent to mines or to industry or concentration camps. There are roughly thirteen million peasant families in Eastern Europe, more than one million of which are *kulaks*. The children of all these families must lose the individualistic traits of their peasant heritage: that is the Communist aim. 474 661 565

Large-scale industrialization plans, for military purposes rather than for consumer production, are being pushed forward with great vigor in all Eastern European states and new labor is required in great numbers. *Kulaks* and other class enemies are an obvious source for this labor. By tapping this source, the surplus agricultural population will be disposed of and the people with individualist outlook gradually destroyed. If there is a shortage of workers in agriculture, as for instance in Czechoslovakia now, industrial workers already persuaded to the collective way of thinking can be utilized. 433

The term *kulak* has come to mean anyone who is against collectivization, and all *kulaks* are to be destroyed. The process of destruction is quickly changing the status of the agrarian population in this region. The agricultural population is decreasing and, according to estimate, does not amount today to more than 45 per cent of the total population. This decrease is the political consequence of collectivization and not its economic or social result. The collectivization policy itself cannot solve the old problem of rural overpopulation but can only aggravate it. The real aim of Communist collectivization is not to solve this problem but rather to destroy the peasantry. 661

Agriculture, like the other divisions of economic life, has been dictated by state plans which prescribe to the peasant what crops are to be grown and what animals are to be bred. 241 185

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241 185 The peasants do not like regimentation and therefore the Communist economic plans have not brought about any increase in agricultural production.

208 The collectivization policy has further aggravated the situation. The peasants hate even the word "collective." They go about their work with indifference or with fear and hatred. Their aversion to coercion, dictatorship, and controls, their attachment to their land, and their pride in independence, have neutralized all the advantages of large-scale production with its mechanization and its use of modern agricultural methods. The Communist belief that large-scale operation would bring about efficient agricultural production has not materialized.

262 433 241 Agricultural production is decreasing. Eastern Europe used to be a very large exporter of all agricultural products, but it is suffering from shortages today. Food is scarce in these agricultural countries. Before the Second World War, nine out of ten residents of Czechoslovakia were nourished by the produce of Czechoslovakian agriculture. There were no rations. Everybody could buy what he wanted, and the standard of living in Czechoslovakia was the highest in Eastern Europe. Today, according to official Communist pronouncements, every second man in Czechoslovakia, despite strict rationing, has to be supplied from abroad. Milk, butter, and eggs are not distributed to adults at all, and even sugar is in short supply. Czechoslovakia, once the largest exporter of beet sugar in Europe, today cannot provide its diminished population with sugar although it has nearly 15 per cent fewer inhabitants than before 1938 due to the expulsion of the Germans. Bulgaria and Hungary, which had great surpluses of all agricultural products before the last war, must now import foodstuffs for their starving populations. Agricultural production in Eastern Europe has not yet attained the prewar level, although the free farms of Western Europe have surpassed it considerably.

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6 Peasantism: Its Ideology and Achievements

BRANKO M. PEŠELJ

I

That part of Europe which lies east of the Danzig-Trieste line is often referred to as "peasant Europe." This term indicates a twofold concept: Economically, "peasant Europe" stands for that part of the continent which is devoted primarily to agrarian production under the system of small and medium holdings and in which farming represents a tradition, a civilization, and a way of life. Sociologically and culturally, the term "peasant Europe" denotes an area in which by far the greatest portion of the population is peasant and forms a group whose economic, social, and cultural aspects have been genuinely preserved.

The differences between Eastern and Western Europe were less noticeable a hundred years ago than they were at the end of the Second World War. The industrial revolution which swept Western Europe in the second half of the nineteenth century generated profound economic and social changes over the continent as a whole, and contributed to its division into two distinct sectors. A consequence of this partition was the creation of unique social and economic conditions in Eastern Europe. These conditions, in turn, pro-

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178 voked political and social movements, such as had never been known in the West, and which expressed the distinctive socio-economic programs and political and social philosophies of the area.

565 Before any analysis of these peasant movements can be undertaken, it will be necessary to examine their human element, the peasantry. There are three points which are of most significance to this discussion: first, what is a peasantry; second, what are the differences between a peasantry and the rural population of the West, usually known as farmers; and third, what are the special characteristics of the Eastern European peasantry which have justified and made possible its separate political organization.

565 Despite the fact that the peasantry still represents a con-
829 siderable majority of the world's population, a uniform definition for it cannot be found. The reason for this is the different approach of various social and economic schools to the peasant problem. While the Marxists consider the peasantry from a purely economic point of view, evaluating this group only in the system of socialist production, liberals believe that there are aspects to the peasantry besides the economic which should be considered. The liberals point out the importance of the peasant's relationship to his land and the influence of his environment upon him. They realize that there are two elements, the sociological and the cultural, which are of great and equal significance in appraising the peasant society. The sociological element includes the individual's family life, the customs, traits, and trends of neighborhood and village communities, and the peasant's attachment to religious and other traditions. These traditions are upheld by a special type of "progressive conservatism." The cultural element includes all such features as folk songs, folk customs and habits, and so forth, which have developed independent of the cosmopolitan civilization.

In view of the foregoing, the peasantry may be defined

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tentatively as a group settled on a determined territory, having its principal source of livelihood in a cultivation of the soil that is based on the system of the small farm, and possessing its own way of life and its own indigenous culture. 565 829 [181]

This definition will help us answer our second question; namely, what are the differences between the peasants and the farmers. For a long time the rural sociologists of the West made no distinction between these two groups, and it is only recently that adequate attention has been given to this problem. Today it is generally recognized that between these two rural societies there exist essential dissimilarities which result from a permanent infiltration by the cosmopolitan civilization into the rural orbit. This process has been far more intense in the European and American rural groups, the farmers, than in the genuine peasant population. 565 182

With this distinction in mind, the farmers and the genuine peasantry may be contrasted. Economically speaking, the farmers produce primarily for the market, abiding by the established norms of offer and demand. Although they are attached to the land, they consider it almost impersonally and from an economic point of view. Therefore, they are willing to move from one area to another when there are economic reasons. The peasants, on the other hand, produce primarily for home consumption. Because their land is a part of their heritage, they consider it personally, as a part of their life and of their family tradition.

Socially, life in the rural communities of the West has become increasingly urbanized. The peasant society of Eastern Europe has been infiltrated by urban ideas to a far lesser degree and has preserved, generally speaking, many of its original aspects.

Culturally, the indigenous traditions of the farmer population, if not completely vanished, are disappearing rapidly. In the genuine peasant society, cultural traits are still clearly

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565 visible and constitute an outstanding characteristic of this
182 group.

The third point in this discussion of the peasantry concerns the special characteristics of the Eastern European peasantry which have enabled it to maintain a separate political organization. It can be said safely that nowhere in Europe have the characteristics peculiar to peasant society been so well preserved as in this region. Although numerical supremacy has been a factor in the preservation of peasant society, more important is the fact that the peasants of Eastern Europe have manifested in recent history a tremendous self-consciousness, political maturity, and determined will to create political and social organizations of their own, which, so far, have not been emulated by the peasantry in other parts of the globe. The peasantry of Western European countries, such as Spain, Portugal, or Italy, often comprises over 50 per cent of the rural population. However, this Western peasantry has never been able to generate powerful and influential peasant political organizations, nor has it been able to play an outstanding role in national life as has the peasantry of Eastern Europe.

II

566 The greater part of the peasantry in Eastern Europe was liberated from the bondages of serfdom in the year of revolutions, 1848. In that part of Poland which was included in the Russian Empire, the abolition of serfdom was proclaimed in 1861, and in Old Rumania, in 1864. The peasants of the Balkans, subjected to a special type of land tenure relations and vassalage as practiced in the Ottoman empire, were freed gradually with the withdrawal of the Turkish political power, especially after the arrangements made at the Congress of Berlin in 1878.

000 The liberation of the peasantry was a consequence of

The liberation of the peasantry was a consequence of the demands of the new liberal movement and was one of the achievements of the liberal regimes which gained momentum on the Continent after the Napoleonic era. This European liberalism had been a result of the struggle of the bourgeoisie against the old political and economic order upheld previously by the aristocracy. It originated in the theory of natural rights, as interpreted by French political philosophers of the eighteenth century, and included in its doctrine the postulate of political, economic, and social freedom and equality for all individuals. 668 641 565

However, it would be wrong to assume that the formal liberation of the peasantry was an immediate result of its emulation of other classes of society, in particular, of the bourgeoisie. On the contrary, the struggle for the realization of peasant rights had still to be fought.

The ruling regimes imposed political restrictions that were usually based on the tax census system and barred large masses of the peasant population from their right to vote in parliamentary elections. In many of the countries, it was not until the end of the First World War that complete franchise was granted to the peasantry. 641 565 178

Economic freedom, as advocated and practiced by liberalism, soon began to undermine the foundations of the peasant economy. The peasantry, which under feudalism had paid most of its rents and other fees to the landlord in natural produce, was placed suddenly in the midst of a complicated money-economy in which the autarkic arrangements of the peasant familistic economy were no longer valid. Peasant land, which throughout centuries had changed little in price or in value, was suddenly submitted to wide fluctuations in value as a consequence of the rapid development of the communication system and the erection of industrial plants. The appearance of a money-economy created the necessity of establishing an appropriate credit system which heretofore had been lacking completely in the peasant orbit. The state,

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641 however, following its policy of economic freedom, did not
565 deem it necessary to intervene in this problem, and left the
178 peasants open to the merciless exploitation of private banks and usurers. Economic individualism, accentuated by liberalism, induced individual members of the large peasant family groups, known among the Southern Slavs as *zadrugas*, to seek their economic independence. This process provoked a hasty and uncontrolled parcellation of the peasant land and contributed further to the economic weakness and inefficiency of the peasant system of farming.

The solemnly proclaimed social equality of the peasant was a farce. The ruling groups, derived from the bourgeoisie, the newly created bureaucracy, and the remnants of the aristocratic elements, looked upon the peasants with contempt and mistrust, considering them, although necessary to agrarian production, neither fitted nor qualified to take part in politics or public affairs. Social inequality was expressed both by the attitude of dominant ethnical groups to the "peoples of lower categories" and by the division within these groups between intelligentsia and the common people, or peasants.

Obviously, remedies were sought to correct the adverse conditions created in the liberal era, but before these are discussed, it is necessary to credit liberalism for those ideas and measures which, in principle, were universally accepted by the masses and which made possible their political organization. Generally speaking, the ideas of political freedom and of general education and a belief in the individual's capabilities were the stimulating forces behind the organization of the people. However, these ideas did not save liberalism, but prepared the road for its destruction.

829 The first reaction to the flaws in liberalism was the appearance of the "scientific socialism" of Karl Marx. It is important to note that this philosophy was conceived exclusively for the newly created industrial proletariat. The peasants, if

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considered at all, were reviewed and evaluated only from the 829
point of view of production with no attention paid to the human side of their problems. Moreover, the contempt of Marx for the peasantry is well known. He called them a "class of barbarians," and proclaimed his desire to save humanity from the "idiocy of rural life."

The reaction to scientific socialism and a simultaneous opposition to liberalism brought about the birth of Christian democracy which attempted to formulate a middle-road policy between the economic freedom of liberalism and the socialist doctrine of the total negation of the absolute truth, of private property, and of human dignity. Being primarily a reaction to the liberal-socialist dispute on capital-labor relations, this new doctrine was concerned very little, if at all, with the peasant problem which "remained the stepchild of public opinion and of the social policy."

The first attempt to use the contemporary social and eco- 668
nomic ideas for the organization of the peasant masses was 565
partly accountable for the appearance of Populism in Russia in the 1870's. More specifically, Populism was an endeavor to create an ideal agrarian peasant community by applying the theories of scientific socialism. This very fact converted the effort into a unique social and economic movement sharply in conflict with the orthodox Marxism. It became clear very soon to the promoters of Populism that the formulas conceived by Marx were inefficient in a rural society and that diversified methods must be sought if the needs and hopes of the peasants were to be satisfied. This new movement, although peasant, was of revolutionary character, not only demanding the land for the peasants but also advocating its collective ownership under a particular form of Russian organization known as the *mir*. It pointed out that the essence of the Populist program must be the institutions and desires inherent in the people and that it must not represent scientific formulas imported from abroad.

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829 Although Populism exerted some influence on the establishment of the Rumanian peasant movement, it had very little influence upon the other peasant movements in Eastern Europe. At the time when Populism was already an organized political force in Russia, the peasantry in Eastern Europe was still politically inactive. When the peasant mobilization began, more than two decades later, it was influenced little, if at all, by the Populist ideas.

668 565 423 The main reason for the relatively late organization of the peasantry in Eastern Europe was the presence of political and economic conditions essentially different from those prevailing in Tsarist Russia. Whereas regular political life was unknown in Russia, European liberalism favored the formation of political parties which would try to win the sympathies of the peasants by promising them the realization of their desires. Collective ownership of land was not a common institution in Eastern Europe. However, the prediction of Marx relating to the accumulation of capital and further expansion of large estates proved to be incorrect. On the contrary, many large land holdings, unable to accommodate themselves to modern capitalist management, commenced to disintegrate. The land was usually bought, in spite of heavy material sacrifices, by land-hungry neighboring peasants, and thus many new independent peasant holdings were created, which contributed considerably to the strengthening of the peasantry.

Hence, the establishment of a revolutionary peasant movement was checked by existing political conditions: the traditions of the Eastern European peasantry were opposed to collective forms of land ownership and to the socialist tenets of Populism. However, none of the existing political groups was fit to meet the increased desire of the peasantry for an organized action of their own, and, at the turn of the century, on an independent basis and in opposition to the contemporary political and social groups, peasant organization began.

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The common source of the peasant movements resided in the political, social, and economic evils of the liberal regimes, but immediate motives varied slightly in the different countries. In some countries, the emphasis on the necessity for peasant organization was a reaction to the adverse economic conditions to which the peasantry was exposed. In other countries, this move was a political and economic reaction to political and national oppression, economic exploitation, and the contempt of the ruling ethnical groups for the peasantry of subordinated nations. Finally, the Croatian peasants had special motives. Their peasant movement was organized chiefly to struggle for the social and political equality of the peasants against the dominating bourgeoisie and the bureaucracy. The latter, although it represented an insignificant minority in the nation, had monopolized Croatian political life. 668 565 423

The first to outline the philosophical principles of a peasant movement was Ante Radić in Croatia. Influenced by French Romantic philosophers, especially Michelet, Radić published, in 1896, his work, *Osnova*, in which he set forth his concept of the people (in peasant countries this meant the peasantry), and indicated their significance in the political and economic life of the nation. 668 565

The first coherent peasant organizations were those of the Bulgarians and the Czechs who both founded their first peasant political organizations in 1896. They were followed shortly by the Croatians in 1904, and by the Serbians and the Poles in 1905. The first steps for a peasant movement in Rumania were initiated in 1907, while in Hungary the appearance of a genuine peasant movement was retarded by political and socio-economic conditions until 1908. In the Baltic States, true political life started only with the independence gained after the First World War. Subsequently, powerful peasant political organizations were founded in Estonia and Latvia. In Albania the initiative for a peasant political or-

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668 565 ganization did not exist until the Second World War; the organization itself was established after the war by exiled political leaders.

In Slovenia, Slovakia, and Lithuania, on the other hand, truly peasant political organizations have never developed fully. In these Catholic countries the peasantry was influenced from the beginning by the Catholic political thought and subsequently organized on the principles of Christian democracy.

Although the immediate motives for peasant organization in different countries were varied, its demands were everywhere identical because of its common general source—its ideological basis. The programs made the following demands for the peasants: full political rights, proportional participation in public affairs, agrarian reform and distribution of the land to the peasants, social justice, and rights for the peasants in educational facilities equal to the rights of other classes in the state.

829 668 565 To understand better the peasant movements and their aims, three elements of their ideological and organizational structure must be discussed: first, their ideological basis; second, the dogmatic differences between these and other contemporary political and socio-economic trends; and third, the effective points of their practical programs.

829 665 The peasant ideology, or peasantism, is the outlook of the peasantry on the complex of political and socio-economic issues in which the peasants are interested and for whose solution they are fighting. The organizational forms of peasantism, established for the purposes of current political struggle, are the various peasant political parties. Unlike scientific socialism or Christian democracy, peasantism is not the artificial creation of an individual or group of individuals; it contains only those ideas which are inherent in the peasant soul and character. Consequently, the peasant leaders do not conceive the political soul of peasantism but merely interpret

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and articulate its principles. Hence, considerable differences must exist between peasantism and other contemporary movements.

Between peasantism and scientific socialism, there are irreconcilable differences, reflected in philosophical, economic, social, and political concepts. Philosophically, scientific socialism advocates economic determinism, dialectic materialism, and the materialistic interpretation of history. Consequently, it repudiates the existence of a superior being, rejects religion and spiritual values as detrimental to human development, and minimizes the significance of tradition. Peasantism, on the contrary, relies on the idealistic principles of philosophical reasoning, stresses the existence of God, points out the necessity for religious beliefs, and indicates the importance of spiritual values. It emphasizes as of equal importance the significance of tradition in human development and reaffirms its position in the peasant society.

Economically, scientific socialism demands the collectivization of the means of production, including land, and the introduction of a planned socialist economy. It evaluates individuals and collective groups exclusively on the basis of their role in socialist production and repudiates economic individualism in any form. Peasantism, on the contrary, defends firmly the principle of private ownership of the means of production, especially of the peasant land, and teaches that the right to dispose of the fruits of one's own labor is sacred and inviolable. It rejects the planned economy of socialism and favors private initiative and the system of free cooperation.

Socially, scientific socialism teaches the necessity of a permanent class struggle and considers as inevitable the revolutionary overthrow of the existing social and economic order by the proletariat. Peasantism, on the contrary, rejects the idea of class struggle and believes in the possibility of a peaceful coexistence of all classes of society. It also rejects

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the revolutionary methods advocated by scientific socialism, believing that the necessary changes in society can be achieved by peaceful means and evolutionary methods.

Politically, scientific socialism is totalitarian in its concept. It does not tolerate the existence of other political and social systems, nor is it willing to share power with other political groups. Peasantism, on the contrary, is genuinely democratic and ready to collaborate with other political and social forces provided they are democratically disposed and have their roots in the will of the people.

The differences between peasantism and other current ideologies, although existent, are less emphatic. Peasantism distinguishes itself from liberalism mainly in its economic ideas. While it agrees with liberalism on the concepts of political freedom and social equality, it rejects the ideas of the latter on uncontrolled economic liberties. Past experience has proved to the followers of peasantism that in peasant countries unrestricted economic liberties are detrimental to peasant farming and to national economies.

Ideological differences between peasantism and Christian democracy are more subtle. Both ideologies cherish the fundamental principles of human dignity and of individual freedom; both teach the existence of God, reject the materialistic interpretation of the world, and seek to establish a middle road between total economic freedom and complete submission of the individual to the community. Yet, there is an important structural element which has contributed essentially to a separate organization of the peasantry in Eastern Europe. Since 1891 when the papal encyclical, *Rerum Novarum*, was issued, and especially since 1931 with the appearance of the encyclical, *Quadragesimo Anno*, Christian democracy has been an eminently Catholic doctrine and, consequently, not best fitted to attract the peasantry which is made up of different religious denominations. Peasantism, on the contrary, while pointing out the necessity of religion,

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has no preference for any particular religious denomination and is for this reason better adapted to the peasantry. 829 668

Finally, peasantism rejects definitely the political and social concepts of modern totalitarianism. Totalitarian and undemocratic regimes in Eastern Europe during the interwar period were always upheld by military cliques, aristocratic and bureaucratic groups, or by the ruling dynasties whose aims were to keep the power at all costs and whose political methods and social views were diametrically opposed to the fundamental principles of peasantism.

Politically, peasantism advocates a system of parliamentarianism with two additional features: accentuation of local self-government and direct participation in the government of the greatest number of people. Economically, peasantism favors free cooperatives because it believes that cooperation preserves the principles of private property and permits the exercise of private initiative. The latter is favored when cooperative arrangements are not adequate to meet economic requirements.

III

Although the peasant movements and parties were initiated before the First World War, they achieved their full strength and political significance only after the war was over. There were three causes for this postwar rise of peasant political organizations: the formation of the national states, the universal franchise, and the agrarian reforms. 668 641

The formation of national states in Eastern Europe contributed enormously to the development of political life. While the people of this area had heretofore directed most of their political endeavors against the oppression of the ruling nations, in the new era they directed their efforts toward the solution of vital economic and social issues. 641

Universal franchise enabled the peasant population to

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641 participate in national elections and thus intensified the activities of the peasant political organizations. Only a decade earlier, because of the tax census system, none but a limited number of the peasants were entitled to vote, but in the national democratic states this right was granted to every male citizen over twenty-one years of age.

423 In Bulgaria, Rumania, Yugoslavia, Czechoslovakia, and Poland, a considerable number of agrarian reforms were accomplished which distributed large surfaces of arable land to individual peasants. They thus became economically independent and from then on were valiant champions of the peasant program. No substantial land reform was carried out in Hungary until 1945.

642 Unfortunately, the initial success of the peasant parties was not given political effect everywhere and, where peasant regimes were established, they were not of long duration. The advances of the peasant parties were neutralized soon by the counter actions of totalitarian elements which were opposed to democratic principles in general, and to peasant political and social concepts in particular. The peasant parties, faithful to their programs, favored and supported genuinely democratic systems and cooperated with other democratic groups but, with the disappearance of the democratic order, their own position became precarious. It must be admitted that the complicated machinery of a democratic regime was unable to run smoothly at all times in the newly established national states, except in Czechoslovakia. However, this deficiency should not be interpreted as a lack of interest in democratic institutions nor as a disapproving attitude toward the principles of freedom which symbolize Western political thought. The democratic regimes came up against a complex of problems whose complete, satisfactory, and early settlement was somewhat unreasonably expected by the newly created national states. Profiting from these adverse and interrelated domestic conditions, the totalitarian elements found inter-

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vention possible. They usually claimed that this intervention 642
was necessary "to save the country from the total chaos in which it was driven by the unsatisfactory operating of democratic institutions." What was even worse, new regimes were supported often by the Western democracies who used the unjustifiable excuse that "no other solutions were possible."

Despite the mistakes and failures of the democratic regimes, today even the most bitter opponents of peasantism must admit that the peasant parties, as political organizations, were stalwart champions of democratic government and did not, in general, support the established dictatorships or their undemocratic methods.

The greatest achievement of all the peasant groups was 665
that of the Bulgarian Agrarian Union. From its modest be- 642
ginnings in 1896, the Union grew steadily. In the first post- 423
war elections it received a strong relative majority in the 185
National Assembly, and in the elections of April 1923, 212 deputies out of 245 were allotted to the Agrarian Union. At the relatively early date of October 1919, the first Bulgarian peasant government of Aleksander Stambolisky was formed. The most significant of its numerous political and economic achievements was the agrarian reform based on the principles that the land should be the property of those who till it and that every peasant is entitled to only as much land as he and his family are able to cultivate. In spite of the certain weaknesses and deficiencies of this peasant government which contributed to its downfall, its democratic basis cannot be denied. Its reforms converted Bulgaria into a country of small and medium peasant holdings which, despite the forcible overthrow of the peasant regime in June 1923, remained unchanged until the end of the Second World War.

In Czechoslovakia, the Republican Agrarian Party was the 665
strongest party in the Parliament and the most important 642
pillar of the Czechoslovakian democracy. After the political

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665 liberation of the Czechs and the Slovaks in 1918, the party's
642 main goal was to secure economic and social prosperity for the Czech and Slovak peasants, chiefly by promoting cooperative organizations and by defending the interests of the peasant populations. The party averaged forty-five deputies on all national elections and cooperated with other democratic parties in the governments of the Republic. The President of the Party, Antonin Švehla and his successor, Milan Hodža, were for many years Prime Ministers of the Czechoslovakian governments.

665 The Croatian Peasant Party, established in 1904 by the
185 brothers Ante and Stjepan Radić, reached its full political importance in the first postwar elections in Yugoslavia. This was in November 1920, and at that time the party became the undisputed choice of the Croatian people. In all free parliamentary elections since then, the Croatians, and especially the Croatian peasantry, have cast their votes in overwhelming majority for this political group. The principal aims of the party's program were Croatian national independence and social and economic justice. When the president of the party, Stjepan Radić, was assassinated in June 1928, Vladko Maček, who heads the party today, was elected president. In its political struggle, the party has opposed violently the Yugoslav centralism favored by the majority of Serbian political groups, and has been outlawed twice as "dangerous for the interests of the state." In August 1939, a compromise that opened the door for a just settlement of the Serbo-Croatian dispute was reached with the Regency of the Kingdom of Yugoslavia and with certain of the Serbian political parties.

The beginnings of the Polish peasant movements date back to 1905, when the first Polish peasant associations were organized in Galicia under the leadership of Wincenty Witos. With this as an initiative, the Polish peasant party, *Piast*, was founded in Cracow in 1913. During the First World War,

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in the Russian part of Poland, another peasant party, *Liberation*, was born. Its leader was Stanislaw Thugutt. This party emphasized the solution of social and economic problems, demanding primarily an extensive land reform and distribution of the land to the peasants. In liberated and united Poland, these two peasant groups united in 1920 to become the strongest individual Polish political group, but later, in May 1923, one faction dissented. Witos was repeatedly elected Prime Minister and was holding this position in 1926 when the military *coup d'état*, executed by Pilsudski, put an end to democratic government in Poland. In 1928, during the dictatorship, all peasant political groups fused in a united peasant party under the leadership of Witos and Mikolajczyk, but, because of the undemocratic regime, this group was never permitted to take part in Poland's political life.

Although it may be argued that the embryonic stage of peasant organization in Serbia started in 1882 under the influence of the socialist ideas of Svetozar Marković, it is more correct to say that the first truly peasant movement in Serbia began in 1905 with the actions of Milislav Kurtović. In 1920, in the new state, Yugoslavia, the Agrarian Union of the Serbians, Croatians, and Slovenes was established, under the leadership of Joca Jovanović. The Union had little success among the Croatian and Slovenian peasantry, and was later known as the Serbian Agrarian Party. It recruited its followers mainly from the Serbian peasants in Serbia, Bosnia, and northern Dalmatia. The party was in the difficult position of being obliged to compete politically with two well-established Serbian parties, the Radicals and the Democrats. The provisions of the electoral law were unfavorable to the smaller political formations and, for this reason, the party was hindered from obtaining a proportional number of deputies in national elections. In June 1938, after the death of Joca Jovanović, Milan Gavrilović was elected the new president of the party.

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665 The initiative for a peasant organization in Rumania was
185 given in 1907, in Jassy, Bessarabia, by Constantine Stere,
642 who was influenced by Russian Populism. The Rumanian Peasant Party was formally founded in 1919, and Ion Mihalache was elected its President. In 1926, the Rumanian National Party from Transylvania, led by Iuliu Maniu, and the Peasant Party of the Old Kingdom fused into one political group known as the Rumanian National Peasant Party, which became the strongest political organization of the country. In the elections of 1928, the overwhelming majority of votes were cast for this united peasant front, and a peasant government was formed with Maniu as Prime Minister. This party brought about some administrative, economic, and social reforms which aimed at the assurance of the progress of the Rumanian state. Unfortunately, the peasant rule was definitely handicapped by the international agrarian crisis which was at its peak during the period of the peasant government. The party's position was further aggravated by its continuous struggle with the liberals and by numerous intrigues of the Crown calculated to destroy the unity and vigor of the peasant group.

665 Because of specific conditions which existed in Hungary, the organization of the peasantry commenced relatively late. Sandor Czismadia made the first attempt to organize the landless peasants on the principles of agrarian socialism in 1896, but the genuine peasant movement was initiated by István Nagyatádi-Szabó in 1908. The movement grew in strength after the collapse of the first Communist regime of Béla Kun, but its original success and its hopes for the future were skilfully suppressed by the Hungarian ruling class. It was not until 1930 that Zoltan Tildy and Ferenc Nagy undertook the revival of a truly peasant political organization. As a consequence, the Hungarian Smallholders Party was founded. This party fought valiantly against all the odds of the authoritarian Hungarian regime, but was not able to at-

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tain its full strength until after the First World War in the 665
November elections of 1945.

The first international agreement among various peasant 648
groups was reached in 1921, subsequent to the visit of the 665
Bulgarian Premier Stambolisky to Prague. This agreement was between the Bulgarian Agrarian Union and the Czechoslovak Republican Agrarian Party, and was later joined by the Polish Peasant Party. The agreement was, however, of a short duration and of little significance in international relations. In 1923 Stambolisky was overthrown and assassinated, and in 1926 the Prime Minister, Witos, was ousted following the military putsch of Pilsudski.

In 1928 efforts were renewed to achieve an international peasant understanding, and in 1929 the International Agrarian Bureau in Prague was established. The Bureau was presided over by Švehla, and nineteen different peasant organizations from all parts of Europe participated in its work. The Bureau stood for the principles of cooperation, mutual aid, friendship, democracy, and peace. Unfortunately, international conditions did not favor such an association. Except in Czechoslovakia, democratic political movements throughout Eastern Europe were either already outlawed or under heavy pressure of the authoritarian regimes. Moreover, the international agrarian crisis and other unsolved international problems were considerable hindrances to the good will and honest endeavors of the peasant leaders. Nevertheless, the International Agrarian Bureau has contributed considerably to the presentation and defense of the peasant cause in the world. Its activities were discontinued only with the total occupation of Czechoslovakia in March 1939.

IV

As might have been expected, the main efforts of the 661
Communists, when they formed the People's Democracies 661

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665 in Eastern Europe, were directed against the peasant po-
661 litical groups. Besides the unbridgeable ideological differences between peasantism and communism, and the proverbial intolerance of the latter, there were specific reasons why the violence of the Communist regimes reached its climax during the suppression of the peasant political opposition.

First, the peasantry forms a substantial majority in the greater part of the area. The Communists are unscrupulous in their methods, but they are not brainless when considering the accomplishment of their targets. They know that the peasantry can be temporarily intimidated but never permanently quashed if it maintains political organizations of its own. Hence, these organizations had to be crushed before the Communists could expect any success.

Second, the peasant parties constituted the strongest democratic force in the area. The totalitarian elements had been destroyed for the most part by the Second World War, but the peasants, who could not be reproached with either collaboration or totalitarianism and could not be labeled as "fascist reactionaries," remained the greatest danger to the Communists—the self-imposed "liberators and people's friends." Hence, these groups had to be liquidated before the Communist power could be effective and its program carried out.

Third, the peasant parties possessed a vigorous program, and nothing infuriates the Communists more than a challenge to their alleged monopoly on the solution of current issues. It is obvious that those who advocate outgrown ideas in a peasant country have little chance for success, but the political platforms of the peasant parties had far more to offer the peasant population than the forcibly implemented, nebulous formulas and strange institutions imported by the Communists. However, in Communist controlled countries

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no alternatives are permitted, and hence, the peasant leaders had to be eliminated. 665 661

In view of the foregoing, it is not surprising that the formal disappearance of genuine peasant political organizations in this region is today an accomplished fact. Various procedures were used to achieve this. In Yugoslavia, the Croatian Peasant Party and the Serbian Agrarian Union were banned, together with all other democratic parties, at the very beginning of the Communist era. Several fake peasant groups were established whose tasks were to support the proletarization of the country and to demonstrate to the outside world that the "progressive and thinking peasantry" greeted the new reforms enthusiastically.

In Czechoslovakia, some political parties were active in the postwar period preceding the Communist coup in February 1948, but the Czechoslovakian Agrarian Party was deliberately banned at the close of the war, and its leaders arrested and tried for alleged collaboration with the Germans. Today it is obvious that these collaboration charges were a skillful maneuver of the Communists to eliminate their most dangerous opponents.

The Agrarian Union in Bulgaria was at first in the coalition government with the Communists, who held the key positions in the army and in the administration. Through direct Soviet intervention and the political violence of the Communists, the Agrarians were first reduced to one third of their actual strength, and subsequently liquidated with the trial of their leader, Petkov, in September 1947.

In Rumania the situation was similar. Hopes for the promised free elections were not realized and, in August 1947, the peasant leaders, Maniu and Mihalache, were sentenced to life imprisonment as "foreign agents and enemies of the people." This meant the end of organized peasant opposition in Rumania. In Poland Mikolajczyk attempted in vain to secure

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665 the rights of the Peasant Party, but in the controlled elections
661 of January 1947, the party was reduced to twenty-seven deputies which completely paralyzed it in its further political struggle.

The situation was different in Hungary. In the elections of November 1945, the Hungarian Smallholders Party polled 59 per cent of all the votes and subsequently formed the government under the premiership of Ferenc Nagy. However, only eighteen months later, after numerous Communist plots, the party was crushed, and in subsequent developments it was politically liquidated.

When it became impossible for the peasantry to continue its struggle within the respective countries, the exiled peasant leaders founded the International Peasant Union in Washington, D.C., on July 4th, 1947. The Union, in which all peasant groups are represented, issued a program founded on the basic principles of peasant ideology. Its primary purpose is to interest the democratic West in the peasant struggle and to offer hope to the enslaved peasantry for its eventual liberation.

V

000 This brief analysis of peasantism in Eastern Europe is not intended to be a glorification of the peasantry and its movement. The peasants are not a God-chosen group, neither are their leaders without faults and errors. Mistakes have been committed by the peasant parties in the past, and many more may be committed in the future. But who does not err in politics and public affairs? Surely these imperfections are not sufficient reason for disfavoring the peasantry or for rejecting the idea of an active support of peasant political organizations. The purpose of this essay has been to indicate the importance of the peasantry in the struggle of the free world with the Communists.

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It is clear that the peasants, as a group, represent the greatest obstacle to Communist victory. The immediate goal of the Communists is to crush the peasant resistance, to destroy their political power, and to convert them into an amorphous, subservient mass. Hence, the free world must aim to preserve the peasantry as a separate and dynamic group, and to strengthen its political formations. 661

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7 Industrial and Social Policies Between the Wars

GEZA TELEKI

101 Eastern Europe, from the Baltic to the Aegean, is
175 a security zone both for the states of Western Europe and
178 for Russia. Besides acting as a safety valve for neighboring powers, this region is a passageway between them. Military and population movements fan out from here into the East or converge into the West.

Both West and East have accused this part of Europe of being unstable and backward. Both have wanted to influence it and have not wanted to admit that the backwardness, confusion, and instability of this area are in large measure due to power politics. Tribes, peoples, and states have changed and have been changed in this region throughout the centuries. As a result, there is no stability of boundaries, or of peoples and governments. The evolution of the region can be viewed as a mirror which reflects the history of Europe with all its quirks and irregularities.

Although both world wars began in Eastern Europe, it would be absurd to claim that they were caused solely by these nations and their problems. The social, economic, and political interests of the great powers which clashed in this area and influenced its peoples played an important role in the course of events in Eastern Europe.

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Because of this situation, the different peoples of this region turn three different masks to the world. One is always turned toward the West, one toward the East, and one is used for the stage show that these peoples put on for each other. If a nation of Eastern Europe takes off its mask, it may disappear from the stage forever. This is an important point to keep in mind in trying to understand the evolution of these countries. 101 178

Another important factor in the history of this region is that all the important ideologies and social revolutions have moved from West to East. Nationalism and the abolition of serfdom reached Eastern Europe in the nineteenth century. Industrialization advanced eastward at the end of the nineteenth century and during the first half of the twentieth. The closer a state was connected with the West, the sooner its transformation took place, while the other states were forced to develop in a comparatively short time in order to maintain their status as equals.

I

As a result of the Treaty of Versailles, everything changed in this area of constant change—boundaries, minorities, administrations, politics, and economics. In spite of these changes, and this is most important, the Eastern European countries remained predominantly agricultural. 178 162 241

The proportions of populations dependent upon agriculture in the several states within a decade after gaining full independence were as follows: Albania, 80 per cent; Bulgaria, 75 per cent; Rumania, 72 per cent; Yugoslavia, 76 per cent; Poland, 60 per cent; Hungary, 51 per cent; and Czechoslovakia 33 per cent. In contrast to these figures, the percentages of gainfully occupied males in industry in the same period were: Bulgaria, 13 per cent; Rumania, 11 per cent; Yugoslavia, 14 per cent; Poland, 22 per cent; Hungary, 26

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178 per cent; and Czechoslovakia, 41 per cent. Thus it can be
162 easily seen that, with the exception of Czechoslovakia whose
241 industry was the most developed in the region, the countries of Eastern Europe were predominantly agricultural and peasant in nature. Yet despite the predominantly peasant character of these countries, the peasants as such had relatively little political influence.

178 Although there was an increase in the output of agricul-
241 tural goods in all these countries between 1918 and 1945,
511 the competition offered by overseas cereals strongly affected the agriculture of Eastern Europe. Cereals, one of the major products of the region, had to be undersold to Germany. Added to this unfortunate situation, the world depression of 1929 came as a terrible blow to the economy of Eastern Europe, the most disastrous years lasting from 1931 until 1934. Industry, with its frequent cartels, was better able to defend itself than was agriculture, and thus the "price scissors," or the disparity between agricultural and industrial prices, cut mostly into the income of the agricultural population. This resulted in a general lowering of both the purchasing power and the standard of living. Loans at high rates of interest were frequent and taxation increased the poverty of the peasants. These, as the major element of the population, pressed heavily for reforms and spread malcontent in their respective countries.

185 Soon after the First World War, some states realized that
167 the solution to this situation was industrialization. Emigra-
433 tion, as a possible solution, was not favored in any of the Eastern European states as it would have decreased manpower. Since war was considered more or less imminent after 1933, military and industrial groups were especially opposed to any large-scale loss of population, although emigration was never prohibited by actual government order.

185 Bohemia, which had been in a highly advantageous posi-
433 tion in the industrialization program of Austria before the

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First World War, was the only well-developed industrial region and provided the foundations of the industrial economy of Czechoslovakia. Poland and Hungary had some valuable industries which aided their development considerably. In the other states, industrialization made slow progress and often operated on an unsound basis. Many plants were erected, the products of which were not related to the needs of the respective countries. National welfare was often neglected and industries were built for the enrichment of a few individuals. Not even mining was efficient. Mines were exhausted or were reopened mainly on the basis of sudden export needs and with no thought that the industries might convert the mineral raw materials into consumer goods. Hungary, where bauxite was sold to Germany and aluminum was repurchased at a high price, offers an excellent example.

Mining, metallurgy, heavy industry, and textiles were favored but they were not related to the purchasing power of the masses or to the production of raw materials. Because of the low production of textile raw material, large textile plants were run on imports. Cereals, livestock, and other agricultural goods were exported to balance the budget. Thus, much of the capital had to be spent on transportation expenses. The attention paid to agricultural industry was insufficient despite the fact that mineral raw materials, agricultural products, and timber were assets upon which a satisfactory program of industrialization could have been based.

The causes for this situation are to be found in the political instability of Eastern Europe and in the lack of sufficient skills and resources. It was a region of wars and insecurity where little nations faced each other with mistrust and fought each other as fiercely as they did the outside powers. Industrial policy between the two world wars was dependent on power politics. The policy of economic self-sufficiency, or autarky, was engendered by nationalistic as-

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648 pirations mostly in order to develop a modern industry ca-
433 pable of meeting war needs.
178

The assumption that work invested in industrial development would improve economic conditions was a decisive factor in influencing states to industrialize. This assumption was particularly valid in regions with climatic extremities and little arable land. Some of the means used to foster industrialization were technical education, customs, embargoes, tax exemptions, monopolies, favorable credit policies, and provisions protecting the joint interests of domestic industries. The assembly line system, as influenced by the United States, was started in the industrial sector in the '30's.

Branches of industry requiring specialized skill were developed mainly in Czechoslovakia and Hungary, but they did not attract many from the surplus peasant population which still preferred unskilled jobs. The competition, such as it was, for unskilled jobs resulted in a low wage level. Therefore, the increase in purchasing power was gradual. Peasant poverty and the lack of skill and capital were the fundamental problems facing industrialization programs and the new governmental economic policies.

426 The general poverty was further increased by the fact
439 that the small Eastern European countries were debtor states. The solvency of Czechoslovakia was dependent on the export of industrial goods, while other states depended upon agricultural exports or, as in Rumania, upon mineral raw materials and lumber as well as on agricultural goods. Foreign debts, incurred before and after the First World War, weighed heavily on the budgets of the individual countries. Only one half of the debts were repaid during the interwar period. Foreign loans were given too often on the basis of political considerations. The boundaries erected by the 1920 peace treaties had already broken up natural economic and geographic areas, and the disproportionate lending policies of foreign powers hindered the uniform economic development of East-

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ern Europe. The individual states became more and more 426
antagonistic and trade within the Eastern European area 439
often took a course contrary to the requirements of reasonable economic policies. Free trade, cherished in the first postwar years, was soon abandoned for the sake of a policy of protective tariffs. Customs, duties, and foreign exchange restrictions to prevent speculation, were introduced to protect economic development and strength.

Both "economic nationalism" and "small power imperial- 186
ism" were features characteristic of this area in the period 433
between the wars. When the economic position of the new 648
states in the '20's is compared with the situation prior to the First World War, the problems of these states emerge clearly. The economic well-being of the old Austro-Hungarian empire lay in the regional character of its economic organization, which depended mostly on a coordinated internal market and a natural division of labor between the component parts of the empire. Although it was a social and cultural mosaic, the empire was organized in such a manner as to take advantage of the regional distribution of natural resources and the differing skills of the various populations.

The peace treaties ending the First World War, while meeting the political aspirations of various nationalities, did not provide a satisfactory solution to the economic problems of the region, and the newly created states were divided by serious political and economic differences. Political animosity soon led to economic warfare, and self-sufficiency, the driving motivation of the new states, precluded any real possibility of economic cooperation. The world depression of the early '30's led to the final economic and psychological collapse of Eastern European stability and opened the door wide to German economic penetration and the eventual conquest of the region.

The foreign trade of the Eastern European countries in 439
the years 1919-1944 was far smaller than it should have

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439 been, considering the size and population of these countries. Although they comprised roughly 25 per cent of Europe's area and population, excluding the European part of the Soviet Union, they handled no more than 10 or 11 per cent of Europe's exports and imports. About one third of the trade of the Eastern European area was purely regional. With the exception of Albania which traded mainly with Italy, Eastern Europe's trade list was headed by Germany, followed by the competing states of Austria, Great Britain, and the United States. The predominance of Germany became even greater during the war years. Trade was one of Germany's most important means of influencing the political, social, and cultural life of this region.

II

178 By 1918 the countries of Eastern Europe had reached different stages of social evolution. In Poland and Hungary the aristocracy had preserved considerable power in spite of a rising intellectual bourgeoisie. In Rumania and Croatia the power of the aristocracy had been wiped out by the land reforms and leadership had been taken over by a commercial middle class. In Czechoslovakia a strong bureaucratic and commercial element had risen to leadership. In the Baltic states, also, it was mainly the commercial class which had ascended to leading positions. Yugoslavia, Bulgaria, and Albania had no aristocracy and only a small intellectual bourgeoisie and commercial class.

It was generally from the rural stratum of village teachers,
369 priests, station masters, and notaries that the new bourgeoisie and the ruling class arose. The children of an educated father, who was able to secure a better place in society, had a better chance of entering a university—the sanctuary as much of social position and status as of knowledge. However, those who succeeded in obtaining graduate and other degrees in

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fields such as law, medicine, engineering, or economics often 369
renounced their humble origin and were happy to be absorbed into the urban population. Even the newly formed commercial class preferred to stay in the cities. As a result, the urban population increased steadily and towns grew rapidly.

Urbanization advanced with the growth of industry. An 369
illustration of this is offered by the growth in population of 162
six industrial cities in each of the following countries: Poland, Czechoslovakia, Hungary, Rumania, Yugoslavia, and Bulgaria. The total population of these cities rose from six and one-half million to ten million between the two world wars. The pace of industrialization was most rapid in Bulgaria, Yugoslavia, and Poland, where the aforementioned cities almost doubled their urban population. In the other three countries (Czechoslovakia, Hungary, Rumania), the population in these cities increased by approximately 30 per cent. Striking examples of how industrialization and transportation attracted people to cities are given by Katowice, a coal and heavy industry center in Silesia, whose population rose from forty-five to one hundred and thirty-three thousand, and by Gdynia, Poland's Baltic port, whose population rose from three to one hundred and fourteen thousand between the wars.

The regional distribution of industrial population was not uniform. Around 1930, 90 per cent of Czechoslovakia's industrial population lived in the Czecho-Moravian district. Poland's industrial population concentrated around Warsaw, Lodz, and the Silesian coal basin. In Hungary, 41 per cent of the people earning their livings in industrial occupations were concentrated in Budapest. In Yugoslavia, 63 per cent of the industrial wage earners lived in Croatia and in the regions that had previously been Hungarian. In Rumania, 25 per cent of the industrial population lived in Transylvania and 28 per cent in Muntenia. Only Bulgaria's industrial pop-

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369 ulation showed any tendency toward decentralization, with
162 30 per cent of her total industrial population living in the district of Sofia.

The industrial population of these countries was occupied as follows: 25 to 30 per cent in the textile and clothing industries; 18 to 21 per cent in heavy and metallurgy industries; 11 to 22 per cent in the food industry; and 7 to 17 per cent in the lumber industry. A variation in industrial goods and in producing plants was found only in Czechoslovakia and Hungary, in southern Poland and Transylvania, and in the areas of the former Austro-Hungarian Empire.

466 One of the major problems facing the new governments
745 in their industrialization programs was to equate the growth
185 of the industrial working populations with improvement in industrial working and social conditions. Social legislation in the interwar period attained considerable progress in this direction. Prior to 1914 there already existed in Eastern Europe various social insurance and pension plans, and these were expanded between 1919 and 1939. Compulsory workers' accident and health insurance plans were introduced whereby both employers and wage earners contributed to a central fund to provide coverage for accident, illness, maternity, disability, old age, death, and unemployment. Generally speaking, the working day was reduced to eight hours, with a maximum forty-eight hour week, and the age minimum for child and woman labor was fixed at fourteen years or, in the case of heavy and dangerous work, such as mining, at sixteen to eighteen years. However, rigid application of these measures was far from universal.

A notable innovation was the establishment by the agrarian regime in Bulgaria of a compulsory labor service for the development of public works in place of the traditional military service which had been prohibited by the peace treaty. Expenditures in 1937 for social services for the entire region averaged 3 per cent of the estimated national in-

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come. Once again, Czechoslovakia headed the list with 5.5 per cent while the Balkan countries devoted only 1.5 per cent of their national income to social services. In the same year the number of persons registered as unemployed in the various countries was as follows: Czechoslovakia, 408,000; Poland, 347,000; Hungary, 47,000; Yugoslavia, 21,600; and Rumania, 10,800.

A major consequence of industrialization and urbanization was the rapid growth both of an urban proletariat and of the bureaucracy. Those people who had been separated from their ancestral rural surroundings and traditions and often from the influence of their families became increasingly detached from spiritual matters and turned more and more towards materialistic and technical spheres. The number of bureaucrats grew rapidly and this resulted in political favoritism and in desk-level programs which very seldom touched the people of the countryside.

It cannot be said, however, that no progress was made or that standards of living were consistently low. It must be remembered that it was not until the First World War that many of these countries attained independence. A part of Poland had just emerged from Russian domination and certain areas of the Balkan states had just freed themselves from Ottoman rule. Even Hungary, Czechoslovakia, Croatia, and parts of Poland had been freed only recently from Austro-German political and economic controls. Under these circumstances, the progress made by these countries, notwithstanding failures and mistakes, was considerable indeed.

III

The states that had dominated this region before the First World War—Germany, Austria-Hungary, Russia, and the Ottoman empire—showed little interest in improving the educational standards of the large masses in Eastern Europe.

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871 Illiteracy in the prewar era was extremely prevalent except in
212 Bohemia, Slovenia, a part of Hungary, and the formerly German-ruled section of Poland. Following the various educational reforms and the expansion of facilities during the '20's, the illiteracy rates were: 31.4 per cent (1934) for Bulgaria, 4.1 per cent (1930) for Czechoslovakia, 6.0 per cent (1941) for Hungary, 23.1 per cent (1931) for Poland, 23.1 per cent (1948) for Rumania, and 45.2 per cent (1931) for Yugoslavia. In spite of the notable progress attained within a decade and a half of liberation, the problem of achieving literacy and education for the masses remained a considerable one.

658 In the interwar period, a vast number of schools were built and many universities were founded or enlarged. National statistics show that on the average 3 per cent of the estimated national incomes was devoted to education for the region as a whole. Czechoslovakia, with 3.5 per cent, had the largest budgetary provision for education, spending in 1937 the
871 equivalent of eighty-four million dollars. Universal compulsory elementary education was introduced widely in this area. However, the number and quality of teachers did not increase
[565] as rapidly as did the buildings. Therefore, especially in the eastern and southern regions, semieducated or semiskilled individuals were numerous, and anyone who had been exposed to education considered himself an "intellectual." Under such circumstances, this term very often stood for mere prestige, and the "intellectuals" exerted influence out of proportion to their training. A poor system of communication, a dispersed settlement pattern, mediocre teachers and, last but not least, the rather uncooperative behavior of the peasants impeded the possibilities of an adequate education for the peasant class, which represented the majority of Eastern Europe's population.

000 Due to the prevalence of a liberalism linked with national-

Due to the prevalence of a liberalism linked with national- 186
ism, studies concentrated on history, which was generally 871
given a romantic interpretation. The study of geography was 814
heavily larded with political convictions and misinterpretations of ethnography. Although the universities of Czechoslovakia and Hungary were on a high academic level at a time when other universities were just becoming active, their students spent too much time in petty politics. Most of the 186
student organizations supported some political person or 668
party and, as a consequence, were strongly influenced by demagogues. The Polish and Rumanian universities especially were exploited by politicians, and often even by the police, for political purposes. Frequent political meetings aroused a discontented idealism and produced only too often regrettable chauvinistic or antisemitic behavior.

Anti-Semitism became a common denominator with which 798
Hitler was able to unite the rising youth and the politicians of Eastern Europe. The responsibility for this state of affairs lay with the governments and the ruling groups.

Although the new boundaries had been drawn on the 563
principle of national self-determination, the mixture of nationalities in many areas, as well as historical and geographical factors, had resulted in the inclusion of important minorities within the new states. These minorities were fragments of peoples rather than whole nations as had been the case before the war and, since they were in many cases unwilling citizens of the new states, their presence constituted a grave problem. The eight million inhabitants of Poland, Rumania, and Czechoslovakia that spoke Russian, Ukrainian (Ruthenian), and White Russian as their mother tongue, the almost six million German-speaking citizens of Czechoslovakia, Poland, Rumania, Yugoslavia, and Hungary, and the almost three million Hungarian-speaking inhabitants of neighboring Rumania, Czechoslovakia and Yugoslavia—these represented the most important, but by no means all, the minority

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563 peoples. The accompanying table shows the distribution of languages in Eastern Europe in the interwar period as established by the League of Nations.

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Distribution of Principal Languages in Eastern Europe about 1930 *

(APPROXIMATE FIGURES IN THOUSANDS)

Language	*Albania*	*Bulgaria*	*Czechoslovakia*	*Hungary*	*Poland*	*Rumania*	*Yugoslavia* **
Russian	—	12	—	—	139	451	25
Ukrainian	—	—	569	1	4,442	641	31
White Russian	—	—	—	—	1,697	—	—
Polish	—	—	100	—	21,993	38	18
Czechoslovakian	—	—	9,757	108	38	43	138
Serbo-Croatian	—	—	6	55	—	48	10,257
Slovene	—	—	—	5	—	—	1,159
Bulgarian	—	5,275	—	3	—	364	73
German	—	4	3,318	479	741	761	602
Rumanian	13	16	14	16	—	13,181	276
Greek	37	10	—	—	—	21	—
Albanian	984	—	—	—	—	4	524
Gypsy	—	81	33	8	—	101	54
Hungarian	—	—	720	8,001	—	1,555	557
Turkish	30	622	—	—	—	288	180
Others	—	58	213	12	2,866	561	41
Totals	1,064	6,078	14,730	8,688	31,916	18,057	13,935

* Based on Dudley Kirk, *Europe's Population in the Interwar Years* (Geneva: League of Nations), Table 17, pp. 228-29.

** A. Meillet, *Les Langues dans l'Europe nouvelle* (Paris, 1928), p. 426, estimated that Macedonian was spoken by 628,000 in Yugoslavia in 1926, but in the official census this group was not distinguished from those speaking Serbo-Croatian.

563 The peacemakers were conscious of the problem that had
648 been created, and in order to make certain that the different linguistic groups would receive fair treatment it was required of these states that they subscribe to carefully worded provisions for the protection of their minorities. These pro-

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visions were included in the peace treaties with Hungary and 563
Bulgaria, and the states that had been created or enlarged 648
as a result of the war assumed similar obligations. The provisions for the protection of minorities were concerned with the use of language in schools and courts, the practice of religion, and the equitable administration of social security. Their implementation by the respective governments was supervised by a Minorities Commission in the League of Nations, and a system of petitions was established for bringing injustices to the attention of the League. Although the principles underlying this system represented a great advance over pre-war practice, the efforts at implementation failed to meet the needs of the situation. In many cases the minorities continued to be discriminated against, and even when they were not, nationalist movements sponsored by neighboring countries often proved irresistible. As a result, the problem of minorities became one of the fundamental sources of political instability in Eastern Europe.

Another unfavorable factor was that richer families sent /77
their children to foreign universities, especially to France, .87
Germany, and Great Britain, while there was little student 871
exchange among the Eastern European countries themselves. Educated people knew a great deal about Western Europe, but much less about neighboring states and peoples. Naturally, this was even more so among nations which had been enemies in the First World War and which now fiercely condemned their citizens if they praised the culture or progress of a former enemy. However, this situation was not unique to this region. It was characteristic of Europe as a whole and, like the development of nationalism and industry, moved from West to East.

Many of Eastern Europe's difficulties stemmed from the 642
instability of its political life. Governments changed con- 578
stantly and political parties fought each other to the last breath. Due to the many changes of government, an unwhole-

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642 somely large proportion of state funds was used for political
578 competition. Taxes were high and the entire taxation system was geared to make the poor people pay for the political and economic program of the government or of the ruling classes.
647 Planning was poor and administration far from efficient. Bohemia-Moravia had inherited from Austria a relatively competent administrative machinery, and Hungary's was organized along nineteenth-century lines. Administrative systems in former Russian and Turkish areas were a continuation of the previous imperial regimes, and were considered
[687] definitely the worst in Eastern Europe. Inefficiency and corruption mitigated somewhat the dictatorial character of these administrations. Bribery was customary and necessary on every level and affected the poor and the minorities. The problem of corruption was most serious in high official circles. Often the biggest fortunes were made in politics through embezzling discretionary funds that were left at the disposal of government members. Selling protective tariffs to industrialists in order to receive shares from foreign companies for concessions was a prevalent practice. Administrative officials were endowed with the nickname "bicyclists," which carried the implication that these officials trampled upon their subordinates and bowed before their bosses.

578 This attitude and the belief that the masses should support all projects of the ruling circles produced a harsh conflict of interests between the bourgeoisie, the mixed aristocratic and middle class, and the industrial workers and peasants. The fundamental conflict, however, was between the bureaucracy and the peasantry. The great differences in the cultural levels in many of the Eastern European countries made things worse. Different religious and ethnic groups and contrasting social standards contributed to regional hostilities and did nothing to facilitate the task of the administrators. The fault lay not alone with the rulers and administrators as is so often supposed by Western authors and statesmen. The people in

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general were slow to learn and to develop their abilities. 578
They did not cooperate with regulations and laws even when such were to their own benefit, an attitude that stems from many centuries of oppression.

IV

It is difficult to say what turn the development of Eastern 648
Europe might have taken if, after gaining full freedom and independence in the twentieth century, the countries of this region had been given the chance to progress in a peaceful era. The countries of Eastern Europe, immediately after recovering from the traumatic depression of the 1930's, were confronted with German and Russian imperialism without even a chance to settle down for a period of healthy evolution. Unhappily, the Western European powers, after their unfortunate appeasement policy towards Hitler which completely confused the Eastern European nations, joined hands too tightly with communist Russia. The Eastern European states, semidemocratic, semidictatorial, balancing between bankruptcy and future recovery, between socialism and aristocratic-bourgeois traditions, were a brutally realistic mirror of Europe's modern revolution.

Germany used all means possible to influence and to domi- 648
nate the area. Basing its actions upon meticulous studies of 439
the history, geography, politics, economics, social life, and cultural habits of the respective countries, Germany gained influence through the use of economic penetration, antisemitism, social-revolutionary propaganda, antibolshevism, and diplomacy. The Eastern European states could not very well defend themselves against such brilliantly conducted infiltration. Nor could their economics develop satisfactorily when American, British, French, and Swiss businessmen were completely disinterested in trade and investment in Eastern Europe since the prospects for profit were not great in that

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648 area. It is unjust to accuse the Eastern European states of
439 favoring Germany when this country alone was willing to trade with them and did not demand hard currency payments. Germany bought large quantities of Eastern European products and forced the sellers to buy from her various articles, including gadgets, luxury goods, and many other products, the prices of which were beyond the purchasing power of the buyers.

668 Antisemitic movements in Eastern Europe often received
578 aid in the form of money from Nazi Germany which practice increased dependence upon that country. Through the various Nazi-supported parties in almost every country and through fifth column organizations, the Germans instigated conflicts between the ruling classes and the dissatisfied social elements. At the same time antibolshevik propaganda was strongly and successfully supported by German diplomacy.

648 Czechoslovakia, in 1938, was the first to lose her independence. Poland fell in 1939, and Yugoslavia followed in 1941. The years 1939 through 1944 were truly critical for Eastern Europe. The German-Russian imperialistic pincers tightened steadily. Nazi Germany won easy diplomatic victories over the Western European powers whose conciliatory policies were astounding. Even more astounding was their sudden turn to anti-German propaganda and war. Squeezed between the arbitrary policy of the Western powers and the expanding German and Soviet giants, the Eastern European nations had no other choice than to muddle through. Apprehensively watching an alliance of giants and often impressed by the achievements of these powers, they tried to appease them, aid them, or fight them.

722 Peace economy was turned into war economy. This decreased unemployment, and war losses decreased it even further. The most active age group, already reduced by the slump in birth rate after the First World War, was thinned even more. Youth, accustomed to tackling problems in terms

722 of romantic politics, opposed everything that
represented the traditions and experience of the
older generation. The potential balancing factor,
which was the activity of the middle-aged group,
was already weak due to the small numbers of
000 this group. The West did not offer any stable
philosophy and the East had only a negative one--
that of destroying the West. In the midst of
this confusion stood Eastern Europe, a region
of mixed peoples and small countries inimical
to one another and not fully understanding the
rights and responsibilities that they had so
recently acquired. Although they foresaw the
dangers ahead, they could not resist the pre-
ssure of their larger neighbors. The traditional
society and the new institutions of these
countries disintegrated, and once again they
became an area of military conflict between the
great powers.

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8 Industrial and Social Policies of the Communist Regimes

JAN H. WSZELAKI

I

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More than thirty years ago, Lenin defined Communism in Russia as Soviet power plus electrification. In our time, the essence of the situation in the countries of Eastern Europe is the Communist police state plus industrial revolution. Local or imported Communists, under the supervision of the Kremlin, have been for years in full control of all levers of power in these countries. Their basic aim in social and economic fields, just as it is in Soviet Russia, is a complete transformation of society through industrial revolution. To this supreme aim and supreme method, all other issues have been subordinated. The process of this industrial revolution with its many ramifications extends into all fields of human activity behind the Iron Curtain, influences the lives of all ninety million inhabitants of the captive countries proper, and will have profound consequences of moral, political, economic, social, and strategic character not only for these countries but for the world as a whole. From the European point of view, the industrial revolution of Eastern Europe is an outstanding historical event comparable in its implications to the great wars of the present century. We are witnessing

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the gradual decline of the traditional rural and mainly peasant 185
structure of this part of Europe and the emergence of an in- 471
dustrial urbanized society. This transformation is now in full 661
swing and will continue until it runs its course—no one can say when or how—or until external factors end the Russian control of Eastern Europe and its nations rid themselves of their own Communists. Even then, the industrial development of that area will presumably continue, though for different reasons and with vastly different methods. The Communist regimes may go, but the results of the industrial revolution will remain.

This essay is concerned with the effects of these revolu- 121
tionary events on the social and economic development of the countries of Eastern Europe. To cover this involved subject adequately, much time and space would be necessary. The writer must limit himself here to the discussion of the few selected aspects of the problem that he regards as fundamental. Discussion of the industrial targets as established by the single countries in their long-range plans, half or more of which have already been achieved, cannot be included in this study.

Suffice it to say here that all over Eastern Europe the Com- 185
munist regimes are modernizing the existing mines and in- 433
dustrial plants and are building scores of new mines and thousands of large new plants, mostly supposed to produce capital goods as a basis for further industrial production. The anticipated result of the present first series of long-range plans, expected to terminate in less than two years, will be a large increase in the extraction of fuel and the doubling, in some cases tripling and quadrupling, of the heavy industrial potential of the individual nations of this region, some of which had a large industrial output before the last war. This vast operation requires that great numbers of peasants be transferred from agriculture to industry, mining, and construction. Once carried out, the first series of plans is to be

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185 followed by a second, with the targets again much increased.
433 The preparation of these second five year plans has already begun. Their nature can be inferred from the electoral program of the National Front in Poland, published in the fall of 1952. The Warsaw regime proposes to raise the per capita industrial output of Poland by 1960 to ten times the by no means negligible standard of 1938. In other words, it intends that the Polish per capita industrial output shall surpass the present per capita industrial output of France. Other satellite governments probably have similar plans. Whatever may be thought about the feasibility of such grandiose plans, it should not be forgotten that under the Soviet regime Russia has evolved from a backward agricultural country, which it still was in 1928 when the first Five Year Plan was launched, into the second industrial power of the world, surpassing in total production Japan, France, Britain, and Germany.

The aims of enforced industrialization are several. The first is the numerical increase of factory workers who, as proletarians, are supposed to be not only the cream of society but convinced Communists as well. This early theory of the Soviet revolution, together with the term 'proletariat,' is falling into disuse. It has never been proven by facts: at other times and in other places, men entering the industrial process have not been inclined necessarily to become Communists, and there is no evidence that they are so inclined in the captive countries today. The second aim was defined on many occasions by Stalin. According to him, the Socialist transformation of society can be achieved and kept secure only by a steady growth in heavy industrial production, which at any given time must exceed the increase of light customer-serving industries and of agriculture. This rather abstract formula means, among other things, that in order to survive foreign aggression a Communist state or states must possess enough heavy industry to produce the necessary weapons at any given moment. Stalin's judgment was correct, though not

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necessarily Communist, since it applies to all states exposed to dangers from their neighbors. Another meaning of this formula is that Communist states cannot afford to depend on the non-Communist world for essential raw materials or machinery, since such imports might be stopped at the moment when they are most urgently needed. Consequently, a Communist state should produce these goods on its own. Here again, a distant echo of Russia's defeat during the First World War can be heard. Stalin seems to be saying that Communist Russia must never again be incapacitated or even hindered by industrial weakness. Indeed, his industrial Russia of 1941 withstood the German onslaught far better than had the imperial Russia of 1914.

The realization of this aim demands that all hitherto unused resources of manpower and dormant material wealth be utilized as rapidly as possible. At some future time these resources may well bring rich life to the people. But so long as the Soviet Union is encircled by potential enemies such resources must remain at the disposal of the state which defends "the social conquests of the revolution." The systematic realization of all these aims is assured through the consecutive five year plans for the development of the Soviet economy.

A year or two after the end of the Second World War, the Soviet Union felt certain that the West no longer had the means or desire to interfere with Soviet control of the so-called liberated nations of Eastern Europe. The countries of this region could be regarded henceforth as an extension of the Soviet Union proper, and their resources could be used for the achievements of the same aims as those of the Soviet Union. Under the transitory semi-Communist governments of that time, the captive nations showed enormous vitality in reconstructing their war-damaged economies. Since 1948-50 this vitality has been canalized into long-range industrial plans which have been synchronized with one another and

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185 with the Soviet master plans. The captive nations were al-
433 lowed to preserve the external attributes of sovereignty and their governments were granted an advisory voice in the preparation of these national plans. But the supreme control of the plans remained in the hands of Moscow, and their primary goal was, and is, rapid industrialization.

II

178 The possibilities of industrialization in Eastern Europe are considerable, but obviously not unlimited. They depend on the availability of manpower and its technical know-how, on industrial raw materials and machinery, on capital needed for investments, and on markets capable of absorbing the products of the new industries.

464 Before the last war, five million persons were employed in the mining and in the medium and large manufacturing industries of the six major countries of the area. Today this number exceeds nine million. There is a shortage of labor, both skilled and unskilled, in Eastern Germany and in the Czech part of Czechoslovakia. The reserves of manpower—land laborers, dwarf-farm owners, and married women—are limited in Hungary and the Slovak part of Czechoslovakia, large in Poland, and even larger in Rumania and in the three Balkan countries. The areas where labor is short coincide to a large degree with those of low natural increase of popula-
369 tion, and vice versa. In the first period of reconstruction after
464 the war, there was in many parts of the area a movement of
166 the population from the villages to the towns in search of urban, not necessarily industrial, employment. For instance, in Poland alone, two and one-half million persons moved into towns during the first seven postwar years. This movement is now over, as well as the postwar enthusiasm for reconstruction, and the governments have to recruit new workers by propaganda and sometimes by half-coercion. Unless

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living conditions improve considerably in the cities, the governments will have difficulty in procuring the hundreds of thousands of new industrial workers they require annually. However, manpower is still one of the principal assets of the captive countries.

The quality of this manpower is, generally speaking, better than is assumed in the West. First, there is a considerable industrial tradition, which goes back to the Middle Ages, in Saxony, Bohemia, and southern Poland. Second, the average intelligence of the people is fairly high; given time and education an average village boy or girl can become a skilled worker and, in many cases, a qualified technician, although of course such students lack the always evident association of American youth with motor vehicles and other machinery.

It might be interesting to quote here a relevant passage from the report of the mission of the U.N. Food and Agricultural Organization, which was composed mostly of American experts, after its return from Poland in 1948:

> It is the opinion of the Mission that if the Polish nation had an opportunity to be educated according to the standards of western Europe and to carry out a peaceful economic development, the world would be amazed by the result. Imperfectly developed resources of intelligence constitute the greatest potential wealth of the Polish people. It is a raw material of far greater value than [Polish] coal . . .[1]

Assuming that this is a sound judgment, there is no reason to doubt that it applies also to the other countries of this region.

The number of graduate engineers, chemists, and scientists in Eastern Europe declined greatly during the last war and during the postwar flight to the West, but is now increasing rapidly. The joint know-how of such technicians should not be underestimated, especially when Russian technical experience is added to it. Technical inventions and improve-

[1] *Report of the FAO Mission for Poland* (Washington, 1948), p. 18.

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463 ments made by single countries of the area are systematically exchanged with Russia and other captive countries, and many thousands of Soviet, Czech, Eastern German, and Hungarian experts, technical advisers, and skilled specialists are employed by the less advanced countries of the area. It is difficult, if at all feasible, to compare the sum of technical knowledge behind the Iron Curtain to that in the free world. Undoubtedly, the countries of Eastern Europe lag behind the free world in all technical respects, but it would be imprudent to believe that they are not making much technical progress.

433 377 The area as a whole and the single countries within it, except for Eastern Germany and Czechoslovakia, are, generally speaking, self-sufficient in foodstuffs. It also has sufficient reserves of solid and liquid fuel. Using both these reserves and their hydroelectric power, it can produce an in-
433 creasing amount of electric power. On the other hand, the
135 area is poor in metallic ores. There is much bauxite in Hungary, and supplies of lead and zinc in Poland. Yugoslavia and Bulgaria are rich in many ores. However, there is not enough iron or manganese ore in Eastern Europe, far from enough copper, no tin, and a lack of many supplementary metals of significance to modern metallurgy. Chemical raw materials are abundant, especially in Poland and Rumania, but the area lacks phosphate rock and is poor in sulphur compounds. It has no jute, very little cotton, not enough wool, and no rubber. The resulting limitations to industrial expansion are obvious. They are offset to some extent by the existence of dormant resources and by the fact that the southern Balkan area has not yet been properly explored. It is possible that the Balkan mountains contain more mineral wealth than has been assumed hitherto. Soviet geologists are certain that this is so. Some deficiencies in raw materials can be met, as was the practice under Hitler, by using substitutes such as synthetic oil, rubber, yarn, and plastics. This area can

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produce many substitutes. Today, shortages of raw materials 433
are covered by imports from abroad, most of these from the 135
Soviet Union. Economic autarky is not possible in Eastern Europe alone, but the Soviet bloc, including Russia and China, is almost self-sufficient in raw materials.

Under the unrelenting pressure of Moscow, the output 402
of machinery and plant equipment in this area is making 439
steady and rapid progress. The period when most of these countries must depend on importation of machinery from the West is almost over. Were all Western sources of industrial machinery to be completely closed to the captive area, its industrialization would be slowed and delayed but not halted. As things stand now, much industrial equipment is still imported from Western Europe, legally or illegally, and the Soviet Union can take care of the other shortages. Czechoslovakia, Eastern Germany, and, to a lesser degree, Hungary produce machinery above their home requirements, and part of the surplus goes to other captive countries, to the Soviet Union, and to China.

According to United Nations data,[3] the 1951 indices of 433
industrial production in the single countries of this area in comparison to 1938 were as follows: Eastern Germany, 115 per cent; Czechoslovakia, 168; Rumania, 206; Hungary, 267; Poland, 270; and Bulgaria, 345 per cent. In considering these figures, it is necessary to bear in mind that 1938 was not the peak production year in Eastern Europe. Between 1938 and 1943-44, the industrial output of Czechoslovakia and Hungary rose noticeably owing to the erection of many new industrial plants, so that only a part of their industrial expansion since 1938 can be attributed to the efforts of their present governments. Poland's industrial potential increased in 1945 by at least one third, due to the acquisition of ex-German Silesia. Bulgaria's industrial po-

[3] *Economic Survey of Europe Since the War* (Geneva: United Nations, 1953), p. 239, Table 1.

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433 tential in 1938 was, and still is, insignificant. It is claimed that in 1952 the industrial output of the area rose again by about one fifth.

An estimate of the relative industrial strength of the individual captive countries was made recently in a United Nations publication.[8] If the total industrial output of the area at the end of 1952 is taken as 100, the output of Eastern Germany constitutes 34 per cent of this total, that of Poland 27, of Czechoslovakia 21, of Hungary 9, of Rumania 6, and of Bulgaria 3 per cent. The total industrial output of the entire captive area is equivalent, roughly speaking, to nearly 40 per cent of the total industrial output of the Soviet Union.

185 All this rapid, even violent, industrial expansion cannot
471 be smooth and is, in more ways than one, terribly expensive.
511 There are no miracles in economics, and wealth can be
464 created at different rates of speed, but not at will. The tremendous increase of the state-owned industrial plant in this area is only feasible because the citizens have been deprived of their individual capital, because the consumer demand is being systematically curtailed, and because more and more of the national income, siphoned off by taxation, inflation, and other methods, is being reinvested in industry. This reinvestment is being done at great cost to agriculture. Quantitative industrial progress is also speeded up by the fact that the police state has the means to make everyone work. The prewar urban unemployment and, to some extent, the huge peasant underemployment, caused by the extreme subdivision of rural property, are things of the past. Billions of man-hours which were wasted before the war in enforced idleness are now used for production or, at least, are on tap for production purposes. On the other hand, a large proportion of the men and women kept in concentration and labor camps

[8] *Economic Bulletin for Europe* (Geneva: United Nations, 1952), Vol. V, no. 2 (July, 1953), p. 84, Table 1.

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produce litt'e, if anything, and the vast apparatus of standing 185
armed forces, of police and poli ical supervision, of party 471
machinery and propaganda, does not create wealth but con- 511
sumes it. The onetime waste of unemployment has been partly 464
supplanted by the waste of the immense state machinery of control and compulsion inherent in all totalitarian systems and particularly odious under Communism.

In addition to this costly political overhead, there are three 185
other burdens to the national economies of these countries. One is the cost of planning both on a national scale and in minute detail, an economically unlikely proposition, resulting in duplication of work, omissions, bottlenecks, and other forms of economic confusion. This has been one of the main reasons why the Yugoslav Five Year Plan has never been fully realized. This type of waste can only be eliminated very gradually, if at all. The second type of waste is directly due to Communism. In the free world, private property is fairly 471
generally respected and cared for by its owners and by the public at large. Public property, being the exception rather than the rule, also enjoys respect and cases of vandalism are few. In Eastern Europe, state property is the rule, and very few people give it proper respect. The Communists are aware of this general neglect and the ensuing injury to the economy but believe that in time society will be taught to take care of what is defined as people's wealth. However, during thirty-five years of Communism in Russia, there has been little progress in this direction. The third burden on the state C48
economy is a specific feature of the countries of Eastern 439
Europe. All of them have to pay heavy tribute to the Russian big brother. Russia exploits the captive nations in many ways: by reparations in kind, mixed companies, trade agreements, high prices for imports from Russia and low prices for exports to Russia, maintenance costs for Soviet troops, high salaries for Russian experts and advisers, and the like. These nations cannot express themselves on this topic, but

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648 439 there is overwhelming evidence that they are aware of being fleeced by the Russians to the extent of hundreds of millions of dollars annually.

III

439 185 One of the main results of the existence of the Iron Curtain is the gradual integration of Eastern Europe into the Soviet economy. Under the present circumstances, Soviet Russia lays hands on many of the raw materials and industrial goods, both capital and consumer, that are put out by the captive countries. The realization of its economic plans depends in no small way upon these goods. The industrialization of this area also depends on imports and could not proceed at its present rapid rate without the importation of machinery and, more important, of raw materials from the Soviet Union, in particular from the Ukraine. These countries are meeting with restrictions on the importation of so-called strategic goods from the United States and from some other Western countries. However, even if there were no such restrictions, these countries would have difficulty in paying for imported goods, since they do not produce sufficient surpluses of goods that interest several of the most important Western markets, for instance, the United States, the British dominions, France, and possibly Western Germany. On the other hand, the capacity of the Soviet Union and China to consume goods produced by the states of Eastern Europe is practically limitless.

For all these reasons, in addition to political expediency, trade between this area and the Soviet Union has been increasing rapidly from year to year. Were it not for Soviet iron and manganese ore, colored metals, phosphate rock and sulphur, cotton, wool, and, in certain parts of the area, coke and pig iron, many metallurgical, chemical, and textile plants in the area would have to close down. Indeed, they will do

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so if for some reason, general mobilization in Russia, for example, freight traffic with Russia is interrupted. To sum up, links have been created between these states and Russia which, because of the self-isolation of the latter, did not exist before the war and which would be difficult to sever in the future. 439 185

At the same time that economic links are being established between Eastern Europe and Russia, the individual states, in particular Eastern Germany, Czechoslovakia, Poland, and Hungary, are being economically integrated with each other. This is an inevitable result of the present process of the industrialization of these countries. Trade among them is also expanding constantly, and many plants are being erected by the technically more advanced states of the area on the territory of the less advanced. To quote but one example, the Czechs are building many electric and chemical plants in Poland, Hungary, Rumania, and Bulgaria. There are other forms of this interregional economic collaboration which is, for the most part, better justified economically and more natural than collaboration with the Soviet Union.

The two movements toward integration, one with Russia and the other interregional, are developing in a parallel way. It is difficult to say which of the two trends is more intensive, although possibly that with Russia is. They can be judged by the data, published several months ago in Moscow, on this area's foreign trade for 1951. When checked with United Nations information on the same subject, the following table appears to be substantially correct.

The table shows that the northern part of the area conducts more trade with other states than with the Soviet Union, while the contrary is true of the south of the area. Soviet Russia does as much trade with Rumania and Bulgaria as Nazi Germany used to do around 1940. Because of their geographical position and the rural structure of their economies, these two countries are on their way toward being drawn into

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Foreign Trade of Poland, Czechoslovakia, Hungary, Rumania, Bulgaria, and Albania—1951 [4]

(IN PERCENTAGE OF TRADE WITH)

	USSR	*Other Communist Countries (including Eastern Germany and China)*	*Free World*
Poland	25	33	42
Czechoslovakia	28	32	40
Hungary	29	38	33
Rumania	51	28	21
Bulgaria	58	34	8
Albania	57	43	0

the economic system of the Soviet Union. The remaining four countries are less economically dependent on Russia. The place of Eastern Germany in interregional trade is very important. It is able to supply the rest of this area with much heavy and precision machinery, as well as potash and other fertilizers, in exchange for fuel, foodstuffs, and raw materials.

IV

185 661 642 The social policies of the satellite governments follow in their general outlines those practiced by the Soviet Union but may be described as somewhat more moderate, if only because the respect for human values has been more deeply ingrained in the westernized societies of Eastern Europe than they have in Russia.

The principle dominating these policies is that the Soviet-type revolution was made in the Eastern European countries in the interest of the people and that it continues to serve their interests. There is no speech made or publication issued be-

[4] P. Suslin, "The Consolidation of the Democratic World Market," *New Times* (Moscow), No. 5 (January 28, 1953), p. 10.

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hind the Iron Curtain that does not emphasize the eternal dedication of the People's Democracies to this fundamental concept. It is likely that some members in the lower echelons of the party are sincerely persuaded that this indeed is the case. Not so the ruthless social engineers among the top Communists. These experienced pupils of Moscow realize, of course, that in the Communist system there is a very definite hierarchy of goals, that first things have to come first, and that the expansion of industry comes before the welfare of the people. The two cannot be sought at the same time with the same intensity since the Communist state has not the means to proceed in both directions at once. There is reliable evidence that the four northern satellite governments opposed, insofar as they were able, the imposition on their countries of the immense goals and back-breaking burdens of industrial expansion. They regarded the enormously revised targets of 1950 and 1951 as burdens too heavy on their economies. Nevertheless, they had to yield to Moscow's pressure, which was probably connected with the outbreak of the Korean war. The relatively poor nations of Eastern Europe cannot afford both guns and butter. Since it had to be guns, butter has had to be delayed to a more or less distant future. If this is the case in the Soviet Union, it must be even more so in Eastern Europe. The result is a gradual, though uneven, lowering or at least stagnation of standards of living in Eastern Europe as compared to what they were during the first years after the recent war.

Such a generalization would, of course, be vehemently denied by the satellite governments. They publish statistical data to the effect that much new housing is being built, that more food is being produced and therefore consumed, and that the population is better clad with every passing year. A trained researcher will not accept these claims at their face value. The extremely generalized social statistics from this area are even less reliable than statistics on agricultural out-

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000 put and are without value unless properly interpreted. These statistics should not be rejected outright, but should be juxtaposed with the mass of evidence available from other sources, and then interpreted. It would be misleading to accept blindly every report on life behind the Iron Curtain, whether brought by refugees, published in the exile press, or found in letters
204 coming from that area. The Communist press tries to suppress most adverse information but there are limits to such a policy. If the Iron Curtain papers complain about any material shortage or attack any given material situation, it is a sure sign that the situation has become unbearable for the citizens.

362 On the basis of joint interpretation of the press, private information, and statistical data, the following picture of the economic and social conditions of the captive nations may be formed. The housing situation is bad and probably getting worse because, however large the current building project may be, it cannot provide homes for all those living in the existing deteriorating dwellings and because the building cannot keep up with the rapid increase of urban populations. New apartment houses are jerry-built and in need of constant repair, and the family of a privileged worker or technician will be happy if his services are recompensed by a flat of two rooms with kitchenette and shower. The great urban masses are housed much below this level. The housing problem has not been solved in Russia outside of Moscow. There is no reason to believe it has been solved in Eastern Europe. It will take a dozen or more years to rebuild the war-destroyed cities of East Berlin, Dresden, Budapest, Warsaw, Danzig, Stettin, and Breslau, to mention only a few, and, even when these cities are restored, the quality of the new construction will almost certainly be inferior to that of the prewar years. According to the United Nations, the rate of new construction behind the Iron Curtain is several times slower than it is in Scandinavia, Britain, and Western Germany. Domestic

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commodities, such as kitchen equipment and furniture, are 362
rare and expensive, above the means of an average family, and modern house appliances are hardly known at all. A private car is an extreme rarity and will remain so within the foreseeable future since few passenger cars are being manufactured and almost none imported.

As far as food is concerned, there is much truth in the 262
Communist assertion that with the rapid increase of city [369]
populations the production of foodstuffs lags behind the growing demand. Figures for food production in this area do not indicate the amount of consumption, since much of the food produced is stocked as army and war reserve or exported to Russia and China. The true situation is that while there is no actual hunger most of the population is fed at standards far below those of Western Europe. The diet is monotonous, consisting largely of bread, noodles, cereals, potatoes, common vegetables, and puddings, to judge from advice given to housewives by women's publications. Protective foods are fewer than before the war though probably more evenly distributed. Before the war, in the poorer parts of the area, the urban unemployed and millions of so-called dwarf-sized farm holders were as a rule underfed. Today the unemployed have disappeared, but the inmates of the labor camps are starving, and the poor peasants are no better off than before. The families living on middle-sized farms consume more food than before the war, because an incentive for selling produce is lacking.

The caloric value of foodstuffs consumed by the working population in the cities has, if anything, decreased. At home, families eat what the British used to eat a few years ago, but they have less of it. The quality of food consumed in the public eating places maintained by factories and the like is described as extremely bad, and so is the service. Standing in food lines, often in vain, consumes a large part of the housewife's time. This, added to the difficulty of cooking be-

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262 cause of the fuel shortage, makes a bitter joke of the Com-
[845] are a few brighter spots in this picture. The soldiers and policemen are well fed and so are the privileged classes of senior government and party workers, and of artists and writers. The numerical strength of these new, privileged strata of society is less than that of the pre-war middle class, and their standard of living is undoubtedly lower.

262 Data have been published lately that illustrate the low
511 level of consumption of food behind the Iron Curtain. These data concern the increase of sales of certain staples in Czechoslovakia in 1952 over those in 1951, and, for once, they are disclosed not in meaningless percentages, as is the rule behind the Iron Curtain, but in absolute figures. An analysis of these figures shows the increase in sales of sugar and butter to the extent, respectively, of two ounces and less than half an ounce per capita per month. The alleged increase in sales of coffee actually lags behind the increase in the population. Only the amount of tea sold has really increased. However, the Czechoslovakians are not tea but coffee drinkers. They used to produce more sugar than they could consume before the war. Yet the text in question continues: "The above figures show that the standard of living of the Czechoslovak people is irresistibly on the upward trend." Another example is a long letter from a coal miner in Poland, whose only subject was a detailed description of how he tried in vain for weeks in the fall of 1952 to buy a piece of sausage. In his fury with the regime and "the Russkis" behind it, the humble writer rose to the rhetoric of a Patrick Henry and declared that since there was no sausage life was not worth living. "And to think that I actually used to grumble against the pre-war government!" was his final confession. It should be noted that pre-war Poland had a large surplus of pork.

656 In the summer of 1953, the Soviet government announced
511 that it would take many measures to relieve the all too ob-

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vious shortages of consumer goods and to increase substantially the standard of living of the Soviet population. This announcement was followed by similar declarations in the captive countries. Their governments bound themselves to increase investments in agriculture, housing and light industries producing consumer goods. In Eastern Germany, Hungary, Czechoslovakia and Rumania, and somewhat later in Poland, qualified promises were made to the effect that the hitherto very rapid rate of heavy industrial expansion would be slowed down. At the same time two of the greatest works under construction in the area have been interrupted if not abandoned: the Danube-Black Sea canal in Rumania and, to all appearances, the huge HUKO iron and steel 'combinat' in Eastern Slovakia. These public statements were in themselves equivalent to an official admission that the condition of the population was miserable.

Time alone will show whether, and to what extent, these new policies will be realized. The bumper 1953 harvest in most of the key provinces of the area would undoubtedly relieve its food scarcity if it were not for the fact that a great deal of this harvest has been earmarked for export. The Soviet government stated recently that it would import food and consumer goods from Eastern Europe to the extent of some 660 million dollars, and Eastern Germany expects to import similar goods from this area, as well as from China which has little to export, in the amount of 125 million dollars. The captive area proper, suffering itself from an acute shortage of consumer goods, would thus be forced to contribute to the betterment of the Soviet and Eastern German economies at the rate of more than eleven dollars per capita of its population. Even if the governments of the area do their best to increase the standard of living of the working masses, much time must inevitably pass between the inauguration of the new policy and the actual increase in the production of consumer goods. For example, the present insufficient produc-

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511 tion capacity of cement plants and brick factories would have to be increased before there can be any question of more housing. This is but one example out of many of its kind. There is a manifest contradiction between the present Russian-enforced armament production in the area, which has not been curtailed, and the intended mass production of consumer goods. The two cannot be carried on simultaneously. For these reasons alone, the recent statements of the Communist governments should be regarded with much scepticism.

288 295 433 The situation as regards clothing and footwear is even worse. The problem of obtaining it is nearly insoluble for the average family. It is far more difficult than in Russia where millions wear Polish textiles and Czech shoes. To discuss this question in detail is beyond the scope of this essay. Suffice it is to say that, according to the present long-range plans, Eastern Germany expects to produce in 1955 only 1.3 pairs of leather shoes per capita, Rumania 1.2 pairs, Hungary 1 pair, and Poland 0.7 pairs. No one can say what proportion of this footwear will be earmarked for export to Russia and China or assigned in advance to the army and security police and what will be left for the population. It is for such reasons that behind the Iron Curtain it is illegal to photograph the people on the streets or to export abroad such documentary evidence of their poor garb.

657 745 In contrast to the situation regarding food, housing, and clothing, the number and range of social services have been considerably extended, and these state services should in all fairness be regarded as significant steps taken to offset the low standard of living. It is little known that prewar Poland and Czechoslovakia, not to speak of Germany, had state-operated systems of social insurance and public health more advanced than any existing at the time in France or the United States. These systems have been enlarged under Communism. The quality of their services is too often insufficient, but the

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people accept them as their due and can no longer visualize 657
life without them. A large and, according to official claims, 745
growing part of national income is being spent on social insurance, public health, family allowances, maternity and children care, workers' vacations, so-called physical culture, and the like. There is no comparison between the philosophy of the welfare state in Britain and that of Communism in Eastern Europe, but there are some similar functions in both systems. For much the same reasons that the Conservative government in London could never think of taking back the social reforms of the Labor government, no post-Communist government in Eastern Europe will be able to consider curtailing the privileges accorded to the working class by the present regimes.

V

The most important and politically the most decisive of 641
the privileges granted by the State is education, understood 208
always strictly in the Communist sense of the term. The Communist regimes are aware that they cannot seriously expect to win the minds of the majority of the adult population. Anyone who was twenty years old in 1938 in Bohemia or Moravia, in 1939 in Poland, in 1941 in Serbia, and as late as 1944 in Hungary or Rumania, can contrast his present situation as an individual and as a part of his nation to his situation under a non-Communist government, however imperfect the latter may have been. There is no way of knowing how many of these men and women regret the past and hate the present, but they undoubtedly constitute a large majority of the adult population of the area. From the Communist point of view, these men and women are incurable. The future of the Red regimes depends on the youngsters who know nothing about the past, are isolated from the freedoms of the West, and are daily taught that Russia is their shin-

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641 ing example. The regime knows that it cannot assure a decent
208 standard of living to the adult population and probably realizes that the coming generation will not live much better. However, it hopes that the young ones will be more pliable. Since they will not know that life can be better, they will not grumble. In the political and moral field, the desire to capture the minds of the youth is what industrialization is in the economic domain—the primary goal to which all others
185 must be subordinated. From another angle, education, especially technical education, is the necessary counterpart and precondition of the fully industrialized, urbanized, and mechanized socialist society.

168 The first point of the Communist program for the young
185 generation is to insure its numerical strength. Before the last war, the populations of Poland, Rumania, Yugoslavia, Bulgaria, and Slovakia were increasing with great though gradually diminishing rapidity. In the Czech lands proper and in Hungary, the natural increase was low with a trend towards demographic standstill. Some economists believed that the key problem of Eastern Europe, that of rural poverty due to overpopulation, could not be solved unless the population ceased to multiply so rapidly. From the strictly economic point of view, there was much truth in that assertion. The Communist regimes, including that of Yugoslavia, have taken the opposite stand. Their publications wage a war against the prewar theory which they say is born of despondency characteristic of capitalism. Communism, they claim, will solve all problems. But to prosper, People's Democracies need many children. Whether because of these social policies or because of other reasons, the prewar trend toward low natality has been reversed in most countries of the area. No demographic data on Rumania have been published for some years, which may mean that the policy of high natality has not been successful there. Elsewhere, data show that many more children are being born now than before the war and

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more of them survive infancy. In consequence, if rather fragmentary national statistics are to be believed, the rate of increase in population has risen to what it was a generation before. Roughly speaking, the number of Hungarians has been increasing annually by 60,000, that of Czechs and Slovaks (mainly Slovaks) by 140,000, that of Yugoslavs by 180,000, and that of Poles by over 400,000. Whether this trend will continue for a long time, no one can say.

The second point of the program in respect to youth is an all-out attack on illiteracy. Before the war, the area as such was making rapid progress in schooling, and in its western part illiteracy was no longer known. In its eastern and southeastern regions, however, there were still large residues of illiteracy in the adult population and, in spite of compulsory elementary education, there were not enough schools in some rural districts. The result was that some children never went to school. The Communist regimes claim that they have done away with a large proportion of illiteracy among adults and even elderly people, and that illiteracy as a condition is gone forever. There is no way of checking this assertion but it is likely that it is correct. The obvious comment is that the more literate people there are, the stronger a weapon Communist printed propaganda will be. Thus, the new schools behind the Iron Curtain are but the first installment of a vast campaign of propaganda and indoctrination.

The third and, in a sense, the most important point of the program is the great effort of the Communist regimes to promote professional and technical education on secondary and academic levels. The fulfillment of the long-range economic plans depends, in the last analysis, on its cadres, that is, on its trained personnel. To use a Communist simile, the new industrial army, millions strong, needs hundreds of thousands of noncommissioned and commissioned officers. These men and women are being graduated all over the captive area from technical schools of every description. The numbers

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874 both of graduates and of schools are several times larger than
185 before the war and are still increasing. The educational level is much lower than it was either before the war or in the free West, but it tallies with the Communist conception of superior education which aims at mass production of technicians specialized in one limited field and not instructed in general culture. Here again, these countries have to follow Soviet precedents, and narrow specialization is the method and the aim of education.

874 The emergence before long of thousands of newly gradu-
565 ated engineers, chemists, and the like, will have a profound effect on the economic and social structure of the area. These young people will be the managerial class of the future. Their lives will be dependent on the industrial trend of the economy of the captive nations. Unlike the new teachers, lawyers, writers, and other intellectuals, who will have to be agents of the Communist political machine, the new technicians will be allowed to serve both their own and national interests without being associated day in and day out with the sinister doings of the police state. Technology, like medicine, is one of the very few fields of creative activity open to non-Communists. When this is taken into consideration, it will be seen that the young men and women who besiege institutes of technology and other technical schools behind the Iron Curtain are very largely those who wish to preserve some independence of spirit. In their own domain, they will be able to dedicate themselves to creating national material wealth without paying more than lip service to the political framework in which they exist. This kind of work, where there is much less political supervision, may possibly come to be
565 considered the closest thing to individual initiative. In contrast to the 'Commissar' group of the new middle class, the new managerial stratum of these societies is, or may become, aware of the superiority of life in the free world and thus be a potential ally of the West. There seems to be, however, a

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condition attached to such a speculation. Were the West to 525
deny the principle of industrial transformation of these countries and to envisage their 'return to pastoral status,' the new managerial class together with the working class would range itself automatically against the West.

VI

The economic and social revolution which these countries 178
have undergone has been imposed on them very largely from 181
the outside. It has been successful because it was backed by the whole strength of a great military empire but also because the material and moral ravages of war and German occupation had shattered the prewar fabric of society and exposed its structural weaknesses. The society which is emerging from this revolution will be very different from the former one. Even if a true liberation of this part of Europe were to occur, the restitution of many old forms of life would not be feasible. The greatest harm that the captive nations have suffered and will suffer through the imposed revolution are the inflictions upon the souls and the minds of the people. Gradual de-Christianization, loosening of family ties, fear and distrust of political authorities and of the neighbor, Russification and falsification of national past, coarsening of manners, and the awful deposit of lies and prejudices of propaganda and non-technical schooling: all these are weapons which are levelled upon the minds and souls of the people. The undoing of these moral effects of Communist policies could only be gradual, and it would take a long time.

In the social and economic fields, the effects of Com- 178
munism have not been so uniformly somber. That goods can 433
be produced under Communism has been learned from Russian precedents. That Communism cannot assure to the people a decent standard of living is a fact that cannot be denied by any amount of propaganda, and it is also true that

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178 never in the last century have so many people worked so hard
433 for such meager rewards. However, in the social field, the extension of social services and of technical education can be credited to the Communist regimes. In the economic field, although the tax on the people has been almost unimaginably great, it must be admitted that the badly needed industrial development of formerly rural areas of Eastern Europe is due to the Communists.

178 The latter point needs clarification. The Wilsonian East-
433 ern Europe of 1918 inherited from Austria-Hungary, im-
369 perial Russia, and the old primitive Balkans an obsolete social structure of rural overpopulation and poverty due to insufficient industrial and urban development. The Czech lands, Polish Silesia, and a few lesser industrial regions were exceptions to the general structure of the area. Left to themselves by the indifferent West, having undergone the shock of the depression as only rural states can suffer it, the free nations of the area, again with the exception of Czechoslovakia, could in the interwar period neither solve their grave social problems nor defend themselves in the hour of danger. The existence of a poor and defenseless group of nations in the heart of Europe surrounded on East and West by two highly industrialized powers was an anachronism and an indirect invitation to aggression. After the disintegration of Eastern Europe between 1938 and 1941, the causes of this disaster were examined by thinkers of many nations, and many of them came to the conclusion that the disaster was inevitable not only because of the political disunity of this area but also because of its economic and productive inferiority. Rural societies had no chance of survival in the heavily armed world of the late '30's if only because they were unable to produce the weapons with which they could have deterred aggression effectively. The awareness of this fact has deeply influenced the political thinking of the nations concerned. It is inevitable that the Poles, to take but one example, should

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reflect that, had their country had a sufficient industrial basis 178
in 1939 to equip ten armored divisions for which she had 433
enough trained manpower, her loss of independence and 369
many other events in modern history could have been prevented.

The present industrialization of Eastern Europe is gradu- 178
ally eliminating this handicap of the past. To be sure, the 661
increase of the industrial potential of these countries lies in 185
the interest of the Soviet Union in its own military prepara- 648
tions. The men in the Kremlin may dispose as they wish of this area's industrial plants together with all its human and material resources with the single exception of the spirit of its peoples. From the standpoint of both the immediate and long-range interests of the West, any addition to the wealth or the strength of Eastern Europe is unwelcome so long as the latter remains a part of the Soviet bloc. These countries are of course aware of this situation, but they have to think also about their future. They hope that one day the Iron Curtain will be lifted and they know that at that time they will need all their new industrial wealth in order to cease being an area of social unrest and a target for exploitation by powerful neighbors as well as a hotbed for world wars. Nobody has disputed the right of Russia to evolve into an industrial power. No one can expect the countries of Eastern Europe to relinquish their hopes of freedom and their rights to prosperity which, in the light of their past, are linked to the modernization of their economic structure. Wendell Willkie said during the last war that "Only the productive can be strong, and only the strong can be free." His words apply to all nations alike. The nations of Eastern Europe are potential allies of the West. Those who earnestly desire a better world should bear in mind that the lasting interests of these friendly nations transcend their temporary position as Russia's enforced associates.

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PART THREE

THE SEARCH FOR REGIONAL SECURITY

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9 International Relations Between the Wars

HENRY L. ROBERTS

I

000 The most striking aspect of the constellation of states in Eastern Europe after 1918 was that it should have come into existence at all. It is not that these states were "artificial" creations. It is rather that the appearance at that time of a zone of independent nation-states, from the Baltic to the Aegean, was largely the consequence of the simultaneous collapse, through war and revolution, of both Germany and Russia, an eventuality not anticipated in 1914. One cannot say what would have been the picture in Eastern Europe had either Germany or Russia emerged victorious, but certainly it would have been very unlike that which actually came about.

648 The continued independence of the area was dependent
186 upon preventing either of the two great powers from gaining ascendency or from working with the other to control the non-Germanic and non-Russian peoples of the area, as they had done during much of the nineteenth century. This was a common burden of all the states of Eastern Europe after 1918. Unfortunately, it was almost their only real point of unity. The other unifying factor was that they were pre-

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648 dominantly agrarian states, rather uncomfortably situated
186 between a highly industrialized West and a "proletarian" U.S.S.R.

In nearly all other respects the area is marked by wide diversity. The boundaries between the different linguistic and cultural groups, often not clear, were generally not congruent either with natural boundaries or with the frontiers as they emerged after the First World War. In consequence, there were a series of territorial controversies which, in keeping the region at odds with itself, were of tragic significance. To take a few of the more critical examples: Vilna was contested by Poland and Lithuania, and Teschen by Poland and Czechoslovakia. Hungary and Czechoslovakia disputed the borders of Slovakia and Carpatho-Ruthenia. Transylvania was an issue between Rumania and Hungary. The Dobrogean quadrilateral divided Rumania and Bulgaria, and the latter was in turn in conflict with Yugoslavia over Macedonia and with Greece over access to the Aegean. In addition, of course, there were the unresolved issues involving the great powers which bordered Eastern Europe: Danzig, Upper Silesia, and Bessarabia, to name only three sore points.

186 Accompanying and to some extent a consequence of these
563 differences was the constant controversy over minorities. It
648 is unjust to say that the Versailles treaties, in breaking up the old multi-national empires, merely reproduced the old nationality conflicts within the new components. On the contrary, many more people than before lived within states controlled by their own nationals. Yet the solution was far from perfect. The very establishment of the national principle as the basis for the state carried with it a strong impulse to consolidate and coordinate—with resulting pressures on the minorities. Certainly the mood of strong nationalism, often accompanied by an inner lack of self-confidence, frequently led to unfair treatment of minorities. One must admit, nevertheless, that the multi-national principle, as represented in

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actual fact by the Austro-Hungarian Empire and the Russian Empire, did not in the years before 1914 seem to offer any real framework for constructive development. To be sure, there were many projects for the reorganization of these states, but on close examination they reveal little basis in reality. 186 563 648

In addition to the frontier and minorities problems, there was also the phenomenon of economic nationalism. Insofar as the restrictive effects of economic nationalism, especially the high tariffs, added to the difficulties of the region, they were symptomatic rather than a basic cause of trouble. In most instances, economic nationalism developed as a natural, if not particularly enlightened, reaction to the fact that these new states were under strong incentive to strengthen their economies as rapidly as possible. Because of many political uncertainties, they tended to proceed along the path of economic nationalism: "By ourselves alone" as the Rumanian liberals used to say. In this, of course, the behavior of the Eastern European states was not unlike that of the larger states, but the results in this area were often preposterous. For example, the chopping up of the Danube basin into a number of different tariff areas certainly was not a rational action. 186 648

Before turning to the development of international relations in this period, one further observation should be made. In comments on the vicissitudes of this part of the world, one encounters two opposing views. One is expressed by the phrase "the Balkanization of Europe," which carries with it the implication that the stability of Europe was perennially upset by the bickering, intrigue, and petty rivalries of the small states of Eastern Europe. The other view is that the Eastern European states were behaving as well as they could under constant subjection to the machinations of the great powers who tried to use them as pawns. Both views are misleading. During the interwar period, the wisdom and stupidity 000

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of statesmen and peoples were fairly evenly distributed. It is true, of course, that the actions of the great powers inevitably had the more far-reaching effects, and in that sense their responsibility for the course of events is the greater. But one may doubt that their motives were either nobler or meaner than those of the small powers. The real trouble lay in the interplay of relations between the great and small powers, and for this all must carry a burden of responsibility.

II

It has been noted that the occasion for the independence of the Eastern European states was the collapse of both Russia and Germany in 1918. From the point of view of the new Eastern European states, the most favorable postwar situation would have been a continuation of Russian and German weakness, with these two powers at odds with one another. The worst situation would have been a strong Russia and a strong Germany working in cooperation. During the 1920's German-Russian relations were comparatively close, but both powers were weak. In the 1930's they both were much stronger, but in general hostile. In 1939 they joined forces with catastrophic results. Unfortunately, the states of Eastern Europe were not in a position to control these developments. The recovery in strength of Germany and Russia lay beyond the range of the small countries' influence as did the course of German-Soviet relations. There were two possibilities open to the Eastern European states: to gain support from other great powers, more specifically, the victors of the First World War; and to work among themselves in building up their collective strength.

They were ultimately unable to realize either possibility, but the failure to accomplish the first was of more consequence. In the last analysis, the great powers responsible for

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the outcome of the First World War and for the Versailles settlement were likewise responsible for the ordered evolution of the new peace. The reasons for their failure in this undertaking lie in a field of international relations beyond the scope of this essay. A few points must suffice. The United States, during the interwar period, was of little positive value in this connection. Great Britain's position, until the spring of 1939, may be summarized by Sir Austen Chamberlain's private remark in 1925 that "For the Polish corridor, no British government ever will or ever can risk the bones of a British grenadier." Time was to show that British as well as Pomeranian grenadiers were not beyond risk.

The case of France was different, and one of the anchor points of European stability appeared to be France's military and other connections with the states of Eastern Europe, especially in the 1920's. Unfortunately, the French policy, particularly evident in the 1930's, of working with the states of Eastern Europe came into conflict with two of her other policies. One was the tendency to work out relations with Germany directly, or in concert with the other great powers. This pattern is traceable from Locarno, through the Four Power Pact, to Munich, and was a trend that the Eastern European states viewed with justified alarm. The other policy was the tendency to rely upon the Soviet Union, especially after 1934, as a counterweight to Germany. This was a development unacceptable to that part of Eastern European strategy which looked for support against both Germany and Russia.

Italy, the fourth victorious power at Versailles, was also interested in Eastern Europe, but in this case the consequences were more damaging than helpful. Although Italy was a victorious power, it had strong revisionist interests, and the 1920's were marked by an intense Franco-Italian rivalry in the southern part of Eastern Europe. The Stresa Front in 1934-1935 temporarily aligned France and Italy in

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000 their opposition to German pressure on Austria, but later Italy usually sided with Germany, although not without certain uneasy doubts.

In general, then, France was the one great power really committed to support the *status quo* in Eastern Europe, and France, as it proved, was not enough.

648 Within the area itself, all the Eastern European states had a common interest in avoiding great power control, an interest whose object became tragically apparent when the whole area was dominated by Hitler after 1941. The First World War had brought into being several formations or groupings of the Eastern European states. However, the beneficiaries of the war must be distinguished from the losers. Some states were new creations, or had greatly added to their prewar territory. Others—Bulgaria, Hungary, and Austria—had been in the camp of the Central Powers. Bulgaria's losses date both from the First World War and from the Second Balkan War of 1913, in which it had lost territory to Rumania, Yugoslavia, Greece, and Turkey. In the case of Hungary, a strong case could be made that it, too, was a successor state, but as a defeated power it was obliged to sign the Treaty of Trianon. One can, perhaps, justify each of Hungary's territorial losses to Czechoslovakia, Rumania, and Yugoslavia, on either ethnic, economic, or strategic grounds—though not all three at once—but the cumulative effect of all these detachments was such as to make the Hungarian cry, "No, no, never," a justifiable response. This meant, of course, that in Danubian and Balkan Europe, there was a profound disunity, which served to block efforts at extended common action.

North of the Carpathians a somewhat different situation prevailed. Finland, the Baltic States, and Poland were all beneficiaries of the new settlement. Unhappily, Vilna and Teschen provided, or at least symbolized, disputes which inhibited common action in that region.

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III

Despite this disunity, important efforts were made to bring 648 greater cohesiveness and unity to Eastern Europe. Of these the most important was the Little Entente, formed through a series of treaties between Czechoslovakia, Yugoslavia, and Rumania in 1920-1921. The sponsors of these treaties had as a broader and eventual aim the establishment of a great entente extending, as expressed by Take Ionescu, the Rumanian statesman, from the Baltic to the Aegean. Nevertheless, the immediate and specific objective was more limited: the defense of the territorial settlement of the Treaty of Trianon against Hungary and opposition to any effort to bring back the Habsburgs. In the case of the Yugoslav-Rumanian treaty, provision was also made for the defense of the Treaty of Neuilly against Bulgaria.

In the course of time a fairly extensive philosophy of the meaning of the Little Entente was formulated. The Entente became active in the League of Nations, of which the Entente members were ardent supporters. By 1926, the Entente became linked with France through a series of understandings and agreements. The statutes of the Entente were gradually enlarged to include agreements for the settlement of mutual disputes by arbitration, and later, in 1933-34, for the creation of a Permanent Council, an Economic Council, and a permanent secretariat. All these steps were aimed at coordinating and unifying the foreign policies of the three members and at increasing their efficacy in the world as a whole.

Seen in retrospect, the Little Entente had certain shortcomings. It was directed against Hungary and, despite various efforts, the rift between the Entente and Hungarian revisionism was never overcome. Perhaps too great emphasis was placed on Hungary which was, after all, a very secondary power in these years, and probably weaker militarily than any

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648 single Entente power. At the same time, the treaties had nothing to say about meeting threats arising from great powers. There was no immediate community of interests in this regard, since each of the three members was potentially threatened by a different great power: Czechoslovakia by Germany, Rumania by Soviet Russia, and Yugoslavia by Italy. The Czechoslovakians had no direct conflicts with the Russians, the Rumanians had no direct conflicts with the Germans, and neither were at odds with Italy. This meant that the Entente was overprotected from internal, but underprotected from external, danger. This flaw became evident in the later half of the 1930's.

To the south of the Little Entente, a Balkan grouping also came into being. The idea of a Balkan confederation was not a new one. Programs for achieving South Slav unity had been in the air from the time the Balkan states began to emerge from Turkish control. But a series of quarrels, especially concerning Macedonia, had always blocked these efforts. In the early 1930's a number of Balkan conferences were held. While significant achievements could be listed—the creation of machinery for the settlement of disputes, projects for intellectual cooperation, and even a project for a customs union—these achievements were largely procedural and technical. They did not extend to real political innovations. The Balkan Entente, formed in 1934, comprised Greece, Turkey, Rumania, and Yugoslavia, but not Bulgaria, which was not willing to accept the premise of no territorial revision. The Bulgarian position was not as intense as the Hungarian, and in certain political groups there was a real desire for South Slav unity. But it should be noted that a reconciliation on such lines would have had a doubtful reception in such a state as Rumania which was very sensitive about being an island of Latinity in a sea of Slavs, as the phrase went. The terms of the Balkan Entente provided for defense against a Balkan aggressor only, not against a great power. The Balkan

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Entente was linked by two of its members to the Little Entente, but one cannot say that this association measurably increased the unity of Eastern Europe. 648

An extension of the Little Entente to the north was blocked by the Polish-Czechoslovakian conflict, by Poland's unwillingness to enter a grouping directed against its traditional Hungarian friends, and by a certain Polish reluctance to become committed to the preservation of the *status quo* south of the Carpathians. The one real link here was the Polish-Rumanian joint defense agreement which, unlike the other arrangements, was directed against a great power, the Soviet Union.

As for the Baltic region, no great achievement can be recorded. Finland tended to orient itself toward the Scandinavian states. Poland and Lithuania did not even establish diplomatic relations until 1938, and then only under a Polish ultimatum. There was an alliance between Latvia and Estonia in 1923, and in 1934 a modest Baltic Entente covering the three Baltic states was signed, but it was not of great moment.

In general, looking from north to south, one sees the appearance of a number of groups aiming at the preservation of stability and independence in the area. Nevertheless, there were ominous gaps between and within the groups, and no sufficient measures for threats from without. The key connections, of course, were the Little Entente and the French ties with it and with Poland.

Apart from these alignments, which stood for the *status quo* and the Versailles system, there were certain other combinations which should be mentioned. Italy, which was in competition with France, attempted to counter the French ties with the Little Entente by the Rome Protocols of 1934 with Austria and Hungary—a clear example of the dangers of the reciprocal interplay of great and small power differences. Poland, under Colonel Beck, had some rather ambi-

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648 tious plans for achieving a bridge to the West via the Scandinavian states, and to create a great Baltic bloc. But the Scandinavian states, at this time, were not entering into the power combinations of Central and Eastern Europe, and the project never got beyond some goodwill tours. Finally, in 1938, Beck, with Ciano, discussed the formation of a Rome-Belgrade-Budapest-Warsaw axis, with the intent of checking German eastward expansion which was now clearly in the offing. But it was very late in the day for such a project, and it never came to any practical fulfillment.

Perhaps the most extensive, although abortive, effort to increase the security of Eastern Europe, this time in conjunction with the great powers, was the French attempt to achieve a so-called Eastern Locarno agreement. The states of Eastern Europe had been understandably disturbed by the Locarno agreements of 1925 which had seemed to settle, by international guarantee, Germany's western frontiers but which had done this at the cost of inviting German revisionism on its eastern frontiers. In 1934-35 France tried to achieve an agreement on the Eastern territorial settlement; Germany, Russia, Poland, Czechoslovakia, and the Baltic states were to be signatories with France as a guarantor of the treaty. Germany, however, refused to participate. This led to a Polish refusal to underwrite what would then have been an anti-German combination. Eventually the project was reduced to the French-Soviet-Czechoslovakian mutual assistance agreements of 1935, which were clearly something other than a regional organization.

648 668 Apart from these various diplomatic combinations, certain other efforts were made to increase the unity of Eastern Europe. Of some interest in this respect is the International Agrarian Bureau, also known as the Green International, founded by leaders of peasant or agrarian parties in a number of Eastern European states in 1921. In its heyday in the 1920's it included peasant parties from Czechoslovakia, Bul-

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garia, Yugoslavia, Rumania, Austria, Switzerland, Poland, France, the Baltic States, and Finland. The literature of the late 1920's concerning Eastern Europe shows that this peasantist or agrarian movement was widely regarded as the hope of the future. Here was a movement representing a basic common interest of the area and transcending national frontiers. 648 668

Unhappily the promise in this movement was never realized, and the movement eventually collapsed. The agrarian parties were not able to dominate the domestic political scene in most of these countries, and the whole position of agriculture was undermined by the advent of the depression in 1929. A governmental effort to organize some defense of agricultural interests was made in 1930 in the form of an agrarian bloc, including Bulgaria, Estonia, Hungary, Latvia, Poland, Czechoslovakia, Yugoslavia, and Rumania. At a number of international conferences and at the League of Nations, this movement attempted to coordinate economic policy and to gain preferential treatment for agricultural exports from the industrial states of Western Europe. This effort achieved nothing tangible, and under the lash of the depression, these states were driven to a policy of *sauve qui peut*.

IV

The depression and the rise of Hitler were undoubtedly the major factors in starting the breakup of whatever cohesion had been achieved in the calmer years of the 1920's. For a time, to be sure, even after Hitler came to power, the Eastern European states showed a good deal of ability to act together. The Little Entente, together with Poland, was largely effective in protesting against the Four-Power Pact of 1933. The extension of the powers of the Little Entente in 1934 and the creation of the Balkan Entente in the same year also showed a positive response to the new dangers. In the false calm of 1934 a number of voices could be heard saying that 648

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648 at last the Balkans had come of age and were no longer a source of European trouble. This was partly true, but somewhat irrelevant.

Unhappily, the breakdown was not far off. In 1934 Poland signed its non-aggression pact with Nazi Germany. Poland was clearly in a very difficult position and it is not hard to understand the attraction of an offer which seemed to promise an alleviation of the German revisionist campaign. The pact served, however, to increase the disunity of Eastern Europe. Although it was the basic intention of Polish policy to maintain an even balance between its two great neighbors, this agreement served in effect to bring Poland increasingly to a position paralleling that of Germany. This tendency was heightened when Czechoslovakia, by its 1935 pact with the Soviet Union, came to look eastward for support. Here again the local Polish-Czechoslovakian conflict became involved in a more extensive and dangerous diplomatic issue.

The other states whose interests lay in the preservation of the *status quo* also engaged in an increasing amount of fence-mending. The Stoyadinovic government in Yugoslavia moved to improve its relations with Germany. In Rumania, Titulescu, who had favored a cautious *rapprochement* with the Soviet Union, was replaced in 1936, and King Carol tried with increasing difficulty to follow a policy of balance. This was a hard job since he was being pressed domestically by the growing threat of the pro-German Iron Guard.

The events that led to the disintegration of Eastern Europe are too familiar to require more than the listing of a few of the more important: The failure of France and Britain to challenge the German remilitarization of the Rhineland left Hitler relatively free to turn eastward. The formation of the Axis and Mussolini's withdrawal of support from Austria paved the way for the Anschluss. And finally, of course, the Munich crisis was followed by the breakup of Czechoslovakia, in which Hungary and Poland participated. Certainly

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the ultimate responsibility for the collapse of Czechoslovakia 648
must rest with the Western powers, yet it is conceivable that had the Eastern European states, above all Poland and Czechoslovakia, stood together, it might have been possible to stiffen the French spine at this fatal juncture. From Munich the road led to the crises of 1939, and eventually to the German-Soviet pact of August, which spelt the end of independent Eastern Europe.

Germany's economic penetration of Eastern Europe after 648
1933 was not a primary factor in the breakup of this region. 439
While the reality of the penetration cannot be denied, for it meant much more than foisting aspirin and cameras on the Eastern European states, its importance may be questioned. This penetration did not really impair the political independence of these states until after the diplomatic situation had deteriorated greatly, and some of the German trade agreements which really bound the economies of the area were a result rather than a cause of the shift in the balance of power.

One may ask at this point about the influence of the 648
domestic political and social problems of Eastern Europe on 642
international relations. A good deal has been written about the failure of parliamentary and constitutional regimes in Eastern Europe, and their replacement by authoritarian regimes. Some have concluded from this that there was a tendency on the part of these regimes to gravitate toward Hitler and to refuse to have anything to do with the Soviet Union at a time when Litvinov was loudly calling, at the League and elsewhere, for collective security against aggression.

The relationship between foreign and domestic policy is always a complex and debatable one. In the case of Eastern Europe, however, one must steer a course between two inadequate interpretations of this relationship, which may be called the Popular Frontist and the Retrospective Vindica-

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648 tionist. The first, which is roughly the one described above,
642 is not tenable. Documentary evidence which has appeared since the war makes it difficult to consider the Popular Front as anything but an instrument of Communist advance. It is quite evident that the Communists were not renouncing their ultimate aims either in Eastern Europe or elsewhere. It is also clear that the U.S.S.R. was not seriously prepared to stand up for the collective security it was calling for, although admittedly it was never required to do so. At the time of Munich, the Germans were not particularly anxious about the danger from the Soviet side. Moreover, it appears from the diplomatic memoirs of the Eastern European statesmen that they tended, as a group, to view the Soviet danger in the traditional terms of the "colossus of the East" as a perennial threat, whether or not it had a Communist regime. Thus their suspicions of the U.S.S.R. cannot be reduced to a reflection of the "class conflict."

Regarding the second interpretation, it should be recognized that there was a special antipathy to the U.S.S.R. on the part of the Eastern European countries, which led to certain misjudgments of the relative dangers existing in the 1930's. Pilsudski, for example, after ordering an intelligence survey of his two powerful neighbors in 1933-34, concluded that, while both were dangerous from the Polish point of view, in the short run the Soviet Union was more likely than Germany to follow an erratic and aggressive course. This proved to be a miscalculation. One nevertheless gains the impression that a similar mood was prevalent in the diplomatic circles of Eastern Europe. This served to reduce the area of maneuverability in the final crisis and did not afford any way out of the tragic impasse of 1939.

648 During the war years, Eastern Europe disappeared as a
722 region of independent states. Germany and the Soviet Union divided most of the area into spheres of influence and, with the German attack on Russia in June 1941, the whole region

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fell directly or indirectly under German domination. There 648
was, nevertheless, some continuity. Among the governments- 722
in-exile, the struggle for future independence was clear and explicit. Likewise, among the German satellites, there was a persistent attempt to maintain a degree of independence. The extent of the resistance of Hungary to Hitler has come out quite clearly since the war in the memoirs of the statesmen involved. Even such an active and cooperative Eastern European satellite leader as Marshal Antonescu seems finally to have placed his hopes on a German defeat from the West, while he continued in the effort to keep Russia at bay in the East.

It should also be noted, however, that the old frictions did 648
not disappear. One major motive for Antonescu's entering 186
the war, apart from the desire to recover Bessarabia, was his wish to put himself in a favorable position vis-à-vis Germany to press for the return of Northern Transylvania, which had been lost to Hungary in 1940. This old conflict continued unabated throughout the war.

It is worth noting, finally, the importance to Eastern Eu- 000
rope of the fact that Russia did not emerge victorious in the First World War. We do not know what such a Russian regime would have been like or how it would have treated Eastern Europe, but we do have some clues from the secret treaties and arrangements made by the Entente powers during the war. Poland, including the German and Austrian sections, would probably have been incorporated into Russia. By an agreement in 1915 Russia was to obtain Constantinople and the Turkish territory in Europe. In a Russian-French exchange of notes in February 1917, Russia was given complete freedom to determine its own western frontiers. Thus the intrusion of Russia far into Eastern Europe was a likelihood in 1914-18, and was staved off in 1919-21 only to reappear as a reality in 1945 under new and decidedly more dangerous circumstances. In this sense there had been

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a rather bleak continuity, of which Eastern European statesmen were far more aware than were the diplomats in Western Europe or the United States.

V

From this brief survey of international relations in Eastern Europe, it is clear that the states of the region, certainly singly and perhaps even collectively, had only a marginal control over their destiny. Traditionally they have been the objects rather than subjects of history. This appeared less true in the twenty years between 1919 and 1939, but in an age of superpowers it will be more true than ever and their only hope will be to speak and act together.

It must be recognized that the mutual conflicts which divided the Eastern European states were not merely damaging but exorbitant in their cost. Surely Teschen was not worth the struggle either to Czechoslovakia or to Poland when it is set against the disaster which overtook both and which might possibly have been averted by their common action. However, creative steps were taken by the Little and Balkan Ententes in the 1920's and 1930's toward increasing cooperation. One should not underestimate these achievements because of their ultimate failure. At the very least, they showed that the states of Eastern Europe could work together and devise an institution capable of growth and of assuming an increasing number of functions. Yet they arouse only moderate enthusiasm. One authority has said that "Both ententes made excellent beginnings, and they constituted steps in the right direction." This same authority had to grant, however, that Hungary and Bulgaria were never included, and that the stimulus for these Ententes lay largely in a fear of neighboring Eastern European states.

In looking ahead, one must recognize that these national conflicts represent a major hurdle to be overcome. One can-

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not assume that the Little Entente eventually would have reached a stage when Hungary also would have joined. It is extremely difficult for institutions to transcend the limitations inherent in the motives for their formation, and it remains to be shown that the so-called functional approach to international organization—that is, an approach by economic, technical, or intellectual cooperation—can successfully bypass the real political conflicts that stand between nations. Any future federative or entente movement that hopes to encompass all of Eastern Europe must squarely face all political problems of a divisive nature. Only by transcending rather than disregarding the national principle can harmonious order be achieved in Eastern Europe.

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3

10 The Structure of the Soviet Orbit

JACOB B. HOPTNER

000 Political satellite systems are not unknown in recorded history. Maintaining the myth of independence, satellite governments are always similar in structure and political ideology to the primary political planet around which they revolve. Thus the path or orbit in which the secondary planets travel is preordained by the major planet.

I

727 The Soviet orbit was born in the winter of 1944-45, when the standards of the victorious Soviet armies were firmly implanted by their bearers into the soil of Eastern Europe. By May 1945, the flag of the Kremlin flew from Stettin in the Baltic to the frontiers of Greece and Turkey. This territorial conquest cannot be ascribed to the success of Russian diplomacy alone. The decisions reached at the diplomatic conference tables merely confirmed the advances of the Red Army divisions. The diplomatic agreements, which were derived from wartime military developments, nevertheless contributed their share to the extension of Communism over Eastern Europe. The Soviet Union successfully utilized the

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main body of interallied agreements—particularly those of Moscow, Teheran, Yalta, and Potsdam, along with the armistice agreements and the subsequent peace treaties—as their authority to impress the Soviet system of controls over the territories newly taken from the Germans.

By the end of 1945, the Soviet Union was in a position to control the political destinies of Rumania, Hungary, and Bulgaria under the sanctions provided by the armistice terms. However, the process of coordination into the Soviet sphere was anything but smooth and gave little evidence of the much-vaunted Russian planning. Although Rumania was under the Russian thumb within twelve days after the signing of the Yalta agreement, that unhappy country remained a monarchy until December 1947. Czechoslovakia did not fall completely into the Soviet net until 1948, while Hungary fought a losing battle until 1947. Controlled elections elsewhere facilitated the extension of Communist power, so that between the period 1945 and the end of the year 1947 the process of political assimilation was completed. Local Communist parties were installed in all countries—save Yugoslavia where political control had been in the hands of the Communist Party since 1944—by the grace of the Soviet power. In this period the Soviet pattern of inculcating obedience through terror was rapidly imposed.

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From the Soviet point of view this revolution was but an action on the part of sovereign states, rather than of satellite states as that term is used in the West. Not only were the states of Eastern Europe sovereign, according to Communist doctrine, but the Communist parties that controlled the political life of their respective countries held that their major function was to protect the national independence of their states against the imperialism of the West. This theory had expression in the basic document of the Communist Information Bureau—the resolution on world affairs which appeared on October 5, 1947.

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648 The Communist Information Bureau, or the Cominform as it is generally called, was formed in September 1947, and at that time embraced the Communist parties of the Soviet Union, Bulgaria, Hungary, Rumania, Poland, Czechoslovakia, Yugoslavia, France, and Italy. The Cominform has never claimed to possess the authority of the earlier Communist International, or Comintern, through which Moscow transmitted instructions in the years between 1919 and 1943, but it seems likely that it was originally intended to be something more than a propaganda agency. Nevertheless, apart from four conferences on public record, the only evidence of the activity of the Cominform has been its journal, *For a Lasting Peace, For a People's Democracy*. As a publicity agency on the policy level the Cominform can command attention for its public statements, but there is no evidence that it exercises any authority in determining Communist policy.

It is rather to the Communist Party of the Soviet Union that one must look for the source of policy decisions in the Soviet orbit. The evidence supports the view that all decisions on policy in the satellite states are made by the central organs of the Communist Party in Moscow, and are transmitted through its instrumentalities. No one can say with certainty which Soviet deputies in the individual countries are the principal source of authority, or which leaders of the local Communist parties are the trusted agents of Moscow. Experience has nevertheless shown that, with the important exception of the Yugoslav Communists, none of the satellite parties has strayed very far from the path determined in Moscow.

649 In addition to the dominant influence of the Communist
186 parties, both the revival of Pan-Slav sentiment and what may be called the Soviet myth contributed to the creation of the Soviet orbit. With the coming of the Second World War, Russia once again proclaimed itself the liberator of Eastern Europe and the ideas of Pan-Slavism were revived, but with a

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decided difference in emphasis. It is significant that in August 1941, shortly after the Nazi invasion of Russia, the Soviet government summoned an All-Slav Congress to Moscow. The emphasis of this meeting was on industrialization, cultural autonomy, and respect for the national culture and language of each Slav people. The message sent by the Congress to the Slav peoples was typical of its sentiments:

> Oppressed brother Slavs! A grave danger threatens us. The hour has struck for the entire Slavic world to unite and destroy fascism utterly and without loss of time.
>
> We have come together as equals among equals. Our one, burning desire is that the Slavic nations, together with all other nations, should live their lives freely and in peace within the boundaries of their countries.

In a speech later that year, on November 6, Generalissimo Stalin amplified these sentiments by declaring:

> Our aim is to aid the peoples in their liberation struggle against the Hitler tyranny and then to provide them with the opportunity freely to build their life in accordance with their desire. There must be no interference with the domestic affairs of other nations.

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To this Slavic appeal was added an admiration for the Soviet war effort. Many Slavs saw the Russian sufferings as mirroring their own on a gigantic scale, so that the ordinary peasant, to whom a military account of a Red Army victory would mean nothing, carried in his mind a vivid image of the scorched earth, the devastation which Russia suffered, and the hardships and ferocity of his Slav brother's struggle. With the memory of their own unaided fight deeply rooted in their minds, the Slavs watched Russia bearing the brunt of the land war in a way they could understand because the conditions were familiar to them. In Yugoslavia, for example, the Communist Party's growing prestige as the war progressed provided the Soviet Union with a great measure of reflected glory as a communist state. Many Yugoslavs transferred their admiration for the Communist Party's role in their own

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186 liberation struggle to admiration for communism itself, and
208 so to the Soviet Union.

Thus the Soviet myth—the supposed victories of the ideals of social reform of the Bolshevik revolution over police and bureaucratic persecutions of the Tsars—went hand in hand with the ties of race of the old Slav mystique. But by 1946, the emphasis of Pan-Slavism shifted to a position reminiscent of the "Slavophile" doctrines of the nineteenth century. Danilevski's prophecies in his *Russia and Europe* (1869) were in the process of realization. Using the language of peace and love, which seemed to him two typical Slav qualities, he had predicted a federation under Russian leadership, as the outcome of a war between Russia and Europe. The federation would consist of Russia (including Galicia, northern Bukovina and Carpatho-Ukraine), the territory of the South Slavs with Istria and Trieste, Rumania, the Czech and Slovak territories, Hungary, Bulgaria, Greece, and Constantinople, as well as sections of Turkey. Many of his prophecies, which at the time undoubtedly seemed fantastic, have come true in the last five years.

648 The triumph of Russia over Eastern Europe set the tone
186 for the great Slav Congress which was held in Belgrade on December 8, 1946. That the permanent headquarters of the Pan-Slav movement was to be located in this city, as was the headquarters of the Cominform newspaper—*For a Lasting Peace, For a People's Democracy*—is hardly surprising. The speeches and the program of the Congress proclaimed that the Slav peoples lead the world both in the struggle against war, for peace and democracy, and in cultural achievements. Finally, the Congress created the usual organizational methods to further Slavic cultural cooperation. A serious blow was dealt by Tito's defection from the orbit to this attempt at empire building through the Pan-Slav idea, but nevertheless the flow of propaganda continued.

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II

The reality of Soviet political control over Eastern Europe, implemented by the Communist parties in each country, has been supplemented by a network of political and economic treaties. During the period between December 12, 1943 and April 6, 1948, the Soviet Union concluded "treaties of friendship, cooperation and mutual assistance" with each of its present satellites—Czechoslovakia, Poland, Rumania, Hungary and Bulgaria—as well as with the then satellite Yugoslavia and with a neutralized Finland. Each instrument is a treaty of military alliance defining the *casus foederis* which brings it into operation and prohibits the satellite from joining in coalitions directed against the Soviet Union.

The conclusion of these treaties formalized an already existing reduction of the status of the Eastern European countries in the field of international policy to the rank of camp-followers of the Soviet Union. The treaties were only a screen behind which political control, military planning and rearmament were exercised. The Eastern European satellites are linked with each other by a network of seventeen bilateral treaties bearing the same title, concluded between March 18, 1946 and April 16, 1949. It seems that thereafter no further alliances were signed inside the Soviet bloc.

After Tito's revolt and excommunication in June 1948, the Soviet Union and its satellites unilaterally denounced their alliances with Yugoslavia during September and October 1949 in violation of the pertinent treaty provisions. Nevertheless the network of the Soviet bloc was almost completed after Yugoslavia's defection by the conclusion of four other inter-satellite alliances. The present state of the structure must naturally be evaluated in the light of the Yugoslav gap, of Tito's still precarious ties with the West, and of

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648 the recent Ankara treaty of friendship and collaboration of February 28, 1953 linking Yugoslavia with Greece and Turkey against "non-provoked aggression" from the north.

A detailed analysis and comparison of the provisions of these treaties as a method of arriving at conclusions of some political significance is obviously open to serious objections. The instruments of alliance are a symptom of complete subservience rather than a reflection of actual legal relations prevailing between the contracting parties, and must be reinterpreted in the light of the changed political situation. It must nevertheless be recalled that the first four intersatellite treaties were concluded before the creation of the Cominform and the following nine, including all but one in the Balkan-Danube region, before Tito's revolt at a time when Soviet control was not yet absolute.

The first obvious fact that emerges from a tabulation of a total of twenty-four military alliances is that Albania is not linked officially by such a treaty to the Soviet Union, and together with East Germany remains without a formal guarantee of Soviet military assistance in case of attack. Such a situation was not unreasonable so long as Tito was the Kremlin's staunchest ally. A treaty of July 9, 1946 linked Albania to Yugoslavia, and Albania's status was one of a sub-satellite, practically under the control and supervision of the Yugoslav government and Communist Party. The ultimate transformation of Albania into a federal state of Yugoslavia or the Balkan Federation was privately discussed.

Albania is now formally linked only to Bulgaria. The alliance signed December 16, 1947 ironically and without precedent stresses Albania's ties to Yugoslavia. The Soviet Union probably was and still is reluctant to commit itself formally to defend such an isolated and exposed position, preserving complete freedom of action depending on actual circumstances. The lack of formal Soviet pledges may prove

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to be fallacious, but an ostensibly Bulgarian airlift and sea 648
supply of Soviet arms is more probably envisaged.

East Germany, in the legally paradoxical position of an occupied part of an ex-enemy country and at the same time a Soviet satellite representing in Malenkov's recent words "a bulwark in the struggle for a united, peace-loving and democratic Germany," has so far concluded no alliance treaties either with the Soviet Union or with any of its satellites. Its treaty with Poland of July 6, 1950, recognizing the Oder-Neisse boundary as definitive, contains no military alliance clauses. However, the joint German-Polish, German-Czechoslovakian and German-Hungarian declarations of June 6, June 23 and June 24, 1950, respectively, represent an accession on the part of East Germany to the Soviet "peace" camp and a pledge to "use all its forces in order to foil the plans of the imperialist war incendiaries and to strengthen peace." In Soviet semantics this may create almost the same obligations as a formal alliance.

The alliances concluded by the Soviet Union with its six (now five) Eastern European satellites represent a consistent pattern. In these treaties the *casus foederis* bringing military assistance into operation does not consist in an overt act of aggression, but typically: "Should one of the . . . parties be involved in armed conflict with Germany, attempting to renew her policy of aggression, or with any other State allying itself with Germany, directly or in any other way, in her aggressive policy. . . . " (Art. 2, USSR-Rumania, and Art. 3, USSR-Czechoslovakia). The term "policy of aggression" was substituted and therefore probably means policy of "Drang nach Osten," and consequently may be applied to any official statement directed against the Oder-Neisse boundary, considered by the Soviet bloc as "the boundary of peace."

The Soviet alliances have two major characteristics: First, they are operative regardless of whether the attack originates from Germany or its allies, or from a member of the Soviet

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648 bloc. Of special importance in connection with the latter eventuality is the typical obligation preceding the *casus foederis* "to take jointly all measures in their power to remove any threat of repeated aggression on the part of Germany, or of any State allying itself with Germany directly or in any other way" (Art. I, par. 1, USSR-Rumania). The involvement may well arise from such "measures." Secondly, they are directed not only against Germany but also against any state allying itself directly or in any other way with Germany in its aggressive policy. This vague language may cover any kind of endorsement of the revision of Germany's present eastern border.

So far as Germany itself is concerned, such a *casus foederis* is based in part on the language of Article 53, paragraph 1 of the United Nations Charter which stipulates that the authorization of the Security Council is not required for "measures against any enemy state . . . provided for . . . in regional arrangements directed against renewal of aggressive policy on the part of any such state. . . ." This provision, absent from the Dumbarton Oaks proposals, was introduced in the joint amendments submitted by the Big Four to the San Francisco Conference on May 5, 1945. This formula was used by the Soviet Union even before that date. The Soviet Union has repeatedly declared that the satellite alliances are based on Article 53 of the United Nations Charter, although insofar as they are directed against the Western Powers they violate the Charter. The possibility of a pseudo-legal alibi for a unilateral Soviet military action against Germany and the North Atlantic powers after a ratification of the European Defense Community Pact should therefore be recognized.

A detailed analysis of the original sixteen (now only ten) inter-satellite alliances reveals roughly two separate types covering different though partially overlapping geographical sectors of the Soviet bloc. The links connecting countries

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located in different sectors belong to one or the other type 648 apparently at random.

The first group includes the Balkan and Danubian states (Bulgaria, Albania, Hungary, Rumania and, formerly, Yugoslavia), which are bound together by treaties manifesting a consistent pattern. They are operative only in case of formal military aggression, and not in cases of aggression by means short of war. A typical provision reads: "In the event . . . [of] attack . . . [on] one of the . . . Parties threatening its independence, or to enslave it or sever part of its territory." Moreover they are directed not only nominally against Germany but more generally against "Germany or any third power," which in practice means against any state outside the Soviet bloc. Greece was mentioned by name together with "American and British imperialists" when some of the treaties were signed. Italy is also a possibility in connection with Albania. Obviously the name of Germany is used here as a transparent camouflage and the Balkan-Danubian bloc is a military alliance clearly directed against the Western powers and their allies in the region, although it is cast in the form of a defensive alliance.

The second, or northern group embracing Poland and Czechoslovakia—to which Hungary and Rumania are separately linked—forms a bloc partially overlapping with the first. They are connected by the type of alliances linking all satellites to the Soviet Union. The familiar provisions regarding "joint measures" against any threat of aggression by Germany or her allies, the "aggressive policy" of Germany as the *casus foederis*, and the direction of the treaties against states "joining Germany's aggressive policy directly or in any other way," are also to be found here, as well as the reference to Article 53 of the United Nations Charter.

The fact that the political and military alliances within the Soviet orbit are exclusively bilateral, has more than legal

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648 significance. It represents the application of the old Russian distrust and fear of multilateral groupings formed by neighbor states along Russia's borders. This traditional attitude has been applied by the Kremlin to its satellites in the Soviet orbit to prevent federation schemes and especially closer economic and ultimately political ties between Communist Poland and Communist Czechoslovakia, that might eventually give groups of these countries bargaining power with the Soviet Union.

III

648 In any discussion of the Soviet orbit—particularly during
727 the developments of the first postwar years—a clear distinction must be made by the reader between two types of states. The first includes the former enemy countries: Rumania, Hungary, and Bulgaria. In the second are the countries that were in the Allied camp: Albania, Czechoslovakia, Poland, and Yugoslavia.

The former Axis satellites were required by the peace treaties to pay reparations not only to the Soviet Union but to certain allied countries as well. Thus Hungary was to pay reparations to Yugoslavia and to Czechoslovakia while Bulgaria was to pay Yugoslavia and Greece. Since payments were made in goods, they represented a budget item rather than items in international trade. The armistice agreements further established the right of the Soviet Union to charge Bulgaria, Hungary, and Rumania with the costs of occupation. The Potsdam Agreement also recognized the right of the Soviet Union to the so-called German and Italian assets located in the territories in these three countries. In this period the orbit served as a source of raw materials and a processor of finished and semifinished goods for the Soviet Union.

As early as 1945, the Soviet Union began to negotiate

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As early as 1945, the Soviet Union began to negotiate trade agreements with all the Eastern European countries. 648 In the beginning these trade agreements were limited to the 439 determination of goods to be mutually delivered during a specific period of time. In time these trade agreements were replaced by more elaborate documents which established definite goals to be achieved in the exchange of commodities between the countries concerned. If the new treaties and agreements indicate anything, they indicate the primacy of economics in the Soviet outlook. This was but one means by which the preponderance of the Soviet Union in the area was assured.

Although the Council on Mutual Economic Assistance (Comecon) was announced to the world in 1949, it is not yet clear that complete economic integration exists. What is clear is a trend to make the various captive countries of the orbit dependent upon the Soviet Union, since the area does not possess half the basic raw materials that it needs. Thus while there is no economic integration of the satellites as a regional bloc, there is a tendency because of their need for raw materials for them to become part of one centralized Soviet system.

This system is best evidenced by the existence of joint or 315 mixed companies. In Rumania, the oil fields are owned by 439 a mixed Soviet-Rumanian company. In effect this means that the Soviets control Rumanian petroleum production. The Russian representatives on the company board control the majority of votes and are in a position to decide policies and production norms. In addition, the companies operate rent free, receive the highest priorities in labor, equipment and resources.

The extent of Soviet parasitism in Eastern Europe might 648 have remained a "state secret" had not the Yugoslavs di- 439 vulged it to the world. As the Yugoslav *White Book* so well documents, one of their major criticisms of the Soviet behavior arose from the negotiations over the so-called Soviet-

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648 Yugoslav joint companies. The Yugoslav experience is of
439 particular interest since it reflects that of the rest of the orbit. The Soviet Union and the Federated People's Republic of Yugoslavia signed an economic agreement on April 11, 1945. The communiqué released after the negotiations stated that the Soviet government agreed to supply the Yugoslav army with arms and ammunition on long-term credits and to aid in the restoration of the Yugoslav war industry. At the same time both sides agreed on mutual deliveries of goods. The Soviet government was to meet the requirements of the Yugoslav economy as to raw materials, technical advice and other services.

The signatories have never made public the details of this agreement, but the Yugoslav-Cominform differences threw some light on Soviet trading techniques. On March 31, 1949, *Borba*, the official newspaper of the Communist Party of Yugoslavia, charged that the Soviet government had violated the agreement for the financial support of Yugoslav students attending Soviet schools by forcing the Yugoslav government to pay for their upkeep in dollars instead of dinars. It also charged that the Soviet Union unilaterally reduced the volume of trade and that the Soviet government forced the Yugoslavs to sell their raw materials at prices below world market prices.

In his description on October 7, 1949, of the operations of Soviet-Yugoslav joint companies, Dr. Vilfan, permanent Yugoslav delegate to the United Nations, branded Russia as an exploiter. Speaking before the Economic and Financial Committee of the United Nations, Dr. Vilfan described Soviet imperialist practices. As an example, he cited the Joint Yugoslav-Soviet Steamship Company (Juspad). Russia, he claimed, had among other things rigged the transportation charges, causing a loss of $19,000,000 to Yugoslavia in 1948. Vilfan further observed that "the superiority of capi-

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talist monopoly has been replaced by the monopolistic position of the more developed Socialist country." 648 439

While Soviet economic policy had much to do with Yugoslavia's ultimate defection from the orbit, the causes lie deep in Yugoslavia's historical experience and that of Tito and his party's rise to political power. Many of the documents regarding the break have been published, yet much more has to be made available before a definitive judgment can be made and many questions answered.

IV

One fact that should be made clear regarding Yugoslavia 648 and its role in the Soviet orbit is that Tito never "broke" with Moscow. While it is true Tito declined the invitation to attend a Cominform meeting called to consider his case, his action cannot be described as a break. It was Moscow that gave Tito the *coup de main*. It was not until a year later that the Yugoslavs attacked Stalin openly.

For centuries, the geographical position of Yugoslavia has made the country a target for political and military pressures from all sides. Now, to the struggle for the control of Yugoslavia's land and sea positions and her resources, the break between Moscow and Belgrade adds a contest for the control of the minds and unquestioned obedience of men. Since Yugoslav Partisans based their National Liberation Movement on the principle of unconditional loyalty to the Soviet Union, prior to the break the Soviet Union had a privileged and controlling position in Yugoslavia's domestic and foreign policy, resources, and manpower.

The institutional system of Yugoslavia fully indicated the allegiance the Partisan leaders had pledged to the Kremlin, and faithfully reflected the structure of the Soviet Union. The People's Front, with the Communist Party of Yugoslavia

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648 at its head, differed only slightly from Russia's one-party state. In external affairs, too, Yugoslavia supported the Soviet Union's aims in Eastern Europe by doing its part to make that area safe for Russia. It participated in the Soviet network of political alliances, it maintained close economic relations with the Soviet Union, it voted in unison with the Soviet bloc in the United Nations General Assembly and its agencies, it participated in the establishment of the Cominform, it sponsored the Pan-Slav Congresses in Eastern Europe and it acted as a supply and training base for violations of the frontiers of the Greek state.

Neither before nor since the dispute have the Yugoslavs given the Western powers opportunities similar to those afforded the Russians, despite the fact that the present regime relied heavily during the Second World War on British technical assistance and on American Lend-Lease.

During the war, the Anglo-Americans supported Tito and his followers solely on grounds of military necessity, and only the British gave some thought to the political consequences of their actions. The two Western powers based their policy on the fact that Tito's Partisans were killing Germans more effectively than their countrymen, the Royalist and anti-Communist Chetniks, who committed political suicide by confusing the main issue of fighting the Nazi invader with their secondary aim of carrying on a civil war with the Partisans and non-Serbian groups. From the start, Tito demanded Western aid not only for military reasons but also for the ultimate purpose of imposing his own political and economic system upon Yugoslavia.

It seems in retrospect that the Western powers made two mistaken assumptions in regard to the Partisans. They believed that the Soviet Union would permit a "representative" government in Yugoslavia after the termination of hostilities, and that Tito and the Partisans would repay their military obligations in acceptable political tender. Once the Commu-

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nist Party in Yugoslavia seized power, at the end of the war, 648 the thin veneer of friendship for the West disappeared. In unison with its neighbors, Yugoslavia directed its controlled press and radio to speak in diatribes and strictures against the "capitalistic and warmongering Western democracies," and, at the same time, to speak in glowing terms of their brother Slavs and comrades-in-arms, the people of the Soviet Union.

The rupture between Belgrade and Moscow has not [208] changed this picture in its essentials. Soviet pressure on Tito has not caused him to alter the existing one-party political or economic structure of his country. Just as Tito has demanded that the socialist countries base their relationships on the principle of equality because he is aware of the Soviet Union's aims in Europe, so too he will resist Western demands for the modification of his policies in return for economic and military support.

The Soviet Union erred in trying arbitrarily to mold the Balkan area to the Kremlin pattern. It failed, in the manner of dictatorships, to take into account the long South Slav tradition of opposition to tyranny and conquest. Unfortunately for the Soviet Union's expansionist plans, the pattern did not allow for the forces of human nature, of which there seem to be more in the Balkans than elsewhere in the world. Only if one recognizes that this is a problem in power relations rather than an ideological dispute, can one grasp the full implications of this dispute.

The shift of Yugoslavia at this juncture is best described 648 by what has been termed "integral nationalism," which ex- 186 presses itself in totalitarian terms. Integral nationalism is totalitarian not only in domestic affairs, but in foreign affairs as well. The nation attempts to make itself feared or "respected" by pursuing firm and bold policies. The nature of Tito's rise to power, the geographical characteristics of Yugoslavia, and Tito's power position relative to the Balkan states

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648 have all contributed to the making of Titoism. Specifically,
186 Titoism can be defined as a form of nationalism which conceives of Yugoslavia as an end in itself, and the rulers of that country are concerned only with the exclusive pursuit of national policies. It is thus not unique in political history nor does it contribute anything new to the diplomatic techniques available to the Western democracies. Titoism is then but a matter of lack of loyalty to a higher power center outside the national state itself.

648 Tito and his colleagues in the Communist Party of Yugoslavia exhibited the utmost faith and loyalty to Stalin and the Soviet Union throughout the war and in the immediate postwar years. Certainly in this period Tito was a marked Stalinist "internationalist." That is, one "who is ready to serve the Soviet Union unreservedly, unhesitatingly, unconditionally. . . ." The Communist Party of Yugoslavia was the sole Communist Party to engage in partisan warfare in the days immediately after the invasion of the Soviet Union by Germany. Up to 1948 the Yugoslav government was completely servile to the Soviet programs in the world diplomatic forums.

The Soviet Union had undoubtedly cast another role for Tito than that of a mere extra on the diplomatic stage. In May of 1946, Tito arrived in Moscow for a number of discussions regarding armament. How important this meeting was is best indicated by the rank of the individuals he took with him. Not only was he accompanied by Alexander Rankovich, who as Minister of Interior is also head of the secret police, but also the chiefs of staff of all the armed services. While it is not known what Tito promised in return for Soviet arms, one is able to speculate from the series of events which began the following month.

In July, Yugoslavia and Albania signed a military alliance, and in August two American planes were shot down in the vicinity of the Austrian-Yugoslavian border. Aid to the Greek Communists began in September; in the following month

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British destroyers were struck by mines in the Corfu Channel, 648 and at the same time the wave of imprisonment of individuals who might prove dangerous to the regime rose even higher than heretofore. By Christmas of 1947, Radio Belgrade announced the existence of the Greek Communist guerrillas as a "free and democratic" government. But this was not recognition. What the Greek Communists required was that very act, and open resistance which would go beyond that already granted by Tito and which was vigorously criticized by the United Nations Special Committee on the Balkans.

Who then was to recognize the Greek Communists first? Certainly not Stalin, but Tito who occupied the central position. Undoubtedly Tito was impressed by the counter measures issued by the Western Powers: the immediacy of American air and sea power then in the Mediterranean, and the announcement of the Truman Doctrine on aid to Greece and Turkey. It is almost mathematically certain that if Tito had recognized the Greek Communists, the war would have been fought on the streets of Belgrade and not on the bare mountains of Greece. How Stalin tried to bribe Tito into recognition is implicit in the negotiations on the Balkan federation in Moscow in February 1948. Stalin proposed that Yugoslavia and Bulgaria unite, and in so doing bring Albania into their fold. Although Tito's representatives did not accept this proposal, Kardelj signed an agreement with Molotov agreeing to mutual consultation on matters relating to foreign policy. Stalin was seemingly now in a position to control Tito and Soviet advisers were serving with the Yugoslav army. Tito's rejection of the invitation to participate in the Marshall Plan made the success of the Yugoslav Five Year Plan contingent upon Stalin's generosity, and the signing of the articles on mutual consultation on foreign affairs closed the circle.

Yet the fact remains that Tito did not recognize the Greek Communist guerrillas. For between the pressures exerted by the Kremlin on one hand and the West on the other, Tito

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648 chose to keep Yugoslavia intact by refusing to become a mere instrument of Soviet policy. He undoubtedly saw clearly that the Kremlin took no risks and would certainly get all of the benefits accruing from these political adventures. In the light of Stalin's definition of a true internationalist, this is what the Cominform communiqué meant when it denounced the Communist party of Yugoslavia as identifying "the foreign policy of the Soviet Union with the foreign policy of the imperialist powers," a policy "appropriate only to nationalists."

668 What effect has Tito's departure from the table of "broth-
665 erly Communist parties" had on those parties? Titoism is primarily a matter of loyalties. In Yugoslavia, there was no higher loyalty than to the state personified by Tito himself. Consequently, the party, the army, and the new bureaucracy could and did remain faithful to Tito. If Titoism is to spread, similar conditions and a similar concept of limited loyalty must exist in the people's democracies. To date there is no evidence that Titoism has taken root in the effective leadership circles of the satellite states, since both Western-minded and Moscow-trained Communists have been affected by the purges. Certainly the purges of Communist leaders in satellite Europe which have occurred since 1948 afford no index as to the extent of Titoism. The purgees had no machinery for independence of action available to Tito. Even if they had, it is not sure they would have acted as Tito did if faced with the choice.

648 What effect has the break had on Yugoslavia itself—on its policies and political philosophy? From the time of the break in June 1948 until November 1949, the Yugoslavs inveighed against the Communist parties of the satellites but not against the sacrosanct personage of Joseph Stalin. The second Cominform meeting held in November 1949 proved quite conclusively to Tito that there were no longer any grounds for conciliation, and he prepared a new political

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dialectic which would reflect the changes in his country's 648
international position.

First, the policies of the Soviet Union and the ideas of Stalin himself were attacked as marked departures from the true path of Socialism. Second, in contradistinction to the 642
policies of "bureaucratic state capitalism" evolved by the 646
Kremlin and followed in slavish pattern by the satellites, Yugoslavia decentralized its machinery of economic planning, gave greater power to workers' councils, reorganized local government, and re-wrote the national constitution. An interesting feature of the recently amended constitution is the provision for a Council of Producers, as one of the two parliamentary bodies. In this council industrial workers are disproportionately represented by 135 deputies, while only 67 represent agriculture. Under this arrangement, the agricultural population has one representative for every 150,825 peasants, while the urban is represented by one deputy for every 30,239 workers.

In its organization, the Council of Producers is strikingly 177
similar to another proposal advanced by another state that .64
adopted the philosophy of integral nationalism, Mussolini's 642
Corporative Italy. According to the latter, the corporations were instruments responsible for "the regulation of the productive forces, with a view to the development of the wealth, the political power and the well-being of the Italian people." This statement of purpose does not differ greatly from the ideology advanced by Kardelj on behalf of the new constitution.

In any event, the character of the power structure—that is, 642
the structure of social power focused on the state—has not changed. Decentralized though the power may be, the Communist party still controls the councils where important decisions are made. Effective opposition to the regime is still unknown. Democrats who have opposed Tito and his policies still remain imprisoned and, while important concessions

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642 have been made to the peasants, state cooperatives are still maintained in the heavy grain producing areas by forces other than the peasants' love of the soil and its products.

If the Yugoslav government will learn the meaning of Lord Acton's axiom on the nature of power, and if the West pursues an intelligent, long-range foreign policy supporting Yugoslavia against Soviet aggression, it may be possible to revive in Yugoslavia and hence in the Balkans as a whole the elements of an independent political life.

V

000 The months following the death of Premier Stalin in March 1953, saw a number of internal changes in the various people's democracies. The principal means of coercion and political control nevertheless remained unchanged: the army and the police forces. These were still bound tightly to Russian controls.

177, 70 701 625 The total number of men in the satellite armies available for service with the Soviet army has been estimated at a million and one-half. Since they are not only trained under Soviet commanders, but operate under the Soviet military code, it is possible to state that the Sovietization of the satellite armies has been completed. Together with the armies, the satellite police form the backbone of the Soviet instruments of coercion. Estimated at a total of 700,000 men, police units organized in military formations range in function from the well-known secret police to People's Militia, Frontier Guards, and Railway Guards. Like the satellite armies, the satellite police are governed by Soviet regulations. Together they enforce a system of order which has been designed to conform with the Soviet model.

241 656 In common with Yugoslavia, certain states in the orbit are strengthening the weakest sector of the economy: agriculture. It is not certain that the Yugoslav experience compelled the

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changes in agricultural policy in the people's democracies. 241
The only causal factor common to both areas is a very prac- 656
tical one: agricultural production has not been in a position to supply the needs of the growing industrial population. The socialist objective of complete nationalization of agriculture has nevertheless not been retracted or withdrawn. On the contrary, the satellites are acting within the orthodox pattern of Soviet experience.

In the economic sphere, the orbit is passing through a 185
period comparable to the Russian New Economic Policy. In the words of Stalin this is a "special policy of the proletarian state counting on the tolerations of capitalist elements, the commanding heights being in the hands of the proletarian state. . . .", in short a policy which aims "at overcoming capitalist elements and building a socialist economy by the method of a direct exchange of products. . . ." As if the Soviet experience itself did not suffice as a guide, there is the advice of Stalin on the proper agricultural policy required to prepare the transition to communism: continued development of the country's industrial resources, the gradual adjustment of collective farming to the nationalized sector of the economy, and the raising of the standards of living and culture. All these the satellite states are in the process of attempting to accomplish. There may be compromises in the short run, but there will be no compromise regarding the ultimate objective—the complete socialization of agriculture.

Changes in agricultural policy are particularly marked in those countries which have been heretofore heavily agricultural: Yugoslavia, Hungary, Albania, and Bulgaria. The restiveness of the population arising from the social and economic consequences of enforced industrialization made these changes necessary. The changes are short-run changes. While budgets for agricultural development will be increased, prices lowered for industrial goods and increased for farm products, establishment of producer cooperatives delayed,

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185 and fines for delay in delivery of agricultural products abolished, the basic policy of collectivization remains. The problem facing the satellite governments is one of tempo, not of objective.

000 The governments of the Soviet orbit are subject to all these strains and stresses which arise from a system of dictatorship over the minds and bodies of men. Nevertheless, the Western observer must be cautious in reading into these changes any amount of wishful thinking. It does not follow that a process of disintegration is taking place within the Soviet orbit. A more realistic attitude would be to assume that since there is no change in the rate of capital investment and armament production, the Soviet empire is anything but on a decline.

At the same time it would be a mistake to ascribe to the rulers of the Soviet orbit a monopoly of political omniscience. They are handicapped by a political dogma which prevents a clear assessment of the problems which face them day in and day out. It would also be an error, on the part of the Western democracies, to examine the problems of Europe today from the vantage point of the past alone. They must be conscious of new variations which arise from the current Eastern European experience.

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11 Problems and Prospects of Federation

KARL W. DEUTSCH

I

The distribution of sovereign states in Central and in Eastern Europe has undergone some striking changes during the last one hundred years. A century ago, in 1853, there were six sovereign states between the Baltic Sea and the Aegean: the empires of Austria, Prussia, Russia, and Turkey, the kingdom of Greece, and the small principality of Montenegro. Two generations later, in 1913, there were ten states in the area, for by then Serbia, Bulgaria, Rumania, and Albania had all become sovereign states. Another ten years later, the number of states had increased to sixteen. Serbia and Montenegro had merged into Yugoslavia, but Hungary, Czechoslovakia, Poland, Latvia, Estonia, Lithuania, and Finland had all been added as sovereign states. After the convulsions of the Second World War, thirteen sovereign states remained in what was now called Eastern Europe. They were the same states which had existed there during the 1920's and 1930's, with the exception of the three small Baltic states of Latvia, Estonia and Lithuania, which had become incorporated under the Soviet dictatorships in the style of the federal republics of the Soviet Union.

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By 1949, Soviet-style dictatorships had been established in seven of these thirteen sovereign states. In these "Iron Curtain" states, dictatorship was and is exercised through a native minority who could not have won power without the support of the Soviet Union and the Soviet armies, and who—with the conspicuous exception of Yugoslavia—could not retain this power if Soviet support were withdrawn. The indirect rule thus exercised by the Soviet dictatorship, with the help of native personnel, over six of the Eastern European states —Poland, Czechoslovakia, Hungary, Rumania, Bulgaria, and Albania—might remind the observer at first glance of the indirect rule exercised in past centuries by the empires of Turkey and Russia over some of the principalities then existing in the region. Upon this superficial view, it might seem that despite all the violent changes in political sovereignty and national allegiance during the last one hundred years, the fundamental dependence of the peoples of this region upon foreign powers had remained essentially unchanged.

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This impression would be quite deceptive. In 1853, the government of Eastern Europe by only six powers had endured for more than two hundred years, with Sweden and Poland rather than Greece and Montenegro playing the roles of the fifth and sixth power at the side of Prussia, Russia, Austria, and Turkey. With the single exception of Poland, which by the end of the eighteenth century had become the victim of her neighbors, the administrative services of these powers were generally based upon foreign personnel drawn from peoples outside the region. Austria and Prussia depended upon the military and administrative services of Germans, Russia upon those of Great Russians, and Turkey in the last analysis had to rely upon the support of the Ottoman Turks. Natives of the different regions supplemented the personnel of these administrative services but did not dominate it. The rule of these foreign or semiforeign empires over the peoples of Eastern Europe was based upon this region's

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overwhelmingly peasant character, its political apathy and 175
military weakness.

Today, in the middle of the twentieth century, most of 176
these conditions have been transformed. All the peoples of Eastern Europe have literate majorities. They have native professional and middle classes. All of them have at least some more or less modern industries and transportation systems. All of them have had two or three generations of broad national and political development, a flourishing of national languages and literatures, and a vigorous growth in native political participation. They have memories of national independence and skills of political organization and action. They can no longer be ruled by alien rulers, and even the Russian dictatorship must deal with them by indirect methods. The peoples of Eastern Europe today can be governed stably only by native political administrations, by native civil services and school systems, and by the appeal—however distorted—to native symbols and traditions, or they cannot be governed at all.

All these changes seem to be irreversible. It would be as difficult to restore illiteracy, apathy, and fundamental ignorance to the peoples of Eastern Europe as it would be to restore the economic and social institutions of 1853. If history teaches us anything, it is at the very least that the distribution of political and military power is subject to rapid change and that every submerged people that has preserved its identity and its capacity to think and act may well expect to find again some opportunity to determine its own destiny in freedom.

II

Yet all was not well with the growth of sovereign states 641
in Eastern Europe. Perhaps the most characteristic feature of the political institutions of the area was the widespread

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641 discontent with them. If people had resented the oppressiveness of the old large empires, many now chafed under the smallness and divisiveness of the national states that had come to succeed them. Eastern European states, large or small, seemed to have a way of frustrating the hopes and ambitions of significant numbers of their citizens. Where men had complained about the lack of national freedom in the past, many now complained about the "balkanization" of the region. It is this underlying restlessness, this *malaise* of Eastern European politics, that gave a peculiar appeal to the demand for Eastern European federation. If we are to understand the prospects and the problems of a federal union in this region, we must first turn our attention to the fundamental needs and discontents that gave rise to the proposal.

175 433 Eastern Europe was a relatively backward area in terms of economic development. Even some of its most highly developed regions, such as the countries of Austria, Hungary, and the Russian-held parts of Poland, had lagged in economic development during the two crucial generations between 1815 and 1875, during which time most Western countries went through decades of tremendous economic growth.[1] In 1850

[1] Cf. Paul Muller, "Osterreich seit 1848," in Hans Mayer, ed., *Hundert Jahre Osterreichischer Wirtschaftsentwicklung*, 1848-1948, (Vienna: Springer Verlag, 1949), pp. 1-20, esp. p. 8; and in the same volume, for the old monopolistic traditions of business at Vienna from 1221 to 1848, and "conditions bordering on lethargy" during the decades preceding 1848, see Otto Gruss, "Ein Jahrhundert Osterreichischer Binnenhandel (1848-1948)," pp. 310-358, esp. pp. 311-317; for figures on the slow introduction of steam engines, the lag in the growth of towns, the slow relative growth of the population occupied in industry, the lack of capital, the national fragmentation of markets, etc., see Karl Heinz Werner, "Osterreichs Industrie und Aussenhandelspolitik 1848 bis 1948," *ibid.*, pp. 359, 479, esp. pp. 624-678, esp. p. 659. See also J. Slokar, *Geschichte der osterreichischen Industrie* (Vienna: Tempsky, 1949), pp. 16-19, 46-54, 177-179; Richard Schuller, "Die Entstehung des osterreichisch-ungarischen Wirtschaftsgebietes," in G. Gratz and R. Schuller, *Der wirtschaftliche Zusammenbruch Osterreich-Ungarns* (Vienna and New Haven: Holder-Pichler-Tempsky and Yale University Press, 1930), pp. 1-35, esp. pp. 23-24; Oscar Jaszi, *The Dissolution of the Habsburg Monarchy* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1929), pp. 185-212.

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Vienna was larger than Berlin and Austria did not appear 175
to lag conspicuously behind Prussia; but by 1866 the lag had 433
become conspicuous and was confirmed on the battlefields of the Austro-Prussian War. There seems to have been a significant acceleration of economic growth between 1880 and 1914; and it has been estimated that between 1900 and 1910 the percentage rate of growth in the national income of Austria was even somewhat faster than it was during the same decade in Western Europe. The percentage growth of the low income of Austria-Hungary was unable, nevertheless, to keep up with the very much higher levels of national income and industrial productivity which meanwhile had been attained in the West.

Such economic growth as did occur was quite unevenly distributed. The economic position of the Germans and a few other groups was a great deal better than that of the rest of the peoples concerned, and the attempts of non-German groups to equal German economic standards often brought them into economic competition and political friction with Germans. After the economic depression of 1873, German nationalists raised the cry for the preservation of German supremacy, and the very attempts to mitigate or overcome economic inequality thus led to intensified economic competition and political conflict.

Economic development was poorly distributed between 175
town and country, as well as between nationalities. In most 162
Western countries, country people had come to share many 433
of the educational and cultural standards of the city populations. In Eastern Europe, by contrast, even the German-Austrian peasants were described before the First World War by the Viennese architect, Adolph Loos, as people wearing different clothes, speaking a different language, and having an infinitely more primitive way of life than the populations of the cities.

The uneven distribution of economic opportunity was re-

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175 inforced in its effect by the extreme splintering of national,
162 linguistic, and religious affiliations. A good map of the na-
433 tionalities, languages, and religions of Eastern Europe would have shown not the large patches of relatively homogeneous populations which are found in so much of Western Europe but rather a polka-dot pattern of intermixed minorities.

182 The relative national uniformity of the West is perhaps, at least in part, the product of a history rich in the processes of successful social learning and acculturation, which merged and melted the different ethnic groups that were left in the Western countries by accidents of migration, wars, and settlement. In Eastern Europe, such accidents of conquest or settlement may well have been even more numerous, but there is also some reason to think that the processes of assimilation were much slower and less effective.

Greater uniformity of language and culture means greater interchangeability of social roles. This is not merely a contributing cause to the growth in social mobility and in the interchange of social roles but is also to some extent their product. Where societies are rigorously stratified, where religions fail to impress upon people an awareness of their essential unity, where the obstacles to a change in occupation or in social role are great, and the rewards for mobility are uncertain and small—in these societies individuals may best succeed in gaining security by clinging tenaciously to their familiar groups, languages, customs, and traditions, and by rejecting any assimilation to other groups except the most privileged as a threat to their existence. The more privileged groups, under these conditions, can only be expected to resent and resist the assimilation or intrusion of strangers, unless these strangers come from regions of clearly greater wealth and greater prestige and seem to bring to the new group assets clearly greater than those they would demand. The lack of unity and assimilation in language and culture in Eastern Europe thus appears as one more aspect of the

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relative lack in fundamental economic innovation and social /182
learning in that geographic area, if we take the extent of such learning and innovation in the Western countries as our standard.

On this view, the Western way of life—thus far the way of 000
life of a minority of mankind—has been built upon a certain fundamental willingness to learn, and a basic acceptance of both some mobility, at least in society, and of some innovations in accustomed practices and habits. Against the background of this Western culture, large-scale markets and economic competition, as well as the impact of the modern centralized state, had a chance of functioning as accelerators of technological and social change: they tended to lure or push people away from social roles or economic occupations which were poorly rewarded and into new roles or occupations where the gains were greater. Western economic and political institutions succeeded the better in this function of accelerating social change where they impinged upon individuals who had the economic and social resources for moving, and at least a minimum of cultural and psychological willingness to do so. Where these economic and cultural preconditions did not exist, however, or where they existed only in part, the effect of the impact of Western institutions was bound to be quite different, and these differences became dramatically visible in the area of Eastern Europe.

III

Eastern Europe, seen from this aspect, was a semi-Western /177
area. It was fully exposed to Western practices and institutions both in the field of higher education, particularly university education, and in the fields of military drill and warfare, and particularly in the use of conscripted armies, although it could operate in this field only as long as no extensive industrial facilities for the use of massed artillery

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177 were needed. Large parts of the area were exposed to Western methods of tax collecting, accounting, and fiscal policy, as well as public administration. They were exposed to the activities of modern bankers, and to a considerable extent to the practices of modern commerce, newspapers, and advertising. They were also exposed in large part to compulsory elementary public education.

177 As a result of these exposures in the nineteenth century, the peoples of Eastern Europe learned to accept completely 571 the prevailing Western standards of theoretical science, as well as of intellectual and artistic life. They accepted to a considerable extent Western ideals of living standards, standards of consumption, wage levels, working conditions, and social welfare. Finally, many of them came to expect Western standards of farm prosperity, rural welfare, and peasant independence and cooperation. In sum, a large part of the populations of Eastern Europe accepted Western living standards as their goal, or at least as a pattern of their claims and expectations.

433 This rapid diffusion of Western-style claims and expectations was not matched by any comparable diffusion of Western-style work habits, savings and investment patterns, levels of productivity, or propensities to technological innovations. Land reforms in Eastern Europe were not only slow in coming, but they did little to increase productivity. The consolidation of separate strips of land, long accomplished in Scandinavia and Western Europe, was still not completed in Eastern Europe by the time of the Second World War. The tools and implements of artisans and peasants changed their traditional shape much more slowly in Eastern Europe than they did in Germany or England and pathetically more slowly than they did in the United States. Throughout most of the regions organized labor feared that increases in productivity would only lead to losses of employment. Employers and businessmen aspired to use the profits

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of their businesses for the purpose of retiring from business 433
themselves, rather than for expanding their productive equipment.

While productivity grew slowly, public health measures 464
were effective and birth rates remained high. Throughout 433
most of the region, the population pressed upon the limited supply of land and on the limited productivity of existing agricultural methods. At the same time, the lagging growth of towns and industries did not absorb completely the increases in population. The results were underemployment in the towns and industrial districts, hidden unemployment in the rural areas, and a general cheapness of human labor. While labor was thus abundant, and was often wastefully used, the skills of most workers remained low, and there was little incentive to improve them. Since capital goods and capital were scarce, there were fewer opportunities for engineers and applied scientists. And since universities, public administration, and banking had become modernized, there were ample employment opportunities for civil servants, clerks, lawyers, teachers, and research scientists.

The result was a startling precocity of Eastern European 178
intellectual life. First-rate university training was fairly widely available throughout the region. Food, land, and domestic services were relatively cheap. Civil servants, intellectuals, and members of the professions had high prestige socially, and they found no severe economic difficulty in maintaining their families and sending their children to universities. While the top-level jobs in commerce, civil service, 178
and universities under the Austro-Hungarian monarchy were 563
perhaps somewhat more easily accessible to persons recruited from the German or Jewish minorities, there were some opportunities for careers for men of outstanding talent from all national backgrounds. Czech scientists reminisce today about the remarkable generation of Czech and Slovak intellectuals and scientists who made their careers during the last thirty

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178 years before the First World War in the Austro-Hungarian
563 monarchy. At the same time, there was relatively little competition for the services of men of high talent on the part of industry, applied science, or practical politics, since all of these activities remained relatively underdeveloped.

578 The coincidence of intellectual precocity with widespread
565 social and economic backwardness led to widespread experiences of frustration. Intellectuals, not unlike the ancient philosopher Plato, dreamed of equalling one day the power and prestige of the aristocracy, for which they lacked the land holdings and family connections; and they dreamed of equalling the comforts and securities of the bourgeoisie—the upper middle class—without either owning a bourgeois amount of property or devoting a bourgeois proportion of their time and attention to money-making or to business matters. They resented the influence of the church and the clergy in the rural areas, without being either willing or able to devote a major part of their own time and attention to the needs of the country population. Almost all classes of society had come to desire Western standards of income, comfort, security, and power, without possessing as yet either the means or the skill necessary to produce them. And all these discontented groups and individuals, pushed forward by the fundamental incongruities in their social evolution, turned to politics and to the state as a remedy for their frustrations.

IV

186 Under these conditions, no type of government and no
631 size of political unit could for long live up to the rising level of popular expectations and the increasingly pressing demands of society. Already, before the year 1914, large states as well as small, national states as well as international, became increasingly strained by social tensions.

In a supra- or multinational state, such as the Austro-

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Hungarian monarchy, an obvious reaction of the population to prolonged social and political disappointment was an increasing demand for national freedom. The sovereign nation-state would give the Czechs a fuller opportunity for careers for their young people and a more worthy share in determining their own destiny. A nation-state centered on Hungary would give Hungarian industries the protection they wanted and would free Hungarians from the delays and frustrations of the imperial relationship to Austria. The national state uniting Slovenes and Croatians with Serbia would help these peoples at long last to make real headway in escaping from their backwardness. During these same years, the peoples in the small national states of the region dreamed of escaping from the compromises and frustrations of their own small-scale political existence by national expansion into some greater and victorious power in their own area. Serbians and Montenegrins came to hope that their lives would somehow improve once Bosnia, Herzegovina, Slovenia, and Croatia had been joined to their own territories in a new Yugoslavia. Bulgarians, Greeks, and Serbians all came to believe that somehow their own lives would improve significantly if all or most of the territory of Macedonia were added to their respective countries.

Throughout large parts of Eastern Europe, the burdens and demands put upon the existing governments thus exceeded the capabilities of those governments and of the states they represented. The Eastern European states, large and small, were thus becoming overcommitted politically, economically, militarily, and socially. Among their peoples this situation encouraged the belief that things would become better once the size of political units in their region was changed. Citizens of small national states such as Serbia hoped for improvement from expansion. Citizens of large states, such as some of the Hungarians or Czechs in Austria-Hungary, began to wonder whether their position could not

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186 be improved by secession. All of them thought that they could
178 improve their position by finding that exact size of political unit in which their own language and their own national culture could be made to predominate and in which their own nationality or ethnic group could be turned into the leading class or social and political elite.

Nationalism in Eastern Europe was thus a reaction to the rapid diffusion of Western claims and to the expectations of security and opportunity throughout a group of societies that were only slowly, if at all, acquiring the productive skill and equipment to satisfy them. National secession, national expansion, and the national state appeared to almost all nationalities in the region as plausible short cuts to the prosperity, power, and prestige they all desired.

178 In the course of events, the experiment was actually made.
433 The Austro-Hungarian monarchy was destroyed and a num-
641 ber of successor states arose from its remains. There is no doubt on the whole that the emergence of these national states represented a significant step forward toward higher levels of popular participation in public affairs, toward political democracy, toward popular education, and even, in some respects, toward greater economic opportunities. But at the same time it seems clear that the change in the size of political units did little or nothing to come to grips with the fundamental causes of the poverty and backwardness of the region, or with the fundamental sources of its peculiar psychological and political frustrations and resentments. National and regional markets and consumer preferences remained as small and as unfavorable to mass production in the new states as they had in the old. Capital remained as scarce and productive investment as uneven and erratic as before.
178 Tools, technologies, and work habits changed slowly if at
[735] all. Poverty persisted. Purchasing power remained low and
464 prices high. Production remained scattered over many small and inefficient factories. Innovations were accepted reluc-

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tantly or not at all. Unemployment became worse than it had ever been. 178 464

Thus social tensions persisted or grew worse. Sometimes they appeared as growing tensions between left and right, with the political middle-of-the-road parties increasingly threatened by fascists or by communists. Sometimes they appeared as tensions between different nationality groups, such as between Serbians and Croatians or between Czechs and Germans. Often the same angry and frustrated individuals could be found backing communism in one year, extreme nationalism in another, and some more or less supranational fascism in a third. Whole districts voted for right-wing radical candidates in one election and for left-wing radicals in another. Nationalism in Eastern Europe was thus the symptom of a more fundamental maladjustment, even though nationalistic policies, once adopted, often served to make this maladjustment worse. Nationalistic governments, as well as most other governments in this region, were becoming increasingly unpopular and during the 1930's showed increasing reluctance to face their own voters. By 1939, before the first German or Russian soldier stepped on their soil, every country of Eastern Europe, with the exceptions of Finland and Czechoslovakia, had succumbed to some form of dictatorship. Nationalism had thus failed to cure the fundamental maladjustments of Eastern European political and economic life. From some points of view its failure was hardly less shattering than the failure of the supranational empires that had preceded it. 186 578 642 208

It was nationalism which first undermined and in part destroyed the traditions of property and the respect for property in Eastern Europe. This attack against property began as early as the era of Prince Bismarck in Germany. The so-called Polish legislation sponsored by the German government and by the German nationalists during and after the Bismarck era showed scant respect for the property 642 423 563

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642 rights of the Polish minority in Germany. It was designed
423 to prevent them from acquiring what was considered German
563 land and to deprive them of such German land as they had managed to acquire in the past. In addition to driving the Poles from German soil, this policy was also designed to eliminate Polish minorities in Eastern Germany by assimilation or expulsion, and the German word *ausrotten*—or exterminate—leaves little doubt as to the ruthlessness of the determination behind this policy. After the First World War, when certain parts of Silesia were incorporated in Poland, former German properties in industrial corporations and other valuables had a way of coming into Polish hands. When from 1939 to 1944 German armies in turn occupied a large part, and later all, of Poland, large amounts of Polish property were again transferred to Germans.

425 In one shape or another, with or without benefit of legal
563 form, this game of transferring property from the temporarily weaker to the temporarily stronger nationalities was played in large areas of Eastern Europe. When in the course of the First World War the Austro-Hungarian government collected large amounts of taxes and additional amounts of ostensibly voluntary war loans for the war efforts of Germany and Austria from the unwilling Czech, Slovakian, and Polish populations, the Austrian empire was in effect transferring important parts of the national wealth of these regions into German hands to be spent for German political and military purposes.[2] After the First World War, formerly Austrian or German mines, banks, and industrial enterprises in Czechoslovakia had a way of becoming Czechoslovakian. After 1939, when the Nazis occupied this country, Czecho-

[2] Cf. G. Gratz and R. Schuller, *op. cit.*, pp. 171-188; Wilhelm Winkler, *Die Einkommensverschiebungen in Osterreich während des Weltkrieges*, (Vienna and New Haven: Holder-Pichler-Tempsky and Yale University Press, 1930), pp. 74-78, 219-221; Alois Rasin, *Financial Policy of Czechoslovakia during the First Year of Its History* (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1923), pp. 7-25.

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slovakian-owned enterprises soon found their way into German hands, and the Dresdner Bank emerged as a major owner of formerly Czechoslovakian property. After Germany had lost the war in 1945, the new government of Czechoslovakia with the support of all political parties—anti-Communists as well as Communists—proceeded to expel all Sudeten Germans and to confiscate their property. Sudeten German anti-Nazis who had been loyal to the Czechoslovakian republic were nominally exempt from these provisions, but the burden of proving their loyalty was put upon their shoulders, and by 1947 the nationalistic atmosphere in the new Czechoslovakia was such that many German anti-Nazis with proven democratic records preferred to emigrate voluntarily to Germany, leaving behind the properties and savings of a lifetime. At the beginning of the year 1948, shortly before the Communists seized power in Czechoslovakia, there were perhaps 2,000,000 individuals who, in one way or another, had acquired some parts of former German property either in the Sudetenland or elsewhere in the country. These people may have found it rather difficult to resist the power and the confiscatory threats of Communism, so long as they themselves were using other people's furniture and were living in other people's houses.

Throughout the region, property rights thus became the plaything of nationalistic politics between Poles and Germans, Czechs and Austrians, Hungarians, Slovakians, and Rumanians, Serbians and Croatians. Few, if any, of the persons who participated in these confiscations considered themselves criminals. Rather they persuaded themselves that they were patriots. They had perhaps suffered themselves during the preceding periods of war or foreign occupation, and this may have seemed to them the only opportunity for getting some sort of reparation. No rationalization, however, could change the ultimate result: during the last thirty years in Eastern Europe, the ownership of

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425 563 property, the right to travel, and the right to work in desirable occupations, have been dependent not upon a man's diligence, honesty, or thrift, but upon the accident of his affiliations with the group temporarily in power. A man's property and freedom thus came to depend upon the official estimation of his "political reliability" or loyalty, which was defined for him by a rapidly changing sequence of politicians and political regimes. Many of the men who practiced these policies of confiscation and repression considered themselves anti-Communists, or professed themselves as such. Yet in their disregard for property rights and civil liberties they did much to pave the way for Communism.

V

185 668 Perhaps it has been memories of the stagnation under the old empires and the conflict and repressions of the following eras of nationalism that have turned many to visions of a safer, broader, and more generous life under an Eastern European federation.

In the minds of those who accepted this vision, a federation of Eastern European states would offer its peoples military security against invasion by outsiders. It would insure economic prosperity, provide a more stable distribution of economic welfare, safeguard property, provide broader opportunities for all, reward work, thrift, and enterprise, and by all these means serve to insure broad and rapid economic growth. In regard to politics, it would safeguard civil liberties. It would guarantee nondiscriminatory treatment to all peoples and minorities and free mobility to individuals throughout the region. It would assure to both individuals and peoples throughout Eastern Europe respect for their diverse habits and traditions, so that none of them would be forced to change their respective customs, work habits, and social institutions more rapidly or more radically than they might

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freely choose. To ease the complex and subtle problems of 185
culture, emotions, and psychology, it was hoped that the 668
federation would insure widespread opportunities for education. It was hoped that it would give to the inhabitants of the region both social and international prestige. It was hoped that it would bring them to a status of equality with the reference groups which they had chosen as yardsticks for comparison, or that in some way an Eastern European federation would make its citizens the equals not only of the French and German peoples but perhaps in time even of the English and American peoples, who have now become the reference groups for standards of achievement throughout the world. Finally it was hoped that such a federation would give rise to inspiring common enterprises that would unite the peoples of Eastern Europe in a new sense of their own identity, as in past centuries the monarchies of Western Europe, according to the philosopher José Ortega y Gasset, have united their own peoples into a sense of dignity and nationhood.

In striking contrast to the splendor of these visions was 648
their relative poverty in specific detail. None of the larger projects for federation in this region were ever negotiated by governments or even by responsible political leaders from the different areas. There was a negotiated project of the Polish-Czechoslovakian federation, worked out by Czechoslovakian and Polish leaders-in-exile during the Second World War, but this project which included only two states in the region was not followed up by the established governments or by the major political organizations after the war.[3]

[3] Cf. United States Department of State, Division of Library and Reference Services, *Danubian Federation: An Annotated Bibliography* (*Bibliography No. 66*), Washington, D.C., October 28, 1952 (multigraphed); Felikas Gross, *Crossroads of Two Continents: A Democratic Federation of East-Central Europe* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1945), pp. 28-34, and for the text of the Polish-Czechoslovakian Declaration, signed in London on January 25, 1942, by representatives of the two

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648 Projects for a Balkan union usually failed to include even the Danubian states and practically never reached out toward Poland and the Baltic. Projects for a Baltic union usually remained limited to Poland and the small Baltic states, leaving the latter faced with the prospect of becoming a minority in what would become in practice a greater Poland.

000 Perhaps most of the substance behind the projects for federation did not consist so much in plans for the future as in memories of the past, and in particular of the Austro-Hungarian monarchy. A reconstituted and enlarged Austria-Hungary, reaching in the North through the accession of Poland and the Baltic states to the shores of the Baltic Sea and including in the South all the Balkan states down to the border perhaps of Turkey, would sum up the many projects for uniting Eastern Europe which have been discussed so often during the last thirty years. It is the general project of a federation of the Danubian countries, enlarged by the addition of Poland to the north, and conceivably by that of Albania and Greece in the south, which needs closer examination.

It is true that such a federation would carry a certain amount of international prestige by virtue of the sheer numbers of its inhabitants, the enormous sums of productive capacities, natural resources, and miles of railroad track scattered throughout the area. Any more fundamental and lasting prestige, however, might well depend upon the effective military capabilities and the actual levels of economic prosperity and growth, and of educational progress and political democracy which the federation could maintain.

The obvious military task for such a federation would be to form a counterweight to Germany or Russia, or to both of them together. Many of these military tasks, how-

governments-in-exile, pp. 102-104; Antoni Plutynski, *We Are 115 Millions* (London: Eyre and Spottiswoode, 1944), pp. 33-36, 114-122; etc.

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ever, seem well beyond the capabilities of the region. Such a federation would have no clear-cut advantage in manpower over either Germany or Russia and would be definitely inferior to the heavy industries and economic war potentials of these two countries, as well as to their productive facilities and transport systems. The military security of such a federation would depend primarily upon the military strength of Western Europe, and perhaps even more upon that of the United States. Given sufficient strength and determination in the Atlantic community, an Eastern European federation could be made secure, but its own military contribution would hardly be necessary, and certainly not decisive. In the absence of sufficient strength among the Western Powers, on the other hand, no amount of military effort on the part of these peoples could make them secure. Any situation in which the military strength of the Western and Eastern Powers were in such delicate balance that an Eastern European federation could make a decisive difference in their military prospects would be extremely rare; and if it should occur, it would be a situation of extreme insecurity rather than security, and would be unlikely to last for long.

A commitment to an active military policy might thus be beyond the military as well as the economic capabilities of the area, as commitments in the First World War proved to be fatally beyond the capabilities of the Austro-Hungarian monarchy. In this case, the result of overcommitment was the dissolution of the larger political unit and its replacement by a number of smaller ones, accompanied for decades by the widespread unpopularity of the very idea of union.

As regards economic prospects, projects of Eastern European union are frequently based on a naïve version of the nineteenth-century economic theory. According to that theory, economic growth would automatically result from free competition; no severe depression or protracted unemploy-

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ment could result under truly free competition, and all actual depressions would be merely the result of political interference in economic life on the part of misguided governments. Under such a *laissez faire* economy, the rates of saving and capital formation would automatically be high, capital would be invested in the most productive uses, and a continuous stream of creative innovations and technological improvements would be introduced as a matter of course.

These visions have little to do with the realities of the economic development of underdeveloped areas, as economists now know them. The propensity to save, the rate of capital formation, the tendencies to invest money in productive machinery rather than in land or liquid funds and to apply science and to accept technical innovations—all these are largely matters of society and culture and, to a significant extent, matters of public policy.[4]

None of these problems—terms of trade, capital formation, the savings rates, investment patterns, and innovation rates—are necessarily insoluble, but their solution is essential to economic growth, and none of them will be solved automatically by the effects of federation. Free trade has resulted not only in the relative wealth of England, but also in the relative poverty of Portugal. If English rather than Portuguese living standards are eventually attained in Eastern Europe, this will be due to a very considerable amount of careful

[4] Cf. W. W. Rostow, *The Process of Economic Growth* (New York: Norton, 1952), pp. 12-106; J. M. Clark, "Common and Disparate Elements in National Growth and Decline," in National Bureau of Economic Research, *Problems in the Study of Economic Growth* (New York, N.B.E.R.), July 1949 (multigraphed), pp. 33-37; Joseph Schumpeter, "Theoretical Problems of Economic Growth," *The Journal of Economic History*, Supplement VII, 1947, pp. 1-9; Albert Kervyn, "Approaches to the Problem of Economic Development," *World Politics* (July 1953), pp. 569-578; B. F. Roselitz, Ed., *The Progress of Underdeveloped Countries* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1952); United Nations, *Measures for the Economic Development of Underdeveloped Countries* (New York, 1951).

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study of the problems and conditions of economic growth in this region.

As long as major economic difficulties and frustrations persist in Eastern Europe, political democracy in that region is likely to remain in a precarious position. With the persistence of rural tensions resulting from village poverty and overpopulation, with strikes and unemployment among labor, with bitter competition for white-collar jobs, with the ever-present tendency of the wealthy to flee with its accumulations of capital (a tendency likely to become worse under government-imposed currency regulations and controls), economic stagnation or disruption will probably be a constant threat, and always with it will be the twin temptations of nationalism and dictatorship. The fatal gap between the rapid growth of popular needs and expectations and the slow growth of economic and social opportunities might continue to plague and eventually might even shatter an Eastern European federation, much as it plagued and eventually shattered both supranational empires and national states in the past.

If the plans for an Eastern European federation do not offer in themselves any answer to the general problems of economic growth and political stability, neither do they offer any answer to a number of the most burning specific problems of the area.

Just what would be the role of the Austrian and German peoples in an Eastern European federation? An increasing number of Germans is demanding rather vehemently the return to Germany of the formerly German territories which at present form the western provinces of Poland and which contain a large part of the industrial capacity of the Polish republic. There are almost 3,000,000 Sudeten German evacuees scattered through Germany and Austria, and many of these persons cherish hopes of returning some day to the

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Sudetenland and to their former properties, and perhaps even hope to gain additional properties and power by way of compensation or booty at the next turn of the wheel of political fortune.

To be sure, German claims for restoration or new expansion may recede into the background as the present generation of German evacuees grows old and if the children of this generation find new roots and new prospects within the present boundaries of Germany. However, German claims on Eastern Europe, backed by the existence of some 10,000,000 displaced Germans from Eastern Europe as well as by the growing German industry and the growing prospects for the restoration of a German army, will continue for at least ten or fifteen years to be a major factor in the political universe of Central Europe.

Distinct from the issue of the East Germans is the problem of German Austria. The German city of Vienna lies east of both Zagreb and Prague. If Bohemia has been compared by German writers to a Slavic wedge thrust into Germany, so Austria could be compared to a German wedge pushed into Eastern Europe. Would the Austrians be included in an Eastern European federation and, if so, what would their position be? If they were not included in an Eastern federation, would they be permitted to resume their efforts for union with Germany, as was attempted by both the German and the Austrian Social Democrats after 1918 and again by the Bruening-Curtius government in 1930, and as was finally accomplished by the violent action of the Nazis in 1938? If Austria were to join neither Germany nor an Eastern European federation, where would it go, and how would its people make a living?

The German and Austrian problems are only two of the major nationality problems of the Eastern European area. What would be done about the Magyars and Rumanians in Transylvania? Would the former Ukrainian territories of Po-

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land and Czechoslovakia remain outside the Eastern European federation? 000

Perhaps more important, where would the center of the federation be? There seems to be no first-rate rail center east of Vienna between the north and south of Eastern Europe. Are there one or more potential metropolitan regions for the entire European area, and could they be linked by an integrated transportation system? If not, could an Eastern European federation function without them?

VI

At present none of these questions can be answered easily or quickly. Necessary to their solution are many more facts than are now available. Among the first steps that can be undertaken at this time towards strengthening the prospects of a free and democratic Eastern European federation is the undertaking of some of the fundamental research which has been given insufficient attention in the past.

Such research would enable us to evaluate more correctly the extent to which political amalgamation of Eastern Europe is practicable and how likely it is that integration without amalgamation could maintain peace and security. Political amalgamation would mean the merging of political institutions and would emphasize particularly the abolition of sovereign national governments in Eastern Europe and the transfer of their powers to a single common government. Integration without amalgamation might mean the retention of national sovereignty, modified by a sense of community among all participating political units that would lead to the conviction that a war among them would be anachronistic and impossible.

Integration without amalgamation can be found between Norway and Sweden, and perhaps among all the Scandinavian countries. It can also be found between the United

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States and Canada, and perhaps between the United States and Mexico. In all these cases, the nations involved have demilitarized the borders separating them from each other. They stand ready to defend their national soil against foreign invaders, but they do not expect to be invaded or to go to war with their neighbor. The United States and Canada have even entered in substance into a relationship of alliance under which they stand ready to aid each other against outside enemies. The demilitarized borders between Norway and Sweden and between the United States and Canada are visible expression of the development of the habits, practices, and institutions of mutual trust and quick responsiveness possible between neighboring nations.

Common governments, too, require such mutual habits and understanding and responsiveness, if they are to mean more than the forcible subjection of the peoples living under them. It seems significant that the Swedes and Norwegians were on the verge of open hostilities at the beginning of the twentieth century when they were still living under a common crown and that relations between these two peoples have improved continually since Norway, like Sweden, attained its sovereign freedom. It may well be that the greater the degree of common government, the greater must be the amount of effective mutual understanding and responsiveness. And it may also be true that, at a given level of mutual understanding and voluntary self-adjustment, a nonamalgamated community would be practicable where a common government would founder in mutual conflict.

Dependable habits of mutual understanding and responsiveness are indicators—though not the only indicators—of the capabilities of the political institutions which maintain a political community. Some of the many other indicators of such capabilities are the material resources at the disposal of the community and the speed with which these can be recommitted to meet new pressures or new challenges. The

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number of duties a government must discharge and the amount of expectations and pressures a security community has to meet represent a load upon the institutions or community; there is a balance between the political load of decision-making, responsiveness, and capacity to act on the one hand, and the actual capabilities of a government or a political community on the other hand.

It is this balance between integration loads and integration capabilities which may decide the fortunes of a political community, whether it be a unitary state or a regional federation. A better understanding of the probable loads and strains and of the probable resources and capabilities of the political communities in Eastern Europe will do much to indicate what degree of political amalgamation will prove practicable in this area, and what kind of political, economic, or military overcommitments may have to be avoided.

During the presidential campaign in the United States in 1952 both General Eisenhower and Governor Stevenson agreed that the liberation of the peoples of Eastern Europe would eventually come, not through destructive war, but through the steady pressure and the increasingly attractive example of the strong and successful development of the Western democracies. In the age of atomic energy, the chains of tyranny cannot be burst by atom bombs if men are to liberate anything more than cemeteries. Rather, the chains will have to be corroded gradually by the ever-present and relentless example of Western freedom.

This may be a slow process but it may in the end be a surer one. It will require from the Western world more and better research and a greater understanding of the needs and conditions of the Eastern European peoples. Such research may show that historical developments are not always slow and that centuries are not always necessary for the evolution of conditions necessary to a great and democratic federation. There is much to be accomplished before a free Eastern

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European federation can emerge from the assembly line of history. But it is possible that preparations can be made quickly as well as slowly, once people know what they must do, and once they have gained faith that tyranny and war can be banished forever from Eastern Europe.

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12 Eastern Europe and the Postwar Balance of Power

C. E. BLACK

In the Second World War as in the first, Eastern Europe was the scene of the opening hostilities and became one of the principal battlefields. Yet this region played a different role in the peace settlements following the two world wars, for after the first it remained a power vacuum for a generation and after the second it became a part of the power system of one of the victorious states. An understanding of the process by which this region came to occupy a critical position in the postwar balance is essential to a discussion of the policies that have been formulated to redress this situation.

I

During the Second World War, the three leading members of the United Nations coalition were in agreement that Eastern Europe should be liberated from the Axis, but when it came to discussing what political system should replace Axis rule it soon became apparent that their points of view conflicted. Of the three powers, the Soviet Union had the most immediate interest in this region. The policy of establishing a sphere of influence in Eastern Europe has deep roots in

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Russian history and formed an important aspect of Tsarist foreign policy before the First World War.

Soviet weakness after the revolution forced this policy into the background, but the disintegration of the European political system in the decade after the world depression prepared the ground for a revival of Russian influence. It is not known for certain when this traditional Russian aim was reformulated in Soviet terms, but it was unmistakably discernible in Molotov's negotiations with the Western democracies and with Germany in the summer of 1939. The Soviet terms in each case stipulated an extension of Soviet influence, through annexation or political control, along the entire borderland from the Baltic to the Black Sea. The fact that the Germans were better able than their rivals to pay this price gave them an initial advantage in the ensuing war, but did not prevent Nazi-Soviet relations from foundering on the same issue in the winter of 1940-41.

As soon as the U.S.S.R. had recovered from the first impact of the Nazi attack, Soviet diplomacy set its sights toward confirming and extending the sphere of influence acquired during the period of the Nazi-Soviet pact. Molotov tried unsuccessfully in the spring of 1942 to have recognition of the recent Russian territorial gains made a condition to the conclusion of the Anglo-Soviet treaty of alliance. Soviet policy then turned its attention to the Eastern European governments-in-exile, and the treaty of alliance concluded with the Czechoslovakian government at the end of 1943 marked the first success in this line of action. Where this kind of diplomacy failed, as in the case of Poland and Yugoslavia, Soviet support was transferred to rival organizations.

Communist-organized partisan movements were an important instrument of Soviet policy in Yugoslavia and Albania, as well as in Greece. In Poland, Rumania, Bulgaria, and Hungary, on the other hand, no progress was made until

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Soviet troops arrived on the scene in 1944. These operations took place behind a screen of propaganda that stressed the desirability of establishing independent and democratic governments in Eastern Europe after the war, and in the prevailing spirit of wartime unity only the most clear-headed students of Russian affairs grasped the nature of Soviet intentions.

From long experience, the British government sensed the danger to postwar stability inherent in the Soviet domination of Eastern Europe. At the same time, British strategy supported a plan, which arose from military necessity, to outmaneuver the Axis armies by striking at them indirectly on their southern flank. Thus, both interest and expediency inclined the British towards supplementing the cross-Channel attack by a major campaign from Italy aimed at the Danubian region, and they pressed for this strategy in Anglo-American councils once the initial success in North Africa had been assured. The American and Soviet objections that were registered at the Tehran Conference and the reluctance of the Turks to abandon their neutrality spelled the defeat of these plans.

The British now tried to gain influence in Eastern Europe by other means. Although it was clear that the extended Soviet frontiers of 1941 would have to be conceded at the end of the war, Churchill originally favored the formation of a Danubian and a Balkan federation as members of a European Regional Council. However, under the circumstances that developed after the Tehran Conference and with the growing possibility of a unilateral Russian settlement in Eastern Europe, Churchill was forced to seek a foothold for direct British influence as an alternative to the European solution for which he had found no backing from his allies. The transfer of British support from Mihailović to Tito, the attempts to restore relations between the U.S.S.R. and the

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000 Polish government-in-exile, the encouragement of Beneš in his efforts to develop close Soviet-Czechoslovakian relations —these and other measures were now taken.

The most important of these policies, adopted initially without American participation, was the decision to negotiate directly with the U.S.S.R. for a division of the Balkans into spheres of influence. This policy led to the conclusion in October, 1944, of a formal agreement that conceded to the British a predominant interest in Greece in return for the recognition of a similar Soviet interest in Rumania and Bulgaria. In Yugoslavia and Hungary the influence of the two powers was to be shared. Although this agreement was made only for the duration of the war, it established a pattern for subsequent developments.

A number of considerations led the United States to pay less attention to Eastern Europe during the war than did the U.S.S.R. and the United Kingdom. The most immediate was the essentially military outlook of the American leaders, which led them to regard the defeat of Germany and Japan as ends in themselves and to disregard the realignment of power that might result from this policy. Underlying this approach, was the profound distrust of American public opinion for any strategy, particularly in Europe, that was not clearly directed towards the earliest possible conclusion of hostilities. The experience of President Roosevelt as a member of the Wilson administration had taught him the indecision of American opinion on issues of foreign policy, and the plan for the drafting and ratification of the Charter of the United Nations before the termination of hostilities reveals the modest view taken by the administration of the support that it could expect from the voters on these issues.

This cautious American approach was also evidenced by the handling of foreign affairs in the Presidential elections of 1940 and 1944 and by the many constitutional devices

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that were used to bypass Congress on delicate issues of foreign policy. Moreover, the prospect of a prolonged struggle with Japan after the defeat of Germany served only to increase this caution regarding commitments in Europe. That this assumption regarding American opinion was soundly based became evident as soon as the war was over, when the rapid demobilization of the armed forces and the abrupt termination of Lend-Lease reflected the belief of the American voter that with the military defeat of the enemy a stable peace had been established.

In addition to these considerations, it should be noted that President Roosevelt apparently left the Tehran Conference convinced that Stalin's promises and statements of policy could be taken at face value. Although the President would have been quick to recognize the fallacy of this assumption once the evidence became available, as is clear from his reaction to events in Poland during the last weeks of his life, he spoke and acted during the period in which the determining decisions were made as though the extension of Soviet and Communist influence were matters of no serious concern. In his Fourth Inaugural Address, in what was intended to be a summary of his political philosophy, President Roosevelt conveyed to the American public his views on foreign policy in a manner that was characteristic of his thinking during this period:

> We have learned to be citizens of the world, members of the human community.
>
> We have learned the simple truth, as Emerson said, that, 'The only way to have a friend is to be one.'
>
> We can gain no lasting peace if we approach it with suspicion and mistrust—or with fear. We can gain it only if we proceed with the understanding and the courage which flow from conviction.

In view of the predominant American influence in the war councils of the Western allies, the major dispositions made in the last year of the war all tended to leave Eastern Europe

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648 to the Russians. The decision to weaken the campaign in Italy—with the possibility of pressing on into the Danubian region—in order to invade southern France in the summer of 1944, followed from this attitude, as did the granting to the Soviet High Command of overriding powers in the armistice terms concluded with Rumania, Bulgaria, and Hungary. Under the circumstances, the only limitations placed on Soviet influence in Eastern Europe were those created by the advance of the allied armies in the West and by the prompt British occupation of Greece. By the time of the Yalta conference this tendency to accept a Soviet orbit in Eastern Europe was in full swing. It followed logically that the provisional postwar governments of Poland and Yugoslavia should be based on the Communist regimes already on the spot and that full confidence should be placed in the Soviet agreement to assist "the earliest possible establishment through free elections of governments responsive to the will of the people."

In the immediate postwar period, the American and British foreign ministers made some effort through diplomacy to reduce Soviet influence in Eastern Europe. By this time, however, their bargaining power had been largely dissipated, since neither their own governments nor public opinion gave them strong support, and the U.S.S.R. found it necessary to make few concessions to win the Western signatures to the peace treaties concluded with the former Axis satellites in 1947. By the end of that year the governments of Albania, Bulgaria, Hungary, Poland, and Rumania were in Soviet hands, and that of Czechoslovakia was within easy reach. Exceptional circumstances limited Soviet influence in Yugoslavia and permitted Tito to break loose in 1948, but after this incident the Soviet hold on the other countries in Eastern Europe was tightened and these countries were soon consolidated into a closely knit political and economic orbit.

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II

In the bipolar system of international relations that emerged in the first postwar years, Eastern Europe played a critical role in the balance of power—defining this term as a system of political organization in which no single state is permitted to gain sufficient strength to impose its will on the other states. It is easy enough to demonstrate the increment to Soviet power represented by the Eastern European orbit in terms of strategic positions, manpower, production, raw materials, and a rich variety of skills. Yet the importance of Eastern Europe to Russia does not lie primarily in these gains. It lies rather in the advantage that it gives to Soviet policy in neutralizing and eventually absorbing the continent of Europe itself, which at this stage constitutes the key to the balance of power. Russia and Eastern Europe alone clearly do not spell world domination, but Russia and the European continent as a whole represent a sum of power that if properly organized could give the Soviet leaders a dominant position.

The alternative to a Soviet orbit in Eastern Europe originally contemplated by the Western allies was not a corresponding Western orbit on the Soviet border, but rather the organization in Europe as a whole of a political system independent of either Soviet or American influence. Whether it was through the European Regional Council proposed by Churchill when he visited Washington in May, 1943, or through the United Nations Charter drafted in its original form on the instructions of Roosevelt, the Western allies hoped to see in both Eastern and Western Europe the restoration of states that were independent, peace-loving, and as democratic as their capabilities permitted. With such a system it was hoped that the very atmosphere of Europe

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would encourage those political forces in Eastern Europe which favored democracy and social progress, and that the security of the Soviet Union would be assured by the absence of organized power in Europe and by the international regime of the United Nations.

That the Western democracies, and especially the United States, delayed so long in recognizing the threat of Soviet domination in Eastern Europe may be attributed to several factors. The outcome of the inter-allied wartime negotiations regarding strategy had been presented to the public as agreed decisions, and the Soviet position in Eastern Europe was at first accepted as part of an allied plan blessed by Churchill and Roosevelt. Moreover, many persons in the West were so poorly informed regarding the Soviet system as to believe that it would bring great positive gains to the peoples of Eastern Europe. Even more influential was the paradoxical view held by many that, although Soviet power was too great to be resisted in Eastern Europe, there was no reason to fear its extension beyond that region. In fact, the very opposite was the case. Although the establishment of an Eastern European orbit was certainly a major objective of the Soviet leaders in 1944-45 and in fact they made efforts to gain control in Western Europe as well, there is much evidence that they would have accepted a great deal less if they had been required to negotiate with determined British and American counterproposals. As soon as they perceived that the Western allies had no intention of backing up their diplomatic notes of protest, they proceeded to exploit their advantage to the full both within and beyond the region. The Soviet leaders thus established their controls over the power structure of Eastern Europe during the first two postwar years. Only when they tried to extend their political influence from the southern periphery of their orbit into Greece and Turkey did they finally provoke British and American countermeasures.

The United Kingdom had been a vigilant guardian of the

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balance of power during the war, and only American objections had prevented the launching of at least a limited campaign from Italy into the Danubian region in 1944. After the war the position was reversed, and the United States found itself assuming the role that the British, through lack of means, were reluctantly forced to relinquish. It was an arduous course in adult education that brought American policy to the point of accepting political responsibility in the Eastern Mediterranean, but once the decision was taken it was systematically implemented. During the period of containment, as American policy between 1947 and 1953 is generally referred to by friends and critics alike, the international position of Eastern Europe underwent important changes.

The policy of containment, in the words of its leading proponent, was "designed to confront the Russians with unalterable counter-force at every point where they showed signs of invading upon the interests of a peaceful and stable world." The belief that Soviet leaders would be restrained rather than provoked by such action rested on a careful study of their ideology and conduct. The gradual and ultimate character of Marx's world revolution as interpreted in Russia, the flexibility exhibited by Moscow's policy in the past, and the presence of inherent weaknesses in the Soviet system, seemed to justify the hope that containment would bring a halt to Soviet expansionism. In a limited sense a policy of containment had already been attempted in 1945-46 with respect to the Iranian question and other issues, and when American policy took a firm stand on well-chosen ground it met with unaccustomed success. When it was finally adopted in 1947, the policy of containment thus had a practical foundation in American experience as well as a considered basis in theory.

It is important to recognize that this policy was expected not only to bring the expansion of Soviet power to a halt but ultimately to contribute to the disintegration of that power in its home territory. It was believed that, if the United States

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could establish itself as a leading ideological force in the world by adroit propaganda and more particularly by adopting a vigorous and responsible approach to the myriad of problems that confront society in a revolutionary age, the source of Soviet strength would be greatly weakened. It was maintained that the attraction of communism in Russia and around the world would suffer greatly by this competition, and that the Soviet leaders might eventually be led by the frustration of their policies to make significant and permanent adjustments in their political system. In this sense, the policy of containment was considered by its proponents to be a positive though gradual policy in the field of political warfare and to be negative or defensive only in a military sense.

The policy of containment was evolved as a reply to the consolidation of Soviet power in Eastern Europe, to the aggressive attitude of the Communist parties all over the world, and in particular to the indirect Soviet aggression against Greece and the threats to Turkey. The new approach called for a reversal of the demobilization trend in the United States and for the initiation of a whole series of programs in the political, economic, and propaganda fields. By the very nature of the situation, this policy, or any other, could not be expected to bear important fruits for a number of years, and indeed during the period under discussion American policy suffered many serious defeats. In Asia Soviet power was in no sense contained and, if Soviet influence is not yet decisive in the Near and Middle East, conditions are favorable to its growth.

Only in Europe, with the reduction in influence of the Communist parties, the development of comprehensive plans for the economic and political integration of Western Europe and the establishment of NATO, did the policy of containment bear early fruit. Yet even the defeats in the Far East, serious though they were, contributed their share to the ultimate success of the new policy. The key to containment is

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the creation of a counter-force to Soviet power, and of all the events that spurred the American government and public opinion to a sense of responsibility, the victory of communism in China and Communist aggression in Korea were the most important.

It was the threat of Communist expansion in Eastern Europe that led to the announcement of the Truman Doctrine in March, 1947, and it was in northern Greece that the policy of containment met its first formal test and eventually won an important victory. In this instance, the first step in creating "an unalterable counter-force" to Soviet power was to establish beyond serious doubt the reality of the threat. This was accomplished through the machinery of the United Nations, and the report submitted by the Security Council Commission of Investigation Concerning Greek Frontier Incidents in May, 1947, served as an important rallying point for world opinion. The identification of the purpose and character of the threat facilitated the sending of aid to Greece, and after a bitter struggle the expansion of Soviet power in this region was halted.

The frustration of the Albanian, Bulgarian, and Yugoslavian forces that were serving as instruments of Soviet policy in Greece led to serious repercussions behind the Iron Curtain. The policy of containment was certainly only one of the factors that led to the break between Tito and Stalin, and it cannot claim the principal credit for this important setback to Soviet policy. Yet it is difficult to see how Tito could have broken away in 1948, or at least with such relative ease, if the United States had shown no interest in the threat to Greece, if the Communist parties had not been forced out of the governments in France and Italy, and if the general atmosphere of international relations had been one of an unimpeded expansion of Soviet power.

It is probably also correct to credit the policy of containment with the important change that occurred in Soviet policy

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000 in Eastern Europe in 1948. Difficult as it is to know what goes on within the Kremlin apparatus, the available evidence indicates that in the first postwar years a policy was followed of aggressively exploiting every opportunity to extend the influence of Communism all over Europe. When Europe rallied under the leadership of the Truman Doctrine in 1947-48 to inflict defeats on the Communists in many quarters, emphasis was placed on a defensive consolidation of the gains already made. Although this process strengthened the Communist position in Eastern Europe in certain respects, it was accompanied by many actions that served further to educate Western opinion as to the true nature of Soviet rule. The Communist *coup d'état* in Czechoslovakia, the masquerade trials of many political and religious leaders and of an American businessman and a correspondent, made a great impression on the West. American opinion in particular took new interest in Eastern Europe. Refugee scholars and political leaders from this region were now encouraged by the newly formed National Committee for a Free Europe to rally their followers and define their aims, and propaganda directed to Eastern Europe was developed by Radio Free Europe and by the Voice of America.

All this represented a great change in the American attitude and formed the necessary background for more positive steps. Significant among these was the signature at Ankara on February 28, 1953, of a Treaty of Friendship and Cooperation between Greece, Turkey, and Yugoslavia. The conclusion of this pact reflects the rapid development of events since the initial extension of American aid to Greece and Turkey in 1947. The support of Yugoslavia as a member of the Security Council of the United Nations in 1949 against serious Soviet opposition and the extension of formal American aid to Tito in 1950, marked the transition of that country from a bitter enemy of the West to an associate, if not an ally. At the same time, the accession of Greece and Turkey to

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NATO in 1951 brought these countries into a closer working relationship with the West. The Balkan pact of 1953 is not a military alliance, but an agreement to consult on all matters of common interest and to cooperate on questions concerning defense and on problems in the economic, technical, and cultural fields. The significance of this treaty, despite the many obstacles in the way of its implementation, lies in the creation of an alternative to the methods employed in the Soviet orbit. The treaty protects its members from Communist pressure and at the same time provides a rallying point for states desiring to break away from Soviet control should the opportunity arise.

III

The policy of containment, as a theory of foreign policy, aroused considerable public debate because it was initially presented in such general terms as to be open to many interpretations. If containment is interpreted as the policy actually pursued by the United States in the period between the announcement of the Truman Doctrine in 1947 and the inauguration of the new administration in 1953, few would deny that this policy resulted in a significant change in the morale and strength of the Western democracies. Acknowledging this vital gain, responsible students of foreign policy nevertheless questioned whether strengthening Western Europe was enough, and maintained that the role of Eastern Europe in the balance of power was such that the Soviet Union would continue to have a significant advantage in the struggle for Europe as a whole until its grip on this region had been broken. Although the policy of containment anticipated the ultimate disintegration of Soviet power, its critics thought this process too gradual and advocated the more dynamic course of liberating Eastern Europe from Communist rule by means short of war.

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000 Insofar as the outlines of a policy of peaceful liberation have been suggested by its proponents, one may explore briefly its assumptions, the conditions necessary for its implementation, and some of the methods that it might employ. The underlying assumption of this policy was set forth by Mr. Dulles when, as Secretary of State-Designate, he stated on January 15, 1953: "We shall never have a secure peace or a happy world so long as Soviet Communism dominates one-third of all the peoples that there are, and is trying at least to extend its rule to many others." The purpose of a policy of liberation would thus be to guarantee the security of the free world. It would be a limited political offensive for defensive purposes.

Liberation by means short of war calls for the offsetting of Soviet power in Europe so that in eventual negotiations for a European settlement the U.S.S.R. could be induced to withdraw its military forces behind the Russian frontier. It also calls for the piecemeal winning over of the countries of Eastern Europe by the diverse methods of political warfare. In Soviet eyes, the withdrawal called for under this policy would not be regarded as a defeat but only as a strategic retreat, carried out while accumulating forces for a renewed political offensive. There is good evidence that such a maneuver is in accord with Soviet doctrines. The Western world has no reason to argue with this Soviet rationalization, although its own purpose would be to convert this temporary withdrawal into a long-term stability.

There is a great deal to be said for such a conception of peaceful liberation, but before it can be implemented the United States must assume a more vigorous leadership in the free world, especially in Europe, and clear-cut decisions must be made regarding a post-liberation program for Eastern Europe. The political and economic integration of Western Europe is directly pertinent to a policy of liberation. Important to building a position of strength in Europe is the

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continued development of NATO and the ratification and implementation of the various agreements relating to the European Defense Community. To the extent that these plans can be strengthened by adopting the proposed European Political Community, United States policy should assist such a development. Without a further strengthening of the Western democracies, little can be done in Eastern Europe.

Equally important is the reunification of Germany and the negotiation of an Austrian peace treaty. It is possible to imagine an occasional individual country, such as Albania, leaving the Soviet fold at some opportune moment before this is done, but it is very difficult to envisage a general liberation of Eastern Europe. The role of Germany and Austria in the Second World War has not yet been forgotten in Eastern Europe, and a solution of the problems that they represent would be reflected not only in Soviet military dispositions but also in public opinion in this region. If Austria and one or both of the two zones of Germany could be fitted into such patterns of political and economic integration as may be established in Europe, conditions very favorable to a policy of liberation would result. Even something less than this rather ambitious goal would have significant results. If, on the other hand, the ambiguous status of Austria and Germany continues without change, Russian political and military pressures on Eastern Europe will remain strong.

A further prerequisite of a policy of liberation, and perhaps a more important one, is the adoption of clear-cut United States objectives in Eastern Europe. Whether they be used as propaganda, as a basis for negotiation with the Soviet Union, or merely as a frame of reference for government officials, the range of possible terms must be thoughtfully considered. Such terms must meet many requirements. They must be acceptable on political and security grounds to the United States and to NATO. They must appeal to large segments of the peoples of Eastern Europe, although it is of

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course too much to hope that all can be pleased. Since the aim is liberation by means short of war, such terms would also have to be acceptable in the last analysis to the Soviet Union, if not today at least in the changed circumstances that may be created in the next few years.

The drafting of such policy objectives is a large assignment, and all that can be done here is to suggest a few of the problems. On the question of frontiers, for instance, the United States cannot remain silent if it is to implement a dynamic policy. Yet the difficulties in taking a position on this issue are great. If the United States demanded a Soviet surrender of all the territories in Eastern Europe that it has annexed since 1938, a demand for which a case in international law could doubtless be made, the leaders of the U.S.S.R. and of many other states would not take it seriously. If the United States insisted on returning western Poland to Germany, on the other hand, it would not only alienate France but would also place an invaluable propaganda weapon in Russian hands for use in Eastern Europe. It may be that the only recourse will be to support the frontiers as they exist today, although this solution would cause great anguish in Poland and Rumania, as well as in Germany.

Equally difficult questions would have to be resolved in other fields of policy. The question of a new regional organization for Eastern Europe, for instance, would be vital. Should the incorporation of this region into the Western European defense arrangements be demanded, or should the states of Eastern Europe be encouraged to seek a form of neutrality such as that enjoyed today by Finland and Sweden? Should the goal of a Europe united by a common political and economic framework be pursued, or should Eastern Europe be left out of the federal proposals under consideration if this seems necessary to achieve greater freedom of negotiation? Should Communist regimes of a Titoist persuasion be accepted in these countries, or should prompt free

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elections be required? If it were not desirable that these and other decisions be made public, at least the responsible branches of government should have a clear idea of the range of possibilities within which they are operating.

Similarly in the social and economic fields important policy decisons would have to be made. Eastern Europe is no longer an underdeveloped area in the accepted sense of the term, and in significant respects it is in advance of the Soviet Union. However, it is true that in the period between the two wars the countries of this region failed to work out satisfactory solutions to the major problems of agricultural improvement, industrialization, and international trade. This is not to say that Soviet policy in this region since the Second World War has succeeded, for it has not. Nevertheless, the Communists appear to have recognized some of the main problems and, at least in the fields of industry and trade, have done something about them in their own characteristic way. It may be questioned whether Western policy has in the past given these problems equally serious consideration.

IV

If a policy of liberation by means short of war is to be implemented, not only must Soviet power be offset but the individual countries of Eastern Europe must be won over by more direct means. The substance of this process in each country is the removal of the reins of power from persons acting under Soviet discipline. Essential features of this task must be accomplished on the spot by nationals of each country, but the United States and its allies in Western Europe would have important responsibilities. These would lie chiefly in the realm of propaganda and intelligence.

The purpose of propaganda in this process would be to keep the hope of freedom alive in the minds of the peoples of this region and to undermine the self-confidence of the groups

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that now hold the reins of power. Almost a decade has passed since the heavy hand of Communist rule was laid on these countries, and during this period their peoples have been subjected to relentless Communist propaganda. A great effort has been made to convince them of the benefits of the new rule, but the daily evidence of the burdens imposed upon them negates most of this propaganda. At the same time, an equal effort has been made to bring home to them the inevitability of communism and the hopelessness of resistance. It must be recognized that the peoples of Eastern Europe have had little evidence from the Western world of its interest in their fate or understanding of their problems.

The hope of freedom could certainly be strengthened in Eastern Europe if a genuine appreciation of the problems of this region were demonstrated in propaganda and disseminated by radio and other available means. As it became widely known that the West understood the political, economic, and social problems of this region and that concrete solutions within a democratic framework were under discussion, confidence that liberation was a feasible policy would be greatly increased. This propaganda should reveal a knowledge on the part of the West not limited to broad matters of policy, but including a most intimate acquaintance with the details of life in each country—information that can only be gained by the maintenance of direct contacts.

While the great majority of the peoples of Eastern Europe are well aware of the burdensome character of the Communist regimes, there obviously remain important groups in each country that are still wholeheartedly faithful to communism. An essential task of propaganda would therefore be to undermine the faith of these elements and to convince them that a better alternative is available. Much could be done to bring home to these people the distortions in theory and the practical tyranny of the regimes that they support. A vast arsenal of facts is available for demonstrating the stu-

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pidity of the Soviet way of doing things. Yet the conveying of this information alone would not be enough, and as a policy of liberation got under way it would be necessary to impress the supporters of communism with solemn warnings of the inevitable failure of their enterprise. At the same time, some moderation of their fate might be offered to those who changed sides in time. There is no more important task of propaganda than that of dividing, dispersing, and defeating the ranks of those who hold the reins of power, and in the last analysis they can be expected to succumb without a major counterattack only when the reality of Western strength and purposefulness can be brought home to them.

An indispensable requirement of both the propaganda effort and the conduct of other aspects of policy is intelligence of day-to-day events in each country of Eastern Europe. Developments within the government, the prisons, the factories, and the countryside must be followed in detail if a policy of liberation is to be a success. The use that can be made of such information in the field of propaganda is obvious, but it is of even more importance in determining concentrations of effort, maneuver, and timing in the tactics of liberation. Moreover, a reliable system of direct contacts, such as those which must already exist in some measure under the direction of the exiled political leaders and organizations, would be of great value in bringing pressure to bear on the vital and sensitive points of each government at the right time.

Even if these tasks in the field of propaganda and intelligence were successfully carried out, the substance of liberation would not have been achieved until the reins of power had been transferred to persons not acting under Soviet discipline. How this transfer of power is to be achieved by means short of war is one of the most debated features of a policy of liberation. Secretary Dulles has cited the defection of Tito as one of the forms that liberation may take, although he did not hold it up as a necessary prototype. Indeed, it must be recog-

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nized that Yugoslavia was unique in Eastern Europe before 1948, in its relative freedom from infiltration by Soviet agents. There appears to be no reason to believe that similar independence from Soviet policy now exists for any other Communist regime in this region. An armed popular uprising is also unlikely to achieve success, and Secretary Dulles has taken special care to point out that sponsorship of such uprisings forms no part of United States policy.

If Titoism and popular uprisings are to be discounted for the foreseeable future, the transfer of power must be expected to occur principally as a result of splits and defections within the Communist elite and possibly, under certain circumstances, of *coups d'état* on the part of opposition groups. The feasibility of such actions can in the last analysis be evaluated only with regard to specific countries and situations. Suffice it to recognize that under the proper conditions such transfers of the reins of power are within the realm of possibility. The success of such efforts would depend both on the degree of stability of the Soviet orbit and on the way in which the situation had been prepared by creating a counter-force to Soviet power by negotiation, and by propaganda and intelligence. The task of a policy of peaceful liberation is to make a success of these preparatory measures.

V

The policy of the Western democracies towards Eastern Europe since the debate of 1952 has shown few of the dynamic qualities called for by the proponents of liberation. The fact is that containment and liberation are not the dramatic alternatives that their proponents claimed them to be, for they have in view the same ends and in very large measure the same means. The difference in the two approaches lies rather in the estimate of what it is possible to do. The proponents of peaceful liberation envisaged the early develop-

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ment of opportunities in Eastern Europe and the launching of a vigorous effort to exploit them. Yet recent experience, despite many dramatic events, has led to a policy much more modest than that of peaceful liberation and in some respects more restricted even than that conducted under the banner of containment.

Of the many factors that account for this slackening of pace, the most obvious is the reluctance of the Western democracies to undertake the commitments that a more dynamic policy would require. The burdens of rearmament and the strains of the wars in Korea and Indo-China have taken their toll, and Western political leaders have found it difficult to confront their peoples with demands for higher taxes and greater sacrifices. In the United States, for instance, the trend has been towards a smaller budget and some reduction of foreign commitments, and the reaction of Congress to the Declaration on Captive Peoples, proposed by President Eisenhower in February, 1953, was not encouraging to proponents of liberation.

At the same time, developments within the Soviet orbit have not reflected a significant weakening of Soviet controls. The death of Stalin and the fall of Beria no doubt served to lower the morale of the local Communist elites, and popular uprisings in East Germany and elsewhere have provided fresh evidence of a fierce spirit of resistance. Yet the promptness with which they were suppressed was as impressive as the spirit that these uprisings reflected, and in their subsequent concessions to the peasants and consumers the Communist regimes appear to have relinquished none of their effective power. The situation is sufficiently fluid to permit expert observers to differ in their interpretation of events, but the preponderance of evidence seems to indicate that Eastern Europe is still firmly in Communist hands.

The Western "counter-force" has thus been slow abuilding. The goal of a negotiated settlement with the Soviet Union

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has not been lost to sight, but there are serious differences of opinion as to when the balance of power will have tipped sufficiently towards the West to permit it to take full advantage of its great resurgence of strength in recent years and hence to negotiate on a basis of equality. Contrary to the view of many European leaders, American official opinion maintains that until the unfinished business of Korea and of the European Defence Community has been settled the Western democracies will not be able to match the bargaining power of the Soviet Union.

In the meantime, the peoples of Eastern Europe are rounding out a decade of Communist rule and may well be asking themselves what they can expect from the West. In reply, the Western democracies can point with assurance to the great strides that they have made since 1947 in organizing their strength and in facing up to the realities of international relations. They can also point to their progress in establishing economic and political institutions designed to provide a federal structure in which both Eastern and Western Europe may find security and stability. The Western democracies cannot publish a timetable for the development of their policies, but they can make it unmistakably clear at each step that they will not consider their own peace and security assured until the states of Eastern Europe can freely participate in European affairs.

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[For further information on Peasant groups and organizations see pages 109-131 in category 116.]

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Who are these generals? How do they relate to the established elites of their society? What kind of training and education do they have? These are the kinds of questions to which Dr. Pool addresses himself in this study. Dr. Pool has served as Assistant Director of Research for the RADIR project and as author or collaborator in the following volumes: *The Comparative Study of Symbols; The "Prestige Papers": A Survey of Their Editorials; Symbols of Internationalism; Symbols of Democracy; The Nazi Elite;* and *Kuomintang and Chinese Communist Elites.*

[before p. i]

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SATELLITE GENERALS

A Study of Military Elites in the Soviet Sphere

by Ithiel de Sola Pool

with the collaboration of

George K. Schueller

Robert H. Billigmeier

Cary Fisher

Paul Katona

Cheng Yuan

Janusz K. Zawodny

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THE HOOVER INSTITUTE STUDIES

000 This series of studies undertakes to describe the world revolution of our time and its consequences for world politics and national policy. These studies were conducted by the Hoover Institute and Library on War, Revolution, and Peace as part of its research project on Revolution and the Development of International Relations (RADIR Project). Daniel Lerner served as director of research and Ithiel de Sola Pool served as assistant director of research for the project.

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PREFACE

In the academic year 1952-53 a group of scholars at the Hoover Library strove to learn something about the social structure of modern military institutions by applying the technique of elite analysis to the leadership of a number of armies. Few institutions of comparable influence have been as little studied by social scientists as have armed forces. The present volume is a report on a particularly little known group of armies, those of the satellites. It is an analysis of biographical data on their general officers. 121

A year ago the manuscript of this monograph was sent away. Now reading proof, I realize with some pain how swift-moving is the revolution of our times. It poses to this author an immediate dilemma: to correct statements about it which are now out of date and gain the advantages of hindsight, or to leave some embarrassing evidences of his fallibility, reporting only what the research showed at the time it was done. In general I have followed the latter policy. Since I cannot now undertake a new analysis of the 1955 generals of the satellite armies, it seems better not to doctor the conclusions which flowed from the analysis of the 1951-52 generals so as to make the findings conform better to what has actually happened since. Except in the chapter on China, no changes in the text have been made since its completion shortly after the fall of Beria. In the Chinese chapter we have simply cut some illustrative material which derived much of its interest from the fact that it gave current information on who held what posts. With a major reorganization of the Chinese government in the fall of 1954, that became passé. The conclusions, however, have been left in full view.

When the manuscript was written, Malenkov was the ruler of Russia and the "new course" in the satellites was just getting under way. However, the data had been analyzed and the conclusions drawn w ll before then. Our conclusion was that a vigorous militarization was going on in the satellites. During the new course, with its emphasis on coexistence and consumers' goods, one could have doubted this conclu on. The fall of Malenkov, and with it the restoration of an emphasis in the satellites on military production and military preparation, has justified the thesis (p. 27) that the new course was a temporary deviation, the thesis which led us to stick to the conclusions deriving from our 1951-52 data.

As I look over the monograph, what I might change now are not so much specific statements as emphases. We mention the gradual softening of the pattern of purges, yet perhaps in our prognoses the pattern of 1938 still weighs a little too heavily. A number of generals who had be n purged when we wrote have reappeared in minor or symbolic posts, notably General Svoboda in Czechoslovakia. Perhaps future purges will be more gradual and less conspicuous than now, though they will not cease. Army officers in particular may be han-

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000 dled more gingerly now that the army has gained considerable independent power in Russia. The rise of the power of the army within the Russian Politburo is a trend of which we showed no awareness and which may have implications for the satellites.

There have, of course, been a number of changes of detail such as the appointment of General Jelen as Interior Minister in Slovakia and the appearance of General Wagrowski as Polish representative in Korea. Such developments, however, do not change the conclusions and it is general findings, not biographical particulars, with which we are concerned.

The most rapid changes have been in China. The situation of two years ago led us to speculate about the possibilities of internal regional conflicts within the Communist movement. Peking, however, was even more aware than we of this possibility and has acted on it strenuously. The trend toward centralization has been marked. Without fresh research I cannot speculate on how much regionalism remains. The external threat in Korea and Formosa may have helped push the centralizing tendency. Similarly it may have been responsible for much of the modernization of the Chinese armies in the past couple of years. Severe external dangers might lead to internal breakdowns, but mild external threats such as those now faced by the Chinese may have had the opposite effect.

The present study was a co-operative endeavor. The senior author is not a specialist on Eastern Europe nor China. He has been able to do this job because he had the help of his fellow authors who wrote reports on countries with which they were closely familiar. The authors of these reports have had no opportunity to review or to judge the ways in which the senior author has used their documents. They have no responsibility for the conclusions drawn nor for errors here published, but the study would have been impossible without their conscientious work and extensive knowledge.

The author has also drawn on the wisdom, experience, and knowledge of a number of other scholars who have helped guide him through unfamiliar ground. I am particularly grateful to Mrs. Adele Bergman and Mrs. Gladys Bolloten, Messrs. K. C. Chao, Constantin A. Dimitropoulos, Joseph Goldsen, Andrew Gyorgy, Colonel Theodore A. Holdahl, USMC, Colonel Daniel Ivanovici, Morris Janowitz, Lt. Z. Jaxwinski, Paul Kecskemeti, Konrad Kellen, Joseph Korbel, Daniel Lerner, Nicholas Spulber, and Witold Sworakowski. They have all been most generous with their knowledge and counsel. A special word of thanks is due to Miss Jean Neergaard who kept the varied operations of the research project moving smoothly.

Ithiel de Sola Pool

Cambridge, Mass.
February 21, 1955

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I. INTRODUCTION

A. The Subject of the Paper

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This is a study of leadership in Communist armies. More precisely it is a study of the conflict between two needs which the Communists face if they are to build up satellite armies: the need for loyal military leaders and the need for skilled ones. Every army, indeed every institution, has this dilemma. It needs leaders who believe in its cause, but it also needs leaders who are proficient. Even a free and stable society has some difficulty locating men who are both adequately loyal and adequately competent. For a dogmatic and revolutionary society the problem is more difficult.

A free society asks only basic loyalty not doctrinaire fanaticism, and basic loyalty it generally commands from those who grow up in it. A free and stable society can therefore pick the most capable men and take it for granted that they will ordinarily do what is demanded of them.

On the other hand, a society which demands that its leaders adhere to every detail of a dogmatic line cannot take loyalty for granted. A society with a fanatical creed must favor leaders who are orthodox over those who are able. If the fanatical society is a revolutionary one it must also favor untutored rebels over experienced leaders.

The Communist movement is both doctrinaire and revolutionary. It is a dogma in arms. Because it uses arms it has a desperate need for skilled military leadership. But because it is revolutionary and fanatical it often beheads its most skillful leaders.

That is a dilemma for the new Communist armies; it is the classic dilemma of revolutions. How the satellites attempt to resolve it and secure for themselves an adequate military leadership is the subject of this paper.

B The Satellite Armed Forces and Their Generals

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Until 1945 the Soviet Union, with such minor appendages as Outer Mongolia, was the world's sole Communist power. The Red Army was therefore the only Communist state army illustrating this dilemma between loyalty and professional skill. But the problem was not a new one to the Communists for they had come upon it in their considerable tradition of revolutionary militarism.

From the time of Engels, himself a military specialist, Communist political thinking has focused heavily on problems of utilization of armed forces. Revolutionary armies were built illegally and in turn collapsed as Communist bids for power failed. Even in countries where no Communist army had ever existed, Communists paid considerable attention to military affairs and trained their followers in the use of arms. The Twenty-One Points laid down at the Second

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Congress of the Comintern as conditions for admission into the Communist International required all parties to maintain an underground organization in preparation for civil war. All Communist parties were also instructed to colonize the armed forces both for subversion and for the training of their followers. One point required that,

> Persistent and systematic propaganda and agitation must be carried on in the army, where Communist groups should be formed in every military organization. Wherever, owing to repressive legislation, agitation becomes impossible it is necessary to carry on such agitation illegally. But refusal to carry on or participate in such work should be considered equal to treason to the revolutionary cause and incompatible with affiliation to the Third International.[1]

In Russia, Spain, and China there emerged out of civil wars a considerable number of experienced military men who were also revolutionary Communist politicians. In Russia the Civil War was the crucible in which an entire generation of Bolshevik leaders was formed and hardened. The revolutionary Chinese Communist Army, already a major force, was well on the way to becoming a state army, in the 1930's, though it still had many characteristics of a guerrilla force. The leaders of the Spanish International Brigade, including many Russian officers in camouflage, scattered after defeat to various countries where Communist violence was being prepared and there they became potential military leaders.

Thus there existed by 1945 a considerable body of Communist military leadership and also of Communist military doctrine, but except insofar as the Russian experience provided a model it all concerned the special situation of makeshift revolutionary struggle. It is only since 1945 that we have been able to decipher the lines of Communist military policy, beyond the borders of Russia in a period of state power rather than in a struggle for it. Since 1945 the Communists have acquired ten state armies backed by all the sanctions of legal compulsion, taxing power, and relative permanency. These are the armed forces of Poland, Czechoslovakia, Hungary, Albania, Bulgaria, Romania, China, North Korea, East Germany, and Jugoslavia, which last the Muskovite Communists eventually lost.

In taking over these armies the Communists have drawn upon three sources for leaders:

1. The non-Communist regular armies which they supplanted
2. Irregular forces which the Communists had previously formed or supported
3. The Russian Army

To these elements a fourth is now being added: newly trained young officers whose entire career has been under the satellite regime.

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The relationship between these four elements has not been a static one. On the contrary the history of each satellite army is a history of purges. "Purging," we hasten to explain, is a word we use in its original and also Bolshevik sense of elimination. Some purge victims are just retired or fired. Some are imprisoned. A few are executed. The latter have given the term "purge" a frightful aura which it fully deserves but it should be understood that a man may be purged without severe punishment. He may simply be demoted or demobilized.

In the first stage of evolution of the satellite armies a few well-tried and fanatical Communist officers were put in key positions and at the same time some notably anti-Communist officers were either retired or tried as war criminals. At first, however, the bulk of the general officers in the new armies were experienced men retained from the old armies. Then followed three or four years in which these old-line officers were gradually replaced, partly by newly-trained younger men, partly by older Communists, and partly by Russian officers. The old Communists who have loyalty but not professional skill have not fared well in the long run. In the process of successive purges many of the hardened Communists from the prewar era have been eliminated by new personnel of a less revolutionary type. The planned end result of this process of successive recruitment and purging is supposed to be an armed force led by a new type of officer whom the Communists are desperately striving to train, a young Soviet-educated type who will be— they hope— unquestioningly Communist but also proficient militarily. The actual end result world politics will determine and only history will know.

C. Satellite and Russian Armies: Similarities and Differences

In a companion study to this one Daniel Lerner traces the parallel evolution of the Russian Army and finds that history bequeathed to it three main types of general officer: (1) the highly trained pre-revolutionary officer who is retained for his technical skill, (2) the 'muzhik' general or uneducated but dynamic man who won his power by personal leadership in the Civil War but who lacked the scientific and technical knowledge to build a modern army, and (3) the Soviet-trained young professional.[1a] As we noted above, each of these types has its analogues in the satellite countries and in addition there is a fourth type: the imported Russian officer.

The pre-Communist professional officers presented much the same problem in Russia and the satellites. In both they were needed for a certain length of time. In both many of the old officer corps were either excluded for unreliability or ruled themselves out by rejecting the Communist regime. Of those officers who remained available a few were selected, generally from among the lower ranks, and from among men who had shown their ambition and plasticity

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by actions— often reprehensible. In Russia a Civil War record of loyalty to the Bolshevik regime was the passport to acceptance. In the satellites the best passport was having lived in Russia. The old officers who were used longest in the satellites were often those who had gotten to Russia during World War II either as exiles or prisoners of war, had then been "re-educated," and had fought the Germans under Russian control. Besides these Russian-indoctrinated officers a surprising number of the career men whom the Russians promoted to high commands were scoundrels whose prewar career had been blighted by scandal, bribery, conspiracy, etc. And finally the Russians favored officers from ethnic minorities. These included Jews who were held back in prewar Eastern Europe and also Ukrainians, Hungarians in Romania, Slovaks in Hungary, etc. In short they favored men who in sociologists' jargon may be called "marginal," that is, men whose ties to the core of the old society were weak, men whom it had oppressed, men who were never part of the in-group, men with conflicting loyalties. These career officers were used and then discarded. In Russia they were used for twenty years. In the satellites they are disappearing faster. In Poland they have already vanished from key positions. In Czechoslovakia they were still in top positions eight years after World War II, but their days are clearly numbered.

Corresponding to the muzhik generals of Russia are the Communist party men in the satellites, but the differences between them and the muzhiks are as great as the similarities.

They share with the muzhik generals both an unswerving loyalty to the Soviet regime and technical incompetence. They differ in that they are politicians rather than soldiers. The muzhik generals were men of personal dynamism who made their records as leaders of men in combat. The Communist party generals in the satellites are more often behind-the-scenes intriguers who made their records as political officers or in the NKVD. A very few of them, for example General Swierczewski (Walter), were muzhiks of the Spanish Civil War. A few were in the underground in World War II, but no underground hero is now prominent in a satellite army. The underground leaders have been purged.

Some of the present high officers, like General Alexei Cepicka, the Czechoslovak Minister of the Armed Forces, have no military records at all, having made their reputations in politics. Lieutenant General Leontin Salajan, Romanian Chief of Staff, member of the Communist party since 1922, is another politician in uniform. He became an army officer for the first time when he was made Chief of Staff, and Deputy Minister of the Armed Forces in 1950. The majority of the Communist party officers, however, did serve in World War II. They served in Russian-organized divisions of their own nationality. The Russians organized Polish, Czech, Slovak, Romanian, Hungarian, and other units, sometimes out of refugees— sometimes

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out of prisoners of war. In these units lower officers were quickly promoted to high commands and Communists, often with limited military experience, were made political officers. The political officer, whether at the army, the division, or the brigade level, was normally second in command. These political officers at the end of World War II were captains, majors, or colonels. Rank, however, was no obstacle to their assuming top positions in the new armies. Fantastically rapid promotions were common. Communists who had not been military men at all or who had been field grade officers found themselves made major generals or lieutenant generals overnight. As one of the Romanian generals wrote in 1948, "There will be no more promotions according to ranks . . . Any candidate from any rank can be given any position."[2]

While rank did not hold the Communist generals back, incapacity did. The precise posts held by the Communist generals differ from satellite to satellite, but in principle we can say they were confined within four types of position:

1. The political department of the army
2. Branches concerned with supply and business administration such as the Quartermaster Corps, the Comptroller General, or munitions production
3. Titular top positions such as Minister or Deputy Minister, the latter especially if more experienced officers hold real power behind the scenes
4. Special security troops

Tried party men invariably staff the political administration. Old Communists also always staff the Ministry of State Security (or state control) and/or the Ministry of Interior[3] which includes the internal security troops. The positions under items 3 and 4 vary in the different satellites sometimes being reserved for old party men, sometimes not.

It is important to note that whether to fill a post with an old party man or not to is a deliberate decision made for that post or class of posts. The allocation of jobs among the different types of officers is not a matter of chance. It is not determined by the free competition of individuals each judged on his own merits. On the contrary, each class of posts is explicitly or implicitly reserved for old party men, or for Russians, or for members of the old officers corps, or for newly-trained young officers. When a post is vacated it is normally refilled by the same type of officer as before unless there has been a change in policy.

It is clear from the above that the long-time Communist agitators who became political generals are by no means always favored by the Kremlin. In this respect they differ clearly from the Russian mushik generals who survived the Soviet purges. The Politburocrats in Moscow do not have ties of personal friendship for men like

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*648 Bodnaras, Farkas, Berling, or Cepicka such as they have for Vorishilov or Budenny. The Politburocrats undoubtedly regard the former, as they do all foreign Communists and indeed all Communists outside their own clique, with a large measure of contempt. So the Soviet bosses have kept the Communist generals from putting their hands to really important military professional matters and have freely purged them.

The most important differences between the Russian and satellite army leadership patterns arise from the fact that the satellites are satellites. Except perhaps in China, the armed forces which have been permitted to develop, are strictly subordinated to Russian control and to Russian needs, techniques, and personnel. In countries with long traditions of antagonism to Russia, as most of the satellite countries are, this creates an obvious source of tension and vulnerability within the satellite armed forces.

While this basic source of vulnerability is so obvious as to need no further comment here, it would be a mistake to consider the satellite armed forces as undifferentiated masses of discontented persons ready to seize the first opportunity for liberation. Such feelings certainly exist but it is a problem for research to determine some of the factors relevant to their intensity, distribution, and change-over time. Satellite armies are complicated combinations of fanatical Communists, would-be Titoists, would-be defectors waiting for a chance to escape, politically inert persons, and miscellaneous other elements.

D. The Uses of Military Elite Studies

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The importance of leadership in an army need not be stressed. We have chosen to study general officers because of their determining role in the making of key decisions or in a failure to make them. Mass demoralization in the ranks may destroy the fighting effectiveness of an army, but mass demoralization may itself be a symptom of leadership failings. The collapse of the Chinese Nationalist Army, for example, was not so much a failure of morale in the ranks as it was a failure of morale at the highest level. Corruption and defeatism were particularly prevalent at the command level. The political warfare that was most devastating to Chinese Army morale was that which bribed and disoriented its leading cadres. Students of sykewar have sometimes overlooked the implications of such facts. Despite

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the importance of leadership, students of psychological warfare in the recent past have tended to neglect the possibility of achieving results through communication to the opposing elite.[3a]

Elite communications are important even when the aim is mass demoralization; they are more important when elite actions are sought. Rebellion against the powers that be or resistance to their demands has far more often been sparked by dissident elite elements than by mass sufferings. In the last war, for example, the most dramatic resistance to Hitler—the July 20 movement—came from the higher ranks of the army and from aristocratic and elite elements of society. It was to them rather than to the masses of the German people that appeals of a political character were and could have been effectively addressed.

The elite are not unreachable. The elite have access to a breadth of information which is denied to men in the ranks. They have access to superior channels of information and have greater freedom of movement and contact.

While the elite are particularly important and also particularly accessible to sykewar, problems of reaching them have been studied less by scholars than problems of reaching armies as wholes. The way of life and attitudes of contemporary military leaders have been but little described in writing. A vast lore exists on the classical military man, but the modern military man is a new type. The complexity of modern warfare has made partly irrelevant what historians and biographers of the past have said about the conduct and feelings of military commanders. The modern general officer is a technician and specialist as well as a fighter and leader of men. The old image of the courageous and dramatic leader with a band of personally devoted followers is by no means out of date but it is now only part of a much more complex picture of what a commander must be. We have yet to delineate a full image of the motivations, loyalties, and attitudes of the general who must also concern himself with the complexities of modern science, technology logistics, record keeping, recruitment, propaganda, and finance.[3b]

No academic scholar regardless of his professional competence can hope to draw this image satisfactorily by himself. The scholar, ordinarily a man with a nonmilitary background and lacking a lifetime of training in military doctrine and military practice, can hope at best either to add a few insights arising from his specialized techniques or to systematize the far deeper perceptions which military specialists themselves are bound to have. It will only be when the present generation of military men from all countries has enriched the available body of firsthand material through memoirs, essays, and histories that the social scientist will be able to turn to this literature and add to it the understanding that arises from general theories of human behavior. We do not pretend for a moment in the present study to offer anything like a definitive interpretation of the

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mores and manners of any current military elites. We can provide only a few glimmering insights. The man of lifelong military experience may deepen these if he finds in here data whose significance his individual experience will enable him better to understand.

We cite as one example of the type of fact arising from our research the striking and significant finding that the satellite armies as distinct from Communist revolutionary armies, tend to select top leaders not for qualities of personal courage and personal leadership but for bureaucratic management skills.

This specific example of a change in the breed of men chosen for leadership after Communist regimes are stabilized illustrates the broader question of the relationship between elite structure and social behavior. Our present study is predicated upon the assumption that a man's way of life determines to a considerable extent the sort of person he will be and the types of things he will do. This is not a new notion. In 1889 Spenser Wilkinson, Chichele Professor of Military History at Oxford University, proclaimed that:

> "War is, from first to last, an affair of the soul; the predominant partner in the business is the mind or spirit . . . Examine your thoughts, your whole stock of ideas, and see where they come from. You will find that, for the most part, you caught them, like so many colds, from the people about you. Thoughts are the common property of a number of people living together, the connecting link between the members of a community. . . A child born into an English family learns as he grows the English words, in using which he begins to think the thoughts of his nation. As he grows up he imbibes the ideas of his class, or his trade, profession, of his political party, and of his church or sect. Tell me a man's birthplace, his family, his school, his occupation, sect and party, and I will tell you with pretty fair accuracy his stock of thoughts."[4]

Such extreme determinism is not implied by this study. We do not question for a minute that individuality and special circumstances interplay with these more stable background factors. The morale of a soldier varies with his immediate circumstances in regard to food, promotions, advance or retreat, mail service, etc., as well as his social background. Sykewar field operations require attention to such current facts around which discontent is expressed. But the more stable factors influence how a person will ultimately respond to situational variations.

The relationship between the situational and stable factors is a complicated one. Perhaps three points can be made. (1) Certain stable factors determine who will be vulnerable to which situational deprivations or inducements. (2) Certain stable factors determine the available communication nets through which situational discontents may be expressed or fail of expression. (3) Certain stable

sources of discontent determine whether or not a given situation will be seized upon to rationalize that discontent.

(1) Many examples can be cited of differential vulnerability of different social strata to the same situations. Shils and Janowitz point out that among German deserters in World War II there was a very large participation of Volksdeutsche not to mention Austrians, Poles, and Russians.[5] Despite the fact that the Volksdeutsche had been among the most chauvinist elements in the period of Nazi successes, the fact that they were not easily assimilated into closely-knit primary groups in the German Army made them especially susceptible to surrender propaganda.

For different reasons German chaplains seemed to be particularly susceptible to the propaganda of the Russian-controlled Free Germany Committee. They were most vulnerable to humanitarian and semi-pacifist appeals for ending the war quickly— a further example of a predisposition to vulnerability arising from life history.

The Czechoslovak Army, due to the many vicissitudes it suffered, is a particularly good example of an army in which different social segments responded differently to different pressures because of different life experiences. It was originally formed in 1919 of a combination of ex-Austro-Hungarian officers, ex-officers of the Czech legion in Russia in World War I, and some former officers of Czech legions in France and Italy. During the twenties and thirties top positions in the army were shared by the legionnaires and the one-time Czech career officers of the Austrian Army. During the first decade the latter was the dominant group in the highest positions. These former Austrian officers had received good military education and experience during their lifetime service in the Austrian Army and they proved very useful to the young Czechoslovak Army. They were distinguished from the legionnaires in several respects. They were older. The greater part of them were born in Bohemia (near Germany) not in Moravia nor Slovakia. They came from a somewhat higher social stratum than did the legionnaires. They had started their careers in the army and had never experienced other occupations. Their military training was exclusively Austrian and they came from the most urbanized and industrialized portions of the country.

Around 1930 most of the ex-Austrian officers had been retired. By this time the younger legionnaires, most of whom had been recruited from Russian prisoner of war camps during World War I, had received enough theoretical military education and had advanced sufficiently in rank to take over the positions of the "Austrians." The great majority of the legionnaires had started their lives in non-military occupations before World War I. They came largely from Moravia. The reason for this was purely accidental although its ultimate consequence was significant. During World War I the Moravian recruits were sent to the Eastern Front whereas regiments recruited in Bohemia served on the Italian Front. When the Bolsheviks

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took power and quit the war, the organized Czech units who had been caught in Russia had to fight their way out, engaging in a long, bitter, and heroic struggle with the Bolsheviks all the way from the Eastern Front across Siberia to Vladivostok. In the course of this struggle they acquired experience and an esprit de corps which made them by the 1930's the leading elements of the new Czechoslovak Army. It therefore happened that the newer group of officers came largely from Moravia, a less industrialized and more Slavic portion of the country, and that their fathers were predominantly members of low and middle-income farm and white collar groups.

The majority of the legionnaire officers received their theoretical military education at the Czech War College established in 1919 by the French Military Mission and a considerable number had gone to the École de Guerre in Paris. This added to their common heritage of pro-Western experience. After the German occupation it was among the Slovaks who had not played a major role in the army previously that the strongest collaborationist force was built. There was apparently only one Slovak general officer in 1939, Division General Rudolf Viest, but others were promoted to general rank during the German occupation.

We could continue this story tracing what happened to the Czechoslovak Army-in-exile. The Czechoslovak refugees who arrived in France during the first months after the German occupation of Czechoslovakia found a considerable number of Slovaks who had been residents of France for many years. The refugees and these together made up the first Czechoslovak division in France. The Slovaks had been confused by the political events in Slovakia and as a result their attachment to the Czechoslovak cause was weak. In the chaos of the French defeat many of them considered the war lost and refused to leave France. About half the division was evacuated to Great Britain but this was a distinctly self-selected group. The number of officers was far out of proportion to the number of men and some hundreds of officers had to accept demotion to the ranks. A full 48 percent of the men who arrived in England were members of the intelligentsia and a large percentage were Jews. Many of the officers were young and inexperienced and some were anti-Semitic. Most of the difficulties and schisms were given a political veneer. Among a great portion of the soldiers there were strong socialist leanings and communist leanings besides nationalist ones. All this made the troops fertile soil for every possible kind of propaganda: defeatist, pro-German, pro-Hungarian, etc. The Communists in view of the Soviet-German treaty were agitating for desertion from the army. A number of them led by Dr. Vlado Clementis (recently executed in Prague) left the army for the duration of the Soviet-German pact, most of them to rejoin when the Soviet Union was attacked.

In this unusually complex history of an army sharply riven by national, political and career differences, we see in some detail how vulnerability to special situations may differ depending upon

long-term identifications with various segments of the social structure.

(2) Not only does susceptibility to situational pressures vary with the social structure but so does the opportunity for communicating whatever discontent may arise. Whether an unfavorable event will have an adverse effect on morale obviously depends on the communication net which either promotes or restricts knowledge of it. In Germany toward the end of World War I, for example, the two key factors in the decline of morale were the food situation and the Social Democratic movement. The food situation affected many strata of the population and was the source of the most important discontent. It might, however, have had little effect on the German war effort if it had not been for the existence of a highly organized and powerful labor movement, which was semi-pacifist in its orientation. The main agitation of the Social Democrats was not around the food situation but rather around the desirability of negotiating for peace. This very abstract and ideological agitation became effective because of the coexistence of popular discontent arising from hunger, and at the same time the hunger became effective because an organized group provided a communication net for expression of anti-war feelings. Thus the organized proletariat was the source of Germany's greatest vulnerability. Although that class was not necessarily the most discontented group, it was the group whose discontents had an effective channel of expression.

(3) Situational discontents are also related to long-run social tensions in that they provide the rationalizations in terms of which continued hostilities are expressed. In China, for example, the main complaint against the Nationalist armies was that they were corrupt, demoralized, and irresponsible. The charges of corruption were no doubt borne out by facts. At the same time there is good reason to feel that corruption was not the real reason why much of the Chinese population turned against the Nationalist military leadership. The allegation of corruption was rather a rationalization of conflicts between major social segments in China. An earlier study in this series, Kuomintang and Chinese Communist Elites by Robert C. North, showed that the top leadership of the Nationalists was predominantly an urban merchant group, while the top leadership of the Communists was predominantly rural (both landlord and peasant) and intellectual.

According to Chinese traditions, nepotism, protection of one's family fortunes against the interests of the state, and what we would consider graft were parts of the mores of the business groups which provided much of the Nationalist leadership. Corruption did not carry the same connotations as in the West On the other hand, China as a whole is a peasant country and one in which top prestige goes not to business men but to scholars. Persons of rural origin and professional groups were not satisfied with the leadership provided by the western-oriented Nationalist trading elements. It was this conflict

121 of social strata, of basic ideology, and of national perspective which was expressed in the revulsion against the graft and corruption of the business-oriented Nationalist leadership. The Nationalist failure was a failure to broaden its base of leadership rather than simply a failure of administration. The former, however, was seldom discussed in day-to-day politics. The latter was on everybody's lips.

Political intelligence requires awareness of both the immediate issues around which conflicts come to take place and of the social structure in which these conflicts develop. The former can only be studied quickly from day to day as the conflicts develop. Long-range planning must focus on some of the basic sources of vulnerability which can be kept in mind as specific situations emerge. This study is not designed to spot the particular sources of tension and conflict which may arise at any given time point in the future. It is designed to identify the elements in the lives and careers of satellite officers which may differentiate the reactions of one group from those of another, or which may lead them to view one another with either trust or distrust, or which may lead them to view broad world questions either with knowledge and perspective or provincially, or which may lead them to have either purely hostile or just mixed feelings about the Soviet regime.

*701 E. The Evolution and Future of the New Communist Armies

*648 In the United States the most popular lay theory about the satellite armies (as about the satellites themselves) is that they are temporary jerry-built structures riven by inner tension and designed only as a makeshift until such time as the Russians are ready to incorporate them within the Russian Army itself. Our research leads to a different conclusion, namely that the Soviet plan has been to build up the satellite armies for a long stint. We cannot exclude the possibility that some day in the future it may become Russian policy to eliminate the satellites as separate nations. It may even be that such a long-range plan rests today somewhere in the files of the Kremlin. While that is a possibility, it seems improbable from the evidence now available to us. Our findings indicate rather a Soviet plan to develop the satellite forces into important, strong, but separate offensive forces completely subordinate to and allied with, but not part of the Russian Army.

1. The Period of Coalition, 1945-48:

It was not until 1947 that this plan began to be implemented by the Soviets. Until that time their great problem in all the European satellites was to consolidate Communist power.

In each of the European satellites a coalition government was formed immediately after the war including both Communists and non-Communists. The Benes government-in-exile returned from

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London to Czechoslovakia by agreement with the Russians and with a firm resolution to co-operate sincerely with the Communists. The Communist party was given a few ministries in the new Czechoslovak government, but the Ministry of Defense as in most of the European satellites was put in the hands of at least a nominal non-Communist, a supposedly non-party general, who had, however, been commander of the Czechoslovak forces sponsored by the Russians on the Eastern Front. The Polish government-in-exile, unlike the Czechoslovak one, was unwilling to play the Communist game. The army of General Anders 200,000 strong preferred to stay abroad. Few career officers returned. Defense was therefore put under a known Communist but one who had earlier been a career officer. In Romania and Hungary the heads of the new armies of 1945-48 were men who had actually fought against the Russians at the time that their countries were allies of the Nazis. Though they were generally officers who had in some way resisted the Nazi policies either by helping to switch their countries to the Allied side at the end of the war or by resisting Nazi demands, they were career officers with non-Communist or even anti-Communist records. Still they were accepted as coalition elements by the Communists.

During this period of coalition, the Communists were strengthening their position and building bases for future action. They could afford to leave the nominal headship of the defense departments in non-Communist hands because the armies were then mostly shells often exceeded in size by the police and frontier forces in the Communist-controlled security ministry. The Communists took over the political department of each of the armies and also the special security forces and the police.

The political departments were innovations modeled upon Soviet practice. They were far more important than a western-type morale or education department although they fulfilled that function too. Two other crucial functions under their direction were control of loyalty and control of personnel. Special police squads were formed within the armed forces which carried out arrests. These took over the job from Revolutionary People's Committees which operated immediately at the close of the war. A control commission on the Soviet model operated to check deviations. A cadres division was formed within each political department to train and recruit loyal Communists. Potential opponents were purged.

All the satellite armies were subjected to purges even during the coalition period. The armies of the defeated countries, such as Hungary and Romania, were reduced by the terms of the peace treaties to a fraction of their former size. Some officers could be kept but the large majority had to be discharged. Communists gained control of the process of selection and used this as a means of eliminating all potentially strong opponents. In Poland and Czechoslovakia, former allies, the army was not reduced in the same way,

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but the Communists insisted that officers whom they distrusted be eliminated or relegated to minor positions. For example, the men whom Benes had singled out to be Minister of Defense and Chief of Staff were vetoed by the Communists and assigned by compromise to trivial posts.

Frontier troops or other special security troops were used as special Communist militias. Indeed in the defeated countries, since their regular armies were restricted by treaty, the special security forces, which the Communists completely controlled, became larger than the armies. Thus by 1947, when the order went out from Moscow to end the period of compromise and coalition, the Communists were in a position to take over the armies just as they were in a position to take over state power.

A key factor which cannot be neglected in explaining Communist strength, was the Soviet occupation troops. In the defeated countries Russian occupation troops remained by agreement of the Allies, and those countries were placed under the supervision of allied control commissions which however the Russians ran with an arbitrary hand. In Allied countries like Poland and Czechoslovakia, vast numbers of Russian troops remained to guard the lines of communication to Germany and Austria.

The presence of Russian forces put all the trumps in the Communists' hands; but even though they held all the high cards, the Communists were not willing to play competitive games. Around 1947-48, in a series of coups the Communists eliminated political competition. The leaders of the Small Holders and Social Democratic parties in Hungary were tried and imprisoned and Prime Minister Nagy was forced to leave the country in May 1947. In December 1947, King Michael was forced to abdicate his throne. In February 1948 the followers of Benes were forced into a second exile. The "people's democracies" were turned into totalitarian Soviet states.

2. The Period of Consolidation, 1948-50

At the moment when coalitions with non-Communists were being ended and power was being placed firmly in Communist hands, the Russians decided that the armies of the satellites would be sufficiently reliable and sufficiently under control to transform them from mere internal security and defensive forces to strong offensive instruments. That was also the moment at which the Western alliance was taking firm shape under the impact of steps such as the Truman Doctrine and Marshall Plan. It was a moment, from the Russian point of view for counter measures. A rapid build-up was started which has increased satellite strength to roughly five times what it had been at the nadir.

The satellites were sold Russian tanks, motorized weapons, and airplanes. In each satellite the non-party or coalition Minister of Defense was replaced by a member of the Politburo who was one of

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the top four or five Communists in the country. In Romania Emil Bodnaras became Minister of Defense in December 1947. In August 1948 Mihaly Farkas received that post in Hungary. In November 1949, Marshal Konstantin Rokossovski, a leading officer of the Russian Army, became Minister of National Defense in Poland. Finally in April of 1950 Alexis Cepicka, the son-in-law of President Gottwald, took over the Defense Ministry in Czechoslovakia.

When each new Communist boss of the armed forces took over, purging and reorganization were vastly accelerated. The new boss was himself not necessarily a military man. He was a Communist militant with a long record of revolutionary action. That record may have included some fighting in the Spanish Civil War or on the Eastern Front in World War II. On the other hand in the case of General Cepicka, it included no previous military record at all. Yet the new Communist bosses and some of their associates were immediately given direct commissions as high ranking generals.

The first job of these Communist bosses was to eliminate potentially disloyal or factious elements. In this process the last of the leading officers of the old armies were eliminated. In Czechoslovakia, where the army had less of an anti-Russian tradition than elsewhere and where probably more pro-Communists could be found in its ranks, a good many former junior officers of the regular army were promoted to high positions, but both in Czechoslovakia and elsewhere the high ranking pre-Communist offi[illegible] [illegible]re finally eliminated at that moment, as were many pr[illegible]war low ranking officers.

The consolidation of power over the army in the hands of a top ranking Communist, was also the signal for a new type of purge which took place between 1949 and 1952. All leading non-Communist elements having been eliminated, the purgers turned on the Communists themselves. These purges of Communists served the important function of eliminating loyal incompetents who had played their role by infiltrating and subverting the army but now were a barrier to its becoming an effective fighting force. The purges also served the purposes of political gleichgeschaltung or conformism. Potential factionalists, not only from the army but from all walks of life, were disgraced as Titoists and used as horrible examples.

The Bolsheviks have a fantastic fear of even mere germs of political opposition. Any kind of political machine or any kind of group loyalty other than that organized by the Politburo itself must be ruthlessly eliminated. The Russian Communists have a vivid phrase to designate personal alliances or informal relations among officials; the phrase is "family relations." All such relations are condemned. Common loyalties or common historical origins of special groups are regarded as a danger. A major reason for the purges was to destroy the germs of possible groups or factions. In the Rajk trial in Hungary one such machine was destroyed. In

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648 Romania the Prime Minister, i.e. the top Communist who alone is allowed to have some kind of machine, has placed two of his own men as Deputy Ministers of Defense thus barring close ties between the Deputies and the Minister who commands them, Bodnaras.

000 Only in China is this principle deviated from, but out of necessity, not preference. The Chinese Civil War was fought by a vast but primitive army. It had only meager means of communication and used elementary strategies. Its victory was a victory of guerrilla tactics and politics. Even after success the Chinese had neither the professional skill nor the transportation and communication equipment necessary to establish an effectively unified national army. They divided the control of China among four field armies. These field armies share with general headquarters at Peking much real power. Each of the four field armies is headed by a group of two to four top generals who could under appropriate circumstances come to be like war lords. They are the bosses of their areas in China. On the other hand these regional leaders are loyal to the regime and during recent months the Communist regime has been able to increasingly centralize its still loose control. Its unity is indeed greater than that of any predecessor regime, but it has not been able to reach the Communist desideratum of a situation in which no effectual power lies anywhere but in the Politburo itself. The situation that exists in China is one that Bolsheviks dread. It is a situation in which someone has enough power so that under certain hypothetical future circumstances he could follow an independent policy if he wished. This is as yet an unsolved problem for the Chinese Communists. As students of Lenin and Stalin they must view this situation as a temporary compromise to be changed as soon as possible.

*648 With this one exception the satellite armies have been purged of all foci of independent action.[5a] The conditions for political opposition have been eliminated. At the same time indoctrination for political loyalty has been stepped up to fantastic proportions. The political departments undertake immense programs of indoctrination. All high officers are required to take courses at political military institutes, and many are sent to Russia for political as well as technical training.

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The notion of a nonpolitical army whose members are not allowed to take part in partisan activity and who are sometimes not even allowed to vote is completely rejected behind the Iron Curtain. As soon as the Russians came in they insisted upon identifying each officer with a political party. By now, of course, only Communist party activities are permitted, but in the period of coalition the Communists even went so far as to compel career officers to associate themselves with non-Communist parties rather than to stay neutral. In Hungary, for example, where before the war officers were not permitted to take part in politics, the selection and pro-

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motion of officers after the war was done openly and explicitly on the basis of allocations to each party. The attack on nonpartisanship has been one of the characteristic features of all the Communist armies. The Kosice program of the new Czechoslovak government enunciated on March 27, 1945, announced,

> "In order to see our army educated in the spirit of the state, of democracy, and anti-Fascism, the government wants to make an end, once and for all, to the 'non-political nature' of the army. The government takes this view in the knowledge that under this 'nonpartisanship' hides underestimation of the moral factor in battle, and that under this cloak thrive reactionary, anti-democratic, and capitulationist tendencies. . . .
>
> "In order to develop and maintain among the members of the armed forces even under the hardest trials and most difficult conditions of battle a fighting morale and a high anti-Fascist spirit, the institution of 'enlightenment officers' shall be established in all military units, components, and institutions. These enlightenment officers shall be deputies of the respective commanders for the sphere of education and enlightenment, and at higher commands they shall direct departments of education and enlightenment. The directing educational organ in the framework of the Ministry of National Defense shall be the 'General Administration of Education and Enlightenment' whose chief shall be directly subordinated to the Minister of National Defense and his deputy."[6]

Political departments are now generally headed by one of the deputy ministers of defense. Reporting to him and his powerful and always Communist-controlled headquarters staff is a network of political officers. These political officers (referred to in the Kosice program above as Enlightenment Officers and often called commissars) serve in every unit, generally as the second in command. During the coalition period, if the commanding officer was not a Communist, the commissar was often the real power. The political department is a powerful agency of propaganda and control through which the Communists seek to assure the loyalty of the new satellite armies.

3. The Period of Development, 1950 on

Loyalty, however, is but one of the prime requisites of satellite officers. We have already noted that the great dilemma which the Communists face is to combine such loyalty with professional

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competence. Ever since the Communists decided, in 1947, to convert the satellite armies into effective, offensive forces, they have faced a situation in which the purely political abilities of Communist generals could satisfy them no more than the mixed loyalties of prewar career officers. The Kremlin knows that Communist fanaticism is no guarantee of military skill and that security depends upon having a leadership with an abundance of skill.

The Communist solution to this dilemma is to raise a new generation of officers trained by the Communists themselves and combining the desired traits of loyalty and professionalism.

In every one of the satellites a tremendous effort is being put on training and military education. Education, expansion, and modernization are the keynotes of satellite military activity during the past few years.[7] Military training is of course universal. A uniform pattern copying that of Russia was established in each of the European satellites in 1950. The age of service was lowered to twenty and the term was extended to two years with longer periods up to three years being required in the air force, the security troops, etc. In addition there is extensive military training through sports groups and mass organizations. In each of the satellites there is an organization such as the Czech SVARZAM, paralleling the Soviet DOSAAF. The SVARZAM or Federation for Cooperation with the Army encourages training units in schools, sports clubs, trade unions, factories, etc.

Along with this training of mass manpower goes an intensive program of officer training. The officer trainees are singled out for elite status with good pay and many privileges. They are, however, not recruited from among a social or economic elite. On the contrary, they are drawn widely from proletarian backgrounds. That they promote proletarians is the Communist boast and apparently also their practice. A small sample of Hungarian colonels which we studied revealed a large number who came from the work bench, thus confirming reports of refugee officers. Men who had shown qualities of leadership in trade unions and in communist activities have been given a chance to rise from proletarian status to the officer corps. In Eastern Europe this is a rare and significant opportunity because a military career is held in high esteem and until recently it was beyond the reasonable aspirations of an ordinary worker. It seems probable that men who have had such an opportunity opened to them view the Communist regime with less disfavor than the more fully oppressed elements of the population. The Soviets hope that they can secure the loyalty of the rising corps of young officers by virtue of the fact that the officers are individuals who could not have become officers under the old regime.

These young officers are not only proletarian in origin and privileged in status; they are also subjected to an intensive and thorough program of education. A system of military schools is being developed modeled on the Soviet pattern. Many of the instructors are Red

Army officers. The most promising and politically reliable officers are sent for advanced training to military academies in the Soviet Union.[7a] In addition military schools are proliferating in the satellite countries themselves. In December of 1951 the Poles opened a military technical academy in Warsaw and the Felix Djerzhinski Military Political Academy. In Czechoslovakia the Brno Polytechnic School was changed into a Military Technical Academy. Similar measures were taken at about the same time in all the satellites.

It is easy both to overestimate and to underestimate how well the political indoctrination and the technical training of this new generation of officers is taking. This is a topic on which our data does not shed a great deal of light. Our data perhaps enables us to estimate what the Soviet plan was in the period from 1950 on, but whether this plan will work is another story. The most significant evidence that it does not work is the continuing flow of occasional defectors from among the privileged strata of young officers being trained for top positions of military leadership. On the other hand, we should not exaggerate the significance of such defectors. Westerners have often underestimated the potentiality of the Soviet system for continuing to work even in the face of universal and profound discontent. The Soviet system depends upon total conformity but not upon total satisfaction. It places far more reliance on the whip than on the carrot.

We are prone to assume that Soviet prevarication and obscurantism defeat themselves, but the existence and the actions of considerable cadres of Communist officers is evidence enough that the Russian methods of indoctrination often do work to some extent. A surprising proportion of the Communist officers in our sample are former prisoners of war, men whom the Russians kept under miserable conditions in prison camps and then, when the time was auspicious, released to serve in Soviet-sponsored armies. It is easy to understand why these men elected combatant service that would take them back to their homelands rather than sitting idly in prison camps, but the ex P-W's were not simply transitory tools of Russian policy who seized an opportunity to get away from Russia. Many of them became effective and active Communist propagandists. Many of them became leaders in the process of infiltration, subversion, and purging which transformed the East European armies into Soviet tools. To some extent the Soviet process of indoctrination works and the Soviet processes of technical training work even more.

At the same time it would be foolish to assume that the new generation of Russian-trained satellite officers will be all the Russians expect them to be. "The new Soviet man" even in Russia is not what he is supposed to be. The qualities of dogged fanaticism, hard work, initiative, and loyalty which he is supposed to have as a result of Soviet training are even less conspicuous in him than in old capitalist men. If that is true in Russia, it is even more true in the satellites.

*701 In the satellite countries not only are there general human traits
*748 which resist molding, but there is also a heritage of anti-Russian nationalism. This nationalism is not likely to be stilled even in a generation of proletarian officers selected for their contempt for the old elites of prewar days. Nationalism does not die that easily.

Whatever turn future events actually take, the Soviet plan as revealed by developments starting in 1950 seems to be predicated upon the assumption that satellite officers can be transformed into loyal tools. Undoubtedly this plan overestimates the plasticity of human beings, as do all Soviet plans. How far it will prove wrong, the data of this study do not tell us. The data tell what the Soviet plan is or was that is important, for to some extent the plan will condition what the Soviets do and therefore what will actually happen.

4. The Future

If the 1950 program is adhered to we may expect some rather significant transformations in the structure of the satellite armies and countries within the next few years. At some point, probably not in 1955 or even 1956 but probably no further away than 1962 or 1963, the new generation of officers who have been in training since 1945 will be ready for promotion to general officer rank and to key positions. When this happens the character of the military elite will undergo a drastic change. At that time the present officers, whether Communist party militants with inadequate military knowledge or old career officers of doubtful loyalty, will be ready for removal in favor of the new type of officer. In the Soviet pattern this will be the signal for a purge. Such a purge occurred in Russia in 1937. Then, the entire leadership of the Red Army was ruthlessly liquidated. Tens of thousands of officers simply disappeared. Their positions were filled by products of recent Soviet military training. The parallel purge indicated for the satellite countries may be neither so complete nor so ruthless. There are indications that the Russians have learned some lessons from the great purges of the 1930's and are now handling purges in a more circumspect fashion. Furthermore, many of the officers who are now in leading positions in the satellite countries are Russians. It seems unlikely that the satellites will be permitted to handle these with the ruthlessness they apply to their natives.

There is considerable question whether Russian officers will be removed at all. Most commentators on the satellite armies seem to feel that the use of Russian officers is the trend of the future. This is one aspect of the belief that the satellite armies will be absorbed into the Russian Army and the satellites into the Soviet Union, a prognosis which we deem unlikely. A number of items of evidence lead to our contrary conclusion. In the first place it should be noted

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that the Russian officers are to a significant extent not pure and simple Russians. Many of the officers whom refugee propagandists label as Russians—and rightly from many points of view—also have some roots in the satellite countries they now rule. The Kremlin went through the ranks of the thousands of East Europeans living within Russia and serving within the Red Army and culled a group who could be sent back to their lands of origin to enter politics and military life there. These men, many of whom were originally Communist refugees from their home countries, are unquestionably loyal to Russia and to the Soviet regime. Many of them are much more Russian than anything else, but they do represent a mixed type which will not easily replenish itself. The Communists seem too aware, both in Europe and China, of the value of choosing leaders with some ethnic ties to those they lead, to make the mistake of attempting a policy of total Russianization.

Furthermore, the emphasis the Soviets are putting upon training of leading cadres among the new generation of satellite nationals indicates that it is on them rather than just on a continuing flow of imported Russian officers on whom they are counting for future satellite military leadership. This is not to say that technical advisers and behind-the-scenes emissaries from Russia will cease playing a dominant role. On the contrary they undoubtedly will continue to pull the wires and a familiar pattern of colonial rule will emerge in which a few key officers from the ruling land direct the activity of a dependent force. That seems more likely to be the pattern than one in which the very existence of the satellite nations, their armies, and their officer cadres will be terminated.

It may be noted that the history of the Baltic republics is a contrary example which indicates a preference for the more drastic pattern. The Baltic states not only became part of the Soviet Union, but they have been vigorously denationalized. Mass transfers of population have been perpetrated and at the time of writing the administration of these republics is being shaken up with Russians taking the key posts. When the Baltic republics were absorbed twenty Baltic generals were commissioned in the Russian Army. By 1952 only one of these had been promoted. They had served their purpose at the moment of absorption and were no longer needed. The other satellites, however, present a different problem for the Russians than do the Baltic republics. In the other satellites the magnitude of the populations and the areas to be absorbed would be much greater and so the process of absorption would create more problems than it would solve. From the Russian point of view it is probably preferable not to have to assimilate large populations with strong nationalist feelings and with recent experience in the non-Soviet world. The Russians probably prefer to hide behind two Iron Curtains against the West, one on the Elbe and a second on their own frontier. Considerations such as these perhaps explain a Russian

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program of building the satellite armies as units with the external trappings of separateness and independence although in reality they will of course be fully Russian-controlled.

On these assumptions about the probable future course of events we can anticipate an interesting and perhaps a bitter struggle between the different strata of officers when the time is ripe for a change in leadership to the now young officers of the Soviet generation. There will probably be no open factional struggles, for factions are too vigorously repressed in the Soviet system, but there will probably be charges of factional conspiracy as in Russia in 1937. In reality the tensions will perhaps be limited to feelings, prejudices, and attitudes expressed in covert ways. The lines of tension are already fairly clear. The career officers must know that their days are numbered, recognizing the portents of a purge in the rise of a new generation of officers.

The Communist militants on the one hand and the technicians on the other have conflicting myths in terms of which they justify their respective values. The myth of the Communist is a political one. He believes in his own omnipotence as a Marxist, if not as an individual. His dogma, he believes, gives him the power to successfully manipulate men who lack its magic key. He thinks the mana of Marxism offsets his lack of formal training. He made his mark in a hard school of illegal activity and conspiracy in which he started as the underdog. Now he finds that by virtue of his Marxism he has conquered the old ruling groups of professional officers, capitalists, aristocrats, etc. With all the confidence of the self-made man he is likely to think of the technician as a servant who should do what the politicians decide. He is apt to believe in the Soviet myth that a Bolshevik can do anything and that the doctrine which has brought him to power holds the key to all complex questions. His fantasy of power may have roots in genuine cunning and ruthlessness. His ability may merely be that of a behind-the-scenes operator, but he may sometimes also be a man of real magnetism who knows how to lead men, though if he carries that too far he is apt to be purged.

The officers of the new generation will be men of a very different stripe. They will rarely have the kind of dynamism, hardness, and purposefulness of the Communist militant. They may be unquestioningly loyal, but their loyalty is more apt to be of a passive than an active kind. Their interests will be technical and private rather than political and public. They will be good technicians and admire science and technological know-how. As experts they may take professional pride in their work but they are less apt to have an all embracing self-confidence in themselves as leaders of men.

Indeed the leader who wins the confidence of his men by qualities of personal devotion and drive is in some ways the forgotten man of the satellite military elite. His qualities impinge too closely upon the special prerogative of the party and of the political department.

INTRODUCTION

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For that reason he is a dangerous character. He is capable of too 701* much independence. In the satellite armies men of this type have 648* been less able to hold higher military posts than have either the behind-the-scenes politicians or the military technicians. The leaders of the World War II underground movement have been virtually eliminated from top jobs. The successful infantry commanders rise neither so fast nor so far as artillery men, engineers, or other technicians. The qualities of personal leadership may be better appreciated at lower levels which do not come within the purview of this study, but at the apex of the military hierarchy personal leadership is something which the Communists do not permit. When a new generation of officers take the top posts, the level of competence may rise and perhaps the problem of loyalty may have become less acute, but the new elite will not consist of dynamic leaders. It will be an elite which has grown up under the controls of the political department, the security police, and Russian observers. It may be an elite not prone to exercise strong personal leadership.

F. The Study and the Sample

The above conclusions are based upon an analysis of biographical 159 data concerning generals in the satellite countries. From the bio- 701* graphical data we tried to get light on three aspects of the structure 648* of the satellite armies. (1) We have attempted to describe the process by which the satellite armies were taken over and communized 127 insofar as this process involved changes in the kinds of men wielding power. (2) We have attempted to evaluate the breadth of background, education, and experience of those types of men who have finally gained power with a view to providing a basis for judgment of their potential effectiveness as leaders, and their prospective loyalty or discontent. (3) We have attempted to identify whatever fissures and lines of differentiation exist between segments of the armed forces.

To study these three topics we collected biographical data on general officers in five satellite countries: Poland, Czechoslovakia, Hungary, Romania, and China.[8] In each case we compiled as many biographies of general officers as we could obtain, the criterion of selection being availability. In view of the difficulty of obtaining any data no more rigorous type of sampling was possible. We included general officers of the air forces and navies as well as the land armies.[9] When we could obtain the data we added as special subsamples general officers in semi-military police and security formations. In all of the satellite countries the special security troops, though under the Ministry of Interior or its equivalent in peacetime, are integrated with the armed forces and commanded by officers with military rank.

Ideally a study of military leadership should study not only gen- 121* 701* 648

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erals but also lower ranking officers and also the relationships between the ranks. However, published biographies—our primary source—do not exist for lower ranking officers and do not tell us anyanything directly about relationships. This study attempts to do only that which can be done with an analysis of the top levels of the military elite viewed, of course, in the context of background information. It is not a complete study of military leadership in the satellites.

In order to trace the trends in the satellite regimes we stratified the sample of generals by time period. We collected biographical data not only about the postwar generals, but also for a sample of generals of the pre-Communist regimes. We broke the samples of satellite generals into groups according to the date at which their careers terminated. Thus for Romania we have a sample of pre-1940 generals, a sample of generals active on the axis side between 1940 and 1944, a sample of generals who maintained their careers during the early postwar years, 1944-47, and finally a sample of those generals who have continued to operate since 1948.

Data on contemporary history such as the data of this study quickly grows out of date. The research for this study was done during the academic year 1952-53. While every attempt was made to get up-to-date materials, it was inevitable that the satellite sources which were read and analyzed were published for the most part in 1951 and 1952. They too had a time lag between the facts to which they referred and the date at which they were printed. Roughly speaking, we can say that the picture presented in this study is the picture as of the year 1951.

The sources for a study of satellite armies are so thin at best that no consistent effort has been made to limit the moment for which we are presenting a snapshot. Wherever material is available we have used it. Where later information has come in, even up to the moment of the final revision of this text, we have tried to take account of it, although no systematic effort has been made to bring the study up to the minute. What we here present is a picture of Soviet plans and procedures as of two years ago with some corrections suggested by more recent events.

The most important event in the Soviet world during these past two years was of course the death of Stalin and the installation of the Malenkov regime with its slightly modified tactical line. Stalin died on March 5, 1953 by which time almost all the research for the study had been completed.

In the half year since then the new Soviet dictators have found it necessary to make concessions to the people at least while they are consolidating their rule. In Russia the emphasis has been on consumers' goods. In the satellites where riots in Berlin and strikes in Czechoslovakia have shown how intense is the prevailing discontent, the new line has also been to make concessions to the desires of the populace. Without any real evidence we may hazard the hunch

that one unpublicized aspect of this new line may be a slowing down of the program of military preparation in the satellites and a re-evaluation of their military potential. Both the open outbreak of satellite discontent and the Politburo's desire to stress temporary economic concessions might lead to such changes in military policy.

For all these reasons we may guess that the picture to be drawn in this study, based as it is upon 1951 data, represents the Soviet plans for the satellite armies at the end of the Stalin era, but not in all respects the way in which things are actually working out at the present moment. We do not know how present actualities diverge from the plans nor what recent changes have been made in the plans. However great these divergences and changes may be, it still remains useful to see how the Politburo conceived the prospects of satellite military development just before the traumatic event of Stalin's death. Whatever corrections future developments will force us to make in our prognoses, one useful piece of data will be the intentions with which the Russians started. It is to ascertain these that our data is relevant.

G. The Method

The methods used in this study are more fully described in the general introduction to the Hoover Institute Elite Series, The Comparative Study of Elites, An Introduction and Bibliography, by Harold D. Lasswell, Daniel Lerner, and C. Easton Rothwell. We record for each individual in our sample certain standardized biographical facts such as the date of his birth, date of death, cause of death, jobs held, place of origin, occupation of father, schools attended, associations joined, foreign travel, awards and decorations, publications, etc. A list of fifty characteristics for which we look when they are available is presented on pages 26-27 of the above mentioned volume. For general officers, among the most important special characteristics on which we sought data were their military training, their nonmilitary education, their branch of service, their combat record, the extent to which they held nonmilitary jobs, the extent to which they participated in politics, their record of promotions, etc.

The data on any individual is recorded on a punch card and tabulations are then made of the incidence of the coded characteristics in different armies or different parts of the same army.

H. The Problem of Sources

It is difficult to obtain biographical information on officers, particularly on those from totalitarian countries. We started this project with an experimental attitude and with the hope, but no conviction, that the desired information might be obtained. On the whole

127 we are more than satisfied with this aspect of our endeavor. The most fruitful single source consisted of Who's Who's and similar biographical dictionaries and encyclopedias. Other printed sources include memoirs, obituaries, and articles about prominent figures which appear from time to time even in totalitarian countries. We also relied to some extent on informants who had had firsthand contact with the armies in question. They were often able to provide kinds of information which do not normally appear in brief printed sources.

Unfortunately the sources are not consistent in their accuracy or criteria of reporting. For one country we may have very adequate information on education but not on parental occupation. For another country it may be the other way around. There is also the possibility and indeed likelihood of falsification in some of the biographical reports. The Communists often present fanciful biographies. They tend, for example, to play up or invent humble backgrounds. They also tend to emphasize the native satellite origins and experiences of officers whose real life histories may involve prolonged residence in Russia while refugee sources emphasize the foreign origins of Communist officials. Thus two quite different biographies of Marshal Rokossovski have been published.

Having expressed these warnings about the reliability of some of the sources, it would be a mistake to regard them as invalidating the data. While the data undoubtedly contain a wider margin of errors than is customary in domestic social science studies, they are far more precise and reliable than mere subjective untested impressions. Our goal was to get better information than heretofore available, not to get perfect information. What we report here is the result of as careful a process of checking and evaluation as we were able to make. We feel that there are some trends which it reveals of which there need be little doubt even though individual errors have crept into the data.

1. Introduction to the Case Studies

121 In this introductory chapter we have talked of the European satellites as if they were more or less the same. In the subsequent chapters we shall examine them one by one. In so doing we shall note differences in the problems faced and solutions taken, differences which we have so far neglected. We have been able to discuss the East European satellites as a unit since they follow a common set of Russian-originated patterns. We have examined above the sequence of parallel policy changes from one of coalition to one of consolidation to one of training and development which seem to indicate a common set of Soviet directives. We have also noted the adherence to Russian practices in equipment, uniforms, training, and regulations.

The end result was an organizational structure for the satellite

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armies conforming fairly closely to that in Russia. The normal pattern at the time of Stalin's death was to have a Minister of Defense who was one of the top Communist bosses and under him three deputy ministers, one of them in charge of the land army, one of them Chief of Staff, and one of them head of the political department. At general headquarters below these men were a series of inspectors in charge of different arms and services. These and the commanders of the three or four military districts into which the country is divided constituted the top of the military elite.

But in the Soviet world no plan however permanent it is proclaimed to be, is more than a temporary pattern valid until a new line is adopted. Under the Malenkov regime some significant changes have been taking place in military and governmental structures in Russia which have been or will be imitated in the satellites. It would be a mistake to base long-run predictions upon the temporary expedients adopted by Malenkov in the period of consolidation of his power. It is our assumption that a far better clue to long-run Soviet policies and programs is to be found in the plans underway at the time of Stalin's death. Recent deviations from these are more likely to be temporary adjustments than permanent changes in line.

Both the temporary adjustments and the permanent changes are ordered from Moscow and copied in the satellites with a greater or lesser time lag. Each Russian twist or turn is mirrored throughout the Soviet world. An order from Moscow whether it be to give certain key jobs to the best of the newly trained officers, or whatever else it may be, could start a process of purging (with greater or lesser violence) which would sweep in disciplined fashion from one satellite to another. We are about to describe how the basic Soviet military pattern was followed with appropriate variations in each of the satellites from the end of the war to the end of the Stalinist era.

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II. CZECHOSLOVAKIA

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Of all the satellite armies, the Czechoslovak shows the most continuity with the past. Its evolution has been marked by purges, crises, and drastic shake-ups, but to a slightly lesser degree than elsewhere in Eastern Europe. The main reason for the greater historical continuity in Czechoslovakia than elsewhere is the fact that the previous top governmental and military authorities made a sincere, even if shortsighted, effort to work with Russia and the local Communists.

On May 16, 1945, President Benes returned to Prague from London, where he had spent the war heading a government-in-exile. He returned to a country that had been liberated by the Allied Armies from the west, by the Russian Army from the east, and by resistance forces which had arisen in the last year of the war, notably in Slovakia. By December the Russian and Allied Armies had left Czechoslovakia and armed force was in the hands of a new Czechoslovak government formed by agreement of the London government and the Communists.

In May 1946 the first postwar elections were held and from these emerged what was supposed to have been the stable government of Czechoslovakia. In these elections the Communist party polled 37 percent of the vote, the largest vote for any one party. As a result, President Benes invited Klement Gottwald to become Prime Minister, but the government he formed was a coalition government with only nine Communist party members out of twenty-six ministers. Jan Masaryk, a non-party man, was Minister of Foreign Affairs, and Ludvik Svoboda, also technically a non-party man, was Minister of National Defense. Thus the government was in theory a coalition in which the Communists were to be but one party.

It was this government and the substantially similar provisional government that preceded the elections which had the task of establishing a new Czechoslovak Army. It had available to it a considerable reservoir of skilled and trained military personnel. It could draw its officers from three main sources: the London Army, the Moscow Army, and the resistance forces.

A. The London Army

In the introduction we traced the origins of the World War II army of the London government-in-exile. We noted there that it consisted both of recent refugees and of Czechs and Slovaks who had been living in France and elsewhere in the West. It included a substantial number of experienced officers from the Czechoslovak Army of the interwar period. It included such a large number of former officers, in fact, that until 1943 there were not enough enlisted men for all of them and 400 officers had to serve as plain soldiers. Among the officers were at least six leading ones who had been general officers before 1938. These were Generals Ingr, Neumann, Janousek, Hasal,

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Viest, and Vicherek. Also available were many field grade officers of wide experience.

The senior Czechoslovak officer in London was Division General Sergej Ingr, Minister of National Defense in the government-in-exile. General Ingr, who had fought in Russia and later in France and Italy during World War I, became a captain in the new Czechoslovak Army in 1918. Originally a volunteer in the Austro-Hungarian Army in 1914, he became a member of the Serbian Volunteer Division at Odessa in 1916, and of the Czechoslovak Legion in Russia in the same year. The following year he joined the Czechoslovak Legion in France and in 1918 the Czechoslovak Legion in Italy. In the new Czechoslovak Army he fought as an infantry officer in local conflicts in Teschen and Slovakia. Promoted to the rank of major, he was assigned to the War College in Prague from 1920-23, and after that entered general staff work. By 1925 he was lieutenant colonel and Vice-Chief of Staff of one of the three land military commands. He held field commands in 1928 in charge of Frontier Battalion 5, in 1931 as a colonel in command of the 38th Infantry Regiment, and again in 1933 when he commanded the 6th Infantry Brigade of the 8th Division, of which Division he became commander in 1935, after promotion to brigadier general. By 1938 he held the rank of division general and commanded an army corps. In the meantime he had also served additional time in the general staff, as a section chief and also in the office of the Minister of National Defense. When the German occupation began he was for a while the commander of the "ON" (Obrana Naroda), a military underground organization. He then escaped to France, where in 1939 he was Commander in Chief of the Czechoslovak forces. When France fell he escaped to Britain.

The career of the Chief of Staff of the Czechoslovak Army in Great Britain, Division General Bedrich Neumann, was similar. He too had fought in Russia during World War I. As a major in the 11th Rifle Regiment of the Czechoslovak Legion he fought the Bolsheviks, after the Revolution. Upon joining the new Czechoslovak Army he too went to the War College in Prague and when he finished in 1922 he was assigned to the general staff, where he became a section chief in 1929. By 1931 he was second deputy chief of the general staff. In the meantime, he had held field commands. In 1928 as a colonel he commanded the 5th Infantry Regiment. From 1935 to 1938 he commanded the 5th Division, first as a brigadier general and later as a division general. He too joined a military underground organization after the German occupation, the Vojenske Ustredi or Military Center. This Center operated largely out of the Office of Price Control of the Nazi puppet government of the protectorate of Bohemia-Moravia. Neumann had been appointed deputy chief of this office and took advantage of his post to staff the agency with fellow anti-Germans. In 1940 he escaped from Czechoslovakia to Great Britain, where he was Chief of Staff till toward the end of the War. He was

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000 then made chief of the SVAB, the staff intended for the rebuilding of the Czechoslovak armed forces after liberation.

A slightly different set of World War II experiences is revealed by General Karel Klapalek, who also served in the Czechoslovak Legion in Russia until 1920. He was a captain when he returned home to command first the 35th and then the 36th Infantry Regiments. In the early 1930's he taught in the Czechoslovak Military Academy. After the German occupation of Czechoslovakia Major Klapalek escaped to the Middle East and commanded a unit of about battalion strength which took part in the campaign of North Africa. Before the fall of France Czechoslovak officers and soldiers arrived regularly in Beirut after a difficult escape from Czechoslovakia through the Balkans in order to join the Czechoslovak Army in France. After the fall of France this escape route was cut and those Czechoslovak officers stranded in the Near East formed a new military unit. When General Mezl, its first commander, died, Klapalek succeeded to the command of this unit. In 1944, when the fighting in North Africa ended, Klapalek along with many other Czechoslovak officers went to Russia and for the last year of the war fought on the Eastern Front.

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These thumbnail biographies, along with two others appended in a footnote,[10] give a composite picture of one type of leader available to the new Czechoslovak Army: a career officer with experience beginning in the Czechoslovak Legion in World War I and continuing until service with the forces of the London government in World War II. After World War I they were trained and educated largely by the French, particularly in the Ecole de Guerre. The chief leadership material consisted of general staff officers who had had rotating staff and field assignments. Most had infantry command experience. After the German occupation most of them joined some underground circle, but soon escaped to the West. In World War II they fought in Western Europe, or in smaller numbers in North Africa. Some were later sent to Russia by the London government to fight on the Eastern Front. Their heritage of common experience and common training gave to the leadership of the Czechoslovak exile army a strong element of cohesion.

The record of the armed forces of the London government during World War II was a good one. The available infantry forces were not numerous but the Czechoslovak Tank Brigade took a prominent part in the siege of Dunkirk, where the German garrison put up a long and bitter fight. They advanced along with American forces to Pilsen and were then allowed to return to Prague in May 1945.

Though small, the most active and also the most successful Czechoslovak arm in the West during World War II was the air force. In October of 1940 an agreement was signed between the British and Czechoslovak governments according to which Czechoslovak airmen became members of the Royal Air Force for the duration of the war. Between July 1940 and May 1941 three Czechoslovak

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fighter squadrons and one bomber squadron were formed. Many Czechoslovak pilots who could not be placed with the Czechoslovak units served with British units in Great Britain, the Middle East, and elsewhere. Three Czechoslovak officers became commanders of British squadrons. In the Battle of Britain, the Czechoslovak pilots shot down 56 enemy planes and throughout the war in the West at least 313. Toward the end of 1940 the Czechoslovak air force in Great Britain consisted of 1,287 officers and men. [726]

The land and air forces under the command of the Czechoslovak government-in-exile in Great Britain were the main source of experienced officers from which the new Czechoslovak government was expected to draw in building its armed forces. * 701* 648

B. The Moscow Army

A second source of officers was the Czechoslovak fighting forces under Russian sponsorship in Eastern Europe. In March and April of 1939 about twenty-five hundred Czechoslovak soldiers and officers had gone to Poland in the hope of fighting the Germans. Their hope was frustrated, however. They wished to form a Czechoslovak Legion and did organize a Czechoslovak military group in Krakow on April 30, 1939. A "legion of Czechs and Slovaks" was, however, not officially recognized by the Polish government until after the actual outbreak of war, since the Allies were anxious to avoid any acts which might be construed as provocations of the Germans. The French Embassy in Warsaw pressed both the Polish government and General Prchala, the highest ranking Czech officer in Poland, to abstain from official recognition. Under such circumstances, in which the Czechoslovaks were being organized only covertly and unofficially in the brief time from May to September, and, it might be added, with considerable conflicts and tensions among the Poles and Czechs, the Czech forces were never adequately organized or equipped. For these reasons the Czechoslovak military group in Krakow tried with partial success to find transportation to France beginning just before the outbreak of the War and continuing thereafter. Twelve hundred military persons reached France. The remainder, almost a thousand men, were concentrated in a military camp at Baranowicze in northeastern Poland. Except for 189 of these who were transferred to another camp and eventually made their way to the Middle East, this group was interned by the advancing Red Army when it occupied eastern Poland. The group was preserved as a unit in internment camps, first in the Ukraine and then east of Moscow. In 1940 the Soviet government agreed to a request of the Czechoslovak government-in-exile to release some of the officers and men, and two small units left the U.S.S.R. for the Middle East. Later in the spring of 1941 the whole group was transferred to the Middle East with the exception of twenty-five officers, three doctors,

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and sixty-five non-commissioned officers, who at the request of Lieutenant Colonel Svoboda remained in Russia as the nucleus of a possible future Czechoslovak fighting unit.

After the invasion of Russia by Germany in 1941, an agreement was signed between the U.S.S.R. and the Czechoslovak government-in-exile providing for the formation in the Soviet Union of Czechoslovak military units under Czechoslovak commanders. The utilization of the units was to be determined by the Soviet high command. Thus Colonel Svoboda began organizing and training the first Czechoslovak battalion in the U.S.S.R., which was sent to the front under his command in January 1943. The unit consisted primarily of Czechoslovak and Carpathian Ruthenians who had fled to the Soviet Union and of Czechoslovak residents of Russia. The transfer of this unit to the front came about at Svoboda's special request, directed, without the knowledge of the Czechoslovak command in London, to Marshal Stalin.

With the permission to induct additional volunteers, the First Czechoslovak Brigade was formed in 1943. The Soviet military authorities then asked that Svoboda be promoted and appointed Commander of the brigade. The Ministry of National Defense in London complied. Later in 1944 additional Czechoslovak units were formed in the U.S.S.R. At that time General Kratochvil, the one-time Commander of the first Czechoslovak regiment which had fought in France in 1940, became for a few months Commander of all Czechoslovak forces in the U.S.S.R. while Svoboda commanded the brigade in the field. The Russians, however, soon restored their more pliant tool, General Svoboda, to full command.

General Ludvik Svoboda was presented by the Communists to the outside world as a non-Communist. He did not join the party openly until 1948 and it is not possible to say when he joined secretly before that. But from the beginning of his activity in the U.S.S.R. he was a pliant tool. His father had been a small farmer in Moravia and he himself had been drafted into the Austro-Hungarian Army in 1914. Like most of the other leaders of the inter-war Czechoslovak Army he served in the Czechoslovak Legion in Russia in which he was a captain of infantry. From 1921 to 1931 he continued as an infantry officer in the new Czechoslovak Army, rising from captain to major. Then he served for three years as a teacher in the Czechoslovak Military Academy, returning to a battalion command from 1934-38. Unlike the officers whose biographies we sketched above, he played no central role in the Czechoslovak Army until World War II. He achieved his prominence as the front man for the Communists. From the time the Russians found it expedient to use him until he was purged by them in 1951, he complied with their every request. He wrote a pamphlet in 1946 entitled Marxismus-Leninismus Statni Filosofie SSSR (Marxism-Leninism, the State Philosophy of the U.S.S.R.). He was a member of the presidium of the Central Com-

mittee of the Russo-Czechoslovak Friendship Association. His daughter went to school in Moscow and by 1948, if not before, he was a member of the Communist party. 701* 648*

As we noted before, it was a very small group of officers on whom Svoboda and the Communists could draw initially for the development of their new Czechoslovak forces. With the rapid growth of the Czechoslovak Army Corps in 1944 there arose a need for a greater number of officers. After long delays caused by political objections of the Soviet government, about one hundred Czechoslovak officers arrived from England and the Middle East to serve in the corps. At the same time the corps command selected 350 soldiers from the ranks and sent them to Soviet officers schools. After completion of their training they rejoined the corps as sublieutenants. 648* 702

But soon the available manpower began to grow rapidly as Slovak troops whom the Germans had mobilized began to desert to and be captured by the Allied side. Much of the original army corps was lost in September 1944, when the Red Army opened the Battle for the Dukla Pass in the Carpathians. Here the First Czechoslovak Army Corps fought its heaviest battle of the war. When after one month of bloody fighting the Corps had penetrated through the Pass and stood on the border of Slovakia, it counted about 18,000 men; the battle had cost it 6,500 casualties. 726* 701

After arrival in Czechoslovak territory the army corps began drafting Czechoslovak citizens into the ranks so that at the end of the war it stood 80,000 strong supported by the victorious Red Army and highly advertised as the nucleus of the new Czechoslovak Army of the future although still short on trained officers. Now, just as after World War I, a new Czechoslovak Army was to be built on the basis of its Russian antecedents, only this time the spirit was very different. Instead of a cohesive group with a common experience of national struggle against the Bolsheviks, it was an ad hoc group rapidly formed under Soviet sponsorship. In this respect it differed markedly in experience, morale, and traditions from the army leadership coming from London. 701* 648*

C. The Slovak Resistance Forces

If it had not been for the assimilation of Slovak forces and resistance groups, the army corps coming from Russia would indeed have been a shell. It is to this third source of military personnel, the resistance movements, that we now turn our attention. 701*

The most important resistance was in Slovakia. After the destruction of Czechoslovakia in 1939 the Germans established a Slovak State separated from Bohemia and Moravia with an army of its own. This army consisted of Slovak personnel from the prewar Czechoslovak Army and of the plant and equipment found at the time on the territory of Slovakia. There had been only one Slovak general in the

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*701 Czechoslovak Army of 1939, Division General Rudolf Viest, a one-time legionnaire in Russia. He was appointed in 1939 to the post of Inspector General of the new Slovak Army. In the winter of 1939-40, however, he fled to France, where he became commander of the First Czechoslovak Division. From 1940-44 he served as Secretary of State in the Ministry of National Defense in London. He resigned this post when an uprising broke out in Slovakia and left to command the army in rebellion. When the uprising collapsed two months later, he and his deputy, General Golian, were captured by German troops and executed.

Since there were no high-ranking Slovak officers available, the leadership of the Slovak Army necessarily came from younger officers who were promoted to general rank by the new Slovak government. In 1941 the Germans asked the Slovaks to contribute as allies to the German military effort. The Slovaks sent a mechanized division to the southern front where it remained from 1941 until 1943, when the bulk of it deserted to the Russians. During these same years two other Slovak divisions performed occupation duty in Russia and another Slovak unit served in Italy.

725 In 1944 intensive partisan activity developed in Slovakia. The partisan units consisted mostly of Slovaks, but there were also Czechs, Russians, and even a number of French and other Allied ex-prisoners of war who had escaped from German captivity. Some of the units were led by Red Army officers, and they were often supplied by the Soviets with equipment and ammunition. That summer the partisans, sometimes in conjunction with units of the Slovak Army, controlled large parts of Slovakia, important lines of communication, and often whole towns. By the end of August it had become impossible for the Slovak government to assert its authority in Slovakia, and it was announced that the German Army would occupy the country and restore order.

In the meantime, a number of Slovak politicians, both Communist and non-Communist, and a small group of Slovak officers, had been preparing for an armed uprising. They had been in touch with the Czechoslovak government in London which had approved their plans. The preparations for the uprising were cut short by the announcement of the impending arrival of the German troops in Slovakia. On August 29, 1944, the Slovak National Council, and the Military commander appointed by the Czechoslovak government in London, in the name of the Czechoslovak Republic issued proclamations to the Slovak people and the Slovak Army asking them to join together in the fight against the invading German Army and the collaborationist Slovak government in Bratislava. Banska Bystrica, the headquarters of the land forces of the Slovak Army, became the center of the uprising and the headquarters of the First Czechoslovak Army in Slovakia. Slovak troops and the Slovak gendarmerie together with partisan units assumed control over most of central and western Slo-

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vakia, and began fighting the advancing German divisions. Only in eastern Slovakia the situation remained confused.

The rebellion failed, however. The reasons were varied. Some officers, mainly in eastern Slovakia, where two Slovak divisions were stationed, hesitated in taking decisive action; as a result the two divisions were practically immobilized. A satisfactory unity of command of the fighting forces in Slovakia had not been achieved. The First Czechoslovak Army, as the rebellious army was called, consisted primarily of units of the defunct Slovak Army, and was led by Slovak officers acting on behalf of the Czechoslovak Republic, and loyal to the Czechoslovak government in London. The partisan units on the other hand were in many cases under Communist, sometimes Russian, leadership; their primary loyalty belonged to the Red Army, and they were accordingly noncommital about the restoration of the Czechoslovak Republic. They continued to operate as independent units.

The principle cause of the failure of the rebellion was none of these. It was the lack of outside support. It was generally understood that the success of the uprising depended not only on the loyalty of the Slovak officers and soldiers of the Czechoslovak Republic, but also on adequate help from the outside. The Russians promised such help, but then failed to give it. They followed in a somewhat less conspicuous fashion the same policy in Slovakia which they later followed at Prague and most notoriously at Warsaw. That is to say, they promoted an uprising which they then did not support, permitting the rebellious forces to serve as a minor harassment to the Germans while at the same time being largely exterminated. Their extermination guaranteed that there would be no independent and organized resistance movement left after the Russians took over.

Facilities for Allied aid to the Slovak resistance were available. There were air fields for the landing of Allied planes. The Red Army stood at the time on the borders of eastern Slovakia, and it was expected that with Allied help Slovakia could be held militarily long enough to allow the Red Army to cross the Carpathians. But these calculations proved to be false. The Russians blocked effective aid.

While the fighting was in progress in Slovakia during September and October, the Czechoslovak government in London tried desperately to mobilize help from no matter where. Soviet authorities, however, protested against any possible Western interference in the operations in Slovakia. As a result Western help remained limited to the arrival by air from Italy of a group of American officers and soldiers of the OSS carrying a handful of arms. They were all eventually captured by the Germans and executed. From the Soviet side there had been promised that at least the Second Czechoslovak Paradesant Brigade would be shipped to Slovakia by air, but only small elements of it arrived, and other Soviet aid was limited to scattered

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small arms shipments and limited aerial support by the First Czechoslovak Air Regiment from the U.S.S.R.

On October 28, 1944, Banska Bystrica was occupied by German forces, and within the next few days the First Czechoslovak Army ceased to exist as an organized force. The partisans retired into the mountains and so did some of the Slovak troops; others dispersed and went home. When the new Czechoslovak Army was being formed after the War, the officers of the 1944 uprising provided a significant new element for the officers corps.

The Slovak officers who had prepared the uprising were all relatively young men educated in Czechoslovak military schools during the early years of the Republic, and dedicated to the Czechoslovak idea. The relatively high positions they came to hold in the Slovak Army were ideally suited for their conspiratorial activities. The most prominent of these men were Lieutenant Colonel Jan Golian, Chief of Staff of the Slovak Army Land Forces; Lieutenant Colonel Dr. Mikulas Ferjencik, Chief of the Slovak Army Veterinary Service; and Lieutenant Colonel Mirko Vesel, Chief of Slovak Army Intelligence. On the eve of the uprising Golian was promoted to brigadier general by the Czechoslovak government in London, and appointed Commander of the First Czechoslovak Army until the arrival from London of Division General Rudolf Viest. When Viest came to Slovakia and assumed command over the army, Golian served as his deputy.

After the collapse of the uprising, while retreating to the mountains, Generals Viest and Golian were captured in the first week of November by German troops and executed. Ferjencik and Vesel survived, the former in the mountains, the latter on a political mission in London. Both were promoted after the war to brigadier general, and both are today exiles in the West.

While numerically the most important source of resistance personnel came from the Slovak Army, mention should also be made of the resistance in the German protectorate of Bohemia-Moravia. We have already noted that in 1939 and 1940 there were military underground associations in the protectorate, but most of the leading officers in them eventually found their way to the West.

There was in Bohemia-Moravia a minor collaborationist force. More than anything else the government army was a German propaganda stunt. It was established by Adolf Hitler as a "concession" to the Czech people, and in recognition of their "autonomy" within the German Reich. This so-called army was made up of about seven thousand Czechs clad in old Czechoslovak uniforms, but it was devoid of any firearms. These troops were split up in small garrisons in a few larger Czech cities.

Later in the war the force was increased by a few thousand, and some units were sent to Italy for occupation duty behind the front. In time most of them deserted to the Allies. The remainder stayed

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at home in the protectorate, where they eventually took part in the May 1945 uprising against the Germans.

At the end of the war as German power was collapsing, the underground in Prague and elsewhere in Czechoslovakia came out into the open and tried to secure liberation a few days before the arrival of the Allied Armies. The uprising in Prague was predicated upon the assumption that the American troops, which were rapidly advancing, were about to arrive. However, by agreement with the Russians the Americans stopped at Pilsen, a short distance to the west of Prague. It was the troops of the Vlasov Army which had deserted from the German side which first arrived in Prague, leaving two days later followed by the Red Army four days after the uprising began.

D. The New Czechoslovak Army

1. The Sample

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It was from all these sources—the armed forces of the government-in-exile, the Czechoslovak armed forces mobilized by the Russians, and the resistance armed forces, many of whom were originally in German satellite armies— that the new Czechoslovak government could draw for its future leadership. In order to consider how the actual selection of leaders was made and how some groups gave way to others we have studied a sample of sixty-one men who were generals at some period between 1945 and the present. Ten of these are Communist militants, fifty-one are career officers. These sixty-one provide a fairly adequate sample of all those who have held general rank in the past eight years. Altogether we may estimate that some ninety generals were active between 1941 and 1951. Of these at least fifteen were killed in the war against Germany. A few were reaching normal retirement age by 1945.[11] It is thus clear that we have some data on a large majority of the generals of the last few years. In the remainder of this section of the report we shall study the characteristics of these sixty-one out of the 167 in our full Czechoslovak sample dating from 1918. Of the fifty-one career officers, seven came from the Czechoslovak Army in the U.S.S.R., of whom three had transferred from the London forces in the West. Some eighteen others were connected with the Czechoslovak government-in-exile. Three came from the Slovak Army and five others from the underground. Two others were mainly collaborators though they must have had some peculiar record to have obtained post-liberation posts. On sixteen we have no information about World War II activities. Ten of these are men who were very junior officers until after the completion of the Soviet take-over process, at which time they rose to prominence. They were men most of whom had spent the war years in Czechoslovakia or in the Russian forces.

Of the eighteen officers who were already generals by 1944, ten

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*701 were connected with the Czechoslovak government-in-exile and four came out of the underground. Three others had already become generals before 1939 but played no major role in World War II. Thus our sample reveals that the solid core of experienced officers was the London group. Those who came to compete with them after 1945 were younger and less prominent.

2. The Communists Seize Control

*701 Even before the war was ended and the exiles returned home from various directions, the struggle for control of the army had begun.
*648 "On April 18, 1945, at Kosice, Slovakia, where the first postwar Czechoslovak government was formed, President Edward Benes signed a decree appointing General Sergej Ingr, former Minister of National Defense in the London government-in-exile, commander-in-chief of the Czechoslovak armed forces, and General Alois Liska, former commander of the Czechoslovak armoured brigade in Great Britain, chief of staff. But these appointments were vetoed by the Kremlin and Benes had to sign a fresh decree nominating as Minister of National Defense General Ludvik Svoboda, commander of the Czechoslovak brigade formed in Russia, and as chief of staff General Bohumil Bocek-Chodsky, that is, two 'Muscovites' instead of two 'Londoners'."[12]

The Communists tried to start a frame-up to the effect that General Ingr together with General Moravec, Chief of the Intelligence Service of the London government, had promoted a Fascist coup. However, the Communists were not yet strong enough to dispose of their opponents by this typical Bolshevik device. The intervention of President Benes prevented this frame-up and in 1947 General Ingr, who in the meantime had been kept completely on the sidelines, was named Minister to the Netherlands.[12a] Moravec was given the command of a division from 1945 to 1948 despite the Communist charges. Liska, who had been scheduled to be Chief of Staff was given the less strategic post of Commander of the War College.

One top London officer who was not allowed to retain any position in the army was General Bedrich Neumann. It will be recalled that in 1944 he had been appointed Chief of the Staff for the rebuilding of the armed forces of the new Czechoslovak state. Though scheduled by the London government for that top post, he was too notably and vigorously anti-Communist to be permitted to hold any position between 1945 and his return to exile in 1948.

Unlike the very top London officers, Neumann and Ingr, most of the London officers were permitted (like Moravec) to retain military positions for the three years from 1945 until the coup in February 1948. They were, however, shunted into less influential positions. Of the sixteen London officers who were generals in the period 1945 to 1948, seven were in positions of lesser status under the

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new Czechoslovak government than they had been under the government-in-exile. In addition to those whom we have already mentioned, Janousek became representative of the chief of the general staff for international affairs instead of head of the air force. Langer became president of the Army Medical Research Institute instead of Director General of Medical Services. Spaniel after a short period as chief of the Military Office of the President was given a troop command in the provinces. Only two London generals found themselves temporarily in stronger positions after their return home. General Vicherek was put in command of the air force in place of General Janousek. Until 1943 he had been the chief of the Air Force Department of the Ministry of National Defense in London, but from then to the end of the war he was head of the Red Cross. The other advance was experienced by General Heliodor Pika, who, although with the London government, had spent the war in Moscow as military attaché. While General Pika was very anti-Communist and soon paid for his refusal to co-operate with the Stalin regime, still it is interesting that initially in choosing one London officer for the post of deputy chief of staff this one, whom the Russians knew well, was chosen. Three generals, Bartik, Hasal, and Kumpost, continued the same work that they had been doing in London while four officers changed to jobs so non-comparable that it is hard to say whether they represented changes in status. Two of these, however, received military posts abroad, one in Canada and one in London, positions in which their influence on events in Czechoslovakia was certainly reduced. The leading London officers and the only ones with positions of influence after 1945 were General Pika, deputy chief of staff, and General Hasal, chief of the Military Office of the President. Thus we see that the London officers were quickly pushed into positions where they had relatively little control.

Between 1945 and 1948 the Communist aim was to so structure the officers corps as to establish a strong power position for themselves and to influence key decisions. Until 1948 no attempt was made to dispense with the services of the officers who followed Benes. Rather they were neutralized and circumvented.

One measure used to weaken the power of the regular officers was to build up irregular military formations outside the army. As in each Communist country a National Security Corps (SNB) was formed in the Ministry of Interior which was headed by a Communist. In addition considerable power devolved at Communist insistence from the central government to localities where Communist-sponsored "national committees" exercised a good deal of authority in the early days after liberation from the Nazis.

The army itself was made to conform to the Soviet rather than Western models. The March 27, 1945 Kosice Program of the new government said:[13]

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"The Government wants to continue solidifying the fighting collaboration of the Czechoslovak Army with the Red Army. The Government sees in the Red Army a model for the building of a new, a truly democratic, and anti-fascist Czechoslovak Army.

"In order to make possible the closest fighting cooperation with the Red Army . . . the organization, the equipment, and the training of the Czechoslovak armed forces shall be the same as the organization, the equipment, and the training of the Red Army."

While steps were taken in this direction at once— on May 20, 1945, General Svoboda announced that the new army would follow Soviet regulations and use Soviet equipment— it was not until 1950 that conformity to Russian practices became complete. For a few years compromise with the practices and power of the regular Czechoslovak Army prevailed.

The situation remained in a tenuous balance until the coup of 1948. It is widely maintained that enough power remained with Benes and his loyal supporters in the army so that the coup could have been defeated had the President ordered the officers to resist. No such orders were given, however. Benes acceded to the Communist demands and remained as a figurehead until June while the Communists seized all real power. They destroyed the existing army leadership. Eighteen of the officers in our sample were purged in the coup, or refused to co-operate thereafter. Most of them escaped abroad into a second exile. Of these eighteen purgees, fourteen were men whom we described above as London officers. In addition four other officers in the sample, three of them originally from the underground, were purged in the coup. One other, General Neumann, had been purged earlier but as a London officer who joined the second exile, he could well be considered together with the eighteen victims of the 1948 coup. Just three London officers in our sample tried to stay on by accepting Communist policies. Thus the coup eliminated the large majority of the top generals.

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What were the characteristics of these men whom the Communists eliminated from the Czechoslovak Army command? Their most important characteristic was belonging to a tightly-knit and cohesive group which had developed initially out of the Czechoslovak Legion in World War I, had been trained by the French in the École de Guerre and elsewhere during the inter-war years, and had fought for the government-in-exile during World War II. Ten of the eighteen had indeed belonged to the Czechoslovak Legion which fought in Russia during World War I and then fought the Bolsheviks. Another four had fought on other fronts in the First World War. All but two of them had records of combat experience. Ten of them had commanded

infantry units. One of these and four others had been artillery officers. One doctor, one veterinarian, one intelligence officer, and one supply and transport officer account for the rest. They were thus a group with well-rounded command experience. They were for the most part mature men; their median age in 1945 was fifty, and all but four of them were between forty-five and fifty-five, two being older and two younger. Six of them had had general staff experience and had been trained at the War College. These officers were for the most part a well-educated middle class group. According to General Cepika even in 1945 only 7 percent of the students in the Czechoslovak Military Academy were of working class origin.[14] Thus all but a few of the men chosen for officer training came from comfortable backgrounds where they might have been expected to receive a good education.

It is obvious that the Czechoslovak Army suffered a severe loss of professional skill when the officers corps was purged of Benes' supporters. It was easy at that time to think that the result would be demoralization and a leadership of sycophants and fools. It does not seem to have turned out that way. As the Soviet Army purge of the 1930's also revealed, it is easy to overestimate the indispensability and irreplaceability of an established leadership. Confusion and ineptitude may reign temporarily but with a certain amount of compromise replacements can be developed. We now wish to examine who the replacements were, what sort of men they were, and what happened to them.

3. The Collaborationists

Ultimately the Communists sought an army of convinced and trained Communists, but in the short run they had to use the services of some experienced officers from the old Czechoslovak Army whom they persuaded to stay on despite the coup. In retrospect one may wonder at the shortsightedness of these high-level officers who stayed on. All of them were eventually purged. At latest information the officers in our sample who remain in the Czechoslovak Army include none who in 1944 were higher than lieutenant colonel and the largest number of them were then only majors. The high-ranking officers whom the Russians persuaded to stay on after 1948 generally lasted in favor for no more than a couple of years. One in our sample was dropped early in 1948, four more in 1950, five more in 1951, and three in 1952, making a total of thirteen career officers in our sample who stayed on after the coup but were ultimately purged. The most striking fact which differentiated these thirteen officers from the eighteen who broke with the government of Czechoslovakia at the time of the coup was the small number of London officers in the collaborating group. It will be recalled that fourteen of the eighteen who supported Benes in 1948 had served the London

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government during the war. Of those in our sample who stayed on after 1948 only two had been London officers, General Alois Vicherek and General Rudolf Bulandr. General Vicherek had been chief of the Air Force Department of the Ministry of National Defense from 1941 to 1943 but at that time he lost this important post and from then till the end of the war he served as President of the Red Cross. General Bulandr fought in North Africa during the war and apparently joined the Communist party after his return to Czechoslovakia. He did not become prominent until after the coup of 1948, at which time he became brigadier general and deputy chief of the general staff. In addition to these two London officers three others who stayed on after 1948 had served with the government-in-exile but had later been transferred to the Czechoslovak Army in the U.S.S.R.

It is worth noting the Soviets' success in indoctrinating these men who served under them. We are readily aware of the disillusionment which so often follows from firsthand experience with Soviet life. But the reaction of contact is not always that. The net result of Soviet experience and indoctrination has been sufficiently binding for the Soviets to systematically favor persons who have lived under their influence. General Svoboda, who was Minister of National Defense from 1945-50, is one obvious example. In addition it is noteworthy that the two other prominent generals who joined Svoboda in February 1948, in a meeting of the Central Action Committee of the National Front and thus affirmed their loyalty to the new regime, were Generals Bocek and Klapalek both of whom had served in Russia in World War II.

General Bohumil Bocek had been captain in the Czechoslovak Legion in Russia in World War I and an infantry officer in the postwar Czechoslovak Army. In 1930 he had served in the Ministry of National Defense and after that commanded a frontier battalion. With the outbreak of World War II he made his way to France and served there and in Great Britain as a colonel until 1943. He was then selected as one of the officers to be sent to the U.S.S.R. In 1945 the Russians had sufficient confidence in him to permit him to become chief of the general staff. Thus he and Svoboda were the top officers during the Benes period. General Bocek's willingness to co-operate with the Communists after the coup did him little good. Within a few months he was removed from office. His name appeared again in the limelight in 1952, when he was arrested and implicated in the Slansky trial.

General Klapalek, it will be recalled, had commanded the Czechoslovak troops in the Middle East. When the fighting there was over, he too went to the U.S.S.R., where for a while he commanded the First Czechoslovak Army Corps. From 1945 until he was purged in 1950 he headed the Land Military Command of Prague. The third London officer in our sample who was transferred in 1943 to the Eastern Front was General Jan Satorie. He played no important role

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in the immediate post-liberation period but from 1950 to 1952 he was chief of the Military Office of the President. He is reported to have committed suicide when the government "discovered" that he was implicated in an illegal officers organization. While none of these officers survived long, all proved willing to work with the Russians as long as the Russians found them acceptable, a testimony to the impact of Russian indoctrination and persuasion.

In addition to officers who had been indoctrinated by the Russians on the Eastern Front, a number of the officers who tried to continue working with the Communists came from the underground. General Zdenek Novak, who in 1945 commanded the military occupation of the border territories and from 1948 to 1950 headed the Brno Land Military Command, had been head of the military underground organization which succeeded the ON in 1944, and fought in the Prague uprising of 1945. He was used until 1951, when he was arrested. General Bruno Zapletal had been an official of the Office of Price Control of Bohemia-Moravia in 1939 and a member of the Military Underground. Before the war he was a quartermaster colonel. He did not play a prominent role in the immediate postwar years but later became chief of the quartermaster corps, from which post he was removed in 1951 for "neglect of duties." A third underground officer who remained in the Communist Army after 1948 reveals a slightly different pattern of experience. General Miso Sirica was a member of the Slovak Army. He had been a member of the Legion in Czech Russia in World War I and then an infantry officer in the Czechoslovak Army. He remained in the Nazi-controlled Slovak Army after 1939 and during World War II fought against the Red Army. He advanced to the rank of colonel and received several German decorations. Back in Slovakia in 1944 he joined the insurgent forces during the uprising, joined the Communist party, and was promoted to general. He played no conspicuous role in the immediate post-liberation years but then became Commander of the Land Military Command of Bratislava until finally purged in 1950. In that year it was announced that he left "for a cure in Carlsbad."

The Nazi collaborationist record of General Sirica before he reversed sides in 1944 is not unique. On the contrary, a number of officers who worked with the Communists did so after a record of Fascist or collaborationist activities. Joining the Communist party was less repulsive to these men than to the democratic followers of Benes, and also it was a means of protecting themselves against the consequences of their earlier actions. An even more striking example is that of General Simon Drgac. General Drgac served in Italy during the first World War and with the Czechoslovak Army after the war. He attended the course for general staff officers and the War College. He was military attaché to Paris from 1929 to 1931, and became a section chief of the general staff in 1934. After the German occupation of Czechoslovakia he was prominently active in the Ger-

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man-sponsored, semi-Fascist political organization Narodni Sourucenstvi, which was supposed to take the place of all political parties previously in existence. However, in 1945 General Drgac seems to have joined the Communist party. Despite his collaborationist record he was accepted and became Commander of the Military Academy in 1945. Then after the Communist coup in 1948 he was promoted to chief of the general staff.

One explanation of Drgac's acceptability to the Communists for several years is an interesting one. It has been asserted that in 1937, when he was head of Czechoslovak military intelligence, he was the man through whom some German documents passed to Russia (with the full cognizance of the Benes government) which implicated Tukachevskii and were the basis of his execution. Perhaps Drgac was being shown Russian gratitude for these documents, which ironically enough, were Nazi forgeries intended to reach Russia in just that way. Such Communist rewards are but fleeting, however. In 1950 Drgac was removed.

By drawing upon officers whom they had indoctrinated on the Eastern Front and on officers whose previous records left them at a disadvantage, the Communists maintained some continuity within the Czechoslovak Army after 1948. They did not recruit many officers who had been part of the cohesive and effective London forces but rather officers who did not belong to this cadre and particularly those who had betrayed their trust in the past. Needless to say, a large proportion of these officers were members of the Communist party but this is not a very significant fact because most of them joined only after 1945 or 1948 and joining was merely another way of expressing their willingness to collaborate with their new Communist bosses.

The last one of the thirteen in our sample of career officers who served after the coup is a special case. He had become an active Communist even before World War II. This was General Frantisek Pavel, whose life history is more like that of the new Communist generals whom we shall discuss below than it is like that of the career officers whom we are discussing here, although General Pavel had been a career officer before he became a Communist. He was a first lieutenant in the 30th Rifle Regiment of the Austro-Hungarian Army. After the war he became a career infantry officer and as a staff captain was sent to the War College from 1928 to 1931. The highest rank he reached was major on the staff of the 37th Infantry Regiment in 1934. When the civil war in Spain broke out Major Pavel joined the Republican Army and fought there. He next appeared as a Communist deputy in the Czechoslovak National Assembly in 1946. He was made Commander of the SNB, security troops, from 1948 to 1951. In 1949 and 1950, when the SNB was in the Ministry of Interior, Pavel was Deputy Minister of Interior and then when the Ministry of Interior was split in two and the SNB became part of the Ministry of

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National Security, he became Deputy Minister of National Security. He was arrested in 1951 and connected with Rudolf Slansky.

In addition to these thirteen men who tried to collaborate with the Communists but were ultimately purged, we have in our sample fourteen generals who were regular officers in the prewar Czechoslovak Army and who have apparently been successful in holding on to their positions up to now. We know less about these men than about the generals so far discussed since they were all officers of relatively low rank until after World War II. Two of them, Karel Vegr and Cenek Ruzicka, had become lieutenant colonels by the end of the war. Five others were majors. None of them became generals until 1948. In part, but only in part, the low status of these men until recently is due to their youth. In 1945 they were all between forty and fifty-three and all but four of them were over forty-five. They thus averaged about five years younger than the generals who were eliminated in the 1948 coup. Eight of them had fought in World War I while six entered the Czechoslovak Army from the Military Academy. This may be compared with the fact that of the eighteen officers in our sample who were purged in 1948 all but two had been World War I veterans and those two were Slovaks who had risen into prominence through the Slovak rebellion in 1944. Of the thirteen generals who tried to collaborate with the Communists but were purged, all but one had a World War I record. Being more youthful and not being part of the old guard of the Czechoslovak Army which traced its power to the Czechoslovak struggle for independence in the First World War nor sharing that formative experience they were both more acceptable and more amenable to the Communists.

In line with their relatively junior status we find, as we would expect, that fewer of these officers had been to the War College or had had general staff experience. Only two of them had held important staff assignments before the Second World War. Josef Ejem was Staff Captain of the General Staff in the Ministry of National Defense in 1929 and Karel Vegr had the same status in 1930. Generals Ejem, Hanus, Janda, Papousek, and Tokan are known to have attended the War College in Prague.

Although these men were certainly old enough to have established significant military records in World War II, not one of them did so. Generals Hanus, Michalica, and Sacher are reported to have fought with the Russians in World War II. General Rypl was a Major and Flight Commander in the RAF commanding the 313th Czechoslovak Fighter Squadron. General Vegr was a member of the military underground and worked at a munitions factory in Vsetin, Moravia. For the rest, their World War II records were so inconspicuous as to be unknown although it may be presumed that the majority either fought in the East or were in some underground movement.

While it is thus clear that the regular officers on whom the Communist government of Czechoslovakia has drawn are not an outstand-

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TABLE 3

Rank of pre-1945 Career Officers included in the post-1945 Sample	Purged Before 1948	Purged in 1948 Coup	Purged After 1948 Coup	Not Purged
Rank in 1939				
Lieutenant				2
Captain		2		2
Staff Captain	1			3
Major		4	3	5
Lieutenant Colonel	1	3	3	2
Colonel		5	4	
Brigadier General	3	1	3	
Higher General	1	3		
Don't know				
Rank in 1944				
Lieutenant				1
Captain				1
Staff Captain				2
Major		3	2	5
Lieutenant Colonel	1	4		2
Colonel	1	3	5	
Brigadier General	3	5	5	
Higher General	1	3	1	
Don't know				3
Total	6	18	13	14

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ing group, they have been elevated into a significant part of the current military leadership. They have risen rapidly from the lower ranks but provide a measure of continuity between the older, French-trained Czechoslovak Army and the new Communist Army. It may be expected, however, that with the passage of time these men will be continuously more isolated and many of them may be purged. Although valuable because they are technically trained and have a considerable amount of experience, they come nevertheless, out of an old school which a rising generation of communist-trained officers will probably regard with a certain amount of distrust and distance. For one thing they stem from higher social stations than do the young junior officers whom the Communist regime is now training. In 1950

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General Cepicka could claim that 50 percent of the entering students and 40 percent of the students in both years of Czechoslovak Military Academy were of proletarian origin in contrast to 7 percent in 1945.

In one interesting respect the old-line officers whom the Communists retained differed from the ones they purged or who refused to go along with them. The bulk of the generals in the pre-Communist Czechoslovak Army had primarily infantry experience or a combination of infantry and general staff experience. However, some belonged to more mechanized branches: artillery, cavalry, and air corps. These were 30 percent of our pre-Communist sample. When we tabulate those among them whom the Communists have retained as generals, we find that somewhat more, 43 percent, came from these more technical branches. This may reflect in part the Communists' needs. They found it necessary to accept the technical know-how of these officers. On the other hand it may also reflect a subtle difference in the officers' own points of view. The traditional military norms held to particularly by that group in the officer corps which had come out of the Czechoslovak Legion in Russia and which remained loyal to Benes may have had slightly less hold on a group of officers whose interests and careers centered on technical know-how; they were perhaps somewhat more susceptible to the communistic myths of industrialization and planning. Whatever the causes for the difference in the amount of collaborationism in the different branches, it manifests the general tendency for the technician, along with the bureaucrat, and the desk men, to be favored in the satellite armies.

These older officers, whom the Communists assimilated from the prewar army, have come to hold a good many of the highest positions. The Minister of National Defense is not himself one of them, but they do include the Chief of Staff and Deputy Minister of National Defense, General Vaclav Kratchovil, and another Deputy Minister of National Defense, Vaclav Thor. They also include the Commander of the Czechoslovak air force General Josef Hanus, and the Chief of the Military Office of the President, General Bohumil Chlan, as well as the Commander of the Prague Military District, until recently General Frantisek Janda, and the Commander of the Bratislava military region, General Jaroslav Tokan. A challenge to these men and their positions may ultimately be expected from the new post-1948 trainees of the Czechoslovak military schools.

4. The Communists

One might have expected an effective challenge to them already from old-line Communists without previous military careers. This expectation has proved to be wrong. There are a handful of old-line Communists in key positions in the Czechoslovak Army but they have suffered purging and insecurity to at least the same degree as the regular officers.

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As a matter of fact the Communist militants reached the apex of their power in 1950 when they were brought in temporarily to facilitate the major reorganization of the army which took place in that year. Shortly, however, there was a reaction in favor of the professionals. Before April 1950 all the top positions were held by career officers such as Minister of National Defense Svoboda and the Chief of Staff Drgac. Then when Alexej Cepicka took over as Minister, the top structure of the Ministry was reorganized. In 1950 four Deputy Ministers were appointed. Two like Cepicka were Communist militants with no military qualifications. These were the Chief of Staff Prochazka, who is now teaching at the University of Prague, and Bedrich Rejcin, head of military intelligence who has since been hanged. A third of the four Deputy Ministers, the head of the political department, General Lestovicka, although originally a career officer had joined the Communist movement in 1929. He was implicated in the Slansky trial. The other Deputy Minister was the only regular officer among them, General Drnec who was also later implicated in the Slansky trial.

By 1952 this leading group had been thoroughly purged with three of the five in complete disgrace. Only Cepicka remained. The three Deputy Ministers in 1952 included two career officers; Generals Kratochvil and Thor, and General Hruska, a Communist militant who had charge of the political department. The normal satellite balance had been struck by which professionals held the key technical posts and the Communist politicians had been relegated to their special political department. The Soviet masters of Czechoslovakia thus assured themselves of a professionally competent army, not merely a loyally Communist one.

The life histories of the Communist generals reveal both how little professional experience mattered to the Communists when they were primarily concerned with infiltrating, subverting, and controlling the army, but also how insecure were the men whom the Communists used as tools for these processes. All the Communist militants who headed the army except the top boss, Cepicka, have since been discarded. The Communist militants served a purpose, as dispensable tools in a period of transformation. They were useful as propagandists and conspirators, not soldiers. They had a background of residence in the Soviet Union, often coupled with service in Red Army Intelligence or the Red Army Political Affairs Department (e.g. Prochazka, Rejcin, Kopold, probably Pavel, and Lastovicka as Czech Ambassador to Moscow in 1948-50). Some had past politico-military experience in the Spanish Civil War (e.g. Lastovicka, Pavel, Kopold). Most of them have now been tried as traitors and purged (e.g. Rejcin, Lastovicka, Pavel, Kopold). With the appointment of Cepicka, the top military post, that of Minister of National Defense, was put into the hands of one of the three or four top Communists in Czechoslovakia instead of into the hands of a military leader.

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General Svoboda had been a pliant tool of the Russians, so much so that he outlasted by a couple of years the non-Politburo Ministers of Defense in the other satellite countries. Still in 1950 he was reduced from Minister of National Defense to the honorific status of Vice-Premier and Head of the State Office for Physical Education and Sport. He held this position until 1951. In 1952 he was listed as a member of the presidium of the Central Committee of the Czechoslovak-Soviet Friendship Association. After being reduced to these purely titular offices he is reported to have disappeared physically during the last year.

His successor, Dr. Alexej Cepicka, was born in 1908 and brought up by his widowed mother, who owned a private employment agency for domestic personnel in the provincial town of Kromeriz, Moravia. 661 There he attended the gymnasium and was an average student. Later he studied law, in which he achieved his doctorate. He worked as a candidate for the bar in an attorney's office in Ostrava. Investigated for financial irregularities in the middle 1930's he was expelled from the list of candidates by the Chamber of Advocates in Brno. Cepicka's early politics are ambiguous at best. He joined the Communist party only in 1938, though he claims that during his student years he was a leader of Communist student organizations. On the other hand, however, during his imprisonment by the Germans in a concentration camp during World War II, the president of the Protectorate of Bohemia-Moravia, Dr. Hacha, intervened in his behalf and claimed in a letter to Hitler (a copy of which after the war was found in Hacha's office) that Cepicka in his younger years had assisted in editing a strictly rightist paper which attacked Masaryk and Benes as pro-Communists. Hacha's intervention was of no avail. After the war Cepicka returned to Kromeriz and became chairman of the local "national committee" of that town. He administered the community so arbitrarily that he embarrassed even some of the Communists. He was elected to the Constituent National Assembly in May 1946 and was one of the Communist party representatives on the Constitutional Committee. In December 1947 Cepicka succeeded his fellow Communist, Alois Zmrhal, as Minister of Internal Trade, to become after the coup in February 1948 Minister of Justice.

Before the coup Cepicka organized a bombing attempt on the lives of Jan Masaryk, Dr. Zenkl, and Dr. Drtina. The investigation of that plot carried out by the Ministry of Justice had already begun to compromise the Communist party when it was suddenly ended by the coup which made Cepicka himself Minister of Justice. The Justice Department officers, public prosecutors, the judges who had been assigned to the case were prosecuted and liquidated by Cepicka, who staged fake trials against them. He piloted through the Cabinet and National Assembly a new Act for the Protection of the Republic, acts to reorganize the profession of law and the judiciary, to replace the established courts by Communist-dominated people's courts,

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661 and new civil, criminal, and procedural codes. In addition to being Minister of Justice he was secretary general of the Central Action Committee of the National Front and head of the State Office for Ecclesiastical Affairs, in which capacity he persecuted the clergy and subjugated the churches. In April 1950, he was made Minister of National Defense. Up to that time there is no record of his having had any military service, but on October 6, 1950, he received the rank of army general.

Cepicka derived much of his power from his marriage to Martha, the daughter of Klement Gottwald, in July 1948. Martha Gottwald Cepicka has also been active in politics. She joined the Ministry of Foreign Affairs after the coup and within a year she was a Chief of Division. Naturally there have been various rumors about fluctuations in the fortunes of Cepicka. At the time of the Slansky trial there were rumors that he might be in disgrace. More recently there have been rumors of an affair between Madame Cepicka and disgraced Bedrich Geminder and of a pending divorce. Such rumors notwithstanding, Cepicka became a Deputy Prime Minister on February 2, 1953, and was a member of the Czech delegation to Stalin's funeral. At the Gottwald funeral Cepicka was one of the four pallbearers and his wife appeared prominently. As of the date of writing Cepicka is a powerful member of the Politburo and seems as secure as any member of a satellite elite.

* 701 *648 The Communist chief of the general staff, on the other hand, was a bird of passage. The first chief of the general staff after the war had been General Bohumil Bocek, a career officer who had fought under the Russians in World War II and whom they forced on an unwilling Benes. He did not long survive Benes in office, however. Although he backed the coup of 1948, he himself was removed a few months later and was replaced by General Simon Drgac whom we noted to be a former Nazi collaborator. The latter survived in this office until 1950. Then the prewar career officer Drgac was replaced by the Marxist theoretician, Army General Dr. Jaroslav Prochazka. Prochazka's father had been a teacher in an industrial school. He had studied law and had received his doctorate in that field. His first military experience came in the Austro-Hungarian Army in World War I. He fought in the Czechoslovak Legion, first in Russia and then in France, where he was a lieutenant of the 22d Infantry Regiment. He remained associated with that regiment of the Czechoslovak Army through 1922, but he was a reservist and not a regular officer. By 1919 he had already become a Communist, being a founding member of the Czechoslovak party. He served on the City Council at Pilsen around 1920. He then became an official of the Czechoslovak railways. In 1924 he left Czechoslovakia and from then until 1945 lived in Russia. It is alleged that he left Czechoslovakia in order to avoid service in the army.

During World War II the Soviet government made extensive use of

Dr. Prochazka as a propagandist. He was a broadcaster on the Soviet radio in 1941 and editor of Nova Sloboda, the newspaper of the First Czechoslovak Army Corps in the U.S.S.R. In that army corps he headed the so called "enlightenment service," first as a captain and then as a major. Back in Czechoslovakia after liberation he was chief of the Army Educational Service from 1945 to 1950 and as such was responsible for Communist indoctrination in the army. Then in 1950 this Communist propagandist was made chief of the general staff. He remained in that post until 1952. Then despite his long record of communist activity and his extensive Communist connections—his brother is the principal author of the 1948 Czechoslovak constitution and was ambassador to the United States in 1950-52—he was abruptly dismissed, possibly in connection with the purge of Slansky and his associates. Prochazka then became professor in the Faculty of Social Sciences at the Charles University at Prague. He was succeeded by Vaclav Kratchovil, one of the newly promoted prewar junior army officers to whom we referred above. Prochazka's Communist record served him no stead when, in 1952, the Communists decided to restore professional skill to full recognition. *701 *648 [41]

Another Communist purged in that process was Bedrich Rejcin born 1911, Fritz Reizinger. He was a Sudeten German of Jewish family from Pilsen. He received his political training in the U.S.S.R., where he lived for some time in the 1930's until 1945. From 1941 until 1945 he was a political education officer in the Czechoslovak Army in the U.S.S.R. In 1948 as a colonel he was chief of the secret police in the Ministry of the Interior. Then in 1950 he was made Deputy Minister of National Defense for Military Intelligence and promoted to brigadier general and then to division general. He was arrested in 1951 and in the Slansky trial he was charged not only with an attempt to seize the Communist party organization in the Czechoslovak Army, but also with Zionism, Titoism, Trotskyism, and treason. He was hanged in November 1952. *701 *648 661

Another purged Communist Deputy Minister of National Defense was Bohuslav Lastovicka. He was born in Bohemia in 1905 and prepared for a military career. He entered the Military Academy around 1922 for training as an artillery officer and was commissioned as a second lieutenant in 1924. He served with the artillery until 1929, when he was transferred into the reserves as "incapable of field service, capable of local services," a formula used in the Czechoslovak Army of that period for politically unassimilable elements. Despite his Communist views he was promoted to first lieutenant in the reserves in 1931. During the 1930's he was editor of Rude Pravo, the central organ of the Communist party of Czechoslovakia. Then in 1936 he went to Spain and commanded the Gottwald Artillery Battery in the civil war. After the defeat of the Loyalists he became a refugee in France and then in England. He spent the war years in London as a broadcaster for the Czechoslovak section of the BBC.

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Upon his return to Prague he became director of the Czechoslovak Broadcasting Corporation, which position he held until 1948. At that time he was appointed ambassador to the U.S.S.R. When he returned from there in 1950, he became Deputy Minister for National Defense in charge of the army political department, with the rank of brigadier general and later division general. He remained in this position until 1951, at which time he was arrested, presumably in connection with the Slansky trial.

The Deputy Ministers of National Defense who now remained in office included, as already noted, the standard three for a satellite of whom but one is a Communist militant, General Cenek Hruska. He heads the political administration of the army. Little is known about General Hruska. He rose to his present position mainly through the political administration. As a brigadier general he was chief of the Central Political Administration from 1950 to 1952, at which time he became division general and Deputy Minister. He shares the status of Deputy Minister with General Kratchovil, whose life history we have already reviewed and with another professional officer, General Vaklav Thor. Thor began his military service in the Austro-Hungarian Army. He became a career officer in the Czechoslovak Army in 1920, transferring from the Reserves. He served in the artillery, rising from second lieutenant to staff captain in the years before the war. He, like Hruska, was made a Deputy Minister when the associates of Slansky were removed from office in 1952.

Our sample includes one other new Communist officer who was purged and whose biography reveals how freely the Communists bestow military rank for political purposes. That officer was Dr. Bohumil Ecer. Like Prochazka and Cepicka, he earned a doctor's degree in law. After the First World War he practiced in Brno, where he joined the Communist party. In 1930 he was Deputy Mayor of Brno as a member of the Communist party. In 1936 or 1937 he was expelled from the party for "Trotskyist tendencies." At the outbreak of the Second World War he lived in Paris from where he escaped to England in 1942. There he was employed in the Ministry of Justice working on a draft decree on retribution. He therefore later became the Czech delegate to the Interallied Commission for the Punishment of War Criminals and to the U.N. War Commission. For this essentially political and legal job he was made a colonel and later a brigadier general. After his return to Prague in September 1948, he became professor of international penal law in Brno University. Since 1950 he has disappeared from view. He was given his rank with no regard to military purposes, technical qualifications, or military experience. When his function was served the Communists discarded him just as readily as they appointed him, and they left genuine military responsibilities in the hands of technically qualified persons not necessarily having a Communist record.

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The Communist militants who retained their positions have gen-

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erally been in the political administration of the army as, for example General Hruska, or in the security forces which, however, were probably thoroughly shaken up in the last few months. On September 15, 1953, as part of the Malenkov change of line, Minister of Security, General Karol Bacilek was demoted to Secretary of the Communist party in Slovakia. Our data precede that date, but as of the end of our information one Communist officer who remained in military office was Dr. Antonin Rasla, a lawyer, who is head of the military court in Bratislava. He was certainly not an officer of the Czechoslovak Army at any time through 1935. The first occasion on which he appears in a military role is in the Slovak uprising of 1944, in which he was a Communist party member of the Slovak National Council and of its presidium and had the military rank of staff captain. In 1945 he became a lieutenant colonel in the Ministry of National Defense, and in 1952 acquired his present position. Another Communist in a security position was General Hofmann, who until recently was Commander of the Personal Guard of Gottwald and other top party officials. In this capacity he was a general of the SNB. His military background stems from the Spanish Civil War.

We might, finally, mention Division General Oskar Jelen, Deputy Minister of National Security from 1952. Jelen was the illegitimate son of the Hungarian nobleman, Aladar Platt, on whose estate he was born. His mother was married to the estate manager, Jelen. He was brought up as a Hungarian and became a village school teacher. He attended a school for reserve officers and about 1927, after being drafted, he served as a reserve lieutenant in the artillery in the late 1920's and '30's. During World War II he joined the Nazi puppet Slovak Army. In 1945 he was regional secretary of the Slovak Communist party in Kosice and chairman of the District National Committee there. He was so inefficient in these functions that he was, it appears, to a great extent responsible for the defeat of the Communist party in the elections of 1946 in that region. He remained in these offices in Kosice for some time after the coup of 1948. He was next heard from when he suddenly appeared in the Ministry of National Security as Deputy Minister, first holding the rank of brigadier general and then in 1952 division general.

5. The Present Balance and the Future

While ruthless, demoralized, and uneducated political hatchet men may fill important security and political posts, the significant point to note is that for professional military activity the Communists have turned to professional military men wherever they felt they could trust them at all. In each satellite country there is a tenuous balance between professionally-qualified officers and bumptious Communist newcomers, which balance must hold until a new generation of young well-trained and well-indoctrinated officers is ready to take over. The balance is not the same in each case, how-

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ever. Later we shall note that in Poland no core of trustworthy professional officers was available to the Communists. They solved the problem by transforming Russian army officers into Poles, thus securing a leadership that is both skilled and loyal, even if not popular. In Romania too we shall note that apparently no core of acceptable officers is available. As a result we find there a group of prewar officers holding important positions but with Communist politicians riding herd on them in the very top positions. In Czechoslovakia the Communists found a solution from their point of view more satisfactory than the Romanian but perhaps less so than the Polish. They have relied on very junior career officers who have been rapidly promoted plus a few Communists relegated to political control positions.

This solution was arrived at in a step-by-step process, as in all the European satellites. The first step was the gradual establishment of Communist bases of influence between 1945 and 1948. The second step was initiated with the coup of February 1948 and involved the elimination of all officers who were not willing collaborators with the Soviets. The third step occurred in April 1950, when a sweeping reorganization adapted the army closely to the Soviet model and replaced even the would-be collaborators by new Communist officers. The final step so far was the replacement in 1952 of most of these Communists by new professionals of prewar low rank. Even this, however, is but a temporary expedient. The present group of officers will also go when Soviet-trained and Soviet-educated replacements become available. The final purge as yet foreseeable must await the maturation of the postwar, post-Soviet generation.

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III. POLAND

A. Introduction

The process by which the Polish Army was sovietized was in some ways similar and in some ways different from that just described for Czechoslovakia. In both cases a leadership which had cohesion and tradition was destroyed by the Communists. A new leadership had to be found, but in both Czechoslovakia and Poland, it consisted not primarily of Communist party militants, who were also purged from leading positions, but by military technicians. In both armies, however, the Communist activists retained the leading positions in the political administration and in the police and security forces. Thus in both armies there is a sharp differentiation between professional leadership in the purely military branches and civilians in uniform in a few other departments.

There are two important and inter-related differences between the way in which a new leadership was developed in Poland and in Czechoslovakia. 1. In Poland the new leadership of professionals was provided mainly by Russian Army officers ordered into the Polish Army, whereas in Czechoslovakia it has been temporarily provided by former low-ranking Czechoslovak career officers aided, it is true, by Soviet advisers and supplemented by a smaller number of imported Russian officers. 2. In Poland there was less continuity than in Czechoslovakia between the prewar and postwar armies. Much of the prewar officer corps was destroyed in the Katyn massacres and many of those who remain alive followed General Anders in refusing to return to Poland thus marking themselves off from the path of Benes and his followers. The process of freezing out of the old leadership, which in Czechoslovakia occupied the Communists from 1945 to 1948, was already largely completed in Poland with the end of the war in 1945 since the old leadership was dead or in England.

Partly because the Polish Army was more quickly, completely, and effectively sovietized than the Czech, partly because of strong military traditions in Polish life, and partly because Poland's military potential is greater than that of any other satellite, the Russians have developed the Polish Army further than that of any other East European country. From the Russian point of view the use of Russian Army officers to man the upper reaches of the Polish Army assures a more satisfactory combination of loyalty and professional skill than could be obtained in any other way. These factors plus the fact that Poland was an Ally and therefore her rearming was at first viewed as legitimate even by the western powers facilitated a rapid remilitarization of the country. The Polish Army today is a power to be reckoned with.

Our whole sample includes biographies of 152 Polish generals. From these we have drawn a special sample of those who served or were available for service in the 1945-1952 period. This sample consists of 71 generals, who in turn break down into the following groups:

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14 generals who refused to return to Poland at the end of the war
5 who returned but have not been mentioned since and presumably were not admitted to the new army at all
18 officers of the prewar army who returned to Poland and served but were eliminated from the new army between 1947 and the present
4 officers who returned and apparently have been able to stay in the army up to now[15]
3 new Communist generals who have been purged
14 new Communist generals who have retained positions of influence in Poland, most of them, however, not in the army
11 Red Army officers who have been transferred to the Polish Army

B. The Polish Army to 1945

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In the years before World War I there was no Polish state. Thus the army officers of the postwar state were generally men who had received their initial training either in Austria, Germany, or Russia. Of the 100 generals in our full sample who served in pre-Communist Poland (all born before 1901) 40 were born under Austrian rule, 38 under Russian, and 8 under German. Although born under the rule of these three countries, they had a consciousness of their Polish national affiliation, and before 1918 many of them belonged to patriotic nationalist groups aiming at freeing the fatherland such as the Polish Riflemen's Union.

The outstanding nationalist leader of that period was Marshal Joseph Pilsudski. In 1914 he mobilized the para-military Polish units into a brigade to fight at the side of the Austrian Army against the Russians. In 1916 the Austrian government demanded of Pilsudski that his brigade take a loyalty oath. This demand was refused by Pilsudski and his staff and consequently many of the officers were charged with treason and put in Austrian military jails. Later they were released and the exploits of Pilsudski and his brigade in the Polish Legion of the Austrian Army grew into a national legend. By the end of the war in 1918 he and his staff formed the nucleus of the new army of the young republic. To this group were added some officers born and trained in Russian-occupied Poland and a very small number born and trained in German-occupied Poland.

These three elements—slightly heterogeneous but all patriotic Poles speaking the same language and reared in a traditional atmosphere of revolt against their respective partition powers—formed the highest level of the interwar Polish officer corps. Nearly all of them took part in the Russo-Polish War and led by Pilsudski they saved Warsaw from Russian occupation in 1920.

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At the end of the Russo-Polish War fierce party conflicts and disagreements characterized the Polish political scene. Pilsudski, who

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opposed the political parties, wrote from retirement defending the point of view that the army and its officer corps represent the nation's most treasured heritage and are independent of political power holders. The army, he argued, should not have to take orders from the Minister of War, who would necessarily be a politician. When the domestic situation in 1926 reached a nadir, Pilsudski staged a comeback with his famous march on Warsaw. Within three days, supported by regiments still loyal to him commanded by his followers, Generals Zeligowski and Rydz-Smigly, Marshal Pilsudski was in power again. He nominated a new cabinet with himself as Minister of War. While some of the officers who had influence in later years such as Generals Anders and Kukiel, fought against the Pilsudski coup, most of the top officers of the 1930's were part of the tightly-knit group that followed Pilsudski and rose to power with him.

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The cohesive officer corps of the interwar years not only shared a set of common experiences and political identifications; they also had a common social background. They generally had a higher education. Out of fifty-eight interwar generals in our sample only six stopped their schooling at the secondary level and twenty-six had been to a civilian university. The large majority came from upper or middle class homes. Their fathers were often professional men or landlords. Many belonged to the nobility or had wives of aristocratic birth.

It was from this elite and cohesive officer corps that the government-in-exile in London drew its general officers although it should be noted that Sikorski, the head of the exile armies, purged a considerable number of former Pilsudski men. While the government-in-exile drew its military leadership from this prewar officer corps, only a small proportion of the total was available to it, for the toll of the Second World War was enormous. In 1939 there were 19,731 officers in the Polish Army not including reserve officers. Of these the large majority, perhaps as many as 17,000, became prisoners of war either of the Germans or of the Russians. Many of these were never heard from again. Something like eight thousand Polish officers disappeared in the Soviet Union during the war. Forty-three hundred of these can be accounted for as having been murdered by the Russians at Katyn. Thousands of others simply disappeared. Later in the war when Russia was no longer an ally of Germany but rather an "ally" of Poland, the Soviets permitted the remaining imprisoned officers to leave Russia to join the Allied fighting forces. Only a very few could be found alive to do so.

Of the few thousand Polish officers who were not imprisoned early in World War II, the majority went underground and participated in partisan warfare. Many of them succeeded in escaping into exile to serve with the Polish forces abroad.

From this limited group, later supplemented by the few survivors

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*701 released from Soviet prison camps and still further supplemented by officers released toward the end of the war from German prison camps and by officers rising from the underground, the armies of the Polish government-in-exile were built. These forces numbered a couple of hundred thousand and their combat record was excellent. The first corps was based in England and included fifteen squadrons in the Royal Air Force as compared to twelve French, four Czech, etc. The second corps fought in Italy under the command of General Anders.

Our sample contains fifteen general officers of these forces. Out of the fifteen, six had been generals in prewar Poland. Four of them had been cavalry officers, a branch which in the interwar Polish Army was aristocratic in composition and prestigeful in status. If the group of officers in exile differed at all from a cross section of their colleagues who spent the War in prison or in Poland, however, it was only in being somewhat younger and more vigorous. Only two in our sample of exile officers had played a leading role in the Pilsudski group since their median age in 1939 was only forty-seven. In World War I and even 1926 they were young officers not yet in the inner circle. At those times they were, however, already launched in their careers and thus had had extensive combat experience in World War I, in the Russo-Polish War and in other military events of the time.

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*648 As in Czechoslovakia, this well-trained, loyal, and experienced officer corps of the government-in-exile did not become a significant factor in the new army. Unlike in Czechoslovakia, their exclusion occurred at once and partly on their own initiative. The Benes government-in-exile made every effort to appease the Russians. The Polish government-in-exile with the events of Katyn still fresh in its memory was neither so tractable nor so unrealistic. This is not the place to go into the complex history of the wartime struggle between the Mikolajzek government in London and the Lublin government formed by the Soviets. While a formal amalgamation was forced by the Allies, the Communist future of Poland was sufficiently clear in 1945 so that General Anders refused to return. He asked of the British government and was granted the right of resettlement within the British Commonwealth for the Polish army-in-exile of about 200,000. Some of these soldiers including a few high officers decided to return to their homeland to try to live under the new Communist regime, but the bulk of the military leadership of the wartime Polish Armies in the West remains in exile to this day. Thus the Polish Army began the process of sovietization at approximately the point of discontinuity with the past reached by the Czechoslovak regime at the end of the 1948 coup.

It is worthwhile comparing the generals who refused to return to Poland with those who did go back or who stayed in Poland. It is

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also interesting to compare those who returned and were accepted at least temporarily into the army with those with whom the Communists would have no truck. The esprit de corps that arose from belonging to an organized force with strong traditions and cohesion seems to have been a major factor fostering a refusal to return. Wartime groupings persist today. Those who served in the Polish Army in the West tended to stay in the West while those who spent the war years in prisoner of war camps were more likely than their colleagues to attempt to make peace with the Communists. The underground fighters, of course, found themselves in Poland rather than having to return. Furthermore there were two underground armies. The officers who had been members of the Communist underground naturally stayed in Communist Poland. So did some officers of the larger anti-Communist underground such as Tatar, Kirchmeyer, and Herman, but many leaders such as General Bor escaped Communist Poland and are now in exile. Those officers who spent the war years fighting in one of the three Polish divisions formed by the Russians on the Eastern Front were likely to stay in Communist Poland and were generally sufficiently acceptable to remain active in the new regime. Our sample is small, but it at least suggests these important differences in response to the new regime according to the individual's World War II associations.

TABLE 4

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Comparison of Returners and Non-returners Main activity during war	P.W.	Underground	Fought on E. Front	Fought on W. Front	Don't Know	Total
Returners						
Died or played no role after return	2	-	-	1	4	
In army then purged	7	5 1/2*	-	4 1/2*	1	18
Still in army	-	-	3 1/2*	1/2*	-	4
All Returners	9	5 1/2*	3 1/2*	6*	5	29
Non-returners	2	2	-	8	2	14

*In a couple of cases a man's activity was fairly evenly divided. One man was for fairly equal periods in the underground and then in the London Army, and another was in the Russian-sponsored and London Armies.
These two men are assigned 1/2 to each.

*701 *648 Another factor associated with the decision to return or not was the branch of military service in which the officer had made his career. Again our sample must be used with caution because of its small size, but it is suggestive. Five out of seven cavalry men in our sample, remained in exile. On the other hand, those who had been closely associated with the prewar general staff tended to return— eight out of eleven. All the artillery men in the sample also returned. It is not possible to give a definitive explanation of these facts without knowing the inside history of the intrigues, factions, and personal ties which differentiated one group from another in the prewar Polish Army but it will be noted that the results do correspond to a set of similar ones which recur at other points in our data. Those segments of the old armies with the strongest traditions of personal leadership, of combat heroism, and professional pride— such as the aristocratic cavalry— resisted the Communist take-over process most strongly. On the other hand, the Communists were better able to temporize with those segments of the armies most concerned with industrial technology and also with those segments concerned with administration and politics. It was in the latter groups that they found a few collaborators and which they favored.

D. The Army of Communist Poland 1945-48

*701 *648 661 Most of the experienced officers who returned to Poland at the end of the war were taken into the new Communist Army but did not last long. They were purged between 1947 and 1951. Perhaps the luckiest ones were those who were never taken in or who were purged early, for at first the Communists simply retired their victims. Later they were likely to try and execute them.

Our sample includes twenty-nine officers who returned to Communist Poland. Five apparently were not admitted to any postwar military career. Eighteen had such a career for a while and were then purged, and four appear to still hold office. Two died natural deaths.

The distinctive characteristics of the group which was never allowed into the military hierarchy of Communist Poland were age, rank, and identification with the Pilsudski clique. All of them were fifty-four or over in 1945;[16] four of them had been prewar generals; three had been prominent Pilsudskians.

In our sample of generals who could have been active in the period since 1945, there are nine individuals prominently identified with the Pilsudski group. Five of those were among the ones who refused to return to Poland at the end of the war. Three returned to Poland and played no role in the military life thereafter. Only one of those whom the Communists used in the Polish Army for shorter or longer periods after the war was identified by our researchers as associated with the Pilsudski group.

The officers who were permitted to resume their careers in 1945

were of less exalted rank, younger, and with fewer Western contacts. The majority had been colonels in 1939 (thirteen out of twenty-four). The larger number had not served with the Polish Armies in the West. Seven were liberated from prisoner of war camps, and five had been in the underground throughout the war. Only five had served in the Anders armies. In addition, four had served in the Soviet-sponsored Polish Armies. These are the only four in our entire sample of prewar Polish officers who apparently still remain in office. All those in our sample who joined the new Polish Army upon returning from London, upon returning from prisoner camps, or upon coming out of hiding, have since been purged. Let us now review these purges.

The four most prominent officers — prewar generals — in our sample who were taken back into the new Communist Armies in 1945 were Generals Mieczyslaw Boruta-Spiechowicz, Gustav Paszkiewicz, Jerzy Kirchmayer, and Michal Zymierski. These four illustrate some of the typical experience patterns of prewar officers in Communist Poland.

General Boruta was an infantry officer throughout his career. He volunteered for the Austrian Army in 1914, when he was twenty, and rose from infantry private to captain during World War I. He fought also in the Polish-Russian war. From 1939-41 he was a prisoner of the Russians. Then in 1941 he was released and fought on the Eastern Front for a short while. He was one of the officers allowed to go West and the following year he was in the Middle East. He ended the war as a corps commander in Scotland. After the war he returned to Poland but was dismissed from the army in 1946. At that time he settled as a small farmer in the new territories of western Poland and has disappeared from public attention since then. It was reported in 1951[17] that he was serving in the army again, but in view of the failure of his name to appear in any prominent position this information is either incorrect or he is serving in a minor capacity.

Another officer who was simply released from the new Polish Army was General Gustav Paszkiewicz. General Paszkiewicz was born of good family in 1892 in Russian-occupied Poland. He married Helena Baroness Hartingh. He graduated from the military academy in Vilna and in 1913 became a cadet officer in the Russian infantry. After the First World War he served in an artillery regiment of the Polish Army and later in the infantry again. During the Second World War he served in the West as a major general. When he returned to Communist Poland in 1945 he was given the job of pacification of northeastern Poland; i. e., his job was to disarm and subdue the Polish underground. The units of the Home Army and Underground Fighters who had fought the Germans for Polish independence would not tolerate the surrender of their territory to the Russians and had to be suppressed. He did his job in a most brutal and bloody manner. He manifested his willingness to collaborate with the Communists in

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a number of other ways too. He was a member of parliament in Communist Poland supposedly representing the Peasant party from 1945 to 1948 and he was a member of the presidium of a Communist-front organization, the Union of Fighters for Democracy and Independence. Until 1948 he continued as a lieutenant general. At that time he was apparently released from the army despite the vigorous support he had given the Communist cause. He then received a trivial job in the Ministry of Forestry.

The above officers attempted to make their peace with the Russians even though they had served at least the larger part of the war in the West. The next two prewar generals to be examined served in the underground, one under London direction and one under Communist direction.

General Jerzy Kirchmayer was born in Krakow in 1895. He was first inducted into the army in 1918. In 1939 he was with the general staff, and in that year he was promoted from major to colonel. With the collapse of the Polish forces he became a part of the resistance serving as Chief of Staff of the Warsaw District of the London government's Armia Krajowa, or underground, army. He took part in the Warsaw uprising in 1944. This was the famous episode in which the Russians first called upon the underground to revolt and then halted their troops shortly in front of Warsaw while the Germans decimated the underground forces. As one of the survivors of this early "purge" he joined the new Communist Army in 1945 and was made an instructor in the General Staff Academy. He was promoted first to brigadier general and then major general. He worked with the new government as a publicist. He served with General Paszkiewicz on the presidium of the Union of Fighters for Democracy and Independence. He was even sent as a propagandist to the United States to influence American citizens of Polish origin. His attempts to hew to the line failed too, and in 1951 he was convicted of espionage and treason together with his fellow alumni of the anti-Nazi underground Generals Tatar, Herman, and Spychalski.

General Michael Zymierski had a somewhat atypical career although in its very atypicality it is in some respects representative of the Communist generals. Like General Pavel among the Czechoslovaks he combined a career as a regular army officer with a career as a Communist militant and is in some respects typical of each type. General Zymierski's real name is Lyzwinski. He was born in Krakow in 1890. His brother, a locksmith, was condemned to death for murdering the manager of a book firm. At that time, 1913, he changed his name to Zymirski. The heirs of a Polish hero by that name sued him and in order to save confusion, he changed his name again to Zymierski.

In 1914 he joined Pilsudski's legion and was gravely wounded. Unlike Pilsudski and his followers, however, he did not refuse the loyalty oath of allegiance to Austria in 1917.

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In 1918 he was accepted into the Polish Army and he fought the Soviets in 1920. In that war he advanced to the rank of general. After the war he was appointed assistant to the chief quartermaster in the Ministry of Military Affairs. In 1927 he was charged with taking a bribe and sentenced to loss of rank, dishonorable discharge, and five years imprisonment. Upon release he went to France and worked for the firm of Coty.

When the civil war broke out in Spain he enlisted with the Republic Army and it is at that point that he became involved with the Communists. After the Spanish Civil War he remained in exile until 1939. Then at the very moment that Polish patriots were escaping from Poland to the West, Zymierski returned to Poland. It will be recalled that at this period when Zymierski fled from France, Communists were evading military service in France and justifying the Soviet pact with Germany.

Zymierski offered his services to the Polish underground but he was not acceptable. However, after the Nazi invasion of Russia the Communists started their own underground called the People's Guard in which he became an important figure. Three years later he was appointed its Commander in Chief and also a member of the Presidium of the National Home Council. With the defeat of Germany he became the Commander in Chief of the Polish Armed Forces and from 1945 until 1949 he was the leading military man of Communist Poland.

General Zymierski was allowed to stay in office until November 6, 1949, when he was dismissed and replaced by Soviet Marshal Konstantin Rokossovski. Even before his dismissal he had been merely a figurehead tolerated by the Russians, who made all the important decisions through their technical advisers, but at the end of 1949 when the Russians decided to build up the Polish Army, equipping it with new and advanced weapons and increasing its numbers, Zymierski was fired and relegated to the relatively meaningless position of a member of the Council of State. That position was only the first step toward complete disappearance from public life. At the present time he is in disgrace and has vanished from view.

The history of the officers of the old Polish Army who tried to serve under the Communists is summarized for all intents and purposes in these four cases of prewar generals. Of the twenty-two career officers in our sample who entered service under the Communists, only a very small number were ever given important, policy-making positions and these only for a short while. Among the most prominent are the two we have already noted, Generals Zymierski and Paszkiewicz plus General Zygmunt Berling. In addition one career officer commanded the Navy for a while, two commanded military districts until 1950, two were in indeterminate positions in the artillery department of the Ministry of Defense. Three were division commanders after their return. Three were attachés, one in London

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until 1947, one in Washington until 1948, and one in Moscow in 1950-51. Three taught in the General Staff Academy. Two were Chiefs of Staff of military districts. One was in charge of physical training; and one became curator of state race horses.[17a]

General Berling is a special case in that, like General Svoboda in Czechoslovakia, he had been the front man for the Communists in organizing a Russian-sponsored satellite force on the Eastern Front. Berling was a pre-1914 member of the Rifleman's Union. He fought in World War I and in the Pilsudski movement in 1926. In World War II he was in the small group of officers who were allowed to survive in Russian captivity. He was among some seventy singled out in 1940 for survival, segregation, and indoctrination in the famous "Villa of Bliss" in the suburbs of Moscow. Along with his fellow survivors he became an officer of the force which General Anders organized in Russia after the Nazi invasion of June 1941. However, when General Anders led that Polish Army out of Russia into Persia in 1942 Berling deserted and joined the Polish Communist units. He was then promoted to general officer rank and played the leading role in organizing the Kosciuszko Division of Poles in Russia in 1943. He commanded the Division and later the First Polish Corps into which it grew. After the War Berling's star waned rapidly. Our latest information is that in 1949 he was commandant of the General Staff Academy. Supposedly he is still a general in some inconspicuous position.

Berling, Zymierski, Paszkiewicz, and the other regular officers who once were important in the Polish Communist Army were birds of passage. Except for the four officers who had served in the Soviet-sponsored forces during World War II, all career officers in our sample were out of any military post by 1951, and two of those four may possibly have also been removed.[17b] The other eighteen career officers in the sample were retired or arrested.

The removals occurred in several stages. Four or five lost their posts in 1947 or shortly thereafter. In none of these cases was the victim publicly disgraced or arrested. In one case he was retired and in the others simply disappeared from view. The same thing happened to the two or three who lost their jobs in 1948. Of these, one, General Modelski, who was attaché in Washington, refused to return when called home. The others simply disappeared from their positions of prominence. Thus during the period of Zymierski's administration the method of ridding the new army of prewar military elements was relatively mild even though the generals eliminated at that period included all of the former government-in-exile officers in our sample of readmitted returners. They constituted five of the nine career officers in our sample definitely eliminated during Zymierski's incumbency.

When Zymierski was removed at the end of 1949 a number of other changes were made at the same time. In fact roughly three hundred officers of all ranks were removed in the six months after Rokossovski

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took over. Rear Admiral Steyer was released and the top Navy commands were taken over by two former Russian naval officers. Rear Admiral K. V. Cherokov is now Commander in Chief of the Navy and Rear Admiral Szylingowski is Commander of the Fleet. Admiral Steyer is apparently still free. Another general purged in 1949 was General Bruno Romiszewski, the prewar chief of the Artillery Department of the War Office. He was not only removed but was demoted from Major General to Colonel and arrested.

The remaining prewar generals in our sample who had not served under the Russians were all removed in one group in 1951. They were charged with conspiracy, espionage, and treason. The generals implicated were Mossor, Tatar, Kirchmayer, Kuropieska, Herman, and Spychalski. All but the last, who was a new Communist officer, were regular officers of the prewar Polish Army.

Thus by the end of 1951 the top level Polish officer corps was virtually a new one with but meagre vestiges of the old officer corps within it. Officers who had fought for liberation in the First World War, against the Russians in 1920, and in the army of the Polish government-in-exile in World War II were no longer to be found. Officers with such background and experience had been eliminated partly by their own choice in refusing to return in 1945 and those few who had chosen to return had by that date been discarded.

E. The New Polish Army

The new Polish military leadership is recruited from four main elements. 1. An insignificant handful of Russian-trained pre-1945 officers converted to the Communist cause. 2. A certain number of Communists trained for military careers in the Spanish Civil War, PW camps, the underground, and similar activities. 3. A considerable number of former officers of the Russian Army who hold all the key positions. 4. Young officers who have been trained in the last few years or are now being trained.

1. We have already noted that the prewar officers and career officers on whom greatest reliance was placed in the period of transition before 1950 and most notably the few who have survived are the ones who were trained and indoctrinated in Russia. We have described the segregation of a handful of officers reprieved from the mass murder of Katyn for future use.

After the War the Communists used a similar pattern of purging, selection and indoctrination on another group of non-Communist officers, the officers of the underground anti-Nazi Home Army. We know very little about this episode, nor what the Communists did with their prisoners. But it is known that when the Russians occupied Poland they arrested non-Communist underground fighters and

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*701 deported many to Russia. There they were thoroughly screened and
*648 some successfully indoctrinated. Thus both from the Polish regular
army and from the underground, there existed a corps of officers
661 who had been subjected to Soviet indoctrination to which some of
them had succumbed.

Even these thoroughly indoctrinated officers have been largely purged, however. Membership in the wartime underground, once a badge of courage and honor, has become a stigma in Communist Poland. The heroes of the underground are never mentioned in the Communist press. The heroic episodes of the resistance are buried in a pall of silence. The ex-members of the underground are watched by the police and are denied promotion. Like ex-aristocrats or ex-capitalists they are pariahs. Lt. Zdzislaw Jazwinsky who flew his MIG to Bornholm and thus escaped, reports that he hid his activity in the underground for he would not have been admitted to the pilot training program had it been known.

*701 2. The old Communists are also a passing element in Polish mili-
*648 tary leadership. They have not been eliminated, but as we have seen they have been relegated rather quickly either to civilian functions or to a few relatively subsidiary military functions. Of the twelve Communist generals in our sample who have not been purged, eight are no longer in military positions at all. As of 1953 one was Minister of Foreign Affairs, and a second one director of the press department in that Ministry. One was Minister of State Control, another Minister of Public Security, i.e., in charge of the police, and another chief of militia in that Ministry. Six are members of the Politburo and one is secretary of the Communist party. Another one has been reduced to a minor political position. Four of these eight switched from military to political activities almost immediately after the end of the war and the remaining four fairly quickly thereafter. Of the four who are apparently still in military life three are in the political administration of the army and one in the quartermaster department.[18]

Despite the fact that these "old" Communists are young men, their median age at present being between forty-seven and forty-eight, they are obviously not being permitted to play a major role in Poland's military development, for which role indeed they are not particularly qualified. All of them had some military experience fighting in the Soviet-sponsored forces or (in two instances) in the underground during World War II, and at least two of them fought in the Spanish Civil War. Nevertheless their activities even when they were in the army were largely political. Seven of them were political officers. Two others were in military police work, two in quartermaster work, and two in staff work. It is clear that this element in the Polish Army will not play a significant role outside of their narrow political preserve and is apt to be regarded with considerable resentment by the officers whose professional role is a more normally military one.

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3. The former Russian Army officers are the backbone of the present Polish military leadership. They hold all the top positions outside of the two specialties reserved for Polish Communists and they also hold many positions below the top level. When we identify a person as "Russian" here, we do not mean to imply that he has no Polish background at all. The Russians have often selected Red Army officers of appropriate ancestry or origins to colonize in satellite armies. When we call a general a Russian in this study we mean that he was for a considerable period a resident of Soviet Russia, that he was a citizen of the U.S.S.R., and—most important of all—that he had become a career officer in the Russian Army. We do not include in the category of colonized Russians those persons who fought for the Soviets only in World War II and who lived in Russia for only a few years. We do, however, include as Russians some persons who may claim to be Polish (and in other chapters Hungarian, etc., mutatis mutandis) in nationality, birth, or upbringing. It is important to stress this point for some propagandistic sources have left the impression that Russians without pretense are the men who have taken over some satellite officer corps. The situation is, however, a little less simple. The men the Russians sent back are sometimes marginal individuals. For example, they sometimes sent men who were originally Communist refugees from the jails of their home country. They fled to Russia and took up residence there, some as early as 1918. They have now been returned to high offices in their native lands after up to a quarter century of Russianization. They still have a flimsy basis, however, for claiming a satellite nationality. They can sometimes lay claim to satellite nationality in their knowledge of the language, in family ties, in early associations, etc. The language they often speak with a foreign accent either from long residence abroad or because they really belong to some special ethnic group. It is Russian policy to trust members of minorities to dominate their majority neighbors—e.g., Hungarians in Slovakia or Slovaks in Hungary. In Poland the biggest such group is the Ukrainians. Since national frontiers do not correspond to ethnic ones—and have varied at that—it is easy for the Communists to present a Ukrainian as a Pole. It is difficult to rigidly label many marginal persons as unreservedly "Poles" or "Russians."

While the large majority of Russian officers in Poland can make no pretense of being anything but Russian, for some key posts they have culled marginal persons from the Russian Army and planted them in the satellite forces. To take a hypothetical illustration: suppose a Ukrainian grew up in the western parts of Russia before World War I—parts that became Polish in the interwar years—and then was drafted into the Czarist Army; suppose, then, in 1918, he joined the Bolsheviks and served in the Red Army ever after; such a man would now qualify by Soviet standards to be passed off as a Pole. He would speak both Polish and Russian though both with a

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Ukrainian accent, and he would have a home town that was at one time in Poland. Yet he would clearly be a Muscovite Bolshevik in loyalties.

For the bulk of the Russian officers no camouflage is used. They are simply kept out of the limelight. Lieutenant Jazwinsky reports that the normal mode of communication on the job between Polish and Russian officers was that the Russians talked Russian and the Poles answered in Polish. Social conversation was mostly in Russian. Most of the Polish officers picked up some Russian. The Russians sometimes knew Polish and sometimes not. Furthermore the Russians below the top elite (and some were as low as majors) kept their Russian citizenship and military rank. Jazwinski said that as long as they did that they got paid by both armies. Despite these clear indications of a prevailing intent of the middle ranks to treat Polish service as a temporary assignment in a Russian career, key figures were drawn in many cases from the pool of marginal individuals. The Polish forces under Russian control in World War II and the mass of Communist refugees in Russia provided a pool for the recruiting of such a group of officers. It needs to be stressed that this is not a continuing source of supply.

Our sample of nine ex-Russian officers who are now generals in the Polish Army includes the Minister of National Defense and two of the three vice-ministers (the third heads the political administration.) It includes the Chief of Staff, the Head of the Engineers, the Commander of the Fleet, and one of the four District Commanders in Poland. Not included in our sample of biographies, but also former Russian officers, are the men who command the air forces, the armored forces, artillery, etc. Because biographies of less prominent men are hard to obtain the Russian officers on whom we were able to obtain biographies include only two generals in less prominent positions, one an artillery commander and one Chief of Staff of a military district. But it should be noted that general officers of the Polish Army today even below top levels are very largely ex-Soviet officers. They provide for the Polish Army the kind of technically qualified and experienced leadership which in Czechoslovakia was provided by former junior officers of the old Czechoslovak Army. Partly because Czechoslovakia is farther from Russia and so Russians could be less easily passed off as Czechoslovaks but even more because the cadres of the old officer corps were less co-operative with the new regime in Poland than in Czechoslovakia, the source of a technically qualified military leadership had to be slightly different, but in both cases we find that the importance of military experts is fully recognized and that military leadership is being given to military men, not to amateurs.

4. Two possibilities exist for the future. One, and the more commonly predicted one, is that the Polish military leadership will be totally absorbed by the Russian Army and no pretense will remain

that the Polish Army is an independent force. That is likely to happen only if the Russians eventually decide on a policy of total absorption of Poland or the satellites into the Soviet Union as Soviet Republics. The other and more likely alternative is that the Russians intend eventually to replace the present officers by a new generation of Soviet-trained Poles. 701* 648

Since the new generation of Soviet-trained Poles are still young men in the lower and middle ranks of the officers' corps, we cannot get a clear picture of the long-run Soviet plan from an analysis of the generals. The surmise that the Russians plan to develop a new satellite military leadership from the postwar officer candidates is based primarily upon the tremendous emphasis they place on training. The Polish Army, as all the satellite armies, has focused more attention in its publications, regulations, and plans upon educational and training programs both technical and political than on any other aspect of military life. A pre-military training corps for youth has been organized as has been done in each of the satellite countries. 702 There has also been a proliferation of new institutions for higher military education since 1950. The founding of an Academy of the General Staff (named after General Karol Swierczwski), a technical military academy (named after Jaroslaw Dabrawski), and a political military academy (named after Felix Dzierzynski the Polish founder of the Russian secret police) were all decreed on March 22, 1951. These schools are for advanced training of selected officers. Below them are two less advanced types of officer schools. There are basic schools for officers' training and advanced schools for higher functions. Then the cream are sent to the academies. In 1952 Kultura listed twenty-seven military schools in Poland.[19] 874

The elaborate training program for a new generation of Polish fliers has recently been fully described by the two courageous pilots who escaped to Denmark in their Migs.[19a] Lt. Z. Jazwinski, a young man of twenty-two, who described his experience to the present author, had been a member of the underground in Warsaw at the age of fourteen or fifteen. He was wounded in the Warsaw uprising. After the war he entered a gymnasium from which he graduated in 1949. He then went to work in a radio factory to earn a living. At the same time he took evening courses in radio, but all along his ambition was to get into the air force. He had applied in 1948 and at that time was rejected. He volunteered again in 1950 and was accepted. 707 702

To get accepted he had had to make a record that from the point of view of the Young Communist League (the ZMP) was impeccable. The ZMP plays a major role in the process of officer selection, particularly for the air force and other elite branches. In fact, in July 1952 the ZMP officially "took over leadership of the Air Force." That is to say their role in the selection of the most suitable young people for the air force and the airplane industry was then formalized.[19b] It goes without saying that Jazwinski had to have been a

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707 member of the ZMP. That, indeed, was his reason for joining. In
702 the factory he was also a member of the trade union. Intense activity in these groups, however, was not required. It was enough to be a member; selection was not limited to active officers or leaders.

Among the candidates who applied for pilot training only a small number were admitted. The number runs between 5 and 7 percent and never goes higher than 10 percent. Among the criteria of selection, social background comes first and also absence of any such political disqualification as relatives abroad or former membership in the underground. Good health is also a major consideration. Finally, candidates take a theoretical and political examination.

Those volunteers who were rejected for the air force or the navy (the most prestigeful branches) were generally offered a chance to enter another officers' training program such as those for infantry, artillery, radio, communications, transport, quartermaster, engineers, cavalry, and political officer training.[19c]

707 The pilot training course for which Jazwinski was admitted took
702 two years. During the first three months the candidates undergo basic training and a life that is miserably hard. They exercise out
208 of doors in the middle of the winter in bathing suits. One day they were compelled to run 10 kilometers in full packs and gas masks. Food was bad and the work so hard that there was no time to write a letter. During this period they are supervised by infantry corporals

Those who survive this ordeal then enter three months of theoretical training, at the end of which they begin to learn to fly. They learn to fly a number of types of planes and take political as well as technical courses. They must pass examinations on both sets of subjects. The political information they learn more or less by rote and stock answers are required. However, the grades are taken seriously and make a good deal of difference to the candidate. He cannot be promoted if his grades on the political examinations are poor. A "C" on a political examination is more serious than a "C" on a technical one. The candidate must be able to answer such questions as: What Lenin said at the 10th Party Congress, what Stalin said at the latest Party Congress; questions on the history of the Russian Communist party; questions about Stalin's work; questions about the goals of Communism; questions on how Poland is following the example of the Soviet Union. There were no questions on Polish history before 1945, but students were expected to know such things as where the first Polish Government was formed after the war, who was the first prime minister after the war, and so forth. They had to know the official versions of the lives of Stalin, Beiruth, Dzierzynski, and Trotsky.

707 In addition to the grades on the political exams, candidates are
702 constantly being rated by their associates. Everyone who deals with a candidate must fill out forms concerning his behavior. These are filled out by political officers, commanding officers, instructors,

etc. In addition, there is secret reporting by informants, but who does that the candidate seldom knows. 707

While life eases up after the first three months, it remains quite strenuous all through training school. Those who have gone that far are strongly motivated to fly. The students, Jazwinski believes, are so eager that the rigors of the program do not dismay them. They regard it as hard and occasionally when exhausted will give vent to anger, but in all probability would ask for more rather than less training in the field of their choice. Flying is their number one subject of conversation after the inevitable subject of girls. 702 *

For two years the candidate looks forward to nothing but his commission. The students do not even talk about the long-run prospects of their future careers. It seems enough at that stage to get the commission which is so hard to earn and which carries so much weight. When the officer is commissioned his whole life changes. He becomes a member of the elite. The food he gets is excellent and the housing very satisfactory. At first a young officer sometimes has to share a room with another, but soon each gets a room to himself. Pay is at a level comparable to that of a cabinet minister, and the pilots carry the prestige that officers have always had in Polish life. 701 707

Political training continues, but is now reduced to two hours a week during which the officers listen to informal talks. These are no longer important since the officers are not working fo[illegible]ades, but attendance is required.

The best of the officers are given an opportunity to attend the Air Force Academy in Moscow. (Unlike most branches the air force has no academy in Poland.) Not all the officers given this chance will accept, since acceptance requires a further postponement of marriage for several years and a lot of theoretical training instead of flying experience. [874]

Training at the Academy does not affect an officer's promotion prospects in the short run, but it may have a great effect upon his ultimate rank. The few percent who get a chance to go to the Academy may expect to be promoted to captain after their return. In the meanwhile those who stayed at home have been in active service and during the same period would probably have been promoted also. However, only those who had been to the Academy could reasonably expect to be promoted beyond the rank of major later on.

This whole pattern of training which exists not only in the air force but in each branch of the armed forces is predicated upon the belief among the trainees that they have an unlimited future in their military careers. At the present time, there are few Polish officers in the higher ranks. The higher commanders are, as already noted, officers borrowed from the Russian Army. After Rokossovski completed his reorganization, fully 90 percent of the leading posts in the Ministry of National Defense were given to officers with Soviet experience.[19d] All army commanders and district commanders are 701 * 648 *

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Soviet officers. But the level at which Soviet officers are found goes much lower than that. In a typical division the captains and lieutenants will be Polish; any general and the colonels will be Russian; majors may be both. The training program is obviously predicated upon the presupposition that new Polish officers will soon reach considerably higher ranks than is now common. While it may occur to a Westerner to wonder whether this is a Russian propaganda promise that will be soon broken, this apparently has not occurred to the eager and ambitious young Polish officers. The more energetic of them are convinced that there is no ceiling to their promotions and that the Russian officers are there temporarily. Indeed Jazwinski reports that during the period of his own training he saw the level of positions filled by Poles gradually rise. Polish instructors were beginning to replace some of the Russian instructors. Thus at the time Jazwinski left he would consider it normal to find at a training airfield only a couple of Russians, a commandant, and perhaps a deputy. At an operational base, however, there would normally be eight Russians to a division, including the commander of the division, the chief of engineers, three regimental commanders, and three regimental engineers. In his own division however two of these eight were Poles. Furthermore, Jazwinski believed that officers returning from the Academy in Moscow (most of whom were very well impressed with the excellence of their training) could expect appointments as regimental commanders.

The Russian plan may be for a gradual transition to an army commanded by an increasing number of new Polish officers, but we may well question how far their plan can create new men who are both loyal and skilled. In the presence of historic national hostility how far will the Russians be able to trust the new generation of Polish officers? The flight of Lieutenants Jarecki and Jazwinski and other patriotic Poles makes it clear that there are limits to the powers of Soviet indoctrination even when coupled with all the privileges and opportunities given the selected elite. But Lieutenant Jazwinski's own report helps us put this conflict of loyalties in proper perspective. Jazwinski reports fairly good relations between the Russians and Polish officers. The Russians are not ostracized as were the Germans during the last war. The difference in rank between most Polish and Russian officers limits the amount of social mixing, but Russian officers in general are judged as individuals. All the officers, both Polish and Russian, and their wives live in special apartment houses set aside for them in the town near the airfield. Social relations generally take place within the apartment house and within the officer group. There is little contact with the town. To the extent that differences in rank do not prevent it, officers of both nationalities meet at the same dances and affairs.

The Russian officers, while mixing with the Poles on a relatively good inter-personal basis, seldom adopt Polish nationality. A cer-

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tain number of them who drink or run into other difficulties are sent back to Russia. It is too early to know whether there will be a regular rotation for officers whose performance is satisfactory, but for the moment Russian officers in the Polish army since they are paid twice have a strong incentive to remain Russians.

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To the extent that living relationships are an index, it is clear that the carefully selected, trained, and highly rewarded younger generation of Polish officers are not in a state of constant incipient rebellion. On the other hand, they are undoubtedly patriotic Poles. Normal feelings of nationalism will undoubtedly persist among them, and when the opportunity comes, many will follow the lead of such courageous defectors as Jarecki and Jazwinski and show the hollowness of the Soviet hope for a generation of thoroughly loyal servants. But as long as a favorable environment for national liberation does not develop, the Soviets can probably count upon the utilization of a growing cadre of trained Communist career officers. To the extent that the Russians have or believe they have such a cadre, leadership will pass increasingly to them. When these young men, trained in the period since 1945, become sufficiently mature there may well be a drastic shift in the Polish military elite. It is unlikely that the shift will take the shape of a traditional Soviet purge. That is unlikely because the present leaders who will be recalled and retired are Russian and the Poles will not be permitted such an insubordinate action as a purge of Russians. However, many Russian officers will undoubtedly be quietly recalled to their homeland and others will be retired, though a leavening of Russians will undoubtedly remain. Just how this process will work out we cannot say, and it will undoubtedly involve changes in plan and friction between groups. How far the process will go will undoubtedly depend on how far the Russians find they can trust the young Communists they are training.

F. Some Sample Biographies

1. Some Muscovites

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The most prominent example of a Muscovite officer is Marshal Konstantin Rokossovski, Minister of National Defense and Vice-Premier of Poland. He was born in what is now Poland in 1896. His father was a locomotive engineer who died in 1904. He himself worked in a hosiery factory and as a stone cutter. In 1912 he was arrested in connection with a socialist demonstration and strike. In 1914 he was drafted into the Russian Army as a private. He joined the Bolshevik forces immediately after the revolution and made his career in the Red Army from then on. During the Civil War he was a cavalry commander. It is reported that as a result of the purge in 1937-38 he was retired or confined to quarters but was later relezsed. By June 1940 he was a major general in the Red Army's armored units. His rise during the Second World War was dramatic especially as

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701 commanding officer at Stalingrad. In 1944 he was made Marshal in
*648 the Russian Army and in 1946 he was a deputy to the Supreme Soviet of the U.S.S.R. This "Pole" was sent to Warsaw in 1949 to become Minister of National Defense and a member of the Politburo of the Communist party.

The significant thing about Rokossovski's appointment was not that it signaled much increase in Soviet infiltration of the Polish Army. Most of the other key positions were already held by former Red Army officers. The significant things about Rokossovski's appointment were (1) that it carried through the general satellite pattern of putting a very high-ranking promiment and trustworthy Communist in command of the satellite force in preparation for a major build up of it and (2) that it gave prominence to a man whom everybody knew to be a Russian. Until that time the Russian officers had been confined to posts somewhat less in the public eye although of great importance.

For example, the second most important officer in Poland was Army General Wladyslaw Korczyc, Vice-Minister of National Defense and Chief of Staff. He has held this position continuously from 1945 until the present. Despite his high post we do not know a great deal about his life history. He was drafted into the Russian Army as a private in 1914. By 1921 we find him in command of the Red Communard's Officers School in Moscow. It is not clear whether he was commander of the international unit of the school or of the entire school. The trainees in this school co-operated with a Red Army cavalry brigade in combat against Cossack forces in the Civil War. We do not know what General Korczye did in the years until World War II. By implication of some statements in his own writings, it seems that he was not engaged in the Spanish Civil War. He next appears as Chief of Staff of the Russian-sponsored Polish First Army in 1943 and as Commander of this army at the time of the capture of Warsaw in 1944. It will be recalled that this capture was deliberately delayed to permit the decimation of the Polish underground forces. For his part in this action, called the "defense" of Warsaw, he was decorated in 1945 by President Bierut of Communist Poland with the Cross Virtuti Militari Third Rank. He also became Chief of Staff of the Polish Army and was raised to the rank of general. The only indication about his origins is his name. Korczyc is a typical Polish peasant nobility name. The peasant nobility was the lowest stratum of gentry, who worked their own soil.[20] Korczyc has been on the editorial board of Bellona, the Warsaw military journal,[21] and he has written a number of articles including such items as "Main Aspects of Soviet Operational Art."[22]

The second Vice-Minister of National Defense is Army General Stanislav Giliarovich Poplawski. He succeeded General Karol Swierczewski (General Walter of Spanish Civil War fame) when the latter was assassinated by Ukrainian patriots. General Swierczewski, the

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son of an industrial worker, had been born in Warsaw in 1896 and evacuated, along with the entire Gerlach Optical Instrument Factory where he worked, to Russia proper in 1915. In 1917 he volunteered for the Red Army. Under General Korczyc he was political commissar of the school of Red Communards. From 1924 until 1927 he was trained at the Frunze Military Academy and continued to serve in the Red Army. During the Spanish Civil War he fought in the International Brigade commanding the Fourteenth Brigade. After Franco's victory he returned to Russia and was assigned to lecture, giving accounts of his experiences in Spain. During World War II he commanded the Second Polish Army under Soviet auspices and from 1945 to 1946 commanded the Poznan Military District. He then became Commander of all Polish Military Forces and Vice-Minister of National Defense. He was assassinated on March 28, 1947, when ambushed on a tour of inspection.

His place was taken by the present incumbent, now called Inspector of Combat Preparedness and Vice-Minister. General Poplawski had up to that time been Commander of the Wroclaw, or Third, Military District. He had come into the Polish Army from the Russian Army, in which he had been promoted to major general on February 14, 1943. In the Polish forces during World War II he was the Commanding Officer of the First Army on the Eastern Front.

The artillery, the engineers, the air force, and the navy, as well as other branches and departments, have also been commanded by a succession of former Russian officers. General Jerzy Bordzilowski, Commander of the Engineering Corps, was promoted to major general in the Russian Army in 1942 and lieutenant general of Engineers in July 1945. Rear Admiral Szylingowski, Fleet Commander (under Rear Admiral Cherokov, Naval Commander in Chief) served as a Soviet adviser from 1947 to 1949 but then became himself commanding officer. General Bolesdaw Czerniawski, one-time commander of artillery but recalled to Russia in 1948, was made a major general in the Russian Army in August 1942, and presumably has reverted to service in the Russian Army. Major General Aleksander Romeyko, one-time commanding officer of the Polish Air Force, has also been recalled to Russia. In this case the recall was somewhat more artfully managed. He was sent ostensibly as air attaché to Moscow in 1951, at which time another Russian officer, General Turkel, arrived to take the post.

2. Some Party Militants

It is clear that almost all the major policy-making positions are filled by Russian army officers. There are, however two exceptions, one important and the other less so. Both the Quartermaster Corps and the political administration of the army seem to be the reserve of the old Communists rather than of technically trained but not nec-

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essarily political Russian generals. The first quartermaster general and a Vice-Minister of National Defense was Brigadier General Piotr Jaroszewicz. He was not a military man. He was born in 1910 and until 1939 he was a public school teacher in Poland. Under German occupation he took part in the Communist underground and in 1942 was Chief of Staff. Then in 1943 he joined the Polish forces under Russian sponsorship, being a political officer first with the Kosciuszko Division and then of the First Army. He ended the war as a colonel and after the war was sent to the school for political officers in Warsaw. In January 1946 he was raised to the rank of General of the Brigade and later major general. In the meantime he had become Vice-Minister of Defense, switching from responsibility for political education[23] to responsibility for war industry[24] and finally to responsibility for the quartermaster department. Shortly thereafter, he shifted his field of activities from technical military matters to political matters and on November 21, 1953 became one of the eight Vice-Premiers of Poland.

He was succeeded as quartermaster by Brigadier General Jan Gorecki, who held the post of quartermaster general from 1947 to 1950. He was born in 1915 of a Jewish family and went to the Jagellon University in Krakow to study law. During World War II he fought in the First Infantry Division of the Soviet-sponsored Polish Army and then was second in command of an artillery battery. He rose rapidly from that position and in 1947 was promoted from being a Deputy to the Third Vice-Minister, Jaroszewicz, to become himself quartermaster general.

In 1950, after Rokossovski took over, Gorecki was succeeded by another old Communist, but one who had spent about two decades in Russia, General Waclaw Komar. General Komar was born around 1905. His origins are relatively little known, although we do know that he was a Communist for many years and some reports say that he comes from a worker's family and was arrested several times. He rose to prominence in the Civil War in Spain, where he was known as Colonel Wacek and was one of the associates of General Walter-Swierczewski. He headed a two-battalion group in the International Brigade. It may be that Komar served in the Soviet Army early in World War II, but there is no clear record to this effect. It seems more likely that he was a long-time resident in Russia and had been trained there as a Communist activist. It is believed that he had not been in Poland for any length of time since the middle 1920's. When the Russians formed a new Polish Army in World War II, Komar became the chief intelligence officer. After the war he organized the military Office of Foreign Affairs and also organized international brigades in Bulgaria, Hungary, and Romania to fight in the Civil War in Greece. These brigades were not used in Greece, however, but were sent instead to Lower Silesia in Poland. He also organized the military Office of Foreign Affairs which was in charge of liaison

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with military attachés, both Polish attachés abroad and foreign attachés in Warsaw. He replaced all prewar officers in posts as attachés by party members. He was thus in charge of a large part of military intelligence work. It may be added that he also had reporting to him security police agents abroad. There is some reason to believe that he was transferred to the post of quartermaster general because Rokossovski wanted only Russians in the intelligence department of the general staff. In March 1953 at the Eighth Plenum of the Executive Committee of the Polish Communist Party, the Minister of Security, Radkiewicz, announced that Komar had been liquidated. While we would like to know if his successor is also an old Party militant, we have as yet no information.

It is not hard to see why the Russians left the Quartermaster Corps as Polish domain. In the first place, they may have regarded these positions as something of a sinecure. They certainly did not regard them as major military policy-making posts. More important, however, the members of the Quartermaster Corps deal with the public in a much more direct and dependent way than do other generals. They negotiate contracts, visit factories, and deal with civilians in economic enterprise.

It is still easier to see why the Russians permitted Poles to be political officers. In the first place, political officers must do propaganda and morale work within the ranks of an army which has no love for Russians. The political department, of all branches, needs rapport with the ranks. In the second place, the Soviet professional officers who head the Polish Army probably do not share the Politburo's regard for the political department. Lieutenant Jazwinski reports that the political department was the dumping ground for officer candidates not qualified for other branches. Candidates of peasant origin are pushed into that school on the assumption, widely shared in Eastern Europe, that peasants do not have the endowment and training for branches requiring greater intelligence. The educational requirement for political officers is lower than for any other branch. It is enough to have a primary education. Furthermore, candidates who fail in other programs are often transferred to the political department. Jazwinski referred to ten such cases in the pilot training program.

In the third place, low as other requirements may be, a political officer does need certain inclinations and corresponding aptitudes which are not necessarily those of a highly qualified technician. Some of the Russian officers like General Walter-Swierczewski, were old Communist militants and probably as well qualified for agitational work as any of the present incumbents, but for the most part the Soviet officers are technicians chosen because they combine experience with loyalty to Russia. While political officers need not be technically qualified, they can well use experience in the arts of skulduggery and manipulation. The political department, while it has

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*701 been repeatedly purged, has remained in the hands of Polish Communist politicians.

*648 The first postwar Chief of Political Affairs in the Polish Army was Major General (then Colonel) Wiktor Grosz. He held this position only briefly in 1945, when the army was still under overall Soviet command. He was a journalist by profession, and, according to John Gunther, knows eight languages. He had been director of press activities of the Union of Polish Patriots in Moscow in 1942. He volunteered for the Soviet Army immediately upon the Nazi invasion of Russia and by 1943 became political officer and second in command of the First Artillery Regiment of the First Kosciuszko Division. He was then a major. He rose to the position of Chief of the Main Political Office, but shortly after left the Department of Defense for the Foreign Office, in which he has played an important role since. He was first director of the press department and more recently has been Polish Ambassador to Czechoslovakia.

He was succeeded as the leading political officer by Piotr Jaroszewicz to whom we have already referred and then by Lieutenant General Marian Spychalski. General Spychalski was born in 1906 in Lodz, the son of a railway engineer. He got a diploma in architecture at the Polytechnic College in Warsaw. Already as a student he became involved in socialist activities under the name of Marek. He was a free lance architect for a while and then had a position in the Poznan city government. While there he was Regional Secretary of the Communist party. In 1937 he became assistant manager of the Planning Department of the City of Warsaw. After the outbreak of the war Spychalski went to Lwow, formed close contacts with the Russians, and returned to Warsaw in 1941. He became the first Chief of Staff of the Communist underground organization, the People's Guard, a position which he held until replaced by a more prominent Communist, Joswiak-Witold, who was smuggled back from Russia. He remained on the staff and headed intelligence and counterintelligence work. In 1944 he went to Moscow to assist in the organization of the National Home Council. He joined Berling's Army and became Chief of Staff. He advanced from lieutenant colonel to colonel and in 1945 was appointed first Vice-Minister of National Defense. He was also a member of the Politburo and mayor of Warsaw. As first Vice-Minister he was chief of political affairs. (Later on more emphasis was placed by the Russians on the military value of the Polish Army and the first Vice-Minister then became the one who headed the fighting forces, but at this earlier period the latter was third Vice-Minister, and the Pole in charge of political indoctrination had the title of first Vice-Minister.) General Spychalski soon fell from favor. While he took part in vigorously condemning the deviationist Gomulka in the central committee in 1948, he himself did not last long thereafter. In the same year he was put out of the political department and in the spring of 1949 he was removed entirely from his military posts and

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he returned to architecture and the position of Minister of Reconstruction. The year after that he was expelled from that post and from the Politburo. His attempts at self-criticism were rejected and he was fired and imprisoned for "rightist deviations" and "traitorous negligence." 701* 648 661

He was succeeded as chief of the Main Office for Political Education by Major General Mieczyslaw Wagrowski, who had been a political officer in the first Polish Infantry Division under Soviet command in 1942, then in 1945 was military attaché at the Polish legation in London. From 1948 until November or December 1949, when Rokossovski took over, he headed the political work in the Polish Army. Since then, he was chairman of the District National Council in Gdansk and, in 1953, Polish member of the Neutral Nations Supervisory Commission in Korea. Rokossovski replaced him in political education by General Edward Ochab, again an old Polish Communist. Ochab was the son of a policeman in Krakow. He worked as a printer and then went to commercial school. His first political interest was in the co-operative movement. From 1925 to 1928 he was an organizer for co-operatives. In 1928 he entered the reserve officers school but at that time he was becoming radical and was dishonorably discharged for political activity. From then on he was active in the Communist party, being arrested in 1930 and again in 1932, when he was sentenced to four years imprisonment. In 1937 he was again arrested and this time sentenced to ten years in prison but was released during the war with Germany in 1939. He then went to Russia and in 1943 turned up as second in command of the Kosciuszko Division and as its political officer. He was, however, only a colonel at that time. At the end of the war he held a number of important posts, being in 1945 first Vice-Minister of the Ministry of Public Administration and then the Plenipotentiary for Regained Territories. In 1948 he became Vice-Minister of National Defense and chief of the Main Political Office of the army until the middle of 1950. At that time Marian Naszkowski took his place and Ochab went into nonmilitary activities, becoming most recently secretary of the Central Committee of the Polish Communist party.

Naszkowski took Ochab's position as Vice-Minister of National Defense and as chief "Politruk." He came from a well-to-do, conservative Jewish family. His father was a notary public in Lwow. Naszkowski, who was born in 1912, studied law at the University of Lwow and joined the Communist party while a student there in 1935. He was arrested several times prior to 1939 and was finally sentenced to eight years in prison, but like Ochab was released in September of 1939. When the Russians occupied Lwow, he collaborated with them and then in 1941, when Russia was invaded, he joined the Polish forces in the Soviet Union. Like Ochab he was a political officer in the Kosciuszko Division, being deputy commander of the Third Regiment. After the war he became military attaché in Paris and then Ambas- * 701* 648

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sador to Moscow, where he served from 1946 until 1949, at which time he was called back to take charge of the Political Office of the army.

He has recently been replaced by Major General Kazimierz Witaszewski. That fact indicates that Rokossovski is still following the policy of heading the political department by old-line Polish Communists. Witaszewski in his early youth was a textile worker and tinsmith's apprentice in Lodz. He was arrested in 1928, at the age of twenty-two, for distributing illegal literature. He was a member of strike committees in 1928, 1933, and 1936. He was arrested again in 1937 and was elected to the Lodz Municipal Council in 1938. He apparently fled to Russia after the collapse of Poland in 1939. Then he too joined the Polish forces there serving as a political officer. His previous military experience had been as a draftee in 1929-31. After the war he was general secretary and chairman of the Central Committee of Polish Trade Unions, and from 1947 to 1949 Vice-Minister of Labor and Social Welfare. Most recently before being made a major general in 1952, he was chief of the cadre section of the Central Committee of the Communist party.

While the fact that the political department is left to Poles by the Russians might be taken as indicating some contempt for it by the professional officers, a review of the Polish press reveals that that is not the full story. The political department is regarded highly by the regime. The press gives primary play in its military news to the politization of the army. Whatever the Communists' esoteric evaluation of the relative significance of strategy, arms, and morale, their public attention is focused overwhelmingly on the preparation of the mind.

Military affairs continue to receive a considerable play in the press although less since 1948 than before. The present government entertains a lively sense of the important position of the army in the cultural value system of the Polish nation. The tone in which military themes are treated continues unchanged from prewar times insofar as the soldier, whether officer or enlisted man, is presented as a romantic hero.

Political education in the army is a theme which is played up far more than the state of its military preparedness or its function as an instrument of defense. A great deal is said about the new values to which the soldier must become oriented. An important new theme is the role of the officer from the general down as the teacher and protector of the soldier. Much is said about incidents of camaraderie between enlisted men and officers both during the war and after. The humble background and the revolutionary record of the generals is emphasized; on the other hand their military record is not overplayed, and no particular attempt is made to underplay the fact that these are political generals; both their political function and their political background are pointed up.

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The prima facie impression one receives from the press is that the chief effort of the administrative apparatus of the army is directed toward the indoctrination of the army personnel rather than toward direct military preparation. In this connection myth building is taking place around the figures of the generals with lasting organic connections with the Party; the myth emphasizes their political role and background.

Few of the prewar Polish or Russian-trained generals are emphasized. Such few hero-worshipped generals with Russian training as the late General Swierczewski are well established figures of long standing in the military pantheon of communism. On the other hand those prewar Polish generals who, like Prugar-Kettling, are played up, are anything but heroic—they are men of high professional competence and of obscure political background. Not unnaturally, their professional competence is made much of, while little if anything is said about their past or present political and social beliefs and activities or about their personal characteristics. But the press in general rarely mentions the professionals among the generals.[24a] The generals who are played up as personalities and accorded greatest prominence are those who occupy important positions in the Party, while little is said about personal characteristics of the professional soldiers, including Russian-trained men like Korczyc. The chief function of the publicized generals has been and is politi[illegible] 'ucation and control over the army.

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IV. ROMANIA

A. Introduction

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The last two chapters dealt with countries which had been in the Allied coalition in World War II. The next two chapters deal with states which joined the Axis against Russia and the Allies. Wartime alignment makes some difference, though less than one might guess, in the postwar development of a satellite's armies. The Soviets felt and behaved in much the same way toward the Romanian and Hungarian officer corps as toward their erstwhile allies, the Czechoslovaks and Poles. They feared and distrusted them all and dispensed with their leaders as quickly as feasible, but they also freely used them for a while.

The Soviets came to terms with the Romanian government in 1944 and promptly proceeded to accept as allies men who until then had been fighting against them on the field of battle. They retained these army leaders in 1945 and 1946 although, as in Czechoslovakia, Communists were increasingly infiltrated into the Romanian Army during those years. Then in December 1947, just over a month before the Czech coup, the Communists took over and started building a Soviet-type army.

While the parallels in developments in all the East European satellites are striking, the former enemy powers differ from the former allies in two respects: a) a Russian army of occupation remained on the spot in official control of former enemy territories, and b) no Western pressure backed the old officer corps and old elite of the enemy state against Russian purging.

a) In Romania and Hungary Soviet troops after the war were an army of occupation. In Poland and Czechoslovakia they were officially not a controlling force.

The importance of this difference should not be exaggerated. Russian troops remained in most of Eastern Europe. They were indeed withdrawn from Czechoslovakia within a few months after the end of the war. In Poland, on the other hand, five divisions stayed[25] ostensibly guarding lines of communication to eastern Germany. In Romania and Hungary, a strong Russian occupation force continued on the spot until after the signing of peace treaties giving the Soviets an effective lever of control. After the peace treaties were signed Soviet troops remained, the justification, as in Poland, being the need to guard lines of communication.

b) In Romania and Hungary, former enemy states, the Russians were under no allied pressure to assimilate the old elite such as the Benes' followers in Czechoslovakia. The West did not demand that the Russians accept officers who fought for the Axis in World War II. On the contrary there was some Western desire for their demobilization. Whatever promises of forgiveness the Russians gave were on

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their own initiative and directly to the Romanian and Hungarian officers themselves, not to foreign powers. In Czechoslovakia and Poland the Soviets were bound by wartime commitments to the United States and Britain to treat with the governments-in-exile and with their forces as genuine and legitimate parts of the new postwar regimes. When the Soviets repudiated these promises and eliminated the old non-Communist leadership from all significant power positions, the Western world was horrified and bitter. There was less Western support for the old leadership in Romania and Hungary. Few objected, for example, when Army General Nicolae Macici, who was held responsible for the cruelty of the administration of Odessa by Romanian occupation, was tried as a war criminal and sentenced to death, a sentence which was then commuted to twenty-five years ~~of hard~~ labor. This was a relatively noncontroversial act, even though he was among the most capable of the Romanian officers and, when Romania switched sides, brilliantly commanded the Romanian forces against the Germans. Many of the Romanian and Hungarian officers, like Macici, were viewed in the West as war criminals or at least as doubtful characters.

Nevertheless the Soviets did use many former officers. In Romania and Hungary, just as in Czechoslovakia, a considerable segment of the old army leadership was retained for a while.

In Romania, the prewar officers are still retained as generals in fairly considerable numbers. In Hungary, as we shall see, they were retained for a while, but few remain. In this respect the current situation in Romania is like that in Czechoslovakia, and the current situation in Hungary like that in Poland. There are a number of reasons for the difference. We have already referred to such factors as traditional national attitudes toward Russia, World War II records, willingness to collaborate, etc. But here we wish to note another factor: social composition. We have already noted the strong aristocratic element in the Polish officer corps. Below we shall note some different but relevant facts about the gentry in the Hungarian Army. In Czechoslovakia and Romania the available army leaderships were less tied to social strata due for Soviet liquidation. In Romania after World War I a deliberate effort was made to make officer careers available to peasants' sons. Stipends were offered making military education financially feasible for persons of modest means. The resulting officer corps lacked some of the group morale of the Polish, for example. For this and other reasons it was also a corps with a rather low reputation for integrity. It was widely asserted that many Romanian officers could be bought. Both the social and the moral characteristics of the Romanian officers helped the Russians find among them men acceptable for their purposes, and so they continue to use them.

B. The Evolution of the Present Romanian Army

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From 1941 on the Romanian Army made substantial contributions

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726 *648 to the German military campaigns against the southern regions of the Soviet Union. Numbering approximately thirty divisions, the Romanians first achieved the reconquest of territory which Russia had recently severed from Romania. The Romanian forces were then moved across the Dniester to support the Germans in the successful campaign against Odessa. The Romanian Army was in large measure responsible for the successful siege of Sebastopol and the capture of the Crimea. In the autumn and winter of 1942 an estimated Romanian force of fifteen divisions fought alongside the German troops in the offensive against Stalingrad. Like the Germans, the Romanians suffered extremely heavy losses at Stalingrad, and their military strength on the Eastern Front was never again brought up to the level existing prior to that campaign.

[727] By August 1944 Romania had lost 110,000 men killed and 180,000 captured, though she still had twenty divisions active on the front and nine divisions stationed in the interior of Romania. By that time it had become clear that Germany was not going to win the war and that Romania had chosen the wrong side. The pro-Nazi government of Marshal Ion Antonescu was overthrown on August 23, 1944, by a coup d'état engineered by King Michael. Romania immediately changed sides in the war. The former enemy, Russia, became a military ally and the Axis associates of three years past became enemies. The Romanians faced the immediate task of clearing the country of the more than half million German troops remaining there. This was accomplished relatively quickly. The Red Army was in Bucharest by the last day of August. Then in co-operation with Soviet forces the Romanians participated in the campaigns against the German and Hungarian Armies in Hungary and Czechoslovakia.

704 *648 Along with the regular Romanian troops used in these actions there were two divisions of Romanians which had been organized by the Soviets primarily out of prisoners of war and which for some time had already been fighting on the Soviet side. The members of these divisions gave their oath of allegiance to the "new order" not to the Romanian king.[26]

These two divisions were culled from among a much larger number of Romanian PW's. Besides the 180,000 PW's in August 1944, another 280,000 Romanians were seized and sent to Russia thereafter even though Romania was presumably Russia's ally. Of these hundreds of thousands the large majority never returned. A substantial portion of those who did return were the members of the divisions formed in the PW camps. These units were named the Tudor Vladimirescu and Horia-Closca-Crisan Divisions. The former was under the command of Nicolae Cambrea, a lieutenant colonel who had been captured at Stalingrad and who had been won over by the efforts of Ana Pauker and other Romanian Communists who worked in the prison camps. After the fighting on the Central Euro-

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pean Front ended, it became a major factor in the new Romanian Army. The Horia-Closca-Crisan Division was organized later and did not become quite so important in the War but it also provided much thoroughly indoctrinated personnel for the Communist regime.

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Another group of ex-PW officers returned long after the war was over. In 1946 the Communists sent back 500 specially selected and indoctrinated officers. Those 500 officers were led by the then Colonel Victor Draganescu, a career artillery officer who has since become Major General, Ministerial Councillor in the Ministry of Interior, and commander of security troops. These 500 officers were greeted by big Communist-sponsored demonstrations and their return was presented as a token of Soviet magnanimity. Draganescu said, "We express our gratitude toward Generalissimo Stalin, because of his large understanding granted the Rumanian Government in allowing Rumanian prisoners to return even before the conclusion of peace."[27]

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Re-trained PW's were thus one major source of Communist officers. Another source was a para-military force organized beginning in the autumn of 1944 by Emil Bodnaras. This was the "Guard of Patriotic Defense." It was equipped by the Soviet Occupation Army from captured German supplies. At the same time a law was passed incorporating all "anti-fascist fighters" into the Romanian Army in a bloc. "Actually the number of Partisans operating in Rumania during the war against Germany had been infinitesimal."[28] They were mainly organized afterwards by the Communists who decided who was to be considered as having been an anti-fascist fighter. Under this law such leading Communist politicians as Emil Bodnaras, Vasile Luca, George Vasilichi, and Ana Pauker became generals.

Another special force which the Communists built was that of the Ministry of Internal Affairs, (for a while divorced from that Ministry and placed in a separate Ministry of State Security, but perhaps now recombined.) The government of the Romanian People's Republic has devoted much attention to these special security forces. Some measure of their importance is revealed by the fact that a couple of years ago the budget for these troops was considerably larger than that of the Ministry of Armed Forces.[29] A more satisfactory index of relative size is troops. The troops under the Ministry of Interior number at least 120,000, but probably 160,000, while the regular army was estimated by Tito as 300,000 in 1950, but is probably only 225,000.

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While the ranks of the officers corps were being filled with Communists, regular officers were dismissed <u>en masse</u> after the War. The first purge had already occurred with the coup d'état of August 1944 even before the Communists were involved. The Sanatescu government formed at that time was staffed largely by generals who had not been closely identified with the previous Antonescu regime or who, like Generals Radescu and Aldea, had opposed it. The generals

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* 701 and admirals who had been most intimately associated with Anton-
*648 escu were arrested and several, among them Generals Antonescu,
661 Pantazi, and Vasiliu, were taken to the Soviet Union, where they were questioned and held until their trials in Bucharest in 1946.

With the end of the War the purge went further. Procedures for elimination of war criminals and collaborators were laid down in 1945 and numerous trials were held in 1946. At the same time the size of the army was being cut and many officers were simply dismissed. The Treaty of Paris in 1946 provided that the total military forces of Romania (including land, air, and marine force as well as frontier guards) could not exceed 138,000. The actual number of troops in active service at one time fell as low as 90,000. These were culled from fifteen regular divisions and two Communist divisions which had fought the Germans. The reduction in force was pushed as an ideal opportunity to get rid of political opponents.

The Communist take-over did not occur without resistance. The years from 1945 through 1950 were marked by a series of successively more stringent Communist demands for control.

668 The first prime minister after the coup was General Sanatescu.
643 He was not sufficiently acceptable to the Russians and on December 6, 1944, he was replaced by General Nicolae Radescu, who had been known as an opponent of Antonescu and the Nazis and had spent some time in a concentration camp. Radescu, however, was by no means a pro-Communist or a Communist tool and he also lasted only briefly, being ousted on February 27, 1945 at the demand of Vyshinski, the Russian representative in Romania. A few days later a government was formed by Dr. Petru Groza who also had not been a Communist. He was indeed one of the wealthiest men in Romania and had been something of a collaborator with the Nazis, but he was sufficiently pliable to be used by the Russians for a considerable period. It was not until June 2, 1952, that he was replaced as Prime Minister by a top Communist leader, Gheorghiu-Dej. Groza is still a figurehead in Romanian politics under the title of President of the Presidium.

* 701 With the formation of the Groza government there came the first
*648 major shake-up in the army command. During the succeeding twelve
661 months thousands of officers were removed. General Ion Negulescu, Minister of National Defense, was replaced by General Constantin Rascanu, a man who had been Chief of the Military Police under the Antonescu regime and later was disgraced and sent home from the front for engaging in black market operations. He ingratiated himself with the Communists by leading the group of officers who forced Radescu out of office.

During 1946 the non-Communist officers showed increased resistance to the sovietization of the army and the country. Toward the end of the year the Communists decided upon a further shake-up. Rascanu was discharged as Minister of the Armed Forces and replaced by General Mihail Lascar, former prisoner of war, who had served in the Horia-Closca-Crisan Division. Before that he had fought well on

the German side as commander of a brigade on the Russian front. He was then a major general and was decorated by the Germans with the Iron Cross with Oak Leaves and promoted to the rank of General of the Army. Before his capture he was often called the 'hero of Stalingrad.' After his capture by the Russians, however, he co-operated well with them. Lascar served as Minister of Armed Forces until replaced by Emil Bodnaras in the next major shake-up on December 24, 1947. Lascar then became Inspector General of the Army and First Deputy Minister of the Armed Forces, a position which he held until the subsequent shake-up in March of 1950.

Of all these turning points perhaps the most important was that of December 1947, the Romanian counterpart of the Prague coup of a month and a half later. In December 1947 Emil Bodnaras took over and at the same time King Michael was forced to abdicate. That was the decisive shift in both the political and military spheres. General Lascar, Bodnaras' predecessor, had been a career officer even if an indoctrinated one. Bodnaras, on the other hand, was a long-time Communist whose military career had ended in disgrace.

Bodnaras was born in the early 1900's in Bucovina. According to the usual story his father was a Ruthenian peasant of Ukrainian background and his mother a German. One of our informants who knew him indicates, however, that that is not so, and it seems that we have here one of the many cases in which interested refugee circles prefer to label current Communist leaders as foreigners rather than admit that their own nationals can be traitors.

In the middle 1920's Bodnaras went to military school and was commissioned a second lieutenant in 1927. From 1927 to 1930 he took an artillery course and in the latter year was promoted to first lieutenant. At the time he became involved in Communist espionage, and when caught fled to Russia. He was tried in absentia for desertion and espionage and sentenced to five years imprisonment. In 1933 he attempted to slip back into Romania, was caught and served the years from 1933 to 1936 in prison. At that time he escaped and again went to live in the U.S.S.R. During World War II Bodnaras was assigned to party organizational and propaganda activities rather than to fighting the Germans. When the war was over, the Communists placed him as Secretary of State in the office of the Prime Minister, a job concerned with the secret intelligence service. He was in this position until the Soviets decided to take complete control of the army and to communize and develop it.

When Bodnaras took over, he brought in a new group of deputy ministers and changed many commands. The end result of his activities to date is a situation in which Communist party militants control the very top positions but quite a few career officers remain in posts just below them. This result was reached in a zigzag course of three stages.

1. The reorganization in the period from December 1947 to 1950

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*701 *648 paralleled what was happening in all the satellites at the same period. The army was reorganized according to Soviet patterns, and supplies and equipment were brought into uniformity with Soviet standards. Instrumentalities were developed for strict political surveillance within the military forces. Provision was made for an elaborate program of political indoctrination and the Guard of Patriotic Defense was integrated in 1949 with the troops operating under the Ministry of Internal Affairs. The process of purging hit old Communists, officers of the Tudor Vladimirescu and Horia-Closca-Crisan Divisions, and career officers alike, but it was most vigorously directed against the latter. Still career officers continued to play a role at all levels. It is not clear from our sources whether there were at that time the usual three or perhaps four deputy ministers of the armed forces, but of these three or four deputy ministers two continued to be career officers until March 1950.[30]

2. In March 1950 party militants came to fill all the deputy minister posts and from then until 1952 the emphasis seemed to be on Bolshevisation.

*701 *648 661 3. The most recent major shake-up came in April of 1952 when five fliers of the Romanian Air Force flew to Yugoslavia. At that time the discharges hit not only prewar career officers, but also many of the Communist officers. These included the Vice-Minister of the Armed Forces, Major General Constantin Doncea, who is reported to have been executed, and Major General Villiam Suder, Inspector General of the Army and also Vice-Minister of the Armed Forces. Suder then became Minister of the Coal Industry, from which position he has now been dismissed, and he is presumably in disgrace. The military shake-up of 1952 is not well covered in the data yet available outside Romania. We, however, may take the discharge of two vice-ministers as a sign of a rather far-reaching and drastic shake-up at other levels too. The shake-up of late 1952 may well have marked a reaction to the dominance of incompetent politicians in favor of professional soldiers. The refugee Buletinul Militar of October 1953 informs us that "For about 6 months the Communist Party has made big efforts through the Ministry of Armed Forces to recruit career military men who had been previously removed as dangerous. They are promised either directly or indirectly very attractive advantages if they apply for recall in the active cadres of the Army." At the same time Communist officers are apparently being purged, and in typical Soviet fashion the charge leveled at the victims is that of doing precisely what the regime itself is doing. The nature of the regime's policy is thus camouflaged. "Numerous officers converted from civilians by the Party have been found guilty of conniving with career officers. Some of those, guilty of sincerity and naivete, have been thrown into Communist jails."[30a]

Whatever the latest trend, however, the period since 1948 was notable both for the retention of a significant number of career officers

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and for their subordination to a group of Communist generals who in turn took their orders from Soviet officers.

C. The Leading Cadres of the Present Romanian Army

Let us attempt a somewhat more detailed analysis of the two main identifiable groups of present general officers: the career officers and the old Communists.

We have biographies on ninety-one generals who have been in the army at some time since the Russian forces reached Romania toward the end of the last war. Of these forty-four have not been purged as of our latest information. Among these forty-four generals who are still in good repute with the regime, twenty-four are career officers and only twenty are new Communist officers. The reliance upon prewar cadres becomes even more clear when we note that five of the twenty Communist officers are no longer active in military positions but have transferred back to civilian political work and nine are in security posts not under the Ministry of Armed Forces. Thus our sample of Communist militants currently active in army affairs is reduced to six. The table below gives a breakdown of the sample of postwar officers.

TABLE 5

Romanian Generals in the Sample

Career officers who have not been purged	24	
Communist officers who have not been purged	20	
Total who have not been purged		44
Career officers purged in 1944	8	
Career officers purged in 1945	14	
Career officers purged in 1946	5	
Career officers purged in 1947	4	
Career officers purged in 1948	4	
Career officers purged in 1949	2	
Career officers purged in 1950	4	
Career officers purged in 1951	3	
Career officers purged in 1952	1	
Total career officers purged	45	
Communist officers purged	2*	
Total purged		47
Grand total		91
Total career officers	69	
Total Communists	22	

*One in 1952, one in 1953.

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*701 *648 661 While the ranks of the career officers have been ruthlessly purged, the purging has been selective. What criteria have been applied in selecting officers who have been reprieved and continue to be tolerated even now? The outstanding criterion has been Soviet experience. The Russians have trusted those officers whom they captured and indoctrinated during World War II. Of the forty-four officers who have been purged, only four (i.e. 9 percent) are known to have been prisoners of war. At least nine of the twenty-four officers still in office were such indoctrinated prisoners and at least one more fought under the Russians (i.e. 42 percent). We do not know the complete wartime careers of certain generals in the sample. If we did the contrast might well be still more striking. Within our sample only one career officer still in a position of command can definitely be established as not having been a Russian prisoner of war. Russian experience seems to be the passport of a considerable majority of the career officers whom the Russians have continued to trust in important military posts.

*701 *648 When we turn to the Communists we also find that Russian experience and Russian affiliations are an important element in advancement. Of the twenty Communist generals who retain positions of power we know that at least nine have had Soviet experience and regarding the other half we are simply uninformed. Probably many of these have also been in Russia. Four of the twenty Communist generals in our sample are themselves Russians camouflaged as Romanians. Two others were in Russia as Communists and helped organize the Romanian Communist divisions, as did also one of the two purged Communists.

As in Poland, Communist generals are heavily concentrated in the political administration of the army and in the special security troops. The lines between posts reserved for Communists and other posts are not drawn quite so sharply in Romania as they have been in Poland. Four of the twenty-four officers in our current career officer sample have security or police jobs rather than regular military jobs. One, Major General Nicolae Dobre, career artillery officer, is reported to be Chief of Staff of the security troops. A second career artillery officer is Major General Victor Draganescu, ex-prisoner of war of the Russians. He was reported in 1952 to be in command of security troops. One career general, Major General Alexander Petrescu, is president of the political department of the Military Court of Justice. He qualified himself for this job by a record as the outstanding war criminal under the Nazis. During the Antonescu regime he was Director General of concentration camps and also had sentenced several Communists to death. He was dismissed from service in 1944 but one year later he was again president of the political section of the Bucharest Military Tribunal. In that position he presided when the Communists tried Iuliu Maniu, the Peasant party leader.

While these few career men hold jobs in the security field, most such jobs are held by Communists and a considerable number by Russians disguised as Romanian Communists. There are four of the

Communist generals in our sample who appear to be Russians operating under pseudonyms. These are Lieutenant General Pavel Cristescu, Lieutenant General Gheorghe Pintilie, Major General Vladimir Mazaru, Major General Nicolschi. All of them have been with the Ministry of Interior or Ministry of State Security, but of course carry military titles and command troops. In addition one other general whose nationality is unknown and who may perhaps be a Russian, Major General Bulan, is probably in command of security troops.

The Minister of Interior (formerly Minister of State Security), Major General Alexander Draghici, is a Romanian Communist who has been a party leader since the 1930's and was arrested then for Communist activities. In addition three other Romanian Communist generals command security or frontier troops. Security officers account for nine of the twenty Communist generals still in good favor with the regime and it will be recalled that five others were in non-military political positions.

The remaining six party generals include the Minister of Armed Forces, Emil Bodnaras, and two deputy ministers. Another Deputy Minister has been changed within the last year and we do not know the identity of the incumbent. It would be revealing to know if the last is a party man like his predecessor, Major General Viliam Suder, or a professional.

D. Some Typical Officers

Let us review now some typical biographies of Romanian generals of each of the two main kinds.

1. Career officers

When General Bodnaras became Minister of the Armed Forces he continued at first to fill two of the Deputy Minister posts with career officers. One of them was General of the Army Mihail Lascar, who became Inspector General and first Deputy Minister. He was a retrained prisoner of war whose biography we have already surveyed. In March 1950 he was dismissed in disgrace and was accused of wartime atrocities against Russian partisans on the Eastern Front.

As second Deputy Minister and Chief of Staff, Bodnaras chose another career officer, General Septimus Pretorian. He had been commissioned in 1914 and had risen to the rank of Major General by 1942. During the Antonescu, pro-Nazi regime he was assistant chief of the Secretariat of the Ministry of War. Despite that unpromising background he managed to come to terms with the Communists by helping them in the overthrow of the Radescu regime in 1945 and the establishment of the Communist-controlled Groza government. This service did not render him secure for long. He lasted for only two months as Chief of the General Staff and a year later he was put on trial for bribery, misappropriation of public funds, and embezzlement, and sentenced to twelve years in prison. He was succeeded by General Constantin Popescu, whose first qualification for Communist confi-

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dence was also that he had participated with General Pretorian and a few others in signing the letter against Radescu which forced him out of power. After this act he was appointed Chief of the State Security Administration in the Ministry of Interior, a position in which he had abundant opportunity to prove his cruelty and adaptability to Communist demands and maneuvers. He remained Chief of the General Staff until March 1950, when a party militant took his place. He has since left military activities.

Below the ministerial level career generals continue in such posts as Inspector of Artillery, Deputy Chief of Staff, two commanders of military regions, Commander of the Military Academy, three division commanders, one commander of an army corps, one of an artillery corps, and one of an armored corps, Chief of Staff of the Security Troops, Commander in Chief of the Navy, etc. Our sample of twenty-four includes at least five lieutenant generals.

Typical of the remaining career officers is General Alexander Gavrilescu, Commander of the second military region with headquarters in Bucharest. General Gavrilescu is an artillery officer and a graduate of the War College in prewar Romania. In the fall of 1944 he was Chief of Staff of the Fourth Army fighting on the Eastern Front. When the Fourth Army turned upon the German and Hungarian troops in Transylvania and Hungary, General Gavrilescu denounced the Commander of the Army, General Avranescu, and his own deputy chief of staff to the Soviet Commander of their front, Marshal Malinovski. Both these officers were imprisoned and Gavrilescu succeeded to the command of the Fourth Army.

Two other top career officers in the present Romanian Army are Lieutenant Generals Stere Stefanescu and Iacob Teclu. Both these men are former prisoners of war of the Russians. Stefanescu is now Commander of the first military region with headquarters at Iasi and had been Commander of the second military region before Gavrilescu. He was also an artillery officer in the prewar Romanian Army and took part in the formation of the Horia-Closca-Crisan Division in the Russian prison camps. Lieutenant General Teclu was a colonel when he was captured in 1942. He then served as Chief of Staff of the Horia-Closca-Crisan Division.

It may be noted that most of the present general officers retained from the prewar Romanian Army were colonels until the Communists promoted them. We have information on the pre-Communist rank of ten career officers and of these eight were colonels and only two were already generals. The single most important distinguishing feature of the career officers who remain in the army, however, is the large proportion among them who are indoctrinated prisoners of war.

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2. Communist Officers

When Bodnaras became Minister of the Armed Forces, he immediately put a Communist in as Deputy Minister in charge of the

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Political Department. This is not surprising. It is indeed surprising that the Communists had permitted Major General Mihail Maltopol, a career officer, to hold this position until that time even though General (then Colonel) Maltopol had been a prisoner of war whom they indoctrinated and who joined the Tudor Vladimirescu Division. Still only a trusted Communist could be permitted to head the Political Department so Maltopol was made chief of the Military Museum.

Maltopol was replaced by Lieutenant General Petre Borila, the first of a series of prominent Communists to hold the position of Deputy Minister in charge of the Political Department. General Borila is a Romanian of Russian origin. He participated in the rebellion of Tatar Banar in Bessarabia in 1923-24, and was sentenced to twenty years imprisonment. After five years he escaped from prison and went to Russia, where he joined the secret police. He came to Romania in 1944 as an agent of the NKVD with the rank of major. He became an instructor in the Directorate of Education, Culture, and Propaganda. Shortly after Bodnaras took office he promoted Borila to Major General and Deputy Minister. Since then Borila has left military work and his latest known position is with the Presidium of the State Control Commission or in other words, a purger. He was succeeded by Major General Mihail Florescu, Spanish Civil War veteran, who is now Minister of Chemical Industry, then by Major General Gheorghe Stefanescu, and finally by Major General Nicolae Ceausescu, who had previously been Deputy Minister of Agriculture.

General Ceausescu perhaps owes his position to an association with Prime Minister Gheorghiu-Dej going back to the thirties when they were railroaders together. Ceausescu joined the Communist party in 1932 when he was about twenty-nine but had no prominent record of activity until after the war. In 1944 he was a foreman in the Crivitza engine works of the State Railway. In 1947 he became a member of the Central Committee of the Communist party and in 1948 of the Orgburo. On March 18, 1950 he was given the rank of major general although he had no previous military experience. In 1952 he was promoted to lieutenant general. He is regarded as Gheorghiu-Dej's man and a check on Bodnaras. The power of his position is indicated by the fact that he, not Bodnaras, attended Stalin's funeral.

Altogether there were in 1952 nine generals among the forty-six members of the Central Committee of the Romanian Communist party. A typical one of them and one of the most important is Lieutenant General Leontin Salajan, Deputy Minister of the Armed Forces and Chief of the General Staff. According to our information General Salajan is a Hungarian born in Transylvania, his original name being Szilagy. He was a worker having worked both as a cobbler and as a steel turner. At the age of nineteen he became a Communist sympathizer. Two years later he joined the party. In 1926,

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*701 665 the same year that he joined the Communist party, he entered his military service as an infantryman. Somehow he managed to escape a criminal record in Romania although he continued in Communist activity working in an airplane factory. During the war, if not earlier, he was in Russia though his activities there cannot be determined. After the war he turned up as secretary of the Communist party in the city of Oradea, which is located in the disputed border territory between Hungary and Romania. This section, which was at that time Hungarian, was in fact under the rule of the Red Army. It was returned to Romania after the Groza government was formed and the Soviets were satisfied that they could completely control the Romanian regime. By that time (1947) he was secretary of the Communist party of Salaj County, the province of his birth. In 1949 he became president of the army's Control Commission. In the same year he was also Deputy Minister of Justice and then Deputy Minister of Construction. He had still never been an officer. Then on March 18, 1950, he was made Deputy Minister of the Armed Forces and Chief of Staff. At the same time he was given the rank of major general and was promoted the following year to lieutenant general. In 1950 he was also given the Order of the Defense of the Fatherland. In 1952 he became a member of the Central Committee of the Communist party. According to some reports Salajan owes his ascendance for the most part to his friendship with the Prime Minister of Romania Georghiu-Dej. These sources claim that he is Georghiu-Dej's man, placed as Chief of Staff as a check on Bodnaras. Whether these rumors have any foundation or not, it is clear that Salajan's function as Chief of Staff must be primarily political and not military. A Western observer may wonder how such a man with his meagre knowledge of the arts of war can be Chief of Staff. The reason that Salajan can do without professional military competence is that the real Chief of Staff is not Salajan but the representative of the Russian General Staff for the Romanian Army. That, however, is a solution only for the moment.

*701 E. Prospects of Romanian Military Development

If our analysis of the trends in the satellite armies is correct, we must regard the present situation in the Romanian Army as an unstable and transitory one. Power is shared between a small group of utterly incompetent and unprofessional political Communists at the very top and some career officers who have been indoctrinated by the Communists (largely in PW camps) immediately below them. At the same time Russian officers perform many functions behind the scenes (not as in the Polish Army being openly integrated into the regular normal chain of command). This is not a satisfactory situation from the Soviet point of view either in terms of efficiency or in terms of loyalty. Both the Communist militants and the career officers are lacking in some respects.

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Their successors will be young officers now in training, for in Romania as in the other satellites "the selection of future officers is the primary preoccupation of the regime."[31] The majority of officer candidates are chosen from among soldiers in training though members of the Young Communist League may be admitted directly to officer candidates school. The candidates are chosen above all for social origin, are screened carefully, and are given political as well as technical training. New political officers too now generally come out of this kind of training rather than being directly commissioned from civilian life as in the period up to 1950. The officers training course lasts two years. For more advanced and theoretical training many officers are sent to the Soviet Union.

To some extent this training scheme undoubtedly works to produce effective and reliable officers. A refugee source has admitted that "Officers who have completed the Communist schools are well prepared from the professional point of view and the majority are devoted to the Communist regime. This is due to the fact that a majority are people of low social origins who now have a material situation and social position such as they could not have dreamed of before and who know that if this regime collapsed they would lose all their privileges."[31a]

Perhaps there are more seeds of disaffection than the quotation indicates, but it well portrays one set of facts and the ones on which the Russians are banking. For the moment the Russians are probably far less satisfied with the leadership of the Romanian Army than they are with that of the Polish, and even the Czechoslovak Armies for it fails notably to combine technical skill with political loyalty in a proper amalgam. It would not be surprising for a "conspiracy" to be announced involving some of the highest officers in the Romanian Ministry of Armed Forces. Whether or not the changes take that form, the direction of reform away from the present mixed military leadership toward a more professional young one may reasonably be predicted.

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A. The Hungarian Army in 1945

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The Hungarian Army is one in which generals from the prewar officer corps have almost all been eliminated. The Russians eliminated prewar officers in Hungary partly because they viewed the Hungarian officer corps as pro-German in orientation. Many Hungarian officers were of German descent. It is often hard to trace their German origins, since it became common to Magyarize German names, but a notable proportion of officers had German roots. Furthermore the Hungarian Army was an outgrowth of the Austro-Hungarian Army. At the end of World War I the Imperial Army was divided, Austrian officers joining the Austrian Army and Hungarian officers the Hungarian, but old traditions and associations retained some hold. Feelings of solidarity with Austrian officers even before 1918 had been tinged with ambivalence arising from jealousy and a sense of inferiority. Moreover after 1918 Hungarians put great emphasis on the severance of ties with Austria; they wanted to be independent, vide the changing of names. Yet some potential identification with their Austrian colleagues remained, arising from common background and training.

The strongest factor making for a pro-German orientation in the interwar years was probably Hungarian revisionism rather than inherited tradition. The Germans were looked upon as possible allies in a struggle to recover Transylvania from Romania. As Germany's revisionist stand grew more pronounced under Hitler, the pro-German orientation of the Hungarian Army was strengthened. At the same time the overwhelming strength of the German "ally" aroused great apprehension. Latent fear of the Germans was concentrated among Hungarian officers of non-German stock. German minority members easily became pan-Germanist. Others, especially around the Regent Horthy and in civilian circles, began to see in German power a grave portent.

The conflict between some groups of civil politicians and the army in their attitude toward Germany became clear when Hitler invaded Russia on June 22, 1941. Two days later the general staff recommended that Hungary join the Axis in the war. The foreign office was opposed. At that point the German and Hungarian military authorities announced that the Soviets had bombed Hungarian territory, an episode which may or may not have actually occurred. On the basis of this incident Hungary was forced into the war.

While an ally of Germany against Russia, Hungary's war effort was rather halting and halfhearted. It was considerably smaller than that of Romania. The Hungarians did send two armies into the field the first of which was very small. Ultimately both were completely cut to pieces, the Russians taking many Hungarian prisoners of war.

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Not only was the Hungarian military effort relatively unenthusiastic, so too was the Hungarian adoption of Nazi domestic policies. There was probably more freedom in Hungary during the first years of the war than in any other portion of the Axis territories except Finland. The relative mildness of the Hungarian regime may be seen in the character of its persecution of the Jews. Stringent anti-Jewish laws were enacted in 1938. They were, however, mild compared to those of the Nazis, and there was no systematic extermination until March 1944, when German troops occupied Hungary. A good many army officers with some Jewish blood or with Jewish wives were retired in 1941 or even before, but some few were protected and remained until 1944. While Jews were not inducted into the ordinary units of the armed forces, during the War, neither were they put into concentration camps or gas chambers. They were mobilized into a Jewish Labor Battalion which was sent to the Eastern Front and was there overrun by the Russians, who took its personnel prisoner. *

The relative mildness of the Hungarian regime gave way in 1943 to a brutal fascist dictatorship, when the Sztójay-Imredy government was formed, and even more after the Germans occupied Hungary. The Regent Horthy opposed these developments. When German fortunes in the war declined, he dismissed the Sztójay-Imredy government and tried to duplicate the feat of King Michael by announcing that Hungary was withdrawing from the war against Russia. His attempted coup in October 1944 failed, however, and the Germans put Szalasi in for a few bitter months of totalitarian rule. 701* 648 642

The desperate measures of Szalasi and the Nazis were obviously futile by this time, and some leading Hungarian officers went over to the Russians. In October of 1944, Colonel General Bela Miklos, who had been Commander of the First Army, was sent to negotiate an armistice and came to terms with the Russians. Colonel General Janos Vörös and Lieutenant General Gabor Faragho also went over. These generals in Debrecen formed a Russian-sponsored provisional government, in which Miklos was Prime Minister, Vörös Minister of Defense, and Faragho Minister of Supply. While the bulk of the Hungarian officer corps did not follow Miklos but continued to fight, the new government was able to return to Budapest in April of 1945 on the heels of Russian advances.

The Miklos government lasted thirteen months. It and the generals associated with it were used by the Soviets during the critical transition period. In November 1945 it was replaced and its members were all soon arrested. Vörös, the Minister of Defense, was seized in January of 1946 and was liquidated. Miklos died naturally in 1952. *

Miklos, Vörös, and Faragho had all been prominent officers in the pre-Soviet Hungarian Army. Faragho had been military attaché in Moscow in 1940 and a member of the peace mission to Moscow 701* 648 661

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701 sent by Horthy in 1944, which experience, however, did not save
648 him in the end. The Soviets were willing to work with such a man as long as expediency demanded, but not permanently. Against these favorable facts from the Russian viewpoint was the fact that he had
661 been Chief Inspector of the Gendarmerie in 1943. It may be noted that in prewar Hungary the gendarmerie and state police, which in peace time were under the Ministry of Interior, in war time were incorporated into the army directly under the Chief of Staff. Miklos had been first aide-de-camp to Horthy and was therefore, in the long run, not acceptable to the Communists. Vörös, who had been Chief of the General Staff in 1944, had in that capacity accompanied Horthy on a visit to Hitler. The services which these men performed for the Russians at the end of the war exempted them from immediate removal and in some cases, such as that of Miklos, from execution. But they did not, in the long run, exempt them from removal.

One reason why the officers who went over to the Russians at the end of the war were purged so quickly— more quickly than in Romania— is that they were of relatively upper class origins. One of the factors determining an officer's attitude toward the German occupation, Nazism, and the Szalasi Fascist movement was class origins. It is not accidental that those generals who in the great crisis remained loyal to the Regent and directly or indirectly took part in the frustrated armistice attempt were perhaps without exception members of Magyar gentry families. They included such generals as Lajos Veress, Bela Miklos, Istvan Naday, Gabor Faragho, Geza Lakatos, Sz'lard Bakay, and others. None of them came from the lower-middle classes. Descendants of the lower-middle classes were more inclined to follow a new star, such as that of the demagogue Szalasi and later the Communists, while the gentry in its nationalistic conservatism was opposed to parvenus such as Hitler or Szalasi. Because of their high status and conservatism the generals who rejected Nazism and stood close to Horthy, backing his attempt to end the war, were for the long haul quite unacceptable to the Russians, despite the fact that they had brought Hungary over to the Russian side. No ideological dogmatism prevented the Russians from using them when they needed them. But as men of unacceptable views and a strong independent social standing they did not fit the long-run requirements of the Stalinist system of organizing power, which is based on total control from the center and the elimination of autonomous elites.

* 701 B. The Period of Communist Infiltration

665 As in all the satellite countries, the period between 1945 and 1947
642 was one of uneasy coalition between the Communists and non-Communist parties. As in each of the satellite countries, the titular heads of the government were leaders of non-Communist parties who fought

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a rearguard action against both the Russian occupation authorities and the Communist party in order to save their country from total dictatorship. The Communists, however, were step-by-step building up bases of action, finding sources of support, and infiltrating key positions in the country.

In Hungary the major party was the Small Holders party. From November 1945, when the Miklos provisional government came to an end, to December 1948, when a clearly Communist government took over, there were a series of governments headed by members of the Small Holders party. The prime ministers were, in sequence, Zolt'an Tildy, Ferenc Nagy, and Lajos Dinnyés. At the same time there was a series of Ministers of National Defense, who were also until September 9, 1948, members of other parties than the Communist. Some of these were high-ranking generals, some were not. As our previous case studies reveal, the Minister of National Defense in the Communist satellite countries (and in those countries also before the Communists took over) was normally a general. There was not the sharp distinction between civil and military authority which is common in some Western countries. It is as unusual in East Europe for the Minister of National Defense not to be the top-ranking general as it is unusual here for him to be so.

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In Hungary, however, that was not the situation. Until September 1948 the Ministers of National Defense, though officers, were chosen in terms of civilian politics as much as for military considerations. The list of Ministers of Defense includes, in sequence: Janos Vörös, Jenö Tombor, Albert Bartha, Lajos Dinnyés, Peter Veres, Mihaly Farkas, and Istvan Bata. Until Veres they were all Small Holders party members. Veres was a member of the National Peasant party and a more pliable tool of the Communists. Farkas was a Communist leader and Bata a Soviet officer. Of these Ministers we have already met Colonel General Janos Vörös, one of the three leading officers in the Miklos group which went over to the Russians at the end of the war. Albert Bartha was also a leading officer who just before his appointment had been one of the three commissioners responsible for selecting officers for discharge as the Hungarian Army was cut to treaty size. On this commission he represented the non-Communist point of view but was consistently outvoted two-to-one in trying to retain career officers and keep out Communists. Bartha had been a Social Democrat in 1918 and rejoined them in 1945. Ferenc Nagy gives an interesting picture of the procedure by which Bartha was chosen Minister. He writes in his memoirs:

> "I still had to appoint a new man as Minister of Education and another in the place of Eugene Tombor, Minister of Defense, who had died . . . My nominee for the defense post was John Eröss, until now

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reparations commissioner . . . I took my list to Sviridov [the Soviet Commander in occupied Hungary]. Sviridov's attitude was as I had supposed. First he protested sharply against my wish to appoint a civilian Minister of War . . . I began to argue with him, pointing out that we had no high-ranking soldier capable of reorganizing the army well. For this reason a man distinguished in public affairs should head it.

"Sviridov began to name a list of generals. I knew well that he wanted me to appoint General Palffy-Oesterreicher, but he did not dare to mention his name to me. Finally, he proposed Albert Bartha, retired general and a Smallholder Member of Parliament." 32

Bartha lasted from August 20, 1946, to March 14, 1947, when he was replaced by a more pliant leader of the Smallholders party, Lajos Dinnyés. Dinnyés, as we have noted, was soon promoted to Prime Minister, and his place was taken by Veres, the last non-Communist Minister of Defense.

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All this while the Minister of Defense, like the Prime Minister himself, was becoming more and more of a figurehead. Communist officers within his department were acting on their own, taking orders from their party leaders and from Russian occupation officials instead of from their official superiors. A typical episode is related by Nagy:

"Just before Christmas prime ministry officials received confidential reports that the army's political squad had arrested eight or ten men . . . This political squad, originally established by the Debrecen government to investigate officers who had fled or been forced by the Nazis to retreat to the West, now was headed by the very dangerous Communist, General Palffy-Oesterreicher . . .

"Startled by the report, I called the War Minister to account: 'Are you aware that the political squad in your ministry arrested a number of prominent men?'

" 'General Palffy-Oesterreicher is the head of the division. He has reported nothing,' he answered, 'I too learned of the arrests by accident and was just about to order a report.'

" 'Please let me have the details immediately,' I instructed.

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"'I shall bring General Palffy along and we shall report together,' Bartha replied.

"A few hours later, I was informed that the political squad had taken Dominick Szentivanyi, one of the signers of the Moscow armistice of 1944, and a Minister Plenipotentiary in the foreign office, and another group of officers; my source added the charges of conspiracy had been fabricated . . . In the afternoon Bartha and General Palffy-Oesterreicher called on me.

"'I understand, General, that the political squad which you head has arrested a number of officers and civilians. When I asked your minister for an explanation, he informed me that you had not reported the matter to him.'

"'We were not able to inform the minister because our reports were incomplete. Now, however, I am in a position to say what happened.' His story was that former officers were conspiring to overthrow the present order and set up a new regime . . . .

"I turned to Bartha, 'Please go and question the suspects yourself, to verify the assertions of General Palffy. Then please report to me immediately afterwards.'

"'Good,' said Bartha. After Palffy had left he added: 'There are suspicious doings in the political division. I have been informed that its assistant director, Lt. Colonel Kruchina, is not permitted to set foot in their house of detention.'

"'Send Kruchina to me,' I requested . . .

"The following morning my secretary told me that Lt. Colonel Kruchina had come furtively to the prime ministry and wished to speak to me. 'What need is there for secrecy?' I asked as Kruchina stepped into the room. 'They are watching every move I make, ever since Palffy gave orders not to let me into the house of detention.'

"Kruchina told me . . . that only Palffy and two Communist catchpoles communicated with the prisoners; no one else was allowed at the interrogations . . .

"A few days later, in a dark street, Kruchina was

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> attacked and almost abducted; wounded, he shot at his fleeing assailant. He found refuge at the British Military Mission and was finally able to leave Hungary . . .
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> "Next day Bartha told me that he had visited the house of detention, as instructed, but Communist subordinates had refused to allow him to see the prisoners in the absence of Palffy. Palffy, arriving, stated that the prisoners had been handed over to the police because there were civilians among them and that he could not have permitted the minister to speak with the prisoners in any case, because it had been expressly forbidden by General Sviridov."

The narrative goes on to tell how the Minister of Defense Bartha, at the instructions of the Prime Minister, went again to try to see the prisoners. The Chief of the Political Division of the Police, Gabor Peter, first refused to let him in. Then Peter's superior, Minister of Interior Rajk, also refused, always referring to the desires of General Sviridov. Then Nagy himself went to see General Sviridov, who denied giving any such orders.

With this statement of Sviridov's in hand Nagy felt that General Palffy had been compromised and started proceedings to discipline and discharge him for disobeying the orders of his superior and refusing to permit his Minister in to see the prisoners. Nagy felt that "At last this notorious Communist agent was caught in his own trap." But this confidence of Nagy's was naive. As soon as he took steps against Palffy, the Communists went into action. The political squad made new arrests and Rajk telephoned the Prime Minister to tell him that the investigations would have to be continued against his wishes, "because they had unearthed a serious large-scale conspiracy."

Rakosi, the Hungarian Communist leader, then phoned and demanded, "How can you even think of starting an investigation against someone [Palffy] at the very time when, discovering the conspiracy directed against our democracy, he is rendering the greatest service to it . . . Besides, Palffy-Oesterreicher is an exemplary democrat." But despite Rakosi's diatribes, Nagy thought he could go on with the proceedings against Palffy. Then, however, came the final blow. A Soviet general arrived with a message from Sviridov. Sviridov continued to deny that he had given orders to Palffy to keep the Minister of War from the prisoners, but he said that the translator had made a mistake and Palffy had thought that there was such an order. There was therefore nothing wrong or malicious in Palffy's actions and, concluded the message, "If you, Mr. Premier, do not stop the investigation of Palffy, the Soviet Military Police will take over the

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entire proceedings in the matter of the conspiracy."[32] The Soviet Commander thus made it clear that the Communist clique in the Ministry of Defense was to be given a free hand in disregard of the nominal Minister.

This pattern of infiltration, dual power, and conspiracy is the same as that in all the satellite countries in the years 1945-48. There were, however, three rather distinctive features in the Hungarian development, all of which arose out of the character of Hungary's participation in World War II.

First, there was no corps of wartime officers with a record of collaboration with the Soviets. As we have already noted, the Russians had fewer high Hungarian officers whom they could use in 1945 than they did in Romania because the officer corps was partly pro-German and had made far less effort against Germany in the last days of the war. A majority of Hungarian officers did not follow Miklos but continued to fight against the Russians. Furthermore there was virtually no underground activity against the Nazis in Hungary. The handful of individuals in our sample whose biographies contain some record of anti-Nazi underground activities are almost invariably Jews. Not only was a group who had made an anti-Nazi record relatively lacking among the Hungarian officers at home. There had also been a relatively minor effort by ex Hungarian prisoners of war whom the Soviets re-trained. There were hundreds of thousands of Hungarian prisoners in the Soviet camps but there was no r[illegible] Hungarian Army recruited among these. There was no Soviet-sponsored force comparable to the Polish Army on the Eastern Front nor to the Tudor Vladimirescu and Horia-Closca-Crisan Division formed by the Romanians. The Soviets did indeed organize some forces out of the PW camps, but as we shall see, they were relatively minor. There was therefore no officer cadre allied to the Soviets on whom the Russians could draw for military leadership.

A second distinctive point in Hungarian development is that the Jewish minority played a more significant role in the Hungarian Army than elsewhere, and a third is that a tightly-knit clique around Palffy began in 1947-48 to take control of the army.

To explain these three points, we turn to our sample of Hungarian generals who have been active in the period from 1945 to now. Our sample consists of twenty-one career officers (of whom four remain in the army, the other seventeen having been purged) and twelve new Communist generals (none of whom have been purged to date). We shall examine the origins and careers of these thirty-three men.

1. The Available Sources of Recruitment

The generals used since 1945 came from a number of different sources. There was, as we have noted, no one obvious source of recruitment for the Communists comparable to the Polish or Romanian Soviet-controlled army which fought on the Eastern Front in World War II, or for that matter comparable to the western armies of the Polish and Czecho-

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slovakian governments-in-exile. The sources were the following:

a. Career Officers Who Went Over to the Russians. Four of the Hungarian officers in our sample were officers who had gone over to the Russians along with Miklos at the end of the war, but as we have already seen, there were relatively few such officers and on the whole they did not last long in the new army because of their gentry and Horthyite backgrounds. Three of the four capitulators in our sample were purged in 1945 and one lasted until 1950.

b. PW's. The Hungarian prisoners of the Russians included, of course, both officers and enlisted men. Our sample of postwar generals includes five former PW's, of whom three were already career officers and two were enlisted men raised by the Communists to officer rank.

There were quite a few Hungarian prisoners of war, the Hungarian Second Army of 150,000 and the much smaller Hungarian First Army having been pretty well smashed on the Eastern Front. The prisoners were organized and propagandized by Hungarian Communists who had been living in Russia for many years. The leading figures in this effort were Sandor Nogradi, now Deputy Minister of Defense, and Geza Revesz, now Inspector General of the Land Army. They organized a number of Hungarian partisan units and Nogradi served as liaison officer between these partisan units and the Red Army. They also started to organize the first independent Hungarian Division, for the leadership of which they chose artillery captain György Porfy.

Porfy, who was born about 1909, went to cadet school in Hungary and to the Ludovika Military Academy, the Hungarian officers' training school. He fought on the Eastern Front in 1941 and 1942, at which time he was captured. Proving himself amenable to Communist blandishment he was sent for a one-year military course in Leningrad and to a Communist party training school. After taking part in the formation of the first independent division he returned to Hungary and was made deputy city commander of Budapest in 1946. His role in those years was as a leading security officer. He next appears, after the Communists had completely taken over the Hungarian Army, as a major general and Inspector of Artillery, or in other words, head of the artillery department of the Ministry of Defense. As a career officer and graduate of the Ludovika he did not last long, however. He was reported arrested in 1950.

In our sample the two PW career officers have been purged, one in 1950, one in 1951. The three PW enlisted men, who have since become generals, survive. An interesting example of the latter is Major General Ferenc Janossy.

Janossy was a Protestant clergyman. He had, however, the misfortune to have some Jewish blood and so in Axis Hungary he was assigned not to the regular army but to the Jewish Labor Brigade. There he served as chaplain to the Protestants of Jewish descent in

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the Brigade. When taken prisoner he became a Communist and was sent to a Communist party training school and a partisan warfare training school in the U.S.S.R. He learned his Communist lesson so well that he was given the job, in postwar Hungary, of organizing the education and training of political officers. In 1948 he organized an academy for such officers both of the army and in the police. His military rank rose to that of major general and his latest position is Deputy Minister of People's Culture.

These biographies illustrate the type of officer drawn from the PW camps but this source was less abundant than in other satellite countries.

c. Other Career Officers. Four out of the twenty-one career officers in our sample remain in the army. The rest have been eliminated. If this sample is at all representative, then it is clear that only a very small number of leading officers from the prewar army retain any function in present-day Hungary. It is significant to note that of these four, two are in highly technical units. One of these is Major General Imre Radvany, Deputy Chief of the Institute of Military Technology, and another is General Daniel Görgenyi, Inspector General of Technical Units. Before the war Görgenyi was an engineering officer and Radvany an artillery officer. After the war Radvany established his loyalty to the Communists by joining the Small Holders party as a Communist plant. It is probably not that alone, however, which has yielded him his current security, but rather his technical know-how.[33a] The other two career officers from our sample who are still in the army include the District Commander in Debrecen, General Victor Gomöri, and a quartermaster officer.

d. The Bela Kunists. One group that has shown very great survival power in the present Hungarian Army are the early members of the Communist party. Ever since the unsuccessful Bela Kun regime in Hungary, a considerable number of the defeated Bela Kun supporters lived in exile in Russia. In addition, a number of people who were engaged in minor capacities in that episode had since been living in Hungary. Some of them, in recent years, have been taken into important Communist positions.

The attitude of the Soviet regime toward the Hungarian exiles living in Russia was far from uniformly favorable. They had been roughly handled in the great purges of the 1930's in which Bela Kun himself was toppled from his position as hero to that of traitor and liquidated. The Hungarian refugees who survived the purges, however, were thoroughly subservient and indoctrinated Stalinists. The Russians could count on them. Furthermore, the Russians had to use them for they found hardly any native Communists of professional standing in Hungary, and not even people with a resistance record. The new Communist leadership was therefore largely provided from among the émigrés who had somehow weathered all the

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purges. These men are of course no longer young. Their minimum age must be around fifty, but some of them are still available. At least five and probably more of the present Communist generals in our sample have experience in the Bela Kun regime.

One of these men is General Geza Revesz, an extremely important figure in the present Hungarian Army, to whom we have already referred. Revesz was born in 1903. He was sentenced for his part in the Bela Kun episode to four years in jail, but was sent to Russia in 1922 in a prisoner exchange. He lived in Russia from 1922 until 1945 except for a period when he fought in the Spanish Civil War. In the meantime he had been getting technical training. He had gone to technical school in Budapest for one year, and then in the late 1920's he took an engineering course in the U.S.S.R. While in engineering school he married a Russian fellow-student. In 1932 he enlisted as a captain in the Corps of Engineers of the Russian Army. He ultimately rose to the rank of lieutenant colonel. During World War II, as we have already noted, he was chosen by the Russians to recruit Hungarian prisoners for use in partisan warfare.

Another important officer who was involved in the Bela Kun regime is Major General Mihaly Szalvay, a former mason and the son of a peasant family. Our informants indicate that he has been an exile from Hungary since 1919, when he was twenty-four. He lived all over Europe until the early 1930's, when he went to the U.S.S.R. Then from 1936 to 1939 he fought in the Spanish Civil War as Commander of the Rakosi Brigade. He had already been a captain in the Russian Army before going to Spain and upon his return he went to a school for partisan warfare and rejoined the Red Army. Late in the war he was assigned to the First Hungarian Division under Soviet sponsorship and returned to Hungary as a lieutenant colonel. From 1948 to 1950 he was Commander in Chief of the Frontier Guards, a very important assignment for reasons that we shall see later. Since then he has been in the Ministry of Defense.

Not all those who were involved in the Bela Kun episode spent the intervening years in Russian exile. An interesting example is Major General Istvan Gyori-Nagy, head of the legal section of the Judge Advocate's Department in the years 1949 and 1950. He had been a regular officer in that department in 1914-19. He was stripped of his rank and dismissed in 1919, being rehabilitated on Communist orders in 1945.

e. Other Communist Officers. A number of other old Communists whose activities date back to 1919 or before should perhaps be considered in much the same category as the survivors of the Bela Kun exile, even though they did not chance to be in Hungary in 1919. Among these are apparently Generals Nogradi, Bata, and Muennich.

Nogradi, born Nussbaum in Nograd County, which lies just over the Czechoslovak border from post-World War I Hungary, was an iron worker. He became involved in the Social Democratic movement

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before 1919. Since 1919, when he was twenty-five, he has been a Communist activist. He served as a courier between the U.S.S.R. and Czechoslovakia and did party work in Spain during the Civil War. After the Spanish Civil War he went to the Leningrad Military Academy for two years of training in partisan warfare. His World War II activity in organizing partisans among the Hungarian prisoners we have already described. He is now a Deputy Minister of Defense.

General Istvan Bata deserves special comment. At the time that this study was completed he was Chief of the General Staff. But then in July 1953 a major shake-up occurred in the Hungarian regime which marked the turn to a new tactical course in the satellites. Following the death of Stalin, the Berlin riots, and Czech strikes, a new more lenient policy was decided upon for the satellites. Peasants were permitted to leave the collective farms. Consumers were promised better living standards quickly (though, of course, not given them.)

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While the new course has been adopted in all the European satellites, it was first and most dramatically introduced in Hungary. In typical Soviet fashion a new line had to be announced to the world by a dramatic shake-up and purge. In this instance the dramatic move was the resignation of the famous Communist Matyas Rakosi as Premier on July, 2, 1953 and his replacement by Imre Nagy. At the same time Mihaly Farkos was replaced as Minister of Defense by Istvan Bata.

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Bata was born in Tura, Hungary, in 1901, in a Slovak peasant family. By 1918 he had gone to the Soviet Union and enlisted in the Red Army, which remained his career. He was a staff officer of the Russian Army in World War II and indeed did not return to Hungary until 1948, at which time the Russians decided he should be a Hungarian. He was presented to the senior Hungarian Army officers at the Communist party headquarters by Geza Revesz in 1948. In 1950 he w n promoted to be Chief of the General Staff. At that time he was still not a Deputy Minister, but he outranked General Szabo who was Second Deputy Minister, the position ordinarily belonging to the Chief of Staff. In July 1953 Bata jumped directly into the post of Minister.

Until Bata became Minister of Defense, Russian Army officers in the higher ranks of the Hungarian Army were relatively inconspicuous compared to their situations in Poland and they are also relatively few. Revesz and Bata were both mysterious figures hiding in the shadows. Revesz's proclivity for behind-the-scenes action is illustrated by the pattern of his behavior on his return to Hungary from the U.S.S.R. in 1945. Without any publicity he occupied a tiny room at Commun. t party headquarters as the actual head of the Military Affairs Department of the party although he did not have that title. Not even his name plate appeared on his door and few had any idea of his position. Revesz and Bata were lieutenant generals and

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701 both held posts which, according to the ordinary satellite pattern, *148 would make them Deputy Ministers of Defense. They, together with the then Minister of Defense Farkas, and Deputy Minister Nogradi, were the most important officers in Hungary. However, neither of the Russians was officially a Deputy Minister. Now Bata has emerged from the shadows, but he and other Russian officers still avoid publicity and limelight.

It is worthy of note that at the very moment that Bata was raised to control of the armed forces, the general tenor of the shifts made in enforcing the new course was "to install 'native' rather than 'Muscovite' leaderships."[33b] The replacement of Farkas by Bata was probably a move toward achieving greater military proficiency rather than part of a general shift toward more open sovietization.

The three Deputy Ministers of Defense were, at latest information (the summer of 1953): Sandor Nogradi, whom we have already discussed, Istvan Szabo, whom we mentioned as Bata's former nominal superior, and Karoly Janza. Janza, who was a colonel in the political department of the Ministry of Defense as late as the spring of 1950, was born around 1900. He worked in the Ganz shipyards in Budapest until the Second World War. After the war he was sent to a Communist party propaganda school and made departmental chief and managing director of the Ganz shipyards, in which post he served from 1947 to 1950. Then in 1950 he was sent to take an officers' training course and put in the political department. In the same year he was promoted to major general and Deputy Minister. As a sidelight on his character it is interesting to note that he was convicted and imprisoned in December 1945 for membership in a gangster group charged with robbery. The post he holds as Deputy Minister (formerly the third) would ordinarily make him at least a lieutenant general, and Revesz's superior. But we note that in fact Revesz (like Bata) was the lieutenant general and Janza only a major general, and that Revesz is Inspector General of the Land Army, the position ordinarily held by the First Deputy Minister.

Nogradi, who heads the political department, which ordinarily rates only the Third Deputy Minister, was First Deputy Minister until the numbering scheme was dropped. The reason for this is obvious. He is the only one of the three Deputy Ministers who really was a Deputy Minister in terms of status and in terms of power over the operations in his area of the department. The two figurehead Deputy Ministers were therefore ranked below him until the numbers were dropped.

This departure from the ordinary satellite pattern may well not last long, if indeed it has not already been rectified under Bata. Indeed, when this manuscript was first completed in May 1953 we wound up this section saying

> "If a change is imposed to establish normal practice, one of two things may happen. The mysterious

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and powerful Soviet officers, Revesz and Bata . . . may be moved into the public limelight and openly become Deputy Ministers. Alternatively some newly trained rising Communists . . . may combine the jobs now held both by the Deputy Ministers and the Soviet officers."

Events went faster than we anticipated. Bata jumped not to Deputy Minister but to Minister. We do not know if all the other anomalies have been ironed out, and only time will tell whether the other half of our prediction, the rise of newly-trained Communist officers, will also be confirmed or prove to be a groundless speculation.

2. Jewish Officers

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So far we have noted the absence of any one main source for recruitment of leading officers for the present Hungarian Army. We turn now, however, to a group which has or had significant representation in this army though it plays a relatively small role in the other satellite armies. That is officers of Jewish descent. Such officers have been rather extensively represented both among the Bela Kunist exiles and among the career officers whom the Communists used and then discarded.

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Until World War II, Eastern Europe was the largest center of Jewish population and an area in which the peculiar position of the Jews was such that one might have expected them to play a major role in postwar satellite armies. Actually, except in Hungary, they do not do so, partly due to Nazi extermination and partly due to Russian anti-Semitism. The Jews before the war were a fairly large minority in Eastern Europe. More important than their numbers in the total population is the fact that in these predominantly peasant countries the Jews were a quite significant portion of the urban population, and it is the urban population which has been politically active in the new regime. In prewar Poland, for example, 27 percent of the urban population was Jewish, and if we were to consider only the relatively well-educated, politically-alert segments of the urban population, the proportion would be even higher.

Furthermore, the Jews were a persecuted minority. Even before the Hitler terror they lived in a state of continuous oppression and consequent dissatisfaction. After the rise of Hitler this entire population lived in the shadow of impending doom. For ten or twelve years they saw the handwriting on the wall and for much of that time lived never knowing whether the next day would be their last, never knowing when they would be seized and thrown into a gas chamber. Those Jews who found themselves captured by the Russians were, therefore, fortunate. Their reception was far from friendly, but those who succeeded in escaping death under the Nazis found themselves at least favored with prison camp tutelage and a propaganda barrage. One would ordinarily expect this group to provide fertile soil for Soviet indoctrination, and indeed the history of some Commu-

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563 nist leaders in Eastern Europe reveals that on some this indoctrination took. But against all these factors rendering some Jews susceptible to use by the Soviets were a number of other factors which have limited the role of Jews in satellite military elites. The two most important factors operating to limit their role in satellite armies are Soviet anti-Semitism and the physical destruction of potential Jewish leadership in most of Eastern Europe.

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It is only in the last two years that the western world has become acutely aware of Soviet anti-Semitism. The anti-Jewish trials in Czechoslovakia and other satellite countries within recent months have made the point perfectly clear. But, as a matter of fact, the process of eliminating Jews from key positions has been going on for some time in most Soviet-dominated areas. Jews have not been totally eliminated. There is a lot more variation in the Soviet process of anti-Semitic purging than there was in the ideological anti-Semitism of the Nazis. The Soviets distrust the Jews because they are intellectual, educated, and western oriented— cosmopolitans in Soviet jargon—but they have been eliminating them individual by individual rather than by flat edict. Nevertheless a large proportion of satellite Jewish leaders in the past few years have been eliminated. In our sample of the Hungarian military elite, half of the generals of Jewish origin, descent, or relationship had been removed by 1950 and more have been removed in the last few months.

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701 In our sample of thirty-four generals who have been active since 1945, ten were in some way identified with the Jewish minority. It is significant that only five of these ten were themselves actually Jews. Two others had married Jews, one (whose biography we have already given) was a Protestant of Jewish origin, another a Catholic of Jewish origin, and another part-Jewish. By the standards of East European and Nazi anti-Semitism, however, they were branded with the label of Jew. With few exceptions they were purged from the wartime Hungarian Army and forced into the Jewish Labor Brigade. They became susceptible to the blandishments of the new regime in Hungary because they had been mistreated by the old.

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At the same time the mistreatment they suffered was not such as to destroy them completely. We must not forget that under Hitler six million Jews were exterminated in Eastern Europe. That fact, plus the fact that in countries like prewar Poland it was virtually impossible for a person of Jewish origin to have a military career at all, means that after the war there were available in most of the countries of Eastern Europe relatively few Jewish officers with training and experience. A certain number of Jews are found in the political department and other unspecialized parts of the satellite armies, but except in Hungary they are for the most part not found among the professionally skilled military leaders. In Hungary it was possible for a person with some Jewish blood or Jewish relatives to have a military career and it was also somewhat more likely that he might

survive the Hitler era. Thus we find that six out of the twenty-two career officers in our sample have some ethnic ties to the Jewish minority as do four out of the twelve new Communist officers in our sample. It is significant that the proportion is much the same for the two groups.

Before we leave this topic, it might be well to comment on the reason for the large proportion of what we are calling Jewish representation in the army which is not really Jewish at all, but consists of persons with some ancestral or marital ties to the Jewish community. It is striking that of the ten "Jews," fully half are not persons who considered themselves Jews or even whose parents considered themselves Jews, for it goes without saying that nobody who has a leading post in a satellite country today attributes any religion to himself. The men who were vulnerable to the Communist blandishments were not ones who belonged to the Jewish minority, knew it and accepted it, but were rather persons who wanted to consider themselves part of the majority community but found that the majority community would not accept them. They were persons whose families had been converted, or persons who were completely Christian in origin and identification, but who suddenly found themselves being discriminated against because of their wives.

The most famous of these characters, who turned to the Communists because of discriminations arising from the Jewish origin of his wife, was the notorious General Palffy. The fact that he was regarded as in some sense Jewish (although actually he was not), and that Farkas, the former Minister of National Defense, is Jewish made the Jews in the Hungarian Army appear to be more conspicuous than their statistical distribution justified. They are, however, overrepresented and as such illustrate a general principle which we have found to hold, not only in the Hungarian Army, but in all the satellite armies: namely that members of national minority groups in the various East European countries are particularly likely to be selected by the Communists to provide leadership.

Particularly in the secret police and the political department the Communists prefer to terrorize the population by agents who are not members of that population themselves. In Russia itself the Cheka was, originally, primarily a Latvian and Polish organization. In Hungary the former, but now purged, head of the State Defense Authority (the secret police) was Jewish. The Communists feel that persons who are not part of the majority community will have fewer personal connections and thus less sympathy for those among whom they live. At the same time Soviet anti-Semitism and particularly that of Malenkov has reversed that policy as far as Jews are concerned and has eliminated most of them from leadership by now.

3. The Palffy Clique

The signal for the rise of a postwar military elite in Hungary was Soviet General Sviridov's authorization to Major General Palffy,

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organizer and head of Hungary's new military intelligence, to organize the frontier guard in the summer of 1946. The avowed aim of this measure was to prevent hostile elements from infiltrating the country. But in fact this new organization, in co-operation with the military political department and the state security organ of the police, began to build the Iron Curtain around Hungary. It soon became a force of fifteen battalions, i.e., about two-thirds of the country's armed force at that time. It developed, in other words, into a Communist party army.

Initially the authorization was for a somewhat smaller force but still one of sufficient size to represent a real threat to the government. The origins of this force in 1946 are reported by Nagy. He tells how the Minister of Defense, Eugene Tombor, called him aside and told him that, "he had called by request at the office of General Konratov,[34] the Soviet head of the military section of the Allied Control Commission," the latter "have instructed him to increase the border guard from 5,000 to 10,000 men and appoint as commander . . . Colonel Palffy-Oesterreicher." Tombor at first threatened to resign but finally accepted these orders. His indignation arose largely because Palffy was regarded with abhorrence and aversion by all military circles in Hungary.

General Palffy (He changed his name from Oessterreicher in 1934) was born in a middle-class family in Romania in 1909. His father was a bank manager and his father's family had been small landowners. He graduated from the Ludovika Military Academy at the age of twenty-three and was commissioned second lieutenant in the artillery. He was selected as a candidate for training for the general staff. (In prewar Hungary, as in most European countries, the general staff corps was an elite group separated from the rest of the army by special training and by the addition of the phrase "of the general staff" to the rank.) As with all trainees for general staff positions, he was sent abroad for a year of experience, in his case to the Italian Army. In 1939 he participated as a captain in the occupation of the Carpatho-Ukraine and won praise from the Minister of Defense for his part.

However, in the same year he resigned his army commission because of his Jewish wife. He went to work in the United Incandescent Bulb Factory, where a fellow employee and future associate was Captain of the General Staff Laszlo Solym, a man with problems similar to those of Palffy and a man who had already joined the Communist party. At the end of the war Palffy rejoined the army. He organized the political department of the Ministry of Defense and was promoted in 1945 from major to colonel and in 1946 to major general. We have already noted that he organized the Frontier Guards at the same time as he was head of the political department.

By 1947 Palffy had become the leading military personality of the country. The military elite for the period 1947-48 was identical with

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his personal entourage. This clique was most homogeneous. Its members were men of about forty years of age, graduates from the Ludovika Military Academy, whose career had been broken during the previous regime for one reason or another. These reasons were in some cases Jewish mothers or wives and in other cases personal malfeasance. They were gifted, ambitious men, most of them opportunists. Their training as professional army officers traditionally conservative in spirit formed a most peculiar background to the Communist attitude which they assumed in or about 1945. Their rise to elite status was accomplished in February 1948, when Palffy was promoted from his job as head of the political department to be Inspector General of the army replacing General Huthy, the last Mohican of the old guard. In accordance with the usual satellite pattern the Inspector General, who is in effect the Commander in Chief, became Deputy Minister of Defense, and he was promoted at the same time to lieutenant general. From that time until Farkas became Minister of Defense in August of the same year, Palffy was the real boss of the Hungarian Army since the non-Communist Minister had by then been reduced to a mere figurehead.

Altogether seven officers in our sample can be described as members of the Palffy clique. These include Lieutenant General Laszlo Solym, Chief of Staff from 1948-50; Major General Bela Kiraly, Deputy Chief of Staff at the same time; Major General La[illegible]ldi, who succeeded Palffy as head of the political department when Palffy was promoted; Lieutenant Gustav Illy, Inspector of Training from 1947 to 1949; Lieutenant General Kalman Revai, who succeeded Palffy as Inspector General of the Army for a short time; Major General Merenyi-Scholtz, surgeon general; and Lieutenant Istvan Beleznay. Of these General Solym was of part-Jewish and part-German descent though he was himself a Roman Catholic. General Beleznay married a Jewish woman. General Földi was convicted of embezzlement of army funds in 1937 and retired. General Illy was a homosexual and also was of part-Jewish descent, although himself a Roman Catholic. General Revai was Jewish. General Merenyi-Scholtz had been decorated by the Nazis. These were the facts which had disrupted their careers and which drew them together into a clique, motivated by mutual advantage and ready to sell out to the Communists for military advancement.

The Communists could not tolerate such a tightly-knit, homogeneous clique in control of the army. They could tolerate it no more when it was nominally a Communist clique than when it consisted of followers of Benes in Czechoslovakia or of Pilsudskians in Poland. Under no Communist regime is a personal machine permitted to emerge if it can be helped. The only machine must be that of the top leaders of the party. Any other personal ties within a formal organization are in Russia abusively labeled "family relations" and are condemned. It is therefore not surprising that in 1948, or more

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701 *648 likely the end of 1947, when word went out from Moscow to the satellite countries that the satellite armies were to be built up into a major military force and that they were at the same time to be completely taken over by the Communists, it was not Palffy, the head of the military clique, who was made boss of the army but a Politburo member and Communist leader who had not been part of the Hungarian Army until then. Mihaly Farkas became the Hungarian counterpart of Emil Bodnaras, Alexis Cepicka, and Konstantin Rokossowski.

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701 *648 661 Palffy was not immediately ousted. He remained on as Deputy Minister of Defense and Inspector General of the army for a few months but the significance of the move was at once apparent. Palffy was immediately compelled to throw some of his close associates to the lions including Major General Lajos Földi, whom he had just put in as his successor as head of the political department. Within a week after Farkas took over, Major General Lajos Földi was arrested and charged with sedition and espionage. These events clearly foreshadowed the great purge which was to take place about a year later. Perhaps Palffy thought that by presenting a few heads on a silver platter he might evade the obviously impending purge. Enver Hoxha in Albania was able to get away with a similar move when he delivered General Koxhi Xoxe to Moscow's sacerdotes. In Hungary, however, the last vestiges of Palffydom were to be purged in 1949-50. By the middle of 1950 not one member of the clique remained free. About eighty officers had been purged as Palffyites. Palffy himself turned up as one of the principal defendents in the Rajk trial and was executed by hanging on October 24, 1949.

The indictment states, along with a lot of nonsense about an international espionage plot, the real Communist objections to Palffy, although these are stated in Aesopian language. In effect, it says that he tried to build a personal clique and that he had under his own control a sufficient military force so that he could prove a dangerous and independent character. The indictment said in part, "It was Palffy's task to direct the organization in the military sphere. With Rajk's consent he protected and promoted reactionary Horthyite fascist officers in the army appointing to high and important posts those whom he knew would blindly follow his villainous aims and instructions." In other words, he built up a clique of old army officers. "He drew up and set forth in writing a plan which he considered could be carried out with the help of ten battalions. These battalions were designed by Palffy for the seizure of important public buildings, post offices, broadcasting stations, the premises of the Central Committee of the Party," etc. In Communist Aesopian language this, of course, refers to the special Frontier Guard which Palffy had indeed built up at Russian behest and which he did indeed control as a kind of personal army.

The Hungarian case probably makes clearer than any other the hostility of the Communists to any kind of cohesive, well-integrated

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clique, machine, or group. In Czechoslovakia we saw that the Communists destroyed a cohesive officer corps with common experiences in World War I, common training shortly thereafter, and loyalty to a common leader, Benes. In Poland likewise we saw that they quickly eliminated a tightly-knit group of Pilsudskians. In Hungary the picture is even clearer because they destroyed not only a tightly-knit and cohesive old officer corps, but also a new communist officer group which threatened to emerge with loyalties and private relations of its own. The corps of regular officers in the Hungarian Army did indeed have considerable elements of cohesion. These arose not primarily from common social origins but rather from common training and experience.

Before 1918 a military career carried considerable prestige in Hungary though not as much as in Germanic lands. It was not ordinarily the career choice for aristocrats' sons, except for a few crack regiments. Nor was the officers' uniform a mystical object as in Prussia. Yet the prestige of the officer was high and the gentry was well represented in the officer corps. The gentry was a class ranking just below the aristocrats, but (regardless of wealth) above business men and professionals.

After 1918 the prestige of a military career declined for the opportunities were limited. Pay was poor. The army was reduced in size. The crack regiments were abolished. The proportion of non-gentry officers therefore rose and a large sector of the officer corps came to consist of members of national minorities such as Austrians and Czechs.

All in all the Hungarian Army of 1939 was led by an officer corps in which an overwhelming majority came from the wide range of the lower and upper-middle classes including the lesser gentry. Top aristocrats were scarce in the army but so were sons of proletarians. There was thus no sharply defined military caste comparable to that in Prussia and to some extent in Poland. It is true indeed that there was a tradition that at least one son should follow his father's example in choosing a military career, but other factors contributed to democratization. In the early 1920's there was a brief period in which sons of non-commissioned officers of the regular army, who were themselves predominantly of peasant stock, were strongly encouraged to attend cadet schools or military academies. Another wave of such democratization was a corollary of Gömbös' premiership since Gömbös was himself the son of a village teacher.

While the base of recruitment was thus broad, the process of selection created a rather tightly-knit officer corps. With hardly any exceptions, senior officers were graduates of cadet schools or military academies. It was possible for inductees to attend officer candidate schools and qualify for regular army careers after post-commission courses, but very few of this category ever rose to senior rank.

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*701 874 Hungary's one and only military academy was the Ludovika in Budapest, but it was not unusual for Hungarian boys to have attended military academies in Austria. Candidates graduated as a rule as second lieutenants at the age of about twenty-one.[35] Military academies could be entered after completion of secondary school or military secondary school. A parallel sequence of training was that in the cadet schools both in Hungary and Austria, which were attended by students in the fourteen to eighteen age groups. The graduates of these emerged as "third lieutenants" at the age of about eighteen. Technical officers were often sent—usually as first lieutenants—to technical universities, where they gained civilian degrees.

Before 1918 staff officers were trained in the Vienna Staff College and during the war at various staff courses. After the Treaty of Trianon, Hungarian staff officer candidates attended the new Budapest Staff College. Graduates had to serve a brief trial period as staff officers and were then given the title "of the General Staff" affixed to their rank. They served as a rule from time to time as field officers thus interrupting their staff service. As staff officers or staff officer candidates, they spent several months abroad assigned to a foreign army unit on special duty and it was compulsory for them to master at least two foreign languages, one of them German. The priority sequence was German, French, English, Italian, Czech and Slovak, Serbo Croat, Romanian. *701

Almost all generals came from the ranks of these officers "of the General Staff" with the exception of a very few of the lowest ranking generals, major generals. In the early 1920's it became a rule that only general staff officers could rise to the rank of general. A very few exceptions occurred, however, during World War II.

Thus we see that, with perhaps one or two exceptions, all members of the military elite chose a military career before the age of eighteen. They were then put through a common course of training and belonged to a common select group of staff officers. After retirement they often continued to play an important elite role. Some retired generals were appointed by the Regent as members of the upper house and/or privy counsellors. The Commander in Chief of the army and, after the abolition of this post, the Chief of General Staff, were ex-officio members of the upper house. Generals in the Regent's entourage remained, after retirement, unofficially his military advisers. Some had more influence on high level military policy after their retirement than any officers on the active list.

Furthermore, the only way to reach this influential status was through the normal channels of promotion. Direct commissions were unknown in the prewar Hungarian Army. Every officer began his career as a lieutenant. There were rigid rules of promotion according to seniority and efficiency rating. Priority by virtue of efficiency rating was limited—below the rank of colonel—to a maximum of five years over the normal seniority scale. Extraordinary promotions

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for gallantry occurred only in time of war. On account of poor efficiency ratings promotions could be delayed or suspended. An elaborate system of court martial, disciplinary and court of honor proceedings was provided for cases of criminal or immoral behavior to decide upon forced retirement with or without pension and with or without the right of keeping the rank. Officers on the active list, of whom the number of generals was generally around one hundred, were barred from political and business activities. Members of the armed forces including the police, commissioned and non-commissioned, were disenfranchised and had no right to belong to a political party. After 1944, however, membership in the Fascist Arrow Cross Party was no longer prohibited and after the war all the legal parties, Communist, Small Holders, etc., played a major role in selecting officers. Finally certain common historic struggles added to the cohesiveness of the old officer corps. A certain elite status was acquired by an officer's record in the counterrevolutionary movement in 1919 and his belonging to Horthy's National Army at that time.

It is obvious that the cohesive character of the regular Hungarian officer corps was one reason for the rapid elimination of these men by the Communists. The first Communist reaction was to replace them by men who had been thrown out of this tightly-knit group for reasons of their behavior or for reasons of discrimination. However, when the group of officers whom they brought in showed signs themselves of forming a tightly-knit corps, the Communists cracked down ruthlessly with a demonstration trial designed to make the lesson clear: no one but the Politburo may have ambitions for power.

C. The Final Period of Bolshevization

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The elimination of the career officers and Ludovika graduates, even those who belonged to the Palffy clique, posed for the Hungarian Army the same dilemma as was posed in each of the satellite countries and for that matter in the Soviet Union too—how to obtain both professional skill and political loyalty. We have seen that the dilemma was solved in slightly different ways in the different countries. In Hungary, as in Romania, it was temporarily solved by bringing a group of politicians into the top posts, despite the fact that they had had relatively inadequate military experience. Among these there were indeed a sprinkling of career officers concentrated in the more technical positions and a sprinkling of converted Russian Army officers. From 1949 until 1953 the political horn of the dilemma was seized in preference to the professional one. That was the period during which the old Bolshevik Farkas was Minister of Defense. The army was reorganized with considerations of loyalty being put above considerations of efficiency. That is probably why the Hungarian Army is still relatively small and less heavily relied on by the Russians than the "friendly" Czech army or the well-con-

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701 trolled and Russified Polish force. The resolution of the central
[703] problem faced by the Russians was slower in the army of Hungary.
*648 Only with the appointment of the experienced Russian soldier, General Bata, as Minister of Defense has professionalism acquired appropriate standing.

On the whole Russia has had to cope with the lack of adequate professional officers in Hungary, as in Romania, by subordinating the satellite army very definitely to the Soviet forces on the spot. The power of the Soviet occupation is summarized in a document on Soviet Imperialism: Hungary 1944-48.[36] It was agreed at the Yalta Conference in February 1945 that each of the ex-enemy countries in Eastern Europe would be supervised by the three main allied powers acting jointly, and an allied Control Commission was set up. "The Allies agreed that the chairman of the Commission would be the Soviet representative . . . but the representatives of the three powers were to act jointly . . . From the very start the Soviet representatives consistently acted unilaterally in the name of the commission without consultation or notice to their British and American colleagues . . . Moreover the Soviet chairman ordered that all communications between the representatives of the western allies and the Hungarian authorities be channeled through him.

"The Soviet element used its military powers to further the cause
[208] of the Hungarian Communists in many ways. For example, it exercised censorship over all telegraph connections and permitted criticisms of the western allies in press and radio, but none of the U.S.S.R. The Soviet element seized virtually all of the newsprint in the country and Hungarian newspapers were able to obtain the paper only with the consent of the Red Army . . .

"Soviet influence was further strengthened by the presence of the Red Army in Hungary. Early in 1945 these troops numbered as high as one million and, despite protests from the western allies, were withdrawn very slowly . . . In the final treaty, negotiated in Paris during the winter of 1946-47, the USSR won the right to keep troops in Hungary." In 1951 at least four active Soviet divisions were estimated to be in Hungary and some estimates of Soviet troops there ran very much higher.[37]

That is why when Mihaly Farkas took over control of the Hungarian Army he needed only a modicum of military skill. That modicum he had. He had served in the Spanish Civil War and indeed had also had some military training in the Czechoslovak Army before that. After the Spanish Civil War he served in the Russian Army as an officer. He was, however, not regarded primarily as a military man and his first job after the war was as Undersecretary of Interior in charge of the organization of police. He was Deputy Secretary General of the Communist party and a member of the Politburo. In general his background and training, as that of all of the satellite Ministers of Defense whom we have studied except Rokossowski, was muc

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more that of the politician than of the military man. He had been engaged in revolutionary activities since 1920, when at the age of sixteen he participated in the Young Workers Movement in eastern Slovakia. Farkas when appointed Defense Minister was simply referred to as Comrade Farkas without military rank, and on the photograph of his oath-taking ceremony he appeared in mufti. This was not unnatural in Hungary, for his predecessors had also been civilians at the time of becoming Minister. The following May Day, however, he received a direct commission as Colonel General and took the salute of the parade in uniform, his breast covered with medals. In radio talks to the forces, he was often referred to as "Hungary's first soldier." Since his replacement as Minister of Defense Farkas has returned to civilian political activity. He is still a member of the Politburo.

During the period he headed it, Farkas was typical of the very top men in the Hungarian military establishment. Of five of these men on whom we have biographies (including the Minister and two Deputy Ministers) three formerly fought in the Spanish Civil War and two others were primarily Russian Army officers. Four had active Russian Army experience. None were simply Hungarian Communists with no military background, but at the same time all of them were Communists first and military professionals second. Like Farkas, who had been a printer's apprentice, then a revolutionary in Czechoslovakia, and then the holder of high political office before he moved into the army, so too had Nogradi, first Deputy Minister, been an iron worker and then a revolutionary in Czechoslovakia. After World War II Nogradi became Underscretary for Industry, Undersecretary at the Prime Minister's Office, and finally Vice-Chairman of the Committee for Appointment of Civil Servants before moving into the Ministry of Defense.

While the new military leadership of 1949 may have been professionally untrained, it would be a mistake to assume that the result was a disintegration of the Hungarian Army. On the contrary, as we have noted in each of the satellite countries, it was with the decision to build the satellite armies into important fighting forces that the Russians made the decision to subject each of them to major Communist control. This has been done most effectively in Poland, where the Communist control was exercised by well-trained professional Russian officers. The transitional compromise arrangements in Romania and Hungary were undoubtedly less satisfactory from the point of view of the Russians and so these armies have been given a smaller role and have been permitted a smaller build-up. But on the other hand, as soon as Farkas took over things began to happen. These may be summarized under three heads: 1) the complete imposition of Soviet rules, patterns, and methods of organization; 2) the rapid build-up of the army; and 3) a systematic effort to train a new generation of young, professionally qualified but politically loyal, officers who will some day take over from both the vestiges of the

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*701 *648 old career officers and from the Communist politicians, except perhaps in the very top post or posts.

In August 1950 Soviet military regulations were made compulsory in the Hungarian Army. At that time Nogradi explained in a speech that this action would inject "a new warrior spirit" into the army. "Having learned Stalinist strategy and tactics, our armed forces will be ready to fight and to win."[38]

[728] The new army did not long stay within the confines of the treaty of peace. According to Article 12 of the treaty, the armed forces were to consist of no more than 65,000 men. In December 1950 Marshal Tito estimated them at 165,000, and in July of 1951 Dedijer estimated them at 200,000.[39] They were already three times as numerous as permitted in the treaty. The build-up continued, however. The 1951 military expenditures were estimated to exceed those of 1949 and 1950 combined and to be ten times as great as those in 1948. Roads, railways, and air fields were built. Indeed even in the period since the death of Stalin the Hungarians announced a new and expanded build-up of their armed forces.

*701 *648 661 This expansion under Farkas was accompanied by accelerated purges. According to a speech which Farkas delivered in March 1951 the number of new officers in the Hungarian Army staff rose from 5.5 percent in January 1949 to 80.7 percent in January 1951. The new officers, he said, included 38.1 percent industrial workers, 20.5 percent agricultural workers, 13.5 percent peasants, 7.4 percent artisans and merchants, and 20.5 percent intellectuals.[40] The rapid increase in new officers meant both that old officers had been purged and that the number of officers had grown greatly. The two years after Farkas took over were years of the most rapid and profound change.

By 1953 the Hungarian Army had been transformed into a politically-acceptable force but its highly political leadership no longer met the needs for technical competence and had done its own job so well that it could be replaced. General Bata then took over.

*701 *648 It is, of course, difficult to get valid information on the new military structure. In 1950 the organization and administrative structure of the Ministry of Defense and of military offices became a secret even to the staff themselves. Organizational charts are no longer posted in the offices and name plates rarely appear on doors. Jurisdiction and spheres of activity are no longer clearly and publicly defined and amendments to the defense act are not published. In this respect, of course, Hungary is simply following the standard Iron Curtain pattern.

We have, however, for Hungary one set of data which we do not have for any of the other satellites and which tells us a little about the program for training a new officer corps composed of people who are both professionally qualified and politically loyal. For Hungary we have a small sample of biographies of colonels. Because they are

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not very prominent, their biographies tend to be sketchy, but we do have a few significant facts about them. Our sample contains nine colonels who are now in the Hungarian Army. They hold posts such as Deputy Chief of the Military Political Department, political officer in the department, head of the confidential group in that department, section chief at the Education Department in the Ministry of Defense, Deputy Chief of the Operational Department in the Ministry of Defense, two divisional commanders, and one regimental commander.

Of these men a very significant proportion are proletarian in origin. One was formerly an iron worker, another a butcher, another a locksmith, another a tailor's assistant, and another a factory laborer. Three of them were prisoners of the Russians during World War II. The four whose dates of birth we know were born in 1905, 1907, 1917, and 1919. If these four are at all representative, the group is fairly young ranging primarily between thirty-five and forty-five. Some of the ones in the political department tend to be either Jewish or of Jewish descent. None of the others in our sample are, however.

The most significant single fact about them is the recency of their training. While a number of them had seen military service earlier, their training as officers has generally been accomplished under the Communist regime. One of them was a reserve lieutenant in the Romanian Army before World War II and became a captain in the Hungarian Army immediately after the war. Another was a reserve second lieutenant of artillery before the war. Both of these became prisoners of war and were re-trained. Four others, however, are clearly "quickie" officers. One was recently sent to an infantry officers' course for six months and was made a lieutenant colonel upon graduation. Another was a Communist party secretary and was commissioned third lieutenant in 1945 in the military political department and has risen since. Another was a lawyer who was sent to school in Moscow in 1947 and upon his return was put into the military political department, and the fourth became an officer after a three-months' course of training in an anti-aircraft program within the last few years. We do not know the precise military course of three of the other colonels but we do know that their regular education stopped with four years or, in two cases, six years of elementary school, an educational background which would have completely excluded them from officers' ranks until the Communist program of training.

There is good reason to believe that the pattern here revealed is substantially similar to that in each of the other satellites for which we have no data on the field grade officers. If it is representative, we may conclude that it will not be long before these men rise to replace the men who were their chiefs under Farkas. The type of newly trained young man who is both politically reliable and at the same time has become a career army man or is being trained for it is

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apparently not confined to the company grade. On the contrary, such men have apparently penetrated by now almost up to the point just below general officer rank. It is at this point that we may expect something analogous to the 1938 purge of the Red Army to occur. It might be a mistake to expect it to take the same bloody and violent form. While that is not excluded, it seems likely that the Soviets will be more circumspect and subtle this time. Their objective of getting a professionalized group of officers, who at the same time have no ties to the old professional cadres, seems likely to be realizable without bloodshed in the visible future. Many of the present top-position holders will then undoubtedly lose their jobs and only the Minister and perhaps the Deputy Ministers will remain as representatives of solid party experience in much the same way as the Politburo in Russia has retained its dominance while the other old Bolsheviks have been eliminated in favor of new professional men.[41]

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NOTES

000 1. Protokoll des II. Welt Kongresses der Kommunistischen Internationale (Hamburg: 1921), p. 390.

1a. "The Role of Brains in the Total State," Commentary, August 1953, pp. 167-173.

2. Quoted in Reuben H. Markham, Rumania Under the Soviet Yoke (Boston: Meador Publishing Co., 1949), p. 407.

Cf. also the following statement from the Kosice program of the new Czech government, March 27, 1945: "Commissioning and promoting of officers shall not be based on formal rules only; extraordinary faster advancement (or commissioning) of the ablest . . . shall be supported." Za novou lidovou demokratickou armádu (Prague: Svoboda, 1945), pp. 7-11.

*701 *648 661 3. These were originally one. They were separated in Russia so the satellites followed suit. In 1950 Czechoslovakia, in November 1951 Poland, and September 1952 Romania, for example, separated them. Under the Malenkov regime in Russia, however, they were recombined under Beria. The satellites imitated and recombined them (e.g. the Czechs) in September 1953. After Beria was purged in Russia, they too were purged.

3a. But cf. Hans Speur, "Psychological Warfare Reconsidered" in Daniel Lerner and Harold Lasswell, The Policy Sciences (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1951) p. 266.

3b. Cf. Morris Janowitz, Working Paper on the Professional Soldier and Political Power (Mimeographed), Bureau of Government, Institute of Public Administration, University of Michigan, July 1953.

4. Spencer Wilkinson, War and Policy: Essays (London: Constable and Co. Ltd., 1910), p. 361.

5. Edward Shils and Morris J. Janowitz, "Cohesion and Disintegration in the Wehrmacht" in Daniel Lerner, Propaganda — War and Crisis (New York: George W. Stewart, 1951), p. 373.

5a. There is some reason to believe that in Russia itself after the death of Stalin the desired monolithic control was shaken. In the period before the purge of Beria, at least, there was a jockeying for power. Some observers believe that the Russian Army even now retains some potential independent power as against Malenkov and the party.

* 6. Op. cit.

*701 *648 874 7. The emphasis in the period since 1948 on military training was fully foreshadowed in the plans of the Russians as revealed in the Kosice program of the new Czech government in 1945. This announced that the government "shall request from the Red Army professors and instructors for instruction in the Czechoslovak military schools. It shall endeavor to send the largest possible number of the ablest officers to Soviet military schools, up to the highest military institutes and academies." Za novou lidovou demokratickou armádu pp. 7-11.

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SATELLITE GENERALS

7a. For example, the New York Times of August 4, 1951 reported that Marshal Govorov had started a course in Moscow for satellite staff officers.

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8. As a control we collected similar data on general officers in pre-Communist periods in those countries and on general officers in four non-Communist countries. The latter included: one democratic country, Sweden, and one country that has not generally been democratic, Japan; one country, Spain, in which the army, like the satellite armies, came into present form through civil war, though a civil war in which the outcome was an anti-Communist victory; and one country with a brand new but non-Communist army, namely India. The data on these control samples have not been as intensively analyzed as those on the satellites and are not reported here. Cf. Some Comparative Data on Military Elites, Hoover Institute, 1953. (Mimeographed.) The following table reports the number of biographies studied:

TABLE 1
TOTAL BIOGRAPHIES

China	129
Czechoslovakia	167
Hungary	173
India	65
Japan	294
Poland	152
Romania	132
Spain	179
Sweden	62
U.S.S.R.	217
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9. The nature of the armed forces of the countries with which we are concerned led to the overwhelming majority of the general officers studied being army officers.

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TABLE 2
SATELLITES

	Army	Navy	Air Force	Police and Security Troops	Combined Service Forces	Total
Czech						
1. 1918-44	85		3	5		93
2. 1945-48	35		2	2		39
3. 1948-	26		2	7		35

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TABLE 2 (Continued)

SATELLITES

	Army	Navy	Air Force	Police and Security Troops	Combined Service Forces	Total
Hungary						
1. Pre-1944	95	2	3	4		104
2. 1945-52	33		2	16		51
3. Police				18		18
Poland						
1. 1918-39	56	2				58
2. 1939-45	38	2	2			42
3. 1945-52	36	2	1	13		52
Romania						
1. Pre-1940	7	1		3		11
2. 1940-44	23	2	2	2		29
3. 1944-47	28	1	1	2		32
4. 1948-	44	1	2	13		60
China						
1. Nationalists	50	3	2		6	61
2. Communists	62	4	1	1		68

10. The leading Czechoslovak air force officer in Britain during the war was Brigadier General Karel Janousek, Inspector General of the Czechoslovak Air Force and an honorary Vice-Marshal of the RAF. General Janousek began his military career in the Austro-Hungarian Army in 1914 as a member of the 57th Infantry Regiment. Like Neumann he was a member of the Czechoslovak Legion which fought the Bolsheviks until 1920. There he served as a captain in the First Infantry Regiment. He was at the War College in Prague until 1923, at which time he was briefly assigned to the general staff. The following year, however, he was transferred to the air force. For the next decade and a half he alternated between general staff work and commands of various air force units. When the Germans took over Czechoslovakia, he escaped to France serving first there and then in England.

Another outstanding Czechoslovak officer was General Alois Liska, Commander of the Czechoslovak Brigade and later of the First Czechoslovak Tank Corps during World War II. He too served as first lieutenant in the Czechoslovak Legion in Russia until 1920. In the new Czechoslovak Army his career was largely with the artillery.

701 He served with the 51st Artillery Regiment and with the Land Artil-
*648 lery Command in Prague. By 1935 he was a colonel and commander of the 51st Artillery Regiment. He became a brigadier general only in exile during World War II, during which he showed unusual capabilities of command.

000 11. We excluded from our sample those generals over sixty in 1945 who were not taken into active positions on the theory that this might conceivably have been due to age rather than political factors.

12. K. M. Smogorzewski, "Soviet Satellite Armies in Europe," The Fortnightly, MXVII N.S., September 1951, p. 602.

12a. Hubert Ripka, Czechoslovakia Enslaved: the Story of the Communist Coup d'Etat (London: Victor Gollancz, 1950), p. 30.

13. Op. cit.

14. Lidova Demokracie, July 12, 1950.

15. In addition there are in our sample two who returned and died of natural causes shortly after the war so that it is not possible to classify them as having been either purged or not purged.

16. It will be recalled that we are omitting from our sample of available officers those who were more than sixty on the theory that failure to incorporate them into the new armies might have been simply on the grounds of age.

* 17. "Glos Polski," Toronto, Canada, September, 1951.

701 17a. A glance at the table of organization of the Polish high com-
*648 mand makes clear how small a role the career officers ever played and how completely they have been eliminated from leadership now.

661 Minister of National Defense: Zymierski (career officer) to 11/6/49; Rokossovski (Russian) since.

Deputy Minister and Chief of Staff: Korczyc (Russian) 1945 on.

Deputy Minister and Commander of Land Forces: Swierczewski (Russian) to 3/28/47; Poplawsky (Russian) since.

Deputy Minister and Chief of the Political Department: Several, all Polish C.P. militants.

Inspector Generals - all now Russian: Artillery, Engineers, Signal troops, Armored troops, etc.

Commander of the Air Force: Romeyko (Russian) to 1951; Turkel (Russian) since.

Commander in Chief of Navy: Steyer (career officer) to 1949; Cherokov (Russian) since.

Commanders of Military Districts

- Warsaw: Paszkiewicz (career officer) to 1948; Rotkevich (Russian) since.
- Bydgoszcz: Szylingowski (Russian) 1945; Poltuzycki (Russian) now.
- Wroclaw: Daniluk (career officer) to 1950; Strazhesky (Russian) since.
- Cracow: Mossor (career officer) 1945; Kieniewicz (Russian now.

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17b. These few old officers who remain have been reduced to minor positions. One is a military attaché, one in the general staff academy, one is curator of the state race horses, and the fourth in some unidentifiable minor position.

18. It is not clear whether the last of these men is still actually in the position to which we are assigning him. He was in that position in 1951, but there is some reason to believe that his position may have changed.

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19. Colonel Jozef Jaklicz, "Armia," Kultura, II, special issue, Paris 1952, pp. 62-99.

19a. Franciszek Jarecki, "Flights for Freedom Pierce Iron Curtain," Life, April 6, 1953, p. 32. Alexander T. Jordan, "Why Jarecki Flew West," Readers Digest, October 1953, pp. 110-14.

19b. News from Behind the Iron Curtain, Vol. II, No. 7, July 1953, p. 16.

19c. The intelligence school is different from the others in that candidates cannot volunteer for it directly. Intelligence officers are picked from among the other programs during the training period.

19d. Jaklicz, op. cit.

20. Cf. Thomas, William I. and Znaniecki, Florian. The Polish Peasant in Europe and America. (New York: A. A. Knopf, 192[illegible]

21. There are two journals of this name; one published in Poland and one in exile.

22. Bellona, 1948, Vol. 30 (1948) 2-3. London: Instytut Historyczny im. Gen. Sikorskiego.

23. Chief of the Governing Board of the Department of Political Education of the Polish Army.

24. Deputy Chairman for War Industry.

24a. It might be noted that the same focus on a limited number of highly political names occurs even in the officers training program. Lieutenant Jazwinski reported that for his political courses he had to learn the names and positions of Marshal Rokossovski and the four vice-ministers of national defense. Besides those he knew about Generals Swierczewski (Walter), Zymiersky, and Radkiewicz, all high-ranking political figures, past or current. In addition, he knew of General Romeyko, Commander of the Air Force at the time that Jazwinski was in school, and of General Turkel, his successor. For the rest he could not identify any of the Polish generals. This is merely one more indication of the severe limitation the Soviets put upon attention to broader political and military problems. Conversation focuses on divisional gossip concerning local people and events. The mass media focus on a few symbolic political figures. In between these two extremes there is a vast area about which communication and knowledge are severely restricted. This illustrates what Mr. Lerner has called the discipline of "limited perspectives."

25. Smogorzewski, op. cit., p. 597.

26. Markham, p. 413.

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27. Markham, op. cit., p. 419.
28. Markham, op. cit., p. 417.
29. Nation Roumaine, March 15, 1952; Ibid., January 1, 1952. That statistic, however, may involve some Communist juggling.
30. The structural outline of the Ministry of the Armed Forces in 1950 and 1951 was as follows:

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I. THE MINISTRY OF THE ARMED FORCES
1. Minister of the Armed Forces: General of the Army Emil Bodnaras
2. Deputy Ministers: Lieutenant General Leontin Salajan, Chief of Staff
Major General Viliam Suder, Inspector General of the Army—since replaced
Major General Nicolae Ceausescu
Major General Constantin Doncea (allegedly executed since)
3. Departments:
(1) Superior Political Department of the Army
(2) Department of Education and Instruction
(3) Department of Organization and Mobilization
(4) Department of Information and Counterespionage
(5) Department of Ground Forces
(6) Department of Air Forces
(7) Department of Naval Forces
(8) Department of Partisan Forces
(9) Department of Mechanized Forces
(10) Department of Motorized Forces
(11) Department of Artillery
(12) Department of Transportation and Communication
(13) Department of the Secretariat
(14) Department of Justice
(15) Department of Administration and Commissariat
(16) Department of Accounting
(17) Department of Sanitation

II. THE ARMY GENERAL STAFF
1. Chief of Staff: Lt. General Leontin Salajan
2. Deputy Chief of Staff: Maj. General Iacob Teclu

III. THE ACADEMY OF ADVANCED MILITARY STUDIES
1. Commandant: Major General Iosif Butoi

IV. THE ARMY COMMANDS: MILITARY REGIONS
1. Bucarest: Lt. Genl. Alexander Gavrilescu
2. Craiova:
3. Iasi: Lt. Genl. Stere Stefanescu
4. Cluj:

V. THE ARMY CORPS COMMANDS
1. First Army Corps: Craiova
2. Second Army Corps: Bucarest

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3. Third Army Corps: Iasi
4. Fourth Army Corps: Bacu
5. Fifth Army Corps: Brasov
6. Sixth Army Corps: Cluj
7. Seventh Army Corps: Sibiu
8. Mountain Corps: Targu Mures
9. Cavalry Corps: Timisoara
10. Motorised Corps: Bucarest
11. Air Corps: Bucarest
12. Navy: Constanta

The structural outline of the Ministry of Internal Affairs was as follows in 1950-51. In 1952 it must have been drastically changed for it was divided into two ministries, that of Interior and that of State Security. We have no reliable information on the present structure, however.

I. THE MINISTRY OF INTERNAL AFFAIRS (M.A.I.)

1. Minister of Internal Affairs: Major General Alexandru Draghici (now Minister of State Security)
2. The General Staff of the M.A.I. Troops
   (1) Chief of Staff
   (2) Political Department
   (3) Juridical Department
   (4) Department of the Militia
3. M.A.I. Troops (120,000)
   (1) Frontier Guards
   (2) Internal Security
      a. Information Section
      b. Counter-sabotage Section
      c. Investigation Section
      d. Operation Section
      e. Prosecution Section
      f. Cadres Section
      g. Secretariat
      h. Technical Section
   (3) Fire Troops
   (4) Aviation Units

30a. Buletinul Militar, I (1953) 5, p. 17.

31. "The Recruitment of Cadres in the Army of the Rumanian Popular Republic," Buletinul Militar, I (1953) 5.

31a. Ibid.

32. The Struggle Behind the Iron Curtain, (New York: The Macmillan Company, 1948), pp. 280ff.

33. Nagy, op. cit., pp. 311-19.

33a. A similar case of the use of a technician not in our sample is that of General Kalman Ternegy pulled out of prison where he was serving an eight-year sentence for collaboration with the Germans and made Inspector General of Artillery. Cf. Andrew Gyorgy's forthcoming publication on the take-over process in Hungary.

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800 33b. News from Behind the Iron Curtain, December 1953, Vol. II, No. 12, p. 5.

34. Presumably General Kondrateev.

35. Between 1923 and 1929 they graduated as first lieutenants.

36. Mimeographed, no date.

37. Smogorzewski, op. cit., p. 597.

38. Quoted in Ibid, p. 660.

39. Ibid.

40. News from Behind the Iron Curtain, Supplement, March 1-15, 1951, p. 7.

41. One other special sample which we have for Hungary and not for any of the other satellite countries is that of a group of police officers. It should be re-emphasized that these men have regular army ranks and that the relationship of the security troops under the State Security Authority and the troops under the Ministry of Defense is much closer in the Soviet world than in the West. It might be worthwhile here to give a couple of sample biographies.

Gabor Peter was until February 1953, when he was ousted, the head of the State Security Authority. He was perhaps the most notorious character in the entire Hungarian hierarchy. He was an old GPU man. Between 1919 and 1944 he frequently acted as courier between Budapest and Moscow. He was arrested a number of times. From 1941 to 1944 he lived in Russia. In 1944 he became head of the terror organ of the Hungarian Communist party and as such carried out a number of armed assignments against the Germans during the occupation. Then in the new Hungary he became head of the political department of the Budapest police in 1945. At that time he was a colonel. He rose to be lieutenant general in the Ministry of Interior and then when the Security Authority was separated, the head of the latter.

His father had been a village grocer. He himself became a tailor's assistant. He is of Jewish descent. He is small, flutters, minces, lisps, has a passion for flowers, which fill his office. To speak to him is like talking to "a fluttering maiden lady who has at last achieved a little garden plot of her own." He devised insidious tortures and methods for getting what he wants from his prisoners. He particularly liked to torment intellectual and formerly influential Jews.*

Another of these police characters is Ferenc Muennich. He is a man of about sixty. He went to law school and was a member of the Galilei Circle, a group of leftwing university students, during World War I. He joined the Communist party in 1918 and became chief of a unit known as Red Guards in the Bela Kun period. After the defeat of the Hungarian Communist regime he fled to Vienna.

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*Nicholas Nyaradi, My Ringside Seat in Moscow, New York: Thomas Y. Crowell, 1952.

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[For military organization in Czechoslovakia, Poland, Hungary, and Romania and for the Russian domination of the military in these satellite countries see category 116, pp. 1-117, 147-154]

[52] THE NEW PARTY STATUTES IN THE STATES OF THE EASTERN BLOC

665 In the course of the past year the statutes of the Communist parties of Bulgaria, Hungary, Czechoslovakia, Poland, and the Soviet occupation zone in Germany have been ratified anew at the party conventions of the respective countries. In the following pages these statutes will be compared with one another and with the statute of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union (CPSU) of October 1952. This comparison is of particular interest because the death of Stalin and the events that followed it intervened between the ratification of the statute of the CPSU and that of the other statutes. The effects of these events have given rise to a number of changes in the statutes, which can be determined to an equal degree in all the cases at hand.

In this connection it is particularly striking that the statute of the Bulgarian Communist Party was affected least of all by the events mentioned, and that in other respects too it is an almost literal copy -- with extremely few exceptions -- of the statute of the CPSU of 1952. Although the other statutes also seem to reflect very clearly the model of the Soviet statute, and although they too are largely merely literal translations, they nevertheless reveal many differences in details. The question of the extent to which these differences simply reflect differences resulting from the natural conditions in the country concerned, or actually reveal differences in the political structure, is a field wide open to conjecture and speculation. In any case, it is certain that the party statute is an excellent indication of the level of "development toward Socialism" which each country is thought to have attained in the opinion of the Communist ideologists, among them, undoubtedly, the Soviet ideologists primarily. In this respect the preamble especially is highly revealing. The preamble has the greatest significance as an explanation of the program. For this reason these preambles -- except in the [53] case of the SED -- will be reproduced in their entirety. The decrees concerning the relation of the party to the army and police units are also of particular interest.

The Hungarian statute is most strongly differentiated from that of the CPSU. This coincides strikingly with the fact that Hungary today occupies a unique position among the states of the Eastern bloc with respect to its economy as well as its internal political setup. In the statute of the Hungarian Communist Party centralization has been developed to the highest degree, leaving very little likelihood that party elements at the lower level might exert influence upon those at a high level. In comparing many individual details one gains the impression

665 that a weak internal stability is to be supported by all the organizational means available. It appears, paradoxically, that in Hungary it is easiest to be taken into the party and to be removed from it again.

In the comparison offered here, I have presented the material, as far as possible, without expressing any opinion about it, in order to leave the judgment up to the reader himself.

Those questions are dealt with first that concern several or all the countries under discussion. Individual countries are dealt with next, with the preamble of the party statute of each one, and with reference to individual points that represent special features of the country and have no counterparts in the other statutes or very few.

GENERAL OBSERVATIONS

In general--that is, with the exception of Bulgaria--concepts like "self-criticism and criticism from below," "party morale (or ethics)," "personal conduct of life" (in the sense of moral demands), and "fight against bureaucracy" are stressed somewhat more strongly.

The variations in the conceptual pattern ("establishment of socialism," instead of "establishment of communism," "people's democracy," or "sovereignty of the workers and farmers," instead of "Soviet order," and so forth) can already be observed, for the most part, from the preambles which are given below in their entirety. To these are added concepts like "national front," "struggle for the re-unification of Germany," and so on. With the exception of Bulgaria--in accordance with its political and geographical position--concepts like "imperialistic agencies," "influences hostile to the people," "remnants of capitalism," and so forth, play a role of some importance, which is not accorded them in the statute of the CPSU.

In all the statutes, the top level of the organization--that is, the executive organ of the central committee--is subdivided into a Politburo and Secretariat, a division such as was carried out de facto in the Soviet Union also after the death of Stalin. The short-lived institution of the party Presidium still exists only on paper in the statutes of the CPSU. The division of responsibility between the Politburo and the Secretariat is formulated in the Bulgarian statute as follows:

> 34. The Central Committee of the BCP will organize the Politburo to supervise the work of the Central Committee between the latter's plenary sessions and to carry on the current work of an organizational and executive character; likewise it will establish the Secretariat to control the carrying out of party

*665 decisions.

The corresponding paragraph in the remaining statutes is in almost literal agreement with this.

The organs set up for intraparty control are now again uniformly called party control commissions. In the Hungarian statute, as in that of the CPSU, the "Committee for Party Control of the Central Committee " possesses authority, that is, fully authorized agents, at the lower party levels, who are "independent of the local organs." In Germany and in Bulgaria, on the other hand, the local party control commissions are in each case appointed and organized by the corresponding (provincial, district, and regional) administrations and are entirely controlled in their activity by the Central Party Control Commission. The Central [54] Commission, on its part, must have its decisions confirmed by the Central Committee. In Poland, on the other hand, the local control commissions are established by the Central Control Commission and they work under its direction. In the Czech statute there are no decrees on the relationship of the Central Party Control Commission to the local control commissions. On the whole, however, the Central Control Commission is subordinated to the general party organs, or at least to the Central Committee. Its functions approximately correspond in all satellite parties to those provided in the statute of the CPSU for the Committee for Party Control of the Central Committee.

The revision commissions (among them also the Central Revision Commission) in none of the statutes reveal any essential differences from the decrees concerned which are contained in the statute of the CPSU. The local revision commissions are appointed by the highest local organ, the conference; they are responsible to it and they are ranked with the other local organs.

In all the statutes of the satellite parties the following sentence from the statute of the CPSU (Art. 59) is missing:

> In rank-and-file organizations with no more than 100 party members the work of the party will, as a rule, be performed by party functionaries who, at the same time, will not be exempted from production work.

The provisions contained in the statute of the CPSU concerning the question as to when a "broad discussion on the union scale" may be regarded as necessary (Art. 28), are lacking in all the other statutes. Likewise the preceding paragraph in the statute of the CPSU concerning the "free and objective discussion of questions involving party policies in the individual party organs or in the party as a whole (also Art. 28), is entirely left out in the Hungarian statute and in the Polish statute has been considerably shortened.

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In all the statutes -- with the exception of the Bulgarian -- the following paragraph, which likewise belongs in this context, is also missing:

> 30. In case the Central Committee does not convoke the extraordinary party convention within the time limit established in paragraph 29, the organizations which have called for the convening of the extraordinary party convention have the right to form an organization committee which will be empowered with the rights of the Central Committee in respect to the convening of the extraordinary party convention.

In the paragraph dealing with the "building up of the party and intraparty democracy" there was newly introduced in the Polish, the German, the Czech, and the Hungarian -- but not in the Bulgarian! -- party statute, a passage about the "principle of collective leadership." In the Czech text it reads as follows:

> 26. An integrating constituent of intraparty democracy is collective leadership. The collective leadership is the supreme principle for the actions and the decisions of all party organs and organizations. The application of the principle of collective leadership offers the best guarantee for the rightness of the decisions arrived at and secures wide latitude of initiative for the masses of the party. The principle of collective leadership in no way weakens personal responsibility. The cult of personality is contrary to the principles of a Marxist-Leninist party.

The other statutes read similarly, though phrased more briefly.

In all the statutes -- except for the Bulgarian -- the sentence from the statute of the CPSU (Art. 58) is missing:

> All the Communists who work in the central apparatus of a ministry belong to the party organization that embraces the entire ministry.

In Bulgaria and Hungary, as well as in the Soviet Union, party conferences on the highest (national or federal) level are not mentioned, but only those on a provicial, district, regional, and local scale. In Poland, Czechoslovakia, and Germany, on the other hand, such conferences have been provided for also on a nation-wide scale. Their tasks and the prerequisites for [55] their convening are treated in great detail. In the statute of the CP of Czechoslovakia the corresponding passage reads as follows:

> 35. In the time between the party conventions the Central Committee of the Communist Party of Czechoslovakia (KSC) will summon conferences on a nation wide scale to deal with

*665 urgent problems of party policy. The delegates to these nation-wide conferences shall be elected at the sessions of the provincial commissions. The number of the delegates and the quotas of representation shall be determined by the KSC. Members of the Central Committee of the KSC who were not elected as delegates will take part in the conference in a consulting capacity.

36. The nation-wide conference will be empowered with the right to alter the party statutes and to exchange a portion of the members of the Central Committee. It has the right to expel from the Central Committee certain of its individual members whom they feel are not certain properly to fulfill the duties of members of the Central Committee, and it has the right to replace them by others; this right extends, however, only to a fifth of the number of the members of the Central Committee elected by the party congress.

The nation-wide conference will complement the number of the members of the Central Committee of the KSC from the number of those candidates who were elected by the party congress, and in their place it shall elect the corresponding number of new candidates of the Central Committee.

37. The decisions of the nation-wide conference are to be confirmed by the Central Committee of the KSC; except for those decisions concerning the new election of members and candidates of the Central Committee. The decisions of the nation-wide conference that have been confirmed by the Central Committee shall be considered binding for all the organizations of the party.

The corresponding decrees in the statute of the SED have practically the same content. However, they are phrased more briefly, and in the Polish statute they have been confined to three sentences dealing with the convening, the election of the delegates, and the voting order of such conferences.

On the level of provinces, districts, regions, and so forth, the corresponding--ordinary and extraordinary--conferences are a kind of local party convention or delegates' gathering with powers that vary in specific details but are essentially the same in the Soviet Union as in the satellite states.

The provisions concerning size, organization, and method of operation of the rank-and-file organizations and their subdivisions (party groups) vary somewhat in details. In principle, however, they are the same in their basic structure and agree with the statute of the CPSU. Only Hungary to a certain extent occupies a special position with a number of additional decrees. (Compare below in the special paragraph

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dealing with the Hungarian statute.) The same applies to the lower local organizations, in which certain differences result wholly from a consideration of the respective economic structure and settlement pattern of the country concerned. The peculiar Soviet feature of the individual republics of the Union and of the autonomous republics and regions finds a counterpart, to a certain extent, in the relationship of the Communist Party of Slovakia and the Communist Party of the whole of Czechoslovakia.

In all the statutes the right to control the rank-and-file organizations is now established in their respective administrations, a feature which is also contained in the statute of the CPSU. Excepted from this are not only the ministries and central authorities (as in the statute of the CPSU), but also -- with the exception of Hungary -- all the other state administrative organizations. Here the rank-and-file organizations merely have responsibility for reporting defects that have come to their attention, and the like, to the higher-ranking authorities, that is, both to those of the party and of the state. The party organs on all levels, on the other hand, are expressly charged with the obligation of influencing, directing, and controlling the activities of the elected state bodies (as well as all the other public institutions and organizations), through the rank-and-file party organizations (in Poland it is a question of only the individual party members) which are contained within them. In Hungary however, these obligations are not transferred to the rank-and-file organizations, to be sure, but only to the middle and higher party organs (district, or city, or county, that is, Budapest). On the other hand, this general function, with respect to extent and effectiveness has been formulated much more concisely and more inclusively in the following sentence (Article 25b, and also Article 26b):

[56] ... it must constantly take care that the organs responsible for these matters put into effect the legal rights of the working people and apply all methods to the end that the material, social, and cultural interests of the people shall be satisfied in accordance with them.

The election of the party organs -- insofar as this has been provided for in the party statutes -- in Poland, Bulgaria, Hungary, and Germany must be "secret and democratic"; in the Soviet Union merely "secret"; and in Czechoslovakia it does not have to be either of the two.

The other statutes are more careful than the statute of the CPSU -- except for Hungary -- in threatening severe punishments by the party, especially expulsion from the party. Even the Bulgarian statute is somewhat milder in this matter, the Polish statute is downright

*665 anxious on this score, and the Czech and German statutes are somewhere in between. But while expulsion, as the severest punishment of the party, is used less as a threat and is for that reason not dealt with quite so fully, the other party sanctions, mentioned only very briefly in the statute of the CPSU, are accorded much more space, and in the Polish statute a special section ("II. Procedure Against Party Members in the Case of a Breach of Party Discipline") has even been dedicated to them.

The system of party sanctions is essentially uniform and provides for the following steps (according to the terminology of the statute of the SED):

Warning.
Reprimand.
Severe reprimand.
Temporary interdict to occupy a leading position in the party or in the apparatus of the state. (This step exists only in Bulgaria, Poland, and Czechoslovakia.)
Severe censure with threat of expulsion. (This step exists only in Bulgaria and Czechoslovakia.)
Demotion to the status of a candidate for the duration of at most one year. (Not contained in the Czech statute.)
Expulsion from the party.

The procedure in applying party sanctions is, by and large, uniform also, and it is dealt with in detail in the individual statutes. In all cases the person concerned has the right to present an appeal to higher party authorities. As a matter of principle the party sanctions are decreed by the individual's rank-and-file organization. In more serious cases, however, they must be confirmed by superior authorities. In the case of serious offenses, the superior authorities and the party control commissions are permitted to introduce party procedures and to decree party punishments.

It is only the Hungarian statute that is as free with the threat of expulsion from the party as that of the CPSU, and it says nothing more specific about the party punishments. Even the decree contained in the statute of the CPSU, as in all the other statutes, enjoining "the highest degree of caution and comradely care" and a "careful testing of the complete accuracy of the accusations preferred against the party member" (Article 14, CPSU), has been omitted in the Hungarian statute. Aside from this, the Hungarian and Czech statutes are the only ones that do not have an article corresponding to Article 13 of the statute of the CPSU, which states:

In those cases in which a member of the party has committed

665 offenses punishable by law, he will be expelled from the party, and at the same time the administrative and judicial authorities will be notified concerning the offense.

In being taken into the party the individual who is applying for membership must pass through a period of candidacy. This period has been set at:

One Year in the Soviet Union, in Bulgaria, and in Poland. (In Poland it may, in exceptional cases, be reduced to a period of six month.)

Two years in Czechoslovakia. In the case of workers who have been working for more than two years in industrial production, however, it is only one year.

[57] One half to two years in the SED (that is, one half year "for workers and agricultural workers who, before they applied for membership, were active in industry or in agriculture for a period of at least five years," as well as "for young workers and agricultural workers"; one year "for all remaining workers, craftsmen, and other lower technical leadership cadres, for members of agricultural production associations"; two years "for employees, active independent farmers, manual laborers, members of the intelligentsia, and all others.")

One half year in Hungary. (However, in exceptional cases, the period of candidacy may be dispensed with altogether.)

To be accepted as a candidate, the individual applicant needs recommendations from members of the party with the following qualifications:

In the Soviet Union and in Bulgaria from three members who have been in the party for at least three years.

In Czechoslovakia and in the SED from two members who have been in the party for at least two years.

In Poland and Hungary from two members who have been in the party for at least one year.

The person presenting the recommendation must be well acquainted with the person he recommends for at least one year -- six months in Hungary -- on the basis of common work.

Taking in former members of other parties is made particularly difficult, and among its prerequisites are five recommendations from party members of many years' standing. An exception to this is the Polish statute, which has no such provision. In the statute of the SED this decree has reference only to parties founded there after 1945. (It therefore is not applicable, for instance, to former members

665 of the NSDAP, Nationalsozialistische Deutsche Arbeiterpartei.)

One of the required recommendations can, in the case of applicants who have come from the Communist youth organization of the country concerned, be replaced by the recommendation of this organization.. This does not, apply to Poland or Czechoslovakia, however. This is undoubtedly related to the fact that in the Czech statute the youth organization and its relation to the party is not mentioned at all, and mentioned comparatively briefly in the Polish statute. On the other hand, in Poland (as in the Soviet Union), "the youth up to the age of twenty is admitted into the party exclusively from the ranks of the Federation of Polish Youth."

In all the statutes -- except the Hungarian -- the desire is clearly evident to see to it that the candidates, after the period of their candidacy has elapsed, will actually either be taken into the party as members, or -- as the case may be -- will be rejected and crossed off the list of candidates. There are to be no "perpetual candidates."

The ordinary party congress, the highest organ of the party in the country, is supposed to be convened every four years (in Poland and in Hungary every three years). The plenary session of the Central Committee is supposed to convene every six months in the Soviet Union and in Czechoslovakia, every four months in Poland and in Germany, every three months in Bulgaria and Hungary. The plenary conference on the next level (province, vojvod ship, federal republic, and so forth) is to be summoned every two years in Czechoslovakia, Hungary, and Germany, every year and a half in the Soviet Union, every year in Poland and Bulgaria. The plenary session of the provincial committee is supposed to convene at least every three months in Hungary, every two months in the Soviet Union, Bulgaria, and Poland, every six weeks in Germany and Czechoslovakia.

PARTY AND ARMED FORCES - POLICE AND TRAFFIC SYSTEM

Poland:

55. In military units (army, air force, navy) the party organizations carry out their activities on the basis of special instructions. The work of the party in the army is directed by the chief political administration of the Polish Army. This administration possesses the authority of a department of the Central Committee.

665 Czechoslovakia:

72. The members of the party and candidates (for party membership) in the armed forces join formation organizations as rank-and-file organizations. The founding and work of these formation organizations will be carried out according to the principles laid down by the Central Committee of the KSC.

[587] In the version of the Czech statute of December 18, 1952, the "National Security Corps" (that is, the police, gendarmerie), had been included in this regulation.

Soviet Occupation Zone in Germany:

74. The party organizations in the People's Police assigned to barracks and in the traffic system will work on the basis of special instructions confirmed by the Central Committee.

Their political organs are obligated to maintain close contact with local party administrations.

Bulgaria:

The corresponding paragraph in the Bulgarian statute (IX, Arts. 60 to 62) is considerably more detailed and reproduces word for word paragraph X of the statute of the CPSU. The troop units of the Ministry of the Interior are expressly included in the regulation, however, while in the statute of the CPSU they were not even mentioned.

Hungary:

The corresponding paragraph (39) agrees literally with the statute of the CPSU, except that it does not contain the provision concerning a minimum period of party membership for higher functionaries, a provision which is missing elsewhere also throughout the Hungarian statute (see below).

SOVIET UNION

1. The Communist Party of the Soviet Union /CPSU/ is a voluntary fighting federation of like-minded persons, of Comminists organized from members of the working class, from the class of actively working farmers, and from the creative intelligentsia.

After the CPSU had organized the union of the workers' class and of the actively working class of farmers, it accomplished through struggle, as a result of the great October Revolution of 1917, the

*665 fall from power of the capitalists and great landowners, the establishment of the dictatorship of the proletariat, the liquidation of capitalism, and the abolition of the exploitation of man by man, and it guaranteed the establishment of a socialist society.

Now the chief tasks of the CPSU are to build up a comunistic society by a gradual transition from Socialism to Communism, constantly to raise the material and cultural level of this society, to educate the members of the society in the spirit of internationalism and the establishment of fraternal associations among the workers of all countries; and to consolidate in every way possible the active defense of the Soviet homeland against aggressive actions from her enemies.

BULGARIA

1. The Bulgarian Communist Party [BCP] is a voluntary fighting federation of like-minded persons, of Communists organized from members of the working class, from the class of actively working farmers, and from the creative intelligentsia. In its activities it is guided by the theory of Marxist-Leninism.

Under the influence of the great Socialist October Revolution the party of loyal Socialists, which had arisen and been set up as the Marxist party of the workers' class in Bulgaria, in relentless battle against reformism and leftist radicalism, had changed its name to the Bulgarian Communist Party in 1919. By ceaslessly learning from the CPSU, it became organized and grew up into a strongly militant Marxist-Leninist party. It succeeded in organizing the union of the working class and the farmers on the basis of the personal historic experience of the workers of our country, and it managed to place itself at their helm. In the years of the Second World War it united in the Fatherland Front the patriotic forces of the people in the battle against fascism and for the national liberty and independence of Bulgaria. In the favorable international situation which had come into existence as a result of the victory of the Soviet Union in the war, the BKP, finding

*665 immediate support in the arrival of the victorious army of the Soviet liberators in the Balkans, organized an armed anti-imperialist and anti-fascist popular uprising, destroyed the fascist dictatorship on September 9, 1944, and established a popular democratic government as its own form of the dictatorship of the proletariat. By making use of the disinterested, altruistic help of the Soviet Union and of the historic experience of the CPSU, the BKP, in fraternal co-operation with other countries of the people's democracy, proceeded to the socialistic transformation of the country.

[59] Now the main tasks of the BKP are to give capitalism its final deathblow; to eliminate any and all exploitation of man by man, and to guarantee the establishment of a socialistic society, to raise the material and cultural level of the workers constantly, to cement the union of the working class with the actively working farmers' class, to educate the workers in the spirit of socialistic patriotism, internationalism, and the re-establishment of fraternal associations with the workers of all countries, to solidify Bulgarian-Soviet friendship as the most important impetus to our socialistic development; and to strengthen by all forces available the active defense of the fatherland against the aggressive actions of its enemies.

The final goal of the party is the establishment of a communistic society.

Probably purely formal significance is the provision stipulating that an absolute and not a relative majority is required for the election of functionaries and party organs. As a rule it may be assumed that such elections produce the usual 90 to 100 percent in favor of the proposed candidate anyway.

POLAND

The United Polish Workers' Party [PZPR] is the leading organized department of the Polish working class, the leading force of the Polish people. It is the highest organizational form of the working class and the mouthpiece for the interests of the workers in the city and on the land.

The PZPR is guided in its activities by the doctrine of

*665 Marxist-Leninism.

The PZPR leads the people on the path that has been opened up to humanity by the great Socialist October Revolution. The Polish people entered upon this course thanks to the historic victory of the Soviet Union over Hitlerite fascism, thanks to the liberation of the homeland from the yoke of the Hitlerite occupation, and, finally, thanks to the victorious attainment of sovereignty on the part of the workers with the working class at their head.

The creation of the United Polish Workers' Party terminated the more than fifty-year-old schism in the ranks of the Polish working class. It brought about the victory of Marxist-Leninism over reformism and nationalism.

The creation of the PZPR strengthened the forces of the working class and heightened their leading role in the battle of the creative proletariat for the consolidation of the people's democracy, for the strengthening of Polish independence, in the battle for the destruction of the resistance on the part of the capitalistic forces supported by imperialism, in the battle for the establishment of Socialism.

The PZPR is ceaselessly cementing the union of the workers and the farmers as the unshakable foundation of the sovereignty of the people. It guarantees the interconnection of city and rural districts, leads the struggle of farmers with small or medium-sized farms against exploitation by the kulaks, until the final, complete annihilation of the latter, and it marches forward on the course that creates the preconditions for the planned, voluntary rise of the farming masses to the socialist economy, on the path of swift and thorough-going advance in well-being and culture throughout the country.

The PZPR unites the intelligentsia with the masses of the people in the establishment of Socialism, in the endeavor to extend education and culture, and to promote the flowering of the sciences and arts. It endeavors to guarantee work for the youth of the workers, farmers, and intellectuals, and to assure their general progress and development. It supports the ZMP (Federation of Polish Youth), the leading organization of the younger generation.

The PZPR practices full equality for woman by providing her with possibilities of working and being active in all areas of life, in the state, in the economy, as well as in the social

*665 life. This is done especially through a constantly more inclusive care program of state protection for mother and child.

The PZPR strives for the union of all patriotic forces in society within the ranks of the National Front on behalf of the people's Poland, its development and its progress, in the name of the fight for freedom among peoples, against the aggressive intentions of the enemies of the Polish people--both the remnants of capitalism in the country itself and hostile imperialistic forces.

The PZPR is the preserver of the best traditions of the fighters of the Polish people for freedom and for social progress.

The PZPR is the heir of the revolutionary tradition of the Polish workers' movement and of the international proletariat, the SDKPiL, KPP, PPR, and of the left unity wing of the PPS.

The PZPR proceeds in harmony with the principles of the international solidarity of the working class, and it draws its doctrine from the struggles of the Polish and the international workers' movement, in particular from the experience of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union, the leading section of the world-wide workers' movement, organizer and leader of the victorious revolution and of the establishment of Communism in the Soviet Union.

The PZPR firmly combines the preservation of independence and the establishment of Socialism in Poland with the fight for freedom by the international camp of democracy and Socialism against hostile imperialistic forces and fascism, for peace, human freedom, democracy, and Socialism. This campaign is being conducted under the leadership of the Soviet Union.

The historic victories of the Polish workers, achieved under the leadership of the PZPR, are contained in the constitution of the Polish people's republic, that great charter of the freedom of the Polish people.

The PZPR constitutes a fighting organization of one mold. It is ceaselessly increasing the number of its workers and drawing its strength from the solidarity of its ranks, from the unity of its will and its activity.

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The most important tasks of the PZPR today are: Creating a socialistic society, guaranteeing constant growth in the well-being and the culture of the working class, as well as of all workers in the city and in the country, by means of constant development of production on the basis of improved technique; educating the members of society in the spirit of patriotism and internationalism; strengthening the people's state and consolidating the defense of the fatherland.

The prerequisites for membership in the party do not exclude--as they do in the CPSU--every employer from the outset. The following can become members:

Workers, farmers, with small and medium-sized farms, members of the intellegentsia, and every person actively engaged in work, who feels himself called to it, who is active, who has confidence in his environment, and is dedicated to the cause of Socialism.

The decrees concerning the duties of the party members are phrased somewhat differently from those in the statutes of the CPSU. For example, the paragraph about the choice of cadre is missing (choice according to aptitude only, not according to personal relations), though it appears in the other party statutes. The stipulations concerning uniform party discipline, lack of candor toward the party, watchfulness, and the keeping of party and state secrets are stated more briefly. On the other hand, some duties are enumerated which clearly show an endeavor to increase the significance of the party and of its members in daily political and economic life, and to heighten its influence upon those who are not members. Of the party member is required, among other things (Article 2.):

...to take an active part in the political life of the party and of the country, to be ready to sacrifice himself for the cause of the working people against exploiters, to fight against imperialistic fascism and reactionary forces, to consolidate the international solidarity of the working class, to serve native Poles and the cause of Socialism faithfully....

...to organize the people for the struggle to accomplish the tasks of the party....

*665

> ...to protect the integrity of the party ranks, to preserve the high moral level of the party member....
>
> ...by personal example to spur on those who are not members of the party to raise their working productivity and their working discipline.

Particularly detailed is the provision that the person who recommends someone for acceptance into the party "should in so doing be convinced that he is recommending a valuable companion to the party. A party member who has given his recommendation lightly or not in good faith will be held responsible for this by the party." This sentence seems all the more severe in view of the fact that elsewhere in the Polish statute practically no threats of punishment are expressed.

For the endeavor to counteract the passivity of many members of the party, and to stir them to action, the following sentence, which is not included in the statute of the CPSU, is also highly characteristic:

> A member of the party who has not taken part in the life of the party for a fairly long time, who does not take part in the work of the party organization, and is indifferent toward the party, can (!) be struck off the list of the party members.

No compulsory minimum period of party membership is provided for in Poland for secretaries of the Vojvod-ship and of the district committees or of the rank-and-file organizations.

Of the tasks of the rank-and-file organizations--besides those that are mentioned in the statute of the CPSU--the following are named: To campaign against reactionary propaganda and sabotage in the /61/ economy; to increase the watchfulness of the masses of the people with respect to all misdeeds of the internal and external enemies of the people's Poland; to provide for the proper development of the labor unions, the fraternal associations, and other social institutions; to protect the political, moral, and professional education of youth.

The Polish Central Committee is able itself to depose individual members of its organization and to replace them by new ones (who already were Central Committee candidates once before). But,

their number may not exceed at any time one fifth of the total number of committee members elected by the party convention. 665

CZECHOSLOVAKIA

1. The Communist Party of Czechoslovakia (KSC) is a voluntary fighting federation of like-minded persons, Communists organized from members of the working class, of the actively working farmers' class, and of the creative intelligentsia. In its activities it is guided by the theory of Marxist-Leninism.

The KSC, which organized the union of the working class of the actively working farmers' class, and of the creative intelligentsia, in order to break the power of the exploiting classes and to renew national freedom, achieved, as a result of the historic victory of the Soviet Union over German fascism, the founding of the people's democratic order, and with the help of the Soviet Union it brought about the establishment of Socialism in Czechoslovakia.

Making use of the rich experience of the CPSU, the KSC set as its main task: to build up a socialistic order of society, constantly to raise the material and cultural level of the working people, to educate the working people in the spirit of socialistic patriotism and proletarian internationalism, faithfulness, and friendship towards the Soviet Union, and in the creation of fraternal associations with the working people of all countries; and to consolidate the active defense of the homeland against the aggressive actions of its enemies.

The final goal of the party is the establishment of a Communist society.

The decrees concerning the organizations and highest organs of the Communist Party of Slovakia (KSS)--subordinated to the KSC, but to a certain degree autonomous-correspond to those of the KSC except for the two provisions:

> ...The Central Committee of the KSS proposes to the KSC the representatives (of the party) for the autonomous provincial government (sbor povereniku) and for the Slovakian National Council....

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> ...will at regular intervals account to the KSC concerning its activities.

Concerning the tasks of rank-and-file organization it is stated--aside from the decrees contained in the statute of the CPSU--that it must

> ...help the members of the party and the candidates who have been entrusted with a public function or who are performing work outside the party, to fulfill their duties in an exemplary manner and to see to it that they are responsible to the party organs for this activity of theirs.

SOVIET OCCUPATION ZONE IN GERMANY

Since the text of the SED statute is, comparatively, more easily accessible to the German reader, a reproduction of the preamble has been dispensed with here. The new statute of the SED was published for the first time in "Neues Deutschland" for April 10, 1954.

Employers are not excluded from membership in the party as a matter of principle:

> As members of the party are accepted those workers who are active and dedicated to the cause of the party, employees, farmers who are members of co-operatives, independent, actively working farmers and manual laborers, as well as members of the intelligentsia.

Of the members of the party it is required--over and above the duties contained in the statute of the CPSU--that they take part in the life of the party and attend the party gatherings; convince and win over the masses, and learn from them; be an example not only in professional but also in political and personal life. The passage about uniform party discipline, which in its first draft corresponded exactly to the statute of the CPSU, has been greatly shortened in the final version.

[62] Criticism of party members and party functionaries is expressly permitted, not only at the party gatherings but also in the party's daily press.

In the SED the party member has the obligation not only--as in Czechoslovakia--to report any change in job or change in residence

but he must even inform the party beforehand of his intention to make such a change. (The statutes of the CPSU and of the other countries contain no provisions whatever concerning the duty to make reports.) 665

Paragraph IX ("Party and Free German Youth") contains a recognition of the work of the FDJ (Freie Deutsch Jugend: Free German Youth). In spirit it virtually corresponds with the parallel paragraph in the statute of the CPSU, in its formulation, however, it diverges from it to a considerable degree.

HUNGARY

1. The name of the party is: Hungarian Workers' Party (MDP). The MDP is the party of the working class, of the actively working people. In its ranks it unites the progressive forces of the Hungarian people: the working class, the working farmers, and the best among the intellectuals. The party is a voluntary fighting federation. In its actions it is guided by the teachings of Marx--Engels--Lenin--Stalin.

The MDP preserves faithfully the revolutionary heritage of the Hungarian working class. It is the continuation of the glorious battle for freedom of the Hungarian people and it perpetuates and further develops the progressive tendencies of Hungarian history.

The MDP created the unity of the working class and the fraternal confederation between the workers and the active farmers. Under the leadership of the party and with the help of the mighty Soviet Union as it liberated our fatherland, the Hungarian people terminated the sovereignty of the exploiters and created in Hungary the people's democratic order. The party educates--in the spirit of socialistic patriotism and of proletarian internationalism--the workers' class and the Hungarian people toward friendship with the peoples of the Soviet Union and the workers of the world, and by all means at its command it consolidates the defense of the fatherland.

The highest task of the MDP is the establishment of a socialist society, the constant raising of the material and cultural level of the working people. The final goal of the party is the establishment of a communistic society.

In divergence from all the other statutes it gives no provisions

665 stipulating that members and candidates of the Central Committee may not present recommendations for persons who want to enter the party for the first time. Likewise there are no provisions concerning a special procedure in expelling members of the Central Committee from the party.

In paragraph V ("The Organizational Structure of the Party"), in the title of which no mention is made of "intraparty democracy," Article 26 of the statute of the CPSU is missing. It states:

> 26. At the elections of the party organs the voting by lists is prohibited. Each individual candidatry must be voted upon, on which occasion all party members are guaranteed the absolute right to reject candidates and to criticize them....

In the paragraph dealing with the highest organs of the party the provision ordinarily contained in all the statutes is not mentioned:

> The party convention is considered as empowered to make decisions if no less than half the number of all the members of the party who were represented at the last regular party convention are represented at it.

Concerning the Central Committee there is the following additional statement (Article 17):

> The members of the Central Committee have equal rights. The members of the Central Committee (thus not only those of the Politburo, or of the Secretariat, and so forth) must be informed about all important questions.

The sentence above concerning the equal rights of the members of the Committee is a stereotype that recurs in all the subordinate party organs.

It is expressly stipulated (Article 18c) that the First Secretary of the Central Committee is to be elected by the Central Committee itself (and not by the party congress). In exceptional cases the Central Committee may co-opt new members in the intervals between the party /63/ congresses, but only up to 15 per cent of the full complement of its members (Article 20).

Neither for the Central Committee secretaries nor for other party functionaries is a minimum period of membership in the party required, as is the case in the other countries. For this, on the other hand, even in the rank-and-file organizations, the First Secretary who has been elected must be confirmed by the Central Committee.

Among the responsibilities of the Central Commission there is

145* mentioned expressly (Article 21c), among others, that it is supposed

> ...to guard against the possibility of elements that are harmful to the working population and to the moral standards, as well as enemies of the people, insinuating themselves into the party.

Concerning the duties of the lower organs of the party, the following sentence (Article 26c) is to be found, which shows the importance attached to work in the fields:

> The regional party committee is the rank-and-file organization designed to steer the village party organizations. Through responsible political action the development of the machine stations, the agricultural co-operatives (Kolchose), and the state farms (Sowchose) is to be guaranteed. The political work among the workers at the machine stations, the agricultural co-operatives, and the state farms, as well as among the working farmers with individual farmsteads, must constantly be cultivated. Care must be taken for the constant consolidation of the association between the workers' class and the working farmers' class, as well as for the improvement of the work of the village party organizations so that agricultural production will constantly be raised.

To this corresponds Article 32b, according to which it is the task of the rank-and-file organizations--

> ...forcefully to arouse the workers in the factories, in the machine stations, on the state farms, and in all places of production, by means of the work of political enlightenment; to contribute to the fulfillment of the plan, to the raising of productivity, improvement of quality, consolidation of working discipline, to the development of working contests and to the movement of peak-production workers. In the villages it must educate through its work of political enlightenment the members of the agricultural co-operatives and the active independent farmers toward the improvement of the agricultural economy and the raising of production....

Also the fact that for "field workers and active farmer" in general the lowest membership fee of all has been set (Article 54) shows the interest in the work on the land.

The strong centralization within the party finds expression, among other things, in Articles 30 and 51, to which there are no corresponding articles in the statutes of the other countries:

*665

30. The local party committees are to be confirmed, in the final analysis, by the Central Committee. The Central Committee is entitled, in cases in which sufficient grounds for doing so seem to exist, to dissolve individual party committees or to annul the election of individual members of the party committees. Under extraordinary circumstances the Central Committee is empowered to appoint an interim party committee.

51. The Central Committee may start proceedings against each and any member of the party who is harming the interests or the discipline of the party, and it may resort to measures which will restore order. The Central Committee is empowered to dissolve such party organizations as appear to counteract the goals and the principles or the statute of the party.

The last-named article belongs in the special section(XIV), which deals with party discipline. This section exists in the Hungarian--elsewhere only in the Polish--statute. Its introductory sentences (Article 42) are couched in an extremely emphatic way. They demand a "truly iron discipline" and they conclude with the words:

> The MDP can only preserve its unity and its strength through an unrelenting campaign against seditious and undisciplined elements.

The following articles of this section are also worthy of note:

44. The party committees...shall elect disciplinary commissions from their ranks. These commissions shall investigate questions of a disciplinary nature, and they shall report about them to the party committee.

50. Decisions concerning expulsion from the party or other disciplinary punishments may not be made public without prior permission from the higher party organ or from the Central Control Commission.

The Editors

10: Mehnert
665

E1 Europe E1

[For a discussion of the influence of the statute of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union of October 1952 on the party statutes in the states of the eastern bloc (i.e. Bulgaria, Hungary, Czechoslovakia, Poland and East Germany) and a reprint of the preambles to the respective party statutes, see E1 Europe, 10: Mehnert, category 116, entire source]

2: Milosz S-5 (no date)1953 El Europe El

swallowing live frogs; and, thus rationally convinced, he may swallow a first frog, then the second; but at the third his stomach will revolt. In the same way, the growing influence of the doctrine on my way of thinking came up against the resistance of my whole nature.

The decision to refuse all complicity with the tyranny of the East—is this enough to satisfy one's conscience? I do not think so. I have won my freedom; but let me not forget that I stand in daily risk of losing it once more. For in the West also one experiences the pressure to conform —to conform, that is, with a system which is the opposite of the one I have escaped from. The difference is that in the West one may resist such pressure without being held guilty of a mortal sin.

My book takes the reader into the world inhabited by the intellectuals of Warsaw, Prague, Bucharest, and Budapest. It is a world familiar to me, but it may well seem to him foreign and even exotic. I try to explain how the human mind functions in the people's democracies. If I have been able to write this book, it is because the system invented by Moscow has seemed, and still seems to me infinitely strange. Any civilization, if one looks at it with an assumption of naive simplicity (as Swift looked at the England of his day), will present a number of bizarre features which men accept as perfectly natural because they are familiar. But nowhere is this so marked as in the new civilization of the East, which moulds the lives of eight hundred millions of human beings. We are, I think, only beginning to understand it, and in years to come thousands of books will be devoted to the study of this stupefying and loathsome phenomenon.

This book is at the same time a battlefield, in which I have given shape to my combats with the doctrine I have rejected. This, then, explains my method of writing; I give

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12/ the enemy his arms, I follow his arguments, at times I even copy his way of reasoning. In other words, I seek to create afresh the stages by which the mind gives way to compulsion from without, and to trace the road along which men in people's democracies are led on to orthodoxy.

4: Wszelaki U-4 (no date) 1952 El Europe El

Introduction

121 SINCE 1948-1949 an industrial revolution has been taking place in the mid-European area now controlled by the satellite governments which in turn are controlled by Soviet Russia. According to the long-range plans adopted by the governments of Eastern Germany, Czechoslovakia, Poland, Hungary, Rumania, Bulgaria and Albania, several thousand new, large and medium-sized industrial plants (including mines and power plants) are being erected all over the captive area, while thousands of existing plants are being modernized, developed and extended. A score or two of the new plants under construction, or still in the blueprint stage, may be described as huge even by American standards. A large part of this program — possibly as much as half of it — had already been implemented by the end of 1951, with the result that the heavy industrial potential of the area has been doubled in comparison with that of 1938. At least, that is what the leading Communist economists of the area are claiming.[1] The other half of the program remains to be fulfilled by the end of 1954 or the beginning of 1955 when the present five or six year plans are expected to terminate in most of the captive area. Under relentless pressure of the Soviet Union, the satellite governments are doing everything in their power to fulfill and overfulfill the prescribed program if possible ahead of schedule. The issue of the armament race between the West and the Soviet Empire depends very largely on the success or failure of the industrial development of captive Europe.

The feasibility of this huge program depends in turn on the fuel and power at the disposal of the satellite governments at present and during the next few years. The captive area cannot count upon any large-scale importation of fuel and power from

121 outside — though there are small local exceptions to this rule — and must itself produce enough not only to cover all its own present and future requirements but also to export considerable amounts of coal and oil to Russia and Western Europe. As the demand for fuel and power for industry, transportation and domestic use is increasing fast, the captive area must develop its supply of fuel and power at a correspondingly rapid rate. If it does not, the long-range economic plans will not be fulfilled in time.

Theoretically, a large increase in the output of fuel and power is feasible. The mid-European captive area possesses considerable wealth in sources of fuel and power, a great part of which has not yet been fully exploited. Among these resources, the great Silesian coal field, now shared by Poland and Czechoslovakia, with its reserves equal to, if not larger than, those of the Ruhr basin in Germany, is undoubtedly the most important. The area also possesses enormous reserves of lignite in Eastern Germany and Bohemia, petroleum in Rumania, Albania and the Soviet zone of Austria, and considerable water power in the basins of the Danube, the Vistula, and the Balkan rivers. Because of its coal, lignite and water power, the area is already producing much electric power and is capable of producing in the near future twice or even three times as much, thus reaching the Western European level of production.

Practically, however, the implementation of the vast program is meeting with many difficulties, and will meet with more in the near future.

A more detailed analysis of the fuel and power production in the captive area, both actual and planned, follows.

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FOOTNOTES

[1] Hilary Minc, *A Fruitful Collaboration of Free Peoples*, quoted after *Pravda*, Moscow, by *Zycie Gospodarcze* (Economic Life), Warsaw, 1951, No. 19. Minc states that, in comparison with 1938, the total industrial output in the first half of 1951 reached 165 percent in Czechoslovakia, 208 percent in Rumania, 268 percent in Poland, 273 percent in Hungary and 335 percent in Bulgaria, while that of Albania reached 423 percent in 1950. The 1938 level of the industrial output in the Soviet zone of Germany was exceeded towards the end of 1950, and by the middle of 1951 might have reached 115 percent of the 1938 production. 113 121 ●

[2] Jean Chardonnet, *Les conséquences économiques de la guerre*, Paris, Hachette, 1947. [113]

[3] No detailed exact figures of the coal output in the Silesian-Ostravan basin can be given. It is not easy to distinguish it statistically from the global data of output in Poland and Czechoslovakia, both of which have coal mines outside of that basin. The annual and long-range plans of all captive countries are based only upon such global data and do not make distinction between the production of individual basins. 316 443

[4] Hungarian, Rumanian and Bulgarian statistics do not make sufficient distinction between black and brown coal. Figures concerning the coal output in these three countries are estimated according to the ratio between the output of the two kinds of coal as known from previous statistics. That ratio is supposed to be constant.

[5] During the third quarter of 1951 the plan for coal extraction in Eastern Germany was not entirely fulfilled, yet output increased by 11.5 percent in comparison with the corresponding quarter of 1950 (*Wirtschaft*, Berlin, 1951, No. 43). The minor Czech coal basins were by the end of September 1951, about 150,000 tons, *i.e.*, some 3 or 4 percent behind the prescribed target (speech by Premier Zápotocký, *Rude Pravo*, Prague, 1 November 1951). The Hungarian coal and lignite mines were 6 percent behind the plan for the second quarter of 1951, and 10 percent behind that for the third quarter (*Nepszava*, Budapest, 23 October 1951); yet an official report claimed that in the second quarter of 1951 the output of both black and brown coal exceeded by 22 percent that of the second quarter of 1950 (*Gospodarka Planowa*, Warsaw, 1951, No. 9); the Tatabánya black coal mines were responsible for almost half the coal deficit (speech by Rakosi, *Nepszava*, 23 October 1951). In Rumania the situation was apparently somewhat

5: Free Europe Committee U-4 (no date) 1954 E1 Europe E1

PREFACE

N. S. Khrushchev's speech of September 8, 1953, in which the dismal state of Soviet agriculture was first acknowledged by a top Soviet leader, and the splurge of agricultural concessions offered by Soviet and Satellite governments in the ensuing months, have focused widespread attention in the Western World on the question of the viability of the Communist agricultural system. 121

Many Western observers have long been convinced that the nature of Soviet economic growth prohibits the development of a healthy agriculture. The present desperate efforts to create some order in the economic disarray revealed by Khrushchev and others have only confirmed the harshest judgments of these observers. It seemed appropriate, therefore, that at the same time as the Communist leaders were engaged in a revaluation of agricultural policy that a serious effort be made — on this side of the Iron Curtain — to assess the nature of the current crisis and the agricultural system that produced it.

• • •

This study is primarily concerned with the agricultural structure of the East European Satellites of the Soviet Union, and with the efforts those Satellite regimes have made to transplant the developed Soviet agricultural system to new terrain.

The basic characteristics of the land system which the Soviet planners devised and put into practice during the first Five Year Plan are taken up in order to set the background for the Satellite efforts to duplicate the Soviet model in the 1948-53 period. This new type of land structure is treated not merely as the expression of a specific ideology, but as part of a set of economic relations upon which the Communist State and industrial machine rests. In other words, collectivized agriculture is not only a Marxist dogma, but a functioning economic system which in the quarter century of its existence has performed considerable services for its Communist masters. The fact that collectivized agriculture was imposed by force, is held together only by the most vigilant and brutal police

● 121 action, and is based upon a general decline in living standards for both workers and peasants, should not obscure the fact that the modern Soviet political and economic system would be impossible without it.

The success which the Soviet agricultural apparatus has achieved in increasing the State's share of the total agricultural produce is considered one of the keys to the endurance of this apparatus and the continued Communist reliance upon it.

The study then proceeds to describe the East European agricultural "revolution," and examines particularly those aspects which distinguished it from the Russian Revolution. The attempt to duplicate the Soviet land structure is explored with these important distinguishing characteristics in mind. The same criteria by which the Soviet system was measured are applied to the East European agricultural system – the degree of increased peasant exploitation – and comparisons are made which indicate why Soviet collectivization was so much more successful than its Eastern Europe counterpart.

The study ends with an examination of the present agricultural crisis. The problems involved are no longer merely tactical, but have become increasingly institutional. The agricultural system which the Communists imposed upon the population has now begun to impose itself upon the Communists. Its internal mechanism exercises considerable force of its own, and the New Course which engulfed the Communist world after Joseph Stalin's death in 1953 is analyzed in these terms.

• • •

The antagonism between town and country described in this paper has not been confined to the history of industrialization in the Communist countries. The capacity of dynamic urban forces to manipulate the market to the detriment of the less-organized peasantry is a part of the story of industrialization of nearly every modern nation.

But this study describes an area of the world where this antagonism has been raised to the highest pitch by political regimes of unprecedented authority and brutality. The complete political disenfranchisement of the peasantry has resulted in a degree of exploitation hardly equalled in modern times.

This extraordinary economic feat has been made possible partly by the degree to which the Communist regimes have been able to

exploit the working classes under whose banners they took power, and whose enforced sacrifice of purchasing power has made Communist industrialization programs economically feasible. 121

The success of the Communist economic program then is largely a reflection of the ability of the Communist dictatorship to exploit *all* of the oppressed classes to a degree hitherto considered impossible. But this success, as Stalin's successors have discovered, is a very fragile thing, requiring constant care and protection from those millions whose forced sacrifices made it possible.

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114 seeking asylum. There was a campful of escapees, mostly
727 Czechs and Slovaks, at Valka near Nuremberg.

We Americans used before the war to roam freely in the countries on the other side. Many of us either came from there or are descended from people who did. It is strange not to be able to cross the border now, and of course the fact makes it only too easy to consign the whole region to a sort of mono-
181 chrome limbo. We need to remind ourselves constantly that here are some of the oldest, most cultivated, most individualistic, and most heroic of the nations of the West. Were one merely to list all the deeds of great valor which have been wrought here in more than two thousand years, or all the notable works of art, music, and literature which were created by men at home in these regions, the summary would be a brilliant one, indeed. Yet it is no doubt primarily dedication to religion that gave these cultures their individuality and vitality.

• 121 For convenience's sake we may follow Julius Caesar's example and divide the whole area into three parts. The first embraces the lands which were once portions of the Austro-Hungarian Empire, which collapsed in 1918 but, despite its faults, must in retrospect be termed one of the most coherent and civilized states known to modern history. Once I compared notes with Arnold Toynbee about the singular fact that wherever one crossed those vanished boundaries, whether to the north of Cracow or to the east of Budapest, the sense of coming into the familiar world of the West was immediate and unmistakable. There was a manifest ease and gracefulness of the art of living, reflected in all the many buildings, humble or ornate, in which that art found expression. Vienna, Prague, Budapest, Cracow, Zagreb, Bratislava—these cities were built by the collective genius which Austria somehow managed to evoke and nurture, even though the people who lived in them might more often than not talk of tyranny.

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The second part used to be called the Balkans, because these lands, north of the Greek seas, were identified with the mountains which traversed them. Ancient Rome had established its power on their slopes, and later the peoples who settled there after the Slovenian invasions of the Dark Ages accepted the faith of the Eastern Church. To this they clung with fidelity during centuries of subjection to the Turks; and as soon as their freedom had been regained this faith was everywhere restored in cities and rural communes alike. It is unfortunate that so little about this aspect of Rumanian and Bulgarian history has been known to us generally. Recalled recently with philosophic nostalgia in such books as Gheorghiu's *Twenty-fifth Hour*, some awareness of it is an indispensable prerequisite for judging what has happened during the last terrible years. /21/

The third part consists of Poland outside the old Austrian border, the small Baltic States to the north (Latvia, Estonia, and Lithuania) given back to bondage by Hitler in an hour of mad bargaining for power, and those territories taken from Germany in the aftermath of the Yalta and Potsdam conferences. The tragedy which has befallen these peoples is heartrending. It is believed, for example, that one-fourth of the population of Estonia has been deported to Siberia by the Russians. Whatever the blunders of all governments concerned may have been, it is difficult to read the chronicles of horror inflicted on their erstwhile subjects without shuddering. There is little even in the history of Nazi savagery which can outdo, for example, the conquest of German Silesia. Consider, by way of illustration, the fate of Neisse, center of Silesian Catholic activity, which was entered by the Russian army on Palm Sunday, 1945. After scenes of rape, murder, and violence almost unparalleled even in the long history of war, the little city with its priceless churches was put to the torch, so that the thousand inmates of the great home for the aged burned to death in their /21/ 927

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121 beds. All these lands will never again become what they once
727 were—regions of constant struggle and short-lived serenity, of poverty and its exploitation, of poetry, fervor, and sadness. Those of us who have, for example, seen peasant women trudging for many miles through the omnipresent dust to kneel for an hour at the shrines of Silesia will never forget either the fact or its meaning.

781 There is not a foot of the old soil of Central Europe which
156 has not been consecrated by endurance for the sake of the things of the spirit and the mind. Indeed, I have sometimes wondered, reading the Polish and Silesian poets and novelists, why the longing to hold out should have persisted during many difficult centuries—why, for instance, Polish forests in thrall to the Czars should have hidden priest and ritual with such fidelity. Perhaps the explanation, in so far as it is of this world, can be found in the deep human urge for the preservation of identity. Custom and language were vital symbols of the self, and without them men felt they could not live. But stronger than all else was the deep, primitive, mystical desire for identification with Eternal Righteousness, manifest to the believer in the life of the Redeemer. To give up the faith was to surrender not merely one's self but the world as well.

798 To be sure these men and women were very human, often
563 poverty-stricken and untutored, sometimes intolerant and oppressive. The effort to conserve themselves and their identity spilled over into moments of vengeful outrage inflicted upon others because they were different. Thus anti-Semitism has a long history in Eastern Europe studded with bloody pogroms. Although curbed in Austro-Hungarian regions it was latent there, too, as the shameful events of 1938 proved, but manifest elsewhere continuously with varying intensity. Or who can forget the repression of the Ukrainians in Poland under the Pilsudski government, the conflict between Czechs and Slovaks,

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PREFACE

In the course of the Second World War the Soviet Armies entered a number of countries in Europe and stayed in them some months or years. These are Poland, Czechoslovakia, Hungary, Rumania, Bulgaria, Yugoslavia, the Soviet Zones of Germany and Austria. A study of the conditions of the hundred million people inhabiting this region is of great interest in itself; it gains even more from the fact that such a study throws light, from a new vantage point, on the Russian reality. Napoleon said: 'Une armée dehors, c'est l'État qui voyage', and the study of the influence of the Soviet 'armée dehors' teaches us about the essence of the Soviet State itself. The fact that there are more chinks in the 'Iron Curtain' between the Russian satellites and the rest of the world than between the older and better preserved curtain shutting out Russia, facilitates the study of the nature of Stalin's regime through the prism of conditions in the satellite countries. These conditions must be comprehended in the dynamics of their change, the dynamics of the rise and consolidation of the rule of the Communist Parties.

Although the same Party rules in the Soviet Zone of Germany, I have not thought it advisable to cover this area in the present study, as it is impossible to survey this Zone without covering Germany as a whole, which is in itself a wide and complicated question. Another Communist-dominated State I have omitted is Albania, the reason being the scarcity and poverty of information regarding this tiny country.

A study of current history is always fraught with the risk that the absence of distance tends to endanger accuracy of knowledge and scientific detachment; the risk exists that a more unified impression is given than knowledge of the subject warrants, and that conclusions are coloured by personal values. The only counter to this is scientific scrupulousness. While the difficulties in the way of the study of current history must be borne in mind, the study itself is not to be avoided, as it is part of history itself, and the effort to understand and

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was in the mode of appropriation, in the legal expression of the right to exploit.* 000

Another example of class exploitation based not on private but on 'public' ownership is the Church of the Middle Ages. The Church acquired about a third of all the land of Europe as a whole, and in some countries even the majority of the land (e.g. Hungary, Bohemia). Formally, this was public property, the property of the Christian community, and it bore the official name of 'patrimonium pauperum'—the inheritance of the poor. This, however, did not make the conditions of the serfs on Church land fundamentally different from those of the serfs on the private feudal estates. For even though the clergy did not have the right of inheritance (not being allowed to raise families) and were often of plebeian origin, they were not less harsh exploiters than the feudal nobility. Thus 'public' property by itself does not exclude the exploitation of man by man.

The first part of this book attempts to show that the chief means of production and exchange in the Russian satellites are in the hands of the state (in part the Russian state), and that they will be more and more so concentrated. The second part attempts to show that these countries have undemocratic, totalitarian police regimes, which means that they are not 'owned' by the people—workers, peasants and intellectuals—but by the self-appointing and self-perpetuating bureaucracy itself. From these two propositions, if they can be proved, the 121

*Sources used on feudalism in the Arab East:

A. N. Poliak—*Feudalism in Egypt, Syria, Palestine and Lebanon*, London, 1939.

A. N. Poliak—*Les Révoltes Populaires en Egypte a l'Epoque des Mamelukes et leurs causes économiques*. Appeared in *Revue des Etudes Islamiques*, Paris, 1934.

A. N. Poliak—Various articles that appeared in the Hebrew periodical *Hamezhek Hashituſi*, Tel Aviv.

A. Kremer —*Geschichte der herrschenden Ideen des Islam*, Leipzig, 1868.

A. Kremer —*Culturgeschichte des Orients unter den Chalifen*, Wien, 1875-7.

C. H. Becker —*Beiträge zur geschichte Aegyptens unter dem Islam*, Strassbourg, 1902-3.

†There have even been cases of state-ownership of the means of production with *equality* between the different 'owners' of the state, equality in the right collectively to exploit those whom the state owned. Spartan society was a case of 'communism' in slave ownership. Kautsky characterized this regime in the following terms: 'The Spartans made up the minority, perhaps a tenth of the population. Their state was based on real War Communism, the barrack communism of the ruling class. Plato drew his ideal of the state from it. The ideal differed from real Sparta only in that it was not the military chiefs, but the 'philosophers', that is, the intellectuals, who directed the war communism'. (*Die Materialistische Geschichtsauffassung*, Zweiten Band, Berlin, 1927, pp. 132-3).

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121 only conclusion possible would be that the Bureaucracy is the owner of the wealth of these countries, that as well as being the ruling class politically, it is the ruling class economically.

471 *The Abolition of all Elements of Democracy in the Factory*

466 The relations between the state-bureaucracy and the people in the economy as a whole permeate each sector of it down to the individual enterprise. The macrocosm and the microcosms are governed by the same rules.

In Russia from 1917 to 1928 the running of the industries was, formally at least, in the hands of what was called the Troika (that is, trio)—the workers' factory committee, the Party cell and the manager. With the disappearance of all democracy in the Party and trade unions, the Troika gradually lost its functions till it became a mere label. Nevertheless it did not cease to stand officially at the head of the plant, nominally running it, and even to show signs of life by acting as something of a brake on the high-handedness of the plant manager, until 1929. Thus Dr. A. Baykov, in *The Development of the Soviet Economic System* (London, 1946), states:

'*De facto*, during that period (before the Five Year Plan—Y.G.) the director was largely dependent on the works' trade union organ, the "Zavkom" (the factory trade union committee) and on the Party cell, the organ of the Communist Party at the enterprise. Representatives of these organizations considered it their duty to supervise the director's activities, and usually interfered with his decisions'. (p. 115).

But even the remnants of workers' democracy in the plants disappeared with the Five Year Plans, which were called . . . 'The Victory of Socialism'. A resolution of the Central Committee of the Party decided that the workers' committee of the factory 'may not intervene directly in the running of the plant or endeavour in any way to replace plant management. They shall by all means help to secure one-man control, increased production, plant development, and, thereby, improvement of the material conditions of the working class'. (*Pravda*, 7th September, 1929).

The manager is in full and sole charge of the plant. All his economic orders are unconditionally binding on all the workers. He alone shall select, promote and remove personnel

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Preface

101 Eastern Europe—the region embracing Albania, Bulgaria, Czechoslovakia, Hungary, Poland, Rumania, and Yugoslavia, and for certain limited purposes the Soviet zones of Germany and Austria as well—has long been familiar to students of European history. To Western public opinion in general, however, this region has become known chiefly as a result of the two world wars, for which it provided some of the major diplomatic problems and military battlefields.

000 Despite the significant role of Eastern Europe, the Western democracies have tended to regard it primarily as a region of inherent economic poverty and political instability. They have failed either to recognize the extent to which its problems reflected their own policies, or to see it as an area vital to their security. This lack of understanding of the problems and significance of Eastern Europe was most conspicuous at the end of the Second World War. At that time decisions were reached and concessions made by the West on the basis of assumptions that were not firmly grounded in the realities of this region. Important lessons were eventually learned, but not until great harm had been done to the peoples of Eastern Europe and consequently also to the welfare of the Western democracies.

•121 The purpose of the essays in this volume is to review the record of the recent past in order to interpret the many-sided

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•121 challenge presented by Eastern Europe. They describe this region in its transition from agrarian underdevelopment and political strife toward a more complex society, a more productive economy, and a more stable political system. The end of this process of transition is not yet in sight, and it has in most respects been set back by the policies of the Communist regimes since the Second World War. At the same time Eastern Europe remains a region of dynamic developments that have remained in many ways beyond the range of Western understanding.

These essays reflect the considerable diversity in experience and points of view of the authors. Some have wrestled with the problems of Eastern Europe as responsible members of governments both before and since the Second World War. Although they are acquainted at first hand with the policies of the Communist regimes, they write less from bitterness than from a desire to interpret for the West the lessons of their experience. Others bring to their subjects such objectivity as is afforded by academic study, and view Eastern Europe with a degree of abstraction difficult for those whose families and careers are directly involved. Still others combine academic study with some measure of personal experience that has permitted them to test the values that printed volumes do not always convey.

These diversities of background and viewpoint are merged in the common desire to interpret the challenge offered by Eastern Europe to the leaders of the Western democracies. Underlying these essays is the belief that a careful survey of the problems of this region is a first and essential step in the search for solutions in a democratic spirit. Although no blueprint for meeting the challenge of Eastern Europe is here attempted, an understanding of this region essential to the drafting of such a blueprint is offered.

000 With one exception, these essays were presented in a somewhat different form as lectures at the Institute of Public Af-

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2 The Liberal Tradition

HUBERT RIPKA

121 829 This essay will endeavor to show that liberalism has its own tradition in the countries of Eastern Europe and that the liberal regimes set up in this area succumbed not so much to internal factors as to the unfavorable international situation. In other words, the development of liberalism in this region between the two world wars was a part of the course of liberal democracy in Europe as a whole.

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829 It is necessary first to define liberalism. This force will not be interpreted here as a political ideology of certain political parties or social classes. Although, historically speaking, liberalism has been identified most often with the so-called middle classes, its ideology has a far wider basis. It aims above and beyond the demands of one social class to a political and social order of all society which is based on liberty, equality, and the reign of law. It is in this sense that liberalism will be dealt with in this essay.

It would be impossible to understand the liberalism of any one country if it were discussed only in terms of the

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the gradual decline of the traditional rural and mainly peasant structure of this part of Europe and the emergence of an industrial urbanized society. This transformation is now in full swing and will continue until it runs its course—no one can say when or how—or until external factors end the Russian control of Eastern Europe and its nations rid themselves of their own Communists. Even then, the industrial development of that area will presumably continue, though for different reasons and with vastly different methods. The Communist regimes may go, but the results of the industrial revolution will remain.

This essay is concerned with the effects of these revolutionary events on the social and economic development of the countries of Eastern Europe. To cover this involved subject adequately, much time and space would be necessary. The writer must limit himself here to the discussion of the few selected aspects of the problem that he regards as fundamental. Discussion of the industrial targets as established by the single countries in their long-range plans, half or more of which have already been achieved, cannot be included in this study.

Suffice it to say here that all over Eastern Europe the Communist regimes are modernizing the existing mines and industrial plants and are building scores of new mines and thousands of large new plants, mostly supposed to produce capital goods as a basis for further industrial production. The anticipated result of the present first series of long-range plans, expected to terminate in less than two years, will be a large increase in the extraction of fuel and the doubling, in some cases tripling and quadrupling, of the heavy industrial potential of the individual nations of this region, some of which had a large industrial output before the last war. This vast operation requires that great numbers of peasants be transferred from agriculture to industry, mining, and construction. Once carried out, the first series of plans is to be

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PREFACE

In the academic year 1952-53 a group of scholars at the Hoover Library strove to learn something about the social structure of modern military institutions by applying the technique of elite analysis to the leadership of a number of armies. Few institutions of comparable influence have been as little studied by social scientists as have armed forces. The present volume is a report on a particularly little known group of armies, those of the satellites. It is an analysis of biographical data on their general officers.

A year ago the manuscript of this monograph was sent away. Now reading proof, I realize with some pain how swift-moving is the revolution of our times. It poses to this author an immediate dilemma: to correct statements about it which are now out of date and gain the advantages of hindsight, or to leave some embarrassing evidences of his fallibility, reporting only what the research showed at the time it was done. In general I have followed the latter policy. Since I cannot now undertake a new analysis of the 1955 generals of the satellite armies, it seems better not to doctor the conclusions which flowed from the analysis of the 1951-52 generals so as to make the findings conform better to what has actually happened since. Except in the chapter on China, no changes in the text have been made since its completion shortly after the fall of Beria. In the Chinese chapter we have simply cut some illustrative material which derived much of its interest from the fact that it gave current information on who held what posts. With a major reorganization of the Chinese government in the fall of 1954, that became passé. The conclusions, however, have been left in full view.

When the manuscript was written, Malenkov was the ruler of Russia and the "new course" in the satellites was just getting under way. However, the data had been analyzed and the conclusions drawn w ll before then. Our conclusion was that a vigorous militarization was going on in the satellites. During the new course, with its emphasis on coexistence and consumers' goods, one could have doubted this conclu on. The fall of Malenkov, and with it the restoration of an emphasis in the satellites on military production and military preparation, has justified the thesis (p. 27) that the new course was a temporary deviation, the thesis which led us to stick to the conclusions deriving from our 1951-52 data.

As I look over the monograph, what I might change now are not so much specific statements as emphases. We mention the gradual softening of the pattern of purges, yet perhaps in our prognoses the pattern of 1938 still weighs a little too heavily. A number of generals who had be n purged when we wrote have reappeared in minor or symbolic posts, notably General Svoboda in Czechoslovakia. Perhaps future purges will be more gradual and less conspicuous than now, though they will not cease. Army officers in particular may be tae-

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I. INTRODUCTION

A. The Subject of the Paper

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This is a study of leadership in Communist armies. More precisely it is a study of the conflict between two needs which the Communists face if they are to build up satellite armies: the need for loyal military leaders and the need for skilled ones. Every army, indeed every institution, has this dilemma. It needs leaders who believe in its cause, but it also needs leaders who are proficient. Even a free and stable society has some difficulty locating men who are both adequately loyal and adequately competent. For a dogmatic and revolutionary society the problem is more difficult.

A free society asks only basic loyalty not doctrinaire fanaticism, and basic loyalty it generally commands from those who grow up in it. A free and stable society can therefore pick the most capable men and take it for granted that they will ordinarily do what is demanded of them.

On the other hand, a society which demands that its leaders adhere to every detail of a dogmatic line cannot take loyalty for granted. A society with a fanatical creed must favor leaders who are orthodox over those who are able. If the fanatical society is a revolutionary one it must also favor untutored rebels over experienced leaders.

The Communist movement is both doctrinaire and revolutionary. It is a dogma in arms. Because it uses arms it has a desperate need for skilled military leadership. But because it is revolutionary and fanatical it often beheads its most skillful leaders.

That is a dilemma for the new Communist armies; it is the classic dilemma of revolutions. How the satellites attempt to resolve it and secure for themselves an adequate military leadership is the subject of this paper.

B The Satellite Armed Forces and Their Generals

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Until 1945 the Soviet Union, with such minor appendages as Outer Mongolia, was the world's sole Communist power. The Red Army was therefore the only Communist state army illustrating this dilemma between loyalty and professional skill. But the problem was not a new one to the Communists for they had come upon it in their considerable tradition of revolutionary militarism.

From the time of Engels, himself a military specialist, Communist political thinking has focused heavily on problems of utilization of armed forces. Revolutionary armies were built illegally and in turn collapsed as Communist bids for power failed. Even in countries where no Communist army had ever existed, Communists paid considerable attention to military affairs and trained their followers in the use of arms. The Twenty-One Points laid down at the Second

*701 6 *648

SATELLITE GENERALS

Bodnaras, Farkas, Berling, or Cepicka such as they have for Vorishilov or Budenny. The Politburocrats undoubtedly regard the former, as they do all foreign Communists and indeed all Communists outside their own clique, with a large measure of contempt. So the Soviet bosses have kept the Communist generals from putting their hands to really important military professional matters and have freely purged them.

The most important differences between the Russian and satellite army leadership patterns arise from the fact that the satellites are satellites. Except perhaps in China, the armed forces which have been permitted to develop, are strictly subordinated to Russian control and to Russian needs, techniques, and personnel. In countries with long traditions of antagonism to Russia, as most of the satellite countries are, this creates an obvious source of tension and vulnerability within the satellite armed forces.

While this basic source of vulnerability is so obvious as to need no further comment here, it would be a mistake to consider the satellite armed forces as undifferentiated masses of discontented persons ready to seize the first opportunity for liberation. Such feelings certainly exist but it is a problem for research to determine some of the factors relevant to their intensity, distribution, and change-over time. Satellite armies are complicated combinations of fanatical Communists, would-be Titoists, would-be defectors waiting for a chance to escape, politically inert persons, and miscellaneous other elements.

D. The Uses of Military Elite Studies

•121 One reason for studying how the Communists imposed their control upon the satellite armies, the kinds of satellite officers upon whom the Soviets rely, and the tensions among them, is that these facts have some bearing on the willingness and capability of the satellite forces to fight. We have no illusions that our data will foretell the conduct of the satellite forces in any given operational situation. We hope, however, that they may bring light to bear on a few of the relevant factors.

The importance of leadership in an army need not be stressed. We have chosen to study general officers because of their determining role in the making of key decisions or in a failure to make them. Mass demoralization in the ranks may destroy the fighting effectiveness of an army, but mass demoralization may itself be a symptom of leadership failings. The collapse of the Chinese Nationalist Army, for example, was not so much a failure of morale in the ranks as it was a failure of morale at the highest level. Corruption and defeatism were particularly prevalent at the command level. The political warfare that was most devastating to Chinese Army morale was that which bribed and disoriented its leading cadres. Students of sykewar have sometimes overlooked the implications of such facts. Despite

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the importance of leadership, students of psychological warfare in the recent past have tended to neglect the possibility of achieving results through communication to the opposing elite.[3a]

Elite communications are important even when the aim is mass demoralization; they are more important when elite actions are sought. Rebellion against the powers that be or resistance to their demands has far more often been sparked by dissident elite elements than by mass sufferings. In the last war, for example, the most dramatic resistance to Hitler—the July 20 movement—came from the higher ranks of the army and from aristocratic and elite elements of society. It was to them rather than to the masses of the German people that appeals of a political character were and could have been effectively addressed.

The elite are not unreachable. The elite have access to a breadth of information which is denied to men in the ranks. They have access to superior channels of information and have greater freedom of movement and contact.

While the elite are particularly important and also particularly accessible to sykewar, problems of reaching them have been studied less by scholars than problems of reaching armies as wholes. The way of life and attitudes of contemporary military leaders have been but little described in writing. A vast lore exists on the classical military man, but the modern military man is a new type. The complexity of modern warfare has made partly irrelevant what historians and biographers of the past have said about the conduct and feelings of military commanders. The modern general officer is a technician and specialist as well as a fighter and leader of men. The old image of the courageous and dramatic leader with a band of personally devoted followers is by no means out of date but it is now only part of a much more complex picture of what a commander must be. We have yet to delineate a full image of the motivations, loyalties, and attitudes of the general who must also concern himself with the complexities of modern science, technology logistics, record keeping, recruitment, propaganda, and finance.[3b]

No academic scholar regardless of his professional competence can hope to draw this image satisfactorily by himself. The scholar, ordinarily a man with a nonmilitary background and lacking a lifetime of training in military doctrine and military practice, can hope at best either to add a few insights arising from his specialized techniques or to systematize the far deeper perceptions which military specialists themselves are bound to have. It will only be when the present generation of military men from all countries has enriched the available body of firsthand material through memoirs, essays, and histories that the social scientist will be able to turn to this literature and add to it the understanding that arises from general theories of human behavior. We do not pretend for a moment in the present study to offer anything like a definitive interpretation of the

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mores and manners of any current military elites. We can provide only a few glimmering insights. The man of lifelong military experience may deepen these if he finds in here data whose significance his individual experience will enable him better to understand.

We cite as one example of the type of fact arising from our research the striking and significant finding that the satellite armies as distinct from Communist revolutionary armies, tend to select top leaders not for qualities of personal courage and personal leadership but for bureaucratic management skills.

This specific example of a change in the breed of men chosen for leadership after Communist regimes are stabilized illustrates the broader question of the relationship between elite structure and social behavior. Our present study is predicated upon the assumption that a man's way of life determines to a considerable extent the sort of person he will be and the types of things he will do. This is not a new notion. In 1889 Spenser Wilkinson, Chichele Professor of Military History at Oxford University, proclaimed that:

> "War is, from first to last, an affair of the soul; the predominant partner in the business is the mind or spirit . . . Examine your thoughts, your whole stock of ideas, and see where they come from. You will find that, for the most part, you caught them, like so many colds, from the people about you. Thoughts are the common property of a number of people living together, the connecting link between the members of a community. . . A child born into an English family learns as he grows the English words, in using which he begins to think the thoughts of his nation. As he grows up he imbibes the ideas of his class, or his trade, profession, of his political party, and of his church or sect. Tell me a man's birthplace, his family, his school, his occupation, sect and party, and I will tell you with pretty fair accuracy his stock of thoughts."[4]

Such extreme determinism is not implied by this study. We do not question for a minute that individuality and special circumstances interplay with these more stable background factors. The morale of a soldier varies with his immediate circumstances in regard to food, promotions, advance or retreat, mail service, etc., as well as his social background. Sykewar field operations require attention to such current facts around which discontent is expressed. But the more stable factors influence how a person will ultimately respond to situational variations.

The relationship between the situational and stable factors is a complicated one. Perhaps three points can be made. (1) Certain stable factors determine who will be vulnerable to which situational deprivations or inducements. (2) Certain stable factors determine the available communication nets through which situational discontents may be expressed or fail of expression. (3) Certain stable

INTRODUCTION

sources of discontent determine whether or not a given situation will be seized upon to rationalize that discontent.

(1) Many examples can be cited of differential vulnerability of different social strata to the same situations. Shils and Janowitz point out that among German deserters in World War II there was a very large participation of Volksdeutsche not to mention Austrians, Poles, and Russians.[5] Despite the fact that the Volksdeutsche had been among the most chauvinist elements in the period of Nazi successes, the fact that they were not easily assimilated into closely-knit primary groups in the German Army made them especially susceptible to surrender propaganda.

For different reasons German chaplains seemed to be particularly susceptible to the propaganda of the Russian-controlled Free Germany Committee. They were most vulnerable to humanitarian and semi-pacifist appeals for ending the war quickly—a further example of a predisposition to vulnerability arising from life history.

The Czechoslovak Army, due to the many vicissitudes it suffered, is a particularly good example of an army in which different social segments responded differently to different pressures because of different life experiences. It was originally formed in 1919 of a combination of ex-Austro-Hungarian officers, ex-officers of the Czech legion in Russia in World War I, and some former officers of Czech legions in France and Italy. During the twenties and thirties top positions in the army were shared by the legionnaires and the one-time Czech career officers of the Austrian Army. During the first decade the latter was the dominant group in the highest positions. These former Austrian officers had received good military education and experience during their lifetime service in the Austrian Army and they proved very useful to the young Czechoslovak Army. They were distinguished from the legionnaires in several respects. They were older. The greater part of them were born in Bohemia (near Germany) not in Moravia nor Slovakia. They came from a somewhat higher social stratum than did the legionnaires. They had started their careers in the army and had never experienced other occupations. Their military training was exclusively Austrian and they came from the most urbanized and industrialized portions of the country.

Around 1930 most of the ex-Austrian officers had been retired. By this time the younger legionnaires, most of whom had been recruited from Russian prisoner of war camps during World War I, had received enough theoretical military education and had advanced sufficiently in rank to take over the positions of the "Austrians." The great majority of the legionnaires had started their lives in non-military occupations before World War I. They came largely from Moravia. The reason for this was purely accidental although its ultimate consequence was significant. During World War I the Moravian recruits were sent to the Eastern Front whereas regiments recruited in Bohemia served on the Italian Front. When the Bolsheviks

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took power and quit the war, the organized Czech units who had been caught in Russia had to fight their way out, engaging in a long, bitter, and heroic struggle with the Bolsheviks all the way from the Eastern Front across Siberia to Vladivostok. In the course of this struggle they acquired experience and an esprit de corps which made them by the 1930's the leading elements of the new Czechoslovak Army. It therefore happened that the newer group of officers came largely from Moravia, a less industrialized and more Slavic portion of the country, and that their fathers were predominantly members of low and middle-income farm and white collar groups.

The majority of the legionnaire officers received their theoretical military education at the Czech War College established in 1919 by the French Military Mission and a considerable number had gone to the École de Guerre in Paris. This added to their common heritage of pro-Western experience. After the German occupation it was among the Slovaks who had not played a major role in the army previously that the strongest collaborationist force was built. There was apparently only one Slovak general officer in 1939, Division General Rudolf Viest, but others were promoted to general rank during the German occupation.

We could continue this story tracing what happened to the Czechoslovak Army-in-exile. The Czechoslovak refugees who arrived in France during the first months after the German occupation of Czechoslovakia found a considerable number of Slovaks who had been residents of France for many years. The refugees and these together made up the first Czechoslovak division in France. The Slovaks had been confused by the political events in Slovakia and as a result their attachment to the Czechoslovak cause was weak. In the chaos of the French defeat many of them considered the war lost and refused to leave France. About half the division was evacuated to Great Britain but this was a distinctly self-selected group. The number of officers was far out of proportion to the number of men and some hundreds of officers had to accept demotion to the ranks. A full 48 percent of the men who arrived in England were members of the intelligentsia and a large percentage were Jews. Many of the officers were young and inexperienced and some were anti-Semitic. Most of the difficulties and schisms were given a political veneer. Among a great portion of the soldiers there were strong socialist leanings and communist leanings besides nationalist ones. All this made the troops fertile soil for every possible kind of propaganda: defeatist, pro-German, pro-Hungarian, etc. The Communists in view of the Soviet-German treaty were agitating for desertion from the army. A number of them led by Dr. Vlado Clementis (recently executed in Prague) left the army for the duration of the Soviet-German pact, most of them to rejoin when the Soviet Union was attacked.

In this unusually complex history of an army sharply riven by national, political and career differences, we see in some detail how vulnerability to special situations may differ depending upon

long-term identifications with various segments of the social structure.

(2) Not only does susceptibility to situational pressures vary with the social structure but so does the opportunity for communicating whatever discontent may arise. Whether an unfavorable event will have an adverse effect on morale obviously depends on the communication net which either promotes or restricts knowledge of it. In Germany toward the end of World War I, for example, the two key factors in the decline of morale were the food situation and the Social Democratic movement. The food situation affected many strata of the population and was the source of the most important discontent. It might, however, have had little effect on the German war effort if it had not been for the existence of a highly organized and powerful labor movement, which was semi-pacifist in its orientation. The main agitation of the Social Democrats was not around the food situation but rather around the desirability of negotiating for peace. This very abstract and ideological agitation became effective because of the coexistence of popular discontent arising from hunger, and at the same time the hunger became effective because an organized group provided a communication net for expression of anti-war feelings. Thus the organized proletariat was the source of Germany's greatest vulnerability. Although that class was not necessarily the most discontented group, it was the group whose discontents had an effective channel of expression.

(3) Situational discontents are also related to long-run social tensions in that they provide the rationalizations in terms of which continued hostilities are expressed. In China, for example, the main complaint against the Nationalist armies was that they were corrupt, demoralized, and irresponsible. The charges of corruption were no doubt borne out by facts. At the same time there is good reason to feel that corruption was not the real reason why much of the Chinese population turned against the Nationalist military leadership. The allegation of corruption was rather a rationalization of conflicts between major social segments in China. An earlier study in this series, Kuomintang and Chinese Communist Elites by Robert C. North, showed that the top leadership of the Nationalists was predominantly an urban merchant group, while the top leadership of the Communists was predominantly rural (both landlord and peasant) and intellectual.

According to Chinese traditions, nepotism, protection of one's family fortunes against the interests of the state, and what we would consider graft were parts of the mores of the business groups which provided much of the Nationalist leadership. Corruption did not carry the same connotations as in the West On the other hand, China as a whole is a peasant country and one in which top prestige goes not to business men but to scholars. Persons of rural origin and professional groups were not satisfied with the leadership provided by the western-oriented Nationalist trading elements. It was this conflict

121 of social strata, of basic ideology, and of national perspective which was expressed in the revulsion against the graft and corruption of the business-oriented Nationalist leadership. The Nationalist failure was a failure to broaden its base of leadership rather than simply a failure of administration. The former, however, was seldom discussed in day-to-day politics. The latter was on everybody's lips.

Political intelligence requires awareness of both the immediate issues around which conflicts come to take place and of the social structure in which these conflicts develop. The former can only be studied quickly from day to day as the conflicts develop. Long-range planning must focus on some of the basic sources of vulnerability which can be kept in mind as specific situations emerge. This study is not designed to spot the particular sources of tension and conflict which may arise at any given time point in the future. It is designed to identify the elements in the lives and careers of satellite officers which may differentiate the reactions of one group from those of another, or which may lead them to view one another with either trust or distrust, or which may lead them to view broad world questions either with knowledge and perspective or provincially, or which may lead them to have either purely hostile or just mixed feelings about the Soviet regime.

*701 E. The Evolution and Future of the New Communist Armies

*648 In the United States the most popular lay theory about the satellite armies (as about the satellites themselves) is that they are temporary jerry-built structures riven by inner tension and designed only as a makeshift until such time as the Russians are ready to incorporate them within the Russian Army itself. Our research leads to a different conclusion, namely that the Soviet plan has been to build up the satellite armies for a long stint. We cannot exclude the possibility that some day in the future it may become Russian policy to eliminate the satellites as separate nations. It may even be that such a long-range plan rests today somewhere in the files of the Kremlin. While that is a possibility, it seems improbable from the evidence now available to us. Our findings indicate rather a Soviet plan to develop the satellite forces into important, strong, but separate offensive forces completely subordinate to and allied with, but not part of the Russian Army.

1. The Period of Coalition, 1945-48:

It was not until 1947 that this plan began to be implemented by the Soviets. Until that time their great problem in all the European satellites was to consolidate Communist power.

In each of the European satellites a coalition government was formed immediately after the war including both Communists and non-Communists. The Benes government-in-exile returned from

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For that reason he is a dangerous character. He is capable of too much independence. In the satellite armies men of this type have been less able to hold higher military posts than have either the behind-the-scenes politicians or the military technicians. The leaders of the World War II underground movement have been virtually eliminated from top jobs. The successful infantry commanders rise neither so fast nor so far as artillery men, engineers, or other technicians. The qualities of personal leadership may be better appreciated at lower levels which do not come within the purview of this study, but at the apex of the military hierarchy personal leadership is something which the Communists do not permit. When a new generation of officers take the top posts, the level of competence may rise and perhaps the problem of loyalty may have become less acute, but the new elite will not consist of dynamic leaders. It will be an elite which has grown up under the controls of the political department, the security police, and Russian observers. It may be an elite not prone to exercise strong personal leadership.

F. The Study and the Sample

The above conclusions are based upon an analysis of biographical data concerning generals in the satellite countries. From the biographical data we tried to get light on three aspects of the structure of the satellite armies. (1) We have attempted to describe the process by which the satellite armies were taken over and communized insofar as this process involved changes in the kinds of men wielding power. (2) We have attempted to evaluate the breadth of background, education, and experience of those types of men who have finally gained power with a view to providing a basis for judgment of their potential effectiveness as leaders, and their prospective loyalty or discontent. (3) We have attempted to identify whatever fissures and lines of differentiation exist between segments of the armed forces.

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To study these three topics we collected biographical data on general officers in five satellite countries: Poland, Czechoslovakia, Hungary, Romania, and China.[8] In each case we compiled as many biographies of general officers as we could obtain, the criterion of selection being availability. In view of the difficulty of obtaining any data no more rigorous type of sampling was possible. We included general officers of the air forces and navies as well as the land armies.[9] When we could obtain the data we added as special subsamples general officers in semi-military police and security formations. In all of the satellite countries the special security troops, though under the Ministry of Interior or its equivalent in peacetime, are integrated with the armed forces and commanded by officers with military rank.

Ideally a study of military leadership should study not only gen-

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erals but also lower ranking officers and also the relationships between the ranks. However, published biographies— our primary source— do not exist for lower ranking officers and do not tell us anyanything directly about relationships. This study attempts to do only that which can be done with an analysis of the top levels of the military elite viewed, of course, in the context of background information. It is not a complete study of military leadership in the satellites.

In order to trace the trends in the satellite regimes we stratified the sample of generals by time period. We collected biographical data not only about the postwar generals, but also for a sample of generals of the pre-Communist regimes. We broke the samples of satellite generals into groups according to the date at which their careers terminated. Thus for Romania we have a sample of pre-1940 generals, a sample of generals active on the axis side between 1940 and 1944, a sample of generals who maintained their careers during the early postwar years, 1944-47, and finally a sample of those generals who have continued to operate since 1948.

Data on contemporary history such as the data of this study quickly grows out of date. The research for this study was done during the academic year 1952-53. While every attempt was made to get up-to-date materials, it was inevitable that the satellite sources which were read and analyzed were published for the most part in 1951 and 1952. They too had a time lag between the facts to which they referred and the date at which they were printed. Roughly speaking, we can say that the picture presented in this study is the picture as of the year 1951.

The sources for a study of satellite armies are so thin at best that no consistent effort has been made to limit the moment for which we are presenting a snapshot. Wherever material is available we have used it. Where later information has come in, even up to the moment of the final revision of this text, we have tried to take account of it, although no systematic effort has been made to bring the study up to the minute. What we here present is a picture of Soviet plans and procedures as of two years ago with some corrections suggested by more recent events.

The most important event in the Soviet world during these past two years was of course the death of Stalin and the installation of the Malenkov regime with its slightly modified tactical line. Stalin died on March 5, 1953 by which time almost all the research for the study had been completed.

In the half year since then the new Soviet dictators have found it necessary to make concessions to the people at least while they are consolidating their rule. In Russia the emphasis has been on consumers' goods. In the satellites where riots in Berlin and strikes in Czechoslovakia have shown how intense is the prevailing discontent, the new line has also been to make concessions to the desires of the populace. Without any real evidence we may hazard the hunch

that one unpublicized aspect of this new line may be a slowing down of the program of military preparation in the satellites and a re-evaluation of their military potential. Both the open outbreak of satellite discontent and the Politburo's desire to stress temporary economic concessions might lead to such changes in military policy.

For all these reasons we may guess that the picture to be drawn in this study, based as it is upon 1951 data, represents the Soviet plans for the satellite armies at the end of the Stalin era, but not in all respects the way in which things are actually working out at the present moment. We do not know how present actualities diverge from the plans nor what recent changes have been made in the plans. However great these divergences and changes may be, it still remains useful to see how the Politburo conceived the prospects of satellite military development just before the traumatic event of Stalin's death. Whatever corrections future developments will force us to make in our prognoses, one useful piece of data will be the intentions with which the Russians started. It is to ascertain these that our data is relevant.

G. The Method

The methods used in this study are more fully described in the general introduction to the Hoover Institute Elite Series, The Comparative Study of Elites, An Introduction and Bibliography, by Harold D. Lasswell, Daniel Lerner, and C. Easton Rothwell. We record for each individual in our sample certain standardized biographical facts such as the date of his birth, date of death, cause of death, jobs held, place of origin, occupation of father, schools attended, associations joined, foreign travel, awards and decorations, publications, etc. A list of fifty characteristics for which we look when they are available is presented on pages 26-27 of the above mentioned volume. For general officers, among the most important special characteristics on which we sought data were their military training, their nonmilitary education, their branch of service, their combat record, the extent to which they held nonmilitary jobs, the extent to which they participated in politics, their record of promotions, etc.

The data on any individual is recorded on a punch card and tabulations are then made of the incidence of the coded characteristics in different armies or different parts of the same army.

H. The Problem of Sources

It is difficult to obtain biographical information on officers, particularly on those from totalitarian countries. We started this project with an experimental attitude and with the hope, but no conviction, that the desired information might be obtained. On the whole

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we are more than satisfied with this aspect of our endeavor. The most fruitful single source consisted of Who's Who's and similar biographical dictionaries and encyclopedias. Other printed sources include memoirs, obituaries, and articles about prominent figures which appear from time to time even in totalitarian countries. We also relied to some extent on informants who had had firsthand contact with the armies in question. They were often able to provide kinds of information which do not normally appear in brief printed sources.

Unfortunately the sources are not consistent in their accuracy or criteria of reporting. For one country we may have very adequate information on education but not on parental occupation. For another country it may be the other way around. There is also the possibility and indeed likelihood of falsification in some of the biographical reports. The Communists often present fanciful biographies. They tend, for example, to play up or invent humble backgrounds. They also tend to emphasize the native satellite origins and experiences of officers whose real life histories may involve prolonged residence in Russia while refugee sources emphasize the foreign origins of Communist officials. Thus two quite different biographies of Marshal Rokossovski have been published.

Having expressed these warnings about the reliability of some of the sources, it would be a mistake to regard them as invalidating the data. While the data undoubtedly contain a wider margin of errors than is customary in domestic social science studies, they are far more precise and reliable than mere subjective untested impressions. Our goal was to get better information than heretofore available, not to get perfect information. What we report here is the result of as careful a process of checking and evaluation as we were able to make. We feel that there are some trends which it reveals of which there need be little doubt even though individual errors have crept into the data.

I. Introduction to the Case Studies

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In this introductory chapter we have talked of the European satellites as if they were more or less the same. In the subsequent chapters we shall examine them one by one. In so doing we shall note differences in the problems faced and solutions taken, differences which we have so far neglected. We have been able to discuss the East European satellites as a unit since they follow a common set of Russian-originated patterns. We have examined above the sequence of parallel policy changes from one of coalition to one of consolidation to one of training and development which seem to indicate a common set of Soviet directives. We have also noted the adherence to Russian practices in equipment, uniforms, training, and regulations.

The end result was an organizational structure for the satellite

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armies conforming fairly closely to that in Russia. The normal pattern at the time of Stalin's death was to have a Minister of Defense who was one of the top Communist bosses and under him three deputy ministers, one of them in charge of the land army, one of them Chief of Staff, and one of them head of the political department. At general headquarters below these men were a series of inspectors in charge of different arms and services. These and the commanders of the three or four military districts into which the country is divided constituted the top of the military elite.

But in the Soviet world no plan however permanent it is proclaimed to be, is more than a temporary pattern valid until a new line is adopted. Under the Malenkov regime some significant changes have been taking place in military and governmental structures in Russia which have been or will be imitated in the satellites. It would be a mistake to base long-run predictions upon the temporary expedients adopted by Malenkov in the period of consolidation of his power. It is our assumption that a far better clue to long-run Soviet policies and programs is to be found in the plans underway at the time of Stalin's death. Recent deviations from these are more likely to be temporary adjustments than permanent changes in line.

Both the temporary adjustments and the permanent changes are ordered from Moscow and copied in the satellites with a greater or lesser time lag. Each Russian twist or turn is mirrored throughout the Soviet world. An order from Moscow whether it be to give certain key jobs to the best of the newly trained officers, or whatever else it may be, could start a process of purging (with greater or lesser violence) which would sweep in disciplined fashion from one satellite to another. We are about to describe how the basic Soviet military pattern was followed with appropriate variations in each of the satellites from the end of the war to the end of the Stalinist era.

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fairs and Regional Studies of the Graduate School of Arts and Science at New York University in the summer of 1953. They were prepared under the auspices of the Mid-European Studies Center of the National Committee for a Free Europe, Inc. The assistance provided by the Center, both material and editorial, was vital to the completion of this volume. The editor is responsible in matters of planning and organization, but the views expressed herein are those of the several authors.

C. E. BLACK

Princeton, New Jersey
November, 1953

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241 area is much smaller in Eastern Europe than in Western
511 Europe. This is shown clearly in the following table:
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AGRICULTURAL PRODUCTION PER HECTARE OF AGRICULTURAL LAND

	Crop Units	Index		Crop Units	Index
Denmark	57	100	Czechoslovakia	31	54
England and Wales	46	81	Hungary ..	21	37
Netherlands ..	91	160	Bulgaria ..	19	33
Switzerland ..	89	156	Poland.. ..	18	32
Belgium	63	111	Rumania ..	17	30
France	26	46	Yugoslavia ..	17	30
Germany	44	79	Albania ..	17	30

If the agricultural population of Eastern Europe is to have the same quantity of agricultural products per head as in Western Europe, not only must half of them be removed, but the agricultural output must be doubled.

The low productivity in Eastern Europe is not the result of
• [134] infertility of the soil. On the contrary, the soil of Eastern Europe, and especially the excellent black soil of the Danube Plain, is on the whole much richer than the naturally poor soil of Western Europe. The low productivity is due to three main causes, the scarcity of livestock, the scanty use of fertilizers and the lack of agricultural implements and machinery.

LIVESTOCK DENSITY (1938)

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	Cattle per 100 ha. Agricultural Area	Pigs per 100 ha. Arable Land
Czechoslovakia ..	59.1	65.3
Hungary	24.9	55.3
Poland	41.3	40.6
Rumania	23.5	23.5
Bulgaria	41.0	22.1
Yugoslavia	29.8	46.0
Germany	69.8	122.5
France	45.2	34.4
Denmark	103.1	106.1

(PEP—Political and Economic Planning-*Economic Development in S.E. Europe*, 1945, p. 34).

In this table the figures for the countries of Eastern Europe include a large number of oxen and buffaloes which are used mainly as draught animals. In the quality of its livestock Eastern Europe compares even more unfavourably with Western Europe than in the quantity.

407 On the question of agricultural implements and machinery,
241 the PEP study states :

'The value of all agricultural equipment used per hectare of arable land was estimated by a Roumanian source at Lei 1,000

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COAL

All six major countries of the captive area possess their own hard coal, but more than 80 percent of the coal reserves of this entire region are concentrated in the Silesian (also called Silesian-Ostravan) coal basin, where it has been mined since the late eighteenth century in an ever increasing quantity. The Silesian coal basin is one of the four major basins in continental Europe: its prewar production was surpassed by that of the Ruhr basin, but in turn exceeded that of the Donets basin in the Ukraine and of the Franco-Belgian coal basin. 135

For political reasons, a planned exploitation of the Silesian coal basin had for a long time been impossible. Until 1914 it was divided by state boundaries between Germany (which possessed the most valuable part of it in Upper Silesia), Austro-Hungary (the Ostrava-Karvinna coal fields and the so-called Cracow basin), and Russia (the Dombrowa basin in Russian Poland). The interests of the three great powers were, to say the least, not parallel; moreover, ethnic frontiers between the Germans, the Poles and the Czechs crossed the basin and caused serious tension. After the first World War the Silesian basin was redistributed, somewhat more along ethnic lines, among Germany, Poland and Czechoslovakia, and as a result of that division new political difficulties arose among the three powers. The Germans claimed the part of Upper Silesia which became Polish, and the Poles the eastern part of the Karvinna field which was adjudged Czech. In 1938 the latter mines were transferred to Poland, and in 1939 both the Czech and Polish coal fields, including those of Cracow and Dombrowa, were forcibly incorporated into "Greater" Germany. Between 1939 and late 1944 the entire Silesian basin was administered from Berlin and run as one unit. During these years, particularly in 1943, the produc- 316

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LIGNITE

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THE term lignite or brown coal[8] covers a number of class D coals (international classification of 1913) of comparatively low caloric value. This does not mean that all lignites are poor quality coals; on the contrary, some of them, mined in Czechoslovakia, Hungary, Rumania, and Bulgaria, are "rich" lignites whose caloric value often reaches that of the class B semi-bituminous coals. That is why they are so often classified together with hard coal in local statistics. A British authority on coal, Sir Richard Redmayne, says that 2.8 tons of German lignite are equivalent to one ton of hard coal; according to the *Economic Survey of Europe in 1949*,[9] that ratio should be 4.5. The latter source says that 1.7 tons of Czech lignite and 3 tons of that from unspecified "other countries" are equivalent to one ton of hard coal. The last ratio seems to be too general because much of the Danubian-Balkan lignite is as good as the Czech. These discrepancies between qualified authorities are cited here as proof that an exact evaluation in terms of coal of the total caloric value of the lignite produced by the captive part of Europe is very difficult.

It should be borne in mind that lignite is a specifically mid-European type of fuel. In 1947-1949, the last years for which complete statistical data are available, no less than 65 percent of the world production of lignite, except that of the Soviet Union, was concentrated in the present captive area of Europe. This percentage may be even higher today; the extraction of lignite is growing in the captive area while, with a few exceptions (Western Germany, Yugoslavia, Australia) it remains stationary elsewhere.

The bulk of mid-European lignite used to be consumed in the production of electric power or converted into briquettes whose

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caloric value is generally twice that of lignite (the German classification: *Steinkohle*, 7,000 calories; *Braunkohle*, 2,500 calories; *Briquetten*, 5,000 calories). Since the first World War an ever increasing proportion of lignite is being used in Middle Europe as a base for the production of synthetic nitrate and as a cheap raw material for producing semi-coke, various tars, and synthetic oil.[10] Thus lignite has become a basis for the powerful electric plants and chemical industries of Eastern Germany and Czechoslovakia and, on a lesser scale, for similar industries in the Danubian and Balkan countries. The exception is Poland. There, little lignite has been extracted hitherto, though reserves are considerable, because of the abundance of hard coal. Lignite as such or in the form of briquettes has been used thus far instead of coal for domestic purposes, transportation, and in every industrial production but metallurgy. Now the satellite governments are on the verge of discovering a method of converting lignite into metallurgic coke. A great lignite coking plant at Lauchhammer in Eastern Germany and another in Borsod in Hungary, now under construction, are expected to be put in motion in 1952. Should this new method prove practical, Eastern Germany, Hungary, and Rumania would depend in the future much less on the importation of Polish and Soviet coke for steelmaking than they do now.

The deposits of lignite are spread over the captive area south of the Berlin-Warsaw line, and they are particularly rich in Saxon Lusace (Lausitz), Sachsen-Anhalt, Thuringia, and Bohemia. In the peak prewar year of 1929 Bulgaria produced 1.6 million tons of lignite, Czechoslovakia 22.6 million, Hungary 7.0 million and Rumania 2.7 million tons. Germany produced 174.5 million tons of lignite, of which approximately two thirds were extracted in what is now the Soviet zone and Polish Silesia. The total production of lignite in the present captive zone in 1929 reached 150 million tons. In 1943, the peak production year of World War II, the output of Bulgaria rose to 3.8 million tons, that of Czechoslovakia to 27.6 million, and that of Hungary to 11.2 million tons, while the output of Rumania remained stationary. The

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135 433 total output of Germany, again mainly Eastern, reached 250.7 million tons. The total 1943 output of lignite in the present captive area may be estimated as exceeding 200 million tons. In 1948 all these figures were much lower (except in Polish Silesia, which produced about 4 million tons) but had a marked tendency to increase. In 1949 Czechoslovakia produced 26.5 million tons of lignite, Hungary 5.5 million, Poland 4.6 million, and Rumania 2.8 million. The official figure of lignite production in Eastern Germany in 1950 was 137 million tons, and the total output of this fuel in the captive area could be estimated as reaching 185 million tons.

[185] The plans for 1953-1955 are as follows: Bulgaria is expected to produce 6 million tons of lignite in 1953, Czechoslovakia 38.8 million in 1953, Eastern Germany 225.2 million in 1955,[11] Hungary 25 million in 1954, Poland 8.4 million in 1955, and Rumania 7.7 million in 1955. The Czech and Eastern German targets are very high in comparison with their past and present output, and the Hungarian target seems to be unrealistic. Anticipating that the three plans to be terminated in 1955 may in fact be implemented earlier, a tentative figure of some 310 million tons of lignite may be accepted as that of the total output of lignite in the captive area to be achieved by the end of 1954 or the beginning of 1955. According to the ratios accepted by the *Economic Survey of Europe*, these figures would represent the equivalent of about 50.1 million tons of hard coal in Eastern Germany, 22.7 million tons in Czechoslovakia, and 12.1 million tons in the remaining four countries of captive Europe — a total of about 85 million tons. If other ratios were accepted as a basis for this computation, the total would be very much larger.

Together with the 133 million tons of hard coal which is the 1954-1955 target of the captive area, the grand total output of hard fuel for that area anticipated by 1954-1955 comes to 218 million tons of coal or coal equivalent, or more if the higher ratios of conversion are applied. Taken at its minimum, the goal of 218 million tons of coal or coal equivalent exactly coincides with the coal production of the United Kingdom in 1949, which was 218.5 million tons.

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Unfortunately it is impossible to compare the present or planned global output of both coal and lignite extracted in the captive area of Europe with the corresponding output of the Soviet Union. The Soviet statistics do not make a distinction between coal and lignite, although there is considerable difference between the caloric value of anthracite extracted in the Donets basin, for instance, and lignite from the so-called Moscow basin or several other basins located in Asiatic Russia. The entire coal and lignite production of the Soviet Union in 1950 was 264 million tons, and that projected for 1960 is 500 million tons.[12] Both these figures include far more coal than lignite, but the exact ratio between the two types of hard fuel is not available. The anticipated production of 133 million tons of hard coal and 310 million tons of lignite in the captive area by 1954-1955, a total of 218 million tons in coal equivalent, can be put side by side with a tentative figure of some 380-390 million tons of coal and lignite which Soviet Russia expects to extract by the same time.[13] The Soviet figure is undoubtedly larger than that of captive Europe, but it would be hard to say what percentage the latter would represent of the former — perhaps 55 or 60 or even 65 percent. The only really valid conclusion is that hard fuel produced in the captive area constitutes an extremely significant addition to that mined in the Soviet empire proper.

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COKE

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WHILE at least two thirds of the Ruhr coal is of coking quality and thus can be used for steelmaking, this is not the case with the Silesian coal, only one third of which can be converted into coke. Moreover, the deposits of coking coal are concentrated in the western part of the Silesian-Ostravan basin. As a consequence, before World War II the German and Czech Silesias could produce much more coke than Poland in the eastern part of the basin. This situation has changed completely since the incorporation of German Upper Silesia into Poland. Outside the main Silesian-Ostravan basin there is much high grade coking coal in Lower Silesia, now Polish, and some in the secondary coal fields in Eastern Germany, Bohemia, Hungary, and Rumania. All in all, in comparison with Western Europe, the captive area is relatively poor in coking coal.

In 1929 Czechoslovakia produced 3,350,000 tons of coke, Poland 2,123,000 tons, and Rumania 72,500 tons; the output of Eastern Germany, which included German Silesia, was some 6,000,000 tons; that of Hungary was negligible, and Bulgaria produced no coke. The peak of war production in Eastern Germany was achieved in 1943, and in Czechoslovakia in 1944, when production reached almost 5 million tons. The last published figures of postwar coke production in Czechoslovakia date from 1948, when it reached 4,940,000 tons, and in Poland from 1949, when it reached 5,720,00 tons. Little coke was produced by the remaining captive countries, and figures pertaining to their output are not available.

Since 1948-1949, when long-range plans were launched for an extensive development of the steelmaking capacity in the captive area, the problem of its coke supply became more difficult. Eastern Germany, Hungary, and Rumania have to import

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coke from Poland and Czechoslovakia in order to cope with the demand of their steel plants, which have been rebuilt and are being extended. The exportation of coke interferes with the heavy requirements of the huge steel plants in the Silesian-Ostravan basin and puts much strain on the overworked railroad system of the captive area. As noted previously, the coal-poor countries of the area have to concentrate upon finding a practical method of converting lignite, of which they have much, into coke. It is probably premature to say that this problem has been successfully solved, or that lignite coke about to be produced on a large scale in Eastern Germany and Hungary will be as satisfactory for steelmaking as "ordinary" coal coke. Still, this minor technical revolution seems to be well on its way.

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Not all satellite governments have disclosed their long-range targets for coke output. Among the large producers of coke, Poland expects to produce 9.9 million tons of coke in 1955 (in fact, earlier) and Czechoslovakia 8 million tons in 1952. This large increase of coke-making capacity cannot be achieved without the erection of many new coke plants. Several such plants of a very large size have already been put into motion in the Silesian-Ostravan basin or are still under construction. Eastern Germany anticipates for 1955 a production of 1.7 million tons of the new lignite coke[14] and of an undisclosed amount of coal coke which, on the strength of indirect indices, could be estimated at about 1.3 million tons. Rumania plans to produce 0.7 million tons of coke in 1955. The Hungarian target has never been disclosed — it cannot be high — and that of Bulgaria is negligible. It can be very tentatively estimated that the entire captive area expects to produce some 23-24 million tons of coke by 1954-1955.[15]

This tentative estimate may be compared with 19.9 million tons of coke produced by the Soviet Union in 1936 (the last known figure), and 44.3 million tons which was the top wartime production of Germany in 1943. France, without the Saar, produced only 8.2 million tons of coke in 1949.

It should be borne in mind that an average of about 1.4 tons

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135 433 of coking coal are required to produce one ton of coke, and somewhat over one ton of coke to make one ton of steel.[16] In the light of these figures, should the captive area of Europe produce, as it plans, 23-24 million tons of coke by 1954-1955 — which depends on the amount of coal it will mine — it would have little difficulty in covering the requirements of its planned production of steel, estimated at about 16.5 million tons by 1954-1955.

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OIL

THE captive area of Europe is much less rich in oil than in hard fuel. At the same time its resources in oil are much larger than those of Western Europe. In the interwar period the principal oil fields of the present captive area were situated in Rumania, and the much less important ones in Southern Poland. The Austrian and Hungarian oil resources were not exploited; in fact, they were not known to exist. Rumanian production rose steadily and reached its peak output of 8.7 million metric tons in 1936; since then, the output has been decreasing. In 1938 Rumania produced 6.6 million tons of oil and Poland 0.5 million; in the same year, oil began to flow from the new fields in Austria and Hungary. In 1939 the eastern and richer part of the Polish oil fields (Drohobycz and Boryslaw) was annexed by Soviet Russia. During World War II the Nazis brought up the Austrian output to 1.2 million tons (1944) and that of Hungary to over 0.8 million (1943), but they were unable to increase or even to maintain the level of Rumanian production, whose war peak was reached in 1942 with 5.7 million tons.

Rumanian oil fields and refineries at Ploesti and its vicinity were heavily bombed by the Allies during the war, but the ensuing damage was on the whole speedily repaired. When the Soviet authorities took over the Rumanian oil fields in the fall of 1944, they began by seizing much of the drilling material and refinery equipment and removing it to Russia. In consequence, the productivity of the Rumanian oil fields was drastically impaired. For the same reason, the productivity of the Hungarian and Austrian oil fields (all Austrian wells are situated in the Soviet zone) also declined sharply. The initial Soviet policy of indiscriminate plundering, however, was soon replaced by one of rebuilding all mid-European oil wells under Russian control

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— including Albania — and exploiting them to the utmost of their capacity. Since then, except for the insignificant Czechoslovak and Polish oil fields which are run by local governments, the really large captive oil fields have been operated by Soviet or mixed semi-Soviet companies. This means that they are managed by Soviet specialists using Soviet machinery and installations, according to the Soviet methods of extraction, which the Russians regard as more progressive than those used in the West. A huge and ever growing amount of money and energy is being invested in the extention of the existing fields and the search for new ones. The Soviet idea seems to be that the foreign companies which operated the oil fields in the captive area in the past were only looking for immediate profits and never did their job properly and that there is bound to be more oil all over Middle Europe. Insofar as Rumania and Hungary are concerned, the results of the Soviet efforts cannot be considered remarkable. The output of Hungary remains stationary, while in Rumania, partly because of Russian haste and the harshness of their methods, there have been until the present time constant difficulties of every kind with machinery, organization, and manpower — perhaps even some sabotage.[21] The best proof of this is the fact that no statistics on oil production in absolute figures have been officially published in Rumania since 1947; had there been good reason for boasting, the figures undoubtedly would have been made known. On the other hand, there is much evidence that the Russians have been more successful in Albania, and even more so in their zone of Austria.

The present rate of oil output in Rumania, and for that matter in most of the other captive or Soviet-controlled countries (there is no oil in the Soviet zone of Germany), is the subject of much speculation.[22] Every authority has its own set of estimates, and there are surprising differences between them. Only a few of these diverging estimates can be quoted here. Thus the *Economic Survey of Europe in 1950*, an official publication of the United Nations — bound as it is to accept the indices occasionally given by the satellite governments and to draw its conclusions from

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them — estimates that in 1950 the Rumanian output of crude oil reached 5.35 million metric tons, that of Hungary (which lagged behind its plan for 1950) 0.55 million, of Poland 0.18 million, and of Czechoslovakia 0.05 million metric tons. Together with the Soviet zone of Austria, whose production the *Survey* estimates at 1.5 million tons, the total 1950 output of the captive area should have reached 7.63 million metric tons — plus that of Albania, for which the *Survey* gives no figure.

According to the other authoritative sources, the above-quoted figure on the Rumanian output reflects the nonfulfilled plans of the Rumanian government rather than the actual level of production. Competent Rumanian experts residing in the United States claim that the 1950 oil output in Rumania did not exceed 4.2 or perhaps even 4.0 million tons.[23] On the other hand, it is possible that the *Survey* underestimated the output of oil in Austria and Czechoslovakia. Thus, according to accredited American sources with access to much special information, the 1950 output of oil in the Soviet-controlled section of Europe was: Albania, 1,915,000 metric tons; Austria, 2,247,000 tons; Czechoslovakia, 275,000 tons; Hungary, 490,000 tons; Poland, 138,000 tons; and Rumania, 4,360,000 tons — a total of 9,415,000 metric tons. This total is larger than most of the other estimates because of the high figures for Austria and Czechoslovakia, and in particular because of the surprisingly high figure for Albania.[24] It should be noted that the corresponding figure for the Soviet Union in 1950 is presumed to have been 37,600,000 metric tons. If the above-quoted American estimate is exact, it would mean that the output of oil in the captive part of Europe amounts to as much as one fourth of that of Russia proper.

Whatever estimate is accepted for 1950, it may be assumed that the 1951 output of oil in captive Europe will be somewhat larger. It is true that according to official admissions the 1951 oil production in Czechoslovakia and Hungary has been lagging behind the plan, but this does not necessarily mean that it has fallen below the level of the preceding year. On the other hand,

315 it is claimed that by the middle of 1951 the Rumanian output
● 135 was 19 percent larger than by the middle of 1950, and the
433 Polish output in the third quarter of 1951 was 11 percent larger than that of the third quarter of 1950.[25] Moreover, new oil fields were discovered recently in the Soviet zone of Austria at Schwardorf south of the Danube, opening up, it is asserted, "fantastic possibilities" for the future.[26]

It is not easy to have an accurate idea of how much oil should be extracted in the captive part of Europe in the light of the investments and other measures foreseen in the long-range economic plans. The current plans anticipate that in 1955 Rumania should produce 10 million metric tons and Poland about 0.4 million; Czechoslovakia plans to extract 0.15 million tons by 1952. The planned figure for Hungary has never been disclosed, and neither have been those for Austria and Albania, both of which produce oil for the Soviet Union. Yet it is certain that the Soviet authorities operating the oil fields in the three last-mentioned countries *must* have definite targets which they have to reach by the end of 1954, when most of the present long-range economic plans of the captive countries will, in fact, terminate. These targets, together with the three disclosed ones, may add up to any figure between 13 and 16 million metric tons of oil; that is, between about 94 and about 115 million barrels — an output depending on many unpredictable elements. A tentative figure of 13 million metric tons to be reached by 1954 has been adopted in this study as a basis for further computations.[27]

This estimate for 1954 — which may be a low one — should be compared with the 60 million metric tons of crude petroleum the Soviet government expects to extract in 1960.[28]

To the tentative figure for 1954 should be added the growing output of synthetic oil produced in the northern part of the captive area.

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NATURAL GAS

In Europe, even more than in America, most of the natural gas extracted as a by-product of oil refining had been for a long time wasted, and its utilization for lighting, fuel, and extraction of natural gasoline is a comparatively new process. International statistics do not exist for its production but only for its consumption in the given states, which is supposed to be equal to its effective collection within the same boundaries.[29] In 1930 Rumania, with its consumption of 1,206 million cubic meters of natural gas, and Poland, with 487 million, were responsible for nearly one hundred percent of the total European output of this gas. Several long-distance gas pipelines were laid in Rumania. The pipeline connecting Daszawa in the Polish oil fields with Warsaw was still unfinished by September 1939; the Russians redirected that line to Kiev. During World War II the extraction of natural gas was started in the present Russian zone of Austria and in Hungary.

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The last known statistics for gas production in absolute figures in Rumania date from 1947, when it reached 1,176 million cubic meters; in Poland (which lost to Russia two thirds of its oil fields) from 1948, when it was 162 million cubic meters; and in Hungary from 1947, when it was 100 million cubic meters; and in Austria from 1949, when it was 59 million cubic meters. The Rumanian output was then small in comparison with its peak in 1936, when it reached 2,130 million cubic meters. Since 1947-1949 no figures for natural gas extraction have been published by any captive or Soviet-controlled country, and some of the percentile indices disclosed by these countries are contradictory. There are reasons to assume, however, that there has been since 1947 a steady though slow increase of that production in Hungary and a much more rapid one in Poland and Rumania.

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316 443 more favorable: although the output of black and brown coal was also lagging behind schedule, its extraction in the second quarter of 1951 was claimed to have exceeded that of the second quarter of 1950 by 26 percent (*Gospodarka Planowa*, 1951, No. 10). No detailed data are known for coal extraction in Bulgaria.

[6] 100 million tons (according to some indirect indices, 103 million) in Poland, 25 million in Czechoslovakia, 3.5 million in Eastern Germany, about 3 million in Hungary, about one million in Rumania, and about 0.5 million in Bulgaria. The Eastern German target, originally set at 4 million tons, was subsequently reduced to 3.5 million tons (the Law of 1 November 1951, *Wirtschaft*, Berlin, 1951, No. 44) — the only known instance of this kind. Yet various utterances of the chief planners in Poland and Rumania, and of Eastern Germany as well, leave little doubt that the long-range economic plans of these countries, supposed to terminate by the end of 1955, will be accelerated by one year, as has already happened with the Czechoslovak and Hungarian plans. In anticipation of that step, the writer assumes throughout his study that the figures of planned output in Eastern Germany, Poland, and Rumania in 1955 in fact pertain to 1954. An arbitrary but plausible figure of one million tons increase in the coal output in Czechoslovakia has been accepted for 1954 in comparison with the output planned for 1953.

[7] London *Economist*, 24 February 1951. According to the Soviet Fourth Five Year Plan, that figure should have been 86 million tons. Since the plan was overfulfilled, it was probably larger.

135 443 [8] Most of the descriptive data on lignite comes from an exhaustive study by Sir Richard Redmayne, *Encyclopædia Britannica*, 1943, Vol. V. p. 878 ff.

[9] United Nations, Geneva, 1950, p. 231.

[10] Redmayne, *op. cit.*

[11] In its original version of 1950 the Eastern German Five Year Plan foresaw a production of 205 million tons of lignite by 1955. The new figure of 225.2 million tons in 1955 comes from the revised version of the plan as adoped in the law of 1 November 1951, (*Wirtschaft*, Berlin, No. 44, 2 November 1951).

[12] The first figure is based on the indices of the coal production in 1951 in comparison with the preceding years, as published by the Soviet press. The second comes from Stalin's speech of 9 February 1946.

[13] In his speech of 7 November 1951, Beria stated that in the course of the past several years the output of coal in the Soviet Union has been growing on the average of 24 million tons per year. (*Pravda*, 7 November 1951).

[14] The vast Lauchhammer lignite coking plant now under construction (and possibly some other new plants) is expected to produce 300,000

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tons of coke in 1952, 1,300,000 tons by 1953 and 1,700,000 tons by 1955 (speech of 31 October 1951, by Heinrich Rau, Eastern German minister of planning, *Wirtschaft*, Berlin, 1951, No. 44). However the rapidly growing requirements of the new Eastern German metallurgic plants cannot be satisfied by the two locally produced types of coke and a large importation of coke from Poland. In its four year trade agreement with the Soviet Union of 27 September 1951, the Eastern German government assured itself the importation of 250,000 tons of coke from Russia annually for the period 1952-1955 (*Wirtschaft*, Berlin, 1951, No. 42).

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[15] An estimate of the writer, based on the assumption that most of the hard coal extracted in Eastern Germany and Hungary, as well as in Rumania, will be converted into coke. Thus, the huge steel plant at Dunapentele (Stalinváros) in Hungary, now under construction, is expected to be run on Hungarian produced coke, converted from the local Pécs coal. The demand for coke by that plant alone may exceed one million tons.

[16] *European Steel Trends*, United Nations, Geneva, 1949, p. 40.

[17] An unpublished study on Czechoslovak industry by Dr. V. Pauliat of New York.

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[18] National Economic Plan for 1951, *Dziennik Ustaw* (Journal of Laws), Warsaw, 31 March 1951.

[19] Heinrich Rau, speech of 31 October 1951, *Wirtschaft*, Berlin, 1951, No. 44.

[20] A conservative estimate of the writer.

[21] See the *Information Bulletin* of the Rumanian National Committee, Washington, for 1950 and 1951, and *La Nation Roumaine*, Paris, *passim*.

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[22] Here are some of the non-quoted estimates: the *Review of International Affairs*, Belgrade, 28 March 1951 — 3.5 million tons; *World Today*, London, Royal Institute of International Affairs, April 1951 — 3.8 million; *Etudes et Conjonctures*, Paris, a semi-official publication, January-February 1951 — 4.3 million; *Gospodarka Planowa* (Planned Economy), Warsaw, February 1951 — 5.46 million tons. The Belgrade magazine is biased.

[23] The first figure comes from the Rumanian National Committee, *supra*, the second from Dr. G. G. Rom.

[24] According to the *Wirtschaftsdienst*, Hamburg, June 1951, Albania planned to extract 306,000 tons of oil in 1950. According to Musil, the Albanian correspondent of *Wirtschaft* (Berlin, No. 48 of 30 November 1951), the Albanian extraction of oil reached 192,000 tons in 1948 and increased to 307,000 tons in 1950.

[25] Figures taken from recent official reports.

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315 [26] United Press from Vienna, quoted after *Anglo-Polish Review*, London, October 1951.

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[27] An estimate of the writer, shared by some other researchers.

[28] Stalin's speech of 9 February 1946.

[29] United Nations *Statistical Yearbook*, New York, 1949-50, p. 145. This is no longer true. In 1945 pipelines were laid to convey natural gas from Rumania to the Soviet Union.

[30] Data for Rumania and Poland taken from the official reports on the fulfillment of the annual and quarterly plans.

382 [31] Most of the data which follow are based upon Jean Chardonnet, *Les conséquences économiques de la guerre*, Paris, Hachette, 1947.

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[32] J. A. Wilder, *Polish Regained Territories*, London, 1948.

[33] Dr. Paulat's study on the industrial development of Czechoslovakia, 1951.

[34] *Wirtschaft*, Berlin, *passim;* also advertisements in the Eastern German press.

[35] *Wirtschaft*, Berlin, 1951, No. 1.

[36] *Wirtschaft*, Berlin, 1951, No. 44 of November 2.

[37] See page 29.

[38] Speech of minister for planning, Dolanský, introducing the revised plan (end of February 1951).

[39] *Wirtschaft*, Berlin, 1951, No. 44 of November 2.

[40] Leuna plant employs 28,000 people, and is the greatest single plant in Eastern Germany. Karl Kühn (*Wirtschaft*, Berlin, 1951, No. 18) stated that Leuna could produce much more gasoline in 1950, because the installed capacity would permit such production, but that nitrogen-making had priority.

[41] Speech by Hilary Minc, *Trybuna Ludu*, Warsaw, 24 May 1951.

[42] United Nations *Statistical Yearbook*, New York, 1949-50. In 1937 Czechoslovakia produced 42,600 tons of benzol and Poland 31,100 tons; in 1936 Germany, outside the Bizone, produced 131,000 tons.

[43] *Ibidem*, p. 110.

37 [44] Professor H. Herbich, quoted by S. Rotarski, "The Unexploited Resources of Europe," in *Eastern Quarterly*, London, January 1950. The four rivers are the Columbia, Colorado, Sacramento, and San Joaquin.

[45] Speech by Heinrich Rau on 31 October 1951. See footnote 14.

[46] *Trybuna Ludu*, Warsaw, 24 October 1951.

[47] Dr. V. Paulat. See footnote 17.

[48] Exhaustive data on that problem in *Wirtschaft*, Berlin, 1950, No. 51.

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463 ments made by single countries of the area are systematically exchanged with Russia and other captive countries, and many thousands of Soviet, Czech, Eastern German, and Hungarian experts, technical advisers, and skilled specialists are employed by the less advanced countries of the area. It is difficult, if at all feasible, to compare the sum of technical knowledge behind the Iron Curtain to that in the free world. Undoubtedly, the countries of Eastern Europe lag behind the free world in all technical respects, but it would be imprudent to believe that they are not making much technical progress.

433 377 The area as a whole and the single countries within it, except for Eastern Germany and Czechoslovakia, are, generally speaking, self-sufficient in foodstuffs. It also has sufficient reserves of solid and liquid fuel. Using both these reserves and their hydroelectric power, it can produce an increasing amount of electric power. On the other hand, the 433 area is poor in metallic ores. There is much bauxite in Hungary, and supplies of lead and zinc in Poland. Yugoslavia and Bulgaria are rich in many ores. However, there is not enough iron or manganese ore in Eastern Europe, far from enough copper, no tin, and a lack of many supplementary metals of significance to modern metallurgy. Chemical raw materials are abundant, especially in Poland and Rumania, but the area lacks phosphate rock and is poor in sulphur compounds. It has no jute, very little cotton, not enough wool, and no rubber. The resulting limitations to industrial expansion are obvious. They are offset to some extent by the existence of dormant resources and by the fact that the southern Balkan area has not yet been properly explored. It is possible that the Balkan mountains contain more mineral wealth than has been assumed hitherto. Soviet geologists are certain that this is so. Some deficiencies in raw materials can be met, as was the practice under Hitler, by using substitutes such as synthetic oil, rubber, yarn, and plastics. This area can

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produce many substitutes. Today, shortages of raw materials are covered by imports from abroad, most of these from the Soviet Union. Economic autarky is not possible in Eastern Europe alone, but the Soviet bloc, including Russia and China, is almost self-sufficient in raw materials.

Under the unrelenting pressure of Moscow, the output of machinery and plant equipment in this area is making steady and rapid progress. The period when most of these countries must depend on importation of machinery from the West is almost over. Were all Western sources of industrial machinery to be completely closed to the captive area, its industrialization would be slowed and delayed but not halted. As things stand now, much industrial equipment is still imported from Western Europe, legally or illegally, and the Soviet Union can take care of the other shortages. Czechoslovakia, Eastern Germany, and, to a lesser degree, Hungary produce machinery above their home requirements, and part of the surplus goes to other captive countries, to the Soviet Union, and to China.

According to United Nations data,[2] the 1951 indices of industrial production in the single countries of this area in comparison to 1938 were as follows: Eastern Germany, 115 per cent; Czechoslovakia, 168; Rumania, 206; Hungary, 267; Poland, 270; and Bulgaria, 345 per cent. In considering these figures, it is necessary to bear in mind that 1938 was not the peak production year in Eastern Europe. Between 1938 and 1943-44, the industrial output of Czechoslovakia and Hungary rose noticeably owing to the erection of many new industrial plants, so that only a part of their industrial expansion since 1938 can be attributed to the efforts of their present governments. Poland's industrial potential increased in 1945 by at least one third, due to the acquisition of ex-German Silesia. Bulgaria's industrial po-

[2] *Economic Survey of Europe Since the War* (Geneva: United Nations, 1953), p. 239, Table 1.

CHAPTER III

Ketman

● 155 OFFICIALLY, contradictions do not exist in the minds of the citizens in the people's democracies. Nobody dares to reveal them publicly. And yet the question of how to deal with them is posed in real life. More than others, the members of the intellectual elite are aware of this problem. They solve it by becoming actors.

It is hard to define the type of relationship that prevails between people in the East otherwise than as acting, with the exception that one does not perform on a theater stage but in the street, office, factory, meeting hall, or even the room one lives in. Such acting is a highly developed craft that places a premium upon mental alertness. Before it leaves the lips, every word must be evaluated as to its consequences. A smile that appears at the wrong moment, a glance that is not all it should be can occasion dangerous suspicions and accusations. Even one's gestures, tone of voice, or preference for certain kinds of neckties are interpreted as signs of one's political tendencies.

A visitor from the Imperium is shocked on coming to the West. In his contacts with others, beginning with porters or taxi drivers, he encounters no resistance. The people he meets are completely relaxed. They lack that internal concentration which betrays itself in a lowered head

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or in restlessly moving eyes. They say whatever words come to their tongues; they laugh aloud. Is it possible that human relations can be so direct?

Acting in daily life differs from acting in the theater in that everyone plays to everyone else, and everyone is fully aware that this is so. The fact that a man acts is not to his prejudice, is no proof of unorthodoxy. But he must act well, for his ability to enter into his role skillfully proves that he has built his characterization upon an adequate foundation. If he makes a passionate speech against the West, he demonstrates that he has at least 10 per cent of the hatred he so loudly proclaims. If he condemns Western culture lukewarmly, then he must be attached to it in reality. Of course, all human behavior contains a significant amount of acting. A man reacts to his environment and is molded by it even in his gestures. Nevertheless, what we find in the people's democracies is a conscious mass play rather than automatic imitation. Conscious acting, if one practices it long enough, develops those traits which one uses most in one's role, just as a man who became a runner because he had good legs develops his legs even more in training. After long acquaintance with his role, a man grows into it so closely that he can no longer differentiate his true self from the self he simulates, so that even the most intimate of individuals speak to each other in Party slogans. To identify one's self with the role one is obliged to play brings relief and permits a relaxation of one's vigilance. Proper reflexes at the proper moment become truly automatic.

This happens in literature as well. A poet writing a piece of propaganda does not confine himself to a purely rationalistic approach. Imbued with the thought that poetry ideally should be suited to recitation in chorus at a meeting, he begins by tuning himself to an appropriate

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modern in the West. But how can one still the thought 626
that aesthetic experiences arise out of something organic, 517
and that the union of color and harmony with fear is as difficult to imagine as brilliant plumage on birds living in the northern tundras?

Professional Ketman[1] is reasoned thus: since I find my- 626
self in circumstances over which I have no control, and 155 ●
since I have but one life and that is fleeting, I should strive to do my best. I am like a crustacean attached to a crag on the bottom of the sea. Over me storms rage and huge ships sail; but my entire effort is concentrated upon clinging to the rock, for otherwise I will be carried off by the waters and perish, leaving no trace behind. If I am a scientist I attend congresses at which I deliver reports strictly adhering to the Party line. But in the laboratory I pursue my research according to scientific methods, and in that alone lies the aim of life. If my work is successful, it matters little how it will be presented and toward whose glory. Discoveries made in the name of a disinterested search for truth are lasting, whereas the shrieks of politicians pass. I must do all they demand, they may use my name as they wish, as long as I have access to a laboratory and money for the purchase of scientific instruments.

If I am a writer, I take pride in my literary achievements. Here, for example, is my treatise on Swift, a Marxist analysis. This type of analysis, which is not synonymous with the Method or the New Faith, makes possible a keen penetration into historical events. Marx had a genius for observation. In following him one is secure against attack, for he is, after all, the prophet; and one can proclaim one's belief in the Method and the New Faith in a preface fulfilling much the same function as dedications to kings or tsars in times past. Here is my translation of a sixteenth-century poem, or my novel

[1] [For a definition of "Ketman", see cat. 116, pp. 57-60 - Analyst]

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626 whose scene is laid in the distant past. Aren't they of per-
155 manent value? Here are my translations from Russian. They are viewed with approbation and have brought me a large sum of money, but certainly Pushkin is a great poet, and his worth is not altered by the fact that today his poems serve Him as a means of propaganda. Obviously I must pay for the right to practice my profession with a certain number of articles and odes in the way of tribute. Still one's life on earth is not judged by transitory panegyrics written out of necessity.

These two examples of professional Ketman should demonstrate how little discomfort it creates for the rulers. It is the source of considerable dynamic force and one cause of the tremendous impetus toward education. The object is to establish some special field in which one can release one's energies, exploit one's knowledge and sensibility, and at the same time escape the fate of a functionary entirely at the mercy of political fluctuations. The son of a worker who becomes a chemist makes a *permanent* advance. The son of a worker who becomes a member of the security police rises to the surface, where large ships sail but where the sea is changeable and stormy. But most important of all, chemical experiments, bridges, translations of poetry, and medical care are exceptionally free of falsity. The State, in its turn, takes advantage of this Ketman because it needs chemists, engineers, and doctors. From time to time, it is true, there come from above muffled grumbles of hatred against those who practice Ketman in the realm of humanistic studies. Fadeyev, Moscow's literary overseer, attacked the University of Leningrad because one of its students had written a dissertation on the English poet, Walter Savage Landor. "Who needs Landor? Who ever heard of him?" cried Fadeyev. So it would

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seem that moderation and watchfulness are indicated for those who espouse this form of Ketman. 626 /55

Sceptical Ketman is widely disseminated throughout intellectual circles. One argues that humanity does not know how to handle its knowledge or how to resolve the problems of production and division of goods. The first scientific attempts to solve social problems, made in the nineteenth century, are interesting but not precise enough. They happened, however, into the hands of the Russians who, unable to think otherwise than dogmatically, raised these first attempts to the dignity of dogma. What is happening in Russia and the countries dependent upon her bespeaks a kind of insanity, but it is not impossible that Russia will manage to impose her insanity upon the whole world and that the return to reason will occur only after two or three hundred years. Finding oneself in the very midst of an historical cyclone, one must behave as prudently as possible, yielding externally to forces capable of destroying all adversaries. This does not prevent one from taking pleasure in one's observations, since what one beholds is indeed unprecedented. Surely man has never before been subjected to such pressure, never has he had to writhe and wriggle so to adapt himself to forms constructed according to the books but obviously not to his size. All his intellectual and emotional capacities are put to the test.

Whoever contemplates this daily sight of repudiation and humiliation knows more about man than an inhabitant of the West who feels no pressure other than that of money. The accumulating of this store of observations is the activity of a miser who counts his treasure in secret. Since this Ketman is based on a total lack of belief in the Method, it helps one conform externally to the obligatory

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626 line by allowing for complete cynicism, and therefore for
155 elasticity in adjusting oneself to changing tactics.

626 *Metaphysical Ketman*[1] occurs generally in countries with
779 a Catholic past. Most examples of it within the Imperium are found in Poland. This Ketman depends upon a *suspended* belief in a metaphysical principle of the world. A man attached to this Ketman regards the epoch in which he lives as anti-metaphysical, and hence as one in which no metaphysical faith can emerge. Humanity is learning to think in rationalistic and materialistic categories; it is burdened with immediate problems and entangled in a class war. Other-worldly religions are crumbling, living through a period of crisis and, what is worse, serving to defend the obsolete order. This does not mean that mankind will not return to a better and purified religion in the future. Perhaps the New Faith is an indispensable purgatory; perhaps God's purpose is being accomplished through the barbarians, i.e. the Center,[2] who are forcing the masses to awaken out of their lethargy. The spiritual fare these masses receive from the New Faith is inferior and insufficient. Still one must commend the Center for breaking new ground and for demolishing externally splendid but internally rotten façades. One should cooperate in this task without betraying one's attachment to the Mystery. All the more so because the Mystery has no possibility of appearing in literature, for example, and because neither the language nor the ideas at the disposal of contemporary man are ripe enough to express it.

This metaphysical Ketman in its turn has a number of varieties. Certain practicing Catholics serve even in the security police, and *suspend* their Catholicism in executing their inhumane work. Others, trying to maintain a Christian community in the bosom of the New Faith, come out publicly as Catholics. They often succeed in preserving

[1] [For a definition of Ketman, see cat 116, 180 5760 Analyst]
[2] [Moscow — Analyst]

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829 can ease somewhat the tensions created by this process of fulfillment. But beneath the activity and bustle of daily life is the constant awareness of an irrevocable choice to be made. One must either die (physically or spiritually), or else one must be reborn according to a prescribed method, namely, the taking of Murti-Bing pills. People in the West are often inclined to consider the lot of converted countries in terms of might and coercion. That is wrong. There is an internal longing for harmony and happiness that lies deeper than ordinary fear or the desire to escape misery or physical destruction. The fate of completely consistent, non-dialectical people like Witkiewicz is a warning for many an intellectual. All about him, in the city streets, he sees the frightening shadows of internal exiles, irreconcilable, non-participating, eroded by hatred.

829 In order to understand the situation of a writer in a
● 156 people's democracy, one must seek the reasons for his activity and ask how he maintains his equilibrium. Whatever one may say, the New Faith affords great possibilities for an active and positive life. And Murti-Bing is more tempting to an intellectual than to a peasant or laborer. For the intellectual, the New Faith is a candle that he circles like a moth. In the end, he throws himself into the flame for the glory of mankind. We must not treat this desire for self-immolation lightly. Blood flowed freely in Europe during the religious wars, and he who joins the New Faith today is paying off a debt to that European tradition. We are concerned here with questions more significant than mere force.

I shall try to grasp those profound human longings and to speak about them as if one really could analyze what is the warm blood and the flesh, itself, of man. If I should try to describe the reasons why a man becomes a revolu-

1/A [see category 116, p. 4 -- Analyst]

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tionary I would be neither eloquent nor restrained enough. I admit that I have too much admiration for those who fight evil, whether their choice of ends and means be right or wrong. I draw the line, however, at those intellectuals who *adapt* themselves, although the fact that they are adapted and not genuine revolutionaries in no way diminishes their newly acquired zeal and enthusiasm.

829 156

There are, I believe, a few key concepts which may lead us to understand why they accept Murti-Bing.

THE VOID

The society portrayed by Witkiewicz is distinguished by the fact that in it religion has ceased to exist as a force. And it is true that religion long ago lost its hold on men's minds not only in the people's democracies, but elsewhere as well. As long as a society's best minds were occupied by theological questions, it was possible to speak of a given religion as the way of thinking of the whole social organism. All the matters which most actively concerned the people were referred to it and discussed in its terms. But that belongs to a dying era. We have come by easy stages to a lack of a common system of thought that could unite the peasant cutting his hay, the student poring over formal logic, and the mechanic working in an automobile factory. Out of this lack arises the painful sense of detachment or abstraction that oppresses the "creators of culture." Religion has been replaced by philosophy which, however, has strayed into spheres increasingly less accessible to the layman. The discussions of Husserl by Witkiewicz's heroes can scarcely interest a reader of even better-than-average education; whereas the peasants remained bound to the Church, be it only emotionally and traditionally. Music, painting, and poetry became some-

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829 thing completely foreign to the great majority of people.
156 A theory developed that art should become a substitute for religion: "metaphysical feelings" were to be expressed in the "compression of pure form"; and so form soon came to dominate content.

To belong to the masses is the great longing of the "alienated" intellectual. It is such a powerful longing that, in trying to appease it, a great many of them who once looked to Germany or Italy for inspiration have now become converted to the New Faith. Actually, the rightist totalitarian program was exceptionally poor. The only gratification it offered came from collective *warmth:* crowds, red faces, mouths open in a shout, marches, arms brandishing sticks; but little rational satisfaction. Neither racist doctrines, nor hatred of foreigners, nor the glorification of one's own national traditions could efface the feeling that the entire program was improvised to deal with
829 problems of the moment. But Murti-Bing is different. It
812 lays scientific foundations. At the same time, it scraps all
156 vestiges of the past. Post-Kantian philosophy, fallen into disrepute because of its remoteness from the life of men; art designed for those who, having no religion, dare not admit that to seek the "absolute" through a juxtaposition of colors and sounds is cowardly and inconclusive thinking; and the semi-magic, semi-religious mentality of the peasants—these are replaced by a *single* system, a single language of ideas. The truck driver and elevator operator employed by a publishing firm now read the same Marxist classics as its director or staff writers. A day laborer and a historian can reach an understanding on this basis of common reading. Obviously, the difference that may exist between them in mental level is no smaller than that which separated a theologian from a village blacksmith in the middle ages.

[See category 116, p. 11 — Analysis]

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But the fundamental principles are universal; the great spiritual schism has been obliterated. Dialectical materialism has united everyone, and philosophy (i.e., dialectics) once more determines the patterns of life. It is beginning to be regarded with a respect one reserves only for a force on which important things depend: bread and milk for one's children, one's own happiness and safety. The intellectual has once more become *useful*. He who may once have done his thinking and writing in his free moments away from a paying job in a bank or post office, has now found his rightful place on earth. He has been restored to society, whereas the businessmen, aristocrats, and tradespeople who once considered him a harmless blunderer have now been dispossessed. They are indeed delighted to find work as cloakroom attendants and to hold the coat of a former employee of whom they said, in pre-war days, "It seems he writes." We must not oversimplify, however, the gratifications of personal ambition; they are merely the outward and visible signs of social usefulness, symbols of a recognition that strengthens the intellectual's feeling of *belonging*.

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THE ABSURD

Even though one seldom speaks about metaphysical motives that can lead to a complete change of people's political opinions, such motives do exist and can be observed in some of the most sensitive and intelligent men. Let us imagine a spring day in a city situated in some country similar to that described in Witkiewicz's novel. One of his heroes is taking a walk. He is tormented by what we may call the *suction* of the absurd. What is the significance of the lives of the people he passes, of the senseless bustle, the laughter, the pursuit of money, the stupid

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the weapons of the dialectician and those of his adversary. A match between the two is like a duel between a foot soldier and a tank. Not that every dialectician is so very intelligent or so very well educated, but all his statements are enriched by the cumulated thought of the masters and their commentators. If every sentence he speaks is compact and effective, that is not due to his own merits, but to those of the classics he has studied. His listeners are defenseless. They could, it is true, resort to arguments derived from their observations of life, but such arguments are just as badly countenanced as any questioning of fundamental methodology. The dialectician rubs up against his public at innumerable meetings of professional organizations and youth groups in clubs, factories, office buildings, and village huts throughout the entire converted area of Europe. And there is no doubt that he emerges the victor in these encounters.

It is no wonder that a writer or painter doubts the wisdom of resistance. If he were sure that art opposed to the official line could have a lasting value, he probably would not hesitate. He would earn his living through some more menial job within his profession, write or paint in his spare time, and never worry about publishing or exhibiting his work. He believes, however, that in most cases such work would be artistically poor, and he is not far wrong. As we have already said, the objective conditions he once knew have disappeared. The objective conditions necessary to the realization of a work of art are, as we know, a highly complex phenomenon, involving one's public, the possibility of contact with it, the general atmosphere, and above all freedom from involuntary subjective control. "I can't write as I would like to," a young Polish poet admitted to me. "My own stream of thought has so many tributaries, that I barely succeed in damming

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off one, when a second, third, or fourth overflows. I get 156 ● halfway through a phrase, and already I submit it to 626 Marxist criticism. I imagine what X or Y will say about it, and I change the ending."

Paradoxical as it may seem, it is this subjective impotence that convinces the intellectual that the one Method is right. Everything proves it is right. Dialectics: I predict the house will burn; then I pour gasoline over the stove. The house burns; my prediction is fulfilled. Dialectics! I predict that a work of art incompatible with socialist realism will be worthless. Then I place the artist in conditions in which such a work *is* worthless. My prediction is fulfilled.

Let us take poetry as an example. Obviously, there is poetry of political significance. Lyric poetry is permitted to exist on certain conditions. It must be: 1) serene; 2) free of any elements of thought that might trespass against the universally accepted principles (in practice, this comes down to descriptions of nature and of one's feelings for friends and family); 3) understandable. Since a poet who is not allowed to *think* in his verse automatically tends to perfect his form, he is accused of formalism.

It is not only the literature and painting of the people's 000 democracies that prove to the intellectual that *things cannot be different.* He is strengthened in this belief by the news that seeps through from the West. The Western world is the world of Witkiewicz's novel. The number of its aesthetic and philosophical aberrations is myriad. Disciples imitate disciples; the past imitates the past. This world lives as if there had never been a Second World War. Intellectual clans in Eastern Europe know this life, but know it as a stage of the past that isn't worth looking back on. Even if the new problems are so oppressive that they can break a great many people, at least they are con-

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000 The assertion that historical guilt is individual guilt *per se* is nothing more than the subterfuge of a guilty and lying conscience. This does not mean that one can put off the problem of historical guilt with easy generalizations. Stupidity, i.e. inability to understand the mechanism of events, can cause tremendous suffering. In this sense, the Polish commanders who gave the order to start the Warsaw uprising in 1944 are guilty of stupidity, and their guilt has an individual character. Another individual guilt, however, weighs upon the command of the Red Army which refused to aid the insurgents—not out of stupidity, but on the contrary out of a full understanding of "historical processes," i.e. a correct evaluation of power.

One more example of guilt through stupidity is the attitude of various societies toward thinkers, writers, or artists whose vision reached into the future and whose works were largely incomprehensible to their contemporaries. The critic who denied the value of these works might have acted in good faith, but by his stupidity he condemned men of incomparably greater worth than himself to poverty, even persecution. The specific trick of the Christian-Stalinists is to lump these two concepts of guilt, individual and historical, together, while it is only in a few instances that these concepts coincide.

• 156 659 Catholics who accept the Party line gradually lose everything except the phraseology of their Christian metaphysics. The true content of their faith becomes the Method by a psychological process well-known to Christians in the people's democracies. The existence of a large number of loyal half-Christians in the subjugated part of Europe could have a tremendous effect on the Imperium's political plans. Toleration and even support of these "Christian-patriots," as they are called, enables the Center to avoid a dangerous conflict. The transition from Chris-

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tianity to a cult of History takes place imperceptibly. 156 ●
Without doubt, the greatest success of the Imperium 659
would come if it could install a Party-line pope in the Vatican. A mass in the Basilica of St. Peter in Rome, performed by such a pope, with the assistance of dignitaries from those subjugated countries which are predominately Catholic, would be one of the most important steps toward the consolidation of the world empire.

Christians who serve the Eastern Imperium ingeniously resolve the problem posed by Jesus' words "Render therefore unto Caesar the things that are Caesar's; and unto God the things that are God's." Until now the contrast between the ordinary man and Caesar has never been effaced. Christianity guaranteed this division by teaching that every man had his own history, distinct from the history of the social group or the nation to which he belonged. If, as is taught today from the Elbe to Vladivostok, the history of every man is nothing more than the reflection of the history of his class, and if his class is personified in Caesar, then it is clear that the man who rebels against Caesar rebels against himself. Christians who agree to this thesis prove they no longer believe in God's judgment of each man's acts. Fear that History will damn them eternally motivates their submission.

The Party knows that the conflict between true Chris- 185
tianity and the Revolution is fundamental. The Revolu- 65
tion aims at the highest goal the human species has ever 659
set for itself on earth, the end of "man's exploitation of man." To do this, it must replace man's desire for profit with a feeling of collective responsibility as a motive for action. This is a distant and honorable goal. Probably it will not be reached quickly; and probably, too, for a long period it will be necessary to maintain a constant terror in order to instill that feeling of responsibility by force.

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● 156 But Christianity contains a dual set of values; it recognizes man to be a "child of God" and also a member of society. As a member of society, he must submit to the established order so long as that order does not hinder him in his prime task of saving his soul. Only by effacing this dualism, i.e. raising man as a purely social creature, can the Party release the forces of hatred in him that are necessary to the realization of the new world.

156 659 The masses in highly industrialized countries like England, the United States, or France are largely de-Christianized. Technology, and the way of life it produces, undermines Christianity far more effectively than do violent measures. The erosion of religious beliefs is also taking place in Central and Eastern Europe. There, the core of the problem is to avoid galvanizing the forces of Christianity by some careless misstep. It would be an act of unforgivable carelessness, for example, to close the churches suddenly and prohibit all religious practice. Instead, one should try to split the Church in two. Part of the clergy must be compromised as reactionaries and "foreign agents"—a rather easy task, given the utterly conservative mentality of many priests. The other part must be bound to the state as closely as the Orthodox Church is in Russia, so that it becomes a tool of the government. A completely submissive Church—one that may on occasion collaborate with the security police—loses authority in the eyes of the pious. Such a Church can be preserved for decades, until the moment when it dies a natural death due to a lack of adherents.

So there are measures that can be taken even against 156 the Church, this last stronghold of opposition. Nevertheless, the masses in the people's democracies behave like a man who wants to cry out in his sleep and cannot find his voice. They not only dare not speak, they do not know

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what to say. Logically, everything is as it should be. From the philosophical premises to the collectivization of the farms, everything makes up a single closed whole, a solid and imposing pyramid. The lone individual inevitably asks himself if his antagonism is not wrong; all he can oppose to the entire propaganda apparatus are simply his irrational desires. Should he not, in fact, be ashamed of them?

The Party is vigilantly on guard lest these longings be transmuted into new and vital intellectual formulas adapted to new conditions and therefore capable of winning over the masses. Neither the reaction nor the Church are as great a menace as is *heresy*. If men familiar with dialectics and able to present dialectical materialism in a new light appear, they must be rendered harmless at once. A professor of philosophy who clings to obsolete "idealistic" concepts is not particularly dangerous. He loses his lectureship, but he is allowed to earn a living by editing texts, etc. Whereas a professor who, using the names of Marx and Engels, permits himself departures from orthodoxy sows seeds from which alarming crops may grow.

Only the bourgeois persists in thinking that nothing results from these nuances of thought. The Party knows that much can come of them: there was a time when the Revolution was merely a nuance in the thinking of a little group of theoreticians led by Lenin, quarreling around a café table in Switzerland. The most neuralgic points of the doctrine are philosophy, literature, the history of art, and literary criticism; those are the points where man in his unfortunate complexity enters the equation. The difference of a tiny fraction in the premises yields dizzying differences after the calculation is completed. A deviation from the line in the evaluation of some work of art may

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failed. In fact, History itself exploded one after another the formulas that have been considered binding. This time, however, the rulers have mastered dialectics so, they assert, they will know how to modify the doctrine as new necessities arise. The judgments of an individual man can always be wrong; the only solution is to submit unreservedly to an authority that claims to be unerring.

But what can the doctrine do about the unformulated longings of men? Why does a good Communist, without any apparent reason, suddenly put a pistol to his head? Why does he escape abroad? Isn't this one of those chasms over which the scientifically constructed bridges pass? People who flee from the people's democracies usually give as their chief motive the fact that life in these countries is psychically unbearable. They stammer out their efforts to explain: "The dreadful sadness of life over there"; "I felt I was turning into a machine." It is impossible to communicate to people who have not experienced it the undefinable menace of total rationalism.

To forestall doubt, the Party fights any tendency to delve into the depths of a human being, especially in literature and art. Whoever reflects on "man" in general, on his inner needs and longings, is accused of bourgeois sentimentality. Nothing must ever go beyond the description of man's behavior as a member of a social group. This is necessary because the Party, treating man exclusively as the by-product of social forces, believes that he becomes the type of being he pictures himself to be. He is a social monkey. *What is not expressed does not exist.* Therefore if one forbids men to explore the depths of human nature, one destroys in them the urge to make such explorations; and the depths in themselves slowly become unreal.

I should like to clear up in advance a possible misunderstanding. Personally, I am not in favor of art that is too

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121 beds. All these lands will never again become what they once
727 were—regions of constant struggle and short-lived serenity, of poverty and its exploitation, of poetry, fervor, and sadness. Those of us who have, for example, seen peasant women trudging for many miles through the omnipresent dust to kneel for an hour at the shrines of Silesia will never forget either the fact or its meaning.

781 There is not a foot of the old soil of Central Europe which
156 has not been consecrated by endurance for the sake of the things of the spirit and the mind. Indeed, I have sometimes wondered, reading the Polish and Silesian poets and novelists, why the longing to hold out should have persisted during many difficult centuries—why, for instance, Polish forests in thrall to the Czars should have hidden priest and ritual with such fidelity. Perhaps the explanation, in so far as it is of this world, can be found in the deep human urge for the preservation of identity. Custom and language were vital symbols of the self, and without them men felt they could not live. But stronger than all else was the deep, primitive, mystical desire for identification with Eternal Righteousness, manifest to the believer in the life of the Redeemer. To give up the faith was to surrender not merely one's self but the world as well.

798 To be sure these men and women were very human, often
563 poverty-stricken and untutored, sometimes intolerant and oppressive. The effort to conserve themselves and their identity spilled over into moments of vengeful outrage inflicted upon others because they were different. Thus anti-Semitism has a long history in Eastern Europe studded with bloody pogroms. Although curbed in Austro-Hungarian regions it was latent there, too, as the shameful events of 1938 proved, but manifest elsewhere continuously with varying intensity. Or who can forget the repression of the Ukrainians in Poland under the Pilsudski government, the conflict between Czechs and Slovaks,

INTRODUCTION

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For that reason he is a dangerous character. He is capable of too much independence. In the satellite armies men of this type have been less able to hold higher military posts than have either the behind-the-scenes politicians or the military technicians. The leaders of the World War II underground movement have been virtually eliminated from top jobs. The successful infantry commanders rise neither so fast nor so far as artillery men, engineers, or other technicians. The qualities of personal leadership may be better appreciated at lower levels which do not come within the purview of this study, but at the apex of the military hierarchy personal leadership is something which the Communists do not permit. When a new generation of officers take the top posts, the level of competence may rise and perhaps the problem of loyalty may have become less acute, but the new elite will not consist of dynamic leaders. It will be an elite which has grown up under the controls of the political department, the security police, and Russian observers. It may be an elite not prone to exercise strong personal leadership.

F. The Study and the Sample

The above conclusions are based upon an analysis of biographical data concerning generals in the satellite countries. From the biographical data we tried to get light on three aspects of the structure of the satellite armies. (1) We have attempted to describe the process by which the satellite armies were taken over and communized insofar as this process involved changes in the kinds of men wielding power. (2) We have attempted to evaluate the breadth of background, education, and experience of those types of men who have finally gained power with a view to providing a basis for judgment of their potential effectiveness as leaders, and their prospective loyalty or discontent. (3) We have attempted to identify whatever fissures and lines of differentiation exist between segments of the armed forces.

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To study these three topics we collected biographical data on general officers in five satellite countries: Poland, Czechoslovakia, Hungary, Romania, and China.[8] In each case we compiled as many biographies of general officers as we could obtain, the criterion of selection being availability. In view of the difficulty of obtaining any data no more rigorous type of sampling was possible. We included general officers of the air forces and navies as well as the land armies.[9] When we could obtain the data we added as special subsamples general officers in semi-military police and security formations. In all of the satellite countries the special security troops, though under the Ministry of Interior or its equivalent in peacetime, are integrated with the armed forces and commanded by officers with military rank.

Ideally a study of military leadership should study not only gen-

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ference between affluent squire and penniless peasant, there was a great human stir in Poland. It felt good, being there and talking to people, even if I had only forty words of Polish, carefully memorized from a piece of paper, and supplemented with German when there was somebody present who could understand that language, as there usually was. Everybody had a share in at least three great ideas. There was the dream of economic improvement, no longer wholly a dream. Then there was the ideal of nationhood, unfortunately too irrationally cherished, as was very natural in view of the people's past. And finally there was the mystical solidarity of the Christian (or the Jewish) community, real and vital though encrusted no doubt with what some would call poetry and others superstition. One could see a good deal of the ugly passions of the illiterate and the prejudiced. But there were also the great loves which Ladislas Reymont has described: love of the tiller for the soil, of the boys for the girls, of a people for the Virgin Mary, full of grace and goodness.

And now? I repeat. It is not tragedy that has thrown a black blanket over all this. It is just that the iron heel has come down behind the iron curtain. Here are the unadorned population statistics of the "People's Democracies" as they were available prior to World War II:

Bulgaria	6,106,000	Poland	31,000,000
Czechoslovakia	14,726,000	Rumania	18,025,277
Hungary	8,683,000	East Germany	17,313,734
			(census of 1946)

In addition, here are the statistics for the Baltic States absorbed by Russia:

Estonia	1,114,900
Latvia	1,900,045
Lithuania	2,361,142

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• 16 These figures are subject to correction, but are adequate for the present purpose. They indicate that the population of Stamford, Connecticut, could be multiplied into this total subjected European population about fourteen hundred times. That is, every man, woman, and child in such a community has fourteen hundred counterparts over there. Fourteen hundred Stamfords with its schools and churches, its jails and railroad station, its doctors and lawyers, its butchers and bakers, its little children and its grandfathers—all of them, every day and every night, first under the heel of Hitler and then under the heel of Stalin.
668 And every living soul has been steeped in a bath of propaganda for twelve years, one version being that there exists a master race, and another that "Anglo-American imperialism" does an endless series of misdeeds, such as sending potato bugs to Eastern Germany and disease-spreading insects to Korea. He may not believe all this, but he must not say so even to himself.

For the nerve center of this propaganda is terror. The Communist always begins with the devices of infiltration. These he is taught to handle adroitly. He can take over a labor union almost before its members suspect that he has any desire to do so. In the presence of liberals he can be a boon companion, and discreetly assent to his neighbor's views about Whitehead or St. Thomas Aquinas. But when the Russian Army is on hand to support him he is camouflaged only moderately. Everyone knows that his bosses have arrived from Moscow after a period of intensive training. But so long as "imperialist powers" are in relative control he appreciates each and every opportunity to pretend that he is some one else.

668 697 He uses the radio and the newspaper, the friendly gathering of citizens, and the picture magazine. But the instrumentalities upon which he really relies are the secret police and the concentration camp. The police are not primarily there to ferret out plots. It is their business to cajole a vast army of informers

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'STANDARD' AND 'SURPLUS' AGRICULTURAL POPULATIONS, EASTERN EUROPE, AROUND 1930

	Population Dependent on Agriculture 000's omitted	*'Standard' Population* 000's omitted	*'Surplus' Population Number* 000's omitted	*'Surplus' Population Per cent*
Czechoslovakia ..	4,812	5,038	—226	—4.7
Hungary	4,472	3,471	1,001	22.4
Poland	19,347	9,425	9,922	51.3
Rumania	13,069	6,348	6,721	51.4
Bulgaria	4,088	1,921	2,167	53.0
Yugoslavia ..	10,629	4,097	6,532	61.5
Albania	800	178	622	77.7
Total	57,217	30,478	26,739	46.7

(op. cit. pp. 63-4).

46.7 per cent, nearly half the agricultural population of Eastern Europe, is 'surplus' population.

Out of its active population, employable in industry and services, agriculture can dispense with about 12 million people.

This calculation of W. E. Moore is based on the assumption that if the average level of production of agricultural goods for Europe as a whole were to prevail in Eastern Europe, there would be a surplus population of 26.7 million, of whom 12 million would be employable. But if it is assumed that the level of output remains unaltered, then the resulting calculation of surplus employable population will be different. Such a calculation was made by PEP which estimates that in 1937 the agricultural overpopulation in the Eastern European countries was 14-15 million (i.e., about half W. E. Moore's figure) of which about 6 million were employable in industry and services.

161 The war led to a considerable change as regards the 'surplus' agricultural population in Poland. The population of Poland dropped from an estimated 35,090,000 in 1938 to an estimated 23,800,000 in 1948, as a result of the killing of 6 million inhabitants by the Nazis and changes in the eastern frontiers which transferred 6 million Ukrainians and White Russians to the U.S.S.R. About 32,100,000 people lived within the present frontiers before the war. It seems, therefore, that Poland has 'solved' the problem and may be excluded from the list of countries with an agricultural overpopulation. Even so the overpopulation in the countries of Eastern Europe as a whole remains a vast problem: according to W. E. Moore there is a

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'surplus' agricultural population of 17 million, according to PEP, 9 million. 161

Another factor is the natural increase of population. Eastern Europe is undergoing the so-called 'vital revolution'—more precisely its first half. During this stage (through which Western Europe passed during the nineteenth century) the death rate declines steeply (as a result of better hygienic conditions, etc.), while the birth rate does not fall. The natural increase of population is therefore very high. In the second half of the 'vital revolution' the birth rate falls quickly (the stage which Western Europe has reached). Today the annual increase of population is three times higher in the East than in the West of Europe. Only after the majority of the population has been urbanised (with the resulting increase in the use of birth control) will Eastern Europe get over the first half of the vital revolution. Meanwhile, according to the PEP study, 000 there is in Eastern Europe an annual increase of 610 thousand people of working age, employable in industry and services (free professions, etc.). They will have to be absorbed in the course of industrial development, as well as the present 6 or so million surplus agricultural propulation. The dimensions of the problem will be appreciated when it is realised that the estimated annual intake into mining and manufacturing industry in the years 1935-7 in these countries was only 270 thousand. If there were an annual intake of 700 thousand into mining and manufacturing industry and services, it would take two generations merely to absorb the surplus agricultural population, without lowering the density of the agricultural population to the level prevailing in Western Europe.

Even this modest industrialistion would require vast capital expenditure. K. Mandelbaum in his book *The Industrialisation of Backward Areas*, Oxford, 1945, estimated the capital requirement per newly employed worker in modern large scale industry in Eastern Europe at £450. In calculating the total cost of the industrialisation of East Europe, account must also be taken of investments needed in public utilities connected with industrialisation (houses, roads, electricity, gas and water supply, etc.), which would, at least, double the amount. On this basis the employment of 700 thousand additional people per year would require about £600-650 million (in pre-war

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But in the end these possessions stirred the envy not merely 794
of ambitious and worldly men but also of the land-hungry 471
poor. To be sure the Abbot of a flourishing monastery might 578
correctly point out that the revenues did not enrich the monks, who normally lived under his guidance by an austere religious rule. These religious in their bare cells did not taste the fine vintages pressed from monastery grapes carefully tended by brothers who rose at four for Matins and then expended themselves zealously for the cause of God. Nevertheless the critics were not by any means only emancipated spirits who found moral discipline irksome and the Church old-fashioned. They were also earnest, weather-beaten peasants, with no soil to till, and often desperately poor, who understandably looked upon Church estates with a covetous eye. And of course everywhere the well applauded and sharp-tongued ideologies of the time—Marxism, Nationalism, Nihilism—were allied against the Church, often looked upon by the seemingly more enlightened folk of those days as the heritor of a creed outworn. And it must be admitted that sometimes a segment of the clergy, grown comfortable and worldly, acted as if they thought so, too.

Protestantism inside the old Empire clung to the enclaves 795
which had been established during the era of the Reformation and the Counter-Reformation. Despite the strife incident to the [162] ●
Thirty Years' War both Lutheranism and Calvinism maintained themselves resolutely in Hungary, for example, so that prior to the outbreak of World War II Catholics in that country constituted about 67 per cent of the population, while Protestants numbered nearly 27 per cent and adhered to both the Lutheran and the Calvinist tradition. In Czechoslovakia the situation was relatively the same, though the number of Protestant groups was greater. A considerable part of the population —6 per cent in 1932—professed no religion of any kind. Another characteristic of the old Empire was the presence of the

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CHAPTER I

CHANGES IN PROPERTY: THE LAND REFORM

★

423 A DESCRIPTION of the economic condition of Stalin's satellites must begin with a consideration of the changes brought about in property relations after the overthrow of the rule of Hitler and his vassals in the countries of Eastern and South-Eastern Europe. As most of the population in these countries earntheir living in agriculture* it is convenient to begin with an examination of the changes in land ownership.

There is a widely held belief that the feudal system, with the characteristic feature of the large latifundia, continued to prevail east of the Elbe until the arrival of the Soviet army. The prevalence of this idea is due partly to ignorance, but also to the propaganda spread since the war by the governments of this region, who try to paint as black a picture as possible of the property relations which previously prevailed there in order to magnify the importance of the land reforms they have carried out. This view is incorrect, since before World War II, and in some areas even before World War I, a series of land reforms had already to a large extent changed the system of landholding in the countryside. On the other hand it would not be correct to minimise the extent of the land reforms carried out since the war.

ODO To arrive at a balanced estimate of the extent of land reforms each country will have to be dealt with separately, even though for lack of space only a brief statement of the facts can be given. The countries will be dealt with in order, beginning with those in which the changes in the ownership of land after World

● 162 *Of the total population those engaged in agriculture, fishing and forestry made up: in Bulgaria (1934) 80 per cent; Yugoslavia (1931) 79 per cent; Rumania (1930) 78 per cent; Poland (1931) 65 per cent; Hungary (1930) 53 per cent; Czechoslovakia (1930) 38 per cent.

[Text starts on p. 15]

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with a high standard of living which is able to pay good prices 511
for the dairy products, meat, eggs, etc. (Thus the prosperity of 438
Holland and Denmark depends on the prosperity of the urban population in Britain). In Eastern Europe the growth of grass and root crops is made difficult by the dry climate, and so, intensive production of meat, as in Denmark, Holland, Eire, England, etc., is impossible. But this does not preclude the production of milk and the raising of pigs. In some areas, there are excellent natural conditions for specialised crops, e.g., in Bulgaria and Serbia for tobacco and grapes. Other areas—and these form the greater part of Eastern Europe—are more suitable for growing corn, which could be done on the American model with tractors and combine harvesters, instead of with draught animals whose feeding takes up a lot of the arable land. In many places the best results could be achieved by mixed farming, combining mechanized corn growing with intensive production of milk, pigs, vegetables and fruits. But however agriculture develops in this area, experience has shown that the decisive factor in raising the standard of living in the countryside is the accessibility of expanding urban markets. No raising of the rate of agricultural production, no improvement in the standard of living is possible without rapid industrialisation, which will enable the surplus agricultural population to be absorbed, will provide a market for agricultural products and will supply agricultural implements and machinery as well as industrial consumption goods for the peasants. In addition the peasants need 'cheap government' and a cheap marketing system.

Problems of Industrial Development

If Eastern Europe is to be industrialised, large amounts of 162
capital will be needed, which can be estimated by considering the number of people to be absorbed into industry. Obviously any such calculation can be only approximate and be put forward by way of illustration.

First there is the surplus population in agriculture. W. E. Moore calculated this by estimating what was a 'reasonable' European standard of agricultural population. The result was as follows :

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●162

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total number of foreign workers in Germany, including prisoners of war and foreign civilian workers officially recognized as foreigners, but excluding workers from Alsace-Lorraine and Sudetenland, exceeded six million in 1943. In 1944 the high mark of eight million was reached (of whom nearly 2 million were p.o.w.'s—Y.G.)' (p. 264). He adds: 'Altogether, it can be estimated that the displacement of 30 million or more people during Hitler's rule over Europe has resulted in the permanent shifting of 2–3 million. The final redistribution of Europe's population was due to Germany's defeat, which opened the way for a new and in this case permanent migration of another twenty-five million*, probably the greatest in European history' (p. 305).

Considerations of space make it necessary to choose between alternative methods of describing the character of the expulsions, either by relating more or less in detail the fate of the Germans in one of the East European countries, or briefly surveying the fate of the Germans in them all. The former method is preferable, and the treatment of the Germans in Czechoslovakia will be taken as the example.

The Sudeten Germans

The Sudeten Germans were not new inhabitants of Sudetenland. They came there about 700 years ago, when Spain was still in the hands of the Arabs, and some centuries before America was discovered. They were as numerous as the populations of some of Europe's small states. The 1930 census put their number at 3.2 million, as compared with Norway's 2.8 million, Finland's 3.6 million, Denmark's 3.7 million and Switzerland's 4.1 million.

The social structure of the Sudeten German community was not very different from that of the Czechs or Slovaks except that the percentage of workers was higher (a little higher than among the Czechs, and much higher than among the Slovaks). According to the 1930 census, the national communities comprised different social groups in the following proportions:—

*In this is included some millions of non-Germans: Poles who had migrated from the area annexed by Russia (about 4 million) to the Western territories taken from Germany, Czechs and Slovaks who migrated to Sudetenland, displaced persons who returned to their countries, Jewish refugees who migrated to Palestine and other countries, etc.

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other than Lenin, who wrote of that very Church: 'That shameful and accursed past when the Church was in feudal dependence on the State and Russian citizens were in feudal dependence on the established Church'. The Church, however, conveniently forgets Lenin's words and rewrites its past. Thus Karpov said: 'The Russian Orthodox Church in the days of hard trial, which our Fatherland repeatedly underwent in the past, did not break its link with the people, it lived with their needs, their hopes, their wishes and contributed its mite to the common struggle . . . ' 659

Religious Denominations in Eastern Europe

The experience of Russia has served the Kremlin as a pattern for its handling of the religious question in the satellite countries. 162 779

In these countries there are two main religious denominations, the Roman Catholic and the Greek Orthodox.

The available statistics on the distribution of population according to religion are pre-war censuses. Since then changes in boundaries, the migration of populations, and the annihilation of many people during the war, including nearly the whole of the Jewish population of these countries (of nearly 5 million Jews only 700 thousand remained) have made these statistics obsolete. But for lack of more recent data they will have to be used, and if care is taken the margin of error need not be too big.

There are big Roman Catholic communities in all the satellite countries except Bulgaria. In Poland, Roman Catholics comprise more than 90 per cent of the population, in Czechoslovakia 73 per cent, in Hungary 64 per cent, in Yugoslavia 37 per cent and in Rumania 6 per cent. In three of these countries there are considerable Greek Orthodox communities: in Bulgaria, 86 per cent of the population, in Rumania 70 per cent and in Yugoslavia 49 per cent. In Hungary and Czechoslovakia there are important Protestant minorities (26 per cent and 8 per cent of the population respectively). In Bulgaria, Moslems form 13 per cent of the population and in Yugoslavia 11 per cent.

The Communists' Attitude to the Orthodox Church

From the beginning the Communist Parties and Governments showed entirely different attitudes towards the Greek Orthodox 659

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563

Principal Eastern European Nationalities Before the First World War *

(APPROXIMATE FIGURES IN THOUSANDS)

	Austria Hungary [a]	Russia [b]	Germany [c]	Rumania [d]	Serbia [e]	Montenegro [f]	Bulgaria [g]	Albania [h]
Poles	5,000	7,931	3,086	—	—	—	—	—
Magyars	10,100	—	—	—	—	—	—	—
Czechs	6,550	—	—	—	—	—	—	—
Slovaks	1,950	—	—	—	—	—	—	—
Slovenes	1,300	—	—	—	—	—	—	—
Croatians	2,625	—	—	—	—	—	—	—
Serbians	1,925	—	—	—	4,048	—	—	—
Mohammedan Serbo-Croatians in Bosnia	650	—	—	—	—	—	—	—
Macedonian Slavs	—	—	—	—	500	—	100	—
Montenegrins	—	—	—	—	—	516	—	—
Rumanians	3,200	1,122	—	7,136	—	—	—	—
Bulgarians	—	173	—	200	—	—	4,153	—
Albanians	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	800

* Fully satisfactory statistics on the nationalities of Eastern Europe for this period are not available, owing to inadequate census data as well as the imprecision of the concept of "nationality." The above figures refer only to the nationalities that emerged as independent states, or dominant members thereof, after the First World War. They omit the Germans, Ukrainians (Ruthenians), Turks, Italians, and others who formed a significant part of the population of this region in 1914. The following are the sources used:

[a] Robert A. Kann, *The Multinational Empire*, Vol. II, p. 305; based on census of 1910.

[b] Brokgauz-Efron, *Entsiklopedicheskii Slovar*, Suppl. Vol. II, App., p. xii; based on census of 1897.

[c] *Statesman's Yearbook*, 1914, p. 890; based on census of 1900.

[d] *Ibid.*, p. 1213, estimates of 1913.

[e] *Ibid.*, p. 1282, estimate for 1913, author's estimate of Macedonian Slavs.

[f] *Ibid.*, p. 1090, estimate for 1913.

[g] *Ibid.*, p. 727, estimate for 1914; author's estimate of Macedonian Slavs.

[h] *Ibid.*, p. 621, estimate for 1913.

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5 Land Reform and Agricultural Improvement

LADISLAV FEIERABEND

I

162 Eastern Europe was overwhelmingly peasant be-
167 tween the two world wars. The peasantry, for whom land
369 was not merely a means of production or of income, but the established basis of family life, formed the majority of the population. The main problem of this region was rural overpopulation. In the period before the First World War, the surplus young people emigrated in considerable numbers to the United States and to other overseas countries. After 1918 this outlet was closed, and everybody had to remain on his home soil. There was too little land for too many people: roughly twice as many people were living off the land as was the case in Western Europe.

423 Everybody wanted land and therefore the price was
241 enormously high. After money was spent to buy the land, there was not enough left to buy the numbers of cattle that the holding could support or to improve farming techniques. Lack of capital was responsible for the fact that farming methods remained the same as they had been for fifty or more years. The yields were very low, and there was no possibility of increasing them. In fact, yields decreased be-

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423 cause the land was becoming exhausted. This was due to a
241 lack of manure and fertilizer and to the peasants' ignorance of land preservation techniques.

[464] Labor remained so cheap that the introduction of labor-saving devices did not pay. Overpopulation meant that there were more people living on holdings than were needed for the farm work. This situation caused underemployment. Since overpopulation decreased the output per man and with it the earnings per man, a very low standard of living resulted.

423 The size of the farms, which on the average was barely
656 ten acres, was a problem in itself, and the custom of dividing
185 land after the death of a peasant made the situation even more acute. The holdings consisted of many small and scattered strips so that it was impossible for the peasant to use machines, even when they were available. However, the land reforms, carried out after the First World War by the different governments, did have some success in equalizing the amounts of land held by the different peasants.

The land reforms grew out of political and national considerations rather than out of social and economic policy. The first and main objective of the agrarian parties was to expropriate the big landowners and to transfer their land to the peasants. The usual procedure was to fix a maximum acreage, usually about five hundred acres, and to decree that all land in excess of this amount should be sold to peasants, either to create new farms or to add to the area of peasant farms already in existence. Under these reforms, about twenty-five million acres were distributed, for the most part in quite small plots, averaging one hectare, or 2.4 acres. The smaller farms were given more land than the large, so that there was some leveling of the incomes derived from farming.

162 These reforms did not remedy the unhappy condition of
464 the peasantry, since they were unable to remove the main
511 causes for distress. If all the agricultural land of this region

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had been distributed equally among the peasants, the main result would have been the equalization of poverty. It was obvious that redistribution of the national income and wealth could not, by itself, greatly improve the condition of the people. The surplus agricultural population which was estimated, on the basis of the system of cultivation prevailing in that area, to be about fifteen million persons had to be absorbed, and that was an insoluble problem. This problem was heightened by the fact that between 1919 and 1939 the natural increase of population in this area remained almost three times as high as that in the West.

Some alleviation of the situation was sought in the development of industries. However, industrialization was a long-term measure, and the expense only added to the peasants' burden. The fiscal policy of the Eastern European states was to accumulate the national capital necessary for industrialization by taxes, tariffs, and prices. No money, or very little, was left for the peasants.

II

It would be unjust, however, to say that nothing was done to improve the lot of the peasantry. The governments were well aware that the land reforms should be supplemented by economic measures such as agrarian credits, modern cooperatives, development of transport, cheaper farm machinery, technical education and training. A great deal was accomplished by these measures.

The supply of credit was particularly important to the peasants. The need for capital to begin operations and to finance certain family needs, especially the weddings of daughters, made borrowing necessary. As banks would not make advances, money had to come from moneylenders who charged very high rates of interest. Often, the moneylender was the middleman who bought the peasant's produce

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Because of this situation, the different peoples of this region turn three different masks to the world. One is always turned toward the West, one toward the East, and one is used for the stage show that these peoples put on for each other. If a nation of Eastern Europe takes off its mask, it may disappear from the stage forever. This is an important point to keep in mind in trying to understand the evolution of these countries. 101 178

Another important factor in the history of this region is that all the important ideologies and social revolutions have moved from West to East. Nationalism and the abolition of serfdom reached Eastern Europe in the nineteenth century. Industrialization advanced eastward at the end of the nineteenth century and during the first half of the twentieth. The closer a state was connected with the West, the sooner its transformation took place, while the other states were forced to develop in a comparatively short time in order to maintain their status as equals.

I

As a result of the Treaty of Versailles, everything changed in this area of constant change—boundaries, minorities, administrations, politics, and economics. In spite of these changes, and this is most important, the Eastern European countries remained predominantly agricultural. 178 162 241

The proportions of populations dependent upon agriculture in the several states within a decade after gaining full independence were as follows: Albania, 80 per cent; Bulgaria, 75 per cent; Rumania, 72 per cent; Yugoslavia, 76 per cent; Poland, 60 per cent; Hungary, 51 per cent; and Czechoslovakia 33 per cent. In contrast to these figures, the percentages of gainfully occupied males in industry in the same period were: Bulgaria, 13 per cent; Rumania, 11 per cent; Yugoslavia, 14 per cent; Poland, 22 per cent; Hungary, 26

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178 per cent; and Czechoslovakia, 41 per cent. Thus it can be
●163 easily seen that, with the exception of Czechoslovakia whose
241 industry was the most developed in the region, the countries of Eastern Europe were predominantly agricultural and peasant in nature. Yet despite the predominantly peasant character of these countries, the peasants as such had relatively little political influence.

178 Although there was an increase in the output of agricul-
241 tural goods in all these countries between 1918 and 1945,
511 the competition offered by overseas cereals strongly affected the agriculture of Eastern Europe. Cereals, one of the major products of the region, had to be undersold to Germany. Added to this unfortunate situation, the world depression of 1929 came as a terrible blow to the economy of Eastern Europe, the most disastrous years lasting from 1931 until 1934. Industry, with its frequent cartels, was better able to defend itself than was agriculture, and thus the "price scissors," or the disparity between agricultural and industrial prices, cut mostly into the income of the agricultural population. This resulted in a general lowering of both the purchasing power and the standard of living. Loans at high rates of interest were frequent and taxation increased the poverty of the peasants. These, as the major element of the population, pressed heavily for reforms and spread malcontent in their respective countries.

185 Soon after the First World War, some states realized that
167 the solution to this situation was industrialization. Emigra-
433 tion, as a possible solution, was not favored in any of the Eastern European states as it would have decreased manpower. Since war was considered more or less imminent after 1933, military and industrial groups were especially opposed to any large-scale loss of population, although emigration was never prohibited by actual government order.

185 Bohemia, which had been in a highly advantageous posi-
433 tion in the industrialization program of Austria before the

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fields such as law, medicine, engineering, or economics often 369
renounced their humble origin and were happy to be absorbed into the urban population. Even the newly formed commercial class preferred to stay in the cities. As a result, the urban population increased steadily and towns grew rapidly.

Urbanization advanced with the growth of industry. An 369
illustration of this is offered by the growth in population of 162
six industrial cities in each of the following countries: Poland, Czechoslovakia, Hungary, Rumania, Yugoslavia, and Bulgaria. The total population of these cities rose from six and one-half million to ten million between the two world wars. The pace of industrialization was most rapid in Bulgaria, Yugoslavia, and Poland, where the aforementioned cities almost doubled their urban population. In the other three countries (Czechoslovakia, Hungary, Rumania), the population in these cities increased by approximately 30 per cent. Striking examples of how industrialization and transportation attracted people to cities are given by Katowice, a coal and heavy industry center in Silesia, whose population rose from forty-five to one hundred and thirty-three thousand, and by Gdynia, Poland's Baltic port, whose population rose from three to one hundred and fourteen thousand between the wars.

The regional distribution of industrial population was not uniform. Around 1930, 90 per cent of Czechoslovakia's industrial population lived in the Czecho-Moravian district. Poland's industrial population concentrated around Warsaw, Lodz, and the Silesian coal basin. In Hungary, 41 per cent of the people earning their livings in industrial occupations were concentrated in Budapest. In Yugoslavia, 63 per cent of the industrial wage earners lived in Croatia and in the regions that had previously been Hungarian. In Rumania, 25 per cent of the industrial population lived in Transylvania and 28 per cent in Muntenia. Only Bulgaria's industrial pop-

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369 ulation showed any tendency toward decentralization, with
•162 30 per cent of her total industrial population living in the district of Sofia.

The industrial population of these countries was occupied as follows: 25 to 30 per cent in the textile and clothing industries; 18 to 21 per cent in heavy and metallurgy industries; 11 to 22 per cent in the food industry; and 7 to 17 per cent in the lumber industry. A variation in industrial goods and in producing plants was found only in Czechoslovakia and Hungary, in southern Poland and Transylvania, and in the areas of the former Austro-Hungarian Empire.

466 One of the major problems facing the new governments
745 in their industrialization programs was to equate the growth
185 of the industrial working populations with improvement in industrial working and social conditions. Social legislation in the interwar period attained considerable progress in this direction. Prior to 1914 there already existed in Eastern Europe various social insurance and pension plans, and these were expanded between 1919 and 1939. Compulsory workers' accident and health insurance plans were introduced whereby both employers and wage earners contributed to a central fund to provide coverage for accident, illness, maternity, disability, old age, death, and unemployment. Generally speaking, the working day was reduced to eight hours, with a maximum forty-eight hour week, and the age minimum for child and woman labor was fixed at fourteen years or, in the case of heavy and dangerous work, such as mining, at sixteen to eighteen years. However, rigid application of these measures was far from universal.

A notable innovation was the establishment by the agrarian regime in Bulgaria of a compulsory labor service for the development of public works in place of the traditional military service which had been prohibited by the peace treaty. Expenditures in 1937 for social services for the entire region averaged 3 per cent of the estimated national in-

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563 peoples. The accompanying table shows the distribution of languages in Eastern Europe in the interwar period as established by the League of Nations.

●162 197

Distribution of Principal Languages in Eastern Europe about 1930 *

(APPROXIMATE FIGURES IN THOUSANDS)

Language	*Albania*	*Bulgaria*	*Czechoslovakia*	*Hungary*	*Poland*	*Rumania*	*Yugoslavia* **
Russian	—	12	—	—	139	451	25
Ukrainian	—	—	569	1	4,442	641	31
White Russian	—	—	—	—	1,697	—	—
Polish	—	—	100	—	21,993	38	18
Czechoslovakian	—	—	9,757	108	38	43	138
Serbo-Croatian	—	—	6	55	—	48	10,257
Slovene	—	—	—	5	—	—	1,159
Bulgarian	—	5,275	—	3	—	364	73
German	—	4	3,318	479	741	761	602
Rumanian	13	16	14	16	—	13,181	276
Greek	37	10	—	—	—	21	—
Albanian	984	—	—	—	—	4	524
Gypsy	—	81	33	8	—	101	54
Hungarian	—	—	720	8,001	—	1,555	557
Turkish	30	622	—	—	—	288	180
Others	—	58	213	12	2,866	561	41
Totals	1,064	6,078	14,730	8,688	31,916	18,057	13,935

* Based on Dudley Kirk, *Europe's Population in the Interwar Years* (Geneva: League of Nations), Table 17, pp. 228-29.

** A. Meillet, *Les Langues dans l'Europe nouvelle* (Paris, 1928), p. 426, estimated that Macedonian was spoken by 628,000 in Yugoslavia in 1926, but in the official census this group was not distinguished from those speaking Serbo-Croatian.

563 648 The peacemakers were conscious of the problem that had been created, and in order to make certain that the different linguistic groups would receive fair treatment it was required of these states that they subscribe to carefully worded provisions for the protection of their minorities. These pro-

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Vienna was larger than Berlin and Austria did not appear 175
to lag conspicuously behind Prussia; but by 1866 the lag had 433
become conspicuous and was confirmed on the battlefields of the Austro-Prussian War. There seems to have been a significant acceleration of economic growth between 1880 and 1914; and it has been estimated that between 1900 and 1910 the percentage rate of growth in the national income of Austria was even somewhat faster than it was during the same decade in Western Europe. The percentage growth of the low income of Austria-Hungary was unable, nevertheless, to keep up with the very much higher levels of national income and industrial productivity which meanwhile had been attained in the West.

Such economic growth as did occur was quite unevenly distributed. The economic position of the Germans and a few other groups was a great deal better than that of the rest of the peoples concerned, and the attempts of non-German groups to equal German economic standards often brought them into economic competition and political friction with Germans. After the economic depression of 1873, German nationalists raised the cry for the preservation of German supremacy, and the very attempts to mitigate or overcome economic inequality thus led to intensified economic competition and political conflict.

Economic development was poorly distributed between 175
town and country, as well as between nationalities. In most 162 ●
Western countries, country people had come to share many 433
of the educational and cultural standards of the city populations. In Eastern Europe, by contrast, even the German-Austrian peasants were described before the First World War by the Viennese architect, Adolph Loos, as people wearing different clothes, speaking a different language, and having an infinitely more primitive way of life than the populations of the cities.

The uneven distribution of economic opportunity was re-

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175 inforced in its effect by the extreme splintering of national,
● 162 linguistic, and religious affiliations. A good map of the na-
433 tionalities, languages, and religions of Eastern Europe would have shown not the large patches of relatively homogeneous populations which are found in so much of Western Europe but rather a polka-dot pattern of intermixed minorities.

182 The relative national uniformity of the West is perhaps, at least in part, the product of a history rich in the processes of successful social learning and acculturation, which merged and melted the different ethnic groups that were left in the Western countries by accidents of migration, wars, and settlement. In Eastern Europe, such accidents of conquest or settlement may well have been even more numerous, but there is also some reason to think that the processes of assimilation were much slower and less effective.

Greater uniformity of language and culture means greater interchangeability of social roles. This is not merely a contributing cause to the growth in social mobility and in the interchange of social roles but is also to some extent their product. Where societies are rigorously stratified, where religions fail to impress upon people an awareness of their essential unity, where the obstacles to a change in occupation or in social role are great, and the rewards for mobility are uncertain and small—in these societies individuals may best succeed in gaining security by clinging tenaciously to their familiar groups, languages, customs, and traditions, and by rejecting any assimilation to other groups except the most privileged as a threat to their existence. The more privileged groups, under these conditions, can only be expected to resent and resist the assimilation or intrusion of strangers, unless these strangers come from regions of clearly greater wealth and greater prestige and seem to bring to the new group assets clearly greater than those they would demand. The lack of unity and assimilation in language and culture in Eastern Europe thus appears as one more aspect of the

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member of the Government, it was learned today. Rumania could not afford to lose the services of merchants and industrialists, M. Pătrăscanu said. He expressed the opinion that the country would pursue a more liberal policy toward this class than the French have.' What an outcry there would have been in the Communist press if a similar announcement had been made by a non-Communist Minister in the West! 642 661

Tătărescu did not hestitate to attack 'anarchists' (i.e., workers). In an interview with *The New York Times* correspondent in Bucharest on 21st October, 1945, he declared that a strenuous discipline must be introduced in industry and an end brought to the 'excesses' of the workers' committees.

It was hardly surprising that the capitalists faced the future with perhaps a little anxiety even if they were satisfied with the existing state of affairs. There was great optimism among businessmen, as the serious Swiss paper *Neue Zürcher Zeitung* pointed out (10th February, 1947) giving this illustration: 'As the Bucharest economic journal *Finantze si Industrie* reports, in the last year (1946—Y.G.) in Rumania there were established 355 new stock companies with a total capital of 20.3 milliard Lei.'

For years business continued to be good and speculation in the free market active, although the conditions of the working people were appalling and, after the drought of 1946-7, starvation stared them in the face. Some idea of the conditions of the people at this time can be got from '*A Survey of the Health of the People in Several European Countries affected by the War* published on November 19th, 1948, by *La Documentation Francaise* and consisting of reports of the International Committee of the Red Cross which describes the dreadful tragedy which overtook Rumania, the country most affected by the drought: 'It is difficult to convey the misery of the Rumanian population in 1947: famine prevailed in whole sections of the country, in some regions people were eating grass and the bark of trees and even clay. It is estimated that 6,000,000 persons were dependent on the government in 1947-48. Here are some of the consequences of the famine and misery which prevailed in this country: 1. The complete disappearance of little children in some districts . . . infant mortality actually reached a rate of 80% . . . 2. An increase of 511 262 165

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511 all kinds of diseases and a steep rise of the mortality rate;
262 corpses were thrown into sewers adjacent to the houses.
165 3. Universal poverty conducive to the spread of venereal diseases . . . one out of twelve persons is syphilitic according to recent reports furnished by the Minister of Health . . .'

All this time the fortunes of the capitalists were not touched as they were working for reparations for Russia. They and the new state bureaucracy flourished, while the lion's share of the surplus value produced in Rumania was taken, of course, by the Kremlin.*

642 The bureaucratic and militarist character of the Rumanian
693 state was not altered and many of the former officials remained in office. Of the legal system, Pătrăşcanu could say: 'The
645 procedures, methods, traditions and structure of Rumanian jurisprudence have remained unchanged since a Communist became Minister of Justice. No more than 20 new judges out of 2,000 have been appointed. About a quarter of the old staff have been purged or pensioned'. (*Christian Science Monitor*, 12th December, 1945). This policy is symbolised by the fact that 'Just two weeks before the start of the trial of Iuliu Maniu . . . a discreet announcement was published in Bucharest newspapers recording the appointment of a new chief of the military tribunal of the second army corps district (the one to preside over Maniu's trial—Y.G.) . . . the wartime director general of all prisons and concentration camps in Rumania'. (*New York Herald Tribune*, 7th November, 1947).

701 The structure of the army remained hierarchical, with the
645 complete subordination of the soldiers to their officers, and with no soldiers' committees. For three years even the composition of its personnel showed a marked continuity with the past. For instance, Lieutenant-Colonel Nicolae Cambrea, commander of the Rumanian units fighting against Russia at Stalingrad, was promoted by the Groza government to the rank of General, and appointed Assistant Chief of Staff. Major Popescu-Argetoia, an active Fascist in the past, was put at the head of the secret police. General Vasiliu Rascanu, Chief of Military Police during the war against Russia, was appointed Minister of War. Another old general, Pretorian, was appointed Chief of Staff at the same time. General Lascar,

*See above pp.

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The strongest proof that Russia's national policy does not create harmonious and fraternal relations between the different peoples is the dissolution of a number of national republics. A year before the war, when there was tension between Russia and Japan on the Manchurian border, the *entire* Korean population on the Russian side of the border was transferred to Kazakstan and Uzbekistan.

On 28th August, 1941, the entire population of the Volga German Republic was transferred East of the Urals. The German Republic was one of the oldest national republics of Russia. As early as 19th October, 1918, the Workers' Commune of Volga Germans was constituted, and on 19th December, 1923, it was reconstituted as the Autonomous Soviet Socialist Republic of Volga Germans. It was one of the first republics to achieve almost complete collectivisation. *International Press Correspondence* of 18th April, 1936, said: 'The German Soviet Republic on the Volga is a living proof of the cultural and national progress which follows on the victory of socialism and a living disproof of the lies and slanders spread by the fascist enemies of the proletariat'. Just two years before their expulsion, an article appeared in *Moscow News* called: 'Volga German Republic, a Vivid Illustration of Soviet National Policy in Practice'. Then, after the Volga Germans had for so many years been commended for the unanimous support of the regime, came the decree of the dissolution of their republic, with the following explanation: 'According to reliable information received by military authorities, there are thousands and tens of thousands of diversionists and spies among the German population of the Volga region who are prepared to cause explosions in these regions at a signal from Germany. No Germans (living in the Volga districts—Y.G.) ever reported to Soviet authorities the presence of such great numbers of diversionists and spies. Therefore, the German population of the Volga regions are covering up enemies of the Soviet people and the Soviet power.'

In the areas of the U.S.S.R. formerly occupied by the Germans a number of republics were dissolved. These dissolutions were not even mentioned in the press, and it was only when *Pravda* on 17th October, 1945, gave a list of the constituencies for the coming general elections, that it was

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166 discovered that a number of republics had disappeared, since
563 when one cannot know: the autonomous Crimean Tartar,
656 Kalmyk and Checheno-Ingush Soviet Republics and the autonomous Karachev region were abolished and the non-Russian populations deported.

In Ukraine, Khrushchev, head of the government, declared in August, 1946, that half the leading personalities of the Ukrainian Party had been expelled in the previous eighteen months. It would be too much even for the Great Russian bureaucracy to expel 30 million Ukrainians and dissolve their 'republic'.

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185 with the Soviet master plans. The captive nations were al-
433 lowed to preserve the external attributes of sovereignty and their governments were granted an advisory voice in the preparation of these national plans. But the supreme control of the plans remained in the hands of Moscow, and their primary goal was, and is, rapid industrialization.

II

178 The possibilities of industrialization in Eastern Europe are considerable, but obviously not unlimited. They depend on the availability of manpower and its technical know-how, on industrial raw materials and machinery, on capital needed for investments, and on markets capable of absorbing the products of the new industries.

464 Before the last war, five million persons were employed in the mining and in the medium and large manufacturing industries of the six major countries of the area. Today this number exceeds nine million. There is a shortage of labor, both skilled and unskilled, in Eastern Germany and in the Czech part of Czechoslovakia. The reserves of manpower—land laborers, dwarf-farm owners, and married women—are limited in Hungary and the Slovak part of Czechoslovakia, large in Poland, and even larger in Rumania and in the three Balkan countries. The areas where labor is short coincide to a large degree with those of low natural increase of population, and vice versa. In the first period of reconstruction after
369 the war, there was in many parts of the area a movement of
464 the population from the villages to the towns in search of
● 166 urban, not necessarily industrial, employment. For instance, in Poland alone, two and one-half million persons moved into towns during the first seven postwar years. This movement is now over, as well as the postwar enthusiasm for reconstruction, and the governments have to recruit new workers by propaganda and sometimes by half-coercion. Unless

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living conditions improve considerably in the cities, the governments will have difficulty in procuring the hundreds of thousands of new industrial workers they require annually. However, manpower is still one of the principal assets of the captive countries.

The quality of this manpower is, generally speaking, better than is assumed in the West. First, there is a considerable industrial tradition, which goes back to the Middle Ages, in Saxony, Bohemia, and southern Poland. Second, the average intelligence of the people is fairly high; given time and education an average village boy or girl can become a skilled worker and, in many cases, a qualified technician, although of course such students lack the always evident association of American youth with motor vehicles and other machinery.

It might be interesting to quote here a relevant passage from the report of the mission of the U.N. Food and Agricultural Organization, which was composed mostly of American experts, after its return from Poland in 1948:

> It is the opinion of the Mission that if the Polish nation had an opportunity to be educated according to the standards of western Europe and to carry out a peaceful economic development, the world would be amazed by the result. Imperfectly developed resources of intelligence constitute the greatest potential wealth of the Polish people. It is a raw material of far greater value than [Polish] coal . . .[1]

Assuming that this is a sound judgment, there is no reason to doubt that it applies also to the other countries of this region.

The number of graduate engineers, chemists, and scientists in Eastern Europe declined greatly during the last war and during the postwar flight to the West, but is now increasing rapidly. The joint know-how of such technicians should not be underestimated, especially when Russian technical experience is added to it. Technical inventions and improve-

[1] *Report of the FAO Mission for Poland* (Washington, 1948), p. 18.

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CHAPTER VII

SLAV AGAINST TEUTON

ONE OF THE MOST appalling deeds of the Communist Parties of Eastern Europe—especially in Czechoslovakia and Poland—was the brutal expulsion of millions of people, both men and women, young and old, from their homes, for no reason but that they were Germans and not Slavs. As V. Gollancz says, the expulsion of the Germans is 'among the greatest crimes since Genghis Khan.'

The Kremlin hoped to derive many advantages from this expulsion. The Slavs of Eastern Europe would naturally look for leadership to the greatest Slav nation, Russia. Moreover, the threat of the return of the millions of Germans who had been expelled would create a barrier of suspicion and hatred between Eastern Europe and the Western Powers who control Western Germany where the majority of those expelled found refuge. As a result of the expropriation of the Germans, most of the industry of Czechoslovakia and Poland—the two most industrialised countries of Eastern Europe—could be transferred to the state (i.e., to the control of the Communist Party) while 'national unity' and 'order' were maintained. The inhuman explusion of the Germans would inevitably demoralise the Slavs, both morally and intellectually, as it would accustom them to the most brutal crimes and would involve them as accomplices in these crimes. (Of course, with its usual unscrupulousness, the Kremlin now appeals to German nationalism. Instead of Slavs against Teutons, the Russians and Germans, the two greatest peoples, as Stalin said in his message of October 13th, 1949, must stand together against the imperialist West.)

Let us begin with a description of the persecution and expulsion of the Germans in Eastern Europe after the war.

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Number of Germans Expelled

167 R. H. M. Worsley, in an article called 'Mass Expulsion', in
563 *Nineteenth Century* (December, 1945) gives the following sum-
661 mary of the expulsion of Germans:

Country of Permanent Residence	*Number Involved*	*Statistical Source*
East Prussia	2,333,301	*Statistisches Jahrbuch fuer das Deutches Reich*, census for 1933.
Pomerania	1,920,897	
West Prussia	337,578	
Lower Silesia	3,204,004	
Upper Silesia	1,482,765	
Total	9,278,545	
German minorites in the Baltic States	200,000	Estonian, Latvian, Lithuanian data.
War-time German immigration to:—		
Poland	800,000	I.L.O., *Displacement of Population in Europe* p. 38
Occupied Eastern Territories ..	300,000	
German minority in Poland ..	1,059,000	Polish census, 1921.
War-time immigration to Czechoslovakia	480,000	I.L.O., *Displacement of Population in Europe*, p. 38
Sudeten	3,231,688	Czechoslovakian census, 1930.
German minorities in:—		
Hungary	520,000	Hungarian census, 1920.
Rumania	740,000	Royal Inst. of International Affairs, *South-Eastern Europe*. p. 8.
Yugoslavia	513,472	
Grand Total	17,062,716	

This table somewhat exaggerates the extent of the expulsions, for it is based on pre-war statistics, and during the war a considerable proportion of the populations of these areas was killed, and before the end of the war many had fled from the areas. In addition a number of Germans remain in Eastern Europe: 500 thousand in Rumania, 250–300 thousand in Hungary, 200 thousand in Czechoslovakia—altogether about a million. E. M. Kulischer, in his book *Europe on the Move* (New York, 1949) says that the total number of Germans expelled after the war was 11,200,000 (p. 302). (This does not include the 4 million Germans who fled in 1945–6 from the Soviet zone of Germany to the Western zone, nor those who fled after this date). Whichever figure is taken of the number of Germans who were expelled or who fled from the East, it exceeded even the number expelled and recruited for labour by Hitler during the war. On this point Kulischer writes: 'The

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total number of foreign workers in Germany, including prisoners of war and foreign civilian workers officially recognized as foreigners, but excluding workers from Alsace-Lorraine and Sudetenland, exceeded six million in 1943. In 1944 the high mark of eight million was reached (of whom nearly 2 million were p.o.w.'s—Y.G.)' (p. 264). He adds: 'Altogether, it can be estimated that the displacement of 30 million or more people during Hitler's rule over Europe has resulted in the permanent shifting of 2–3 million. The final redistribution of Europe's population was due to Germany's defeat, which opened the way for a new and in this case permanent migration of another twenty-five million*, probably the greatest in European history' (p. 305).

Considerations of space make it necessary to choose between alternative methods of describing the character of the expulsions, either by relating more or less in detail the fate of the Germans in one of the East European countries, or briefly surveying the fate of the Germans in them all. The former method is preferable, and the treatment of the Germans in Czechoslovakia will be taken as the example.

The Sudeten Germans

The Sudeten Germans were not new inhabitants of Sudetenland. They came there about 700 years ago, when Spain was still in the hands of the Arabs, and some centuries before America was discovered. They were as numerous as the populations of some of Europe's small states. The 1930 census put their number at 3.2 million, as compared with Norway's 2.8 million, Finland's 3.6 million, Denmark's 3.7 million and Switzerland's 4.1 million.

The social structure of the Sudeten German community was not very different from that of the Czechs or Slovaks except that the percentage of workers was higher (a little higher than among the Czechs, and much higher than among the Slovaks). According to the 1930 census, the national communities comprised different social groups in the following proportions:—

*In this is included some millions of non-Germans: Poles who had migrated from the area annexed by Russia (about 4 million) to the Western territories taken from Germany, Czechs and Slovaks who migrated to Sudetenland, displaced persons who returned to their countries, Jewish refugees who migrated to Palestine and other countries, etc.

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5 Land Reform and Agricultural Improvement

LADISLAV FEIERABEND

I

162 Eastern Europe was overwhelmingly peasant be-
• 167 tween the two world wars. The peasantry, for whom land
369 was not merely a means of production or of income, but the established basis of family life, formed the majority of the population. The main problem of this region was rural overpopulation. In the period before the First World War, the surplus young people emigrated in considerable numbers to the United States and to other overseas countries. After 1918 this outlet was closed, and everybody had to remain on his home soil. There was too little land for too many people: roughly twice as many people were living off the land as was the case in Western Europe.

423 Everybody wanted land and therefore the price was
241 enormously high. After money was spent to buy the land, there was not enough left to buy the numbers of cattle that the holding could support or to improve farming techniques. Lack of capital was responsible for the fact that farming methods remained the same as they had been for fifty or more years. The yields were very low, and there was no possibility of increasing them. In fact, yields decreased be-

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stable, fair prices for agricultural products and to secure them a market. The Czechoslovakian Grain State Monopoly, established in 1934, was the only institution to bring any real benefit to the farming population. In other Eastern European countries, the situation reduced even further both the internal market and the income per head of the rural population. Less money than ever was available for improvements or for educating the peasants in new methods and techniques.

The alleviation of this situation came from Nazi Germany. Since 1935 Germany had been buying the greatest proportion of this region's agricultural surpluses and, in return, had been sending its own industrial goods into that area. Eastern Europe, and the Balkan states especially, became so dependent upon Germany's buying that the term "economic conquest" became a reality. This conquest, which was later political and military, of course did not bring any remedy to the agricultural problem of this region.

III

The Second World War devastated whole countries. Nowhere did the four horsemen of the Apocalypse reap a greater harvest than in Poland and Yugoslavia. In their wake came a troubled period which brought with it all the miseries and hardships that have always attended political and social revolutions. Vast numbers of the population were killed during the war. In Poland alone these numbered six million. The unbalance which this caused was greatly aggravated by enormous shifts of population in many of the Eastern European countries. The Germans were expelled from Poland and Czechoslovakia in millions, and from Hungary, Yugoslavia, and Rumania in hundreds of thousands. The total number of Germans expelled from this region was estimated at over eleven million. Changes in state

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728 frontiers were another cause for great migrations. Four mil-
•167 lion Poles moved from the territory which was incorporated into the U.S.S.R., and millions of Poles, Czechs, and Slovaks moved into districts formerly inhabited by the Germans. Although these changes alleviated the problem of rural overpopulation in Eastern Europe, there was still, at the end of the Second World War, a surplus population estimated at nine million.

665 The Communist parties in various Eastern European
423 states knew very well how to exploit this situation. They
656 knew that it was vital to the success of revolution that the peasantry should not be opposed to it. They knew that the Russian Revolution had been achieved only because Lenin was fully aware of the desire of the peasant for more land.

471 Orthodox Marxist theory required that the land be nation-
423 alized and that it be administered by the state. Land was
662 considered the most important means of production, and it
656 had to be treated as such. This dogma was abandoned by Lenin for tactical reasons. He nationalized land in the Soviet Union during the revolution of 1917, but distributed it under ninety-nine-year leases to small and medium peasants for private exploitation. It was the political pressure of the peasants which forced Lenin to change his political doctrine and implement the agrarian program of the Populists, his political opponents. Lenin and his followers did not approve of the peasant who, according to them, was a relic of the precapitalistic society. It was Lenin's view that "small, individual farming gives birth to capitalism and the bourgeoisie daily, hourly, spontaneously and on a mass scale," and that in the future classless society the peasant was to assume the status of a worker on the land as his fellow in town was a worker in industry.

Political expediency determined Lenin's change in tactics. He supported small agrarian property holders only because

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178 per cent; and Czechoslovakia, 41 per cent. Thus it can be
162 easily seen that, with the exception of Czechoslovakia whose
241 industry was the most developed in the region, the countries of Eastern Europe were predominantly agricultural and peasant in nature. Yet despite the predominantly peasant character of these countries, the peasants as such had relatively little political influence.

178 Although there was an increase in the output of agricul-
241 tural goods in all these countries between 1918 and 1945,
511 the competition offered by overseas cereals strongly affected the agriculture of Eastern Europe. Cereals, one of the major products of the region, had to be undersold to Germany. Added to this unfortunate situation, the world depression of 1929 came as a terrible blow to the economy of Eastern Europe, the most disastrous years lasting from 1931 until 1934. Industry, with its frequent cartels, was better able to defend itself than was agriculture, and thus the "price scissors," or the disparity between agricultural and industrial prices, cut mostly into the income of the agricultural population. This resulted in a general lowering of both the purchasing power and the standard of living. Loans at high rates of interest were frequent and taxation increased the poverty of the peasants. These, as the major element of the population, pressed heavily for reforms and spread malcontent in their respective countries.

185 Soon after the First World War, some states realized that
● 167 the solution to this situation was industrialization. Emigra-
433 tion, as a possible solution, was not favored in any of the Eastern European states as it would have decreased manpower. Since war was considered more or less imminent after 1933, military and industrial groups were especially opposed to any large-scale loss of population, although emigration was never prohibited by actual government order.

185 Bohemia, which had been in a highly advantageous posi-
433 tion in the industrialization program of Austria before the

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641 ing example. The regime knows that it cannot assure a decent
208 standard of living to the adult population and probably realizes that the coming generation will not live much better. However, it hopes that the young ones will be more pliable. Since they will not know that life can be better, they will not grumble. In the political and moral field, the desire to capture the minds of the youth is what industrialization is in the economic domain—the primary goal to which all others
185 must be subordinated. From another angle, education, especially technical education, is the necessary counterpart and precondition of the fully industrialized, urbanized, and mechanized socialist society.

168 The first point of the Communist program for the young
185 generation is to insure its numerical strength. Before the last war, the populations of Poland, Rumania, Yugoslavia, Bulgaria, and Slovakia were increasing with great though gradually diminishing rapidity. In the Czech lands proper and in Hungary, the natural increase was low with a trend towards demographic standstill. Some economists believed that the key problem of Eastern Europe, that of rural poverty due to overpopulation, could not be solved unless the population ceased to multiply so rapidly. From the strictly economic point of view, there was much truth in that assertion. The Communist regimes, including that of Yugoslavia, have taken the opposite stand. Their publications wage a war against the prewar theory which they say is born of despondency characteristic of capitalism. Communism, they claim, will solve all problems. But to prosper, People's Democracies need many children. Whether because of these social policies or because of other reasons, the prewar trend toward low natality has been reversed in most countries of the area. No demographic data on Rumania have been published for some years, which may mean that the policy of high natality has not been successful there. Elsewhere, data show that many more children are being born now than before the war and

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more of them survive infancy. In consequence, if rather fragmentary national statistics are to be believed, the rate of increase in population has risen to what it was a generation before. Roughly speaking, the number of Hungarians has been increasing annually by 60,000, that of Czechs and Slovaks (mainly Slovaks) by 140,000, that of Yugoslavs by 180,000, and that of Poles by over 400,000. Whether this trend will continue for a long time, no one can say.

The second point of the program in respect to youth is an all-out attack on illiteracy. Before the war, the area as such was making rapid progress in schooling, and in its western part illiteracy was no longer known. In its eastern and southeastern regions, however, there were still large residues of illiteracy in the adult population and, in spite of compulsory elementary education, there were not enough schools in some rural districts. The result was that some children never went to school. The Communist regimes claim that they have done away with a large proportion of illiteracy among adults and even elderly people, and that illiteracy as a condition is gone forever. There is no way of checking this assertion but it is likely that it is correct. The obvious comment is that the more literate people there are, the stronger a weapon Communist printed propaganda will be. Thus, the new schools behind the Iron Curtain are but the first installment of a vast campaign of propaganda and indoctrination.

The third and, in a sense, the most important point of the program is the great effort of the Communist regimes to promote professional and technical education on secondary and academic levels. The fulfillment of the long-range economic plans depends, in the last analysis, on its cadres, that is, on its trained personnel. To use a Communist simile, the new industrial army, millions strong, needs hundreds of thousands of noncommissioned and commissioned officers. These men and women are being graduated all over the captive area from technical schools of every description. The numbers

CHAPTER II

THE EAST EUROPEAN SETTING

1. *General Factors*

In the early spring and summer of 1944 the Soviet armies breached the German defenses on the Dniester and the Bug and, advancing through the territories of pre-war Romania and Poland, entered a region which, for purposes of convenience, may be termed Eastern Europe.[1] By the time World War II had ended a year later Soviet power was established as far as the Elbe river in the west and the borders of Greece in the south. The path was cleared for Communist reorganization of Eastern Europe.

In the first months the primary lever of political and social change was the Soviet Army itself. But the new imperial apparatus did not long depend solely upon direct military intervention. In the wake of the advancing armies a well-organized political apparatus moved which, though few in numbers, was endowed with much of the militancy and dynamism of the Soviet system.

Generally, post-war Communist leadership was Moscow-trained, had served long apprenticeships in the Comintern apparatus, and was familiar with the hierarchal operations of an organization which invested all initiative in the Moscow center.[2] Although some of the leaders had led a furtive underground existence between the wars, they were no longer genuine revolutionaries, but agents of an imperial power designated with imposing the developed Soviet political and economic system on countries whose languages

[1] The term Eastern Europe, as used here, includes what is often referred to as Central and Eastern Europe, but does not include Russia, which is frequently considered part of Eastern Europe. Certain German writers, seeing in the region a mosaic of under-developed and politically weak states, have sometimes used the phrase *Zwischen-Europa* ("Between Europe"). For the purposes of this paper, the term Eastern Europe is taken to be coextensive with the Soviet satellite sphere, excluding East Germany, but including Yugoslavia whose regime broke with Moscow in 1948.

[2] The character of the post-war seizure of power by the Communist Parties of Eastern Europe is treated more fully below, pp. 42-43. For a good general account of these events, see Hugh Seton-Watson, *The East European Revolution* (Oxford, 1950), pp. 167-229.

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735 Greek Orthodox Church, which though united in its Uniate form with Rome, preserved its old language and customs. This Church became the target of special Russian propagandistic and repressive efforts as soon as the Iron Curtain was established.

565 Elsewhere outside the former realm of the Habsburgs the
795 situation was comparable. In Poland a Catholic peasantry
369 whose loyalty was deeply moving lived confidently though primitively in the light of a mystical faith, while worldliness and skepticism were prevalent among the upper classes. It was commonly said there, after World War I, that the most religious of peoples was governed by the most morally lax of bureaucrats; and that may well have been the case. Nor could the coming of industrialism to such mushroom cities as Lodz, so bitterly lamented by Ladislas Reymont, bring about the immediate solution of any grave social problem. Nevertheless, as we shall see, there existed in Poland religious elites of extraordinary quality and dedication. In eastern Germany, overwhelmingly Protestant despite certain vigorous centers of Catholic activity such as the Ermland in East Prussia and the border districts west of Poznan (Silesia was a province apart, its culture having been developed under the Habsburgs), one could go from the old conservative, rural Church communities of the landed estates along the Baltic Sea to the liberal atmosphere of Saxony, where the social problems inherent in modern industrial society dominated thought and action. Concerning the Balkans one need say here only that, though they suffered from the normal diseases of feudalism, they offered much of vital and absorbing interest to the student of religious life.

●175 These observations will help to explain the situation which
186 followed the First World War. The old Austro-Hungarian Empire was dissolved, and dissident nationalist sentiment, supported by the will of the victorious Allies, demanded the crea-

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tion of separate states. Therewith a tide of Liberalism merged 175
with the currents of upsurging tribal nationalism to create the 186
pattern of conflict which was later to prove so advantageous to the totalitarians. Czech nationalism, having in Thomas Masaryk a brilliantly effective standard-bearer, seemed at first blush to usher in a new era of democratic and progressive social thought. It soon became obvious, however, that the autonomism of the Czechs—which led at the outset even to the establishment of a National Church—would of necessity engender comparable feelings in the breasts of the other peoples in the Czechoslovak Republic. The Slovaks rallied round their own traditions of language and culture, and swiftly but surely became committed to a quest for autonomy which found a temporary though unsatisfactory haven under Hitler. Among Sudeten Germans feeling was almost as strong and led ultimately to the fateful formation of a political party which advocated union with Germany. Nor was the situation different elsewhere. Yugoslavia was plagued from the beginning by deep and bitter conflict among the Serbs, the Croats, and the Slovenes.

In Hungary a violent Communist revolution, spearheaded in 175
late 1918 by Béla Kun, ruled for a time by bloodshed. But ere 669
long this uprising, which had very little popular support, was 794
put down; reaction set in, and a dictatorial government was established after it had compiled its own catalogue of excesses. Here was made manifest, probably for the first time, how significant the stability of religious groups could prove to be. Not only did they temper noticeably the excesses of extremists, but under the leadership of great churchmen they began to build organizations dedicated to social improvement. It is also true [829]
that bitter experience under the Béla Kun regime made Hungary one of the most anti-Communist countries of Europe.

And so, as the turbulence engendered by the war apparently 795
subsided, it seemed probable that a period of relative security

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of the State, to an extent undreamed of in Czarist Russia. We were wont, many of us, to make uncomplimentary references to the clergy of the old regime. Some of the strictures were too sweeping. But, alas, what we must be prepared to say about the Russian Church under the Soviets is far more devastating. It has become an institution which all but blesses the concentration camp system, and escorts slave labor to its doom with a kind of liturgical brass band.

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The Soviet objective is to reduce religious organizations outside Russia to the status of the Orthodox Church at home. The formula is always and everywhere the same, though it may be applied with greater or lesser rigor. Therefore inevitably the Vatican becomes the great antagonist, to be fought with every means. The Holy See, pledged to the profession of the Christian Gospels without dilution of the ethical obligations which they impose upon everyone who accepts them in the Catholic sense, cannot agree that the Church is to be an instrument of the State —even, indeed, a benign and merciful instrument. The Vatican is therefore the ignoble Fascist Beast of the Bolshevik Apocalypse. Upon the heads of persons who remain loyal to the ancient See of Catholic Christendom, blows have rained in constant succession. This is the direst persecution the Church has suffered since the days of the Caesars.

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Because most of what may be reported concerns the Catholic Church, a brief review of its history and endeavors in Eastern Europe will help to bring events into perspective. The cleavage of the Roman Empire, establishing the rivalry between the emperors of Rome and Byzantium, begot two Churches also, each claiming for itself the charisma of Apostolic Christianity. With the passing of time, profound differences of a dogmatic, moral, and canonical kind developed. The organizational character of religion was also modified radically, so that, while in the East the ties binding the religious nations to the historic pa-

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triarchal See of Constantinople were either broken completely 175
or allowed to become loose and tenuous, in the West the struc- 795
ture of the Roman Catholic Church became more monolithic 779
in fact, if not in theory. No doubt this divergence was rooted partly in theology, but one cause was the decline of Constantinople as an important Christian center and its subjection to Turkish rule.

Yet there could never be any doubt that both Churches were [793]
intensely and ardently Catholic. They kept the tradition of the
priesthood as a sacramental ordination administered by bish- [796]
ops whose authority had been handed down in direct line of succession from the Apostles. Both retained the Mass as that in which the Sacrifice of Christ was reenacted so that His body and blood might be with the Church always. Devotion to the Virgin Mary, so long a thorn in the flesh of Western Protestantism, was a common heritage and treasure, however different the conceptions of Mary's personality and presence or the liturgies in which her praise was spelled out in prayer. Therefore efforts to effect reunion have never flagged since the Middle Ages. The fact that they have failed may well be, as many writers have thought, one of the great tragedies of history.

For every thoughtful Western Catholic the virtues and atti- 000
tudes cherished in the East are precious because they reflect mystical prayer and thought and often the vital, profound humility of the human sinner who does not lose himself in "personalism": the personalism which in the West has so often favored the delusion that the rights and righteousness of man are pearls grown within himself through the practice of religion or morality, independent of the sacred order which is in God and which, when he is sometimes devout and submissive, he may possess in the deepest core of his being. On the other hand the West, unlike the East, has an illustrious tradition of endeavor to permeate the speculative and practical intelligence by holi-

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and reverenced those who, however worthily or unworthily, represented it to the world. The Western Catholic is as free as anyone else to come to his insight into the fullness of the meaning of Christianity but he has a certainty held with profound gratitude that when he is in his Church he will not unwittingly find strange gods upon the altars.

In any event, the quest for reunion continued and reached, as has been indicated, an initial nadir during the period of the Crusades and a moment of optimistic hopefulness at the Councils of Ferrara and Florence during the fifteenth century. Only a brief reference to either is possible here. The Crusaders, who were roused by eloquent preachers like St. Bernard to take up arms and make the long journey eastward to wrest the Holy Places associated with the life and death of Our Lord from the Turks, served a consecrated cause; but many of them were very human, indeed. Some historians conclude from the sermons of St. Bernard and other preachers of the time that the purely mundane benefits which accrued to the men who took up the Cross were so great that many ruffians (contrary to romantic historians, the Middle Ages had their share of them) embarked on the adventure. It is also evident that although the Crusades owed their origin to an appeal for help from the Byzantine Emperor, to which the monks of Cluny responded as best they could, the net cultural result was that the East was not only disappointed in what the West could achieve but disgusted with the conduct of the armies, even as since that time many another occupied country has been with foreign soldiers who have been billeted on its soil. On the other hand, the West heard many a report about the corruption and venality of the East, even as the home people in this our day have listened to shocking stories of lands which their soldier sons have seen. It must be added that the subsequent continued dominion of the Turks likewise dampened the ardor of friendship.

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175 The great Councils to which we have referred opened in a
795 spirit of optimism, despite the nationalistic bickering to which
641 Europe was then subject. The Greeks were in a conciliatory mood, due largely to their need of Western allies against the followers of Mohammed, but they arrived in Europe at a time of bitter conflict over whether a Council took precedence over the Pope. The Decree of Union did not satisfy the great mass of the Greeks, even though the overwhelming majority of their ecclesiastical representatives assented to it in accordance with the wishes of the Emperor. The only positive result was the formation of the Greek Churches in union with Rome, usually called the Uniate Churches. In Russia, as we have seen, the Czar vetoed any plan of reunion.

But the great dream of reunion did not die, and after World War I it was revived especially by Pope Pius XI, who had intimate personal knowledge of conditions in Eastern Europe from the high vantage point of the Holy See. Institutions under the auspices of the Papacy were established to promote the achievement of One Fold and One Shepherd. At the same time the Protestant Ecumenical Council likewise began to search for ways in which to draw the Eastern Churches into union, with the Churches bound together under its roof. These efforts were not wholly useless, but it was again obvious that the disunity of the Christian West had puzzled and confused rather than attracted the East.

175 Meanwhile great changes had taken place. The Papacy was
829 compelled to reckon with the rise of secularism, which swept
795 across Eastern Europe from the West during the nineteenth century. Medieval ecclesiastical institutions were widely identified with feudalism; and in addition new intellectual and scientific movements gave rise to a widespread conviction that religion was in itself a barrier to the development of the good, or at least the prosperous, society. The attack on feudalism

[1. Councils of Ferrara and Florence, 15th cent. - Analyst.]

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which became the great French Revolution of 1789 was also a rebellion against the privileged Church; and after the rise of a capitalistic society the estrangement of the poor from religion became the dominant fact in the cultural history of Western Europe. Hegelian philosophy—combining a doctrine of the constantly mobile and shifting Mind with a theory of the State as the sole primordially ordained center of permanence in an otherwise impermanent world—came to prominence at a time when dissatisfaction with Liberalism (in the continental sense) was breeding myths of political utopianism among the masses. Of these myths the strongest, temporarily at least, was the Marxist faith, rooted in a class-conscious usurpation of Hegelian thought. Yet observers who looked deeply into the wellsprings from which the intellectual behavior of the time was fed could see that a creed drastically counter to Marxism was arising in many different places, almost spontaneously. This might be termed dynamic traditionalism—that is, investing the past of man with sacredness and subsequently selecting from it forces and figures that could be made objects of the cult, in which the concept of human sacrality might receive a quasi-liturgical form. Perhaps such a force might be race, or classical antiquity, or one of the urges which some historians read into the Renaissance. To the exponents of dynamic traditionalism, the Catholic Church often seemed to be one great force among many others. For did it not have discipline, as Charles Maurras observed, and a heritage of beauty ranging all the way from the austerity of Cluny to the gorgeous splendor of St. Peter's?

This traditionalism tempted many Catholics—was indeed a far greater peril to orthodoxy than even the antecedent, all-pervading Liberalism. That no doubt had led not a few to believe that the Christian creed was outmoded and so could be made serviceable only by adapting it, more or less subtly, to the assumptions of modern scientific and philosophical

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829 thought; but dynamic traditionalism transformed the Church
795 of the Master into a genteel and eminently historical institution, with the role of conferring the august dignity of an assumed other world upon the power politics of the here-and-now. The robes of prelates fitted very well into the pageantry of the State, and so there were not a few who thought that a benediction might well be expended upon Nazis and Fascists, to the accompaniment of incense and carefully selected items of Gregorian chant, if only their grandiose parades would include a section devoted exclusively to the clergy. It may be said parenthetically that today no one knows whether the Russia of Stalin was a devotee of Marxism or of dynamic traditionalism. Had Stalin donned the robes of Ivan, who could have told which heresy he was espousing?

175 A succession of great Popes, possibly the most remarkable
793 in the long annals of the Church, accepted the challenge. Leo
795 XIII, intellectual and aristocratic, recognized the necessity for demonstrating to the workers that they were not at present inside the realms of a Christian civilization that doomed them to a condition of perennial peonage. His successor, Pope Pius X, left to the world the conviction that the Church is the servant of peace; and Benedict XV committed all Catholics to the support of an international order. In 1922 began the vigorous pontificate of Pius XI, distinguished for the world-wide scope of his interests and sympathies. Whereas during several centuries the See of Rome had worn an air of Roman provincialism, the tireless leadership of this learned, mountain-climbing North Italian imparted to it a new tinge of contemporaneousness and cosmopolitanism. The Vatican ended its old quarrel with the Italian State over the Papal territories, even though at some risk of seeming to assent to the dictatorship of Mussolini. It acquired a radio station, an Americanized library system, and even a scientific academy. Through adroit and concilia-

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tory diplomatic activity agreements were reached with the new states of Europe as well as with many countries overseas concerning relationships between Church and State. In ways which were often startlingly new, the laity was associated with the clergy in the work of the Church; and social reform was advocated, in the spirit of a great Encyclical letter restating and re-forming the principles of the moral teaching concerning society which are implicit in the Catholic tradition. All these things were then kept alive under the next Pope, Pius XII.

It is part of the universal tragedy of our time that so very much of what seemed so promising should have been engulfed by the fearful upheavals which, originating in Europe, for a time threatened to shatter the foundations of human society everywhere. In Adolf Hitler appeared the demagogic voluntarist who gave the heresy of dynamic traditionalism its most drastic and frightening formulation. Meanwhile, in nearly every other country Marxism became the gospel of the dissident intellectuals, who often were able to commit to their view sections of the working population, indeed not infrequently unwilling sections. Yet Pius XI had felt, almost from the moment he assumed Pontificate, that a great and shattering storm was brewing in Europe. That is why he labored so vigorously for the development of the Church in other parts of the world, including Africa and Asia. He took steps to forestall the disaster, opposing the mighty heresies whenever he could even though sometimes the infection had spread so far among Catholics themselves that—as in the case of the *Action française*—Princes of the Church did not concur with him.

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In Eastern Europe the position of the Church was inevitably and critically affected by inability to arrive at a *modus vivendi* with the Bolshevik government. The lengthy story of efforts to reach an agreement cannot be told here; but it may be recalled that until the summer of 1924 a Papal Relief Mission was ac-

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185 tal to an understanding of the problems of Eastern Europe, and much of the political extremism of this region can be traced to the frustrations resulting from this failure.

The most obvious reason for the failure to achieve a European standard, and probably also the most important, has been the persistent necessity of giving priority to national security over human welfare. This problem has, of course, been faced by all modern states, but it has affected the peoples of Eastern Europe to an unusual degree. It would not be too much to say that the insecurity of these states, due more to regional factors than to size, has been the source of [648] most of their difficulties. Of the various solutions that have been attempted, including national opportunism, alliances with great powers, regional pacts, and participation in the League of Nations, none has met the special needs of the situation.

I

186 The European wars resulting from the French Revolution and the Napoleonic conquests infected the leaders of the Eastern European peoples with the modern spirit of nationalism and liberalism, but the peace settlement concluded in 1815 did little to satisfy the hopes that had been aroused. The peoples of this region remained under the firm rule of the Romanov, Habsburg, Hohenzollern, and Ottoman dynasties, and before long the process of national liberation came to occupy their principal energies. Of the many national groups in this region, only the Serbians and the Montenegrins achieved any measure of independence before 1815, although the Magyars occupied within the Austrian monarchy a position of special influence. The remaining nationalities in this region had not yet taken the first steps towards independence. The struggle for freedom lasted for a full century, and was a complex process in which the

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ivalries among the nationalities frequently occupied as much 186
nergy as the struggle against the dynastic governments.

The development of nationalism and liberation in East- 186
rn Europe was the product of many influences. Within the 668
arger framework of the enlightenment, the peoples of this
egion were stimulated by the philosophy of nationalism de-
eloped by Herder and his school and by the ideas of the
French Revolution disseminated through cultural channels
nd by Napoleon's armies. The Poles, Czechs, and Magyars
vere most strongly influenced by this new spirit at first, and
ntil the middle of the nineteenth century liberalism took
recedence over nationalism. In this period a Czartoryski, a
'alacky, and a Széchenyi worked for reforms within the
olitical framework established in 1815, and their policies
roduced significant results. It was only after the defeat of
iberalism in the abortive revolutions of 1848 that national-
sm came to predominate, and this nationalism was rapidly
ardened by the opposition that it encountered. By the end
f the century only the Magyars had achieved the substance
f their national aims, and this at the expense of becoming
mong the most rigorous oppressors of their own non-
Iagyar minorities. The peoples of Southeastern Europe
chieved independence only to a limited degree before the
irst World War, while the Poles and Czechs remained under
rm imperial rule. The approximate distribution of these
ationalities at the turn of the century is illustrated by the
ble on page 8.

Of all the oppressed peoples of Eastern Europe, the Poles 563
vere the most numerous and their situation in 1815 the 175
ost acute. Possessors of a proud tradition of government
ating back to the later middle ages, and at one time the
ird in area and fourth in population among the European
owers, they had suffered domestic disintegration and ter-
torial partition in the eighteenth century. In the peace set-
ement of 1815 the largest segment of Poland was in-

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corporated in Russia as a nominal "Kingdom." Cracow became a free city under the joint protection of Russia, Prussia, and Austria, while western Poland became the Prussian province of Posen (Poznan), and the province of Galicia was ceded to Austria. For a brief period it seemed that the Kingdom of Poland might develop a degree of autonomy under Russian rule, but the firm suppression of the insurrection of 1830 brought an end to this hope. The mid-century revolutions were echoed in all four parts of Poland, and in each section ended with a further tightening of the imperial regime. In German and Russian Poland minority rights were increasingly disregarded in the latter half of the nineteenth century, and the city of Cracow lost its freedom through Austrian annexation. Only in the Austrian province of Galicia did the Poles develop a significant degree of self-government in this period, and in this atmosphere the Polish national movement was able to develop.

The Czechs and the Slovaks almost lost their identity after the annexation of the Kingdom of Bohemia by the Habsburgs in the seventeenth century, but in the revolutionary era they regained interest in their national culture. In the first half of the nineteenth century they were infected by the new spirit of nationalism and contributed such leaders as Dobrovsky, Šafařik, Palacky, and Havliček. However, here as elsewhere, the revolutions of 1848 brought defeat and retrenchment. As the Austrian government became more decentralized, the Czechs won increasing rights of local self-government, and by 1900 the questions of Czech autonomy and the Czech language had been raised by such leaders as Masaryk and Kramař to issues of European importance. The Slovaks, under the harsher rule of the Magyars, did not fare so well. Small in number and living in the underdeveloped reaches of the Carpathian mountains, the Slovaks lacked the cultural heritage of the Czechs. Nevertheless, under Štúr, Šafařik, and Kollar a Slovak national renaissance

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took place, and in the generation before the First World War a bitter struggle was waged against Magyar rule.

The exceptional character of Hungary's position was derived both from its traditions of provincial administrative autonomy, which can be traced to the thirteenth century, and from the fact that it had within its boundaries substantial Slavic and Rumanian minorities. Although the Hungarians, or Magyars, were less a minority than a member of the ruling group, they were by no means satisfied with the somewhat ambiguously defined rights of self-government granted when the Austrian Empire was created in 1804. The Hungarian nobility became an important force for reform within the empire and contributed many leaders to the liberal movement. Under the moderate guidance of Széchenyi important reforms were accomplished, but the more radical nationalist program of Kossuth was defeated in 1848-49 by the combined efforts of Austrian and Russian troops. Both the Magyar and the non-Magyar peoples were discriminated against in the period of Austrian centralism that followed, but with the military decline of Austria the privileges of Hungary were reasserted. The Austro-Hungarian compromise of 1867, negotiated under the wise statesmanship of Déak, gave Hungary a constitutional position equal to that of Austria within the empire and a political influence that was frequently greater despite certain economic disabilities.

Although Croatia enjoyed a degree of autonomy in Hungary after 1868, having in fact occupied the position of a dependency of Hungary intermittently since the eleventh century, it still suffered many limitations. The experience of Napoleonic rule in 1809-13 and the growth of Gaj's nationalist movement under the name of Illyrianism brought Croatian national feeling to the point where it could no longer suffer with equanimity the cultural and political restrictions imposed by the Magyars. The neighboring

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Slovenes, under Austrian rule, developed a national program under the leadership of Kopitar. The government of the German Austrians was certainly milder than that of the Magyars, but in the years before the First World War the Slovenes, like their Croatian cousins, had reasons to feel that their political development was being unjustifiably restricted by Habsburg policies. 175 186 563

The temper and direction of Croatian and Slovene nationalism was increasingly influenced by the successful efforts of the Serbians and the Montenegrins, who were also Serbian in language. Before 1815 both peoples had struck their first blows for independence from Turkish rule. Within the Habsburg empire, an important minority of Serbians was divided between Austrian, Hungarian, and Croatian rule, and was augmented in 1878 when Bosnia-Herzegovina came under the joint administration of Austria and Hungary. This province had a mixed population of Croatians, Serbians, and Mohammedans who were largely of Serbo-Croatian origin. In the eighteenth century significant concessions had been made to the Serbian minority in Hungary, but subsequent events led to a decline in their position and after the compromise of 1867 the situation was ripe for a national protest.

It was nevertheless in the Ottoman empire that the Serbian national movement, inspired by Obradović and Karadžić, found its most active rallying point. The Montenegrins gained recognition of their independence from Turkish rule in 1799, and the Serbians, starting with their first uprising in 1804, took advantage of every weakness in the Ottoman system to wrest increasing political independence and territorial aggrandizement. The years 1817, 1829, 1856, 1878, and 1913 mark the important stages of Serbian growth, and these developments were watched with warm interest by the South Slavs within the Habsburg empire. The question of South Slav national rights now be-

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came linked with the struggle of Austria-Hungary and Russia for hegemony in the Balkans, and the annexation of the Slav-inhabited Ottoman province of Bosnia-Herzegovina by the Habsburgs in 1908 was as important an event in South Slav politics as it was in European diplomacy. In view of Serbian indignation at this Habsburg stroke, it is not surprising that Sarajevo, the capital of Bosnia-Herzegovina, became the site of the incident that detonated the First World War.

In the Turkish territories south of Serbia, the Macedonian Slavs inhabiting the valleys of the Vardar and Struma rivers spoke a language closely related to both Serbian and Bulgarian. During the greater part of the nineteenth century, Serbian efforts were concentrated on the national struggle, and within Turkish territory Macedonia became tied to Bulgaria by administrative and political bonds. The absence of a clearcut Macedonian nationality made this province a source of a bitter rivalry between Serbia and Bulgaria that greatly hampered the national movements of the two contestants in the generation before the First World War.

To the east of Serbia, the Bulgarian national renaissance was somewhat delayed by the greater tenacity of Ottoman rule. By the middle of the century the national movement was nevertheless fully developed in its literary and religious aspects, and in 1878 the Russian-Turkish war brought political independence. Unlike the Serbians, whose territory was expanded gradually through the century, the Bulgarians were given immediate hope of a full realization of their territorial aims when the Russians appeared able in the spring of 1878 to impose their will on Turkey. The revision of these initial peace terms a few months later, as a result of British and Austrian pressure, resulted in a greatly reduced Bulgaria and in a nationalist movement that was stimulated to an unusual degree by this frustration. Despite its preoccupation with territorial aggrandizement, the

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Bulgarian government nevertheless made significant social and political progress in the years before the First World War.

The situation of the Rumanians was similar to that of the Serbians in that one part of their people lived under severe limitations within the Habsburg empire, while across the border in Turkey their co-nationals gained the substance of national independence by the middle of the century. The Rumanians in the Habsburg empire lived primarily under Hungarian rule after the compromise of 1867, and despite certain political concessions they never gained full national recognition. The vigorous struggle led by Vaida-Voevod and Maniu against political and cultural discrimination had a significant impact on the balance of forces within the empire but failed to achieve any concrete success before the First World War. The Rumanians in the Turkish provinces of Moldavia and Wallachia, adjacent to the Russian frontier and overlapping into the neighboring Russian province of Bessarabia, were able, because of this strategic position, to extract important concessions from the Ottoman government. By 1829 they attained autonomy under a Russian protectorate, and the Treaty of Paris in 1856 created the conditions under which they were to gain full independence within a generation. Like Serbia, this free Rumanian state was to exert a powerful attraction upon the discontented Rumanian minority within Austria-Hungary and eventually contributed to the disruption of the empire.

The Albanians fell under Turkish rule in the fifteenth century after the brief but heroic resistance of Skanderbeg, and during the period of Turkish rule they contributed many distinguished personalities to the Ottoman civil service as well as a dynasty to the Turkish province of Egypt. It was not until the neighboring Greeks and Serbians gained their independence and began to covet the lands of the Albanians that an active movement for national liberation developed

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175 among the latter. At the same time the strategic position of
186 Albania with respect to the Adriatic made it an object of
563 imperial interest on the part of Austria-Hungary and Italy. When the Albanian liberation movement got under way, it thus had to guard against a variety of dangers, and finally in 1912 during the Balkan wars it became the last state in Europe to proclaim its independence from Turkish rule.

000 This rapid glance at the national movements in Eastern Europe in the century before the First World War gives particular attention to those peoples that achieved their independence as a result of that conflict. At the same time, important issues of political and religious rights that were associated with the national movements but did not play an equally important role in the political outcome of the First World War have not been discussed. The Germans also had significant national minorities in this region, but their national movement took a different direction. The same may be said of the Jewish minorities that played an important role in the lands inhabited by the Poles, Magyars, and Rumanians. Their position, especially in Russian Poland, was frequently worse than that of other minorities, and their liberation movement took the form of Zionism. It is important to recognize that there were many influential groups in Eastern Europe that for one reason or another preferred increased autonomy within the existing political framework to complete liberation. Indeed, the peoples of this region made important social and economic progress in the century before the First World War, and when independence was won it soon became apparent that some of the nations with the highest level of attainment were those that had remained longest under alien rule.

Much has been said in criticism of the peace settlement in Eastern Europe at the end of the First World War, but it must be allowed that the principle of national self-determination was applied with considerable consistency.

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7. Industrial and Social Policies Between the Wars

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101 Eastern Europe, from the Baltic to the Aegean, is
175 a security zone both for the states of Western Europe and
178 for Russia. Besides acting as a safety valve for neighboring powers, this region is a passageway between them. Military and population movements fan out from here into the East or converge into the West.

Both West and East have accused this part of Europe of being unstable and backward. Both have wanted to influence it and have not wanted to admit that the backwardness, confusion, and instability of this area are in large measure due to power politics. Tribes, peoples, and states have changed and have been changed in this region throughout the centuries. As a result, there is no stability of boundaries, or of peoples and governments. The evolution of the region can be viewed as a mirror which reflects the history of Europe with all its quirks and irregularities.

Although both world wars began in Eastern Europe, it would be absurd to claim that they were caused solely by these nations and their problems. The social, economic, and political interests of the great powers which clashed in this area and influenced its peoples played an important role in the course of events in Eastern Europe.

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11 Problems and Prospects of Federation

KARL W. DEUTSCH

I

The distribution of sovereign states in Central and in Eastern Europe has undergone some striking changes during the last one hundred years. A century ago, in 1853, there were six sovereign states between the Baltic Sea and the Aegean: the empires of Austria, Prussia, Russia, and Turkey, the kingdom of Greece, and the small principality of Montenegro. Two generations later, in 1913, there were ten states in the area, for by then Serbia, Bulgaria, Rumania, and Albania had all become sovereign states. Another ten years later, the number of states had increased to sixteen. Serbia and Montenegro had merged into Yugoslavia, but Hungary, Czechoslovakia, Poland, Latvia, Estonia, Lithuania, and Finland had all been added as sovereign states. After the convulsions of the Second World War, thirteen sovereign states remained in what was now called Eastern Europe. They were the same states which had existed there during the 1920's and 1930's, with the exception of the three small Baltic states of Latvia, Estonia and Lithuania, which had become incorporated under the Soviet dictatorships in the style of the federal republics of the Soviet Union.

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By 1949, Soviet-style dictatorships had been established in seven of these thirteen sovereign states. In these "Iron Curtain" states, dictatorship was and is exercised through a native minority who could not have won power without the support of the Soviet Union and the Soviet armies, and who—with the conspicuous exception of Yugoslavia—could not retain this power if Soviet support were withdrawn. The indirect rule thus exercised by the Soviet dictatorship, with the help of native personnel, over six of the Eastern European states —Poland, Czechoslovakia, Hungary, Rumania, Bulgaria, and Albania—might remind the observer at first glance of the indirect rule exercised in past centuries by the empires of Turkey and Russia over some of the principalities then existing in the region. Upon this superficial view, it might seem that despite all the violent changes in political sovereignty and national allegiance during the last one hundred years, the fundamental dependence of the peoples of this region upon foreign powers had remained essentially unchanged.

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This impression would be quite deceptive. In 1853, the government of Eastern Europe by only six powers had endured for more than two hundred years, with Sweden and Poland rather than Greece and Montenegro playing the roles of the fifth and sixth power at the side of Prussia, Russia, Austria, and Turkey. With the single exception of Poland, which by the end of the eighteenth century had become the victim of her neighbors, the administrative services of these powers were generally based upon foreign personnel drawn from peoples outside the region. Austria and Prussia depended upon the military and administrative services of Germans, Russia upon those of Great Russians, and Turkey in the last analysis had to rely upon the support of the Ottoman Turks. Natives of the different regions supplemented the personnel of these administrative services but did not dominate it. The rule of these foreign or semiforeign empires over the peoples of Eastern Europe was based upon this region's

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overwhelmingly peasant character, its political apathy and military weakness.

Today, in the middle of the twentieth century, most of these conditions have been transformed. All the peoples of Eastern Europe have literate majorities. They have native professional and middle classes. All of them have at least some more or less modern industries and transportation systems. All of them have had two or three generations of broad national and political development, a flourishing of national languages and literatures, and a vigorous growth in native political participation. They have memories of national independence and skills of political organization and action. They can no longer be ruled by alien rulers, and even the Russian dictatorship must deal with them by indirect methods. The peoples of Eastern Europe today can be governed stably only by native political administrations, by native civil services and school systems, and by the appeal—however distorted—to native symbols and traditions, or they cannot be governed at all.

All these changes seem to be irreversible. It would be as difficult to restore illiteracy, apathy, and fundamental ignorance to the peoples of Eastern Europe as it would be to restore the economic and social institutions of 1853. If history teaches us anything, it is at the very least that the distribution of political and military power is subject to rapid change and that every submerged people that has preserved its identity and its capacity to think and act may well expect to find again some opportunity to determine its own destiny in freedom.

II

Yet all was not well with the growth of sovereign states in Eastern Europe. Perhaps the most characteristic feature of the political institutions of the area was the widespread

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641 discontent with them. If people had resented the oppressiveness of the old large empires, many now chafed under the smallness and divisiveness of the national states that had come to succeed them. Eastern European states, large or small, seemed to have a way of frustrating the hopes and ambitions of significant numbers of their citizens. Where men had complained about the lack of national freedom in the past, many now complained about the "balkanization" of the region. It is this underlying restlessness, this *malaise* of Eastern European politics, that gave a peculiar appeal to the demand for Eastern European federation. If we are to understand the prospects and the problems of a federal union in this region, we must first turn our attention to the fundamental needs and discontents that gave rise to the proposal.

• 175 433 Eastern Europe was a relatively backward area in terms of economic development. Even some of its most highly developed regions, such as the countries of Austria, Hungary, and the Russian-held parts of Poland, had lagged in economic development during the two crucial generations between 1815 and 1875, during which time most Western countries went through decades of tremendous economic growth.[1] In 1850

[1] Cf. Paul Muller, "Osterreich seit 1848," in Hans Mayer, ed., *Hundert Jahre Osterreichischer Wirtschaftsentwicklung*, 1848-1948, (Vienna: Springer Verlag, 1949), pp. 1-20, esp. p. 8; and in the same volume, for the old monopolistic traditions of business at Vienna from 1221 to 1848, and "conditions bordering on lethargy" during the decades preceding 1848, see Otto Gruss, "Ein Jahrhundert Osterreichischer Binnenhandel (1848-1948)," pp. 310-358, esp. pp. 311-317; for figures on the slow introduction of steam engines, the lag in the growth of towns, the slow relative growth of the population occupied in industry, the lack of capital, the national fragmentation of markets, etc., see Karl Heinz Werner, "Osterreichs Industrie und Aussenhandelspolitik 1848 bis 1948," *ibid.*, pp. 359, 479, esp. pp. 624-678, esp. p. 659. See also J. Slokar, *Geschichte der osterreichischen Industrie* (Vienna: Tempsky, 1949), pp. 16-19, 46-54, 177-179; Richard Schuller, "Die Entstehung des osterreichisch-ungarischen Wirtschaftsgebietes," in G. Gratz and R. Schuller, *Der wirtschaftliche Zusammenbruch Osterreich-Ungarns* (Vienna and New Haven: Holder-Pichler-Tempsky and Yale University Press, 1930), pp. 1-35, esp. pp. 23-24; Oscar Jaszi, *The Dissolution of the Habsburg Monarchy* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1929), pp. 185-212.

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Vienna was larger than Berlin and Austria did not appear 175
to lag conspicuously behind Prussia; but by 1866 the lag had 433
become conspicuous and was confirmed on the battlefields of the Austro-Prussian War. There seems to have been a significant acceleration of economic growth between 1880 and 1914; and it has been estimated that between 1900 and 1910 the percentage rate of growth in the national income of Austria was even somewhat faster than it was during the same decade in Western Europe. The percentage growth of the low income of Austria-Hungary was unable, nevertheless, to keep up with the very much higher levels of national income and industrial productivity which meanwhile had been attained in the West.

Such economic growth as did occur was quite unevenly distributed. The economic position of the Germans and a few other groups was a great deal better than that of the rest of the peoples concerned, and the attempts of non-German groups to equal German economic standards often brought them into economic competition and political friction with Germans. After the economic depression of 1873, German nationalists raised the cry for the preservation of German supremacy, and the very attempts to mitigate or overcome economic inequality thus led to intensified economic competition and political conflict.

Economic development was poorly distributed between 175
town and country, as well as between nationalities. In most 162
Western countries, country people had come to share many 433
of the educational and cultural standards of the city populations. In Eastern Europe, by contrast, even the German-Austrian peasants were described before the First World War by the Viennese architect, Adolph Loos, as people wearing different clothes, speaking a different language, and having an infinitely more primitive way of life than the populations of the cities.

The uneven distribution of economic opportunity was re-

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175 inforced in its effect by the extreme splintering of national,
162 linguistic, and religious affiliations. A good map of the na-
433 tionalities, languages, and religions of Eastern Europe would have shown not the large patches of relatively homogeneous populations which are found in so much of Western Europe but rather a polka-dot pattern of intermixed minorities.

182 The relative national uniformity of the West is perhaps, at least in part, the product of a history rich in the processes of successful social learning and acculturation, which merged and melted the different ethnic groups that were left in the Western countries by accidents of migration, wars, and settlement. In Eastern Europe, such accidents of conquest or settlement may well have been even more numerous, but there is also some reason to think that the processes of assimilation were much slower and less effective.

Greater uniformity of language and culture means greater interchangeability of social roles. This is not merely a contributing cause to the growth in social mobility and in the interchange of social roles but is also to some extent their product. Where societies are rigorously stratified, where religions fail to impress upon people an awareness of their essential unity, where the obstacles to a change in occupation or in social role are great, and the rewards for mobility are uncertain and small—in these societies individuals may best succeed in gaining security by clinging tenaciously to their familiar groups, languages, customs, and traditions, and by rejecting any assimilation to other groups except the most privileged as a threat to their existence. The more privileged groups, under these conditions, can only be expected to resent and resist the assimilation or intrusion of strangers, unless these strangers come from regions of clearly greater wealth and greater prestige and seem to bring to the new group assets clearly greater than those they would demand. The lack of unity and assimilation in language and culture in Eastern Europe thus appears as one more aspect of the

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185 were by far the most important; the increase of educational
641 opportunities and general culture; and the development of the economy through agricultural improvement and the expansion of industry and trade.

•177 Political freedom in Eastern Europe before the First
642 World War ranged in degree from negligible rights, as those of the Slovaks in Hungary or of the Poles in Russia, to independent states with constitutions of strongly democratic tendencies, as in certain countries of Southeastern Europe. The latter had been influenced by Western models, and made provision for parliamentary government based on wide suffrage. The constitutions of Serbia, Rumania, and Bulgaria, drafted in the latter half of the nineteenth century by native statesmen experienced in the ways of Western constitutionalism, were founded on a genuine faith in democracy. It is true that royal or ministerial authoritarianism and resort to rough methods were not uncommon in these countries, yet the social egalitarianism already prevailing in Serbia and Bulgaria was a strong force for democracy in these coun-
[66] tries. Although illiteracy and political inexperience remained a serious obstacle to orderly government, the generation before the First World War offers significant examples of governments being changed by orderly democratic procedures. Illustrative of the difficulties under which popular elections with universal male suffrage were conducted is the fact that in the Bulgarian election of 1880 only 32 per cent of those eligible to vote cast their ballots, in contrast to about 80 per cent in France and Belgium and 60 per cent in Germany and Italy in the period 1875-80.

177 Hungary had a longer tradition of constitutional govern-
642 ment than did the Balkan states and after 1867 was in most
563 respects an independent state, but its social structure was more conservative and its desire for political democracy less evident. Moreover, the Magyar achievement of political autonomy was marred by the oppressive treatment of the

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non-Magyar minorities. Thus in a parliament that as late as 1910 represented scarcely more than one quarter of the adult male population, the Magyars who numbered just over one half the population, apart from Croatia, had 405 seats to 8 for the Slovak and Rumanian minorities. The Croatians were represented by 40 deputies when mutual Croatian-Hungarian affairs were under discussion. The Czechs and the Poles in the Austrian provinces developed an aristocratic form of local self-government in the latter half of the nineteenth century and contributed distinguished statesmen to the Austrian government, and at least the Czechs gained experience in the techniques and responsibilities of democracy in local government and in unofficial organizations. Similarly in the Polish-inhabited lands of the German and Russian empires, little opportunity was available for gaining experience in electoral and parliamentary procedures.

Educational opportunities in Eastern Europe were steadily improved in the century after 1815 despite frequently hostile government attitudes. The greatest progress in this field was made in the Czech-inhabited provinces of the Habsburg monarchy, where general compulsory education was introduced in 1869. In Hungary popular education was started somewhat later, and illiteracy among the Magyars declined rapidly. The schools, however, were used as a vehicle for the Magyarization of the non-Magyar minorities of Hungary and, as a consequence, the great majority of Slovak and Rumanian children were compelled to get their education in the Magyar language. In Hungary, discounting Croatia, there were four times as many Magyar-language schools as non-Magyar and five times as many Magyar schoolteachers. The Slovenes under Austrian rule and the autonomous Croatians fared a great deal better, while in independent Montenegro, Serbia, Bulgaria, and Rumania, national school systems were developed insofar as meager resources permitted. The Poles fared differently in their three parts. In

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665 actions a triple objective: to mislead the people, to prevent the postwar restoration of political parties by their original leaders and members or to break them up if they had been restored already, and to beguile foreign opinion into believing that multiparty systems still existed in the Eastern European countries.

The lack of popular support of the Communist parties is visible even today in the countries behind the Iron Curtain. For this reason, in the last elections in Poland and in Rumania in 1952, and in Hungary in 1953, the lists of candidates, made out completely by the Communists, were presented to the people under the disguise of a "National Front." The National Front is represented as a coalition of political parties, trade unions, youth organizations, scientific societies and so forth, and is highlighted by the names of "patriot-priests" and "progressive Catholics." The Communist press in Poland admits that the institution of the National Front was necessary in the elections of 1952 because in 60 per cent of the voting localities, especially in the villages, there were "white spots," that is, areas where there did not exist a single cell of the Communist Party.

665 In summary, it can be said that the Communist dictator-
177 ship was imposed upon the countries behind the Iron Cur-
642 tain under the name of People's Democracy through the following means: Moscow's strategic and political machinations during the war; the direct intervention of the Red Army and the NKVD in the internal affairs of these countries both at the end of and after the war; either the falsification of the will of these nations in the elections or the *coup d'état*, as in Hungary in 1947, and in Czechoslovakia in 1948.

665 An analysis of Communist strength clearly shows that the Communists could not have expected in a single case to assume power in a democratic and parliamentary manner. And, it must be added, the peoples of the Eastern Euro-

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665 tanism" of the West was introduced, and the Communists vigorously went about the destruction of the remaining private property, the collectivization of agriculture, and the transformation of the remaining independent cooperatives into a sector of the Communist state economy. It was therefore, in theory and practice a period of the establishment of socialist states, ruled by the dictatorship of the proletariat and disguised by the name of People's Democracy. This period was marked by the accelerated tempo of the communization of all spheres of national life, by the integration of the economies of the People's Democracy into the Soviet economy, and by political and legislative preparations for the incorporation of these countries into the Soviet Union.

•177 642 Analysis of the constitutions imposed upon the captive countries shows that the People's Democracies are dictatorships of the proletariat different in form but not in substance from the Soviet system. No matter when the constitutions of the People's Democracies were imposed or whether there were differences in their wording, the most important provisions are the same in each constitution. More light can be cast on these constitutions by the political circumstances in which they were imposed and by their preambles than by a dry analysis of their provisions.

[643] In Bulgaria in 1946 the Communists falsified the elections, and in 1947 they introduced in the Parliament the draft of a new constitution. According to this draft, the president was still to be the head of the state and not the Chairman of the Presidium of the Parliament as in Soviet Russia. On September 23, 1947, the leader of the opposition, Petkov, was hanged by the Communists, and on December 4, 1947, a revised constitution was imposed upon Bulgaria. This new constitution went further in its provisions than the constitutions imposed several years later in the other captive countries. The office of the president

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was abolished and the office of the President of the National Assembly was established. Article 1 does not speak of a "socialist state governed by the dictatorship of the proletariat" but neither does it mention "People's Democracy." It only proclaims that Bulgaria is a "People's Republic with a representative Government . . . . where all power derives from the people and belongs to the people." 177 642

The Albanian Constitution of March 15, 1946, also proclaims that "Albania is a People's Republic in which all powers are derived from and belong to the people." It provides also that the "President of the Presidium of the People's Convention is the head of the State." The constitutions of both countries faithfully reflect the Soviet system and, in the event of the incorporation of these countries into the U.S.S.R., no significant constitutional changes would be necessary. [643]

In Hungary on August 31, 1947, after the *coup d'état* of May 1947 against the government of Premier Nagy, new elections were held, and in August 1949 a new constitution was introduced. One section of the preamble to this constitution states the following:

> Our people under the leadership of the working class, steeled in the battles during the last decades, enriched by the experience of the revolution of 1919, and relying on the USSR laid the foundation of socialism and our country now is going forward by means of the people's democracy, toward socialism.

Hungary became a People's Republic (Article 1) and was proclaimed "a state of the workers and of the working peasantry" (Article 2). The constitution further stated that "The close union of the workers and working peasantry shall be accomplished in the Hungarian People's Republic under the leadership of the workers" (Article 3), and that "The working people shall gradually oust the capitalist elements and consistently build the socialist economic order" (Ar-

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642 ticle 4). The Presidium of the People's Republic with its
177 President was established and the post of the President abolished.

In Czechoslovakia on May 9, 1948, following the *coup d'état* of February 1948, a new constitution was enacted. The preamble reads: "We, the Czechoslovakian People, declare that we are firmly resolved to build up our liberated State as a People's democracy which will ensure to us a
[643] peaceful road to socialism." Article 1 states that "The Czechoslovakian State is a People's democratic Republic. The people are the sole source of all power in the State." According to this constitution, the President of the Republic remained the head of the state and Czechoslovakia still differs from the other captive countries in this respect.

In Yugoslavia, Tito introduced at the very beginning the most advanced form of a Soviet-style system; he recently reassumed the title of President of the Republic in place of the title of President of the National Assembly.

In Poland, after the falsification of the elections in 1947, a so-called Little Constitution, based on the Soviet system of councils, was introduced. It established a Council of State whose "chairman" was also the President of the Republic. On July 22, 1952, a new constitution was imposed upon Poland. The preamble to this constitution states:

> The Polish People's Republic is a republic of the working people. . . .
>
> As a result of the revolutionary struggles and changes, the power of the capitalists and landlords has been overthrown and the state of People's democracy has been established. The basis of the present people's power constitutes the alliance of the working class with the working peasantry. In this alliance the leading role belongs to the working class, the leading class of the society, basing itself on the revolutionary achievements of the Polish and international working movement, on the historical experiences of the victorious building of socialism in the USSR, the first state of workers and peasants. . . .

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> The Polish People's Republic is a state of People's democracy. In the Polish People's Republic power belongs to the working people of town and country. (Article 1)

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The office of the President of the Republic was abolished and the office of the Chairman of the Council of State became the highest post in the state. Poland is no longer the Republic of Poland. It is now called the Polish People's Republic. [643]

In Rumania, the constitution of 1948 was replaced by a new constitution forced upon Rumania on July 18, 1952. The preamble to the new constitution declares that "The Rumanian People's Republic is a state of working people of town and countryside," and that "The present Constitution of the Rumanian People's Republic embodies the results so far obtained by the working people headed by the working class, in building a socialist society in our country." The highest organ of state power is the General National Assembly and its Presidium, while the highest executive and administrative organ of state power is the Council of Ministers. The organs of state power in regions, districts, towns, and rural localities are the people's councils of the working people of town and country.

The examples cited from the texts and preambles of the constitutions of the captive countries show clearly that, although the Communist dictatorship in the Soviet Union has achieved the first phase in the development of communism —"the socialist state based on the dictatorship of the proletariat"—and is now on the way to the higher phase, the People's Democracies, according to communist theory, are still on the road to the first phase. This theoretical distinction made by the Communists has no great importance in practice particularly inasmuch as constitutional changes in all these People's Republics have made complete political and legal preparations for incorporation into the U.S.S.R.

As far as Yugoslavia is concerned, in the period of friendly

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642 Stalin-Tito relations her communist system was much fur-
177 ther advanced than that of any other Iron Curtain country, and since the break with Stalin only insignificant changes have been made in the structure of the highest organs of government. Tito still declares clearly and without any reservation that he intends to maintain the communist system in that country at any price.

IV

208 When communist propaganda speaks of the liberation of
661 the oppressed masses from the slavery of the privileged and the rich, it stresses the term, People's Democracy. But does this term really signify freedom? Does it respect human dignity? Does it recognize equality among the people? Does it abolish undue privileges and the exploitation of the working people? It does not. In practice, it does not even provide personal freedom or personal security.

697 The overcrowded prisons and the many thousands of peo-
661 ple in the forced labor camps bear witness to this. The Soviet Union and all the countries occupied by it are a large prison from which the majority of the people would escape if they only could. They would flee from the "Communist paradise" partly because of the difficult economic conditions, but mostly because of the unbearable atmosphere created by the insecurity and complete lack of freedom which are part of this system.

The majority of the people escaping today are average people—workers, peasants, craftsmen, small merchants, and others who have never belonged to any privileged or exploiting class. I have read a number of books on the living conditions in the Soviet forced labor camps; I have studied thousands of reports of Poles who have passed through Soviet camps and prisons; I have had hundreds of talks with the victims of the Soviet regime. And I have come

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relative lack in fundamental economic innovation and social /182
learning in that geographic area, if we take the extent of such learning and innovation in the Western countries as our standard.

On this view, the Western way of life—thus far the way of 000
life of a minority of mankind—has been built upon a certain fundamental willingness to learn, and a basic acceptance of both some mobility, at least in society, and of some innovations in accustomed practices and habits. Against the background of this Western culture, large-scale markets and economic competition, as well as the impact of the modern centralized state, had a chance of functioning as accelerators of technological and social change: they tended to lure or push people away from social roles or economic occupations which were poorly rewarded and into new roles or occupations where the gains were greater. Western economic and political institutions succeeded the better in this function of accelerating social change where they impinged upon individuals who had the economic and social resources for moving, and at least a minimum of cultural and psychological willingness to do so. Where these economic and cultural preconditions did not exist, however, or where they existed only in part, the effect of the impact of Western institutions was bound to be quite different, and these differences became dramatically visible in the area of Eastern Europe.

III

Eastern Europe, seen from this aspect, was a semi-Western /177 ●
area. It was fully exposed to Western practices and institutions both in the field of higher education, particularly university education, and in the fields of military drill and warfare, and particularly in the use of conscripted armies, although it could operate in this field only as long as no extensive industrial facilities for the use of massed artillery

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177 were needed. Large parts of the area were exposed to Western methods of tax collecting, accounting, and fiscal policy, as well as public administration. They were exposed to the activities of modern bankers, and to a considerable extent to the practices of modern commerce, newspapers, and advertising. They were also exposed in large part to compulsory elementary public education.

177 As a result of these exposures in the nineteenth century, the peoples of Eastern Europe learned to accept completely 571 the prevailing Western standards of theoretical science, as well as of intellectual and artistic life. They accepted to a considerable extent Western ideals of living standards, standards of consumption, wage levels, working conditions, and social welfare. Finally, many of them came to expect Western standards of farm prosperity, rural welfare, and peasant independence and cooperation. In sum, a large part of the populations of Eastern Europe accepted Western living standards as their goal, or at least as a pattern of their claims and expectations.

433 This rapid diffusion of Western-style claims and expectations was not matched by any comparable diffusion of Western-style work habits, savings and investment patterns, levels of productivity, or propensities to technological innovations. Land reforms in Eastern Europe were not only slow in coming, but they did little to increase productivity. The consolidation of separate strips of land, long accomplished in Scandinavia and Western Europe, was still not completed in Eastern Europe by the time of the Second World War. The tools and implements of artisans and peasants changed their traditional shape much more slowly in Eastern Europe than they did in Germany or England and pathetically more slowly than they did in the United States. Throughout most of the regions organized labor feared that increases in productivity would only lead to losses of employment. Employers and businessmen aspired to use the profits

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main body of interallied agreements—particularly those of Moscow, Teheran, Yalta, and Potsdam, along with the armistice agreements and the subsequent peace treaties—as their authority to impress the Soviet system of controls over the territories newly taken from the Germans.

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By the end of 1945, the Soviet Union was in a position to control the political destinies of Rumania, Hungary, and Bulgaria under the sanctions provided by the armistice terms. However, the process of coordination into the Soviet sphere was anything but smooth and gave little evidence of the much-vaunted Russian planning. Although Rumania was under the Russian thumb within twelve days after the signing of the Yalta agreement, that unhappy country remained a monarchy until December 1947. Czechoslovakia did not fall completely into the Soviet net until 1948, while Hungary fought a losing battle until 1947. Controlled elections elsewhere facilitated the extension of Communist power, so that between the period 1945 and the end of the year 1947 the process of political assimilation was completed. Local Communist parties were installed in all countries—save Yugoslavia where political control had been in the hands of the Communist Party since 1944—by the grace of the Soviet power. In this period the Soviet pattern of inculcating obedience through terror was rapidly imposed.

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From the Soviet point of view this revolution was but an action on the part of sovereign states, rather than of satellite states as that term is used in the West. Not only were the states of Eastern Europe sovereign, according to Communist doctrine, but the Communist parties that controlled the political life of their respective countries held that their major function was to protect the national independence of their states against the imperialism of the West. This theory had expression in the basic document of the Communist Information Bureau—the resolution on world affairs which appeared on October 5, 1947.

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dialectic which would reflect the changes in his country's 648
international position.

First, the policies of the Soviet Union and the ideas of Stalin himself were attacked as marked departures from the true path of Socialism. Second, in contradistinction to the 642
policies of "bureaucratic state capitalism" evolved by the 646
Kremlin and followed in slavish pattern by the satellites, Yugoslavia decentralized its machinery of economic planning, gave greater power to workers' councils, reorganized local government, and re-wrote the national constitution. An interesting feature of the recently amended constitution is the provision for a Council of Producers, as one of the two parliamentary bodies. In this council industrial workers are disproportionately represented by 135 deputies, while only 67 represent agriculture. Under this arrangement, the agricultural population has one representative for every 150,825 peasants, while the urban is represented by one deputy for every 30,239 workers.

In its organization, the Council of Producers is strikingly 177 ●
similar to another proposal advanced by another state that .64
adopted the philosophy of integral nationalism, Mussolini's 642
Corporative Italy. According to the latter, the corporations were instruments responsible for "the regulation of the productive forces, with a view to the development of the wealth, the political power and the well-being of the Italian people." This statement of purpose does not differ greatly from the ideology advanced by Kardelj on behalf of the new constitution.

In any event, the character of the power structure—that is, 642
the structure of social power focused on the state—has not changed. Decentralized though the power may be, the Communist party still controls the councils where important decisions are made. Effective opposition to the regime is still unknown. Democrats who have opposed Tito and his policies still remain imprisoned and, while important concessions

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177 By 1949, Soviet-style dictatorships had been established in
.64 seven of these thirteen sovereign states. In these "Iron Cur-
642 tain" states, dictatorship was and is exercised through a native
631 minority who could not have won power without the support of the Soviet Union and the Soviet armies, and who—with the conspicuous exception of Yugoslavia—could not retain this power if Soviet support were withdrawn. The indirect rule thus exercised by the Soviet dictatorship, with the help of native personnel, over six of the Eastern European states —Poland, Czechoslovakia, Hungary, Rumania, Bulgaria, and Albania—might remind the observer at first glance of the indirect rule exercised in past centuries by the empires of Turkey and Russia over some of the principalities then existing in the region. Upon this superficial view, it might seem that despite all the violent changes in political sovereignty and national allegiance during the last one hundred years, the fundamental dependence of the peoples of this region upon foreign powers had remained essentially unchanged.

175 This impression would be quite deceptive. In 1853, the government of Eastern Europe by only six powers had endured for more than two hundred years, with Sweden and Poland rather than Greece and Montenegro playing the roles of the fifth and sixth power at the side of Prussia, Russia, Austria, and Turkey. With the single exception of Poland, which by the end of the eighteenth century had become the victim of her neighbors, the administrative services of these powers were generally based upon foreign personnel drawn from peoples outside the region. Austria and Prussia depended upon the military and administrative services of Germans, Russia upon those of Great Russians, and Turkey in the last analysis had to rely upon the support of the Ottoman Turks. Natives of the different regions supplemented the personnel of these administrative services but did not dominate it. The rule of these foreign or semiforeign empires over the peoples of Eastern Europe was based upon this region's

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chosen by lot. Then at the appointed hour in the night they pounce on their victim and hack him to pieces in a bestial fashion.

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Such is the situation in Russia. There are also concentration camps in the satellite countries, called in Communist language "People's Democracies." It has been estimated that more than 1,000,000 persons have been sent to such camps, and the number may be far greater. Not included in this figure, for example, are Eastern Germany and the former Baltic States. The existence of concentration camps has been widely advertised, and decrees establishing them are on the statute books of all the People's Democracies. The decrees merely apply to the country in question the provisions of Article 59 of the Criminal Code of U.S.S.R. The first Article of the Criminal Code of Rumania, for example, as reported by Albert K. Herling, reads as follows:

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> Criminal law has for its purpose defending the Rumanian People's Republic and its legal order against actions dangerous to society by enforcing legal measures of social defense against persons who commit such actions. In the meaning of the preceding paragraph any action and omission that brings harm to the economic, social and political structure, or to the security of the Rumanian People's Republic, or which disturbs the legal order established by the people under the leadership of the working class is to be considered dangerous to society. The actions which are considered dangerous for society can be punished even when they are not expressly prohibited by law. In such cases the extent and limit of criminal responsibility is to be determined in accordance with the legal provisions in force for similar crimes.*

E.

The number of camps in the area reported by persons who assert that they were present in them is so vast that the names by

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* Statement issued on June 18, 1952, in behalf of the International League for the Rights of Man.

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642 have been made to the peasants, state cooperatives are still maintained in the heavy grain producing areas by forces other than the peasants' love of the soil and its products.

If the Yugoslav government will learn the meaning of Lord Acton's axiom on the nature of power, and if the West pursues an intelligent, long-range foreign policy supporting Yugoslavia against Soviet aggression, it may be possible to revive in Yugoslavia and hence in the Balkans as a whole the elements of an independent political life.

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000 The months following the death of Premier Stalin in March 1953, saw a number of internal changes in the various people's democracies. The principal means of coercion and political control nevertheless remained unchanged: the army and the police forces. These were still bound tightly to Russian controls.

●177, 70 701 625 The total number of men in the satellite armies available for service with the Soviet army has been estimated at a million and one-half. Since they are not only trained under Soviet commanders, but operate under the Soviet military code, it is possible to state that the Sovietization of the satellite armies has been completed. Together with the armies, the satellite police form the backbone of the Soviet instruments of coercion. Estimated at a total of 700,000 men, police units organized in military formations range in function from the well-known secret police to People's Militia, Frontier Guards, and Railway Guards. Like the satellite armies, the satellite police are governed by Soviet regulations. Together they enforce a system of order which has been designed to conform with the Soviet model.

241 656 In common with Yugoslavia, certain states in the orbit are strengthening the weakest sector of the economy: agriculture. It is not certain that the Yugoslav experience compelled the

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visions were included in the peace treaties with Hungary and Bulgaria, and the states that had been created or enlarged as a result of the war assumed similar obligations. The provisions for the protection of minorities were concerned with the use of language in schools and courts, the practice of religion, and the equitable administration of social security. Their implementation by the respective governments was supervised by a Minorities Commission in the League of Nations, and a system of petitions was established for bringing injustices to the attention of the League. Although the principles underlying this system represented a great advance over pre-war practice, the efforts at implementation failed to meet the needs of the situation. In many cases the minorities continued to be discriminated against, and even when they were not, nationalist movements sponsored by neighboring countries often proved irresistible. As a result, the problem of minorities became one of the fundamental sources of political instability in Eastern Europe.

Another unfavorable factor was that richer families sent their children to foreign universities, especially to France, Germany, and Great Britain, while there was little student exchange among the Eastern European countries themselves. Educated people knew a great deal about Western Europe, but much less about neighboring states and peoples. Naturally, this was even more so among nations which had been enemies in the First World War and which now fiercely condemned their citizens if they praised the culture or progress of a former enemy. However, this situation was not unique to this region. It was characteristic of Europe as a whole and, like the development of nationalism and industry, moved from West to East.

Many of Eastern Europe's difficulties stemmed from the instability of its political life. Governments changed constantly and political parties fought each other to the last breath. Due to the many changes of government, an unwhole-

CHAPTER V

OLD FAILURE AND NEW COURSE (1953)

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1. *The System in Crisis*

The year 1953 constituted a major turning point in the development of agricultural policy throughout the Soviet sphere. Repercussions were felt from the most remote *kolkhoz* in Siberia to the most backward mountain farm in Albania. For the first time since 1928, when the initial Communist collectivization drive was launched, the powerful Communist mechanism for intensifying exploitation of the peasantry was halted and a period of concession, retrenchment, and cautious retreat was ushered in.

Unlike previous pauses in the Communist offensive against the peasantry — in 1930, 1935, and 1941-5 — the 1953 "readjustment" was acompanied by a revaluation of the entire relationship between agrarian policy and industrial expansion. The 1930 Stalin "Dizziness With Success" speech signified only a temporary pause in the first Five Year Plan; the 1935 decree enlarging private household plots represented only a slight reorganization of the still fluid *kolkhoz* structure; and the relaxation of 1941-45 was due largely to the special exigencies of World War II. None of the concessions made during these periods (with the possible exception of the wartime years) were as broad in scope as those of 1953; and none were offered as an integral part of a concern for mounting disproportions afflicting the entire economic life.

The elaboration of post-Stalin agricultural policies serves not merely as a climax to the indictment of the Communist land program, but as a sharp cleavage in the history of collectivization through which its inner character might be most acutely analyzed. This study has therefore, drawn heavily upon the flood of frank speeches made by Communist leaders in the second half of 1953. Their candor, like the correspondence which attended the Tito-Stalin

dispute in 1948, illumine areas of conflict and difficulty hitherto only guessed at. 185 178

The causes of argicultural retrenchment were various and a full exploration of them is not appropriate here. But from the multiplicity of probable causes, two basic facts may be singled out: First, the poltical readjustment which took place following Stalin's death brought about a number of organic changes in the Communist movement. The precise nature of the changes generated by the sudden loss of Stalin is little known, and even less understood; but clearly they had very important social and economic implications. Some of the most oppressive and aggressive features of Communism, feasible when Stalin was at the helm, were evidently not feasible when in the hands of a "collective leadership." Stalinist policies had resulted in the growing economic disproportions described above: the hysterical drive for industrialization, the steady decline of the standard of living, and the stagnation of agriculture, conditions which may be considered the secondary causes of the New Course, insofar as the death of Stalin made it imperative that drastic steps be taken to alter them. 656

To the very eve of the New Course in 1953, the traditional Stalinist agricultural offensive was in full swing. Indeed, in Czechoslovakia, Hungary, and especially in Poland, collectivization drives were reaching their greatest pitch in the spring of 1953. The slogan, "liquidation of the kulaks," was generally accepted, and the entire peasantry subjected to ceaseless harassment. In the Soviet Union the decline of livestock population between 1950 and 1953 reflected the harsh spirit of the last years of Stalin's life. The basic measure of success was heavy industrial production; the keynote was the increasing obedience and discipline demanded at the 19th Party Congress; and the tone was set by the Slansky trial in Prague at the end of 1952, and the arrest of the Kremlin doctors in Moscow at the beginning of 1953.

The New Course therefore represented a sudden break in the rising curve revealed by these events. Between Stalin's death in March and Imre Nagy's astounding New Course address in Hungary in July, the governments of almost every Communist country made various minor concessions which presaged the more drastic

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[1] For a detailed exposition of the events of 1953 leading up to promulgation of the New Course, together with an analysis of current trends, see "New Policies in the Soviet Sphere" (Free Europe Press: New York, November 1953).

185 reforms to come. Amnesties were declared in Soviet Russia and
178 Romania, the imprisoned American correspondent, William Oatis,
656 was released in Czechoslovakia, the aggressive anti-Tito line of the preceding years was modified everywhere, and in East Germany reforms were announced which, because they communicated regime indecision to the people, touched off the famous June 17th revolt. This revolt, and an earlier, perhaps more significant one in Czechoslovakia, seem only to have accelerated the pace of change in the sphere. By October 1953 New Course policies had been announced by all of the Communist countries (with the exception, of course, of China). "We must note, and we must state frankly before the whole country," said the new Hungarian Premier Imre Nagy, "that the objectives of the augmented Five Year Plan are beyond our strength"[2] "We must adopt . . . a considerably reduced tempo of industrialization which will enable us to step up output of consumer goods and ensure a still greater development of agriculture," the Bulgarian Premier Vulko Chervenkov said on September 8th.[3] "It has become clear," said Czechoslovak Premier Viliam Siroky on September 15th, "that certain targets of the extended Five-Year Plan for heavy industry were too high."[4]

The agricultural policy pattern that emerged in the middle of 1953 varied from one country of the Soviet sphere to the next. Yet everywhere, with the possible exception of Hungary, where the crisis assumed a special severity, the new policies were essentially the same. Polish Premier Bierut explained in his New Course address in October that it was:

> . . . no mere coincidence that the . . . problem of what the emphasis of our future economic development should be . . . has appeared today with equal force and timeliness in all countries of the Socialist camp.

These similarities in pace and timing, he explained, arise,

> not only from the identical character of social changes taking place in these countries but also from the basic similarity — in spite of certain differences — in the class structure of the countries which are engaged in Socialist construction.[5]

The "social changes" of which Bierut spoke were the growing economic disproportions, the vast expansion of an industrial plant at the expense of living standards and agricultural prosperity. The

[2] *Szabad Nep* (Budapest), July 5, 1953.
[3] *Rabotnichesko Delo* (Sofia), September 9, 1953.
[4] *Rude Pravo* (Prague), September 16, 1953.
[5] Quoted by S. Jedrychowski, *Nowe Drogi* (Warsaw), No. 10, 1953.

"problem" the New Course had to grapple with, as Bierut stated it, was to determine "what the emphasis of our future economic development should be." Clearly the "problem" could only be solved by modifying past emphases, and this meant, first of all, a new policy toward agriculture. 178 185 656

In Bulgaria, where over half the land is in the "Socialist sector," the New Course has had the least impact; in East Germany, on the other hand, where capitalist elements are still plentiful, the post-Stalin reorientation had its most pronounced effect. In Poland, where collectivization had proceeded very slowly and cautiously up to 1953, the New Course signified only an abrupt halt in the land offensive, but little retreat. In Romania, where collectivization had also been modest in scope, the reforms were broader, producing a plethora of decrees and resolutions. In Czechoslovakia and Hungary, where the pace of collectivization had been rapid and stormy, the New Course brought about a reversal of the aggressive policies, a sharp reversal in Hungary, a slighter one in Czechoslovakia.

The national variations were great; but the basic features of the New Course were areawide:

1. An attempt is being made to increase the proportion of national resources alloted to agriculture. "We must teach our people," said Polish theoretician Jacob Berman, "after this long period of concentration on heavy industry, to achieve a balance between heavy and light industry."[6] The State budgets for the year 1954 announced in Bulgaria, Czechoslovakia and Hungary reflected this shift in emphasis.[7]

2. The effort to increase the agricultural produce available to the cities by further peasant exploitation has been halted. Greater emphasis is to be placed upon the use of material incentives, rather than on administrative pressure, in increasing total agricultural yield. "We must," said Berman, "put on the market goods which the peasant is interested in purchasing," since, as he explained, the increased supply of goods for the cities was to be partially the result of an "increased supply of consumer goods to the countryside."[8]

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[6] *Trybuna Ludu* (Warsaw), November 6, 1953.
[7] In Hungary, for example, the 1954 State budget plans for doubling the proportion of total investment allocated to agriculture (Report of Bela Szalai to the Hungarian National Assembly, January 22, 1954). Elsewhere, the increase is more modest but nevertheless significant.
[8] *Trybuna Ludu* (Warsaw), November 6, 1953.

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3. Consequently, the policy of collectivization, designed to insure a steady supply of goods to the cities without much payment in return, loses a large part of its meaning, and the collectivization drive itself is halted. While it is true that collectivized farming is still officially considered the highest form of agrarian organization,[9] the revised economic plans of the Satellite regimes do not intend appreciable extension of the "Socialist sector." Indeed, the goal of increasing the standard of living precludes, for some time, the resumption of any Communist land offensive.

4. Similarly, the New Course has made something of an anomaly of the traditional practices of the Communist land offensive: the division of the peasantry into antagonistic groups, the discrimination against the independent peasantry as a whole, the compilation of "kulak lists." These techniques, which were so well adapted to the collectivization campaign, lose much of their meaning in the new atmosphere. Again and again Communist leaders admonish their bureaucracy to cease treating the peasant as an "enemy" and everywhere but in Bulgaria it is now openly declared that the independent peasantry must be relied upon for the major portion of the agricultural produce.[10] Violent anti-kulak campaigns must also be relinquished as long as the regimes are interested in agricultural production and not merely in agricultural redistribution. Therefore, the post-Stalin regimes call for "limitation" of the "kulak" rather than his "elimination."[11]

5. Since increased agricultural production is the urgent and immediate necessity, and since increased administrative force cannot be used to obtain it, incentives for the peasant must be broadened. Delivery quotas are reduced; delivery prices are increased; taxes and fees of all sorts are lowered; and arrears in many categories are canceled. The pattern is nowhere identical; but in each country most of the same devices were employed.

"We must understand," said Berman, [that the new policy] "is going to cost a large sum of money. If the peasant gets this money but doesn't get any goods for it, including those which he

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[9] See, for example, the Bierut speech at the 2nd Congress of the Polish Workers Party (PZPR), March 10, 1954.

[10] "We shall not and must not force anybody to join agricultural cooperatives, and we also do not think that the private farmer represents our enemy, we consider him our ally" (Czechoslovak President Antonin Zapotocky, *Rude Pravo*, February 23, 1954).

[11] See, for example, Gheorghio-Dej, *For a Lasting Peace*, November 6, 1953.

really wants . . . there will be no increase in [agricultural] production." Therefore, a dual policy of increased payment for agricultural goods and increased production of vitally needed farmers' commodities is instituted. 656 178 185 423

6. An attempt is being made to redress the balance so far as the concentration of techniques is concerned. A vigorous effort to detach technicians from cities and urban industries and to send them to farms for whose direction and assistance they were ostensibly trained, is being made in conjunction with the new plan.[12] This is true everywhere in the Soviet sphere, especially in Poland the USSR, and Romania.

7. If the New Course is designed partly to consolidate the existing agricultural structure, it must be revaluated in terms of long-range perspectives. Hence, those collective farms which have the least social stability and economic viability are permitted to return to the private sector. In Czechoslovakia, where some 40 per cent of the farms were not paying their own way, according to Premier Siroky, a small percentage of the farms were permitted to disband in the fall of 1953.[13] In Yugoslavia, where hundreds of collectives in mountainous areas produced very little and served only as a drain on the State treasury, almost half of these farms have been dissolved since 1951.[14] And in Hungary, where peasant dissatisfaction was so great that, even with a police-State normally equipped to handle discontent, it constituted an element of such basic instability that almost half of the collectivized households have left the "Socialist sector."[15]

Above all, the New Course represents an effort to stabilize and consolidate the system of relationships carved out by the East European regimes. The next few years are likely to witness a concentrated Communist effort to make a smoothly-functioning economic order out of the conquests already gained, rather than sweeping away present problems by posing future challenges, as they have done in the past.

The New Course does not, by any stretch of the imagination,

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[12] The program of reinforcing the technical assistance to the countryside has encountered considerable resistance from the technicians themselves, and, indeed, in the USSR, the government complains that many technicians who go to the countryside refuse to take their families with them, so convinced are they that the new assignments are temporary (*Pravda*, November 27, 1953).
[13] *Rude Pravo* (Prague), November 10, 1953.
[14] *Borba* (Belgrade), February 29, 1953.
[15] *Szabad Nep* (Budapest), December 31, 1953.

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represent a repudiation of the agricultural organization pioneered by the Soviet planners in the early 1930s and brought to Eastern Europe in the late 1940s. The basic characteristics of this organization cannot be abandoned without the most thoroughgoing re-orientation of the whole economy. The New Course cannot therefore be compared with the New Economic Policy of early Soviet history. The NEP was declared before the Soviet industrial and bureaucratic system had been built, and a retreat to a relatively free market system was possible. The New Course, on the other hand, has been promulgated within the framework of an already fully-elaborated industrial and bureaucratic system, and the regimes can no longer rely upon the free market for agricultural produce.

Having built this social system and enclosed themselves within it, the East European Communists have lost much of the freedom of choice and flexibility which aided them so greatly in their post-war assumption of power. Therefore, they are subject to the internal laws of the system, and it is doubtful whether they can make a success of their efforts to reorient its basic relationships. The authoritarian order is well adapted to the leadership of a rapidly expanding heavy industrial, semi-military economy, but it is badly equipped to handle the problems of small-scale agriculture and consumer demand. In nine months of operation, the New Course has already made it clear that the greatest obstacle to stabilization of the Stalinist social order comes from the social order itself, and its voracious demands.[16]

Prior to the introduction of the New Course, it was widely assumed that the East European Communist drive to emulate Soviet achievements was inexorable, and required only time for completion. In particular, it was assumed that the Satellite regimes could not rest until collectivization was completed, as if the Communists could not face themselves ideologically with one independent farm remaining. But the events of 1953 have highlighted the degree to which Communist agricultural policy has been, from the start, conditioned by the bedrock economic needs of a developing social structure, rather than by the abstract demands of rigid doctrine. Indeed, even the Soviets, whose collectivized agriculture had attained the state of "near-perfection" and completion toward which

[16] For an extensive discussion of internal bureaucratic resistance to the New Course see "The Bureaucracy Wavers," *News from Behind the Iron Curtain* (Free Europe Press, New York), January, 1953.

the East European Communists were striving, are in the process of readjusting the structure in line with the new political relationships. 656 178 185

No doubt the present *modus vivendi* between the peasantry and the Communist regimes is precarious and unstable, at best an uneasy truce between essentially antagonistic social forces. But there is good reason to believe that the Communists are determined to keep this mid-way course for some time to come, with only minor wavering within the ranks. 423

3. *"Salami Tactics" and the New Course* 423

The development of East European Communism since World War II has been dominated by the pragmatic methods of "salami tactics," the theory expounded by Hungarian ex-Premier Rakosi, which justified pursuit of any social or economic program that reinforces Communist political power. The advocacy of land reform facilitated Communist absorption of the State machine in 1945-46, and therefore became approved Communist "agrarian policy." Similarly, since advocacy of a productive middle peasantry may help to facilitate Communist retention of power in 1953-54, it has become approved Communist "agrarian policy." At each stage, the Communists speak as if no other policy had ever been considered, and as if no other policy could possibly be.[17] As always, however, their primary concern is with power, and their ideological pronouncements tailored to suit it. The New Course is a development very much within the spirit of the "salami tactics" philosophy.

The success and failure of Communist agriculture policy in Eastern Europe may be attributable to these same "salami tactics." This strategem of slow suffocation made possible the seizure of power under circumstances unsuited to "classic" revolutionary forms; and it was well suited to a political apparatus incapable of a frontal revolutionary attack. The policy of slow, piecemeal land collectivization made possible the extension of the "Socialist sector" at a pace which did not arouse the united antagonism of the peasantry at any one time, thus avoiding the type of militant resist-

[17] See above 91-2 for a brief discussion of official explanations of change in policy. Considering the importance of changes in policy emphasis in 1953, it is remarkable that the Communists have made so few attempts to analyze their past performances. The official definition of "Socialism" itself was altered during 1953 (see Fogarasi, *Tarsadalmi Szemle* (Budapest), September-October, 1953), and to this date not a single Communist theoretician has acknowledged the fact.

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871 Austrian Galicia they underwent a great cultural revival in
563 the latter part of the nineteenth century, and this was the only area in which schools and universities using the Polish language could develop freely. The Polish population in Prussia lived under better educational conditions than did their co-nationals in Russia, but in both countries they were subjected to vigorous programs of denationalization.

871 The state of popular education in Eastern Europe is re-
212 vealed by illiteracy figures for the years 1920-21, before the new independent states had exerted an influence on education. The rate of illiteracy for males and females of school age and over was 7 per cent for Czechoslovakia, 15 per cent for Hungary, and between 30 and 40 per cent for Poland and Yugoslavia. The rate was between 40 and 50 per cent for Rumania and Bulgaria, and in Albania it was much higher. These figures may be compared with illiteracy rates of under 1 per cent for Great Britain and Germany, 6 per cent for the United States, and about 50 per cent for Russia.

[873] It is worth noting that the low level of literacy in most of Eastern Europe did not prevent the development of a high level of culture among educated persons. The universities of Prague, Cracow, and Budapest were the most distinguished among many of high level, and very significant contributions to European culture in the arts and sciences came from this region. The "intelligentsia," as those with higher education and professional skills were referred to, provided both the leadership of the national movements and the statesmen of the nations born at the end of the First World War. As individuals they were the equals of the political leaders of the great powers and included in their number many great Europeans.

566 Agricultural improvement, or the increase in produc-
423 tivity and in the welfare of the population dependent on
● 178 agriculture, is a complex process. In Eastern Europe, it involved in particular the release of the peasants from feudal

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servitude, the adoption of improved techniques of agricultural production and marketing, and the improvement of the lot of the individual peasant through land reform and the combined efforts of the landlords and the state. Most of European Turkey had never known feudalism in the Western sense, and the peasants of Serbia and Bulgaria emerged early as independent landowners with a sound understanding of their own interests. In many areas of Rumania, Austria-Hungary, and the Polish sections of Germany and Russia, however, the peasants were freed from feudal restrictions only to sink into a deeper misery, sometimes called "neo-serfdom," that stemmed from lack of capital and the resultant economic dependency on the landlords. As a consequence, while independent peasant political parties began to develop among the Czechs and southern Slavs shortly after the turn of the century, the peasants in Russia in 1905 and in Rumania in 1907 resorted to the desperate method of revolution.

The agrarian backwardness that characterized the greater part of Eastern Europe was a great challenge to social and political philosophers, and it was not surprising that the First World War left in its wake attempts at radical solutions by leaders acting in the name of the proletariat or the peasantry. The recommendation of the economists, in the presence of this agrarian poverty and overpopulation, was that agricultural improvement be accompanied by the extension of industry and trade. In the areas where large landowners exercised full political control, this recommendation was not welcomed as the landowners tended to favor fiscal policies that kept the price of grain high and the peasant poor. In other areas, however, important industrial development took place. Thus, the Austrian provinces of Bohemia and Moravia, with their preponderant Czech population, accounted for a little over one half the entire industrial output of Austria-Hungary. This production included coal and

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•178 433 iron as well as consumer goods and benefited by the large market that the empire provided. Significant industrial development also took place in Hungary and in other parts of the empire. Similarly, in Russian Poland important industries were developed, but these suffered from the discriminatory policy of the Russian government and from the lack of communications.

457 471 Capital for the economic development of this region came chiefly from France until the 1890's, when German and Austrian capital became increasingly active. In Eastern Europe in general, and particularly in the Balkans, loans had as much a political as an economic incentive. Since the credit of Serbia, Bulgaria, and Rumania was poor, the bondholders were able to insist on a variety of controls to assure payment. Although a substantial amount of this capital was used to finance armament and eventually wars, investments of permanent value were also made. Notable among these was the railroad from Vienna to Constantinople, completed in 1888, which with its branches formed the backbone of the transportation system of Southeastern Europe.

III

186 631 Collective security and economic interdependence, as these terms are understood today, were certainly among the motives of the various plans for regional organization proposed for Eastern Europe in the century before the First World War. Yet the nineteenth century was for Europe an age in which war was the exception rather than the rule and national frontiers were not the barriers to trade and to the movements of peoples that they have since become. Although motives of power politics in the modern sense were always present, regionalism in this era was also concerned

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186 668 829 had they not been broken or dangerously weakened by the foreign forces of fascism and Communism.

829 178 Czechoslovakia bears witness to this thesis. In Czechoslovakia, as in the other countries, there existed antiliberal, reactionary, nationalist, and fascist trends which attracted certain of the bourgeoisie and rich farmers. These forces were held in check by the democratic thought and genuine patriotism of a great majority of the nation, including the so-called middle classes and the intelligentsia. Nearly everybody followed the principles of the great democrat, Masaryk. Conditions were more favorable to democratic liberalism in Czechoslovakia than in the other Eastern European countries, because this nation was highly industrialized, even in agriculture, because her social structure was happily balanced between industry, agriculture, and bureaucracy, or intelligentsia, and because the cultural level of her people was high. The middle classes, strong in numbers and in social value, and the progressive farmers, who owned middle-sized farms, were reliable support for the liberal democratic regime. The Social Democratic Party, headed by Hampl, Bechyně, Meissner, and Dérer, was influenced spiritually far more by Masaryk than by Marx. The Agrarian Party had liberal-minded leaders among whom Antonín Švehla and Milan Hodža proved to have statesmen's abilities. The Catholic Party, under the wise leadership of the great patriot Jan Šrámek, was progressive in social matters. In Slovakia the process of democratization met with greater difficulties. Slovakia, because of its agrarian structure, resembled the other Eastern European countries more than it did the industrialized Bohemia. However, the transformation of Slovakia into a democratically functioning part of Czechoslovakia proves that other Eastern European countries could have developed in a similar way had democracy been given enough time to exercise its influence upon them.

It is certainly to the credit of Czechoslovakia that she

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continually improved her democratic regime during the twenty years of her existence and that her democracy was destroyed only by an attack from without by Nazi Germany. Nevertheless, the other countries of Eastern Europe, economically, socially, and culturally less progressive, cannot be blamed if, in the antiliberal climate of the '30's, they were unable to develop into genuine democracies. The people in these countries did not long less for freedom and for social progress than did the people in other parts of Europe or on other continents. If the unremitting struggle for freedom of the Eastern European countries and their difficult geographic position were kept in mind, the liberal striving of these countries and their aptitude for democratic development would be judged more favorably than is sometimes the case.

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In Germany, which was probably economically and technically the most highly developed country on the European continent and which had a high cultural and social level, liberalism was no more influential than in the agrarian countries of Eastern Europe. It was certainly infinitely weaker than in Czechoslovakia. In Germany and in Italy, democracy did not succumb to foreign, but to internal, antiliberal forces. In Russia, liberalism undoubtedly was far weaker than in Eastern Europe.

IV

The development of liberalism in Eastern Europe in the period between the two wars shows clearly that this force was far stronger there than in Germany, Italy, or Russia, and that it attained real success in Czechoslovakia. There were conditions in Eastern Europe that favored the development of liberalism into an influential spiritual, political, and social movement. The most promising forces in this regard were the striving of these nations for freedom

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6 Peasantism: Its Ideology and Achievements

BRANKO M. PEŠELJ

I

That part of Europe which lies east of the Danzig-Trieste line is often referred to as "peasant Europe." This term indicates a twofold concept: Economically, "peasant Europe" stands for that part of the continent which is devoted primarily to agrarian production under the system of small and medium holdings and in which farming represents a tradition, a civilization, and a way of life. Sociologically and culturally, the term "peasant Europe" denotes an area in which by far the greatest portion of the population is peasant and forms a group whose economic, social, and cultural aspects have been genuinely preserved.

The differences between Eastern and Western Europe were less noticeable a hundred years ago than they were at the end of the Second World War. The industrial revolution which swept Western Europe in the second half of the nineteenth century generated profound economic and social changes over the continent as a whole, and contributed to its division into two distinct sectors. A consequence of this partition was the creation of unique social and economic conditions in Eastern Europe. These conditions, in turn, pro-

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178 voked political and social movements, such as had never been known in the West, and which expressed the distinctive socio-economic programs and political and social philosophies of the area.

565 Before any analysis of these peasant movements can be undertaken, it will be necessary to examine their human element, the peasantry. There are three points which are of most significance to this discussion: first, what is a peasantry; second, what are the differences between a peasantry and the rural population of the West, usually known as farmers; and third, what are the special characteristics of the Eastern European peasantry which have justified and made possible its separate political organization.

565 829 Despite the fact that the peasantry still represents a considerable majority of the world's population, a uniform definition for it cannot be found. The reason for this is the different approach of various social and economic schools to the peasant problem. While the Marxists consider the peasantry from a purely economic point of view, evaluating this group only in the system of socialist production, liberals believe that there are aspects to the peasantry besides the economic which should be considered. The liberals point out the importance of the peasant's relationship to his land and the influence of his environment upon him. They realize that there are two elements, the sociological and the cultural, which are of great and equal significance in appraising the peasant society. The sociological element includes the individual's family life, the customs, traits, and trends of neighborhood and village communities, and the peasant's attachment to religious and other traditions. These traditions are upheld by a special type of "progressive conservatism." The cultural element includes all such features as folk songs, folk customs and habits, and so forth, which have developed independent of the cosmopolitan civilization.

In view of the foregoing, the peasantry may be defined

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The liberation of the peasantry was a consequence of the demands of the new liberal movement and was one of the achievements of the liberal regimes which gained momentum on the Continent after the Napoleonic era. This European liberalism had been a result of the struggle of the bourgeoisie against the old political and economic order upheld previously by the aristocracy. It originated in the theory of natural rights, as interpreted by French political philosophers of the eighteenth century, and included in its doctrine the postulate of political, economic, and social freedom and equality for all individuals. 668 641 565

However, it would be wrong to assume that the formal liberation of the peasantry was an immediate result of its emulation of other classes of society, in particular, of the bourgeoisie. On the contrary, the struggle for the realization of peasant rights had still to be fought.

The ruling regimes imposed political restrictions that were usually based on the tax census system and barred large masses of the peasant population from their right to vote in parliamentary elections. In many of the countries, it was not until the end of the First World War that complete franchise was granted to the peasantry. 641 565 178

Economic freedom, as advocated and practiced by liberalism, soon began to undermine the foundations of the peasant economy. The peasantry, which under feudalism had paid most of its rents and other fees to the landlord in natural produce, was placed suddenly in the midst of a complicated money-economy in which the autarkic arrangements of the peasant-familistic economy were no longer valid. Peasant land, which throughout centuries had changed little in price or in value, was suddenly submitted to wide fluctuations in value as a consequence of the rapid development of the communication system and the erection of industrial plants. The appearance of a money-economy created the necessity of establishing an appropriate credit system which heretofore had been lacking completely in the peasant orbit. The state,

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641 however, following its policy of economic freedom, did not
565 deem it necessary to intervene in this problem, and left the
178 peasants open to the merciless exploitation of private banks and usurers. Economic individualism, accentuated by liberalism, induced individual members of the large peasant family groups, known among the Southern Slavs as *zadrugas*, to seek their economic independence. This process provoked a hasty and uncontrolled parcellation of the peasant land and contributed further to the economic weakness and inefficiency of the peasant system of farming.

The solemnly proclaimed social equality of the peasant was a farce. The ruling groups, derived from the bourgeoisie, the newly created bureaucracy, and the remnants of the aristocratic elements, looked upon the peasants with contempt and mistrust, considering them, although necessary to agrarian production, neither fitted nor qualified to take part in politics or public affairs. Social inequality was expressed both by the attitude of dominant ethnical groups to the "peoples of lower categories" and by the division within these groups between intelligentsia and the common people, or peasants.

Obviously, remedies were sought to correct the adverse conditions created in the liberal era, but before these are discussed, it is necessary to credit liberalism for those ideas and measures which, in principle, were universally accepted by the masses and which made possible their political organization. Generally speaking, the ideas of political freedom and of general education and a belief in the individual's capabilities were the stimulating forces behind the organization of the people. However, these ideas did not save liberalism, but prepared the road for its destruction.

829 The first reaction to the flaws in liberalism was the appearance of the "scientific socialism" of Karl Marx. It is important to note that this philosophy was conceived exclusively for the newly created industrial proletariat. The peasants, if

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7 Industrial and Social Policies Between the Wars

GEZA TELEKI

101 Eastern Europe, from the Baltic to the Aegean, is
175 a security zone both for the states of Western Europe and
•178 for Russia. Besides acting as a safety valve for neighboring powers, this region is a passageway between them. Military and population movements fan out from here into the East or converge into the West.

Both West and East have accused this part of Europe of being unstable and backward. Both have wanted to influence it and have not wanted to admit that the backwardness, confusion, and instability of this area are in large measure due to power politics. Tribes, peoples, and states have changed and have been changed in this region throughout the centuries. As a result, there is no stability of boundaries, or of peoples and governments. The evolution of the region can be viewed as a mirror which reflects the history of Europe with all its quirks and irregularities.

Although both world wars began in Eastern Europe, it would be absurd to claim that they were caused solely by these nations and their problems. The social, economic, and political interests of the great powers which clashed in this area and influenced its peoples played an important role in the course of events in Eastern Europe.

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Because of this situation, the different peoples of this region turn three different masks to the world. One is always turned toward the West, one toward the East, and one is used for the stage show that these peoples put on for each other. If a nation of Eastern Europe takes off its mask, it may disappear from the stage forever. This is an important point to keep in mind in trying to understand the evolution of these countries. 101 178

Another important factor in the history of this region is that all the important ideologies and social revolutions have moved from West to East. Nationalism and the abolition of serfdom reached Eastern Europe in the nineteenth century. Industrialization advanced eastward at the end of the nineteenth century and during the first half of the twentieth. The closer a state was connected with the West, the sooner its transformation took place, while the other states were forced to develop in a comparatively short time in order to maintain their status as equals.

I

As a result of the Treaty of Versailles, everything changed in this area of constant change—boundaries, minorities, administrations, politics, and economics. In spite of these changes, and this is most important, the Eastern European countries remained predominantly agricultural. 178 162 241

The proportions of populations dependent upon agriculture in the several states within a decade after gaining full independence were as follows: Albania, 80 per cent; Bulgaria, 75 per cent; Rumania, 72 per cent; Yugoslavia, 76 per cent; Poland, 60 per cent; Hungary, 51 per cent; and Czechoslovakia 33 per cent. In contrast to these figures, the percentages of gainfully occupied males in industry in the same period were: Bulgaria, 13 per cent; Rumania, 11 per cent; Yugoslavia, 14 per cent; Poland, 22 per cent; Hungary, 26

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178 per cent; and Czechoslovakia, 41 per cent. Thus it can be
163 easily seen that, with the exception of Czechoslovakia whose
241 industry was the most developed in the region, the countries of Eastern Europe were predominantly agricultural and peasant in nature. Yet despite the predominantly peasant character of these countries, the peasants as such had relatively little political influence.

178 Although there was an increase in the output of agricul-
241 tural goods in all these countries between 1918 and 1945,
511 the competition offered by overseas cereals strongly affected the agriculture of Eastern Europe. Cereals, one of the major products of the region, had to be undersold to Germany. Added to this unfortunate situation, the world depression of 1929 came as a terrible blow to the economy of Eastern Europe, the most disastrous years lasting from 1931 until 1934. Industry, with its frequent cartels, was better able to defend itself than was agriculture, and thus the "price scissors," or the disparity between agricultural and industrial prices, cut mostly into the income of the agricultural population. This resulted in a general lowering of both the purchasing power and the standard of living. Loans at high rates of interest were frequent and taxation increased the poverty of the peasants. These, as the major element of the population, pressed heavily for reforms and spread malcontent in their respective countries.

185 Soon after the First World War, some states realized that
167 the solution to this situation was industrialization. Emigra-
433 tion, as a possible solution, was not favored in any of the Eastern European states as it would have decreased manpower. Since war was considered more or less imminent after 1933, military and industrial groups were especially opposed to any large-scale loss of population, although emigration was never prohibited by actual government order.

185 Bohemia, which had been in a highly advantageous posi-
433 tion in the industrialization program of Austria before the

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First World War, was the only well-developed industrial /185
region and provided the foundations of the industrial econ- 433
omy of Czechoslovakia. Poland and Hungary had some valuable industries which aided their development considerably. In the other states, industrialization made slow progress and often operated on an unsound basis. Many plants were erected, the products of which were not related to the needs of the respective countries. National welfare was often neglected and industries were built for the enrichment of a few individuals. Not even mining was efficient. Mines were exhausted or were reopened mainly on the basis of sudden export needs and with no thought that the industries might convert the mineral raw materials into consumer goods. Hungary, where bauxite was sold to Germany and aluminum was repurchased at a high price, offers an excellent example.

Mining, metallurgy, heavy industry, and textiles were 433
favored but they were not related to the purchasing power of the masses or to the production of raw materials. Because of the low production of textile raw material, large textile plants were run on imports. Cereals, livestock, and other agricultural goods were exported to balance the budget. Thus, much of the capital had to be spent on transportation expenses. The attention paid to agricultural industry was insufficient despite the fact that mineral raw materials, agricultural products, and timber were assets upon which a satisfactory program of industrialization could have been based.

The causes for this situation are to be found in the politi- 648
cal instability of Eastern Europe and in the lack of suf- 433
ficient skills and resources. It was a region of wars and in- 178
security where little nations faced each other with mistrust and fought each other as fiercely as they did the outside powers. Industrial policy between the two world wars was dependent on power politics. The policy of economic self-sufficiency, or autarky, was engendered by nationalistic as-

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648 433 178 pirations mostly in order to develop a modern industry capable of meeting war needs.

The assumption that work invested in industrial development would improve economic conditions was a decisive factor in influencing states to industrialize. This assumption was particularly valid in regions with climatic extremities and little arable land. Some of the means used to foster industrialization were technical education, customs, embargoes, tax exemptions, monopolies, favorable credit policies, and provisions protecting the joint interests of domestic industries. The assembly line system, as influenced by the United States, was started in the industrial sector in the '30's.

Branches of industry requiring specialized skill were developed mainly in Czechoslovakia and Hungary, but they did not attract many from the surplus peasant population which still preferred unskilled jobs. The competition, such as it was, for unskilled jobs resulted in a low wage level. Therefore, the increase in purchasing power was gradual. Peasant poverty and the lack of skill and capital were the fundamental problems facing industrialization programs and the new governmental economic policies.

426 439 The general poverty was further increased by the fact that the small Eastern European countries were debtor states. The solvency of Czechoslovakia was dependent on the export of industrial goods, while other states depended upon agricultural exports or, as in Rumania, upon mineral raw materials and lumber as well as on agricultural goods. Foreign debts, incurred before and after the First World War, weighed heavily on the budgets of the individual countries. Only one half of the debts were repaid during the interwar period. Foreign loans were given too often on the basis of political considerations. The boundaries erected by the 1920 peace treaties had already broken up natural economic and geographic areas, and the disproportionate lending policies of foreign powers hindered the uniform economic development of East-

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439 been, considering the size and population of these countries. Although they comprised roughly 25 per cent of Europe's area and population, excluding the European part of the Soviet Union, they handled no more than 10 or 11 per cent of Europe's exports and imports. About one third of the trade of the Eastern European area was purely regional. With the exception of Albania which traded mainly with Italy, Eastern Europe's trade list was headed by Germany, followed by the competing states of Austria, Great Britain, and the United States. The predominance of Germany became even greater during the war years. Trade was one of Germany's most important means of influencing the political, social, and cultural life of this region.

II

178 By 1918 the countries of Eastern Europe had reached different stages of social evolution. In Poland and Hungary the aristocracy had preserved considerable power in spite of a rising intellectual bourgeoisie. In Rumania and Croatia the power of the aristocracy had been wiped out by the land reforms and leadership had been taken over by a commercial middle class. In Czechoslovakia a strong bureaucratic and commercial element had risen to leadership. In the Baltic states, also, it was mainly the commercial class which had ascended to leading positions. Yugoslavia, Bulgaria, and Albania had no aristocracy and only a small intellectual bourgeoisie and commercial class.

It was generally from the rural stratum of village teachers, 369 priests, station masters, and notaries that the new bourgeoisie and the ruling class arose. The children of an educated father, who was able to secure a better place in society, had a better chance of entering a university—the sanctuary as much of social position and status as of knowledge. However, those who succeeded in obtaining graduate and other degrees in

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185 with the Soviet master plans. The captive nations were al-
433 lowed to preserve the external attributes of sovereignty and their governments were granted an advisory voice in the preparation of these national plans. But the supreme control of the plans remained in the hands of Moscow, and their primary goal was, and is, rapid industrialization.

II

178 The possibilities of industrialization in Eastern Europe are considerable, but obviously not unlimited. They depend on the availability of manpower and its technical know-how, on industrial raw materials and machinery, on capital needed for investments, and on markets capable of absorbing the products of the new industries.

464 Before the last war, five million persons were employed in the mining and in the medium and large manufacturing industries of the six major countries of the area. Today this number exceeds nine million. There is a shortage of labor, both skilled and unskilled, in Eastern Germany and in the Czech part of Czechoslovakia. The reserves of manpower—land laborers, dwarf-farm owners, and married women—are limited in Hungary and the Slovak part of Czechoslovakia, large in Poland, and even larger in Rumania and in the three Balkan countries. The areas where labor is short coincide to a large degree with those of low natural increase of population, and vice versa. In the first period of reconstruction after
369 the war, there was in many parts of the area a movement of
464 the population from the villages to the towns in search of
166 urban, not necessarily industrial, employment. For instance, in Poland alone, two and one-half million persons moved into towns during the first seven postwar years. This movement is now over, as well as the postwar enthusiasm for reconstruction, and the governments have to recruit new workers by propaganda and sometimes by half-coercion. Unless

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condition attached to such a speculation. Were the West to deny the principle of industrial transformation of these countries and to envisage their 'return to pastoral status,' the new managerial class together with the working class would range itself automatically against the West. 565

VI

The economic and social revolution which these countries have undergone has been imposed on them very largely from the outside. It has been successful because it was backed by the whole strength of a great military empire but also because the material and moral ravages of war and German occupation had shattered the prewar fabric of society and exposed its structural weaknesses. The society which is emerging from this revolution will be very different from the former one. Even if a true liberation of this part of Europe were to occur, the restitution of many old forms of life would not be feasible. The greatest harm that the captive nations have suffered and will suffer through the imposed revolution are the inflictions upon the souls and the minds of the people. Gradual de-Christianization, loosening of family ties, fear and distrust of political authorities and of the neighbor, Russification and falsification of national past, coarsening of manners, and the awful deposit of lies and prejudices of propaganda and non-technical schooling: all these are weapons which are levelled upon the minds and souls of the people. The undoing of these moral effects of Communist policies could only be gradual, and it would take a long time. 178 181

In the social and economic fields, the effects of Communism have not been so uniformly somber. That goods can be produced under Communism has been learned from Russian precedents. That Communism cannot assure to the people a decent standard of living is a fact that cannot be denied by any amount of propaganda, and it is also true that 178 433

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178 never in the last century have so many people worked so hard
433 for such meager rewards. However, in the social field, the extension of social services and of technical education can be credited to the Communist regimes. In the economic field, although the tax on the people has been almost unimaginably great, it must be admitted that the badly needed industrial development of formerly rural areas of Eastern Europe is due to the Communists.

178 The latter point needs clarification. The Wilsonian East-
433 ern Europe of 1918 inherited from Austria-Hungary, im-
369 perial Russia, and the old primitive Balkans an obsolete social structure of rural overpopulation and poverty due to insufficient industrial and urban development. The Czech lands, Polish Silesia, and a few lesser industrial regions were exceptions to the general structure of the area. Left to themselves by the indifferent West, having undergone the shock of the depression as only rural states can suffer it, the free nations of the area, again with the exception of Czechoslovakia, could in the interwar period neither solve their grave social problems nor defend themselves in the hour of danger. The existence of a poor and defenseless group of nations in the heart of Europe surrounded on East and West by two highly industrialized powers was an anachronism and an indirect invitation to aggression. After the disintegration of Eastern Europe between 1938 and 1941, the causes of this disaster were examined by thinkers of many nations, and many of them came to the conclusion that the disaster was inevitable not only because of the political disunity of this area but also because of its economic and productive inferiority. Rural societies had no chance of survival in the heavily armed world of the late '30's if only because they were unable to produce the weapons with which they could have deterred aggression effectively. The awareness of this fact has deeply influenced the political thinking of the nations concerned. It is inevitable that the Poles, to take but one example, should

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reflect that, had their country had a sufficient industrial basis in 1939 to equip ten armored divisions for which she had enough trained manpower, her loss of independence and many other events in modern history could have been prevented.

The present industrialization of Eastern Europe is gradually eliminating this handicap of the past. To be sure, the increase of the industrial potential of these countries lies in the interest of the Soviet Union in its own military preparations. The men in the Kremlin may dispose as they wish of this area's industrial plants together with all its human and material resources with the single exception of the spirit of its peoples. From the standpoint of both the immediate and long-range interests of the West, any addition to the wealth or the strength of Eastern Europe is unwelcome so long as the latter remains a part of the Soviet bloc. These countries are of course aware of this situation, but they have to think also about their future. They hope that one day the Iron Curtain will be lifted and they know that at that time they will need all their new industrial wealth in order to cease being an area of social unrest and a target for exploitation by powerful neighbors as well as a hotbed for world wars. Nobody has disputed the right of Russia to evolve into an industrial power. No one can expect the countries of Eastern Europe to relinquish their hopes of freedom and their rights to prosperity which, in the light of their past, are linked to the modernization of their economic structure. Wendell Willkie said during the last war that "Only the productive can be strong, and only the strong can be free." His words apply to all nations alike. The nations of Eastern Europe are potential allies of the West. Those who earnestly desire a better world should bear in mind that the lasting interests of these friendly nations transcend their temporary position as Russia's enforced associates.

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overwhelmingly peasant character, its political apathy and military weakness.

Today, in the middle of the twentieth century, most of these conditions have been transformed. All the peoples of Eastern Europe have literate majorities. They have native professional and middle classes. All of them have at least some more or less modern industries and transportation systems. All of them have had two or three generations of broad national and political development, a flourishing of national languages and literatures, and a vigorous growth in native political participation. They have memories of national independence and skills of political organization and action. They can no longer be ruled by alien rulers, and even the Russian dictatorship must deal with them by indirect methods. The peoples of Eastern Europe today can be governed stably only by native political administrations, by native civil services and school systems, and by the appeal—however distorted—to native symbols and traditions, or they cannot be governed at all.

All these changes seem to be irreversible. It would be as difficult to restore illiteracy, apathy, and fundamental ignorance to the peoples of Eastern Europe as it would be to restore the economic and social institutions of 1853. If history teaches us anything, it is at the very least that the distribution of political and military power is subject to rapid change and that every submerged people that has preserved its identity and its capacity to think and act may well expect to find again some opportunity to determine its own destiny in freedom.

II

Yet all was not well with the growth of sovereign states in Eastern Europe. Perhaps the most characteristic feature of the political institutions of the area was the widespread

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of their businesses for the purpose of retiring from business 433
themselves, rather than for expanding their productive equipment.

While productivity grew slowly, public health measures 464
were effective and birth rates remained high. Throughout 433
most of the region, the population pressed upon the limited supply of land and on the limited productivity of existing agricultural methods. At the same time, the lagging growth of towns and industries did not absorb completely the increases in population. The results were underemployment in the towns and industrial districts, hidden unemployment in the rural areas, and a general cheapness of human labor. While labor was thus abundant, and was often wastefully used, the skills of most workers remained low, and there was little incentive to improve them. Since capital goods and capital were scarce, there were fewer opportunities for engineers and applied scientists. And since universities, public administration, and banking had become modernized, there were ample employment opportunities for civil servants, clerks, lawyers, teachers, and research scientists.

The result was a startling precocity of Eastern European 178
intellectual life. First-rate university training was fairly widely available throughout the region. Food, land, and domestic services were relatively cheap. Civil servants, intellectuals, and members of the professions had high prestige socially, and they found no severe economic difficulty in maintaining their families and sending their children to universities. While the top-level jobs in commerce, civil service, 178
and universities under the Austro-Hungarian monarchy were 563
perhaps somewhat more easily accessible to persons recruited from the German or Jewish minorities, there were some opportunities for careers for men of outstanding talent from all national backgrounds. Czech scientists reminisce today about the remarkable generation of Czech and Slovak intellectuals and scientists who made their careers during the last thirty

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178 563 years before the First World War in the Austro-Hungarian monarchy. At the same time, there was relatively little competition for the services of men of high talent on the part of industry, applied science, or practical politics, since all of these activities remained relatively underdeveloped.

578 565 The coincidence of intellectual precocity with widespread social and economic backwardness led to widespread experiences of frustration. Intellectuals, not unlike the ancient philosopher Plato, dreamed of equalling one day the power and prestige of the aristocracy, for which they lacked the land holdings and family connections; and they dreamed of equalling the comforts and securities of the bourgeoisie—the upper middle class—without either owning a bourgeois amount of property or devoting a bourgeois proportion of their time and attention to money-making or to business matters. They resented the influence of the church and the clergy in the rural areas, without being either willing or able to devote a major part of their own time and attention to the needs of the country population. Almost all classes of society had come to desire Western standards of income, comfort, security, and power, without possessing as yet either the means or the skill necessary to produce them. And all these discontented groups and individuals, pushed forward by the fundamental incongruities in their social evolution, turned to politics and to the state as a remedy for their frustrations.

IV

186 631 Under these conditions, no type of government and no size of political unit could for long live up to the rising level of popular expectations and the increasingly pressing demands of society. Already, before the year 1914, large states as well as small, national states as well as international, became increasingly strained by social tensions.

In a supra- or multinational state, such as the Austro-

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Hungarian monarchy, an obvious reaction of the population to prolonged social and political disappointment was an increasing demand for national freedom. The sovereign nation-state would give the Czechs a fuller opportunity for careers for their young people and a more worthy share in determining their own destiny. A nation-state centered on Hungary would give Hungarian industries the protection they wanted and would free Hungarians from the delays and frustrations of the imperial relationship to Austria. The national state uniting Slovenes and Croatians with Serbia would help these peoples at long last to make real headway in escaping from their backwardness. During these same years, the peoples in the small national states of the region dreamed of escaping from the compromises and frustrations of their own small-scale political existence by national expansion into some greater and victorious power in their own area. Serbians and Montenegrins came to hope that their lives would somehow improve once Bosnia, Herzegovina, Slovenia, and Croatia had been joined to their own territories in a new Yugoslavia. Bulgarians, Greeks, and Serbians all came to believe that somehow their own lives would improve significantly if all or most of the territory of Macedonia were added to their respective countries.

Throughout large parts of Eastern Europe, the burdens and demands put upon the existing governments thus exceeded the capabilities of those governments and of the states they represented. The Eastern European states, large and small, were thus becoming overcommitted politically, economically, militarily, and socially. Among their peoples this situation encouraged the belief that things would become better once the size of political units in their region was changed. Citizens of small national states such as Serbia hoped for improvement from expansion. Citizens of large states, such as some of the Hungarians or Czechs in Austria-Hungary, began to wonder whether their position could not

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186 be improved by secession. All of them thought that they could
178 improve their position by finding that exact size of political unit in which their own language and their own national culture could be made to predominate and in which their own nationality or ethnic group could be turned into the leading class or social and political elite.

Nationalism in Eastern Europe was thus a reaction to the rapid diffusion of Western claims and to the expectations of security and opportunity throughout a group of societies that were only slowly, if at all, acquiring the productive skill and equipment to satisfy them. National secession, national expansion, and the national state appeared to almost all nationalities in the region as plausible short cuts to the prosperity, power, and prestige they all desired.

178 In the course of events, the experiment was actually made.
433 The Austro-Hungarian monarchy was destroyed and a num-
641 ber of successor states arose from its remains. There is no doubt on the whole that the emergence of these national states represented a significant step forward toward higher levels of popular participation in public affairs, toward political democracy, toward popular education, and even, in some respects, toward greater economic opportunities. But at the same time it seems clear that the change in the size of political units did little or nothing to come to grips with the fundamental causes of the poverty and backwardness of the region, or with the fundamental sources of its peculiar psychological and political frustrations and resentments. National and regional markets and consumer preferences remained as small and as unfavorable to mass production in the new states as they had in the old. Capital remained as scarce and productive investment as uneven and erratic as before.
178 Tools, technologies, and work habits changed slowly if at
[935] all. Poverty persisted. Purchasing power remained low and
464 prices high. Production remained scattered over many small and inefficient factories. Innovations were accepted reluc-

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tantly or not at all. Unemployment became worse than it had ever been. 178 464

Thus social tensions persisted or grew worse. Sometimes they appeared as growing tensions between left and right, with the political middle-of-the-road parties increasingly threatened by fascists or by communists. Sometimes they appeared as tensions between different nationality groups, such as between Serbians and Croatians or between Czechs and Germans. Often the same angry and frustrated individuals could be found backing communism in one year, extreme nationalism in another, and some more or less supranational fascism in a third. Whole districts voted for right-wing radical candidates in one election and for left-wing radicals in another. Nationalism in Eastern Europe was thus the symptom of a more fundamental maladjustment, even though nationalistic policies, once adopted, often served to make this maladjustment worse. Nationalistic governments, as well as most other governments in this region, were becoming increasingly unpopular and during the 1930's showed increasing reluctance to face their own voters. By 1939, before the first German or Russian soldier stepped on their soil, every country of Eastern Europe, with the exceptions of Finland and Czechoslovakia, had succumbed to some form of dictatorship. Nationalism had thus failed to cure the fundamental maladjustments of Eastern European political and economic life. From some points of view its failure was hardly less shattering than the failure of the supranational empires that had preceded it. 186 578 642 208

It was nationalism which first undermined and in part destroyed the traditions of property and the respect for property in Eastern Europe. This attack against property began as early as the era of Prince Bismarck in Germany. The so-called Polish legislation sponsored by the German government and by the German nationalists during and after the Bismarck era showed scant respect for the property 642 423 563

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114 seeking asylum. There was a campful of escapees, mostly
727 Czechs and Slovaks, at Valka near Nuremberg.

We Americans used before the war to roam freely in the countries on the other side. Many of us either came from there or are descended from people who did. It is strange not to be able to cross the border now, and of course the fact makes it only too easy to consign the whole region to a sort of mono-
•181 chrome limbo. We need to remind ourselves constantly that here are some of the oldest, most cultivated, most individualistic, and most heroic of the nations of the West. Were one merely to list all the deeds of great valor which have been wrought here in more than two thousand years, or all the notable works of art, music, and literature which were created by men at home in these regions, the summary would be a brilliant one, indeed. Yet it is no doubt primarily dedication to religion that gave these cultures their individuality and vitality.

121 For convenience's sake we may follow Julius Caesar's example and divide the whole area into three parts. The first embraces the lands which were once portions of the Austro-Hungarian Empire, which collapsed in 1918 but, despite its faults, must in retrospect be termed one of the most coherent and civilized states known to modern history. Once I compared notes with Arnold Toynbee about the singular fact that wherever one crossed those vanished boundaries, whether to the north of Cracow or to the east of Budapest, the sense of coming into the familiar world of the West was immediate and unmistakable. There was a manifest ease and gracefulness of the art of living, reflected in all the many buildings, humble or ornate, in which that art found expression. Vienna, Prague, Budapest, Cracow, Zagreb, Bratislava—these cities were built by the collective genius which Austria somehow managed to evoke and nurture, even though the people who lived in them might more often than not talk of tyranny.

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6 Peasantism: Its Ideology and Achievements

BRANKO M. PEŠELJ

I

That part of Europe which lies east of the Danzig-Trieste line is often referred to as "peasant Europe." This term indicates a twofold concept: Economically, "peasant Europe" stands for that part of the continent which is devoted primarily to agrarian production under the system of small and medium holdings and in which farming represents a tradition, a civilization, and a way of life. Sociologically and culturally, the term "peasant Europe" denotes an area in which by far the greatest portion of the population is peasant and forms a group whose economic, social, and cultural aspects have been genuinely preserved.

The differences between Eastern and Western Europe were less noticeable a hundred years ago than they were at the end of the Second World War. The industrial revolution which swept Western Europe in the second half of the nineteenth century generated profound economic and social changes over the continent as a whole, and contributed to its division into two distinct sectors. A consequence of this partition was the creation of unique social and economic conditions in Eastern Europe. These conditions, in turn, pro-

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tentatively as a group settled on a determined territory, having its principal source of livelihood in a cultivation of the soil that is based on the system of the small farm, and possessing its own way of life and its own indigenous culture.

This definition will help us answer our second question; namely, what are the differences between the peasants and the farmers. For a long time the rural sociologists of the West made no distinction between these two groups, and it is only recently that adequate attention has been given to this problem. Today it is generally recognized that between these two rural societies there exist essential dissimilarities which result from a permanent infiltration by the cosmopolitan civilization into the rural orbit. This process has been far more intense in the European and American rural groups, the farmers, than in the genuine peasant population.

With this distinction in mind, the farmers and the genuine peasantry may be contrasted. Economically speaking, the farmers produce primarily for the market, abiding by the established norms of offer and demand. Although they are attached to the land, they consider it almost impersonally and from an economic point of view. Therefore, they are willing to move from one area to another when there are economic reasons. The peasants, on the other hand, produce primarily for home consumption. Because their land is a part of their heritage, they consider it personally, as a part of their life and of their family tradition.

Socially, life in the rural communities of the West has become increasingly urbanized. The peasant society of Eastern Europe has been infiltrated by urban ideas to a far lesser degree and has preserved, generally speaking, many of its original aspects.

Culturally, the indigenous traditions of the farmer population, if not completely vanished, are disappearing rapidly. In the genuine peasant society, cultural traits are still clearly

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condition attached to such a speculation. Were the West to 565
deny the principle of industrial transformation of these countries and to envisage their 'return to pastoral status,' the new managerial class together with the working class would range itself automatically against the West.

VI

The economic and social revolution which these countries 178
have undergone has been imposed on them very largely from 181
the outside. It has been successful because it was backed by the whole strength of a great military empire but also because the material and moral ravages of war and German occupation had shattered the prewar fabric of society and exposed its structural weaknesses. The society which is emerging from this revolution will be very different from the former one. Even if a true liberation of this part of Europe were to occur, the restitution of many old forms of life would not be feasible. The greatest harm that the captive nations have suffered and will suffer through the imposed revolution are the inflictions upon the souls and the minds of the people. Gradual de-Christianization, loosening of family ties, fear and distrust of political authorities and of the neighbor, Russification and falsification of national past, coarsening of manners, and the awful deposit of lies and prejudices of propaganda and non-technical schooling: all these are weapons which are levelled upon the minds and souls of the people. The undoing of these moral effects of Communist policies could only be gradual, and it would take a long time.

In the social and economic fields, the effects of Com- 178
munism have not been so uniformly somber. That goods can 433
be produced under Communism has been learned from Russian precedents. That Communism cannot assure to the people a decent standard of living is a fact that cannot be denied by any amount of propaganda, and it is also true that

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tentatively as a group settled on a determined territory, having its principal source of livelihood in a cultivation of the soil that is based on the system of the small farm, and possessing its own way of life and its own indigenous culture. 565 829 [181]

This definition will help us answer our second question; namely, what are the differences between the peasants and the farmers. For a long time the rural sociologists of the West made no distinction between these two groups, and it is only recently that adequate attention has been given to this problem. Today it is generally recognized that between these two rural societies there exist essential dissimilarities which result from a permanent infiltration by the cosmopolitan civilization into the rural orbit. This process has been far more intense in the European and American rural groups, the farmers, than in the genuine peasant population. 565 182

With this distinction in mind, the farmers and the genuine peasantry may be contrasted. Economically speaking, the farmers produce primarily for the market, abiding by the established norms of offer and demand. Although they are attached to the land, they consider it almost impersonally and from an economic point of view. Therefore, they are willing to move from one area to another when there are economic reasons. The peasants, on the other hand, produce primarily for home consumption. Because their land is a part of their heritage, they consider it personally, as a part of their life and of their family tradition.

Socially, life in the rural communities of the West has become increasingly urbanized. The peasant society of Eastern Europe has been infiltrated by urban ideas to a far lesser degree and has preserved, generally speaking, many of its original aspects.

Culturally, the indigenous traditions of the farmer population, if not completely vanished, are disappearing rapidly. In the genuine peasant society, cultural traits are still clearly

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565 visible and constitute an outstanding characteristic of this
182 group.

The third point in this discussion of the peasantry concerns the special characteristics of the Eastern European peasantry which have enabled it to maintain a separate political organization. It can be said safely that nowhere in Europe have the characteristics peculiar to peasant society been so well preserved as in this region. Although numerical supremacy has been a factor in the preservation of peasant society, more important is the fact that the peasants of Eastern Europe have manifested in recent history a tremendous self-consciousness, political maturity, and determined will to create political and social organizations of their own, which, so far, have not been emulated by the peasantry in other parts of the globe. The peasantry of Western European countries, such as Spain, Portugal, or Italy, often comprises over 50 per cent of the rural population. However, this Western peasantry has never been able to generate powerful and influential peasant political organizations, nor has it been able to play an outstanding role in national life as has the peasantry of Eastern Europe.

II

566 The greater part of the peasantry in Eastern Europe was liberated from the bondages of serfdom in the year of revolutions, 1848. In that part of Poland which was included in the Russian Empire, the abolition of serfdom was proclaimed in 1861, and in Old Rumania, in 1864. The peasants of the Balkans, subjected to a special type of land tenure relations and vassalage as practiced in the Ottoman empire, were freed gradually with the withdrawal of the Turkish political power, especially after the arrangements made at the Congress of Berlin in 1878.

000 The liberation of the peasantry was a consequence of

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175 inforced in its effect by the extreme splintering of national,
162 linguistic, and religious affiliations. A good map of the na-
433 tionalities, languages, and religions of Eastern Europe would have shown not the large patches of relatively homogeneous populations which are found in so much of Western Europe but rather a polka-dot pattern of intermixed minorities.

182 The relative national uniformity of the West is perhaps, at least in part, the product of a history rich in the processes of successful social learning and acculturation, which merged and melted the different ethnic groups that were left in the Western countries by accidents of migration, wars, and settlement. In Eastern Europe, such accidents of conquest or settlement may well have been even more numerous, but there is also some reason to think that the processes of assimilation were much slower and less effective.

Greater uniformity of language and culture means greater interchangeability of social roles. This is not merely a contributing cause to the growth in social mobility and in the interchange of social roles but is also to some extent their product. Where societies are rigorously stratified, where religions fail to impress upon people an awareness of their essential unity, where the obstacles to a change in occupation or in social role are great, and the rewards for mobility are uncertain and small—in these societies individuals may best succeed in gaining security by clinging tenaciously to their familiar groups, languages, customs, and traditions, and by rejecting any assimilation to other groups except the most privileged as a threat to their existence. The more privileged groups, under these conditions, can only be expected to resent and resist the assimilation or intrusion of strangers, unless these strangers come from regions of clearly greater wealth and greater prestige and seem to bring to the new group assets clearly greater than those they would demand. The lack of unity and assimilation in language and culture in Eastern Europe thus appears as one more aspect of the

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relative lack in fundamental economic innovation and social learning in that geographic area, if we take the extent of such learning and innovation in the Western countries as our standard. /182

On this view, the Western way of life—thus far the way of life of a minority of mankind—has been built upon a certain fundamental willingness to learn, and a basic acceptance of both some mobility, at least in society, and of some innovations in accustomed practices and habits. Against the background of this Western culture, large-scale markets and economic competition, as well as the impact of the modern centralized state, had a chance of functioning as accelerators of technological and social change: they tended to lure or push people away from social roles or economic occupations which were poorly rewarded and into new roles or occupations where the gains were greater. Western economic and political institutions succeeded the better in this function of accelerating social change where they impinged upon individuals who had the economic and social resources for moving, and at least a minimum of cultural and psychological willingness to do so. Where these economic and cultural preconditions did not exist, however, or where they existed only in part, the effect of the impact of Western institutions was bound to be quite different, and these differences became dramatically visible in the area of Eastern Europe. 000

III

Eastern Europe, seen from this aspect, was a semi-Western area. It was fully exposed to Western practices and institutions both in the field of higher education, particularly university education, and in the fields of military drill and warfare, and particularly in the use of conscripted armies, although it could operate in this field only as long as no extensive industrial facilities for the use of massed artillery 177

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tianity to a cult of History takes place imperceptibly. Without doubt, the greatest success of the Imperium would come if it could install a Party-line pope in the Vatican. A mass in the Basilica of St. Peter in Rome, performed by such a pope, with the assistance of dignitaries from those subjugated countries which are predominately Catholic, would be one of the most important steps toward the consolidation of the world empire.

Christians who serve the Eastern Imperium ingeniously resolve the problem posed by Jesus' words "Render therefore unto Caesar the things that are Caesar's; and unto God the things that are God's." Until now the contrast between the ordinary man and Caesar has never been effaced. Christianity guaranteed this division by teaching that every man had his own history, distinct from the history of the social group or the nation to which he belonged. If, as is taught today from the Elbe to Vladivostok, the history of every man is nothing more than the reflection of the history of his class, and if his class is personified in Caesar, then it is clear that the man who rebels against Caesar rebels against himself. Christians who agree to this thesis prove they no longer believe in God's judgment of each man's acts. Fear that History will damn them eternally motivates their submission.

The Party knows that the conflict between true Christianity and the Revolution is fundamental. The Revolution aims at the highest goal the human species has ever set for itself on earth, the end of "man's exploitation of man." To do this, it must replace man's desire for profit with a feeling of collective responsibility as a motive for action. This is a distant and honorable goal. Probably it will not be reached quickly; and probably, too, for a long period it will be necessary to maintain a constant terror in order to instill that feeling of responsibility by force.

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135 total output of Germany, again mainly Eastern, reached 250.7
433 million tons. The total 1943 output of lignite in the present captive area may be estimated as exceeding 200 million tons. In 1948 all these figures were much lower (except in Polish Silesia, which produced about 4 million tons) but had a marked tendency to increase. In 1949 Czechoslovakia produced 26.5 million tons of lignite, Hungary 5.5 million, Poland 4.6 million, and Rumania 2.8 million. The official figure of lignite production in Eastern Germany in 1950 was 137 million tons, and the total output of this fuel in the captive area could be estimated as reaching 185 million tons.

[185] The plans for 1953-1955 are as follows: Bulgaria is expected to produce 6 million tons of lignite in 1953, Czechoslovakia 38.8 million in 1953, Eastern Germany 225.2 million in 1955,[11] Hungary 25 million in 1954, Poland 8.4 million in 1955, and Rumania 7.7 million in 1955. The Czech and Eastern German targets are very high in comparison with their past and present output, and the Hungarian target seems to be unrealistic. Anticipating that the three plans to be terminated in 1955 may in fact be implemented earlier, a tentative figure of some 310 million tons of lignite may be accepted as that of the total output of lignite in the captive area to be achieved by the end of 1954 or the beginning of 1955. According to the ratios accepted by the *Economic Survey of Europe*, these figures would represent the equivalent of about 50.1 million tons of hard coal in Eastern Germany, 22.7 million tons in Czechoslovakia, and 12.1 million tons in the remaining four countries of captive Europe — a total of about 85 million tons. If other ratios were accepted as a basis for this computation, the total would be very much larger.

Together with the 133 million tons of hard coal which is the 1954-1955 target of the captive area, the grand total output of hard fuel for that area anticipated by 1954-1955 comes to 218 million tons of coal or coal equivalent, or more if the higher ratios of conversion are applied. Taken at its minimum, the goal of 218 million tons of coal or coal equivalent exactly coincides with the coal production of the United Kingdom in 1949, which was 218.5 million tons.

315 Thus, the increase of Polish production in 1950 over that in
● 185 1949 was officially described as "an enormous jump" and the
433 output of gas in the third quarter of 1951 was alleged to have been 173 percent of that the whole year before. In Rumania the 1950 output increased, according to the official press, by 24 percent in comparison with that of 1949, and the output of the first half of 1951 was alleged to have been larger by one third than that of the first half of 1950.[30] It is not possible to check these assertions, but they may correspond to the truth. Rumania would not be building three plants for the chemical processing of gas unless there were good reasons for expecting an increase in the extraction of gas.

[185] According to their long-range plans, which officially terminate in 1955 but are expected to be fulfilled by 1954, Rumania anticipates extracting 3,900 million cubic meters of natural gas, and Poland 480 million meters. These targets are moderate in comparison with those foreseen for oil extraction. The Hungarian target for 1954 is unknown, and so is the Soviet plan for Austria. The Czech output is negligible. A hypothetical figure of some 5,000 million cubic meters of natural gas, almost entirely dependent on the unpredictable Rumanian output, is the best that can be surmised for the entire captive area in 1954.

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ELECTRIC POWER

ELECTRIFICATION was Lenin's panacea for poverty and backwardness, and much of this belief has been accepted as gospel by the satellite governments, in particular those of the Balkan states. This theoretical attitude does not differ from that adopted in practice throughout the world. All over the globe, the installed capacity of the generators and the total production of electric energy have been increasing with great rapidity, especially during the last twenty-five years. The captive countries, with the obvious exception of Eastern Germany, have been under-invested in electric energy for a long time and thus have lagged considerably behind Western Europe. As their thermal and water power resources are on the whole no less than those of Western Europe, the extra emphasis on the output of electric energy by the present satellite governments can and should lead, within their current long-range plans, to a striking increase in that production. New hydroelectric plants will of course produce new energy, while the output of the new thermal plants will, as is commonly accepted, represent at least one-fifth more power than that which would be produced by direct combustion of the same amount of hard and liquid fuels. Without a sufficiently high output of electric energy, the huge chemical plants under construction in the captive area, the planned aluminum and special steel plants, and the railroads about to be electrified could not possibly be operated.

[185] 377

Coal and lignite are, and for a long time will be, supplying the great bulk of electric power in the captive area, since water power has not been hitherto sufficiently developed. The potential hydroelectric capacity of the area is very high in the Danube basin. Excluding Germany and Austria, it is evaluated at nearly 17 million kilowatts, *i.e.*, as much as that of the four Pacific coast rivers in the United States. The Vistula, the Oder, the

"The output of coal increased in 1950 by 5 percent in comparison with that of 1949. Industrial production as such increased by 30.8 percent in comparison with 1949. It follows that industry grows far more rapidly than the production of fuel. At the same time, railroad transportation increases more rapidly than the output of coal. The demand of the market for coal as domestic fuel is also increasing . . . in 1950, the consumption of domestic coal was nearly 3.5 times as large as prewar. . . . At the same time, the demand for coal for exportation remains unchanged. . . . In that situation, the problem of increasing the output of coal, of fulfilling and overfulfilling the plan, must become one of the central issues of our work in 1951." This quotation comes from a speech of Hilary Minc, the economic master of Poland, which he delivered in February 1951, to introduce the economic plan for 1951.[67] There is no doubt that these words apply equally well to Czechoslovakia and all the other captive countries. 371

Probably the best economic brain behind the Iron Curtain, Minc realizes very well the danger of the situation. In his speech he offered a number of remedies: new investments (*i.e.*, new mines), higher mechanization and increased efficiency in organization and labor. There is no doubt, again, that as long as the discrepancy between the supply of coal and the demand for it by industry and transport remains the only reason for worry by the Polish or any other satellite government, these measures, which are already being applied, can improve the performance of the mines and increase the output of coal. Statistics show that output has been increasing in Poland by about 4 million tons per annum (1948: 70 million tons; 1949: 74 million; 1950: 78 million tons). But this rate of increase appears to be insufficient. Unless it can be accelerated, the target of 100 million tons of coal by 1955 (in practice, by 1954) will not be achieved. Moreover, even if this goal should be achieved, the planned output would not cover the demand as described by Minc. [185]

It is a fact that even if the Communist economy functions at an optimum "normal" level the efficiency of labor in coal mining 316

316 and oil extracting cannot be raised above a certain point, lower than that of the prewar period, whatever the achievements in other branches in industry. Polish coal miners were the best in Europe: in 1937 the per capita production of coal was 0.8 tons daily in France and Belgium, 1.2 tons in Great Britain, 1.6 tons in Holland, 1.5 tons in Germany, and 1.8 tons in Poland; that of Polish Silesia was 2.0 tons daily.[68] Since the last war, despite great efforts, moral persuasion and flattery, and the bonuses, uniforms and medals with which the Warsaw government has cajoled the coal miners, at the same time threatening them with police reprisals, the individual productivity of the coal miners has never reached its prewar level. The postwar per capita production in Poland has never exceeded 75 to 80 percent of prewar figures,[69] and until the crisis of 1951 that level could have been regarded as more or less fixed. The performance of the Czech, Hungarian, and Rumanian coal miners has been, if anything, lower.

Even before the present crisis, since human nature cannot be influenced beyond a certain point, the satellite governments knew that they must replace the ineffective men by effective machinery. In this they have followed the experience of the Soviet Union, which for years had been suffering from the fluidity and inefficiency of labor in mining. There is much to be done in this respect. All over the captive area many mines are technically obsolete and not sufficiently mechanized, and production continues to depend in the last analysis on the human element. In these mines new methods of production are being introduced. Underground traction is being electrified, transmission belts installed, and machinery for winding and hoisting, sizing and washing is being introduced. Soviet mechanical coal cutters, the so-called Donbas coal combines, are expected gradually to replace the more antiquated methods of coal cutting.[70]

● 185 316 The best possibility for the satellite governments to increase the output of coal lies in the expected production of the new "scientific" coal mines which are being built in the course of the present long-range plans. Within its Six Year Plan

Poland alone anticipates the construction of eleven large mines 185
with a total annual output of 9 million tons of coal, and 36 exten- 316
sions of the existing mines with an output of 14 million tons. Of the former, 8 mines are presently under construction, each of them expected to produce 6 to 10 thousand tons of coal daily.[71] More money was invested in Polish coal mining in 1950 than during the years 1945-49 inclusive, and the 1951 investment is far larger than that of 1950.[72] Similar investments in the other captive countries are being made with increasing rapidity.

While the output of coal has been stimulated by all these 316
methods, efforts are being made to restrain the consumption of coal and to insure more efficient utilization. Since the middle of 1950, saving coal, in particular coal of good quality, has become one of the basic aims of the captive area's economy. The daily press eulogizes engineers and technicians who manage to operate factories and run trains on minimum quantities of coal or on low grade coal. All over the captive area, railroads and industrial plants substitute lignite or coal waste for hard coal fuel. In Soviet Berlin alone, the substitution of lignite for coal at the Klingenberg power plant will result in the saving of 500,000 tons of hard coal per annum.[73] At the same time electrification is being speeded up, since it will result in a lesser expenditure of fuel. During the last war, when the Nazis were faced with a grave fuel shortage, the "heat-engineers"[74] charged with this problem by the minister of armaments, Speer, introduced far-reaching improvements in the exploitation of the hydroelectric and thermal plants and saved up to 50 percent of the fuel and current.[75] Many of these men are available behind the Iron Curtain and, together with their colleagues from the other captive countries and with Soviet advisers, they are doing their best to wring the most they can from the local resources. When Selbmann, minister of heavy industry, states that the Eastern German thermal plants have reached the outside limit of load capacity,[76] the statement must be taken at its face value.

This analysis of the situation seems to lead to the conclusion 316
that under "normal" conditions the Communist regimes of cap- 433

315 duction of oil is different: there is no guarantee that new investments will produce oil. On the eve of World War II, the Polish oil fields were regarded as being gradually exhausted: between 1900 and 1938 their annual production fell from some 4 million metric tons to 0.5 million. The production of the much richer Rumanian oil fields fell from a peak of 8.7 million tons in 1936 to 5.2 million tons in 1943, and the prevailing technical opinion was that they had passed their production peak. The point of departure of the current long-range plans is that the new oil fields in Albania, Czechoslovakia, and Hungary (and Austria as well) can be developed almost at will, and that the exhaustion of the oil fields in Rumania and Poland can be halted and that production can be stimulated. The satellite governments and the Soviet experts who manage most of the oil fields take for granted that they contain much untapped oil, and that it can and will be extracted. More effort than ever before is being expended in the search for new sources of oil and in full exploitation of the existing wells. According to the Rumanian Five Year Plan about five million feet of new drilling will be made in 1955, while in the top production year of 1936 new drilling reached only one million feet.[81] According to the same plan Rumania will manufacture most of its own oil mining machinery and make the installations in its plants. Altogether the equivalent of 860 million dollars will be invested in the Rumanian oil industry in the course of the current plan.[82] As noted above, the oil production hitherto obtained does not seem to confirm such optimism, especially in view of the fact that since the summer of 1951 the situation in the Rumanian oil fields as well as in the others, has been much complicated by the food crisis.

[185]

371 To sum up: after consideration of all data pertaining to fuel and power production in the captive area of Europe, both actual and planned, the following conclusions can be made. If the satellite governments do not fundamentally revise their attitude towards labor, especially during the present food crisis, and unless rapid technical and organizational progress is attained in hard coal extraction, the coal shortage may develop into a bottle-

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377 1. It may be taken for granted that every effort will be made to fulfill the Eastern German, Polish, and Rumanian plans one year ahead of schedule, that is, by the end of 1954 or beginning of 1955.

2. It may be expected that, having fulfilled its plan for power by the end of 1951, Bulgaria will launch a new plan which may aim at an output of about one billion *kwh* more by the end of 1954 or the beginning of 1955 — an entirely justified supposition.

3. It is true that the output of 16.5 billion *kwh* which Czechoslovakia plans to reach in 1955 cannot be accepted as its target for 1954 or beginning of 1955, and a much lower figure should be taken instead.

4. But the larger Bulgarian and the lower Czechoslovakian figure may compensate one another, especially if a lower figure of the Hungarian output in 1954 (6,000 million *kwh* instead of 6,500 million) is accepted as the basis for the tentative computation.

Under the circumstances the writer regards the mere arithmetic sum of the six national targets, equivalent to more or less 82 billion *kwh*, as an entirely acceptable hypothesis: the margin of error should not exceed one billion *kwh*.

[60] Harry Schwartz, *New York Times*, 23 January 1951.

[61] Estimates of the writer.

371 [62] *Economic Survey of Europe in 1949*, United Nations, Geneva, 1950, p. 231.

[63] 82 billion *kwh* represent the equivalent of somewhat over 50 million tons of coal (1,590 *kwh* equivalent to one ton of coal, see footnote 62). This figure corresponds to a general figure for Europe; see p. 12 of the same *Survey*.

[64] Estimates of the writer.

[65] Silesian coal has been exported for generations, and trade in it flourished between the two World Wars. Industrial production and railroad transportation in the countries named depend to some extent on the specific technical quality of Polish coal.

[66] 800 million *kwh* from Hamburg and West Berlin, according to *Wirtschaftsrevue*, Karlsruhe, 15 December 1950. See also footnote 14.

371 [67] *Trybuna Ludu*, Warsaw, 1951, No. 53.

433 [68] *Statistical Yearbook of Poland*, 1939, p. 239; also *European Steel*
316 *Trends*, United Nations, Geneva, 1949, p. 51.

[69] Evaluation by Alfred Zauberman, *Dziennik Polski*, London, 1951.

[70] The production of the Donbas combines began in 1951 at the Piotrowice plant of heavy mining machinery in Poland (*Wirtschaft*, Berlin, 1951, No. 32) and in at least one of the corresponding plants in Czechoslovakia.

● 185 [71] *Trybuna Ludu*, Warsaw, 1951, No. 160.

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[72] National Plan for 1951. 185

[73] *Wirtschaft*, Berlin, 1951, No. 21. 316

[74] Chardonnet. The German word is "Wärme-Ingenieure."

[75] *Ibidem.*

[76] *Wirtschaft*, Berlin, 1949, No. 13.

[77] The German technical word is "Abraum."

[78] Max Fritsch in *Wirtschaft*, Berlin, 1951, No. 32.

[79] Redmayne, *op. cit.* 315

[80] *Wirtschaft*, Berlin, 1951, No. 40.

[81] *Rumanian Information Bulletin*, Washington, 25 January 1951. 185

[82] *Ibidem.*

were generated by the agricultural crisis and the ensuing famine of 1920-21. To meet the needs of the urban population, the Bolsheviks decreed a forced food levy (December 14, 1920) by which peasants were ordered to deliver their entire surplus to the State. The peasants, retaliating in kind, produced little more than their own needs demanded. Scattered peasant uprisings, together with the Kronstadt rebellion early in 1921, combined to force a change of policy on the new regime. The strict codes of "War Communism" were abrogated and the New Economic Policy (NEP) was launched. Delivery quotas were introduced (amounting to a tax-in-kind) and peasants were encouraged to produce for a flourishing free market.

Thus, for a time under NEP the peasants, who now controlled almost all the arable land, were permitted to enjoy the fruits of their revolutionary exertions. Agricultural production recovered rapidly and a degree of national prosperity resulted. But the Bolsheviks had paid a price for this prosperity — the restoration of free market relations between town and country.

The Leninist Dilemma

The unstable compromise of NEP postponed the inevitable clash between the "proletarian dictatorship" and the victorious peasant revolution. Two parallel developments were rapidly to hasten the impending struggle: throughout the NEP period (1921-28) the peasants tightened their hold on the land, many of them growing relatively prosperous, and thereby fortifying their gains. At the same time the Bolsheviks were tightening their hold on the political machinery of the State and turning their party into a monolithic organization capable of an outright offensive against the rest of the country. Thus, the stage was set for the gigantic economic struggle of the late twenties.

The issue at stake between the Bolsheviks and the peasantry was only partly ideological. The conflict between the Bolshevik belief in the superior efficacy of large-scale "socialist" farming and the peasants' allegiance to his traditional "way of life" was important, but this conflict was subordinated to another one which was economic in character. The peasants and the Bolshevik regime faced each other across the table on which the grain produce of Russia was negotiated. And it was, in fact, in the realm of economics

578 that the two antagonists met and clashed in the "war" which re-
185 sulted in collectivized agriculture.[18]

The problem which the Bolsheviks had to deal with may be briefly stated. NEP had insured the continued political existence of the regime; but salvation had been achieved at a great price. To obtain a sufficient supply of agricultural produce to feed the rising urban population and, if possible, to permit acceleration of industrial growth, it was necessary to provide increased incentives for the peasantry. But to provide incentives for an increased supply of produce to the cities, it was also necessary to create an industry capable of supplying peasants with the consumer goods and agricultural machinery they demanded in exchange. Without recourse to foreign capital, this, in turn, was impossible, unless a steadily increasing supply of agricultural produce was guaranteed.

The problem of breaking this vicious circle occupied the thoughts of the best Party theoreticians throughout the period of NEP. Some, like Bukharin, suggested a solution bearing some resemblance to the pre-Revolutionary policies of Witte and Stolypin — a "gradualist" approach to industrialization, encouragement of the more efficient middle peasant producers, and limited recourse to foreign capital. Trotsky, as the leader of the radical Left Wing, called for an immediate drive for industrialization in which the peasants would absorb the major shock. The theoretical debate rose to its climax in the late twenties, coinciding with the final victory of the Stalinist faction of the Bolshevik Party and the resurgence of the agricultural crisis in a new form.[19]

The Pre-collectivization Crisis

185 The Stalinist "solution" to the agricultural crisis (collectiviza-
471 tion) did not proceed according to a predetermined plan or theory.
423 Rather, it was developed pragmatically as a response to critical

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[18] Lazar Volin, a foremost American student of Soviet agriculture, also assigned priority to the practical, as opposed to the ideological basis of collectivization. He explained the Communist attachment to the *kolkhoz* in this way: "First, the practical or pragmatic reasons . . . [revolving] around the need for large supplies of cheap agricultural products to feed and clothe the growing industrial population and the army . . . Second, an ideological predilection for agrarian collectivism, rooted in the Marxist-Leninist-Stalinist dogma." Lazar Volin, "Agricultural Organization," *Soviet Economic Growth*, Abraham Bergson (editor), White Plains, N. Y., 1953, p. 286.

[19] A reliable account of the heated Party economic debate may be found in Maurice Dobb, *Soviet Economic Development since* 1917 (New York, 1948), pp. 208-229, and of the political implications of the debate in Isaac Deutscher, *Stalin: A Political Biography* (Oxford, 1949), pp. 294-304.

economic conditions and the special requirements of the first Five Year Plan. Indeed, the first collectivization drive was expected to bring only 14 per cent of the land into the "socialist sector". The overwhelming success of the drive was as much a surprise to the Communist leadership as to the peasants themselves. And it was only when the drive turned out to be so phenomenally successful that the Communist planners stepped up the targets and pace of the Five Year Plan itself.

The agricultural crisis which inspired the collectivization drive of the first Five Year Plan had its origins in two situations: First, the acute grain shortage of 1927-28, and second, and more important, the post-Revolutionary structure of the land (see Chart I). As a result of the peasant revolution of 1917-18, the small and medium peasantry occupied almost all the arable land in the Soviet Union. Where they had produced only 50 per cent of nation's grain in pre-war times, they produced 85 per cent in 1926-27. Since the poor and middle peasants marketed a far smaller percentage of the grain they produced than had the great landowners and kulaks of pre-war times, their domination of the land produced a serious drop in marketed commodities.

Thus, while total grain production had declined by only five per cent below pre-Revolutionary levels, marketed grain had declined by *more than 50 per cent* — from 26 per cent of five billion poods in 1913 to 13.3 per cent of 4.749 billion poods in 1926-27.[20] The cities received far less grain than they had received in pre-war times; and due to a number of factors (among them the competition between various State purchasing agencies), the cities were paying a higher price for the grain they could obtain. One of the most serious consequences of this new relationship was the fact that little grain was available for foreign export to pay for desperately needed capital equipment.

The basic problem for the regime was to create an agricultural structure which would enable the State to siphon off a *far greater proportion of the total product,* at a price it wished to pay, than was possible under the conditions of NEP. While it is true that the regime wished to increase total agricultural production, and may have expected to achieve the goal through increased mechanization of the farms, this target was secondary. For achieving the primary goal — extraction of a greater *proportion* of the produce —

[20] A pood equals 36 pounds.

the vehicle of the large-scale collective farm, heretofore neglected, stood ready at hand.[21] 185 471

The very essence of the *kolkhoz* (collective farm) system lay in the ease with which it facilitated extraction of heavy tribute from the land in the form of extremely cheap supplies of foodstuffs and industrial crops. Thus, the rise of the Stalinist land system was closely connected with the Party's program of break-neck industrialization, massive capital investments, and strategic projects at the expense of consumption. The ever-tightening hold of the regime over the industrial working class made possible implementation of these policies without the development of consumer goods facilities; and therefore the regime could permit a drop in the levels of consumption without jeopardizing its plan. The new agricultural program — designed primarily to *redistribute* agricultural produce rather than to *increase* it — was consistent with this aspect of the plan. Moreover, the political hold collectivization afforded over the peasants assured State control of the rural labor supply and enabled the State to channel manpower into non-agricultural occupation as it deemed necessary. 423

This was the general rationale behind collectivization. The immediate cause for the first collectivization drive lay, however, in the mounting economic tensions of the late 1920s. As early as 1925-26 the regime had sought to reimpose many of the agrarian controls lifted in 1921, at the time of the inauguration of NEP. To implement this policy, agricultural prices were once again restricted and production itself subjected to heavy taxes. Retaliating in kind, the peasants drove production downward, hoarded again, and consumed what they could not hide or sell.[22] As a consequence State grain collections in 1928-29 dropped more than one-third below the level of two years before. Tension in the countryside mounted. The means by which the new monolithic party chose to meet this situation was of a magnitude equal to the challenge.

The Stalinist Solution to the Land Problem

The great offensive against the peasantry was launched late 423 185

[21] The *artel* was considered the best form of collective agriculture since it combined a sufficient number of communal features to guarantee State control with sufficient household autonomy to make it structurally feasible to the peasants. The State-appointed managers, supported by local party administrators, could enforce peasant cooperation with the Plan; and the continued existence of individual households offered the peasant that minimum of private incentive consistent with the cooperation.

[22] This crisis is well described in Dobb, p. 222.

423 in 1928, but it was not until one year later, when Stalin called for
185 "liquidation of the kulaks as a class," that its full weight was felt. Since the actual number of kulaks in post-Revolutionary Russia was not very great, this slogan made it abundantly clear that the frankly military offensive was directed against the peasantry as a whole. The story is well known: the dispatch of Communist shock cadres to the villages, the mass deportations, the herding of peasants into hastily formed collective units, the calculated famine in the Ukraine, the wholesale slaughter of livestock by the desperate peasants, the brief pause ordered by Stalin early in 1930, the renewed offensive in 1931-32, the collapse of the opposition, and the final establishment of a collective farm system in all essential respects resembling that of today. There were many subsequent modifications of the system; but its basic features were firmly established in the "avalanche" of collectivization in the 1928-32 period.

In evaluating the success of the drive and the system it created, it is necessary to reiterate that the primary utility of the collective farm lay in its efficiency as an economic and political *control device*, by which rapid industrialization of the Soviet Union could be facilitated, and not in its efficiency of production. To the extent that it made industrialization possible, it is possible to show that Soviet collectivization "succeeded."

241 So far as production is concerned, the efficiency of the collec-
423 tive farm was, and remains, low. It has been estimated that Soviet grain production in 1939 did not exceed that of 1928 by much more than the increase of sown area over the 11 intervening years.[23] Similarly, the gross production value of Soviet agriculture in 1940 exceeded 1928 by only a small fraction, though in the bumper year of 1937 the harvest may have been as much as 14 per cent higher.[24] Throughout the 1930s the Soviets put forth many claims of increased agricultural productivity which were, however, discounted by most Western experts. Western scepticism was vindicated by the 1953 acknowledgement of agricultural deterioration by N. S. Khrushchev, one of the chief architects of later Soviet agricultural policy.[25]

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[23] Naum Jasny, *Socialized Agriculture of the U.S.S.R.* (Stanford, 1950), p. 548.
[24] *Ibid.*, p. 673.
[25] Jasny's figures, which are cited above, are somewhat lower than official Soviet boasts. He made allowance for statistical falsification involved in such Soviet practices as measuring production in accordance with the "biological yield," a misleading statistical device employed by the Soviets since the early thirties and condemned by Malenkov in his August 8th, 1953 address.

TABLE 1

DIVISION OF AGRICULTURAL PRODUCT IN USSR BEFORE AND AFTER COLLECTIVIZATION †

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Year	Total Yield*	Obligatory Deliveries Million Centners	Obligatory Deliveries Percent of Total Crop	Retained by Farmers Million Centners	Retained by Farmers Percent of Total Crop**
1927/8	605.9	112.2	18.5	493.7	100
1932/3	570.1	185.2	32.5	384.9	77.9
1933/4	677.1	228.7	33.8	448.4	90.8
1934/5	669.5	226.6	33.8	442.9	89.7
1935/6	677.5	249.3	36.8	428.2	86.7
1936/7	612.5	260.0	42.4	353.5	71.4

† Propkopovicz, S. N., *Russlands Volkswirtschaft unter den Sowjets*, (Zurich, 1944), pp. 136, 138.

* Net totals, after seeds deducted from the total yield.

** 100 equals total crop retained by farmer 1927/8. Figures for subsequent years show percentage 1927/8 total retained.

But whatever the failure of collectivization to achieve productive efficiency, and other ostensible goals widely advertised in the propaganda of the time,[26] the Soviet State remained completely loyal to the system, bolstering it by police action and developing its distinctive features over the years. Evidently, the regime considered that for its investment, it was receiving an adequate return. The explanation for this unswerving loyalty to the system, in the face of the massive difficulties encountered, is to be found in the striking change in the pattern of grain collection after collectivization (see Table 1). In 1928 the State collected no more than 18.5 per cent of the total grain crop, while in 1937 an estimated 42.4 per cent was Sta[illegible]-collected.[27] That this was a direct result of collectivization [illegible]ay be seen in the fact that, from the start, the collectivized sector

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[26] For example, one of the regime claims was that collectivization wiped out the inequality between the rich kulak and the poor peasant. The hypocrisy of this claim was made evident in the agricultural order that replaced the old one. Thus Jasny writes: "The former *kulaki*, actually the more energetic, harder working peasants, are now replaced by the army of chairmen of the *kolkhozy*, tractor drivers, combine operators, and the like. These workers both number and earn more than the *kulaki* . . ." (Jasny, p. 75).

[27] Harry Schwartz (p. 313) gives the Figure 15 per cent for 1928 and 40 per cent for 1939.

241 produced more for the market per hectare of arable land than did
423 the private sector. In 1932, 60 per cent of all households in the
185 Soviet Union had been collectivized, embracing 66 per cent of the sown area. Yet the collective and State farms (*sovkhozy*) supplied 84 per cent of the marketed grain and 83 per cent of the cotton.[28]

With the reinforcement of the collective farm system the State
241 was in a position where it could force the peasants to serve as a
185 cushion for harvest shocks. In 1937, a bumper year, the peasants
471 received 35.9 per cent of the total grain crop for division among
423 themselves; but in 1938-39, mediocre crop years, the peasants received only 26.9 and 22.9 per cent of the total, despite the fact that a smaller gross volume was to be shared.[29] In each case primary State needs governed the division of the agricultural yield. The Soviet Government had created an administrative apparatus which insured, in the words of one observer, that "if anyone was to starve, [the peasants] would be the first to do so."[30]

The function of the State farms in the Soviet system is similarly linked to the problem of agricultural deliveries. Though accounting for no more than 10 per cent of the arable area in 1937, the *sovkhozy* delivered 30 per cent of the milk, 25 per cent of the wool, and 24 per cent of the meat delivered to the State in that year. Whereas the grain producing collectives delivered only one-third of their total product to the State in the late thirties, the *sovkhozy* contributed three-quarters of their crop.[31] Hence, it may be said that, from the point of view of the Soviet planner, the State farms bore a superiority over the collective farms similar to the superiority of the collectives over the private farms.

471 The case for collectivization was aptly summed up by N. A.
423 Voznesensky when he revealed that the Soviet government in World War II collected three times the annual amount of grain collected by the Czarist regime during World War I when "72 per cent of all marketed grain was concentrated in the hands of estate owners and kulaks." This threefold increase in marketable surplus

[28] Dobb, p. 240. There were, of course, other factors which accounted for the meagre quantity of goods placed on the market by the private sector, in particular, the amount of State discrimination against the private farms.
[29] Harry Schwartz, p. 265. Schwartz writes with regard to this question: "Only the government's complete domination of the peasantry through the collective farm system made this sharp change in the amount of grain collected possible." (p. 313).
[30] Leonard Hubbard, *The Economics of Soviet Agriculture* (London, 1939), p. 123.
[31] Harry Schwartz, p. 285.

241 edly conscious of the fact that the extraordinary rapidity of Soviet industrial growth in the thirties was achieved partly at the cost of a greater disparity between industrial and agricultural development than was characteristic of the major Western nations.

241 185 The extent to which the Communists were prepared to permit a lag in agricultural progress was indicated, first of all, by the small portion of national resources the Plans allocated to agriculture. As shown in Table 20, the planned investment in agriculture averaged around 10 per cent of the total investment schedule. In evaluating the figures in Table 20 it should be remembered that, with the exception of Czechoslovakia, the economies of Eastern Europe were primarily agricultural. Furthermore, in the period of the Plans, an increasingly large share of the land came under the control of the State, whose investment policy is here under scrutiny.

Another indication of the conscious purpose behind Communist agricultural neglect is to be found in the Plan targets set for farm commodities. As Table 21 indicates, the Plans provide for approximately four times as great an increase in the production of producer goods as of agricultural goods. And while a 50 per cent increase in agriculture is not negligible, it represents a goal the Communists, on the basis of Soviet experience, knew they could not possibly fulfill.[11]

TABLE 21

433 PLANNED FIVE YEAR PLAN PRODUCTION INCREASES
(Poland – Six Years)

Country	Producer Goods	Consumer Goods	Agriculture
	(Year preceding Plan = 100)		
Bulgaria (1948-53)	326	273	137
Czechoslovakia (1948-53)	230	170	153
Hungary (1950-54)	380	245	154
Poland (1950-56)	254	211	150

[11] The underfulfillment of agricultural and light industry targets in the USSR had become almost a tradition, and the East European Communists certainly were conscious of this heritage. They must have known, too, that the failure to fulfill the targets set for non-heavy industrial production did not stop the Soviet planners from setting targets far beyond possible attainment in the next plan (see Harry Schwartz, pp. 305-329). This adamant refusal to bring non-heavy industrial targets into the realm of reality was part of the dogma, firmly held up to Stalin's death, that the rapid expansion of heavy industry did not in any way deter the development of light industry, a dogma which was patently false, but one which for reasons of public safety, had to be upheld.

In pre-war Soviet Plans the targets for consumer goods and agricultural products were invariably underfulfilled, despite the fact that the targets were always set much below those for industry. Indeed, so slight was Communist concern for consumer goods and agriculture that the same targets were frequently repeated in successive Plans.[12] Since we have seen that the Eastern European Communists were deeply influenced by the Soviet experience, it can be assumed that they had few real illusions concerning their capacity to fulfill even those relatively modest targets set for consumer goods and agriculture. "While industrial production in 1953 compared with 1948," said the Czechoslovak Premier Viliam Siroky, "will increase two-fold, agricultural production during the same period will increase only one-third, and will still be below pre-war levels."[13] But the frankest admission of this planned economic disproportion was made by the then Premier, Antonin Zapotocky, in 1949.

> We must rid ourselves of any fond illusions that a rise in the standard of living may be regarded as a necessary corollary, or even ought to precede the successful implementation of the Plan. The exact opposite is the truth: In order to make it possible that our material and cultural level be raised, it will first be necessary to fulfill the Plan . . .[14]

Zapotocky's concise formula was carried out to the letter, as the chronic inadequacy of the urban food supply showed. A similarly candid discussion of the alternatives was given by Hilary Minc, Chairman of the Polish State Planning Commission. His effort to speak frankly on these questions was part of a debate among Polish Communist leaders during the winter of 1951-52. Collectivization had been halted some time in mid-1951; and the question of regaining Communist initiative on the land was evidently being discussed. Minc told a meeting of the activists of the Party Central Committee on October 9th, 1951 that the low level of agricultural production was due to the growing discrepancy between agricultural and industrial production, and therefore he concluded that the acceleration of collectivization (and the further widening of the gulf which it implied) would only intensify the difficulties.[15] Minc was answered on January 9th, 1952, by Eugeniusz Szyr, his deputy

[12] See, for example, Dobb, p. 292.
[13] *Rude Pravo* (Prague), September 16, 1953.
[14] Quoted in *News from Behind the Iron Curtain* (Free Europe Press, New York), December, 1953, p. 6.
[15] Report to the meeting of activists, Central Committee of the Polish Workers Party, October 9, 1951.

433 in the Planning Commission, who said that the discrepancy between
185 agriculture and industry was "legitimate and in accord with the general conditions of the developing productive forces."[16] In a *Nowe Drogi* article published in February 1952, the then President, Bierut, put the final stamp of disapproval on Minc's analysis of the agricultural failure by stating that "the low production in agriculture cannot be explained by conditions and objective reasons." In other words, it was not, he said, the Government's policy which was responsible for the agricultural lag, but the ineptness with which the policy was being implemented by officials.[17]

Bierut answered Minc by denying that an agricultural lag was a necessary corollary of rapid industrial expansion. It is doubtful that he actually believed this to be true, but in order to justify the increased pace of industrialization it was necessary to maintain this dogma. By reiterating the dogma, Bierut ended this brief, but very significant argument; soon full-scale collectivization was resumed in Poland.

Later in 1952, Bierut again complained of lagging agriculture, citing figures to show the widening disproportion (see Table 22). The "rate of increase of agricultural production remains far below the needs of the economy," he said, but he steadfastly refused to acknowledge that the breakneck industrial pace might be responsible.[18] As events turned out, the figures he cited to show agricultural insufficiency decidedly overestimated future agricultural produc-

TABLE 22 *

PRODUCTION IN POLAND – BY SECTOR
(1949 = 100)

	1949	1950	1951	1952	1953 (Planned)
Socialist Industry	100	131	152	192	258
Agriculture as a Whole....	100	111	106	115	150

* B. Bierut, Report at the "Plenum of the Central Committee of the PZPR," June 14-15, 1952.

[16] *Nowe Drogi*, December, 1951, p. 35.
[17] *Nowe Drogi*, February, 1952, pp. 7-8.
[18] *Trybuna Ludu* (Warsaw), November 6, 1953.

n.[19] Undoubtedly, Bierut was conscious of the fantastic optimism 433
the planned 50 per cent increase in agricultural production by 185 ●
53; but he could not admit it until the 1953 New Course released
n from some of the extended industrial targets which had made
e agricultural lag necessary. In his speech to the Central Com-
ttee Plenum in October 1953, Bierut vindicated Minc's original
alysis, and acknowledged that the simultaneous expansion of
th agriculture and industry at the planned pace was impossible.

Since the New Course constituted a partial repudiation of the
ogram of ever-increasing economic disproportion, Communist
aders felt free to admit the gravity of the situation created by
eir previous policies. Gheorghiu-Dej, the Romanian Premier, for
ample, declared:

> The rate of industrialization has been forced, especially as regards heavy industry, which led to the establishment of too large a volume of capital investment in comparison with the national revenue, exceeding even the provisions of the Five Year Plan.[20]

other words, the bureaucratic machine tended to distort the
vestment schedule even more than called for in the Plan. "As the
sult of the allocation of too large capital investments for heavy
dustry," Gheorghiu-Dej continued, "agriculture—surely one of the
incipal branches of the national economy—and consumer goods
ave not been supplied with sufficient funds . . ." In Bulgaria, the
sproportions were apparently as pronounced as those in Romania
t, for a variety of reasons, Bulgarian Premier Vulko Chervenkov
id not feel it necessary to criticize them so sharply. But he too,
his September 8, 1953 New Course address, complained of the
rious lag in consumer goods and agriculture resulting from the
nbalanced investment program.[21] The most dramatic revelation of
gricultural neglect in the Satellite area came from Hungary in
remier Imre Nagy's speech of July 4, 1953, in which he condemned
the most severe terms the hitherto-accepted policy of heavy
dustrial emphasis.[22] Unlike the other Satellite leaders, who tended

[19] In actual fact the planned targets for 1952 and 1953 were not even partially
lfilled. Instead of 115 per cent in 1952, only 104.9 per cent was reached;
d instead of 150 per cent in 1953, only 109.0 per cent was reached
(*Gospodarka Planowa* [Warsaw], No. 12, 1953, p. 10).

[20] *Scanteia* (Bucharest), August 23, 1953.

[21] *Rabotnichesko Delo* (Sofia), September 9, 1953. At the 6th Congress of
e Bulgarian Communist Party, both Chervenkov and the Chairman of the
tate Planning Commission, Georgi Chankov, acknowledged that agriculture
d seriously lagged behind industry (*Rabotnichesko Delo*, March 2, 1954).

[22] *Szabad Nep* (Budapest), July 5, 1953.

433 to treat the growing economic disproportions as an *aberration* of
185 the Plans, or at least of the intention of the Plans, or an unfortunate and inexplicable oversight, Nagy clearly assigned responsibility for the failure to the leadership itself. Bierut and Gheorghiu-Dej phrased their announcements of the New Course in such a way as to hint that the agricultural failure had been the result of official policy, but they hedged considerably. The extremely critical economic situation in Hungary of 1953 forced Nagy to treat the past policy with a frankness which was not as apparent elsewhere. But despite the reticence elsewhere, it was clear that the growing disproportions were the result of deliberate Communist application, with slight variations, of the formula stated by Zapotocky in 1949.

665 The most striking proof of the secondary role which agricultural development played in Eastern Europe is the general weakness of the Communist political apparatus in the countryside. In this respect East European Communists followed closely in the Soviet footsteps, where approximately 85 per cent of the kolkhozes were without a Party organization in 1949.[33] In Poland, Jacob Berman admitted, 43 per cent of the *villages* were without a Party organization altogether,[34] and elsewhere in the block the situation was no better.[35]

The absence of strong and viable Party units in the countryside reflects the unwillingness of the Communist leadership to assign its best technical and administrative personnel outside heavy industry, as well as the natural gravitation of rising bureaucrats—many of them, after all, drawn from the countryside itself—to the comforts of city life. Throughout the Soviet sphere the composition of the Communist Parties has become increasingly identified with the new managerial bureaucracy and, consequently, the Party units tend to exist in those places where the concentration of technicians is greatest.

This partly explains why implementation of the New Course in 1953-54 has made it imperative that the Party organizations in the countryside be strengthened. The East European regimes have

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[33] Merle Fainsod, *How Russia Is Ruled* (Cambridge, 1953), p. 454. Fainsod also notes that only 17.7 per cent of the Party members in the predominantly agricultural Ukraine were engaged in agricultural pursuits.

[34] *Trybuna Ludu*, November 6, 1953.

[35] See the speeches of the Czechoslovak Minister of Agriculture, Jindrich Uher (*Rude Pravo*, December 19, 1953), and the Hungarian Minister of Agriculture, Andras Hegedus (*Szabad Nep*, December 31, 1953).

CHAPTER V

OLD FAILURE AND NEW COURSE (1953)

1. *The System in Crisis*

The year 1953 constituted a major turning point in the development of agricultural policy throughout the Soviet sphere. Repercussions were felt from the most remote *kolkhoz* in Siberia to the most backward mountain farm in Albania. For the first time since 1928, when the initial Communist collectivization drive was launched, the powerful Communist mechanism for intensifying exploitation of the peasantry was halted and a period of concession, retrenchment, and cautious retreat was ushered in.

Unlike previous pauses in the Communist offensive against the peasantry — in 1930, 1935, and 1941-5 — the 1953 "readjustment" was acompanied by a revaluation of the entire relationship between agrarian policy and industrial expansion. The 1930 Stalin "Dizziness With Success" speech signified only a temporary pause in the first Five Year Plan; the 1935 decree enlarging private household plots represented only a slight reorganization of the still fluid *kolkhoz* structure; and the relaxation of 1941-45 was due largely to the special exigencies of World War II. None of the concessions made during these periods (with the possible exception of the wartime years) were as broad in scope as those of 1953; and none were offered as an integral part of a concern for mounting disproportions afflicting the entire economic life.

The elaboration of post-Stalin agricultural policies serves not merely as a climax to the indictment of the Communist land program, but as a sharp cleavage in the history of collectivization through which its inner character might be most acutely analyzed. This study has therefore, drawn heavily upon the flood of frank speeches made by Communist leaders in the second half of 1953. Their candor, like the correspondence which attended the Tito-Stalin

dispute in 1948, illumine areas of conflict and difficulty hitherto only guessed at.

The causes of argicultural retrenchment were various and a full exploration of them is not appropriate here. But from the multiplicity of probable causes, two basic facts may be singled out: First, the poltical readjustment which took place following Stalin's death brought about a number of organic changes in the Communist movement. The precise nature of the changes generated by the sudden loss of Stalin is little known, and even less understood; but clearly they had very important social and economic implications. Some of the most oppressive and aggressive features of Communism, feasible when Stalin was at the helm, were evidently not feasible when in the hands of a "collective leadership." Stalinist policies had resulted in the growing economic disproportions described above: the hysterical drive for industrialization, the steady decline of the standard of living, and the stagnation of agriculture, conditions which may be considered the secondary causes of the New Course, insofar as the death of Stalin made it imperative that drastic steps be taken to alter them.

To the very eve of the New Course in 1953, the traditional Stalinist agricultural offensive was in full swing. Indeed, in Czechoslovakia, Hungary, and especially in Poland, collectivization drives were reaching their greatest pitch in the spring of 1953. The slogan, "liquidation of the kulaks," was generally accepted, and the entire peasantry subjected to ceaseless harassment. In the Soviet Union the decline of livestock population between 1950 and 1953 reflected the harsh spirit of the last years of Stalin's life. The basic measure of success was heavy industrial production; the keynote was the increasing obedience and discipline demanded at the 19th Party Congress; and the tone was set by the Slansky trial in Prague at the end of 1952, and the arrest of the Kremlin doctors in Moscow at the beginning of 1953.

The New Course therefore represented a sudden break in the rising curve revealed by these events. Between Stalin's death in March and Imre Nagy's astounding New Course address in Hungary in July, the governments of almost every Communist country made various minor concessions which presaged the more drastic

[1] For a detailed exposition of the events of 1953 leading up to promulgation of the New Course, together with an analysis of current trends, see "New Policies in the Soviet Sphere" (Free Europe Press: New York, November 1953).

185 178 656 reforms to come. Amnesties were declared in Soviet Russia and Romania, the imprisoned American correspondent, William Oatis, was released in Czechoslovakia, the aggressive anti-Tito line of the preceding years was modified everywhere, and in East Germany reforms were announced which, because they communicated regime indecision to the people, touched off the famous June 17th revolt. This revolt, and an earlier, perhaps more significant one in Czechoslovakia, seem only to have accelerated the pace of change in the sphere. By October 1953 New Course policies had been announced by all of the Communist countries (with the exception, of course, of China). "We must note, and we must state frankly before the whole country," said the new Hungarian Premier Imre Nagy, "that the objectives of the augmented Five Year Plan are beyond our strength"[2] "We must adopt . . . a considerably reduced tempo of industrialization which will enable us to step up output of consumer goods and ensure a still greater development of agriculture," the Bulgarian Premier Vulko Chervenkov said on September 8th.[3] "It has become clear," said Czechoslovak Premier Viliam Siroky on September 15th, "that certain targets of the extended Five-Year Plan for heavy industry were too high."[4]

The agricultural policy pattern that emerged in the middle of 1953 varied from one country of the Soviet sphere to the next. Yet everywhere, with the possible exception of Hungary, where the crisis assumed a special severity, the new policies were essentially the same. Polish Premier Bierut explained in his New Course address in October that it was:

> . . . no mere coincidence that the . . . problem of what the emphasis of our future economic development should be . . . has appeared today with equal force and timeliness in all countries of the Socialist camp.

These similarities in pace and timing, he explained, arise,

> not only from the identical character of social changes taking place in these countries but also from the basic similarity — in spite of certain differences — in the class structure of the countries which are engaged in Socialist construction.[5]

The "social changes" of which Bierut spoke were the growing economic disproportions, the vast expansion of an industrial plant at the expense of living standards and agricultural prosperity. The

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[2] *Szabad Nep* (Budapest), July 5, 1953.
[3] *Rabotnicheske Delo* (Sofia), September 9, 1953.
[4] *Rude Pravo* (Prague), September 16, 1953.
[5] Quoted by S. Jedrychowski, *Nowe Drogi* (Warsaw), No. 10, 1953.

"problem" the New Course had to grapple with, as Bierut stated it, was to determine "what the emphasis of our future economic development should be." Clearly the "problem" could only be solved by modifying past emphases, and this meant, first of all, a new policy toward agriculture. 178 185 656.

In Bulgaria, where over half the land is in the "Socialist sector," the New Course has had the least impact; in East Germany, on the other hand, where capitalist elements are still plentiful, the post-Stalin reorientation had its most pronounced effect. In Poland, where collectivization had proceeded very slowly and cautiously up to 1953, the New Course signified only an abrupt halt in the land offensive, but little retreat. In Romania, where collectivization had also been modest in scope, the reforms were broader, producing a plethora of decrees and resolutions. In Czechoslovakia and Hungary, where the pace of collectivization had been rapid and stormy, the New Course brought about a reversal of the aggressive policies, a sharp reversal in Hungary, a slighter one in Czechoslovakia.

The national variations were great; but the basic features of the New Course were areawide:

1. An attempt is being made to increase the proportion of national resources alloted to agriculture. "We must teach our people," said Polish theoretician Jacob Berman, "after this long period of concentration on heavy industry, to achieve a balance between heavy and light industry."[6] The State budgets for the year 1954 announced in Bulgaria, Czechoslovakia and Hungary reflected this shift in emphasis.[7]

2. The effort to increase the agricultural produce available to the cities by further peasant exploitation has been halted. Greater emphasis is to be placed upon the use of material incentives, rather than on administrative pressure, in increasing total agricultural yield. "We must," said Berman, "put on the market goods which the peasant is interested in purchasing," since, as he explained, the increased supply of goods for the cities was to be partially the result of an "increased supply of consumer goods to the countryside."[8]

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[6] *Trybuna Ludu* (Warsaw), November 6, 1953.
[7] In Hungary, for example, the 1954 State budget plans for doubling the proportion of total investment allocated to agriculture (Report of Bela Szalai to the Hungarian National Assembly, January 22, 1954). Elsewhere, the increase is more modest but nevertheless significant.
[8] *Trybuna Ludu* (Warsaw), November 6, 1953.

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3. Consequently, the policy of collectivization, designed to insure a steady supply of goods to the cities without much payment in return, loses a large part of its meaning, and the collectivization drive itself is halted. While it is true that collectivized farming is still officially considered the highest form of agrarian organization,[9] the revised economic plans of the Satellite regimes do not intend appreciable extension of the "Socialist sector." Indeed, the goal of increasing the standard of living precludes, for some time, the resumption of any Communist land offensive.

4. Similarly, the New Course has made something of an anomaly of the traditional practices of the Communist land offensive: the division of the peasantry into antagonistic groups, the discrimination against the independent peasantry as a whole, the compilation of "kulak lists." These techniques, which were so well adapted to the collectivization campaign, lose much of their meaning in the new atmosphere. Again and again Communist leaders admonish their bureaucracy to cease treating the peasant as an "enemy" and everywhere but in Bulgaria it is now openly declared that the independent peasantry must be relied upon for the major portion of the agricultural produce.[10] Violent anti-kulak campaigns must also be relinquished as long as the regimes are interested in agricultural production and not merely in agricultural redistribution. Therefore, the post-Stalin regimes call for "limitation" of the "kulak" rather than his "elimination."[11]

5. Since increased agricultural production is the urgent and immediate necessity, and since increased administrative force cannot be used to obtain it, incentives for the peasant must be broadened. Delivery quotas are reduced; delivery prices are increased; taxes and fees of all sorts are lowered; and arrears in many categories are canceled. The pattern is nowhere identical; but in each country most of the same devices were employed.

"We must understand," said Berman, [that the new policy] "is going to cost a large sum of money. If the peasant gets this money but doesn't get any goods for it, including those which he

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[9] See, for example, the Bierut speech at the 2nd Congress of the Polish Workers Party (PZPR), March 10, 1954.

[10] "We shall not and must not force anybody to join agricultural cooperatives, and we also do not think that the private farmer represents our enemy, we consider him our ally" (Czechoslovak President Antonin Zapotocky, *Rude Pravo*, February 23, 1954).

[11] See, for example, Gheorghiu-Dej., *For a Lasting Peace*, November 6, 1953.

really wants . . . there will be no increase in [agricultural] production." Therefore, a dual policy of increased payment for agricultural goods and increased production of vitally needed farmers' commodities is instituted. 656 178 185 423

6. An attempt is being made to redress the balance so far as the concentration of techniques is concerned. A vigorous effort to detach technicians from cities and urban industries and to send them to farms for whose direction and assistance they were ostensibly trained, is being made in conjunction with the new plan.[13] This is true everywhere in the Soviet sphere, especially in Poland the USSR, and Romania.

7. If the New Course is designed partly to consolidate the existing agricultural structure, it must be revaluated in terms of long-range perspectives. Hence, those collective farms which have the least social stability and economic viability are permitted to return to the private sector. In Czechoslovakia, where some 40 per cent of the farms were not paying their own way, according to Premier Siroky, a small percentage of the farms were permitted to disband in the fall of 1953.[13] In Yugoslavia, where hundreds of collectives in mountainous areas produced very little and served only as a drain on the State treasury, almost half of these farms have been dissolved since 1951.[14] And in Hungary, where peasant dissatisfaction was so great that, even with a police-State normally equipped to handle discontent, it constituted an element of such basic instability that almost half of the collectivized households have left the "Socialist sector."[15]

Above all, the New Course represents an effort to stabilize and consolidate the system of relationships carved out by the East European regimes. The next few years are likely to witness a concentrated Communist effort to make a smoothly-functioning economic order out of the conquests already gained, rather than sweeping away present problems by posing future challenges, as they have done in the past.

The New Course does not, by any stretch of the imagination,

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[13] The program of reinforcing the technical assistance to the countryside has encountered considerable resistance from the technicians themselves, and, indeed, in the USSR, the government complains that many technicians who go to the countryside refuse to take their families with them, so convinced are they that the new assignments are temporary (*Pravda*, November 27, 1953).
[13] *Rude Pravo* (Prague), November 10, 1953.
[14] *Borba* (Belgrade), February 29, 1953.
[15] *Szabad Nep* (Budapest), December 31, 1953.

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represent a repudiation of the agricultural organization pioneered by the Soviet planners in the early 1930s and brought to Eastern Europe in the late 1940s. The basic characteristics of this organization cannot be abandoned without the most thoroughgoing reorientation of the whole economy. The New Course cannot therefore be compared with the New Economic Policy of early Soviet history. The NEP was declared before the Soviet industrial and bureaucratic system had been built, and a retreat to a relatively free market system was possible. The New Course, on the other hand, has been promulgated within the framework of an already fully-elaborated industrial and bureaucratic system, and the regimes can no longer rely upon the free market for agricultural produce.

Having built this social system and enclosed themselves within it, the East European Communists have lost much of the freedom of choice and flexibility which aided them so greatly in their postwar assumption of power. Therefore, they are subject to the internal laws of the system, and it is doubtful whether they can make a success of their efforts to reorient its basic relationships. The authoritarian order is well adapted to the leadership of a rapidly expanding heavy industrial, semi-military economy, but it is badly equipped to handle the problems of small-scale agriculture and consumer demand. In nine months of operation, the New Course has already made it clear that the greatest obstacle to stabilization of the Stalinist social order comes from the social order itself, and its voracious demands.[16]

Prior to the introduction of the New Course, it was widely assumed that the East European Communist drive to emulate Soviet achievements was inexorable, and required only time for completion. In particular, it was assumed that the Satellite regimes could not rest until collectivization was completed, as if the Communists could not face themselves ideologically with one independent farm remaining. But the events of 1953 have highlighted the degree to which Communist agricultural policy has been, from the start, conditioned by the bedrock economic needs of a developing social structure, rather than by the abstract demands of rigid doctrine. Indeed, even the Soviets, whose collectivized agriculture had attained the state of "near-perfection" and completion toward which

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[16] For an extensive discussion of internal bureaucratic resistance to the New Course see "The Bureaucracy Wavers," *News from Behind the Iron Curtain* (Free Europe Press, New York), January, 1953.

the East European Communists were striving, are in the process of readjusting the structure in line with the new political relationships. 656 178 185

No doubt the present *modus vivendi* between the peasantry and the Communist regimes is precarious and unstable, at best an uneasy truce between essentially antagonistic social forces. But there is good reason to believe that the Communists are determined to keep this mid-way course for some time to come, with only minor wavering within the ranks. 423

3. *"Salami Tactics" and the New Course* 423

The development of East European Communism since World War II has been dominated by the pragmatic methods of "salami tactics," the theory expounded by Hungarian ex-Premier Rakosi, which justified pursuit of any social or economic program that reinforces Communist political power. The advocacy of land reform facilitated Communist absorption of the State machine in 1945-46, and therefore became approved Communist "agrarian policy." Similarly, since advocacy of a productive middle peasantry may help to facilitate Communist retention of power in 1953-54, it has become approved Communist "agrarian policy." At each stage, the Communists speak as if no other policy had ever been considered, and as if no other policy could possibly be.[17] As always, however, their primary concern is with power, and their ideological pronouncements tailored to suit it. The New Course is a development very much within the spirit of the "salami tactics" philosophy.

The success and failure of Communist agriculture policy in Eastern Europe may be attributable to these same "salami tactics." This strategem of slow suffocation made possible the seizure of power under circumstances unsuited to "classic" revolutionary forms; and it was well suited to a political apparatus incapable of a frontal revolutionary attack. The policy of slow, piecemeal land collectivization made possible the extension of the "Socialist sector" at a pace which did not arouse the united antagonism of the peasantry at any one time, thus avoiding the type of militant resist-

[17] See above 91-2 for a brief discussion of official explanations of change in policy. Considering the importance of changes in policy emphasis in 1953, it is remarkable that the Communists have made so few attempts to analyze their past performances. The official definition of "Socialism" itself was altered during 1953 (see Fogarasi, *Tarsadalmi Szemle* (Budapest), September-October, 1953), and to this date not a single Communist theoretician has acknowledged the fact.

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CHAPTER V

THE ECONOMIC PLANS OF THE SATELLITES

ALL THE satellite countries have introduced economic Plans. 185 ●
These plans are of two kinds: the short-term plans, which ran 433
from 1947 to 1948-9, whose aim was recovery, and the long-term plans, which began in 1949 or 1950, whose aim is to raise production considerably above the pre-war level. Yugoslavia alone did not undertake the two kinds of plans but started with a Five Year Plan (1947-51), while Rumania has not yet gone beyond the scope of one-year plans (she intends to introduce a Five Year Plan in 1951). Let us examine the main features of the plans.

The long-term plans have very ambitious targets of output. They fix an annual increase in the gross national product of 8 per cent in Czechoslovakia, 10 per cent in Hungary and Poland, 12 per cent in Bulgaria and 14 per cent in Yugoslavia. As regards the annual increase in manufactured products, it is 9 per cent in Czechoslovakia, 11 per cent in Poland, 13 per cent in Hungary, 17 per cent in Bulgaria and 37 per cent in Yugoslavia.

To arrive at a correct conception of what these percentages mean, it is necessary to know on what basis these percentual calculations have been made. For instance, the industrial production in the U.S. and British Zones of Germany rose between December, 1946, and December, 1948, by 137 per cent, or on a yearly average by 68.5 per cent, but this in itself does not signify any really spectacular achievement for Germany, since in December, 1946, the level of production was exceptionally low, and even after the increase of 137 per cent, it did not reach the pre-war level. It is difficult to discover what is the exact starting point from which the plans of the Eastern European countries set out, as there is very little

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185 433 information available on the subject. It is known that the agricultural output in the basic year was, in percentage of pre-war output, in Bulgaria, 70 per cent; in Czechoslovakia, 80 per cent; in Hungary, 85 per cent; in Poland, 70 per cent; in Yugoslavia, 69 per cent. As regards the industrial output in the basic year, it was, in comparison with the pre-war level, in Czechoslovakia, 102 per cent; in Poland, 133 per cent; in Bulgaria, 170 per cent. As far as Poland is concerned, it must be borne in mind that the addition of the 'Regained Territories' doubles her industrial capacity. It is not known how much weight is given in the plans to industrial as compared with agricultural output in the total national output. The rise of the total national production would have been considerably less proportionately if any year *before* and not *after* the war had been chosen as the basic year, since agricultural output in the 'basic year' was in each country below the pre-war level of output and industrial output was above while only a small minority of the population was engaged in industry.

In addition, it is obvious that in general any calculation in percentages of the rise of output that does not take into consideration the absolute magnitude of the basis will paint a rosier picture the more backward the country is. Thus if Yugoslavia's Five Year Plan envisages an increase in the output of crude steel of 223 per cent in 1951 above the level of 1939, it might leave the impression that the achievements of Yugoslavia's steel industry will be four times greater than that of the United States between 1937 and 1948, when she increased her output by 56 per cent. But if the achievement of the industries of the two countries is described in absolute magnitudes, a totally different impression is given. The production of Yugoslavia's steel industry will rise, if the Plan is fulfilled, from 240 thousand tons to 760 thousand tons, i.e., by a little more than half a million tons; while that of the U.S.A. rose from 51.4 million tons to 80.3 million, i.e., by 28.9 million tons. André Philip, French delegate to the Economic Commission for Europe, illustrated this point by saying that his grandson had recently cut a second tooth, thus increasing his dental production by 100 per cent—but he still had less teeth than most people.

There is another aspect to the question. Figures of the rise in output, when the amount of investment or disinvestment is

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not taken into account, can be misleading. If the owner of a factory does not renew its machinery, buildings, and so forth, but instead builds a new factory which is equal in value to the depreciation of the old, then the *immediate* result is that two factories are producing instead of one, and the output rises, although the amount of his capital remains unchanged, and after the total depreciation of his old factory, output will decline to the level of only one factory. The same principle holds good for the countries of Eastern Europe, where the rise in output over the past few years has not been accompanied by a parallel increase in the investment of capital. In some cases, it has even been accompanied by disinvestment, as the following table, dealing with agriculture, shows:

	Level of Agricultural Production (Index numbers. 1934-8 = 100)			Estimated Net Investment in Fixed Capital in Agriculture and Fisheries (in million dollars, 1938 prices)	
	1946/7	*1947/8*	*1948/9*	*1947*	*1948*
Bulgaria ..	67	71	—	−13	−11
Czechoslovakia	80	62	80	−21	−19
Hungary ..	57	67	85	−11	−5
Poland ..	46	59	70	−5	11

(U.N. *Economic Survey of Europe in 1948*, Geneva, 1949, pp. 17, 51)

(In order not to get a false picture one should bear in mind that the negative balance of investments in agriculture in fixed capital may have been offset by an increase in livestock, which is not included in the figures).

Another example of the same phenomenon is the textile and clothing industry of Poland. This showed a big rise in output in 1947, and at the same time a net disinvestment of 10 million dollars in 1938 prices (Ibid. p. 53).

Another factor must be taken into account. In the backward conditions of Eastern Europe, even a small addition to the net investment may bring about a disproportionately large addition to the output, the more so—in the short run—if certain whole new industries are built while other plants or branches of industry are starved of capital.

Even with these reservations, the investment plans of the countries of Eastern Europe should not be underestimated, though the statistics are really related to gross new investments (without depreciation being taken into account). In absolute figures the targets were:

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CAPITAL EXPENDITURE
(MILLION DOLLARS 1948 PRICES)

Country	Period	Total	Yearly
Poland	1947-9	1,950	650
	1950-5	—	—
Czechoslovakia	1947-8	1,340	670
	1949-53	5,800	1,160
Hungary ..	1947-9	570	190
	1950-4	2,200	440
Rumania ..	1949	450	450
Yugoslavia ..	1947-51	2,900	580
Bulgaria	1947-8	221	111
	1949-53	850	170

(Ibid. p. 203)

Thus every year a gross investment is planned of about 4 thousand million dollars in 1948 prices. This is a tremendous figure, making up about 20-25 per cent of the national incomes of these countries. Such a large investment, of course, places a heavy burden on the shoulders of the population.

How do these investment targets compare with actual investments in other countries? The gross annual investment, according to the Plans, will be about 45 dollars (at 1948 prices) per head of population. As against this in 1948 the *net* investment *at 1938 prices* (which are about half of 1948 prices) in the countries of Western Europe was: Norway 55 dollars, Sweden 42, United Kingdom 36, Denmark 32, Netherlands 27, France 16, Belgium (1947) 16, Italy 10. (Ibid. p. 48). Thus compared with investments in Western Europe the investments planned in Eastern Europe are not very spectacular.* To realise them will require great sacrifices on the part of the populations and yet are far too small to help, in the foreseeable future, to bridge the gap between the levels of development of Western and Eastern Europe.

The magnitude of the investments planned fall short of these countries' needs of rapid industrialisation. This is clearly revealed by considering the question of how many people will be absorbed in industry in proportion with the agricultural overpopulation and the natural increase of population. The Polish Plan fixes a total increase of 300,000 in the number of people

*This was reflected most clearly in a comparison of the actual net investments in fixed capital per head of population in 1949 (dollars in 1938 prices): Norway 59, U.K. 41, Sweden 36, Denmark 32, Netherlands 31, France 24; the corresponding figures for the countries of Eastern Europe were: Yugoslavia 12, Hungary 12, Poland 9, Czechoslovakia 8. (United Nations, *Economic Survey of Europe in 1949*, Geneva, 1950, p. 39).

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in manufacturing industry, the Czechoslovak Plan an increase of 250,000, the Bulgarian Plan an increase of 90,000 and the Hungarian Plan an increase of 300,000 (including industries other than manufacturing). The U.N. Survey that gives these facts, remarks: 'These figures, if related to present employment in manufacturing, indicate a substantial increase. If, however, the figures are related to the total populations of the countries, they are less striking. In the four countries mentioned, additional employment in industry over the plan period accounts for only 1 to 2 per cent of the total population, which in itself is expected to rise by some 5 per cent in the same period' (p. 206).

On many points the plans are silent. Unlike Russia's first Five Year Plan or the plans of the Organisation for European Economic Co-operation for Western Europe, the Plans of the 'People's Democracies' contain no information about foreign trade either among themselves or between each of them and Russia, or the West. They also blur over the question of how the total national income will be divided between consumption and accumulation (investment), but contain only some scattered information about the planned consumption of some particular goods. This silence speaks volumes. The non-publication of information about foreign trade is intended to cover up the exploitation of these countries by Russia; the non-publication of information about the division of the national income between consumption and accumulation is intended to cover up the exploitation of the masses under the banner of industrialisation.

This last point about the division of the national income between consumption and accumulation is of vital importance when we attempt to discover the factors determining the living conditions of the masses. Burdened with a terrible backwardness, an autocratic bureaucracy and the yoke of Russian imperialism, industrialisation will inevitably be carried out in such a way that compulsory savings will far surpass what the people themselves would be ready to save of their own free will. In such circumstances, consumption must be subordinated to accumulation, as the experience of Eastern Europe over the past few years (and of twenty years' planning in Russia) has clearly shown. The following table illustrates the 'capital

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434 starvation' of the industries producing consumption goods, while the new capital investment is directed into the capital goods industries:

ESTIMATED NET INVESTMENT IN FIXED CAPITAL IN INDUSTRY IN 1947
(MILLIONS OF DOLLARS IN 1938 PRICES)

	Hungary		Poland	
Food processing, etc. ..	−1.7	−1.5	−1.4	−11.7
Textiles and clothing ..	0.5		−10.0	
Leather and rubber ..	0.1		0.2	
Paper and printing	−0.4		−0.5	
Timber and timber products	−0.1		0.2	
Building materials, etc. ..	−0.7		−1.0	
Metals and engineering ..	5.3	5.8	7.4	13.6
Chemicals	0.5		6.2	
Total manufacturing ..	3.5		1.1	

(Ibid. p. 53)

This is a foretaste of the future.*

185 433 As regards agriculture the Plans for all the countries, except Poland, provide that the output shall exceed the pre-war level, by about a sixth in Czechoslovakia and Hungary, and a third to a half in Yugoslavia and Bulgaria. In Poland it may not exceed its pre-war level in present territory. (Ibid. p. 206).

*In U.S.S.R. the relatively great lag in industries producing means of consumption behind those producing means of production is shown by the following official data of the division of the gross output of industry:

DIVISION OF GROSS OUTPUT OF INDUSTRY INTO MEANS OF PRODUCTION AND MEANS OF CONSUMPTION (IN PERCENTAGES)

	1913	1928	1932	1937	1940	1942 (Planned)
Means of production	33.3	32.8	53.3	57.8	61.0	62.2
Means of consumption	66.7	67.2	46.7	42.2	39.0	37.8

It is very difficult to check the *absolute* change in the production of different means of consumption. In Russian statistics a number of simple tricks are used to describe the situation in more glowing terms than is true. The output of a number of consumption industries is given only in monetary terms; the production of the small factories which, till 1928, made an important contribution to the production of means of consumption, is not included.

Official statistics can therefore show a tremendous rise in the output of shoes, which, however, cannot be squared with the facts. The number of animals slaughtered annually after the big 'collectivisation' drive never reached the number slaughtered previously, as it was not until 1938 that the total number of livestock reached the 1929 figure (in 1929 cattle numbered 68.1 million, in 1938, 63.2; sheep and goats numbered 147.2 and 102.1 million respectively). At the same time the surplus of imported hides, skins and leather over exported was 54.3 thousand tons in 1928 as against only 15.6 thousand tons in 1938. Only Stalinist statisticians can produce the 'miracle' of tripling the number of leather shoes out of a decreasing quantity of leather. The Russian government, relying on the 'short memory' of the people, or more correctly on the oppressive machinery which ensures that past memories remain unuttered, adds insult to injury. While promising a tremendous rise in the production of means of con-

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A technical revolution in agriculture is also planned for the coming few years (except in Yugoslavia). This is shown by the tremendous rise in the number of tractors: 185 433 407

ACTUAL AND PLANNED NUMBER OF TRACTORS IN RELATION TO ARABLE LAND

Country	*Year*	*Number (thousands)*	*Arable land per Tractor (hectares)*
Poland	1946	5.5	3,000
	1955	76.5	220
Czechoslovakia	1946	11.8	460
	1953	45.0	120
Hungary	1947	11.9	490
	1954	21.0†	280
Rumania	1948	11.0	850
	1949	12.5	740
Bulgaria	1946	4.6	920
	1953	10.0	430
Yugoslavia	1946	4.0	1,800
	1951	4.5	1,710
Total	1946	44.9	1,100
	Last year of plan	169.5	290

(Ibid. p. 208). †state tractors only.

Agriculture will be reorganised on the new technical basis, state and co-operative farms replacing the small peasant farms.

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sumption with every Five-Year Plan, it fixes the actual target of the Plan at a volume of production which does not exceed the target of former Plans. This is shown clearly by the following table:

TARGETS OF PRODUCTION FOR THE END OF THE FIVE-YEAR PLANS

	First 1932-3	*Second 1937*	*Third 1942*	*Fourth 1950*
Some Means of Consumption				
Cotton goods (milliard metres) ..	4.7	5.1	4.9	4.7
Woollen goods (million „) ..	270	220	177	159
Linen (million metres)	500	600	985	—
Vegetable oil (thousand tons) ..	1,100	750	850	880
Sugar (million tons)	2.6	2.5	3.5	2.4
Some Means of Production				
Electric Current (million kwh.) ..	22	38	75	82
Coal (million tons)	75	152.5	243	250
Pig iron (million tons)	10	16.0	22	19.5
Steel (million tons)	10.4	17	28	25.4
Oil and gas (million tons) ..	21.7	46.8	54	35.4

(Actually in the territory of the U.S.S.R., in 1913, 2,854 million metres of cotton goods and 95-110 million metres of woollen goods were produced; in 1937 the corresponding figures were 3,181 and 98).

Therefore, when the Russian government boasts that 'in 1950 we will reach the level of 4.7 thousand milliard metres of cotton goods' it does not prevent them from having made the same promise twenty years ago, when the population of U.S.S.R. was about fifty millions less than now.

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423 474 ●[185] The Eastern European governments will avoid such damaging twists and turns. According to the Plans, the technical basis for collectivisation will be much better prepared than it was in Russia. In 1933 in Russia, when 65.6 per cent of the peasants were in kolkhozes, there was one tractor per 615 hectares of arable land. When the current Plans are completed, the *minority* of peasants in the satellite countries will be in co-operative farms while there will be one tractor per 290 hectares. The co-operative farms in the 'People's Democracies' are leaving the majority of the livestock to the peasants as their private property, and are even compromising with the private interests of the peasants on the question of co-operative cultivation of the land, as can be seen from an examination of the types of co-operative farms in these countries.

In Hungary there are three types of co-operative farms:

1. The lowest, in which ploughing and sowing alone are done collectively while further cultivation and harvesting are done by the individual peasants. Draught animals or machines for the ploughing and sowing are obtained from the members or from the nearest State Tractor Station. In the former case, the members who own the draught animals or machines are paid a customary rent for them. Each member pays the cost of ploughing and sowing according to the quantity and quality of land he owns.

2. The intermediary type is similar to the lowest type except for the fact that harvesting and threshing are also done collectively.

3. In the highest type all the land is pooled for common cultivation, except for about two acres which are kept by each member as his private plot. Members are paid wages according to the amount and quality of work they do and rent according to the quantity and quality of land they contributed. No more than 25 per cent of the profit may be set aside for rent.

In Russia the peasant belonging to the lowest form of 'co-operative farm'—the kolkhoz—is allowed less private property than members of the highest form in Hungary. In many districts no kolkhoznik is allowed to own more than 0.6 acres, in others 1.2 acres and, in a small number of districts,

[See category 116, p. 115 -- Analyst]

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Warsaw will be liberated . . . Polish soldiers and the Red Army are coming to assist you.' (Quoted by L. M. Oak in the American *New Leader*, November, 13th, 1944). 669

Even more monstrous than the description of the rising as untimely is its condemnation as reactionary and fascist in character. If the Warsaw uprising had really been reactionary the Kremlin's attitude to it would have been very different. It is enough to recall the goodwill manifested to General Béla Miklós of Hungary and King Michael of Rumania. Russia was hostile to the Warsaw uprising precisely because it was quite independent of Communist influence, was dominated by the P.P.S. and was a socially progressive movement.

After the military defeat of September, 1939, which marked the disintegration of the dictatorial semi-fascist regime of the 'Colonels', the workers and peasants, organised in the P.P.S. and in the Peasant Party, became the backbone of the underground army, called Armia Krajowa (A.K.), the Home Army. The extreme right did not belong to the A.K. but to the National Armed Forces (Narodowe Sily Zbrojne). Military units of the P.P.S. and the Polish Peasant Party joined the A.K. and retained their identity as autonomous units. The clandestine parliament—the Council of National Unity—relied mainly on the workers and peasants.

The programme of the Home Army was described in its underground organ, *Biuletyn Informacyjny* of 9th September, 1943, in an article entitled 'What Kind of Poland are we Fighting for?' This clearly stated that the future Poland must have 'freedom of speech, freedom of opinion, freedom of association; it will be a Poland of social justice and welfare for the wide masses, liberated from capitalistic chaos; a Poland which will nationalise its great factories and plants; a Poland which will fundamentally transform its agrarian regime, modernize its system of distributing goods, expand its network of co-operatives and industrialize the country'. 185 669

On 15th August, 1944, after the Warsaw Commune's 15 days' existence, the Council of National Unity issued a manifesto to the people which included the following statement:

'In this war, Poland is not only fighting for her existence and political independence, but also for loftier aims. The Atlantic Charter, which defined the military aims of the United Nations,

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185 assures to Poland its legitimate aspirations and its historic
169 needs. Threatened by repeated aggression of imperialist Powers, she must be certain of security and the possibility of working in peace for generations. She wants to be able to govern herself according to her own principles and laws. These principles have already been published in the declaration of 26th July, 1944. They guarantee the regime of the future Republic based on political liberty and social justice.

'The principles of the Polish democratic Republic are as follows:

'1. A constitution guaranteeing governments in accordance with the will of the people.

'2. A democratic electoral law faithfully reflecting public opinion through general and municipal elections.

'3. Agrarian reform covering all estates of over 50 hectares as well as German landed property determined by a preliminary decree; the surplus population being directed towards industry and handicrafts.

'4. Socialisation of key industries.

'5. Participation of the workers in the management of enterprise and control by the workers of industrial production.

'6. All citizens have the right to work and to a decent standard of living.

'7. A just redistribution of the social income.

'8. All citizens have the right to education and culture.' (Zaremba, *La Commune de Varsovie* (Fel.) Paris, 1947, pp. 39-40).

Although the Warsaw uprising had basically a national-liberatory and social revolutionary character, it nevertheless had many negative, reactionary elements in its leadership. The P.P.S. leaders, with their inclination to compromise, and in the name of 'national unity', agreed to keep the military leadership in the hands of army experts headed by General Bor-Komorowski. The Russian Government let Hitler murder the rebels of Warsaw, not because their commander came from the old Polish Army, but because the rebellion was an expression of new forces, nationally and socially independent of the Kremlin.

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the ultimate liberation of Croatia, Bosnia, Slovenia, etc.—all this was an enormous contribution of the Yugoslav Army in the struggle for the establishment of unity among the peoples of Yugoslavia.' The unity of the peoples and their equality was symbolised in the fact that a Croat (Tito) led the revolt in Serbia, a Serbian Jew (Moše Pijade) led the rising in Montenegro, and a Montenegrin (Vukmanović) led the partisans in Macedonia. 668 186 663

This policy explains the phenomenon that military units of Italians, Hungarians and even German partisans fought in Tito's army. A large number of Italian soldiers joined the Partisans after the fall of Mussolini and formed the Garibaldi Volunteer units which were large enough to consist of a number of divisions. In the Slovene littoral, where Slovenes and Italians live side by side, Italian and Slovene Partisans formed common units, and Italians took an active and equal part in the work of the People's Committees, the embryonic administration of the new state. In spite of the cruelty displayed by the Hungarian occupation armies in the zone which they annexed, a cruelty greater even than that of the German armies, Tito succeeded in recruiting a battalion of Hungarian volunteers, the Petöfi Sandor battalion. There was also a Czech battalion in the Partisan Army. In July, 1943, a campaign was launched to enlist members of the German minority living in Yugoslavia in the Partisan army and this campaign met with some success, a Volksdeutsche battalion being organized to fight with the Partisans.

The social programme of Tito's Partisans was conservative. The Anti-Fascist Council of National Liberation (A.V.N.O.J.) —the Partisans' parliament—at its first meeting in Bihać on 26th November, 1942, proclaimed a programme, two of whose points were: 668 185

'The inviolability of private property and the providing of every possibility for individual initiative in industry, trade and agriculture.

'No radical changes whatsoever in the social life and activities of the people except for the replacement of reactionary village authorities and gendarmes who may have gone over to the service of the invaders by popularly elected representatives truly democratic and popular in character. All the most

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668 important questions of social life and State organisation will be
185 settled by the people themselves through representatives who will be properly elected by the people after the end of the war.'

These aims were constantly reiterated by the Partisan press and radio during the remaining three years of the war.

To illustrate the conservative character of the Partisans' social programme, it is only necessary to quote the oath taken by the new Croat volunteers: 'I swear by God Almighty and by all I hold dear that on my word of honour I shall always be true to the traditions of my ancestors. I will always fulfil trust towards the Croat people and will defend with my blood my national home from the German, Italian and Hungarian oppressors, and the traitors of my people. So help me God'. (Radio Free Yugoslavia, 13th June, 1943).

To reinforce this appeal to tradition a confessor or chaplain (vjerski referent) was attached to all the large military units.

668 This policy met with opposition from some members of the Communist Party of Yugoslavia. An uprising in July, 1941, in Montenegro raised the banner of 'Soviet Montenegro', and in Herzegovina, deviations from the Party line by the Party organisation called forth harsh criticism from Aleksandar Ranković, one of the foremost leaders of the Party and today Minister of the Interior. (*Proleter*, December, 1942). In spite of some leftist deviations, however, the Bihać programme was consistently implemented until the liberation of all Yugoslavia.

668 Until the end of 1944, no social changes or changes in
471 property ownership were introduced. On 14th February, 1945, Vice-Premier Kardelj insisted in a broadcast that in her economic structure Yugoslavia had not abandoned and would not abandon the general framework of capitalism.

The Bihać programme could be adhered to with comparative ease because the areas in the hands of the Partisans were those to which social conservatism was most acceptable. Both the most industrialised parts of Yugoslavia, Slovenia and Northern Croatia, came into the Partisans' hands only at the end of 1944 or beginning of 1945. The area in which there was a considerable number of rich peasants and German settlers, whose land would have been suitable for redistribution among the poorer peasantry, was also in the North. Thus until the end of 1944 or beginning of 1945 there were not many capitalists

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most continuously. As minority groups, the peoples of Eastern Europe tended to suffer from discrimination at the hands of the governments whose territory they inhabited and, once they were infected with the spirit of the enlightenment, national liberation came to be regarded as the solution to all their problems. Significant reforms were indeed carried out in the nineteenth century within the existing political framework, but the road to reform was obstructed by many obstacles. Although national liberation almost inevitably means revolution and war, it appeared to many Eastern European leaders to be preferable to the available alternatives. The diplomatic history of Europe was, in fact, punctuated by great crises as one province after another broke loose from the Ottoman empire, and when this process culminated in the First World War and the liberation of the remaining peoples of this region, it was widely regarded as a logical step in human progress.

The leaders of Eastern European opinion did not regard national liberation as an end in itself, but rather as the best means for promoting the modernization of their peoples. This aim was stated in many different ways, some speaking of education, others of freedom, and many more of economic welfare. This is certainly a much broader objective than the principle of free and equal trade enunciated by Wilson, but that principle was an essential prerequisite to modernization in the view of the American president. In general terms it would not be unfair to say that the goal of Eastern European leaders in the last two centuries has been to raise the spiritual and material level of their peoples to the European standard established by England, France, Germany, and their smaller neighbors. This interpretation of their goal is certainly very generalized, yet it represents more accurately the aspirations of this region than do the specific programs of individual leaders or schools of thought. The fact that this objective has not yet been attained is fundamen-

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185 tal to an understanding of the problems of Eastern Europe, and much of the political extremism of this region can be traced to the frustrations resulting from this failure.

The most obvious reason for the failure to achieve a European standard, and probably also the most important, has been the persistent necessity of giving priority to national security over human welfare. This problem has, of course, been faced by all modern states, but it has affected the peoples of Eastern Europe to an unusual degree. It would not be too much to say that the insecurity of these states, due more to regional factors than to size, has been the source of [648] most of their difficulties. Of the various solutions that have been attempted, including national opportunism, alliances with great powers, regional pacts, and participation in the League of Nations, none has met the special needs of the situation.

I

186 175 The European wars resulting from the French Revolution and the Napoleonic conquests infected the leaders of the Eastern European peoples with the modern spirit of nationalism and liberalism, but the peace settlement concluded in 1815 did little to satisfy the hopes that had been aroused. The peoples of this region remained under the firm rule of the Romanov, Habsburg, Hohenzollern, and Ottoman dynasties, and before long the process of national liberation came to occupy their principal energies. Of the many national groups in this region, only the Serbians and the Montenegrins achieved any measure of independence before 1815, although the Magyars occupied within the Austrian monarchy a position of special influence. The remaining nationalities in this region had not yet taken the first steps towards independence. The struggle for freedom lasted for a full century, and was a complex process in which the

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With certain notable exceptions involving injustice to new German, Magyar, and Ruthenian minorities, the boundaries were drawn about as close to linguistic frontiers as economic and geographic viability permitted. The trouble lay less with the peacemakers than with the principle of national self-determination, especially when applied without the two compensating factors stipulated in Wilson's program: free trade and international organization. The shortcomings of this un-Wilsonian settlement were serious, and cast a long shadow over the next generation. Central among these shortcomings was the exaggerated emphasis on the spirit of exclusive state nationalism, a natural but in the end disastrous consequence of the prolonged concern with national liberation. This spirit, in its postwar manifestations, became an obstacle to the solution of the many boundary disputes, raised protective trade barriers around the new states to the point of self-strangulation, and prevented the organization of a sound system of collective security.

II

Although the hope of the Eastern European leaders for the spiritual and material development of their peoples was placed increasingly in national liberation, it should not be forgotten that in the century after 1815 the peoples of this region made significant gains in the process of modernization. This process, considered as the expansion of human rights within a framework of increasing productivity and distribution in all branches of the economy, developed at an uneven rate in the different parts of Eastern Europe. In the broadest sense, modernization may be considered as the transition from a feudal and agrarian to a democratic and industrialized society, and in this region it involved certain characteristic steps. The most important of these steps were: the growth in human rights, of which the political

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185 641 were by far the most important; the increase of educational opportunities and general culture; and the development of the economy through agricultural improvement and the expansion of industry and trade.

177 642 Political freedom in Eastern Europe before the First World War ranged in degree from negligible rights, as those of the Slovaks in Hungary or of the Poles in Russia, to independent states with constitutions of strongly democratic tendencies, as in certain countries of Southeastern Europe. The latter had been influenced by Western models, and made provision for parliamentary government based on wide suffrage. The constitutions of Serbia, Rumania, and Bulgaria, drafted in the latter half of the nineteenth century by native statesmen experienced in the ways of Western constitutionalism, were founded on a genuine faith in democracy. It is true that royal or ministerial authoritarianism and resort to rough methods were not uncommon in these countries, yet the social egalitarianism already prevailing in Serbia and Bulgaria was a strong force for democracy in these coun- [66] tries. Although illiteracy and political inexperience remained a serious obstacle to orderly government, the generation before the First World War offers significant examples of governments being changed by orderly democratic procedures. Illustrative of the difficulties under which popular elections with universal male suffrage were conducted is the fact that in the Bulgarian election of 1880 only 32 per cent of those eligible to vote cast their ballots, in contrast to about 80 per cent in France and Belgium and 60 per cent in Germany and Italy in the period 1875-80.

177 642 563 Hungary had a longer tradition of constitutional government than did the Balkan states and after 1867 was in most respects an independent state, but its social structure was more conservative and its desire for political democracy less evident. Moreover, the Magyar achievement of political autonomy was marred by the oppressive treatment of the

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1947 but not to the years following. The period of the New Economic Policy in Russia was called "the period of a certain revival of capitalism"; in reality, it was a kind of retreat of communism from economic difficulties.

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In the captive countries there was no "period of revival of capitalism." Since the very inception of communism, there has been a systematic liquidation of all private property, carried out in premeditated fashion within the limits of existing conditions and possibilities. In the beginning, the question of private property arose only in regard to small trade, dwelling houses, building, crafts, and, in a larger degree to peasant farming. Hence, the Communists advocated the principle of a three-sector economy, composed of state economy—after an immediate nationalization of medium and heavy industries, landlords' estates, and forests—of cooperative economy, and of private economy.

665 661

The fact that this period, the traces of which we still find in the constitutions of the captive countries, was planned from above as no more than a transitional period, is best proved by the accusation leveled against the former Communist Vice-Premier of Poland, Gomulka, at the meeting of the Central Committee of the Communist Party in Warsaw, in 1948. Gomulka was told then that his main guilt was not that he agreed to the principles of the three-sector economy but that he acted according to these principles. It was explained to him then that he had proceeded as though he wanted to keep the system although he knew that it was transitional.

665

In 1947, after the falsification of the elections and the destruction of the opposition of the independent peasant parties in Bulgaria, Rumania, Hungary, Yugoslavia, and Poland, the Cominform was established and Communist policy abandoned its nationalist line and adopted the line of internationalism. A special declaration of the differences between Communist internationalism and the "cosmopoli-

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423 cause the land was becoming exhausted. This was due to a
341 lack of manure and fertilizer and to the peasants' ignorance of land preservation techniques.

[464] Labor remained so cheap that the introduction of labor-saving devices did not pay. Overpopulation meant that there were more people living on holdings than were needed for the farm work. This situation caused underemployment. Since overpopulation decreased the output per man and with it the earnings per man, a very low standard of living resulted.

423 The size of the farms, which on the average was barely
656 ten acres, was a problem in itself, and the custom of dividing
185 land after the death of a peasant made the situation even more acute. The holdings consisted of many small and scattered strips so that it was impossible for the peasant to use machines, even when they were available. However, the land reforms, carried out after the First World War by the different governments, did have some success in equalizing the amounts of land held by the different peasants.

The land reforms grew out of political and national considerations rather than out of social and economic policy. The first and main objective of the agrarian parties was to expropriate the big landowners and to transfer their land to the peasants. The usual procedure was to fix a maximum acreage, usually about five hundred acres, and to decree that all land in excess of this amount should be sold to peasants, either to create new farms or to add to the area of peasant farms already in existence. Under these reforms, about twenty-five million acres were distributed, for the most part in quite small plots, averaging one hectare, or 2.4 acres. The smaller farms were given more land than the large, so that there was some leveling of the incomes derived from farming.

162 These reforms did not remedy the unhappy condition of
464 the peasantry, since they were unable to remove the main
51 causes for distress. If all the agricultural land of this region

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had been distributed equally among the peasants, the main result would have been the equalization of poverty. It was obvious that redistribution of the national income and wealth could not, by itself, greatly improve the condition of the people. The surplus agricultural population which was estimated, on the basis of the system of cultivation prevailing in that area, to be about fifteen million persons had to be absorbed, and that was an insoluble problem. This problem was heightened by the fact that between 1919 and 1939 the natural increase of population in this area remained almost three times as high as that in the West. 162 464 511

Some alleviation of the situation was sought in the development of industries. However, industrialization was a long-term measure, and the expense only added to the peasants' burden. The fiscal policy of the Eastern European states was to accumulate the national capital necessary for industrialization by taxes, tariffs, and prices. No money, or very little, was left for the peasants.

II

It would be unjust, however, to say that nothing was done to improve the lot of the peasantry. The governments were well aware that the land reforms should be supplemented by economic measures such as agrarian credits, modern cooperatives, development of transport, cheaper farm machinery, technical education and training. A great deal was accomplished by these measures. 452 185

The supply of credit was particularly important to the peasants. The need for capital to begin operations and to finance certain family needs, especially the weddings of daughters, made borrowing necessary. As banks would not make advances, money had to come from moneylenders who charged very high rates of interest. Often, the moneylender was the middleman who bought the peasant's produce

452 and supplied him with goods. Frequently he had a strong
185 and pernicious hold on the peasant.

Therefore, the cooperative movement began with the
474 foundation of credit societies which formed a very large
668 proportion of all cooperatives. Besides these, there were co-
656 operative societies which supplied agricultural needs such as tools and seeds, traded agricultural products, and processed all sorts of produce. In Bulgaria, Hungary, and Rumania the cooperative movements were state-controlled. In Czechoslovakia the movement was independent but favored by the state; in Poland, beginning with the economic depression of the 1930's it was state-supported and therefore dependent.

The cooperative problem was a difficult one. On the one hand, cooperation among economically weak peasants could not succeed unless there was some collaboration with, or help from, the central authorities. On the other hand, such a relationship between strong and weak tended to develop into state domination of the cooperative movement.

474 The administrators of the cooperatives sometimes abused
452 their prerogatives. They would occasionally grant government loans, not in response to genuine needs or because of commercial considerations, but with a view to the substantial number of votes which one cooperative society could guarantee at election time. In some instances, cooperatives served only well-to-do peasants because some governments were opposed to the social revolutionary ideology of the smaller peasants. In Rumania the cooperative societies were forced to assume the function of the tax collector. In Hungary the cooperatives belonged to the peasants in appearance only. In reality, they were capitalist enterprises and were not in peasant hands.

Except in Czechoslovakia, agricultural cooperation did not play any decisive role in the economic life of the peasantry, nor was it able to alleviate the existing adverse

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Russian *kulak*. The village rich are not allowed to enter a collective or are expelled if they become members. A merciless battle is being waged to ruin them. They are being liquidated as peasants, removed from villages, and sent to mines or to industry or concentration camps. There are roughly thirteen million peasant families in Eastern Europe, more than one million of which are *kulaks*. The children of all these families must lose the individualistic traits of their peasant heritage: that is the Communist aim. 474 661 565

Large-scale industrialization plans, for military purposes rather than for consumer production, are being pushed forward with great vigor in all Eastern European states and new labor is required in great numbers. *Kulaks* and other class enemies are an obvious source for this labor. By tapping this source, the surplus agricultural population will be disposed of and the people with individualist outlook gradually destroyed. If there is a shortage of workers in agriculture, as for instance in Czechoslovakia now, industrial workers already persuaded to the collective way of thinking can be utilized. 433

The term *kulak* has come to mean anyone who is against collectivization, and all *kulaks* are to be destroyed. The process of destruction is quickly changing the status of the agrarian population in this region. The agricultural population is decreasing and, according to estimate, does not amount today to more than 45 per cent of the total population. This decrease is the political consequence of collectivization and not its economic or social result. The collectivization policy itself cannot solve the old problem of rural overpopulation but can only aggravate it. The real aim of Communist collectivization is not to solve this problem but rather to destroy the peasantry. 661

Agriculture, like the other divisions of economic life, has been dictated by state plans which prescribe to the peasant what crops are to be grown and what animals are to be bred. 241 185

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241 The peasants do not like regimentation and therefore the
185 Communist economic plans have not brought about any increase in agricultural production.

208 The collectivization policy has further aggravated the situation. The peasants hate even the word "collective." They go about their work with indifference or with fear and hatred. Their aversion to coercion, dictatorship, and controls, their attachment to their land, and their pride in independence, have neutralized all the advantages of large-scale production with its mechanization and its use of modern agricultural methods. The Communist belief that large-scale operation would bring about efficient agricultural production has not materialized.

262 Agricultural production is decreasing. Eastern Europe
433 used to be a very large exporter of all agricultural products,
241 but it is suffering from shortages today. Food is scarce in these agricultural countries. Before the Second World War, nine out of ten residents of Czechoslovakia were nourished by the produce of Czechoslovakian agriculture. There were no rations. Everybody could buy what he wanted, and the standard of living in Czechoslovakia was the highest in Eastern Europe. Today, according to official Communist pronouncements, every second man in Czechoslovakia, despite strict rationing, has to be supplied from abroad. Milk, butter, and eggs are not distributed to adults at all, and even sugar is in short supply. Czechoslovakia, once the largest exporter of beet sugar in Europe, today cannot provide its diminished population with sugar although it has nearly 15 per cent fewer inhabitants than before 1938 due to the expulsion of the Germans. Bulgaria and Hungary, which had great surpluses of all agricultural products before the last war, must now import foodstuffs for their starving populations. Agricultural production in Eastern Europe has not yet attained the prewar level, although the free farms of Western Europe have surpassed it considerably.

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vention possible. They usually claimed that this intervention was necessary "to save the country from the total chaos in which it was driven by the unsatisfactory operating of democratic institutions." What was even worse, new regimes were supported often by the Western democracies who used the unjustifiable excuse that "no other solutions were possible." 642

Despite the mistakes and failures of the democratic regimes, today even the most bitter opponents of peasantism must admit that the peasant parties, as political organizations, were stalwart champions of democratic government and did not, in general, support the established dictatorships or their undemocratic methods.

The greatest achievement of all the peasant groups was that of the Bulgarian Agrarian Union. From its modest beginnings in 1896, the Union grew steadily. In the first postwar elections it received a strong relative majority in the National Assembly, and in the elections of April 1923, 212 deputies out of 245 were allotted to the Agrarian Union. At the relatively early date of October 1919, the first Bulgarian peasant government of Aleksander Stambolisky was formed. The most significant of its numerous political and economic achievements was the agrarian reform based on the principles that the land should be the property of those who till it and that every peasant is entitled to only as much land as he and his family are able to cultivate. In spite of the certain weaknesses and deficiencies of this peasant government which contributed to its downfall, its democratic basis cannot be denied. Its reforms converted Bulgaria into a country of small and medium peasant holdings which, despite the forcible overthrow of the peasant regime in June 1923, remained unchanged until the end of the Second World War. 665 642 423 185

In Czechoslovakia, the Republican Agrarian Party was the strongest party in the Parliament and the most important pillar of the Czechoslovakian democracy. After the political 665 642

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665 liberation of the Czechs and the Slovaks in 1918, the party's
642 main goal was to secure economic and social prosperity for the Czech and Slovak peasants, chiefly by promoting cooperative organizations and by defending the interests of the peasant populations. The party averaged forty-five deputies on all national elections and cooperated with other democratic parties in the governments of the Republic. The President of the Party, Antonin Švehla and his successor, Milan Hodža, were for many years Prime Ministers of the Czechoslovakian governments.

665 The Croatian Peasant Party, established in 1904 by the
185 brothers Ante and Stjepan Radić, reached its full political importance in the first postwar elections in Yugoslavia. This was in November 1920, and at that time the party became the undisputed choice of the Croatian people. In all free parliamentary elections since then, the Croatians, and especially the Croatian peasantry, have cast their votes in overwhelming majority for this political group. The principal aims of the party's program were Croatian national independence and social and economic justice. When the president of the party, Stjepan Radić, was assassinated in June 1928, Vladko Maček, who heads the party today, was elected president. In its political struggle, the party has opposed violently the Yugoslav centralism favored by the majority of Serbian political groups, and has been outlawed twice as "dangerous for the interests of the state." In August 1939, a compromise that opened the door for a just settlement of the Serbo-Croatian dispute was reached with the Regency of the Kingdom of Yugoslavia and with certain of the Serbian political parties.

The beginnings of the Polish peasant movements date back to 1905, when the first Polish peasant associations were organized in Galicia under the leadership of Wincenty Witos. With this as an initiative, the Polish peasant party, *Piast*, was founded in Cracow in 1913. During the First World War,

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In the Russian part of Poland, another peasant party, *Liberation*, was born. Its leader was Stanislaw Thugutt. This party emphasized the solution of social and economic problems, demanding primarily an extensive land reform and distribution of the land to the peasants. In liberated and united Poland, these two peasant groups united in 1920 to become the strongest individual Polish political group, but later, in May 1923, one faction dissented. Witos was repeatedly elected Prime Minister and was holding this position in 1926 when the military *coup d'état*, executed by Pilsudski, put an end to democratic government in Poland. In 1928, during the dictatorship, all peasant political groups fused in a united peasant party under the leadership of Witos and Mikolajczyk, but, because of the undemocratic regime, this group was never permitted to take part in Poland's political life.

Although it may be argued that the embryonic stage of peasant organization in Serbia started in 1882 under the influence of the socialist ideas of Svetozar Marković, it is more correct to say that the first truly peasant movement in Serbia began in 1905 with the actions of Milislav Kurtović. In 1920, in the new state, Yugoslavia, the Agrarian Union of the Serbians, Croatians, and Slovenes was established, under the leadership of Joca Jovanović. The Union had little success among the Croatian and Slovenian peasantry, and was later known as the Serbian Agrarian Party. It recruited its followers mainly from the Serbian peasants in Serbia, Bosnia, and northern Dalmatia. The party was in the difficult position of being obliged to compete politically with two well-established Serbian parties, the Radicals and the Democrats. The provisions of the electoral law were unfavorable to the smaller political formations and, for this reason, the party was hindered from obtaining a proportional number of deputies in national elections. In June 1938, after the death of Joca Jovanović, Milan Gavrilović was elected the new president of the party.

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665 The initiative for a peasant organization in Rumania was
185 given in 1907, in Jassy, Bessarabia, by Constantine Stere,
642 who was influenced by Russian Populism. The Rumanian Peasant Party was formally founded in 1919, and Ion Mihalache was elected its President. In 1926, the Rumanian National Party from Transylvania, led by Iuliu Maniu, and the Peasant Party of the Old Kingdom fused into one political group known as the Rumanian National Peasant Party, which became the strongest political organization of the country. In the elections of 1928, the overwhelming majority of votes were cast for this united peasant front, and a peasant government was formed with Maniu as Prime Minister. This party brought about some administrative, economic, and social reforms which aimed at the assurance of the progress of the Rumanian state. Unfortunately, the peasant rule was definitely handicapped by the international agrarian crisis which was at its peak during the period of the peasant government. The party's position was further aggravated by its continuous struggle with the liberals and by numerous intrigues of the Crown calculated to destroy the unity and vigor of the peasant group.

665 Because of specific conditions which existed in Hungary, the organization of the peasantry commenced relatively late. Sandor Czismadia made the first attempt to organize the landless peasants on the principles of agrarian socialism in 1896, but the genuine peasant movement was initiated by István Nagyatádi-Szabó in 1908. The movement grew in strength after the collapse of the first Communist regime of Béla Kun, but its original success and its hopes for the future were skilfully suppressed by the Hungarian ruling class. It was not until 1930 that Zoltan Tildy and Ferenc Nagy undertook the revival of a truly peasant political organization. As a consequence, the Hungarian Smallholders Party was founded. This party fought valiantly against all the odds of the authoritarian Hungarian regime, but was not able to at-

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178 per cent; and Czechoslovakia, 41 per cent. Thus it can be
162 easily seen that, with the exception of Czechoslovakia whose
241 industry was the most developed in the region, the countries of Eastern Europe were predominantly agricultural and peasant in nature. Yet despite the predominantly peasant character of these countries, the peasants as such had relatively little political influence.

178 Although there was an increase in the output of agricul-
241 tural goods in all these countries between 1918 and 1945,
511 the competition offered by overseas cereals strongly affected the agriculture of Eastern Europe. Cereals, one of the major products of the region, had to be undersold to Germany. Added to this unfortunate situation, the world depression of 1929 came as a terrible blow to the economy of Eastern Europe, the most disastrous years lasting from 1931 until 1934. Industry, with its frequent cartels, was better able to defend itself than was agriculture, and thus the "price scissors," or the disparity between agricultural and industrial prices, cut mostly into the income of the agricultural population. This resulted in a general lowering of both the purchasing power and the standard of living. Loans at high rates of interest were frequent and taxation increased the poverty of the peasants. These, as the major element of the population, pressed heavily for reforms and spread malcontent in their respective countries.

• 185 Soon after the First World War, some states realized that
167 the solution to this situation was industrialization. Emigra-
433 tion, as a possible solution, was not favored in any of the Eastern European states as it would have decreased manpower. Since war was considered more or less imminent after 1933, military and industrial groups were especially opposed to any large-scale loss of population, although emigration was never prohibited by actual government order.

185 Bohemia, which had been in a highly advantageous posi-
433 tion in the industrialization program of Austria before the

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First World War, was the only well-developed industrial region and provided the foundations of the industrial economy of Czechoslovakia. Poland and Hungary had some valuable industries which aided their development considerably. In the other states, industrialization made slow progress and often operated on an unsound basis. Many plants were erected, the products of which were not related to the needs of the respective countries. National welfare was often neglected and industries were built for the enrichment of a few individuals. Not even mining was efficient. Mines were exhausted or were reopened mainly on the basis of sudden export needs and with no thought that the industries might convert the mineral raw materials into consumer goods. Hungary, where bauxite was sold to Germany and aluminum was repurchased at a high price, offers an excellent example.

Mining, metallurgy, heavy industry, and textiles were favored but they were not related to the purchasing power of the masses or to the production of raw materials. Because of the low production of textile raw material, large textile plants were run on imports. Cereals, livestock, and other agricultural goods were exported to balance the budget. Thus, much of the capital had to be spent on transportation expenses. The attention paid to agricultural industry was insufficient despite the fact that mineral raw materials, agricultural products, and timber were assets upon which a satisfactory program of industrialization could have been based.

The causes for this situation are to be found in the political instability of Eastern Europe and in the lack of sufficient skills and resources. It was a region of wars and insecurity where little nations faced each other with mistrust and fought each other as fiercely as they did the outside powers. Industrial policy between the two world wars was dependent on power politics. The policy of economic self-sufficiency, or autarky, was engendered by nationalistic as-

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369 ulation showed any tendency toward decentralization, with
162 30 per cent of her total industrial population living in the district of Sofia.

The industrial population of these countries was occupied as follows: 25 to 30 per cent in the textile and clothing industries; 18 to 21 per cent in heavy and metallurgy industries; 11 to 22 per cent in the food industry; and 7 to 17 per cent in the lumber industry. A variation in industrial goods and in producing plants was found only in Czechoslovakia and Hungary, in southern Poland and Transylvania, and in the areas of the former Austro-Hungarian Empire.

466 One of the major problems facing the new governments
745 in their industrialization programs was to equate the growth
• 185 of the industrial working populations with improvement in industrial working and social conditions. Social legislation in the interwar period attained considerable progress in this direction. Prior to 1914 there already existed in Eastern Europe various social insurance and pension plans, and these were expanded between 1919 and 1939. Compulsory workers' accident and health insurance plans were introduced whereby both employers and wage earners contributed to a central fund to provide coverage for accident, illness, maternity, disability, old age, death, and unemployment. Generally speaking, the working day was reduced to eight hours, with a maximum forty-eight hour week, and the age minimum for child and woman labor was fixed at fourteen years or, in the case of heavy and dangerous work, such as mining, at sixteen to eighteen years. However, rigid application of these measures was far from universal.

A notable innovation was the establishment by the agrarian regime in Bulgaria of a compulsory labor service for the development of public works in place of the traditional military service which had been prohibited by the peace treaty. Expenditures in 1937 for social services for the entire region averaged 3 per cent of the estimated national in-

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come. Once again, Czechoslovakia headed the list with 5.5 per cent while the Balkan countries devoted only 1.5 per cent of their national income to social services. In the same year the number of persons registered as unemployed in the various countries was as follows: Czechoslovakia, 408,000; Poland, 347,000; Hungary, 47,000; Yugoslavia, 21,600; and Rumania, 10,800.

A major consequence of industrialization and urbanization was the rapid growth both of an urban proletariat and of the bureaucracy. Those people who had been separated from their ancestral rural surroundings and traditions and often from the influence of their families became increasingly detached from spiritual matters and turned more and more towards materialistic and technical spheres. The number of bureaucrats grew rapidly and this resulted in political favoritism and in desk-level programs which very seldom touched the people of the countryside.

It cannot be said, however, that no progress was made or that standards of living were consistently low. It must be remembered that it was not until the First World War that many of these countries attained independence. A part of Poland had just emerged from Russian domination and certain areas of the Balkan states had just freed themselves from Ottoman rule. Even Hungary, Czechoslovakia, Croatia, and parts of Poland had been freed only recently from Austro-German political and economic controls. Under these circumstances, the progress made by these countries, notwithstanding failures and mistakes, was considerable indeed.

III

The states that had dominated this region before the First World War—Germany, Austria-Hungary, Russia, and the Ottoman empire—showed little interest in improving the educational standards of the large masses in Eastern Europe.

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8 Industrial and Social Policies of the Communist Regimes

JAN H. WSZELAKI

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More than thirty years ago, Lenin defined Communism in Russia as Soviet power plus electrification. In our time, the essence of the situation in the countries of Eastern Europe is the Communist police state plus industrial revolution. Local or imported Communists, under the supervision of the Kremlin, have been for years in full control of all levers of power in these countries. Their basic aim in social and economic fields, just as it is in Soviet Russia, is a complete transformation of society through industrial revolution. To this supreme aim and supreme method, all other issues have been subordinated. The process of this industrial revolution with its many ramifications extends into all fields of human activity behind the Iron Curtain, influences the lives of all ninety million inhabitants of the captive countries proper, and will have profound consequences of moral, political, economic, social, and strategic character not only for these countries but for the world as a whole. From the European point of view, the industrial revolution of Eastern Europe is an outstanding historical event. comparable in its implications to the great wars of the present century. We are witnessing

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the gradual decline of the traditional rural and mainly peasant 185
structure of this part of Europe and the emergence of an in- 471
dustrial urbanized society. This transformation is now in full 661
swing and will continue until it runs its course—no one can say when or how—or until external factors end the Russian control of Eastern Europe and its nations rid themselves of their own Communists. Even then, the industrial development of that area will presumably continue, though for different reasons and with vastly different methods. The Communist regimes may go, but the results of the industrial revolution will remain.

This essay is concerned with the effects of these revolu- 121
tionary events on the social and economic development of the countries of Eastern Europe. To cover this involved subject adequately, much time and space would be necessary. The writer must limit himself here to the discussion of the few selected aspects of the problem that he regards as fundamental. Discussion of the industrial targets as established by the single countries in their long-range plans, half or more of which have already been achieved, cannot be included in this study.

Suffice it to say here that all over Eastern Europe the Com- 185
munist regimes are modernizing the existing mines and in- 433
dustrial plants and are building scores of new mines and thousands of large new plants, mostly supposed to produce capital goods as a basis for further industrial production. The anticipated result of the present first series of long-range plans, expected to terminate in less than two years, will be a large increase in the extraction of fuel and the doubling, in some cases tripling and quadrupling, of the heavy industrial potential of the individual nations of this region, some of which had a large industrial output before the last war. This vast operation requires that great numbers of peasants be transferred from agriculture to industry, mining, and construction. Once carried out, the first series of plans is to be

185 followed by a second, with the targets again much increased.
433 The preparation of these second five year plans has already begun. Their nature can be inferred from the electoral program of the National Front in Poland, published in the fall of 1952. The Warsaw regime proposes to raise the per capita industrial output of Poland by 1960 to ten times the by no means negligible standard of 1938. In other words, it intends that the Polish per capita industrial output shall surpass the present per capita industrial output of France. Other satellite governments probably have similar plans. Whatever may be thought about the feasibility of such grandiose plans, it should not be forgotten that under the Soviet regime Russia has evolved from a backward agricultural country, which it still was in 1928 when the first Five Year Plan was launched, into the second industrial power of the world, surpassing in total production Japan, France, Britain, and Germany.

The aims of enforced industrialization are several. The first is the numerical increase of factory workers who, as proletarians, are supposed to be not only the cream of society but convinced Communists as well. This early theory of the Soviet revolution, together with the term 'proletariat,' is falling into disuse. It has never been proven by facts: at other times and in other places, men entering the industrial process have not been inclined necessarily to become Communists, and there is no evidence that they are so inclined in the captive countries today. The second aim was defined on many occasions by Stalin. According to him, the Socialist transformation of society can be achieved and kept secure only by a steady growth in heavy industrial production, which at any given time must exceed the increase of light customer-serving industries and of agriculture. This rather abstract formula means, among other things, that in order to survive foreign aggression a Communist state or states must possess enough heavy industry to produce the necessary weapons at any given moment. Stalin's judgment was correct, though not

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necessarily Communist, since it applies to all states exposed to dangers from their neighbors. Another meaning of this formula is that Communist states cannot afford to depend on the non-Communist world for essential raw materials or machinery, since such imports might be stopped at the moment when they are most urgently needed. Consequently, a Communist state should produce these goods on its own. Here again, a distant echo of Russia's defeat during the First World War can be heard. Stalin seems to be saying that Communist Russia must never again be incapacitated or even hindered by industrial weakness. Indeed, his industrial Russia of 1941 withstood the German onslaught far better than had the imperial Russia of 1914.

The realization of this aim demands that all hitherto unused resources of manpower and dormant material wealth be utilized as rapidly as possible. At some future time these resources may well bring rich life to the people. But so long as the Soviet Union is encircled by potential enemies such resources must remain at the disposal of the state which defends "the social conquests of the revolution." The systematic realization of all these aims is assured through the consecutive five year plans for the development of the Soviet economy.

A year or two after the end of the Second World War, the Soviet Union felt certain that the West no longer had the means or desire to interfere with Soviet control of the so-called liberated nations of Eastern Europe. The countries of this region could be regarded henceforth as an extension of the Soviet Union proper, and their resources could be used for the achievements of the same aims as those of the Soviet Union. Under the transitory semi-Communist governments of that time, the captive nations showed enormous vitality in reconstructing their war-damaged economies. Since 1948-50 this vitality has been canalized into long-range industrial plans which have been synchronized with one another and

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185 433 with the Soviet master plans. The captive nations were allowed to preserve the external attributes of sovereignty and their governments were granted an advisory voice in the preparation of these national plans. But the supreme control of the plans remained in the hands of Moscow, and their primary goal was, and is, rapid industrialization.

II

178 The possibilities of industrialization in Eastern Europe are considerable, but obviously not unlimited. They depend on the availability of manpower and its technical know-how, on industrial raw materials and machinery, on capital needed for investments, and on markets capable of absorbing the products of the new industries.

464 Before the last war, five million persons were employed in the mining and in the medium and large manufacturing industries of the six major countries of the area. Today this number exceeds nine million. There is a shortage of labor, both skilled and unskilled, in Eastern Germany and in the Czech part of Czechoslovakia. The reserves of manpower—land laborers, dwarf-farm owners, and married women—are limited in Hungary and the Slovak part of Czechoslovakia, large in Poland, and even larger in Rumania and in the three Balkan countries. The areas where labor is short coincide to a large degree with those of low natural increase of population, and vice versa. In the first period of reconstruction after the war, there was in many parts of the area a movement of the population from the villages to the towns in search of urban, not necessarily industrial, employment. For instance, in Poland alone, two and one-half million persons moved into towns during the first seven postwar years. This movement is now over, as well as the postwar enthusiasm for reconstruction, and the governments have to recruit new workers by propaganda and sometimes by half-coercion. Unless

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433 tential in 1938 was, and still is, insignificant. It is claimed that in 1952 the industrial output of the area rose again by about one fifth.

An estimate of the relative industrial strength of the individual captive countries was made recently in a United Nations publication.[3] If the total industrial output of the area at the end of 1952 is taken as 100, the output of Eastern Germany constitutes 34 per cent of this total, that of Poland 27, of Czechoslovakia 21, of Hungary 9, of Rumania 6, and of Bulgaria 3 per cent. The total industrial output of the entire captive area is equivalent, roughly speaking, to nearly 40 per cent of the total industrial output of the Soviet Union.

185 All this rapid, even violent, industrial expansion cannot
471 be smooth and is, in more ways than one, terribly expensive.
511 There are no miracles in economics, and wealth can be
464 created at different rates of speed, but not at will. The tremendous increase of the state-owned industrial plant in this area is only feasible because the citizens have been deprived of their individual capital, because the consumer demand is being systematically curtailed, and because more and more of the national income, siphoned off by taxation, inflation, and other methods, is being reinvested in industry. This reinvestment is being done at great cost to agriculture. Quantitative industrial progress is also speeded up by the fact that the police state has the means to make everyone work. The prewar urban unemployment and, to some extent, the huge peasant underemployment, caused by the extreme subdivision of rural property, are things of the past. Billions of man-hours which were wasted before the war in enforced idleness are now used for production or, at least, are on tap for production purposes. On the other hand, a large proportion of the men and women kept in concentration and labor camps

[3] *Economic Bulletin for Europe* (Geneva: United Nations, 1952), Vol. V, no. 2 (July, 1953), p. 84, Table 1.

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produce litt'e, if anything, and the vast apparatus of standing 185
armed forces, of police and poli ical supervision, of party 471
machinery and propaganda, does not create wealth but con- 511
sumes it. The onetime waste of unemployment has been partly 464
supplanted by the waste of the immense state machinery of control and compulsion inherent in all totalitarian systems and particularly odious under Communism.

In addition to this costly political overhead, there are three 185
other burdens to the national economies of these countries. One is the cost of planning both on a national scale and in minute detail, an economically unlikely proposition, resulting in duplication of work, omissions, bottlenecks, and other forms of economic confusion. This has been one of the main reasons why the Yugoslav Five Year Plan has never been fully realized. This type of waste can only be eliminated very gradually, if at all. The second type of waste is directly due to Communism. In the free world, private property is fairly 471
generally respected and cared for by its owners and by the public at large. Public property, being the exception rather than the rule, also enjoys respect and cases of vandalism are few. In Eastern Europe, state property is the rule, and very few people give it proper respect. The Communists are aware of this general neglect and the ensuing injury to the economy but believe that in time society will be taught to take care of what is defined as people's wealth. However, during thirty-five years of Communism in Russia, there has been little progress in this direction. The third burden on the state C48
economy is a specific feature of the countries of Eastern 439
Europe. All of them have to pay heavy tribute to the Russian big brother. Russia exploits the captive nations in many ways: by reparations in kind, mixed companies, trade agreements, high prices for imports from Russia and low prices for exports to Russia, maintenance costs for Soviet troops, high salaries for Russian experts and advisers, and the like. These nations cannot express themselves on this topic, but

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648 439 there is overwhelming evidence that they are aware of being fleeced by the Russians to the extent of hundreds of millions of dollars annually.

III

439 185 One of the main results of the existence of the Iron Curtain is the gradual integration of Eastern Europe into the Soviet economy. Under the present circumstances, Soviet Russia lays hands on many of the raw materials and industrial goods, both capital and consumer, that are put out by the captive countries. The realization of its economic plans depends in no small way upon these goods. The industrialization of this area also depends on imports and could not proceed at its present rapid rate without the importation of machinery and, more important, of raw materials from the Soviet Union, in particular from the Ukraine. These countries are meeting with restrictions on the importation of so-called strategic goods from the United States and from some other Western countries. However, even if there were no such restrictions, these countries would have difficulty in paying for imported goods, since they do not produce sufficient surpluses of goods that interest several of the most important Western markets, for instance, the United States, the British dominions, France, and possibly Western Germany. On the other hand, the capacity of the Soviet Union and China to consume goods produced by the states of Eastern Europe is practically limitless.

For all these reasons, in addition to political expediency, trade between this area and the Soviet Union has been increasing rapidly from year to year. Were it not for Soviet iron and manganese ore, colored metals, phosphate rock and sulphur, cotton, wool, and, in certain parts of the area, coke and pig iron, many metallurgical, chemical, and textile plants in the area would have to close down. Indeed, they will do

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so if for some reason, general mobilization in Russia, for example, freight traffic with Russia is interrupted. To sum up, links have been created between these states and Russia which, because of the self-isolation of the latter, did not exist before the war and which would be difficult to sever in the future.

At the same time that economic links are being established between Eastern Europe and Russia, the individual states, in particular Eastern Germany, Czechoslovakia, Poland, and Hungary, are being economically integrated with each other. This is an inevitable result of the present process of the industrialization of these countries. Trade among them is also expanding constantly, and many plants are being erected by the technically more advanced states of the area on the territory of the less advanced. To quote but one example, the Czechs are building many electric and chemical plants in Poland, Hungary, Rumania, and Bulgaria. There are other forms of this interregional economic collaboration which is, for the most part, better justified economically and more natural than collaboration with the Soviet Union.

The two movements toward integration, one with Russia and the other interregional, are developing in a parallel way. It is difficult to say which of the two trends is more intensive, although possibly that with Russia is. They can be judged by the data, published several months ago in Moscow, on this area's foreign trade for 1951. When checked with United Nations information on the same subject, the following table appears to be substantially correct.

The table shows that the northern part of the area conducts more trade with other states than with the Soviet Union, while the contrary is true of the south of the area. Soviet Russia does as much trade with Rumania and Bulgaria as Nazi Germany used to do around 1940. Because of their geographical position and the rural structure of their economies, these two countries are on their way toward being drawn into

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Foreign Trade of Poland, Czechoslovakia, Hungary, Rumania, Bulgaria, and Albania—1951 [4]

(IN PERCENTAGE OF TRADE WITH)

	USSR	*Other Communist Countries (including Eastern Germany and China)*	*Free World*
Poland	25	33	42
Czechoslovakia	28	32	40
Hungary	29	38	33
Rumania	51	28	21
Bulgaria	58	34	8
Albania	57	43	0

the economic system of the Soviet Union. The remaining four countries are less economically dependent on Russia. The place of Eastern Germany in interregional trade is very important. It is able to supply the rest of this area with much heavy and precision machinery, as well as potash and other fertilizers, in exchange for fuel, foodstuffs, and raw materials.

IV

185 661 642 The social policies of the satellite governments follow in their general outlines those practiced by the Soviet Union but may be described as somewhat more moderate, if only because the respect for human values has been more deeply ingrained in the westernized societies of Eastern Europe than they have in Russia.

The principle dominating these policies is that the Soviet-type revolution was made in the Eastern European countries in the interest of the people and that it continues to serve their interests. There is no speech made or publication issued be-

[4] P. Suslin, "The Consolidation of the Democratic World Market," *New Times* (Moscow), No. 5 (January 28, 1953), p. 10.

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hind the Iron Curtain that does not emphasize the eternal dedication of the People's Democracies to this fundamental concept. It is likely that some members in the lower echelons of the party are sincerely persuaded that this indeed is the case. Not so the ruthless social engineers among the top Communists. These experienced pupils of Moscow realize, of course, that in the Communist system there is a very definite hierarchy of goals, that first things have to come first, and that the expansion of industry comes before the welfare of the people. The two cannot be sought at the same time with the same intensity since the Communist state has not the means to proceed in both directions at once. There is reliable evidence that the four northern satellite governments opposed, insofar as they were able, the imposition on their countries of the immense goals and back-breaking burdens of industrial expansion. They regarded the enormously revised targets of 1950 and 1951 as burdens too heavy on their economies. Nevertheless, they had to yield to Moscow's pressure, which was probably connected with the outbreak of the Korean war. The relatively poor nations of Eastern Europe cannot afford both guns and butter. Since it had to be guns, butter has had to be delayed to a more or less distant future. If this is the case in the Soviet Union, it must be even more so in Eastern Europe. The result is a gradual, though uneven, lowering or at least stagnation of standards of living in Eastern Europe as compared to what they were during the first years after the recent war.

Such a generalization would, of course, be vehemently denied by the satellite governments. They publish statistical data to the effect that much new housing is being built, that more food is being produced and therefore consumed, and that the population is better clad with every passing year. A trained researcher will not accept these claims at their face value. The extremely generalized social statistics from this area are even less reliable than statistics on agricultural out-

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641 ing example. The regime knows that it cannot assure a decent
208 standard of living to the adult population and probably realizes that the coming generation will not live much better. However, it hopes that the young ones will be more pliable. Since they will not know that life can be better, they will not grumble. In the political and moral field, the desire to capture the minds of the youth is what industrialization is in the economic domain—the primary goal to which all others
185 must be subordinated. From another angle, education, especially technical education, is the necessary counterpart and precondition of the fully industrialized, urbanized, and mechanized socialist society.

168 The first point of the Communist program for the young
185 generation is to insure its numerical strength. Before the last war, the populations of Poland, Rumania, Yugoslavia, Bulgaria, and Slovakia were increasing with great though gradually diminishing rapidity. In the Czech lands proper and in Hungary, the natural increase was low with a trend towards demographic standstill. Some economists believed that the key problem of Eastern Europe, that of rural poverty due to overpopulation, could not be solved unless the population ceased to multiply so rapidly. From the strictly economic point of view, there was much truth in that assertion. The Communist regimes, including that of Yugoslavia, have taken the opposite stand. Their publications wage a war against the prewar theory which they say is born of despondency characteristic of capitalism. Communism, they claim, will solve all problems. But to prosper, People's Democracies need many children. Whether because of these social policies or because of other reasons, the prewar trend toward low natality has been reversed in most countries of the area. No demographic data on Rumania have been published for some years, which may mean that the policy of high natality has not been successful there. Elsewhere, data show that many more children are being born now than before the war and

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more of them survive infancy. In consequence, if rather fragmentary national statistics are to be believed, the rate of increase in population has risen to what it was a generation before. Roughly speaking, the number of Hungarians has been increasing annually by 60,000, that of Czechs and Slovaks (mainly Slovaks) by 140,000, that of Yugoslavs by 180,000, and that of Poles by over 400,000. Whether this trend will continue for a long time, no one can say. 168 185

The second point of the program in respect to youth is an all-out attack on illiteracy. Before the war, the area as such was making rapid progress in schooling, and in its western part illiteracy was no longer known. In its eastern and southeastern regions, however, there were still large residues of illiteracy in the adult population and, in spite of compulsory elementary education, there were not enough schools in some rural districts. The result was that some children never went to school. The Communist regimes claim that they have done away with a large proportion of illiteracy among adults and even elderly people, and that illiteracy as a condition is gone forever. There is no way of checking this assertion but it is likely that it is correct. The obvious comment is that the more literate people there are, the stronger a weapon Communist printed propaganda will be. Thus, the new schools behind the Iron Curtain are but the first installment of a vast campaign of propaganda and indoctrination. 871 185 212

The third and, in a sense, the most important point of the program is the great effort of the Communist regimes to promote professional and technical education on secondary and academic levels. The fulfillment of the long-range economic plans depends, in the last analysis, on its cadres, that is, on its trained personnel. To use a Communist simile, the new industrial army, millions strong, needs hundreds of thousands of noncommissioned and commissioned officers. These men and women are being graduated all over the captive area from technical schools of every description. The numbers 874 185

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874 both of graduates and of schools are several times larger than
185 before the war and are still increasing. The educational level is much lower than it was either before the war or in the free West, but it tallies with the Communist conception of superior education which aims at mass production of technicians specialized in one limited field and not instructed in general culture. Here again, these countries have to follow Soviet precedents, and narrow specialization is the method and the aim of education.

874 The emergence before long of thousands of newly gradu-
565 ated engineers, chemists, and the like, will have a profound effect on the economic and social structure of the area. These young people will be the managerial class of the future. Their lives will be dependent on the industrial trend of the economy of the captive nations. Unlike the new teachers, lawyers, writers, and other intellectuals, who will have to be agents of the Communist political machine, the new technicians will be allowed to serve both their own and national interests without being associated day in and day out with the sinister doings of the police state. Technology, like medicine, is one of the very few fields of creative activity open to non-Communists. When this is taken into consideration, it will be seen that the young men and women who besiege institutes of technology and other technical schools behind the Iron Curtain are very largely those who wish to preserve some independence of spirit. In their own domain, they will be able to dedicate themselves to creating national material wealth without paying more than lip service to the political framework in which they exist. This kind of work, where there is much less political supervision, may possibly come to be
565 considered the closest thing to individual initiative. In contrast to the 'Commissar' group of the new middle class, the new managerial stratum of these societies is, or may become, aware of the superiority of life in the free world and thus be a potential ally of the West. There seems to be, however, a

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reflect that, had their country had a sufficient industrial basis 178
in 1939 to equip ten armored divisions for which she had 433
enough trained manpower, her loss of independence and 369
many other events in modern history could have been prevented.

The present industrialization of Eastern Europe is gradu- 178
ally eliminating this handicap of the past. To be sure, the 661
increase of the industrial potential of these countries lies in 185
the interest of the Soviet Union in its own military prepara- 648
tions. The men in the Kremlin may dispose as they wish of this area's industrial plants together with all its human and material resources with the single exception of the spirit of its peoples. From the standpoint of both the immediate and long-range interests of the West, any addition to the wealth or the strength of Eastern Europe is unwelcome so long as the latter remains a part of the Soviet bloc. These countries are of course aware of this situation, but they have to think also about their future. They hope that one day the Iron Curtain will be lifted and they know that at that time they will need all their new industrial wealth in order to cease being an area of social unrest and a target for exploitation by powerful neighbors as well as a hotbed for world wars. Nobody has disputed the right of Russia to evolve into an industrial power. No one can expect the countries of Eastern Europe to relinquish their hopes of freedom and their rights to prosperity which, in the light of their past, are linked to the modernization of their economic structure. Wendell Willkie said during the last war that "Only the productive can be strong, and only the strong can be free." His words apply to all nations alike. The nations of Eastern Europe are potential allies of the West. Those who earnestly desire a better world should bear in mind that the lasting interests of these friendly nations transcend their temporary position as Russia's enforced associates.

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changes in agricultural policy in the people's democracies. 241
The only causal factor common to both areas is a very prac- 656
tical one: agricultural production has not been in a position to supply the needs of the growing industrial population. The socialist objective of complete nationalization of agriculture has nevertheless not been retracted or withdrawn. On the contrary, the satellites are acting within the orthodox pattern of Soviet experience.

In the economic sphere, the orbit is passing through a 185
period comparable to the Russian New Economic Policy. In the words of Stalin this is a "special policy of the proletarian state counting on the tolerations of capitalist elements, the commanding heights being in the hands of the proletarian state. . . .", in short a policy which aims "at overcoming capitalist elements and building a socialist economy by the method of a direct exchange of products. . . ." As if the Soviet experience itself did not suffice as a guide, there is the advice of Stalin on the proper agricultural policy required to prepare the transition to communism: continued development of the country's industrial resources, the gradual adjustment of collective farming to the nationalized sector of the economy, and the raising of the standards of living and culture. All these the satellite states are in the process of attempting to accomplish. There may be compromises in the short run, but there will be no compromise regarding the ultimate objective—the complete socialization of agriculture.

Changes in agricultural policy are particularly marked in those countries which have been heretofore heavily agricultural: Yugoslavia, Hungary, Albania, and Bulgaria. The restiveness of the population arising from the social and economic consequences of enforced industrialization made these changes necessary. The changes are short-run changes. While budgets for agricultural development will be increased, prices lowered for industrial goods and increased for farm products, establishment of producer cooperatives delayed,

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185 and fines for delay in delivery of agricultural products abolished, the basic policy of collectivization remains. The problem facing the satellite governments is one of tempo, not of objective.

000 The governments of the Soviet orbit are subject to all these strains and stresses which arise from a system of dictatorship over the minds and bodies of men. Nevertheless, the Western observer must be cautious in reading into these changes any amount of wishful thinking. It does not follow that a process of disintegration is taking place within the Soviet orbit. A more realistic attitude would be to assume that since there is no change in the rate of capital investment and armament production, the Soviet empire is anything but on a decline.

At the same time it would be a mistake to ascribe to the rulers of the Soviet orbit a monopoly of political omniscience. They are handicapped by a political dogma which prevents a clear assessment of the problems which face them day in and day out. It would also be an error, on the part of the Western democracies, to examine the problems of Europe today from the vantage point of the past alone. They must be conscious of new variations which arise from the current Eastern European experience.

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425 property, the right to travel, and the right to work in desir-
563 able occupations, have been dependent not upon a man's diligence, honesty, or thrift, but upon the accident of his affiliations with the group temporarily in power. A man's property and freedom thus came to depend upon the official estimation of his "political reliability" or loyalty, which was defined for him by a rapidly changing sequence of politicians and political regimes. Many of the men who practiced these policies of confiscation and repression considered themselves anti-Communists, or professed themselves as such. Yet in their disregard for property rights and civil liberties they did much to pave the way for Communism.

V

185 Perhaps it has been memories of the stagnation under
668 the old empires and the conflict and repressions of the following eras of nationalism that have turned many to visions of a safer, broader, and more generous life under an Eastern European federation.

In the minds of those who accepted this vision, a federation of Eastern European states would offer its peoples military security against invasion by outsiders. It would insure economic prosperity, provide a more stable distribution of economic welfare, safeguard property, provide broader opportunities for all, reward work, thrift, and enterprise, and by all these means serve to insure broad and rapid economic growth. In regard to politics, it would safeguard civil liberties. It would guarantee nondiscriminatory treatment to all peoples and minorities and free mobility to individuals throughout the region. It would assure to both individuals and peoples throughout Eastern Europe respect for their diverse habits and traditions, so that none of them would be forced to change their respective customs, work habits, and social institutions more rapidly or more radically than they might

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freely choose. To ease the complex and subtle problems of 185 ● culture, emotions, and psychology, it was hoped that the 668 federation would insure widespread opportunities for education. It was hoped that it would give to the inhabitants of the region both social and international prestige. It was hoped that it would bring them to a status of equality with the reference groups which they had chosen as yardsticks for comparison, or that in some way an Eastern European federation would make its citizens the equals not only of the French and German peoples but perhaps in time even of the English and American peoples, who have now become the reference groups for standards of achievement throughout the world. Finally it was hoped that such a federation would give rise to inspiring common enterprises that would unite the peoples of Eastern Europe in a new sense of their own identity, as in past centuries the monarchies of Western Europe, according to the philosopher José Ortega y Gasset, have united their own peoples into a sense of dignity and nationhood.

In striking contrast to the splendor of these visions was 648 their relative poverty in specific detail. None of the larger projects for federation in this region were ever negotiated by governments or even by responsible political leaders from the different areas. There was a negotiated project of the Polish-Czechoslovakian federation, worked out by Czechoslovakian and Polish leaders-in-exile during the Second World War, but this project which included only two states in the region was not followed up by the established governments or by the major political organizations after the war.[3]

[3] Cf. United States Department of State, Division of Library and Reference Services, *Danubian Federation: An Annotated Bibliography* (*Bibliography No. 66*), Washington, D.C., October 28, 1952 (multigraphed); Feliks Gross, *Crossroads of Two Continents: A Democratic Federation of East-Central Europe* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1945), pp. 28-34, and for the text of the Polish-Czechoslovakian Declaration, signed in London on January 25, 1942, by representatives of the two

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000 try living on remembered glories, be imitated in Prague or Warsaw? Why should English plays, written for a completely different public, be played in these Eastern capitals? One must break that habit of imitation which was inevitable as long as French, English, or Belgian capital, investing in the mines, railroads, and factories of the "Eastern Marches," pushed its books, films, and styles upon them. Just as nationalized industry now stands on its own feet, so Eastern European cultures must learn to stand by their own strength.

626 Unhappily, in freeing themselves from the spell of the West, the literature, science, and art of these Marches[3] became totally dependent on the new metropolis. Once imitation was spontaneous and voluntary, but now it is obligatory. Any attempt to find one's own way is denounced as Titoism. Any attempt to reach into one's own national past is possible only to the extent that that past parallels the development of the Russian nation. One may turn to folklore, obviously, and to the realistic plays of the nineteenth century. But, for example, Poland has a tradition of romantic drama which does not lend itself to realistic representation. It also possesses a tradition of stage production which is known as "monumental theater." To continue such traditions would smack of dangerous heresy. The fight against "cosmopolitanism" is in reality nothing more than the act of emptying a retort and refilling it with a different fluid. In the past, a particular substance was created in this retort through the interaction of native and imported elements. Today the imported element appears in much purer form, for a sufficient number of laboratory workers are eager to maintain the necessary respect for the formula.

● 186 In the last century, the "decadent West" was condemned by patriotic Russian historians because it was liberal, and

3 [The "Eastern Marches" --Analyst]

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because the ideas that emanated from it threatened autocratic governments. Nor was it only these defenders of the throne who criticized it mercilessly. One has but to read Tolstoi's *What Is Art?* to get a picture of the scorn for Western sophistication that is so typical of the Russians. Tolstoi regarded Shakespeare's plays as collections of bloody crimes, and French painting (this was the period of the flowering of Impressionism) as the daubs of degenerates. After the Revolution, when once again the social system of Russia differed from that of the West, it was not difficult to enlarge on this precedent with a goodly number of arguments. Didn't Russia's strength lie in its suspicion of the West; and weren't even the Tsarist historians working for the Revolution by cultivating Russia's self-assurance and faith in the special calling of the nation? Conscious of their hitherto latent power, the "Scythians," as the great Russian poet Blok called his nation, at last began to march. Therefore, it would seem that the nations lying between the Baltic and Mediterranean seas would do well to imitate this Russian self-assurance and free themselves from the bad habit of parroting the West.

The intellectual understands, of course, that he himself is "cosmopolitan" since he looks to the West for *something*. This does not mean, however, that he complains about the orders that have banished Parisian boulevard art, or American detective stories from his country. A great many cultural phenomena which excite the "elite" in Western countries are distasteful to him. Asked whether T. S. Eliot's *The Cocktail Party* should be played in his native land, he would undoubtedly answer "No"; whereas, he finds *The Wasteland* by the same author an interesting piece of poetry. The new acquisition that the people of Central and Eastern Europe will never want to re-

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186 linquish is the feeling of responsibility for what the public gets from editors or producers. If, for example, one considers a play bad, one should not present it even though it might be a considerable financial success. (Just imagine a Prague or Warsaw worker looking at *The Cocktail Party*!) On the other hand, the ban on Stravinsky's *Le Sacre du printemps* is obviously absurd. The "cosmopolitanism" of the intellectual I describe is very moderate. He makes distinctions between what is worthy of his respect in the West and what owes its success to cheap publicity appealing to the taste of a dubious "elite."

The superiority of Russian realist painting (*pieredwizniki*) over French Impressionism has been proved in Moscow. Unfortunately, the eye is used in the appreciation of a painting, and the most learned discourse cannot transform an ugly canvas into a great work of art—which is obviously to be deplored! At every step, be it in the realm of aesthetics or ethics, one encounters the opposition that the strangeness of man raises against the wisest of theories. It is reasonable that a responsibly raised child should inform on his father if he observes his behavior to be contrary to the good of the social order on whose well-being the happiness of all mankind depends. And yet the disgust such behavior awakens in many people is just as inexplicable as their preference for Manet over Russian nineteenth-century realists.

000 The recklessness with which the Russians are carrying out their mental operations in the people's democracies is reaching dangerous proportions. Consistent reasoning which orders one to by-pass a fact when a concept comes into conflict with reality must eventually lead to costly errors. Hitler's war on "degenerate art" sprang from the same seed as the new ethics of his party which ordered the slaughter of "inferior races"; and in these very ideas lay

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ever, to proceed somewhat in the manner of a naturalist determining major groups and families.

National Ketman is broadly diffused throughout the masses, and even the upper brackets of the Party in the various dependent states are not free of it. Because Tito, like Sadra, announced his heresy to all the world, millions of human beings in the people's democracies must employ exceedingly ingenious means of masking themselves. Instructive displays of condemnation of those who wished to follow the national road to socialism in individual Eastern capitals taught the public what kind of phrases and reflexes can expose one to reproach for harboring this fatal tendency. The surest safeguard is to manifest loudly one's awe at Russia's achievements in every field of endeavor, to carry Russian books under one's arm, to hum Russian songs, to applaud Russian actors and musicians enthusiastically, etc. A writer who has not consecrated a single work to outstanding Russian figures or to Russian life, but has confined himself to national themes, cannot consider himself entirely safe. The chief characteristic of the people who practice this Ketman is an unbounded contempt for Russia as a barbaric country. Among the workers and peasants it is most often purely emotional, and based on observation of either the soldiers of the liberating army, or (since during the war a great many were in areas directly administered by the Russians) of Russians in their daily life.

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Because until now the living standard of the masses in Russia was so much lower than that of the so-called people's democracies, national Ketman finds abundant nourishment. It cannot be defined simply as nationalism. For many centuries hatred existed between the Central European Slavs and the Germans, still it was colored

[For a definition of "Ketman", see cat. 116; pp. 57-60 -- Analyst]

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186 626 among the Slavs by a respect for Germany's material achievements. On the other hand, perceiving by comparison the greater refinement of his own customs, his greater organizational ability (be it only in respect to transportation or the handling of machinery), the Central European would express his attitude toward Russia, if he could, by a disdainful shrug of his shoulders—which, however, doesn't prevent him from shuddering in fear before the countless hordes pouring out of the Euro-Asian continent.

But this Ketman is not exclusively emotional in its appeal. Amid the young intelligentsia of working-class origin the overwhelming opinion can be summed up shortly as "Socialism—yes, Russia—no"; and this is where the subtleties of doctrinal differences arise. The countries of Europe, this line of reasoning begins, are infinitely more prepared to realize socialism than Russia. Their population is more intelligent; most of their land is under cultivation; their systems of communication and their industry are more highly developed. Measures based on absolute cruelty are unnecessary and even pointless since there exists a greater degree of social discipline. Nevertheless, "the national road to socialism" has been condemned and many efforts made to prove that whoever is opposed to total adaptation to Russian models and to surrendering to Russian dictatorship is a traitor who must share the fate of Tito—that is, must come out against the Center, and thus weaken its war potential without which there can be no revolution on a world scale. To pronounce oneself against this thesis would be to deny the New Faith and to introduce in its place a different faith, for example one directly linked to Marx and Engels. Many do so. Others, seeing in the alliance between Tito and the West an example of historical fatality, and rejecting the idea that this fatality

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may be due simply to the Center's policy toward dependent nations, shut themselves up in a Ketman which does not hamper the Center in its external acts. A true Moslem, even though he be deeply attached to his Ketman, never seeks to injure Islam in those areas where it is fighting for its life against unbelievers. Such Ketman expresses itself only in practical moves which do no harm in the world struggle, but which on the other hand safeguard national interests whenever possible.

The Ketman of Revolutionary Purity is a rare variety, more common in the large cities of Russia than in the people's democracies. It is based on a belief in the "sacred fire of the revolutionary epoch of Lenin" which burns in such a poet as Mayakovski. Mayakovski's suicide in 1930 marked the end of an era distinguished by the flowering of literature, the theater, and music. The "sacred fire" was dampened, collectivization was introduced mercilessly, millions of Soviet citizens perished in slave labor camps, a ruthless policy toward non-Russian nations was established. Literature became flat and colorless under the influence of imposed theories; Russian painting was destroyed; Russian theater, then the foremost in the world, was deprived of freedom to experiment; science was subjected to directives from Party chiefs. A man who reasons thus hates Him with all his heart, holding Him responsible for the terrible lot of the Russian people and for the hatred they inspire in other nations.

Still, he is not altogether sure whether He is necessary or not. Perhaps in extraordinary periods such as the present the appearance of a tyrant must be considered desirable. Mass purges in which so many good communists died, the lowering of the living standard of the citizens, the reduction of artists and scholars to the status of yes-men, the extermination of entire national groups—what

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186 other man would dare undertake such measures? After
626 all, Russia stood firm against Hitler; the Revolution weathered the attack of enemy armies. In this perspective, His acts seem effective and even justified, perhaps, by an exceptional historical situation. If He had not instituted an exceptional terror in the year 1937, wouldn't there have been more people willing to help Hitler than there actually were? For example, doesn't the present-day line in scholarship and art, no matter how at odds it may be at times with common sense, effectually raise Russian morale in the face of the war that threatens? He is an infamous blot on the bright New Faith, but a blemish we must tolerate for the moment. And indeed we must even support Him. The "sacred fire" has not gone out. When victory is achieved, it will burst forth again with its old strength, the bonds He imposed will fall away, and relations between nations will operate on new and better principles. This variety of Ketman was widespread if not universal in Russia during the Second World War, and its present form is a rebirth of an already once-deceived hope.

626 *Aesthetic Ketman*[1] is born of the disparity between man's
517 longings and the sense-satisfactions the New Faith offers. A man of taste cannot approve the results of official pressure in the realm of culture no matter how much he applauds the latest verses, how many flattering reviews he writes of current art expositions, nor how studiously he pretends that the gloomy new buildings coincide with his personal preferences in architecture. He changes completely within the four walls of his home. There one finds (if he is a well-situated intellectual) reproductions of works of art officially condemned as bourgeois, records of modern music, and a rich collection of ancient authors in various languages. This luxury of splendid isolation is pardoned him so long as his creative work is effective prop-

[1] [For a definition of "ketman", see cat. 116, pp. 57-60 -- Analyst]

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795 Greek Orthodox Church, which though united in its Uniate form with Rome, preserved its old language and customs. This Church became the target of special Russian propagandistic and repressive efforts as soon as the Iron Curtain was established.

565 Elsewhere outside the former realm of the Habsburgs the
795 situation was comparable. In Poland a Catholic peasantry
369 whose loyalty was deeply moving lived confidently though primitively in the light of a mystical faith, while worldliness and skepticism were prevalent among the upper classes. It was commonly said there, after World War I, that the most religious of peoples was governed by the most morally lax of bureaucrats; and that may well have been the case. Nor could the coming of industrialism to such mushroom cities as Lodz, so bitterly lamented by Ladislas Reymont, bring about the immediate solution of any grave social problem. Nevertheless, as we shall see, there existed in Poland religious elites of extraordinary quality and dedication. In eastern Germany, overwhelmingly Protestant despite certain vigorous centers of Catholic activity such as the Ermland in East Prussia and the border districts west of Poznan (Silesia was a province apart, its culture having been developed under the Habsburgs), one could go from the old conservative, rural Church communities of the landed estates along the Baltic Sea to the liberal atmosphere of Saxony, where the social problems inherent in modern industrial society dominated thought and action. Concerning the Balkans one need say here only that, though they suffered from the normal diseases of feudalism, they offered much of vital and absorbing interest to the student of religious life.

175 These observations will help to explain the situation which
● 186 followed the First World War. The old Austro-Hungarian Empire was dissolved, and dissident nationalist sentiment, supported by the will of the victorious Allies, demanded the crea-

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tion of separate states. Therewith a tide of Liberalism merged 175
with the currents of upsurging tribal nationalism to create the 186
pattern of conflict which was later to prove so advantageous to the totalitarians. Czech nationalism, having in Thomas Masaryk a brilliantly effective standard-bearer, seemed at first blush to usher in a new era of democratic and progressive social thought. It soon became obvious, however, that the autonomism of the Czechs—which led at the outset even to the establishment of a National Church—would of necessity engender comparable feelings in the breasts of the other peoples in the Czechoslovak Republic. The Slovaks rallied round their own traditions of language and culture, and swiftly but surely became committed to a quest for autonomy which found a temporary though unsatisfactory haven under Hitler. Among Sudeten Germans feeling was almost as strong and led ultimately to the fateful formation of a political party which advocated union with Germany. Nor was the situation different elsewhere. Yugoslavia was plagued from the beginning by deep and bitter conflict among the Serbs, the Croats, and the Slovenes.

In Hungary a violent Communist revolution, spearheaded in 175
late 1918 by Béla Kun, ruled for a time by bloodshed. But ere 669
long this uprising, which had very little popular support, was 794
put down; reaction set in, and a dictatorial government was established after it had compiled its own catalogue of excesses. Here was made manifest, probably for the first time, how significant the stability of religious groups could prove to be. Not only did they temper noticeably the excesses of extremists, but under the leadership of great churchmen they began to build organizations dedicated to social improvement. It is also true [829]
that bitter experience under the Béla Kun regime made Hungary one of the most anti-Communist countries of Europe.

And so, as the turbulence engendered by the war apparently 795
subsided, it seemed probable that a period of relative security

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797 tive in Russia at the request of the government, bringing food,
659 clothing, and medicine to many tens of thousands. Yet even while this work of charity was in progress, priests and prelates
798 were sentenced to death and executed, churches were looted
648 and closed, and many of the faithful were exiled. The Bolsheviks insisted that, until the Vatican recognized the regime as a lawfully constituted government, clergymen professing allegiance to Rome must be regarded as enemies; Russian émigré circles were just as vehement in demanding that no such recognition be accorded; and circles representative of the Orthodox Church opposed even the Papal Relief Mission, on the ground that its directors were in reality proselytizers. In the circumstances, the Vatican tried to carry on its relief work as long as possible, and to use whatever influence it could muster to save the persecuted bishops and priests. In the end, however, the isolated remnants of Roman Catholicism in Russia lost even
E the remotest hope that Rome could do anything for them.

659 The countries west of Russia, most of them newly estab-
●186 lished, presented less formidable obstacles to the mission of
795 the Church; but in not a few of them conditions were turbulent enough. In Czechoslovakia, for example, insurgent nationalism combined with anticlericalism to create within the Catholic clergy a sizable group who not only wished to rid the Church of every vestige of association with the Habsburgs but also strove to "reform" the ecclesiastical organization itself and to do away with such constraints as celibacy. However, the secession and subsequent excommunication of this group led to a great strengthening of the loyal majority. Catholics were collectively more resolute, and by 1925 the fever had abated, and relations between Church and State were established on a solid foundation. Elsewhere the story was similar, though perhaps less stormy and tawdry.

OOO In attempting to visualize the complex continuous effort by

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563 energetic crusade against Serb 'infidels.' Serb fascists retaliated
668 by murdering Croats and Moslems *en masse* in Bosnia, Herze-
661 govina, Dalmatia and elsewhere. While engaged in this communal slaughter, the quislings of each nation—Croats, Slovenes, Moslems and Serbs—collaborated with Berlin or Rome or with both.

642 Unlike them General Draža Mihailović, the military com-
668 mander of King Peter and his government in exile, stood for a united Yugoslavia including all the nations, but united under the rule of Serbia. His Chetniks were ready to take an active part in the massacre of Croats and Moslems, and Mihailović himself called upon the Allies to bomb Zagreb, the Croat capital, in revenge for their treachery. He even circulated propaganda maps of a future Yugoslavia in which Croatia was reduced to a small strip of land. To the Croatian, Montenegrin, Slovenian and also Serbian peasants and workers the old centralised administration symbolised by Mihailović represented the tax-collector, the gendarme and the corrupt local official. Mihailović's policy condemned him to increasing isolation and so to impotency, and finally to collaboration with the Germans and Italians against Tito's Partisans.

668 The only Party which fought for the unity of Yugoslavia on
186 the basis of the equality of all its component nations was the
563 Communist Party. The refugees from the pogroms constituted the first Partisan units, and the communal conflicts faced Tito's movement squarely with the problem whose solution proved to be decisive for its successes in the struggle for the liberation of the country from Axis occupation.

By a policy of national equality and of opposition to all communal conflicts, whether led by Ustashe and Moslem pogromists or Nedić and the Chetnik 'avengers', the Communist Party of Yugoslavia succeeded in welding the different peoples together. As Lieutenant-General Svetozar Vukmanović (better known as 'Tempo') said in his speech on the occasion of the celebration of 'Yugoslav Army Day' on 22nd December, 1947: 'The fighting of the Serbian and Montenegrin proletarian and shock brigades in Bosnia and Croatia; the fighting of Bosnian, Croatian and Montenegrin units in Serbia; the fighting of Serbian, Croatian, Bosnian, Macedonian, Montenegrin and Slovene units on the Srem front and beyond, for

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the ultimate liberation of Croatia, Bosnia, Slovenia, etc.—all this was an enormous contribution of the Yugoslav Army in the struggle for the establishment of unity among the peoples of Yugoslavia.' The unity of the peoples and their equality was symbolised in the fact that a Croat (Tito) led the revolt in Serbia, a Serbian Jew (Moše Pijade) led the rising in Montenegro, and a Montenegrin (Vukmanović) led the partisans in Macedonia.

This policy explains the phenomenon that military units of Italians, Hungarians and even German partisans fought in Tito's army. A large number of Italian soldiers joined the Partisans after the fall of Mussolini and formed the Garibaldi Volunteer units which were large enough to consist of a number of divisions. In the Slovene littoral, where Slovenes and Italians live side by side, Italian and Slovene Partisans formed common units, and Italians took an active and equal part in the work of the People's Committees, the embryonic administration of the new state. In spite of the cruelty displayed by the Hungarian occupation armies in the zone which they annexed, a cruelty greater even than that of the German armies, Tito succeeded in recruiting a battalion of Hungarian volunteers, the Petöfi Sandor battalion. There was also a Czech battalion in the Partisan Army. In July, 1943, a campaign was launched to enlist members of the German minority living in Yugoslavia in the Partisan army and this campaign met with some success, a Volksdeutsche battalion being organized to fight with the Partisans.

The social programme of Tito's Partisans was conservative. The Anti-Fascist Council of National Liberation (A.V.N.O.J.) —the Partisans' parliament—at its first meeting in Bihać on 26th November, 1942, proclaimed a programme, two of whose points were:

'The inviolability of private property and the providing of every possibility for individual initiative in industry, trade and agriculture.

'No radical changes whatsoever in the social life and activities of the people except for the replacement of reactionary village authorities and gendarmes who may have gone over to the service of the invaders by popularly elected representatives truly democratic and popular in character. All the most

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Hysterical Chauvinism

The war ended, the tune changed. The Communist Party discovered two advantages to be gained from the expulsion of the Germans, first the awakened political consciousness of the masses could be diverted into a reactionary, chauvinist channel, secondly, the majority of the industries (previously owned by Germans) could be transferred to the state without any need for the active intervention of the working class and without the bourgeoisie being able to oppose such a transference. Gottwald declared on 12th May, 1945: 'The new Republic will be a Slav state, a Republic of the Czechs and the Slovaks. We will deprive the Germans and the Hungarians, who have so heavily sinned against our peoples and the Republic of their citizenship and severely punish them.' The Communist Minister of Information, Václav Kopecky, speaking over Radio Prague on 25th May, 1945, said: 'The Czechoslovak army is already prepared for the purification of the border area of the Republic from Germans and Hungarians, and for the restoration of the wealth of these old Slav areas into the hands of the Czechs and the Slovaks.' In a speech at Liberec (Reichenberg) he said: 'We will clear Liberec of the German enemies, and we will do it so thoroughly that there will remain not the smallest place where the German seed could grow once more. We shall expel all the Germans, we shall confiscate their property, we shall de-Germanize not only the town but the whole area . . . so that the victorious spirit of Slavdom shall permeate the country from the frontier ranges to the interior.'

The Communist Minister of Education, Zdeněk Nejedly, said on 29th May, 1945: 'We do not know any progressive Germans, nor are there any.' 'Germany, once the most feared power in Europe, does not exist any more; for us it means that the German question is once and for all solved. We will continue the work of our predecessors; we will *purify Prague and the border districts*, and we are in the position to do so *because we have a great helper in doing this—the Red Army*. Not every army would have helped us in doing this. . . Now is no time for vacillation. We cannot say we will look neither to the West nor to the East, but will wait. We must today say "Yes" or "No". We must decide *either for the East or for the West. I do not believe that it is a problem for the Czech people*. We belong to the great

[See category 116, p. 188 -- Analyst]

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186 Slav bloc at the head of which the great Russian people stands
661 with its chief, Stalin.' With a rising fervour of chauvinism he
563 goes on: 'Consider Middle Europe—there are Hungarians. What can they do? Then the Rumanians—what can they do? And what can the Germans do? They have no future anywhere. *We are greater than all of them*; with our culture we can stand up to all of them. And they will see that they in their hopeless situation will be happy only to follow our leadership. How many composers are there in Europe who are the equal of Smetana? How many painters of the rank of Mánes and Aleš? How many historians the equal of Palacký? How many scientists of the greatness of Purkyně? . . . Our culture must be national . . . Nothing but cultural ruins surround us . . . We will first of all carry our civilization to the border regions, and there will plant our national cultural ideal.' (Quoted by *Der Sozialdemokrat*, June, 1945).

The Communist Party outdid the Czechoslovak bourgeoisie in chauvinist ardour, but the latter did its best to prove that it was not less anti-German and chauvinistic than the Communists. Thus, for instance, Dr. Ivo Ducháček of the People's Party (Catholics) said in the Provisional National Assembly, March, 1946: 'We want to exclude nobody from this success, though it is true that, for instance, the Communist Party had in the years 1939, 1940 and 1941 no such clear and uncompromisingly Slavic conceptions in this matter as it has today. However, I regard it as a downright falsification of history and as a building up of legends, which I do not hesitate to call pre-election legends, if the Communists, of all parties, assert that the credit for the transfer of the Germans from our country is due mainly to them or almost alone to them' (*Lidova Demokracie*, March 9th, 1946, quoted in *Der Sozialdemokrat*, London, May, 1946).

In this nationalistic competition, the Communist Party had certain advantages. First, it could point to the fact that nowhere, except in the Russian-controlled territories, were Germans evicted *en masse*. Secondly, and of greater importance, the expulsion was organised and German property redistributed by a Communist Minister of the Interior, Václav Nosek. The Security Corps which carried out the physical expulsion was headed by members of the Communist Party. (In Poland, too,

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the Communist Party was in charge of the expulsion of the Germans from the Western territories, and the settlement of Poles in their place. There Gomulka, then General Secretary of the Party, was responsible). 186 661 563

Because in the popular view the Communist Party bore the greatest responsibility for the expulsion, there was a much higher percentage of Communist supporters among the new Czech settlers in the Sudeten areas than in any other part of the country, even than in the big towns where large numbers of workers were concentrated. In the 1946 general elections, in the districts of Jablonec and Turnov the Communist Party polled 70 per cent of the votes, in Kadaň 62 per cent, Falknov 59 per cent, in Aš over 50 per cent, and so on. (The situation in the Western Territories of Poland was similar, hence the Communist leaders insisted on giving highly disproportionate representation to these areas in the general elections of January, 1947).

The whole of the Sudeten population, except some tens of thousands of indispensable skilled workers, was expelled from the country. Those who remained had to do compulsory labour for a minimum of twelve hours a day, and, if the employer thought it necessary, fifteen hours. The National Committees organised this compulsory labour. According to their decrees, the German workers in Czechoslovakia were forbidden to belong to trade unions, were excluded from social benefits, had to give a quarter of their wages as reparations to the state, were not entitled to holidays, and their children were not allowed to attend school. 466 611 563

In the first few days after the defeat of the German army in Czechoslovakia, some cracks were made in the wall of national animosity by open fraternisation between Czech and German workers. For instance, a number of rank and file communists in Bodenbach began to publish a daily paper in Czech and German; it was called *Rudý Prapor—Rote Fahne.* It was short-lived, for Nosek immediately prohibited the publication of any German paper or of any paper in two languages one of which was German. 563 661

It is ironical to note that the excesses against the Germans in Czechoslovakia were taking place at the same time—with the Red Army's entry into Germany—as the Russian

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CHAPTER VII

'TITOISTS' BEFORE TITO

TITOISM expresses the struggle of a small nation led by its bureaucracy against oppression by the Great Russian bureaucracy. The Tito-Stalin conflict throws light not only on the Rajk-Stalin, Gomulka-Stalin or Kostov-Stalin conflicts, where the issue is the national oppression of the peoples of Stalin's new vassal states, but also on the national question in the U.S.S.R. herself. It is instructive to survey this little-known aspect of Russian policy.

The most numerous non-Russian people in the U.S.S.R. are the Ukrainians. Their national aspirations have constantly been suppressed by a series of purges. In 1930 the Ukrainian Academy of Sciences was dissolved and members of it arrested for 'national deviations'. In 1933, Skrypnik, the most prominent leader of the Ukrainian Communist Party and a member of its Central Committee and Political Bureau, committed suicide in order to avoid arrest. At the same time Kostubinsky, the Vice-President of the Council of People's Commissars of the Ukraine (the Ukrainian Government), Kovnar, the Commissar of Agriculture, and a few score of high officials were shot as nationalists. To prevent further deviations, Postyshev was sent to Ukraine from Moscow in 1933 to reorganise the party and the state administration. He was given dictatorial powers. At the 12th Congress of the Ukrainian Communist Party in 1933, he said: 'In Ukraine our leading Party members and Comrade Stalin himself are specially hated. The class enemy has been to a good school in this country and has learned how to struggle against Soviet rule. In Ukraine have settled the remnants of many counter-revolutionary parties and organizations. Kharkov has gradually become the centre of attraction for all sorts of nationalistic and other counter-revolutionary organizations. They have all been drawn to this centre and they have spread their webs all over the Ukraine, making use of our Party system for their own ends. You remember, Comrades,

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661 when twenty Secretaries of Party Regional Committees dared
182 to declare that it was impossible to fulfil the Harvest Plan'
687 (Nos. 15–21 of *Proletarian*, Kharkov, 1934, quoted by W. E. D. Allen, *The Ukraine*, Cambridge, 1940, p. 326). Postyshev expelled more than a quarter of the members of the Ukrainian Communist Party. Three years later he himself suffered a similar fate, being expelled and arrested. In his place came Kosior, from Moscow. He, in due course, was also arrested. In 1937, Lyubchenko, Chairman of the Council of People's Commissars of Ukraine, committed suicide in order to avoid arrest. The Commissars Petrovski and Eiche were liquidated.

Other republics have a similar history. In the Republic of White Russia, Goloded, who for ten years was Chairman of the Council of People's Commissars, was in 1937 arrested as a Trotskyist. Some months later his successor as chairman, Cherviakov, committed suicide to avoid arrest He had been Chairman of the Central Executive Committee of White Russia (i.e., President of the Republic) for seventeen years.

In Tadjikistan, the Chairman of the Executive Committee was purged as a nationalist in 1934. His successor held the position for three years and then suffered a similar fate. Walter Padley, in his article 'Empire or Free Union?' in *Politics*, New York, Spring, 1948, gives the following list of some of the foremost people in the national republics who were purged in 1937:

Presidents	*Republic*
Cherviakov	White Russia
Rahkhimbayev	Tadjikistan
Arkupov	Karelian
Shotemur	Tadjikistan
Lordkipanide	Adjar
Dolgat	Daghestan
Kunz	Volga-German
Prime-Ministers	*Republic*
Goloded	White Russia
Mgalobishvili	Georgia
Khodjaev	Uzbekistan
Rakhinov	Tadjikistan
Bondarenko	Ukraine
Ovakabelashvili	Transcaucasia.

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The direction of people's minds along the groove required by Moscow begins at school. Pupils in Ukraine are made to pay tribute to Kutuzov, known as the hangman of the Ukrainians. Chmelnitzki, who massacred the Jews and betrayed the Ukrainian peasants into Russian serfdom must be acclaimed a national hero. Pupils in Azerbaidjan must be taught that the Russian occupation of their country in 1806 was not symbolic of the superiority of Russian arms alone, but shows the long attachment of Azerbaidjan to Russian culture. It is often very difficult for the non-Russian scholars to explain their history in the way required, and they are frequently accused of nationalism. In the summer of 1944, the Central Committee of the C.P.S.U. severely criticized the cultural work of the Tartar Republic, its main defalcation being nationalist falsifications in the teaching of its national history. The Tartars were instructed to emphasize the elements in their history which united them with Russia (*Propagandist*, 15th June, 1944). The journal *Kultura i Zhizn* of 30th November, 1945, is devoted mainly to criticisms of 'nationalist deviations' in the teaching of history. The institutes of history in the Ukrainian, Tartar, Bashkir, Armenian, Georgian, Latvian and White Russian Republics all come in for their measure of stern criticism.

The war proved a great test for Stalin's national policy. The fact that the soldiers of the U.S.S.R. fought with great courage proves nothing by itself. Russia's greatest military victories in the eighteenth century were won by Suvorov in Catherine the Great's reign, the worst period of serfdom. The serfs who were so cruelly exploited showed immense heroism and self-sacrifice in the army. In the Second World War the German and Japanese soldiers doggedly persisted in their struggle even when all hope of military victory was lost, but this fact does not prove that there were harmonious social relations within these countries.

It is extremely difficult to discover the whole truth about the number of quislings in Russia. The case of General Vlassov is well known. He received the highest orders of the Red Army at the beginning of the war, but on being taken prisoner by the Germans, organised an army of between 100,000 and 1,000,000 prisoners of war from the U.S.S.R. to fight by the side of the Germans. This by itself, however, indicated very little. Hitler,

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186 for instance, was more successful in finding quislings in France
668 than in Russia, but much less successful in Poland, where he could not get one general or military unit to fight on his side. Nevertheless, Vlassov's defaulting was disquieting to the Russian authorities, and they took care never to mention it in the press or over the radio.

At the end of the war, repeated attacks in the press on fascist influence in the areas of occupation—Ukraine, White Russia, Crimea and the Caucasus—serve as clear testimony to the apathy or even enmity of the populations to the Russian authorities. For instance, *Bolshevik* of 17th August, 1944, stated: '. . . the population of White Russia was for three years deprived of real Soviet information, and was under the influence of lying fascist propaganda. This applied also to other now freed areas. The Soviet people remained true to their Fatherland. (Examples follow—Y.G.) . . . This does not give us the right to quiescence. The treacherous enemy, with his lying propaganda, with his bloody terror, hitherto unparalleled in history, demoralised more than a few people, brought more than a little confusion in their consciousness. He strengthens his agency which conducts skilled undermining work . . .' In another issue of *Bolshevik* there occurs this statement: 'The existence and the vitality of vestiges of capitalism in the mind of people in our country is explained not only by the fact that people's minds are lagging behind economic conditions, but also by the influence of an alien ideology . . . The German fascist occupants endeavoured to implant the ideology of private property and of nationalism . . . (The enemy) did his utmost to demoralise them, to poison their consciousness and to sap their belief in the rightness of our great cause.' (Quoted by *The Economist*, 16th March, 1946).

The explanation is not convincing. The Nazi reign of terror would not sow doubts and breed hatred against the Russian regime, but on the contrary, would put it in a much better light in the eyes of the oppressed. This quotation reveals that, in spite of the German terror and oppression, anti-Russian 'nationalist deviations' occurred. To one who knows how to read the Communist Party press, such an admission, repeated in numerous articles, is a sure sign that an important fact is being touched on.

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000 It was nevertheless not entirely by chance that President Wilson took the initiative during the First World War in proclaiming that a just settlement in Eastern Europe was a prerequisite to world peace. Not only were Americans in many walks of life becoming aware of the importance of this region, but Wilson himself had at one time given some attention to its problems. As early as 1877, as an undergraduate at the College of New Jersey (now known as Princeton University), Wilson wrote a paper on "Prince Bismarck," which reflected his interest in the role of Eastern Europe in the international relations of that period; but this was only a student's essay, and it touched on Eastern Europe no more than peripherally. It was as an international statesman that Wilson came forward in 1918 to proclaim in his Fourteen Points three principles, among others, that he considered fundamental to a peaceful settlement. These principles were: national self-determination for the peoples of Eastern Europe (Points X-XIII), free and equal trade (Point III), and a general association of nations (Point XIV).

This image of a just settlement was only partially achieved in the peace treaties for, although the new frontiers followed reasonably closely the national principles, the equally vital requirements of free trade and collective security were in large measure neglected. What is significant about Wilson's program is not the ultimate failure of the peace settlement, since his own program was implemented only in part, but the fact that he correctly stressed the three central issues affecting the destiny of Eastern Europe. Throughout modern history, the peoples of this region have struggled with the problems of national liberation, modernization, and regional organization, and in reviewing their history these three categories provide a useful framework of analysis.

●186 563 Of these three problems, that of national liberation is certainly the one that has concerned the peoples of this area

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most continuously. As minority groups, the peoples of Eastern Europe tended to suffer from discrimination at the hands of the governments whose territory they inhabited and, once they were infected with the spirit of the enlightenment, national liberation came to be regarded as the solution to all their problems. Significant reforms were indeed carried out in the nineteenth century within the existing political framework, but the road to reform was obstructed by many obstacles. Although national liberation almost inevitably means revolution and war, it appeared to many Eastern European leaders to be preferable to the available alternatives. The diplomatic history of Europe was, in fact, punctuated by great crises as one province after another broke loose from the Ottoman empire, and when this process culminated in the First World War and the liberation of the remaining peoples of this region, it was widely regarded as a logical step in human progress.

The leaders of Eastern European opinion did not regard national liberation as an end in itself, but rather as the best means for promoting the modernization of their peoples. This aim was stated in many different ways, some speaking of education, others of freedom, and many more of economic welfare. This is certainly a much broader objective than the principle of free and equal trade enunciated by Wilson, but that principle was an essential prerequisite to modernization in the view of the American president. In general terms it would not be unfair to say that the goal of Eastern European leaders in the last two centuries has been to raise the spiritual and material level of their peoples to the European standard established by England, France, Germany, and their smaller neighbors. This interpretation of their goal is certainly very generalized, yet it represents more accurately the aspirations of this region than do the specific programs of individual leaders or schools of thought. The fact that this objective has not yet been attained is fundamen-

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185 tal to an understanding of the problems of Eastern Europe, and much of the political extremism of this region can be traced to the frustrations resulting from this failure.

The most obvious reason for the failure to achieve a European standard, and probably also the most important, has been the persistent necessity of giving priority to national security over human welfare. This problem has, of course, been faced by all modern states, but it has affected the peoples of Eastern Europe to an unusual degree. It would not be too much to say that the insecurity of these states, due more to regional factors than to size, has been the source of [649] most of their difficulties. Of the various solutions that have been attempted, including national opportunism, alliances with great powers, regional pacts, and participation in the League of Nations, none has met the special needs of the situation.

I

•186 175 The European wars resulting from the French Revolution and the Napoleonic conquests infected the leaders of the Eastern European peoples with the modern spirit of nationalism and liberalism, but the peace settlement concluded in 1815 did little to satisfy the hopes that had been aroused. The peoples of this region remained under the firm rule of the Romanov, Habsburg, Hohenzollern, and Ottoman dynasties, and before long the process of national liberation came to occupy their principal energies. Of the many national groups in this region, only the Serbians and the Montenegrins achieved any measure of independence before 1815, although the Magyars occupied within the Austrian monarchy a position of special influence. The remaining nationalities in this region had not yet taken the first steps towards independence. The struggle for freedom lasted for a full century, and was a complex process in which the

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ivalries among the nationalities frequently occupied as much 186
nergy as the struggle against the dynastic governments.

The development of nationalism and liberation in East- 186
rn Europe was the product of many influences. Within the 668
arger framework of the enlightenment, the peoples of this
egion were stimulated by the philosophy of nationalism de-
eloped by Herder and his school and by the ideas of the
French Revolution disseminated through cultural channels
nd by Napoleon's armies. The Poles, Czechs, and Magyars
were most strongly influenced by this new spirit at first, and
ntil the middle of the nineteenth century liberalism took
recedence over nationalism. In this period a Czartoryski, a
Palacky, and a Széchenyi worked for reforms within the
olitical framework established in 1815, and their policies
roduced significant results. It was only after the defeat of
iberalism in the abortive revolutions of 1848 that national-
sm came to predominate, and this nationalism was rapidly
ardened by the opposition that it encountered. By the end
f the century only the Magyars had achieved the substance
f their national aims, and this at the expense of becoming
among the most rigorous oppressors of their own non-
Magyar minorities. The peoples of Southeastern Europe
chieved independence only to a limited degree before the
First World War, while the Poles and Czechs remained under
irm imperial rule. The approximate distribution of these
ationalities at the turn of the century is illustrated by the
able on page 8.

Of all the oppressed peoples of Eastern Europe, the Poles 563
were the most numerous and their situation in 1815 the 175
most acute. Possessors of a proud tradition of government
dating back to the later middle ages, and at one time the
third in area and fourth in population among the European
powers, they had suffered domestic disintegration and ter-
ritorial partition in the eighteenth century. In the peace set-
tlement of 1815 the largest segment of Poland was in-

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corporated in Russia as a nominal "Kingdom." Cracow became a free city under the joint protection of Russia, Prussia, and Austria, while western Poland became the Prussian province of Posen (Poznan), and the province of Galicia was ceded to Austria. For a brief period it seemed that the Kingdom of Poland might develop a degree of autonomy under Russian rule, but the firm suppression of the insurrection of 1830 brought an end to this hope. The mid-century revolutions were echoed in all four parts of Poland, and in each section ended with a further tightening of the imperial regime. In German and Russian Poland minority rights were increasingly disregarded in the latter half of the nineteenth century, and the city of Cracow lost its freedom through Austrian annexation. Only in the Austrian province of Galicia did the Poles develop a significant degree of self-government in this period, and in this atmosphere the Polish national movement was able to develop.

The Czechs and the Slovaks almost lost their identity after the annexation of the Kingdom of Bohemia by the Habsburgs in the seventeenth century, but in the revolutionary era they regained interest in their national culture. In the first half of the nineteenth century they were infected by the new spirit of nationalism and contributed such leaders as Dobrovsky, Šafařik, Palacky, and Havliček. However, here as elsewhere, the revolutions of 1848 brought defeat and retrenchment. As the Austrian government became more decentralized, the Czechs won increasing rights of local self-government, and by 1900 the questions of Czech autonomy and the Czech language had been raised by such leaders as Masaryk and Kramař to issues of European importance. The Slovaks, under the harsher rule of the Magyars, did not fare so well. Small in number and living in the underdeveloped reaches of the Carpathian mountains, the Slovaks lacked the cultural heritage of the Czechs. Nevertheless, under Štúr, Šafařik, and Kollar a Slovak national renaissance

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175 took place, and in the generation before the First World
●186 War a bitter struggle was waged against Magyar rule.
563 The exceptional character of Hungary's position was derived both from its traditions of provincial administrative autonomy, which can be traced to the thirteenth century, and from the fact that it had within its boundaries substantial Slavic and Rumanian minorities. Although the Hungarians, or Magyars, were less a minority than a member of the ruling group, they were by no means satisfied with the somewhat ambiguously defined rights of self-government granted when the Austrian Empire was created in 1804. The Hungarian nobility became an important force for reform within the empire and contributed many leaders to the liberal movement. Under the moderate guidance of Széchenyi important reforms were accomplished, but the more radical nationalist program of Kossuth was defeated in 1848-49 by the combined efforts of Austrian and Russian troops. Both the Magyar and the non-Magyar peoples were discriminated against in the period of Austrian centralism that followed, but with the military decline of Austria
[643] the privileges of Hungary were reasserted. The Austro-Hungarian compromise of 1867, negotiated under the wise statesmanship of Déak, gave Hungary a constitutional position equal to that of Austria within the empire and a political influence that was frequently greater despite certain economic disabilities.

Although Croatia enjoyed a degree of autonomy in Hungary after 1868, having in fact occupied the position of a dependency of Hungary intermittently since the eleventh century, it still suffered many limitations. The experience of Napoleonic rule in 1809-13 and the growth of Gaj's nationalist movement under the name of Illyrianism brought Croatian national feeling to the point where it could no longer suffer with equanimity the cultural and political restrictions imposed by the Magyars. The neighboring

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Slovenes, under Austrian rule, developed a national program under the leadership of Kopitar. The government of the German Austrians was certainly milder than that of the Magyars, but in the years before the First World War the Slovenes, like their Croatian cousins, had reasons to feel that their political development was being unjustifiably restricted by Habsburg policies.

The temper and direction of Croatian and Slovene nationalism was increasingly influenced by the successful efforts of the Serbians and the Montenegrins, who were also Serbian in language. Before 1815 both peoples had struck their first blows for independence from Turkish rule. Within the Habsburg empire, an important minority of Serbians was divided between Austrian, Hungarian, and Croatian rule, and was augmented in 1878 when Bosnia-Herzegovina came under the joint administration of Austria and Hungary. This province had a mixed population of Croatians, Serbians, and Mohammedans who were largely of Serbo-Croatian origin. In the eighteenth century significant concessions had been made to the Serbian minority in Hungary, but subsequent events led to a decline in their position and after the compromise of 1867 the situation was ripe for a national protest.

It was nevertheless in the Ottoman empire that the Serbian national movement, inspired by Obradović and Karadžić, found its most active rallying point. The Montenegrins gained recognition of their independence from Turkish rule in 1799, and the Serbians, starting with their first uprising in 1804, took advantage of every weakness in the Ottoman system to wrest increasing political independence and territorial aggrandizement. The years 1817, 1829, 1856, 1878, and 1913 mark the important stages of Serbian growth, and these developments were watched with warm interest by the South Slavs within the Habsburg empire. The question of South Slav national rights now be-

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came linked with the struggle of Austria-Hungary and Russia for hegemony in the Balkans, and the annexation of the Slav-inhabited Ottoman province of Bosnia-Herzegovina by the Habsburgs in 1908 was as important an event in South Slav politics as it was in European diplomacy. In view of Serbian indignation at this Habsburg stroke, it is not surprising that Sarajevo, the capital of Bosnia-Herzegovina, became the site of the incident that detonated the First World War.

In the Turkish territories south of Serbia, the Macedonian Slavs inhabiting the valleys of the Vardar and Struma rivers spoke a language closely related to both Serbian and Bulgarian. During the greater part of the nineteenth century, Serbian efforts were concentrated on the national struggle, and within Turkish territory Macedonia became tied to Bulgaria by administrative and political bonds. The absence of a clearcut Macedonian nationality made this province a source of a bitter rivalry between Serbia and Bulgaria that greatly hampered the national movements of the two contestants in the generation before the First World War.

To the east of Serbia, the Bulgarian national renaissance was somewhat delayed by the greater tenacity of Ottoman rule. By the middle of the century the national movement was nevertheless fully developed in its literary and religious aspects, and in 1878 the Russian-Turkish war brought political independence. Unlike the Serbians, whose territory was expanded gradually through the century, the Bulgarians were given immediate hope of a full realization of their territorial aims when the Russians appeared able in the spring of 1878 to impose their will on Turkey. The revision of these initial peace terms a few months later, as a result of British and Austrian pressure, resulted in a greatly reduced Bulgaria and in a nationalist movement that was stimulated to an unusual degree by this frustration. Despite its preoccupation with territorial aggrandizement, the

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Bulgarian government nevertheless made significant social and political progress in the years before the First World War. 175 186 563

The situation of the Rumanians was similar to that of the Serbians in that one part of their people lived under severe limitations within the Habsburg empire, while across the border in Turkey their co-nationals gained the substance of national independence by the middle of the century. The Rumanians in the Habsburg empire lived primarily under Hungarian rule after the compromise of 1867, and despite certain political concessions they never gained full national recognition. The vigorous struggle led by Vaida-Voevod and Maniu against political and cultural discrimination had a significant impact on the balance of forces within the empire but failed to achieve any concrete success before the First World War. The Rumanians in the Turkish provinces of Moldavia and Wallachia, adjacent to the Russian frontier and overlapping into the neighboring Russian province of Bessarabia, were able, because of this strategic position, to extract important concessions from the Ottoman government. By 1829 they attained autonomy under a Russian protectorate, and the Treaty of Paris in 1856 created the conditions under which they were to gain full independence within a generation. Like Serbia, this free Rumanian state was to exert a powerful attraction upon the discontented Rumanian minority within Austria-Hungary and eventually contributed to the disruption of the empire.

The Albanians fell under Turkish rule in the fifteenth century after the brief but heroic resistance of Skanderbeg, and during the period of Turkish rule they contributed many distinguished personalities to the Ottoman civil service as well as a dynasty to the Turkish province of Egypt. It was not until the neighboring Greeks and Serbians gained their independence and began to covet the lands of the Albanians that an active movement for national liberation developed

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175 among the latter. At the same time the strategic position of
●186 Albania with respect to the Adriatic made it an object of
563 imperial interest on the part of Austria-Hungary and Italy. When the Albanian liberation movement got under way, it thus had to guard against a variety of dangers, and finally in 1912 during the Balkan wars it became the last state in Europe to proclaim its independence from Turkish rule.

000 This rapid glance at the national movements in Eastern Europe in the century before the First World War gives particular attention to those peoples that achieved their independence as a result of that conflict. At the same time, important issues of political and religious rights that were associated with the national movements but did not play an equally important role in the political outcome of the First World War have not been discussed. The Germans also had significant national minorities in this region, but their national movement took a different direction. The same may be said of the Jewish minorities that played an important role in the lands inhabited by the Poles, Magyars, and Rumanians. Their position, especially in Russian Poland, was frequently worse than that of other minorities, and their liberation movement took the form of Zionism. It is important to recognize that there were many influential groups in Eastern Europe that for one reason or another preferred increased autonomy within the existing political framework to complete liberation. Indeed, the peoples of this region made important social and economic progress in the century before the First World War, and when independence was won it soon became apparent that some of the nations with the highest level of attainment were those that had remained longest under alien rule.

Much has been said in criticism of the peace settlement in Eastern Europe at the end of the First World War, but it must be allowed that the principle of national self-determination was applied with considerable consistency.

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178 iron as well as consumer goods and benefited by the large
433 market that the empire provided. Significant industrial development also took place in Hungary and in other parts of the empire. Similarly, in Russian Poland important industries were developed, but these suffered from the discriminatory policy of the Russian government and from the lack of communications.

457 Capital for the economic development of this region came
471 chiefly from France until the 1890's, when German and Austrian capital became increasingly active. In Eastern Europe in general, and particularly in the Balkans, loans had as much a political as an economic incentive. Since the credit of Serbia, Bulgaria, and Rumania was poor, the bondholders were able to insist on a variety of controls to assure payment. Although a substantial amount of this capital was used to finance armament and eventually wars, investments of permanent value were also made. Notable among these was the railroad from Vienna to Constantinople, completed in 1888, which with its branches formed the backbone of the transportation system of Southeastern Europe.

III

•186 Collective security and economic interdependence, as
631 these terms are understood today, were certainly among the motives of the various plans for regional organization proposed for Eastern Europe in the century before the First World War. Yet the nineteenth century was for Europe an age in which war was the exception rather than the rule and national frontiers were not the barriers to trade and to the movements of peoples that they have since become. Although motives of power politics in the modern sense were always present, regionalism in this era was also concerned

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with the reconciliation of national differences through federal arrangements and with the broader cultural relationships of peoples with a common linguistic heritage. The most readily identifiable of these proposals are those associated with the Panslav movement, the plans for the reorganization of the Habsburg empire, and the federation schemes of the independent Danubian states None of these projects embraced the entire region of Eastern Europe as it is understood today, but all were inspired by ideas relevant to the problems faced by this region in the twentieth century. /86 631

The many-sided Panslav movement in its modern form can be traced to the new interest in Slavic history and languages shown by German scholars at the end of the eighteenth century. A realization of their cultural heritage was soon aroused among Slavic intellectual leaders, and it exerted a powerful stimulus to nationalism among the Poles, Czechs, and Croatians. Certain Polish thinkers in the first hopeful years after the settlement of 1815 favored Polish-Russian cooperation as a basis for Slavic unity, but in a few decades the Poles were seeking the aid of their fellow Slavs in the West against Russian oppression. The map and statistics of Slavic peoples published by the Slovak scholar, Šafařik, in 1842 were widely greeted as a revelation of Slavic strength, and in the revolutionary year of 1848 a congress was held in Prague to rally the peoples of the Slavic world. This rather haphazard gathering revealed the political weakness of Panslavism, but it produced some noble statements of individual and national rights and strengthened the self-confidence of the Slavic peoples as to their contribution to European civilization. In publicizing the views of the non-Russian Slavic leaders at the height of their liberal phase, the congress thus served a purpose. Although Slavic nationalism took precedence over liberalism in the latter half of the century, the ideas expounded at Prague in 1848 were never entirely forgotten. /86 648

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186 668 648 Much more was heard about Panslavism between 1848 and 1914, but during this period it was used primarily as a weapon of Russian expansionism. The Slavic movement evolved in Russia early in the century under the name of Slavophilism and, with the founding of a Slavic committee in Moscow in 1857, it entered a Panslav phase. In 1867 non-Russian Slavs were summoned to a congress in Moscow in connection with a Slav ethnographic exhibition, and at this meeting it was not difficult to discern the expansionist tendencies of Russian Panslavism. During the Russian-Turkish war of 1876-78, this movement developed into an outburst of emotional imperialism, and much was said of bringing all Slavs together under Russian rule. European power politics prevented an undue extension of Russian influence in 1878, but Panslavism came to serve Russian policy and was directed increasingly against the Habsburg empire. This trend was particularly evident at the third Panslav Congress held in Prague in 1908. Although the Russian constitutional reforms of 1905-06 made a favorable impression on non-Russian Slavs and brought about some real concessions to the Polish minority, Russian foreign policy never gave up the idea of pushing the Russian frontier to the West. Had the Tsarist regime survived the First World War it would certainly have demanded that large parts of Eastern Europe be annexed or brought into a satellite relationship, and a liberal Russian government might also have favored the Westward expansion of Russian influence.

631 642 The multinational empire of the Habsburgs offered the most challenging problem to the federalists, and the proposals for its constitutional reorganization were varied and ingenious. Of the many ideas arising out of the revolution of 1848, the most comprehensive was the constitution drafted by the freely elected Austrian assembly. After this assembly

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642 many as fifteen federated states, and many hoped that re-
563 organization along such lines would draw towards the empire the Slav and Rumanian peoples on its periphery and thus strengthen its international position. None of these proposals had a serious chance of success, however, and when the empire was finally defeated it disintegrated into its national units.

631 The independent states of Southeastern Europe faced
• 186 problems that were different from those of the Habsburg
648 lands, and their alliance and federation schemes were designed to meet the realities of power politics. Once the grandiose plans of the 1848er's had been forgotten, one of these being a proposal for a federation stretching from Poland to Serbia, new schemes were developed around the vigorous Serbian ruler Prince Michael Obrenović. Several agreements were concluded in the 1860's among the Serbian, Montenegrin, Rumanian, Bulgarian, and Greek national leaders with the aid of Russian diplomacy, but these efforts were soon overshadowed by the Russian-Turkish conflict. In the long run, the territorial rivalries among the Balkan states proved to be the principal obstacle to their cooperation, and even the successful Balkan Alliance that defeated Turkey in 1912 disintegrated within a year into interallied war. What is significant is that the initiative throughout this period lay with the great powers, and the federation and alliance plans that got beyond the drafting stage were in general those backed by Russia or Austria-Hungary. The principal reality in international relations was the search for security on the part of these two powers that drove them to regard expansion into Southeastern Europe as a guarantee against political humiliation and military defeat. However, the balance was too close for either to succeed in this game, and it was left to a world conflict to clear the stage for a new order.

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Contrary to many Germans, Eastern European liberals remained true to political democracy but, in the field of economic policy, they were in accord with German views, giving preference to state interference and support rather than to free competition and individual initiative. 829 471

Differences in the economic development of Western Europe and the United States, on the one hand, and of Germany and Eastern Europe, on the other hand, influenced the thinking of socialists in these countries and account for the differences in their outlook and their method of political action. While Western socialists sought to realize their aims by their own concerted self-help action (in Anglo-Saxon countries and Scandinavia particularly through trade unionism and political influence exercised in parliaments, in Latin countries either through revolution or political infiltration of public institutions), German and Eastern European socialists tended more and more towards economic and political statism. Moreover, the agrarians of Eastern Europe, like the liberals, socialists, and Christian (Catholic) Democrats, also asked for state action to further their economic and social aims. This tendency to look towards the state for aid in economic matters explains why many liberals, particularly in Czechoslovakia, favored vast social reforms benefiting the working class. It is also worth mentioning that the representatives of the liberal-minded bourgeoisie in Czechoslovakia were always in favor of the highly progressive social legislation enacted in that country.

The tendency to ask the state for support in economic matters was a characteristic of the nationalism of Eastern European liberals. On the whole, however, the nationalism of liberals and of many others in this region was no more intense than the nationalism of similar groups in any of the Western countries, and among the liberals themselves there were great differences in interpreting liberalism. 186

In Eastern Europe, liberalism was more closely connected

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186 with nationalism than it was in the West. This can be attributed chiefly to the fact that beginning with the nineteenth century national liberation found most of its protagonists and representatives among the liberal-minded intellectuals and statesmen. Consequently, almost all the liberals of this region appear as "national liberals." The fusing of liberalism and nationalism continued even after the First World War, chiefly because the Eastern European nations felt that they were endangered by the imperialistic designs of Germany, Italy, and Russia. The nations of this region, faced with such a danger, sought the protection of one or another of the European powers.

The historical development of these nations from the nineteenth century on, their geographic location, their special interests and dissimilar historical traditions—all these factors were instrumental in the growth of nationalism, an intense power which greatly influenced all the contemporary political trends (liberal, socialistic, agrarian, Catholic, etc.). Although nationalism impeded efforts for closer cooperation between the Eastern European nations, it proved to be a powerful force against both Nazi and Soviet imperialism.

It would be a mistake to assume that all Eastern European nationalism was chauvinistic. In this region, as elsewhere, there were two schools of nationalism: one of liberal, tolerant, internationally-minded patriotism; the other, of overbearing, aggressive chauvinism, or provincially limited nationalism. Western influence was predominant in the first trend; German and, to some extent, Russian in the second.

The Eastern European liberals, like the other political groups, were divided between these two trends. As a striking example, one can cite the ideological and political differences between two Czechoslovakian liberals: Thomas G. Masaryk and Karel Kramář. Masaryk, who of all the Eastern Europeans was the most deeply imbued with Western

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liberalism, was opposed from the start to chauvinistic nationalism. All his life he advocated and pursued, to use his own expression, "European and world politics." He attempted to reach an agreement with Germany as to the problem of the German minority within Czechoslovakia and to solve other nationality problems to the satisfaction of all. He hoped that Czechoslovakia would become another Switzerland. 186

Kramář, on the other hand, linked Czechoslovakian national interests with Tsarist Russia. He persistently defended the concept of Czechoslovakia as a "national state" in which the Czechoslovakians would be the leading people and minorities would be delegated to a secondary position. His policy was openly anti-German. He envisaged, in the terms of romantic Pan-Slavism, a great Slav federation headed by a "democratic Russia." Viewing the League of Nations and all international institutions with skepticism, he warned the nation to rely on its own strength. Basically, Kramář's theories were defensive. In practice, they would have served as protection against German imperialism.

A similar difference existed in Rumania between the Bratianu brothers, the leaders of the Liberal Party, and Titulescu, the famous Rumanian Minister of Foreign Affairs. Titulescu did not belong to any political party, but his philosophy was definitely liberal. Politically, the Bratianu brothers were liberals in the sense that they defended parliamentary freedom against constitutional monarchy and opposed autocratic ambitions of the prince, later King Carol. Economically, they linked liberalism with the interests of the commercial and banking class. They strove to industrialize the country but, at the same time, they barred foreign capital. In this regard, their economic nationalism was most apparent. 648 186 665

Titulescu, unlike the Bratianu brothers, combined his

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648 genuine patriotism with sincere internationalism. He was
186 an ardent supporter of the League of Nations. He advocated
665 the principle of collective security. He tried to establish better relations with Soviet Russia. It was he who coined the phrase, "the spiritualization of boundaries." However, he was unable to win sufficient following in the ruling circles, and King Carol, who opposed his broad-minded policy, forced him to resign in 1936.

186 Poland serves as a clear example of the dominance of
665 nationalism over other political and social trends. In the nineteenth century liberalism attracted many of the Poles who were living in exile, especially those in France. Polish liberals worked enthusiastically with Mazzini in the "Young Europe" movement, and many of them took part unselfishly in the revolution of 1848. However, the great national struggle for the liberation and unification of Poland came to assume first place in the interests of all Polish patriots. Roman Dmowski, a prominent Polish statesman, had been devoted to the principles of liberalism in his youth but, during the national political struggle, he became a passionate nationalist of very conservative leanings. After the re-establishment of Polish independence, liberalism strongly influenced certain small Polish groups, for instance the Democratic and Labor Parties. In the latter, the Catholic influence was strongly felt. Ignace Paderewski, the famous pianist, who contributed greatly to the liberation of Poland in the First World War, belonged to the liberals.

The absence of a pronounced liberal trend and tradition in Poland was undoubtedly one of the reasons why Polish democracy, despite the liberal constitution of 1921, succumbed to the nationalistic pressure of Marshal Pilsudski, who established a semidictatorial regime in 1926 which lasted until the fall of Poland in 1939. The principal defenders of Polish democracy were the Agrarian Party, the Socialists, and the Christian Democrats. Naturally, nation-

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alism was strong even in these parties. It must be remembered that even the ardor of Polish Catholicism had its roots in Polish nationalism: Catholicism was a defense against the Eastern Orthodox Russians as well as against the Protestant Prussians. 186 665

The Polish National Democratic Party, which represented the middle class and the intelligentsia, became chauvinistic and violently antisemitic in spite of its original liberal aspirations. It fought against Pilsudski's dictatorship more for reasons of power politics than for ideological reasons. From 1930 on, this party inclined, and especially its younger members, more and more towards fascism. Nationalism suppressed the liberal elements of this party almost entirely.

In Poland, where nationalism was more extreme than in the other Eastern European countries, liberalism was limited mostly to certain intellectual groups. One important group had its headquarters at the University of Cracow, with Professor Estreicher as its leader. Liberalism influenced the agrarians and socialists of Poland inasmuch as these groups much preferred democracy to dictatorship.

The case of Poland brings to mind very forcibly a factor which as a rule is not given its due: that is, the dependence of the nations of Eastern Europe upon the other nations of Europe and the rest of the world. The freedom of these nations is dependent on the freedom of all other European nations, including Russia.

It can be said, therefore, that liberalism can prosper in these countries only if the climate of Europe is favorable. As soon as a regime of any of the big powers on the European continent tends towards aggressive expansionism or becomes totalitarian, by definition imperialistic, the liberty of all European nations, great and small, is threatened, and liberalism finds itself in mortal danger.

History clearly proves the accuracy of this analysis. In 000

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weak in comparison with that of the Agrarian Party which still followed Stambolisky's tradition. 668 642

The Agrarian and the Socialist parties and some Catholics, as well as the liberals, carried on the struggle against dictatorship in Bulgaria, Rumania, Poland, and Hungary. They fought for real democracy in the sense of the best liberal tradition. In Austria the Social Democrats were the main force opposing clerical fascism. It is interesting that in Hungary the conservative aristocrats opposed fascist trends. Szálasi, who led the important Arrow-Cross movement, was the most conspicuous of these men. Count Bethlen and Count Teleki also opposed the Nazi pressure, and the latter's efforts were climaxed by his symbolic suicide in 1941.

The opposition to dictatorship and to fascism or Nazism was motivated differently in the individual Eastern European countries and was carried on by different political parties. Notwithstanding these differences, the original inspiration to opposition lay in two main ideas: a longing for freedom and a patriotic devotion to national independence. Pure democratic liberalism is the expression of these two ideas, both of which prove convincingly that the love of freedom was deeply rooted in these countries. Internal antiliberal forces alone would not have been able to crush democratic aspirations. Whenever the elections were more liberal than usual, for instance, in Rumania in 1928 or in Bulgaria in 1931, the democratic parties won. In Poland, Pilsudski's followers, who represented only a small minority of the nation, were well aware that the only means by which they could maintain their regime was political terror. In spite of the pressure of the reactionaries and the influence of fascists and Nazis, the remnants of liberalism in Hungary survived until nearly the end of the Second World War. In view of these facts, it is clear that the liberal democratic forces could have mastered internal difficulties successfully 186 668 829

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186 668 829 had they not been broken or dangerously weakened by the foreign forces of fascism and Communism.

Czechoslovakia bears witness to this thesis. In Czechoslovakia, as in the other countries, there existed antiliberal, reactionary, nationalist, and fascist trends which attracted certain of the bourgeoisie and rich farmers. These forces were held in check by the democratic thought and genuine patriotism of a great majority of the nation, including the so-called middle classes and the intelligentsia. Nearly everybody followed the principles of the great democrat, Masaryk. Conditions were more favorable to democratic liberalism in Czechoslovakia than in the other Eastern European countries, because this nation was highly industrialized, even in agriculture, because her social structure was happily balanced between industry, agriculture, and bureaucracy, or intelligentsia, and because the cultural level of her people was high. The middle classes, strong in numbers and in social value, and the progressive farmers, who owned middle-sized farms, were reliable support for the liberal democratic regime. The Social Democratic Party, headed by Hampl, Bechyně, Meissner, and Dérer, was influenced spiritually far more by Masaryk than by Marx. The Agrarian Party had liberal-minded leaders among whom Antonín Švehla and Milan Hodža proved to have statesmen's abilities. The Catholic Party, under the wise leadership of the great patriot Jan Šrámek, was progressive in social matters. In Slovakia the process of democratization met with greater difficulties. Slovakia, because of its agrarian structure, resembled the other Eastern European countries more than it did the industrialized Bohemia. However, the transformation of Slovakia into a democratically functioning part of Czechoslovakia proves that other Eastern European countries could have developed in a similar way had democracy been given enough time to exercise its influence upon them.

It is certainly to the credit of Czechoslovakia that she

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000 might have been, aggravated the popular suspicion that democracy and representative institutions were inadequate to deal with the elementary problem of economic security, if, indeed, these institutions did not themselves bring on this problem.

The talking point most used by the Communist and other total dictatorships today is the wholly unjustified assertion that representative democracy cannot cope with the problem of guaranteeing elementary economic security, and that, if this problem is to be solved, mankind must suffer the harsh tyranny and arbitrary discretion of dictatorship. Until we succeed in extirpating from the minds of men the association of dictatorship and security, born largely of the depression and the aftermath of war and appealing especially to countries with little technological development, the future of representative institutions will be none too bright.

What has just been said does not apply directly to the earlier authoritarian regimes of Eastern Europe since these, as already pointed out, came into being for the most part in the 1920's and hence antedated the depression. Nevertheless, this economic debacle aggravated the trend toward authoritarianism in these parts. In the cases of the second Bulgarian *coup d'état* in 1934 and King Carol's assumption of power in Rumania in 1938, economic influences can be discerned. The decline in trade and employment in the early '30's bore a distinct relationship to the weakening of the democratic regime in Bulgaria, and the incoming authoritarian regime adopted statist methods to meet these problems. Moreover, the depression weakened the resistance of the region as a whole to Nazi economic penetration, and the influence of the Western democracies declined as the world markets for the exports of Eastern Europe disappeared.

642 Another factor that paralyzed the democratic will and
186 advanced the cause of reaction, especially in Eastern Europe,

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was the extreme nationalism that characterized many political and military leaders. In this region, diversion of state expenditures from armaments to social welfare and gestures of friendship to neighboring countries were regarded by many as a form of treason. The schools and the press preached incessantly that the vindication of a nation's territorial aspirations was a value of the highest order, and authoritarian leaders, acting in the name of such doctrines, generally met with little resistance. It was frequently only a small group of liberal-minded professional men, and in some cases the peasant parties, that placed a high value on social and economic improvement and resisted the authoritarian trend. Thus nationalism, which a century earlier had formed the vanguard of liberalism, now became its most treacherous enemy.

Any account of the vulnerability of free institutions must also comment on the peculiar and often fatal tolerance which democratic governments have exhibited during the past two or three decades towards those who have overtly threatened its existence. Those who governed free states hesitated to deny traditional rights to Communists, fascists, and others even though these groups clearly intended to use such rights to facilitate their own seizure of power. Many pages of recent history have chronicled this dismal story, especially those which tell of the success of German and Italian fascism and of Lenin's bid for power in Russia. Not until 1930 did the political leadership of the Weimar Republic muster the courage to ban street demonstrations, uniforms, vigilantism, and other abuses of the traditional rights of association and expression. By that time, however, Hitler had already sealed the fate of the Republic. He triumphed, even as Mussolini and Lenin had done before him, because the legal regime failed to deny him the opportunity of perverting the privileges of a free state. Among the narrower and more tangible causes of the great reaction, the paralysis

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ern Europe. The individual states became more and more 426
antagonistic and trade within the Eastern European area 439
often took a course contrary to the requirements of reasonable economic policies. Free trade, cherished in the first postwar years, was soon abandoned for the sake of a policy of protective tariffs. Customs, duties, and foreign exchange restrictions to prevent speculation, were introduced to protect economic development and strength.

Both "economic nationalism" and "small power imperial- 186
ism" were features characteristic of this area in the period 433
between the wars. When the economic position of the new 648
states in the '20's is compared with the situation prior to the First World War, the problems of these states emerge clearly. The economic well-being of the old Austro-Hungarian empire lay in the regional character of its economic organization, which depended mostly on a coordinated internal market and a natural division of labor between the component parts of the empire. Although it was a social and cultural mosaic, the empire was organized in such a manner as to take advantage of the regional distribution of natural resources and the differing skills of the various populations.

The peace treaties ending the First World War, while meeting the political aspirations of various nationalities, did not provide a satisfactory solution to the economic problems of the region, and the newly created states were divided by serious political and economic differences. Political animosity soon led to economic warfare, and self-sufficiency, the driving motivation of the new states, precluded any real possibility of economic cooperation. The world depression of the early '30's led to the final economic and psychological collapse of Eastern European stability and opened the door wide to German economic penetration and the eventual conquest of the region.

The foreign trade of the Eastern European countries in 439
the years 1919-1944 was far smaller than it should have

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Due to the prevalence of a liberalism linked with national- 186
ism, studies concentrated on history, which was generally 871
given a romantic interpretation. The study of geography was 814
heavily larded with political convictions and misinterpretations of ethnography. Although the universities of Czechoslovakia and Hungary were on a high academic level at a time when other universities were just becoming active, their students spent too much time in petty politics. Most of the 186
student organizations supported some political person or 668
party and, as a consequence, were strongly influenced by demagogues. The Polish and Rumanian universities especially were exploited by politicians, and often even by the police, for political purposes. Frequent political meetings aroused a discontented idealism and produced only too often regrettable chauvinistic or antisemitic behavior.

Anti-Semitism became a common denominator with which 798
Hitler was able to unite the rising youth and the politicians of Eastern Europe. The responsibility for this state of affairs lay with the governments and the ruling groups.

Although the new boundaries had been drawn on the 563
principle of national self-determination, the mixture of nationalities in many areas, as well as historical and geographical factors, had resulted in the inclusion of important minorities within the new states. These minorities were fragments of peoples rather than whole nations as had been the case before the war and, since they were in many cases unwilling citizens of the new states, their presence constituted a grave problem. The eight million inhabitants of Poland, Rumania, and Czechoslovakia that spoke Russian, Ukrainian (Ruthenian), and White Russian as their mother tongue, the almost six million German-speaking citizens of Czechoslovakia, Poland, Rumania, Yugoslavia, and Hungary, and the almost three million Hungarian-speaking inhabitants of neighboring Rumania, Czechoslovakia and Yugoslavia—these represented the most important, but by no means all, the minority

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9 International Relations Between the Wars

HENRY L. ROBERTS

I

000 The most striking aspect of the constellation of states in Eastern Europe after 1918 was that it should have come into existence at all. It is not that these states were "artificial" creations. It is rather that the appearance at that time of a zone of independent nation-states, from the Baltic to the Aegean, was largely the consequence of the simultaneous collapse, through war and revolution, of both Germany and Russia, an eventuality not anticipated in 1914. One cannot say what would have been the picture in Eastern Europe had either Germany or Russia emerged victorious, but certainly it would have been very unlike that which actually came about.

648 The continued independence of the area was dependent
186 upon preventing either of the two great powers from gaining ascendency or from working with the other to control the non-Germanic and non-Russian peoples of the area, as they had done during much of the nineteenth century. This was a common burden of all the states of Eastern Europe after 1918. Unfortunately, it was almost their only real point of unity. The other unifying factor was that they were pre-

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648 dominantly agrarian states, rather uncomfortably situated
186 between a highly industrialized West and a "proletarian" U.S.S.R.

In nearly all other respects the area is marked by wide diversity. The boundaries between the different linguistic and cultural groups, often not clear, were generally not congruent either with natural boundaries or with the frontiers as they emerged after the First World War. In consequence, there were a series of territorial controversies which, in keeping the region at odds with itself, were of tragic significance. To take a few of the more critical examples: Vilna was contested by Poland and Lithuania, and Teschen by Poland and Czechoslovakia. Hungary and Czechoslovakia disputed the borders of Slovakia and Carpatho-Ruthenia. Transylvania was an issue between Rumania and Hungary. The Dobrogean quadrilateral divided Rumania and Bulgaria, and the latter was in turn in conflict with Yugoslavia over Macedonia and with Greece over access to the Aegean. In addition, of course, there were the unresolved issues involving the great powers which bordered Eastern Europe: Danzig, Upper Silesia, and Bessarabia, to name only three sore points.

186 Accompanying and to some extent a consequence of these
563 differences was the constant controversy over minorities. It
648 is unjust to say that the Versailles treaties, in breaking up the old multi-national empires, merely reproduced the old nationality conflicts within the new components. On the contrary, many more people than before lived within states controlled by their own nationals. Yet the solution was far from perfect. The very establishment of the national principle as the basis for the state carried with it a strong impulse to consolidate and coordinate—with resulting pressures on the minorities. Certainly the mood of strong nationalism, often accompanied by an inner lack of self-confidence, frequently led to unfair treatment of minorities. One must admit, nevertheless, that the multi-national principle, as represented in

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actual fact by the Austro-Hungarian Empire and the Russian Empire, did not in the years before 1914 seem to offer any real framework for constructive development. To be sure, there were many projects for the reorganization of these states, but on close examination they reveal little basis in reality.

In addition to the frontier and minorities problems, there was also the phenomenon of economic nationalism. Insofar as the restrictive effects of economic nationalism, especially the high tariffs, added to the difficulties of the region, they were symptomatic rather than a basic cause of trouble. In most instances, economic nationalism developed as a natural, if not particularly enlightened, reaction to the fact that these new states were under strong incentive to strengthen their economies as rapidly as possible. Because of many political uncertainties, they tended to proceed along the path of economic nationalism: "By ourselves alone" as the Rumanian liberals used to say. In this, of course, the behavior of the Eastern European states was not unlike that of the larger states, but the results in this area were often preposterous. For example, the chopping up of the Danube basin into a number of different tariff areas certainly was not a rational action.

Before turning to the development of international relations in this period, one further observation should be made. In comments on the vicissitudes of this part of the world, one encounters two opposing views. One is expressed by the phrase "the Balkanization of Europe," which carries with it the implication that the stability of Europe was perennially upset by the bickering, intrigue, and petty rivalries of the small states of Eastern Europe. The other view is that the Eastern European states were behaving as well as they could under constant subjection to the machinations of the great powers who tried to use them as pawns. Both views are misleading. During the interwar period, the wisdom and stupidity

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fell directly or indirectly under German domination. There 648
was, nevertheless, some continuity. Among the governments- 722
in-exile, the struggle for future independence was clear and explicit. Likewise, among the German satellites, there was a persistent attempt to maintain a degree of independence. The extent of the resistance of Hungary to Hitler has come out quite clearly since the war in the memoirs of the statesmen involved. Even such an active and cooperative Eastern European satellite leader as Marshal Antonescu seems finally to have placed his hopes on a German defeat from the West, while he continued in the effort to keep Russia at bay in the East.

It should also be noted, however, that the old frictions did 648
not disappear. One major motive for Antonescu's entering 186
the war, apart from the desire to recover Bessarabia, was his wish to put himself in a favorable position vis-à-vis Germany to press for the return of Northern Transylvania, which had been lost to Hungary in 1940. This old conflict continued unabated throughout the war.

It is worth noting, finally, the importance to Eastern Eu- 000
rope of the fact that Russia did not emerge victorious in the First World War. We do not know what such a Russian regime would have been like or how it would have treated Eastern Europe, but we do have some clues from the secret treaties and arrangements made by the Entente powers during the war. Poland, including the German and Austrian sections, would probably have been incorporated into Russia. By an agreement in 1915 Russia was to obtain Constantinople and the Turkish territory in Europe. In a Russian-French exchange of notes in February 1917, Russia was given complete freedom to determine its own western frontiers. Thus the intrusion of Russia far into Eastern Europe was a likelihood in 1914-18, and was staved off in 1919-21 only to reappear as a reality in 1945 under new and decidedly more dangerous circumstances. In this sense there had been

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decided difference in emphasis. It is significant that in August 1941, shortly after the Nazi invasion of Russia, the Soviet government summoned an All-Slav Congress to Moscow. The emphasis of this meeting was on industrialization, cultural autonomy, and respect for the national culture and language of each Slav people. The message sent by the Congress to the Slav peoples was typical of its sentiments:

> Oppressed brother Slavs! A grave danger threatens us. The hour has struck for the entire Slavic world to unite and destroy fascism utterly and without loss of time.
>
> We have come together as equals among equals. Our one, burning desire is that the Slavic nations, together with all other nations, should live their lives freely and in peace within the boundaries of their countries.

In a speech later that year, on November 6, Generalissimo Stalin amplified these sentiments by declaring:

> Our aim is to aid the peoples in their liberation struggle against the Hitler tyranny and then to provide them with the opportunity freely to build their life in accordance with their desire. There must be no interference with the domestic affairs of other nations.

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To this Slavic appeal was added an admiration for the Soviet war effort. Many Slavs saw the Russian sufferings as mirroring their own on a gigantic scale, so that the ordinary peasant, to whom a military account of a Red Army victory would mean nothing, carried in his mind a vivid image of the scorched earth, the devastation which Russia suffered, and the hardships and ferocity of his Slav brother's struggle. With the memory of their own unaided fight deeply rooted in their minds, the Slavs watched Russia bearing the brunt of the land war in a way they could understand because the conditions were familiar to them. In Yugoslavia, for example, the Communist Party's growing prestige as the war progressed provided the Soviet Union with a great measure of reflected glory as a communist state. Many Yugoslavs transferred their admiration for the Communist Party's role in their own

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186 liberation struggle to admiration for communism itself, and
208 so to the Soviet Union.

Thus the Soviet myth—the supposed victories of the ideals of social reform of the Bolshevik revolution over police and bureaucratic persecutions of the Tsars—went hand in hand with the ties of race of the old Slav mystique. But by 1946, the emphasis of Pan-Slavism shifted to a position reminiscent of the "Slavophile" doctrines of the nineteenth century. Danilevski's prophecies in his *Russia and Europe* (1869) were in the process of realization. Using the language of peace and love, which seemed to him two typical Slav qualities, he had predicted a federation under Russian leadership, as the outcome of a war between Russia and Europe. The federation would consist of Russia (including Galicia, northern Bukovina and Carpatho-Ukraine), the territory of the South Slavs with Istria and Trieste, Rumania, the Czech and Slovak territories, Hungary, Bulgaria, Greece, and Constantinople, as well as sections of Turkey. Many of his prophecies, which at the time undoubtedly seemed fantastic, have come true in the last five years.

648 The triumph of Russia over Eastern Europe set the tone
186 for the great Slav Congress which was held in Belgrade on December 8, 1946. That the permanent headquarters of the Pan-Slav movement was to be located in this city, as was the headquarters of the Cominform newspaper—*For a Lasting Peace, For a People's Democracy*—is hardly surprising. The speeches and the program of the Congress proclaimed that the Slav peoples lead the world both in the struggle against war, for peace and democracy, and in cultural achievements. Finally, the Congress created the usual organizational methods to further Slavic cultural cooperation. A serious blow was dealt by Tito's defection from the orbit to this attempt at empire building through the Pan-Slav idea, but nevertheless the flow of propaganda continued.

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nist Party in Yugoslavia seized power, at the end of the war, 648 the thin veneer of friendship for the West disappeared. In unison with its neighbors, Yugoslavia directed its controlled press and radio to speak in diatribes and strictures against the "capitalistic and warmongering Western democracies," and, at the same time, to speak in glowing terms of their brother Slavs and comrades-in-arms, the people of the Soviet Union.

The rupture between Belgrade and Moscow has not [208] changed this picture in its essentials. Soviet pressure on Tito has not caused him to alter the existing one-party political or economic structure of his country. Just as Tito has demanded that the socialist countries base their relationships on the principle of equality because he is aware of the Soviet Union's aims in Europe, so too he will resist Western demands for the modification of his policies in return for economic and military support.

The Soviet Union erred in trying arbitrarily to mold the Balkan area to the Kremlin pattern. It failed, in the manner of dictatorships, to take into account the long South Slav tradition of opposition to tyranny and conquest. Unfortunately for the Soviet Union's expansionist plans, the pattern did not allow for the forces of human nature, of which there seem to be more in the Balkans than elsewhere in the world. Only if one recognizes that this is a problem in power relations rather than an ideological dispute, can one grasp the full implications of this dispute.

The shift of Yugoslavia at this juncture is best described 648 by what has been termed "integral nationalism," which ex- 186 presses itself in totalitarian terms. Integral nationalism is totalitarian not only in domestic affairs, but in foreign affairs as well. The nation attempts to make itself feared or "respected" by pursuing firm and bold policies. The nature of Tito's rise to power, the geographical characteristics of Yugoslavia, and Tito's power position relative to the Balkan states

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648 have all contributed to the making of Titoism. Specifically,
186 Titoism can be defined as a form of nationalism which conceives of Yugoslavia as an end in itself, and the rulers of that country are concerned only with the exclusive pursuit of national policies. It is thus not unique in political history nor does it contribute anything new to the diplomatic techniques available to the Western democracies. Titoism is then but a matter of lack of loyalty to a higher power center outside the national state itself.

648 Tito and his colleagues in the Communist Party of Yugoslavia exhibited the utmost faith and loyalty to Stalin and the Soviet Union throughout the war and in the immediate postwar years. Certainly in this period Tito was a marked Stalinist "internationalist." That is, one "who is ready to serve the Soviet Union unreservedly, unhesitatingly, unconditionally. . . ." The Communist Party of Yugoslavia was the sole Communist Party to engage in partisan warfare in the days immediately after the invasion of the Soviet Union by Germany. Up to 1948 the Yugoslav government was completely servile to the Soviet programs in the world diplomatic forums.

The Soviet Union had undoubtedly cast another role for Tito than that of a mere extra on the diplomatic stage. In May of 1946, Tito arrived in Moscow for a number of discussions regarding armament. How important this meeting was is best indicated by the rank of the individuals he took with him. Not only was he accompanied by Alexander Rankovich, who as Minister of Interior is also head of the secret police, but also the chiefs of staff of all the armed services. While it is not known what Tito promised in return for Soviet arms, one is able to speculate from the series of events which began the following month.

In July, Yugoslavia and Albania signed a military alliance, and in August two American planes were shot down in the vicinity of the Austrian-Yugoslavian border. Aid to the Greek Communists began in September; in the following month

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178 years before the First World War in the Austro-Hungarian
563 monarchy. At the same time, there was relatively little competition for the services of men of high talent on the part of industry, applied science, or practical politics, since all of these activities remained relatively underdeveloped.

578 The coincidence of intellectual precocity with widespread
565 social and economic backwardness led to widespread experiences of frustration. Intellectuals, not unlike the ancient philosopher Plato, dreamed of equalling one day the power and prestige of the aristocracy, for which they lacked the land holdings and family connections; and they dreamed of equalling the comforts and securities of the bourgeoisie—the upper middle class—without either owning a bourgeois amount of property or devoting a bourgeois proportion of their time and attention to money-making or to business matters. They resented the influence of the church and the clergy in the rural areas, without being either willing or able to devote a major part of their own time and attention to the needs of the country population. Almost all classes of society had come to desire Western standards of income, comfort, security, and power, without possessing as yet either the means or the skill necessary to produce them. And all these discontented groups and individuals, pushed forward by the fundamental incongruities in their social evolution, turned to politics and to the state as a remedy for their frustrations.

IV

●186 Under these conditions, no type of government and no
631 size of political unit could for long live up to the rising level of popular expectations and the increasingly pressing demands of society. Already, before the year 1914, large states as well as small, national states as well as international, became increasingly strained by social tensions.

In a supra- or multinational state, such as the Austro-

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Hungarian monarchy, an obvious reaction of the population to prolonged social and political disappointment was an increasing demand for national freedom. The sovereign nation-state would give the Czechs a fuller opportunity for careers for their young people and a more worthy share in determining their own destiny. A nation-state centered on Hungary would give Hungarian industries the protection they wanted and would free Hungarians from the delays and frustrations of the imperial relationship to Austria. The national state uniting Slovenes and Croatians with Serbia would help these peoples at long last to make real headway in escaping from their backwardness. During these same years, the peoples in the small national states of the region dreamed of escaping from the compromises and frustrations of their own small-scale political existence by national expansion into some greater and victorious power in their own area. Serbians and Montenegrins came to hope that their lives would somehow improve once Bosnia, Herzegovina, Slovenia, and Croatia had been joined to their own territories in a new Yugoslavia. Bulgarians, Greeks, and Serbians all came to believe that somehow their own lives would improve significantly if all or most of the territory of Macedonia were added to their respective countries.

Throughout large parts of Eastern Europe, the burdens and demands put upon the existing governments thus exceeded the capabilities of those governments and of the states they represented. The Eastern European states, large and small, were thus becoming overcommitted politically, economically, militarily, and socially. Among their peoples this situation encouraged the belief that things would become better once the size of political units in their region was changed. Citizens of small national states such as Serbia hoped for improvement from expansion. Citizens of large states, such as some of the Hungarians or Czechs in Austria-Hungary, began to wonder whether their position could not

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186 be improved by secession. All of them thought that they could
178 improve their position by finding that exact size of political unit in which their own language and their own national culture could be made to predominate and in which their own nationality or ethnic group could be turned into the leading class or social and political elite.

Nationalism in Eastern Europe was thus a reaction to the rapid diffusion of Western claims and to the expectations of security and opportunity throughout a group of societies that were only slowly, if at all, acquiring the productive skill and equipment to satisfy them. National secession, national expansion, and the national state appeared to almost all nationalities in the region as plausible short cuts to the prosperity, power, and prestige they all desired.

178 In the course of events, the experiment was actually made.
433 The Austro-Hungarian monarchy was destroyed and a num-
641 ber of successor states arose from its remains. There is no doubt on the whole that the emergence of these national states represented a significant step forward toward higher levels of popular participation in public affairs, toward political democracy, toward popular education, and even, in some respects, toward greater economic opportunities. But at the same time it seems clear that the change in the size of political units did little or nothing to come to grips with the fundamental causes of the poverty and backwardness of the region, or with the fundamental sources of its peculiar psychological and political frustrations and resentments. National and regional markets and consumer preferences remained as small and as unfavorable to mass production in the new states as they had in the old. Capital remained as scarce and productive investment as uneven and erratic as before.
178 Tools, technologies, and work habits changed slowly if at
[735] all. Poverty persisted. Purchasing power remained low and
464 prices high. Production remained scattered over many small and inefficient factories. Innovations were accepted reluc-

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tantly or not at all. Unemployment became worse than it had ever been.

Thus social tensions persisted or grew worse. Sometimes they appeared as growing tensions between left and right, with the political middle-of-the-road parties increasingly threatened by fascists or by communists. Sometimes they appeared as tensions between different nationality groups, such as between Serbians and Croatians or between Czechs and Germans. Often the same angry and frustrated individuals could be found backing communism in one year, extreme nationalism in another, and some more or less supranational fascism in a third. Whole districts voted for right-wing radical candidates in one election and for left-wing radicals in another. Nationalism in Eastern Europe was thus the symptom of a more fundamental maladjustment, even though nationalistic policies, once adopted, often served to make this maladjustment worse. Nationalistic governments, as well as most other governments in this region, were becoming increasingly unpopular and during the 1930's showed increasing reluctance to face their own voters. By 1939, before the first German or Russian soldier stepped on their soil, every country of Eastern Europe, with the exceptions of Finland and Czechoslovakia, had succumbed to some form of dictatorship. Nationalism had thus failed to cure the fundamental maladjustments of Eastern European political and economic life. From some points of view its failure was hardly less shattering than the failure of the supranational empires that had preceded it.

It was nationalism which first undermined and in part destroyed the traditions of property and the respect for property in Eastern Europe. This attack against property began as early as the era of Prince Bismarck in Germany. The so-called Polish legislation sponsored by the German government and by the German nationalists during and after the Bismarck era showed scant respect for the property

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caloric value is generally twice that of lignite (the German classification: *Steinkohle*, 7,000 calories; *Braunkohle*, 2,500 calories; *Briquetten*, 5,000 calories). Since the first World War an ever increasing proportion of lignite is being used in Middle Europe as a base for the production of synthetic nitrate and as a cheap raw material for producing semi-coke, various tars, and synthetic oil.[10] Thus lignite has become a basis for the powerful electric plants and chemical industries of Eastern Germany and Czechoslovakia and, on a lesser scale, for similar industries in the Danubian and Balkan countries. The exception is Poland. There, little lignite has been extracted hitherto, though reserves are considerable, because of the abundance of hard coal. Lignite as such or in the form of briquettes has been used thus far instead of coal for domestic purposes, transportation, and in every industrial production but metallurgy. Now the satellite governments are on the verge of discovering a method of converting lignite into metallurgic coke. A great lignite coking plant at Lauchhammer in Eastern Germany and another in Borsod in Hungary, now under construction, are expected to be put in motion in 1952. Should this new method prove practical, Eastern Germany, Hungary, and Rumania would depend in the future much less on the importation of Polish and Soviet coke for steelmaking than they do now.

The deposits of lignite are spread over the captive area south of the Berlin-Warsaw line, and they are particularly rich in Saxon Lusace (Lausitz), Sachsen-Anhalt, Thuringia, and Bohemia. In the peak prewar year of 1929 Bulgaria produced 1.6 million tons of lignite, Czechoslovakia 22.6 million, Hungary 7.0 million and Rumania 2.7 million tons. Germany produced 174.5 million tons of lignite, of which approximately two thirds were extracted in what is now the Soviet zone and Polish Silesia. The total production of lignite in the present captive zone in 1929 reached 150 million tons. In 1943, the peak production year of World War II, the output of Bulgaria rose to 3.8 million tons, that of Czechoslovakia to 27.6 million, and that of Hungary to 11.2 million tons, while the output of Rumania remained stationary. The

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661 population, they are so dependent on the centralised Party
652 machine and the N.K.V.D. that they are nothing but local
523 quislings.

646 A study of the national composition of the Supreme Soviet
661 of the U.S.S.R. gives a clear picture of the subordination of the non-Russian peoples. Vs. Felix and Ju. Snov made an interesting analysis in the Ukrainian Socialist review, *Vpered* (Munich, 1950, No. 3), using as their basis the list of M.P.'s published in *Pravda* on 15th March, 1950. Of the 25 deputies every republic sent to the Soviet of Nationalities, 5 from Ukraine S.S.R. were Russians, 4 from Uzbek S.S.R., 6 from Kazakh S.S.R., 5 from Lithuanian S.S.R., 6 from Latvian S.S.R., 5 from Tadjik S.S.R. and 6 from Kirghiz S.S.R. Actually, these Russians hold the key positions in the administration of the republics. For instance, of the 5 Russian deputies from the Tadjik S.S.R., two were D. K. Vishnevski, who is the Minister of State Security (M.G.B.) for Tadjikistan, and A. V. Kharchenko, who is the Minister of the Interior (M.V.D.) for Tadjikistan.

661 The overriding control of Moscow over the administration
652 of the national republics explains the complete defeat of all the
523 national resistance movements hitherto. It also explains the defeat of the 'Titoists' in Poland, Bulgaria, Hungary and Rumania. Tito has been successful so far because Moscow never controlled the state apparatus of Yugoslavia. She was 'liberated' not by the Soviet Army but by her own National Liberation Army, organised and led by Yugoslavs.

● 197 The cultural life of the various nations is also subjected to
652 Russification. When the Bolsheviks came to power, they
523 introduced the Latin alphabet for the many nations in Russia which had no written language at all, and 71 written languages in this form were introduced. This was considered the simplest and most progressive means of promoting the cultural development of these people, and it underlined the fact that there was no intention of Russification. Stalin reversed this progressive policy. In 1936, the Latin alphabet was replaced by the Cyrillic, which is much more complicated, and in 1938 Russian was made a compulsory language in all Secondary schools of the U.S.S.R.

Even more important than the language people speak or write is what they speak or write.

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563 peoples. The accompanying table shows the distribution of languages in Eastern Europe in the interwar period as established by the League of Nations.

162 Distribution of Principal Languages in Eastern Europe about 1930 *
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(APPROXIMATE FIGURES IN THOUSANDS)

Language	*Albania*	*Bulgaria*	*Czechoslovakia*	*Hungary*	*Poland*	*Rumania*	*Yugoslavia* **
Russian	—	12	—	—	139	451	25
Ukrainian	—	—	569	1	4,442	641	31
White Russian	—	—	—	—	1,697	—	—
Polish	—	—	100	—	21,993	38	18
Czechoslovakian	—	—	9,757	108	38	43	138
Serbo-Croatian	—	—	6	55	—	48	10,257
Slovene	—	—	—	5	—	—	1,159
Bulgarian	—	5,275	—	3	—	364	73
German	—	4	3,318	479	741	761	602
Rumanian	13	16	14	16	—	13,181	276
Greek	37	10	—	—	—	21	—
Albanian	984	—	—	—	—	4	524
Gypsy	—	81	33	8	—	101	54
Hungarian	—	—	720	8,001	—	1,555	557
Turkish	30	622	—	—	—	288	180
Others	—	58	213	12	2,866	561	41
Totals	1,064	6,078	14,730	8,688	31,916	18,057	13,935

* Based on Dudley Kirk, *Europe's Population in the Interwar Years* (Geneva: League of Nations), Table 17, pp. 228-29.

** A. Meillet, *Les Langues dans l'Europe nouvelle* (Paris, 1928), p. 426, estimated that Macedonian was spoken by 628,000 in Yugoslavia in 1926, but in the official census this group was not distinguished from those speaking Serbo-Croatian.

563 The peacemakers were conscious of the problem that had
648 been created, and in order to make certain that the different linguistic groups would receive fair treatment it was required of these states that they subscribe to carefully worded provisions for the protection of their minorities. These pro-

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000 put and are without value unless properly interpreted. These statistics should not be rejected outright, but should be juxtaposed with the mass of evidence available from other sources, and then interpreted. It would be misleading to accept blindly every report on life behind the Iron Curtain, whether brought by refugees, published in the exile press, or found in letters • 204 coming from that area. The Communist press tries to suppress most adverse information but there are limits to such a policy. If the Iron Curtain papers complain about any material shortage or attack any given material situation, it is a sure sign that the situation has become unbearable for the citizens.

362 On the basis of joint interpretation of the press, private information, and statistical data, the following picture of the economic and social conditions of the captive nations may be formed. The housing situation is bad and probably getting worse because, however large the current building project may be, it cannot provide homes for all those living in the existing deteriorating dwellings and because the building cannot keep up with the rapid increase of urban populations. New apartment houses are jerry-built and in need of constant repair, and the family of a privileged worker or technician will be happy if his services are recompensed by a flat of two rooms with kitchenette and shower. The great urban masses are housed much below this level. The housing problem has not been solved in Russia outside of Moscow. There is no reason to believe it has been solved in Eastern Europe. It will take a dozen or more years to rebuild the war-destroyed cities of East Berlin, Dresden, Budapest, Warsaw, Danzig, Stettin, and Breslau, to mention only a few, and, even when these cities are restored, the quality of the new construction will almost certainly be inferior to that of the prewar years. According to the United Nations, the rate of new construction behind the Iron Curtain is several times slower than it is in Scandinavia, Britain, and Western Germany. Domestic

2: Milosz S-5 (no date)1953 El Europe El

is needed if Christianity is to be reborn. The religious fervor of the Christians in the people's democracies would seem to indicate as much. One merely wonders if theirs isn't the piety of a mouse caught in a trap, and if it hasn't come just a bit too late.

The official order is to evince the greatest horror of the West. Everything is evil there: trains are late, stores are empty, no one has money, people are poorly dressed, the highly praised technology is worthless. If you hear the name of a Western writer, painter, or composer, you must scoff sarcastically, for to fight against "cosmopolitanism" is one of the basic duties of a citizen. Cosmopolitanism is defined as admiration for the (bourgeois) culture of the West. The term was invented in Moscow, and is not new in the history of Russia. Over a hundred years ago, Tsarist historians spoke with aversion of the "decadent West." It was in the decadent West of that time that Marx and Engels were writing, and it is from that West that it later proved necessary to import not only their work, but many other discoveries as well. In practice the fight against cosmopolitanism in the people's democracies takes the form of elaborate prescriptions indicating which Western writers of the past (those "progressive for their day") can be translated, what Western painting and music (usually created before 1870) is "healthy," etc.

No mattter how much trouble these detailed orders create for editors, publishers, and music directors, the "fight against cosmopolitanism" is not entirely without rational justification. Its motive in the Center is clear: too broad a scale of comparison is incompatible with the moral health of the citizens. In the people's democracies, which have been subjected to Western influence for centuries, it is a question of liquidating bad habits. You break a smoker of his habit by taking away his cigarettes.

7:Gluckstein S-4 (no date)1952 El Europe El

parties and organisations to concentrate all forces for the mobilisation of the masses. The Party appeals to the Social Democratic Party, the trade unions and all other working-class organisations to bring about immediately unity of action and trade union unity. The Party appeals to all democratic forces of Rumania to act in concert for the immediate mobilisation of the workers, peasants and all other sections of the labouring masses of the Rumanian people and of all other nations living in Rumania in order to prevent the interference of Nazi Germany in the internal affairs of Rumania, in order to achieve the dissolution of all Nazi agencies in Rumania (the fascist and Trotskyist parties and organisations), the prohibition of their propaganda and the arrest of their leaders, and in order to set up in place of the pro-fascist Tătărescu Government a government which would adopt the slogan "for peace, liberty, bread and land" and would unite all democratic parties and organisations with the national Zaranist Party (Maniu's Party—Y.G.) in the lead.' (*International Press Correspondence*, 27th November, 1937). 661

In defending himself against the Communist Party's attack, Maniu tried to quote such statements as this, but of course the Communist-controlled censorship and police were on the alert. On January, 1946, the censor of the Russian Occupation Authorities struck out an item in the Opposition paper *Ardealul* which gave a verbatim quotation from the 1938 edition of the *Small Soviet Encyclopaedia* in which Maniu's party was described as anti-Fascist, democratic and pro-Soviet. (*Manchester Guardian*, 14th January, 1946). The Communists obviously could not allow Maniu to quote what they had repeatedly said about him in the years 1936-39. Now the slogan of their alliance with Tătărescu in the General Elections of 1946 (which allotted 75 seats in the new Parliament to Tătărescu's party as against 68 to the Communists) was: 'Do not vote for Maniu, who shot the workers in 1933.' 208 661

When the Russian Army entered Poland, a group headed by Andrzej Witos, Wladyslaw Kowalski, Wincenty Baranowski, Antoni Korzycki, Jozef Putek, Bronislaw Drzewiecki and Stanislaw Banczyk proclaimed themselves the leaders of Stronnictwo Ludowe, (S.L.), the Peasant Party. Some of them, like Kowalski, Korzycki, or Baranowski were simply Communists in 661

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was the extreme nationalism that characterized many political and military leaders. In this region, diversion of state expenditures from armaments to social welfare and gestures of friendship to neighboring countries were regarded by many as a form of treason. The schools and the press preached incessantly that the vindication of a nation's territorial aspirations was a value of the highest order, and authoritarian leaders, acting in the name of such doctrines, generally met with little resistance. It was frequently only a small group of liberal-minded professional men, and in some cases the peasant parties, that placed a high value on social and economic improvement and resisted the authoritarian trend. Thus nationalism, which a century earlier had formed the vanguard of liberalism, now became its most treacherous enemy.

Any account of the vulnerability of free institutions must also comment on the peculiar and often fatal tolerance which democratic governments have exhibited during the past two or three decades towards those who have overtly threatened its existence. Those who governed free states hesitated to deny traditional rights to Communists, fascists, and others even though these groups clearly intended to use such rights to facilitate their own seizure of power. Many pages of recent history have chronicled this dismal story, especially those which tell of the success of German and Italian fascism and of Lenin's bid for power in Russia. Not until 1930 did the political leadership of the Weimar Republic muster the courage to ban street demonstrations, uniforms, vigilantism, and other abuses of the traditional rights of association and expression. By that time, however, Hitler had already sealed the fate of the Republic. He triumphed, even as Mussolini and Lenin had done before him, because the legal regime failed to deny him the opportunity of perverting the privileges of a free state. Among the narrower and more tangible causes of the great reaction, the paralysis

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sented by the Communists as the liberation of the Ukrainian, 648
Byelorussian, and Lithuanian peoples from the yoke of the Polish landlords; Hitler's war against France and England were presented as a battle against Anglo-Saxon imperialism. After the fall of France the Polish Communists, together with those sent from France, assumed a neutral attitude toward the Nazi occupation and terror in Poland. They did not take part in the underground struggle of the Polish nation. They were tolerated by the Gestapo and moved about freely. Only after Hitler's attack on Russia in 1941 did they regain the "spirit of patriotism" and join the Polish underground struggle against Hitler.

Various events greatly discredited the reputation of the 665
Polish Workers' Party (one of the guises under which the 661
Polish Communists masqueraded during the war years). 208
Such events were the massacre of the Polish war prisoners at Katyn, the death of hundreds of thousands of people deported to Soviet forced labor camps in the years 1939-1941, the deportation in 1944 of over 40,000 members of the underground Home Army who had been fighting against the Germans and aiding the entering Red Army, and the return to Poland of a number of Poles who had experienced the Soviet reality. Further discredit was brought to the Polish Workers' Party by the presence of the Communist Lublin Committee. The Committee seized power in Poland with the aid of the Soviet army and the NKVD and nominated as ministers of the government persons who had been in the German concentration camps and had served the Gestapo faithfully.

According to its reports in 1937, the Communist Party 665
of Poland had 6,000 regular members and 12,000 members in the Communist Association of Polish Youth. Experts are of the opinion, however, that these figures were exaggerated by the leadership of the party which was afraid of presenting to Moscow a true report of the extent of its influence. *New*

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642 Stalin-Tito relations her communist system was much fur-
177 ther advanced than that of any other Iron Curtain country, and since the break with Stalin only insignificant changes have been made in the structure of the highest organs of government. Tito still declares clearly and without any reservation that he intends to maintain the communist system in that country at any price.

IV

●208 When communist propaganda speaks of the liberation of
661 the oppressed masses from the slavery of the privileged and the rich, it stresses the term, People's Democracy. But does this term really signify freedom? Does it respect human dignity? Does it recognize equality among the people? Does it abolish undue privileges and the exploitation of the working people? It does not. In practice, it does not even provide personal freedom or personal security.

697 The overcrowded prisons and the many thousands of peo-
661 ple in the forced labor camps bear witness to this. The Soviet Union and all the countries occupied by it are a large prison from which the majority of the people would escape if they only could. They would flee from the "Communist paradise" partly because of the difficult economic conditions, but mostly because of the unbearable atmosphere created by the insecurity and complete lack of freedom which are part of this system.

The majority of the people escaping today are average people—workers, peasants, craftsmen, small merchants, and others who have never belonged to any privileged or exploiting class. I have read a number of books on the living conditions in the Soviet forced labor camps; I have studied thousands of reports of Poles who have passed through Soviet camps and prisons; I have had hundreds of talks with the victims of the Soviet regime. And I have come

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241 The peasants do not like regimentation and therefore the
185 Communist economic plans have not brought about any increase in agricultural production.

208 The collectivization policy has further aggravated the situation. The peasants hate even the word "collective." They go about their work with indifference or with fear and hatred. Their aversion to coercion, dictatorship, and controls, their attachment to their land, and their pride in independence, have neutralized all the advantages of large-scale production with its mechanization and its use of modern agricultural methods. The Communist belief that large-scale operation would bring about efficient agricultural production has not materialized.

262 Agricultural production is decreasing. Eastern Europe
433 used to be a very large exporter of all agricultural products,
241 but it is suffering from shortages today. Food is scarce in these agricultural countries. Before the Second World War, nine out of ten residents of Czechoslovakia were nourished by the produce of Czechoslovakian agriculture. There were no rations. Everybody could buy what he wanted, and the standard of living in Czechoslovakia was the highest in Eastern Europe. Today, according to official Communist pronouncements, every second man in Czechoslovakia, despite strict rationing, has to be supplied from abroad. Milk, butter, and eggs are not distributed to adults at all, and even sugar is in short supply. Czechoslovakia, once the largest exporter of beet sugar in Europe, today cannot provide its diminished population with sugar although it has nearly 15 per cent fewer inhabitants than before 1938 due to the expulsion of the Germans. Bulgaria and Hungary, which had great surpluses of all agricultural products before the last war, must now import foodstuffs for their starving populations. Agricultural production in Eastern Europe has not yet attained the prewar level, although the free farms of Western Europe have surpassed it considerably.

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people accept them as their due and can no longer visualize 657
life without them. A large and, according to official claims, 745
growing part of national income is being spent on social insurance, public health, family allowances, maternity and children care, workers' vacations, so-called physical culture, and the like. There is no comparison between the philosophy of the welfare state in Britain and that of Communism in Eastern Europe, but there are some similar functions in both systems. For much the same reasons that the Conservative government in London could never think of taking back the social reforms of the Labor government, no post-Communist government in Eastern Europe will be able to consider curtailing the privileges accorded to the working class by the present regimes.

V

The most important and politically the most decisive of 641
the privileges granted by the State is education, understood 208
always strictly in the Communist sense of the term. The Communist regimes are aware that they cannot seriously expect to win the minds of the majority of the adult population. Anyone who was twenty years old in 1938 in Bohemia or Moravia, in 1939 in Poland, in 1941 in Serbia, and as late as 1944 in Hungary or Rumania, can contrast his present situation as an individual and as a part of his nation to his situation under a non-Communist government, however imperfect the latter may have been. There is no way of knowing how many of these men and women regret the past and hate the present, but they undoubtedly constitute a large majority of the adult population of the area. From the Communist point of view, these men and women are incurable. The future of the Red regimes depends on the youngsters who know nothing about the past, are isolated from the freedoms of the West, and are daily taught that Russia is their shin-

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641 ing example. The regime knows that it cannot assure a decent
208 standard of living to the adult population and probably realizes that the coming generation will not live much better. However, it hopes that the young ones will be more pliable. Since they will not know that life can be better, they will not grumble. In the political and moral field, the desire to capture the minds of the youth is what industrialization is in the economic domain—the primary goal to which all others
185 must be subordinated. From another angle, education, especially technical education, is the necessary counterpart and precondition of the fully industrialized, urbanized, and mechanized socialist society.

168 The first point of the Communist program for the young
185 generation is to insure its numerical strength. Before the last war, the populations of Poland, Rumania, Yugoslavia, Bulgaria, and Slovakia were increasing with great though gradually diminishing rapidity. In the Czech lands proper and in Hungary, the natural increase was low with a trend towards demographic standstill. Some economists believed that the key problem of Eastern Europe, that of rural poverty due to overpopulation, could not be solved unless the population ceased to multiply so rapidly. From the strictly economic point of view, there was much truth in that assertion. The Communist regimes, including that of Yugoslavia, have taken the opposite stand. Their publications wage a war against the prewar theory which they say is born of despondency characteristic of capitalism. Communism, they claim, will solve all problems. But to prosper, People's Democracies need many children. Whether because of these social policies or because of other reasons, the prewar trend toward low natality has been reversed in most countries of the area. No demographic data on Rumania have been published for some years, which may mean that the policy of high natality has not been successful there. Elsewhere, data show that many more children are being born now than before the war and

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decided difference in emphasis. It is significant that in August 1941, shortly after the Nazi invasion of Russia, the Soviet government summoned an All-Slav Congress to Moscow. The emphasis of this meeting was on industrialization, cultural autonomy, and respect for the national culture and language of each Slav people. The message sent by the Congress to the Slav peoples was typical of its sentiments:

> Oppressed brother Slavs! A grave danger threatens us. The hour has struck for the entire Slavic world to unite and destroy fascism utterly and without loss of time.
>
> We have come together as equals among equals. Our one, burning desire is that the Slavic nations, together with all other nations, should live their lives freely and in peace within the boundaries of their countries.

In a speech later that year, on November 6, Generalissimo Stalin amplified these sentiments by declaring:

> Our aim is to aid the peoples in their liberation struggle against the Hitler tyranny and then to provide them with the opportunity freely to build their life in accordance with their desire. There must be no interference with the domestic affairs of other nations.

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To this Slavic appeal was added an admiration for the Soviet war effort. Many Slavs saw the Russian sufferings as mirroring their own on a gigantic scale, so that the ordinary peasant, to whom a military account of a Red Army victory would mean nothing, carried in his mind a vivid image of the scorched earth, the devastation which Russia suffered, and the hardships and ferocity of his Slav brother's struggle. With the memory of their own unaided fight deeply rooted in their minds, the Slavs watched Russia bearing the brunt of the land war in a way they could understand because the conditions were familiar to them. In Yugoslavia, for example, the Communist Party's growing prestige as the war progressed provided the Soviet Union with a great measure of reflected glory as a communist state. Many Yugoslavs transferred their admiration for the Communist Party's role in their own

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186 liberation struggle to admiration for communism itself, and
● 208 so to the Soviet Union.

Thus the Soviet myth—the supposed victories of the ideals of social reform of the Bolshevik revolution over police and bureaucratic persecutions of the Tsars—went hand in hand with the ties of race of the old Slav mystique. But by 1946, the emphasis of Pan-Slavism shifted to a position reminiscent of the "Slavophile" doctrines of the nineteenth century. Danilevski's prophecies in his *Russia and Europe* (1869) were in the process of realization. Using the language of peace and love, which seemed to him two typical Slav qualities, he had predicted a federation under Russian leadership, as the outcome of a war between Russia and Europe. The federation would consist of Russia (including Galicia, northern Bukovina and Carpatho-Ukraine), the territory of the South Slavs with Istria and Trieste, Rumania, the Czech and Slovak territories, Hungary, Bulgaria, Greece, and Constantinople, as well as sections of Turkey. Many of his prophecies, which at the time undoubtedly seemed fantastic, have come true in the last five years.

648 The triumph of Russia over Eastern Europe set the tone
186 for the great Slav Congress which was held in Belgrade on December 8, 1946. That the permanent headquarters of the Pan-Slav movement was to be located in this city, as was the headquarters of the Cominform newspaper—*For a Lasting Peace, For a People's Democracy*—is hardly surprising. The speeches and the program of the Congress proclaimed that the Slav peoples lead the world both in the struggle against war, for peace and democracy, and in cultural achievements. Finally, the Congress created the usual organizational methods to further Slavic cultural cooperation. A serious blow was dealt by Tito's defection from the orbit to this attempt at empire building through the Pan-Slav idea, but nevertheless the flow of propaganda continued.

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nist Party in Yugoslavia seized power, at the end of the war, 648 the thin veneer of friendship for the West disappeared. In unison with its neighbors, Yugoslavia directed its controlled press and radio to speak in diatribes and strictures against the "capitalistic and warmongering Western democracies," and, at the same time, to speak in glowing terms of their brother Slavs and comrades-in-arms, the people of the Soviet Union.

The rupture between Belgrade and Moscow has not [208] changed this picture in its essentials. Soviet pressure on Tito has not caused him to alter the existing one-party political or economic structure of his country. Just as Tito has demanded that the socialist countries base their relationships on the principle of equality because he is aware of the Soviet Union's aims in Europe, so too he will resist Western demands for the modification of his policies in return for economic and military support.

The Soviet Union erred in trying arbitrarily to mold the Balkan area to the Kremlin pattern. It failed, in the manner of dictatorships, to take into account the long South Slav tradition of opposition to tyranny and conquest. Unfortunately for the Soviet Union's expansionist plans, the pattern did not allow for the forces of human nature, of which there seem to be more in the Balkans than elsewhere in the world. Only if one recognizes that this is a problem in power relations rather than an ideological dispute, can one grasp the full implications of this dispute.

The shift of Yugoslavia at this juncture is best described 648 by what has been termed "integral nationalism," which ex- 186 presses itself in totalitarian terms. Integral nationalism is totalitarian not only in domestic affairs, but in foreign affairs as well. The nation attempts to make itself feared or "respected" by pursuing firm and bold policies. The nature of Tito's rise to power, the geographical characteristics of Yugoslavia, and Tito's power position relative to the Balkan states

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tantly or not at all. Unemployment became worse than it had ever been. 178 464

Thus social tensions persisted or grew worse. Sometimes they appeared as growing tensions between left and right, with the political middle-of-the-road parties increasingly threatened by fascists or by communists. Sometimes they appeared as tensions between different nationality groups, such as between Serbians and Croatians or between Czechs and Germans. Often the same angry and frustrated individuals could be found backing communism in one year, extreme nationalism in another, and some more or less supranational fascism in a third. Whole districts voted for right-wing radical candidates in one election and for left-wing radicals in another. Nationalism in Eastern Europe was thus the symptom of a more fundamental maladjustment, even though nationalistic policies, once adopted, often served to make this maladjustment worse. Nationalistic governments, as well as most other governments in this region, were becoming increasingly unpopular and during the 1930's showed increasing reluctance to face their own voters. By 1939, before the first German or Russian soldier stepped on their soil, every country of Eastern Europe, with the exceptions of Finland and Czechoslovakia, had succumbed to some form of dictatorship. Nationalism had thus failed to cure the fundamental maladjustments of Eastern European political and economic life. From some points of view its failure was hardly less shattering than the failure of the supranational empires that had preceded it. 186 578 642 208

It was nationalism which first undermined and in part destroyed the traditions of property and the respect for property in Eastern Europe. This attack against property began as early as the era of Prince Bismarck in Germany. The so-called Polish legislation sponsored by the German government and by the German nationalists during and after the Bismarck era showed scant respect for the property 642 423 563

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871 Austrian Galicia they underwent a great cultural revival in
563 the latter part of the nineteenth century, and this was the only area in which schools and universities using the Polish language could develop freely. The Polish population in Prussia lived under better educational conditions than did their co-nationals in Russia, but in both countries they were subjected to vigorous programs of denationalization.

871 The state of popular education in Eastern Europe is re-
• 212 vealed by illiteracy figures for the years 1920-21, before the new independent states had exerted an influence on education. The rate of illiteracy for males and females of school age and over was 7 per cent for Czechoslovakia, 15 per cent for Hungary, and between 30 and 40 per cent for Poland and Yugoslavia. The rate was between 40 and 50 per cent for Rumania and Bulgaria, and in Albania it was much higher. These figures may be compared with illiteracy rates of under 1 per cent for Great Britain and Germany, 6 per cent for the United States, and about 50 per cent for Russia.

[873] It is worth noting that the low level of literacy in most of Eastern Europe did not prevent the development of a high level of culture among educated persons. The universities of Prague, Cracow, and Budapest were the most distinguished among many of high level, and very significant contributions to European culture in the arts and sciences came from this region. The "intelligentsia," as those with higher education and professional skills were referred to, provided both the leadership of the national movements and the statesmen of the nations born at the end of the First World War. As individuals they were the equals of the political leaders of the great powers and included in their number many great Europeans.

566 Agricultural improvement, or the increase in produc-
423 tivity and in the welfare of the population dependent on
178 agriculture, is a complex process. In Eastern Europe, it involved in particular the release of the peasants from feudal

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come. Once again, Czechoslovakia headed the list with 5.5 per cent while the Balkan countries devoted only 1.5 per cent of their national income to social services. In the same year the number of persons registered as unemployed in the various countries was as follows: Czechoslovakia, 408,000; Poland, 347,000; Hungary, 47,000; Yugoslavia, 21,600; and Rumania, 10,800.

A major consequence of industrialization and urbanization was the rapid growth both of an urban proletariat and of the bureaucracy. Those people who had been separated from their ancestral rural surroundings and traditions and often from the influence of their families became increasingly detached from spiritual matters and turned more and more towards materialistic and technical spheres. The number of bureaucrats grew rapidly and this resulted in political favoritism and in desk-level programs which very seldom touched the people of the countryside.

It cannot be said, however, that no progress was made or that standards of living were consistently low. It must be remembered that it was not until the First World War that many of these countries attained independence. A part of Poland had just emerged from Russian domination and certain areas of the Balkan states had just freed themselves from Ottoman rule. Even Hungary, Czechoslovakia, Croatia, and parts of Poland had been freed only recently from Austro-German political and economic controls. Under these circumstances, the progress made by these countries, notwithstanding failures and mistakes, was considerable indeed.

III

The states that had dominated this region before the First World War—Germany, Austria-Hungary, Russia, and the Ottoman empire—showed little interest in improving the educational standards of the large masses in Eastern Europe.

871 Illiteracy in the prewar era was extremely prevalent except in
212 Bohemia, Slovenia, a part of Hungary, and the formerly German-ruled section of Poland. Following the various educational reforms and the expansion of facilities during the '20's, the illiteracy rates were: 31.4 per cent (1934) for Bulgaria, 4.1 per cent (1930) for Czechoslovakia, 6.0 per cent (1941) for Hungary, 23.1 per cent (1931) for Poland, 23.1 per cent (1948) for Rumania, and 45.2 per cent (1931) for Yugoslavia. In spite of the notable progress attained within a decade and a half of liberation, the problem of achieving literacy and education for the masses remained a considerable one.

658 In the interwar period, a vast number of schools were built and many universities were founded or enlarged. National statistics show that on the average 3 per cent of the estimated national incomes was devoted to education for the region as a whole. Czechoslovakia, with 3.5 per cent, had the largest budgetary provision for education, spending in 1937 the
871 equivalent of eighty-four million dollars. Universal compulsory elementary education was introduced widely in this area. However, the number and quality of teachers did not increase
[565] as rapidly as did the buildings. Therefore, especially in the eastern and southern regions, semieducated or semiskilled individuals were numerous, and anyone who had been exposed to education considered himself an "intellectual." Under such circumstances, this term very often stood for mere prestige, and the "intellectuals" exerted influence out of proportion to their training. A poor system of communication, a dispersed settlement pattern, mediocre teachers and, last but not least, the rather uncooperative behavior of the peasants impeded the possibilities of an adequate education for the peasant class, which represented the majority of Eastern Europe's population.

000 Due to the prevalence of a liberalism linked with national-

8: Black S-4 (no date) 1954 El Europe El

more of them survive infancy. In consequence, if rather fragmentary national statistics are to be believed, the rate of increase in population has risen to what it was a generation before. Roughly speaking, the number of Hungarians has been increasing annually by 60,000, that of Czechs and Slovaks (mainly Slovaks) by 140,000, that of Yugoslavs by 180,000, and that of Poles by over 400,000. Whether this trend will continue for a long time, no one can say. 168 185

The second point of the program in respect to youth is an all-out attack on illiteracy. Before the war, the area as such was making rapid progress in schooling, and in its western part illiteracy was no longer known. In its eastern and southeastern regions, however, there were still large residues of illiteracy in the adult population and, in spite of compulsory elementary education, there were not enough schools in some rural districts. The result was that some children never went to school. The Communist regimes claim that they have done away with a large proportion of illiteracy among adults and even elderly people, and that illiteracy as a condition is gone forever. There is no way of checking this assertion but it is likely that it is correct. The obvious comment is that the more literate people there are, the stronger a weapon Communist printed propaganda will be. Thus, the new schools behind the Iron Curtain are but the first installment of a vast campaign of propaganda and indoctrination. 871 185 212

The third and, in a sense, the most important point of the program is the great effort of the Communist regimes to promote professional and technical education on secondary and academic levels. The fulfillment of the long-range economic plans depends, in the last analysis, on its cadres, that is, on its trained personnel. To use a Communist simile, the new industrial army, millions strong, needs hundreds of thousands of noncommissioned and commissioned officers. These men and women are being graduated all over the captive area from technical schools of every description. The numbers 874 185

241 1949, is hardly feasible. Analysis of similar claims advanced in other captive countries reveals similar discrepancies and exaggerations.

There are two areas of agricultural production which require special comment. In one the Communists have achieved a very modest success; in the other their failure has been conspicuous. In both instances the results shed light on the general character of Communist agrarian policy, for the success was in industrial crops, the failure in livestock.

● 231 Livestock production—both dairy products and meat—is rightly regarded as one of the basic indices of agricultural prosperity and health. This is so because the cost, in terms of grain produce siphoned off for fodder, is usually high, and only an economy which has a sufficiently high productivity level can afford it. In other words, the caloric value of a given quantity of meat is far lower than that of the grain used in producing it. Only those countries producing a sufficient grain surplus can therefore consider expanding the livestock population. In pre-war Eastern Europe, the general practice was to export surplus grain. On the other hand, a more richly endowed land such as Denmark converted its surplus grain into dairy products before exporting it, and thereby further enriched itself. In Communist Eastern Europe, where grain produc-

TABLE 25

NUMBER OF CATTLE IN EASTERN EUROPE*

Country	1938	1952	Percent of Pre-War
	(millions of head)		
Czechoslovakia	4.4	4.3	98
Poland	9.9	7.4	75
Hungary	2.3	1.8	78
Romania	3.5	3.5	100
Bulgaria	1.5	—**	—**
Yugoslavia	4.3	4.8	112

* All countries except Romania: *Economic Survey of Europe Since the War*, (Geneva, 1953). Romania: Gh. Gh-Dej, in *For a Lasting Peace*, August 28, 1953.

** No figures for Bulgaria are available. However, Chervenkov, speaking December 16, 1953, admitted that livestock were still below pre-war levels.

tion had hardly reached pre-war levels by 1951, and the demands 231
of the urban population were rapidly increasing, the possibilities of increased livestock production were small. Indeed, the fodder supply was below the level necessary for maintaining *existing* livestock population. Therefore (see Table 25), the number of cattle in Eastern Europe had not, by 1952, quite achieved the pre-war levels.

But livestock failure is not recorded merely in terms of quantity, but in quality as well. Czechoslovak Premier Siroky furnished an interesting comment on this point:

> In the sphere of animal husbandry we must proceed from the fact that of late the head of cattle has increased without a corresponding extension of the fodder base. Consequently, the head of cattle has grown to the detriment of the quality of the stock and its productivity. Without a serious extension of the fodder base it will be impossible to ensure improvement of the productivity of the stock which, from the point of view of supplying the people with high-grade meat and other high-grade products of animal husbandry, is a most urgent matter.[25]

One of the chief causes of livestock deterioration is the reliance of 231
East European regimes upon the increasingly impoverished non- 471
collectivized sector for most livestock produce. As Table 26 makes clear, in each country the livestock in the socialist sector is proportionately less than the amount of land "socialized." Moreover, the major portion of the stock in the collectivized sector is not collective property, but belongs to the peasant households. In Poland, for example, 71 per cent of the cattle, 75.5 per cent of the sheep, and 75.8 per cent of the hogs in the collectivized land belongs to private household plots.[26]

Thus while the "Socialist sector" concentrates upon marketing 241
grain and industrial crops, the private sector and the collectivized households emphasize livestock products. However, as the private sector has been deprived of credits and resources with which to purchase fodder and other necessities, the quality of the livestock has inevitably deteriorated. In spite of the introduction of new "zootechnical methods" on certain model farms, most livestock con-

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[25] *For a Lasting Peace*, September 18, 1953. Remarks of a very similar character cropped up in the August 22nd address of the Romanian Premier, Gheorghiu-Dej, and in the September 8th address of the Bulgarian Premier Chervenkov.
[26] *Ekonomista* (Warsaw), III, 1953, p. 48.

231 tinues to be bred and raised by the traditionally backward East European methods.

TABLE 26

PERCENTAGE OF TOTAL LIVESTOCK IN SOCIALIST SECTOR IN 1952*

Country	Percent of Land in Socialist Sector	Cattle	Sheep	Hogs	Horses
Czechoslovakia	48.0	33.0	39.7	38.0	—
Poland	17.0	7.8	—	9.2	7.1
Bulgaria	53.0	25.2	29.9	17.6	43.5

* Sources: Czechoslovakia, Nepomucky, *Rude Pravo*, February 5, 1953; Poland, *Wies w Liczbach*, p. 25 (Warsaw, 1951); Bulgaria, Chervenkov, *For a Lasting Peace*, September 11, 1953.

241 While animal husbandry lagged, industrial crops crept ahead. Even in this realm, despite increased investments, results have not been spectacular. Few reliable production statistics are available. Table 27 shows only the increase in area given over to industrial crops.[37]

2. *The Return on the Investment*

423 In its basic features the picture thus far drawn of East European agriculture resembles the one drawn earlier of Soviet agriculture: a strenuous effort to force the peasantry into a farm system over which the State could exercise direct administrative control; a feverish effort to build modernized industry at a pace which precluded much investment in agriculture; a resultant stagnation of and, in some instances, a deterioration of, agricultural production; and a constant tension between State and the peasants arising from their unending struggle over the fruits of the peasants' labors.

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In the USSR, however, the victory of the State over the peasantry was concluded with far greater finality than in Satellite Eastern Europe; the system held together over a quarter of a century which included the most severe war-time trials. Collectivization in the USSR possesses stability because it has managed to provide the State with the minimum of foodstuffs necessary for its economic

[37] It is significant that among the many steps taken to implement the New Course in several East European countries was the reduction of the area sown with industrial crops.

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But if the State Farms exceed independent farms in grain marketing, the so-called kulaks exceed even the State Farms. With only 11.1 per cent of the arable land, they account for 19 per cent of the marketed grain. Precisely for this reason the Polish economist, Jerzy Tepicht, in an article published in December 1953, warned against the "irresponsible policy of destroying the productive capacity" of the kulaks.[46] If the kulaks cannot be broken, the regime must cooperate with them or risk an agricultural crisis such as occurred in Hungary in 1953.

The same Tepicht, in an article on the general problem of marketing, tried to establish the thesis that State Farms had come to play the same role in marketing that had formerly been held by large landowners.[47] In pre-war times the large landowners, holding 18.1 per cent of the land, contributed 29.9 per cent of the total marketed grain. Today, the State Farms, holding 12 per cent of the arable land, deliver 21.2 per cent of the marketed grain. Tepicht concludes that the marketing ability of the State Farms equals that of the pre-war landed estates, and thereby justifies the existence of the State Farms. The only flaw in his argument – aside from the peculiarity of such a justification on the part of a Communist! – lies in the fact that the majority of the State Farms (73.7 per cent) are in the Western territories where private farms also deliver high grain surpluses to the market. Holding only 31.1 per cent of the arable land, private farmers in the Western territories market 65.4 per cent of the grain delivered by the private sector in all Poland.[48] It seems likely, therefore, that the superior marketing power of the State Farms is due as much to their geographical location as to their internal structure.

In addition, it should be noted that the State Farms have established their grain marketing record at the cost of a very poorly developed livestock, a condition which they have in common with the collectives. Whereas the small farmers, with 11.5 per cent of the arable land, possess 20 per cent of the pigs and cows, and all the independent farms, with 76.5 per cent of the arable land, raise 93.1 per cent of the cattle and 90.1 per cent of the pigs, the State Farms, with 12 per cent of the land, raise only 9.2 per cent of the

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[46] *Trybuna Ludu*, (Warsaw) December 31, 1953.
[47] *Ekonomista*, III, 1953, pp. 31-2.
[48] *Ibid*, p. 35. Tepicht's figures differ from those given above (Table 29) but the difference is slight, and either set would support his argument.

pigs and six per cent of the cows. The kolkozes, with over six per cent of the land, raise less than one per cent of the cattle, pigs, and sheep.[49] The neglect of livestock is evidently characteristic of large-scale farming in Poland since the kulaks, who also produce a high marketable surplus, have also had negligible success in animal husbandry.

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Despite these modifications, the State Farms have played a sizeable role in establishing the Communist-desired relationship between the town and country. It is also clear that, up to this point, the collectivized sector has played a very limited role.

Czechoslovakia

The data relating to sector-by-sector marketing in Czechoslovakia is, unfortunately, even more scattered than in Poland, and permits less conclusive inferences. For example, it is known that in 1950 the State purchased 46 per cent of the grain production of both sectors, collective and private. It is also known that in 1949 the farms of less than 10 hectares—virtually all the private sector—contributed only 33 per cent of their production to the State.[50] Therefore, it can be assumed that the "Socialist sector"—mostly State Farms in 1949, but including a large number of collectives in 1950—contributed a higher portion of its produce than did the private farms. Furthermore, in 1951 farms of under 10 hectares accounted for only 39 per cent of grain deliveries, so that presumably the larger farms contributed more than their proportionate share of the market.[51]

In 1953, according to official Czechoslovak statistics, the "Socialist sector," comprising over 50 per cent of the land, accounted for 51 per cent of the marketed grain, 46 per cent of the marketed cattle, 57 per cent of the marketed pigs, and 43 per cent of the marketed milk.[52] These figures suggest that the market benefits gained by the Czechoslovak State are quite modest, and frequent claims that the collectives fulfill quotas more fully than the private

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[49] *Trybuna Ludu*, December 31, 1953; Jan Wyrozebski, Radio Warsaw, January 22, 1954.

[50] *Rude Pravo*, (Prague) February 22, 1951.

[51] *Nova Mysl* (Prague), November, 1953. The farms under 10 hectares, comprising 51 per cent of the arable land, contributed only 39 per cent of the marketed grain while the collective farms in 1951, holding 19 per cent of the land, contributed 20.7 per cent of the marketed grain.

[52] *Zpravy Statniho Uradu Statistickeho* (Prague), January 31, 1954.

433 farms are not altogether true.[53] At the same time, the greater con-
231 fidence the regime has in the capacity of the collectives to fulfill
475 quotas is not altogether unjustified.

[231] Although the bulk of livestock in Poland is in the private sector, a sizeable portion of the livestock in Czechoslovakia is in the "Socialist sector." In 1952, 33.8 per cent of the cattle, 37.7 per cent of the hogs, and 38.7 per cent of the sheep were in the "Socialist sector."[54]

Although the Czechoslovak regime may have gained some market advantages from collectivization, its victory remains quite inconclusive. With the New Course, the regime, in turning to the private sector for agricultural reinforcement, acknowledged that the advantage gained was insufficient for its purposes.[55]

Hungary

423 The transformation of the agricultural structure in Hungary in
433 1945-46 was the most drastic of the post-war land reforms; and there is unquestionably a connection between the semi-revolutionary character of that agrarian reform and the special gravity of the Hungarian farm crisis in mid-1953. Whether this crisis had its roots in peasant hyper-sensitivity to the imposition of an overlordship resembling former conditions, or to the destruction of traditional trade relationships between town and country is not altogether clear; but that a close connection exists between the 1945-46 reform and the 1953 crisis is difficult to doubt.[56]

The impact of the 1945-46 reforms on the traditional trade

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[53] For example, *Rude Pravo* (December 4, 1953), asserted that the collective farms had fulfilled their quotas for grain by 103 per cent while the private farms had fulfilled their quota by only 77 per cent. A similar differential held for the fulfillment of meat, pork, and milk quotas.

[54] Cited in *Zycie Gospodarcze* (Warsaw), April 19, 1953, p. 484.

[55] As in Poland, the Czechoslovak New Course placed special emphasis upon protecting the productive capacity of the kulaks while at the same time, of course, limiting his alleged urge to engage in speculation and exploitation. "It would harm our agricultural economy," said Minister of Agriculture Uher, if the land which the kulaks occupied was not "fully utilized by them" (*Rude Pravo*, November 10, 1953).

[56] A subjective factor such as the peasants' degree of class consciousness is difficult to incorporate into an analysis of this type. However, without some recourse to this factor, it is difficult to explain the special depth of the 1953 Hungarian crisis, so much more pronounced was it than similar crises in the sphere. The series of articles in the Hungarian press during the fall and summer of 1953 portraying the countryside during the period of kolkhoz dissolutions certainly suggested that the Hungarian peasantry felt a hatred for their oppressors of an intensity hardly rivaled in the Sphere. It should not be forgotten that the strongest of the post-World War II peasant parties in the sphere was the Smallholders' Party of Hungary, which received 57 per cent of the vote in 1947 elections.

7:Gluckstein S-4 (no date)1952 El Europe El

241 area is much smaller in Eastern Europe than in Western
511 Europe. This is shown clearly in the following table:
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AGRICULTURAL PRODUCTION PER HECTARE OF AGRICULTURAL LAND

	Crop Units	Index		Crop Units	Index
Denmark	57	100	Czechoslovakia	31	54
England and Wales	46	81	Hungary ..	21	37
Netherlands ..	91	160	Bulgaria ..	19	33
Switzerland ..	89	156	Poland	18	32
Belgium	63	111	Rumania ..	17	30
France	26	46	Yugoslavia ..	17	30
Germany	44	79	Albania ..	17	30

If the agricultural population of Eastern Europe is to have the same quantity of agricultural products per head as in Western Europe, not only must half of them be removed, but the agricultural output must be doubled.

The low productivity in Eastern Europe is not the result of
[134] infertility of the soil. On the contrary, the soil of Eastern Europe, and especially the excellent black soil of the Danube Plain, is on the whole much richer than the naturally poor soil of Western Europe. The low productivity is due to three main causes, the scarcity of livestock, the scanty use of fertilizers and the lack of agricultural implements and machinery.

LIVESTOCK DENSITY (1938)

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	Cattle per 100 ha. Agricultural Area	Pigs per 100 ha. Arable Land
Czechoslovakia ..	59.1	65.3
Hungary	24.9	55.3
Poland	41.3	40.6
Rumania	23.5	23.5
Bulgaria	41.0	22.1
Yugoslavia	29.8	46.0
Germany	69.8	122.5
France	45.2	34.4
Denmark	103.1	106.1

(PEP—Political and Economic Planning-*Economic Development in S.E. Europe*, 1945, p. 34).

In this table the figures for the countries of Eastern Europe include a large number of oxen and buffaloes which are used mainly as draught animals. In the quality of its livestock Eastern Europe compares even more unfavourably with Western Europe than in the quantity.

407 On the question of agricultural implements and machinery,
241 the PEP study states :

The value of all agricultural equipment used per hectare of arable land was estimated by a Roumanian source at Lei 1,000

5: Free Europe Committee U-4 (no date) 1954 E1 Europe E1

CHART I

241 GRAIN PRODUCED and MARKETED in SOVIET RUSSIA

Pre-World War I and 1926-27*



* Stalin, Problems of Leninism, (Eng. ed. 1940.) p. 205.

p. 18

423 185 in 1928, but it was not until one year later, when Stalin called for "liquidation of the kulaks as a class," that its full weight was felt. Since the actual number of kulaks in post-Revolutionary Russia was not very great, this slogan made it abundantly clear that the frankly military offensive was directed against the peasantry as a whole. The story is well known: the dispatch of Communist shock cadres to the villages, the mass deportations, the herding of peasants into hastily formed collective units, the calculated famine in the Ukraine, the wholesale slaughter of livestock by the desperate peasants, the brief pause ordered by Stalin early in 1930, the renewed offensive in 1931-32, the collapse of the opposition, and the final establishment of a collective farm system in all essential respects resembling that of today. There were many subsequent modifications of the system; but its basic features were firmly established in the "avalanche" of collectivization in the 1928-32 period.

In evaluating the success of the drive and the system it created, it is necessary to reiterate that the primary utility of the collective farm lay in its efficiency as an economic and political *control device*, by which rapid industrialization of the Soviet Union could be facilitated, and not in its efficiency of production. To the extent that it made industrialization possible, it is possible to show that Soviet collectivization "succeeded."

241 423 So far as production is concerned, the efficiency of the collective farm was, and remains, low. It has been estimated that Soviet grain production in 1939 did not exceed that of 1928 by much more than the increase of sown area over the 11 intervening years.[23] Similarly, the gross production value of Soviet agriculture in 1940 exceeded 1928 by only a small fraction, though in the bumper year of 1937 the harvest may have been as much as 14 per cent higher.[24] Throughout the 1930s the Soviets put forth many claims of increased agricultural productivity which were, however, discounted by most Western experts. Western scepticism was vindicated by the 1953 acknowledgement of agricultural deterioration by N. S. Khrushchev, one of the chief architects of later Soviet agricultural policy.[25]

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[23] Naum Jasny, *Socialized Agriculture of the U.S.S.R.* (Stanford, 1950), p. 548.
[24] *Ibid.*, p. 673.
[25] Jasny's figures, which are cited above, are somewhat lower than official Soviet boasts. He made allowance for statistical falsification involved in such Soviet practices as measuring production in accordance with the "biological yield," a misleading statistical device employed by the Soviets since the early thirties and condemned by Malenkov in his August 8th, 1953 address.

TABLE 1

DIVISION OF AGRICULTURAL PRODUCT IN USSR BEFORE AND AFTER COLLECTIVIZATION †

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Year	Total Yield*	Obligatory Deliveries Million Centners	Obligatory Deliveries Percent of Total Crop	Retained by Farmers Million Centners	Retained by Farmers Percent of Total Crop**
1927/8	605.9	112.2	18.5	493.7	100
1932/3	570.1	185.2	32.5	384.9	77.9
1933/4	677.1	228.7	33.8	448.4	90.8
1934/5	669.5	226.6	33.8	442.9	89.7
1935/6	677.5	249.3	36.8	428.2	86.7
1936/7	612.5	260.0	42.4	353.5	71.4

† Propkopovicz, S. N., *Russlands Volkswirtschaft unter den Sowjets*, (Zurich, 1944), pp. 136, 138.

* Net totals, after seeds deducted from the total yield.

** 100 equals total crop retained by farmer 1927/8. Figures for subsequent years show percentage 1927/8 total retained.

But whatever the failure of collectivization to achieve productive efficiency, and other ostensible goals widely advertised in the propaganda of the time,[26] the Soviet State remained completely loyal to the system, bolstering it by police action and developing its distinctive features over the years. Evidently, the regime considered that for its investment, it was receiving an adequate return. The explanation for this unswerving loyalty to the system, in the face of the massive difficulties encountered, is to be found in the striking change in the pattern of grain collection after collectivization (see Table 1). In 1928 the State collected no more than 18.5 per cent of the total grain crop, while in 1937 an estimated 42.4 per cent was Sta' -collected.[27] That this was a direct result of collectivization ...ay be seen in the fact that, from the start, the collectivized sector

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[26] For example, one of the regime claims was that collectivization wiped out the inequality between the rich kulak and the poor peasant. The hypocrisy of this claim was made evident in the agricultural order that replaced the old one. Thus Jasny writes: "The former *kulaki*, actually the more energetic, harder working peasants, are now replaced by the army of chairmen of the *kolkhozy*, tractor drivers, combine operators, and the like. These workers both number and earn more than the *kulaki* . . ." (Jasny, p. 75).

[27] Harry Schwartz (p. 313) gives the Figure 15 per cent for 1928 and 40 per cent for 1939.

241 423 185 produced more for the market per hectare of arable land than did the private sector. In 1932, 60 per cent of all households in the Soviet Union had been collectivized, embracing 66 per cent of the sown area. Yet the collective and State farms (*sovkhozy*) supplied 84 per cent of the marketed grain and 83 per cent of the cotton.[28]

241 185 471 423 With the reinforcement of the collective farm system the State was in a position where it could force the peasants to serve as a cushion for harvest shocks. In 1937, a bumper year, the peasants received 35.9 per cent of the total grain crop for division among themselves; but in 1938-39, mediocre crop years, the peasants received only 26.9 and 22.9 per cent of the total, despite the fact that a smaller gross volume was to be shared.[29] In each case primary State needs governed the division of the agricultural yield. The Soviet Government had created an administrative apparatus which insured, in the words of one observer, that "if anyone was to starve, [the peasants] would be the first to do so."[30]

The function of the State farms in the Soviet system is similarly linked to the problem of agricultural deliveries. Though accounting for no more than 10 per cent of the arable area in 1937, the *sovkhozy* delivered 30 per cent of the milk, 25 per cent of the wool, and 24 per cent of the meat delivered to the State in that year. Whereas the grain producing collectives delivered only one-third of their total product to the State in the late thirties, the *sovkhozy* contributed three-quarters of their crop.[31] Hence, it may be said that, from the point of view of the Soviet planner, the State farms bore a superiority over the collective farms similar to the superiority of the collectives over the private farms.

471 423 The case for collectivization was aptly summed up by N. A. Voznesensky when he revealed that the Soviet government in World War II collected three times the annual amount of grain collected by the Czarist regime during World War I when "72 per cent of all marketed grain was concentrated in the hands of estate owners and kulaks." This threefold increase in marketable surplus

[28] Dobb, p. 249. There were, of course, other factors which accounted for the meagre quantity of goods placed on the market by the private sector, in particular, the amount of State discrimination against the private farms.
[29] Harry Schwartz, p. 285. Schwartz writes with regard to this question: "Only the government's complete domination of the peasantry through the collective farm system made this sharp change in the amount of grain collected possible." (p. 313).
[30] Leonard Hubbard, *The Economics of Soviet Agriculture* (London, 1939), p. 123.
[31] Harry Schwartz, p. 285.

423 the growing strength of the peasants and a further consolidation of a distinctly peasant culture with its special mores and traditions.[10]

Post-Reform Conditions

423 Despite the undoubted benefits which land reform brought to many formerly impoverished peasants, the agricultural economy of Eastern Europe remained largely stagnant in the inter-war period. The failure of the reforms to work a radical improvement in the standard of living and to raise total agricultural production may be attributed to the fact that the reforms themselves were primarily *political* rather than *economic* in intent. They were motivated very largely by the "green rising," the panic fear of Bolshevism (which seized power in Bela Kun's Hungary in 1919 and swept to the gates of Warsaw in 1920), the social upheaval of the First World War, and the new nationalism. In no case is there evidence that an overall increase of agricultural production was the primary goal. Like the vast revolution in the Russian countryside of 1917-18, the East European reforms were designed to "distribute wealth, rather than to produce it."[11]

In short, if the reforms narrowed the gap between rich and poor, they failed to create the lasting conditions of agricultural prosperity. Indeed, by reducing the area of the landed estates which traditionally produced large marketable surpluses, the reforms hindered urban-industrial growth and restricted cash exports.[12] As a consequence, the agricultural level of Eastern Europe remained far below that of the more advanced countries of Western Europe (see Table 2). Essentially the same picture emerges from computation of the annual per hectare yield of the East European countries (see Chart II).

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[10] *Agrarian Problems from the Baltic to the Aegean* (Royal Institute of International Affairs, London, 1944), p. 58.

[11] Wilbert E. Moore, *Economic Demography of Eastern and Southern Europe* (Geneva, 1945), p. 100. For a similar view, stressing the *political* rather than the *economic* motivation of the East European land reform, see David Mitrany, *The Land and the Peasant in Rumania* (Oxford, 1930), Chapter 10.

[12] Data on the relative efficiency of small and large-scale farming in Eastern Europe are scanty, but Seton-Watson concluded that it was generally true that "the smaller the holding, the lower the productivity of the soil." (Seton-Watson, p. 86). Similarly, Moore held that "the large holdings tend to yield a greater product per unit of capital by more nearly maximum utilization of work animals." (Moore, p. 101). But whether or not large-scale farming was more *efficient* than small-scale farming, there is no doubt that the large-scale farms produced a higher proportion of the *marketed* produce, although this factor varied from country to country and from region to region.

CHART II

● 241

ANNUAL YIELD per ACRE, AVERAGE 1933-37*

IN CWTS



* Agrarian Problems from the Baltic to the Aegean, Royal Institute of International Affairs, London, 1944, p. 53.

p. 31

TABLE 2

611 **ANNUAL CONSUMPTION OF BASIC FOODSTUFFS IN PRE-WAR EASTERN EUROPE**
(in lbs.)

	Wheat & Rye	Maize	Potatoes	Sugar	Meat	Milk	Fats	Eggs (No.)
Poland	392	—	550	27	50	260	21	90
Czechoslovakia	275	25	260	47	68	290	40	169
Hungary	550	—	220	28	57	240	30	95
Romania	245	400	110	15	55	140	25	90
Yugoslavia	265	340	130	12	44	160	18	45
Bulgaria	440	—	85	12	45	150	19	80
Denmark	265	Nil	250	117	124	410	67	115

* *Agrarian Problems from the Baltic to the Aegean*, pp. 44.

241 311 The land, some of it rich, but most of it poor, was exploited in a backward fashion — in Bulgaria and Yugoslav Macedonia many of the peasants worked with a wooden plow not very different in design from one described by Virgil in the *Georgics* 19 hundred years before. The inevitable subdivision of the land among the peasant's sons made application of modern agricultural techniques virtually impossible, and the accumulation of sufficient capital to purchase such equipment out of question. In addition, growing rural over-population kept farm wages low, and made the use of modern machinery uneconomical from the peasants' point of view. [435] Above all, the peasantry was oppressed by the traditional "price scissors," or the disparity between the prices received for their crops on the urban market and prices paid for industrial products, a relationship which arose from the "small domestic market for agricultural products and the small supply of manufactured goods produced by domestic industry."[19]

But the trouble lay not merely in the backwardness of the peasant agricultural system. The political structure of the country, either conservative or semi-fascist, tended to favor urban groups. In the allotment of national resources such projects as peasant

[19] Moore, p. 89.

241 211 banks, agro-technical training schools, agricultural machine industries, and rural communications received only minor allocations. The backward condition of rural transportation made the task of competing with foreign grain — especially American — on the world market that much more difficult and the lack of facilities for the fertilizer production helped maintain the low yield.

The institutional organization of agriculture placed strong impediments to improved efficiency and increased productivity. Thus the small size of peasant holdings, frequently scattered in tiny plots, subdivided through inheritance, in debt to local banks, sometimes still held under tenancy arrangements, all combined to blight the hopes raised by the first post-war reforms.

The means and resources of the various national governments were usually devoted to furthering industrial development and the accumulation of capital for favored projects from which the peasants rarely benefited. While in some countries import duties on motor cars might be reduced, duties on agricultural machinery were gradually raised.[13] The blind pursuit of such policies by the inter-war governments inevitably deepened the rift between town and country, and intensified peasant suspicion of the central regimes. In some cases the response of the regimes to such suspicions was to convert themselves into semi-fascist governments, which were not dependent upon that minimum of popular support which their semi-parliamentary predecessors required for continued existence.[14]

3. *World War II and After*

423 If World War I set in motion the process of land reform, World War II brought that process to a close. No doubt the sudden emergence of the Communists as a major political force in the area expedited completion of the reforms begun in the 1920s, but

[13] *Agrarian Problems from the Baltic to the Aegean*, p. 41-2. In Romania prior to 1928 the government imposed export duties on agricultural products. These duties were revoked but the general disregard for the needs of the landed population remained. And while it is true that there were efforts on the part of East European governments to make some administrative services available to the peasants (such as the Hungarian Social Fund, the O.N.Cs.A.) they were halting and generally short-lived.

[14] The process of excluding peasant parties from any kind of representation in the governments "began with Hungary in 1919, continued with Bulgaria in 1923, with Poland in 1926, with Yugoslavia in 1929, and with Rumania in 1931" (Mitrany, p. 122). Only the Czechoslovak Agrarian Party was able to remain in power, and in Bulgaria the Agrarian Party returned briefly between 1930 and 1934.

CHART IV

DISTRIBUTION OF AGRICULTURAL HOLDINGS BY SIZE AND AREA IN EASTERN EUROPE – CIRCA 1930*

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

* Wilbert Moore, Economic Demography of Eastern and Southern Europe (Geneva), 1945, p. 82.

p. 35

423 existed for a considerable period before the new measures were introduced.[3]

To assess the results of collectivization in Eastern Europe it is necessary to apply the same measuring rod applied to the Soviet Union: to what degree did collectivization facilitate the task of increasing the State's share of the total agricultural product without a proportionate increase in agricultural investment?

This was, in fact, the exact criterion to which Boris Kidrič, the Yugoslav economic planner, was referring when he declared in 1947 that the "business of agriculture in a Socialist society is to supply the towns and industrial centers with food."[4] If, despite every other failure, collectivization has expedited this "supply," it has justified itself in Communist eyes.

312 As in the USSR, land reorganization in Eastern Europe has not
423 resulted in an appreciable increase in East European farm productivity; in many instances, the reverse has been true. That the pre-war levels of agriculture have not yet been regained in Hungary is now freely admitted by Hungarian Communist spokesmen.[5] The Polish theoretician, Stefan Jedrychowski, in a revealing analysis of post-Stalin policies, acknowledged that "in Romania, as well as in Czechoslovakia, agricultural production as a whole has not yet reached the pre-war level, although, for example, it has in the case of cattle."[6] Polish Premier Bierut confessed that the situation in Poland was not very healthy compared to pre-war standards.[7]

● 241 Indeed, the conclusions of the United Nations Food and Agricultural Organization (FAO), issued in 1952 long before the New Course policies, and based upon many unofficial sources, seems generous in retrospect: "All countries in the region," the FAO report stated, "with the exception of Poland, were at, or only slightly below, the pre-war level of agricultural production, and for the

[3] It has been suggested by many that the New Course of 1953 was the consequence of a mounting, ever-deepening economic crisis. However, it is difficult to support such a thesis because, with the possible exception of Hungary, the economic problems which the Communists are now attacking with such vigor have existed for a long time. A more plausible hypothesis is that the political crisis caused by Stalin's death made intolerable the continuation of the vast economic disproportions which had hitherto been mastered.

[4] See above p. 46.

[5] Jozsef Reval, *Tarsadalmi Szemle* (Budapest), October-November, 1953. The crowning indictment of Hungarian agriculture was Reval's declaration that its livestock situation was "worse than it is in the USSR."

[6] Stefan Jedrychowski, *Nowe Drogi* (Warsaw), No. 10, 1953.

[7] Report of Premier Bierut to the 9th Plenum of the Central Committee of the Polish Workers Party, *Trybuna Ludu*, November 6, 1953.

region as a whole production may be tentatively estimated at about five to ten per cent less than before the war."[8] Since the population of the region has declined by about five per cent, the production per capita is probably at pre-war levels. However, because the proportion of total agricultural lands sown with industrial crops has increased, the produce left for food consumption has probably declined. 241

Some harvests were, of course, a great deal better than others; and it is easy to be misled by generalizing on the basis of one particularly good or bad year. Poland had a poor harvest in 1951; and Romania and Hungary suffered badly in 1952. The overall picture of Communist agricultural achievement compared to pre-war patterns is summarized in Table 19.

TABLE 19 *

PRODUCTION OF BASIC CROPS IN EASTERN EUROPE*

(in millions of metric tons)

Commodity	1934-1938	1950	1951
Wheat	14.0	12.8	14.6
Rye	11.8	11.1	11.4
Barley	5.7	4.4	4.9
Oats	6.9	5.1	5.4
Maize	12.2	9.0	12.3
Sugar	2.6	3.2	3.1
Potatoes	67.0	62.9	53.6
TOTAL (In equivalent units of wheat)	62.0	52.6	57.3

* *The State of Food and Agriculture: Review and Outlook*, Food and Agricultural Organization of the United Nations (Rome, 1952), p. 51.

[8] *The State of Food and Agriculture: Review and Outlook* (Food and Agricultural Organization of the United Nations), p. 51 (Rome, October, 1952). The exclusion of Poland may have been justified at the time the FAO report was written, since Polish economic development has been less distorted than in some of its Satellite neighbors. But in 1953 it became apparent that even in Poland agriculture was probably still close to pre-war levels.

CHART XIII

CROP PRODUCTION in the SATELLITES*

(NOT INCLUDING THE BALTIC COUNTRIES) in MILLIONS of METRIC TONS

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

TOTAL WHEAT EQUIVALENT UNITS



* Food and Agricultural Organization (FAO) Report on East European Agriculture, Rome, November, 1952.

** The Wheat Equivalent Unit is determined by comparing the caloric value of a given quantity of wheat with the caloric value of the same quantity of another commodity. By the use of this, unit it is possible to speak of the sum total of various grains in numerical terms.

p.86

According to the FAO analysis, per capita consumption of food (measured in wheat equivalent units) declined from 371 kilograms per head in 1934-38 to 339 in 1950 and 335 in 1951.[9] -241

The momentous failure of East European agriculture cannot be attributed entirely to mistakes in Communist planning, unforeseen circumstances, bad weather, or an exaggerated idea of the efficacy of modern machinery or collectivization. The evidence makes it quite plain that, from the very start, the Communists were embarking upon an economic program which, by its very nature, precluded the possibility of a genuine increase in agricultural production. Considering the degree to which East European Communists modeled their program on Soviet experience, it is unlikely that they were under any illusions on this score. While it is true that in all modern countries, industrial development and investment have exceeded agricultural development,[10] the Communists were undoubt-

TABLE 20 *

PERCENTAGE OF PLANNED INVESTMENT IN AGRICULTURE IN EAST EUROPEAN ECONOMIC PLANS

Country	Period	Percentage to be Invested in Agriculture
Bulgaria	1947-48	6
	1949-53	13
Czechoslovakia	1947-48	7
	1949-53	8
Hungary	1947-49	9
	1950-54	17
Poland	1947-49	13
Romania	1949	9
Yugoslavia	1947-51	8

* *Economic Survey of Europe in 1948*, United Nations, (Geneva, 1949), p. 203.

[9] The Wheat Equivalent Unit is determined by comparing the caloric value of a given quantity of wheat with the caloric value of the same quantity of another commodity. The procedure makes possible the addition of various crops into one numerical total.

[10] In the non-Soviet world industrial growth invariably outpaces agricultural growth on a percentage basis. Industrial production in 1951 in non-Communist Europe was 45 per cent higher than in 1938 while agricultural production was only 10 per cent higher (*Economic Survey of Europe Since the War*, [Geneva], 1953, pp. 167, 239).

●241 edly conscious of the fact that the extraordinary rapidity of Soviet industrial growth in the thirties was achieved partly at the cost of a greater disparity between industrial and agricultural development than was characteristic of the major Western nations.

241 185 The extent to which the Communists were prepared to permit a lag in agricultural progress was indicated, first of all, by the small portion of national resources the Plans allocated to agriculture. As shown in Table 20, the planned investment in agriculture averaged around 10 per cent of the total investment schedule. In evaluating the figures in Table 20 it should be remembered that, with the exception of Czechoslovakia, the economies of Eastern Europe were primarily agricultural. Furthermore, in the period of the Plans, an increasingly large share of the land came under the control of the State, whose investment policy is here under scrutiny.

Another indication of the conscious purpose behind Communist agricultural neglect is to be found in the Plan targets set for farm commodities. As Table 21 indicates, the Plans provide for approximately four times as great an increase in the production of producer goods as of agricultural goods. And while a 50 per cent increase in agriculture is not negligible, it represents a goal the Communists, on the basis of Soviet experience, knew they could not possibly fulfill.[11]

TABLE 21

433 PLANNED FIVE YEAR PLAN PRODUCTION INCREASES

(Poland – Six Years)

Country	Producer Goods	Consumer Goods	Agriculture
	(Year preceding Plan = 100)		
Bulgaria (1948-53)	326	273	137
Czechoslovakia (1948-53)	230	170	153
Hungary (1950-54)	380	245	154
Poland (1950-56)	254	211	150

[11] The underfulfillment of agricultural and light industry targets in the USSR had become almost a tradition, and the East European Communists certainly were conscious of this heritage. They must have known, too, that the failure to fulfill the targets set for non-heavy industrial production did not stop the Soviet planners from setting targets far beyond possible attainment in the next plan (see Harry Schwartz, pp. 305-329). This adamant refusal to bring non-heavy industrial targets into the realm of reality was part of the dogma, firmly held up to Stalin's death, that the rapid expansion of heavy industry did not in any way deter the development of light industry, a dogma which was patently false, but one which for reasons of public safety, had to be upheld.

666 369 463 apparatus grows. When the introduction of the New Course in 1953 made agricultural improvement imperative, the seriousness of this bureaucratic delay and confusion became the subject of frequent attack by Communist orators, confirming the judgment of a prominent American student of Communist agricultural life who wrote:

> When you read . . . of the remarkable increase in the number of agronomists and other agricultural specialists and technicians in the Soviet Union, remember that many of them are not engaged, or do not spend much of their time, in research or extension or other technical work, but are trying to cope with the vast amount of bureaucratic paper work required by the Soviet system.[29]

The recurrent drives to "deflate the ranks of the farm bureaucracy" have not generally, according to this same expert, proved successful.

407 241 An additional measure of the long-standing Communist reluctance to divert national resources to agricultural development is to be found in the relatively lethargic pace of farm mechanization. While it is true (see Table 23) that an increase in the mechanization of the "Socialist sector" did accompany collectivization, the increase was by no means as great as popularly pictured, and was not even as great, proportionally, as the increase which accompanied Soviet collectivization in the early thirties. Since one of the stock justifications of large-scale collectivized farming was, and remains, its alleged capacity to exploit modern farm machinery, the failure of the Communists to supply the farms with adequate machinery indicated the degree to which this Communist argument was a rationalization for a policy of exploitation.

Since the broad Russian plains are more adaptable to use of farm machinery, especially large tractors and combines, comparisons with Eastern Europe and its more broken terrain are not altogether apt. However, it should be noted that the Soviet Union provides a higher proportion of tractors to its farms than do the East European Communist regimes. As indicated in Table 23, there were approximately 107,500 tractors in service in Eastern Europe in 1952-53, compared with approximately 45,000 four years earlier. During the four years of collectivization, then, the tractor park in Eastern Europe was increased by only 62,500. In the USSR, on the other hand, over 100,000 tractors were produced in the year 1936 alone,[30] far fewer than was needed, but far greater proportionately than in Eastern Europe.

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[29] Lazar Volin, "Russia's Agricultural Potential," *Foreign Agriculture*, October, 1953, p. 179.
[30] Harry Schwartz, p. 243.

TABLE 23

GROWTH OF TRACTOR PARK IN EASTERN EUROPE

Country	Number of MTS 1948/49	Number of MTS 1952/53	(Tractors in 1,000's by Sector) MTS 1948/49	MTS 1952/53	State Farms 1948/49	State Farms 1952/53	Total 1948/49	Total 1952/53
Czechoslovakia	800	258	5.0	–	5.0	–	10.0	25.0
Poland	30	376	0.2	15.0	14.3	20.0	14.5	35.0
Hungary	220	400*	8.0	18.5	–	1.5*	–	20.0*
Romania	135	218	5.0*	9.6	3.5	4.4	8.5	15.0
Bulgaria	71	140	3.6	12.3	0.2	0.5	3.8	12.5

Sources:

C: 1949: J. Dolansky, op. cit., 1952: J. Dolansky in *For a Lasting Peace*, July 3, 1953.

P: H. Minc: Le Plan Sexennual (The Six Year Plan), *Notes et Etud. Doc.*, No. 1877, Paris, 1950; tractors: MTS-1953, E. Putcnolkowski, in *For a Lasting Peace*, June 12, 1953. Stat. 1948: *Rocznik Stat.* (Statist. Year), p. 60. 1952 estimated.

H: 1949 in *Hungary Today*. 1952 estimated on the basis of planned figures.

R: 1948: *Problems Economics* (Econ. Problems), No. 1, 1948. Gh.-Dej. in *For a Lasting Peace*, May 29, 1953.

B: Vulko Chervenkov in *For a Lasting Peace*, Sept. 11, 1953.

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244 407 As in the USSR, mere numerical increase in farm machinery creates an exaggerated view of the increased efficiency achieved. Though the tractor emphasis of the Soviet planners of the early thirties was avoided in Eastern Europe, the capacity of farm machinery to solve agricultural problems continued to be overrated. The production record of those farms – many of them the vast State Farms in Czechoslovakia and Poland in which the available machinery was largely concentrated – barely exceeds that of the non-mechanized farms. The official press has frequently complained about the inefficiency of Machine and Tractor Stations and the personnel assigned to them, but these complaints reached a particularly high pitch when the New Course directed official attention to agriculture. "We could have . . . better results in the field of farm machinery," the Polish planner, Jacob Berman, complained at the Ninth Party Plenum in October 1953. "Is it normal," he asked, "that of 6,000 engineers in the Ministry of Machine Industry, only 72 work in factories for agricultural machinery?"[31] Other Communists have complained of the number of idle tractors, the rapid turnover of personnel in the MTS, and the long delays caused by lack of adequate repair facilities.

241 These oft-repeated complaints and the slow pace of agricultural development itself reinforce the impression that Communist claims of extensive mechanization of farms are exaggerated. In Poland, for instance, less than 10 per cent of farming is mechanized.[32] In Czechoslovakia, the most advanced country in the region, agricultural work was mechanized, according to Premier Siroky, up to 28 per cent in 1951 and 30 per cent in 1952. These figures hardly square with those given by Siroky for individual components of mechanized operation: plowing, 20 per cent; sowing, 13 per cent; and tending of crops, 0.08 per cent. Siroky himself expressed great dissatisfaction with the progress of farm mechanization:

> Especially here in Czechoslovakia we had all the prerequisites for ensuring that Socialist industry would effectively contribute to the development of agricultural production, both in the State farms and cooperatives, and in the private sector. However, the aid on the

[31] *Trybuna Ludu*, (Warsaw) November 6, 1953.

[32] At the end of the Six Year Plan (1956) 18.8 per cent of Polish agriculture is to be mechanized (*Nowe Drogi*, July-August, 1950, p. 212). This is to include 80,000 tractors. Since by the end of 1953 approximately 40,000 tractors were in operation, it can be assumed that approximately half of the projected 18.8 per cent mechanization had been achieved, although it is probably much less.

part of the State and Socialist industry was, and remains, inadequate.[33] 24

Judging by this statement, various claims of rapid mechanization advanced by other East European countries must be taken with great scepticism. For example, the Bulgarian regime claimed "overall mechanization" in agriculture of 34.7 per cent in 1952. Actually, the available figures on surface plowed with tractors in 1947-49 reveal that it was 5.1 per cent in 1947, 6.4 per cent in 1948, and 8.3 per cent in 1949.[34] A leap in three years' time to 34.7 per cent "*over-all* mechanization," considering the pace between 1947 and

TABLE 24

COMPARISON OF GROWTH OF COLLECTIVIZED SECTOR WITH DEVELOPMENT OF TRACTOR PARK IN MTS *
(In percent)

Country	Percentage Increase in Land Collectivized	Percentage Increase in Tractors in MTS (15 Hp. units)
Hungary (Summer 1951 - Summer 1953)	218	40.7
Bulgaria (April 1950 - December 1953)	319	67
Romania (April 1951 - Summer 1953)	144	32
Poland (December 1950 - December 1952)	91.5	126

*H: Zoltan Vas, *Szikra*, 1951, p. 15; *Gazdasagpolitikai Tajekoztato*, January, 1952; *Szabad Nep*, March 18, 1954.

B: *News from Behind the Iron Curtain* (Free Europe Press; New York), March, 1954, p. 17; *Agitator's Handbook* (Sofia), No. 36.

R: *News from Behind the Iron Curtain* (Free Europe Press: New York), March, 1954, p. 10; *Viata Sindicala* (Bucharest), August 19, 1951; *Scanteia* (Bucharest), July 4, 1953.

P: *News from Behind the Iron Curtain* (Free Europe Press: New York), February, 1953, p. 17; *Trybuna Ludu* (Warsaw), January 18, 1951, January 29, 1953.

[33] *For a Lasting Peace*, (Bucharest), September 18, 1953.
[34] *Bulgaria Nouvelle* (Sofia), No. 22 (89), December 24, 1949.

241 1949, is hardly feasible. Analysis of similar claims advanced in other captive countries reveals similar discrepancies and exaggerations.

There are two areas of agricultural production which require special comment. In one the Communists have achieved a very modest success; in the other their failure has been conspicuous. In both instances the results shed light on the general character of Communist agrarian policy, for the success was in industrial crops, the failure in livestock.

231 Livestock production—both dairy products and meat—is rightly regarded as one of the basic indices of agricultural prosperity and health. This is so because the cost, in terms of grain produce siphoned off for fodder, is usually high, and only an economy which has a sufficiently high productivity level can afford it. In other words, the caloric value of a given quantity of meat is far lower than that of the grain used in producing it. Only those countries producing a sufficient grain surplus can therefore consider expanding the livestock population. In pre-war Eastern Europe, the general practice was to export surplus grain. On the other hand, a more richly endowed land such as Denmark converted its surplus grain into dairy products before exporting it, and thereby further enriched itself. In Communist Eastern Europe, where grain produc-

TABLE 25

NUMBER OF CATTLE IN EASTERN EUROPE*

Country	1938	1953	Percent of Pre-War
	(millions of head)		
Czechoslovakia	4.4	4.3	98
Poland	9.9	7.4	75
Hungary	2.3	1.8	78
Romania	3.5	3.5	100
Bulgaria	1.5	—**	—**
Yugoslavia	4.3	4.8	112

* All countries except Romania: *Economic Survey of Europe Since the War*, (Geneva, 1953). Romania: Gh. Gh-Dej, in *For a Lasting Peace*, August 28, 1953.

** No figures for Bulgaria are available. However, Chervenkov, speaking December 16, 1953, admitted that livestock were still below pre-war levels.

tion had hardly reached pre-war levels by 1951, and the demands 231
of the urban population were rapidly increasing, the possibilities of increased livestock production were small. Indeed, the fodder supply was below the level necessary for maintaining *existing* livestock population. Therefore (see Table 25), the number of cattle in Eastern Europe had not, by 1952, quite achieved the pre-war levels.

But livestock failure is not recorded merely in terms of quantity, but in quality as well. Czechoslovak Premier Siroky furnished an interesting comment on this point:

> In the sphere of animal husbandry we must proceed from the fact that of late the head of cattle has increased without a corresponding extension of the fodder base. Consequently, the head of cattle has grown to the detriment of the quality of the stock and its productivity. Without a serious extension of the fodder base it will be impossible to ensure improvement of the productivity of the stock which, from the point of view of supplying the people with high-grade meat and other high-grade products of animal husbandry, is a most urgent matter.[35]

One of the chief causes of livestock deterioration is the reliance of 231
East European regimes upon the increasingly impoverished non- 471
collectivized sector for most livestock produce. As Table 26 makes clear, in each country the livestock in the socialist sector is proportionately less than the amount of land "socialized." Moreover, the major portion of the stock in the collectivized sector is not collective property, but belongs to the peasant households. In Poland, for example, 71 per cent of the cattle, 75.5 per cent of the sheep, and 75.8 per cent of the hogs in the collectivized land belongs to private household plots.[36]

Thus while the "Socialist sector" concentrates upon marketing 241
grain and industrial crops, the private sector and the collectivized households emphasize livestock products. However, as the private sector has been deprived of credits and resources with which to purchase fodder and other necessities, the quality of the livestock has inevitably deteriorated. In spite of the introduction of new "zootechnical methods" on certain model farms, most livestock con-

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[35] *For a Lasting Peace*, September 18, 1953. Remarks of a very similar character cropped up in the August 22nd address of the Romanian Premier, Gheorghiu-Dej, and in the September 8th address of the Bulgarian Premier Chervenkov.
[36] *Ekonomista* (Warsaw), III, 1953, p. 48.

TABLE 27

AREA UNDER INDUSTRIAL CROPS 1949 - 1951/52*

(1000 hectares)

	1949						1951/52					
	C	P	H	R	B	Y	C	P	H	R	B	Y
Cotton	–	–	37	60	–	42	–	–	40	150	–	16
Flax	28	109	22	–	–	14	–	–	–	–	–	10
Hemp	5	13	28	–	–	108	–	19	–	–	–	59
Sugar beets	194	250	113	62	31	89	219	275	115	81	32	100
Tobacco	6	14	22	9	30	35	–	20	–	–	–	37

* Data from unpublished manuscript of Dr. Nicholas Spulber (Massachusetts Institute of Technology).

program. The question with respect to Eastern Europe is whether collectivization has provided the same agricultural cushion as it did for the USSR. Specifically, does the collectivized sector in the Satellites provide the State with a higher proportion of the total produce marketed per hectare than the private sector? As was shown, the capacity of the Soviet collectivized sector to produce for the market was its very reason for existence.

The evidence available from Eastern Europe is too scattered and unreliable to justify the type of definite conclusion drawn from the Soviet materials.[38] However, on the basis of an examination of each country in Eastern Europe, some tentative conclusions can be reached.

Throughout the following comparison of the "Socialist" and private sectors, the variety of advantages which the "Socialist sector" enjoys should be kept in mind. First, on the whole the "Socialist sector" comprises better and more fertile land. It is composed of larger farms, capable of supporting more people. In particular, State Farms are frequently, though not always, located on the prosperous lands once belonging to nobles, aristocrats, or German landholders. Second, the "Socialist sector" has at its dis-

[38] The transformation of statistics from an objective science into an arm of State propaganda occurred in the USSR in 1930-31, but several years were necessary for the completion of the task. As a result, there is a great deal more information available concerning the first and second Five Year Plans in the USSR than concerning the Satellite economic developments after 1947. The Satellite Communists, after all, borrowed their techniques of falsification when they had been thoroughly developed in the USSR.

423 posal most of the available farm machinery, either confiscated or
656 purchased after the Second World War and also what has since been manufactured. In Poland in 1951, for example, the "Socialist sector," comprising some 17 per cent of the arable land, had at its disposal 98 per cent of the nation's tractor supply.[39] In Bulgaria in 1948 the "Socialist sector," then comprising only eight per cent of the arable land, already had at its disposal 81 per cent of the tractors and threshing machines.[40] Third, the "Socialist sector" received a high portion of the meager State credits extended to the farm population for constructing new buildings, purchasing fertilizers, seed, and fodder. And fourth, the "Socialist sector" generally received more favorable trade terms from government agencies, and benefited from official tax and delivery quota discrimination against the private sector. The agricultural structure of each country will be analyzed in terms of the above-stated criteria.

BULGARIA

● 241 As everywhere, pertinent information is sparse and only sug-
475 gestive. The State Farms, occupying 2.5 per cent of the arable land,
423 market 1.5 per cent of the nation's grain crop. The "Socialist sector," occupying 52.0 per cent of the arable land, markets 65 per cent of the grain; and the private farms, composing 45.5 per cent of the arable land, market 33.5 per cent of the grain crop.[41] In the light of the aforementioned advantages accruing to the "Socialist sector," and considering the fact that in Bulgaria the "Socialist sector" is concentrated in the fertile valleys (See Chart IX), this division is not altogether surprising. The proportion of marketed grain derived from the "Socialist sector" is greater than its arable land, and almost as much greater as that which the USSR achieved when approximately half of its arable land was collectivized.[42] It should be noted, however, that, as in the USSR, the modest success of the "Socialist sector" as a grain producer was achieved at the cost of neglecting animal husbandry, since a high percentage of the nation's livestock remained in the private sector. But if the "Socialist sector" neglected animal husbandry, it emphasized a few semi-

[39] *Wieś w Liczbach* (Warsaw, 1951), p. 25.

[40] *Pari i Kredit* (Sofia), No. 2, 1948, p. 8.

[41] *Rabotnichesko Delo*, (Sofia) February 26, 1953.

[42] In the Soviet Union in 1932, 66 per cent of the arable land was in the "Socialist sector"; and it supplied 84 per cent of the marketed grain. (Maurice Dobb, *Soviet Economic Development Since 1917*, New York, 1948, p. 249).

industrial crops. In 1953, 75 per cent of the nation's cotton and 84 per cent of its sugar beets were produced in the "Socialist sector."[43] 241 475 423

Poland

Communist authorities in Poland have frequently asserted the superior productivity of the "Socialist sector" of agriculture. But since the claims so frequently contradict each other and contradict general claims concerning the productive capacity of the entire sector, they must be treated cautiously. For example, although the Communists have, at various times, claimed from 15 to 20 per cent greater yield per hectare for collective farms, they do not claim a higher proportionate yield for the sector as a whole.[44]

On the central question of the deliveries made by the two sectors, statistics are equally uncertain. In the year 1950, the Communists seemed confident of the superior capacity of the "Socialist sector" to market its grain. The statistics in Table 28 seem to bear out this confidence.

TABLE 28

PROPORTION OF GRAIN MARKETED IN POLAND IN 1950*

	Winter Wheat	Spring Wheat	Rye
Production Cooperatives	67.0	49.0	31.4
Private Farms	34.3	34.3	28.7

* *Wieś w Liczbach* (Warsaw, 1952), p. 132.

And in 1951 the regime claimed that the "Socialist sector," comprising only 15 per cent of the land, accounted for 23.2 per cent of the marketed grain, while the private sector, comprising 85 per cent of the land, accounted for only 76.8 per cent of the marketed grain. According to these reports, both State Farms and collectives contributed far more than their proportionate share to the market.[45]

However, there is reason to doubt the validity of these statistics. The marketing report in 1953 shows the "Socialist sector" in a

[43] *Zemedelsko Zname* (Sofia), December 2, 1953.
[44] For example, according to *Wieś w Liczbach* (1952), the productive cooperatives have an approximately 20 per cent higher yield than the individual holdings. But other regime statistics indicate that the total produce of the productive cooperatives is no greater — per hectare — than the individual holdings.
[45] *Wieś w Liczbach* (1952).

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TABLE 29

PROPORTION OF GRAIN MARKETED IN POLAND BY SECTOR IN 1953*

Sector	Percent of Marketed Grain	Percent of Arable Land
State Farms	17.0	11.9
Production Cooperatives	6.5	6.5
Small Peasants	7.5	11.5
Middle Peasants	50.0	59.0
Kulaks	19.0	11.1
	100.0	100.0

* *Trybuna Ludu* (Warsaw), December 31, 1953.

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much less flattering light (see Table 29). However, even in 1953 the "Socialist sector" contributed more than its share to the market, and thus economically justified itself. Holding 18.4 per cent of the arable land, the "Socialist sector" contributed 23.5 per cent of the marketed grain. It should be noted, however, that the superiority was confined solely to State Farms. The collective farms, which comprised six per cent of the countryside, marketed no more than six per cent of the total grain.

The important role the State Farms play is made clear in Table 30, where it is demonstrated that, despite the low productivity per hectare, the State Farms outdid others in marketed production.

TABLE 30

PRODUCTION AND MARKETING OF POLISH STATE FARMS 1949 – 1952*

	1949	1950	1951	1952 *(Planned)*
Percent of Total Production (in current prices)	5.4	6.1	7.5	9.6
Percent of Total Marketing	—	6.8	10.5	15.1

* *Wieś w Liczbach*, (Warsaw, 1952), p. 116.

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CHAPTER III

SCARCITY OF CAPITAL

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Problems of Agricultural Development

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AN EXAMINATION of the economic situation of the countries of Eastern and South-Eastern Europe will make it obvious that no redistribution of the national income and wealth will by itself radically improve the condition of the people. For example, if the total agricultural land of the countries (and not, as has been the case, merely the large estates) were distributed equally among the peasants ('Black Distribution' in the phrase of the Russian revolutionaries under the Tsar), the main result would be the equalisation of poverty. As long as the majority of the people are engaged in agriculture and the producivity of labour in agriculture is as low as it is today, no real improvement of their condition is possible.

The level of output of agriculture per head of the agricultural population in Eastern Europe is very low, as can be illustrated by comparing it with other regions. It is, of course, difficult to compare the agricultural productivity of different countries, which produce various products in differing proportions. Fortunately Wilbert E. Moore has undertaken an important statistical work, attempting to fulfil this task for different European countries (op. cit.). He weighs the quantities of agricultural goods produced according to a uniform set of value rations which he calls the Crop Unit (C.U.). For the years 1931-5 on the average, the results were as follows (see top of page 45) (the index calculation has been made from Moore's absolute figures).

Although there are differences in the productivity of agriculture as between the different countries of Eastern Europe, there is a much greater *inequality* between Western Europe as a whole and Eastern Europe as a whole, the latter's productivity being 4-5 times lower than the former's.

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AGRICULTURAL PRODUCTION PER PERSON DEPENDENT ON AGRICULTURE AND PER MALE ENGAGED IN AGRICULTURE

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	Per Person Dependent on Agriculture		*Per Male Engaged in Agriculture*	
	Crop Units	*Index* Denmark = 100	*Crop Units*	*Index* Denmark = 100
Denmark	152	100	411	100
England and Wales	137	90	306	74
Netherlands ..	114	75	302	73
Switzerland	84	55	213	52
Belgium	95	62	230	56
France	75	49	204	50
Germany	84	55	244	59
Czechoslovakia ..	45	30	146	36
Hungary	33	22	96	23
Poland	21	14	72	17
Rumania	21	14	67	16
Bulgaria	20	13	70	17
Yugoslavia ..	17	11	55	13
Albania	10	7	32	8

(p. 35).

The large extent to which this is the *direct* result of the greater density of the agricultural population in Eastern than Western Europe becomes clear if the number of hectares of agricultural land per person dependent on agriculture in the different countries is compared. Taking the number in Denmark as 100, the comparative figures are:

Denmark	100	Czechoslovakia ..	54
England and Wales ..	112	Hungary	59
Netherlands	47	Poland	44
Switzerland	35	Rumania	46
Belgium	57	Bulgaria	20
France	108	Yugoslavia	37
Germany	71	Albania	22

It is clear that there is no exact correlation between countries arranged according to productivity per person dependent on agriculture and according to the quantity of agricultural land per person dependent on agriculture. But that there is a certain correlation can be seen by comparing the countries of Western Europe as a group and the countries of Eastern Europe as a group. In the first group there is twice as much agricultural land per person dependent on agriculture as in the second.

The great density of the agricultural population in Eastern Europe compared with Western Europe goes some way to explaining the low productivity per head of the agricultural population in the former compared with the latter. There is another factor that must be mentioned if the explanation is to be complete, namely, that the agricultural output per unit of

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241 511 433 area is much smaller in Eastern Europe than in Western Europe. This is shown clearly in the following table:

AGRICULTURAL PRODUCTION PER HECTARE OF AGRICULTURAL LAND

	Crop Units	Index		Crop Units	Index
Denmark	57	100	Czechoslovakia	31	54
England and Wales	46	81	Hungary ..	21	37
Netherlands ..	91	160	Bulgaria ..	19	33
Switzerland ..	89	156	Poland	18	32
Belgium	63	111	Rumania ..	17	30
France	26	46	Yugoslavia ..	17	30
Germany	44	79	Albania ..	17	30

If the agricultural population of Eastern Europe is to have the same quantity of agricultural products per head as in Western Europe, not only must half of them be removed, but the agricultural output must be doubled.

[134] The low productivity in Eastern Europe is not the result of infertility of the soil. On the contrary, the soil of Eastern Europe, and especially the excellent black soil of the Danube Plain, is on the whole much richer than the naturally poor soil of Western Europe. The low productivity is due to three main causes, the scarcity of livestock, the scanty use of fertilizers and the lack of agricultural implements and machinery.

LIVESTOCK DENSITY (1938)

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	Cattle per 100 ha. Agricultural Area	Pigs per 100 ha. Arable Land
Czechoslovakia ..	59.1	65.3
Hungary	24.9	55.3
Poland	41.3	40.6
Rumania	23.5	23.5
Bulgaria	41.0	22.1
Yugoslavia	29.8	46.0
Germany	69.8	122.5
France	45.2	34.4
Denmark	103.1	106.1

(PEP—Political and Economic Planning-*Economic Development in S.E. Europe*, 1945, p. 34).

In this table the figures for the countries of Eastern Europe include a large number of oxen and buffaloes which are used mainly as draught animals. In the quality of its livestock Eastern Europe compares even more unfavourably with Western Europe than in the quantity.

407 241 On the question of agricultural implements and machinery, the PEP study states :

'The value of all agricultural equipment used per hectare of arable land was estimated by a Roumanian source at Lei 1,000

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(about £1) for Roumania, Lei 2,000 for Bulgaria, Lei 3,000 for 407
Poland; as against Lei 15,000 for Germany and Lei 42,000 for 241
Switzerland. So far as mechanical equipment is concerned, the disparity was even greater. According to a German source, taking the mechancial equipment per hectare of farm land (in terms of weight) as 100 for Germany, the figure for Bulgaria would be 14, for Yugoslavia 5, for Roumania 3.' (Ibid. p. 32).

A comparison of the extent to which fertilizers are used is 241
equally unfavourable, as can be seen from the following table :

USE OF ARTIFICIAL FERTILIZERS, 1930-1940
(KILOS PER HECTARE OF ARABLE LAND)

	Nitrates	*Phosphates*	*Potash*
Czechoslovakia ..	4.4	8.9	5.0
Poland	1.1	2.3	1.4
Hungary	0.1	0.9	0.1
Yugoslavia ..	0.1	0.4	0.1
Roumania ..	0.02	0.06	0.01
Bulgaria	0.01	0.00	0.00
Germany	18.0	21.4	31.3
France	7.0	17.6	8.7
Denmark	10.7	24.1	7.9

(Ibid. p. 31)

There are a number of other factors which influence the 511
welfare of the agricultural population. The Eastern European 435
peasants suffered from the bad organisation of the marketing of their produce. Two examples will suffice. In Zürich 63 per cent of the retail price of milk went to the milk producer (the rest was divided between wholesale trade, retail and transport), and in Copenhagen 65 per cent; even in the United States where milk is delivered over very great distances the farmer got 46.8 per cent. As against this in Warsaw he got only 30 per cent, and in Belgrade 37.5 per cent (Ibid. pp. 94-5). The Survey of the Royal Institute of International Affairs, *World Agriculture* (1932), tells of a typical Rumanian barley farm, from which barley to the value of Lei 1,006 was sold. But the middlemen's profits and transport charges before the grain left Rumania amounted to Lei 1,202 (p.106).

The high prices of essential industrial goods further militated against the prosperity of the peasants.

The expensiveness of industrial compared with agricultural products in the period before the second world war is revealed by the following index figures of the variation of agricultural and industrial prices in Hungary (July figures):

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to supervise the labour power in the countryside, and, if the wages in the towns are not high enough to attract people from the countryside, they will be drawn there by the mechanisation of agriculture and the elimination of superfluous mouths in the 'collective farms'. Further, if capital construction is being undertaken, which demands very little skill and can be done by a large number of workers with very little or no machinery (for the bureaucracy likes to 'waste' as little of the expensive machinary needed for industrialisation and militarisation as possible) the 'collective farms' can provide an ample supply of this cheap labour from the 'kulaks,' i.e. all who dare to show any resistance to the bureaucracy. As yet it is scarcely possible to prove from experience that this will be the fate of agriculture in the satellites, because the process is only in its early stages. That this is the tendency, however, is clear enough, from the developments so far and from the history of agriculture in Russia since 1928.

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The Example of 'Collectivisation' in Russia

The influence of the collectivisation of agriculture on the agricultural output in Russia is clear from the following table:

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Year	*Sown Area*			*Gross Output of Grain*	*Cattle*
	Total	*Grain*	*Technical Crops*		
	million hectares			million centners	million heads
1928	113.0	92.2	8.6	733.2	70.5
1929 ..	118.0	95.9	8.8	717.4	67.1
1930	127.2	101.8	10.5	835.4	53.9
1931	136.3	104.4	14.0	694.8	47.9
1932	134.4	99.7	14.9	698.7	40.7
1933	129.7	101.6	11.9	808.2	38.4
1934	131.4	104.7	10.7	804.6	42.4
1935	132.8	103.4	10.6	810.9	49.2
1936	133.8	102.4	10.8	744.6	56.7
1937	135.3	104.4	11.2	1,082.6	57.0
1938	136.9	102.4	11.0	854.9	63.2

(S. N. Prokopovicz, *Russlands Volkswirtschaft unter der Sowjets*, Zurich, 1944, p. 133).

This shows that, ten years after the drive towards 'collectivisation' began, the number of cattle was 10 per cent lower than before, while gross grain output was 16 per cent higher. The main reason for the rise was the cultivation of new steppe lands which required agricultural machinery. The total

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423 sown area rose by 21 per cent and the grain area by 11 per
474 cent.

● 241 That the productivity of labour in Russian agriculture, despite the mechanisation, was not higher in 1931-5 than in the countries of Eastern Europe is confirmed by the following calculation made by W. E. Moore:

AGRICULTURAL PRODUCTION PER PERSON DEPENDENT ON AGRICULTURE AND PER MALE ENGAGED IN AGRICULTURE, 1931-5 AVERAGE

	Per Person Dependent on Agriculture Crop Units	*Per Male Engaged in Agriculture* Crop Units
Czechoslovakia	45	146
Hungary	33	96
Poland	21	72
Rumania	21	67
Bulgaria	20	70
Yugoslavia	17	55
Albania	10	32
U.S.S.R.	17	53

(op. cit. p. 35)

Even if the improvement in Russian agricultural production after 1931-5 is taken into account, it is clear that her output per male engaged in agriculture was not more than that of Rumania, Bulgaria or Poland, and must have been far short of that of Hungary or Czechoslovakia.

Does this mean that the rulers of Russia failed to achieve what they aimed at by 'collectivisation'? This question can be answered by examining the proportion of the agricultural output taken by the state in the form of obligatory deliveries:

Year	*Total Yield*		*Obligatory Deliveries*			*Retained by Agriculturists after obligatory deliveries*	
			Quantity	*% of Total*	*% of Total*		
	gross	net*	million centners	gross	net	million centners	Index
1927/8	728.0	605.9	112.2	15.4	18.5	493.7	100
1932/3	698.7	570.1	185.2	26.5	32.5	384.9	77.9
1933/4	808.2	677.1	228.7	28.3	33.8	448.4	90.8
1934/5	804.6	669.5	226.6	28.1	33.8	442.9	89.7
1935/6	810.9	677.5	249.3	30.7	36.8	428.2	86.7
1936/7	744.6	612.5	260.0	34.9	42.4	352.5	71.4

*After deduction of seeds from gross yield.
(Prokopovicz, op. cit. pp. 136, 138).

From 1927/8 to 1936/7 these obligatory deliveries taken by the state from agriculture increased from 112.2 million centners to 260 million (i.e., by 131.8 per cent) and the proportion in the gross yield of agriculture which they represented from

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15.4 per cent to 34.9 per cent, and of the net yield from 18.5 per cent to 42.4 per cent. 423 474

The obligatory deliveries are virtually direct taxes, as the prices paid by the government for the products delivered is only a small percentage (not even 5 per cent) of the price which the government charges the consumer. 241

It is interesting to note that Lenin writes in his book, *The Agrarian Question in Russia at the End of the Nineteenth Century* (1908): 'The horseless and one-horse peasants (i.e., the very poor peasants—Y.G.) pay in the form of taxes *one-seventh and one-tenth* respectively of their *gross* expenditure. It is doubtful whether serf dues were as high as that . . . ' The agricultural toilers in the 'Socialist Fatherland' pay much more than that!* [651]

Collectivisation not only transformed into proletarians those who came into industry, but also those who remained in agriculture. The overwhelming majority of agriculturists are in reality, if not in theory, people who do not own any of the means of production: they are compelled to work an ever-increasing number of days on the kolkhozes for very low payment, below even that of the unskilled worker in the towns. The constant rise in the number of days that every household works in the kolkhoz compared with the quantity of grain per household remaining to it after the obligatory deliveries is shown in the following table : [461]

Year	*Average Number of 'Labour Days'† per Household*		*Grain Retained per Household after Obligatory Deliveries*	
	Number	*Index*	*Centners*	*Index*
1932 ..	257	100	15.8	100
1933 ..	315	122.5	19.3	122.1
1934 ..	354	133.4	20.1	127.2
1935 ..	378	147.1	20.5	129.7
1936 ..	393	152.8	17.3	109.5

†A 'Labour Day' is equivalent to the physical labour day of an unskilled kolkhoznik. The physical labour day of a skilled worker is equivalent to two, three or more 'Labour Days'.

(*Prokopowicz*, op. cit. pp. 136, 138, 164).

*Although the total quantity of products retained by the agriculturists in 1936/7 was lower than in 1927/8 (352.5 million centners and 493.7 million centners respectively) the quantity per household did not decline, and per capita of the agricultural population even rose. This happened because the number of households declined from 25.0 million in 1927/8 to 20.4 million in 1936/7, i.e., by 24 per cent, and the agricultural population decreased from 122.4 million to 78.6 million, i.e., a decline of 35.8 per cent. The fact that the per capita quantity of agricultural products retained by the peasants after making obligatory deliveries rose, does not mean that the conditions of the majority of agriculturists improved, because it was distributed more unevenly to the disadvantage of the masses. This cannot be dealt with here.

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461 To add to the difficulties of the poor agriculturists, not every-
● 241 one has to give the same number of labour days. The higher
423 strata of kolkhozniki give far fewer labour days than the poor
474 kolkhozniki. The reward for their labours, however, is in inverse proportion to the time contributed.

There is less justification in calling the Russian agriculturists of today owners of the means of production than the serfs of the nineteenth century.

Miss D. Warriner in 1940 noted as regards the productivity of Russian agriculture: 'Russia both before and after collectivisation had a lower productivity than Eastern Europe . . . Russian collectivisation has not really achieved much increase in productivity through reforming the peasant system. Yields are still lower in Russia than in every part of Eastern Europe, cattle density is still much lower . . . ' (*Eastern Europe after Hitler*, London, 1940, p. 4). In another place Miss Warriner writes: ' . . . the physical output per man in corn is slightly higher in Russia than in the very poorest regions of Eastern Europe, and the value in terms of industrial products certainly lower'.
511 (*Economics of Peasant Farming*, London, 1939, p. 188). As
423 regards the standard of living of the Russian agriculturists in
474 relation to those of Europe Miss Warriner says: 'As things are
241 at present, on the basis of purchasing power, the Russian farmer is certainly not so well off as the peasants in Poland'. 'On the Russian farms meat consumption must be much lower than in Poland, and milk consumption must be lower also'. (Ibid. pp. 188, 189).* To gain a rough idea of what the standard of living of the Polish peasant was before the war, we quote the following passage: The Polish peasants' 'poverty was proverbial. It was said that during the depression the peasant would split a match four or five times, and would boil potatoes over and over again in the same water to save the salt . . . According to the Polish Minister of Finance the average cash income of the peasant in 1934-5 was eleven groszy (about one penny) a day . . .' (Henryk Frankel, *Poland, The Struggle for Power 1772-1939*, London, 1946, p. 134).

Miss Warriner's analysis, based on Soviet statistics, conforms

*It is regrettable that Miss Warriner in her new book *Revolution in Eastern Europe* (London, 1950) in the chapter 'Collective Farming' overlooks what she herself wrote on the question of collectivisation in Russia in *Economics of Peasant Farming* and also in *Eastern Europe After Hitler*.

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with the conclusion Victor Serge reached from his direct [511]
contact with Russian toilers: 'The vast majority of the peasants 241
live more poorly than before the collectivisation, that is, on 423
the whole, at a level lower than pre-war' (i.e., pre-World War I) 474
(op. cit. p. 37).

The peasants did not gain anything out of the 'collectivisation', but that does not detract one iota from the success of 'collectivisation' from the standpoint of bureaucratic state capitalism.

Miss D. Warriner was quite right when she said of the results of 'collectivisation' in Russia: 'Apparently, then, most of the increase in output could have been achieved by extending the State farms in the sparsely settled and uncultivated regions, without collectivizing the peasant villages in the already settled parts; had there been no collectivization, then all the loss of capital through livestock slaughter would have been avoided and corn production in 1931 and 1932 would have been maintained'. (*Economics of Peasant Farming*, op. cit. p. 174). This is true. But then the state would not have got such a large part of the agricultural output for nothing!

The Satellites Follow in the Footsteps of Russia

Undoubtedly the circumstances in which the collectiviza- 423
tion of agriculture is being and will be carried out in the 474
satellites are to some extent different from those in which it was carried out in Russia. In part they will moderate its results, and in part will render them more severe. The moderating influence will be the lesson learnt from the experience of Russia, which will prevent the Communist Party from making similar mistakes in the satellites; namely, rushing through 'collectivisation' at a feverish pace, far outstripping the development of the necessary technical basis for large-scale farming, and then hastily retreating;* and secondly taking all the livestock—cows, sheep, poultry—away from the peasants and putting them into the kolkhozes, and then reversing their policy after half the livestock had already been slaughtered.

*In October, 1929, 4.1 per cent of all the peasants were included in kolkhozes. Five months later, on 10th March, 1930, 58.0 per cent were. There followed a hasty retreat, and in September of the same year only 21 per cent of the peasants were in kolkhozes. Only after this mismanagement did the tempo of collectivization begin to be less erratic, even though the compulsion to enter the kolkhozes remained very strict for the peasants.

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5 Land Reform and Agricultural Improvement

LADISLAV FEIERABEND

I

162 Eastern Europe was overwhelmingly peasant be-
167 tween the two world wars. The peasantry, for whom land
369 was not merely a means of production or of income, but the established basis of family life, formed the majority of the population. The main problem of this region was rural overpopulation. In the period before the First World War, the surplus young people emigrated in considerable numbers to the United States and to other overseas countries. After 1918 this outlet was closed, and everybody had to remain on his home soil. There was too little land for too many people: roughly twice as many people were living off the land as was the case in Western Europe.

423 Everybody wanted land and therefore the price was
241 enormously high. After money was spent to buy the land, there was not enough left to buy the numbers of cattle that the holding could support or to improve farming techniques. Lack of capital was responsible for the fact that farming methods remained the same as they had been for fifty or more years. The yields were very low, and there was no possibility of increasing them. In fact, yields decreased be-

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423 cause the land was becoming exhausted. This was due to a
● 241 lack of manure and fertilizer and to the peasants' ignorance of land preservation techniques.

[444] Labor remained so cheap that the introduction of labor-saving devices did not pay. Overpopulation meant that there were more people living on holdings than were needed for the farm work. This situation caused underemployment. Since overpopulation decreased the output per man and with it the earnings per man, a very low standard of living resulted.

423 The size of the farms, which on the average was barely
656 ten acres, was a problem in itself, and the custom of dividing
185 land after the death of a peasant made the situation even more acute. The holdings consisted of many small and scattered strips so that it was impossible for the peasant to use machines, even when they were available. However, the land reforms, carried out after the First World War by the different governments, did have some success in equalizing the amounts of land held by the different peasants.

The land reforms grew out of political and national considerations rather than out of social and economic policy. The first and main objective of the agrarian parties was to expropriate the big landowners and to transfer their land to the peasants. The usual procedure was to fix a maximum acreage, usually about five hundred acres, and to decree that all land in excess of this amount should be sold to peasants, either to create new farms or to add to the area of peasant farms already in existence. Under these reforms, about twenty-five million acres were distributed, for the most part in quite small plots, averaging one hectare, or 2.4 acres. The smaller farms were given more land than the large, so that there was some leveling of the incomes derived from farming.

162 These reforms did not remedy the unhappy condition of
464 the peasantry, since they were unable to remove the main
511 causes for distress. If all the agricultural land of this region

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conditions. Credit was no real help unless the peasant had 474
a reasonable expectation of being able to pay back what 452
he had borrowed. In many cases this hope was negligible. A large proportion of the money which the peasants, particularly the small peasants, borrowed went to buy consumer goods. Thus, greater indebtedness did not point to a higher degree of investment, but to the extreme poverty of the small farm.

There was some state help for this situation, especially 474
during the world-wide depression of the 1930's. In Bulgaria 452
and Rumania agricultural debts were converted by govern- 241
ment action. In 1934 some two hundred thousand Bulgarian 656
peasants benefited by reductions in their debts and in the rate of interest and by a prolongation of the time allowed for settlement. In Rumania some two and one-half million peasants were assisted by similar legislation. Other measures, although not so far-reaching, were put into practice elsewhere in Eastern Europe to alleviate peasant indebtedness. But the credit problem was only mitigated, and not solved. The peasants' need for cash remained, and the lack of capital still prevented them from improving their farming techniques or increasing their earning capacity.

The governments promoted intensive cultivation of non-cereals. Grain production was not appropriate to an overpopulated region, and a change to the production of livestock, livestock products, fruit, and vegetables was necessary. In Bulgaria and in some parts of Yugoslavia, intensive cultivation of garden crops, such as tobacco, tomatoes, wine, fruit, and roses was introduced. In Rumania, the cultivation of soya and other oil plants was introduced. These measures were, of course, just a beginning, and could not bring any substantial remedy.

Agriculture played the most important role of any single 241
factor in all the Eastern European countries except Czecho- 434
slovakia. The largest part of the national incomes was de-

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441 rived from agriculture. National prosperity was dependent
434 on the outcome of harvests and on the possibility of agricultural exports.

439 In the interwar period, these countries were victims of the fluctuations of the world market and of the policy of autarky which resulted from them. The countries of Western Europe from 1930 to 1932 imposed high tariffs on food imports in order to ward off the effects of the international slump in agriculture. In doing so, they ruined the Eastern European peasant. Export of agricultural products from all Eastern European countries was reduced to a minimum and prevented these countries from balancing their trade. Thus, it was impossible for them to buy the industrial goods and manufactures on which they depended to maintain industrial employment and the standard of living of the peasants themselves.

This crisis further reduced the possibilities of export because the Eastern European states were unable to compete in prices with the overseas agricultural exporting countries that had technical aid at their disposal and because they could not afford the enormous sums necessary for subsidizing exports of agricultural products. Many attempts were made by agrarian conferences to alleviate the distress by asking a preferential tariff system for this region, which would have meant the almost complete abolition of the most-favored-nation clause in bilateral commercial agreements. Another remedy was seen in the creation of an interstate grain purchasing commission that would buy up the chief surpluses from the Eastern European countries and distribute them among the different European importing countries. These proposed methods arose from the primary need of Eastern Europe, which was to acquire some form of economic security in the world market in order to provide a stable basis for peasant society.

Everything was in vain. It was impossible to achieve

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Russian *kulak*. The village rich are not allowed to enter a collective or are expelled if they become members. A merciless battle is being waged to ruin them. They are being liquidated as peasants, removed from villages, and sent to mines or to industry or concentration camps. There are roughly thirteen million peasant families in Eastern Europe, more than one million of which are *kulaks*. The children of all these families must lose the individualistic traits of their peasant heritage: that is the Communist aim. 474 661 565

Large-scale industrialization plans, for military purposes rather than for consumer production, are being pushed forward with great vigor in all Eastern European states and new labor is required in great numbers. *Kulaks* and other class enemies are an obvious source for this labor. By tapping this source, the surplus agricultural population will be disposed of and the people with individualist outlook gradually destroyed. If there is a shortage of workers in agriculture, as for instance in Czechoslovakia now, industrial workers already persuaded to the collective way of thinking can be utilized. 433

The term *kulak* has come to mean anyone who is against collectivization, and all *kulaks* are to be destroyed. The process of destruction is quickly changing the status of the agrarian population in this region. The agricultural population is decreasing and, according to estimate, does not amount today to more than 45 per cent of the total population. This decrease is the political consequence of collectivization and not its economic or social result. The collectivization policy itself cannot solve the old problem of rural overpopulation but can only aggravate it. The real aim of Communist collectivization is not to solve this problem but rather to destroy the peasantry. 661

Agriculture, like the other divisions of economic life, has been dictated by state plans which prescribe to the peasant what crops are to be grown and what animals are to be bred. 241 185

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241 The peasants do not like regimentation and therefore the
185 Communist economic plans have not brought about any increase in agricultural production.

208 The collectivization policy has further aggravated the situation. The peasants hate even the word "collective." They go about their work with indifference or with fear and hatred. Their aversion to coercion, dictatorship, and controls, their attachment to their land, and their pride in independence, have neutralized all the advantages of large-scale production with its mechanization and its use of modern agricultural methods. The Communist belief that large-scale operation would bring about efficient agricultural production has not materialized.

262 Agricultural production is decreasing. Eastern Europe
433 used to be a very large exporter of all agricultural products,
241 but it is suffering from shortages today. Food is scarce in these agricultural countries. Before the Second World War, nine out of ten residents of Czechoslovakia were nourished by the produce of Czechoslovakian agriculture. There were no rations. Everybody could buy what he wanted, and the standard of living in Czechoslovakia was the highest in Eastern Europe. Today, according to official Communist pronouncements, every second man in Czechoslovakia, despite strict rationing, has to be supplied from abroad. Milk, butter, and eggs are not distributed to adults at all, and even sugar is in short supply. Czechoslovakia, once the largest exporter of beet sugar in Europe, today cannot provide its diminished population with sugar although it has nearly 15 per cent fewer inhabitants than before 1938 due to the expulsion of the Germans. Bulgaria and Hungary, which had great surpluses of all agricultural products before the last war, must now import foodstuffs for their starving populations. Agricultural production in Eastern Europe has not yet attained the prewar level, although the free farms of Western Europe have surpassed it considerably.

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Because of this situation, the different peoples of this region turn three different masks to the world. One is always turned toward the West, one toward the East, and one is used for the stage show that these peoples put on for each other. If a nation of Eastern Europe takes off its mask, it may disappear from the stage forever. This is an important point to keep in mind in trying to understand the evolution of these countries. 101 178

Another important factor in the history of this region is that all the important ideologies and social revolutions have moved from West to East. Nationalism and the abolition of serfdom reached Eastern Europe in the nineteenth century. Industrialization advanced eastward at the end of the nineteenth century and during the first half of the twentieth. The closer a state was connected with the West, the sooner its transformation took place, while the other states were forced to develop in a comparatively short time in order to maintain their status as equals.

I

As a result of the Treaty of Versailles, everything changed in this area of constant change—boundaries, minorities, administrations, politics, and economics. In spite of these changes, and this is most important, the Eastern European countries remained predominantly agricultural. 178 162 241

The proportions of populations dependent upon agriculture in the several states within a decade after gaining full independence were as follows: Albania, 80 per cent; Bulgaria, 75 per cent; Rumania, 72 per cent; Yugoslavia, 76 per cent; Poland, 60 per cent; Hungary, 51 per cent; and Czechoslovakia 33 per cent. In contrast to these figures, the percentages of gainfully occupied males in industry in the same period were: Bulgaria, 13 per cent; Rumania, 11 per cent; Yugoslavia, 14 per cent; Poland, 22 per cent; Hungary, 26

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178 per cent; and Czechoslovakia, 41 per cent. Thus it can be
162 easily seen that, with the exception of Czechoslovakia whose
• 241 industry was the most developed in the region, the countries of Eastern Europe were predominantly agricultural and peasant in nature. Yet despite the predominantly peasant character of these countries, the peasants as such had relatively little political influence.

178 Although there was an increase in the output of agricul-
241 tural goods in all these countries between 1918 and 1945,
511 the competition offered by overseas cereals strongly affected the agriculture of Eastern Europe. Cereals, one of the major products of the region, had to be undersold to Germany. Added to this unfortunate situation, the world depression of 1929 came as a terrible blow to the economy of Eastern Europe, the most disastrous years lasting from 1931 until 1934. Industry, with its frequent cartels, was better able to defend itself than was agriculture, and thus the "price scissors," or the disparity between agricultural and industrial prices, cut mostly into the income of the agricultural population. This resulted in a general lowering of both the purchasing power and the standard of living. Loans at high rates of interest were frequent and taxation increased the poverty of the peasants. These, as the major element of the population, pressed heavily for reforms and spread malcontent in their respective countries.

185 Soon after the First World War, some states realized that
167 the solution to this situation was industrialization. Emigra-
433 tion, as a possible solution, was not favored in any of the Eastern European states as it would have decreased manpower. Since war was considered more or less imminent after 1933, military and industrial groups were especially opposed to any large-scale loss of population, although emigration was never prohibited by actual government order.

185 Bohemia, which had been in a highly advantageous posi-
433 tion in the industrialization program of Austria before the

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642 have been made to the peasants, state cooperatives are still maintained in the heavy grain producing areas by forces other than the peasants' love of the soil and its products.

If the Yugoslav government will learn the meaning of Lord Acton's axiom on the nature of power, and if the West pursues an intelligent, long-range foreign policy supporting Yugoslavia against Soviet aggression, it may be possible to revive in Yugoslavia and hence in the Balkans as a whole the elements of an independent political life.

V

000 The months following the death of Premier Stalin in March 1953, saw a number of internal changes in the various people's democracies. The principal means of coercion and political control nevertheless remained unchanged: the army and the police forces. These were still bound tightly to Russian controls.

177, 70 701 625 The total number of men in the satellite armies available for service with the Soviet army has been estimated at a million and one-half. Since they are not only trained under Soviet commanders, but operate under the Soviet military code, it is possible to state that the Sovietization of the satellite armies has been completed. Together with the armies, the satellite police form the backbone of the Soviet instruments of coercion. Estimated at a total of 700,000 men, police units organized in military formations range in function from the well-known secret police to People's Militia, Frontier Guards, and Railway Guards. Like the satellite armies, the satellite police are governed by Soviet regulations. Together they enforce a system of order which has been designed to conform with the Soviet model.

• 241 656 In common with Yugoslavia, certain states in the orbit are strengthening the weakest sector of the economy: agriculture. It is not certain that the Yugoslav experience compelled the

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changes in agricultural policy in the people's democracies. 241 ●
The only causal factor common to both areas is a very prac- 656
tical one: agricultural production has not been in a position to supply the needs of the growing industrial population. The socialist objective of complete nationalization of agriculture has nevertheless not been retracted or withdrawn. On the contrary, the satellites are acting within the orthodox pattern of Soviet experience.

In the economic sphere, the orbit is passing through a 185
period comparable to the Russian New Economic Policy. In the words of Stalin this is a "special policy of the proletarian state counting on the tolerations of capitalist elements, the commanding heights being in the hands of the proletarian state. . . .", in short a policy which aims "at overcoming capitalist elements and building a socialist economy by the method of a direct exchange of products. . . ." As if the Soviet experience itself did not suffice as a guide, there is the advice of Stalin on the proper agricultural policy required to prepare the transition to communism: continued development of the country's industrial resources, the gradual adjustment of collective farming to the nationalized sector of the economy, and the raising of the standards of living and culture. All these the satellite states are in the process of attempting to accomplish. There may be compromises in the short run, but there will be no compromise regarding the ultimate objective—the complete socialization of agriculture.

Changes in agricultural policy are particularly marked in those countries which have been heretofore heavily agricultural: Yugoslavia, Hungary, Albania, and Bulgaria. The restiveness of the population arising from the social and economic consequences of enforced industrialization made these changes necessary. The changes are short-run changes. While budgets for agricultural development will be increased, prices lowered for industrial goods and increased for farm products, establishment of producer cooperatives delayed,

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tion mentioned above estimated the occupation costs at 12 per cent of the national income of Hungary, making with reparations a total of 30 per cent. Now that the Russian Army has been very much reduced and production has passed the pre-war level, the importance of reparations, acquisitions, etc., in the national income has very much declined. According to T. Mende, who was not unsympathetic to the post-war regime in Hungary, they amounted to 7-11 per cent of the national income (*Fortnightly Review*, July, 1948). When Ernö Gerö, the Minister of Finance, introduced the budget for 1949 in the Hungarian parliament on December 15th, 1948, he said that in 1948, 25.4 per cent of the total expenditure went to pay the reparations, while in 1949, 9.8 per cent of the budget would be allocated for this purpose. This reduction is due largely to the fact that Russia cancelled 50 per cent of the remainder of the reparations from July, 1948.

648 728 434

The value of dismantled machinery, locomotives, wagons, etc., taken by the Russian army in Hungary was estimated at 124 million dollars, and the requisitions of the Russian army that lived on the country were very great. According to the American note of 23rd July, 1946, the Soviet forces had up to June, 1945, taken out of Hungary four million tons of wheat, rye, barley, maize and oats (the total pre-war annual production of these grains was a little over 7 million tons). Of the foodstuffs available for the urban population in the second half of 1945 the Soviet army had appropriated nearly all the meat, one-sixth of the wheat and rye, one-quarter of the legumes, nearly three-quarters of the lard, a tenth of the vegetable oils and a fifth of the milk and dairy products. The note added that extensive requisitioning of food was going on as late as April, 1946. And we must not forget that at the same time the food shortage in Hungary was so serious that not more than 850 calories a day per person were provided, which was even fewer than in Germany and Austria. The death rate, especially among babies, reached alarming proportions.

648 728 [262]

Even countries which were not allies of Germany during the war did not escape the Russian appetite for loot. 60 big industrial enterprises in the Sudeten region and a number of enterprises in other parts of Czechoslovakia were dismantled by the Russian army. In the part of Germany annexed to

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member of the Government, it was learned today. Rumania could not afford to lose the services of merchants and industrialists, M. Pătrăscanu said. He expressed the opinion that the country would pursue a more liberal policy toward this class than the French have.' What an outcry there would have been in the Communist press if a similar announcement had been made by a non-Communist Minister in the West! 642 661

Tătărescu did not hestitate to attack 'anarchists' (i.e., workers). In an interview with *The New York Times* correspondent in Bucharest on 21st October, 1945, he declared that a strenuous discipline must be introduced in industry and an end brought to the 'excesses' of the workers' committees.

It was hardly surprising that the capitalists faced the future with perhaps a little anxiety even if they were satisfied with the existing state of affairs. There was great optimism among businessmen, as the serious Swiss paper *Neue Zürcher Zeitung* pointed out (10th February, 1947) giving this illustration: 'As the Bucharest economic journal *Finantze si Industrie* reports, in the last year (1946—Y.G.) in Rumania there were established 355 new stock companies with a total capital of 20.3 milliard Lei.'

For years business continued to be good and speculation in the free market active, although the conditions of the working people were appalling and, after the drought of 1946-7, starvation stared them in the face. Some idea of the conditions of the people at this time can be got from '*A Survey of the Health of the People in Several European Countries affected by the War* published on November 19th, 1948, by *La Documentation Francaise* and consisting of reports of the International Committee of the Red Cross which describes the dreadful tragedy which overtook Rumania, the country most affected by the drought: 'It is difficult to convey the misery of the Rumanian population in 1947: famine prevailed in whole sections of the country, in some regions people were eating grass and the bark of trees and even clay. It is estimated that 6,000,000 persons were dependent on the government in 1947-48. Here are some of the consequences of the famine and misery which prevailed in this country: 1. The complete disappearance of little children in some districts . . . infant mortality actually reached a rate of 80% . . . 2. An increase of 511 262 165

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511 all kinds of diseases and a steep rise of the mortality rate;
262 corpses were thrown into sewers adjacent to the houses.
165 3. Universal poverty conducive to the spread of venereal diseases . . . one out of twelve persons is syphilitic according to recent reports furnished by the Minister of Health . . . '

All this time the fortunes of the capitalists were not touched as they were working for reparations for Russia. They and the new state bureaucracy flourished, while the lion's share of the surplus value produced in Rumania was taken, of course, by the Kremlin.*

642 The bureaucratic and militarist character of the Rumanian
693 state was not altered and many of the former officials remained in office. Of the legal system, Pătrăşcaru could say: 'The
645 procedures, methods, traditions and structure of Rumanian jurisprudence have remained unchanged since a Communist became Minister of Justice. No more than 20 new judges out of 2,000 have been appointed. About a quarter of the old staff have been purged or pensioned'. (*Christian Science Monitor*, 12th December, 1945). This policy is symbolised by the fact that 'Just two weeks before the start of the trial of Iuliu Maniu . . . a discreet announcement was published in Bucharest newspapers recording the appointment of a new chief of the military tribunal of the second army corps district (the one to preside over Maniu's trial—Y.G.) . . . the wartime director general of all prisons and concentration camps in Rumania'. (*New York Herald Tribune*, 7th November, 1947).

701 The structure of the army remained hierarchical, with the
645 complete subordination of the soldiers to their officers, and with no soldiers' committees. For three years even the composition of its personnel showed a marked continuity with the past. For instance, Lieutenant-Colonel Nicolae Cambrea, commander of the Rumanian units fighting against Russia at Stalingrad, was promoted by the Groza government to the rank of General, and appointed Assistant Chief of Staff. Major Popescu-Argetoia, an active Fascist in the past, was put at the head of the secret police. General Vasiliu Rascanu, Chief of Military Police during the war against Russia, was appointed Minister of War. Another old general, Pretorian, was appointed Chief of Staff at the same time. General Lascar,

*See above pp.

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241 The peasants do not like regimentation and therefore the
185 Communist economic plans have not brought about any increase in agricultural production.

208 The collectivization policy has further aggravated the situation. The peasants hate even the word "collective." They go about their work with indifference or with fear and hatred. Their aversion to coercion, dictatorship, and controls, their attachment to their land, and their pride in independence, have neutralized all the advantages of large-scale production with its mechanization and its use of modern agricultural methods. The Communist belief that large-scale operation would bring about efficient agricultural production has not materialized.

● 262 Agricultural production is decreasing. Eastern Europe
433 used to be a very large exporter of all agricultural products,
241 but it is suffering from shortages today. Food is scarce in these agricultural countries. Before the Second World War, nine out of ten residents of Czechoslovakia were nourished by the produce of Czechoslovakian agriculture. There were no rations. Everybody could buy what he wanted, and the standard of living in Czechoslovakia was the highest in Eastern Europe. Today, according to official Communist pronouncements, every second man in Czechoslovakia, despite strict rationing, has to be supplied from abroad. Milk, butter, and eggs are not distributed to adults at all, and even sugar is in short supply. Czechoslovakia, once the largest exporter of beet sugar in Europe, today cannot provide its diminished population with sugar although it has nearly 15 per cent fewer inhabitants than before 1938 due to the expulsion of the Germans. Bulgaria and Hungary, which had great surpluses of all agricultural products before the last war, must now import foodstuffs for their starving populations. Agricultural production in Eastern Europe has not yet attained the prewar level, although the free farms of Western Europe have surpassed it considerably.

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commodities, such as kitchen equipment and furniture, are 362
rare and expensive, above the means of an average family, and modern house appliances are hardly known at all. A private car is an extreme rarity and will remain so within the foreseeable future since few passenger cars are being manufactured and almost none imported.

As far as food is concerned, there is much truth in the 262
Communist assertion that with the rapid increase of city [369]
populations the production of foodstuffs lags behind the growing demand. Figures for food production in this area do not indicate the amount of consumption, since much of the food produced is stocked as army and war reserve or exported to Russia and China. The true situation is that while there is no actual hunger most of the population is fed at standards far below those of Western Europe. The diet is monotonous, consisting largely of bread, noodles, cereals, potatoes, common vegetables, and puddings, to judge from advice given to housewives by women's publications. Protective foods are fewer than before the war though probably more evenly distributed. Before the war, in the poorer parts of the area, the urban unemployed and millions of so-called dwarf-sized farm holders were as a rule underfed. Today the unemployed have disappeared, but the inmates of the labor camps are starving, and the poor peasants are no better off than before. The families living on middle-sized farms consume more food than before the war, because an incentive for selling produce is lacking.

The caloric value of foodstuffs consumed by the working population in the cities has, if anything, decreased. At home, families eat what the British used to eat a few years ago, but they have less of it. The quality of food consumed in the public eating places maintained by factories and the like is described as extremely bad, and so is the service. Standing in food lines, often in vain, consumes a large part of the housewife's time. This, added to the difficulty of cooking be-

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262 cause of the fuel shortage, makes a bitter joke of the Communist pledge to liberate the housewife from drudgery. There [545] are a few brighter spots in this picture. The soldiers and policemen are well fed and so are the privileged classes of senior government and party workers, and of artists and writers. The numerical strength of these new, privileged strata of society is less than that of the pre-war middle class, and their standard of living is undoubtedly lower.

262 511 Data have been published lately that illustrate the low level of consumption of food behind the Iron Curtain. These data concern the increase of sales of certain staples in Czechoslovakia in 1952 over those in 1951, and, for once, they are disclosed not in meaningless percentages, as is the rule behind the Iron Curtain, but in absolute figures. An analysis of these figures shows the increase in sales of sugar and butter to the extent, respectively, of two ounces and less than half an ounce per capita per month. The alleged increase in sales of coffee actually lags behind the increase in the population. Only the amount of tea sold has really increased. However, the Czechoslovakians are not tea but coffee drinkers. They used to produce more sugar than they could consume before the war. Yet the text in question continues: "The above figures show that the standard of living of the Czechoslovak people is irresistibly on the upward trend." Another example is a long letter from a coal miner in Poland, whose only subject was a detailed description of how he tried in vain for weeks in the fall of 1952 to buy a piece of sausage. In his fury with the regime and "the Russkis" behind it, the humble writer rose to the rhetoric of a Patrick Henry and declared that since there was no sausage life was not worth living. "And to think that I actually used to grumble against the pre-war government!" was his final confession. It should be noted that pre-war Poland had a large surplus of pork.

656 511 In the summer of 1953, the Soviet government announced that it would take many measures to relieve the all too ob-

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511 tion capacity of cement plants and brick factories would have to be increased before there can be any question of more housing. This is but one example out of many of its kind. There is a manifest contradiction between the present Russian-enforced armament production in the area, which has not been curtailed, and the intended mass production of consumer goods. The two cannot be carried on simultaneously. For these reasons alone, the recent statements of the Communist governments should be regarded with much scepticism.

288 295 433 The situation as regards clothing and footwear is even worse. The problem of obtaining it is nearly insoluble for the average family. It is far more difficult than in Russia where millions wear Polish textiles and Czech shoes. To discuss this question in detail is beyond the scope of this essay. Suffice it is to say that, according to the present long-range plans, Eastern Germany expects to produce in 1955 only 1.3 pairs of leather shoes per capita, Rumania 1.2 pairs, Hungary 1 pair, and Poland 0.7 pairs. No one can say what proportion of this footwear will be earmarked for export to Russia and China or assigned in advance to the army and security police and what will be left for the population. It is for such reasons that behind the Iron Curtain it is illegal to photograph the people on the streets or to export abroad such documentary evidence of their poor garb.

657 745 In contrast to the situation regarding food, housing, and clothing, the number and range of social services have been considerably extended, and these state services should in all fairness be regarded as significant steps taken to offset the low standard of living. It is little known that prewar Poland and Czechoslovakia, not to speak of Germany, had state-operated systems of social insurance and public health more advanced than any existing at the time in France or the United States. These systems have been enlarged under Communism. The quality of their services is too often insufficient, but the

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TABLE 2

611 **ANNUAL CONSUMPTION OF BASIC FOODSTUFFS IN PRE-WAR EASTERN EUROPE**

(in lbs.)

	Wheat & Rye	Maize	Potatoes	Sugar	Meat	Milk	Fats	Eggs (No.)
Poland	382	—	550	27	50	260	21	90
Czechoslovakia	275	25	260	47	68	290	40	169
Hungary	550	—	220	28	57	240	30	95
Romania	245	400	110	15	55	140	25	90
Yugoslavia	265	340	130	12	44	160	18	45
Bulgaria	440	—	35	12	45	150	19	80
Denmark	265	Nil	250	117	124	410	67	115

* *Agrarian Problems from the Baltic to the Aegean*, pp. 44.

241 The land, some of it rich, but most of it poor, was exploited
311 in a backward fashion – in Bulgaria and Yugoslav Macedonia many of the peasants worked with a wooden plow not very different in design from one described by Virgil in the *Georgics* 19 hundred years before. The inevitable subdivision of the land among the peasant's sons made application of modern agricultural techniques virtually impossible, and the accumulation of sufficient capital to purchase such equipment out of question. In addition, growing rural over-population kept farm wages low, and made the use of modern machinery uneconomical from the peasants' point of view.
[435] Above all, the peasantry was oppressed by the traditional "price scissors," or the disparity between the prices received for their crops on the urban market and prices paid for industrial products, a relationship which arose from the "small domestic market for agricultural products and the small supply of manufactured goods produced by domestic industry."[19]

But the trouble lay not merely in the backwardness of the peasant agricultural system. The political structure of the country, either conservative or semi-fascist, tended to favor urban groups. In the allotment of national resources such projects as peasant

[19] Moore, p. 89.

241 211 banks, agro-technical training schools, agricultural machine industries, and rural communications received only minor allocations. The backward condition of rural transportation made the task of competing with foreign grain — especially American — on the world market that much more difficult and the lack of facilities for the fertilizer production helped maintain the low yield.

The institutional organization of agriculture placed strong impediments to improved efficiency and increased productivity. Thus the small size of peasant holdings, frequently scattered in tiny plots, subdivided through inheritance, in debt to local banks, sometimes still held under tenancy arrangements, all combined to blight the hopes raised by the first post-war reforms.

The means and resources of the various national governments were usually devoted to furthering industrial development and the accumulation of capital for favored projects from which the peasants rarely benefited. While in some countries import duties on motor cars might be reduced, duties on agricultural machinery were gradually raised.[13] The blind pursuit of such policies by the inter-war governments inevitably deepened the rift between town and country, and intensified peasant suspicion of the central regimes. In some cases the response of the regimes to such suspicions was to convert themselves into semi-fascist governments, which were not dependent upon that minimum of popular support which their semi-parliamentary predecessors required for continued existence.[14]

3. *World War II and After*

423 If World War I set in motion the process of land reform, World War II brought that process to a close. No doubt the sudden emergence of the Communists as a major political force in the area expedited completion of the reforms begun in the 1920s, but

[13] *Agrarian Problems from the Baltic to the Aegean*, p. 11-2. In Romania prior to 1928 the government imposed export duties on agricultural products. These duties were revoked but the general disregard for the needs of the landed population remained. And while it is true that there were efforts on the part of East European governments to make some administrative services available to the peasants (such as the Hungarian Social Fund, the O.N.Cs.A.) they were halting and generally short-lived.

[14] The process of excluding peasant parties from any kind of representation in the governments "began with Hungary in 1919, continued with Bulgaria in 1923, with Poland in 1926, with Yugoslavia in 1929, and with Rumania in 1931" (Mitrany, p. 122). Only the Czechoslovak Agrarian Party was able to remain in power, and in Bulgaria the Agrarian Party returned briefly between 1930 and 1934.

241
311

CHART IV

DISTRIBUTION OF AGRICULTURAL HOLDINGS BY SIZE AND AREA IN EASTERN EUROPE – CIRCA 1930*



* Wilbert Moore, *Economic Demography of Eastern and Southern Europe* (Geneva), 1945, p. 82.

p. 35

423 severely limited by the special character of East European Communism. Bureaucratic in spirit and cautious by temperament, it was neither able, nor did it seriously attempt, to destroy the basic configuration of rural society. As late as 1953, the peasant population remained essentially stable, though the regimes had siphoned off surplus rural manpower to the rapidly expanding industrial centers. The land massing of the farms, on the Soviet model, radically altering the peasant social structure, lay far in the future. The problem facing the Communist planner was the much simpler one of altering the social structure sufficiently to destroy the peasants' capacity to sabotage industrial "grandeur" planned for the new cities.

● 311 423 The land structure prevailing in Eastern Europe after the reforms—the raw substance from which the Communists were to create collective farms — is described in Table 5. The following pattern emerges:

The number of "producing-consuming" units—agricultural holdings of five hectares and less, producing little surplus for the urban market — represented well over three-quarters of the total in Romania, Yugoslavia, and Hungary, and perhaps two-thirds in Poland, Bulgaria, and Czechoslovakia. In this category, approximately 30 percent of the total holdings in Poland and Bulgaria, 50 percent in Czechoslovakia and Romania, and as much as 65-70 percent in Yugoslavia and Hungary were dwarf farms, barely capable of covering the needs of the family in possession.

The group of medium peasant holdings—peasant farms of approximately 5-10 hectares—were a significant category chiefly in Poland and Hungary where they represented approximately one-quarter of the total. These farms were of lesser importance elsewhere in the region.

The group of medium-large holdings—farms of 10-20 hectares—comprised six percent or less of the total throughout the region, reaching 10 percent only in Czechoslovakia and Poland.

The large peasant holdings, or "kulak" farms—of 15-20 hectares and more—varied throughout the region, ranging from one to four percent of the total.

As for the proportionate share of the total arable land, the structure of private ownership had the following characteristics (see Table 6):

TABLE 6

FARMLAND OWNERSHIP IN OR AROUND 1949*

Number of Private Farms (in thousands)

Holdings (in ha.)		Czechos.	Poland	Hung.†	Romania‡	Bulgaria	Yugos.§
Midget:	0-2	696	962	1,404	1,636	316	1,495
Small:	2-5	351	1,084	387	707	418	
Medium:	5-10	255	906	174	551	276	490
Med. Large:	10-20	159	347	55*	154	74	129
Large:	20-50	35	39	27*	34	—	92
TOTAL		1,496	3,338	2,047	3,082	1,084	2,206

† Hungary: divisions are 0-2.8; 2.8-5.7 ha.; 5.7-11.4 ha.; 11.4-20 ha.; 20-50 ha.

‡ Romania: divisions in the first two groups are: from 0-3 ha.; and from 3-5 ha.

§ Yugoslavia: divisions are: 0-5; 5-10; 10-15; and over 15 ha.

* Source as in Table 5.

423 311 The "producing-consuming" units generally comprised one-quarter to one-third of the farmland throughout the region, but in Hungary almost one-half the total.

The medium units, of five to 10 hectares, occupied between one-quarter and one-third of the farm area.

The medium-large holdings controlled 20 percent, or less, of the farmland in Yugoslavia, Hungary, and Bulgaria, and approximately 25 percent in Poland and Czechoslovakia.

Finally, the large holdings—upwards of 15-20 hectares—totaled 10-15 percent of the private farmlands, except in Bulgaria where they did not exist, and in Yugoslavia where they formed close to 20 percent.

661 423 Since the Communists' primary problem was the extraction of agricultural produce from the countryside, the focus of the contemplated agrarian reorganization had to be those viable, surplus-producing farms which traditionally supplied the cities with the produce necessary to their existence. And because it was precisely these farms which were best able to withstand the slow economic pressures of the State, and least interested in economic reform, the Communists had to prepare for a formidable struggle. In order to impose collective structure on these farms, it was necessary to discriminate against them in favor of the collectives. But this very discrimination—the refusal to supply credits, mechanical equipment, and fertilizers, and the collection of higher taxes and delivery quotas—tended to destroy their vitality and decrease the surplus produce in which the Communists were interested. So long, therefore, as these farms remained outside the collective structure, their value to the Communists was decreased as collectivization progressed. Similarly, the favorable treatment afforded the collective farms tended to decrease their basic value to the State. It was difficult to extract a high surplus of produce from farms with lower delivery quotas. These internal contradictions would inevitably continue so long as the *process* of collectivization itself was not completed, and the use of discriminatory tactics was necessary.

It is not altogether surprising that the Satellite planners never pursued an entirely consistent policy in this regard. In the early years, they tended to concentrate on absorbing the poorer farms into the collectives because they were most vulnerable to Communist pressure and appeal. Later, they tended to concentrate on those larger farms whose collectivization was crucial to the success

of their land policy. But no matter how they proceeded—and the 661
pattern differed from one country to another—they could not re- 423
solve the dilemmas posed by a slow paced collectivization. Had they been able to follow the Soviet model of full collectivization in several rapid and brutal campaigns, they might conceivably have avoided some of these pitfalls.

The chief surplus producing sector—the middle farms between 423
10 and 20 hectares—comprised some 900,000 units (See Table 6). 311
The systematic dissociation of this stratum from the upper stratum of owners holding over 20 hectare holdings, and its methodical "fractionalization" represented one of the essential characteristics of the collectivization drive. It was *this* stratum of the farm population which the regime frequently labeled "kulak," adjusting its definition as it became necessary in each situation. By 1950 it was clear that this stratum represented a challenge to the Communists not—as it was alleged—because its members hired farm labor to help work their lands, but because it constituted the producing backbone of the nation, a source of productive strength which the Communists were determined to turn to their own ends.

4. *The Strategy Unfolded*

The post-war expulsions of the *Volksdeutsche* and other German minority groups from Eastern Europe and the expropriation of their lands, together with those of Nazi collaborators, gave the early Communist-dominated regimes their first hold over the agrarian economy. Particularly in Poland, Czechoslovakia, and Yugoslavia the former German holdings formed the nucleus of the State Farms. Confiscation of the great latifundia in Hungary and of royal lands in Romania similarly created a reserve land fund on which the State could draw. In general, forest lands throughout the region were nationalized and administered by managerial panels created for that purpose. In addition, much pasture and meadowland was expropriated by a variety of legal devices, the over-all total equalling some two million hectares of first quality land. The State share in the combined forests, pasturage, and arable land of Eastern Europe ranged from 17 percent in Yugoslavia to 36 percent in Poland, and to as much as 41 percent in Czechoslovakia. Until 1949, the State farms still continued to play a minor role, except in Poland and Czechoslovakia where experiments along these lines were pushed very early.

During 1949-50 the State sector of agriculture expanded rapidly,

423 either by the simple process of extending existing land reserves, or
311 by acquisition—sometimes outright expropriation—of "kulak" lands or communally-organized "model" farms. By the close of 1949, State farms in Czechoslovakia, for example, had increased by 600 percent. By and large, however, the areas controlled by the State farms—particularly in Hungary—contained a disproportionate share of non-cultivated land (see Chart V).

In Czechoslovakia, Poland, and Hungary, the State sector comprised an area of considerable importance, and it was on the State farms—theoretically, at least, the highest existing form of "Socialist agriculture"—that the chief Communist hopes rested. It is, in fact, the case that in the East European Satellites, State Farms achieved a higher level of development in general than in the Soviet Union at a comparable stage, since the initiative of the Russian peasantry in 1917-18 prevented the large-scale land seizures on which a State farming system could be based.

423 But in the Satellites, as in the Soviet Union, the primary effort
474 was devoted to the collective farm. In the Satellites, where the land offensive had a thoroughly bureaucratic character, the collective farms offered the additional advantage of *flexibility*. A variety of collectivized farms were created to facilitate the peasants' progress from independent farming to full collectivity. Even the terms used to describe the collective farms—"Agricultural Producers' Cooperatives" in Poland, for example—were designed to blur the true implications and to mask the ultimate purpose of collectivization. Similarly, in Yugoslavia and Bulgaria, the very name for collective farms—*zadrugi*—was a calculated attempt to evoke memories of the ancestral communal traditions of the southern Balkans.

Thus the regimes trod softly in the early years. In Czechoslovakia, for example, four types of "Uniform Agricultural Cooperatives" (UAC) were established from which the peasants—in accordance with the "voluntary" principle—might choose:

Type I Joint tillage of the land, but retention of title in real property contributed, as well as in draft animals, farm equipment, and the harvested crops.

Type II Joint tillage of the land, but title retained in real property, draft animals, and farm equipment; all boundaries plowed over, and plots grouped in "land

CHART V

GROWTH of STATE FARMS 1949 – 1952*

(percent of arable Land)

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

* Rude Pravo, October 28, 1952; Rocznik Statis. 1949 (Warsaw), 1950; For a Lasting Peace, for a People's Democracy! (Bucharest), January 30, 1953; March 17, 1950; September 11, 1953; Agerpres Yik Yecir (Bucharest), No. 2, January 17, 1953; Pari i Kredit (Sofia), No. 2, 1948, p. 80.

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TABLE 8

PERCENT OF ARABLE LAND COLLECTIVIZED*
1945 - 1953

	1945	1946	1947	1948	1949	1950	1951	1952	June 1953	Dec. 1953
Bulgaria	3.0	3.5	3.7	6.0	11.8	43.0	47.5	51.0	51.7	51.7
Romania					0.1	2.7	3.1	7.2	7.5	7.5
Hungary					0.5	2.6	8.1	18.2	24.6	20.0
Czechoslovakia**					5.4	16.5	19.0	37.9	40.0	38.0†
Poland					0.3	2.2	3.5	4.8	6.7	6.7
Yugoslavia**		0.9	1.5	2.8	13.3	16.1	18.8	11.4	9.5†	—

* Sources for these figures are given in Tables 11 to 20.

** Agricultural land, not arable land.

† The exact dimensions of the kolkhoz dissolutions which have taken place in 1953 in Hungary, Czechoslovakia, and Yugoslavia have not been made public; the figures given above are based on scattered evidence and official hints *Szabad Nep* [Budapest], Dec. 30, 1953, *Rude Pravo* [Prague], 19 December 1953, and G. J. Conrad, *Die Wirtschaft Jugoslawiens*, [Berlin, 1952].)

CHART VI

COLLECTIVIZATION IN EASTERN EUROPE*

(Percent of arable land collectivized)

1948-1953

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

* Data in tables 9 through 17.

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TABLE 9

COLLECTIVIZATION IN BULGARIA*

1944 - 1953

Year	Number of Collectives	Number Formed Yearly	Number Households	Households per Collective†	Average Size Collective†	Hectares per Household†	Number Hectares Collectivized	Percent of Farms	Percent Arable Land
1944	110								
1945	382	272	34,362	90	383	4.2	146,570	3.1	3.0
1946	480	98	41,027	85	359	4.2	172,498	3.7	3.5
1947	549	69	44,100	80	327	4.1	180,040	4.0	3.7
1948	1,100	551	78,900	72	265	3.7	292,380	6.7	6.0
1949	1,608	508	156,483	97	343	3.5	551,572	14.3	11.3
1950	2,587	979	525,628	203	809	4.0	2,092,215	48.0	43.0
1951	2,739	152						51.0	47.5
1952	2,739	0						52.0	51.0
1953	2,747	8	568,989	207	915	4.4	2,512,500	52.3	51.7**

* *Rabotnichesko Delo* (Sofia), May 29, 1950, January 1, 1951, October 28, 1951, January 6, 1953; *Zemedelsko Zname* (Sofia), December 3, 1952, December 2, 1953.

** The figure given by the regime since 1952 for the percentage of arable land is 60.5, and this figure has gained general acceptance among Communist theoreticians and many Western observers. However, it is clear that the figure 60.5 measures a different arable land area than was used in computing the earlier percentagewise figures. The percentages given for 1949 and 1950 indicate that the arable land at the time was approximately 4.9 million hectares; but the 1952 percentage indicates arable land of only 4.15 million hectares. Since the regime has frequently claimed a steadily expanding area of cultivation, this statistical juggling does not make any sense. Therefore, this chart bases its 1952 and 1953 percentagewise calculations upon the same arable land figure used by the regime prior to 1952.

† Calculated on the basis of official data.

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* Statistički Bilten Poljoprivredno Ekonomski, No. 6, 1951, p. 5.



* Rude Pravo (Prague), March 5, 1952

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CHART IX

COLLECTIVIZATION IN BULGARIA BY DISTRICT*

1953

(Percentage of Villages [illegible] Land)

* Statistics from Report on Bulgaria, Institute National d'Etudes et Economiques (Paris), November 1, 1950.

CHART X

COLLECTIVIZATION IN POLAND BY PROVINCE*

1953

(Percentage of Villages with Collective Farms)



* Economists (Warsaw) 3rd quarter, 1953.

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5; Free Europe Committee U-4 (no date) 1954 E1 Europe E1

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TABLE 10

COLLECTIVIZATION IN ROMANIA*

1949 - 1953

Year	Number of Collectives	Number Formed Yearly	Number Households	Households per Collective§	Average Size Collective§	Hectares per Household§	Number Hectares Collectivized	Percent of Arable Land
1949	56	56	4,058	72	—	—	12,500†	0.1
1950	1,027	971	67,719	66	261†	4.0	268,000	2.7
1951	1,069	42	75,065	70	277†	—	300,000†	3.1
1952	1,796	727	165,411	92	360†	—	700,000†	7.2
1953 (June)	1,980	184	185,000	90	369	4.1	732,000	7.5

* Speech of Minister of the Army Botnaras, *Scanteia* (Bucharest), December 31, 1953; *Scanteia*, April 12, 1953; Speech of Premier Gheorghiu-Dej, *Scanteia*, August 23, 1953; *Scanteia*, March 1, 1953; *Probleme Economice*, (Bucharest), No. 5-6, May-June, 1953; *Voprosy Ekonomiki*, (Moscow), No. 10, 1953.

† These are estimates, calculated on the basis of known ratios between number of collectives, number of hectares collectivized, and number of households.

§ Calculated on the basis of official data.

has presented its rulers with singular economic and organizational problems. 423 474

The two crucial years of Romanian collectivization were 1950 and 1952; these two offensive years alternated with periods of quiescence. In 1952, more than 50 percent of the total area collectivized to date was brought into the "Socialist sector," and in the same year the size of individual collective farms themselves increased rapidly. Though the number of new collectives increased by only 75 percent, the area brought into collectives increased by over 130 percent.

In accordance with the general East European patterns, the Romanian collectives were composed of a high percentage of medium farms, a percentage which increased each year (see Table 11). In 1953, the middle farmers comprised 57.8 percent of the total, the small farmers 35.2 percent, and landless farmers the remaining 7.0 percent. While the average size of all Romanian farms is 3.6 hectares, the average size of farms brought into collectives is 4.0 hectares.

TABLE 11

DISTRIBUTION OF FARMS WITHIN ROMANIAN COLLECTIVE SECTOR*
1949 - 1953

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	1949-50	1951	1952	1953
Medium farmers	32.0	29.4	53.0	57.8
Small farmers	62.4	39.0	37.4	35.2
Landless farmers	5.6	31.6	9.6	7.0

* *Probleme Economice* (Bucharest) No. 5-6, May-June, 1953; *Nova Mysl* (Prague), No. 10, 1953.

A unique feature of Romanian collectivization is the establishment of a very "primitive" type of collective, the "Agricultural Associations." Whereas the other countries issue agricultural decrees with a single standard for the entire collective sector, the Romanian agricultural decrees usually distinguish between "Agricultural Associations" and collectives. Including the "Agricultural

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TABLE 12

COLLECTIVIZATION IN HUNGARY*

Year	Number of Collectives	Number Formed Yearly	Number Households	Households per Collective†	Average Size of Collective†	Hectares per Household†	Hectares Collectivized	Percent of Arable Land
1949	1,520	980	37,000	24	137	5.7	208,000	3.7
1950	2,500	1,233	90,000	36	176	4.1	440,000	8.2
1951	4,652	2,152	236,500	51	187	3.7	865,000	16.0
1952	5,315	663	318,500	59	258	4.3	1,374,000	24.6
1953 (April)	—	—	340,000	–	–	4.4	1,494,000	26.8
1953 (Dec.)	4,677	–638	238,000†	51	250	4.7	1,117,000**	20.0

* *Statistikai Szemle* (Budapest) – various numbers, 1950; *Szabad Nep*, January 25, 1950, January 21, 1951, October 27, 1950, February 26, 1951, December 2, 1951; December 16, 1952, May 11, 1953; Radio Budapest, December 29, 1953.

** Estimated on the basis of the known arable land.

† Calculated on the basis of official data.

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TABLE 13

1949 - 1953

COLLECTIVIZATION IN CZECHOSLOVAKIA*

(*Types II, III, and IV*)

Year	Number of Collectives	Number Formed Yearly	Number Households	Households per Collective†	Average Size Collective†	Hectares per Household†	Number Hectares Collectivized	Percent of Agricultural Land
1949	1,700¶	1,700	–	–	–	–	375,000	5.4
1950	3,760	2,060¶	–	–	302	–	1,134,392	16.5
1951	4,452	682	–	–	293	–	1,305,610	19.0
1952	7,290	2,838	–	–	356	–	2,598,073	37.9
1953**	8,284	994	343,911	41	–	8.4	2,900,000¶	40.0

* J. Nepomucky, *Rude Pravo* (Prague), February 15, 1953; *Czechoslovak Economic Bulletin* (Prague), February 1, 1953, pp. 15-16; *Rude Pravo*, December 17, 1952.

** This figure represents the high point in Czechoslovak collectivization; by the end of 1953 the number of collectivised households had fallen off slightly (see speech of Agricultural Minister Uher, printed in *Rude Pravo* (Prague), December 19, 1953).

† Calculated on the basis of official data.

TABLE 14

DISTRIBUTION OF FARMS WITHIN CZECHOSLOVAK COLLECTIVE SECTOR*

—1953—

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Farm Unit (in Hectares)	Percent of Total Farms Collectivized
0-0.5	10.8
0.5-2	22.4
2-5	28.9
5-10	23.5
10-15	13.0
Over 15	3.4
	100.0

* *Zemedelske Noviny* (Prague), May 1, 1953.

POLAND

For a variety of reasons, the impact of collectivization in Poland has been slight. The State farms, organized immediately after the Second World War, controlled nearly twice as much arable land as all collectives formed by mid-1953. In central Poland—that is to say, in the regions of Poland's pre-war territories still remaining (excluding the formerly German districts in the West)—collectivization has hardly been invoked. The majority of Polish collective farms are situated in the old German regions of Silesia, Pomerania, and East Prussia—where the transfer of populations, confiscation of German properties, and firm Party political control made collectivization far easier. 423 474

Whether the vigorous land drive launched in early 1953 (and since slowed down in accordance with Satellite-wide political and economic policies) would have resulted in the rapid expansion of the collective sector is now impossible to say. In Poland, the average size of farms collectivized far exceeded the early post-war national average—approximately 7.5 hectares per holding as against 5.9. Thus, the weight of the Polish farm offensive was directed

8; Free Europe Committee U-4 (no date) 1954 El Europe El

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TABLE 15

COLLECTIVIZATION IN POLAND*

1949 - 1953

Year	Number of Collectives	Number Formed Yearly	Number Households	Households per Collective†	Average Size Collective†	Hectares per Household†	Number Hectares Collectivized	Percent of Farmers	Percent of Agricultural Land
1949	243	243	—	—	226	—	54,830	—	0.3
1950	2,199	1,946	49,500	23	213	9.4	467,611	1.4	2.2
1951	3,054	855	71,000	23	239	10.1	728,561	2.1	3.5
1952	4,900	1,846	100,000	20	204	10.0	1,000,000	3.1	4.8
1953§	7,982	3,082	189,000	24	175	7.4	1,400,000	5.9**	6.7

* Instytut Ekonimiki Rolnej, *Wies w Liczbach* (Warsaw, 1952); *Economista* (Warsaw), III, 1953; *Zycie Gospodarzce* (Warsaw), September 6, 1953.

§ Official collectivization statistics for 1953 are extremely confused and contradictory. The figures presented here are for June, 1953; in subsequent months different figures were released, but they were so inconsistent that the June estimates are employed here. During the summer of 1953 collectivization came to a halt in Poland, and hence the situation remained approximately static throughout the rest of the year.

** Estimate.

† Calculated on the basis of official data.

CHART XI

COMPOSITION of COLLECTIVIZED and NON-COLLECTIVIZED SECTORS in POLAND 1953*

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

* Nowe Drogi, (Warsaw) No. 10, 1953, p. 183.

p. 75

423 474 against the efficient, surplus-producing farm units. A comparison of the collectivized and free sectors in 1953 is set out in Table 16. While only 40 percent of the independent farms were larger than five hectares, slightly more than 75 percent of those collectivized were drawn from this category.

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TABLE 16

DISTRIBUTION OF FARMS IN POLISH COLLECTIVE SECTOR*

— 1951 —

Farm Unit	Percent of Farms Collectivized
Landless	5.8
0 - 2	6.1
2 - 5	14.2
5 - 10	62.8
10 - 15	10.2
Over 15	0.9

* *Wieś w Liczbach* (Warsaw, 1951), p. 131.

423 474 In Poland the collective sector controls 6.7 percent of the total arable land, as against almost 12 percent organized into State Farms. Four types of collectives exist in Poland; the most developed type approaches the Soviet artel.

5: Free Europe Committee U-4 (no date) 1954 El Europe El
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TABLE 17

COLLECTIVIZATION IN YUGOSLAVIA*
1946 - 1952

Year	Number of Collectives	Number Formed Yearly	Number Households	Households per Collective**	Average Size Collective**	Hectares per Household**	Number Hectares Collectivized	Percent of Agricultural Land
1946	494	494	25,062	51	246	4.8	121,518	0.9
1947	779	285	40,590	52	270	5.2	210,986	1.5
1948	1,318	539	60,158	46	246	5.4	323,98[illegible]	2.3
1949	6,625	5,307	340,739	52	278	5.4	1,839,978	13.3
1950	6,968	343	418,659	60	318	5.3	2,226,166	16.1
1951	6,994	26	429,784	62	371	6.0	2,595,000	18.8
1952	6,908	–86	–	–	267	–	1,580,000	11.4

*Informationi Priruchik, (Belgrade), Vol. I, p. 767; *Review of International Affairs*, (Belgrade), Sept. 16, 1952, pp. 16-18; October 1, 1952, pp. 17-18; G. F. Conrad, *Die Wirschaft Jugoslawiens* (Berlin, 1952).

**Calculated on the basis of official figures.

existed for a considerable period before the new measures were introduced.[3]

To assess the results of collectivization in Eastern Europe it is necessary to apply the same measuring rod applied to the Soviet Union: to what degree did collectivization facilitate the task of increasing the State's share of the total agricultural product without a proportionate increase in agricultural investment?

This was, in fact, the exact criterion to which Boris Kidric, the Yugoslav economic planner, was referring when he declared in 1947 that the "business of agriculture in a Socialist society is to supply the towns and industrial centers with food."[4] If, despite every other failure, collectivization has expedited this "supply," it has justified itself in Communist eyes.

As in the USSR, land reorganization in Eastern Europe has not resulted in an appreciable increase in East European farm productivity; in many instances, the reverse has been true. That the pre-war levels of agriculture have not yet been regained in Hungary is now freely admitted by Hungarian Communist spokesmen.[5] The Polish theoretician, Stefan Jedrychowski, in a revealing analysis of post-Stalin policies, acknowledged that "in Romania, as well as in Czechoslovakia, agricultural production as a whole has not yet reached the pre-war level, although, for example, it has in the case of cattle."[6] Polish Premier Bierut confessed that the situation in Poland was not very healthy compared to pre-war standards.[7]

Indeed, the conclusions of the United Nations Food and Agricultural Organization (FAO), issued in 1952 long before the New Course policies, and based upon many unofficial sources, seems generous in retrospect: "All countries in the region," the FAO report stated, "with the exception of Poland, were at, or only slightly below, the pre-war level of agricultural production, and for the

[3] It has been suggested by many that the New Course of 1953 was the consequence of a mounting, ever-deepening economic crisis. However, it is difficult to support such a thesis because, with the possible exception of Hungary, the economic problems which the Communists are now attacking with such vigor have existed for a long time. A more plausible hypothesis is that the political crisis caused by Stalin's death made intolerable the continuation of the vast economic disproportions which had hitherto been mastered.

[4] See above p. 46.

[5] Jozsef Reval, *Tarsadalmi Szemle* (Budapest), October-November, 1953. The crowning indictment of Hungarian agriculture was Reval's declaration that its livestock situation was "worse than it is in the USSR."

[6] Stefan Jedrychowski, *Nowe Drogi* (Warsaw), No. 10, 1953.

[7] Report of Premier Bierut to the 9th Plenum of the Central Committee of the Polish Workers Party, *Trybuna Ludu*, November 8, 1953.

4: Wszelaki U-4 (no date) 1952 El Europe El

OIL

THE captive area of Europe is much less rich in oil than in hard fuel. At the same time its resources in oil are much larger than those of Western Europe. In the interwar period the principal oil fields of the present captive area were situated in Rumania, and the much less important ones in Southern Poland. The Austrian and Hungarian oil resources were not exploited; in fact, they were not known to exist. Rumanian production rose steadily and reached its peak output of 8.7 million metric tons in 1936; since then, the output has been decreasing. In 1938 Rumania produced 6.6 million tons of oil and Poland 0.5 million; in the same year, oil began to flow from the new fields in Austria and Hungary. In 1939 the eastern and richer part of the Polish oil fields (Drohobycz and Boryslaw) was annexed by Soviet Russia. During World War II the Nazis brought up the Austrian output to 1.2 million tons (1944) and that of Hungary to over 0.8 million (1943), but they were unable to increase or even to maintain the level of Rumanian production, whose war peak was reached in 1942 with 5.7 million tons.

Rumanian oil fields and refineries at Ploesti and its vicinity were heavily bombed by the Allies during the war, but the ensuing damage was on the whole speedily repaired. When the Soviet authorities took over the Rumanian oil fields in the fall of 1944, they began by seizing much of the drilling material and refinery equipment and removing it to Russia. In consequence, the productivity of the Rumanian oil fields was drastically impaired. For the same reason, the productivity of the Hungarian and Austrian oil fields (all Austrian wells are situated in the Soviet zone) also declined sharply. The initial Soviet policy of indiscriminate plundering, however, was soon replaced by one of rebuilding all mid-European oil wells under Russian control

4: Wszelaki U-4 (no date) 1952 El Europe El

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— including Albania — and exploiting them to the utmost of their capacity. Since then, except for the insignificant Czechoslovak and Polish oil fields which are run by local governments, the really large captive oil fields have been operated by Soviet or mixed semi-Soviet companies. This means that they are managed by Soviet specialists using Soviet machinery and installations, according to the Soviet methods of extraction, which the Russians regard as more progressive than those used in the West. A huge and ever growing amount of money and energy is being invested in the extention of the existing fields and the search for new ones. The Soviet idea seems to be that the foreign companies which operated the oil fields in the captive area in the past were only looking for immediate profits and never did their job properly [illegible] that there is bound to be more oil all over Middle Europe. Insofar as Rumania and Hungary are concerned, the results of the Soviet efforts cannot be considered remarkable. The output of Hungary remains stationary, while in Rumania, partly because of Russian haste and the harshness of their methods, there have been until the present time constant difficulties of every kind with machinery, organization, and manpower — perhaps even some sabotage.[21] The best proof of this is the fact that no statistics on oil production in absolute figures have been officially published in Rumania since 1947; had there been good reason for boasting, the figures undoubtedly would have been made known. On the other hand, there is much evidence that the Russians have been more successful in Albania, and even more so in their zone of Austria.

The present rate of oil output in Rumania, and for that matter in most of the other captive or Soviet-controlled countries (there is no oil in the Soviet zone of Germany), is the subject of much speculation.[22] Every authority has its own set of estimates, and there are surprising differences between them. Only a few of these diverging estimates can be quoted here. Thus the *Economic Survey of Europe in 1950*, an official publication of the United Nations — bound as it is to accept the indices occasionally given by the satellite governments and to draw its conclusions from

4: Wszelaki U-4 (no date) 1952 El Europe El

them — estimates that in 1950 the Rumanian output of crude oil reached 5.35 million metric tons, that of Hungary (which lagged behind its plan for 1950) 0.55 million, of Poland 0.18 million, and of Czechoslovakia 0.05 million metric tons. Together with the Soviet zone of Austria, whose production the *Survey* estimates at 1.5 million tons, the total 1950 output of the captive area should have reached 7.63 million metric tons — plus that of Albania, for which the *Survey* gives no figure.

According to the other authoritative sources, the above-quoted figure on the Rumanian output reflects the nonfulfilled plans of the Rumanian government rather than the actual level of production. Competent Rumanian experts residing in the United States claim that the 1950 oil output in Rumania did not exceed 4.2 or perhaps even 4.0 million tons.[23] On the other hand, it is possible that the *Survey* underestimated the output of oil in Austria and Czechoslovakia. Thus, according to accredited American sources with access to much special information, the 1950 output of oil in the Soviet-controlled section of Europe was: Albania, 1,915,000 metric tons; Austria, 2,247,000 tons; Czechoslovakia, 275,000 tons; Hungary, 490,000 tons; Poland, 138,000 tons; and Rumania, 4,360,000 tons — a total of 9,415,000 metric tons. This total is larger than most of the other estimates because of the high figures for Austria and Czechoslovakia, and in particular because of the surprisingly high figure for Albania.[24] It should be noted that the corresponding figure for the Soviet Union in 1950 is presumed to have been 37,600,000 metric tons. If the above-quoted American estimate is exact, it would mean that the output of oil in the captive part of Europe amounts to as much as one fourth of that of Russia proper.

Whatever estimate is accepted for 1950, it may be assumed that the 1951 output of oil in captive Europe will be somewhat larger. It is true that according to official admissions the 1951 oil production in Czechoslovakia and Hungary has been lagging behind the plan, but this does not necessarily mean that it has fallen below the level of the preceding year. On the other hand,

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it is claimed that by the middle of 1951 the Rumanian output was 19 percent larger than by the middle of 1950, and the Polish output in the third quarter of 1951 was 11 percent larger than that of the third quarter of 1950.[25] Moreover, new oil fields were discovered recently in the Soviet zone of Austria at Schwardorf south of the Danube, opening up, it is asserted, "fantastic possibilities" for the future.[26]

It is not easy to have an accurate idea of how much oil should be extracted in the captive part of Europe in the light of the investments and other measures foreseen in the long-range economic plans. The current plans anticipate that in 1955 Rumania should produce 10 million metric tons and Poland about 0.4 million; Czechoslovakia plans to extract 0.15 million tons by 1952. The planned figure for Hungary has never been disclosed, and neither have been those for Austria and Albania, both of which produce oil for the Soviet Union. Yet it is certain that the Soviet authorities operating the oil fields in the three last-mentioned countries *must* have definite targets which they have to reach by the end of 1954, when most of the present long-range economic plans of the captive countries will, in fact, terminate. These targets, together with the three disclosed ones, may add up to any figure between 13 and 16 million metric tons of oil; that is, between about 94 and about 115 million barrels — an output depending on many unpredictable elements. A tentative figure of 13 million metric tons to be reached by 1954 has been adopted in this study as a basis for further computations.[27]

This estimate for 1954 — which may be a low one — should be compared with the 60 million metric tons of crude petroleum the Soviet government expects to extract in 1960.[28]

To the tentative figure for 1954 should be added the growing output of synthetic oil produced in the northern part of the captive area.

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NATURAL GAS

In Europe, even more than in America, most of the natural gas extracted as a by-product of oil refining had been for a long time wasted, and its utilization for lighting, fuel, and extraction of natural gasoline is a comparatively new process. International statistics do not exist for its production but only for its consumption in the given states, which is supposed to be equal to its effective collection within the same boundaries.[29] In 1930 Rumania, with its consumption of 1,206 million cubic meters of natural gas, and Poland, with 487 million, were responsible for nearly one hundred percent of the total European output of this gas. Several long-distance gas pipelines were laid in Rumania. The pipeline connecting Daszawa in the Polish oil fields with Warsaw was still unfinished by September 1939; the Russians redirected that line to Kiev. During World War II the extraction of natural gas was started in the present Russian zone of Austria and in Hungary.

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The last known statistics for gas production in absolute figures in Rumania date from 1947, when it reached 1,176 million cubic meters; in Poland (which lost to Russia two thirds of its oil fields) from 1948, when it was 162 million cubic meters; and in Hungary from 1947, when it was 100 million cubic meters; and in Austria from 1949, when it was 59 million cubic meters. The Rumanian output was then small in comparison with its peak in 1936, when it reached 2,130 million cubic meters. Since 1947-1949 no figures for natural gas extraction have been published by any captive or Soviet-controlled country, and some of the percentile indices disclosed by these countries are contradictory. There are reasons to assume, however, that there has been since 1947 a steady though slow increase of that production in Hungary and a much more rapid one in Poland and Rumania.

315 185 433 Thus, the increase of Polish production in 1950 over that in 1949 was officially described as "an enormous jump" and the output of gas in the third quarter of 1951 was alleged to have been 173 percent of that the whole year before. In Rumania the 1950 output increased, according to the official press, by 24 percent in comparison with that of 1949, and the output of the first half of 1951 was alleged to have been larger by one third than that of the first half of 1950.[30] It is not possible to check these assertions, but they may correspond to the truth. Rumania would not be building three plants for the chemical processing of gas unless there were good reasons for expecting an increase in the extraction of gas.

[185] According to their long-range plans, which officially terminate in 1955 but are expected to be fulfilled by 1954, Rumania anticipates extracting 3,900 million cubic meters of natural gas, and Poland 480 million meters. These targets are moderate in comparison with those foreseen for oil extraction. The Hungarian target for 1954 is unknown, and so is the Soviet plan for Austria. The Czech output is negligible. A hypothetical figure of some 5,000 million cubic meters of natural gas, almost entirely dependent on the unpredictable Rumanian output, is the best that can be surmised for the entire captive area in 1954.

Germany (in particular in Saxon Lusace, or Lausitz) has to be 316
mined from deep pits; the rest of it, lying on the surface or in shallow strata up to a depth of 165 feet, can be worked from open mines.[78] The main difficulty lies in removing and carrying away the overburden of soil, sand, and gravel; at present this sometimes amounts to as much as 12 to 15 times the volume of lignite extracted. Unlike those of coal, many lignite seams are very thick.

Most of the shallow strata of lignite are gradually being exhausted, and the ratio of overburden to lignite is slowly but surely increasing. However, many difficult technical and social problems of coal mining do not apply to lignite mining in the northern part of the captive area. This is also true, though not to the same extent, in Hungary and Rumania. The extraction of lignite, in particular in Eastern Germany, does not depend so much on an adequate supply of skilled miners as on machinery, and can be speeded up in proportion to the investment in mechanical excavators and transportation.[79] During the last war the Nazis stepped up the output of lignite by machinery and were able to cover huge requirements for electric power as well as for synthetic oil and rubber. Under present circumstances, the planned quotas for lignite in Eastern Germany and possibly Czechoslovakia can be met assumedly without too much difficulty. This may also be true for some deposits in the southern captive countries. Consequently, thermal electric plants in a large part of the captive area seem to be assured of a sufficient amount of fuel. It is true that hitherto lignite could not have been used in smelting, but the huge iron and steel "West-Kombinat" under construction at Calbe-on-the-Saale in Sachsen-Anhalt will be working exclusively on lignite.[80]

The oil production of the captive area depends on factors 315
which are difficult to assess. The reserves of coal in the area are for all practical purposes unlimited, and new investments in coal and lignite mining, together with a propitiatory attitude towards labor, will always result in more coal being extracted. The pro-

315 duction of oil is different: there is no guarantee that new investments will produce oil. On the eve of World War II, the Polish oil fields were regarded as being gradually exhausted: between 1900 and 1938 their annual production fell from some 4 million metric tons to 0.5 million. The production of the much richer Rumanian oil fields fell from a peak of 8.7 million tons in 1936 to 5.2 million tons in 1943, and the prevailing technical opinion was that they had passed their production peak. The point of departure of the current long-range plans is that the new oil fields in Albania, Czechoslovakia, and Hungary (and Austria as well) can be developed almost at will, and that the exhaustion of the oil fields in Rumania and Poland can be halted and that production can be stimulated. The satellite governments and the Soviet experts who manage most of the oil fields take for granted that they contain much untapped oil, and that it can and will be extracted. More effort than ever before is being expended in the search for new sources of oil and in full exploitation of the [185] existing wells. According to the Rumanian Five Year Plan about five million feet of new drilling will be made in 1955, while in the top production year of 1936 new drilling reached only one million feet.[81] According to the same plan Rumania will manufacture most of its own oil mining machinery and make the installations in its plants. Altogether the equivalent of 860 million dollars will be invested in the Rumanian oil industry in the course of the current plan.[82] As noted above, the oil production hitherto obtained does not seem to confirm such optimism, especially in view of the fact that since the summer of 1951 the situation in the Rumanian oil fields as well as in the others, has been much complicated by the food crisis.

371 To sum up: after consideration of all data pertaining to fuel and power production in the captive area of Europe, both actual and planned, the following conclusions can be made. If the satellite governments do not fundamentally revise their attitude towards labor, especially during the present food crisis, and unless rapid technical and organizational progress is attained in hard coal extraction, the coal shortage may develop into a bottle-

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tons of coke in 1952, 1,300,000 tons by 1953 and 1,700,000 tons by 1955 (speech of 31 October 1951, by Heinrich Rau, Eastern German minister of planning, *Wirtschaft*, Berlin, 1951, No. 44). However the rapidly growing requirements of the new Eastern German metallurgic plants cannot be satisfied by the two locally produced types of coke and a large importation of coke from Poland. In its four year trade agreement with the Soviet Union of 27 September 1951, the Eastern German government assured itself the importation of 250,000 tons of coke from Russia annually for the period 1952-1955 (*Wirtschaft*, Berlin, 1951, No. 42). 135 433

[15] An estimate of the writer, based on the assumption that most of the hard coal extracted in Eastern Germany and Hungary, as well as in Rumania, will be converted into coke. Thus, the huge steel plant at Dunapentele (Stalinváros) in Hungary, now under construction, is expected to be run on Hungarian produced coke, converted from the local Pécs coal. The demand for coke by that plant alone may exceed one million tons.

[16] *European Steel Trends*, United Nations, Geneva, 1949, p. 40.

[17] An unpublished study on Czechoslovak industry by Dr. V. Paulat of New York. 382

[18] National Economic Plan for 1951, *Dziennik Ustaw* (Journal of Laws), Warsaw, 31 March 1951.

[19] Heinrich Rau, speech of 31 October 1951, *Wirtschaft*, Berlin, 1951, No. 44.

[20] A conservative estimate of the writer.

[21] See the *Information Bulletin* of the Rumanian National Committee, Washington, for 1950 and 1951, and *La Nation Roumaine*, Paris, *passim*. 315 135

[22] Here are some of the non-quoted estimates: the *Review of International Affairs*, Belgrade, 28 March 1951 — 3.5 million tons; *World Today*, London, Royal Institute of International Affairs, April 1951 — 3.8 million; *Etudes et Conjonctures*, Paris, a semi-official publication, January-February 1951 — 4.3 million; *Gospodarka Planowa* (Planned Economy), Warsaw, February 1951 — 5.46 million tons. The Belgrade magazine is biased.

[23] The first figure comes from the Rumanian National Committee, *supra*, the second from Dr. G. G. Rosu.

[24] According to the *Wirtschaftsdienst*, Hamburg, June 1951, Albania planned to extract 306,000 tons of oil in 1950. According to Musil, the Albanian correspondent of *Wirtschaft* (Berlin, No. 48 of 30 November 1951), the Albanian extraction of oil reached 192,000 tons in 1948 and increased to 307,000 tons in 1950.

[25] Figures taken from recent official reports.

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[26] United Press from Vienna, quoted after *Anglo-Polish Review*, London, October 1951.

[27] An estimate of the writer, shared by some other researchers.

[28] Stalin's speech of 9 February 1946.

[29] United Nations *Statistical Yearbook*, New York, 1949-50, p. 145. This is no longer true. In 1945 pipelines were laid to convey natural gas from Rumania to the Soviet Union.

[30] Data for Rumania and Poland taken from the official reports on the fulfillment of the annual and quarterly plans.

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[31] Most of the data which follow are based upon Jean Chardonnet, *Les conséquences économiques de la guerre*, Paris, Hachette, 1947.

[32] J. A. Wilder, *Polish Regained Territories*, London, 1948.

[33] Dr. Paulat's study on the industrial development of Czechoslovakia, 1951.

[34] *Wirtschaft*, Berlin, *passim;* also advertisements in the Eastern German press.

[35] *Wirtschaft*, Berlin, 1951, No. 1.

[36] *Wirtschaft*, Berlin, 1951, No. 44 of November 2.

[37] See page 29.

[38] Speech of minister for planning, Dolanský, introducing the revised plan (end of February 1951).

[39] *Wirtschaft*, Berlin, 1951, No. 44 of November 2.

[40] Leuna plant employs 28,000 people, and is the greatest single plant in Eastern Germany. Karl Kühn (*Wirtschaft*, Berlin, 1951, No. 18) stated that Leuna could produce much more gasoline in 1950, because the installed capacity would permit such production, but that nitrogen-making had priority.

[41] Speech by Hilary Minc, *Trybuna Ludu*, Warsaw, 24 May 1951.

[42] United Nations *Statistical Yearbook*, New York, 1949-50. In 1937 Czechoslovakia produced 42,600 tons of benzol and Poland 31,100 tons; in 1936 Germany, outside the Bizone, produced 131,000 tons.

[43] *Ibidem*, p. 110.

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[44] Professor H. Herbich, quoted by S. Rotarski, "The Unexploited Resources of Europe," in *Eastern Quarterly*, London, January 1950. The four rivers are the Columbia, Colorado, Sacramento, and San Joaquin.

[45] Speech by Heinrich Rau on 31 October 1951. See footnote 14.

[46] *Trybuna Ludu*, Warsaw, 24 October 1951.

[47] Dr. V. Paulat. See footnote 17.

[48] Exhaustive data on that problem in *Wirtschaft*, Berlin, 1950, No. 51.

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[72] National Plan for 1951. 185

[73] *Wirtschaft*, Berlin, 1951, No. 21.

[74] Chardonnet. The German word is "Wärme-Ingenieure." 316

[75] *Ibidem.*

[76] *Wirtschaft*, Berlin, 1949, No. 13.

[77] The German technical word is "Abraum."

[78] Max Fritsch in *Wirtschaft*, Berlin, 1951, No. 32.

[79] Redmayne, *op. cit.* 315

[80] *Wirtschaft*, Berlin, 1951, No. 40.

[81] *Rumanian Information Bulletin*, Washington, 25 January 1951. 185

[82] *Ibidem.*

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As early as 1945, the Soviet Union began to negotiate trade agreements with all the Eastern European countries. 648 In the beginning these trade agreements were limited to the 439 determination of goods to be mutually delivered during a specific period of time. In time these trade agreements were replaced by more elaborate documents which established definite goals to be achieved in the exchange of commodities between the countries concerned. If the new treaties and agreements indicate anything, they indicate the primacy of economics in the Soviet outlook. This was but one means by which the preponderance of the Soviet Union in the area was assured.

Although the Council on Mutual Economic Assistance (Comecon) was announced to the world in 1949, it is not yet clear that complete economic integration exists. What is clear is a trend to make the various captive countries of the orbit dependent upon the Soviet Union, since the area does not possess half the basic raw materials that it needs. Thus while there is no economic integration of the satellites as a regional bloc, there is a tendency because of their need for raw materials for them to become part of one centralized Soviet system.

This system is best evidenced by the existence of joint or 315 mixed companies. In Rumania, the oil fields are owned by 439 a mixed Soviet-Rumanian company. In effect this means that the Soviets control Rumanian petroleum production. The Russian representatives on the company board control the majority of votes and are in a position to decide policies and production norms. In addition, the companies operate rent free, receive the highest priorities in labor, equipment and resources.

The extent of Soviet parasitism in Eastern Europe might 648 have remained a "state secret" had not the Yugoslavs di- 439 vulged it to the world. As the Yugoslav *White Book* so well documents, one of their major criticisms of the Soviet behavior arose from the negotiations over the so-called Soviet-

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COAL

All six major countries of the captive area possess their own hard coal, but more than 80 percent of the coal reserves of this entire region are concentrated in the Silesian (also called Silesian-Ostravan) coal basin, where it has been mined since the late eighteenth century in an ever increasing quantity. The Silesian coal basin is one of the four major basins in continental Europe: its prewar production was surpassed by that of the Ruhr basin, but in turn exceeded that of the Donets basin in the Ukraine and of the Franco-Belgian coal basin.

For political reasons, a planned exploitation of the Silesian coal basin had for a long time been impossible. Until 1914 it was divided by state boundaries between Germany (which possessed the most valuable part of it in Upper Silesia), Austro-Hungary (the Ostrava-Karvinna coal fields and the so-called Cracow basin), and Russia (the Dombrowa basin in Russian Poland). The interests of the three great powers were, to say the least, not parallel; moreover, ethnic frontiers between the Germans, the Poles and the Czechs crossed the basin and caused serious tension. After the first World War the Silesian basin was redistributed, somewhat more along ethnic lines, among Germany, Poland and Czechoslovakia, and as a result of that division new political difficulties arose among the three powers. The Germans claimed the part of Upper Silesia which became Polish, and the Poles the eastern part of the Karvinna field which was adjudged Czech. In 1938 the latter mines were transferred to Poland, and in 1939 both the Czech and Polish coal fields, including those of Cracow and Dombrowa, were forcibly incorporated into "Greater" Germany. Between 1939 and late 1944 the entire Silesian basin was administered from Berlin and run as one unit. During these years, particularly in 1943, the produc-

316 tivity of the basin achieved a level which has not been equalled since. It must be admitted, however, that during the last war the Nazis wantonly exploited the coal mines under martial law, with little regard for their future maintenance.

The Silesian coal basin, as such, suffered less damage from direct military action in 1944-1945 than from the strain on manpower, machinery, and installations during the years of war. In 1945 the whole of Upper Silesia was reunited with Poland. Its German population fled or was expelled westwards, while one million minority Poles were recognized as "autochthones" and stayed in Silesia. Since most of the coal miners in the formerly German western part of Upper Silesia belonged to that category, the mines could be worked without interruption. In 1945, too, the Kremlin adjudged the disputed eastern Karvinna mines to Czechoslovakia along the 1937 boundary. There are no Germans left either in Polish Silesia or in the Ostrava basin where they used to be numerous, but there are many Polish miners employed in the latter area. It should be stressed that the former German coal mines in Upper Silesia were situated not more than twenty miles from the prewar boundary, and that the Polish and Czech coal fields are not immediately contiguous. As a matter of course, the present division of the Silesian coal basin between the two Slav neighbors has far more justification from the technical point of view and may be regarded as stable.

[648] In 1947 the Warsaw and Prague governments agreed, in principle, to some measure of collaboration in coal mining, but no joint administration of the nationalized coal mines was created. It is possible that one of the difficulties was that the Poles produce in their part of the basin nearly four times as much coal as the Czechs in theirs, while any joint controlling body would have to be based on parity. In the last analysis, the coal policy of both Poland and Czechoslovakia in Silesia and elsewhere has been conducted since 1948 from Moscow, and there are Russian "advisers" with controlling power in Silesia as well as in all secondary coal basins of the captive area.

The level and character of the coal output in Silesia has always

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THE LEVEL AND CHARACTER OF THE COAL OUTPUT IN SILESIA HAS ALWAYS 316 433

been closely linked with political factors, which will continue to be of great importance in the future.

The peak production of the entire Silesian-Ostravan coal basin was reached under the German administration in 1943, when it yielded about 106 million tons of coal.[2] The decline of extraction began in 1944 and in 1945. With military operations being conducted in the basin itself, and the Red occupation gradually extending westward with all its overwhelming legal, administrative, and social consequences, the working of the mines was so disturbed that the basin produced only about 26 million tons. Since early 1946, however, the rise in production has been very rapid, particularly in Polish Silesia. The restoration of the productivity of the basin between 1946 and 1948 almost to its prewar level must be recognized as a remarkable technical and organizational achievement. The efficiency of the coal miners could not be raised to its prewar level (a characteristic feature of Communist economy) and the loss of many skilled miners, in particular those of German nationality, had to be made good by replacing them by scores of thousands of new, inexperienced men. The real difficulties began when the Warsaw and Prague governments were assigned the task of reaching the wartime peak of coal extraction and exceeding it within the frame of the Czech Five Year Plan and the Polish Six Year Plan. Even so the output of the mines kept growing, though at a slower rate, and in 1950 reached about 87 million tons (73 million tons in the Polish and 14 million tons in the Czech part of the basin), an increase over the 1937 figure.[3] Late in 1950 coal mining in the Ostravan part of the basin met with serious difficulties due to the shortage of manpower: the Czechs, like the French, and lately the British, dislike being coal miners. In the middle of 1951 these difficulties spread to the Polish part of the basin in the wake of food shortages. The subject is discussed in more detail later in this study.

According to the long-term plans, the output of the Silesian basin is expected to exceed the 1943 peak and to reach at least about 112 and perhaps as much as 118 million tons: 92 to 95

316 433 million tons in Poland by 1955, and 20 to 23 million tons in Czechoslovakia by 1953. It can be assumed in advance that every effort will be made to fulfill the Polish plan ahead of schedule, probably by the end of 1954.

The Silesian coal fields are the basic source of hard fuel for the captive area as such and in particular for the two countries which share the basin. But there are in captive Europe a number of minor coal fields spread over this area outside of Silesia, whose joint output represents about one sixth of captive Europe's total production of coal. Even though their 1950 production did not exceed 14 million tons, the secondary coal basins of captive Europe are of decisive importance for such branches of industrial activity as cannot use lignite profitably as hard fuel, and because of their geographical location. In particular, a dozen or more iron and steel plants in Eastern Germany, Western Bohemia, Hungary, and Rumania, situated outside the Silesian-Ostravan basin or even far from it, largely depend on the supply of local coal in their operations.

Among these minor coal basins the following should be noted:

1. The Lower Silesian coal basin in Poland on the northern slopes of the Sudeten Mountains, also known as the Wałbrzych (Waldenberg) basin, with a present output of about 5 million tons of high grade coking coal;

2. The Zwickau-Oelsnitz basin in Saxony, with a present output of roughly 3 million tons;

3. The four minor coal producing areas in Bohemia (Kladno, Plzeň, Trutnov and Rosice basins) with a present joint output of some 4 million tons;

4. Several minor coal fields in Hungary, Rumania, and Bulgaria, with a total present output of about 2 million tons of hard coal.[4]

Since 1949 great efforts have been made to increase the production of these minor basins up to a joint level of approximately 20 million tons of coal at the end of the current long-range economic plans. Judging by the indices of production published by the satellite governments, the progress in these coal fields

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is uneven. The best performance to date has been that of the Saxon basin; the Hungarian and Rumanian output, though lagging behind the inflated annual plans, is described as growing rapidly; the Lower Silesian basin in Poland, where huge investments in machinery are being made, is apparently working in a satisfactory way; the secondary Czech coal fields were in the fall of 1951 several percent behind the prescribed targets.[5] The food crisis of 1951 is having a pronounced adverse effect upon the productivity of the minor Czech and Hungarian coal basins and may lessen that of the Lower Silesian and Rumanian mines. It may be assumed that if all these minor coal basins are capable of much development and extension, only some of them will be able to fulfill on schedule the very high quotas of production set by Moscow.

To sum up, at the end of the present long-range plans, that is on the average by the end of 1954 or beginning of 1955, the entire extraction of coal in all the basins of the captive area is expected to reach about 133 million tons and possibly a few million more.[6] This global target exceeds the prewar output of the Ruhr basin, and is equal to the output of the Soviet Union in 1938; it would be very much larger than the present output of the Donets basin in the Ukraine, estimated at less than 100 million tons.[7] The target of 133.5 million tons can also be compared to the output of bituminous coal in Pennsylvania in 1942 which reached 143 million tons.

"The output of coal increased in 1950 by 5 percent in comparison with that of 1949. Industrial production as such increased by 30.8 percent in comparison with 1949. It follows that industry grows far more rapidly than the production of fuel. At the same time, railroad transportation increases more rapidly than the output of coal. The demand of the market for coal as domestic fuel is also increasing . . . in 1950, the consumption of domestic coal was nearly 3.5 times as large as prewar. . . . At the same time, the demand for coal for exportation remains unchanged. . . . In that situation, the problem of increasing the output of coal, of fulfilling and overfulfilling the plan, must become one of the central issues of our work in 1951." This quotation comes from a speech of Hilary Minc, the economic master of Poland, which he delivered in February 1951, to introduce the economic plan for 1951.[67] There is no doubt that these words apply equally well to Czechoslovakia and all the other captive countries. 371

Probably the best economic brain behind the Iron Curtain, Minc realizes very well the danger of the situation. In his speech he offered a number of remedies: new investments (*i.e.*, new mines), higher mechanization and increased efficiency in organization and labor. There is no doubt, again, that as long as the discrepancy between the supply of coal and the demand for it by industry and transport remains the only reason for worry by the Polish or any other satellite government, these measures, which are already being applied, can improve the performance of the mines and increase the output of coal. Statistics show that output has been increasing in Poland by about 4 million tons per annum (1948: 70 million tons; 1949: 74 million; 1950: 78 million tons). But this rate of increase appears to be insufficient. Unless it can be accelerated, the target of 100 million tons of coal by 1955 (in practice, by 1954) will not be achieved. Moreover, even if this goal should be achieved, the planned output would not cover the demand as described by Minc. [185]

It is a fact that even if the Communist economy functions at an optimum "normal" level the efficiency of labor in coal mining 316

316 and oil extracting cannot be raised above a certain point, lower than that of the prewar period, whatever the achievements in other branches in industry. Polish coal miners were the best in Europe: in 1937 the per capita production of coal was 0.8 tons daily in France and Belgium, 1.2 tons in Great Britain, 1.6 tons in Holland, 1.5 tons in Germany, and 1.8 tons in Poland; that of Polish Silesia was 2.0 tons daily.[68] Since the last war, despite great efforts, moral persuasion and flattery, and the bonuses, uniforms and medals with which the Warsaw government has cajoled the coal miners, at the same time threatening them with police reprisals, the individual productivity of the coal miners has never reached its prewar level. The postwar per capita production in Poland has never exceeded 75 to 80 percent of prewar figures,[69] and until the crisis of 1951 that level could have been regarded as more or less fixed. The performance of the Czech, Hungarian, and Rumanian coal miners has been, if anything, lower.

Even before the present crisis, since human nature cannot be influenced beyond a certain point, the satellite governments knew that they must replace the ineffective men by effective machinery. In this they have followed the experience of the Soviet Union, which for years had been suffering from the fluidity and inefficiency of labor in mining. There is much to be done in this respect. All over the captive area many mines are technically obsolete and not sufficiently mechanized, and production continues to depend in the last analysis on the human element. In these mines new methods of production are being introduced. Underground traction is being electrified, transmission belts installed, and machinery for winding and hoisting, sizing and washing is being introduced. Soviet mechanical coal cutters, the so-called Donbas coal combines, are expected gradually to replace the more antiquated methods of coal cutting.[70]

185 316 The best possibility for the satellite governments to increase the output of coal lies in the expected production of the new "scientific" coal mines which are being built in the course of the present long-range plans. Within its Six Year Plan

Poland alone anticipates the construction of eleven large mines 185
with a total annual output of 9 million tons of coal, and 36 exten- 316
sions of the existing mines with an output of 14 million tons. Of the former, 8 mines are presently under construction, each of them expected to produce 6 to 10 thousand tons of coal daily.[71] More money was invested in Polish coal mining in 1950 than during the years 1945-49 inclusive, and the 1951 investment is far larger than that of 1950.[72] Similar investments in the other captive countries are being made with increasing rapidity.

While the output of coal has been stimulated by all these 316
methods, efforts are being made to restrain the consumption of coal and to insure more efficient utilization. Since the middle of 1950, saving coal, in particular coal of good quality, has become one of the basic aims of the captive area's economy. The daily press eulogizes engineers and technicians who manage to operate factories and run trains on minimum quantities of coal or on low grade coal. All over the captive area, railroads and industrial plants substitute lignite or coal waste for hard coal fuel. In Soviet Berlin alone, the substitution of lignite for coal at the Klingenberg power plant will result in the saving of 500,000 tons of hard coal per annum.[73] At the same time electrification is being speeded up, since it will result in a lesser expenditure of fuel. During the last war, when the Nazis were faced with a grave fuel shortage, the "heat-engineers"[74] charged with this problem by the minister of armaments, Speer, introduced far-reaching improvements in the exploitation of the hydroelectric and thermal plants and saved up to 50 percent of the fuel and current.[75] Many of these men are available behind the Iron Curtain and, together with their colleagues from the other captive countries and with Soviet advisers, they are doing their best to wring the most they can from the local resources. When Selbmann, minister of heavy industry, states that the Eastern German thermal plants have reached the outside limit of load capacity,[76] the statement must be taken at its face value.

This analysis of the situation seems to lead to the conclusion 316
that under "normal" conditions the Communist regimes of cap- 433

316 tive Middle Europe can gradually increase their output of coal,
433 and thus can assure a constant growth of their basic source of industrial energy. Much progress in that direction can be made through high investments and multiple technical improvements, as well as by better organization of production. But the "normal" conditions presuppose that the targets for coal output remain within the range of feasibility and the miners are assured of a minimum acceptable standard of living. In the course of 1951, either one or both of these conditions were not kept by most of the satellite governments, and the planned output of coal is at present exposed to considerable danger.

In February-March 1951, under relentless pressure from Moscow, the Czechoslovak and Hungarian governments were forced to decree a notable speed-up of their long-range industrial plans, equivalent to boosting their annual quotas of production from the beginning of 1951. The Czech 1953 target for coal has been increased from 20.8 to 25 million tons and that of lignite from 32.2 to 38.6 million; the Hungarian 1954 target for both coal and lignite from 24.2 to 27.5 million tons. *Ipso facto,* the annual targets for 1951, 1952, and future years, have been boosted accordingly. Since the old targets were already high, it is perfectly legitimate to doubt whether these new plans can be fulfilled in time. In the light of recent statistical data, Czech coal mining is fulfilling the old plan but not the inflated new one. The same seems to be true in Hungary.

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466 Quite apart from the real or apparent unfeasibility of the two coal plans in question, the recent acute food shortage in most of the captive area (except in Eastern Germany and possibly Bulgaria) has resulted, since the early fall of 1951, in an appreciable lowering of the standard of living of all industrial workers, and of coal miners in particular. The reasons for this food shortage are many: one of them is a long period of drought in most of the captive area and the consequent loss of much of the potato crop, the staple food of the population. Even if the bread grain crops were satisfactory, the shortage of potatoes would be a major calamity for men and animals alike, and by

itself would lead to a shortage of meat, especially pork. This 433
current emergency caught the satellite governments unprepared, 511
the more so because they had been stripping their countries of 466
foodstuffs by military stockpiling, sending vast amounts of meat, sugar, and other staples to Russia and Red China, and antagonizing the peasant producers of food by ever increasing taxes, supply quotas, and other forms of persecution and chicanery. The net consequence of such policies and practices is that in many industrial areas of captive Middle Europe the people have had very little meat since the summer of 1951. Their supply of sugar, vegetables, and potatoes has also been very short. The Polish, Czech, Hungarian, and Rumanian coal miners were already badly housed, badly clothed, and overworked. Now they are also badly fed, and they may be — or actually are — incapable of working as much as is expected. The lowered efficiency of the miners means less coal and less coal means in turn less electric power, less machinery, and less chemicals. A shortage of fuel may be equivalent to a nonfulfillment of industrial targets all over the four countries in question.

Statistical data naturally lag behind the real situation in industry. At the end of 1951 the available statistical figures were not yet fully reflecting the most serious consequences of the food crisis. However, they were indicative of a trend toward a depression in coal mining.

In Poland the coal target for the third quarter of 1951 was 316 ●
not fulfilled, and the actual production was only 2 percent higher 433
than a year before, instead of the expected 5 to 6 percent. During the first half of 1951 coal extraction in Rumania was nearly 8 percent behind the plan, although it was claimed to be 26 percent above the output during the corresponding period of 1950. In the same period in Hungary coal was 6 percent behind the schedule, although again production was claimed to be 22 percent higher than 1950. In Czechoslovakia the slump in coal production was much more pronounced. It began by a temporary failure of production towards the end of 1950; even though it was overcome, the Czech government found itself unable

316 433 to supply adequate supplementary manpower to the coal mines. In the third quarter of 1951 the joint coal and lignite plan was fulfilled only by 91 percent. Lignite mining was more or less satisfactory, but coal mining (in particular in the important Ostrava-Karvinna coal basin) was actually on the verge of a possible breakdown; by the end of October 1951, Czech coal production was 1.3 million tons behind schedule. Eastern Germany alone was implementing its coal plan.

[466] Faced with a direct threat to their planning, the satellite governments took, towards the end of 1951, a series of harsh steps. Their object was to assure higher wages and a better diet for the coal miners and to prevent the increasing absenteeism and bad discipline in the mines, as well as the increasing fluidity of manpower (in particular in Czechoslovakia and Hungary). Under the impact of these measures, the production curve in the all-important Silesian-Ostravan coal basin went upwards again in November and December 1951. It is possible that the Polish coal target for 1951 (somewhat above 83 million tons) was reached before the end of the year. It is doubtful, however, that the Czech target was reached. In the first weeks of 1952 it is too early to say whether this new production rise is temporary or permanent. It depends very largely on the supply of foodstuffs. The police states have at their disposal many effective methods of dealing with critical situations, but they cannot produce foodstuffs at will. It took the Soviet government years to overcome a similar situation in the Donets basin coal mining.

316 The production of lignite in the captive area is far less difficult for the satellite governments, in particular for Eastern Germany, which mines several times more lignite than all the other countries of Middle Europe combined. The explanation lies in the technique of extraction. The deposits of lignite generally lie close to the surface of the ground and can be worked by stripping and scraping from open mines, or they are covered by a shallow overburden[77] that must be removed before the mineral can be mined, as is true of some coal deposits in the United States. Only one fortieth of the nearly unlimited reserves of lignite in Eastern

Germany (in particular in Saxon Lusace, or Lausitz) has to be 316 mined from deep pits; the rest of it, lying on the surface or in shallow strata up to a depth of 165 feet, can be worked from open mines.[78] The main difficulty lies in removing and carrying away the overburden of soil, sand, and gravel; at present this sometimes amounts to as much as 12 to 15 times the volume of lignite extracted. Unlike those of coal, many lignite seams are very thick.

Most of the shallow strata of lignite are gradually being exhausted, and the ratio of overburden to lignite is slowly but surely increasing. However, many difficult technical and social problems of coal mining do not apply to lignite mining in the northern part of the captive area. This is also true, though not to the same extent, in Hungary and Rumania. The extraction of lignite, in particular in Eastern Germany, does not depend so much on an adequate supply of skilled miners as on machinery, and can be speeded up in proportion to the investment in mechanical excavators and transportation.[79] During the last war the Nazis stepped up the output of lignite by machinery and were able to cover huge requirements for electric power as well as for synthetic oil and rubber. Under present circumstances, the planned quotas for lignite in Eastern Germany and possibly Czechoslovakia can be met assumedly without too much difficulty. This may also be true for some deposits in the southern captive countries. Consequently, thermal electric plants in a large part of the captive area seem to be assured of a sufficient amount of fuel. It is true that hitherto lignite could not have been used in smelting, but the huge iron and steel "West-Kombinat" under construction at Calbe-on-the-Saale in Sachsen-Anhalt will be working exclusively on lignite.[80]

The oil production of the captive area depends on factors 315 which are difficult to assess. The reserves of coal in the area are for all practical purposes unlimited, and new investments in coal and lignite mining, together with a propitiatory attitude towards labor, will always result in more coal being extracted. The pro-

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FOOTNOTES

[1] Hilary Minc, *A Fruitful Collaboration of Free Peoples*, quoted after *Pravda*, Moscow, by *Zycie Gospodarcze* (Economic Life), Warsaw, 1951, No. 19. Minc states that, in comparison with 1938, the total industrial output in the first half of 1951 reached 165 percent in Czechoslovakia, 208 percent in Rumania, 268 percent in Poland, 273 percent in Hungary and 335 percent in Bulgaria, while that of Albania reached 423 percent in 1950. The 1938 level of the industrial output in the Soviet zone of Germany was exceeded towards the end of 1950, and by the middle of 1951 might have reached 115 percent of the 1938 production. 113 121

[2] Jean Chardonnet, *Les conséquences économiques de la guerre*, Paris, Hachette, 1947. [113]

[3] No detailed exact figures of the coal output in the Silesian-Ostravan basin can be given. It is not easy to distinguish it statistically from the global data of output in Poland and Czechoslovakia, both of which have coal mines outside of that basin. The annual and long-range plans of all captive countries are based only upon such global data and do not make distinction between the production of individual basins. 316 443

[4] Hungarian, Rumanian and Bulgarian statistics do not make sufficient distinction between black and brown coal. Figures concerning the coal output in these three countries are estimated according to the ratio between the output of the two kinds of coal as known from previous statistics. That ratio is supposed to be constant.

[5] During the third quarter of 1951 the plan for coal extraction in Eastern Germany was not entirely fulfilled, yet output increased by 11.5 percent in comparison with the corresponding quarter of 1950 (*Wirtschaft*, Berlin, 1951, No. 43). The minor Czech coal basins were by the end of September 1951, about 150,000 tons, *i.e.*, some 3 or 4 percent behind the prescribed target (speech by Premier Zápotocký, *Rude Pravo*, Prague, 1 November 1951). The Hungarian coal and lignite mines were 6 percent behind the plan for the second quarter of 1951, and 10 percent behind that for the third quarter (*Nepszava*, Budapest, 23 October 1951); yet an official report claimed that in the second quarter of 1951 the output of both black and brown coal exceeded by 22 percent that of the second quarter of 1950 (*Gospodarka Planowa*, Warsaw, 1951, No. 9); the Tatabánya black coal mines were responsible for almost half the coal deficit (speech by Rakosi, *Nepszava*, 23 October 1951). In Rumania the situation was apparently somewhat

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more favorable: although the output of black and brown coal was also lagging behind schedule, its extraction in the second quarter of 1951 was claimed to have exceeded that of the second quarter of 1950 by 26 percent (*Gospodarka Planowa*, 1951, No. 10). No detailed data are known for coal extraction in Bulgaria.

[6] 100 million tons (according to some indirect indices, 103 million) in Poland, 25 million in Czechoslovakia, 3.5 million in Eastern Germany, about 3 million in Hungary, about one million in Rumania, and about 0.5 million in Bulgaria. The Eastern German target, originally set at 4 million tons, was subsequently reduced to 3.5 million tons (the Law of 1 November 1951, *Wirtschaft*, Berlin, 1951, No. 44) — the only known instance of this kind. Yet various utterances of the chief planners in Poland and Rumania, and of Eastern Germany as well, leave little doubt that the long-range economic plans of these countries, supposed to terminate by the end of 1955, will be accelerated by one year, as has already happened with the Czechoslovak and Hungarian plans. In anticipation of that step, the writer assumes throughout his study that the figures of planned output in Eastern Germany, Poland, and Rumania in 1955 in fact pertain to 1954. An arbitrary but plausible figure of one million tons increase in the coal output in Czechoslovakia has been accepted for 1954 in comparison with the output planned for 1953.

[7] London *Economist*, 24 February 1951. According to the Soviet Fourth Five Year Plan, that figure should have been 86 million tons. Since the plan was overfulfilled, it was probably larger.

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[8] Most of the descriptive data on lignite comes from an exhaustive study by Sir Richard Redmayne, *Encyclopædia Britannica*, 1943, Vol. V. p. 878 ff.

[9] United Nations, Geneva, 1950, p. 231.

[10] Redmayne, *op. cit.*

[11] In its original version of 1950 the Eastern German Five Year Plan foresaw a production of 205 million tons of lignite by 1955. The new figure of 225.2 million tons in 1955 comes from the revised version of the plan as adoped in the law of 1 November 1951, (*Wirtschaft*, Berlin, No. 44, 2 November 1951).

[12] The first figure is based on the indices of the coal production in 1951 in comparison with the preceding years, as published by the Soviet press. The second comes from Stalin's speech of 9 February 1946.

[13] In his speech of 7 November 1951, Beria stated that in the course of the past several years the output of coal in the Soviet Union has been growing on the average of 24 million tons per year. (*Pravda*, 7 November 1951).

[14] The vast Lauchhammer lignite coking plant now under construction (and possibly some other new plants) is expected to produce 300,000

377 1. It may be taken for granted that every effort will be made to fulfill the Eastern German, Polish, and Rumanian plans one year ahead of schedule, that is, by the end of 1954 or beginning of 1955.

2. It may be expected that, having fulfilled its plan for power by the end of 1951, Bulgaria will launch a new plan which may aim at an output of about one billion *kwh* more by the end of 1954 or the beginning of 1955 — an entirely justified supposition.

3. It is true that the output of 16.5 billion *kwh* which Czechoslovakia plans to reach in 1955 cannot be accepted as its target for 1954 or beginning of 1955, and a much lower figure should be taken instead.

4. But the larger Bulgarian and the lower Czechoslovakian figure may compensate one another, especially if a lower figure of the Hungarian output in 1954 (6,000 million *kwh* instead of 6,500 million) is accepted as the basis for the tentative computation.

Under the circumstances the writer regards the mere arithmetic sum of the six national targets, equivalent to more or less 82 billion *kwh*, as an entirely acceptable hypothesis: the margin of error should not exceed one billion *kwh*.

[60] Harry Schwartz, *New York Times*, 23 January 1951.

[61] Estimates of the writer.

371 [62] *Economic Survey of Europe in 1949*, United Nations, Geneva, 1950, p. 231.

[63] 82 billion *kwh* represent the equivalent of somewhat over 50 million tons of coal (1,590 *kwh* equivalent to one ton of coal, see footnote 62). This figure corresponds to a general figure for Europe; see p. 12 of the same *Survey*.

[64] Estimates of the writer.

[65] Silesian coal has been exported for generations, and trade in it flourished between the two World Wars. Industrial production and railroad transportation in the countries named depend to some extent on the specific technical quality of Polish coal.

[66] 800 million *kwh* from Hamburg and West Berlin, according to *Wirtschaftsrevue*, Karlsruhe, 15 December 1950. See also footnote 14.

371 [67] *Trybuna Ludu*, Warsaw, 1951, No. 53.

433 [68] *Statistical Yearbook of Poland*, 1939, p. 239; also *European Steel*
316 *Trends*, United Nations, Geneva, 1949, p. 51.

[69] Evaluation by Alfred Zauberman, *Dziennik Polski*, London, 1951.

[70] The production of the Donbas combines began in 1951 at the Piotrowice plant of heavy mining machinery in Poland (*Wirtschaft*, Berlin, 1951, No. 32) and in at least one of the corresponding plants in Czechoslovakia.

185 [71] *Trybuna Ludu*, Warsaw, 1951, No. 160.

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[72] National Plan for 1951. 185

[73] *Wirtschaft*, Berlin, 1951, No. 21. 316

[74] Chardonnet. The German word is "Wärme-Ingenieure."

[75] *Ibidem.*

[76] *Wirtschaft*, Berlin, 1949, No. 13.

[77] The German technical word is "Abraum."

[78] Max Fritsch in *Wirtschaft*, Berlin, 1951, No. 32.

[79] Redmayne, *op. cit.* 315

[80] *Wirtschaft*, Berlin, 1951, No. 40.

[81] *Rumanian Information Bulletin*, Washington, 25 January 1951. 185

[82] *Ibidem.*

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000 held this poor, often stricken community in thrall was different from that which the Christian peasant nursed at his fireside, with his children and his beasts about him, the words with which it was conjured up were very often the same for both. Love the Lord, thy God; love thy neighbor as thou dost thyself —the affection so hard to find in the daily street, but longed for even more earnestly, desperately than a dear woman is desired, seemed for the moment to have been ushered in over the sagging thresholds. . . . And then, of course, the Sabbath would end and the bitterness would return, and Leah would stand in the street to see the Gentile curse her children. Yet even so there was a bond between the spurner and the spurned. They knew in their hearts that they were all God's children, dirty and dissolute children, but they were certain they had a place to go home to, come the eve of the Lord's Day.

● 346 794 In any event, the general character of the Church and its activities in Central and Eastern Europe was formed historically by the dramatic tension between mass tendencies and leadership. In Austria-Hungary religious institutions grew rich and powerful, sometimes paying for their prosperity with a measure of undue dependence on the Habsburg state. Even now, in a drab time, the traveler through Austria will look with admiration on the great monasteries—St. Peter in Salzburg, Melk on the Danube, St. Florian, Klosterneuburg on a hill above Vienna, and many others—which outdo in splendor manorial castles and are surrounded by rich lands. These were centers of humanistic education, and numerous merited tributes have been paid to them. And in many another place, urban or rural, the Church owned important properties amassed through the generosity of the faithful or received through royal donation. In every part of the Empire, church bells rang rich and deep, even when the piety to which they appealed was woefully superficial.

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000 put and are without value unless properly interpreted. These statistics should not be rejected outright, but should be juxtaposed with the mass of evidence available from other sources, and then interpreted. It would be misleading to accept blindly every report on life behind the Iron Curtain, whether brought by refugees, published in the exile press, or found in letters
204 coming from that area. The Communist press tries to suppress most adverse information but there are limits to such a policy. If the Iron Curtain papers complain about any material shortage or attack any given material situation, it is a sure sign that the situation has become unbearable for the citizens.

• 362 On the basis of joint interpretation of the press, private information, and statistical data, the following picture of the economic and social conditions of the captive nations may be formed. The housing situation is bad and probably getting worse because, however large the current building project may be, it cannot provide homes for all those living in the existing deteriorating dwellings and because the building cannot keep up with the rapid increase of urban populations. New apartment houses are jerry-built and in need of constant repair, and the family of a privileged worker or technician will be happy if his services are recompensed by a flat of two rooms with kitchenette and shower. The great urban masses are housed much below this level. The housing problem has not been solved in Russia outside of Moscow. There is no reason to believe it has been solved in Eastern Europe. It will take a dozen or more years to rebuild the war-destroyed cities of East Berlin, Dresden, Budapest, Warsaw, Danzig, Stettin, and Breslau, to mention only a few, and, even when these cities are restored, the quality of the new construction will almost certainly be inferior to that of the prewar years. According to the United Nations, the rate of new construction behind the Iron Curtain is several times slower than it is in Scandinavia, Britain, and Western Germany. Domestic

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commodities, such as kitchen equipment and furniture, are 362 rare and expensive, above the means of an average family, and modern house appliances are hardly known at all. A private car is an extreme rarity and will remain so within the foreseeable future since few passenger cars are being manufactured and almost none imported.

As far as food is concerned, there is much truth in the 262 Communist assertion that with the rapid increase of city [369] populations the production of foodstuffs lags behind the growing demand. Figures for food production in this area do not indicate the amount of consumption, since much of the food produced is stocked as army and war reserve or exported to Russia and China. The true situation is that while there is no actual hunger most of the population is fed at standards far below those of Western Europe. The diet is monotonous, consisting largely of bread, noodles, cereals, potatoes, common vegetables, and puddings, to judge from advice given to housewives by women's publications. Protective foods are fewer than before the war though probably more evenly distributed. Before the war, in the poorer parts of the area, the urban unemployed and millions of so-called dwarf-sized farm holders were as a rule underfed. Today the unemployed have disappeared, but the inmates of the labor camps are starving, and the poor peasants are no better off than before. The families living on middle-sized farms consume more food than before the war, because an incentive for selling produce is lacking.

The caloric value of foodstuffs consumed by the working population in the cities has, if anything, decreased. At home, families eat what the British used to eat a few years ago, but they have less of it. The quality of food consumed in the public eating places maintained by factories and the like is described as extremely bad, and so is the service. Standing in food lines, often in vain, consumes a large part of the housewife's time. This, added to the difficulty of cooking be-

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brought great pressure to bear upon the urban technicians to go 665
to the villages to improve the technical facilities available for the 369
farms; and simultaneously, strenuous efforts have been made to 463
strengthen the Party organization in the villages. "The situation cannot be tolerated," complained the Hungarian Party organ, *Szabad Nep* in December 1953, "in which skilled and well-educated agricultural experts work in agriculture only in small numbers, and the greater part is engaged in administrative work."[26]

The administrative weakness of the State in the countryside was also evident from the inferior quality of the personnel employed in rural posts. "Not one of the managers of the Machine and Tractor Stations," the Czechoslovak Minister of Agriculture, Jindrich Uher, revealed, "has a higher-school education and only 3.5 per cent have had a secondary education." Moreover, only 10 per cent of the senior agronomists at the MTS had a higher education, and only three per cent of the State Farm workers had completed work at technical schools.[27] Such were conditions in the most modernized of the Satellite nations; undoubtedly, they were much worse elsewhere.

In Poland, for example, an official analysis, based on "incomplete data," revealed that in its 402 Machine and Tractor Stations there were 76 directors, 72 political leaders, 101 senior agronomists, and 101 senior mechanics who had no qualifications for their jobs whatsoever![28] No doubt it was this wretched situation which explains the recent feverish efforts of the Polish Government to train vast numbers of agricultural experts for immediate service as part of its New Course for Agriculture.

But even if the Communists succeed in increasing the output of farm technicians, two serious problems inherent in the system remain. First of all, there is the tendency of these technicians to attach themselves to the central ministerial apparatus from which so much wealth and prestige is derived in the totalitarian state. Secondly, the technicians who have been dispatched to the countryside are burdened with a host of responsibilities unrelated to the task for which they were trained — that is, the endless paper work of Communist bureaucracy. Resolutions, orders, decrees, receipts, dossiers follow each other in an endless succession, requiring immense expenditure of time and effort, and multiplying as the farm

[26] *Szabad Nep* (Budapest), December 4, 1953.
[27] *Rude Pravo* (Prague), December 19, 1953.
[28] *Nowe Drogi* (Warsaw), January, 1954, p. 73.

666 369 463 apparatus grows. When the introduction of the New Course in 1953 made agricultural improvement imperative, the seriousness of this bureaucratic delay and confusion became the subject of frequent attack by Communist orators, confirming the judgment of a prominent American student of Communist agricultural life who wrote:

> When you read . . . of the remarkable increase in the number of agronomists and other agricultural specialists and technicians in the Soviet Union, remember that many of them are not engaged, or do not spend much of their time, in research or extension or other technical work, but are trying to cope with the vast amount of bureaucratic paper work required by the Soviet system.[29]

The recurrent drives to "deflate the ranks of the farm bureaucracy" have not generally, according to this same expert, proved successful.

407 241 An additional measure of the long-standing Communist reluctance to divert national resources to agricultural development is to be found in the relatively lethargic pace of farm mechanization. While it is true (see Table 23) that an increase in the mechanization of the "Socialist sector" did accompany collectivization, the increase was by no means as great as popularly pictured, and was not even as great, proportionally, as the increase which accompanied Soviet collectivization in the early thirties. Since one of the stock justifications of large-scale collectivized farming was, and remains, its alleged capacity to exploit modern farm machinery, the failure of the Communists to supply the farms with adequate machinery indicated the degree to which this Communist argument was a rationalization for a policy of exploitation.

Since the broad Russian plains are more adaptable to use of farm machinery, especially large tractors and combines, comparisons with Eastern Europe and its more broken terrain are not altogether apt. However, it should be noted that the Soviet Union provides a higher proportion of tractors to its farms than do the East European Communist regimes. As indicated in Table 23, there were approximately 107,500 tractors in service in Eastern Europe in 1952-53, compared with approximately 45,000 four years earlier. During the four years of collectivization, then, the tractor park in Eastern Europe was increased by only 62,500. In the USSR, on the other hand, over 100,000 tractors were produced in the year 1936 alone,[30] far fewer than was needed, but far greater proportionately than in Eastern Europe.

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[29] Lazar Volin, "Russia's Agricultural Potential," *Foreign Agriculture*, October, 1953, p. 179.
[30] Harry Schwartz, p. 243.

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795 Greek Orthodox Church, which though united in its Uniate form with Rome, preserved its old language and customs. This Church became the target of special Russian propagandistic and repressive efforts as soon as the Iron Curtain was established.

565 Elsewhere outside the former realm of the Habsburgs the
795 situation was comparable. In Poland a Catholic peasantry
● 369 whose loyalty was deeply moving lived confidently though primitively in the light of a mystical faith, while worldliness and skepticism were prevalent among the upper classes. It was commonly said there, after World War I, that the most religious of peoples was governed by the most morally lax of bureaucrats; and that may well have been the case. Nor could the coming of industrialism to such mushroom cities as Lodz, so bitterly lamented by Ladislas Reymont, bring about the immediate solution of any grave social problem. Nevertheless, as we shall see, there existed in Poland religious elites of extraordinary quality and dedication. In eastern Germany, overwhelmingly Protestant despite certain vigorous centers of Catholic activity such as the Ermland in East Prussia and the border districts west of Poznan (Silesia was a province apart, its culture having been developed under the Habsburgs), one could go from the old conservative, rural Church communities of the landed estates along the Baltic Sea to the liberal atmosphere of Saxony, where the social problems inherent in modern industrial society dominated thought and action. Concerning the Balkans one need say here only that, though they suffered from the normal diseases of feudalism, they offered much of vital and absorbing interest to the student of religious life.

175 These observations will help to explain the situation which
186 followed the First World War. The old Austro-Hungarian Empire was dissolved, and dissident nationalist sentiment, supported by the will of the victorious Allies, demanded the crea-

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out of the 8,000 workers are Party members, only 780 read the Party newspaper. (*For a Lasting Peace, For a People's Democracy*! 15th October, 1948). Thus a large number of workers are merely nominal members of the Party. 466

The large-scale 'purges' in the Parties also express the increasing hostility between the leaders and their 'supporters'. In the 'purge' in Hungary nearly half a million members were expelled from the Party. In Czechoslovakia, there was a 'purge' of a quarter of a million members in 1948 and the first half of 1949. In Rumania, 'over 192,000 hostile elements', that is, over a fifth of the total membership of the Party, were 'purged' between November, 1948, and May, 1950. In Bulgaria, 92,500 members and candidates, out of a total of 442,183, were expelled from the Party between June, 1949 and June, 1950. 468

While the workers within the 'People's Democracies' cannot express their dissatisfaction through the police-controlled plebiscites, miscalled general elections, those on the other side of the frontier, who are close enough to know the reality of the regime inside the 'People's Democracies', and free enough to express their opinion of it—as in Austria and Berlin—have decisively shown their disapproval.

The Expropriation of the Peasantry

The parvenu ruling class in Eastern Europe, in order to add to its wealth and comfort, devotes all its energy to increasing the number of workers employed in state industries. Hence it comes into conflict with the masses of the peasantry. 369

As has been pointed out, the progress of agriculture in the Eastern European countries depends on their industrialisation. Their inherited backwardness, their separation from Western Europe by the division of the Continent into two spheres of influence, Russian imperialist exploitation, the greed of the local bureaucracy—all these factors impede the accumulation of capital, necessary for industrialisation. Had industry already existed on a big scale, the countryside would voluntarily have supplied agricultural products to the urban population in exchange for industrial products, and would also have supplied the necessary labour power for industry, as the surplus population would have been attracted to the towns by their higher

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● 369 standard of life and culture. Conversely, if the village supplied the agricultural products and labour necessary for the towns, industrialisation would have been much accelerated. These two conditions are mutually dependent. But the bureaucracy cannot tolerate a gradual development of agriculture and industry, and prefers to try to escape from the vicious circle by forced 'collectivisation'.

423 All previous land reforms had, for a number of years at
474 least, the effect not only of not increasing the agricultural surpluses available for the towns, but actually of reducing them. This is because large estates, based either on tenants' or workers' labour, obviously have relatively larger surpluses than the small peasant farms, even if both have the same productivity. Land reform, by dividing the large estates into many small peasant farms has, as an immediate consequence, a decline in the marketable agricultural surpluses. The surpluses necessary for industrialisation could be obtained by the encouragement of *kulak* farming, but this would be unwise from the standpoint of the bureaucracy, as socially and politically it would raise a new ruling class clinging tenaciously to private property, and economically it would lead to a demand by the kulaks for industrial goods in exchange for their surpluses. The bureaucracy needs a cheaper way of getting this surplus. It might have recourse to taxation and requisitions. But this too can hardly be relied on to provide large enough quantities of agricultural products for quick industrialisation, for the disgruntled peasant can 'go on strike' and decrease his sowing area, or neglect his fields, so that the surplus available for requisition decreases, or he can hide part of his yield, for it is impossible to supervise millions of small peasants scattered in thousands of villages. These drawbacks are virtually eliminated and the obligatory deliveries much more easily secured if millions of peasants are concentrated in some tens of thousands of large farms. The peasants, it is true, may react to their expropriation and herding in semi-serf camps by slaughtering their livestock. This may reduce the total agricultural production for a number of years and famine may stalk the land bringing death in its train, but no matter. If the quantity of agricultural goods in the hands of the state increases, everything is satisfactory. 'Collectivisation' also enables the state

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5 Land Reform and Agricultural Improvement

LADISLAV FEIERABEND

I

162 Eastern Europe was overwhelmingly peasant be-
167 tween the two world wars. The peasantry, for whom land
369 was not merely a means of production or of income, but the established basis of family life, formed the majority of the population. The main problem of this region was rural overpopulation. In the period before the First World War, the surplus young people emigrated in considerable numbers to the United States and to other overseas countries. After 1918 this outlet was closed, and everybody had to remain on his home soil. There was too little land for too many people: roughly twice as many people were living off the land as was the case in Western Europe.

423 Everybody wanted land and therefore the price was
241 enormously high. After money was spent to buy the land, there was not enough left to buy the numbers of cattle that the holding could support or to improve farming techniques. Lack of capital was responsible for the fact that farming methods remained the same as they had been for fifty or more years. The yields were very low, and there was no possibility of increasing them. In fact, yields decreased be-

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439 been, considering the size and population of these countries. Although they comprised roughly 25 per cent of Europe's area and population, excluding the European part of the Soviet Union, they handled no more than 10 or 11 per cent of Europe's exports and imports. About one third of the trade of the Eastern European area was purely regional. With the exception of Albania which traded mainly with Italy, Eastern Europe's trade list was headed by Germany, followed by the competing states of Austria, Great Britain, and the United States. The predominance of Germany became even greater during the war years. Trade was one of Germany's most important means of influencing the political, social, and cultural life of this region.

II

178 By 1918 the countries of Eastern Europe had reached different stages of social evolution. In Poland and Hungary the aristocracy had preserved considerable power in spite of a rising intellectual bourgeoisie. In Rumania and Croatia the power of the aristocracy had been wiped out by the land reforms and leadership had been taken over by a commercial middle class. In Czechoslovakia a strong bureaucratic and commercial element had risen to leadership. In the Baltic states, also, it was mainly the commercial class which had ascended to leading positions. Yugoslavia, Bulgaria, and Albania had no aristocracy and only a small intellectual bourgeoisie and commercial class.

It was generally from the rural stratum of village teachers, 369 priests, station masters, and notaries that the new bourgeoisie and the ruling class arose. The children of an educated father, who was able to secure a better place in society, had a better chance of entering a university—the sanctuary as much of social position and status as of knowledge. However, those who succeeded in obtaining graduate and other degrees in

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fields such as law, medicine, engineering, or economics often 369 ●
renounced their humble origin and were happy to be absorbed into the urban population. Even the newly formed commercial class preferred to stay in the cities. As a result, the urban population increased steadily and towns grew rapidly.

Urbanization advanced with the growth of industry. An 369
illustration of this is offered by the growth in population of 162
six industrial cities in each of the following countries: Poland, Czechoslovakia, Hungary, Rumania, Yugoslavia, and Bulgaria. The total population of these cities rose from six and one-half million to ten million between the two world wars. The pace of industrialization was most rapid in Bulgaria, Yugoslavia, and Poland, where the aforementioned cities almost doubled their urban population. In the other three countries (Czechoslovakia, Hungary, Rumania), the population in these cities increased by approximately 30 per cent. Striking examples of how industrialization and transportation attracted people to cities are given by Katowice, a coal and heavy industry center in Silesia, whose population rose from forty-five to one hundred and thirty-three thousand, and by Gdynia, Poland's Baltic port, whose population rose from three to one hundred and fourteen thousand between the wars.

The regional distribution of industrial population was not uniform. Around 1930, 90 per cent of Czechoslovakia's industrial population lived in the Czecho-Moravian district. Poland's industrial population concentrated around Warsaw, Lodz, and the Silesian coal basin. In Hungary, 41 per cent of the people earning their livings in industrial occupations were concentrated in Budapest. In Yugoslavia, 63 per cent of the industrial wage earners lived in Croatia and in the regions that had previously been Hungarian. In Rumania, 25 per cent of the industrial population lived in Transylvania and 28 per cent in Muntenia. Only Bulgaria's industrial pop-

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369 ulation showed any tendency toward decentralization, with
162 30 per cent of her total industrial population living in the district of Sofia.

The industrial population of these countries was occupied as follows: 25 to 30 per cent in the textile and clothing industries; 18 to 21 per cent in heavy and metallurgy industries; 11 to 22 per cent in the food industry; and 7 to 17 per cent in the lumber industry. A variation in industrial goods and in producing plants was found only in Czechoslovakia and Hungary, in southern Poland and Transylvania, and in the areas of the former Austro-Hungarian Empire.

466 One of the major problems facing the new governments
745 in their industrialization programs was to equate the growth
185 of the industrial working populations with improvement in industrial working and social conditions. Social legislation in the interwar period attained considerable progress in this direction. Prior to 1914 there already existed in Eastern Europe various social insurance and pension plans, and these were expanded between 1919 and 1939. Compulsory workers' accident and health insurance plans were introduced whereby both employers and wage earners contributed to a central fund to provide coverage for accident, illness, maternity, disability, old age, death, and unemployment. Generally speaking, the working day was reduced to eight hours, with a maximum forty-eight hour week, and the age minimum for child and woman labor was fixed at fourteen years or, in the case of heavy and dangerous work, such as mining, at sixteen to eighteen years. However, rigid application of these measures was far from universal.

A notable innovation was the establishment by the agrarian regime in Bulgaria of a compulsory labor service for the development of public works in place of the traditional military service which had been prohibited by the peace treaty. Expenditures in 1937 for social services for the entire region averaged 3 per cent of the estimated national in-

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come. Once again, Czechoslovakia headed the list with 5.5 per cent while the Balkan countries devoted only 1.5 per cent of their national income to social services. In the same year the number of persons registered as unemployed in the various countries was as follows: Czechoslovakia, 408,000; Poland, 347,000; Hungary, 47,000; Yugoslavia, 21,600; and Rumania, 10,800.

A major consequence of industrialization and urbanization was the rapid growth both of an urban proletariat and of the bureaucracy. Those people who had been separated from their ancestral rural surroundings and traditions and often from the influence of their families became increasingly detached from spiritual matters and turned more and more towards materialistic and technical spheres. The number of bureaucrats grew rapidly and this resulted in political favoritism and in desk-level programs which very seldom touched the people of the countryside.

It cannot be said, however, that no progress was made or that standards of living were consistently low. It must be remembered that it was not until the First World War that many of these countries attained independence. A part of Poland had just emerged from Russian domination and certain areas of the Balkan states had just freed themselves from Ottoman rule. Even Hungary, Czechoslovakia, Croatia, and parts of Poland had been freed only recently from Austro-German political and economic controls. Under these circumstances, the progress made by these countries, notwithstanding failures and mistakes, was considerable indeed.

III

The states that had dominated this region before the First World War—Germany, Austria-Hungary, Russia, and the Ottoman empire—showed little interest in improving the educational standards of the large masses in Eastern Europe.

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185 with the Soviet master plans. The captive nations were al-
433 lowed to preserve the external attributes of sovereignty and their governments were granted an advisory voice in the preparation of these national plans. But the supreme control of the plans remained in the hands of Moscow, and their primary goal was, and is, rapid industrialization.

II

178 The possibilities of industrialization in Eastern Europe are considerable, but obviously not unlimited. They depend on the availability of manpower and its technical know-how, on industrial raw materials and machinery, on capital needed for investments, and on markets capable of absorbing the products of the new industries.

464 Before the last war, five million persons were employed in the mining and in the medium and large manufacturing industries of the six major countries of the area. Today this number exceeds nine million. There is a shortage of labor, both skilled and unskilled, in Eastern Germany and in the Czech part of Czechoslovakia. The reserves of manpower—land laborers, dwarf-farm owners, and married women—are limited in Hungary and the Slovak part of Czechoslovakia, large in Poland, and even larger in Rumania and in the three Balkan countries. The areas where labor is short coincide to a large degree with those of low natural increase of population, and vice versa. In the first period of reconstruction after
• 369 the war, there was in many parts of the area a movement of
464 the population from the villages to the towns in search of
166 urban, not necessarily industrial, employment. For instance, in Poland alone, two and one-half million persons moved into towns during the first seven postwar years. This movement is now over, as well as the postwar enthusiasm for reconstruction, and the governments have to recruit new workers by propaganda and sometimes by half-coercion. Unless

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living conditions improve considerably in the cities, the governments will have difficulty in procuring the hundreds of thousands of new industrial workers they require annually. However, manpower is still one of the principal assets of the captive countries.

The quality of this manpower is, generally speaking, better than is assumed in the West. First, there is a considerable industrial tradition, which goes back to the Middle Ages, in Saxony, Bohemia, and southern Poland. Second, the average intelligence of the people is fairly high; given time and education an average village boy or girl can become a skilled worker and, in many cases, a qualified technician, although of course such students lack the always evident association of American youth with motor vehicles and other machinery.

It might be interesting to quote here a relevant passage from the report of the mission of the U.N. Food and Agricultural Organization, which was composed mostly of American experts, after its return from Poland in 1948:

> It is the opinion of the Mission that if the Polish nation had an opportunity to be educated according to the standards of western Europe and to carry out a peaceful economic development, the world would be amazed by the result. Imperfectly developed resources of intelligence constitute the greatest potential wealth of the Polish people. It is a raw material of far greater value than [Polish] coal . . .[1]

Assuming that this is a sound judgment, there is no reason to doubt that it applies also to the other countries of this region.

The number of graduate engineers, chemists, and scientists in Eastern Europe declined greatly during the last war and during the postwar flight to the West, but is now increasing rapidly. The joint know-how of such technicians should not be underestimated, especially when Russian technical experience is added to it. Technical inventions and improve-

[1] *Report of the FAO Mission for Poland* (Washington, 1948), p. 18.

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commodities, such as kitchen equipment and furniture, are 362
rare and expensive, above the means of an average family, and modern house appliances are hardly known at all. A private car is an extreme rarity and will remain so within the foreseeable future since few passenger cars are being manufactured and almost none imported.

As far as food is concerned, there is much truth in the 262
Communist assertion that with the rapid increase of city [369]
populations the production of foodstuffs lags behind the growing demand. Figures for food production in this area do not indicate the amount of consumption, since much of the food produced is stocked as army and war reserve or exported to Russia and China. The true situation is that while there is no actual hunger most of the population is fed at standards far below those of Western Europe. The diet is monotonous, consisting largely of bread, noodles, cereals, potatoes, common vegetables, and puddings, to judge from advice given to housewives by women's publications. Protective foods are fewer than before the war though probably more evenly distributed. Before the war, in the poorer parts of the area, the urban unemployed and millions of so-called dwarf-sized farm holders were as a rule underfed. Today the unemployed have disappeared, but the inmates of the labor camps are starving, and the poor peasants are no better off than before. The families living on middle-sized farms consume more food than before the war, because an incentive for selling produce is lacking.

The caloric value of foodstuffs consumed by the working population in the cities has, if anything, decreased. At home, families eat what the British used to eat a few years ago, but they have less of it. The quality of food consumed in the public eating places maintained by factories and the like is described as extremely bad, and so is the service. Standing in food lines, often in vain, consumes a large part of the housewife's time. This, added to the difficulty of cooking be-

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178 never in the last century have so many people worked so hard
433 for such meager rewards. However, in the social field, the extension of social services and of technical education can be credited to the Communist regimes. In the economic field, although the tax on the people has been almost unimaginably great, it must be admitted that the badly needed industrial development of formerly rural areas of Eastern Europe is due to the Communists.

178 The latter point needs clarification. The Wilsonian East-
433 ern Europe of 1918 inherited from Austria-Hungary, im-
369 perial Russia, and the old primitive Balkans an obsolete social structure of rural overpopulation and poverty due to insufficient industrial and urban development. The Czech lands, Polish Silesia, and a few lesser industrial regions were exceptions to the general structure of the area. Left to themselves by the indifferent West, having undergone the shock of the depression as only rural states can suffer it, the free nations of the area, again with the exception of Czechoslovakia, could in the interwar period neither solve their grave social problems nor defend themselves in the hour of danger. The existence of a poor and defenseless group of nations in the heart of Europe surrounded on East and West by two highly industrialized powers was an anachronism and an indirect invitation to aggression. After the disintegration of Eastern Europe between 1938 and 1941, the causes of this disaster were examined by thinkers of many nations, and many of them came to the conclusion that the disaster was inevitable not only because of the political disunity of this area but also because of its economic and productive inferiority. Rural societies had no chance of survival in the heavily armed world of the late '30's if only because they were unable to produce the weapons with which they could have deterred aggression effectively. The awareness of this fact has deeply influenced the political thinking of the nations concerned. It is inevitable that the Poles, to take but one example, should

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reflect that, had their country had a sufficient industrial basis in 1939 to equip ten armored divisions for which she had enough trained manpower, her loss of independence and many other events in modern history could have been prevented.

The present industrialization of Eastern Europe is gradually eliminating this handicap of the past. To be sure, the increase of the industrial potential of these countries lies in the interest of the Soviet Union in its own military preparations. The men in the Kremlin may dispose as they wish of this area's industrial plants together with all its human and material resources with the single exception of the spirit of its peoples. From the standpoint of both the immediate and long-range interests of the West, any addition to the wealth or the strength of Eastern Europe is unwelcome so long as the latter remains a part of the Soviet bloc. These countries are of course aware of this situation, but they have to think also about their future. They hope that one day the Iron Curtain will be lifted and they know that at that time they will need all their new industrial wealth in order to cease being an area of social unrest and a target for exploitation by powerful neighbors as well as a hotbed for world wars. Nobody has disputed the right of Russia to evolve into an industrial power. No one can expect the countries of Eastern Europe to relinquish their hopes of freedom and their rights to prosperity which, in the light of their past, are linked to the modernization of their economic structure. Wendell Willkie said during the last war that "Only the productive can be strong, and only the strong can be free." His words apply to all nations alike. The nations of Eastern Europe are potential allies of the West. Those who earnestly desire a better world should bear in mind that the lasting interests of these friendly nations transcend their temporary position as Russia's enforced associates.

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[26] United Press from Vienna, quoted after *Anglo-Polish Review*, London, October 1951.

[27] An estimate of the writer, shared by some other researchers.

[28] Stalin's speech of 9 February 1946.

[29] United Nations *Statistical Yearbook*, New York, 1949-50, p. 145. This is no longer true. In 1945 pipelines were laid to convey natural gas from Rumania to the Soviet Union.

[30] Data for Rumania and Poland taken from the official reports on the fulfillment of the annual and quarterly plans.

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[31] Most of the data which follow are based upon Jean Chardonnet, *Les conséquences économiques de la guerre*, Paris, Hachette, 1947.

[32] J. A. Wilder, *Polish Regained Territories*, London, 1948.

[33] Dr. Paulat's study on the industrial development of Czechoslovakia, 1951.

[34] *Wirtschaft*, Berlin, *passim*; also advertisements in the Eastern German press.

[35] *Wirtschaft*, Berlin, 1951, No. 1.

[36] *Wirtschaft*, Berlin, 1951, No. 44 of November 2.

[37] See page 29.

[38] Speech of minister for planning, Dolanský, introducing the revised plan (end of February 1951).

[39] *Wirtschaft*, Berlin, 1951, No. 44 of November 2.

[40] Leuna plant employs 28,000 people, and is the greatest single plant in Eastern Germany. Karl Kühn (*Wirtschaft*, Berlin, 1951, No. 18) stated that Leuna could produce much more gasoline in 1950, because the installed capacity would permit such production, but that nitrogen-making had priority.

[41] Speech by Hilary Minc, *Trybuna Ludu*, Warsaw, 24 May 1951.

[42] United Nations *Statistical Yearbook*, New York, 1949-50. In 1937 Czechoslovakia produced 42,600 tons of benzol and Poland 31,100 tons; in 1936 Germany, outside the Bizone, produced 131,000 tons.

[43] *Ibidem*, p. 110.

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[44] Professor H. Herbich, quoted by S. Rotarski, "The Unexploited Resources of Europe," in *Eastern Quarterly*, London, January 1950. The four rivers are the Columbia, Colorado, Sacramento, and San Joaquin.

[45] Speech by Heinrich Rau on 31 October 1951. See footnote 14.

[46] *Trybuna Ludu*, Warsaw, 24 October 1951.

[47] Dr. V. Paulat. See footnote 17.

[48] Exhaustive data on that problem in *Wirtschaft*, Berlin, 1950, No. 51.

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[49] *Trybuna Ludu*, Warsaw, 1951, No. 151.

[50] National Five Year Plan, *Drzhaven Vestnik* (Journal of Laws), Sofia, 18 January 1949.

[51] Full data in *Wirtschaft*, Berlin, 1950, No. 46.

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[52] Speech by Rau. See footnote 14.

[53] *Ibidem.*

[54] Dr. V. Paulat.

[55] *Ibidem.*

[56] Data concerning the plants under construction in Poland, Hungary, and Rumania have been taken from various sources in the current press of these countries.

[57] The figures for 1930 and 1943 are taken from the United Nations *Statistical Yearbooks* and the planned figures from the national long-range plans. Those for 1949 and 1950, if not supplied by the *Statistical Yearbooks*, were gathered from a variety of sources in the press of the six captive nations and, indirectly, from interpretation of the plans, in particular those of Bulgaria and Hungary.

The 1930 and 1943 figures for Eastern Germany are estimates of the writer, based upon indirect indications; these figures include the part of Eastern Germany which became Polish in 1945. The power output of the present Soviet zone of Germany in 1938 reached 17.2 billion *kwh*, according to the United Nations *Economic Survey of Europe* in 1950. The Eastern German Five Year Plan, in its revised version of November 1951, foresees that the power output in 1955, to the extent of 33,414 million *kwh*, will be equal to 182.7 percent of the output of power in 1950; it follows that the latter reached 18,343 million *kwh*.

The planned per capita output was obtained by dividing the planned output in absolute figures by the estimated number for the population of a given country in a given year. The total population of the captive area (without Albania) at the beginning of 1951 was almost exactly 90 million; it is presumed that by 1955 it will exceed 94 million. The margin of error in this computation should not exceed, in the opinion of the writer, three to four percent.

From various indirect indications it can be surmised that, in 1951, Eastern Germany expects to reach a power output of about 21 billion *kwh*, Poland about 10.8 billion, and Hungary almost 3 billion. No such computation could be made for Bulgaria, Czechoslovakia, or Rumania on the basis of the material at the disposal of the writer.

[58] R. Damianov, *Bulgaria*, Sofia, 29 January 1951.

[59] The estimate of 82 billion *kwh* is but the sum of the six targets supposed to be reached on various dates. At the same time, it may be safely assumed that this figure does represent a joint target of the captive area to be reached by the end of 1954 or the beginning of 1955. The following reasons seem to lead to such a conclusion:

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A SUMMARY OF ENERGY RESOURCES

371 A computation is possible — admittedly a tentative and approximate one — of the total sum of energy, *i.e.*, fuel and power, which the captive area of Europe expects to possess at the end of its several long-rang plans — more or less, by the end of 1954 or beginning of 1955. Such a computation can be made in terms of coal, in accordance with the ratios of conversion used in the statistical calculations of the United Nations.[62]

Considering all the secondary sources of energy (coke, manufactured gas, synthetic oil, thermal electric energy) as proceeding from the primary sources of energy (coal, lignite, petroleum, natural gas, hydroelectricity), the tentative table of the total primary energy of the captive area can be represented by the following figures: -

Coal	133	million tons
Lignite	85	" " of coal equivalent
Petroleum	17.5	" " " " "
Natural Gas	6	" " " " "
Hydroelectricity	12	" " " " "
Total:	253.5	million tons of coal equivalent

These figures cannot, of course, be taken literally, since they are based on too many assumptions and arbitrary ratios of conversion, nor can they serve as a basis for any further computations. Their value lies in showing a student of the problem the proportions between the main components of the total sum of energy which the captive countries expect to possess as a basis for their industrial activity. Coal represents somewhat more than one half, lignite one third, and petroleum and natural gas not quite one tenth of that total energy. The table also permits the

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conclusion that more than one fifth of the total primary energy will by 1954-1955 be changed into electric power.[63] 371

Geographically speaking, the table shows that, in the domain of fuel and power, the Silesian-Ostravan coal basin represents about half the primary energy which the captive area expects to possess by 1954-1955, and far more than half the primary and secondary energy taken together. Very roughly speaking, Poland expects to produce by 1954-1955 about 40 percent of the total primary energy of the captive area, Eastern Germany more than 25 percent, Czechoslovakia about 20 percent, Rumania about 8 percent, and Hungary about 4 percent.[64]

It must be stressed once again that all these computations are highly approximate, and that they concern the *production* of fuel and power by the captive area and individual countries. The *consumption* of energy by the captive area and its components would be expressed by a quite different set of figures. Approximately one fourth of the coal produced in Poland and possibly more than half the petroleum produced by the area are being exported to Russia, Western Europe, and in lesser quantities to South America and the Middle East.[65] Some electric energy is sold by Western Germany to the Soviet zone,[66] and the Soviet Union will be supplying coke to Eastern Germany and possibly to Rumania. Also the figures for consumption of energy by the individual captive states would be quite different from the above-quoted national figures of production of energy. The computation of these figures lies outside the scope of the present study.

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AN APPRAISAL

● 371 FUEL and power are the basis of every industrial activity. Any increase in fuel and power production must of necessity be a rather slow business: new mines and electric plants, in particular those working on water power, cannot be built on short notice, and an increase in existing capacity is generally limited by technical conditions. Consequently, production of the overwhelming proportion of electric power in the captive area depends on the fuel available for the thermic plants producing the current. The Communist planners in the captive countries, constantly prodded by their Russian supervisers to produce more and more heavy industrial goods, have inaugurated very bold long-range economic plans which they themselves probably regard as not quite reachable. Irrespective of other material and human factors which influence and condition industrial production, such targets can be achieved only if sufficient fuel and power is produced by the captive area. If this essential premise fails, ambitious plans for machine building and chemical production will not be fulfilled.

Considered from this angle, the present level of fuel production — particularly of coal — in most of the captive area has not been very satisfactory ever since 1950, *i.e.*, since the initial stage of the several long-range economic plans. Apart from this apparently enduring insufficiency, a new reason for doubting that the fuel plans will be executed has arisen since the summer of 1951. The production of coal in the four central countries of the captive area (Czechoslovakia, Hungary, Poland, and Rumania) is directly threatened by a different sort of crisis, the first of its kind in this part of Europe since its submission to Soviet control. This is the acute shortage of foodstuffs. Both issues will be considered.

"The output of coal increased in 1950 by 5 percent in comparison with that of 1949. Industrial production as such increased by 30.8 percent in comparison with 1949. It follows that industry grows far more rapidly than the production of fuel. At the same time, railroad transportation increases more rapidly than the output of coal. The demand of the market for coal as domestic fuel is also increasing . . . in 1950, the consumption of domestic coal was nearly 3.5 times as large as prewar. . . . At the same time, the demand for coal for exportation remains unchanged. . . . In that situation, the problem of increasing the output of coal, of fulfilling and overfulfilling the plan, must become one of the central issues of our work in 1951." This quotation comes from a speech of Hilary Minc, the economic master of Poland, which he delivered in February 1951, to introduce the economic plan for 1951.[67] There is no doubt that these words apply equally well to Czechoslovakia and all the other captive countries. 371

Probably the best economic brain behind the Iron Curtain, Minc realizes very well the danger of the situation. In his speech he offered a number of remedies: new investments (*i.e.*, new mines), higher mechanization and increased efficiency in organization and labor. There is no doubt, again, that as long as the discrepancy between the supply of coal and the demand for it by industry and transport remains the only reason for worry by the Polish or any other satellite government, these measures, which are already being applied, can improve the performance of the mines and increase the output of coal. Statistics show that output has been increasing in Poland by about 4 million tons per annum (1948: 70 million tons; 1949: 74 million; 1950: 78 million tons). But this rate of increase appears to be insufficient. Unless it can be accelerated, the target of 100 million tons of coal by 1955 (in practice, by 1954) will not be achieved. Moreover, even if this goal should be achieved, the planned output would not cover the demand as described by Minc. [185]

It is a fact that even if the Communist economy functions at an optimum "normal" level the efficiency of labor in coal mining 316

315 duction of oil is different: there is no guarantee that new investments will produce oil. On the eve of World War II, the Polish oil fields were regarded as being gradually exhausted: between 1900 and 1938 their annual production fell from some 4 million metric tons to 0.5 million. The production of the much richer Rumanian oil fields fell from a peak of 8.7 million tons in 1936 to 5.2 million tons in 1943, and the prevailing technical opinion was that they had passed their production peak. The point of departure of the current long-range plans is that the new oil fields in Albania, Czechoslovakia, and Hungary (and Austria as well) can be developed almost at will, and that the exhaustion of the oil fields in Rumania and Poland can be halted and that production can be stimulated. The satellite governments and the Soviet experts who manage most of the oil fields take for granted that they contain much untapped oil, and that it can and will be extracted. More effort than ever before is being expended in the search for new sources of oil and in full exploitation of the [185] existing wells. According to the Rumanian Five Year Plan about five million feet of new drilling will be made in 1955, while in the top production year of 1936 new drilling reached only one million feet.[81] According to the same plan Rumania will manufacture most of its own oil mining machinery and make the installations in its plants. Altogether the equivalent of 860 million dollars will be invested in the Rumanian oil industry in the course of the current plan.[82] As noted above, the oil production hitherto obtained does not seem to confirm such optimism, especially in view of the fact that since the summer of 1951 the situation in the Rumanian oil fields as well as in the others, has been much complicated by the food crisis.

● 371 To sum up: after consideration of all data pertaining to fuel and power production in the captive area of Europe, both actual and planned, the following conclusions can be made. If the satellite governments do not fundamentally revise their attitude towards labor, especially during the present food crisis, and unless rapid technical and organizational progress is attained in hard coal extraction, the coal shortage may develop into a bottle-

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neck which will seriously threaten the plans for other branches of heavy industry. Throughout the captive area, with the exception of Eastern Germany, this is a grave problem. Whether it can be solved is an open question. The prospect for lignite is satisfactory. On the other hand, it seems improbable that oil targets will be achieved, mainly because of the present situation in the Rumanian oil fields. The production of electric power projected in the several long-range plans can be achieved without much difficulty if based on lignite and low grade coal which cannot be used for other purposes; with difficulty if based upon high grade coal, the supply of which may be insufficient. If based on water power, the production of electric power will depend largely on the investment in new hydroelectric plants.

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377 1. It may be taken for granted that every effort will be made to fulfill the Eastern German, Polish, and Rumanian plans one year ahead of schedule, that is, by the end of 1954 or beginning of 1955.

2. It may be expected that, having fulfilled its plan for power by the end of 1951, Bulgaria will launch a new plan which may aim at an output of about one billion *kwh* more by the end of 1954 or the beginning of 1955 — an entirely justified supposition.

3. It is true that the output of 16.5 billion *kwh* which Czechoslovakia plans to reach in 1955 cannot be accepted as its target for 1954 or beginning of 1955, and a much lower figure should be taken instead.

4. But the larger Bulgarian and the lower Czechoslovakian figure may compensate one another, especially if a lower figure of the Hungarian output in 1954 (6,000 million *kwh* instead of 6,500 million) is accepted as the basis for the tentative computation.

Under the circumstances the writer regards the mere arithmetic sum of the six national targets, equivalent to more or less 82 billion *kwh*, as an entirely acceptable hypothesis: the margin of error should not exceed one billion *kwh*.

[60] Harry Schwartz, *New York Times*, 23 January 1951.

[61] Estimates of the writer.

371 [62] *Economic Survey of Europe in 1949*, United Nations, Geneva, 1950, p. 231.

[63] 82 billion *kwh* represent the equivalent of somewhat over 50 million tons of coal (1,590 *kwh* equivalent to one ton of coal, see footnote 62). This figure corresponds to a general figure for Europe; see p. 12 of the same *Survey*.

[64] Estimates of the writer.

[65] Silesian coal has been exported for generations, and trade in it flourished between the two World Wars. Industrial production and railroad transportation in the countries named depend to some extent on the specific technical quality of Polish coal.

[66] 800 million *kwh* from Hamburg and West Berlin, according to *Wirtschaftsrevue*, Karlsruhe, 15 December 1950. See also footnote 14.

371 [67] *Trybuna Ludu*, Warsaw, 1951, No. 53.

433 [68] *Statistical Yearbook of Poland*, 1939, p. 239; also *European Steel*
316 *Trends*, United Nations, Geneva, 1949, p. 51.

[69] Evaluation by Alfred Zauberman, *Dziennik Polski*, London, 1951.

[70] The production of the Donbas combines began in 1951 at the Piotrowice plant of heavy mining machinery in Poland (*Wirtschaft*, Berlin, 1951, No. 32) and in at least one of the corresponding plants in Czechoslovakia.

185 [71] *Trybuna Ludu*, Warsaw, 1951, No. 160.

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ELECTRIC POWER

ELECTRIFICATION was Lenin's panacea for poverty and backwardness, and much of this belief has been accepted as gospel by the satellite governments, in particular those of the Balkan states. This theoretical attitude does not differ from that adopted in practice throughout the world. All over the globe, the installed capacity of the generators and the total production of electric energy have been increasing with great rapidity, especially during the last twenty-five years. The captive countries, with the obvious exception of Eastern Germany, have been under-invested in electric energy for a long time and thus have lagged considerably behind Western Europe. As their thermal and water power resources are on the whole no less than those of Western Europe, the extra emphasis on the output of electric energy by the present satellite governments can and should lead, within their current long-range plans, to a striking increase in that production. New hydroelectric plants will of course produce new energy, while the output of the new thermal plants will, as is commonly accepted, represent at least one-fifth more power than that which would be produced by direct combustion of the same amount of hard and liquid fuels. Without a sufficiently high output of electric energy, the huge chemical plants under construction in the captive area, the planned aluminum and special steel plants, and the railroads about to be electrified could not possibly be operated.

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Coal and lignite are, and for a long time will be, supplying the great bulk of electric power in the captive area, since water power has not been hitherto sufficiently developed. The potential hydroelectric capacity of the area is very high in the Danube basin. Excluding Germany and Austria, it is evaluated at nearly 17 million kilowatts, *i.e.*, as much as that of the four Pacific coast rivers in the United States. The Vistula, the Oder, the

Elbe, and the lesser Balkan rivers with their affluents within the present captive area are supposed to have a potential capacity of some 3 million kilowatts.[44] A large part of the Danube capacity is located in Yugoslavia, outside the captive area proper, and the great plan for harnessing the Danube at the Iron Gate — almost an equivalent of the Tennessee Valley system — is out of the question as long as Rumania and Yugoslavia, sharing the banks of the Iron Gate, do not cooperate on construction, which can only be a joint one. Yet with water power at the exclusive disposal of the satellite governments much can be done, and has already been done, to raise the percentage of energy produced thus far by hydroelectric plants.

In Eastern Germany the last hydroplants destroyed during the war, such as the regional plants of Niederwartha and Hohenwarte, are expected to be rebuilt soon, and plans are being made for the erection of new ones.[45] In Czechoslovakia, the huge Slapy plant on the Vltava River was completed in 1950, and another at Nošice in Slovakia is being built, in addition to a series of lesser hydroelectric plants at the Vah River; plans are being made for the erection of a huge plant on the Danube near Komárno, with a capacity of 500,000 kilowatts (the capacity of the famous Dnieper Dam is 558,000 kilowatts), and of another large plant on the Vltava River near Prague, supposed to supply power to Central Bohemia;[46] and power has second priority after the Big Ostrava metallurgical plant at Kunčice.[47] In Hungary a large hydroelectric plant is about to be completed at Tiszalök on the Tisza River; it is supposed to supply power to Eastern Hungary.[48] In Poland the Dychów (Deichow) plant on the Bober River, left unfinished by the Nazis, was already in production during the summer of 1951; when finished early in 1952, it will be the largest plant of its kind in Poland, and it will supply current to Lower Silesia and the Stettin area.[49] In Bulgaria two new hydroelectric plants of medium capacity on the Maritsa River were completed in 1950-1951, several more were supposed to be finished before the end of 1951, and thirty more plants of this type are supposed to be built within the

present Five Year Plan.[50] In that country as in Rumania, electrification, based on water power, is regarded as the cornerstone of future industrialization, in accordance with an early Lenin formula for the Soviet Union. A Ten Year 1951-1960 Electrification Plan was recently adopted in Rumania, based in part upon the plans of the prewar Rumanian governments. The only one of its kind in the captive area, this plan anticipates the energy generating capacity of Rumania to reach 2.6 million kilowatts in 1960, *i.e.*, to be almost quadrupled. A hydroelectric plant at Stejar on the Bistritsa River is to be the main plant, with a planned output of 430 million kilowatt hours.[51]

The erection of hydroelectric plants is a slow business, and that is why a number of large thermal plants with much greater capacity will be constructed before the former are fully completed. It would be tedious to enumerate the projects now in construction or in the blueprint stage, the more so because they are not of comparable size and the available information about them is not sufficient. But some of the new thermal plants will apparently be huge. Among them are the great plants of Bergdorf, Kraftwerke Elbe, and Drattendorf in Eastern Germany, with a capacity of 150,000, 288,000 and 450,000 kilowatts respectively, not to mention the lesser projects. Kraftwerke Elbe has been given highest priority among all heavy industrial plants, the building or extension of which is foreseen in the economic plan for 1951.[52] Eastern Germany will spend 1.5 billion marks on the building of new electric plants in the course of its long-range plan, and the 1950 installed capacity is expected to be increased by 2,782,000 kilowatts by 1955.[53] In Czechoslovakia the Most plant, with a capacity of 350,000 kilowatts; the Ervěnice plant, supposed to cover the requirements of Prague and vicinity; the Třebovice plant for the Big Ostrava steel combine; the Barbara plant serving the Karvinna coal mines; and the Nováky plant for western Slovakia and another supposed to serve the HUKO steel combine now under construction in eastern Slovakia, will all be a very large size.[54] The huge Jaworzno II thermal plant, expected to be put in commission

377 in 1952, will supply power for the new Cracow industrial region in Poland (the Nowa Huta steel combine, etc.); the present plants at Chorzów, Laziska, and Zabrze (Hindenburg), all in Upper Silesia, are being considerably extended; and the Miechowice plant near Bytom (Beuthen) now under construction is supposed to become ultimately one of the largest thermal plants in Europe; another plant of very large capacity is being built at Zeran near Warsaw. The Mátravidéki Erönü and Inóta plants in Hungary, and three plants in Rumania, including the one supposed to supply power to the Hunedoara steel combine, are also large plants under construction or already put in commission. At least fifteen plants are under construction, each of which will have a capacity exceeding 100,000 kilowatts and some as much as 450,000 kilowatts. The Dwory plant in Poland, which is being built jointly by the Poles and the Czechs and is expected to send a part of its output of current across the frontier to Czechoslovakia, will have an initial capacity of 140,000 kilowatts.[55] The Inóta plant in Hungary and the Zabrze plant in Poland are being built by the Czechs and will have Czech machinery. In many other plants, except in Eastern Germany and Czechoslovakia, the generators will allegedly come from Russia and will be installed (or have already been installed) by Russian specialists — at least that is what the local press repeats *ad infinitum*. Some of the largest plants under construction will not reach their full capacity before the termination of the present long-range plans and will apparently be extended further after 1955. All new thermal plants are supposed to work on lignite, low grade coal, and coal waste;[56] a large plant at Wizna in Poland, still in the blueprint stage, is supposed to work directly on peat. Many power plants in Poland are being connected by high tension grid, as they are already in Eastern Germany and the Czech provinces.

The following table illustrates the past, present, and planned output of electric energy in the captive countries:[57]

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Electric Energy In Captive Countries, 1930-1955

	1930	1943	1949	1950	Planned	Planned per capita
	(In millions of kilowatt hours)					*(In kwh)*
Bulgaria	95	340	815		1,800 *(1953)*	225
Czechoslovakia	2,993	6,660	7,514	9,100	16,500 *(1955)*	1,180
Eastern Germany	*c.* 10,000	*c.* 27,000	16,500	18,343	33,414 *(1955)*	1,755
Hungary	715	1,806	2,200		6,000-6,500 *(1954)*	630-680
Poland	2,906		8,146	9,340	19,300 *(1955)*	745
Rumania	550	1,271	2,500	2,766	4,700 *(1955)*	275
Total	*c.* 17,259		*c.* 37,675		81,700-82,200	870

It should be borne in mind that the Bulgarian plan is expected to be fulfilled by the end of 1951 or shortly afterwards,[58] and the Eastern German, Polish, and Rumanian plans, supposed to terminate in 1955, are being speeded up so as to be implemented ahead of schedule. With that correction, which influences the computation of the total, it can be seen that the total production of electric power in the captive area, which in 1930 somewhat exceeded 17 billion kilowatt hours and went up in 1949 to nearly 38 billion, is expected to reach about 82 billion kilowatt hours by the end of 1954 or the beginning of 1955.[59]

The 82 billion kilowatt hours of the planned production may be compared with 74 billion kilowatt hours reached in 1943 by Germany, 58 billion of the British production in 1951, and the estimated 1950 output of the Soviet Union of about 90.5 billion kilowatt hours.[60] The long-range target of power production in the Soviet Union is not known. The planned per capita production, averaging 870 kilowatt hours for the entire area, may be compared with the 1949 per capita production (in round figures) of the following countries: Italy 460, France 730, the United Kingdom 1,030, and the United States 2,300.[61] The per

377 capita production of electric power in the Soviet Union in 1950 did not exceed 430 kilowatt hours.

The satellite governments' plans for increasing the output of electric power are ambitious and farfetched. If they are implemented, the results of their fulfillment would by themselves exert a far-reaching and lasting influence upon the economy of the captive nations. Are they being fulfilled? The official statistics of the captive countries seem to confirm that thus far the planned rate of increase of the output of power in the captive area, with the exception of Czechoslovakia, has been maintained. Even in Czechoslovakia, which by the middle of 1951 had fulfilled only 94 percent of its plan for the first half of the year, the output of power is increasing in absolute figures. Thus in the first half of 1951, in comparison with the same period of 1950, the output of power is claimed to have increased by 6 percent in Poland, by 7 percent in Eastern Germany, by 10.7 percent in Czechoslovakia, by 15 percent in Rumania, by 19 percent in Hungary, and by 28 percent in Bulgaria. An output of far more power is anticipated in 1952, when a number of new large plants now under construction will be put into motion. Power production is one of the few major industries in captive Europe which has not yet suffered from the slowing down of general production since the summer of 1951. Of course, the lag in the output of coal in Czechoslovakia and Hungary and in the heavy electric machine building in Eastern Germany, as well as the present acute shortage of foodstuffs in most of the captive area, may sooner or later also have an adverse influence on the production of power and thus delay the execution of the long-range plans. But total states where the human element is but one factor of production have been known to mobilize all possible resources, regardless of cost in men or material, to fulfill their key targets. Power is undoubtedly one of the key targets.

Even if the present plans are entirely successful, only the western half of the captive area, approximately to the Danzig-Warsaw-Budapest line, will reach the relative saturation level in electric power which is one of the features of the progressive

Western European countries. The possible demand for current 377
in wide areas of Poland and Hungary, as well as all over Rumania and Bulgaria, will remain very largely unfulfilled. There are many indications that the satellite governments intend to deal with this problem in subsequent long-range plans.

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[49] *Trybuna Ludu*, Warsaw, 1951, No. 151. 37

[50] National Five Year Plan, *Drzhaven Vestnik* (Journal of Laws), Sofia, 18 January 1949.

[51] Full data in *Wirtschaft*, Berlin, 1950, No. 46. 377 ●

[52] Speech by Rau. See footnote 14.

[53] *Ibidem.*

[54] Dr. V. Paulat.

[55] *Ibidem.*

[56] Data concerning the plants under construction in Poland, Hungary, and Rumania have been taken from various sources in the current press of these countries.

[57] The figures for 1930 and 1943 are taken from the United Nations *Statistical Yearbooks* and the planned figures from the national long-range plans. Those for 1949 and 1950, if not supplied by the *Statistical Yearbooks*, were gathered from a variety of sources in the press of the six captive nations and, indirectly, from interpretation of the plans, in particular those of Bulgaria and Hungary.

The 1930 and 1943 figures for Eastern Germany are estimates of the writer, based upon indirect indications; these figures include the part of Eastern Germany which became Polish in 1945. The power output of the present Soviet zone of Germany in 1938 reached 17.2 billion *kwh*, according to the United Nations *Economic Survey of Europe* in 1950. The Eastern German Five Year Plan, in its revised version of November 1951, foresees that the power output in 1955, to the extent of 33,414 million *kwh*, will be equal to 182.7 percent of the output of power in 1950; it follows that the latter reached 18,343 million *kwh*.

The planned per capita output was obtained by dividing the planned output in absolute figures by the estimated number for the population of a given country in a given year. The total population of the captive area (without Albania) at the beginning of 1951 was almost exactly 90 million; it is presumed that by 1955 it will exceed 94 million. The margin of error in this computation should not exceed, in the opinion of the writer, three to four percent.

From various indirect indications it can be surmised that, in 1951, Eastern Germany expects to reach a power output of about 21 billion *kwh*, Poland about 10.8 billion, and Hungary almost 3 billion. No such computation could be made for Bulgaria, Czechoslovakia, or Rumania on the basis of the material at the disposal of the writer.

[58] R. Damianov, *Bulgaria*, Sofia, 29 January 1951.

[59] The estimate of 82 billion *kwh* is but the sum of the six targets supposed to be reached on various dates. At the same time, it may be safely assumed that this figure does represent a joint target of the captive area to be reached by the end of 1954 or the beginning of 1955. The following reasons seem to lead to such a conclusion:

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1. It may be taken for granted that every effort will be made to fulfill the Eastern German, Polish, and Rumanian plans one year ahead of schedule, that is, by the end of 1954 or beginning of 1955.

2. It may be expected that, having fulfilled its plan for power by the end of 1951, Bulgaria will launch a new plan which may aim at an output of about one billion *kwh* more by the end of 1954 or the beginning of 1955 — an entirely justified supposition.

3. It is true that the output of 16.5 billion *kwh* which Czechoslovakia plans to reach in 1955 cannot be accepted as its target for 1954 or beginning of 1955, and a much lower figure should be taken instead.

4. But the larger Bulgarian and the lower Czechoslovakian figure may compensate one another, especially if a lower figure of the Hungarian output in 1954 (6,000 million *kwh* instead of 6,500 million) is accepted as the basis for the tentative computation.

Under the circumstances the writer regards the mere arithmetic sum of the six national targets, equivalent to more or less 82 billion *kwh*, as an entirely acceptable hypothesis: the margin of error should not exceed one billion *kwh*.

[60] Harry Schwartz, *New York Times*, 23 January 1951.

[61] Estimates of the writer.

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[63] 82 billion *kwh* represent the equivalent of somewhat over 50 million tons of coal (1,590 *kwh* equivalent to one ton of coal, see footnote 62). This figure corresponds to a general figure for Europe; see p. 12 of the same *Survey*.

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[65] Silesian coal has been exported for generations, and trade in it flourished between the two World Wars. Industrial production and railroad transportation in the countries named depend to some extent on the specific technical quality of Polish coal.

[66] 800 million *kwh* from Hamburg and West Berlin, according to *Wirtschaftsrevue*, Karlsruhe, 15 December 1950. See also footnote 14.

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316 *Trends*, United Nations, Geneva, 1949, p. 51.

[69] Evaluation by Alfred Zauberman, *Dziennik Polski*, London, 1951.

[70] The production of the Donbas combines began in 1951 at the Piotrowice plant of heavy mining machinery in Poland (*Wirtschaft*, Berlin, 1951, No. 32) and in at least one of the corresponding plants in Czechoslovakia.

185 [71] *Trybuna Ludu*, Warsaw, 1951, No. 160.

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463 ments made by single countries of the area are systematically exchanged with Russia and other captive countries, and many thousands of Soviet, Czech, Eastern German, and Hungarian experts, technical advisers, and skilled specialists are employed by the less advanced countries of the area. It is difficult, if at all feasible, to compare the sum of technical knowledge behind the Iron Curtain to that in the free world. Undoubtedly, the countries of Eastern Europe lag behind the free world in all technical respects, but it would be imprudent to believe that they are not making much technical progress.

433 377 The area as a whole and the single countries within it, except for Eastern Germany and Czechoslovakia, are, generally speaking, self-sufficient in foodstuffs. It also has sufficient reserves of solid and liquid fuel. Using both these reserves and their hydroelectric power, it can produce an in-
433 creasing amount of electric power. On the other hand, the
135 area is poor in metallic ores. There is much bauxite in Hungary, and supplies of lead and zinc in Poland. Yugoslavia and Bulgaria are rich in many ores. However, there is not enough iron or manganese ore in Eastern Europe, far from enough copper, no tin, and a lack of many supplementary metals of significance to modern metallurgy. Chemical raw materials are abundant, especially in Poland and Rumania, but the area lacks phosphate rock and is poor in sulphur compounds. It has no jute, very little cotton, not enough wool, and no rubber. The resulting limitations to industrial expansion are obvious. They are offset to some extent by the existence of dormant resources and by the fact that the southern Balkan area has not yet been properly explored. It is possible that the Balkan mountains contain more mineral wealth than has been assumed hitherto. Soviet geologists are certain that this is so. Some deficiencies in raw materials can be met, as was the practice under Hitler, by using substitutes such as synthetic oil, rubber, yarn, and plastics. This area can

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MANUFACTURED GAS

THE term manufactured gas usually covers retort gas made in gasworks, carbureted water gas, and coke-oven gas when offered for public consumption, *i.e.*, not consumed by the plant which produces it. Blast furnace gas is not included in the international statistics of gas production which, incidentally, are generally incomplete. Properly speaking, manufactured gas cannot be regarded as a primary fuel, since coal must be consumed in its production. Many forms of gas used to be regarded as waste, however, and the increasing use of various types of gas is equivalent to the utilization of that waste and consequently to a better utilization of hard fuel. Germany has been the pioneer in that direction, and before the last war it produced some 40 percent of the world output of manufactured gas (in 1937, about 20,400 million cubic meters); by 1943, that output had risen to 27,380 million meters. A very large proportion of that gas was made in the present Soviet zone as a by-product of the synthetic oil plants. Elsewhere in the present captive zone the gas output was insignificant: in 1930 the Czechoslovak production was 112 million and the Polish 120 million cubic meters. But during World War II, faced with a shortage of hard fuel, the Nazi administration introduced new methods of exploiting manufactured gas throughout the occupied countries, and since that time its use has been increasing at a very rapid rate.

The Czechoslovak production of manufactured gas rose from about 960 million meters in 1945 to 2,189 million in 1949 and, according to the first, now obsolete, version of the Five Year Plan, was expected to rise to 2,900 million in 1953. This target was to be realized in 1951; further Czech plans are not known. Poland's output in 1948 — the last known figure — was 287 million meters. No figures concerning the planned production of

● 382 manufactured gas have been published by the other satellite governments. It is known, however, that great emphasis is laid by the Eastern German, Hungarian, and Polish governments on an even higher output of gas, and the results obtained may be very high. For instance, gas manufactured by the synthetic oil plant at Most has replaced that produced by the Prague gasworks for use in the capital and its vicinity, allowing a substantial saving of hard coal.[17] Similar measures are being applied or planned elsewhere: for instance, long-distance manufactured gas pipelines were laid in 1951 in Poland.[18] Eastern Germany has made so much progress in the output of manufactured gas that the amount of it at the disposal of industry has been officially described as "more than sufficient" — the only basic commodity which Eastern Germany seems to have produced in abundance. Once the new lignite coking plant (or plants) are in full motion, a number of industrial plants hitherto working on electric power will use gas instead.[19]

Any estimate of the amount of manufactured gas to be produced by the captive area in 1954-1955 would be purely hypothetical. Considering the wealth of coal and lignite processed in that area, however, a tentative total figure of 8 million cubic meters would not be an exaggeration.[20]

SYNTHETIC FUELS

With its comparative shortage of petroleum and its abundance of hard fuel, the captive area of Europe is capable — at least in part — of replacing natural liquid fuel by a synthetic one. The majority of German synthetic oil plants, not all of them completed before the end of the last war, were situated in the present Soviet-controlled area.[81] Out of thirty-two German-built plants of this kind, eleven were situated in the present Soviet zone of Germany, one in Bohemia, and five in present-day Poland. The first group of these plants utilized lignite or low grade coal according to the Bergius method. The plants in this group were generally built on a large scale and included the famous Leuna plant (one million ton capacity), the Magdeburg plant (600,000 ton capacity), two plants at Lützkendorf, the Zeitz and Böhlen plants in Eastern Germany; the Most (Brüx, one million ton capacity) plant in Bohemia, the Police (Pölitz, 600,000 ton capacity) near Stettin in Pomerania, two large plants under construction near Blachownia (Blechhammer) in Upper Silesia, and another plant under construction at Dwory near Oświęcim (Auschwitz) in Poland. Another group of plants, generally much smaller ones, utilized lignite by the Fischer-Tropsch method. Included were five plants in Saxony near Dresden and Leipzig, and a plant under construction near Blachownia. The three Blachownia plants and that of Dwory, construction of which started only when the Western German plants began to suffer from Allied bombing, were never finished and yielded only a fraction of the oil they were expected to produce.

Synthetic oil-producing in "Greater" Germany during World War II rose to the rank of an enormous industry. In 1939 Germany produced slightly over two million metric tons of

382 synthetic oil; at the end of 1943, despite increasingly heavy Allied strafing from the air, this output increased to over six million tons, almost 80 percent of which was produced by the Bergius method. More than half, and possibly as much as three quarters of that oil, was produced in the present captive area, mainly by the Leuna, Most, and Pölitz plants. At that time the synthetic oil plants were consuming 16 percent of all electric power produced by "Greater" Germany, and used 10 million tons of coal and 60 million tons of lignite per year.

Nearly all these plants were heavily damaged during the last months of the war and some of them, like Pölitz, practically [727] destroyed from the air.[32] When the Russians moved into the present captive area in 1945, they dismantled all Polish and many German plants and sent their installations to Russia. The Most plant, taken intact, was declared war trophy and subsequently returned to the Czech government in exchange for the Jachymov uranium mines nearby.[33] All remaining German plants were taken over by the Soviet "state trusts." Several of these plants, like Zeitz and Schwarzheide, belong to the Soviet trust, "Synthese," while Leuna and Lützkendorf constitute special units. Though situated in German territory, the synthetic oil plants are operated under Russian management and may be considered for all practical purposes as Soviet property.

It is difficult to appraise the present capacity and production of the synthetic oil plants in the captive area, since information on this type of production is a closely guarded state secret. It is known, however, that the Leuna, Zeitz, Böhlen, and one of the two Lützkendorf plants in Eastern Germany,[34] as well as the Most plant in Bohemia and the Dwory plant in Poland, do produce synthetic oil on a much lesser scale than during the last war. They also produce the innumerable by-products made by plants of this kind. Speaking on the subject in January 1951, the Eastern German minister of heavy industry, Selbmann, said that he was proud of the "balance-sheet" of this type of industry and its performance in 1950: the annual plan was overfulfilled by 16 percent, with particularly good results at Leuna and

Lützkendorf; the former was producing good automobile gasoline with 68 octane rating, and the latter turbine and other oils.[35] 382

According to the Five Year Plan as revised by the law of 1 November 1951, Eastern Germany produced in 1950, in round figures, 455,000 tons of gasoline and 439,000 tons of Diesel fuel, that is, 894,000 tons of synthetic liquid fuel.[36] There are reasons to assume that in practice this output might have been larger. The previously mentioned American source[37] estimates that in 1950 Eastern Germany produced 945,000 tons of oil, Czechoslovakia 350,000 tons, and Poland 135,000 tons, a total of 1,430,000 tons.

The official long-range plans for the two countries anticipate a Czech production of 525,000 tons of synthetic oil in 1953,[38] and an Eastern German production of 927,000 tons of gasoline and 650,000 tons of Diesel fuel by 1955;[39] that is, 2,092,000 tons of synthetic liquid fuel. To these figures must be added the undisclosed output of the Polish plants. The latter will depend largely on the amount of steel the Warsaw government will be able to assign to the construction of Polish plants; it is known that coal hydrogenation installations require a tremendous amount of steel. It may be that the total plan for the production of synthetic oil by 1954-1955 exceeds 2,500,000 tons. In fact, it may well be that the Eastern German plan underestimates the production anticipated by 1955: while it is in the Soviet interest to exaggerate for propaganda purposes the achievements and targets for all naturally produced sources of fuel and power in the captive area, the contrary may be true in respect to synthetic oil, if only for strategic purposes.

The captive area is capable of producing at least twice and perhaps even three times as much synthetic oil as projected in the long-range plans for its three northern countries. Even now, the capacity of several large synthetic oil plants, in particular of Leuna[40] and Most, exceeds by far the actual production. But the production of synthetic oil demands huge quantities of electric power and hard fuel, and until such power and lignite or coal are available for this particular purpose, the extension or

382 even full utilization of the present plant capacity would be of little practical use. Another factor is that the cost of producing synthetic oil is very high in comparison with the cost of natural petroleum: a gallon of synthetic gasoline produced at the Moss plant may cost as much as one dollar. Furthermore, Polish and Czech specialists in this domain are very few. Should the need of increasing the present production arise, however, the German and Czech plants are capable of much extension; the Dwory plant is being enlarged now, and the rebuilding of one of the Blachownia plants will probably be much advanced in the course of the present Polish Six Year Plan.[41]

Apart from synthetic oil, the captive area produces large quantities of benzol and industrial alcohol, both of which may be used as motor propellants. Eastern German, Czech, and Polish benzol producing capacity may at present exceed 200,000 tons per year and is capable of further increase.[42] The northern half of the captive area is the greatest potato producing area of the world, with a total output more than four times as large as that of the United States (in 1948, 49 million tons as against 12 million in the United States), and thus it is the largest potential producer of alcohol.[43] Current statistical data for alcohol production are not available.

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tons of coke in 1952, 1,300,000 tons by 1953 and 1,700,000 tons by 1955 (speech of 31 October 1951, by Heinrich Rau, Eastern German minister of planning, *Wirtschaft*, Berlin, 1951, No. 44). However the rapidly growing requirements of the new Eastern German metallurgic plants cannot be satisfied by the two locally produced types of coke and a large importation of coke from Poland. In its four year trade agreement with the Soviet Union of 27 September 1951, the Eastern German government assured itself the importation of 250,000 tons of coke from Russia annually for the period 1952-1955 (*Wirtschaft*, Berlin, 1951, No. 42). 135 433

[15] An estimate of the writer, based on the assumption that most of the hard coal extracted in Eastern Germany and Hungary, as well as in Rumania, will be converted into coke. Thus, the huge steel plant at Dunapentele (Stalinváros) in Hungary, now under construction, is expected to be run on Hungarian produced coke, converted from the local Pécs coal. The demand for coke by that plant alone may exceed one million tons.

[16] *European Steel Trends*, United Nations, Geneva, 1949, p. 40.

[17] An unpublished study on Czechoslovak industry by Dr. V. Paulat of New York. 362

[18] National Economic Plan for 1951, *Dziennik Ustaw* (Journal of Laws), Warsaw, 31 March 1951.

[19] Heinrich Rau, speech of 31 October 1951, *Wirtschaft*, Berlin, 1951, No. 44.

[20] A conservative estimate of the writer.

[21] See the *Information Bulletin* of the Rumanian National Committee, Washington, for 1950 and 1951, and *La Nation Roumaine*, Paris, *passim*. 315 135

[22] Here are some of the non-quoted estimates: the *Review of International Affairs*, Belgrade, 28 March 1951 — 3.5 million tons; *World Today*, London, Royal Institute of International Affairs, April 1951 — 3.8 million; *Etudes et Conjonctures*, Paris, a semi-official publication, January-February 1951 — 4.3 million; *Gospodarka Planowa* (Planned Economy), Warsaw, February 1951 — 5.46 million tons. The Belgrade magazine is biased.

[23] The first figure comes from the Rumanian National Committee, *supra*, the second from Dr. G. G. Rosu.

[24] According to the *Wirtschaftsdienst*, Hamburg, June 1951, Albania planned to extract 306,000 tons of oil in 1950. According to Musil, the Albanian correspondent of *Wirtschaft* (Berlin, No. 48 of 30 November 1951), the Albanian extraction of oil reached 192,000 tons in 1948 and increased to 307,000 tons in 1950.

[25] Figures taken from recent official reports.

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315 [26] United Press from Vienna, quoted after *Anglo-Polish Review*, London, October 1951.
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[27] An estimate of the writer, shared by some other researchers.

[28] Stalin's speech of 9 February 1946.

[29] United Nations *Statistical Yearbook*, New York, 1949-50, p. 145. This is no longer true. In 1945 pipelines were laid to convey natural gas from Rumania to the Soviet Union.

[30] Data for Rumania and Poland taken from the official reports on the fulfillment of the annual and quarterly plans.

● 384 [31] Most of the data which follow are based upon Jean Chardonnet, *Les conséquences économiques de la guerre*, Paris, Hachette, 1947.
[113]

[32] J. A. Wilder, *Polish Regained Territories*, London, 1948.

[33] Dr. Paulat's study on the industrial development of Czechoslovakia, 1951.

[34] *Wirtschaft*, Berlin, *passim;* also advertisements in the Eastern German press.

[35] *Wirtschaft*, Berlin, 1951, No. 1.

[36] *Wirtschaft*, Berlin, 1951, No. 44 of November 2.

[37] See page 29.

[38] Speech of minister for planning, Dolanský, introducing the revised plan (end of February 1951).

[39] *Wirtschaft*, Berlin, 1951, No. 44 of November 2.

[40] Leuna plant employs 28,000 people, and is the greatest single plant in Eastern Germany. Karl Kühn (*Wirtschaft*, Berlin, 1951, No. 18) stated that Leuna could produce much more gasoline in 1950, because the installed capacity would permit such production, but that nitrogen-making had priority.

[41] Speech by Hilary Minc, *Trybuna Ludu*, Warsaw, 24 May 1951.

[42] United Nations *Statistical Yearbook*, New York, 1949-50. In 1937 Czechoslovakia produced 42,600 tons of benzol and Poland 31,100 tons; in 1936 Germany, outside the Bizone, produced 131,000 tons.

[43] *Ibidem*, p. 110.

37 [44] Professor H. Herbich, quoted by S. Rotarski, "The Unexploited Resources of Europe," in *Eastern Quarterly*, London, January 1950. The four rivers are the Columbia, Colorado, Sacramento, and San Joaquin.

[45] Speech by Heinrich Rau on 31 October 1951. See footnote 14.

[46] *Trybuna Ludu*, Warsaw, 24 October 1951.

[47] Dr. V. Paulat. See footnote 17.

[48] Exhaustive data on that problem in *Wirtschaft*, Berlin, 1950, No. 51.

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Only after the events of spring 1947 in Hungary which consolidated the power of the Communist Party, and the February, 1948, coup in Czechoslovakia did Moscow consider nationalistic conflicts between Hungarians on the one hand and Slovaks and Czechs on the other superfluous. And duly in autumn 1948, an agreement was concluded between Czechoslovakia and Hungary regularising the status of the Hungarian minority in Slovakia. In January, 1949, the Czechoslovak parliament decided to restore full civil rights to the Hungarians, and to allow them to remain permanently in the country. 563 661

Conflicts Between Rumanians and Hungarians

The bone of contention between Rumania and Hungary was Transylvania in which nearly 2 million Hungarians live. Within 24 hours of the time that the Groza government was established, northern Transylvania, taken from Rumania by Hitler and given to Hungary, was given back to Rumania, even though the majority of its population is Hungarian. Vishinsky openly admitted that this was a reward for the establishment of the Groza Government. Pătrăşcanu, then leader of the Rumanian Communist Party, gratefully acknowledged the fact that Russia was responsible for the transfer. Strange as it may seem, Rákosi also used the conflict to pay a tribute to Russia, stating on 1st June, that at the Paris Conference Britain and the U.S.A. decided on the transfer because of their interests in Rumanian oil. 'Rumania's oil production is 10 times that of Hungary and naturally those countries which are interested in oil, share out their sympathy or antipathy according to whether 100,000 or 1,000,000 tons of oil are at stake. Naturally this fact has an important bearing on their political judgment. Thus when the Hungarian-Rumanian frontier issue was raised at the Paris Conference, the U.S.A. suggested that Rumania should regain her 1940 frontiers without change. Britain immediately agreed to this proposal and the matter was settled.' (*East Europe*, 12th June, 1946). 563 728 [382]

The Hungarian Communist Party demanded on 12th August, 1946, that the Peace Settlement be changed to allow at least that part of Transylvania inhabited by Hungarians to be given back to Hungary. At the same time the Rumanian

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produce many substitutes. Today, shortages of raw materials 433
are covered by imports from abroad, most of these from the 135
Soviet Union. Economic autarky is not possible in Eastern Europe alone, but the Soviet bloc, including Russia and China, is almost self-sufficient in raw materials.

Under the unrelenting pressure of Moscow, the output 402
of machinery and plant equipment in this area is making 439
steady and rapid progress. The period when most of these countries must depend on importation of machinery from the West is almost over. Were all Western sources of industrial machinery to be completely closed to the captive area, its industrialization would be slowed and delayed but not halted. As things stand now, much industrial equipment is still imported from Western Europe, legally or illegally, and the Soviet Union can take care of the other shortages. Czechoslovakia, Eastern Germany, and, to a lesser degree, Hungary produce machinery above their home requirements, and part of the surplus goes to other captive countries, to the Soviet Union, and to China.

According to United Nations data,[2] the 1951 indices of 433
industrial production in the single countries of this area in comparison to 1938 were as follows: Eastern Germany, 115 per cent; Czechoslovakia, 168; Rumania, 206; Hungary, 267; Poland, 270; and Bulgaria, 345 per cent. In considering these figures, it is necessary to bear in mind that 1938 was not the peak production year in Eastern Europe. Between 1938 and 1943-44, the industrial output of Czechoslovakia and Hungary rose noticeably owing to the erection of many new industrial plants, so that only a part of their industrial expansion since 1938 can be attributed to the efforts of their present governments. Poland's industrial potential increased in 1945 by at least one third, due to the acquisition of ex-German Silesia. Bulgaria's industrial po-

[2] *Economic Survey of Europe Since the War* (Geneva: United Nations, 1953), p. 239, Table 1.

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apparatus grows. When the introduction of the New Course in 1953 made agricultural improvement imperative, the seriousness of this bureaucratic delay and confusion became the subject of frequent attack by Communist orators, confirming the judgment of a prominent American student of Communist agricultural life who wrote:

> When you read . . . of the remarkable increase in the number of agronomists and other agricultural specialists and technicians in the Soviet Union, remember that many of them are not engaged, or do not spend much of their time, in research or extension or other technical work, but are trying to cope with the vast amount of bureaucratic paper work required by the Soviet system.[29]

The recurrent drives to "deflate the ranks of the farm bureaucracy" have not generally, according to this same expert, proved successful.

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An additional measure of the long-standing Communist reluctance to divert national resources to agricultural development is to be found in the relatively lethargic pace of farm mechanization. While it is true (see Table 23) that an increase in the mechanization of the "Socialist sector" did accompany collectivization, the increase was by no means as great as popularly pictured, and was not even as great, proportionally, as the increase which accompanied Soviet collectivization in the early thirties. Since one of the stock justifications of large-scale collectivized farming was, and remains, its alleged capacity to exploit modern farm machinery, the failure of the Communists to supply the farms with adequate machinery indicated the degree to which this Communist argument was a rationalization for a policy of exploitation.

Since the broad Russian plains are more adaptable to use of farm machinery, especially large tractors and combines, comparisons with Eastern Europe and its more broken terrain are not altogether apt. However, it should be noted that the Soviet Union provides a higher proportion of tractors to its farms than do the East European Communist regimes. As indicated in Table 23, there were approximately 107,500 tractors in service in Eastern Europe in 1952-53, compared with approximately 45,000 four years earlier. During the four years of collectivization, then, the tractor park in Eastern Europe was increased by only 62,500. In the USSR, on the other hand, over 100,000 tractors were produced in the year 1936 alone,[30] far fewer than was needed, but far greater proprotionately than in Eastern Europe.

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[29] Lazar Volin, "Russia's Agricultural Potential," *Foreign Agriculture*, October, 1953, p. 179.
[30] Harry Schwartz, p. 243.

TABLE 23

GROWTH OF TRACTOR PARK IN EASTERN EUROPE

Country	Number of MTS 1948/49	Number of MTS 1952/53	(Tractors in 1,000's by Sector) MTS 1948/49	MTS 1952/53	State Farms 1948/49	State Farms 1952/53	Total 1948/49	Total 1952/53
Czechoslovakia	500	258	5.0	—	5.0	—	10.0	25.0
Poland	30	376	0.2	15.0	14.3	20.0	14.5	35.0
Hungary	220	400*	3.0	18.5	—	1.5*	—	20.0*
Rumania	135	218	5.0*	9.6	3.5	4.4	8.5	15.0
Bulgaria	71	140	3.6	12.8	0.2	0.5	3.8	12.5

Sources:

C: 1949: J. Dolansky, *op. cit.*, 1952: J. Dolansky in *For a Lasting Peace*, July 8, 1953.

P: H. Minc: Le Plan Sexennual (The Six Year Plan), *Notes et Etud. Doc.*, No. 1377, Paris, 1950; tractors: MTS-1953, E. Puzsolkowski, in *For a Lasting Peace*, June 12, 1953. Stat. 1948: *Rocznik Stat.* (Statist. Year), p. 60. 1952 estimated.

H: 1949 in *Hungary Today*. 1952 estimated on the basis of planned figures.

R: 1948: *Probleme Economice* (Econ. Problems), No. 1, 1948. Gh.-Dej. in *For a Lasting Peace*, May 29, 1953.

B: Vulko Chervenkov in *For a Lasting Peace*, Sept. 11, 1953.

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244 As in the USSR, mere numerical increase in farm machinery
●407 creates an exaggerated view of the increased efficiency achieved. Though the tractor emphasis of the Soviet planners of the early thirties was avoided in Eastern Europe, the capacity of farm machinery to solve agricultural problems continued to be overrated. The production record of those farms – many of them the vast State Farms in Czechoslovakia and Poland in which the available machinery was largely concentrated – barely exceeds that of the non-mechanized farms. The official press has frequently complained about the inefficiency of Machine and Tractor Stations and the personnel assigned to them, but these complaints reached a particularly high pitch when the New Course directed official attention to agriculture. "We could have . . . better results in the field of farm machinery," the Polish planner, Jacob Berman, complained at the Ninth Party Plenum in October 1953. "Is it normal," he asked, "that of 6,000 engineers in the Ministry of Machine Industry, only 72 work in factories for agricultural machinery?"[21] Other Communists have complained of the number of idle tractors, the rapid turnover of personnel in the MTS, and the long delays caused by lack of adequate repair facilities.

241 These oft-repeated complaints and the slow pace of agricultural development itself reinforce the impression that Communist claims of extensive mechanization of farms are exaggerated. In Poland, for instance, less than 10 per cent of farming is mechanized.[22] In Czechoslovakia, the most advanced country in the region, agricultural work was mechanized, according to Premier Siroky, up to 28 per cent in 1951 and 30 per cent in 1952. These figures hardly square with those given by Siroky for individual components of mechanized operation: plowing, 20 per cent; sowing, 13 per cent; and tending of crops, 0.08 per cent. Siroky himself expressed great dissatisfaction with the progress of farm mechanization:

> Especially here in Czechoslovakia we had all the prerequisites for ensuring that Socialist industry would effectively contribute to the development of agricultural production, both in the State farms and cooperatives, and in the private sector. However, the aid on the

[21] *Trybuna Ludu*, (Warsaw) November 6, 1953.

[22] At the end of the Six Year Plan (1956) 18.8 per cent of Polish agriculture is to be mechanized (*Nowe Drogi*, July-August, 1950, p. 212). This is to include 80,000 tractors. Since by the end of 1953 approximately 40,000 tractors were in operation, it can be assumed that approximately half of the projected 18.8 per cent mechanization had been achieved, although it is probably much less.

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241 area is much smaller in Eastern Europe than in Western
511 Europe. This is shown clearly in the following table:
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AGRICULTURAL PRODUCTION PER HECTARE OF AGRICULTURAL LAND

	Crop Units	Index		Crop Units	Index
Denmark	57	100	Czechoslovakia	31	54
England and Wales	46	81	Hungary ..	21	37
Netherlands ..	91	160	Bulgaria ..	19	33
Switzerland ..	89	156	Poland.. ..	18	32
Belgium	63	111	Rumania ..	17	30
France	26	46	Yugoslavia ..	17	30
Germany	44	79	Albania ..	17	30

If the agricultural population of Eastern Europe is to have the same quantity of agricultural products per head as in Western Europe, not only must half of them be removed, but the agricultural output must be doubled.

The low productivity in Eastern Europe is not the result of
[134] infertility of the soil. On the contrary, the soil of Eastern Europe, and especially the excellent black soil of the Danube Plain, is on the whole much richer than the naturally poor soil of Western Europe. The low productivity is due to three main causes, the scarcity of livestock, the scanty use of fertilizers and the lack of agricultural implements and machinery.

LIVESTOCK DENSITY (1938)

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	Cattle per 100 ha. Agricultural Area	Pigs per 100 ha. Arable Land
Czechoslovakia ..	59.1	65.3
Hungary	24.9	55.3
Poland	41.3	40.6
Rumania	23.5	23.5
Bulgaria	41.0	22.1
Yugoslavia	29.8	46.0
Germany	69.8	122.5
France	45.2	34.4
Denmark	103.1	106.1

(PEP—Political and Economic Planning-*Economic Development in S.E. Europe*, 1945, p. 34).

In this table the figures for the countries of Eastern Europe include a large number of oxen and buffaloes which are used mainly as draught animals. In the quality of its livestock Eastern Europe compares even more unfavourably with Western Europe than in the quantity.

407 On the question of agricultural implements and machinery,
241 the PEP study states :

'The value of all agricultural equipment used per hectare of arable land was estimated by a Roumanian source at Lei 1,000

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(about £1) for Roumania, Lei 2,000 for Bulgaria, Lei 3,000 for 407
Poland; as against Lei 15,000 for Germany and Lei 42,000 for 241
Switzerland. So far as mechanical equipment is concerned, the disparity was even greater. According to a German source, taking the mechancial equipment per hectare of farm land (in terms of weight) as 100 for Germany, the figure for Bulgaria would be 14, for Yugoslavia 5, for Roumania 3.' (Ibid. p. 32).

A comparison of the extent to which fertilizers are used is 241
equally unfavourable, as can be seen from the following table :

USE OF ARTIFICIAL FERTILIZERS, 1930-1940
(KILOS PER HECTARE OF ARABLE LAND)

	Nitrates	*Phosphates*	*Potash*
Czechoslovakia ..	4.4	8.9	5.0
Poland	1.1	2.3	1.4
Hungary	0.1	0.9	0.1
Yugoslavia ..	0.1	0.4	0.1
Roumania ..	0.02	0.06	0.01
Bulgaria	0.01	0.00	0.00
Germany	18.0	21.4	31.3
France	7.0	17.6	8.7
Denmark	10.7	24.1	7.9

(Ibid. p. 31)

There are a number of other factors which influence the 511
welfare of the agricultural population. The Eastern European 435
peasants suffered from the bad organisation of the marketing of their produce. Two examples will suffice. In Zürich 63 per cent of the retail price of milk went to the milk producer (the rest was divided between wholesale trade, retail and transport), and in Copenhagen 65 per cent; even in the United States where milk is delivered over very great distances the farmer got 46.8 per cent. As against this in Warsaw he got only 30 per cent, and in Belgrade 37.5 per cent (Ibid. pp. 94-5). The Survey of the Royal Institute of International Affairs, *World Agriculture* (1932), tells of a typical Rumanian barley farm, from which barley to the value of Lei 1,006 was sold. But the middlemen's profits and transport charges before the grain left Rumania amounted to Lei 1,202 (p.106).

The high prices of essential industrial goods further militated against the prosperity of the peasants.

The expensiveness of industrial compared with agricultural products in the period before the second world war is revealed by the following index figures of the variation of agricultural and industrial prices in Hungary (July figures):

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A technical revolution in agriculture is also planned for the coming few years (except in Yugoslavia). This is shown by the tremendous rise in the number of tractors:

ACTUAL AND PLANNED NUMBER OF TRACTORS IN RELATION TO ARABLE LAND

Country	*Year*	*Number (thousands)*	*Arable land per Tractor (hectares)*
Poland	1946	5.5	3,000
	1955	76.5	220
Czechoslovakia	1946	11.8	460
	1953	45.0	120
Hungary	1947	11.9	490
	1954	21.0†	280
Rumania	1948	11.0	850
	1949	12.5	740
Bulgaria	1946	4.6	920
	1953	10.0	430
Yugoslavia	1946	4.0	1,800
	1951	4.5	1,710
Total	1946	44.9	1,100
	Last year of plan	169.5	290

(Ibid. p. 208). †state tractors only.

Agriculture will be reorganised on the new technical basis, state and co-operative farms replacing the small peasant farms.

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sumption with every Five-Year Plan, it fixes the actual target of the Plan at a volume of production which does not exceed the target of former Plans. This is shown clearly by the following table:

TARGETS OF PRODUCTION FOR THE END OF THE FIVE-YEAR PLANS

	First 1932-3	*Second 1937*	*Third 1942*	*Fourth 1950*
Some Means of Consumption				
Cotton goods (milliard metres) ..	4.7	5.1	4.9	4.7
Woollen goods (million ,,) ..	270	220	177	159
Linen (million metres)	500	600	985	—
Vegetable oil (thousand tons) ..	1,100	750	850	880
Sugar (million tons)	2.6	2.5	3.5	2.4
Some Means of Production				
Electric Current (million kwh.) ..	22	38	75	82
Coal (million tons)	75	152.5	243	250
Pig iron (million tons)	10	16.0	22	19.5
Steel (million tons)	10.4	17	28	25.4
Oil and gas (million tons) ..	21.7	46.8	54	35.4

(Actually in the territory of the U.S.S.R., in 1913, 2,854 million metres of cotton goods and 95-110 million metres of woollen goods were produced; in 1937 the corresponding figures were 3,181 and 98).

Therefore, when the Russian government boasts that 'in 1950 we will reach the level of 4.7 thousand milliard metres of cotton goods' it does not prevent them from having made the same promise twenty years ago, when the population of U.S.S.R. was about fifty millions less than now.

578 that the two antagonists met and clashed in the "war" which re-
185 sulted in collectivized agriculture.[18]

The problem which the Bolsheviks had to deal with may be briefly stated. NEP had insured the continued political existence of the regime; but salvation had been achieved at a great price. To obtain a sufficient supply of agricultural produce to feed the rising urban population and, if possible, to permit acceleration of industrial growth, it was necessary to provide increased incentives for the peasantry. But to provide incentives for an increased supply of produce to the cities, it was also necessary to create an industry capable of supplying peasants with the consumer goods and agricultural machinery they demanded in exchange. Without recourse to foreign capital, this, in turn, was impossible, unless a steadily increasing supply of agricultural produce was guaranteed.

The problem of breaking this vicious circle occupied the thoughts of the best Party theoreticians throughout the period of NEP. Some, like Bukharin, suggested a solution bearing some resemblance to the pre-Revolutionary policies of Witte and Stolypin — a "gradualist" approach to industrialization, encouragement of the more efficient middle peasant producers, and limited recourse to foreign capital. Trotsky, as the leader of the radical Left Wing, called for an immediate drive for industrialization in which the peasants would absorb the major shock. The theoretical debate rose to its climax in the late twenties, coinciding with the final victory of the Stalinist faction of the Bolshevik Party and the resurgence of the agricultural crisis in a new form.[19]

The Pre-collectivization Crisis

185 The Stalinist "solution" to the agricultural crisis (collectiviza-
471 tion) did not proceed according to a predetermined plan or theory.
423 Rather, it was developed pragmatically as a response to critical

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[18] Lazar Volin, a foremost American student of Soviet agriculture, also assigned priority to the practical, as opposed to the ideological basis of collectivization. He explained the Communist attachment to the *kolkhoz* in this way: "First, the practical or pragmatic reasons . . . [revolving] around the need for large supplies of cheap agricultural products to feed and clothe the growing industrial population and the army . . . Second, an ideological predilection for agrarian collectivism, rooted in the Marxist-Leninist-Stalinist dogma." Lazar Volin, "Agricultural Organization," *Soviet Economic Growth*, Abraham Bergson (editor), White Plains, N. Y., 1953, p. 286.

[19] A reliable account of the heated Party economic debate may be found in Maurice Dobb, *Soviet Economic Development since 1917* (New York, 1948), pp. 208-229, and of the political implications of the debate in Isaac Deutscher, *Stalin: A Political Biography* (Oxford, 1949), pp. 294-304.

economic conditions and the special requirements of the first Five Year Plan. Indeed, the first collectivization drive was expected to bring only 14 per cent of the land into the "socialist sector". The overwhelming success of the drive was as much a surprise to the Communist leadership as to the peasants themselves. And it was only when the drive turned out to be so phenomenally successful that the Communist planners stepped up the targets and pace of the Five Year Plan itself.

The agricultural crisis which inspired the collectivization drive of the first Five Year Plan had its origins in two situations: First, the acute grain shortage of 1927-28, and second, and more important, the post-Revolutionary structure of the land (see Chart I). As a result of the peasant revolution of 1917-18, the small and medium peasantry occupied almost all the arable land in the Soviet Union. Where they had produced only 50 per cent of nation's grain in pre-war times, they produced 85 per cent in 1926-27. Since the poor and middle peasants marketed a far smaller percentage of the grain they produced than had the great landowners and kulaks of pre-war times, their domination of the land produced a serious drop in marketed commodities.

Thus, while total grain production had declined by only five per cent below pre-Revolutionary levels, marketed grain had declined by *more than 50 per cent* — from 26 per cent of five billion poods in 1913 to 13.3 per cent of 4.749 billion poods in 1926-27.[20] The cities received far less grain than they had received in pre-war times; and due to a number of factors (among them the competition between various State purchasing agencies), the cities were paying a higher price for the grain they could obtain. One of the most serious consequences of this new relationship was the fact that little grain was available for foreign export to pay for desperately needed capital equipment.

The basic problem for the regime was to create an agricultural structure which would enable the State to siphon off a *far greater proportion of the total product*, at a price it wished to pay, than was possible under the conditions of NEP. While it is true that the regime wished to increase total agricultural production, and may have expected to achieve the goal through increased mechanization of the farms, this target was secondary. For achieving the primary goal — extraction of a greater *proportion* of the produce —

[20] A pood equals 36 pounds.

the vehicle of the large-scale collective farm, heretofore neglected, stood ready at hand.[21] 185 471

The very essence of the *kolkhoz* (collective farm) system lay in the ease with which it facilitated extraction of heavy tribute from the land in the form of extremely cheap supplies of foodstuffs and industrial crops. Thus, the rise of the Stalinist land system was closely connected with the Party's program of break-neck industrialization, massive capital investments, and strategic projects at the expense of consumption. The ever-tightening hold of the regime over the industrial working class made possible implementation of these policies without the development of consumer goods facilities; and therefore the regime could permit a drop in the levels of consumption without jeopardizing its plan. The new agricultural program — designed primarily to *redistribute* agricultural produce rather than to *increase* it — was consistent with this aspect of the plan. Moreover, the political hold collectivization afforded over the peasants assured State control of the rural labor supply and enabled the State to channel manpower into non-agricultural occupation as it deemed necessary. 423

This was the general rationale behind collectivization. The immediate cause for the first collectivization drive lay, however, in the mounting economic tensions of the late 1920s. As early as 1925-26 the regime had sought to reimpose many of the agrarian controls lifted in 1921, at the time of the inauguration of NEP. To implement this policy, agricultural prices were once again restricted and production itself subjected to heavy taxes. Retaliating in kind, the peasants drove production downward, hoarded again, and consumed what they could not hide or sell.[22] As a consequence State grain collections in 1928-29 dropped more than one-third below the level of two years before. Tension in the countryside mounted. The means by which the new monolithic party chose to meet this situation was of a magnitude equal to the challenge.

The Stalinist Solution to the Land Problem

The great offensive against the peasantry was launched late 423 185

[21] The *artel* was considered the best form of collective agriculture since it combined a sufficient number of communal features to guarantee State control with sufficient household autonomy to make it structurally feasible to the peasants. The State-appointed managers, supported by local party administrators, could enforce peasant cooperation with the Plan; and the continued existence of individual households offered the peasant that minimum of private incentive consistent with the cooperation.

[22] This crisis is well described in Dobb, p. 222.

●423 in 1928, but it was not until one year later, when Stalin called for
185 "liquidation of the kulaks as a class," that its full weight was felt. Since the actual number of kulaks in post-Revolutionary Russia was not very great, this slogan made it abundantly clear that the frankly military offensive was directed against the peasantry as a whole. The story is well known: the dispatch of Communist shock cadres to the villages, the mass deportations, the herding of peasants into hastily formed collective units, the calculated famine in the Ukraine, the wholesale slaughter of livestock by the desperate peasants, the brief pause ordered by Stalin early in 1930, the renewed offensive in 1931-32, the collapse of the opposition, and the final establishment of a collective farm system in all essential respects resembling that of today. There were many subsequent modifications of the system; but its basic features were firmly established in the "avalanche" of collectivization in the 1928-32 period.

In evaluating the success of the drive and the system it created, it is necessary to reiterate that the primary utility of the collective farm lay in its efficiency as an economic and political *control device*, by which rapid industrialization of the Soviet Union could be facilitated, and not in its efficiency of production. To the extent that it made industrialization possible, it is possible to show that Soviet collectivization "succeeded."

241 So far as production is concerned, the efficiency of the collec-
423 tive farm was, and remains, low. It has been estimated that Soviet grain production in 1939 did not exceed that of 1928 by much more than the increase of sown area over the 11 intervening years.[23] Similarly, the gross production value of Soviet agriculture in 1940 exceeded 1928 by only a small fraction, though in the bumper year of 1937 the harvest may have been as much as 14 per cent higher.[24] Throughout the 1930s the Soviets put forth many claims of increased agricultural productivity which were, however, discounted by most Western experts. Western scepticism was vindicated by the 1953 acknowledgement of agricultural deterioration by N. S. Khrushchev, one of the chief architects of later Soviet agricultural policy.[25]

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[23] Naum Jasny, *Socialized Agriculture of the U.S.S.R.* (Stanford, 1950), p. 548.
[24] *Ibid.*, p. 673.
[25] Jasny's figures, which are cited above, are somewhat lower than official Soviet boasts. He made allowance for statistical falsification involved in such Soviet practices as measuring production in accordance with the "biological yield," a misleading statistical device employed by the Soviets since the early thirties and condemned by Malenkov in his August 8th, 1953 address.

TABLE 1

DIVISION OF AGRICULTURAL PRODUCT IN USSR BEFORE AND AFTER COLLECTIVIZATION †

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Year	Total Yield*	Obligatory Deliveries Million Centners	Obligatory Deliveries Percent of Total Crop	Retained by Farmers Million Centners	Retained by Farmers Percent of Total Crop**
1927/8	605.9	112.2	18.5	493.7	100
1932/3	570.1	185.2	32.5	384.9	77.9
1933/4	677.1	228.7	33.8	448.4	90.8
1934/5	669.5	226.6	33.8	442.9	89.7
1935/6	677.5	249.3	36.8	428.2	86.7
1936/7	612.5	260.0	42.4	353.5	71.4

† Propkopovicz, S. N., *Russlands Volkswirtschaft unter den Sowjets*, (Zurich, 1944), pp. 136, 138.

* Net totals, after seeds deducted from the total yield.

** 100 equals total crop retained by farmer 1927/8. Figures for subsequent years show percentage 1927/8 total retained.

But whatever the failure of collectivization to achieve productive efficiency, and other ostensible goals widely advertised in the propaganda of the time,[26] the Soviet State remained completely loyal to the system, bolstering it by police action and developing its distinctive features over the years. Evidently, the regime considered that for its investment, it was receiving an adequate return. The explanation for this unswerving loyalty to the system, in the face of the massive difficulties encountered, is to be found in the striking change in the pattern of grain collection after collectivization (see Table 1). In 1928 the State collected no more than 18.5 per cent of the total grain crop, while in 1937 an estimated 42.4 per cent was State-collected.[27] That this was a direct result of collectivization may be seen in the fact that, from the start, the collectivized sector

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[26] For example, one of the regime claims was that collectivization wiped out the inequality between the rich kulak and the poor peasant. The hypocrisy of this claim was made evident in the agricultural order that replaced the old one. Thus Jasny writes: "The former *kulaki*, actually the more energetic, harder working peasants, are now replaced by the army of chairmen of the *kolkhozy*, tractor drivers, combine operators, and the like. These workers both number and earn more than the *kulaki* . . ." (Jasny, p. 75).

[27] Harry Schwartz (p. 313) gives the Figure 15 per cent for 1928 and 40 per cent for 1939.

241 produced more for the market per hectare of arable land than did
423 the private sector. In 1932, 60 per cent of all households in the
185 Soviet Union had been collectivized, embracing 66 per cent of the sown area. Yet the collective and State farms (*sovkhozy*) supplied 84 per cent of the marketed grain and 83 per cent of the cotton.[28]

With the reinforcement of the collective farm system the State
241 was in a position where it could force the peasants to serve as a
185 cushion for harvest shocks. In 1937, a bumper year, the peasants
471 received 35.9 per cent of the total grain crop for division among
423 themselves; but in 1938-39, mediocre crop years, the peasants received only 26.9 and 22.9 per cent of the total, despite the fact that a smaller gross volume was to be shared.[29] In each case primary State needs governed the division of the agricultural yield. The Soviet Government had created an administrative apparatus which insured, in the words of one observer, that "if anyone was to starve, [the peasants] would be the first to do so."[30]

The function of the State farms in the Soviet system is similarly linked to the problem of agricultural deliveries. Though accounting for no more than 10 per cent of the arable area in 1937, the *sovkhozy* delivered 30 per cent of the milk, 25 per cent of the wool, and 24 per cent of the meat delivered to the State in that year. Whereas the grain producing collectives delivered only one-third of their total product to the State in the late thirties, the *sovkhozy* contributed three-quarters of their crop.[31] Hence, it may be said that, from the point of view of the Soviet planner, the State farms bore a superiority over the collective farms similar to the superiority of the collectives over the private farms.

471 The case for collectivization was aptly summed up by N. A.
423 Voznesensky when he revealed that the Soviet government in World War II collected three times the annual amount of grain collected by the Czarist regime during World War I when "72 per cent of all marketed grain was concentrated in the hands of estate owners and kulaks." This threefold increase in marketable surplus

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[28] Dobb, p. 249. There were, of course, other factors which accounted for the meagre quantity of goods placed on the market by the private sector, in particular, the amount of State discrimination against the private farms.

[29] Harry Schwartz, p. 285. Schwartz writes with regard to this question: "Only the government's complete domination of the peasantry through the collective farm system made this sharp change in the amount of grain collected possible." (p. 313).

[30] Leonard Hubbard, *The Economics of Soviet Agriculture* (London, 1939), p. 123.

[31] Harry Schwartz, p. 285.

became possible, he concluded, "only on the basis of large-scale mechanized Socialist agriculture."[22] 471 423

THE STALINIST SYSTEM DEVELOPED

Since its establishment during the first Five Year Plan the collective farm system has undergone a period of modification (1933-38), a period of intensified exploitation (1938-41), a period of wartime chaos and relaxation (1941-45), and a period of reimposed controls and further tightening (1945-53).

In the early phases of collectivization, deliveries were fixed by arbitrary "contracts" between the *kolkhozy* and the State — the contracts resembling the compulsory requisitions of War Communism. By 1933 peasant opposition, though generally weak and disorganized, forced the regime to grant minor concessions. Foremost among these was a system of fixed quotas to replace the contractual levies. By this device it was hoped to induce the individual *kolkhoznik* to cultivate more intensively, since any surplus beyond the fixed quota was retained by the collective farm and distributed among its members. The concessionary mood of this era was reflected finally in the Artel Statute of 1935 granting the collective farmer a household plot (one-quarter to one-half hectare) and the right to own a limited number of livestock, permission to sell surplus foodstuffs on the urban free market, a more equitable payment system, and a much restricted voice in *kolkhoz* management.

In the years immediately preceding World War II the Soviet regime had again begun to encroach on the rights granted under the Artel Statute. In 1939 the State decreed severe penalties for infractions of collective farm discipline and in 1940 the workday was lengthened. Similarly the method of computing delivery quotas was made stricter. Henceforth norms were computed not on the basis of actual area sown, but on the basis of arable land owned by the collective farm. Since yield estimates computed by State officials were generally arbitrary, the hardship worked by this new departure was severe.

The main direction of the government on the eve of World War II was thus to restrict further the private sector within the collective farms and to redirect attention to the communal land. The result was that an increasing proportion of the peasants' prod-

[22] Nikolai A. Voznesensky, *The Economy of the U.S.S.R. During World War II* (Public Affairs Press, Washington, D. C., 1948), p. 53.

471 act was taken by the State. The regime was still tightening con-
423 trols when the German Army attacked in June of 1941.

World War II subjected the entire collective system to its severest strain and, as Voznesensky observed, the system continued to supply the minimum of foodstuffs necessary for the war, although the regime had to loosen its hold considerably to guarantee the supply. That this achievement was a tribute to the vitality of the State agricultural administration, rather than the morale of the peasants, is suggested by the fact that in those areas invaded by the Germans - particularly Byelorussia and the Ukraine - large masses of peasants greeted them as liberators with the traditional bread and salt. But the Germans, who were as interested as their predecessors in a high "marketable surplus," maintained the kolkhozy intact. This policy and the standard Hitlerian excesses in conquered Slavic territory soon alienated the peasants.

With the defeat of the Nazi invasion and the cessation of hostilities in Europe and Asia, the Soviet regime sought to reimpose the agrarian controls loosened in wartime. In line with this policy,
[66] the government instituted a vast purge of collective farm directors and decreed a monetary reform in 1947 that wiped out at one stroke most of the savings accumulated by peasants during the war.
[65] Taxes on incomes derived from the household plots were raised sharply in 1948, 1950, and 1951; delivery quotas on dairy products and meats produced in the household plots were also raised. The culmination of this development in the kolkhozy was the shift from the zveno (link, or small unit) work system to large-scale labor brigades. Under an amalgamation program the number of collective farms in the Soviet Union was reduced from 252,000 to 97,000. A further effort in this direction was the plan associated with Khrushchev's name to weld the collective farms into vast "agro-towns" (agrogoroda), in which the peasantry would suffer the final transformation into a rural proletarist. Although this effort met with acknowledged failure, the theory behind it was not abandoned. In Stalin's last published work, Economic Problems of Socialism in the U.S.S.R., he called for a program of "gradual" transformation of collective into public property - in short, the eventual conversion of all agricultural units into State farms." [33]

[33] Joseph Stalin, Economic Problems of Socialism in the U.S.S.R. (International Publishers, New York), p. 51. In the same work Stalin called for a "relatively higher rate of expansion of the production of the means of production." The two programs - further statification of the farms and the acceleration of investment - were, in fact, inseparable.

Stalin's last work represented the apex of the agricultural policies initiated under his leadership during the first Five Year Plan. In the period after his death the Communists lost the offensive for the first time since 1928 and began to restructure the system in terms of new realities.[34] But in all the revaluation of time-honored doctrines which followed Stalin's death, the essential necessity of the *kolkhoz* system to the Soviet way of life has never been disputed. For the Soviet leaders, at least, it had proved its worth. 471/ 423

This, then, was the system which the East European Communist Parties, drawing so heavily upon Soviet experience, attempted to introduce into the newly-conquered regions in the aftermath of World War II.

[34] See below, pp. 118-124.

665 and customs they knew, and of which they were usually natives.[3] As subsequent events were to show, the transplantation of the Soviet system to Eastern Europe proved to be far more complicated than these former Cominternists had perhaps anticipated. Local conditions and traditions of the captive countries were everywhere to balk them, demanding improvisations and flexibilities for which they were unprepared.

The story of land collectivization in the Satellites from 1945 to 1953 is consequently the story of the interaction between a highly developed system of agrarian exploitation torn from its Soviet context, and the indigenous conditions of Eastern Europe which confronted Party political-economic planners at every turn. A brief review of these conditions is in order.

2. *The Rise of the Peasant Proprietor* (1800-1939)

565 423 Although some remnants of an essentially feudal land system survived in areas of Poland and Hungary (particularly the latter) until the eve of World War II, the major features of East European feudalism, contrary to popular belief, died before the beginning of the 20th century.[4] Serfdom was finally abolished by parliamentary legislation or revolutionary action by 1860: in the Austrian "hereditary lands" (including Slovenia, Bohemia and Moravia) as early as 1781; in Croatia in 1848; in Hungary (including Slovakia) in 1849; in Congress Poland in 1861; and in Romania in 1864. Emancipation of the Serbian and Bulgarian peasantry resulted from progressive limitations of the political power of their Turkish overlords, a process which took place throughout the 19th century.

As was the case in Russia, however, emancipation did not solve the basic problems of East European rural society. Indeed, with the growing incorporation of Eastern Europe into the world agricultural market, the problems grew even more severe in the 19th century. Except in Bulgaria and Serbia, where a class of peasant smallholders emerged within the framework of Ottoman society, the abolition of serfdom did not establish a sturdy, independent peasantry such as existed in the West. Even in Bulgaria

[3] "The East European revolution . . . was imposed from outside and from above . . . [and therefore cannot] justly be compared with the revolutions of 1688, 1789, and 1917." (Seton-Watson, p. vii.).

[4] It is necessary, one writer points out, to stress the incorrectness of the widely-held view that "the feudal system, with the characteristic features of the large latifundia, continued to prevail east of the Elbe until the arrival of the Soviet Army." (Ygael Gluckstein, *Stalin's Satellites in Europe*, London, 1952, p. 13).

565 and Serbia the peasants, though not oppressed, were extremely
423 poor. The peasant was no longer tied to the land, but in a great many cases his emancipation meant only that he worked for the same landlord to whom he was once bound. Furthermore, glaring inequalities in the pattern of land ownership developed after emancipation. (Chart IV indicates the inequalities of land distribution surviving the post-World War I reforms).

The root of the problem lay in the fact that emancipation did not lead to a basic improvement in the technological level of farming (with the possible exception of Bohemia) so that with the late 19th century increase in population, the struggle among the peasants was for more land, not for improved technique.[6] In Western Europe the emancipation of the peasantry had been accompanied by the slow certain growth of commerce and industry, but in Eastern Europe no urban society developed to compensate for, and offset, the agrarian dislocations. The rising competition of American grain on the world market further contributed to steady deterioration of the agrarian situation.

565 In the years prior to World War I there developed – both
423 among city intellectuals and peasantry – a growing consciousness of the need for profound reform of the land system. Groups were created to discuss the problems but little concretely was done before the war. The great peasant revolt which shook Romania in 1907, though rapidly suppressed, climaxed this pre-war drive for basic economic change.[6]

World War I, a social as well as a military convulsion, gave the first real impetus to the drive for reform. Stimulated by the success of the peasant revolution in Russia and by local nationalist ferment, the East European peasants organized the first political parties to promulgate demands in the name of the peasants as a distinct class. Their immediate demand was for sweeping land reforms, and their long-range hope was a share in the rule of their countries. "The peasants," in the words of one historian, "were roused and seemingly had learnt that land without liberty, or liberty without land, would be but a half freedom, and that to gain control of power was necessary."[7] In Bulgaria the Agrarian Party, under

[6] The increase in population density in Eastern Europe in recent years is reflected in the fact that, for example, the average Bulgarian farm occupied 7.3 hectares in 1897, and only 4.5 hectares in 1946. Sharp reductions in land per peasant occurred in each of the East European countries.
[6] See Henry Roberts, *Rumania* (New York, 1949), p. 11-21.
[7] David Mitrany, *Marx Against the Peasant* (Chapel Hill, North Carolina, 1951), p. 121.

the leadership of the radical Alexander Stambouliski, took power 669
after the war. Though his regime was overthrown by the reaction- 565
ary Tsankov-Volkov *coup* of 1923, with every excess and barbarity, 423
Stambouliski's premiership left a lasting social imprint. Elsewhere in Eastern Europe peasant parties were not strong enough to take the reigns of government, but the impact of the "green rising" was reflected everywhere in legislative activity.

In Romania about 50 per cent of the arable land (four million 423
hectares) was transferred to peasant smallholders, reflecting the vigor of the 1907 uprising. In newly-created Czechoslovakia and Yugoslavia the reforms were less spectacular, but followed the same area-wide pattern. In these two countries the land reforms had a national as well as social character, the majority of the expropriated lands having been Hungarian and German properties.[8]

The same forces were at work in Poland where the issue of land reform was uppermost in the public consciousness at the time of the nation's reestablishment. Despite determined opposition from the land owning classes, limited land reforms were decreed in 1919 and 1920. But partly because the principle of total compensation was accepted, only two and a half million hectares were distributed among the peasants by 1938, only enough to satisfy the land hunger of approximately half the natural increase in population.[9]

In the entire region only Hungary resisted peasant demands for land reform. There the movement was effectively blocked, first by Bela Kun's temporary Communist dictatorship, and then by the Horthy reaction. The land structure that emerged from the post-war reforms is described in Chart IV.

As Chart IV indicates, the post-World War I reforms left much to be accomplished in the direction of equalizing the peasant land tenure. But from the Baltic to the Aegean the reforms signified

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[8] In Czechoslovakia 12 per cent of the arable land, or 1.7 million hectares, was distributed under the reform; in Yugoslavia 12.5 per cent of the arable land, or 1.8 million hectares, was distributed. The Yugoslav reforms were largely confined to Croatia and Slovenia, former provinces of the Austro-Hungarian Empire.

[9] Ferdynand Zweig, *Poland Between the Wars* (London, 1944), p. 130. Zweig's analysis of the national discussion of reform in the early 1920s is interesting, partly because so many of the arguments employed by those who opposed breaking up the large estates are those which are today used to justify the modern *kolkhoz*! This is true particularly of the argument that "self-sufficient small holdings are supposed to be unsuitable for compulsory deliveries in wartime." (p. 134).

● 423 the growing strength of the peasants and a further consolidation of a distinctly peasant culture with its special mores and traditions.[10]

Post-Reform Conditions

423 Despite the undoubted benefits which land reform brought
241 to many formerly impoverished peasants, the agricultural economy of Eastern Europe remained largely stagnant in the inter-war period. The failure of the reforms to work a radical improvement in the standard of living and to raise total agricultural production may be attributed to the fact that the reforms themselves were primarily *political* rather than *economic* in intent. They were motivated very largely by the "green rising," the panic fear of Bolshevism (which seized power in Bela Kun's Hungary in 1919 and swept to the gates of Warsaw in 1920), the social upheaval of the First World War, and the new nationalism. In no case is there evidence that an overall increase of agricultural production was the primary goal. Like the vast revolution in the Russian countryside of 1917-18, the East European reforms were designed to "distribute wealth, rather than to produce it."[11]

In short, if the reforms narrowed the gap between rich and poor, they failed to create the lasting conditions of agricultural prosperity. Indeed, by reducing the area of the landed estates which traditionally produced large marketable surpluses, the reforms hindered urban-industrial growth and restricted cash exports.[12] As a consequence, the agricultural level of Eastern Europe remained far below that of the more advanced countries of Western Europe (see Table 2). Essentially the same picture emerges from computation of the annual per hectare yield of the East European countries (see Chart II).

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[10] *Agrarian Problems from the Baltic to the Aegean* (Royal Institute of International Affairs, London, 1944), p. 58.

[11] Wilbert E. Moore, *Economic Demography of Eastern and Southern Europe* (Geneva, 1945), p. 100. For a similar view, stressing the *political* rather than the *economic* motivation of the East European land reform, see David Mitrany, *The Land and the Peasant in Rumania* (Oxford, 1930), Chapter 10.

[12] Data on the relative efficiency of small and large-scale farming in Eastern Europe are scanty, but Seton-Watson concluded that it was generally true that "the smaller the holding, the lower the productivity of the soil." (Seton-Watson, p. 86). Similarly, Moore held that "the large holdings tend to yield a greater product per unit of capital by more nearly maximum utilization of work animals." (Moore, p. 101). But whether or not large-scale farming was more *efficient* than small-scale farming, there is no doubt that the large-scale farms produced a higher proportion of the *marketed* produce, although this factor varied from country to country and from region to region.

241 211 banks, agro-technical training schools, agricultural machine industries, and rural communications received only minor allocations. The backward condition of rural transportation made the task of competing with foreign grain — especially American — on the world market that much more difficult and the lack of facilities for the fertilizer production helped maintain the low yield.

The institutional organization of agriculture placed strong impediments to improved efficiency and increased productivity. Thus the small size of peasant holdings, frequently scattered in tiny plots, subdivided through inheritance, in debt to local banks, sometimes still held under tenancy arrangements, all combined to blight the hopes raised by the first post-war reforms.

The means and resources of the various national governments were usually devoted to furthering industrial development and the accumulation of capital for favored projects from which the peasants rarely benefited. While in some countries import duties on motor cars might be reduced, duties on agricultural machinery were gradually raised.[13] The blind pursuit of such policies by the inter-war governments inevitably deepened the rift between town and country, and intensified peasant suspicion of the central regimes. In some cases the response of the regimes to such suspicions was to convert themselves into semi-fascist governments, which were not dependent upon that minimum of popular support which their semi-parliamentary predecessors required for continued existence.[14]

3. *World War II and After*

423 If World War I set in motion the process of land reform, World War II brought that process to a close. No doubt the sudden emergence of the Communists as a major political force in the area expedited completion of the reforms begun in the 1920s, but

[13] *Agrarian Problems from the Baltic to the Aegean*, p. 41-2. In Romania prior to 1928 the government imposed export duties on agricultural products. These duties were revoked but the general disregard for the needs of the landed population remained. And while it is true that there were efforts on the part of East European governments to make some administrative services available to the peasants (such as the Hungarian Social Fund, the O.N.Cs.A.) they were halting and generally short-lived.

[14] The process of excluding peasant parties from any kind of representation in the governments "began with Hungary in 1919, continued with Bulgaria in 1923, with Poland in 1926, with Yugoslavia in 1928, and with Rumania in 1931" (Mitrany, p. 122). Only the Czechoslovak Agrarian Party was able to remain in power, and in Bulgaria the Agrarian Party returned briefly between 1930 and 1934.

423 there were many indigenous forces which played a role as well. The war shook the fragile structure of East European society and made it vulnerable to rapid and drastic change.

Indeed, even in pre-war years the agitation for land reform had begun to take on serious character. By 1939 the rising peasant demands in Poland for further division of the landed estates had posed a critical challenge to the Sanacja regime and there were signs that the Hungarian ruling class were beginning to recognize the inevitability of land redistribution.

423 665 The impact of the war on the consciousness of the people was most dramatically expressed in the political reorientation which accompanied it. Tito's Partisan movement drew important support from the ranks of the impoverished peasantry. The sharp upward surge of the Czechoslovak Communist Party after the war may be taken, at least in part, as an indication of a more radical mood in the population as a whole. In Bulgaria, Romania and Hungary, the ruling classes, which contracted disastrous alliances with Hitler's New Order, had thereby discredited themselves, and gave way to spokesmen for radical action.

These changes were reflected politically in the fact that the main opposition to the Communists in the post-war era came, not from the remnants of the pre-war ruling classes, but from the more progressive peasant, and to a degree, from Social Democratic parties. The general framework of political and social thought had shifted to the left, and parties such as the Smallholders in Hungary and the Peasant Party in Poland assumed the dominant positions denied them in pre-war political life.[15]

423 Under these conditions the rapid conclusion of land reforms was inevitable and the Communists appeared, not as the instigators of reform, but as its overseer. Indeed, the reforms instituted in 1945-46 were not "socialist" in character, even in Hungary and

[15] The history of the non-Communist agrarian reform movements in Eastern Europe, prior to, and during World War II is yet to be written. The task is made somewhat difficult by present Communist efforts to blot out all evidence of the very existence of such movements outside the realm of the Communist Parties. The "Village Explorers" in Hungary, for example, who identified the high standards of peasant culture with an expected national renaissance, helped pave the way for the great reforms of 1945. Other groups, such as the Plowman's Front in Romania and the "Pladne" Agrarians in Bulgaria, also played, or might have played, important roles. The Polish Peasant Party is also worth considering in this respect because its role in the wartime resistance gave it roots among the peasantry sometimes lacking in the inter-war official "peasant" parties.

Poland where they were most extensive. On the contrary, like the 423
reforms of the 1920s, they signified a broadening of the property basis of society, not its limitation, and their aim was redistribution of property and wealth, not the reorganization of production.

Communist participation in the land reforms must be under- 423
stood as a part of their political program, not as a part of their 665
social program of "building socialism." The overriding concern of the East European Communist Parties in the post-war period was not the shape of the future economy, but the assumption of the political power. The Communists offered no opposition to the implementation of the reforms, and, in most cases, expedited them to curry favor with the population. The Communists attuned themselves to the popular mood, carefully concealing the focal point of their operations, which lay in the day-to-day process of consolidating power in the State apparatus, particularly in the Ministries of Interior, Justice, and Agriculture. To this end they worked, often obscurely, in minority positions, in the post-war governing coalitions and supported land programs which actually impeded their own subsequent collectivization drives.

The Communists went so far as to support, on countless occasions, the principle of private property. Thus, in 1945, the Hungarian Communist theoretician, Josef Revai, stated categorically: "There exists a material community of interest between the peasantry and labor: the preservation of the distributed land."[16] And two months later Matyas Rakosi echoed his words, declaring, "We do not want kolkhozes, but strong and prospering small farms."[17] And an organ of the Polish Communists, *Glos Ludu*, expressed itself very clearly in the same year:

> The development of the village economy can not and will not be a copy of the Russian development. Our conditions are different; our national traditions are different as well. The difference is in the psychology of the Pole, and without doubt our Polish way of progress will be different.[18]

The Substance of the Reforms

Assured of full Communist support, the reforms were rapidly 423
implemented throughout the region. The most radical land alterations occurred in Hungary, where the land structure had been least

[16] *Szabad Nep*, August 18, 1945.
[17] *Szabad Nep*, October 16, 1945.
[18] *Glos Ludu*. December 13, 1945.

● 423 affected by inter-war reforms. The Communist-dominated Ministry of Agriculture administered the land distribution (decreed March 17, 1945, following the Debrecen Conference), by the terms of which all holdings greater than 57 hectares were to be divided and all estates in excess of 570 hectares were to be expropriated outright. The resulting change was drastic: at one stroke the great Hungarian latifundia were destroyed (see Table 3).

TABLE 3

STRUCTURE OF HUNGARIAN LAND HOLDING BEFORE AND AFTER POST-WAR REFORM *

Category (Cadastral Acres)	1935		1948	
	Percent of Landholdings	Percent of Area (total)	Percent of Landholdings	Percent of Area (total)
1–10	85.0	19.3	86.9	39.0
10–50	13.3	26.1	12.9	32.0
50–200	1.2	11.5	1.0	12.5
200–3000	0.4	21.0	0.2	12.4
Over 3000	0.1	22.1	0.0	3.2

* *Magyar Statistikai Zsebkonyv*, XV. Evfolyam, Budapest, 1948.

Under the terms of the reform 34.6 per cent of the total arable land was seized and redistributed. The land in possession of those peasants holding fewer than 10 cadastral acres doubled in size, and the land belonging to those holding more than 200 hectares was reduced by nearly two-thirds. Despite local excesses and Communist zeal, the peasants supported the expropriations enthusiastically.

An ominous sign of the future, hidden from the mass of the population at the time, was the sequestration of some of the seized lands for the creation of future state, model, and collective farms. Those farms listed in Table 3 over 3000 cadastral acres were already largely converted into State Farms by 1947, and by 1950 all those over 200 cadastral acres had been similarly converted.

The post-war land reforms in Poland were second in magnitude only to the Hungarian reforms. Approximately 4.6 million hectares

of agricultural land (18 per cent of the national total) were held 423
by farms of more than 50 hectares. By the decrees of September 6, 1944, and January 17, 1945, these lands were distributed among landless peasants and dwarfholders. But the majority of the lands distributed were seized in the so-called Western Territories, the former German districts of Silesia, Pomerania, and East Prussia (see Table 4).

TABLE 4

STRUCTURE OF POLISH LAND HOLDING BEFORE AND AFTER POST-WAR REFORM *

Category of Holding	1935		1946	
	Percent of Holdings	Percent of Total Area	Percent of Holdings	Percent of Total Area
1–5	64.2	14.8	61.2	26.6
5–10	24.8	17.0	27.1	38.8
10–50	10.5	20.9	12.6	33.2
Over 50	0.5	47.3	0.1	1.4

* Source: Moore, p. 82; *Rocznik Statystyczny, 1949*. (Warsaw, 1950), p. 53.

The specific Communist bias of the land reforms was evident in Poland as well as in Hungary. Forty per cent of the lands expropriated in the Western territories and 36 per cent in the rest of the new country were withheld from general distribution and set aside for the creation of State and communal farms.

In Romania the post-World War II reform was comparatively modest, affecting only one-third as much land as was affected by the 1919 reform. Eleven per cent of the land was still held by farms of over 100 hectares, and the decree of March 22, 1945, fixing the legal maximum at 50 hectares, did away with these larger estates. The Romanian reform paralleled those of Hungary and Poland in that for the time it respected the integrity of church lands. Royal lands were not expropriated until the monarchy was suppressed in 1947.

The land seized for redistribution in Czechoslovakia was

● 423 largely concentrated in the Sudentenland and southeast Slovakia where large German and Hungarian minorities had dwelt before the war. The expulsion of all German farmers and most Hungarian farmers in the post-war period resulted in the creation of a 2.6 million hectare land fund for distribution among landless peasantry and dwarfholders. It was not until 1947 that a law was passed which expropriated the properties of large Czech and Slovak land owners. A maximum of 50 hectares was decreed for all land holdings, as the result of which an additional 900,000 hectares was made available for general distribution.

Since the structure of rural society in Bulgaria and Yugoslavia was relatively egalitarian, the extent of the post-World War II reforms in both countries was small compared to those of Hungary, Poland and Romania. In Yugoslavia 850,000 hectares (six per cent of the land) was parcelled out among the peasantry, much of it derived from expropriated land held by German farmers in the Vojvodina. In Bulgaria, where no sizeable foreign element existed on the land, only 134,000 hectares (three per cent of the land) was redistributed among the poor peasants.

4. *The Results of the Reforms*

423 There is no doubt that the Communists manipulated the reforms to bolster their own position and prestige. In each country they controlled the Ministry of Agriculture and administered the land redistribution so that recipients of land felt obligated to the Communist Party. Communist popularity in the former Sudentenland in Czechoslovakia and in the Western Territories of Poland was very great after the war as a result. Furthermore, the diversion of a good portion of the expropriated lands to model and State Farms indicated that the Communists had no intention of forever relying upon an independent peasantry for their agricultural produce.

At the same time, however, there is no justification for the oft-heard contention that the land reforms were merely a prelude to collectivization, and that by dividing up the land the Communists hoped to create so many small and economically non-viable farms that private farming would become impossible. The lack of validity of this charge is clear from the fact that the post-World War I reforms had precisely the same impact on rural society and certainly the aim of those reforms was not to prepare the land for

collectivization. On the contrary, land reform deepened peasant 423
attachment to the land by creating a larger class of land holders. Furthermore, careful study reveals that the *average* size of the East European farm *after* the land reforms was not appreciably smaller than the average of non-estate holdings before the reforms.

That the Communists heralded the land reforms as a triumph for their cause only serves to indicate how demagogic and opportunistic was their behavior in Eastern Europe after the war. In fact, they only completed a land reform begun a quarter of a century earlier by non-Communist regimes. But the reform was portrayed in propaganda as a sudden and unprecedented blow to "feudalism" which only the Communists could have administered. In this way the Communists tried to steal the thunder of those parties in Eastern Europe who had for a quarter of a century fought for completion of land reforms. It was part of the cynical and devious route by which the Communist Parties of Eastern Europe were slowly making their way to full state power.

Indeed, there is considerable evidence to show that the Communists preferred to take power without the aid of genuinely revolutionary movements. The calculated policy of permitting the Nazis to destroy the powerful non-Communist but leftist Polish underground in Warsaw was one indication of the Communist fear of spontaneous and deeply rooted reform movements. As Mitrany points out, "When the Soviet armies first occupied territory in Eastern peasant countries, they did not attempt to use the peasants against the existing regime";[4] instead they concentrated on seizing the centers of political power through which, in time, they were to introduce land reform by official fiat.

This wide divergence in revolutionary tactics between 1917 and 1944-45 arose from two factors. First, the spontaneous revolutionary forces in Eastern Europe were so weak that the Communists, with the aid of onrushing armies, could either defeat them or take them over. Second, the internal bureaucratization of the Communist movement which has occurred since Lenin's day made it imperative that the Communists rely primarily upon their own organization to affect events rather than upon the power of mass human forces. Consequently, they eschewed raising revolutionary slogans and adopted only those slogans which would help ease the path to organizational control.

These differences are of crucial importance in understanding the general course which the "East European Revolution" took, and the particular character of its agricultural policy.

Although Lenin's seizure of political power in 1917 was accompanied by a vast peasant-made reform of the Russian land system, he did not sanctify it with affirmations of his belief in independent peasant farming, as his more cynical East European successors were to do nearly 30 years later. Indeed, by decreeing nationalization of the land immediately after assuming power, Lenin made it clear that he considered individual peasant management of the land a transitional stage.[5] Consequently, Bolshevik policy shifts in the

[4] Mitrany, p. 179.

[5] Theoretical opposition to the land reform as a serious solution to the agrarian problem remained a part of the international Communist policy throughout the twenties, and was abandoned only after the policy shift to the Popular Front (1934-35). Even in the Far East, where the urban proletariat was very small, Comintern agents adhered to this general line. Only in the early thirties, under Mao Tse-tung's leadership, did the Communists in the Far East begin to appreciate the revolutionary potential in the slogan of land reform. During the Popular Front era, when the Communists allied themselves with a variety of previously prohibited groups in Europe and elsewhere, they accustomed themselves to the demagogic opportunism they practiced with such skill after the Second World War. (See Franz Borkenau, *World Communism*, New York, 1939).

661 early years did not require the radical reorientations of the official
423 attitude toward the peasantry and the land so characteristic of later policy in Eastern Europe. The concessionary New Economic Policy itself introduced in 1921, was invariably labeled a "retreat" imposed by circumstances, and Lenin left little doubt that "two steps forward" would follow this "one step backward." However, the post-war Communist Parties of Eastern Europe, empirical and opportunistic, swung with the political tides, professing convenient belief in any economic measures which would increase their political control.

661 These differences are not merely in the *tactics* of revolution, but rather in the changing character of Communism itself. In his volume, Mitrany emphasizes the increasing degree to which contemporary Stalinist Communists were preoccupied with the question of power.[6] Whereas Bela Kun's dictatorship in Hungary in 1919 sacrificed political power partly because it refused to permit or encourage land reforms, Rakosi's post-war dictatorship appealed to popular support by expediting the reform of the land.[7] Indeed, it was Rakosi himself who gave classic elaboration of the new political methods and spirit of Communism in his famous 1952 discussion of "salami tactics." Rather than defeating the Smallholders Party by frontal attack, he explained, they were defeated by ceaseless internal manipulations:

> This gradual, day-by-day 'slicing off' of the reaction lurking within the Smallholders' Party was . . . termed 'salami tactics.' In the course of our incessant struggle against the enemy, its strength was gradually frittered away, and its impact on the working class was waning.[8]

"Salami tactics," then, describe the method by which opposition was suffocated by slow strangulation rather than by outright struggle. This policy demanded a degree of hypocrisy rarely required by Lenin's more forthright methods. Thus, the Bulgarian Communist, Anton Yugov, could declare in 1944 that "this Government, of which I am a member, and on whose behalf I speak, categorically

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[6] Mitrany, p. 170: "Whatever the theoretical pretenses that still surrounded" the Communist movement, he writes, "the issue [had] narrowed down to a question of sheer power."

[7] *Ibid.*, p. 186: "In 1919 the Socialist groups victorious in Munich, Vienna, and Budapest had proclaimed the Marxist agrarian program and, so, quickly lost power; the new regimes controlled by the Communists after 1945 elaborately buried the program so as to retain power."

[8] *Tarsadalmi Szemle* (Budapest), March-April, 1952.

denies that it has any intention of establishing a Communist regime 661
in Bulgaria." And Imre Nagy, the Hungarian Communist, was able to state in 1946 that the main struggle was not between "capitalism and socialism," but between "democracy and reaction *within* capitalism."[9] Within a year or two both Yugov and Nagy were to repudiate these statements completely; but repudiation was impossible until the necessary maneuvers had taken place within the Government which made the Communists no longer dependent upon a minimum of popular acceptance.

This policy of revolution *from above* and *by degrees* influenced every aspect of East European Communist policy, and distinguished it from the earlier Soviet experience. It reflected the degree to which the East European Communist Parties were not indigenous groupings of revolutionary idealists, but agents of an expanding imperial system, bureaucratically organized, and highly regimented. Even in Czechoslovakia, where the Communists had important working class support, the seizure of power was engineered from the Ministry of Interior rather than fought in the streets. Elsewhere, working class support was either non-existent, as in Romania, or minimal, as in Poland, where 1946 shop elections showed the Socialists three times as popular among the workers as the Communists.

This absence of any genuine national support, and the close attachment of these bureaucratized parties to the Soviet military apparatus, made the use of "salami tactics" in the political realm absolutely necessary. The same factors applied to the Communist land policy. The Satellite Parties were no more capable of a Stalinist "offensive on the land," a frontal attack on peasant economy and society, than they had been of a Leninist assault on the centers of governmental power. The same process of "slow suffocation" which had brought the Communists to political power was the only weapon by which the Communists could alter the land structure.

2. *The Pattern and Pace of Collectivization*

The transfer of the Soviet agricultural system to Eastern Europe 423
is a complex and many-sided story, the details of which vary greatly 661
from one country to the next. In Yugoslavia and Bulgaria, for example, efforts to impose the Soviet pattern were begun immediately after the close of the Second World War, while in Poland and

[9] See Gluckstein, pp. 131-142, for a full account of the Communist attempt to pose as defenders of the *status quo* in 1944-45.

● 423 661 Czechoslovakia no serious attempts were made until four years later. In Bulgaria, Czechoslovakia, and Hungary, collectivization has profoundly altered the structure of agrarian economy, while in Poland the pre-Communist land system still remains substantially intact. In Yugoslavia and Bulgaria the collectivization drive, or at least the major effort, was compressed into a relatively short period of time, though elsewhere in the Satellite sphere the land offensive was diffused over several years. In Hungary, and to a lesser degree in Czechoslovakia, the 1953 agrarian crisis has forced the dissolution of an appreciable number of collective farms; but in Poland and Bulgaria the effects of this area-wide crisis, though real, are scarcely as inclusive. These variations in pattern are a reflection of the degree to which Satellite collectivization is a function, not primarily of Communist doctrinal predilections, but of specific local forces and conditions. The general goal was everywhere the same—subordination of free agriculture to the demand of urban-industrial Communist society—but in practice agrarian policies have never been entirely uniform. Among those forces and conditions affecting the pace and intensity of Satellite collectivization were such variables as the strength of the peasant traditions of independent farming, the position of the individual Satellite in the over-all Soviet economic design, the structure of the prevailing land system, the degree of planned industrialization, and the size and dynamism of the national party.

The intimate connection between Communist agricultural policy and the demands of a totalitarian industrial economy was first elaborated by Stalin himself in 1928, when he acknowledged indirectly that the primary goal of collectivization was the increased State share in agricultural production. The Satellite theoreticians were not as blunt as Stalin and usually clothed their economic designs in elaborate ideological terminology. Perhaps the most direct statement on the subject, however, was made by the Yugoslav economic planner, Boris Kidric, in 1947, at a time when his country was the most orthodox and militant of the Satellite states. "The business of agriculture in a Socialist society," he stated, "is to supply the towns and industrial centers with food."[10]

The variety of policies put forward in the ensuing years were derived from this basic goal. Much as the Communists attempted

[10] Borba, (Belgrade), April 25, 1947.

to demonstrate that their policies were motivated by concern for the peasantry, it was clear that the question of ensuring "supply" of "food" for the cities remained the cornerstone of Communist agrarian policy. And though Kidric argued that to achieve this goal the Party was faced with the "categorical imperative of undertaking urgent measures to raise work productivity in agriculture," the hypocrisy of this statement was revealed by the simultaneous decision to allocate the barest minimum of national funds for the effort. Indeed, as the policy itself unfolded, it became clear that what Kidric meant was that it was the "business of agriculture in a Socialist society" to supply goods to the city at a price which the new urban bureaucracy was willing to pay, and that price was very low. Kidric's superior, Tito, was quite frank with regard to this problem:

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> In the same way as we must do our best to make ourselves independent of weather conditions in agriculture, so we must never allow ourselves the luxury of depending on the good will of private food producers. We must undertake measures to secure the necessary food for our industrial population and for carrying forward our Socialist projects. We must protect our food supply against chaos in production and distribution caused by the existence of tens of thousands of small and independent farms.[11]

It was precisely to this extent that the Communists were interested in agriculture. If, in the process of "protecting" themselves from the "chaos" of "tens of thousands of small and independent farms," the level of argicultural production increased, the Communists would indeed be overjoyed; but such an improvement would be peripheral to the basic goal, which was redistribution of the crop rather than its improvement.

To implement this redistribution two courses were open to the State, only one of which was consistent with power realities in Eastern Europe and Communist industrial plans. 1) By increasing the flow of industrial goods from the city to the country, the Communists could stimulate the peasantry to place a greater share of their produce on the market. 2) By creating an agricultural structure through which the State could exercise direct administrative control, the Communists could force the peasantry to increase the share of goods marketed. It was the latter course which was consistent with the Eastern European political situation; and the Com-

[11] *Ibid.*, November 4, 1952.

● 423 661 munists, with the Russian experience guiding them closely, followed it. The decision to collectivize was essentially the decision to pursue this path, for the increased exploitation of the peasantry implicit in it was the only path consistent with "carrying forward of our Socialist projects." The basic preparation for collectivization was therefore in the seizure or creation of those organs of repression through which the Communists could exercise the necessary political control.

The groundwork for post-war collectivization was consequently not laid in the countryside, where Communist influence in these early years was small and generally limited to the new State Farms, but in the cities, where the Parties slowly extended their control over the State apparatus. Once the levers of governmental power were secured, the Communists were able to exert relentless pressure on the farms.

The tactics of the East European Parties in this "offensive" phase were never military, except perhaps in Yugoslavia, where political conditions most closely paralleled those of the Soviet Union in the early Stalinist era. And even in Yugoslavia the chief weapon was slow economic strangulation of the peasantry, an erosive process designed to break the will to resist and in the end leave the class disunited, despairing, and helpless. The offensive tactics of the bureaucratically-minded Satellite Parties deserve more detailed exposition.

Economic Pressure

661 471 This was the most direct means by which the Satellite Parties sought to destroy the independent peasant. Everywhere in the sphere compulsory tax and crop delivery schedules were promulgated, discriminating heavily against the independent sector, and particularly against middle and rich peasants. Collecting revenue was never a primary end of the tax decrees, though funds forced from the countryside were often considerable. Confiscatory delivery quotas served the additional and important function of guaranteeing supplies of foodstuffs for the urban-industrial centers. The primary economic end – the eventual bankruptcy of the individual producer, who in the early post-war years was still thriving by selling on the free and black markets–is well illustrated by the 1953 delivery schedules for Czechoslovakia. On the best land in the country a peasant with five hectares had to deliver three times as much grain to the State *per hectare* as a peasant owning two hec-

661 well-to-do peasants had survived the post-war reforms, the size of this group was minuscule compared to the propaganda concentrated upon it. As the collectivization drive gained momentum, it became increasingly clear that the slogan of the "struggle to liquidate the kulaks" was largely an ideological cover under which a general onslaught against the entire peasantry was being waged.

"The distinguishing feature of this [agricultural] revolution," Stalin once said concerning Soviet collectivization, "is that it was accomplished *from above*, on the initiative of the State, directly supported *from below* by the millions of peasants."[19] His formula was designed to distinguish the "agricultural revolution" from the "socialist revolution" of 1917, which presumably took its initiative *from below*. Therefore, one may assume that the emphasis in his formula is to be placed on its first clause (from above) rather than on the second (from below). The constant state of tension between the peasantry and the State in the years of collectivization is testimony to the reluctance of the peasantry to believe that the drive to "liquidate the kulaks" was being waged in their favor.

[668] The means by which the peasants expressed their antagonism to the agricultural policy were varied and the material on them is voluminous. The Romanian Party organ, *Scanteia*, described the forms which peasant resistance took in this fashion:

> At the present time, the resistance of the capitalist elements [the peasantry] in our country takes various forms: the sabotage of the cultivation and sowing plan, the refusal to complete compulsory delivery quotas and to pay taxes, plotting against the collective farms and peasant partnerships, black market operations and artificially raising prices – going so far as the communication of rumors of the criminal character of arson and murder.[20]

But the most direct evidence of the failure of Communist propaganda to win peasant support for collectivization was the economic apathy of the peasants and the continued impatience and fury of Communist propaganda. Since the regimes did not themselves resort to outright violence, neither did the peasants. But to the policy of slow economic suffocation the peasants countered a policy of passive resistance traditional among the backward peasantry of Eastern Europe.

3. *The Economic Strategy of Collectivization*

● 423 The effort to transform the East European countryside was

[19] *History of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union (Short Course)*. (International Publishers, New York, 1939), p. 305.
[20] Scanteia (Bucharest), April 12, 1953.

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PRIVATE AGRICULTURAL HOLDINGS AND ACREAGE AROUND 1949*

(Percentagewise Distribution)

I. Private Agricultural Holdings According to Size of Property.

Holdings (in ha.)		Czechos.	Poland	Hung.†	Romania‡	Bulgaria	Yugos.§
Midget:	0-2	46.5	28.8	68.6	53.1	29.2	65.0
Small:	2-5	23.5	32.5	18.9	22.9	38.6	
Medium:	5-10	17.1	27.1	8.5	17.9	25.4	21.3
Med. Large:	10-20	10.6	10.4	3.4	5.0	6.8	5.6
Large:	20-50	2.3	1.2	0.6	1.1		4.0
TOTAL		100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	95.9

II. Respective Share in Total Private Farmland Acreage.

Midget:	0-2	7.9	6.0	23.1	—	6.7	34.0
Small:	2-5	17.9	21.5	27.3	—	30.9	
Medium:	5-10	27.2	38.8	22.4	—	41.5	31.3
Med. Large:	10-20	32.1	27.3	18.3	—	20.9	14.6
Large:	20-50	14.9	6.4	8.9	—		19.4
TOTAL		100.0	100.0	100.0	—	100.0	99.3

† Hungary: divisions are from 0-2.8 ha.; 2.8-5.7 ha.; 5.7-11.4 ha.; 11.4-28.7 ha.; 28.7-57.5 ha.
‡ Romania: divisions are from 1-3 ha. (instead of 1-2 ha.) and 3-5 ha.; (instead of 2-5 ha.).
§ Yugoslavia: divisions are from up to 5 ha.; 5-10; 10-15 (instead of 20 ha.) and over 15 ha.
* *C:* J. Stejskal: Program Scitani Zemedelskych v.g. 1950 (Programe of the Census of Agricultural Holdings in 1950) in *Statisticky Zpravodaj*, Vol. XIII, No. 2 (Prague), 1950, p. 46.
P: *Rocznik Statist.* 1949 (Statistical Yearbook), (Warsaw), 1950, p. 54.
H: *Gazdasagstatisztikai Tajekoztato* (Econ. & Stat. Bull.) Vol. 1, No. 13 (Budapest), Dec. 1947, p. 696.
R: N.A. Golopentia & P. Onica: *Recensamantul Agricol, Rep. Pop. Romana* (The Agricultural Census) (Bucharest), 1948, p. 7.
B: *Mesechni Izvestia na Glavnata Direktsia na Statistikata,* (Monthly Bull. of the Gen. Direct. of Statist.) (Sofia), July 1947, p. 27.
Y: Milun Ivanovic: Cooperatives and Agricultural Development, *Review of Intern. Affairs,* Vol. IV, No. 13 (Belgrade), July 1953, p. 17 sq.

● 423 severely limited by the special character of East European Communism. Bureaucratic in spirit and cautious by temperament, it was neither able, nor did it seriously attempt, to destroy the basic configuration of rural society. As late as 1953, the peasant population remained essentially stable, though the regimes had siphoned off surplus rural manpower to the rapidly expanding industrial centers. The land massing of the farms, on the Soviet model, radically altering the peasant social structure, lay far in the future. The problem facing the Communist planner was the much simpler one of altering the social structure sufficiently to destroy the peasants' capacity to sabotage industrial "grandeur" planned for the new cities.

311 423 The land structure prevailing in Eastern Europe after the reforms—the raw substance from which the Communists were to create collective farms — is described in Table 5. The following pattern emerges:

The number of "producing-consuming" units—agricultural holdings of five hectares and less, producing little surplus for the urban market — represented well over three-quarters of the total in Romania, Yugoslavia, and Hungary, and perhaps two-thirds in Poland, Bulgaria, and Czechoslovakia. In this category, approximately 30 percent of the total holdings in Poland and Bulgaria, 50 percent in Czechoslovakia and Romania, and as much as 65-70 percent in Yugoslavia and Hungary were dwarf farms, barely capable of covering the needs of the family in possession.

The group of medium peasant holdings—peasant farms of approximately 5-10 hectares—were a significant category chiefly in Poland and Hungary where they represented approximately one-quarter of the total. These farms were of lesser importance elsewhere in the region.

The group of medium-large holdings—farms of 10-20 hectares—comprised six percent or less of the total throughout the region, reaching 10 percent only in Czechoslovakia and Poland.

The large peasant holdings, or "kulak" farms—of 15-20 hectares and more—varied throughout the region, ranging from one to four percent of the total.

As for the proportionate share of the total arable land, the structure of private ownership had the following characteristics (see Table 6):

● 423 311 The "producing-consuming" units generally comprised one-quarter to one-third of the farmland throughout the region, but in Hungary almost one-half the total.

The medium units, of five to 10 hectares, occupied between one-quarter and one-third of the farm area.

The medium-large holdings controlled 20 percent, or less, of the farmland in Yugoslavia, Hungary, and Bulgaria, and approximately 25 percent in Poland and Czechoslovakia.

Finally, the large holdings—upwards of 15-20 hectares—totaled 10-15 percent of the private farmlands, except in Bulgaria where they did not exist, and in Yugoslavia where they formed close to 20 percent.

661 423 Since the Communists' primary problem was the extraction of agricultural produce from the countryside, the focus of the contemplated agrarian reorganization had to be those viable, surplus-producing farms which traditionally supplied the cities with the produce necessary to their existence. And because it was precisely these farms which were best able to withstand the slow economic pressures of the State, and least interested in economic reform, the Communists had to prepare for a formidable struggle. In order to impose collective structure on these farms, it was necessary to discriminate against them in favor of the collectives. But this very discrimination—the refusal to supply credits, mechanical equipment, and fertilizers, and the collection of higher taxes and delivery quotas—tended to destroy their vitality and decrease the surplus produce in which the Communists were interested. So long, therefore, as these farms remained outside the collective structure, their value to the Communists was decreased as collectivization progressed. Similarly, the favorable treatment afforded the collective farms tended to decrease their basic value to the State. It was difficult to extract a high surplus of produce from farms with lower delivery quotas. These internal contradictions would inevitably continue so long as the *process* of collectivization itself was not completed, and the use of discriminatory tactics was necessary.

It is not altogether surprising that the Satellite planners never pursued an entirely consistent policy in this regard. In the early years, they tended to concentrate on absorbing the poorer farms into the collectives because they were most vulnerable to Communist pressure and appeal. Later, they tended to concentrate on those larger farms whose collectivization was crucial to the success

of their land policy. But no matter how they proceeded—and the pattern differed from one country to another—they could not resolve the dilemmas posed by a slow paced collectivization. Had they been able to follow the Soviet model of full collectivization in several rapid and brutal campaigns, they might conceivably have avoided some of these pitfalls.

The chief surplus producing sector—the middle farms between 10 and 20 hectares—comprised some 900,000 units (See Table 6). The systematic dissociation of this stratum from the upper stratum of owners holding over 20 hectare holdings, and its methodical "fractionalization" represented one of the essential characteristics of the collectivization drive. It was *this* stratum of the farm population which the regime frequently labeled "kulak," adjusting its definition as it became necessary in each situation. By 1950 it was clear that this stratum represented a challenge to the Communists not—as it was alleged—because its members hired farm labor to help work their lands, but because it constituted the producing backbone of the nation, a source of productive strength which the Communists were determined to turn to their own ends.

4. *The Strategy Unfolded*

The post-war expulsions of the *Volksdeutsche* and other German minority groups from Eastern Europe and the expropriation of their lands, together with those of Nazi collaborators, gave the early Communist-dominated regimes their first hold over the agrarian economy. Particularly in Poland, Czechoslovakia, and Yugoslavia the former German holdings formed the nucleus of the State Farms. Confiscation of the great latifundia in Hungary and of royal lands in Romania similarly created a reserve land fund on which the State could draw. In general, forest lands throughout the region were nationalized and administered by managerial panels created for that purpose. In addition, much pasture and meadowland was expropriated by a variety of legal devices, the over-all total equalling some two million hectares of first quality land. The State share in the combined forests, pasturage, and arable land of Eastern Europe ranged from 17 percent in Yugoslavia to 36 percent in Poland, and to as much as 41 percent in Czechoslovakia. Until 1949, the State farms still continued to play a minor role, except in Poland and Czechoslovakia where experiments along these lines were pushed very early.

During 1949-50 the State sector of agriculture expanded rapidly,

● 423 311 either by the simple process of extending existing land reserves, or by acquisition—sometimes outright expropriation—of "kulak" lands or communally-organized "model" farms. By the close of 1949, State farms in Czechoslovakia, for example, had increased by 600 percent. By and large, however, the areas controlled by the State farms—particularly in Hungary—contained a disproportionate share of non-cultivated land (see Chart V).

In Czechoslovakia, Poland, and Hungary, the State sector comprised an area of considerable importance, and it was on the State farms—theoretically, at least, the highest existing form of "Socialist agriculture"—that the chief Communist hopes rested. It is, in fact, the case that in the East European Satellites, State Farms achieved a higher level of development in general than in the Soviet Union at a comparable stage, since the initiative of the Russian peasantry in 1917-18 prevented the large-scale land seizures on which a State farming system could be based.

423 474 But in the Satellites, as in the Soviet Union, the primary effort was devoted to the collective farm. In the Satellites, where the land offensive had a thoroughly bureaucratic character, the collective farms offered the additional advantage of *flexibility*. A variety of collectivized farms were created to facilitate the peasants' progress from independent farming to full collectivity. Even the terms used to describe the collective farms—"Agricultural Producers' Cooperatives" in Poland, for example—were designed to blur the true implications and to mask the ultimate purpose of collectivization. Similarly, in Yugoslavia and Bulgaria, the very name for collective farms—*zadrugi*—was a calculated attempt to evoke memories of the ancestral communal traditions of the southern Balkans.

Thus the regimes trod softly in the early years. In Czechoslovakia, for example, four types of "Uniform Agricultural Cooperatives" (UAC) were established from which the peasants—in accordance with the "voluntary" principle—might choose:

Type I Joint tillage of the land, but retention of title in real property contributed, as well as in draft animals, farm equipment, and the harvested crops.

Type II Joint tillage of the land, but title retained in real property, draft animals, and farm equipment; all boundaries plowed over, and plots grouped in "land

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compounds"; rent received on land, livestock, and equipment contributed.

Type III Joint tillage of the land and joint care of livestock; basic means of production *purchased* by the cooperative; rent still recognized, but limited to 10-20 percent of the total farm income—the remainder of income distributed according to work done.

Type IV Land and means of production common property; land rent abolished as "unearned income," and each member paid according to work units.

Type I is little more than a peasant partnership. Type IV is the true *kolkhoz*, patterned after the Soviet *artel*.

Similarly, in Poland four types were created, in Hungary and Romania three, in Bulgaria only one. The form stressed at any one period might vary from country to country as the needs of the State and the local strategy of collectivization demanded.

The proportion of collectives which are of the most advanced, or kolkhoz, type varied from one country to another. (See Table 7). In Czechoslovakia and Yugoslavia the vast majority of collectives were of an intermediate character as late as 1951; in Romania and Poland, on the other hand, a majority were of the most advanced type.

TABLE 7

DISTRIBUTION OF KOLKHOZES IN COLLECTIVE SECTOR*
1949 - 1952

Countries	Number of Kolkhozy			% of Total Prod. Coop.		
	1950	1951	1952	1950	1951	1952
Czechoslov.	136	259	—	2.6	4.1	—
Poland	1,275	—	2,113	57.9	—	63.0
Romania	1,027	1,089	1,796	100.0	52.1	56.5
Yugoslav.	808	1,049	—	11.6	15.0	—

* *C:* 1950-1951, *Czech. Econ. Bull.*, Feb. 1, 1953, p. 264. 1952, *Rude Pravo* (Prague), Dec. 17, 1952.

* *P:* 1950, *Trybuna Ludu* (Warsaw), Jan. 7, 1951, 1952 (June), *Wies Liczbach. op. cit.*, p. 131.

* *R:* *Probleme Economice* (Econ. Problems), No. 5-6 (Bucharest), May-June 1953. Also: Gh Gh.-Dej in *For a Lasting Peace, etc.* (*Bucharest*), May 29, 1953.

* *Y:* G. J. Konrad, *op. cit.*

Though the multiplicity of collective forms might be taken to indicate a degree of concern for the individual predilections of the peasantry, the erratic course of Satellite collectivization—the fitful starts, jolts, and abrupt halts from year to year—indicates that the initiative always remained with the Bureaucratic Center. (See Chart VI. Had the peasants in fact ever desired collectivization, or had regime propaganda made appreciable headway in the countryside, a steady rise from 1948 through 1953 might have been expected. Instead, even a cursory study reveals a tendency toward "shock" collectivization and land massing in some years, and an equally abrupt levelling of the curve in other years. (See Table 8 and Chart VI). 423 474

BULGARIA

Cooperative farms, in rudimentary forms, existed in Bulgaria even before the First World War. With the advance of Soviet power into the Balkans, collectivization began afresh; with the exception of Yugoslavia, Bulgaria revealed itself as the most vulnerable of the Satellites. Thus, nationalization of basic industries, virtual suffocation of small enterprise, and firm establishment of a one-party regime were achieved by 1947. The political opposition was crushed, the people subjected to an oppressive State apparatus, and mass collectivization begun in earnest before the actual Communist seizure of power in Czechoslovakia had even begun.

Bulgarian collectivization may be characterized by three distinct stages: the first (1945-48) witnessed the rapid organization of the collective farm system and the establishment of at least one kolkhoz in each community; the second (1949-50), a period of "shock" collectivization without parallel elsewhere in the Satellite sphere, saw the expansion of existing collectives and the creation of hundreds of new collectives, and the third (1951-53) was a period of deliberate consolidation in which only slight efforts were made to extend agrarian control.

For Bulgaria the year 1950 was the turning point, the "spinal year" during which the pace of collectivization approached that of Soviet collectivization. More than 60 percent of the entire task of collectivization was completed in that brief 12 month period; the arable area controlled by the collectives rose from 11.3 to 40 percent of the total national land. The most striking feature of the 1950 Bulgarian offensive was not, however, the number of *new* farms added to the existing system, but the increase in *average size* of

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TABLE 8

PERCENT OF ARABLE LAND COLLECTIVIZED*
1945 - 1953

	1945	1946	1947	1948	1949	1950	1951	1952	June 1953	Dec. 1953
Bulgaria	3.0	3.5	3.7	6.0	11.3	43.0	47.5	51.0	51.7	51.7
Romania					0.1	2.7	3.1	7.2	7.5	7.5
Hungary					0.5	2.6	8.1	18.2	24.6	20.0
Czechoslovakia**					5.4	16.5	19.0	37.9	40.0	38.0†
Poland					0.3	2.2	3.5	4.8	6.7	6.7
Yugoslavia**		0.9	1.5	2.3	13.3	16.1	18.8	11.4	9.5†	—

* Sources for these figures are given in Tables 11 to 20.

** Agricultural land, not arable land.

† The exact dimensions of the kolkhoz dissolutions which have taken place in 1953 in Hungary, Czechoslovakia, and Yugoslavia have not been made public; the figures given above are based on scattered evidence and official hints *Szabad Nep* [Budapest], Dec. 30, 1953, *Rude Pravo* [Prague], 19 December 1953, and G. J. Conrad, *Die Wirtschaft Jugoslawiens*, [Berlin, 1952].)

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CHART VI

COLLECTIVIZATION IN EASTERN EUROPE*

(Percent of arable land collectivized)

1945-1953



* Data in tables 9 through 17.

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TABLE 9

COLLECTIVIZATION IN BULGARIA*

1944 - 1953

Year	Number of Collectives	Number Formed Yearly	Number Households	Households per Collective†	Average Size Collective†	Hectares per Household†	Number Hectares Collectivized	Percent of Farms	Percent Arable Land
1944	110								
1945	382	272	34,362	90	383	4.2	146,570	3.1	3.0
1946	480	98	41,027	85	359	4.2	172,498	3.7	3.5
1947	549	69	44,100	80	327	4.1	180,040	4.0	3.7
1948	1,100	551	78,900	72	265	3.7	292,380	6.7	6.0
1949	1,608	508	156,483	97	343	3.5	551,572	14.3	11.3
1950	2,587	979	525,628	203	809	4.0	2,092,215	48.0	43.0
1951	2,739	152						51.0	47.5
1952	2,739	0						52.0	51.0
1953	2,747	8	568,989	207	915	4.4	2,512,500	52.3	51.7**

* *Rabotnichesko Delo* (Sofia), May 29, 1950, January 1, 1951, October 28, 1951, January 6, 1953; *Zemedelsko Zname* (Sofia), December 3, 1952, December 2, 1953.

** The figure given by the regime since 1952 for the percentage of arable land is 60.5, and this figure has gained general acceptance among Communist theoreticians and many Western observers. However, it is clear that the figure 60.5 measures a different arable land area than was used in computing the earlier percentagewise figures. The percentages given for 1949 and 1950 indicate that the arable land at the time was approximately 4.9 million hectares; but the 1952 percentage indicates arable land of only 4.15 million hectares. Since the regime has frequently claimed a steadily expanding area of cultivation, this statistical juggling does not make any sense. Therefore, this chart bases its 1952 and 1953 percentagewise calculations upon the same arable land figure used by the regime prior to 1952.

† Calculated on the basis of official data.

the collectives themselves, a rise of some 200 per cent. In this respect 423 Bulgarian collectivization parallels subsequent events in Hungary, 474 where the creation of new farms was accompanied by the rapid growth in the size of the average unit.

Bulgarian collectivization was largely concentrated in the fertile plains north and south of the Balkan Mountains, particularly in the black-earth region of the Southern Dobrudja acquired from Romania after the Second World War. (See Chart IX). Nevertheless, the average size of the farms incorporated into the collectives appears to be little larger than the average of those poorer farms still free. On the face of it, the facts are difficult to explain since the regime continues to concentrate on the richer farms—those producing effectively for the market, though less vulnerable to economic attack—and these, in turn, might be expected to be the middle-sized farms, and larger, in accordance with the general rule throughout the area.[21] The explanation for this paradox is perhaps to be found in the special conditions of local agriculture. In Bulgaria, the most valuable farmlands are not necessarily the holdings of largest acreage.

Thus, in Bulgaria, variations above or below the average are seldom extreme. The uniform structure of the pre-war agrarian economy has impelled the regime to mass small *rich* units, rather than proceed against holdings of any one class.

Significantly, the country which has had the most success in collectivization was the one which found it unnecessary to resort to a wide range of collective forms. Bulgaria has only one form—approaching the Soviet *kolkhoz*.

Romania

To date collectivization in Romania has proceeded more cautiously than in any other Soviet Satellite, excepting only Poland. The paradox of Romanian collectivization is thus that the nation is geographically and politically subject to the most direct and ponderous of Soviet pressures. Yet the "Socialization" of agriculture is little advanced. It is clear from the Romanian evidence that Sovietization is in no sense a uniform process nor collectivization entirely a doctrinaire program; politically Romania fell to the Communists very early in the post-war struggle, but evidently the nation

[21] According to a Soviet source, "in Bulgaria the majority of the members of the . . . cooperatives are middle peasants." (V. Tikhomirov, *Voprosy Ekonomiki*, Nov. 10, 1953, p. 89).

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CHART VII

COLLECTIVIZATION in YUGOSLAVIA by REPUBLIC*
1950

(Percentage of Agricultural Land)

* Statistički Bilten Poljoprivrede Beograd, No. 6, 1951, p. 5.

CHART VIII

COLLECTIVIZATION in CZECH REGIONS*
(Percentage of Communities with Collective Farms)
-1953-



* Rudé Právo (Prague), March 5, 1953.

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CHART IX

[illegible]

[illegible]

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

* Statistics from Report on Bulgaria,
Institute National d'Etudes et Economiques (Paris), November 1, 1950.

CHART X

COLLECTIVIZATION IN POLAND BY PROVINCE*

1950

(Percentage of Villages with Collective Farms)



* Economic Digest 2nd quarter, 1950. P.67

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TABLE 10

COLLECTIVIZATION IN ROMANIA*

1949 - 1953

Year	Number of Collectives	Number Formed Yearly	Number Households	Households per Collective§	Average Size Collective§	Hectares per Household§	Number Hectares Collectivized	Percent of Arable Land
1949	56	56	4,058	72	—	—	12,500†	0.1
1950	1,027	971	67,719	66	261†	4.0	268,000	2.7
1951	1,069	42	75,065	70	277†	—	300,000†	3.1
1952	1,796	727	165,411	92	360†	—	700,000†	7.2
1953 (June)	1,980	184	185,000	90	369	4.1	732,000	7.5

* Speech of Minister of the Army Botnaras, *Scanteia* (Bucharest), December 31, 1953; *Scanteia*, April 12, 1953; Speech of Premier Gheorghiu-Dej, *Scanteia*, August 23, 1953; *Scanteia*, March 1, 1953; *Probleme Economice*, (Bucharest), No. 5-6, May-June, 1953; *Voprosy Ekonomiki*, (Moscow), No. 10, 1953.

† These are estimates, calculated on the basis of known ratios between number of collectives, number of hectares collectivized, and number of households.

§ Calculated on the basis of official data.

has presented its rulers with singular economic and organizational problems. 423 474

The two crucial years of Romanian collectivization were 1950 and 1952; these two offensive years alternated with periods of quiescence. In 1952, more than 50 percent of the total area collectivized to date was brought into the "Socialist sector," and in the same year the size of individual collective farms themselves increased rapidly. Though the number of new collectives increased by only 75 percent, the area brought into collectives increased by over 130 percent.

In accordance with the general East European patterns, the Romanian collectives were composed of a high percentage of medium farms, a percentage which increased each year (see Table 11). In 1953, the middle farmers comprised 57.8 percent of the total, the small farmers 35.2 percent, and landless farmers the remaining 7.0 percent. While the average size of all Romanian farms is 3.6 hectares, the average size of farms brought into collectives is 4.0 hectares.

TABLE 11

DISTRIBUTION OF FARMS WITHIN ROMANIAN COLLECTIVE SECTOR*
1949 - 1953

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	1949-50	1951	1952	1953
Medium farmers	32.0	29.4	53.0	57.8
Small farmers	62.4	39.0	37.4	35.2
Landless farmers	5.6	31.6	9.6	7.0

* *Problems Economice* (Bucharest) No. 5-6, May-June, 1953; *Nova Myel* (Prague), No. 10, 1953.

A unique feature of Romanian collectivization is the establishment of a very "primitive" type of collective, the "Agricultural Associations." Whereas the other countries issue agricultural decrees with a single standard for the entire collective sector, the Romanian agricultural decrees usually distinguish between "Agricultural Associations" and collectives. Including the "Agricultural

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TABLE 12

COLLECTIVIZATION IN HUNGARY*

Year	Number of Collectives	Number Formed Yearly	Number Households	Households per Collective†	Average Size of Collective†	Hectares per Household†	Hectares Collectivized	Percent of Arable Land
1949	1,520	980	37,000	24	137	5.7	208,000	3.7
1950	2,500	1,233	90,000	36	176	4.1	440,000	8.2
1951	4,652	2,152	236,500	51	187	3.7	865,000	16.0
1952	5,315	663	318,500	59	258	4.3	1,374,000	24.6
1953 (April)	—	—	340,000	—	—	4.4	1,494,000	26.8
1953 (Dec.)	4,677	–638	238,000†	51	250	4.7	1,117,000**	20.0

* *Statisztikai Szemle* (Budapest) — various numbers, 1950; *Szabad Nep*, January 25, 1950, January 21, 1951, October 27, 1950, February 26, 1951, December 2, 1951; December 16, 1952, May 11, 1953; Radio Budapest, December 29, 1953.

** Estimated on the basis of the known arable land.

† Calculated on the basis of official data.

Associations", and the State Farms, the "Socialist sector" in Romania comprises 25 percent of the arable land. 423 474

HUNGARY

Collectivization in Hungary proceeded at a steadier pace than elsewhere. The tempo accelerated in 1952 and 1953, but land policy was not characterized by the abrupt twists and turns so pronounced in Romania and Czechoslovakia. Hungarian collectivization paralleled the Romanian and Bulgarian in that acceleration of the drive was accompanied by rapid expansion of the average size of the collectives themselves. Thus, the average collective organized in 1949 comprised an area of only 135 hectares; in 1952 the average new collective was 770 hectares — an increase of over 500 percent!

Again, in accordance with the general rule, the primary target of Hungarian collectivization was middle-sized farms. The average number of hectares per collectivized household (4.4) surpassed the national pre-collectivization average (2.8). Before the wholesale dissolutions attending the Hungarian New Course, the collectivized sector occupied 26.8 percent of the arable land. Three types of collective farms exist in Hungary; the highest class, however, is not as "advanced" as the Soviet artel.

CZECHOSLOVAKIA

In terms of pace at least, Czechoslovak collectivization represents a remarkable achievement—if East European rather than Soviet standards are applied. Despite a late start, the agricultural offensive proceeded more rapidly in Czechoslovakia than in any other Satellite, excepting only Bulgaria.

The land offensive was mounted in two waves, one in 1950 and the second in 1952. Unfortunately, reliable statistics on Czechoslovak collectivization are extremely sparse so no clear picture emerges. Only 1953 figures are available for the number of households collectivized, and these indicate that the land drive was aimed at absorbing the larger, more productive units. At the end of 1952, more than 56 percent of the middle farmers were in collectives of Types III and IV, while only 40 percent of the small farmers were members. For the actual distribution of farm-types in the collective sector as it changed between 1949 and 1953 see Table 14 and for the geographical distribution of the collectives see Chart VIII.

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TABLE 13

1949 - 1953

COLLECTIVIZATION IN CZECHOSLOVAKIA*

(Types II, III, and IV)

Year	Number of Collectives	Number Formed Yearly	Number Households	Households per Collective†	Average Size Collective†	Hectares per Household†	Number Hectares Collectivized	Percent of Agricultural Land
1949	1,700§	1,700	–	–	–	–	375,000	5.4
1950	3,760	2,060§	–	–	302	–	1,134,392	16.5
1951	4,452	682	–	–	293	–	1,305,610	19.0
1952	7,290	2,838	–	–	356	–	2,598,073	37.9
1953**	8,284	994	343,911	41	–	8.4	2,900,000§	40.0

* J. Nepomucky, *Rude Pravo* (Prague), February 15, 1953; *Czechoslovak Economic Bulletin* (Prague), February 1, 1953, pp. 15-16; *Rude Pravo*, December 17, 1952.

** This figure represents the high point in Czechoslovak collectivization; by the end of 1953 the number of collectivised households had fallen off slightly (see speech of Agricultural Minister Uher, printed in *Rude Pravo* (Prague), December 19, 1953).

† Calculated on the basis of official data.

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TABLE 14

DISTRIBUTION OF FARMS WITHIN CZECHOSLOVAK COLLECTIVE SECTOR*

— 1953 —

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Farm Unit (in Hectares)	Percent of Total Farms Collectivized
0 - 0.5	10.8
0.5 - 2	22.4
2 - 5	26.9
5 - 10	23.5
10 - 15	13.0
Over 15	3.4
	100.0

* *Zemedelske Noviny* (Prague), May 1, 1953.

POLAND

For a variety of reasons, the impact of collectivization in Poland has been slight. The State farms, organized immediately after the Second World War, controlled nearly twice as much arable land as all collectives formed by mid-1953. In central Poland—that is to say, in the regions of Poland's pre-war territories still remaining (excluding the formerly German districts in the West)—collectivization has hardly been invoked. The majority of Polish collective farms are situated in the old German regions of Silesia, Pomerania, and East Prussia—where the transfer of populations, confiscation of German properties, and firm Party political control made collectivization far easier. 423 474

Whether the vigorous land drive launched in early 1953 (and since slowed down in accordance with Satellite-wide political and economic policies) would have resulted in the rapid expansion of the collective sector is now impossible to say. In Poland, the average size of farms collectivized far exceeded the early post-war national average—approximately 7.5 hectares per holding as against 5.9. Thus, the weight of the Polish farm offensive was directed

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TABLE 15

COLLECTIVIZATION IN POLAND*
1949 - 1953

Year	Number of Collectives	Number Formed Yearly	Number Households	Households per Collective†	Average Size Collective†	Hectares per Household†	Number Hectares Collectivized	Percent of Farmers	Percent of Agricultural Land
1949	243	243	—	—	226	—	54,830	—	0.3
1950	2,199	1,946	49,500	23	213	9.4	467,611	1.4	2.2
1951	3,054	855	71,000	23	239	10.1	728,561	2.1	3.5
1952	4,900	1,846	100,000	20	204	10.0	1,000,000	3.1	4.8
1953§	7,982	3,082	189,000	24	175	7.4	1,400,000	5.9**	6.7

* Instytut Ekonimiki Rolnej, *Wies w Liczbach* (Warsaw, 1952); *Economista* (Warsaw), III, 1953; *Zycie Gospodarcze* (Warsaw), September 6, 1953.

§ Official collectivization statistics for 1953 are extremely confused and contradictory. The figures presented here are for June, 1953; in subsequent months different figures were released, but they were so inconsistent that the June estimates are employed here. During the summer of 1953 collectivization came to a halt in Poland, and hence the situation remained approximately static throughout the rest of the year.

** Estimate.

† Calculated on the basis of official data.

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CHART XI

COMPOSITION of COLLECTIVIZED and NON-COLLECTIVIZED SECTORS in POLAND 1953*

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

* Nowe Drogi, (Warsaw) No. 10, 1953, p. 183.

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423 474 against the efficient, surplus-producing farm units. A comparison of the collectivized and free sectors in 1953 is set out in Table 16. While only 40 percent of the independent farms were larger than five hectares, slightly more than 75 percent of those collectivized were drawn from this category.

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TABLE 16

DISTRIBUTION OF FARMS IN POLISH COLLECTIVE SECTOR*

— 1951 —

Farm Unit	Percent of Farms Collectivized
Landless	5.8
0 - 2	6.1
2 - 5	14.2
5 - 10	62.8
10 - 15	10.2
Over 15	0.9

* *Wieś w Liczbach* (Warsaw, 1951), p. 131.

423 474 In Poland the collective sector controls 6.7 percent of the total arable land, as against almost 12 percent organized into State Farms. Four types of collectives exist in Poland; the most developed type approaches the Soviet artel.

YUGOSLAVIA

Yugoslav collectivization is concentrated in two regions: the rich Vojvodina plain, north of Belgrade, traditionally the source of the greatest farm surpluses, and the poor mountainous regions of Macedonia in the South, where land hunger and poverty were extreme (see Chart VII). The collectivization of the Vojvodina was important precisely because of its capacity to produce a marketable surplus for the expanding cities. The collectivization of Macedonia was possible because peasant resistance was slight. In this two-pronged attack, the Yugoslav Communists adhered to the general lines of agrarian policy throughout the Soviet orbit. 423 474

Collectivization in Yugoslavia presents an interesting picture of paradoxical extremes. Prior to its 1948 expulsion from the Cominform, and for a short time thereafter, the Yugoslav regime was the most "advanced" of the Soviet Satellites, swiftly smashing the political opposition, launching a massive program of heavy industrial development, and nationalizing the major economic facilities at an early date. But in 1951, after an interval of indecision, the regime embarked on a program of concession and retrenchment which, in many significant respects, anticipated the New Course later adopted by the entire Soviet sphere.

In common with Bulgaria, the first organizational basis for collectivization was laid down immediately after the war, and the major offensive launched in 1948-49. Moreover, like Bulgaria, the first break in the offensive occurred in 1950. However, the pause in Bulgarian collectivization represented nothing more than a period of consolidation, while the Yugoslav halt grew into the first slow recognition that political and social conditions in Eastern Europe would not permit repetition of the Soviet experience.

The first reaction of the Yugoslav regime to the break with the Cominform was to accelerate the pace of collectivization. Virtually 60 percent of Yugoslav collectivization was achieved in 1949 alone (See Table 17). And if the tempo of collectivization did not reach the pitch attained in neighboring Bulgaria, the struggle between the regime and the peasantry was, if anything, more intense. But it is clear by now that the stubborn resistance of the Yugoslav peasantry—partly responsible for the catastrophic agricultural failure of 1950—was not the only factor working for revision of agrarian policy. A great deal of the dynamism which animated the East European Communists was derived from its Soviet connection.

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TABLE 17

COLLECTIVIZATION IN YUGOSLAVIA*
1946 - 1952

Year	Number of Collectives	Number Formed Yearly	Number Households	Households per Collective**	Average Size Collective**	Hectares per Household**	Number Hectares Collectivized	Percent of Agricultural Land
1946	494	494	25,062	51	246	4.8	121,518	0.9
1947	779	285	40,590	52	270	5.2	210,986	1.5
1948	1,318	539	60,158	46	246	5.4	323,98[illegible]	2.3
1949	6,625	5,307	340,739	52	278	5.4	1,839,978	13.3
1950	6,968	343	418,659	60	318	5.3	2,226,166	16.1
1951	6,994	26	429,784	62	371	6.0	2,595,000	18.8
1952	6,908	–86	—	—	267	—	1,580,000	11.4

*Informationi Priruonik, (Belgrade), Vol. I, p. 767; *Review of International Affairs*, (Belgrade), Sept. 16, 1952, pp. 16-18; October 1, 1952, pp. 17-18; G. F. Conrad, *Die Wirschaft Jugoslawiens* (Berlin, 1952).

**Calculated on the basis of official figures.

When these ties were severed in 1948, the Yugoslav Party began to lose much of its initial fanaticism and grew more complacent about its "historic tasks." 423 474

The revision of Yugoslav agarian policy in 1951-52 coincided with a relaxation of strenuous efforts to industrialize the country and a slight liberalization of the centralized dictatorship. When Tito stated in 1952 that long-neglected agriculture was to receive increased State assistance, the drive for collectivization inevitably lost much of its original meaning and force. The kolkhoz was primarily an administrative device to insure increased extraction of produce from the land at low State-determined prices, and if the State intended to increase investment in agriculture, the collectives were no longer a prime necessity.

5. *Summary*

A. This paper has made note of many of the important differences between collectivization in Eastern Europe and Soviet Russia —the greater reliance upon persuasion as opposed to force, the reluctance to open a full-scale offensive against the peasantry, the greater variety of collective forms and the greater flexibility of their usage. However, these were deviations from an historical norm to which the East European Communists were obligated for most of their inspiration. The enormous influence which the Soviet experience exercised upon them was evidenced not merely in the internal structure and organization of the emerging collective farms, but in their basic proportions (see Chart XII). With the exception of Bulgaria and Poland, the basic lines of the East European farms adhered to the pattern set by the Soviets. In the USSR the average collective covered 490 hectares of arable land; it was composed of 78 households; and each household tended 6.3 hectares of land.[23] The size of the Soviet collectives, and the area per household, slightly exceeds the average for Eastern Europe, but the proportions are so close to one another that the direct influence of the Soviet model cannot be doubted (except possibly in Bulgaria and Poland).

The peculiarity of the Bulgarian collective structure is explained by the centralization of each collective around one rural community with the subdivisions of control stemming from that community. The extremely small proportions of the Polish collec-

[23] Harry Schwartz, pp. 266-267.

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CHART XII

AVERAGE SIZE of COLLECTIVES 1953†

AVERAGE NUMBER of HOUSEHOLDS in a COLLECTIVE 1953

AVERAGE HECTARES per HOUSEHOLD in a COLLECTIVE 1953



* 1952
** 1951
† Data in tables 9 through 17.

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tives can only be explained by the great difficulties encountered in the whole Polish collectivization effort. 423 474

It should be noted that the countries with the largest average area per collectivized household are Poland and Czechoslovakia, while the countries with the smallest are Bulgaria, Romania, and finally, Hungary. The reason for this wide range does not lie in the original land structure, since the average collectivized property does not correspond to the average household area of the non-collectivized farms in the respective countries. The difference, then, probably reflects the success of the Polish and Czechoslovak regimes in collectivizing the larger, and more productive, holdings.

TABLE 18

SPHERE-WIDE COLLECTIVIZATION*

June, 1953

Country	Hectares of Arable Land	Hectares of Collectivized Land	Percent of Land Collectivized
Bulgaria	4,860,000	2,513,500	51.7
**Czechoslovakia	6,860,000	2,900,000	40.0
Hungary	5,550,000	1,500,000	26.8
**Yugoslavia	13,800,000	1,500,000***	10.9
Romania	9,750,000	732,000	7.5
Poland	20,760,000	1,400,000	6.7
Total	61,520,000	10,545,000	17.2

*Data in Tables 11 through 20.

**For both Czechoslovakia and Yugoslavia the figures are given in hectares of agricultural land, not arable land, because the most consistent and reliable data are given in these terms. The effect on the percentage figures in the right-hand column is slight, if any.

***Estimated on the basis of regime statements. See G. J. Conrad, *Die Wirschaft Jugoslawiens*, (Berlin, 1952).

B. In mid-1953, when collectivization was simultaneously halted throughout the Soviet sphere, approximately 17 percent of the arable land of Eastern Europe had been brought into the collectivized

423 474 sector (see Table 18). Roughly another 10 percent belonged to the State Farms, bringing the total arable land in the "Socialist sector" to approximately 27 percent.

In other words, in over four years of feverish effort the Communist governments of Eastern Europe had not achieved what the Soviet government had accomplished in less than four months of its collectivization drive in 1929. As Table 18 indicates, Bulgaria and Czechoslovakia achieved the most significant results; Romania and Poland lagged far behind. Yugoslavia and Hungary, which had done moderately well at one time, were to see the results of years of labor washed away in the onrushing New Course.

This failure was all the more notable for the fact that the Satellite governments had at their disposal not only the lessons of the Soviet experience but direct Soviet supervision as well. Certainly the bureaucratic methods employed by the Eastern European Communists, both in taking power over a silent people and in the process of collectivization itself, were partly responsible for this failure. In the next chapter some of the economic mechanics of the new agricultural order will be discussed and perhaps additional light will be thrown on the emerging debacle.

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5: Free Europe Committee U-4 (no date) 1954 E1 Europe E1

CHAPTER IV

THE BALANCE SHEET OF COLLECTIVIZATION

1. *General Factors*

Earlier in this study[1] it was pointed out that the Stalinist "solution" to the agricultural problem in the Soviet Union, despite its cost in human suffering, satisfied the basic agricultural needs of an expanding heavy industrial machine and the State which rested upon it. The new land structure was no more efficient or productive than the one it had replaced; but it was better suited to guarantee urban food supplies and the rapid accumulation of capital which was the prerequisite for the heavy industrial development upon which the new Soviet State was based. That certain readjustments in that land structure are being called for today, more than a quarter of a century after its initial establishment, does not indicate that, in terms of its original goals, the program was a total failure.[2]

In Eastern Europe, however, the agricultural picture is far more complex. A conclusive assessment of the results of collectivization in terms of the Communists' own goals is therefore more difficult. The extensive agricultural readjustment begun in the middle of 1953 has frequently been interpreted as proof of its failure. However, since the New Course in Eastern Europe was promulgated simultaneously with a similar program in the USSR, its origins may lie as much in the political crisis caused by Stalin's death as in a mounting economic crisis. Indeed, the vast economic disproportions which the New Course was designed to reduce had

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[1] See above pp. 21-2.

[2] These readjustments were announced in September 1953, by the Soviet leader Khrushchev in the same address in which he acknowledged the dismal condition of Soviet agriculture, and in particular the livestock inadequacies (*Pravda*, [Moscow], September 15, 1953).

423 existed for a considerable period before the new measures were introduced.[3]

To assess the results of collectivization in Eastern Europe it is necessary to apply the same measuring rod applied to the Soviet Union: to what degree did collectivization facilitate the task of increasing the State's share of the total agricultural product without a proportionate increase in agricultural investment?

This was, in fact, the exact criterion to which Boris Kidric, the Yugoslav economic planner, was referring when he declared in 1947 that the "business of agriculture in a Socialist society is to supply the towns and industrial centers with food."[4] If, despite every other failure, collectivization has expedited this "supply," it has justified itself in Communist eyes.

311 As in the USSR, land reorganization in Eastern Europe has not
423 resulted in an appreciable increase in East European farm productivity; in many instances, the reverse has been true. That the pre-war levels of agriculture have not yet been regained in Hungary is now freely admitted by Hungarian Communist spokesmen.[5] The Polish theoretician, Stefan Jedrychowski, in a revealing analysis of post-Stalin policies, acknowledged that "in Romania, as well as in Czechoslovakia, agricultural production as a whole has not yet reached the pre-war level, although, for example, it has in the case of cattle."[6] Polish Premier Bierut confessed that the situation in Poland was not very healthy compared to pre-war standards.[7]

241 Indeed, the conclusions of the United Nations Food and Agricultural Organization (FAO), issued in 1952 long before the New Course policies, and based upon many unofficial sources, seems generous in retrospect: "All countries in the region," the FAO report stated, "with the exception of Poland, were at, or only slightly below, the pre-war level of agricultural production, and for the

[3] It has been suggested by many that the New Course of 1953 was the consequence of a mounting, ever-deepening economic crisis. However, it is difficult to support such a thesis because, with the possible exception of Hungary, the economic problems which the Communists are now attacking with such vigor have existed for a long time. A more plausible hypothesis is that the political crisis caused by Stalin's death made intolerable the continuation of the vast economic disproportions which had hitherto been mastered.

[4] See above p. 46.

[5] Jozsef Reval, *Tarsadalmi Szemle* (Budapest), October-November, 1953. The crowning indictment of Hungarian agriculture was Reval's declaration that its livestock situation was "worse than it is in the USSR."

[6] Stefan Jedrychowski, *Nowe Drogi* (Warsaw), No. 10, 1953.

[7] Report of Premier Bierut to the 9th Plenum of the Central Committee of the Polish Workers Party, *Trybuna Ludu*, November 6, 1953.

In pre-war Soviet Plans the targets for consumer goods and agricultural products were invariably underfulfilled, despite the fact that the targets were always set much below those for industry. Indeed, so slight was Communist concern for consumer goods and agriculture that the same targets were frequently repeated in successive Plans.[12] Since we have seen that the Eastern European Communists were deeply influenced by the Soviet experience, it can be assumed that they had few real illusions concerning their capacity to fulfill even those relatively modest targets set for consumer goods and agriculture. "While industrial production in 1953 compared with 1948," said the Czechoslovak Premier Viliam Siroky, "will increase two-fold, agricultural production during the same period will increase only one-third, and will still be below pre-war levels."[13] But the frankest admission of this planned economic disproportion was made by the then Premier, Antonin Zapotocky, in 1949.

> We must rid ourselves of any fond illusions that a rise in the standard of living may be regarded as a necessary corollary, or even ought to precede the successful implementation of the Plan. The exact opposite is the truth: In order to make it possible that our material and cultural level be raised, it will first be necessary to fulfill the Plan . . .[14]

Zapotocky's concise formula was carried out to the letter, as the chronic inadequacy of the urban food supply showed. A similarly candid discussion of the alternatives was given by Hilary Minc, Chairman of the Polish State Planning Commission. His effort to speak frankly on these questions was part of a debate among Polish Communist leaders during the winter of 1951-52. Collectivization had been halted some time in mid-1951; and the question of regaining Communist initiative on the land was evidently being discussed. Minc told a meeting of the activists of the Party Central Committee on October 9th, 1951 that the low level of agricultural production was due to the growing discrepancy between agricultural and industrial production, and therefore he concluded that the acceleration of collectivization (and the further widening of the gulf which it implied) would only intensify the difficulties.[15] Minc was answered on January 9th, 1952, by Eugeniusz Szyr, his deputy

[12] See, for example, Dobb, p. 292.
[13] *Rude Pravo* (Prague), September 16, 1953.
[14] Quoted in *News from Behind the Iron Curtain* (Free Europe Press, New York), December, 1953, p. 6.
[15] Report to the meeting of activists, Central Committee of the Polish Workers Party, October 9, 1951.

231 tinues to be bred and raised by the traditionally backward East European methods.

TABLE 26

PERCENTAGE OF TOTAL LIVESTOCK IN SOCIALIST SECTOR IN 1952*

Country	Percent of Land in Socialist Sector	Cattle	Sheep	Hogs	Horses
Czechoslovakia	48.0	33.0	39.7	38.0	—
Poland	17.0	7.8	—	9.2	7.1
Bulgaria	53.0	25.2	29.9	17.6	43.5

* Sources: Czechoslovakia, Nepomucky, *Rude Pravo*, February 5, 1953; Poland, *Wies w Liczbach*, p. 25 (Warsaw, 1951); Bulgaria, Chervenkov, *For a Lasting Peace*, September 11, 1953.

141 While animal husbandry lagged, industrial crops crept ahead. Even in this realm, despite increased investments, results have not been spectacular. Few reliable production statistics are available. Table 27 shows only the increase in area given over to industrial crops.[37]

2. *The Return on the Investment*

423 658 475 In its basic features the picture thus far drawn of East European agriculture resembles the one drawn earlier of Soviet agriculture: a strenuous effort to force the peasantry into a farm system over which the State could exercise direct administrative control; a feverish effort to build modernized industry at a pace which precluded much investment in agriculture; a resultant stagnation of and, in some instances, a deterioration of, agricultural production; and a constant tension between State and the peasants arising from their unending struggle over the fruits of the peasants' labors.

In the USSR, however, the victory of the State over the peasantry was concluded with far greater finality than in Satellite Eastern Europe; the system held together over a quarter of a century which included the most severe war-time trials. Collectivization in the USSR possesses stability because it has managed to provide the State with the minimum of foodstuffs necessary for its economic

[37] It is significant that among the many steps taken to implement the New Course in several East European countries was the reduction of the area sown with industrial crops.

TABLE 27

AREA UNDER INDUSTRIAL CROPS 1949 - 1951/52*

(1000 hectares)

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	1949						1951/52					
	C	P	H	R	B	Y	C	P	H	R	B	Y
Cotton	–	–	37	60	–	42	–	–	40	150	–	10
Flax	28	109	22	–	–	14	–	–	–	–	–	10
Hemp	5	13	28	–	–	108	–	19	–	–	–	50
Sugar beets	194	250	113	62	31	89	219	275	115	81	32	100
Tobacco	6	14	22	9	30	35	–	20	–	–	–	37

* Data from unpublished manuscript of Dr. Nicholas Spulber (Massachusetts Institute of Technology).

program. The question with respect to Eastern Europe is whether collectivization has provided the same agricultural cushion as it did for the USSR. Specifically, does the collectivized sector in the Satellites provide the State with a higher proportion of the total produce marketed per hectare than the private sector? As was shown, the capacity of the Soviet collectivized sector to produce for the market was its very reason for existence. 423 656 475

The evidence available from Eastern Europe is too scattered and unreliable to justify the type of definite conclusion drawn from the Soviet materials.[38] However, on the basis of an examination of each country in Eastern Europe, some tentative conclusions can be reached.

Throughout the following comparison of the "Socialist" and private sectors, the variety of advantages which the "Socialist sector" enjoys should be kept in mind. First, on the whole the "Socialist sector" comprises better and more fertile land. It is composed of larger farms, capable of supporting more people. In particular, State Farms are frequently, though not always, located on the prosperous lands once belonging to nobles, aristocrats, or German landholders. Second, the "Socialist sector" has at its dis-

[38] The transformation of statistics from an objective science into an arm of State propaganda occurred in the USSR in 1930-31, but several years were necessary for the completion of the task. As a result, there is a great deal more information available concerning the first and second Five Year Plans in the USSR than concerning the Satellite economic developments after 1947. The Satellite Communists, after all, borrowed their techniques of falsification when they had been thoroughly developed in the USSR.

423 posal most of the available farm machinery, either confiscated or
656 purchased after the Second World War and also what has since been manufactured. In Poland in 1951, for example, the "Socialist sector," comprising some 17 per cent of the arable land, had at its disposal 98 per cent of the nation's tractor supply.[39] In Bulgaria in 1948 the "Socialist sector," then comprising only eight per cent of the arable land, already had at its disposal 81 per cent of the tractors and threshing machines.[40] Third, the "Socialist sector" received a high portion of the meager State credits extended to the farm population for constructing new buildings, purchasing fertilizers, seed, and fodder. And fourth, the "Socialist sector" generally received more favorable trade terms from government agencies, and benefited from official tax and delivery quota discrimination against the private sector. The agricultural structure of each country will be analyzed in terms of the above-stated criteria.

BULGARIA

241 As everywhere, pertinent information is sparse and only sug-
475 gestive. The State Farms, occupying 2.5 per cent of the arable land,
423 market 1.5 per cent of the nation's grain crop. The "Socialist sector," occupying 52.0 per cent of the arable land, markets 65 per cent of the grain; and the private farms, composing 45.5 per cent of the arable land, market 33.5 per cent of the grain crop.[41] In the light of the aforementioned advantages accruing to the "Socialist sector," and considering the fact that in Bulgaria the "Socialist sector" is concentrated in the fertile valleys (See Chart IX), this division is not altogether surprising. The proportion of marketed grain derived from the "Socialist sector" is greater than its arable land, and almost as much greater as that which the USSR achieved when approximately half of its arable land was collectivized.[42] It should be noted, however, that, as in the USSR, the modest success of the "Socialist sector" as a grain producer was achieved at the cost of neglecting animal husbandry, since a high percentage of the nation's livestock remained in the private sector. But if the "Socialist sector" neglected animal husbandry, it emphasized a few semi-

[39] *Wieś w Liczbach* (Warsaw, 1951), p. 25.

[40] *Pari i Kredit* (Sofia), No. 2, 1948, p. 8.

[41] *Rabotnichesko Delo*, (Sofia) February 26, 1953.

[42] In the Soviet Union in 1932, 66 per cent of the arable land was in the "Socialist sector"; and it supplied 84 per cent of the marketed grain. (Maurice Dobb, *Soviet Economic Development Since 1917*, New York, 1948, p. 249).

industrial crops. In 1953, 75 per cent of the nation's cotton and 84 per cent of its sugar beets were produced in the "Socialist sector."[43] 241 475 423

POLAND

Communist authorities in Poland have frequently asserted the superior productivity of the "Socialist sector" of agriculture. But since the claims so frequently contradict each other and contradict general claims concerning the productive capacity of the entire sector, they must be treated cautiously. For example, although the Communists have, at various times, claimed from 15 to 20 per cent greater yield per hectare for collective farms, they do not claim a higher proportionate yield for the sector as a whole.[44]

On the central question of the deliveries made by the two sectors, statistics are equally uncertain. In the year 1950, the Communists seemed confident of the superior capacity of the "Socialist sector" to market its grain. The statistics in Table 28 seem to bear out this confidence.

TABLE 28

PROPORTION OF GRAIN MARKETED IN POLAND IN 1950*

	WINTER WHEAT	SPRING WHEAT	RYE
Production Cooperatives	67.0	49.0	31.4
Private Farms	34.3	34.3	28.7

* *Wieś w Liczbach* (Warsaw, 1952), p. 132.

And in 1951 the regime claimed that the "Socialist sector," comprising only 15 per cent of the land, accounted for 23.2 per cent of the marketed grain, while the private sector, comprising 85 per cent of the land, accounted for only 76.8 per cent of the marketed grain. According to these reports, both State Farms and collectives contributed far more than their proportionate share to the market.[45]

However, there is reason to doubt the validity of these statistics. The marketing report in 1953 shows the "Socialist sector" in a

[43] *Zemedelsko Zname* (Sofia), December 2, 1953.
[44] For example, according to *Wieś w Liczbach* (1952), the productive cooperatives have an approximately 20 per cent higher yield than the individual holdings. But other regime statistics indicate that the total produce of the productive cooperatives is no greater — per hectare — than the individual holdings.
[45] *Wieś w Liczbach* (1952).

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TABLE 29

PROPORTION OF GRAIN MARKETED IN POLAND BY SECTOR IN 1953*

Sector	Percent of Marketed Grain	Percent of Arable Land
State Farms	17.0	11.9
Production Cooperatives	6.5	6.5
Small Peasants	7.5	11.5
Middle Peasants	50.0	59.0
Kulaks	19.0	11.1
	100.0	100.0

* *Trybuna Ludu* (Warsaw), December 31, 1953.

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much less flattering light (see Table 29). However, even in 1953 the "Socialist sector" contributed more than its share to the market, and thus economically justified itself. Holding 18.4 per cent of the arable land, the "Socialist sector" contributed 23.5 per cent of the marketed grain. It should be noted, however, that the superiority was confined solely to State Farms. The collective farms, which comprised six per cent of the countryside, marketed no more than six per cent of the total grain.

The important role the State Farms play is made clear in Table 30, where it is demonstrated that, despite the low productivity per hectare, the State Farms outdid others in marketed production.

TABLE 30

PRODUCTION AND MARKETING OF POLISH STATE FARMS 1949 – 1952*

	1949	1950	1951	1952 *(Planned)*
Percent of Total Production (in current prices)	5.4	6.1	7.5	9.6
Percent of Total Marketing	–	6.8	10.5	15.1

* *Wieś w Liczbach*, (Warsaw, 1952), p. 116.

433 farms are not altogether true.[53] At the same time, the greater con-
231 fidence the regime has in the capacity of the collectives to fulfill
475 quotas is not altogether unjustified.

[231] Although the bulk of livestock in Poland is in the private sector, a sizeable portion of the livestock in Czechoslovakia is in the "Socialist sector." In 1952, 33.8 per cent of the cattle, 37.7 per cent of the hogs, and 38.7 per cent of the sheep were in the "Socialist sector."[54]

Although the Czechoslovak regime may have gained some market advantages from collectivization, its victory remains quite inconclusive. With the New Course, the regime, in turning to the private sector for agricultural reinforcement, acknowledged that the advantage gained was insufficient for its purposes.[55]

HUNGARY

● 423 The transformation of the agricultural structure in Hungary in
433 1945-46 was the most drastic of the post-war land reforms; and there is unquestionably a connection between the semi-revolutionary character of that agrarian reform and the special gravity of the Hungarian farm crisis in mid-1953. Whether this crisis had its roots in peasant hyper-sensitivity to the imposition of an overlordship resembling former conditions, or to the destruction of traditional trade relationships between town and country is not altogether clear; but that a close connection exists between the 1945-46 reform and the 1953 crisis is difficult to doubt.[56]

The impact of the 1945-46 reforms on the traditional trade

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[53] For example, *Rude Pravo* (December 4, 1953), asserted that the collective farms had fulfilled their quotas for grain by 103 per cent while the private farms had fulfilled their quota by only 77 per cent. A similar differential held for the fulfillment of meat, pork, and milk quotas.

[54] Cited in *Zycie Gospodarcze* (Warsaw), April 19, 1953, p. 484.

[55] As in Poland, the Czechoslovak New Course placed special emphasis upon protecting the productive capacity of the kulaks while at the same time, of course, limiting his alleged urge to engage in speculation and exploitation. "It would harm our agricultural economy," said Minister of Agriculture Uher, if the land which the kulaks occupied was not "fully utilized by them" (*Rude Pravo*, November 10, 1953).

[56] A subjective factor such as the peasants' degree of class consciousness is difficult to incorporate into an analysis of this type. However, without some recourse to this factor, it is difficult to explain the special depth of the 1953 Hungarian crisis, so much more pronounced was it than similar crises in the sphere. The series of articles in the Hungarian press during the fall and summer of 1953 portraying the countryside during the period of kolkhoz dissolutions certainly suggested that the Hungarian peasantry felt a hatred for their oppressors of an intensity hardly rivaled in the Sphere. It should not be forgotten that the strongest of the post-World War II peasant parties in the sphere was the Smallholders' Party of Hungary, which received 57 per cent of the vote in 1947 elections.

relationship between town and country has received little attention, but evidence suggests that its effect was much the same as that caused by the peasant upheaval of Russia in 1917-18.[57] Pre-war Hungary's agricultural sectors participated in the market as outlined in Table 31. As in pre-revolutionary Russia, the large landowners accounted for a share of the market in excess of their share of total arable land. This superior capacity to market goods reflected, as in Russia, not greater production, but the ability to sell a greater proportion of what they produced. While the peasants marketed 47 per cent of their crop, the large landowners marketed 67 per cent.[58]

By dividing the land more equitably, the 1945-46 reforms upset the equilibrium of the pre-war system. As a result, a larger portion of the total product was consumed by the peasants, and a smaller portion sent to the cities. To rectify this situation, and to restore the cities to the dominant position they had once enjoyed, first the compulsory deliveries system, and then collectivization, were imposed by the Communists.[59] The rapid development of industry and growth of urban population made it imperative that a greater proportion of the produce be siphoned off the land than before the war.

But the Hungarian Communists have acknowledged that they were unable even to restore the pre-war level of land exploitation. The collective farm structure could not compensate for the loss of the large landholdings; and with the bad harvest of 1952, the agricultural situation grew desperate.

This failure was the subject of an extremely interesting analysis by the Communist theoretician, Mrs. Aladar Mod, published some two months prior to the official introduction of the New Course

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[57] It is perhaps significant that the two European countries which experienced a successful Bolshevik seizure of power at the time of World War I were Russia and Hungary.

[58] Mrs. Aladar Mod, *Tarsadalmi Szemle*, April-May, 1953. Most of the material concerning Hungarian market relations is taken from Mod's extremely interesting study published on the eve of the New Course explosion.

[59] In some countries (Czechoslovakia and Poland) the system of compulsory deliveries was taken over directly from the German administration after the war. It is interesting that the totalitarian regimes, faced by the same problems, so frequently work out similar solutions. Just as the Communists in Eastern Europe incorporated Nazi techniques into their apparatus, so the Nazis, when occupying Communist Russia, kept the kolkhozes intact and exploited them as the Communists had done. Like the Soviet planners, the Germans found the collectives to be eminently suited to the economic demands of a totalitarian state.

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TABLE 31

PRE-WAR AGRARIAN TRADE PATTERNS IN HUNGARY*

Sector	Percent of Holdings	Percent of Arable Land	Percent of Total Crop	Percent of Own Crop Marketed	Percent of Total Marketed
Small Holdings (Under 25 cad. acres)	94.0	48	51.6	47.2	43.6
Medium Holdings (25-200 cad. acres)	5.5	28	24.2	63.6	27.4
Large Holdings (Over 200 cad. acres)	0.5	24	24.2	67.0	29.0
TOTAL	100.0	100.0	100.0	55.9	100.0

* *Magyar Statisztikai Zsebkonyv*, (Budapest, 1948), p. 103; *Tarsadalmi Szemle*, April-May, 1953; *Hungarian State Yearbook*, Special Agricultural Issue (Budapest, 1935).

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into Hungary in July 1953. In it she pointed out that the "Socialist sector" produced approximately 10 per cent less for the market than the former landholdings of 200 cadastral acres. "The percentage of grain production for the market," she flatly concluded, after lengthy analysis, "is much lower than it was prior to liberation." As a result, grain exports had been drastically curtailed; yet even after this, the cities were still poorly supplied. Taking 1938 agricultural production as 100, current production has reached the following levels sector-by-sector:

	1938	1951	1952
Working Peasantry	100	130	109
Kulaks	100	46.7	23.4
Large-scale farms	100	73	74.3

The working peasants had increased their total yield because the land under their control had grown by 25 per cent. But theirs was the one sector incapable of substantially contributing to the market. The two sectors capable of supplying the market with a large surplus had declined seriously—the kulak sector in amount of land under its control, and the large landowners (now "Socialist") in general efficiency. The resulting trade relations are described in Table 32.

In each year the percent of the crop delivered by the kulaks excelled that of the "Socialist sector;" but in each year the kulak share of the total crop declined as the result of State encroachment on his land. Inevitably the total amount of grain delivered to the State declined because the "Socialist sector" was unable to make up the loss. Mrs. Mod herself summed up the crisis implicit in the situation these statistics describe:

> The number of small producers is now much larger than it used to be. The producer who used to produce for the market, produces doubly less today; and today they consume much more, and market much less than in the past. Our Socialist large-scale farms, partly for the same reasons and partly on account of their still-existing infantile disorders (inadequate management, lax labor discipline) are for the time being unable to make up for the shortage.

Mrs. Mod refrained from mentioning a third factor in the curtailment of marketed production: the stern refusal of the Communist industrial order to provide incentives for greater production and

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TABLE 32

POST-WAR AGRARIAN TRADE PATTERNS IN HUNGARY*
1949 - 1952

Sector	Percent of Arable Land	Percent of Total G...in Crop Produced	Percent of Crop Delivered to State	Percent of Total Grain Delivery
1949				
Working peasants' farms	75.5	82.1	38.3	75.3
Kulak farms	17.0	16.4	59.9	23.5
Socialist sector	7.5	1.5	31.7	1.2
TOTAL	100.0	100.0	41.7	100.0
1951				
Working peasants' farms	**	72.5	46.9	66.9
Kulak farms	**	10.1	66.2	13.2
Socialist sector	26.0	17.4	58.2	19.9
TOTAL	100.0	100.0	50.8	100.0
1952				
Working peasants' farms	**	69.6	41.7	61.4
Kulak farms	**	5.5	61.0	7.2
Socialist sector	34.5	24.9	59.6	31.4
TOTAL	100.0	100.0	47.4	100.0

* *Tarsadalmi Szemle*, April-May, 1953.
** Data unavailable.

greater trade with the cities. The drastic economic reforms initiated during the summer of 1953 were part of a frantic effort to correct this imbalance, an imbalance pronounced in Hungary and terribly aggravated by the disastrous 1952 harvest.

Romania

The Romanian Government has been more secretive about internal market relations than any other Satellite, making conclusions even more difficult to draw. The "Socialist sector," including the "primitive" agricultural associations, comprise 25 per cent of the arable land. According to Premier Gheorghiu-Dej, this sector produces no more than 25 per cent of the total crop,[60] no more than its proportionate share of the arable land. This suggests that the

[60] Gheorghiu-Dej, *Scanteia*, August 23, 1953.

"Socialist sector," despite its advantages, has given little benefit to the State in terms of marketed produce. The Romanian Council of Ministers frequently complains, as it did on January 28, 1952, that "in spite of all the important benefits given to the peasantry by the State . . . the market was not sufficiently supplied with agricultural products necessary to consumers and to industrial production."[61]

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YUGOSLAVIA

The history of collectivization in Yugoslavia is so complex, and differs in so many respects from the course followed elsewhere in Eastern Europe, that comparisons are difficult. However, in certain fundamental respects, the initial collectivization drive (1948-1950) had the same goals as those guiding the Cominform bloc. No data on produce marketed are available; but production data indicate that in the years of collectivizing, the Government was successful at least in obtaining higher yields on its State and collective farms than from the private sector, and presumably was able to extract a large portion of that yield from the farms. Undoubtedly, this result was due in part to the ability of the Yugoslav regime to collectivize the fertile Vojvodina region (see Chart VII), where yield per hectare was traditionally high. But the "Socialist sector" also included a good deal of the poor and relatively unproductive land of Macedonia, and therefore Table 33, in which the proportion of grain produced by each sector is compared with the proportion of land held, is significant.

OVERALL MARKET PERSPECTIVE

Despite the sparseness and frequent unreliability of the statistical data employed in this analysis, some conclusions may be drawn.

1. In varying degrees, depending upon the country, collectivization in Eastern Europe has actually expedited extraction of agricultural produce from the countryside at the low price consistent with Communist industrial designs. While the system of compulsory deliveries at State-regulated prices was effective to this end, it left enough initiative and power in the hands of the peasantry to hamper the development of industry.

In Bulgaria collectivization results are the most impressive; in Czechoslovakia the gains are less impressive, but still significant. In Poland the regime has had to rely a great deal upon the surplus

[61] *Scanteia*, January 29, 1952.

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TABLE 33

GRAIN PRODUCTION IN YUGOSLAVIA – 1948 - 1951*
BY ECONOMIC SECTOR

(In percent of total production)

Year	Sector	Wheat	Rye	Barley	Oats	Total**	Percent of Arable Land***
1948/49	State	2.3	1.8	7.4	8.5	3.4	3.0
	Cooperative	14.2	11.6	15.1	16.4	14.4	10.0
	Private	83.5	86.6	77.5	75.1	82.2	87.0
1949/50	State	3.2	2.0	14.5	12.4	5.0	4.0
	Cooperative	23.2	24.0	25.4	28.7	23.9	16.0
	Private	73.6	74.0	60.1	58.9	71.1	80.0
1950/51	State	2.8	2.4	17.4	14.5	5.5	4.0
	Cooperative	25.3	28.4	28.3	30.0	26.3	19.0
	Private	71.9	69.2	54.3	55.5	68.2	77.0

* *Bulletin of Information and Documents*, (Belgrade), Vol. 1, No. 4, 1952, pp. 21-26.

** The total is derived from the combined tonnage of the wheat, rye, barley, and oats. Since the caloric value of a ton of wheat is greater than a ton of barley or oats, combining them all in one sum is deceptive. However, for the purposes of the above comparison the rough approximation of the "total" given, based entirely on tonnage, is sufficient. If potato production had been included in this table, then a caloric measurement such as the FAO used in establishing its "Wheat Equivalent Unit" (See Chart XIII) might have been employed, since the caloric content of a given weight of potatoes is only one-fifth that of an equivalent weight of wheat, whereas barley and oats are three-fifths.

*** The figures given for arable land in this table are estimates. Since grain production is given according to the agricultural year and the progress of collectivization according to the calendar year, it was necessary to interpolate the latter figures to accord with the former.

production of State Farms rather than the collectives, and, as in Hungary, kulaks and middle farmers continue to constitute a major source of marketable produce. In Romania the positive results of collectivization appear to be negligible, and, consistently enough, its industrial expansion has been quite modest. And in Hungary collectivization seems to have aggravated an already critical town-country relationship. But even in Hungary, and to a lesser extent Romania, the degree of peasant exploitation was sufficient to insure considerable urban development. 475 423 433

2. At the same time, it must be stressed, the evidence indicates that collectivization was by no means as successful as it was in the Soviet Union. This seems to be true both quantitatively (in terms of percentage of arable land absorbed) and qualitatively (in terms of reorientation of the market). It was not sufficiently comprehensive or intensive to facilitate the rapid increase in peasant exploitation which, from the regimes' viewpoint, justified the bloodshed and brutality of Communist agrarian policy.

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3. Consequently, the policy of collectivization, designed to insure a steady supply of goods to the cities without much payment in return, loses a large part of its meaning, and the collectivization drive itself is halted. While it is true that collectivized farming is still officially considered the highest form of agrarian organization,[9] the revised economic plans of the Satellite regimes do not intend appreciable extension of the "Socialist sector." Indeed, the goal of increasing the standard of living precludes, for some time, the resumption of any Communist land offensive.

4. Similarly, the New Course has made something of an anomaly of the traditional practices of the Communist land offensive: the division of the peasantry into antagonistic groups, the discrimination against the independent peasantry as a whole, the compilation of "kulak lists." These techniques, which were so well adapted to the collectivization campaign, lose much of their meaning in the new atmosphere. Again and again Communist leaders admonish their bureaucracy to cease treating the peasant as an "enemy" and everywhere but in Bulgaria it is now openly declared that the independent peasantry must be relied upon for the major portion of the agricultural produce.[10] Violent anti-kulak campaigns must also be relinquished as long as the regimes are interested in agricultural production and not merely in agricultural redistribution. Therefore, the post-Stalin regimes call for "limitation" of the "kulak" rather than his "elimination."[11]

5. Since increased agricultural production is the urgent and immediate necessity, and since increased administrative force cannot be used to obtain it, incentives for the peasant must be broadened. Delivery quotas are reduced; delivery prices are increased; taxes and fees of all sorts are lowered; and arrears in many categories are canceled. The pattern is nowhere identical; but in each country most of the same devices were employed.

"We must understand," said Berman, [that the new policy] "is going to cost a large sum of money. If the peasant gets this money but doesn't get any goods for it, including those which he

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[9] See, for example, the Bierut speech at the 2nd Congress of the Polish Workers Party (PZPR), March 10, 1954.

[10] "We shall not and must not force anybody to join agricultural cooperatives, and we also do not think that the private farmer represents our enemy, we consider him our ally" (Czechoslovak President Antonin Zapotocky, *Rude Pravo*, February 23, 1954).

[11] See, for example, Gheorghiu-Dej., *For a Lasting Peace*, November 6, 1953.

really wants . . . there will be no increase in [agricultural] production." Therefore, a dual policy of increased payment for agricultural goods and increased production of vitally needed farmers' commodities is instituted. 656 178 185 423

6. An attempt is being made to redress the balance so far as the concentration of techniques is concerned. A vigorous effort to detach technicians from cities and urban industries and to send them to farms for whose direction and assistance they were ostensibly trained, is being made in conjunction with the new plan.[12] This is true everywhere in the Soviet sphere, especially in Poland the USSR, and Romania.

7. If the New Course is designed partly to consolidate the existing agricultural structure, it must be revaluated in terms of long-range perspectives. Hence, those collective farms which have the least social stability and economic viability are permitted to return to the private sector. In Czechoslovakia, where some 40 per cent of the farms were not paying their own way, according to Premier Siroky, a small percentage of the farms were permitted to disband in the fall of 1953.[13] In Yugoslavia, where hundreds of collectives in mountainous areas produced very little and served only as a drain on the State treasury, almost half of these farms have been dissolved since 1951.[14] And in Hungary, where peasant dissatisfaction was so great that, even with a police-State normally equipped to handle discontent, it constituted an element of such basic instability that almost half of the collectivized households have left the "Socialist sector."[15]

Above all, the New Course represents an effort to stabilize and consolidate the system of relationships carved out by the East European regimes. The next few years are likely to witness a concentrated Communist effort to make a smoothly-functioning economic order out of the conquests already gained, rather than sweeping away present problems by posing future challenges, as they have done in the past.

The New Course does not, by any stretch of the imagination,

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[12] The program of reinforcing the technical assistance to the countryside has encountered considerable resistance from the technicians themselves, and, indeed, in the USSR, the government complains that many technicians who go to the countryside refuse to take their families with them, so convinced are they that the new assignments are temporary (*Pravda*, November 27, 1953).
[13] *Rude Pravo* (Prague), November 10, 1953.
[14] *Borba* (Belgrade), February 29, 1953.
[15] *Szabad Nep* (Budapest), December 31, 1953.

656 178 185 423 represent a repudiation of the agricultural organization pioneered by the Soviet planners in the early 1930s and brought to Eastern Europe in the late 1940s. The basic characteristics of this organization cannot be abandoned without the most thoroughgoing reorientation of the whole economy. The New Course cannot therefore be compared with the New Economic Policy of early Soviet history. The NEP was declared before the Soviet industrial and bureaucratic system had been built, and a retreat to a relatively free market system was possible. The New Course, on the other hand, has been promulgated within the framework of an already fully-elaborated industrial and bureaucratic system, and the regimes can no longer rely upon the free market for agricultural produce.

Having built this social system and enclosed themselves within it, the East European Communists have lost much of the freedom of choice and flexibility which aided them so greatly in their postwar assumption of power. Therefore, they are subject to the internal laws of the system, and it is doubtful whether they can make a success of their efforts to reorient its basic relationships. The authoritarian order is well adapted to the leadership of a rapidly expanding heavy industrial, semi-military economy, but it is badly equipped to handle the problems of small-scale agriculture and consumer demand. In nine months of operation, the New Course has already made it clear that the greatest obstacle to stabilization of the Stalinist social order comes from the social order itself, and its voracious demands.[16]

Prior to the introduction of the New Course, it was widely assumed that the East European Communist drive to emulate Soviet achievements was inexorable, and required only time for completion. In particular, it was assumed that the Satellite regimes could not rest until collectivization was completed, as if the Communists could not face themselves ideologically with one independent farm remaining. But the events of 1953 have highlighted the degree to which Communist agricultural policy has been, from the start, conditioned by the bedrock economic needs of a developing social structure, rather than by the abstract demands of rigid doctrine. Indeed, even the Soviets, whose collectivized agriculture had attained the state of "near-perfection" and completion toward which

[16] For an extensive discussion of internal bureaucratic resistance to the New Course see "The Bureaucracy Wavers," *News from Behind the Iron Curtain* (Free Europe Press, New York), January, 1953.

the East European Communists were striving, are in the process of readjusting the structure in line with the new political relationships. 656 178 185

No doubt the present *modus vivendi* between the peasantry and the Communist regimes is precarious and unstable, at best an uneasy truce between essentially antagonistic social forces. But there is good reason to believe that the Communists are determined to keep this mid-way course for some time to come, with only minor wavering within the ranks. 423

3. *"Salami Tactics" and the New Course* 423

The development of East European Communism since World War II has been dominated by the pragmatic methods of "salami tactics," the theory expounded by Hungarian ex-Premier Rakosi, which justified pursuit of any social or economic program that reinforces Communist political power. The advocacy of land reform facilitated Communist absorption of the State machine in 1945-46, and therefore became approved Communist "agrarian policy." Similarly, since advocacy of a productive middle peasantry may help to facilitate Communist retention of power in 1953-54, it has become approved Communist "agrarian policy." At each stage, the Communists speak as if no other policy had ever been considered, and as if no other policy could possibly be.[17] As always, however, their primary concern is with power, and their ideological pronouncements tailored to suit it. The New Course is a development very much within the spirit of the "salami tactics" philosophy.

The success and failure of Communist agriculture policy in Eastern Europe may be attributable to these same "salami tactics." This strategem of slow suffocation made possible the seizure of power under circumstances unsuited to "classic" revolutionary forms; and it was well suited to a political apparatus incapable of a frontal revolutionary attack. The policy of slow, piecemeal land collectivization made possible the extension of the "Socialist sector" at a pace which did not arouse the united antagonism of the peasantry at any one time, thus avoiding the type of militant resist-

[17] See above 91-2 for a brief discussion of official explanations of change in policy. Considering the importance of changes in policy emphasis in 1953, it is remarkable that the Communists have made so few attempts to analyze their past performances. The official definition of "Socialism" itself was altered during 1953 (see Fogarasi, *Tarsadalmi Szemle* (Budapest), September-October, 1953), and to this date not a single Communist theoretician has acknowledged the fact.

423 ance to collectivization which only a party of the strong Soviet type could have withstood.

However, those factors which made "salami tactics" suitable for the seizure of power and the beginning of collectivization made them inappropriate for completion of the task and the final subjugation of the independent peasantry. These disadvantages may be summarized as follows:

423 668 1. Piecemeal collectivization encouraged a type of peasant resistance which, it turned out, was more effective than Soviet peasant resistance. In the USSR collectivization took place so rapidly, and with such tremendous force, that the vast majority of peasants were already well enclosed within the "Socialist sector" by the time a full-scale counter-attack could be prepared. Leonard Hubbard, the English authority, described the Soviet victory in this way:

> The struggle over collectivization ended distinctly in favour of the Soviet Government, unlike the conflict [between the Government and the peasantry] that brought War Communism to a close. The peasants were no longer able to starve the Government into yielding, because the Government had now created an efficient organisation for obtaining the foodstuffs necessary for subsistence of the urban and industrial population.[18]

While it is true that the Soviet peasantry, in retaliation, destroyed a good portion of the nation's livestock, their bargaining power was not improved as a result. The vital shipments of surplus grain were insured, and all means of resistance had been thoroughly destroyed. The famine of 1932-33, mainly affecting the grain-growing regions of Ukraine and South Russia, demonstrated beyond doubt that, in Hubbard's words, "if anybody was to starve, [the peasants] would be the first to do so."

423 661 In Eastern Europe, however, the slow, cautious collectivization precluded the possibility of so calculated and brutal a policy. A sufficient proportion of the peasantry remained outside of the "Socialist sector" to wreak havoc with the Government's general economic plan. The East European regimes could not gain a strong enough position in relation to the peasantry to withstand the tremendous pressures which would be generated by rapid collectivization or a disastrous drought such as 1933. One poor harvest was, consequently, a sufficient jolt to destroy the entire rhythm of the

[18] Leonard Hubbard, *The Economics of Soviet Agriculture*, London, 1939, p. 123.

Satellite industrial program. The oustanding case in point is, of course, Hungary, whose extremely poor harvest of 1952 provided the impetus which paved the way for the crisis of 1953.[19] 423 668

2. The reliance upon slow economic strangulation rather than direct administrative force in collectivization inevitably meant greater reliance on the voluntary will of the peasantry than was necessary in the Soviet collectivization drive. Therefore, the regimes had to take some account of the individual tastes of the peasantry. The variety of intermediate types of collective, the special privileges granted kolkhoz members, reflect the Communist desire to soften the impact of collectivization.[20] The strenuous efforts made to demonstrate to the peasant the economic superiority of collectivism were also part of this effort.

This policy made collectivization possible but at the same time detracted from the very usefulness originally intended for the collectivized farms; that is, the effort to render the collectives attractive to the independent peasant (limited as they were) did not facilitate exploitation of the peasants which was their major economic justification. As was evident from the analysis presented in Chapted IV, the degree of exploitation of the "Socialist sector" was not much greater than the exploitation of the private sector. The difference was, in any case, smaller than that achieved in the Soviet Union, where a prolonged period of persuasion and intra-peasantry discrimination had been unnecessary.

4. *The East European Peasant*

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Peasant resistance is a social force extremely difficult to measure either quantitatively or qualitatively. It expresses itself in many forms and guises, both in open revolt and passive resistance. This is partly because peasant sentiment rarely expresses itself in organizational form but more commonly in individual economic acts. In modern history, governments have found it difficult to elicit fanatical loyalty from the peasant; at best he is obedient. For the same reasons, the peasant has rarely been drawn into the organized revolutionary movements of the time. He has succumbed to few

[19] There was, of course, other factors involved in the Hungarian agricultural crisis of 1953 (see above pp. 109-10).

[20] Mention should be made here of Communist efforts throughout the sphere to flatter the peasant by a superficial glorification of his traditional dance, costumes, handiwork, and other expressions of the peasant culture which once graced the covers of pre-World War II East European tourist guides.

Yugoslav peasants; the special position which Romania occupies in the Soviet empire. These differences are important, and explain many of the variations within the framework of agricultural policy. But these variations fall into that historical experience which distinguishes East European peasantry from its Russian counterpart. These historical differences are of the utmost importance in explaining the failure of the East European Communists to emulate successfully the Soviet example. 565 829 668

5. *The Communist Role in Eastern Europe*

The Communist Parties of Eastern Europe consider themselves progressive forces of the area. In agriculture, they assert that by lifting the backward peasantry out of its traditional lethargy and provincialism, they are performing a service for the peasants and the entire society. The opposition of the peasantry to Communist plans for the rationalization of the land stems from stubborn allegiance to outmoded customs and habits. Vulko Chervenkov, the Bulgarian Premier, gave the classical formulations on this point: 829 668

> The Bulgarian peasant has two souls. One is the love of work and the other is the sense of private ownership. His spirit of private ownership brings him close to the capitalist. His spirit of work brings him close to the working class. Therefore the peasant is hesitant. We Communists, through our tactics and by the collective method, should kill their spirit of private ownership and build our socialist world.[19]

It is precisely this conception of the Communist role in Eastern Europe which the material gathered together here calls into question.

No doubt it is partly true that peasant resistance to collectivization is based on their passionate attachment to the land they till and own. But as has been pointed out, the major issue in the struggle between the Communists and the peasants was the question of the *distribution* of the fruits of the land, rather than the more abstract question of conflicting ideologies. 423 829

The peasants fight not only to protect their ancient traditions but even more to protect their economic rights, and they frequently employ the ancient traditions in defense of their own economic interests. The Communists, for their part, struggle against these traditions not merely out of doctrinaire antagonism but because these customs stand in the way of further exploitation of the

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[21] *Rabotnichesko Delo* (Sofia) September 9, 1953.

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829 peasants and their full incorporation into the state-industrial machinery.[20]

423 Like the great land reforms which followed the First and Second World Wars, the Communist "solution" to the land problem of Eastern Europe is no real solution at all, and since it does not attack the problem at its roots, is not intended to be one. Rather, like the great reforms, the Communist agricultural program is only a means of redistributing the products of the land to suit new political realities. The chief difference between the two movements lies in the fact that while the reforms redistributed the wealth among the peasants themselves, collectivization was designed to redistribute a portion of the national wealth in favor of the new urban Communist bureaucratic class.

[20] The working class has been already incorporated into that structure. But that does not mean that, despite the absence of traditional ties, they are any less opposed to the Communist regimes than the peasants. On the contrary, as the East German and Czechoslovak revolts of mid-1953 demonstrated, the workers are likely to play the leading role in anti-Communist agitation and revolt.

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CHAPTER I

CHANGES IN PROPERTY: THE LAND REFORM

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● 423 A DESCRIPTION of the economic condition of Stalin's satellites must begin with a consideration of the changes brought about in property relations after the overthrow of the rule of Hitler and his vassals in the countries of Eastern and South-Eastern Europe. As most of the population in these countries earntheir living in agriculture* it is convenient to begin with an examination of the changes in land ownership.

There is a widely held belief that the feudal system, with the characteristic feature of the large latifundia, continued to prevail east of the Elbe until the arrival of the Soviet army. The prevalence of this idea is due partly to ignorance, but also to the propaganda spread since the war by the governments of this region, who try to paint as black a picture as possible of the property relations which previously prevailed there in order to magnify the importance of the land reforms they have carried out. This view is incorrect, since before World War II, and in some areas even before World War I, a series of land reforms had already to a large extent changed the system of land-holding in the countryside. On the other hand it would not be correct to minimise the extent of the land reforms carried out since the war.

ODO To arrive at a balanced estimate of the extent of land reforms each country will have to be dealt with separately, even though for lack of space only a brief statement of the facts can be given. The countries will be dealt with in order, beginning with those in which the changes in the ownership of land after World

162 *Of the total population those engaged in agriculture, fishing and forestry made up: in Bulgaria (1934) 80 per cent; Yugoslavia (1931) 79 per cent; Rumania (1930) 78 per cent; Poland (1931) 65 per cent; Hungary (1930) 53 per cent; Czechoslovakia (1930) 38 per cent.

[Text starts on p. 13]

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000 War II were the least, and ending with those in which the changes were the greatest. This order illustrates the course of historical development, since the countries in which the changes were very small after World War II were those in which the greatest changes had been wrought in the past, and those where big changes took place had known but few before.

Bulgaria

423 The national uprising of the Bulgarians in 1878 destroyed feudalism. The Turkish beys fled for their lives and left the Bulgarian serfs in full and free ownership of the land they tilled. [656] The few feudal remnants that were not eliminated in 1878 were swept away by the Agrarian Union Government of Alexander Stamboliisky (1920–23). This government fixed a maximum of 30 hectares of land for any one household (i.e., an area smaller than that fixed as a maximum by the land reforms in any country except Bulgaria herself after World War II). The political instability of this government, ending in its overthrow by a military *coup d'etat* and the murder of its leader as well as of tens of thousands of peasants and workers, resulted in the law of the maximum not being fully applied, so that a certain concentration of ownership took place after 1923. Nevertheless, Bulgaria remained a country with very few 'estates' of more than 30 hectares, a country of small peasant ownership par excellence:

LAND OWNERSHIP IN BULGARIA BEFORE THE 1944 REFORM
(IN PERCENTAGES)

	*Below 5 ha.**	*5-10 ha.*	*10-30 ha.*	*30-50 ha.*	*50 ha. and over*
Number of Owners	63.1	26.2	10.3	0.3	0.1
Area	30.0	36.9	29.5	2.0	1.6

(L. Bojkoff, *Bulgaria is not the Land of Roses Only*, Sofia, 1946, p. 69.)

Wilbert E. Moore, in *Economic Demography of Eastern and Southern Europe* (League of Nations, Geneva, 1945), gives an even lower percentage for the big properties: in 1934 only 2.7 per cent of the land was in the hands of people owning more than 30 hectares each (p. 251).

There were very few tenants in Bulgaria. According to an official report of 31st December, 1926, the cultivated rented

*ha. = hectare = 2.4711 acres.

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land comprised only 1 per cent of all privately owned land. 423 ●
(O. S. Morgan, editor, *Agricultural Systems of Middle Europe. A Symposium*, New York, 1933, p. 50). The number of agricultural workers was also negligible.

After World War II the Communist government fixed a new [656]
maximum of 20 ha. for all parts of the country except Dobrudja where the maximum fixed by Stamboliisky was in force. But although the government hoped to increase its influence among the peasants, the real results of this land reform were not considerable. In his Report to the Second Fatherland Front Congress (Feb. 2-3, 1948) Premier Georgi Dimitrov said that '127,000 families received 1,258,000 decares of land (1 decare = 1/10 hectare—Y.G.) in compliance with the agrarian reform, while 7,863 families were housed and given about 12,000 decares of land. 71,000 decares of land were distributed among 381 State farms, establishments and institutions'. (*Second Fatherland Front Congress*, Sofia, 1948, p.42). Thus altogether 1,341,000 decares, or 134,100 hectares, were distributed. Since the total arable land in 1947 was 7.8 million hectares, the redistribution was relatively small. The land reform affected only about three per cent of the agricultural land.

The limited extent of the last land reform in Bulgaria is shown by the statistics of land ownership before and after it:

	Cultivated Land (in Percentage)		
	1926	*1934*	*1946*
Small farms	28.62	28.90	30.70
Medium "	41.63	41.13	40.60
Large "	29.75	29.97	28.70

Professor Petko Spirkov, who cites this table, draws the obvious conclusion from it: '. . . during the period 1926-1946 there are practically no changes in the distribution of land'. ('Class Structure of our Village,' *Free Bulgaria*, Sofia, March 15, 1949).

Yugoslavia

Serbia achieved virtual national independence in 1830 and full sovereignty in 1877. Then the Turkish feudal lords fled from the country and as in Bulgaria the land remained the property of the former serfs, so that many years before World

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● 423 War I, Old Serbia was a country of small peasants with very few tenants or agricultural workers. A similar situation was created in Montenegro and Dalmatia by their union with Serbia (1918). Only in Croatia and Slovenia, which were torn from the Hungarian part of the Habsburg Empire and added to Yugoslavia in 1918, did there remain big estates to be divided in the inter-war years. There, as a result of the agrarian reform law of 1919 and a number of subsidiary laws which followed, 1,805,000 hectares were distributed among 497,000 peasant families. (O.S. Morgan, op. cit. p. 361). This area made up about a quarter of the total area of Croatia and Slovenia, and about 12.5 per cent of the total agricultural area of Yugoslavia.

The agricultural area of Yugoslavia, prior to World War II, was distributed thus:

	Up to 2 ha.	*2-5 ha.*	*5-10 ha.*	*10-20 ha.*	*20-50 ha.*	*50 and over*
Area ..	6.5%	21.5%	27.0%	22.3%	13%	9.6%

423 A series of laws was passed by the Federated Republic of Yugoslavia in August 1945 by which the maximum land allowed to any individual was 45 hectares, of which either 30-35 hectares were to be arable and 10-15 hectares forest, or 45 hectares arable. All the German settlers and quislings were expropriated and the land owned by the banks, joint stock companies and the Church* taken over by the state.

The final result of the reform was not very great. About 850 thousand hectares changed hands, i.e., about 6 per cent. of the agricultural land of Yugoslavia (of which about half was the property of German peasants who were expelled although they had lived in Yugoslavia for hundreds of years).

Rumania

In the Old Kingdom of Rumania as well as in the territories added to it as a result of the first World War (Transylvania, taken from Hungary, and Bessarabia from Russia), a land reform on a very large scale was carried out after the first World War. Altogether 20,976 large estates with an area of 6,008,098 hectares were expropriated and handed over to 1,368,978 peasants. The agricultural area was distributed thus:

*except that each congregation was allowed to keep 10 hectares.

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	Before the Reform		After the Reform	
	Less than 100 ha.	*More than 100 ha.*	*Less than 100 ha.*	*More than 100 ha.*
Ancient Kingdom	4,593,148	3,397,851	7,369,549	621,450
Bessarabia ..	2,337,811	1,844,539	3,829,731	352,619
Transylvania ..	4,689,855	2,751,457	6,363,664	1,087,648
Bucovina ..	405,000	115,000	480,967	39,033
Total ..	12,025,814	8,108,847	18,033,911	2,100,750
In %	59.77	40.23	89.56	10.44

(O.S. Morgan, ibid. p. 323).

In the provinces annexed to Rumania after the first World War, social and national differences were largely identical, since the landlords were Hungarians and most of the peasants Rumanians. The peasants belonging to the national minorities were not excluded from the land distribution carried out by the Rumanian governments, even though these governments were far from internationalist in outlook. In Transylvania, Bessarabia and Bucovina 206,165 peasant families belonging to national minorities received land in the redistribution side by side with 532,700 Rumanians. 563 423

After the first world war a considerable amount of land again changed hands: the poor peasants lost a lot of their land to the rich peasants. But even so landownership was much less concentrated than before 1918. 423

The second World War resulted in the loss of Bessarabia and Bucovina to Russia. Within the new boundaries of Rumania, estates of more than 100 hectares (calculated from the table given above) comprised an area of 1,709,098 hectares, or 11.07 per cent of all the land. Properties of more than 50 hectares, (about 1,970,300 hectares in all) comprised 17.5 per cent of all the agricultural land. (Rumania, Ministère de l'Information, *La Réforme Agraire en Roumanie*, 1946, p.16).

The land reform law of 22 March, 1945, fixed the maximum land holding allowed at 50 hectares. People owning more than 50 hectares had to give up all land over this amount. Church property, state property and the royal estates were excluded, but the last-named, an area of 132,112 hectares, was expropriated after the abdication of King Michael (December, 1947). All German owners (the German peasant colonies of Transylvania) were expropriated, as well as all 'traitors and war criminals'. [563]

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● 423 Up to September, 1947, land reform affected about 1.4 million hectares, and afterwards, with the distribution of the royal estates, etc., altogether 1.6 million hectares, i.e., about 10 per cent of the agricultural area of Rumania, or a third of the relative extent of the land reform after World War I.

Czechoslovakia

423 563 656 As a result of the Battle of the White Mountain (1620) the Czech nobility was almost completely wiped out and replaced by German Catholic landlords. Thus, when the Czechoslovak Republic was established, there were German landlords and Czech peasants in the Czech areas, and in the Sudetenland—the Border area — mainly German peasants and German landlords. In Slovakia (taken from the Hungarian part of the Hapsburg Empire) there were Magyar landlords and Slovak peasants, and, in the region bordering on Hungary, Hungarian peasants and Hungarian landlords. So that here, the land question and the national question were one, as in other parts of the former Austro-Hungarian Empire: Magyar landlords exploited Slovak, Rumanian, Croat and Ruthenian peasants; German landlords exploited Czech, Ruthenian, Slovene and Polish peasants.

In 1919 the Land Reform Act was passed. It provided for the dividing up of all large estates of more than 100 hectares. But this law was only partially and half-heartedly carried out. Yet, as a result of the land reform, 1.7 million hectares, or 12 per cent of the area of Czechoslovakia, were expropriated, and by 1 January, 1937, 1,272,934 hectares had been redistributed. At the same time in 1930, 13.8 per cent of the agricultural area still remained in properties of over 100 hectares. It was mainly Hungarian and German landlords who were expropriated, but the German and Hungarian peasants, tenants and agricultural workers not only were not excluded, but even benefited from the redistribution. As Miss L. E. Texter writes: 'The German farmer received land even from a Czech landowner'. (*Land Reform in Czechoslovakia*, London, 1923, quoted by E. Wiskemann, *Czechs and Germans*, London, 1938, p. 152).

In 1945 (as a result of the decrees of 19.5.45, 21.6.45, 20.7.45 and 3.9.45) an area of 2.6 million hectares was taken from Germans, landlords and peasants alike. Practically no

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land belonging to non-Germans was touched in Bohemia and Moravia. As a result of the agrarian reform in Slovakia, three hundred thousand hectares were expropriated, of which two-thirds belonged to Hungarians and Germans. 423 563 656

For two years the property of Czech and Slovak landowners was left untouched by the government. Land reform was identified with the national struggle of all the Slavs—Czechs and Slovaks alike—against all the Germans and Hungarians.

Later on it was necessary to reduce the maximum holding in order to pave the way for the total annihilation of the bourgeoisie in Czechoslovakia, and the integration of Czechoslovakia in the Russian Empire. On July 11, 1947, the maximum of 100 hectares fixed in 1919 was reduced to 50 hectares, and as a result another 919 thousand hectares were redistributed.

Thus until July, 1947, land redistribution was aimed at achieving an internal colonisation by the expropriation of 'foreign' proprietors, and the extent of the second wave of land redistribution was only about a quarter of the first.

Poland

After the First World War, Polish governments carried out, if somewhat timidly, certain land reforms. A maximum holding of 180 hectares of arable land was fixed with two exceptions—in suburbs the area allowed to a household was 60 hectares and in the Eastern districts it was 300 hectares. The landlords in the Eastern districts were treated gently because their peasants belonged to the national minorities—Ukrainians and White Russians. The administration was empowered to decide annually what estates should be divided. In fact, Polish landlords were able, by pulling strings, to escape the land reform, and in general only the estates of Russian landlords in Eastern Poland were redistributed. Altogether between 1919 and 1938, 2,654,000 hectares were divided up. (F. Zweig, *Poland between Two Wars*, London, 1944, p. 133). 423 [563]

In spite of this measure of land reform, a not inconsiderable proportion of land remained in the hands of big landowners. In 1931, about 4.6 million hectares, 18.0 per cent of all agricultural land, belonged to farms of more than 50 hectares. But as a single owner might own several farms, each of less than 50 hectares but totalling more than 50 hectares, the area

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423 comprised by properties over 50 hectares after the land reform was even greater than 4.6 million hectares. The lack of statistics on the subject (resulting from the Polish government's attempt to gloss over the reactionary and half-hearted way in which the land distribution was carried out) makes it impossible to estimate more exactly what area was covered by properties of more than 50 hectares. It is, however, evident that the redistribution of land carried out between the two world wars affected 2.6 million hectares, and left about twice that area untouched.

The frontier alterations resulting from World War II fundamentally changed property relations. Eastern Poland, an area of big estates, was lost to Poland, and a new area was gained in the west which—after the expulsion of 8.5 million Germans—was only very sparsely populated.

656 By the decrees of 6 September, 1944, and 17 January, 1945,
423 all Germans and traitors were expropriated, and 50 hectares of arable land was fixed as a maximum individual holding in Old Poland and 100 hectares in the 'Regained Territories'. The Church land was not affected. Polish landlords who had more than 50 hectares received very little compensation for the area they ceded—the equivalent of one year's yield of grain. According to the terms of these decrees, in Old Poland the area to be redistributed was more than 3 million hectares, of which agricultural land (excluding forests) made up 2,131,285 hectares. About 1,256,000 hectares of this belonged to Polish landlords, and 875,000 hectares belonged to Germans. In the Western Territories more than 5 million hectares of agricultural land was taken from Germans and either distributed to Polish peasants (4.5 million) or converted into state farms, agricultural schools, etc.

Thus internal colonization, or expropriation on a nationalist basis, is the key to the change in land ownership in Poland, even more than in Czecholslovakia.

Hungary

423 Unlike her neighbours, Hungary did not undergo any land reform after World War I. The communist government of Béla Kun (1919) did not divide the large estates among the peasants —one of their serious mistakes which made the victory of the

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White Terror easier. If the land had been divided, it would 423 ●
have remained peasant property even after Béla Kun had been overthrown. No power on earth could have changed this. But by a paradox of history, the only country of Eastern and South Eastern Europe that had a Communist government at that period was the only one in which the feudal land structure remained intact.

The pattern of land distribution in Hungary is revealed by the following table:

DISTRIBUTION OF HOLDINGS ACCORDING TO AREA, 1930

Groups of holdings according to area	*Number of Farms*		*Total Area*		*Average area of holdings*
	Thousands	*% of total*	*Thousands of yokes**	*% of total*	*yokes*
Up to 1 yoke	552	34.5	287	1.8	0.52
1-2 yokes	278	17.4	428	2.7	1.54
2-5 "	313	19.6	1,034	6.5	3.30
5-10 "	200	12.5	1,460	9.2	7.30
10-20 "	157	9.8	2,241	14.0	14.27
20-100 "	84	5.3	3,093	19.4	36.82
100 and more yokes	14	0.9	7,390	46.4	527.88
Total	1,598	100	15,933	100	10.00

(International Agrarian Institute, *Six Years of the Agrarian Crisis*, Moscow, 1935, p. 109)

Thus, on the one hand there were 1,143,000 lilliputian holdings (71.5 per cent of all the farms), each less than 5 yokes, making up 11.0 per cent of the total area, and on the other hand, 14,000 large estates (0.9 per cent of all the farms), making up 46.4 per cent of the area.

After World War II the time was overripe for the abolition of large estates oppressing the mass of agricultural workers and tenants.

On 17th March, 1945, the Hungarian government passed 423
a law confiscating the land of gentry with estates of more than 656
50 hectares, as well as the estates of the Church bodies of more than 50 hectares, and of peasant land over 100 hectares. The maximum individual land holding was fixed at 100 hectares, except for those who distinguished themselves in the war against Germany, in which case the maximum was 150 hectares. The so-called 'model farms', that is, vineyards, orchards and other intensive cultures, were exempt from redistribution. As a result, an area of 5.7 million yokes,† i.e.,

*yoke = 0.575 hectares = 1.422 acres

†Of this area, only 456 thousand yokes were expropriated from Germans who were expelled from the country. The rest was the property of big Hungarian landlords.

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423 more than a third of all the cultivated land of Hungary, was
656 distributed among 640,000 families. Thus in Hungary there was a real revolution in agricultural property relations.

To sum up the changes in land ownership brought about
423 since the end of World War II: in Hungary the transformation of property relations in land by the elimination of large estates was tremendous, and a progressive step; the land reform in Rumania, which was the completion of a much wider land reform after World War I, was less extensive but of the same character; in Czechoslovakia and Poland the changes constituted in the main an act of internal colonisation and of the expropriation of millions of Germans and Hungarians; in Yugoslavia and Bulgaria the changes were very small indeed.

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369 standard of life and culture. Conversely, if the village supplied the agricultural products and labour necessary for the towns, industrialisation would have been much accelerated. These two conditions are mutually dependent. But the bureaucracy cannot tolerate a gradual development of agriculture and industry, and prefers to try to escape from the vicious circle by forced 'collectivisation'.

●423 All previous land reforms had, for a number of years at
474 least, the effect not only of not increasing the agricultural surpluses available for the towns, but actually of reducing them. This is because large estates, based either on tenants' or workers' labour, obviously have relatively larger surpluses than the small peasant farms, even if both have the same productivity. Land reform, by dividing the large estates into many small peasant farms has, as an immediate consequence, a decline in the marketable agricultural surpluses. The surpluses necessary for industrialisation could be obtained by the encouragement of *kulak* farming, but this would be unwise from the standpoint of the bureaucracy, as socially and politically it would raise a new ruling class clinging tenaciously to private property, and economically it would lead to a demand by the kulaks for industrial goods in exchange for their surpluses. The bureaucracy needs a cheaper way of getting this surplus. It might have recourse to taxation and requisitions. But this too can hardly be relied on to provide large enough quantities of agricultural products for quick industrialisation, for the disgruntled peasant can 'go on strike' and decrease his sowing area, or neglect his fields, so that the surplus available for requisition decreases, or he can hide part of his yield, for it is impossible to supervise millions of small peasants scattered in thousands of villages. These drawbacks are virtually eliminated and the obligatory deliveries much more easily secured if millions of peasants are concentrated in some tens of thousands of large farms. The peasants, it is true, may react to their expropriation and herding in semi-serf camps by slaughtering their livestock. This may reduce the total agricultural production for a number of years and famine may stalk the land bringing death in its train, but no matter. If the quantity of agricultural goods in the hands of the state increases, everything is satisfactory. 'Collectivisation' also enables the state

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to supervise the labour power in the countryside, and, if the wages in the towns are not high enough to attract people from the countryside, they will be drawn there by the mechanisation of agriculture and the elimination of superfluous mouths in the 'collective farms'. Further, if capital construction is being undertaken, which demands very little skill and can be done by a large number of workers with very little or no machinery (for the bureaucracy likes to 'waste' as little of the expensive machinary needed for industrialisation and militarisation as possible) the 'collective farms' can provide an ample supply of this cheap labour from the 'kulaks,' i.e. all who dare to show any resistance to the bureaucracy. As yet it is scarcely possible to prove from experience that this will be the fate of agriculture in the satellites, because the process is only in its early stages. That this is the tendency, however, is clear enough, from the developments so far and from the history of agriculture in Russia since 1928.

423 474

The Example of 'Collectivisation' in Russia

The influence of the collectivisation of agriculture on the agricultural output in Russia is clear from the following table:

423 474 241

Year	*Sown Area*			*Gross Output of Grain*	*Cattle*
	Total	*Grain*	*Technical Crops*		
	million hectares			million centners	million heads
1928	113.0	92.2	8.6	733.2	70.5
1929 ..	118.0	95.9	8.8	717.4	67.1
1930	127.2	101.8	10.5	835.4	53.9
1931	136.3	104.4	14.0	694.8	47.9
1932	134.4	99.7	14.9	698.7	40.7
1933	129.7	101.6	11.9	808.2	38.4
1934	131.4	104.7	10.7	804.6	42.4
1935	132.8	103.4	10.6	810.9	49.2
1936	133.8	102.4	10.8	744.6	56.7
1937	135.3	104.4	11.2	1,082.6	57.0
1938	136.9	102.4	11.0	854.9	63.2

(S. N. Prokopovicz, *Russlands Volkswirtschaft unter den Sowjets*, Zurich, 1944, p. 133).

This shows that, ten years after the drive towards 'collectivisation' began, the number of cattle was 10 per cent lower than before, while gross grain output was 16 per cent higher. The main reason for the rise was the cultivation of new steppe lands which required agricultural machinery. The total

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423 sown area rose by 21 per cent and the grain area by 11 per
474 cent.
241 That the productivity of labour in Russian agriculture, despite the mechanisation, was not higher in 1931-5 than in the countries of Eastern Europe is confirmed by the following calculation made by W. E. Moore:

AGRICULTURAL PRODUCTION PER PERSON DEPENDENT ON AGRICULTURE AND PER MALE ENGAGED IN AGRICULTURE, 1931-5 AVERAGE

	Per Person Dependent on Agriculture Crop Units	*Per Male Engaged in Agriculture* Crop Units
Czechoslovakia ..	45	146
Hungary	33	96
Poland	21	72
Rumania	21	67
Bulgaria	20	70
Yugoslavia	17	55
Albania	10	32
U.S.S.R.	17	53

(op. cit. p. 35)

Even if the improvement in Russian agricultural production after 1931-5 is taken into account, it is clear that her output per male engaged in agriculture was not more than that of Rumania, Bulgaria or Poland, and must have been far short of that of Hungary or Czechoslovakia.

Does this mean that the rulers of Russia failed to achieve what they aimed at by 'collectivisation'? This question can be answered by examining the proportion of the agricultural output taken by the state in the form of obligatory deliveries:

Year	*Total Yield*		*Obligatory Deliveries*			*Retained by Agriculturists after obligatory deliveries*	
			Quantity	*% of Total*	*% of Total*		
	gross	net*	million centners	gross	net	million centners	Index
1927/8	728.0	605.9	112.2	15.4	18.5	493.7	100
1932/3	698.7	570.1	185.2	26.5	32.5	384.9	77.9
1933/4	808.2	677.1	228.7	28.3	33.8	448.4	90.8
1934/5	804.6	669.5	226.6	28.1	33.8	442.9	89.7
1935/6	810.9	677.5	249.3	30.7	36.8	428.2	86.7
1936/7	744.6	612.5	260.0	34.9	42.4	352.5	71.4

*After deduction of seeds from gross yield.
(Prokopovicz, op. cit. pp. 136, 138).

From 1927/8 to 1936/7 these obligatory deliveries taken by the state from agriculture increased from 112.2 million centners to 260 million (i.e., by 131.8 per cent) and the proportion in the gross yield of agriculture which they represented from

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15.4 per cent to 34.9 per cent, and of the net yield from 18.5 per cent to 42.4 per cent. 423 474 241

The obligatory deliveries are virtually direct taxes, as the prices paid by the government for the products delivered is only a small percentage (not even 5 per cent) of the price which the government charges the consumer.

It is interesting to note that Lenin writes in his book, *The Agrarian Question in Russia at the End of the Nineteenth Century* (1908): 'The horseless and one-horse peasants (i.e., the very poor peasants—Y.G.) pay in the form of taxes *one-seventh and one-tenth* respectively of their *gross* expenditure. It is doubtful whether serf dues were as high as that . . . ' The agricultural toilers in the 'Socialist Fatherland' pay much more than that!* [651]

Collectivisation not only transformed into proletarians those who came into industry, but also those who remained in agriculture. The overwhelming majority of agriculturists are in reality, if not in theory, people who do not own any of the means of production: they are compelled to work an ever-increasing number of days on the kolkhozes for very low payment, below even that of the unskilled worker in the towns. The constant rise in the number of days that every household works in the kolkhoz compared with the quantity of grain per household remaining to it after the obligatory deliveries is shown in the following table : [461]

Year	*Average Number of 'Labour Days'† per Household*		*Grain Retained per Household after Obligatory Deliveries*	
	Number	*Index*	*Centners*	*Index*
1932 ..	257	100	15.8	100
1933 ..	315	122.5	19.3	122.1
1934 ..	354	133.4	20.1	127.2
1935 ..	378	147.1	20.5	129.7
1936 ..	393	152.8	17.3	109.5

†A 'Labour Day' is equivalent to the physical labour day of an unskilled kolkhoznik. The physical labour day of a skilled worker is equivalent to two, three or more 'Labour Days'.

(*Prokopovicz*, op. cit. pp. 136, 138, 164).

*Although the total quantity of products retained by the agriculturists in 1936/7 was lower than in 1927/8 (352.5 million centners and 493.7 million centners respectively) the quantity per household did not decline, and per capita of the agricultural population even rose. This happened because the number of households declined from 25.0 million in 1927/8 to 20.4 million in 1936/7, i.e., by 24 per cent, and the agricultural population decreased from 122.4 million to 78.6 million, i.e., a decline of 35.8 per cent. The fact that the per capita quantity of agricultural products retained by the peasants after making obligatory deliveries rose, does not mean that the conditions of the majority of agriculturists improved, because it was distributed more unevenly to the disadvantage of the masses. This cannot be dealt with here.

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461 To add to the difficulties of the poor agriculturists, not every-
241 one has to give the same number of labour days. The higher
423 strata of kolkhozniki give far fewer labour days than the poor
474 kolkhozniki. The reward for their labours, however, is in inverse proportion to the time contributed.

There is less justification in calling the Russian agriculturists of today owners of the means of production than the serfs of the nineteenth century.

Miss D. Warriner in 1940 noted as regards the productivity of Russian agriculture: 'Russia both before and after collectivisation had a lower productivity than Eastern Europe . . . Russian collectivisation has not really achieved much increase in productivity through reforming the peasant system. Yields are still lower in Russia than in every part of Eastern Europe, cattle density is still much lower . . . ' (*Eastern Europe after Hitler*, London, 1940, p. 4). In another place Miss Warriner writes: ' . . . the physical output per man in corn is slightly higher in Russia than in the very poorest regions of Eastern Europe, and the value in terms of industrial products certainly lower'.
511 (*Economics of Peasant Farming*, London, 1939, p. 188). As
423 regards the standard of living of the Russian agriculturists in
474 relation to those of Europe Miss Warriner says: 'As things are
241 at present, on the basis of purchasing power, the Russian farmer is certainly not so well off as the peasants in Poland'. 'On the Russian farms meat consumption must be much lower than in Poland, and milk consumption must be lower also'. (Ibid. pp. 188, 189).* To gain a rough idea of what the standard of living of the Polish peasant was before the war, we quote the following passage: The Polish peasants' 'poverty was proverbial. It was said that during the depression the peasant would split a match four or five times, and would boil potatoes over and over again in the same water to save the salt . . . According to the Polish Minister of Finance the average cash income of the peasant in 1934-5 was eleven groszy (about one penny) a day . . .' (Henryk Frankel, *Poland, The Struggle for Power 1772-1939*, London, 1946, p. 134).

Miss Warriner's analysis, based on Soviet statistics, conforms

*It is regrettable that Miss Warriner in her new book *Revolution in Eastern Europe* (London, 1950) in the chapter 'Collective Farming' overlooks what she herself wrote on the question of collectivisation in Russia in *Economics of Peasant Farming* and also in *Eastern Europe After Hitler*.

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with the conclusion Victor Serge reached from his direct [511] contact with Russian toilers: 'The vast majority of the peasants 241 live more poorly than before the collectivisation, that is, on 423 the whole, at a level lower than pre-war' (i.e., pre-World War I) 474 (op. cit. p. 37).

The peasants did not gain anything out of the 'collectivisation', but that does not detract one iota from the success of 'collectivisation' from the standpoint of bureaucratic state capitalism.

Miss D. Warriner was quite right when she said of the results of 'collectivisation' in Russia: 'Apparently, then, most of the increase in output could have been achieved by extending the State farms in the sparsely settled and uncultivated regions, without collectivizing the peasant villages in the already settled parts; had there been no collectivization, then all the loss of capital through livestock slaughter would have been avoided and corn production in 1931 and 1932 would have been maintained'. (*Economics of Peasant Farming*, op. cit. p. 174). This is true. But then the state would not have got such a large part of the agricultural output for nothing!

The Satellites Follow in the Footsteps of Russia

Undoubtedly the circumstances in which the collectiviza- 423 tion of agriculture is being and will be carried out in the 474 satellites are to some extent different from those in which it was carried out in Russia. In part they will moderate its results, and in part will render them more severe. The moderating influence will be the lesson learnt from the experience of Russia, which will prevent the Communist Party from making similar mistakes in the satellites; namely, rushing through 'collectivisation' at a feverish pace, far outstripping the development of the necessary technical basis for large-scale farming, and then hastily retreating;* and secondly taking all the livestock—cows, sheep, poultry—away from the peasants and putting them into the kolkhozes, and then reversing their policy after half the livestock had already been slaughtered.

*In October, 1929, 4.1 per cent of all the peasants were included in kolkhozes. Five months later, on 10th March, 1930, 58.0 per cent were. There followed a hasty retreat, and in September of the same year only 21 per cent of the peasants were in kolkhozes. Only after this mismanagement did the tempo of collectivization begin to be less erratic, even though the compulsion to enter the kolkhozes remained very strict for the peasants.

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● 423 474 [185] The Eastern European governments will avoid such damaging twists and turns.[1] According to the Plans, the technical basis for collectivisation will be much better prepared than it was in Russia. In 1933 in Russia, when 65.6 per cent of the peasants were in kolkhozes, there was one tractor per 615 hectares of arable land. When the current Plans are completed, the *minority* of peasants in the satellite countries will be in co-operative farms while there will be one tractor per 290 hectares. The co-operative farms in the 'People's Democracies' are leaving the majority of the livestock to the peasants as their private property, and are even compromising with the private interests of the peasants on the question of co-operative cultivation of the land, as can be seen from an examination of the types of co-operative farms in these countries.

In Hungary there are three types of co-operative farms:

1. The lowest, in which ploughing and sowing alone are done collectively while further cultivation and harvesting are done by the individual peasants. Draught animals or machines for the ploughing and sowing are obtained from the members or from the nearest State Tractor Station. In the former case, the members who own the draught animals or machines are paid a customary rent for them. Each member pays the cost of ploughing and sowing according to the quantity and quality of land he owns.

2. The intermediary type is similar to the lowest type except for the fact that harvesting and threshing are also done collectively.

3. In the highest type all the land is pooled for common cultivation, except for about two acres which are kept by each member as his private plot. Members are paid wages according to the amount and quality of work they do and rent according to the quantity and quality of land they contributed. No more than 25 per cent of the profit may be set aside for rent.

In Russia the peasant belonging to the lowest form of 'co-operative farm'—the kolkhoz—is allowed less private property than members of the highest form in Hungary. In many districts no kolkhoznik is allowed to own more than 0.6 acres, in others 1.2 acres and, in a small number of districts,

[1] [See category 116, p. 115 -- Analyst]

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2.4 acres, and no rent is paid for the land contributed to the kolkhoz. 423 474

In Yugoslavia there are four types of co-operative farms. In the first and second types, the land remains the private property of the co-operative member, and rent is paid for it. In the third type the land remains private property but no rent is paid for it. The fourth type is like the Russian kolkhoz. At present the overwhelming majority of co-operatives belong to the first two types.

In the Bulgarian co-operative farms the net income is generally divided thus: 60 per cent is distributed among the members according to the number of working days they contribute, 30 per cent is paid out in rent in proportion to the quality and quantity of land brought by each peasant into the collective farm. The 'Model Statute of the Co-operative Farms' (adopted by the Second National Conference of Co-operative Farm Representatives, held on April 5–7, 1950) describes another mode of distribution of the income: '. . . a number of working days, from 1 to 5 per decare (1 decare= 1/10 hectare—Y.G.) of land, depending on the quality of the land, fixed by the General Meeting as rent is given as a bonus to every co-operative member. In this way the working days given to every co-operative member for his pooled land are added to the working days contributed by him with his labour, and for the sum of these working days he receives agricultural and animal products and cash'. (Article 17b). For a hectare the owner gets a rent of 10 to 50 days. Since the maximum amount of land permitted a person is 20 hectares (except for Dobrudja where it is 30 hectares), a peasant who gives 20 hectares to the co-operative farm will receive a rent equal to the wages of 200 to 1,000 working days. The co-operative farm thus does not equalise the peasants and abolish exploitation (even if we discount the exploitation of the co-operative as a collective by the state bureaucracy through obligatory deliveries, the fixing of prices for agricultural goods, etc.).

There is another important difference between the agricultural working co-operatives in Eastern Europe and the kolkhozes in Russia. When a peasant leaves the kolkhoz or is expelled from it he loses all rights to the kolkhoz's property;

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● 423 474 when a peasant leaves the agricultural co-operative, he is allowed, at least according to the law, to detach or sell the property he contributed or the plot he received in exchange.

On the other hand there are two factors which will render the results of 'collectivisation' in the satellites more severe than in Russia: 1. As we have seen, the increase in the grain output which followed upon 'collectivisation' in Russia was due in the main to the great extension of the area cultivated; but such an extension is out of the question in the countries of Eastern Europe. 2. Although Eastern Europe is not as suitable for meat and milk production as Western Europe, but, like Russia, is much better for growing corn, it already has many more branches than Russia of intensive farming (milk, pork, vegetables, wines, tobacco, etc.) whose prosperity is dependent on the existence of an urban population with a high and rising standard of living. The present regimes do not augur well for such a development.

Peasant Resistance

423 474 668 Although 'collectivisation' has hardly begun in the 'People's Democracies', the agricultural policy of the governments has already met with a peasant resistance which is on the increase. It is partly resistance to requisitioning and a protest against the lack of industrial goods and partly resistance to 'collectivisation' (of course these two reasons cannot be separated in practice).

Just as it was natural that the resistance of the working class to the industrial policy of the governments of Eastern Europe appeared earliest and was strongest in Czechoslovakia, the most industrialised country in the region (except for the Soviet Zone of Germany and Austria), so is it natural that the peasant resistance to their agricultural policy is boldest in Bulgaria. The reasons for this are: first, Bulgaria is the country least affected by the land reform, so that the peasants have not much to thank the Government for on this score; secondly, Bulgaria has the highest percentage of peasants engaged in small-scale intensive farming—tobacco, grapes, roses—so that the inducement needed to break their opposition to

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'collectivisation' is the greatest; thirdly, the basis upon which the industrialisation of the country is taking place is the weakest (except for Albania), and the industrialisation plan is the most ambitious (except for Yugoslavia), so that the need to squeeze the peasant is the most desperate.* This last point is clearly illustrated by the targets of the various Plans, all of which aim at the 'collectivisation' of only a minority of the peasants—except the Bulgarian plan, which by 1953 aims to have 60 per cent of the peasants in co-operative farms.

The peasant resistance took the characteristic form of non-delivery of their quota of products. Despite the good harvest in 1948, by October 10th only one district had delivered its quota, 13 districts had delivered between 80 and 90 per cent, but many more had not even fulfilled half the quota. (*Rabotnichesko Delo*, organ of the Communist Party, October 15th and 17th, 1948). 1948 was bad enough, but 1949 was much worse. The sowing quotas were nowhere near completion on the final date, March 15th. Only 56 per cent of the wheat quota was completed, 45 per cent of the rye, 55 per cent of the barley, 51 per cent of the oat, and 14 per cent of the sunflower quotas. (*Otechestven Front*, 25th March, 1949). The Ministry of Agriculture reported that many villages met great obstacles in collecting grain. In the village of Dimitrievo, for instance, the Village Council showed no effort to fulfil its duty and barely 1,200 kilos of grain were turned in. The co-operative of Yaborovo village refused to give up its allocation. Many villages had very inadequate granaries, etc., etc. (*Otechestven Front*, 31st July, 1949).

That even members of the Communist Party were taking part in the resistance of the peasantry to the Government's agricultural policy was made clear in Dimitrov's speech at the Fifth Congress of the Bulgarian Communist Party (December 19th, 1948): 'In some villages there were "Party members" and even Party leaderships who did not head the campaign for ensuring food to the people and even de facto sabotaged the delivery of cereals. The same holds true for some village Communists who do not help and sometimes impede the creation

*Yugoslavia, too, did not undergo an extensive land reform, and its very ambitious plan for industrialisation is also based on a very low technical level. But there the peasants are much more tolerant towards the government, because of the threat of Moscow to it.

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423 of co-operative farms'. (G. Dimitrov, *Political Report to Fifth*
474 *Congress of the Bulgarian Communist Party*, Sofia, 1948, p. 80).*
668 The extent of the peasant resistance and its causes were admitted to at the Plenum of the Central Committee of the Bulgarian Communist Party on June 11th and 12th, 1949, where in an excess of 'Bold Self-Criticism', the Party laid bare its 'mistakes' and promised to relax its stringent policy towards the peasantry.

Shortly before the Plenum the Acting-Premier had said that 'no progress was registered since September 9th, 1944, in the output of cereals despite the import of tractors and other agricultural machinery and considerable agro-technical improvements'.

One of the reports to the Plenum says:

'We must admit that we have fastened the screw too tightly in our relations with the medium farmer . . . We must unloosen the screw and switch over to methods which will induce the farmer and especially the medium peasant, by an appeal to his self-interest, to improve and increase his production.'

The Plenum Resolution says:

'Excesses have occurred in the system of quota purchases, which have led to the requisitioning of practically the entire

*Two years later, in his report to the Plenum of the Central Committee (7th and 8th October, 1950) the new General Secretary, Vulko Chervenkov, gave many more details about the sabotage of the agricultural deliveries by Communist Party members and organisations. He said: ' . . . the former Minister of Home Trade last year, under pressure of various appeals from local organs, arbitrarily, quite irresponsibly, without the permission of the Central Committee of the Party and the Government, reduced three and a half times the plan for state grain deliveries. He was unable to grasp the fact that the appeals of the local organs reflected the pressure of private landowners and kulaks against the interests of the state.' ' . . . the party organisations in the districts of Bourgas, Gorna Oryakhovitsa, Rousse and Kolarovgrad . . . yielded to the pressure of a number of primary organisations which expressed private and kulak interests and attempted to wreck the plan for collecting the deliveries . . . ' The same crimes are attributed by Chervenkov to the first secretary of the Stalin District Party Committee, the vice-chairman of its People's Council and the representative of the Central Committee of the Party and Government whose special task was to inspect the collection of the state grain deliveries in the district. 'The District Party Committee and the District People's Council' of the Pleven district 'fell into the hands of the kulaks'; 'the inspector of the Central Committee of the Party attached to the Pleven district played an unenviable role'. In every possible way he supported the local leadership in its 'attempt to attain a reduction of the plan . . . ' The same crimes are attributed to the leadership of the Party and People's Council in Vratsa district and the representative of the Central Committee there, Dimiter Dimov, who was at the same time a secretary of the Central Committee of the Party and a member of the Political Bureau. And this happened after the big 'purge' of 'Kostovists' in 1949!

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marketable part of the produce at fixed low prices. This applies especially to grain farmers, who constitute the huge majority of our peasantry. In this way agricultural producers have been to a large extent deprived of their personal interest in developing and increasing production, improving its quality and generally raising the productivity of agricultural labour . . .' 423 474 668

'In the formation of the co-operative farms, instead of strict compliance with the laws, Government directives and Party instructions, throughout almost the whole country there have been irresponsbile requisitionings of the best and most favourably located land, which is incorporated in the co-operative areas, while the private farmers are given in exchange distant and barren plots. Farmers are not being compensated in accordance with the quantity and real value of the land.'

' . . . peasants are forced to join co-operative farms while they are still unconvinced of their advantages . . .

'To this end the Plenum decides:

'1. That fundamental changes be made in the system of quota purchases so that, while preserving the principle of progressive quotas, agricultural producers shall be left the greater quantity of their excess stocks to sell them freely to the state, cooperatives and consumers at free prices.

'2. That a real and fair correlation be established between the price of cereals and the price of other agricultural products, industrial goods and artisan services; that the prices of cereals be raised . . .

'5. That producers be guaranteed the freedom to sell their surpluses directly to consumers, after delivering their quota to the state . . .

'8. That the supply of the village with staple industrial products, both from local industry and from abroad, be improved . . .

'10 . . . . returning in certain places fields wrongly requisitioned from private farmers who received in exchange land of less value'. (Quoted by *Free Bulgaria*, 1st July, 1949).

The extent to which the Government overdid the exploitation of the peasantry was revealed even more clearly both by the evidence given during the Kostov Trial about the position of the agricultural population, and from the rise in the official prices for agricultural products after the June Plenum.

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423 474 In the Trial the defendant Nikola Pavlov stated that for some years up to the end of 1948 there had been 'a strict quota system which oppressed the peasants'. ' . . . the quota system attained such proportions, that almost everything produced by the peasants was taken away from them, according to this order, and only such a part was left to them, which could only cover the current needs of their families. The quota system included almost all rural produce which served for direct consumption by the population, such as wool, eggs, meat, milk, potatoes, even including apples, chestnuts and peanuts . . . ' This produced a sharp reaction. 'The peasants not only did not sow all areas that they had sown till then, but began to diminish them'. The deposition of Kostov showed very clearly that the poor peasants suffered no less from the quota system than the rich and medium peasants, and were no less discontented. 'The discontent of the poor peasants was also caused by the decree for the collection of wool . . . according to which even peasants owning 1 or 2 sheep were not exempted from the delivery of wool'.*

435 474 423 The extreme hardship the quota deliveries imposed on the[1] peasants is illustrated by the fact that in 1948 they totalled about 11 milliard leva, while free market sales totalled only 715 million.

How low had been the prices paid for the products taken from the peasants is revealed by the extent to which they were raised after the June Plenum: hard wheat was raised from 19 leva per kilogram to 25 (31.6 per cent); ordinary wheat from 17 to 23 leva (35.3 per cent); rye and oats from 15 to 20 leva (33.3 per cent); barley, millet seed and corn from 13 to 18 leva (38.5 per cent); sunflower seed from 25 to 30 leva (20 per cent); dried beans from 30 to 60 leva (100 per cent); lentils from 44 to 55 leva (25 per cent). (*Otechestven Front*, 2nd July, 1949).

*The question arises why we accept this part of the evidence when we consider the Trial as a whole to be a frame-up. (See pp. 301-2). It is one thing to believe in the reality of the meat shortage, the obnoxious character of the quota system and so on—which are known to everyone who lives in the country—and another to believe that only Kostov and his co-defendants were responsible for it, while the rest of the leadership saw nothing of it for three or four years. If we look back at the 'trials' of 'witches' in the middle ages, we may disagree with the 'prosecutor' when he accused the 'witch' of causing the outbreak of a plague, but still accept the accusation as evidence of the existence of a plague at the time.

1 [Bulgarian --- Analyst]

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The resistance of the peasantry has also compelled the 474
government to slow down its drive for 'collectivisation'. On 423
November 15th, 1949, *Otechestven Front* said that eighty-six government commissions had been set up to remedy mistakes in connection with the collective farms. They had to inquire into the activities of 1,264 co-operative farms (two-thirds of all the co-operative farms in the country) and examine 61,854 complaints of illegal requisition of land from peasants who had not joined the co-operatives. In 35,311 cases the land had been restored to its previous owners and those responsible for the mistakes punished.

The Bulgarian government is, it seems, compelled to go gently with the collectivisation drive, but it nevertheless does not renounce its aim. While on January 1st, 1950 there were 1,600 co-operative farms with 156,500 families and 1,377,050 acres, on October 1st, the number of co-operative farms reached 2,249, with 474,800 families and 4,707,700 acres. Thus 43.4 per cent of the agricultural population is in co-operative farms. (Vulko Chervenkov's Report to the Central Committee of the Communist Party, October 7th and 8th, 1950).

Bulgaria is not the only country to experience peasant 423
resistence to government policy. There is a food shortage in 474
Czechoslovakia. The Russians are not responsible for this, as 668
they buy scarcely any agricultural products from Czechoslovakia. Nor does Czechoslovakia export much food to other countries. There was a drought, it is true, but that was two years ago, and even at that time the number of livestock compared with pre-war was better than in any of the other satellites. Moreover the population was much below its pre-war number owing to the expulsion of the Sudeten Germans. The reason for the shortage must therefore be ascribed, at least partly, to the resistance of the peasants to delivering their products to the Government. The peasant resistance also expresses itself in the slowness of the progress of collectivisation. The Minister of Agriculture, Julius Duriš, said at the 9th Congress of the Communist Party, that in only 208 villages out of 13,000 were farm co-operatives operating (*Lidové Noviny*, 28th May, 1949). There had been many cases of almost open revolt at village meetings convened by the Communist Party to launch

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423 474 668 cooperatives, while other meetings had been boycotted by the peasants. The General Secretary of the Party, Rudolf Slansky, went as far as to say: 'The Party has failed to organise an explanatory campaign within its own rank and file, with the result that some Party members, not having been made to understand the significance of the co-operatives and not having been persuaded of their usefulness, have begun to waver and to fall under reactionary influences.'

Poland has had its troubles too. The Government was obliged to supply the wheat growers with far more industrial products than it had planned to do, and at lower prices than were prevailing on the free market. (*Glos Ludu*, May 4th, 1948). Other manifestations of peasant resistance disturbed the countryside. According to *The Times* of 25 January, 1949: 'During the last few weeks of 1948 at least 20 cases were published in the Government-controlled newspapers of Communist organizers killed while on duty in country districts. Most people think the figure much higher'. The Government in alarm retreated, and instead of carrying out its ambitious plan of organising 7,400 co-operative farms in 1949, reduced its target to a mere 200. (*The World Today*, August, 1949). The peasant resistance, although strong enough to slow down the collectivisation drive, did not divert the Communist leaders from their aim. On April 1st, 1949, there were 40 producer co-operatives in Poland; by October 1st, 145; by February 1st, 1950, 332, and by March 5th, 590. Of these 590 co-operative farms, 345 have been founded on a statute similar to that of the Russian kolkhozes, 192 are of what is called the second lowest type: 30-40 per cent of their net income is distributed as rent for land and implements pooled in the co-operatives and 60-70 per cent as wages for labour. 53 were of the lowest type: common cultivation of privately-owned land. (Roman Zambrowski, Secretary of the Central Committee of the P.P.R., in *For a Lasting Peace, For a People's Democracy!* March 10th, 1950). We may assume that the tempo of 'collectivisation' will be accelerated after the first experiments have been completed. An important step in hastening the 'collectivisation' was the decree that put the zloty at par with the Russian rouble: every peasant had until 13th November, 1950 to give up 100 old zloty for one new one, while as regards workers'

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wages and prices three new zloty were changed for 100 old 423
zloty. With their meagre savings swept away, the peasants' 474
resistance to collectivisation will be weakened. 668

Rumania has also experienced great peasant resistance to 'collectivisation'. In June, 1949, the government had to take strong measures against a partisan movement in the countryside, strongest in the Banat region. The government called the resisting peasants 'kulak hooligans', but a mere glance at its extortionate demands from the peasants belies this accusation. Every farm, down to the very smallest, must deliver large amounts of grain for low prices. For example, a peasant who has a farm of only 3 hectares must deliver 22 per cent of the yield for less than 20 per cent of the free market price. (*Neue Zürcher Zeitung*, 7th April, 1949). No wonder the peasants rebel. The 'collectivisation' of Rumanian agriculture is still at its beginning: in September, 1949, the number of co-operative farms was only 55.

In Hungary the government was very careful in approaching 423
the problem of 'collectivisation' and for a long time denied any 474
intention of proceeding with it. Thus, for instance, in a speech before a peasant meeting in Debreczen on June 29th, 1947, Premier Lájos Dinnyes said: '. . . . if the Government had any intention of creating kolkhozy it would not have carried out the land reform. What is good in one country is no use in another. A Hungarian Government which aimed to give up the principle of private property would be digging its own grave and the nation's. We aim to fortify the new peasantry'. (*The Times*, 30th June, 1947). After a certain amount of manoeuvring, nevertheless, the Hungarian Government did proceed to 'collectivise' agriculture, but it did so carefully and slowly. Up to November 1st, 1949, co-operative farms made up only 3.5 per cent of all the arable land of the country, and state farms another 3.5 per cent. Since then it has advanced considerably. In May, 1950, co-operative and state farms made up 17.8 per cent of all the land under cultivation.

In general it can be said that the process of 'collectivisation' is full of contradictions. Its aim is to secure food supplies and agricultural raw materials for the towns and for export, in order to facilitate industrialisation, as well as to get the necessary supply of labour power for industry and public work.

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423 474 The greater the speed of industrialisation, and the smaller the existing amount of capital relatively to labour, the greater the speed of 'collectivisation'. Hence Bulgaria and Yugoslavia have gone much further along this road than the other 'People's Democracies'. At the same time, the greater the tempo of industrialisation, and the greater the subordination of the people's consumption to the needs of capital accumulation, the less the readiness to wait for the establishment of 'collectives' until the technical conditions for large-scale agricultural production (sufficient tractors, combines, etc.) exist, and until the peasants are convinced that large-scale agricultural production is superior, a conviction which depends largely on the readiness or otherwise of the government to supply the peasantry with industrial consumption goods. Social-political factors—the fear of the government, first of all, that it will be isolated or strongly opposed by the peasants—can modify the extent, the speed and the ruthlessness of the 'collectivisation' process.*

The Primitive Accumulation of Capital

000 When the British bourgeoisie first arose it had to drive the peasants off the land in order to get the surplus agricultural produce for the towns as well as the reserves of labour it needed for its growing enterprises. Britain went through this phase of development mainly in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries, of which Marx wrote: 'The history of this . . . is written in the annals of mankind in letters of blood and fire'. (*Capital*, Vol I, p. 786). In its rise the Stalinist bureaucracy must repeat the same process so as to get the wealth of the country under its control.

But much more blood flowed in Russia during this 'primitive accumulation' than in Britain. Stalin accomplished in a few hundred days what it took Britain a few hundred years to accomplish. The scale on which he did it and the success with which he carried it out completely dwarf the actions of the English landlords who let the 'sheep devour man'. They bear grim witness to the superiority of modern industrial economy concentrated in the hands of the state, under the direction of a ruthless bureaucracy.

*See pp. 246-8

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871 Austrian Galicia they underwent a great cultural revival in
563 the latter part of the nineteenth century, and this was the only area in which schools and universities using the Polish language could develop freely. The Polish population in Prussia lived under better educational conditions than did their co-nationals in Russia, but in both countries they were subjected to vigorous programs of denationalization.

871 The state of popular education in Eastern Europe is re-
212 vealed by illiteracy figures for the years 1920-21, before the new independent states had exerted an influence on education. The rate of illiteracy for males and females of school age and over was 7 per cent for Czechoslovakia, 15 per cent for Hungary, and between 30 and 40 per cent for Poland and Yugoslavia. The rate was between 40 and 50 per cent for Rumania and Bulgaria, and in Albania it was much higher. These figures may be compared with illiteracy rates of under 1 per cent for Great Britain and Germany, 6 per cent for the United States, and about 50 per cent for Russia.

[873] It is worth noting that the low level of literacy in most of Eastern Europe did not prevent the development of a high level of culture among educated persons. The universities of Prague, Cracow, and Budapest were the most distinguished among many of high level, and very significant contributions to European culture in the arts and sciences came from this region. The "intelligentsia," as those with higher education and professional skills were referred to, provided both the leadership of the national movements and the statesmen of the nations born at the end of the First World War. As individuals they were the equals of the political leaders of the great powers and included in their number many great Europeans.

566 Agricultural improvement, or the increase in produc-
423 tivity and in the welfare of the population dependent on
178 agriculture, is a complex process. In Eastern Europe, it involved in particular the release of the peasants from feudal

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servitude, the adoption of improved techniques of agricultural production and marketing, and the improvement of the lot of the individual peasant through land reform and the combined efforts of the landlords and the state. Most of European Turkey had never known feudalism in the Western sense, and the peasants of Serbia and Bulgaria emerged early as independent landowners with a sound understanding of their own interests. In many areas of Rumania, Austria-Hungary, and the Polish sections of Germany and Russia, however, the peasants were freed from feudal restrictions only to sink into a deeper misery, sometimes called "neo-serfdom," that stemmed from lack of capital and the resultant economic dependency on the landlords. As a consequence, while independent peasant political parties began to develop among the Czechs and southern Slavs shortly after the turn of the century, the peasants in Russia in 1905 and in Rumania in 1907 resorted to the desperate method of revolution.

The agrarian backwardness that characterized the greater part of Eastern Europe was a great challenge to social and political philosophers, and it was not surprising that the First World War left in its wake attempts at radical solutions by leaders acting in the name of the proletariat or the peasantry. The recommendation of the economists, in the presence of this agrarian poverty and overpopulation, was that agricultural improvement be accompanied by the extension of industry and trade. In the areas where large landowners exercised full political control, this recommendation was not welcomed as the landowners tended to favor fiscal policies that kept the price of grain high and the peasant poor. In other areas, however, important industrial development took place. Thus, the Austrian provinces of Bohemia and Moravia, with their preponderant Czech population, accounted for a little over one half the entire industrial output of Austria-Hungary. This production included coal and

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1947 but not to the years following. The period of the New Economic Policy in Russia was called "the period of a certain revival of capitalism"; in reality, it was a kind of retreat of communism from economic difficulties. S.U. 656

In the captive countries there was no "period of revival of capitalism." Since the very inception of communism, there has been a systematic liquidation of all private property, carried out in premeditated fashion within the limits of existing conditions and possibilities. In the beginning, the question of private property arose only in regard to small trade, dwelling houses, building, crafts, and, in a larger degree to peasant farming. Hence, the Communists advocated the principle of a three-sector economy, composed of state economy—after an immediate nationalization of medium and heavy industries, landlords' estates, and forests—of cooperative economy, and of private economy. E. 656 185 423

The fact that this period, the traces of which we still find in the constitutions of the captive countries, was planned from above as no more than a transitional period, is best proved by the accusation leveled against the former Communist Vice-Premier of Poland, Gomulka, at the meeting of the Central Committee of the Communist Party in Warsaw, in 1948. Gomulka was told then that his main guilt was not that he agreed to the principles of the three-sector economy but that he acted according to these principles. It was explained to him then that he had proceeded as though he wanted to keep the system although he knew that it was transitional. 665 661

In 1947, after the falsification of the elections and the destruction of the opposition of the independent peasant parties in Bulgaria, Rumania, Hungary, Yugoslavia, and Poland, the Cominform was established and Communist policy abandoned its nationalist line and adopted the line of internationalism. A special declaration of the differences between Communist internationalism and the "cosmopoli- 665

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661 cal parties, legislation, courts, and the police who protect
565 the security of the citizens. The state authority is the mediator in the last resort in disagreements between labor and business.

661 The Moloch, which is the Communist state, has on its side the party, the police, and the courts. Special laws con-
466 stantly increase the penalties for the plunder and destruc-
641 tion of the nationalized public property. Because the state is a "people's state" and "does not do injustice to the people," the trade unions act as a tool of the state in raising the productivity and quality of production and fixing the norms of work. The Stakhanovite work system, based on high norms of production and granting starvation-level wages with no means of protection against these, destroys the strength and health of the worker. Strikes are punishable because they are crimes against the interests of the state, and special laws provide discipline of work, penalties for failure to fulfill norms, and forced labor camps for "idlers" and "loafers."

661 Communism deprives the peasant of his beloved land,
641 turns him into a Communist serf, and chains him to the
423 state or collective farm in which the Communist bureaucracy demands of him ever-increasing physical efforts to produce for the insatiable state. After the liquidation of the remnants of private initiative in small business and crafts, the *kulak* peasant, the biggest "capitalist blood-sucker," is dealt with. He is destroyed by tax levies and forced deliveries of agricultural products and is finally evicted from his own farm.

642 Thus, behind the façade of People's Democracy, Communism practices dictatorship in every sphere of life—personal, political, economic, religious, and social. The Communist system creates privileges for the party and makes the citizen economically dependent upon the state. It debases human dignity, wrests faith out of human hearts, kills

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5 Land Reform and Agricultural Improvement

LADISLAV FEIERABEND

I

162 Eastern Europe was overwhelmingly peasant be-
167 tween the two world wars. The peasantry, for whom land
369 was not merely a means of production or of income, but the established basis of family life, formed the majority of the population. The main problem of this region was rural overpopulation. In the period before the First World War, the surplus young people emigrated in considerable numbers to the United States and to other overseas countries. After 1918 this outlet was closed, and everybody had to remain on his home soil. There was too little land for too many people: roughly twice as many people were living off the land as was the case in Western Europe.

423 Everybody wanted land and therefore the price was
241 enormously high. After money was spent to buy the land, there was not enough left to buy the numbers of cattle that the holding could support or to improve farming techniques. Lack of capital was responsible for the fact that farming methods remained the same as they had been for fifty or more years. The yields were very low, and there was no possibility of increasing them. In fact, yields decreased be-

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423 cause the land was becoming exhausted. This was due to a
341 lack of manure and fertilizer and to the peasants' ignorance of land preservation techniques.

[464] Labor remained so cheap that the introduction of labor-saving devices did not pay. Overpopulation meant that there were more people living on holdings than were needed for the farm work. This situation caused underemployment. Since overpopulation decreased the output per man and with it the earnings per man, a very low standard of living resulted.

423 The size of the farms, which on the average was barely
656 ten acres, was a problem in itself, and the custom of dividing
185 land after the death of a peasant made the situation even more acute. The holdings consisted of many small and scattered strips so that it was impossible for the peasant to use machines, even when they were available. However, the land reforms, carried out after the First World War by the different governments, did have some success in equalizing the amounts of land held by the different peasants.

The land reforms grew out of political and national considerations rather than out of social and economic policy. The first and main objective of the agrarian parties was to expropriate the big landowners and to transfer their land to the peasants. The usual procedure was to fix a maximum acreage, usually about five hundred acres, and to decree that all land in excess of this amount should be sold to peasants, either to create new farms or to add to the area of peasant farms already in existence. Under these reforms, about twenty-five million acres were distributed, for the most part in quite small plots, averaging one hectare, or 2.4 acres. The smaller farms were given more land than the large, so that there was some leveling of the incomes derived from farming.

162 These reforms did not remedy the unhappy condition of
464 the peasantry, since they were unable to remove the main
511 causes for distress. If all the agricultural land of this region

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728 frontiers were another cause for great migrations. Four mil-
167 lion Poles moved from the territory which was incorporated into the U.S.S.R., and millions of Poles, Czechs, and Slovaks moved into districts formerly inhabited by the Germans. Although these changes alleviated the problem of rural overpopulation in Eastern Europe, there was still, at the end of the Second World War, a surplus population estimated at nine million.

665 The Communist parties in various Eastern European
●423 states knew very well how to exploit this situation. They
656 knew that it was vital to the success of revolution that the peasantry should not be opposed to it. They knew that the Russian Revolution had been achieved only because Lenin was fully aware of the desire of the peasant for more land.

471 Orthodox Marxist theory required that the land be nation-
423 alized and that it be administered by the state. Land was
662 considered the most important means of production, and it
656 had to be treated as such. This dogma was abandoned by Lenin for tactical reasons. He nationalized land in the Soviet Union during the revolution of 1917, but distributed it under ninety-nine-year leases to small and medium peasants for private exploitation. It was the political pressure of the peasants which forced Lenin to change his political doctrine and implement the agrarian program of the Populists, his political opponents. Lenin and his followers did not approve of the peasant who, according to them, was a relic of the precapitalistic society. It was Lenin's view that "small, individual farming gives birth to capitalism and the bourgeoisie daily, hourly, spontaneously and on a mass scale," and that in the future classless society the peasant was to assume the status of a worker on the land as his fellow in town was a worker in industry.

Political expediency determined Lenin's change in tactics. He supported small agrarian property holders only because

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he regarded the peasant as indispensable to the success of his 471
revolution and to the consolidation of his dictatorship. This 423
policy was reversed by Stalin after 1928 when forced col- 662
lectivization of land in the form of pseudo-cooperatives (col- 656
lective farms) was introduced in the Soviet Union.

Lenin's agricultural policy was adopted by all Eastern European Communist parties after the end of the Second World War. Being minorities in power, they knew that this was the only attitude they could take to the peasantry, the largest social group in this region. Therefore, they supported small agrarian property holders in the first stage of the development of their agricultural policy. There was only one difference between the Communist agricultural policies of Eastern Europe and Russia. Nationalization of land was not a part of the Eastern European policy, as it had not proved expedient in the Soviet Union and therefore was not contained in the agrarian policy of the Comintern for Eastern Europe in the inter-war period.

The Comintern had taken much interest in the Eastern 668
European agrarian question. In 1923 a Red Peasants Inter- 656
national was formed in Moscow as an effort to rally the 427
peasantry to the Communist ideal and to combat the influence of the peasant parties united in the Green International in Prague. The Soviet move to collectivization within the U.S.S.R. in 1929 was not followed by any shift in the agrarian policy of the Comintern. Any mention of collective farming was frowned upon and the whole emphasis was upon attracting or neutralizing the middle peasant by assisting the individual and by supporting with new land reforms the peasant's struggle for more land. This policy was not changed when the Cominform took over the role of the Comintern after the Second World War.

"The land to those who till it personally," was the slogan 471
of all Eastern European Communist parties, and land re- 423
forms were carried out in all countries. In Hungary, Albania, 656

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471 and in parts of Poland, land reforms were overdue, while in
423 other Eastern European states expropriation and expulsion
656 of the Germans formed the main basis of land reforms. Some forty-eight million acres, including forest land, were expropriated by the governments of which thirty million acres were distributed to some three million peasant families. The remainder was retained by the state.

To dispel any doubts as to the ultimate outcome of these reforms, the distributed land was declared the private property of the new owners, and in most countries it was laid down in the constitutions that "the land belongs to those who till it." The price to be paid by the beneficiaries was low, usually the equivalent of one year's harvest payable in ten to twenty installments. No compensation was paid to the old owners for the expropriated land.

The attitude toward the church and its landed property was less uniform than toward the secular owners. However, after some hesitation, most of the church estates exceeding the maximum size laid down in the land reform laws were also expropriated. In this way the church was deprived of its financial independence and of its economic influence on the rural population.

Even in the Baltic States which were incorporated into the Soviet Union, Stalin's methods were not followed. All the land and its resources, as in Russia, were declared public property and nationalized, and all the land in excess of seventy-five acres was expropriated for distribution, but no collectives were formed. However, through a system of differential delivery and farm taxes, the way was paved for ultimate collectivization.

423 All these land reforms had done nothing to solve the old
656 agricultural problem of Eastern Europe. On the contrary, they aggravated the situation. The land became more split up than ever, as larger farms were abolished. The reforms did not solve the problem of technical progress, and made the

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reorganization of agriculture even more necessary than it had been before.

Land reform was a political measure. Its aim was not the reorganization of production, but the redistribution of income. Its aim was to win the small peasant for the Communists, and to weaken the political influence of the agrarian parties. Therefore, the Communists stole the programs of the agrarian parties and publicized them as their own. Beside private ownership, these programs called for mechanization, consolidation of scattered strips, good and guaranteed prices for agricultural products, expansion of credit, reduction of taxes, and social insurance for all peasants.

The smallholders felt quite happy, generally speaking, on their new land. It may have produced less than it had in the hands of its former owners, but the smallholders' income was larger than it had been when they were employed as agricultural laborers. Many of them started believing the Communists and joined the Communist parties. One of the Communist aims was fulfilled.

IV

It should have been obvious to all that the Communists were preparing a program of land collectivization, and that the second stage of their agricultural policy would be similar to what it had been in the Soviet Union. But sufficient attention was not paid to these trends. Practically all forests and large stretches of arable land and pastures became state property and were organized as Communist state farms. District cooperative or state stations were established and equipped with heavy agricultural machinery, which was not practical for use on small fields. The Communists favored the allocation of equipment to cooperatives rather than to private persons. The cooperatives, which performed many public functions such as bulk purchasing of food and supplies, began to

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474 be controlled by the state machine and not by their mem-
423 bers, the peasants. At the same time, the independence of the church and its economic influence on the rural population was broken.

Once the Communists were established safely in power, they shifted their agricultural policy. Except in the Baltic States where the Communists resorted to deportations and in Rumania where they evicted some seventeen thousand Rumanian families from their homes, collectivization was started smoothly and was not recognized as such. The Communists did not speak about collectivization, but about transforming uneconomical small-scale enterprise to large-scale cooperative farming. They are still making great efforts to convince the small peasants that as members of production cooperatives they till their own land and manage their own affairs.

Collectivization is being instituted by a clever transformation of the cooperatives. This process begins with a number of peasants being instructed to form some such organization as a communal laundry, a chick hatchery, or a calf station. Then, usually before sowing or harvest time, the members are persuaded to share their labor, teams, and farm machinery, which sounds like nothing more than neighborly cooperation. The farms continue to be made up of separate private parcels. The next type of cooperative eliminates boundaries and plows out border strips. The expanded fields are worked by the cooperative, with systematic planning for crops, fodder, and hay. Thus, collective mass production is introduced, but the land still belongs to the members.

Collective management is a function of the third type of cooperative. In this type the crops belong to the cooperative, not to its members. The owners of the land give up all their rights of disposal and of management. The members contribute their livestock and most of their agricultural equipment to the organization. Cattle are kept in common barns,

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but a member may retain one cow and a calf, some pigs, 474
sheep, goats, and poultry. He also retains a garden plot of one 423
and one-fourth acres which he can cultivate according to his own wishes. Ten to 20 per cent of a season's profit is deducted from the whole profit and distributed as separate compensation to those members who contributed land for the use of the cooperative.

In the fourth type, no percentage is paid for use of land although the fields still belong to the farmers in the title registers. All profits are divided according to the labor units of the members. This is the real Soviet collective farm, in which private property has become a fiction. Members receive advances in money or supplies during the year for their work. At the end of the year their accounts are balanced on the basis of production and sales.

Collectivization is proceeding at a rapid pace in all the countries of this region. According to the latest news, over 40 per cent of the agricultural land has been collectivized or, in other words, is in the hands either of state farms or of production cooperatives.

Production cooperatives are not genuine cooperatives according to the Western definition of the term. The communist philosophy of subservience rather than freedom, class hatred rather than understanding, aggression rather than tolerance, coercion rather than mutuality, is against all genuine, fundamental cooperative principles. True cooperatives can be founded only on the initiative of their members. Those instigated by authority cannot be considered true cooperatives, nor can those which are under the domination of outside influences. There can be no true cooperatives in Communist countries, because the will of the members cannot be expressed.

Production cooperatives are excellent examples of the Communist pseudo-cooperative. They are created by the government and are dependent upon it. They must accept a

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474 government-dictated constitution. Cooperative members, instead of being the masters of their cooperatives, are their servants. They have to perform tasks which have been fixed without their knowledge or consent. In higher type Communist cooperatives, the members assume the status of landless laborers.

423

If the complete dependency of the cooperatives on the State Tractor and Machine Stations and on the Communist Party is taken into consideration, it is clear that production cooperatives are no more than state enterprises under the disguise of cooperatives. There is only one difference between a state farm and a production cooperative: the members of a cooperative have to bear all production risks. It is true that *de jure* they remain owners of their land, but *de facto* they cease to be owners as they cannot be sure of getting their fields back when they leave the cooperative. According to the constitution of these cooperatives, a member must accept other fields, if return of his own fields would disrupt the cooperative.

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The Communists declare they prefer that peasants join cooperatives voluntarily. However, they are not above persuading private farmers to join by such methods as higher taxes and higher delivery quotas, less fertilizers and other production means at higher prices, and charges for all services higher than those paid by cooperative members. At the same time, they give private farmers no credit, no field hands, and no opportunity to use agricultural machines, while collectives enjoy almost unlimited credit and other facilities. Members of production cooperatives are rewarded by the government with free vacations in the best hotels at winter resorts and with free group travel to the Soviet Union; they are a privileged class in every respect.

In contrast, well-to-do peasants who used hired labor in free times are denounced as being "village rich," a term which is used in Eastern Europe to describe the equivalent of the

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829 Although Populism exerted some influence on the establishment of the Rumanian peasant movement, it had very little influence upon the other peasant movements in Eastern Europe. At the time when Populism was already an organized political force in Russia, the peasantry in Eastern Europe was still politically inactive. When the peasant mobilization began, more than two decades later, it was influenced little, if at all, by the Populist ideas.

668 565 423 The main reason for the relatively late organization of the peasantry in Eastern Europe was the presence of political and economic conditions essentially different from those prevailing in Tsarist Russia. Whereas regular political life was unknown in Russia, European liberalism favored the formation of political parties which would try to win the sympathies of the peasants by promising them the realization of their desires. Collective ownership of land was not a common institution in Eastern Europe. However, the prediction of Marx relating to the accumulation of capital and further expansion of large estates proved to be incorrect. On the contrary, many large land holdings, unable to accommodate themselves to modern capitalist management, commenced to disintegrate. The land was usually bought, in spite of heavy material sacrifices, by land-hungry neighboring peasants, and thus many new independent peasant holdings were created, which contributed considerably to the strengthening of the peasantry.

Hence, the establishment of a revolutionary peasant movement was checked by existing political conditions: the traditions of the Eastern European peasantry were opposed to collective forms of land ownership and to the socialist tenets of Populism. However, none of the existing political groups was fit to meet the increased desire of the peasantry for an organized action of their own, and, at the turn of the century, on an independent basis and in opposition to the contemporary political and social groups, peasant organization began.

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The common source of the peasant movements resided in the political, social, and economic evils of the liberal regimes, but immediate motives varied slightly in the different countries. In some countries, the emphasis on the necessity for peasant organization was a reaction to the adverse economic conditions to which the peasantry was exposed. In other countries, this move was a political and economic reaction to political and national oppression, economic exploitation, and the contempt of the ruling ethnical groups for the peasantry of subordinated nations. Finally, the Croatian peasants had special motives. Their peasant movement was organized chiefly to struggle for the social and political equality of the peasants against the dominating bourgeoisie and the bureaucracy. The latter, although it represented an insignificant minority in the nation, had monopolized Croatian political life.

The first to outline the philosophical principles of a peasant movement was Ante Radić in Croatia. Influenced by French Romantic philosophers, especially Michelet, Radić published, in 1896, his work, *Osnova,* in which he set forth his concept of the people (in peasant countries this meant the peasantry), and indicated their significance in the political and economic life of the nation.

The first coherent peasant organizations were those of the Bulgarians and the Czechs who both founded their first peasant political organizations in 1896. They were followed shortly by the Croatians in 1904, and by the Serbians and the Poles in 1905. The first steps for a peasant movement in Rumania were initiated in 1907, while in Hungary the appearance of a genuine peasant movement was retarded by political and socio-economic conditions until 1908. In the Baltic States, true political life started only with the independence gained after the First World War. Subsequently, powerful peasant political organizations were founded in Estonia and Latvia. In Albania the initiative for a peasant political or-

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641 participate in national elections and thus intensified the activities of the peasant political organizations. Only a decade earlier, because of the tax census system, none but a limited number of the peasants were entitled to vote, but in the national democratic states this right was granted to every male citizen over twenty-one years of age.

423 In Bulgaria, Rumania, Yugoslavia, Czechoslovakia, and Poland, a considerable number of agrarian reforms were accomplished which distributed large surfaces of arable land to individual peasants. They thus became economically independent and from then on were valiant champions of the peasant program. No substantial land reform was carried out in Hungary until 1945.

642 Unfortunately, the initial success of the peasant parties was not given political effect everywhere and, where peasant regimes were established, they were not of long duration. The advances of the peasant parties were neutralized soon by the counter actions of totalitarian elements which were opposed to democratic principles in general, and to peasant political and social concepts in particular. The peasant parties, faithful to their programs, favored and supported genuinely democratic systems and cooperated with other democratic groups but, with the disappearance of the democratic order, their own position became precarious. It must be admitted that the complicated machinery of a democratic regime was unable to run smoothly at all times in the newly established national states, except in Czechoslovakia. However, this deficiency should not be interpreted as a lack of interest in democratic institutions nor as a disapproving attitude toward the principles of freedom which symbolize Western political thought. The democratic regimes came up against a complex of problems whose complete, satisfactory, and early settlement was somewhat unreasonably expected by the newly created national states. Profiting from these adverse and interrelated domestic conditions, the totalitarian elements found inter-

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vention possible. They usually claimed that this intervention 642
was necessary "to save the country from the total chaos in which it was driven by the unsatisfactory operating of democratic institutions." What was even worse, new regimes were supported often by the Western democracies who used the unjustifiable excuse that "no other solutions were possible."

Despite the mistakes and failures of the democratic regimes, today even the most bitter opponents of peasantism must admit that the peasant parties, as political organizations, were stalwart champions of democratic government and did not, in general, support the established dictatorships or their undemocratic methods.

The greatest achievement of all the peasant groups was 665
that of the Bulgarian Agrarian Union. From its modest be- 642
ginnings in 1896, the Union grew steadily. In the first post- 423
war elections it received a strong relative majority in the 185
National Assembly, and in the elections of April 1923, 212 deputies out of 245 were allotted to the Agrarian Union. At the relatively early date of October 1919, the first Bulgarian peasant government of Aleksander Stambolisky was formed. The most significant of its numerous political and economic achievements was the agrarian reform based on the principles that the land should be the property of those who till it and that every peasant is entitled to only as much land as he and his family are able to cultivate. In spite of the certain weaknesses and deficiencies of this peasant government which contributed to its downfall, its democratic basis cannot be denied. Its reforms converted Bulgaria into a country of small and medium peasant holdings which, despite the forcible overthrow of the peasant regime in June 1923, remained unchanged until the end of the Second World War.

In Czechoslovakia, the Republican Agrarian Party was the 665
strongest party in the Parliament and the most important 642
pillar of the Czechoslovakian democracy. After the political

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tantly or not at all. Unemployment became worse than it had ever been. 178 464

Thus social tensions persisted or grew worse. Sometimes they appeared as growing tensions between left and right, with the political middle-of-the-road parties increasingly threatened by fascists or by communists. Sometimes they appeared as tensions between different nationality groups, such as between Serbians and Croatians or between Czechs and Germans. Often the same angry and frustrated individuals could be found backing communism in one year, extreme nationalism in another, and some more or less supranational fascism in a third. Whole districts voted for right-wing radical candidates in one election and for left-wing radicals in another. Nationalism in Eastern Europe was thus the symptom of a more fundamental maladjustment, even though nationalistic policies, once adopted, often served to make this maladjustment worse. Nationalistic governments, as well as most other governments in this region, were becoming increasingly unpopular and during the 1930's showed increasing reluctance to face their own voters. By 1939, before the first German or Russian soldier stepped on their soil, every country of Eastern Europe, with the exceptions of Finland and Czechoslovakia, had succumbed to some form of dictatorship. Nationalism had thus failed to cure the fundamental maladjustments of Eastern European political and economic life. From some points of view its failure was hardly less shattering than the failure of the supranational empires that had preceded it. 186 578 642 208

It was nationalism which first undermined and in part destroyed the traditions of property and the respect for property in Eastern Europe. This attack against property began as early as the era of Prince Bismarck in Germany. The so-called Polish legislation sponsored by the German government and by the German nationalists during and after the Bismarck era showed scant respect for the property 642 423 563

642 rights of the Polish minority in Germany. It was designed
423 to prevent them from acquiring what was considered German
563 land and to deprive them of such German land as they had managed to acquire in the past. In addition to driving the Poles from German soil, this policy was also designed to eliminate Polish minorities in Eastern Germany by assimilation or expulsion, and the German word *ausrotten*—or exterminate—leaves little doubt as to the ruthlessness of the determination behind this policy. After the First World War, when certain parts of Silesia were incorporated in Poland, former German properties in industrial corporations and other valuables had a way of coming into Polish hands. When from 1939 to 1944 German armies in turn occupied a large part, and later all, of Poland, large amounts of Polish property were again transferred to Germans.

425 In one shape or another, with or without benefit of legal
563 form, this game of transferring property from the temporarily weaker to the temporarily stronger nationalities was played in large areas of Eastern Europe. When in the course of the First World War the Austro-Hungarian government collected large amounts of taxes and additional amounts of ostensibly voluntary war loans for the war efforts of Germany and Austria from the unwilling Czech, Slovakian, and Polish populations, the Austrian empire was in effect transferring important parts of the national wealth of these regions into German hands to be spent for German political and military purposes.[3] After the First World War, formerly Austrian or German mines, banks, and industrial enterprises in Czechoslovakia had a way of becoming Czechoslovakian. After 1939, when the Nazis occupied this country, Czecho-

[3] Cf. G. Gratz and R. Schuller, *op. cit.*, pp. 171-188; Wilhelm Winkler, *Die Einkommensverschiebungen in Osterreich während des Weltkrieges*, (Vienna and New Haven: Holder-Pichler-Tempsky and Yale University Press, 1930), pp. 74-78, 219-221; Alois Rasin, *Financial Policy of Czechoslovakia during the First Year of Its History* (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1923), pp. 7-25.

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slovakian-owned enterprises soon found their way into German hands, and the Dresdner Bank emerged as a major owner of formerly Czechoslovakian property. After Germany had lost the war in 1945, the new government of Czechoslovakia with the support of all political parties—anti-Communists as well as Communists—proceeded to expel all Sudeten Germans and to confiscate their property. Sudeten German anti-Nazis who had been loyal to the Czechoslovakian republic were nominally exempt from these provisions, but the burden of proving their loyalty was put upon their shoulders, and by 1947 the nationalistic atmosphere in the new Czechoslovakia was such that many German anti-Nazis with proven democratic records preferred to emigrate voluntarily to Germany, leaving behind the properties and savings of a lifetime. At the beginning of the year 1948, shortly before the Communists seized power in Czechoslovakia, there were perhaps 2,000,000 individuals who, in one way or another, had acquired some parts of former German property either in the Sudetenland or elsewhere in the country. These people may have found it rather difficult to resist the power and the confiscatory threats of Communism, so long as they themselves were using other people's furniture and were living in other people's houses.

Throughout the region, property rights thus became the plaything of nationalistic politics between Poles and Germans, Czechs and Austrians, Hungarians, Slovakians, and Rumanians, Serbians and Croatians. Few, if any, of the persons who participated in these confiscations considered themselves criminals. Rather they persuaded themselves that they were patriots. They had perhaps suffered themselves during the preceding periods of war or foreign occupation, and this may have seemed to them the only opportunity for getting some sort of reparation. No rationalization, however, could change the ultimate result: during the last thirty years in Eastern Europe, the ownership of

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425 563 property, the right to travel, and the right to work in desirable occupations, have been dependent not upon a man's diligence, honesty, or thrift, but upon the accident of his affiliations with the group temporarily in power. A man's property and freedom thus came to depend upon the official estimation of his "political reliability" or loyalty, which was defined for him by a rapidly changing sequence of politicians and political regimes. Many of the men who practiced these policies of confiscation and repression considered themselves anti-Communists, or professed themselves as such. Yet in their disregard for property rights and civil liberties they did much to pave the way for Communism.

V

185 668 Perhaps it has been memories of the stagnation under the old empires and the conflict and repressions of the following eras of nationalism that have turned many to visions of a safer, broader, and more generous life under an Eastern European federation.

In the minds of those who accepted this vision, a federation of Eastern European states would offer its peoples military security against invasion by outsiders. It would insure economic prosperity, provide a more stable distribution of economic welfare, safeguard property, provide broader opportunities for all, reward work, thrift, and enterprise, and by all these means serve to insure broad and rapid economic growth. In regard to politics, it would safeguard civil liberties. It would guarantee nondiscriminatory treatment to all peoples and minorities and free mobility to individuals throughout the region. It would assure to both individuals and peoples throughout Eastern Europe respect for their diverse habits and traditions, so that none of them would be forced to change their respective customs, work habits, and social institutions more rapidly or more radically than they might

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648 433 178 pirations mostly in order to develop a modern industry capable of meeting war needs.

The assumption that work invested in industrial development would improve economic conditions was a decisive factor in influencing states to industrialize. This assumption was particularly valid in regions with climatic extremities and little arable land. Some of the means used to foster industrialization were technical education, customs, embargoes, tax exemptions, monopolies, favorable credit policies, and provisions protecting the joint interests of domestic industries. The assembly line system, as influenced by the United States, was started in the industrial sector in the '30's.

Branches of industry requiring specialized skill were developed mainly in Czechoslovakia and Hungary, but they did not attract many from the surplus peasant population which still preferred unskilled jobs. The competition, such as it was, for unskilled jobs resulted in a low wage level. Therefore, the increase in purchasing power was gradual. Peasant poverty and the lack of skill and capital were the fundamental problems facing industrialization programs and the new governmental economic policies.

426 439 The general poverty was further increased by the fact that the small Eastern European countries were debtor states. The solvency of Czechoslovakia was dependent on the export of industrial goods, while other states depended upon agricultural exports or, as in Rumania, upon mineral raw materials and lumber as well as on agricultural goods. Foreign debts, incurred before and after the First World War, weighed heavily on the budgets of the individual countries. Only one half of the debts were repaid during the interwar period. Foreign loans were given too often on the basis of political considerations. The boundaries erected by the 1920 peace treaties had already broken up natural economic and geographic areas, and the disproportionate lending policies of foreign powers hindered the uniform economic development of East-

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ern Europe. The individual states became more and more 426
antagonistic and trade within the Eastern European area 439
often took a course contrary to the requirements of reasonable economic policies. Free trade, cherished in the first postwar years, was soon abandoned for the sake of a policy of protective tariffs. Customs, duties, and foreign exchange restrictions to prevent speculation, were introduced to protect economic development and strength.

Both "economic nationalism" and "small power imperial- 186
ism" were features characteristic of this area in the period 433
between the wars. When the economic position of the new 648
states in the '20's is compared with the situation prior to the First World War, the problems of these states emerge clearly. The economic well-being of the old Austro-Hungarian empire lay in the regional character of its economic organization, which depended mostly on a coordinated internal market and a natural division of labor between the component parts of the empire. Although it was a social and cultural mosaic, the empire was organized in such a manner as to take advantage of the regional distribution of natural resources and the differing skills of the various populations.

The peace treaties ending the First World War, while meeting the political aspirations of various nationalities, did not provide a satisfactory solution to the economic problems of the region, and the newly created states were divided by serious political and economic differences. Political animosity soon led to economic warfare, and self-sufficiency, the driving motivation of the new states, precluded any real possibility of economic cooperation. The world depression of the early '30's led to the final economic and psychological collapse of Eastern European stability and opened the door wide to German economic penetration and the eventual conquest of the region.

The foreign trade of the Eastern European countries in 439
the years 1919-1944 was far smaller than it should have

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he regarded the peasant as indispensable to the success of his 471
revolution and to the consolidation of his dictatorship. This 423
policy was reversed by Stalin after 1928 when forced col- 662
lectivization of land in the form of pseudo-cooperatives (col- 656
lective farms) was introduced in the Soviet Union.

Lenin's agricultural policy was adopted by all Eastern European Communist parties after the end of the Second World War. Being minorities in power, they knew that this was the only attitude they could take to the peasantry, the largest social group in this region. Therefore, they supported small agrarian property holders in the first stage of the development of their agricultural policy. There was only one difference between the Communist agricultural policies of Eastern Europe and Russia. Nationalization of land was not a part of the Eastern European policy, as it had not proved expedient in the Soviet Union and therefore was not contained in the agrarian policy of the Comintern for Eastern Europe in the inter-war period.

The Comintern had taken much interest in the Eastern 668
European agrarian question. In 1923 a Red Peasants Inter- 656
national was formed in Moscow as an effort to rally the 427
peasantry to the Communist ideal and to combat the influence of the peasant parties united in the Green International in Prague. The Soviet move to collectivization within the U.S.S.R. in 1929 was not followed by any shift in the agrarian policy of the Comintern. Any mention of collective farming was frowned upon and the whole emphasis was upon attracting or neutralizing the middle peasant by assisting the individual and by supporting with new land reforms the peasant's struggle for more land. This policy was not changed when the Cominform took over the role of the Comintern after the Second World War.

"The land to those who till it personally," was the slogan 471
of all Eastern European Communist parties, and land re- 423
forms were carried out in all countries. In Hungary, Albania, 656

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000 the battle map. Data from each country then aid the supreme command in Moscow to establish an over-all strategy.

Different groups of people are the main object of study. The least important is the propertied class which was dispossessed by the nationalization of factories and mines and by the agricultural reform. Their number is insignificant; their way of thinking amusingly old-fashioned. They are no problem. In time they will die off—if need be, with a little help.

The petty bourgeoisie, that is the small merchants and craftsmen, cannot be taken so lightly. They constitute a powerful force, one that is deeply rooted in the masses. Hardly is one clandestine workshop or store liquidated in one neighborhood or city than another springs up elsewhere. Restaurants hide behind a sliding wall of a private house; shoemakers and tailors work at home for their friends. In fact, everything that comes under the heading of speculation sprouts up again and again. And no wonder! State and municipal stores consistently lack even the barest essentials. In the summer, one can buy winter clothes; in the winter, summer wear—but usually of the wrong size and of poor quality. The purchase of a spool of thread or a needle is a major problem, for the one state store in the town may not carry them for a year. Clothes that are given to be mended are held by the local crafts' cooperative for six months. The inns ("Points of Collective Nourishment") are so crowded that people lose the desire to drink with their friends. They know they will have to sit down at a table with strangers and wait, sometimes as long as an hour, before the waiter appears.

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All this creates a field for private services. A worker's wife goes to a nearby town, buys needles and thread, brings them back and sells them: the germ of capitalism.

[By men in the capitals of Central & East Europe --Analyst]

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The worker himself of a free afternoon mends a broken bathroom pipe for a friend who has waited months for the state to send him a repair man. In return, he gets a little money, enough to buy himself a shirt: a rebirth of capitalism. He hasn't time to wait in line on the day that the state store receives a new shipment of goods, so he buys his shirt from a friend. She has cleverly managed to buy three, let us say, through her friendship with the salesgirl and now she resells them at a small profit. She is speculating. What she earns as a cleaning-woman in a state factory is not enough to support her three children since her husband was arrested by the security police. If these manifestations of human enterprise were not wiped out it is easy to guess what they would lead to. A worker would set up a plumbing repairs shop. His neighbor, who secretly sells alcohol to people who want to drink in relative privacy, would open a café. The cleaning-woman would become a merchant, peddling her goods. They would gradually expand their businesses, and the lower middle class would reappear. Introduce freedom of the press and of assembly, and publications catering to this clientele would spring up like mushrooms after the rain. And there would be the petty bourgeoisie as a political force.

What is worse, this matter involves the peasant problem. Peasants, who make up the majority of the population of the country, have a middle-class mentality. They are more deeply attached to their few little hectares of field than the storekeepers are to their little shops. As late as the nineteenth century they were still living in bondage. They oppose collectivization because they see it as a return to a state their fathers found unbearable. To leap out of bed at the signal of an official on a collective farm is just as hateful as to do so at the sound of a gong rung by the overseer of an estate. The peasants' blind hatred worries the

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464 565 well stocked; but given the shortage of food and consumer goods, this is rarely, if ever, the case. For workers' children, social advancement is easy because the Party must recruit the cadres of the new intelligentsia from their ranks. The worker can educate himself by attending countless evening courses. If he stands in good favor with the Party he can enjoy a vacation in a rest home, all expenses [466] paid. On the other hand, he cannot defend himself against exploitation by his employer, the state. His trade union representatives are Party tools. They team together with the factory managers for one purpose: to raise production. Workers are told that a strike is a crime. Against whom are they to strike? Against themselves? After all, the means of production belong to them, the state belongs to them. But such an explanation is not very convincing. The workers, who dare not state aloud what they want, know that the goals of the state are far from identical with their own.

565 433 475 Central and Eastern Europe produce in order to raise the military and economic potential of the Center and to compensate for the industrial backwardness of Russia. Workers and their needs have no influence on production plans. Most of the goods produced ebb away to the East. Besides, every product of a worker's hands is the object of innumerable bookkeeping operations. A whole staff of functionaries sits in every factory, counting, writing reports, compiling statistics; the same thing happens on every rung of the state hierarchy, right through to the state wholesale houses and retail stores. If, at last, the article reaches the consumer, it is very expensive; into its cost are counted the salaries of the swarms of bureaucrats through whose hands it must pass. Factory machines are 565 466 over-aged; there is a scarcity of essential spare parts. So workers are ordered to replace broken parts by whatever

[Moscow — Analyst]

AGRICULTURAL PRODUCTION per PERSON DEPENDENT on AGRICULTURE

AVERAGE 1931-1935.*



* Wilbert E. Moore, *Economic Demography of Eastern and Southern Europe* (Geneva, 1945), p. 35.

p. 33

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241 edly conscious of the fact that the extraordinary rapidity of Soviet industrial growth in the thirties was achieved partly at the cost of a greater disparity between industrial and agricultural development than was characteristic of the major Western nations.

241 185 The extent to which the Communists were prepared to permit a lag in agricultural progress was indicated, first of all, by the small portion of national resources the Plans allocated to agriculture. As shown in Table 20, the planned investment in agriculture averaged around 10 per cent of the total investment schedule. In evaluating the figures in Table 20 it should be remembered that, with the exception of Czechoslovakia, the economies of Eastern Europe were primarily agricultural. Furthermore, in the period of the Plans, an increasingly large share of the land came under the control of the State, whose investment policy is here under scrutiny.

Another indication of the conscious purpose behind Communist agricultural neglect is to be found in the Plan targets set for farm commodities. As Table 21 indicates, the Plans provide for approximately four times as great an increase in the production of producer goods as of agricultural goods. And while a 50 per cent increase in agriculture is not negligible, it represents a goal the Communists, on the basis of Soviet experience, knew they could not possibly fulfill.[11]

TABLE 21

433 PLANNED FIVE YEAR PLAN PRODUCTION INCREASES

(Poland – Six Years)

Country	Producer Goods	Consumer Goods	Agriculture
	(Year preceding Plan = 100)		
Bulgaria (1948-53)	326	273	137
Czechoslovakia (1948-53)	230	170	153
Hungary (1950-54)	380	245	154
Poland (1950-56)	254	211	150

[11] The underfulfillment of agricultural and light industry targets in the USSR had become almost a tradition, and the East European Communists certainly were conscious of this heritage. They must have known, too, that the failure to fulfill the targets set for non-heavy industrial production did not stop the Soviet planners from setting targets far beyond possible attainment in the next plan (see Harry Schwartz, pp. 305-329). This adamant refusal to bring non-heavy industrial targets into the realm of reality was part of the dogma, firmly held up to Stalin's death, that the rapid expansion of heavy industry did not in any way deter the development of light industry, a dogma which was patently false, but one which for reasons of public safety, had to be upheld.

433 in the Planning Commission, who said that the discrepancy between
185 agriculture and industry was "legitimate and in accord with the general conditions of the developing productive forces."[16] In a *Nowe Drogi* article published in February 1952, the then President, Bierut, put the final stamp of disapproval on Minc's analysis of the agricultural failure by stating that "the low production in agriculture cannot be explained by conditions and objective reasons." In other words, it was not, he said, the Government's policy which was responsible for the agricultural lag, but the ineptness with which the policy was being implemented by officials.[17]

Bierut answered Minc by denying that an agricultural lag was a necessary corollary of rapid industrial expansion. It is doubtful that he actually believed this to be true, but in order to justify the increased pace of industrialization it was necessary to maintain this dogma. By reiterating the dogma, Bierut ended this brief, but very significant argument; soon full-scale collectivization was resumed in Poland.

Later in 1952, Bierut again complained of lagging agriculture, citing figures to show the widening disproportion (see Table 22). The "rate of increase of agricultural production remains far below the needs of the economy," he said, but he steadfastly refused to acknowledge that the breakneck industrial pace might be responsible.[18] As events turned out, the figures he cited to show agricultural insufficiency decidedly overestimated future agricultural produc-

TABLE 22 *

PRODUCTION IN POLAND – BY SECTOR
(1949 = 100)

	1949	1950	1951	1952	1953 (Planned)
Socialist Industry	100	131	152	192	258
Agriculture as a Whole....	100	111	106	115	150

* B. Bierut, Report at the "Plenum of the Central Committee of the PZPR," June 14-15, 1952.

[16] *Nowe Drogi*, December, 1951, p. 35.
[17] *Nowe Drogi*, February, 1952, pp. 7-8.
[18] *Trybuna Ludu* (Warsaw), November 6, 1953.

tion.[19] Undoubtedly, Bierut was conscious of the fantastic optimism in the planned 50 per cent increase in agricultural production by 1953; but he could not admit it until the 1953 New Course released him from some of the extended industrial targets which had made the agricultural lag necessary. In his speech to the Central Committee Plenum in October 1953, Bierut vindicated Minc's original analysis, and acknowledged that the simultaneous expansion of both agriculture and industry at the planned pace was impossible.

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Since the New Course constituted a partial repudiation of the program of ever-increasing economic disproportion, Communist leaders felt free to admit the gravity of the situation created by their previous policies. Gheorghiu-Dej, the Romanian Premier, for example, declared:

> The rate of industrialization has been forced, especially as regards heavy industry, which led to the establishment of too large a volume of capital investment in comparison with the national revenue, exceeding even the provisions of the Five Year Plan.[20]

In other words, the bureaucratic machine tended to distort the investment schedule even more than called for in the Plan. "As the result of the allocation of too large capital investments for heavy industry," Gheorghiu-Dej continued, "agriculture—surely one of the principal branches of the national economy—and consumer goods have not been supplied with sufficient funds . . ." In Bulgaria, the disproportions were apparently as pronounced as those in Romania but, for a variety of reasons, Bulgarian Premier Vulko Chervenkov did not feel it necessary to criticize them so sharply. But he too, in his September 8, 1953 New Course address, complained of the serious lag in consumer goods and agriculture resulting from the unbalanced investment program.[21] The most dramatic revelation of agricultural neglect in the Satellite area came from Hungary in Premier Imre Nagy's speech of July 4, 1953, in which he condemned in the most severe terms the hitherto-accepted policy of heavy industrial emphasis.[22] Unlike the other Satellite leaders, who tended

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[19] In actual fact the planned targets for 1952 and 1953 were not even partially fulfilled. Instead of 115 per cent in 1952, only 104.9 per cent was reached; and instead of 150 per cent in 1953; only 109.0 per cent was reached (*Gospodarka Planowa* [Warsaw], No. 12, 1953, p. 10).

[20] *Scanteia* (Bucharest), August 23, 1953.

[21] *Rabotnichesko Delo* (Sofia), September 9, 1953. At the 6th Congress of the Bulgarian Communist Party, both Chervenkov and the Chairman of the State Planning Commission, Georgi Chankov, acknowledged that agriculture had seriously lagged behind industry (*Rabotnichesko Delo*, March 2, 1954).

[22] *Szabad Nep* (Budapest), July 5, 1953.

● 453 to treat the growing economic disproportions as an *aberration* of
185 the Plans, or at least of the intention of the Plans, or an unfortunate and inexplicable oversight, Nagy clearly assigned responsibility for the failure to the leadership itself. Bierut and Gheorghiu-Dej phrased their announcements of the New Course in such a way as to hint that the agricultural failure had been the result of official policy, but they hedged considerably. The extremely critical economic situation in Hungary of 1953 forced Nagy to treat the past policy with a frankness which was not as apparent elsewhere. But despite the reticence elsewhere, it was clear that the growing disproportions were the result of deliberate Communist application, with slight variations, of the formula stated by Zapotocky in 1949.

665 The most striking proof of the secondary role which agricultural development played in Eastern Europe is the general weakness of the Communist political apparatus in the countryside. In this respect East European Communists followed closely in the Soviet footsteps, where approximately 85 per cent of the kolkhozes were without a Party organization in 1949.[23] In Poland, Jacob Berman admitted, 43 per cent of the *villages* were without a Party organization altogether,[24] and elsewhere in the block the situation was no better.[25]

The absence of strong and viable Party units in the countryside reflects the unwillingness of the Communist leadership to assign its best technical and administrative personnel outside heavy industry, as well as the natural gravitation of rising bureaucrats—many of them, after all, drawn from the countryside itself—to the comforts of city life. Throughout the Soviet sphere the composition of the Communist Parties has become increasingly identified with the new managerial bureaucracy and, consequently, the Party units tend to exist in those places where the concentration of technicians is greatest.

This partly explains why implementation of the New Course in 1953-54 has made it imperative that the Party organizations in the countryside be strengthened. The East European regimes have

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[23] Merle Fainsod, *How Russia Is Ruled* (Cambridge, 1953), p. 454. Fainsod also notes that only 17.7 per cent of the Party members in the predominantly agricultural Ukraine were engaged in agricultural pursuits.

[24] *Trybuna Ludu*, November 6, 1953.

[25] See the speeches of the Czechoslovak Minister of Agriculture, Jindrich Uher (*Rude Pravo*, December 19, 1953), and the Hungarian Minister of Agriculture, Andras Hegedus (*Szabad Nep*, December 31, 1953).

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TABLE 29

PROPORTION OF GRAIN MARKETED IN POLAND BY SECTOR IN 1953*

Sector	Percent of Marketed Grain	Percent of Arable Land
State Farms	17.0	11.9
Production Cooperatives	6.5	6.5
Small Peasants	7.5	11.5
Middle Peasants	50.0	59.0
Kulaks	19.0	11.1
	100.0	100.0

* *Trybuna Ludu* (Warsaw), December 31, 1953.

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much less flattering light (see Table 29). However, even in 1953 the "Socialist sector" contributed more than its share to the market, and thus economically justified itself. Holding 18.4 per cent of the arable land, the "Socialist sector" contributed 23.5 per cent of the marketed grain. It should be noted, however, that the superiority was confined solely to State Farms. The collective farms, which comprised six per cent of the countryside, marketed no more than six per cent of the total grain.

The important role the State Farms play is made clear in Table 30, where it is demonstrated that, despite the low productivity per hectare, the State Farms outdid others in marketed production.

TABLE 30

PRODUCTION AND MARKETING OF POLISH STATE FARMS 1949 – 1952*

	1949	1950	1951	1952 *(Planned)*
Percent of Total Production (in current prices)	5.4	6.1	7.5	9.6
Percent of Total Marketing	–	6.8	10.5	15.1

* *Wieś w Liczbach*, (Warsaw, 1952), p. 116.

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FARM PRODUCTION and MARKETING IN POLAND – BY SECTOR*

– 1952 –

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Percent of arable land (L)



Percent of marketed grain (G)



p. 105

● 433 231 475 But if the State Farms exceed independent farms in grain marketing, the so-called kulaks exceed even the State Farms. With only 11.1 per cent of the arable land, they account for 19 per cent of the marketed grain. Precisely for this reason the Polish economist, Jerzy Tepicht, in an article published in December 1953, warned against the "irresponsible policy of destroying the productive capacity" of the kulaks.[46] If the kulaks cannot be broken, the regime must cooperate with them or risk an agricultural crisis such as occurred in Hungary in 1953.

The same Tepicht, in an article on the general problem of marketing, tried to establish the thesis that State Farms had come to play the same role in marketing that had formerly been held by large landowners.[47] In pre-war times the large landowners, holding 18.1 per cent of the land, contributed 29.9 per cent of the total marketed grain. Today, the State Farms, holding 12 per cent of the arable land, deliver 21.2 per cent of the marketed grain. Tepicht concludes that the marketing ability of the State Farms equals that of the pre-war landed estates, and thereby justifies the existence of the State Farms. The only flaw in his argument – aside from the peculiarity of such a justification on the part of a Communist! – lies in the fact that the majority of the State Farms (73.7 per cent) are in the Western territories where private farms also deliver high grain surpluses to the market. Holding only 31.1 per cent of the arable land, private farmers in the Western territories market 65.4 per cent of the grain delivered by the private sector in all Poland.[48] It seems likely, therefore, that the superior marketing power of the State Farms is due as much to their geographical location as to their internal structure.

In addition, it should be noted that the State Farms have established their grain marketing record at the cost of a very poorly developed livestock, a condition which they have in common with the collectives. Whereas the small farmers, with 11.5 per cent of the arable land, possess 20 per cent of the pigs and cows, and all the independent farms, with 76.5 per cent of the arable land, raise 93.1 per cent of the cattle and 90.1 per cent of the pigs, the State Farms, with 12 per cent of the land, raise only 9.2 per cent of the

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[46] *Trybuna Ludu*, (Warsaw) December 31, 1953.
[47] *Ekonomista*, III, 1953, pp. 31-2.
[48] *Ibid*, p. 35. Tepicht's figures differ from those given above (Table 29) but the difference is slight, and either set would support his argument.

pigs and six per cent of the cows. The kolkozes, with over six per cent of the land, raise less than one per cent of the cattle, pigs, and sheep.[49] The neglect of livestock is evidently characteristic of large-scale farming in Poland since the kulaks, who also produce a high marketable surplus, have also had negligible success in animal husbandry.

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Despite these modifications, the State Farms have played a sizeable role in establishing the Communist-desired relationship between the town and country. It is also clear that, up to this point, the collectivized sector has played a very limited role.

Czechoslovakia

The data relating to sector-by-sector marketing in Czechoslovakia is, unfortunately, even more scattered than in Poland, and permits less conclusive inferences. For example, it is known that in 1950 the State purchased 46 per cent of the grain production of both sectors, collective and private. It is also known that in 1949 the farms of less than 10 hectares—virtually all the private sector—contributed only 33 per cent of their production to the State.[50] Therefore, it can be assumed that the "Socialist sector"—mostly State Farms in 1949, but including a large number of collectives in 1950—contributed a higher portion of its produce than did the private farms. Furthermore, in 1951 farms of under 10 hectares accounted for only 39 per cent of grain deliveries, so that presumably the larger farms contributed more than their proportionate share of the market.[51]

In 1953, according to official Czechoslovak statistics, the "Socialist sector," comprising over 50 per cent of the land, accounted for 51 per cent of the marketed grain, 46 per cent of the marketed cattle, 57 per cent of the marketed pigs, and 43 per cent of the marketed milk.[52] These figures suggest that the market benefits gained by the Czechoslovak State are quite modest, and frequent claims that the collectives fulfill quotas more fully than the private

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[49] *Trybuna Ludu*, December 31, 1953; Jan Wyrozebski, Radio Warsaw, January 22, 1954.

[50] *Rude Pravo*, (Prague) February 22, 1951.

[51] *Nova Mysl* (Prague), November, 1953. The farms under 10 hectares, comprising 51 per cent of the arable land, contributed only 39 per cent of the marketed grain while the collective farms in 1951, holding 19 per cent of the land, contributed 20.7 per cent of the marketed grain.

[52] *Zprava Statniho Uradu Statistickeho* (Prague), January 31, 1954.

433 231 475 farms are not altogether true.[53] At the same time, the greater confidence the regime has in the capacity of the collectives to fulfill quotas is not altogether unjustified.

[231] Although the bulk of livestock in Poland is in the private sector, a sizeable portion of the livestock in Czechoslovakia is in the "Socialist sector." In 1952, 33.8 per cent of the cattle, 37.7 per cent of the hogs, and 38.7 per cent of the sheep were in the "Socialist sector."[54]

Although the Czechoslovak regime may have gained some market advantages from collectivization, its victory remains quite inconclusive. With the New Course, the regime, in turning to the private sector for agricultural reinforcement, acknowledged that the advantage gained was insufficient for its purposes.[55]

HUNGARY

423 433 The transformation of the agricultural structure in Hungary in 1945-46 was the most drastic of the post-war land reforms; and there is unquestionably a connection between the semi-revolutionary character of that agrarian reform and the special gravity of the Hungarian farm crisis in mid-1953. Whether this crisis had its roots in peasant hyper-sensitivity to the imposition of an overlordship resembling former conditions, or to the destruction of traditional trade relationships between town and country is not altogether clear; but that a close connection exists between the 1945-46 reform and the 1953 crisis is difficult to doubt.[56]

The impact of the 1945-46 reforms on the traditional trade

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[53] For example, *Rude Pravo* (December 4, 1953), asserted that the collective farms had fulfilled their quotas for grain by 103 per cent while the private farms had fulfilled their quota by only 77 per cent. A similar differential held for the fulfillment of meat, pork, and milk quotas.

[54] Cited in *Życie Gospodarcze* (Warsaw), April 19, 1953, p. 484.

[55] As in Poland, the Czechoslovak New Course placed special emphasis upon protecting the productive capacity of the kulaks while at the same time, of course, limiting his alleged urge to engage in speculation and exploitation. "It would harm our agricultural economy," said Minister of Agriculture Uher, if the land which the kulaks occupied was not "fully utilized by them" (*Rude Pravo*, November 10, 1953).

[56] A subjective factor such as the peasants' degree of class consciousness is difficult to incorporate into an analysis of this type. However, without some recourse to this factor, it is difficult to explain the special depth of the 1953 Hungarian crisis, so much more pronounced was it than similar crises in the sphere. The series of articles in the Hungarian press during the fall and summer of 1953 portraying the countryside during the period of kolkhoz dissolutions certainly suggested that the Hungarian peasantry felt a hatred for their oppressors of an intensity hardly rivaled in the Sphere. It should not be forgotten that the strongest of the post-World War II peasant parties in the sphere was the Smallholders' Party of Hungary, which received 57 per cent of the vote in 1947 elections.

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relationship between town and country has received little attention, but evidence suggests that its effect was much the same as that caused by the peasant upheaval of Russia in 1917-18.[57] Pre-war Hungary's agricultural sectors participated in the market as outlined in Table 31. As in pre-revolutionary Russia, the large landowners accounted for a share of the market in excess of their share of total arable land. This superior capacity to market goods reflected, as in Russia, not greater production, but the ability to sell a greater proportion of what they produced. While the peasants marketed 47 per cent of their crop, the large landowners marketed 67 per cent.[58]

By dividing the land more equitably, the 1945-46 reforms upset the equilibrium of the pre-war system. As a result, a larger portion of the total product was consumed by the peasants, and a smaller portion sent to the cities. To rectify this situation, and to restore the cities to the dominant position they had once enjoyed, first the compulsory deliveries system, and then collectivization, were imposed by the Communists.[59] The rapid development of industry and growth of urban population made it imperative that a greater proportion of the produce be siphoned off the land than before the war.

But the Hungarian Communists have acknowledged that they were unable even to restore the pre-war level of land exploitation. The collective farm structure could not compensate for the loss of the large landholdings; and with the bad harvest of 1952, the agricultural situation grew desperate.

This failure was the subject of an extremely interesting analysis by the Communist theoretician, Mrs. Aladar Mod, published some two months prior to the official introduction of the New Course

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[57] It is perhaps significant that the two European countries which experienced a successful Bolshevik seizure of power at the time of World War I were Russia and Hungary.

[58] Mrs. Aladar Mod, *Torsadalmi Szemle*, April-May, 1953. Most of the material concerning Hungarian market relations is taken from Mod's extremely interesting study published on the eve of the New Course explosion.

[59] In some countries (Czechoslovakia and Poland) the system of compulsory deliveries was taken over directly from the German administration after the war. It is interesting that the totalitarian regimes, faced by the same problems, so frequently work out similar solutions. Just as the Communists in Eastern Europe incorporated Nazi techniques into their apparatus, so the Nazis, when occupying Communist Russia, kept the kolkhozes intact and exploited them as the Communists had done. Like the Soviet planners, the Germans found the collectives to be eminently suited to the economic demands of a totalitarian state.

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TABLE 31

PRE-WAR AGRARIAN TRADE PATTERNS IN HUNGARY*

Sector	Percent of Holdings	Percent of Arable Land	Percent of Total Crop	Percent of Own Crop Marketed	Percent of Total Marketed
Small Holdings (Under 25 cad. acres)	94.0	48	51.6	47.2	43.6
Medium Holdings (25-200 cad. acres)	5.5	28	24.2	63.6	27.4
Large Holdings (Over 200 cad. acres)	0.5	24	24.2	67.0	29.0
TOTAL	100.0	100.0	100.0	55.9	100.0

* *Magyar Statisztikai Zsebkonyv*, (Budapest, 1948), p. 103; *Tarsadalmi Szemle*, April-May, 1953; *Hungarian State Yearbook*, Special Agricultural Issue (Budapest, 1935).

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into Hungary in July 1953. In it she pointed out that the "Socialist sector" produced approximately 10 per cent less for the market than the former landholdings of 200 cadastral acres. "The percentage of grain production for the market," she flatly concluded, after lengthy analysis, "is much lower than it was prior to liberation." As a result, grain exports had been drastically curtailed; yet even after this, the cities were still poorly supplied. Taking 1938 agricultural production as 100, current production has reached the following levels sector-by-sector:

	1938	1951	1952
Working Peasantry	100	130	109
Kulaks	100	46.7	23.4
Large-scale farms	100	73	74.3

The working peasants had increased their total yield because the land under their control had grown by 25 per cent. But theirs was the one sector incapable of substantially contributing to the market. The two sectors capable of supplying the market with a large surplus had declined seriously—the kulak sector in amount of land under its control, and the large landowners (now "Socialist") in general efficiency. The resulting trade relations are described in Table 32.

In each year the percent of the crop delivered by the kulaks excelled that of the "Socialist sector;" but in each year the kulak share of the total crop declined as the result of State encroachment on his land. Inevitably the total amount of grain delivered to the State declined because the "Socialist sector" was unable to make up the loss. Mrs. Mod herself summed up the crisis implicit in the situation these statistics describe:

> The number of small producers is now much larger than it used to be. The producer who used to produce for the market, produces doubly less today; and today they consume much more, and market much less than in the past. Our Socialist large-scale farms, partly for the same reasons and partly on account of their still-existing infantile disorders (inadequate management, lax labor discipline) are for the time being unable to make up for the shortage.

Mrs. Mod refrained from mentioning a third factor in the curtailment of marketed production: the stern refusal of the Communist industrial order to provide incentives for greater production and

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TABLE 32

POST-WAR AGRARIAN TRADE PATTERNS IN HUNGARY*
1949 - 1952

Sector	Percent of Arable Land	Percent of Total Grain Crop Produced	Percent of Crop Delivered to State	Percent of Total Grain Delivery
1949				
Working peasants' farms	75.5	82.1	38.3	75.3
Kulak farms	17.0	16.4	59.9	23.5
Socialist sector	7.5	1.5	81.7	1.2
TOTAL	100.0	100.0	41.7	100.0
1951				
Working peasants' farms	**	72.5	46.9	66.9
Kulak farms	**	10.1	66.2	13.2
Socialist sector	26.0	17.4	58.2	19.9
TOTAL	100.0	100.0	50.8	100.0
1952				
Working peasants' farms	**	69.6	41.7	61.4
Kulak farms	**	5.5	61.0	7.2
Socialist sector	34.5	24.9	59.6	31.4
TOTAL	100.0	100.0	47.4	100.0

* *Tarsadalmi Szemle*, April-May, 1953.
** Data unavailable.

greater trade with the cities. The drastic economic reforms initiated during the summer of 1953 were part of a frantic effort to correct this imbalance, an imbalance pronounced in Hungary and terribly aggravated by the disastrous 1952 harvest.

Romania

The Romanian Government has been more secretive about internal market relations than any other Satellite, making conclusions even more difficult to draw. The "Socialist sector," including the "primitive" agricultural associations, comprise 25 per cent of the arable land. According to Premier Gheorghiu-Dej, this sector produces no more than 25 per cent of the total crop,[60] no more than its proportionate share of the arable land. This suggests that the

[60] Gheorghiu-Dej, *Scanteia*, August 23, 1953.

"Socialist sector," despite its advantages, has given little benefit to the State in terms of marketed produce. The Romanian Council of Ministers frequently complains, as it did on January 28, 1952, that "in spite of all the important benefits given to the peasantry by the State . . . the market was not sufficiently supplied with agricultural products necessary to consumers and to industrial production."[61] 475 423 433

YUGOSLAVIA

The history of collectivization in Yugoslavia is so complex, and differs in so many respects from the course followed elsewhere in Eastern Europe, that comparisons are difficult. However, in certain fundamental respects, the initial collectivization drive (1948-1950) had the same goals as those guiding the Cominform bloc. No data on produce marketed are available; but production data indicate that in the years of collectivizing, the Government was successful at least in obtaining higher yields on its State and collective farms than from the private sector, and presumably was able to extract a large portion of that yield from the farms. Undoubtedly, this result was due in part to the ability of the Yugoslav regime to collectivize the fertile Vojvodina region (see Chart VII), where yield per hectare was traditionally high. But the "Socialist sector" also included a good deal of the poor and relatively unproductive land of Macedonia, and therefore Table 33, in which the proportion of grain produced by each sector is compared with the proportion of land held, is significant.

OVERALL MARKET PERSPECTIVE

Despite the sparseness and frequent unreliability of the statistical data employed in this analysis, some conclusions may be drawn.

1. In varying degrees, depending upon the country, collectivization in Eastern Europe has actually expedited extraction of agricultural produce from the countryside at the low price consistent with Communist industrial designs. While the system of compulsory deliveries at State-regulated prices was effective to this end, it left enough initiative and power in the hands of the peasantry to hamper the development of industry.

In Bulgaria collectivization results are the most impressive; in Czechoslovakia the gains are less impressive, but still significant. In Poland the regime has had to rely a great deal upon the surplus

[61] *Scanteia*, January 29, 1952.

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TABLE 33

GRAIN PRODUCTION IN YUGOSLAVIA – 1948 - 1951*
BY ECONOMIC SECTOR

(In percent of total production)

Year	Sector	Wheat	Rye	Barley	Oats	Total**	Percent of Arable Land***
1948/49	State	2.3	1.8	7.4	8.5	3.4	3.0
	Cooperative	14.2	11.6	15.1	16.4	14.4	10.0
	Private	83.5	86.6	77.5	75.1	82.2	87.0
1949/50	State	3.2	2.0	14.5	12.4	5.0	4.0
	Cooperative	23.2	24.0	25.4	28.7	23.9	16.0
	Private	73.6	74.0	60.1	58.9	71.1	80.0
1950/51	State	2.8	2.4	17.4	14.5	5.5	4.0
	Cooperative	25.3	28.4	28.3	30.0	26.3	19.0
	Private	71.9	69.2	54.3	55.5	68.2	77.0

* *Bulletin of Information and Documents*, (Belgrade), Vol. 1, No. 4, 1952, pp. 21-26.

** The total is derived from the combined tonnage of the wheat, rye, barley, and oats. Since the caloric value of a ton of wheat is greater than a ton of barley or oats, combining them all in one sum is deceptive. However, for the purposes of the above comparison the rough approximation of the "total" given, based entirely on tonnage, is sufficient. If potato production had been included in this table, then a caloric measurement such as the FAO used in establishing its "Wheat Equivalent Unit" (See Chart XIII) might have been employed, since the caloric content of a given weight of potatoes is only one-fifth that of an equivalent weight of wheat, whereas barley and oats are three-fifths.

*** The figures given for arable land in this table are estimates. Since grain production is given according to the agricultural year and the progress of collectivization according to the calendar year, it was necessary to interpolate the latter figures to accord with the former.

production of State Farms rather than the collectives, and, as in Hungary, kulaks and middle farmers continue to constitute a major source of marketable produce. In Romania the positive results of collectivization appear to be negligible, and, consistently enough, its industrial expansion has been quite modest. And in Hungary collectivization seems to have aggravated an already critical town-country relationship. But even in Hungary, and to a lesser extent Romania, the degree of peasant exploitation was sufficient to insure considerable urban development.

2. At the same time, it must be stressed, the evidence indicates that collectivization was by no means as successful as it was in the Soviet Union. This seems to be true both quantitatively (in terms of percentage of arable land absorbed) and qualitatively (in terms of reorientation of the market). It was not sufficiently comprehensive or intensive to facilitate the rapid increase in peasant exploitation which, from the regimes' viewpoint, justified the bloodshed and brutality of Communist agrarian policy.

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THE LEVEL AND CHARACTER OF THE COAL OUTPUT IN SILESIA HAS ALWAYS 316 433

been closely linked with political factors, which will continue to be of great importance in the future.

The peak production of the entire Silesian-Ostravan coal basin was reached under the German administration in 1943, when it yielded about 106 million tons of coal.[2] The decline of extraction began in 1944 and in 1945. With military operations being conducted in the basin itself, and the Red occupation gradually extending westward with all its overwhelming legal, administrative, and social consequences, the working of the mines was so disturbed that the basin produced only about 26 million tons. Since early 1946, however, the rise in production has been very rapid, particularly in Polish Silesia. The restoration of the productivity of the basin between 1946 and 1948 almost to its prewar level must be recognized as a remarkable technical and organizational achievement. The efficiency of the coal miners could not be raised to its prewar level (a characteristic feature of Communist economy) and the loss of many skilled miners, in particular those of German nationality, had to be made good by replacing them by scores of thousands of new, inexperienced men. The real difficulties began when the Warsaw and Prague governments were assigned the task of reaching the wartime peak of coal extraction and exceeding it within the frame of the Czech Five Year Plan and the Polish Six Year Plan. Even so the output of the mines kept growing, though at a slower rate, and in 1950 reached about 87 million tons (73 million tons in the Polish and 14 million tons in the Czech part of the basin), an increase over the 1937 figure.[3] Late in 1950 coal mining in the Ostravan part of the basin met with serious difficulties due to the shortage of manpower: the Czechs, like the French, and lately the British, dislike being coal miners. In the middle of 1951 these difficulties spread to the Polish part of the basin in the wake of food shortages. The subject is discussed in more detail later in this study.

According to the long-term plans, the output of the Silesian basin is expected to exceed the 1943 peak and to reach at least about 112 and perhaps as much as 118 million tons: 92 to 95

316 million tons in Poland by 1955, and 20 to 23 million tons in
● 433 Czechoslovakia by 1953. It can be assumed in advance that every effort will be made to fulfill the Polish plan ahead of schedule, probably by the end of 1954.

The Silesian coal fields are the basic source of hard fuel for the captive area as such and in particular for the two countries which share the basin. But there are in captive Europe a number of minor coal fields spread over this area outside of Silesia, whose joint output represents about one sixth of captive Europe's total production of coal. Even though their 1950 production did not exceed 14 million tons, the secondary coal basins of captive Europe are of decisive importance for such branches of industrial activity as cannot use lignite profitably as hard fuel, and because of their geographical location. In particular, a dozen or more iron and steel plants in Eastern Germany, Western Bohemia, Hungary, and Rumania, situated outside the Silesian-Ostravan basin or even far from it, largely depend on the supply of local coal in their operations.

Among these minor coal basins the following should be noted:

1. The Lower Silesian coal basin in Poland on the northern slopes of the Sudeten Mountains, also known as the Wałbrzych (Waldenberg) basin, with a present output of about 5 million tons of high grade coking coal;

2. The Zwickau-Oelsnitz basin in Saxony, with a present output of roughly 3 million tons;

3. The four minor coal producing areas in Bohemia (Kladno, Plzeň, Trutnov and Rosice basins) with a present joint output of some 4 million tons;

4. Several minor coal fields in Hungary, Rumania, and Bulgaria, with a total present output of about 2 million tons of hard coal.[4]

Since 1949 great efforts have been made to increase the production of these minor basins up to a joint level of approximately 20 million tons of coal at the end of the current long-range economic plans. Judging by the indices of production published by the satellite governments, the progress in these coal fields

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is uneven. The best performance to date has been that of the Saxon basin; the Hungarian and Rumanian output, though lagging behind the inflated annual plans, is described as growing rapidly; the Lower Silesian basin in Poland, where huge investments in machinery are being made, is apparently working in a satisfactory way; the secondary Czech coal fields were in the fall of 1951 several percent behind the prescribed targets.[5] The food crisis of 1951 is having a pronounced adverse effect upon the productivity of the minor Czech and Hungarian coal basins and may lessen that of the Lower Silesian and Rumanian mines. It may be assumed that if all these minor coal basins are capable of much development and extension, only some of them will be able to fulfill on schedule the very high quotas of production set by Moscow.

To sum up, at the end of the present long-range plans, that is on the average by the end of 1954 or beginning of 1955, the entire extraction of coal in all the basins of the captive area is expected to reach about 133 million tons and possibly a few million more.[6] This global target exceeds the prewar output of the Ruhr basin, and is equal to the output of the Soviet Union in 1938; it would be very much larger than the present output of the Donets basin in the Ukraine, estimated at less than 100 million tons.[7] The target of 133.5 million tons can also be compared to the output of bituminous coal in Pennsylvania in 1942 which reached 143 million tons.

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LIGNITE

135 THE term lignite or brown coal[8] covers a number of class D
● 433 coals (international classification of 1913) of comparatively low caloric value. This does not mean that all lignites are poor quality coals; on the contrary, some of them, mined in Czechoslovakia, Hungary, Rumania, and Bulgaria, are "rich" lignites whose caloric value often reaches that of the class B semi-bituminous coals. That is why they are so often classified together with hard coal in local statistics. A British authority on coal, Sir Richard Redmayne, says that 2.8 tons of German lignite are equivalent to one ton of hard coal; according to the *Economic Survey of Europe in 1949*,[9] that ratio should be 4.5. The latter source says that 1.7 tons of Czech lignite and 3 tons of that from unspecified "other countries" are equivalent to one ton of hard coal. The last ratio seems to be too general because much of the Danubian-Balkan lignite is as good as the Czech. These discrepancies between qualified authorities are cited here as proof that an exact evaluation in terms of coal of the total caloric value of the lignite produced by the captive part of Europe is very difficult.

It should be borne in mind that lignite is a specifically mid-European type of fuel. In 1947-1949, the last years for which complete statistical data are available, no less than 65 percent of the world production of lignite, except that of the Soviet Union, was concentrated in the present captive area of Europe. This percentage may be even higher today; the extraction of lignite is growing in the captive area while, with a few exceptions (Western Germany, Yugoslavia, Australia) it remains stationary elsewhere.

The bulk of mid-European lignite used to be consumed in the production of electric power or converted into briquettes whose

135 total output of Germany, again mainly Eastern, reached 250.7
● 433 million tons. The total 1943 output of lignite in the present captive area may be estimated as exceeding 200 million tons. In 1948 all these figures were much lower (except in Polish Silesia, which produced about 4 million tons) but had a marked tendency to increase. In 1949 Czechoslovakia produced 26.5 million tons of lignite, Hungary 5.5 million, Poland 4.6 million, and Rumania 2.8 million. The official figure of lignite production in Eastern Germany in 1950 was 137 million tons, and the total output of this fuel in the captive area could be estimated as reaching 185 million tons.

[185] The plans for 1953-1955 are as follows: Bulgaria is expected to produce 6 million tons of lignite in 1953, Czechoslovakia 38.8 million in 1953, Eastern Germany 225.2 million in 1955,[11] Hungary 25 million in 1954, Poland 8.4 million in 1955, and Rumania 7.7 million in 1955. The Czech and Eastern German targets are very high in comparison with their past and present output, and the Hungarian target seems to be unrealistic. Anticipating that the three plans to be terminated in 1955 may in fact be implemented earlier, a tentative figure of some 310 million tons of lignite may be accepted as that of the total output of lignite in the captive area to be achieved by the end of 1954 or the beginning of 1955. According to the ratios accepted by the *Economic Survey of Europe*, these figures would represent the equivalent of about 50.1 million tons of hard coal in Eastern Germany, 22.7 million tons in Czechoslovakia, and 12.1 million tons in the remaining four countries of captive Europe — a total of about 85 million tons. If other ratios were accepted as a basis for this computation, the total would be very much larger.

Together with the 133 million tons of hard coal which is the 1954-1955 target of the captive area, the grand total output of hard fuel for that area anticipated by 1954-1955 comes to 218 million tons of coal or coal equivalent, or more if the higher ratios of conversion are applied. Taken at its minimum, the goal of 218 million tons of coal or coal equivalent exactly coincides with the coal production of the United Kingdom in 1949, which was 218.5 million tons.

Unfortunately it is impossible to compare the present or planned global output of both coal and lignite extracted in the captive area of Europe with the corresponding output of the Soviet Union. The Soviet statistics do not make a distinction between coal and lignite, although there is considerable difference between the caloric value of anthracite extracted in the Donets basin, for instance, and lignite from the so-called Moscow basin or several other basins located in Asiatic Russia. The entire coal and lignite production of the Soviet Union in 1950 was 264 million tons, and that projected for 1960 is 500 million tons.[12] Both these figures include far more coal than lignite, but the exact ratio between the two types of hard fuel is not available. The anticipated production of 133 million tons of hard coal and 310 million tons of lignite in the captive area by 1954-1955, a total of 218 million tons in coal equivalent, can be put side by side with a tentative figure of some 380-390 million tons of coal and lignite which Soviet Russia expects to extract by the same time.[13] The Soviet figure is undoubtedly larger than that of captive Europe, but it would be hard to say what percentage the latter would represent of the former — perhaps 55 or 60 or even 65 percent. The only really valid conclusion is that hard fuel produced in the captive area constitutes an extremely significant addition to that mined in the Soviet empire proper. 135 433

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COKE

135 433 WHILE at least two thirds of the Ruhr coal is of coking quality and thus can be used for steelmaking, this is not the case with the Silesian coal, only one third of which can be converted into coke. Moreover, the deposits of coking coal are concentrated in the western part of the Silesian-Ostravan basin. As a consequence, before World War II the German and Czech Silesias could produce much more coke than Poland in the eastern part of the basin. This situation has changed completely since the incorporation of German Upper Silesia into Poland. Outside the main Silesian-Ostravan basin there is much high grade coking coal in Lower Silesia, now Polish, and some in the secondary coal fields in Eastern Germany, Bohemia, Hungary, and Rumania. All in all, in comparison with Western Europe, the captive area is relatively poor in coking coal.

In 1929 Czechoslovakia produced 3,350,000 tons of coke, Poland 2,123,000 tons, and Rumania 72,500 tons; the output of Eastern Germany, which included German Silesia, was some 6,000,000 tons; that of Hungary was negligible, and Bulgaria produced no coke. The peak of war production in Eastern Germany was achieved in 1943, and in Czechoslovakia in 1944, when production reached almost 5 million tons. The last published figures of postwar coke production in Czechoslovakia date from 1948, when it reached 4,940,000 tons, and in Poland from 1949, when it reached 5,720,00 tons. Little coke was produced by the remaining captive countries, and figures pertaining to their output are not available.

Since 1948-1949, when long-range plans were launched for an extensive development of the steelmaking capacity in the captive area, the problem of its coke supply became more difficult. Eastern Germany, Hungary, and Rumania have to import

coke from Poland and Czechoslovakia in order to cope with the demand of their steel plants, which have been rebuilt and are being extended. The exportation of coke interferes with the heavy requirements of the huge steel plants in the Silesian-Ostravan basin and puts much strain on the overworked railroad system of the captive area. As noted previously, the coal-poor countries of the area have to concentrate upon finding a practical method of converting lignite, of which they have much, into coke. It is probably premature to say that this problem has been successfully solved, or that lignite coke about to be produced on a large scale in Eastern Germany and Hungary will be as satisfactory for steelmaking as "ordinary" coal coke. Still, this minor technical revolution seems to be well on its way.

Not all satellite governments have disclosed their long-range targets for coke output. Among the large producers of coke, Poland expects to produce 9.9 million tons of coke in 1955 (in fact, earlier) and Czechoslovakia 8 million tons in 1952. This large increase of coke-making capacity cannot be achieved without the erection of many new coke plants. Several such plants of a very large size have already been put into motion in the Silesian-Ostravan basin or are still under construction. Eastern Germany anticipates for 1955 a production of 1.7 million tons of the new lignite coke[14] and of an undisclosed amount of coal coke which, on the strength of indirect indices, could be estimated at about 1.3 million tons. Rumania plans to produce 0.7 million tons of coke in 1955. The Hungarian target has never been disclosed — it cannot be high — and that of Bulgaria is negligible. It can be very tentatively estimated that the entire captive area expects to produce some 23-24 million tons of coke by 1954-1955.[15]

This tentative estimate may be compared with 19.9 million tons of coke produced by the Soviet Union in 1936 (the last known figure), and 44.3 million tons which was the top wartime production of Germany in 1943. France, without the Saar, produced only 8.2 million tons of coke in 1949.

It should be borne in mind that an average of about 1.4 tons

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135 of coking coal are required to produce one ton of coke, and
● 433 somewhat over one ton of coke to make one ton of steel.[16] In the light of these figures, should the captive area of Europe produce, as it plans, 23-24 million tons of coke by 1954-1955 — which depends on the amount of coal it will mine — it would have little difficulty in covering the requirements of its planned production of steel, estimated at about 16.5 million tons by 1954-1955.

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— including Albania — and exploiting them to the utmost of their capacity. Since then, except for the insignificant Czechoslovak and Polish oil fields which are run by local governments, the really large captive oil fields have been operated by Soviet or mixed semi-Soviet companies. This means that they are managed by Soviet specialists using Soviet machinery and installations, according to the Soviet methods of extraction, which the Russians regard as more progressive than those used in the West. A huge and ever growing amount of money and energy is being invested in the extention of the existing fields and the search for new ones. The Soviet idea seems to be that the foreign companies which operated the oil fields in the captive area in the past were only looking for immediate profits and never did their job properly and that there is bound to be more oil all over Middle Europe. Insofar as Rumania and Hungary are concerned, the results of the Soviet efforts cannot be considered remarkable. The output of Hungary remains stationary, while in Rumania, partly because of Russian haste and the harshness of their methods, there have been until the present time constant difficulties of every kind with machinery, organization, and manpower — perhaps even some sabotage.[21] The best proof of this is the fact that no statistics on oil production in absolute figures have been officially published in Rumania since 1947; had there been good reason for boasting, the figures undoubtedly would have been made known. On the other hand, there is much evidence that the Russians have been more successful in Albania, and even more so in their zone of Austria.

The present rate of oil output in Rumania, and for that matter in most of the other captive or Soviet-controlled countries (there is no oil in the Soviet zone of Germany), is the subject of much speculation.[22] Every authority has its own set of estimates, and there are surprising differences between them. Only a few of these diverging estimates can be quoted here. Thus the *Economic Survey of Europe in 1950*, an official publication of the United Nations — bound as it is to accept the indices occasionally given by the satellite governments and to draw its conclusions from

them — estimates that in 1950 the Rumanian output of crude oil reached 5.35 million metric tons, that of Hungary (which lagged behind its plan for 1950) 0.55 million, of Poland 0.18 million, and of Czechoslovakia 0.05 million metric tons. Together with the Soviet zone of Austria, whose production the *Survey* estimates at 1.5 million tons, the total 1950 output of the captive area should have reached 7.63 million metric tons — plus that of Albania, for which the *Survey* gives no figure.

According to the other authoritative sources, the above-quoted figure on the Rumanian output reflects the nonfulfilled plans of the Rumanian government rather than the actual level of production. Competent Rumanian experts residing in the United States claim that the 1950 oil output in Rumania did not exceed 4.2 or perhaps even 4.0 million tons.[23] On the other hand, it is possible that the *Survey* underestimated the output of oil in Austria and Czechoslovakia. Thus, according to accredited American sources with access to much special information, the 1950 output of oil in the Soviet-controlled section of Europe was: Albania, 1,915,000 metric tons; Austria, 2,247,000 tons; Czechoslovakia, 275,000 tons; Hungary, 490,000 tons; Poland, 138,000 tons; and Rumania, 4,360,000 tons — a total of 9,415,000 metric tons. This total is larger than most of the other estimates because of the high figures for Austria and Czechoslovakia, and in particular because of the surprisingly high figure for Albania.[24] It should be noted that the corresponding figure for the Soviet Union in 1950 is presumed to have been 37,600,000 metric tons. If the above-quoted American estimate is exact, it would mean that the output of oil in the captive part of Europe amounts to as much as one fourth of that of Russia proper.

Whatever estimate is accepted for 1950, it may be assumed that the 1951 output of oil in captive Europe will be somewhat larger. It is true that according to official admissions the 1951 oil production in Czechoslovakia and Hungary has been lagging behind the plan, but this does not necessarily mean that it has fallen below the level of the preceding year. On the other hand,

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it is claimed that by the middle of 1951 the Rumanian output was 19 percent larger than by the middle of 1950, and the Polish output in the third quarter of 1951 was 11 percent larger than that of the third quarter of 1950.[25] Moreover, new oil fields were discovered recently in the Soviet zone of Austria at Schwardorf south of the Danube, opening up, it is asserted, "fantastic possibilities" for the future.[26]

It is not easy to have an accurate idea of how much oil should be extracted in the captive part of Europe in the light of the investments and other measures foreseen in the long-range economic plans. The current plans anticipate that in 1955 Rumania should produce 10 million metric tons and Poland about 0.4 million; Czechoslovakia plans to extract 0.15 million tons by 1952. The planned figure for Hungary has never been disclosed, and neither have been those for Austria and Albania, both of which produce oil for the Soviet Union. Yet it is certain that the Soviet authorities operating the oil fields in the three last-mentioned countries *must* have definite targets which they have to reach by the end of 1954, when most of the present long-range economic plans of the captive countries will, in fact, terminate. These targets, together with the three disclosed ones, may add up to any figure between 13 and 16 million metric tons of oil; that is, between about 94 and about 115 million barrels — an output depending on many unpredictable elements. A tentative figure of 13 million metric tons to be reached by 1954 has been adopted in this study as a basis for further computations.[27]

This estimate for 1954 — which may be a low one — should be compared with the 60 million metric tons of crude petroleum the Soviet government expects to extract in 1960.[28]

To the tentative figure for 1954 should be added the growing output of synthetic oil produced in the northern part of the captive area.

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NATURAL GAS

In Europe, even more than in America, most of the natural gas extracted as a by-product of oil refining had been for a long time wasted, and its utilization for lighting, fuel, and extraction of natural gasoline is a comparatively new process. International statistics do not exist for its production but only for its consumption in the given states, which is supposed to be equal to its effective collection within the same boundaries.[29] In 1930 Rumania, with its consumption of 1,206 million cubic meters of natural gas, and Poland, with 487 million, were responsible for nearly one hundred percent of the total European output of this gas. Several long-distance gas pipelines were laid in Rumania. The pipeline connecting Daszawa in the Polish oil fields with Warsaw was still unfinished by September 1939; the Russians redirected that line to Kiev. During World War II the extraction of natural gas was started in the present Russian zone of Austria and in Hungary.

The last known statistics for gas production in absolute figures in Rumania date from 1947, when it reached 1,176 million cubic meters; in Poland (which lost to Russia two thirds of its oil fields) from 1948, when it was 162 million cubic meters; and in Hungary from 1947, when it was 100 million cubic meters; and in Austria from 1949, when it was 59 million cubic meters. The Rumanian output was then small in comparison with its peak in 1936, when it reached 2,130 million cubic meters. Since 1947-1949 no figures for natural gas extraction have been published by any captive or Soviet-controlled country, and some of the percentile indices disclosed by these countries are contradictory. There are reasons to assume, however, that there has been since 1947 a steady though slow increase of that production in Hungary and a much more rapid one in Poland and Rumania.

315 185 ● 433 Thus, the increase of Polish production in 1950 over that in 1949 was officially described as "an enormous jump" and the output of gas in the third quarter of 1951 was alleged to have been 173 percent of that the whole year before. In Rumania the 1950 output increased, according to the official press, by 24 percent in comparison with that of 1949, and the output of the first half of 1951 was alleged to have been larger by one third than that of the first half of 1950.[30] It is not possible to check these assertions, but they may correspond to the truth. Rumania would not be building three plants for the chemical processing of gas unless there were good reasons for expecting an increase in the extraction of gas.

[185] According to their long-range plans, which officially terminate in 1955 but are expected to be fulfilled by 1954, Rumania anticipates extracting 3,900 million cubic meters of natural gas, and Poland 480 million meters. These targets are moderate in comparison with those foreseen for oil extraction. The Hungarian target for 1954 is unknown, and so is the Soviet plan for Austria. The Czech output is negligible. A hypothetical figure of some 5,000 million cubic meters of natural gas, almost entirely dependent on the unpredictable Rumanian output, is the best that can be surmised for the entire captive area in 1954.

Poland alone anticipates the construction of eleven large mines 185
with a total annual output of 9 million tons of coal, and 36 exten- 316
sions of the existing mines with an output of 14 million tons. Of the former, 8 mines are presently under construction, each of them expected to produce 6 to 10 thousand tons of coal daily.[71] More money was invested in Polish coal mining in 1950 than during the years 1945-49 inclusive, and the 1951 investment is far larger than that of 1950.[72] Similar investments in the other captive countries are being made with increasing rapidity.

While the output of coal has been stimulated by all these 316
methods, efforts are being made to restrain the consumption of coal and to insure more efficient utilization. Since the middle of 1950, saving coal, in particular coal of good quality, has become one of the basic aims of the captive area's economy. The daily press eulogizes engineers and technicians who manage to operate factories and run trains on minimum quantities of coal or on low grade coal. All over the captive area, railroads and industrial plants substitute lignite or coal waste for hard coal fuel. In Soviet Berlin alone, the substitution of lignite for coal at the Klingenberg power plant will result in the saving of 500,000 tons of hard coal per annum.[73] At the same time electrification is being speeded up, since it will result in a lesser expenditure of fuel. During the last war, when the Nazis were faced with a grave fuel shortage, the "heat-engineers"[74] charged with this problem by the minister of armaments, Speer, introduced far-reaching improvements in the exploitation of the hydroelectric and thermal plants and saved up to 50 percent of the fuel and current.[75] Many of these men are available behind the Iron Curtain and, together with their colleagues from the other captive countries and with Soviet advisers, they are doing their best to wring the most they can from the local resources. When Selbmann, minister of heavy industry, states that the Eastern German thermal plants have reached the outside limit of load capacity,[76] the statement must be taken at its face value.

This analysis of the situation seems to lead to the conclusion 316
that under "normal" conditions the Communist regimes of cap- 433

316 tive Middle Europe can gradually increase their output of coal,
● 433 and thus can assure a constant growth of their basic source of industrial energy. Much progress in that direction can be made through high investments and multiple technical improvements, as well as by better organization of production. But the "normal" conditions presuppose that the targets for coal output remain within the range of feasibility and the miners are assured of a minimum acceptable standard of living. In the course of 1951, either one or both of these conditions were not kept by most of the satellite governments, and the planned output of coal is at present exposed to considerable danger.

In February-March 1951, under relentless pressure from Moscow, the Czechoslovak and Hungarian governments were forced to decree a notable speed-up of their long-range industrial plans, equivalent to boosting their annual quotas of production from the beginning of 1951. The Czech 1953 target for coal has been increased from 20.8 to 25 million tons and that of lignite from 32.2 to 38.6 million; the Hungarian 1954 target for both coal and lignite from 24.2 to 27.5 million tons. *Ipso facto*, the annual targets for 1951, 1952, and future years, have been boosted accordingly. Since the old targets were already high, it is perfectly legitimate to doubt whether these new plans can be fulfilled in time. In the light of recent statistical data, Czech coal mining is fulfilling the old plan but not the inflated new one. The same seems to be true in Hungary.

433 Quite apart from the real or apparent unfeasibility of the
511 two coal plans in question, the recent acute food shortage in
466 most of the captive area (except in Eastern Germany and possibly Bulgaria) has resulted, since the early fall of 1951, in an appreciable lowering of the standard of living of all industrial workers, and of coal miners in particular. The reasons for this food shortage are many: one of them is a long period of drought in most of the captive area and the consequent loss of much of the potato crop, the staple food of the population. Even if the bread grain crops were satisfactory, the shortage of potatoes would be a major calamity for men and animals alike, and by

itself would lead to a shortage of meat, especially pork. This 433
current emergency caught the satellite governments unprepared, 511
the more so because they had been stripping their countries of 466
foodstuffs by military stockpiling, sending vast amounts of meat, sugar, and other staples to Russia and Red China, and antagonizing the peasant producers of food by ever increasing taxes, supply quotas, and other forms of persecution and chicanery. The net consequence of such policies and practices is that in many industrial areas of captive Middle Europe the people have had very little meat since the summer of 1951. Their supply of sugar, vegetables, and potatoes has also been very short. The Polish, Czech, Hungarian, and Rumanian coal miners were already badly housed, badly clothed, and overworked. Now they are also badly fed, and they may be — or actually are — incapable of working as much as is expected. The lowered efficiency of the miners means less coal and less coal means in turn less electric power, less machinery, and less chemicals. A shortage of fuel may be equivalent to a nonfulfillment of industrial targets all over the four countries in question.

Statistical data naturally lag behind the real situation in industry. At the end of 1951 the available statistical figures were not yet fully reflecting the most serious consequences of the food crisis. However, they were indicative of a trend toward a depression in coal mining.

In Poland the coal target for the third quarter of 1951 was 316
not fulfilled, and the actual production was only 2 percent higher 433
than a year before, instead of the expected 5 to 6 percent. During the first half of 1951 coal extraction in Rumania was nearly 8 percent behind the plan, although it was claimed to be 26 percent above the output during the corresponding period of 1950. In the same period in Hungary coal was 6 percent behind the schedule, although again production was claimed to be 22 percent higher than 1950. In Czechoslovakia the slump in coal production was much more pronounced. It began by a temporary failure of production towards the end of 1950; even though it was overcome, the Czech government found itself unable

316 to supply adequate supplementary manpower to the coal mines.
●433 In the third quarter of 1951 the joint coal and lignite plan was fulfilled only by 91 percent. Lignite mining was more or less satisfactory, but coal mining (in particular in the important Ostrava-Karvinna coal basin) was actually on the verge of a possible breakdown; by the end of October 1951, Czech coal production was 1.3 million tons behind schedule. Eastern Germany alone was implementing its coal plan.

[466] Faced with a direct threat to their planning, the satellite governments took, towards the end of 1951, a series of harsh steps. Their object was to assure higher wages and a better diet for the coal miners and to prevent the increasing absenteeism and bad discipline in the mines, as well as the increasing fluidity of manpower (in particular in Czechoslovakia and Hungary). Under the impact of these measures, the production curve in the all-important Silesian-Ostravan coal basin went upwards again in November and December 1951. It is possible that the Polish coal target for 1951 (somewhat above 83 million tons) was reached before the end of the year. It is doubtful, however, that the Czech target was reached. In the first weeks of 1952 it is too early to say whether this new production rise is temporary or permanent. It depends very largely on the supply of foodstuffs. The police states have at their disposal many effective methods of dealing with critical situations, but they cannot produce foodstuffs at will. It took the Soviet government years to overcome a similar situation in the Donets basin coal mining.

316 The production of lignite in the captive area is far less difficult for the satellite governments, in particular for Eastern Germany, which mines several times more lignite than all the other countries of Middle Europe combined. The explanation lies in the technique of extraction. The deposits of lignite generally lie close to the surface of the ground and can be worked by stripping and scraping from open mines, or they are covered by a shallow overburden[77] that must be removed before the mineral can be mined, as is true of some coal deposits in the United States. Only one fortieth of the nearly unlimited reserves of lignite in Eastern

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more favorable: although the output of black and brown coal was also lagging behind schedule, its extraction in the second quarter of 1951 was claimed to have exceeded that of the second quarter of 1950 by 26 percent (*Gospodarka Planowa*, 1951, No. 10). No detailed data are known for coal extraction in Bulgaria.

[6] 100 million tons (according to some indirect indices, 103 million) in Poland, 25 million in Czechoslovakia, 3.5 million in Eastern Germany, about 3 million in Hungary, about one million in Rumania, and about 0.5 million in Bulgaria. The Eastern German target, originally set at 4 million tons, was subsequently reduced to 3.5 million tons (the Law of 1 November 1951, *Wirtschaft*, Berlin, 1951, No. 44) — the only known instance of this kind. Yet various utterances of the chief planners in Poland and Rumania, and of Eastern Germany as well, leave little doubt that the long-range economic plans of these countries, supposed to terminate by the end of 1955, will be accelerated by one year, as has already happened with the Czechoslovak and Hungarian plans. In anticipation of that step, the writer assumes throughout his study that the figures of planned output in Eastern Germany, Poland, and Rumania in 1955 in fact pertain to 1954. An arbitrary but plausible figure of one million tons increase in the coal output in Czechoslovakia has been accepted for 1954 in comparison with the output planned for 1953.

[7] London *Economist*, 24 February 1951. According to the Soviet Fourth Five Year Plan, that figure should have been 86 million tons. Since the plan was overfulfilled, it was probably larger.

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[8] Most of the descriptive data on lignite comes from an exhaustive study by Sir Richard Redmayne, *Encyclopædia Britannica*, 1943, Vol. V. p. 878 ff.

[9] United Nations, Geneva, 1950, p. 231.

[10] Redmayne, *op. cit.*

[11] In its original version of 1950 the Eastern German Five Year Plan foresaw a production of 205 million tons of lignite by 1955. The new figure of 225.2 million tons in 1955 comes from the revised version of the plan as adoped in the law of 1 November 1951, (*Wirtschaft*, Berlin, No. 44, 2 November 1951).

[12] The first figure is based on the indices of the coal production in 1951 in comparison with the preceding years, as published by the Soviet press. The second comes from Stalin's speech of 9 February 1946.

[13] In his speech of 7 November 1951, Beria stated that in the course of the past several years the output of coal in the Soviet Union has been growing on the average of 24 million tons per year. (*Pravda*, 7 November 1951).

[14] The vast Lauchhammer lignite coking plant now under construction (and possibly some other new plants) is expected to produce 300,000

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tons of coke in 1952, 1,300,000 tons by 1953 and 1,700,000 tons by 1955 (speech of 31 October 1951, by Heinrich Rau, Eastern German minister of planning, *Wirtschaft*, Berlin, 1951, No. 44). However the rapidly growing requirements of the new Eastern German metallurgic plants cannot be satisfied by the two locally produced types of coke and a large importation of coke from Poland. In its four year trade agreement with the Soviet Union of 27 September 1951, the Eastern German government assured itself the importation of 250,000 tons of coke from Russia annually for the period 1952-1955 (*Wirtschaft*, Berlin, 1951, No. 42).

[15] An estimate of the writer, based on the assumption that most of the hard coal extracted in Eastern Germany and Hungary, as well as in Rumania, will be converted into coke. Thus, the huge steel plant at Dunapentele (Stalinváros) in Hungary, now under construction, is expected to be run on Hungarian produced coke, converted from the local Pécs coal. The demand for coke by that plant alone may exceed one million tons.

[16] *European Steel Trends*, United Nations, Geneva, 1949, p. 40.

[17] An unpublished study on Czechoslovak industry by Dr. V. Paulat of New York.

[18] National Economic Plan for 1951, *Dziennik Ustaw* (Journal of Laws), Warsaw, 31 March 1951.

[19] Heinrich Rau, speech of 31 October 1951, *Wirtschaft*, Berlin, 1951, No. 44.

[20] A conservative estimate of the writer.

[21] See the *Information Bulletin* of the Rumanian National Committee, Washington, for 1950 and 1951, and *La Nation Roumaine*, Paris, *passim*.

[22] Here are some of the non-quoted estimates: the *Review of International Affairs*, Belgrade, 28 March 1951 — 3.5 million tons; *World Today*, London, Royal Institute of International Affairs, April 1951 — 3.8 million; *Etudes et Conjonctures*, Paris, a semi-official publication, January-February 1951 — 4.3 million; *Gospodarka Planowa* (Planned Economy), Warsaw, February 1951 — 5.46 million tons. The Belgrade magazine is biased.

[23] The first figure comes from the Rumanian National Committee, *supra*, the second from Dr. G. G. Rosu.

[24] According to the *Wirtschaftsdienst*, Hamburg, June 1951, Albania planned to extract 306,000 tons of oil in 1950. According to Musil, the Albanian correspondent of *Wirtschaft* (Berlin, No. 48 of 30 November 1951), the Albanian extraction of oil reached 192,000 tons in 1948 and increased to 307,000 tons in 1950.

[25] Figures taken from recent official reports.

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377 1. It may be taken for granted that every effort will be made to fulfill the Eastern German, Polish, and Rumanian plans one year ahead of schedule, that is, by the end of 1954 or beginning of 1955.

2. It may be expected that, having fulfilled its plan for power by the end of 1951, Bulgaria will launch a new plan which may aim at an output of about one billion *kwh* more by the end of 1954 or the beginning of 1955 — an entirely justified supposition.

3. It is true that the output of 16.5 billion *kwh* which Czechoslovakia plans to reach in 1955 cannot be accepted as its target for 1954 or beginning of 1955, and a much lower figure should be taken instead.

4. But the larger Bulgarian and the lower Czechoslovakian figure may compensate one another, especially if a lower figure of the Hungarian output in 1954 (6,000 million *kwh* instead of 6,500 million) is accepted as the basis for the tentative computation.

Under the circumstances the writer regards the mere arithmetic sum of the six national targets, equivalent to more or less 82 billion *kwh*, as an entirely acceptable hypothesis: the margin of error should not exceed one billion *kwh*.

[60] Harry Schwartz, *New York Times*, 23 January 1951.

[61] Estimates of the writer.

371 [62] *Economic Survey of Europe in 1949*, United Nations, Geneva, 1950, p. 231.

[63] 82 billion *kwh* represent the equivalent of somewhat over 50 million tons of coal (1,590 *kwh* equivalent to one ton of coal, see footnote 62). This figure corresponds to a general figure for Europe; see p. 12 of the same *Survey*.

[64] Estimates of the writer.

[65] Silesian coal has been exported for generations, and trade in it flourished between the two World Wars. Industrial production and railroad transportation in the countries named depend to some extent on the specific technical quality of Polish coal.

[66] 800 million *kwh* from Hamburg and West Berlin, according to *Wirtschaftsrevue*, Karlsruhe, 15 December 1950. See also footnote 14.

371 [67] *Trybuna Ludu*, Warsaw, 1951, No. 53.

433 [68] *Statistical Yearbook of Poland*, 1939, p. 239; also *European Steel*
316 *Trends*, United Nations, Geneva, 1949, p. 51.

[69] Evaluation by Alfred Zauberman, *Dziennik Polski*, London, 1951.

[70] The production of the Donbas combines began in 1951 at the Piotrowice plant of heavy mining machinery in Poland (*Wirtschaft*, Berlin, 1951, No. 32) and in at least one of the corresponding plants in Czechoslovakia.

185 [71] *Trybuna Ludu*, Warsaw, 1951, No. 160.

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years after the beginning of the Russian occupation. The fear that the revolutionary enthusiasm of the Bulgarian masses (which, except in Yugoslavia, was unparalleled in this region after the war) would lead to too much independence of Russia, and the Russian bureaucracy's confidence that nationalisation could be carried out whenever they wished, caused them to postpone it until the revolutionary wave had ebbed at the end of 1947. 471

The timing of nationalisation in Rumania, Hungary and Bulgaria was determined by another very important factor— the Marshall Plan. The urge to trade with Western Europe, as expressed in the *unanimous* decision of the Czechoslovak government on 4 July, 1947, to take part in the Marshall Conference (a decision revoked when Gottwald and Masaryk visited Moscow on 10th July) made it necessary for Russia to strengthen her control over the economy of Eastern Europe, and this could be done only through state ownership of industries in all these countries. Hence the nationalisations in Bulgaria, Rumania and Hungary. 471 439

Poland

It is impossible to understand the process of nationalisation in Poland without taking into account two factors, namely, in the area of pre-war Poland, the existence of many industries previously controlled by German capital now remaining ownerless, and, what is even more important, the changes in Polish industry brought about by the annexation of the German area east of the Oder-Neisse and the expulsion of the German population from it. This area will be referred to as the Western territories of Poland, and the area of pre-war Poland as Old Poland. 471

The importance of the industry of the Western territories compared with the industry of Old Poland is shown by the following table: 483 471

ACTUAL PRODUCTION IN 1937 (IN THOUSAND TONS)

	Pre-War Poland	*Western Territories*
Coal	36,218.0	29,793.0
Coke	2,328.0	3,229.0
Briquettes ..	17.4	368.6
Brown coal ..	18.4	7,594.0
Zinc and lead ..	800.0	722.1
Iron ore	791.6	73.1

(*The World Today*, March, 1947)

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CHAPTER III

SCARCITY OF CAPITAL

Problems of Agricultural Development

241 511 433 AN EXAMINATION of the economic situation of the countries of Eastern and South-Eastern Europe will make it obvious that no redistribution of the national income and wealth will by itself radically improve the condition of the people. For example, if the total agricultural land of the countries (and not, as has been the case, merely the large estates) were distributed equally among the peasants ('Black Distribution' in the phrase of the Russian revolutionaries under the Tsar), the main result would be the equalisation of poverty. As long as the majority of the people are engaged in agriculture and the producivity of labour in agriculture is as low as it is today, no real improvement of their condition is possible.

The level of output of agriculture per head of the agricultural population in Eastern Europe is very low, as can be illustrated by comparing it with other regions. It is, of course, difficult to compare the agricultural productivity of different countries, which produce various products in differing proportions. Fortunately Wilbert E. Moore has undertaken an important statistical work, attempting to fulfil this task for different European countries (op. cit.). He weighs the quantities of agricultural goods produced according to a uniform set of value rations which he calls the Crop Unit (C.U.). For the years 1931-5 on the average, the results were as follows (see top of page 45) (the index calculation has been made from Moore's absolute figures).

Although there are differences in the productivity of agriculture as between the different countries of Eastern Europe, there is a much greater *inequality* between Western Europe as a whole and Eastern Europe as a whole, the latter's productivity being 4-5 times lower than the former's.

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AGRICULTURAL PRODUCTION PER PERSON DEPENDENT ON AGRICULTURE AND PER MALE ENGAGED IN AGRICULTURE

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	Per Person Dependent on Agriculture		*Per Male Engaged in Agriculture*	
	Crop Units	*Index* Denmark = 100	*Crop Units*	*Index* Denmark = 100
Denmark	152	100	411	100
England and Wales	137	90	306	74
Netherlands ..	114	75	302	73
Switzerland	84	55	213	52
Belgium	95	62	230	56
France	75	49	204	50
Germany	84	55	244	59
Czechoslovakia ..	45	30	146	36
Hungary	33	22	96	23
Poland	21	14	72	17
Rumania	21	14	67	16
Bulgaria	20	13	70	17
Yugoslavia ..	17	11	55	13
Albania	10	7	32	8

(p. 35).

The large extent to which this is the *direct* result of the greater density of the agricultural population in Eastern than Western Europe becomes clear if the number of hectares of agricultural land per person dependent on agriculture in the different countries is compared. Taking the number in Denmark as 100, the comparative figures are:

Denmark	100	Czechoslovakia ..	54
England and Wales ..	112	Hungary	59
Netherlands	47	Poland	44
Switzerland	35	Rumania	46
Belgium	57	Bulgaria	20
France	108	Yugoslavia	37
Germany	71	Albania	22

It is clear that there is no exact correlation between countries arranged according to productivity per person dependent on agriculture and according to the quantity of agricultural land per person dependent on agriculture. But that there is a certain correlation can be seen by comparing the countries of Western Europe as a group and the countries of Eastern Europe as a group. In the first group there is twice as much agricultural land per person dependent on agriculture as in the second.

The great density of the agricultural population in Eastern Europe compared with Western Europe goes some way to explaining the low productivity per head of the agricultural population in the former compared with the latter. There is another factor that must be mentioned if the explanation is to be complete, namely, that the agricultural output per unit of

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241 area is much smaller in Eastern Europe than in Western
511 Europe. This is shown clearly in the following table:
● 433

AGRICULTURAL PRODUCTION PER HECTARE OF AGRICULTURAL LAND

	Crop Units	Index		Crop Units	Index
Denmark	57	100	Czechoslovakia	31	54
England and Wales	46	81	Hungary ..	21	37
Netherlands ..	91	160	Bulgaria ..	19	33
Switzerland ..	89	156	Poland	18	32
Belgium	63	111	Rumania ..	17	30
France	26	46	Yugoslavia ..	17	30
Germany	44	79	Albania ..	17	30

If the agricultural population of Eastern Europe is to have the same quantity of agricultural products per head as in Western Europe, not only must half of them be removed, but the agricultural output must be doubled.

The low productivity in Eastern Europe is not the result of
[134] infertility of the soil. On the contrary, the soil of Eastern Europe, and especially the excellent black soil of the Danube Plain, is on the whole much richer than the naturally poor soil of Western Europe. The low productivity is due to three main causes, the scarcity of livestock, the scanty use of fertilizers and the lack of agricultural implements and machinery.

LIVESTOCK DENSITY (1938)

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	Cattle per 100 ha. Agricultural Area	Pigs per 100 ha. Arable Land
Czechoslovakia ..	59.1	65.3
Hungary	24.9	55.3
Poland	41.3	40.6
Rumania	23.5	23.5
Bulgaria	41.0	22.1
Yugoslavia	29.8	46.0
Germany	69.8	122.5
France	45.2	34.4
Denmark	103.1	106.1

(PEP—Political and Economic Planning-*Economic Development in S.E. Europe*, 1945, p. 34).

In this table the figures for the countries of Eastern Europe include a large number of oxen and buffaloes which are used mainly as draught animals. In the quality of its livestock Eastern Europe compares even more unfavourably with Western Europe than in the quantity.

407 On the question of agricultural implements and machinery,
241 the PEP study states :

'The value of all agricultural equipment used per hectare of arable land was estimated by a Roumanian source at Lei 1,000

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CHAPTER V

THE ECONOMIC PLANS OF THE SATELLITES

ALL THE satellite countries have introduced economic Plans. These plans are of two kinds: the short-term plans, which ran from 1947 to 1948-9, whose aim was recovery, and the long-term plans, which began in 1949 or 1950, whose aim is to raise production considerably above the pre-war level. Yugoslavia alone did not undertake the two kinds of plans but started with a Five Year Plan (1947-51), while Rumania has not yet gone beyond the scope of one-year plans (she intends to introduce a Five Year Plan in 1951). Let us examine the main features of the plans.

The long-term plans have very ambitious targets of output. They fix an annual increase in the gross national product of 8 per cent in Czechoslovakia, 10 per cent in Hungary and Poland, 12 per cent in Bulgaria and 14 per cent in Yugoslavia. As regards the annual increase in manufactured products, it is 9 per cent in Czechoslovakia, 11 per cent in Poland, 13 per cent in Hungary, 17 per cent in Bulgaria and 37 per cent in Yugoslavia.

To arrive at a correct conception of what these percentages mean, it is necessary to know on what basis these percentual calculations have been made. For instance, the industrial production in the U.S. and British Zones of Germany rose between December, 1946, and December, 1948, by 137 per cent, or on a yearly average by 68.5 per cent, but this in itself does not signify any really spectacular achievement for Germany, since in December, 1946, the level of production was exceptionally low, and even after the increase of 137 per cent, it did not reach the pre-war level. It is difficult to discover what is the exact starting point from which the plans of the Eastern European countries set out, as there is very little

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185 information available on the subject. It is known that the agric-
433 cultural output in the basic year was, in percentage of pre-war output, in Bulgaria, 70 per cent; in Czechoslovakia, 80 per cent; in Hungary, 85 per cent; in Poland, 70 per cent; in Yugoslavia, 69 per cent. As regards the industrial output in the basic year, it was, in comparison with the pre-war level, in Czechoslovakia, 102 per cent; in Poland, 133 per cent; in Bulgaria, 170 per cent. As far as Poland is concerned, it must be borne in mind that the addition of the 'Regained Territories' doubles her industrial capacity. It is not known how much weight is given in the plans to industrial as compared with agricultural output in the total national output. The rise of the total national production would have been considerably less proportionately if any year *before* and not *after* the war had been chosen as the basic year, since agricultural output in the 'basic year' was in each country below the pre-war level of output and industrial output was above while only a small minority of the population was engaged in industry.

In addition, it is obvious that in general any calculation in percentages of the rise of output that does not take into consideration the absolute magnitude of the basis will paint a rosier picture the more backward the country is. Thus if Yugoslavia's Five Year Plan envisages an increase in the output of crude steel of 223 per cent in 1951 above the level of 1939, it might leave the impression that the achievements of Yugoslavia's steel industry will be four times greater than that of the United States between 1937 and 1948, when she increased her output by 56 per cent. But if the achievement of the industries of the two countries is described in absolute magnitudes, a totally different impression is given. The production of Yugoslavia's steel industry will rise, if the Plan is fulfilled, from 240 thousand tons to 760 thousand tons, i.e., by a little more than half a million tons; while that of the U.S.A. rose from 51.4 million tons to 80.3 million, i.e., by 28.9 million tons. André Philip, French delegate to the Economic Commission for Europe, illustrated this point by saying that his grandson had recently cut a second tooth, thus increasing his dental production by 100 per cent—but he still had less teeth than most people.

There is another aspect to the question. Figures of the rise in output, when the amount of investment or disinvestment is

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not taken into account, can be misleading. If the owner of a factory does not renew its machinery, buildings, and so forth, but instead builds a new factory which is equal in value to the depreciation of the old, then the *immediate* result is that two factories are producing instead of one, and the output rises, although the amount of his capital remains unchanged, and after the total depreciation of his old factory, output will decline to the level of only one factory. The same principle holds good for the countries of Eastern Europe, where the rise in output over the past few years has not been accompanied by a parallel increase in the investment of capital. In some cases, it has even been accompanied by disinvestment, as the following table, dealing with agriculture, shows:

	Level of Agricultural Production			Estimated Net Investment in Fixed Capital in Agriculture and Fisheries (in million dollars, 1938 prices)	
	Index numbers. 1934-8 = 100				
	1946/7	*1947/8*	*1948/9*	*1947*	*1948*
Bulgaria ..	67	71	—	−13	−11
Czechoslovakia	80	62	80	−21	−19
Hungary ..	57	67	85	−11	−5
Poland ..	46	59	70	−5	11

(U.N. *Economic Survey of Europe in 1948*, Geneva, 1949, pp. 17, 51)

(In order not to get a false picture one should bear in mind that the negative balance of investments in agriculture in fixed capital may have been offset by an increase in livestock, which is not included in the figures).

Another example of the same phenomenon is the textile and clothing industry of Poland. This showed a big rise in output in 1947, and at the same time a net disinvestment of 10 million dollars in 1938 prices (Ibid. p. 53).

Another factor must be taken into account. In the backward conditions of Eastern Europe, even a small addition to the net investment may bring about a disproportionately large addition to the output, the more so—in the short run—if certain whole new industries are built while other plants or branches of industry are starved of capital.

Even with these reservations, the investment plans of the countries of Eastern Europe should not be underestimated, though the statistics are really related to gross new investments (without depreciation being taken into account). In absolute figures the targets were:

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434 starvation' of the industries producing consumption goods, while the new capital investment is directed into the capital goods industries:

ESTIMATED NET INVESTMENT IN FIXED CAPITAL IN INDUSTRY IN 1947
(MILLIONS OF DOLLARS IN 1938 PRICES)

	Hungary		Poland	
Food processing, etc. ..	−1.7	−1.5	−1.4	−11.7
Textiles and clothing ..	0.5		−10.0	
Leather and rubber ..	0.1		0.2	
Paper and printing	−0.4		−0.5	
Timber and timber products	−0.1		0.2	
Building materials, etc. ..	−0.7		−1.0	
Metals and engineering ..	5.3	5.8	7.4	13.6
Chemicals	0.5		6.2	
Total manufacturing ..	3.5		1.1	

(Ibid. p. 53)

This is a foretaste of the future.*

185 As regards agriculture the Plans for all the countries, except
● 433 Poland, provide that the output shall exceed the pre-war level, by about a sixth in Czechoslovakia and Hungary, and a third to a half in Yugoslavia and Bulgaria. In Poland it may not exceed its pre-war level in present territory. (Ibid. p. 206).

*In U.S.S.R. the relatively great lag in industries producing means of consumption behind those producing means of production is shown by the following official data of the division of the gross output of industry:

DIVISION OF GROSS OUTPUT OF INDUSTRY INTO MEANS OF PRODUCTION AND MEANS OF CONSUMPTION (IN PERCENTAGES)

	1913	1928	1932	1937	1940	1942 (Planned)
Means of production	33.3	32.8	53.3	57.8	61.0	62.2
Means of consumption	66.7	67.2	46.7	42.2	39.0	37.8

It is very difficult to check the *absolute* change in the production of different means of consumption. In Russian statistics a number of simple tricks are used to describe the situation in more glowing terms than is true. The output of a number of consumption industries is given only in monetary terms; the production of the small factories which, till 1928, made an important contribution to the production of means of consumption, is not included.

Official statistics can therefore show a tremendous rise in the output of shoes, which, however, cannot be squared with the facts. The number of animals slaughtered annually after the big 'collectivisation' drive never reached the number slaughtered previously, as it was not until 1938 that the total number of livestock reached the 1929 figure (in 1929 cattle numbered 68.1 million, in 1938, 63.2; sheep and goats numbered 147.2 and 102.1 million respectively). At the same time the surplus of imported hides, skins and leather over exported was 54.3 thousand tons in 1928 as against only 15.6 thousand tons in 1938. Only Stalinist statisticians can produce the 'miracle' of tripling the number of leather shoes out of a decreasing quantity of leather. The Russian government, relying on the 'short memory' of the people, or more correctly on the oppressive machinery which ensures that past memories remain unuttered, adds insult to injury. While promising a tremendous rise in the production of means of con-

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A technical revolution in agriculture is also planned for the coming few years (except in Yugoslavia). This is shown by the tremendous rise in the number of tractors:

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ACTUAL AND PLANNED NUMBER OF TRACTORS IN RELATION TO ARABLE LAND

Country	*Year*	*Number (thousands)*	*Arable land per Tractor (hectares)*
Poland	1946	5.5	3,000
	1955	76.5	220
Czechoslovakia	1946	11.8	460
	1953	45.0	120
Hungary	1947	11.9	490
	1954	21.0†	280
Rumania	1948	11.0	850
	1949	12.5	740
Bulgaria	1946	4.6	920
	1953	10.0	430
Yugoslavia	1946	4.0	1,800
	1951	4.5	1,710
Total	1946	44.9	1,100
	Last year of plan	169.5	290

(Ibid. p. 208). †state tractors only.

Agriculture will be reorganised on the new technical basis, state and co-operative farms replacing the small peasant farms.

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sumption with every Five-Year Plan, it fixes the actual target of the Plan at a volume of production which does not exceed the target of former Plans. This is shown clearly by the following table:

TARGETS OF PRODUCTION FOR THE END OF THE FIVE-YEAR PLANS

	First 1932-3	*Second 1937*	*Third 1942*	*Fourth 1950*
Some Means of Consumption				
Cotton goods (milliard metres) ..	4.7	5.1	4.9	4.7
Woollen goods (million „) ..	270	220	177	159
Linen (million metres)	500	600	385	—
Vegetable oil (thousand tons) ..	1,100	750	850	880
Sugar (million tons)	2.6	2.5	3.5	2.4
Some Means of Production				
Electric Current (million kwh.) ..	22	38	75	82
Coal (million tons)	75	152.5	243	250
Pig iron (million tons)	10	16.0	22	19.5
Steel (million tons)	10.4	17	28	25.4
Oil and gas (million tons) ..	21.7	46.8	54	35.4

(Actually in the territory of the U.S.S.R., in 1913, 2,854 million metres of cotton goods and 95-110 million metres of woollen goods were produced; in 1937 the corresponding figures were 3,181 and 98).

Therefore, when the Russian government boasts that 'in 1950 we will reach the level of 4.7 thousand milliard metres of cotton goods' it does not prevent them from having made the same promise twenty years ago, when the population of U.S.S.R. was about fifty millions less than now.

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servitude, the adoption of improved techniques of agricultural production and marketing, and the improvement of the lot of the individual peasant through land reform and the combined efforts of the landlords and the state. Most of European Turkey had never known feudalism in the Western sense, and the peasants of Serbia and Bulgaria emerged early as independent landowners with a sound understanding of their own interests. In many areas of Rumania, Austria-Hungary, and the Polish sections of Germany and Russia, however, the peasants were freed from feudal restrictions only to sink into a deeper misery, sometimes called "neo-serfdom," that stemmed from lack of capital and the resultant economic dependency on the landlords. As a consequence, while independent peasant political parties began to develop among the Czechs and southern Slavs shortly after the turn of the century, the peasants in Russia in 1905 and in Rumania in 1907 resorted to the desperate method of revolution.

The agrarian backwardness that characterized the greater part of Eastern Europe was a great challenge to social and political philosophers, and it was not surprising that the First World War left in its wake attempts at radical solutions by leaders acting in the name of the proletariat or the peasantry. The recommendation of the economists, in the presence of this agrarian poverty and overpopulation, was that agricultural improvement be accompanied by the extension of industry and trade. In the areas where large landowners exercised full political control, this recommendation was not welcomed as the landowners tended to favor fiscal policies that kept the price of grain high and the peasant poor. In other areas, however, important industrial development took place. Thus, the Austrian provinces of Bohemia and Moravia, with their preponderant Czech population, accounted for a little over one half the entire industrial output of Austria-Hungary. This production included coal and

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178 iron as well as consumer goods and benefited by the large
433 market that the empire provided. Significant industrial development also took place in Hungary and in other parts of the empire. Similarly, in Russian Poland important industries were developed, but these suffered from the discriminatory policy of the Russian government and from the lack of communications.

457 Capital for the economic development of this region came
471 chiefly from France until the 1890's, when German and Austrian capital became increasingly active. In Eastern Europe in general, and particularly in the Balkans, loans had as much a political as an economic incentive. Since the credit of Serbia, Bulgaria, and Rumania was poor, the bondholders were able to insist on a variety of controls to assure payment. Although a substantial amount of this capital was used to finance armament and eventually wars, investments of permanent value were also made. Notable among these was the railroad from Vienna to Constantinople, completed in 1888, which with its branches formed the backbone of the transportation system of Southeastern Europe.

III

186 Collective security and economic interdependence, as
631 these terms are understood today, were certainly among the motives of the various plans for regional organization proposed for Eastern Europe in the century before the First World War. Yet the nineteenth century was for Europe an age in which war was the exception rather than the rule and national frontiers were not the barriers to trade and to the movements of peoples that they have since become. Although motives of power politics in the modern sense were always present, regionalism in this era was also concerned

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829 Peter I, there was much more freedom, in spite of the social
571 and cultural backwardness of the people, than there had been under the dictatorship of the Crown in the '30's when the economic and social level of the country was much higher than in prewar years. It is sufficient to compare the liberal Radical, Nikola Pašić, with the unprincipled opportunist Milan Stojadinović (whom Ciano praised as a "true fascist") to realize that the betterment of economic conditions did not prevent the disintegration of democracy in Yugoslavia. Between the two world wars, Poland progressed economically and made great strides in industrialization, yet from 1926 on she was subjected to the semidictatorship of Pilsudski.

[433] In Hungary, after the First World War, the economic situation was not much better than it was in Austria. Yet, in spite of both this and the reactionary regime of Admiral Horthy in Budapest, some vestiges of liberalism survived even the Second World War. In Austria, in spite of the substantial influence exercised in Vienna by the Social Democrats and by the liberal bourgeoisie, a semidictatorial regime was installed in 1934. Germany's economic and social structure was more advanced than that of Czechoslovakia. The grave economic crisis of the '30's caused wide unemployment in both these countries, yet the small Czechoslovakian Republic remained faithful to liberal democracy until she fell before Nazi aggression, while in Germany Hitler was already in power in 1933.

829 These examples are surely sufficient to show that the strength or weakness of liberalism in Eastern Europe did not depend solely, or even mostly, upon economic and social conditions. These were certainly very important factors, but of more importance were the psychological climate and the political tradition within each individual nation. Czechoslovakia remained democratic until her fall because, ever since the Hussite revolution in the fifteenth century, the substantial majority of both Czechs and Slovaks had been

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Russian *kulak*. The village rich are not allowed to enter a collective or are expelled if they become members. A merciless battle is being waged to ruin them. They are being liquidated as peasants, removed from villages, and sent to mines or to industry or concentration camps. There are roughly thirteen million peasant families in Eastern Europe, more than one million of which are *kulaks*. The children of all these families must lose the individualistic traits of their peasant heritage: that is the Communist aim.

Large-scale industrialization plans, for military purposes rather than for consumer production, are being pushed forward with great vigor in all Eastern European states and new labor is required in great numbers. *Kulaks* and other class enemies are an obvious source for this labor. By tapping this source, the surplus agricultural population will be disposed of and the people with individualist outlook gradually destroyed. If there is a shortage of workers in agriculture, as for instance in Czechoslovakia now, industrial workers already persuaded to the collective way of thinking can be utilized.

The term *kulak* has come to mean anyone who is against collectivization, and all *kulaks* are to be destroyed. The process of destruction is quickly changing the status of the agrarian population in this region. The agricultural population is decreasing and, according to estimate, does not amount today to more than 45 per cent of the total population. This decrease is the political consequence of collectivization and not its economic or social result. The collectivization policy itself cannot solve the old problem of rural overpopulation but can only aggravate it. The real aim of Communist collectivization is not to solve this problem but rather to destroy the peasantry.

Agriculture, like the other divisions of economic life, has been dictated by state plans which prescribe to the peasant what crops are to be grown and what animals are to be bred.

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241 The peasants do not like regimentation and therefore the
185 Communist economic plans have not brought about any increase in agricultural production.

208 The collectivization policy has further aggravated the situation. The peasants hate even the word "collective." They go about their work with indifference or with fear and hatred. Their aversion to coercion, dictatorship, and controls, their attachment to their land, and their pride in independence, have neutralized all the advantages of large-scale production with its mechanization and its use of modern agricultural methods. The Communist belief that large-scale operation would bring about efficient agricultural production has not materialized.

262 Agricultural production is decreasing. Eastern Europe
433 used to be a very large exporter of all agricultural products,
241 but it is suffering from shortages today. Food is scarce in these agricultural countries. Before the Second World War, nine out of ten residents of Czechoslovakia were nourished by the produce of Czechoslovakian agriculture. There were no rations. Everybody could buy what he wanted, and the standard of living in Czechoslovakia was the highest in Eastern Europe. Today, according to official Communist pronouncements, every second man in Czechoslovakia, despite strict rationing, has to be supplied from abroad. Milk, butter, and eggs are not distributed to adults at all, and even sugar is in short supply. Czechoslovakia, once the largest exporter of beet sugar in Europe, today cannot provide its diminished population with sugar although it has nearly 15 per cent fewer inhabitants than before 1938 due to the expulsion of the Germans. Bulgaria and Hungary, which had great surpluses of all agricultural products before the last war, must now import foodstuffs for their starving populations. Agricultural production in Eastern Europe has not yet attained the prewar level, although the free farms of Western Europe have surpassed it considerably.

178 per cent; and Czechoslovakia, 41 per cent. Thus it can be
162 easily seen that, with the exception of Czechoslovakia whose
241 industry was the most developed in the region, the countries of Eastern Europe were predominantly agricultural and peasant in nature. Yet despite the predominantly peasant character of these countries, the peasants as such had relatively little political influence.

178 Although there was an increase in the output of agricul-
241 tural goods in all these countries between 1918 and 1945,
511 the competition offered by overseas cereals strongly affected the agriculture of Eastern Europe. Cereals, one of the major products of the region, had to be undersold to Germany. Added to this unfortunate situation, the world depression of 1929 came as a terrible blow to the economy of Eastern Europe, the most disastrous years lasting from 1931 until 1934. Industry, with its frequent cartels, was better able to defend itself than was agriculture, and thus the "price scissors," or the disparity between agricultural and industrial prices, cut mostly into the income of the agricultural population. This resulted in a general lowering of both the purchasing power and the standard of living. Loans at high rates of interest were frequent and taxation increased the poverty of the peasants. These, as the major element of the population, pressed heavily for reforms and spread malcontent in their respective countries.

185 Soon after the First World War, some states realized that
167 the solution to this situation was industrialization. Emigra-
● 433 tion, as a possible solution, was not favored in any of the Eastern European states as it would have decreased manpower. Since war was considered more or less imminent after 1933, military and industrial groups were especially opposed to any large-scale loss of population, although emigration was never prohibited by actual government order.

185 Bohemia, which had been in a highly advantageous posi-
433 tion in the industrialization program of Austria before the

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First World War, was the only well-developed industrial region and provided the foundations of the industrial economy of Czechoslovakia. Poland and Hungary had some valuable industries which aided their development considerably. In the other states, industrialization made slow progress and often operated on an unsound basis. Many plants were erected, the products of which were not related to the needs of the respective countries. National welfare was often neglected and industries were built for the enrichment of a few individuals. Not even mining was efficient. Mines were exhausted or were reopened mainly on the basis of sudden export needs and with no thought that the industries might convert the mineral raw materials into consumer goods. Hungary, where bauxite was sold to Germany and aluminum was repurchased at a high price, offers an excellent example.

Mining, metallurgy, heavy industry, and textiles were favored but they were not related to the purchasing power of the masses or to the production of raw materials. Because of the low production of textile raw material, large textile plants were run on imports. Cereals, livestock, and other agricultural goods were exported to balance the budget. Thus, much of the capital had to be spent on transportation expenses. The attention paid to agricultural industry was insufficient despite the fact that mineral raw materials, agricultural products, and timber were assets upon which a satisfactory program of industrialization could have been based.

The causes for this situation are to be found in the political instability of Eastern Europe and in the lack of sufficient skills and resources. It was a region of wars and insecurity where little nations faced each other with mistrust and fought each other as fiercely as they did the outside powers. Industrial policy between the two world wars was dependent on power politics. The policy of economic self-sufficiency, or autarky, was engendered by nationalistic as-

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648 pirations mostly in order to develop a modern industry ca-
433 pable of meeting war needs.
178

The assumption that work invested in industrial development would improve economic conditions was a decisive factor in influencing states to industrialize. This assumption was particularly valid in regions with climatic extremities and little arable land. Some of the means used to foster industrialization were technical education, customs, embargoes, tax exemptions, monopolies, favorable credit policies, and provisions protecting the joint interests of domestic industries. The assembly line system, as influenced by the United States, was started in the industrial sector in the '30's.

Branches of industry requiring specialized skill were developed mainly in Czechoslovakia and Hungary, but they did not attract many from the surplus peasant population which still preferred unskilled jobs. The competition, such as it was, for unskilled jobs resulted in a low wage level. Therefore, the increase in purchasing power was gradual. Peasant poverty and the lack of skill and capital were the fundamental problems facing industrialization programs and the new governmental economic policies.

426 The general poverty was further increased by the fact
439 that the small Eastern European countries were debtor states. The solvency of Czechoslovakia was dependent on the export of industrial goods, while other states depended upon agricultural exports or, as in Rumania, upon mineral raw materials and lumber as well as on agricultural goods. Foreign debts, incurred before and after the First World War, weighed heavily on the budgets of the individual countries. Only one half of the debts were repaid during the interwar period. Foreign loans were given too often on the basis of political considerations. The boundaries erected by the 1920 peace treaties had already broken up natural economic and geographic areas, and the disproportionate lending policies of foreign powers hindered the uniform economic development of East-

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ern Europe. The individual states became more and more 426
antagonistic and trade within the Eastern European area 439
often took a course contrary to the requirements of reasonable economic policies. Free trade, cherished in the first postwar years, was soon abandoned for the sake of a policy of protective tariffs. Customs, duties, and foreign exchange restrictions to prevent speculation, were introduced to protect economic development and strength.

Both "economic nationalism" and "small power imperial- 186
ism" were features characteristic of this area in the period 433
between the wars. When the economic position of the new 648
states in the '20's is compared with the situation prior to the First World War, the problems of these states emerge clearly. The economic well-being of the old Austro-Hungarian empire lay in the regional character of its economic organization, which depended mostly on a coordinated internal market and a natural division of labor between the component parts of the empire. Although it was a social and cultural mosaic, the empire was organized in such a manner as to take advantage of the regional distribution of natural resources and the differing skills of the various populations.

The peace treaties ending the First World War, while meeting the political aspirations of various nationalities, did not provide a satisfactory solution to the economic problems of the region, and the newly created states were divided by serious political and economic differences. Political animosity soon led to economic warfare, and self-sufficiency, the driving motivation of the new states, precluded any real possibility of economic cooperation. The world depression of the early '30's led to the final economic and psychological collapse of Eastern European stability and opened the door wide to German economic penetration and the eventual conquest of the region.

The foreign trade of the Eastern European countries in 439
the years 1919-1944 was far smaller than it should have

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the gradual decline of the traditional rural and mainly peasant 185
structure of this part of Europe and the emergence of an in- 471
dustrial urbanized society. This transformation is now in full 661
swing and will continue until it runs its course—no one can say when or how—or until external factors end the Russian control of Eastern Europe and its nations rid themselves of their own Communists. Even then, the industrial development of that area will presumably continue, though for different reasons and with vastly different methods. The Communist regimes may go, but the results of the industrial revolution will remain.

This essay is concerned with the effects of these revolu- 121
tionary events on the social and economic development of the countries of Eastern Europe. To cover this involved subject adequately, much time and space would be necessary. The writer must limit himself here to the discussion of the few selected aspects of the problem that he regards as fundamental. Discussion of the industrial targets as established by the single countries in their long-range plans, half or more of which have already been achieved, cannot be included in this study.

Suffice it to say here that all over Eastern Europe the Com- 185
munist regimes are modernizing the existing mines and in- 433
dustrial plants and are building scores of new mines and thousands of large new plants, mostly supposed to produce capital goods as a basis for further industrial production. The anticipated result of the present first series of long-range plans, expected to terminate in less than two years, will be a large increase in the extraction of fuel and the doubling, in some cases tripling and quadrupling, of the heavy industrial potential of the individual nations of this region, some of which had a large industrial output before the last war. This vast operation requires that great numbers of peasants be transferred from agriculture to industry, mining, and construction. Once carried out, the first series of plans is to be

185 followed by a second, with the targets again much increased.
● 433 The preparation of these second five year plans has already begun. Their nature can be inferred from the electoral program of the National Front in Poland, published in the fall of 1952. The Warsaw regime proposes to raise the per capita industrial output of Poland by 1960 to ten times the by no means negligible standard of 1938. In other words, it intends that the Polish per capita industrial output shall surpass the present per capita industrial output of France. Other satellite governments probably have similar plans. Whatever may be thought about the feasibility of such grandiose plans, it should not be forgotten that under the Soviet regime Russia has evolved from a backward agricultural country, which it still was in 1928 when the first Five Year Plan was launched, into the second industrial power of the world, surpassing in total production Japan, France, Britain, and Germany.

The aims of enforced industrialization are several. The first is the numerical increase of factory workers who, as proletarians, are supposed to be not only the cream of society but convinced Communists as well. This early theory of the Soviet revolution, together with the term 'proletariat,' is falling into disuse. It has never been proven by facts: at other times and in other places, men entering the industrial process have not been inclined necessarily to become Communists, and there is no evidence that they are so inclined in the captive countries today. The second aim was defined on many occasions by Stalin. According to him, the Socialist transformation of society can be achieved and kept secure only by a steady growth in heavy industrial production, which at any given time must exceed the increase of light customer-serving industries and of agriculture. This rather abstract formula means, among other things, that in order to survive foreign aggression a Communist state or states must possess enough heavy industry to produce the necessary weapons at any given moment. Stalin's judgment was correct, though not

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necessarily Communist, since it applies to all states exposed to dangers from their neighbors. Another meaning of this formula is that Communist states cannot afford to depend on the non-Communist world for essential raw materials or machinery, since such imports might be stopped at the moment when they are most urgently needed. Consequently, a Communist state should produce these goods on its own. Here again, a distant echo of Russia's defeat during the First World War can be heard. Stalin seems to be saying that Communist Russia must never again be incapacitated or even hindered by industrial weakness. Indeed, his industrial Russia of 1941 withstood the German onslaught far better than had the imperial Russia of 1914.

The realization of this aim demands that all hitherto unused resources of manpower and dormant material wealth be utilized as rapidly as possible. At some future time these resources may well bring rich life to the people. But so long as the Soviet Union is encircled by potential enemies such resources must remain at the disposal of the state which defends "the social conquests of the revolution." The systematic realization of all these aims is assured through the consecutive five year plans for the development of the Soviet economy.

A year or two after the end of the Second World War, the Soviet Union felt certain that the West no longer had the means or desire to interfere with Soviet control of the so-called liberated nations of Eastern Europe. The countries of this region could be regarded henceforth as an extension of the Soviet Union proper, and their resources could be used for the achievements of the same aims as those of the Soviet Union. Under the transitory semi-Communist governments of that time, the captive nations showed enormous vitality in reconstructing their war-damaged economies. Since 1948-50 this vitality has been canalized into long-range industrial plans which have been synchronized with one another and

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185 with the Soviet master plans. The captive nations were al-
● 433 lowed to preserve the external attributes of sovereignty and their governments were granted an advisory voice in the preparation of these national plans. But the supreme control of the plans remained in the hands of Moscow, and their primary goal was, and is, rapid industrialization.

II

178 The possibilities of industrialization in Eastern Europe are considerable, but obviously not unlimited. They depend on the availability of manpower and its technical know-how, on industrial raw materials and machinery, on capital needed for investments, and on markets capable of absorbing the products of the new industries.

464 Before the last war, five million persons were employed in the mining and in the medium and large manufacturing industries of the six major countries of the area. Today this number exceeds nine million. There is a shortage of labor, both skilled and unskilled, in Eastern Germany and in the Czech part of Czechoslovakia. The reserves of manpower—land laborers, dwarf-farm owners, and married women—are limited in Hungary and the Slovak part of Czechoslovakia, large in Poland, and even larger in Rumania and in the three Balkan countries. The areas where labor is short coincide to a large degree with those of low natural increase of population, and vice versa. In the first period of reconstruction after
369 the war, there was in many parts of the area a movement of
464 the population from the villages to the towns in search of
166 urban, not necessarily industrial, employment. For instance, in Poland alone, two and one-half million persons moved into towns during the first seven postwar years. This movement is now over, as well as the postwar enthusiasm for reconstruction, and the governments have to recruit new workers by propaganda and sometimes by half-coercion. Unless

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463 ments made by single countries of the area are systematically exchanged with Russia and other captive countries, and many thousands of Soviet, Czech, Eastern German, and Hungarian experts, technical advisers, and skilled specialists are employed by the less advanced countries of the area. It is difficult, if at all feasible, to compare the sum of technical knowledge behind the Iron Curtain to that in the free world. Undoubtedly, the countries of Eastern Europe lag behind the free world in all technical respects, but it would be imprudent to believe that they are not making much technical progress.

• 433 377 The area as a whole and the single countries within it, except for Eastern Germany and Czechoslovakia, are, generally speaking, self-sufficient in foodstuffs. It also has sufficient reserves of solid and liquid fuel. Using both these reserves and their hydroelectric power, it can produce an in-
433 creasing amount of electric power. On the other hand, the
135 area is poor in metallic ores. There is much bauxite in Hungary, and supplies of lead and zinc in Poland. Yugoslavia and Bulgaria are rich in many ores. However, there is not enough iron or manganese ore in Eastern Europe, far from enough copper, no tin, and a lack of many supplementary metals of significance to modern metallurgy. Chemical raw materials are abundant, especially in Poland and Rumania, but the area lacks phosphate rock and is poor in sulphur compounds. It has no jute, very little cotton, not enough wool, and no rubber. The resulting limitations to industrial expansion are obvious. They are offset to some extent by the existence of dormant resources and by the fact that the southern Balkan area has not yet been properly explored. It is possible that the Balkan mountains contain more mineral wealth than has been assumed hitherto. Soviet geologists are certain that this is so. Some deficiencies in raw materials can be met, as was the practice under Hitler, by using substitutes such as synthetic oil, rubber, yarn, and plastics. This area can

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produce many substitutes. Today, shortages of raw materials 433 ●
are covered by imports from abroad, most of these from the 135
Soviet Union. Economic autarky is not possible in Eastern Europe alone, but the Soviet bloc, including Russia and China, is almost self-sufficient in raw materials.

Under the unrelenting pressure of Moscow, the output 402
of machinery and plant equipment in this area is making 439
steady and rapid progress. The period when most of these countries must depend on importation of machinery from the West is almost over. Were all Western sources of industrial machinery to be completely closed to the captive area, its industrialization would be slowed and delayed but not halted. As things stand now, much industrial equipment is still imported from Western Europe, legally or illegally, and the Soviet Union can take care of the other shortages. Czechoslovakia, Eastern Germany, and, to a lesser degree, Hungary produce machinery above their home requirements, and part of the surplus goes to other captive countries, to the Soviet Union, and to China.

According to United Nations data,[2] the 1951 indices of 433
industrial production in the single countries of this area in comparison to 1938 were as follows: Eastern Germany, 115 per cent; Czechoslovakia, 168; Rumania, 206; Hungary, 267; Poland, 270; and Bulgaria, 345 per cent. In considering these figures, it is necessary to bear in mind that 1938 was not the peak production year in Eastern Europe. Between 1938 and 1943-44, the industrial output of Czechoslovakia and Hungary rose noticeably owing to the erection of many new industrial plants, so that only a part of their industrial expansion since 1938 can be attributed to the efforts of their present governments. Poland's industrial potential increased in 1945 by at least one third, due to the acquisition of ex-German Silesia. Bulgaria's industrial po-

[2] *Economic Survey of Europe Since the War* (Geneva: United Nations, 1953), p. 239, Table 1.

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433 tential in 1938 was, and still is, insignificant. It is claimed that in 1952 the industrial output of the area rose again by about one fifth.

An estimate of the relative industrial strength of the individual captive countries was made recently in a United Nations publication.[3] If the total industrial output of the area at the end of 1952 is taken as 100, the output of Eastern Germany constitutes 34 per cent of this total, that of Poland 27, of Czechoslovakia 21, of Hungary 9, of Rumania 6, and of Bulgaria 3 per cent. The total industrial output of the entire captive area is equivalent, roughly speaking, to nearly 40 per cent of the total industrial output of the Soviet Union.

185 All this rapid, even violent, industrial expansion cannot
471 be smooth and is, in more ways than one, terribly expensive.
511 There are no miracles in economics, and wealth can be
464 created at different rates of speed, but not at will. The tremendous increase of the state-owned industrial plant in this area is only feasible because the citizens have been deprived of their individual capital, because the consumer demand is being systematically curtailed, and because more and more of the national income, siphoned off by taxation, inflation, and other methods, is being reinvested in industry. This reinvestment is being done at great cost to agriculture. Quantitative industrial progress is also speeded up by the fact that the police state has the means to make everyone work. The prewar urban unemployment and, to some extent, the huge peasant underemployment, caused by the extreme subdivision of rural property, are things of the past. Billions of manhours which were wasted before the war in enforced idleness are now used for production or, at least, are on tap for production purposes. On the other hand, a large proportion of the men and women kept in concentration and labor camps

[3] *Economic Bulletin for Europe* (Geneva: United Nations, 1952), Vol. V, no. 2 (July, 1953), p. 84, Table 1.

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511 tion capacity of cement plants and brick factories would have to be increased before there can be any question of more housing. This is but one example out of many of its kind. There is a manifest contradiction between the present Russian-enforced armament production in the area, which has not been curtailed, and the intended mass production of consumer goods. The two cannot be carried on simultaneously. For these reasons alone, the recent statements of the Communist governments should be regarded with much scepticism.

288 295 433 The situation as regards clothing and footwear is even worse. The problem of obtaining it is nearly insoluble for the average family. It is far more difficult than in Russia where millions wear Polish textiles and Czech shoes. To discuss this question in detail is beyond the scope of this essay. Suffice it is to say that, according to the present long-range plans, Eastern Germany expects to produce in 1955 only 1.3 pairs of leather shoes per capita, Rumania 1.2 pairs, Hungary 1 pair, and Poland 0.7 pairs. No one can say what proportion of this footwear will be earmarked for export to Russia and China or assigned in advance to the army and security police and what will be left for the population. It is for such reasons that behind the Iron Curtain it is illegal to photograph the people on the streets or to export abroad such documentary evidence of their poor garb.

657 745 In contrast to the situation regarding food, housing, and clothing, the number and range of social services have been considerably extended, and these state services should in all fairness be regarded as significant steps taken to offset the low standard of living. It is little known that prewar Poland and Czechoslovakia, not to speak of Germany, had state-operated systems of social insurance and public health more advanced than any existing at the time in France or the United States. These systems have been enlarged under Communism. The quality of their services is too often insufficient, but the

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condition attached to such a speculation. Were the West to 565
deny the principle of industrial transformation of these countries and to envisage their 'return to pastoral status,' the new managerial class together with the working class would range itself automatically against the West.

VI

The economic and social revolution which these countries 178
have undergone has been imposed on them very largely from 181
the outside. It has been successful because it was backed by the whole strength of a great military empire but also because the material and moral ravages of war and German occupation had shattered the prewar fabric of society and exposed its structural weaknesses. The society which is emerging from this revolution will be very different from the former one. Even if a true liberation of this part of Europe were to occur, the restitution of many old forms of life would not be feasible. The greatest harm that the captive nations have suffered and will suffer through the imposed revolution are the inflictions upon the souls and the minds of the people. Gradual de-Christianization, loosening of family ties, fear and distrust of political authorities and of the neighbor, Russification and falsification of national past, coarsening of manners, and the awful deposit of lies and prejudices of propaganda and non-technical schooling: all these are weapons which are levelled upon the minds and souls of the people. The undoing of these moral effects of Communist policies could only be gradual, and it would take a long time.

In the social and economic fields, the effects of Com- 178
munism have not been so uniformly somber. That goods can 433
be produced under Communism has been learned from Russian precedents. That Communism cannot assure to the people a decent standard of living is a fact that cannot be denied by any amount of propaganda, and it is also true that

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178 never in the last century have so many people worked so hard
433 for such meager rewards. However, in the social field, the extension of social services and of technical education can be credited to the Communist regimes. In the economic field, although the tax on the people has been almost unimaginably great, it must be admitted that the badly needed industrial development of formerly rural areas of Eastern Europe is due to the Communists.

178 The latter point needs clarification. The Wilsonian East-
433 ern Europe of 1918 inherited from Austria-Hungary, im-
369 perial Russia, and the old primitive Balkans an obsolete social structure of rural overpopulation and poverty due to insufficient industrial and urban development. The Czech lands, Polish Silesia, and a few lesser industrial regions were exceptions to the general structure of the area. Left to themselves by the indifferent West, having undergone the shock of the depression as only rural states can suffer it, the free nations of the area, again with the exception of Czechoslovakia, could in the interwar period neither solve their grave social problems nor defend themselves in the hour of danger. The existence of a poor and defenseless group of nations in the heart of Europe surrounded on East and West by two highly industrialized powers was an anachronism and an indirect invitation to aggression. After the disintegration of Eastern Europe between 1938 and 1941, the causes of this disaster were examined by thinkers of many nations, and many of them came to the conclusion that the disaster was inevitable not only because of the political disunity of this area but also because of its economic and productive inferiority. Rural societies had no chance of survival in the heavily armed world of the late '30's if only because they were unable to produce the weapons with which they could have deterred aggression effectively. The awareness of this fact has deeply influenced the political thinking of the nations concerned. It is inevitable that the Poles, to take but one example, should

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reflect that, had their country had a sufficient industrial basis in 1939 to equip ten armored divisions for which she had enough trained manpower, her loss of independence and many other events in modern history could have been prevented.

The present industrialization of Eastern Europe is gradually eliminating this handicap of the past. To be sure, the increase of the industrial potential of these countries lies in the interest of the Soviet Union in its own military preparations. The men in the Kremlin may dispose as they wish of this area's industrial plants together with all its human and material resources with the single exception of the spirit of its peoples. From the standpoint of both the immediate and long-range interests of the West, any addition to the wealth or the strength of Eastern Europe is unwelcome so long as the latter remains a part of the Soviet bloc. These countries are of course aware of this situation, but they have to think also about their future. They hope that one day the Iron Curtain will be lifted and they know that at that time they will need all their new industrial wealth in order to cease being an area of social unrest and a target for exploitation by powerful neighbors as well as a hotbed for world wars. Nobody has disputed the right of Russia to evolve into an industrial power. No one can expect the countries of Eastern Europe to relinquish their hopes of freedom and their rights to prosperity which, in the light of their past, are linked to the modernization of their economic structure. Wendell Willkie said during the last war that "Only the productive can be strong, and only the strong can be free." His words apply to all nations alike. The nations of Eastern Europe are potential allies of the West. Those who earnestly desire a better world should bear in mind that the lasting interests of these friendly nations transcend their temporary position as Russia's enforced associates.

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641 discontent with them. If people had resented the oppressiveness of the old large empires, many now chafed under the smallness and divisiveness of the national states that had come to succeed them. Eastern European states, large or small, seemed to have a way of frustrating the hopes and ambitions of significant numbers of their citizens. Where men had complained about the lack of national freedom in the past, many now complained about the "balkanization" of the region. It is this underlying restlessness, this *malaise* of Eastern European politics, that gave a peculiar appeal to the demand for Eastern European federation. If we are to understand the prospects and the problems of a federal union in this region, we must first turn our attention to the fundamental needs and discontents that gave rise to the proposal.

175 Eastern Europe was a relatively backward area in terms of
• 433 economic development. Even some of its most highly developed regions, such as the countries of Austria, Hungary, and the Russian-held parts of Poland, had lagged in economic development during the two crucial generations between 1815 and 1875, during which time most Western countries went through decades of tremendous economic growth.[1] In 1850

[1] Cf. Paul Muller, "Osterreich seit 1848," in Hans Mayer, ed., *Hundert Jahre Osterreichischer Wirtschaftsentwicklung*, 1848-1948, (Vienna: Springer Verlag, 1949), pp. 1-20, esp. p. 8; and in the same volume, for the old monopolistic traditions of business at Vienna from 1221 to 1848, and "conditions bordering on lethargy" during the decades preceding 1848, see Otto Gruss, "Ein Jahrhundert Osterreichischer Binnenhandel (1848-1948)," pp. 310-358, esp. pp. 311-317; for figures on the slow introduction of steam engines, the lag in the growth of towns, the slow relative growth of the population occupied in industry, the lack of capital, the national fragmentation of markets, etc., see Karl Heinz Werner, "Osterreichs Industrie und Aussenhandelspolitik 1848 bis 1948," *ibid.*, pp. 359, 479, esp. pp. 624-678, esp. p. 659. See also J. Slokar, *Geschichte der osterreichischen Industrie* (Vienna: Tempsky, 1949), pp. 16-19, 46-54, 177-179; Richard Schuller, "Die Entstehung des osterreichisch-ungarischen Wirtschaftsgebietes," in G. Gratz and R. Schuller, *Der wirtschaftliche Zusammenbruch Osterreich-Ungarns* (Vienna and New Haven: Holder-Pichler-Tempsky and Yale University Press, 1930), pp. 1-35, esp. pp. 23-24; Oscar Jazzi, *The Dissolution of the Habsburg Monarchy* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1929), pp. 185-212.

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Vienna was larger than Berlin and Austria did not appear 175
to lag conspicuously behind Prussia; but by 1866 the lag had 433 ●
become conspicuous and was confirmed on the battlefields of the Austro-Prussian War. There seems to have been a significant acceleration of economic growth between 1880 and 1914; and it has been estimated that between 1900 and 1910 the percentage rate of growth in the national income of Austria was even somewhat faster than it was during the same decade in Western Europe. The percentage growth of the low income of Austria-Hungary was unable, nevertheless, to keep up with the very much higher levels of national income and industrial productivity which meanwhile had been attained in the West.

Such economic growth as did occur was quite unevenly distributed. The economic position of the Germans and a few other groups was a great deal better than that of the rest of the peoples concerned, and the attempts of non-German groups to equal German economic standards often brought them into economic competition and political friction with Germans. After the economic depression of 1873, German nationalists raised the cry for the preservation of German supremacy, and the very attempts to mitigate or overcome economic inequality thus led to intensified economic competition and political conflict.

Economic development was poorly distributed between 175
town and country, as well as between nationalities. In most 162
Western countries, country people had come to share many 433
of the educational and cultural standards of the city populations. In Eastern Europe, by contrast, even the German-Austrian peasants were described before the First World War by the Viennese architect, Adolph Loos, as people wearing different clothes, speaking a different language, and having an infinitely more primitive way of life than the populations of the cities.

The uneven distribution of economic opportunity was re-

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175 inforced in its effect by the extreme splintering of national,
162 linguistic, and religious affiliations. A good map of the na-
●433 tionalities, languages, and religions of Eastern Europe would have shown not the large patches of relatively homogeneous populations which are found in so much of Western Europe but rather a polka-dot pattern of intermixed minorities.

182 The relative national uniformity of the West is perhaps, at least in part, the product of a history rich in the processes of successful social learning and acculturation, which merged and melted the different ethnic groups that were left in the Western countries by accidents of migration, wars, and settlement. In Eastern Europe, such accidents of conquest or settlement may well have been even more numerous, but there is also some reason to think that the processes of assimilation were much slower and less effective.

Greater uniformity of language and culture means greater interchangeability of social roles. This is not merely a contributing cause to the growth in social mobility and in the interchange of social roles but is also to some extent their product. Where societies are rigorously stratified, where religions fail to impress upon people an awareness of their essential unity, where the obstacles to a change in occupation or in social role are great, and the rewards for mobility are uncertain and small—in these societies individuals may best succeed in gaining security by clinging tenaciously to their familiar groups, languages, customs, and traditions, and by rejecting any assimilation to other groups except the most privileged as a threat to their existence. The more privileged groups, under these conditions, can only be expected to resent and resist the assimilation or intrusion of strangers, unless these strangers come from regions of clearly greater wealth and greater prestige and seem to bring to the new group assets clearly greater than those they would demand. The lack of unity and assimilation in language and culture in Eastern Europe thus appears as one more aspect of the

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were needed. Large parts of the area were exposed to Western methods of tax collecting, accounting, and fiscal policy, as well as public administration. They were exposed to the activities of modern bankers, and to a considerable extent to the practices of modern commerce, newspapers, and advertising. They were also exposed in large part to compulsory elementary public education.

As a result of these exposures in the nineteenth century, the peoples of Eastern Europe learned to accept completely the prevailing Western standards of theoretical science, as well as of intellectual and artistic life. They accepted to a considerable extent Western ideals of living standards, standards of consumption, wage levels, working conditions, and social welfare. Finally, many of them came to expect Western standards of farm prosperity, rural welfare, and peasant independence and cooperation. In sum, a large part of the populations of Eastern Europe accepted Western living standards as their goal, or at least as a pattern of their claims and expectations.

This rapid diffusion of Western-style claims and expectations was not matched by any comparable diffusion of Western-style work habits, savings and investment patterns, levels of productivity, or propensities to technological innovations. Land reforms in Eastern Europe were not only slow in coming, but they did little to increase productivity. The consolidation of separate strips of land, long accomplished in Scandinavia and Western Europe, was still not completed in Eastern Europe by the time of the Second World War. The tools and implements of artisans and peasants changed their traditional shape much more slowly in Eastern Europe than they did in Germany or England and pathetically more slowly than they did in the United States. Throughout most of the regions organized labor feared that increases in productivity would only lead to losses of employment. Employers and businessmen aspired to use the profits

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of their businesses for the purpose of retiring from business 433
themselves, rather than for expanding their productive equipment.

While productivity grew slowly, public health measures 464
were effective and birth rates remained high. Throughout 433
most of the region, the population pressed upon the limited supply of land and on the limited productivity of existing agricultural methods. At the same time, the lagging growth of towns and industries did not absorb completely the increases in population. The results were underemployment in the towns and industrial districts, hidden unemployment in the rural areas, and a general cheapness of human labor. While labor was thus abundant, and was often wastefully used, the skills of most workers remained low, and there was little incentive to improve them. Since capital goods and capital were scarce, there were fewer opportunities for engineers and applied scientists. And since universities, public administration, and banking had become modernized, there were ample employment opportunities for civil servants, clerks, lawyers, teachers, and research scientists.

The result was a startling precocity of Eastern European 178
intellectual life. First-rate university training was fairly widely available throughout the region. Food, land, and domestic services were relatively cheap. Civil servants, intellectuals, and members of the professions had high prestige socially, and they found no severe economic difficulty in maintaining their families and sending their children to universities. While the top-level jobs in commerce, civil service, 178
and universities under the Austro-Hungarian monarchy were 563
perhaps somewhat more easily accessible to persons recruited from the German or Jewish minorities, there were some opportunities for careers for men of outstanding talent from all national backgrounds. Czech scientists reminisce today about the remarkable generation of Czech and Slovak intellectuals and scientists who made their careers during the last thirty

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186 be improved by secession. All of them thought that they could
178 improve their position by finding that exact size of political unit in which their own language and their own national culture could be made to predominate and in which their own nationality or ethnic group could be turned into the leading class or social and political elite.

Nationalism in Eastern Europe was thus a reaction to the rapid diffusion of Western claims and to the expectations of security and opportunity throughout a group of societies that were only slowly, if at all, acquiring the productive skill and equipment to satisfy them. National secession, national expansion, and the national state appeared to almost all nationalities in the region as plausible short cuts to the prosperity, power, and prestige they all desired.

178 In the course of events, the experiment was actually made.
● 433 The Austro-Hungarian monarchy was destroyed and a num-
641 ber of successor states arose from its remains. There is no doubt on the whole that the emergence of these national states represented a significant step forward toward higher levels of popular participation in public affairs, toward political democracy, toward popular education, and even, in some respects, toward greater economic opportunities. But at the same time it seems clear that the change in the size of political units did little or nothing to come to grips with the fundamental causes of the poverty and backwardness of the region, or with the fundamental sources of its peculiar psychological and political frustrations and resentments. National and regional markets and consumer preferences remained as small and as unfavorable to mass production in the new states as they had in the old. Capital remained as scarce and productive investment as uneven and erratic as before.
178 Tools, technologies, and work habits changed slowly if at
[735] all. Poverty persisted. Purchasing power remained low and
464 prices high. Production remained scattered over many small and inefficient factories. Innovations were accepted reluc-

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CHAPTER IV

RUSSIA AND THE ECONOMY OF THE SATELLITE STATES

★

Lack of Capital in U.S.S.R.

The extent to which Russia can assist in the industrialisation of Eastern Europe is determined primarily by the level of her national income compared with that of her satellites. On this point Colin Clark has given an unequivocal reply: 434

Country	*Period*	*Real Income per Head of Working Population in International Units*
Czechoslovakia	1925-27	455
Hungary	1925-34	359
Poland	"	352
Yugoslavia	"	330
Bulgaria	"	284
Rumania	1925-39	243
Average		344
U.S.S.R.	1937	379

(Ibid, pp. 40, 86).

The average real income per head of occupied population was lower in U.S.S.R. than in Czechoslovakia but higher than in the other Eastern European countries. The average figure in these countries was about 10 per cent lower than in U.S.S.R. For the sake of comparison it is important to remember that the real income per head of occupied population over the period 1925-34 (i.e., including the 1929-33 slump) was in Britain 1,069 and in U.S.A. 1,381, 182 per cent and 264 per cent higher respectively than in U.S.S.R. in 1937.

Another consideration must be taken into account. The accumulation of capital is dependent not only on an income level which makes it possible to save by abstaining from immediate consumption, but equally necessarily requires that there should be available to the saver (directly or indirectly) the capital goods which he needs. If peasants abstain from consuming half their products, they cannot invest the surplus

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434 in railway construction, unless there is somebody ready to supply, in exchange for their agricultural products, the rails, locomotives, etc. In this connection, the supply of capital goods, the ability of Russia to help the countries of Eastern Europe, is even more limited. Russia's income is not big enough for part of it to be devoted to investments in Eastern Europe. Her heavy industries producing capital goods—the main constituent of any new investment—are much too weak to spare much for her satellites. This would have been absolutely clear had we been able to compare the amount of capital goods produced per capita in the U.S.S.R. with that produced in the countries of the West, but the necessary statistics for such a comparison are not available, and we shall have to resort to a less exact means of comparison to throw light on the subject. We shall compare the production in different countries of steel, the chief material from which capital goods are made. In the U.S.S.R. in 1937 105 kgs. of steel per capita were produced, as against 397 in the U.S.A. (1929), 291 in Germany (1929), 279 in England (1929), and 188 in France (1929).

439 The *Manchester Guardian* of 19 May, 1949, dealt with the need of the satellite states for capital goods and Russia's inability to satisfy it:

'. . . Russia's satellites do genuinely want more trade across the Iron Curtain. They badly need both machinery from Western Europe itself and raw materials from the British Commonwealth. Trade with Russia has quite failed to take the part in their economy that the West, and Germany especially, used to do. The Russians cannot make enough capital goods both for their own needs and for the industrialisation of Eastern Europe; it is, of course, the satellites who go without.'

This explains why at least two of the satellites, Czechoslovakia and Poland, showed clearly that they wished to take part in the Marshall Plan. On 4th July, 1947, the Czechoslovak Government decided *unanimously* to accept the invitation to the Paris Conference convened to discuss the Marshall Plan. A few days later Gottwald and Masaryk left for Moscow and three days later Prague declared that the Government declined to take part in the Conference. Even when, under Moscow's orders, the satellites fell into line on this question, the

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648 concentration camps in the twelve years of Hitler's rule are
728 testimony to this. What magnificent heroism on the part of unarmed and helpless people to challenge the brutal state machine with its all-seeing eye and unlimited terror!

The Communist Parties knew all this very well. Immediately after June 1941 they emphasised that this time, because of Russia's part in the war, no new Versailles Treaty with reparations clauses would be imposed and that the German people would not be made to pay for the crimes of their rulers. The German proletariat, they said, was not more responsible for the war than the English or the French, and they repeated the same views on the question of reparations as the Communist International had after World War I. At that time the leaders of the French Communist Party explained why the French workers should oppose the exaction of reparations from Germany. Thus Gabriel Peri wrote in an article entitled 'On the Eve of the Reparations Conference': '. . . the workers of France and Germany have only *one* interest, viz., that of forming a revolutionary front against financial capital and the heavy industries in both countries. For the enormous sums at stake (the reparations—YG) will naturally be squeezed out of the working masses'. (*International Press Correspondence*, February 1st, 1929).

But all this changed with the hope of Russian victory. With Russia becoming the Power able to extract reparations, her opposition in principle to reparations vanished. Instead she decided to take reparations on a far larger scale than ever the French Government had dared after World War I.

648 Edward Charles in his article 'Reparations, 1919-31', in
728 *The Banker* of April, 1945, writes on the reparations that
● 434 Germany paid after the first world war: 'Reparations before the Dawes Plan brought in some 8 milliard gold marks. From September, 1924, to the end they yielded a further 10 milliards'. There is no reliable calculation of the national income of Germany between the end of the first world war and the introduction of the Dawes Plan. It is therefore impossible to calculate what proportion of the national income reparations made up. But for the years 1924-32 this figure is available. The total national income of Germany for these 9 years was calculated at 564.3 milliard marks, and in the same period

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Germany paid reparations to the extent of 9.8 milliard marks, or 1.7 per cent of the national income. In no year after the first world war did the reparations paid by Germany exceed 4 per cent of the national income. To calculate the burden of these reparations, other criteria besides the national income, such as budget revenue or exports, can be applied. The reparations Germany paid rose from 12.9 per cent of the budget revenue of Germany or 9.9 per cent of the value of its exports in 1924-5, to 25.7 per cent and 18.4 per cent respectively in 1928-9.

With regard to Germany's looting of Europe during the second world war, German official statistics admit that up to 1943 the Reich got from the occupied countries 'special incomes' amounting to 50 milliard marks. British official estimates give a figure of 12.8 milliard dollars for the same period. The two figures thus nearly tally. Nearly all the German robbery took place immediately after the occupation. If we, therefore, assume that the annual looting of the occupied countries by Germany after 1943 was the same as the annual average of 1939 to 1943, we shall certainly not underestimate it: on this basis the total German looting amounted to 20-25 milliard dollars.

A comparison between the reparations paid by Germany after the first world war—about 18 milliard marks or 3.6 milliard dollars—with the 'reparations' that Germany took from Europe in the second world war—20-25 milliard dollars—reveals the increasingly plunderous character of declining capitalism, as exemplified by the Hitler regime.

Russia's attitude to the question of reparations after the second world war was expressed clearly by Prof. Varga in an article published in *War and the Working Class*, 15th October, 1943. He concluded that Germany must pay reparations to the tune of 90 milliard marks or about 22 milliard dollars, and he stated that the Russian government asked in addition for ten million German workers to be sent to Russia for reconstruction work.

A claim for such large reparations, coupled with a demand for ten million workers, i.e., nearly a third of the total German working class, was incompatible with the existence of Germany as an important industrial country. At Yalta, consequently,

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648 Stalin had to demand that 80 per cent of German industry
728 should be dismantled within two years of the cease-fire. (James F. Byrnes, *Speaking Frankly*, London, 1948, pp. 26-7).

In view of the division of Germany between East and West, Russia did not want to exclude the possibility of the Communist Party's influencing the German people, and so she did not press her claim for ten million slave labourers or the dismantling of 80 per cent of German industry. Nevertheless the total sum lost by Germany directly and indirectly under the post-war arrangements in the East exceeded the total sum for which Varga asked.

It is difficult to get a full picture of this looting, as it was carried out in many guises, and those responsible for it were of course extremely anxious to conceal what was happening. But the following facts are incontestable.

First, millions of Germans were expelled from their homes and lost their property. The President of Poland, Bierut, estimated that Poland's gains in the West, i.e., from Germany, have an investment value of 9½ milliard dollars. The property of the Sudeten Germans of Czechoslovakia was estimated at 4 milliard dollars. If we assume that the rest of the Germans who inhabited the former territory of Poland, Hungary, Rumania, etc., were on the average as wealthy as the inhabitants of the portion of Eastern Germany that was annexed to Poland and the Sudetan region, their property must be evaluated at about 6 milliard dollars. Therefore the expulsion of the Germans alone brought in 'reparations' amounting to about 20 milliard dollars.

The Yalta Agreement decided in principle that Germany would pay reparations amounting to 20 milliard dollars, half of which would go to Russia.

Unlike what happened after the first world war, after this war no figures were published of the quantity of reparations taken or the form in which they were taken.

Reparations from Rumania

648 The armistice imposed on Rumania required payment to
728 Russia of reparations in the form of goods amounting in value
434 to 300 million dollars in 1938 world market prices, or 700-800 million dollars today. The reparations were made up as

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follows :—petroleum products, 50 per cent; ships, barges, locomotives and industrial equipment, 32 per cent; agricultural goods and timber 18 per cent. The second group did not make up even as much as 10 per cent of Rumanian exports before the war.

There are no estimates of the proportion of the national income which these reparations represent. The only clue is that given in June 1947 by the vice-Premier, Tatarescu, who gave the proportion as 50 per cent of the total production of Rumanian industry. It would be very unwise to accept this figure uncritically, as it was given on the eve of Tătărescu's conflict with the Communist Party which ended in his expulsion from the Government. Even if it were accurate, this figure would not be very useful as it relates only to industrial production, and not to the whole national product.

In addition to the reparations, Rumania had to give as restitution for goods looted from Russia 100,000 wagon loads of cereals, 260,000 head of cattle, 5,500 wagon loads of sugar, 250 tractors. (Of course, most of the loot taken from Russia by the Rumanians when they occupied it had already been destroyed and lost, and 'restitution' meant taking new products or those in good condition.)

The most important machinery of the Ploesti Oil Refineries was dismantled by the Russian military authorities, and the Rumanians also had to hand over a fifth of the machinery of the textile and metallurgical industries. It must also be remembered that the Russian army lived off the land. There are no statistics of the total cost thus incurred by the country, but it was certainly very great. According to the estimate made in February, 1946, by La Guardia, who was the head of U.N.R.R.A. at the time, the four occupation armies in Austria cost the country 200 million dollars a year. For three years the Russian army in Rumania was not smaller than all the four occupation armies in Austria put together at the beginning of 1946. In view of the complete silence of the Russian authorities about the amount of reparations they took from Rumania, it is impossible to ignore the estimate given by the U.S. delegate to the Paris Peace Conference, Willard L. Thorp, who said on September 23rd, 1946, that Rumania paid in reparations of all kinds 1,050 million dollars and that he estimated that

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648 950 million dollars remained to be paid. E. D. Tappe wrote:
728 'It has been estimated that in fact Roumania, from the armistice to 1 June 1948, paid the U.S.S.R. $1,785 million in goods, etc.; a figure which would represent 84 per cent of Roumania's national income for that period.' (R. R. Betts, editor, *Central and South East Europe, 1945-1948*, London, 1950, pp. 20-21).

Reparations from Hungary

Hungary had to pay reparations in goods amounting to 300 million dollars at 1938 prices, 200 million to U.S.S.R., 50 million to Czechoslovakia and 50 million to Yugoslavia. Industrial goods constituted 83 per cent and agricultural goods 17 per cent of this total. Yet in 1936-7, the proportion of agricultural goods in the total exports of Hungary was 62 per cent, while industrial goods did not make up even a third of all the exports. From this it is clear that Hungarian industry had to make a tremendous effort to supply the reparation goods, especially in view of the terrible devastation her industry suffered in the war, and her own great needs.

An U.N.R.R.A. estimate shows that in 1945, 94 per cent of
648 the working capacity of the metal and engineering industries in
728 Hungary was being used for reparation-goods for Russia. The
434 British parliamentary delegation which visited Hungary in the spring of 1946 estimated that reparation demands amounted to 18 per cent of the national income.

The Hungarian budget for the year 1946-7 set aside for reparations a sum eight times bigger than that allocated to reconstruction (and we must not forget that a large part of the Russian loot is not even included in the budget as it was taken from industries officially in Russian hands). On 23 July, 1946, in a note to the Soviet Government, the U.S. Ambassador in Moscow pointed out that half the current industrial production of Hungary was absorbed in meeting Russia's demands. In some industries, including coal, iron and machine production the proportion was 80-90 per cent. At the Peace Conference in Paris in October, 1946, the U.S. representatives claimed that in the year since the armistice about 35 per cent of the national income of Hungary was spent on the costs of Soviet reparations, occupation and requisitions. The British parliamentary delega-

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tion mentioned above estimated the occupation costs at 12 per cent of the national income of Hungary, making with reparations a total of 30 per cent. Now that the Russian Army has been very much reduced and production has passed the pre-war level, the importance of reparations, acquisitions, etc., in the national income has very much declined. According to T. Mende, who was not unsympathetic to the post-war regime in Hungary, they amounted to 7-11 per cent of the national income (*Fortnightly Review*, July, 1948). When Ernö Gerö, the Minister of Finance, introduced the budget for 1949 in the Hungarian parliament on December 15th, 1948, he said that in 1948, 25.4 per cent of the total expenditure went to pay the reparations, while in 1949, 9.8 per cent of the budget would be allocated for this purpose. This reduction is due largely to the fact that Russia cancelled 50 per cent of the remainder of the reparations from July, 1948.

648 728 434

The value of dismantled machinery, locomotives, wagons, etc., taken by the Russian army in Hungary was estimated at 124 million dollars, and the requisitions of the Russian army that lived on the country were very great. According to the American note of 23rd July, 1946, the Soviet forces had up to June, 1945, taken out of Hungary four million tons of wheat, rye, barley, maize and oats (the total pre-war annual production of these grains was a little over 7 million tons). Of the foodstuffs available for the urban population in the second half of 1945 the Soviet army had appropriated nearly all the meat, one-sixth of the wheat and rye, one-quarter of the legumes, nearly three-quarters of the lard, a tenth of the vegetable oils and a fifth of the milk and dairy products. The note added that extensive requisitioning of food was going on as late as April, 1946. And we must not forget that at the same time the food shortage in Hungary was so serious that not more than 850 calories a day per person were provided, which was even fewer than in Germany and Austria. The death rate, especially among babies, reached alarming proportions.

648 728 [262]

Even countries which were not allies of Germany during the war did not escape the Russian appetite for loot. 60 big industrial enterprises in the Sudeten region and a number of enterprises in other parts of Czechoslovakia were dismantled by the Russian army. In the part of Germany annexed to

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in manufacturing industry, the Czechoslovak Plan an increase of 250,000, the Bulgarian Plan an increase of 90,000 and the Hungarian Plan an increase of 300,000 (including industries other than manufacturing). The U.N. Survey that gives these facts, remarks: 'These figures, if related to present employment in manufacturing, indicate a substantial increase. If, however, the figures are related to the total populations of the countries, they are less striking. In the four countries mentioned, additional employment in industry over the plan period accounts for only 1 to 2 per cent of the total population, which in itself is expected to rise by some 5 per cent in the same period' (p. 206).

On many points the plans are silent. Unlike Russia's first Five Year Plan or the plans of the Organisation for European Economic Co-operation for Western Europe, the Plans of the 'People's Democracies' contain no information about foreign trade either among themselves or between each of them and Russia, or the West. They also blur over the question of how the total national income will be divided between consumption and accumulation (investment), but contain only some scattered information about the planned consumption of some particular goods. This silence speaks volumes. The non-publication of information about foreign trade is intended to cover up the exploitation of these countries by Russia; the non-publication of information about the division of the national income between consumption and accumulation is intended to cover up the exploitation of the masses under the banner of industrialisation.

This last point about the division of the national income between consumption and accumulation is of vital importance when we attempt to discover the factors determining the living conditions of the masses. Burdened with a terrible backwardness, an autocratic bureaucracy and the yoke of Russian imperialism, industrialisation will inevitably be carried out in such a way that compulsory savings will far surpass what the people themselves would be ready to save of their own free will. In such circumstances, consumption must be subordinated to accumulation, as the experience of Eastern Europe over the past few years (and of twenty years' planning in Russia) has clearly shown. The following table illustrates the 'capital

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434 starvation' of the industries producing consumption goods, while the new capital investment is directed into the capital goods industries:

ESTIMATED NET INVESTMENT IN FIXED CAPITAL IN INDUSTRY IN 1947
(MILLIONS OF DOLLARS IN 1938 PRICES)

	Hungary		Poland	
Food processing, etc. ..	−1.7	−1.5	−1.4	−11.7
Textiles and clothing ..	0.5		−10.0	
Leather and rubber ..	0.1		0.2	
Paper and printing	−0.4		−0.5	
Timber and timber products	−0.1		0.2	
Building materials, etc. ..	−0.7		−1.0	
Metals and engineering ..	5.3	5.8	7.4	13.6
Chemicals	0.5		6.2	
Total manufacturing ..	3.5		1.1	

(Ibid. p. 53)

This is a foretaste of the future.*

185 433 As regards agriculture the Plans for all the countries, except Poland, provide that the output shall exceed the pre-war level, by about a sixth in Czechoslovakia and Hungary, and a third to a half in Yugoslavia and Bulgaria. In Poland it may not exceed its pre-war level in present territory. (Ibid. p. 206).

*In U.S.S.R. the relatively great lag in industries producing means of consumption behind those producing means of production is shown by the following official data of the division of the gross output of industry:

DIVISION OF GROSS OUTPUT OF INDUSTRY INTO MEANS OF PRODUCTION AND MEANS OF CONSUMPTION (IN PERCENTAGES)

	1913	1928	1932	1937	1940	1942 (Planned)
Means of production	33.3	32.8	53.3	57.8	61.0	62.2
Means of consumption	66.7	67.2	46.7	42.2	39.0	37.8

It is very difficult to check the *absolute* change in the production of different means of consumption. In Russian statistics a number of simple tricks are used to describe the situation in more glowing terms than is true. The output of a number of consumption industries is given only in monetary terms; the production of the small factories which, till 1928, made an important contribution to the production of means of consumption, is not included.

Official statistics can therefore show a tremendous rise in the output of shoes, which, however, cannot be squared with the facts. The number of animals slaughtered annually after the big 'collectivisation' drive never reached the number slaughtered previously, as it was not until 1938 that the total number of livestock reached the 1929 figure (in 1929 cattle numbered 68.1 million, in 1938, 63.2; sheep and goats numbered 147.2 and 102.1 million respectively). At the same time the surplus of imported hides, skins and leather over exported was 54.3 thousand tons in 1928 as against only 15.6 thousand tons in 1938. Only Stalinist statisticians can produce the 'miracle' of tripling the number of leather shoes out of a decreasing quantity of leather. The Russian government, relying on the 'short memory' of the people, or more correctly on the oppressive machinery which ensures that past memories remain unuttered, adds insult to injury. While promising a tremendous rise in the production of means of con-

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1948: 'Czechoslovakia today can fairly claim to be the hungriest country in Europe—hungrier than even Austria'. The Viennese Socialist paper *Arbeiter Zeitung* wrote on 23rd June, 1948: 'Travellers who often come from Prague to Vienna report that in the last few weeks, for the first time, they have not taken goods from Prague to Vienna, but on their return from Vienna to Prague'. The paper adds particulars of prices on the black market in Prague. It is possible to cite innumerable facts to the same effect. 465 511 565

There can be no doubt about who suffered from the shortages, which were the result partly, but only partly, of the drought of the winter of 1947-8. The drought fails to explain either the acute shortage of textiles, shoes, (in the country of Bata!) and other consumer goods, or the duration of the shortages.

It is clear from official data that the portion of the social product going to the workers is decreasing. In January, 1946, the total product of Czechoslovakian industry was sold for 9.09 milliard crowns; wages and salaries in industry itself came to 2.83 milliard crowns, i.e. 31.6 per cent of the turnover. A year later, in January, 1947, the total sales amounted to 15.66 milliard crowns; wages and salaries came to 4.03 milliard or 25.7 per cent of the turnover. This decline in the portion of wages and salaries was accompanied by an increase in the turnover per hour of work from 50 crowns to 78 crowns, a rise of 56 per cent (*Statistical Bulletin of Czechoslovakia*, published by the State Statistical Office, Prague, July, 1947). If the statistics had included only wages and not salaries as well, the decline would have been even bigger. 465 511 434 565

The journal *Účetnictví a Kontrola*, issued by the trade union publishing house, Práce, submitted the state budget to a detailed analysis in order to get an approximate estimate of the cost of the bureaucracy. This reveals that the travelling expenses of the administration proper—that is, the ministries, not including the administration of the nationalised industries—amounted to not less than 780 million crowns, the maintenance of automobiles to 180 million. How large these amounts are is clear from the fact that the expenditure on travelling of these bureaucrats would cover the difference between the meagre wages of about 300,000 families and a minimum living

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465 standard. In summing up, the article states: 'The public
511 administration swallows 48 per cent of the national income.
434 How will it be possible to raise the standard of living of the
656 whole people, how will the wide layers of the toilers be satisfied, how will it be possible to pay proper salaries to government clerks?' (From an article, 'Let us think about the Figures', quoted by V. Salus in the theoretical paper of the Czech Social Democracy, *Cil*, August 15th, 1947, under the interesting heading, 'Economic Democracy and the New Nobility').*

511 The division of the national income in Yugoslavia is not less
565 unequal than in the other 'People's Democracies.' Vernon
434 Bartlett, when in Belgrade, described the situation in the

*For a time the Communist Party leaders tried to cushion the conflict between the workers and the 'new nobility' by directing the hostility of the masses exclusively against the bourgeoisie. For example in October, 1947, in connection with the relief to the peasants who were suffering from the drought, the Communist Party raised the slogan 'Let the millionaires pay', and proposed as a solution the imposition of a property levy. Of course the bureaucracy, being 'propertyless—in form' would not have to pay anything. The Communist Party tried to overlook the fact that the portion of the national income of Czechoslovakia in the hands of the bourgeoisie was so small, only a quarter of industry being left in their hands, that the only possibility of seriously improving the conditions of the masses was by 1. cutting into the income of the bureaucracy; 2. raising the general national income; 3. preventing Russia from taking her cut from the national income.

The Communist Party claimed that there were 35,000 millionaires in Czechoslovakia. This is a large number, but it is much less impressive when it is realised that they were not pound sterling or dollar millionaires, but crown millionaires. A million crowns in July, 1947, was equal to five thousand pounds sterling. Even according to the Communist Party estimate the wealth of these 35,000 'millionaires' was only 50 milliard (According to the bourgeois paper *Svobodné Slovo* there were only 12,000 millionaires with a property of 22 milliard crowns). 50 milliard crowns is only about a quarter of the *annual national income* of Czechoslovakia.

The conditions of the masses could not therefore be substantially improved at the expense of the bourgeoisie, but only by improvements in the nationalised sectors of the economy and at the expense of the bureaucracy. This is proved by the distribution of the national income:

PERSONAL INCOME AT FACTOR COST (THOUSAND MILLION OF CROWNS.) 1947

1. Entrepreneural profits in industry, trade and professions and private income from capital	22.0
2. Rentals and sub-rentals (including net rental value of owner-occupied dewllings	5.2
3. Independent agriculturists	25.4
4. Wages and salaries	125.9
5. Pensions of Government employees	5.7
6. Unfreezing of blocked accounts to people of limited means	6.3

In addition there were a number of other small items.

(Statistical Office of the United Nations, *National Income Statistics of Various Countries, 1938-1948*, Lake Success, New York, 1950, p. 59).

The figures speak for themselves. The possibility of increasing item 4 at the expense of item 1 is very limited indeed.

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following terms: 'Here, as in Moscow during the war, I am shocked that leaders who boast so much of the dictatorship of the proletariat should enjoy privileges that are relatively far greater than those enjoyed by any privileged class in Britain or in most of the other countries condemned by Moscow as Fascist and imperialist'. (*News Chronicle*, 26th April, 1949). 511 565 434

The situation was described sixteen months later by the correspondent of the *Neue Zürcher Zeitung* in the following terms: 'The social revolution in the eastern countries, which pretended to have the abolition of exploitation and inequality as its aim, leads in actuality to the erection of a *hierarchically ranked social order* with a whole number of privileged layers. This can be observed daily in Yugoslavia in the same way as in the Cominform countries and one will always be astonished at the way in which the bearers of the system take the privileges they enjoy for granted. The proletarians who stand in the queues near the bus stops look with greedy eyes at the lit-up American cars of the state leaders, resplendent in chrome and coloured varnish, which pass swiftly by them. The higher-ups of the State and Party travel in the latest model cabriolets, the great ones of second rank travel in limousines. Skoda and Opeldienst cars are at the disposal of high officers and officials.

'In the entrance to the People's Front Street in Marshal Tito Boulevard stands a big warehouse. Men in khaki or white uniforms with gold epaulettes go in and out. The *warehouse* is reserved *for officers* and their families. There they can buy clothes, shoes, furniture, carpets and other goods of better quality and cheaper price than the common mortal can buy. The officers get their food rations there too—far larger rations than those of workers and clerks. So large are these rations, that in the spring, at the time of the great food scarcity, peasants came to town in order to buy from the officers their surplus fat and flour at black market prices.

'It is obvious that the police and high officials also have their own store. The *warehouse of the political police* is even better supplied than that of the officers. Naturally these categories of the population also have their special rations. It is the same here as in the other Eastern countries: one who has a higher post and a higher salary also gets larger food rations and is less directed to the expensive free market than the poorly-salaried

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small man. Reductions in prices for the higher-paid instead of for those with smaller means . . . ' (*Neue Zürcher Zeitung*, 30th August, 1950)*

One aspect of the problem of the mode of distribution of the social product is this: to what extent is the differentiation between different income groups concomitant with national differences? How much of the cream of the milk produced in the satellites is in the form of higher personal incomes for Soviet officials? These facts are unfortunately covered by a veil of secrecy. Some facts, however, have emerged. A letter of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of Yugoslavia to the Central Committee of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union (dated 13th April, 1948) stated: 'The wages of the Soviet experts (working as advisers in Yugoslavia—Y.G.) were four times as high as the wages of the commanders of our armies and three times as high as the wages of our Federal Ministers. The commander of one of our armies, a lieutenant-general or a colonel-general, then had 9,000 to 11,000 dinars a month, and a Soviet military expert, lieutenant-colonel, colonel and general had from 30,000 to 40,000 dinars. At the same time our Federal Ministers had a salary of 12,000 dinars a month.' The reply of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union (dated 4th May, 1948) did not deny the correctness of these figures, but claimed as an extenuating circumstance the fact that the Yugoslav generals also got 'apartments, servants, food, etc.'

The paper *Glas*, the organ of the People's Front of Serbia, in its issue of 16th December, 1949, gave another example of the same thing. Near Sofia an automobile factory employing Russian, Czech and Bulgarian specialists was being built. The salary of the Russian specialists was 2,000 levas an hour, of the Czechs 2,000-3,000 levas a day, and of the Bulgarian 250-300 levas a day. These differences were certainly not due mainly to differences in skill.

*Since then a big change has taken place. On 14th October, 1950, Marshal Tito signed a decree abolishing special privileges in the supply and distribution of rations and consumer goods, doing away with the special shops of the upper bureaucracy, and transferring all villas and rest homes hitherto reserved for the privileged to the tourist industry. Whether this is a temporary measure resulting from the terrible drought and famine of the 1950-51 winter, it is too early to say.

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conditions. Credit was no real help unless the peasant had 474
a reasonable expectation of being able to pay back what 452
he had borrowed. In many cases this hope was negligible. A large proportion of the money which the peasants, particularly the small peasants, borrowed went to buy consumer goods. Thus, greater indebtedness did not point to a higher degree of investment, but to the extreme poverty of the small farm.

There was some state help for this situation, especially 474
during the world-wide depression of the 1930's. In Bulgaria 452
and Rumania agricultural debts were converted by govern- 241
ment action. In 1934 some two hundred thousand Bulgarian 656
peasants benefited by reductions in their debts and in the rate of interest and by a prolongation of the time allowed for settlement. In Rumania some two and one-half million peasants were assisted by similar legislation. Other measures, although not so far-reaching, were put into practice elsewhere in Eastern Europe to alleviate peasant indebtedness. But the credit problem was only mitigated, and not solved. The peasants' need for cash remained, and the lack of capital still prevented them from improving their farming techniques or increasing their earning capacity.

The governments promoted intensive cultivation of non-cereals. Grain production was not appropriate to an overpopulated region, and a change to the production of livestock, livestock products, fruit, and vegetables was necessary. In Bulgaria and in some parts of Yugoslavia, intensive cultivation of garden crops, such as tobacco, tomatoes, wine, fruit, and roses was introduced. In Rumania, the cultivation of soya and other oil plants was introduced. These measures were, of course, just a beginning, and could not bring any substantial remedy.

Agriculture played the most important role of any single 241
factor in all the Eastern European countries except Czecho- 434
slovakia. The largest part of the national incomes was de-

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241 rived from agriculture. National prosperity was dependent
434 on the outcome of harvests and on the possibility of agricultural exports.

439 In the interwar period, these countries were victims of the fluctuations of the world market and of the policy of autarky which resulted from them. The countries of Western Europe from 1930 to 1932 imposed high tariffs on food imports in order to ward off the effects of the international slump in agriculture. In doing so, they ruined the Eastern European peasant. Export of agricultural products from all Eastern European countries was reduced to a minimum and prevented these countries from balancing their trade. Thus, it was impossible for them to buy the industrial goods and manufactures on which they depended to maintain industrial employment and the standard of living of the peasants themselves.

This crisis further reduced the possibilities of export because the Eastern European states were unable to compete in prices with the overseas agricultural exporting countries that had technical aid at their disposal and because they could not afford the enormous sums necessary for subsidizing exports of agricultural products. Many attempts were made by agrarian conferences to alleviate the distress by asking a preferential tariff system for this region, which would have meant the almost complete abolition of the most-favored-nation clause in bilateral commercial agreements. Another remedy was seen in the creation of an interstate grain purchasing commission that would buy up the chief surpluses from the Eastern European countries and distribute them among the different European importing countries. These proposed methods arose from the primary need of Eastern Europe, which was to acquire some form of economic security in the world market in order to provide a stable basis for peasant society.

Everything was in vain. It was impossible to achieve

TABLE 2

611 **ANNUAL CONSUMPTION OF BASIC FOODSTUFFS IN PRE-WAR EASTERN EUROPE**

(in lbs.)

	Wheat & Rye	Maize	Potatoes	Sugar	Meat	Milk	Fats	Eggs (No.)
Poland	392	—	550	27	50	260	21	90
Czechoslovakia	275	25	260	47	68	290	40	160
Hungary	550	—	220	26	57	240	30	95
Romania	245	400	110	15	55	140	25	90
Yugoslavia	265	340	130	12	44	160	18	45
Bulgaria	440	—	85	12	45	150	19	80
Denmark	265	Nil	250	117	124	410	67	115

* *Agrarian Problems from the Baltic to the Aegean*, pp. 44.

241 The land, some of it rich, but most of it poor, was exploited
311 in a backward fashion — in Bulgaria and Yugoslav Macedonia many of the peasants worked with a wooden plow not very different in design from one described by Virgil in the *Georgics* 19 hundred years before. The inevitable subdivision of the land among the peasant's sons made application of modern agricultural techniques virtually impossible, and the accumulation of sufficient capital to purchase such equipment out of question. In addition, growing rural over-population kept farm wages low, and made the use of modern machinery uneconomical from the peasants' point of view.
[435] Above all, the peasantry was oppressed by the traditional "price scissors," or the disparity between the prices received for their crops on the urban market and prices paid for industrial products, a relationship which arose from the "small domestic market for agricultural products and the small supply of manufactured goods produced by domestic industry."[19]

But the trouble lay not merely in the backwardness of the peasant agricultural system. The political structure of the country, either conservative or semi-fascist, tended to favor urban groups. In the allotment of national resources such projects as peasant

[19] Moore, p. 89.

tares. On the poorest land in the country a peasant with five 661
hectares had to deliver almost twice as much per hectare as a 471
peasant with two hectares.[12] In Romania, a peasant with four hectares of land was required to deliver three-and-a-half times as much produce per hectare as a peasant holding two hectares of land.[13] This pattern was followed throughout the area.

Prices paid for produce were invariably low and insofar as com- 435
parison is possible, lower than pre-war prices, as manifest in the 471
huge discrepancies between free market prices and State prices. Moreover, the discrepancy between the prices paid to the peasantry and prices charged in retail shops for the same commodities far exceeded the cost of transportation and processing incurred by the State. In some cases a "coupon" system, ostensibly designed to compensate the peasant, was instituted. Under these terms, foodstuffs and industrial crops delivered to official collection centers were paid for by small sums in currency and coupons entitling the peasant to buy, at low controlled prices, in State shops. In practice, the system generally proved to be nothing more than a propaganda device. Since consumer goods were in short supply, and usually reserved for the urban market, the villages were frequently without such basic commodities as matches and kerosene.

Nevertheless, the confiscatory tax and delivery schedules were 471
seldom fully enforced. It has, in fact, been demonstrated that literal 661
enforcement was impossible, since in countless cases the State demands *exceeded* the individual peasant's capacity to produce. The quota levels and the severe legal punishments decreed for quota arrears were not, however, entirely unrealistic. The penalties prescribed for under-delivery were invoked only when it suited the regime purposes for a gradual extension of control over the agrarian economy. The effect of cumulative delivery failures was intended to reduce the independent peasant to the status of a tenant at sufferance, since he could be legally expropriated whenever the State chose.

The control the State exercised over industrial and financial sectors of East European economies was similarly an important weapon in the campaign against the peasant. As a result of heavy industrial emphasis, the agricultural sector was generally denied help from nationalized credit institutions. Insofar as credit was ex-

[12] Decree of the Ministry of Bulk Purchasing, January 30, 1953.
[13] *Scanteia*, (Bucharest). May 18, 1950.

CHART XV

WORK TIME IN HOURS NEEDED TO PURCHASE*

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1	POTATOES	1 Kg.	5	MILK	1 L.
2	CABBAGE	1 Kg.	6	SUGAR	1 Kg.
3	EGG	1 En.	7	PORK	1 Kg.
4	BREAD	1 Kg.	8	BUTTER	1 Kg.

1 Kg = 2.2046 lbs. 1 L. = 1.06 Qt.



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

* Official U. S. Government statistics.

** Post Currency Reform — Black Rye Bread (White Bread = 1.09)

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(about £1) for Roumania, Lei 2,000 for Bulgaria, Lei 3,000 for 407
Poland; as against Lei 15,000 for Germany and Lei 42,000 for 241
Switzerland. So far as mechanical equipment is concerned, the disparity was even greater. According to a German source, taking the mechancial equipment per hectare of farm land (in terms of weight) as 100 for Germany, the figure for Bulgaria would be 14, for Yugoslavia 5, for Roumania 3.' (Ibid. p. 32).

A comparison of the extent to which fertilizers are used is 241
equally unfavourable, as can be seen from the following table :

USE OF ARTIFICIAL FERTILIZERS, 1930-1940
(KILOS PER HECTARE OF ARABLE LAND)

	Nitrates	*Phosphates*	*Potash*
Czechoslovakia ..	4.4	8.9	5.0
Poland	1.1	2.3	1.4
Hungary	0.1	0.9	0.1
Yugoslavia ..	0.1	0.4	0.1
Roumania ..	0.02	0.06	0.01
Bulgaria	0.01	0.00	0.00
Germany	18.0	21.4	31.3
France	7.0	17.6	8.7
Denmark	10.7	24.1	7.9

(Ibid. p. 31)

There are a number of other factors which influence the 511
welfare of the agricultural population. The Eastern European 435
peasants suffered from the bad organisation of the marketing of their produce. Two examples will suffice. In Zürich 63 per cent of the retail price of milk went to the milk producer (the rest was divided between wholesale trade, retail and transport), and in Copenhagen 65 per cent; even in the United States where milk is delivered over very great distances the farmer got 46.8 per cent. As against this in Warsaw he got only 30 per cent, and in Belgrade 37.5 per cent (Ibid. pp. 94-5). The Survey of the Royal Institute of International Affairs, *World Agriculture* (1932), tells of a typical Rumanian barley farm, from which barley to the value of Lei 1,006 was sold. But the middlemen's profits and transport charges before the grain left Rumania amounted to Lei 1,202 (p.106).

The high prices of essential industrial goods further militated against the prosperity of the peasants.

The expensiveness of industrial compared with agricultural products in the period before the second world war is revealed by the following index figures of the variation of agricultural and industrial prices in Hungary (July figures):

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	1913	1925	1929	1933	1936	1937
Agricultural ..	100	125	114	57	71	80
Industrial ..	100	138	133	107	117	125

(E. Hertz, *The Economic Problem of the Danubian States*, London, 1947, p. 194)

The same phenomenon was expressed some time before World War II by a Croatian peasant speaking thus to an English investigator:

'Life is getting more and more difficult. The prices we can obtain are so very low. Look, before 1914 I could get two pair of boots for a hundredweight of wheat. Today I must give two hundredweights of wheat in exchange for one pair of boots. For one kilogram of nails, I must give one kilogram of wool. When I sold a sheep before 1914, I could buy fifty metres of cottons in exchange. Now I cannot get fifty metres of cotton-stuff even for four sheep.

'Things are no better on the coast of Dalmatia either. Before 1914 they could get a suit of clothes for a hectolitre of wine. Today they must give three hectolitres of wine for a suit. Before 1914 they could get ten boxes of matches for a litre of wine, today they must give a litre of wine for every single box.' (P. Lamartine Yates and D. Warriner, *Food and Farming in Post-War Europe*, London, 1943, p. 28).

High taxation added to the difficulties of the mass of peasants in Eastern Europe.

Last but not least, there was the burden of debts, a result of the poverty of the peasants and a very important contribution to it.

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There are two main groups of countries today whose agricultural populations enjoy a relatively high standard of living—on the one hand the corn and meat producing countries with large, highly mechanized farms (U.S.A., Canada and Australia), and on the other hand, countries like Denmark, Switzerland, Holland and Belgium which go in for intensive production of dairy products, meat and vegetables. In both cases only 20-30 per cent of the whole population is engaged in agriculture, the well-organised and highly developed agriculture being the accompaniment of an advanced industrial organization. The highly mechanized, extensive producers are dependent on a huge, world-wide market, the intensive producers are dependent on the existence of an urban population

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423 In the Trial the defendant Nikola Pavlov stated that for
474 some years up to the end of 1948 there had been 'a strict quota system which oppressed the peasants'. '. . . the quota system attained such proportions, that almost everything produced by the peasants was taken away from them, according to this order, and only such a part was left to them, which could only cover the current needs of their families. The quota system included almost all rural produce which served for direct consumption by the population, such as wool, eggs, meat, milk, potatoes, even including apples, chestnuts and peanuts . . . ' This produced a sharp reaction. 'The peasants not only did not sow all areas that they had sown till then, but began to diminish them'. The deposition of Kostov showed very clearly that the poor peasants suffered no less from the quota system than the rich and medium peasants, and were no less discontented. 'The discontent of the poor peasants was also caused by the decree for the collection of wool . . . according to which even peasants owning 1 or 2 sheep were not exempted from the delivery of wool'.*

● 435 The extreme hardship the quota deliveries imposed on the[1]
474 peasants is illustrated by the fact that in 1948 they totalled
423 about 11 milliard leva, while free market sales totalled only 715 million.

How low had been the prices paid for the products taken from the peasants is revealed by the extent to which they were raised after the June Plenum: hard wheat was raised from 19 leva per kilogram to 25 (31.6 per cent); ordinary wheat from 17 to 23 leva (35.3 per cent); rye and oats from 15 to 20 leva (33.3 per cent); barley, millet seed and corn from 13 to 18 leva (38.5 per cent); sunflower seed from 25 to 30 leva (20 per cent); dried beans from 30 to 60 leva (100 per cent); lentils from 44 to 55 leva (25 per cent). (*Otechestven Front*, 2nd July, 1949).

*The question arises why we accept this part of the evidence when we consider the Trial as a whole to be a frame-up. (See pp. 301-2). It is one thing to believe in the reality of the meat shortage, the obnoxious character of the quota system and so on—which are known to everyone who lives in the country—and another to believe that only Kostov and his co-defendants were responsible for it, while the rest of the leadership saw nothing of it for three or four years. If we look back at the 'trials' of 'witches' in the middle ages, we may disagree with the 'prosecutor' when he accused the 'witch' of causing the outbreak of a plague, but still accept the accusation as evidence of the existence of a plague at the time.

1 [Bulgarian --- Analyst]

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with a high standard of living which is able to pay good prices for the dairy products, meat, eggs, etc. (Thus the prosperity of Holland and Denmark depends on the prosperity of the urban population in Britain). In Eastern Europe the growth of grass and root crops is made difficult by the dry climate, and so, intensive production of meat, as in Denmark, Holland, Eire, England, etc., is impossible. But this does not preclude the production of milk and the raising of pigs. In some areas, there are excellent natural conditions for specialised crops, e.g., in Bulgaria and Serbia for tobacco and grapes. Other areas—and these form the greater part of Eastern Europe—are more suitable for growing corn, which could be done on the American model with tractors and combine harvesters, instead of with draught animals whose feeding takes up a lot of the arable land. In many places the best results could be achieved by mixed farming, combining mechanized corn growing with intensive production of milk, pigs, vegetables and fruits. But however agriculture develops in this area, experience has shown that the decisive factor in raising the standard of living in the countryside is the accessibility of expanding urban markets. No raising of the rate of agricultural production, no improvement in the standard of living is possible without rapid industrialisation, which will enable the surplus agricultural population to be absorbed, will provide a market for agricultural products and will supply agricultural implements and machinery as well as industrial consumption goods for the peasants. In addition the peasants need 'cheap government' and a cheap marketing system.

Problems of Industrial Development

If Eastern Europe is to be industrialised, large amounts of capital will be needed, which can be estimated by considering the number of people to be absorbed into industry. Obviously any such calculation can be only approximate and be put forward by way of illustration.

First there is the surplus population in agriculture. W. E. Moore calculated this by estimating what was a 'reasonable' European standard of agricultural population. The result was as follows :

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years after the beginning of the Russian occupation. The fear that the revolutionary enthusiasm of the Bulgarian masses (which, except in Yugoslavia, was unparalleled in this region after the war) would lead to too much independence of Russia, and the Russian bureaucracy's confidence that nationalisation could be carried out whenever they wished, caused them to postpone it until the revolutionary wave had ebbed at the end of 1947.

The timing of nationalisation in Rumania, Hungary and Bulgaria was determined by another very important factor—the Marshall Plan. The urge to trade with Western Europe, as expressed in the *unanimous* decision of the Czechoslovak government on 4 July, 1947, to take part in the Marshall Conference (a decision revoked when Gottwald and Masaryk visited Moscow on 10th July) made it necessary for Russia to strengthen her control over the economy of Eastern Europe, and this could be done only through state ownership of industries in all these countries. Hence the nationalisations in Bulgaria, Rumania and Hungary.

Poland

It is impossible to understand the process of nationalisation in Poland without taking into account two factors, namely, in the area of pre-war Poland, the existence of many industries previously controlled by German capital now remaining ownerless, and, what is even more important, the changes in Polish industry brought about by the annexation of the German area east of the Oder-Neisse and the expulsion of the German population from it. This area will be referred to as the Western territories of Poland, and the area of pre-war Poland as Old Poland.

The importance of the industry of the Western territories compared with the industry of Old Poland is shown by the following table:

ACTUAL PRODUCTION IN 1937 (IN THOUSAND TONS)

	Pre-War Poland	*Western Territories*
Coal	36,218.0	29,793.0
Coke	2,328.0	3,229.0
Briquettes ..	17.4	368.6
Brown coal	18.4	7,594.0
Zinc and lead ..	200.0	722.1
Iron ore	791.6	73.1

(*The World Today*, March, 1947)

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434 in railway construction, unless there is somebody ready to supply, in exchange for their agricultural products, the rails, locomotives, etc. In this connection, the supply of capital goods, the ability of Russia to help the countries of Eastern Europe, is even more limited. Russia's income is not big enough for part of it to be devoted to investments in Eastern Europe. Her heavy industries producing capital goods—the main constituent of any new investment—are much too weak to spare much for her satellites. This would have been absolutely clear had we been able to compare the amount of capital goods produced per capita in the U.S.S.R. with that produced in the countries of the West, but the necessary statistics for such a comparison are not available, and we shall have to resort to a less exact means of comparison to throw light on the subject. We shall compare the production in different countries of steel, the chief material from which capital goods are made. In the U.S.S.R. in 1937 105 kgs. of steel per capita were produced, as against 397 in the U.S.A. (1929), 291 in Germany (1929), 279 in England (1929), and 188 in France (1929).

439 The *Manchester Guardian* of 19 May, 1949, dealt with the need of the satellite states for capital goods and Russia's inability to satisfy it:

'. . . Russia's satellites do genuinely want more trade across the Iron Curtain. They badly need both machinery from Western Europe itself and raw materials from the British Commonwealth. Trade with Russia has quite failed to take the part in their economy that the West, and Germany especially, used to do. The Russians cannot make enough capital goods both for their own needs and for the industrialisation of Eastern Europe; it is, of course, the satellites who go without.'

This explains why at least two of the satellites, Czechoslovakia and Poland, showed clearly that they wished to take part in the Marshall Plan. On 4th July, 1947, the Czechoslovak Government decided *unanimously* to accept the invitation to the Paris Conference convened to discuss the Marshall Plan. A few days later Gottwald and Masaryk left for Moscow and three days later Prague declared that the Government declined to take part in the Conference. Even when, under Moscow's orders, the satellites fell into line on this question, the

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incapacity of Russia to supply their needs made it more and more pressing for them to try to get equipment from Western Europe. This need expressed itself in the case of Yugoslavia in a revolt against the Moscow ukase (see Part III, *The Rebellious Satellite*) and in the case of the other satellites in an appeal to the West to supply the goods—an appeal that, because of its expediency, was not vetoed by Moscow. At the Conference of the Economic Commission for Europe of the United Nations, the Polish and Czech delegates asked for trade with Western Europe, by which they could obtain capital goods. The Bulgarian delegate stated that his country could not improve her economic position to any extent without increasing her imports, especially of machines, from the West. (United Nations Documents, E/ECE/SR4/1-25).

Russia, with the majority of her population engaged in agriculture, is faced with the same problem as her satellites (apart from the Czech lands of Czechoslovakia and the Soviet Zones of Germany and Austria)—large-scale industrialisation. The terrible destruction suffered by the U.S.S.R. in World War II, as well as the preparations for World War III, which require the same materials as industrialisation—steel, coal, machinery, etc.—render Russia even less able to help the countries of Eastern Europe.

Dismantling, Looting, Requisitioning

When the populations of Eastern Europe, mainly of the ex-enemy countries, first met the Russian Army and State officials, they did not see them bringing gifts, supplying machinery, locomotives, etc., but looting their country.

Stalin forgot that the Communist International had preached for years against the reparation articles of the Versailles Treaty, and had reiterated that the German workers bore the real burden of reparations, although they did not profit in any way from the war. In World War II the crimes of the Nazi Army were incomparably worse than those of the Kaiser Army in World War I, yet the German people drew no benefit at all from this. On the contrary, the first victim of the Hitler terror was the German people itself. The 800 thousand German Communists, Socialists, trade unionists, Catholics, etc. (not including the German Jews) who passed through prisons and

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648 Poland the Russian army dismantled, according to the estimates
728 of the Communist Minister of Industry, Hilary Minc, 25-30 per cent of all the industrial equipment of the area. (Speech delivered in Warsaw on 20th October, 1945). In Old Poland too, the Russian army dismantled machinery, notably in the Lodz and Bialystok textile works.*

Trade Between Russia and her Satellites

● 439 An important feature of the foreign trade policy of Russia and her satellites is the tendency towards self-sufficiency or autarchy. The following table illustrates this as far as Russia herself is concerned:

U.S.S.R. FOREIGN TRADE (IN MILLION PRE-1914 GOLD RUBLES)

Year	*Export*	*Import*
1913†	1520.1	1375.0
1924/5..	577.8	723.4
1927/8..	791.6	945.5
1932	574.9	704.0
1937	377.2	294.2
1938	287.8	300.4

The tendency towards economic isolation from the West on the part of the satellites is shown by the following table dealing with the foreign trade of Czechoslovakia, Hungary, Poland, Rumania, Yugoslavia and Bulgaria: (see top of page 63).

As Yugoslavia did not publish figures of foreign trade for the years 1947 and 1948 it was not possible to take them into consideration in drawing up this table. Otherwise the tendency of these countries to trade mainly among themselves and with Russia and to restrict trade relations with countries independent of Russia would have been even more pronounced.

It would of course be one-sided to conclude that this tendency is entirely the result of the choice of these countries them-

000 *Incidentally, even backward China was not left untouched by the greed of the Russian bureaucracy. In June, 1946, Edwin Pauley, U.S. Reparations Commissioner, visited Manchuria and inspected 80 per cent of the Japanese war industry. In his report he stated that the Russian removal of equipment was on such a scale as to retard Manchuria's development by a generation and reduce the country to an agricultural economy. The principal items of equipment removed were machine tools and electrical equipment, although in some cases whole plants were completely stripped. Steel production was reduced by more than 50 per cent. Pauley estimated that altogether the machinery dismantled by the Russians was worth 850 million dollars. (*The World Today*, August, 1946). That this was a very heavy burden for Manchuria is clear from the fact that in 1932-1943 the total Japanese investments in Manchuria were evaluated at 5,393 million yen (about 1,200 million dollars).

†In the pre-1914 boundaries.

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EAST EUROPEAN COUNTRIES' FOREIGN TRADE
(MILLIONS OF DOLLARS IN 1938 PRICES)

	Import			Export		
	1938	1947	1948	1938	1947	1948
Trade among themselves and with U.S.S.R. ..	154	184*	355*	161	162*	314*
Trade with other countries ..	750	458†	411†	920	276†	384†
Total	904	642	766	1,081	438	698
And in percentages:						
Trade among themselves and with U.S.S.R. ..	17.0	28.6	46.3	14.9	37.0	45.0
Trade with other countries ..	83.0	71.4	53.7	85.1	63.0	55.0
Total	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0

(Calculated from the table on pp. 66-7 of United Nations *Economic Survey of Europe in 1948*, Geneva, 1949).

selves. To a very considerable extent it was imposed on them by impediments to East-West trade, for which the U.S.A. is responsible. She herself and all the countries who get Marshall Aid enforced an embargo on the export to Eastern Europe of strategic goods, as defined by the secret list of the State Department which covers, apparently, nearly all capital equipment.‡ This has been denounced on many occasions by the governments of Eastern Europe. (See, for instance, the speeches of the representatives of the Russian bloc of countries in the United Nations Economic Commission for Europe).

But equally certainly the 'Iron Curtain' created by the United States is not the only, or even the chief, cause of the tendency of members of the Russian bloc to trade mainly among themselves. This becomes clear from an examination of the trend of Russian foreign trade since 1929, when it was not faced by conditions of economic blockade. During the world depression it was very easy for any country willing to *buy* to come to bilateral trade agreements with other countries. This is illustrated by Germany's trade with the countries of Eastern

*excluding Yugoslavia.

†excluding trade between Germany and Yugoslavia.

‡According to Poland's Foreign Minister, Modzelewski, this term is interpreted to include 'cotton linters, synthetic resin, condenser tubes, radio valves, measuring apparatus, gramophone recording discs, needles for the textile industry, ball bearings, etc.'. (Speech in the second committee of the United Nations General Assembly, 2nd November, 1948).

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439 Europe since 1936. Yet Russia took advantage of this to only a small extent. (See table above).*

In 1938, U.S.S.R. and the countries of Eastern Europe bought 17 per cent of their imports from each other (in this case including Yugoslavia), in 1948 they bought 46.3 per cent (in this case excluding Yugoslavia), while the corresponding percentages for exports were 14.9 per cent and 45 per cent.

An analysis of the item 'Trade among themselves and with U.S.S.R.' reveals a very illuminating fact. The trade between the Eastern European countries themselves is not much larger today than it was before the war, but their trade with U.S.S.R. has increased tremendously:

	Imports (millions of dollars in 1938 prices)			Exports (millions of dollars in 1938 prices)		
	1938	*1947*	*1948*	*1938*	*1947*	*1948*
Trade among Eastern European countries themselves ..	147	87	186	147	87	186
Trade between Eastern European countries and U.S.S.R.	7	97*	169*	14	75*	128*

* excluding Yugoslavia.

While the foreign trade of the countries of Eastern Europe with each other was 27 per cent higher in 1948 than in 1938, their imports from U.S.S.R. rose by 2,314 per cent, and their exports to U.S.S.R. by 814 per cent. It must be remembered that 'reparations' to Russia are not included in these figures and that while Yugoslavia's trade with the other countries of Eastern Europe is included, her trade with U.S.S.R. in 1948 is not. Otherwise the rise would have been even bigger.

The long-term trade agreements between U.S.S.R. and the Eastern European countries stipulated a continuation of the expansion of their mutual trade in 1949 over 1948. Thus the trade of the U.S.S.R. with Poland was due to rise by some 35 per cent, with Czechoslovakia by more than 45 per cent, while trade with Rumania was to be more than doubled and that with Hungary to be trebled. U.S.S.R. trade with Yugo-

*This shows how demagogic is the slogan of the Communist Party in Britain today—'Trade with U.S.S.R. and the People's Democracies!'—which assumes that these countries, in contradistinction to the U.S.A., indulge in trade with no political strings attached, that they are ready to trade on a large scale with Britain or any other country that is not under the same political system. Yet U.S.S.R. and her satellites broke nearly all trade relations with Yugoslavia after the Stalin-Tito clash. See pp. 238-9.

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slavia on the other hand was to be curtailed in 1949 to a bare eighth of the 1948 value.

The economic needs of these countries will tend to lead in time to increasing integration of their economies and increasing trade among themselves (already today there is a considerable increase in the trade of Czechoslovakia with Poland and a number of other satellites). But so long as their policitical systems remain unchanged, trade between the satellites will remain subordinated to the trade of each of them with Russia. The pattern of the trade is moulded within the framework of an increasingly autarchic Empire. The establishment of the Council for Mutual Economic Aid (or 'Comecon') in January, 1949, to co-ordinate the trade of the 'People's Democracies' with each other and the U.S.S.R. came to fortify Russian *Grossraumwirtschaft.*

Let us now pass from the quantities of goods exchanged to their quality. The commodity composition of the present trade between Russia and her satellites is very different from that between an industrial imperialist power and her agrarian colonies. Thus while Britain is a great importer of raw materials and foodstuffs from her colonies and supplies them with manufactured goods, and while a similar relationship existed between Germany and the countries of Eastern Europe before the second world war, Russia both exports and imports primary products and manufactured goods to and from her satellites. She supplies them with tractors and industrial machinery as well as raw materials such as cotton, iron ore, manganese, chemicals and grain. She also imports from them machinery (Czechoslovakia, Hungary) and manufactured consumer goods. Russia supplies raw materials and gets a portion of the manufactured goods produced from the raw materials, e.g., she gives cotton and gets cotton goods, gives leather (especially to Czechoslovakia) and gets shoes, etc. This composition of Russia's trade with her satellites shows that she is faced with a problem similar to theirs—the industrialisation of the country.*

The prices Russia pays for the commodities she buys from her satellites and the prices she takes for what she sells to them

*In the future, it seems, it will be impossible to find out how the foreign trade of the Russian satellites is divided among different countries, as instead of the foreign trade being evaluated in dollars it will be evaluated in rubles (as is already being done in Poland).

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439 are, for some reason, kept secret. While it is easy to find out, for example, how many yards of cotton goods Britain sold in 1948 to various countries, and at what prices, information about the quantity of cotton goods supplied to Russia by Hungary and their price is as jealously guarded as a military secret. Tito, after the rift with the Cominform, could say that there was 'capitalist trade among socialist countries'. No official of the Cominform has denied that capitalist principles of trade prevail among the 'People's Democracies' and between them and Russia, far less attempted to show what other principles prevail. One of the essential characteristics of capitalist trade is that when one side is in a monopolistic position it can generally buy more cheaply and sell more dearly than the other. The tendency towards autarchy of Russia and her satellites and the political power of the Kremlin over the governments of the satellites—which are, of course, connected phenomena—put each of the satellites into a position of utter dependence *on* the monopolist trader. This explains both the scarcity of information on prices and the deleterious character for Russia of the information which did leak out and which would otherwise have been inexplicable.

The Polish-Soviet agreement dated August 16th, 1945, stipulated that from 1946 onwards, Poland was to deliver to U.S.S.R. at a special price the following quantities of coal: 1946, 8 million tons; from 1947 to 1950, 13 million tons each year; and subsequently 12 million tons annually as long as the occupation of Germany continued. This coal, however cheap it was, was not to be paid for by Russian products but by reparations taken from Germany by Russia and transferred to Poland. According to Prof. W. J. Rose, the price agreed on was said to be 2 dollars per ton (*Poland Old and New*, London, 1948, p. 290). Stanisław Mikolajczyk, who was Vice-Premier of Poland at the time, reports that the agreement was for an even lower price, 1.25 dollars a ton (*The Pattern of Soviet Domination*, London, 1948, pp. 158-9). As far as is known, Poland did not get anything on this account. Russia's excuse could be very simple: the Western Powers did not carry out their obligations to supply Russia with reparations from Western Germany. Anyhow, 12-13 million tons of coal at 2 or 1.25 dollars a ton, was extremely cheap. At the time of the

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signing of the Polish-Soviet agreement Denmark and Sweden were offering Poland 12 dollars a ton, subsequently to be raised to 16 dollars. The robbery of Poland through this transaction alone amounted to over 100 million dollars a year*. In 1948, Russia cut her demands for Polish coal to 7 million tons a year; even so this is a heavy commitment for Poland.

Another example of these sharp trade practices is given by Felix Belair in the *New York Herald Tribune* (quoted by E. Germain, 'L'Europe orientale depuis deux ans', *Quatrième Internationale*, Paris, March-April, 1949). He quotes the case of the agreement of U.S.S.R. with Czechoslovakia by which shoes manufactured from leather supplied by U.S.S.R. to the former Bata Plants were sold to Russia at a price fixed at 170 Crowns although the actual cost price per pair was 300 Crowns. At the same time, when Czechoslovakia was forced by the severe drought of 1947-8 to buy 600 thousand tons of grain from Russia, she was made to pay more than 4 dollars a bushel, while the United States sold a bushel of grain for 2.5 dollars. The price charged was thus over 50 per cent higher than that prevailing in the world market. Another example is that of Bulgarian tobacco. Russia bought four-fifths of Bulgaria's 1948 tobacco crop so cheaply that she could afford to sell it to Italy for dollars at a price which undercut by 35 per cent the Bulgarians who were also trying to secure dollars with the remainder of their tobacco. "Borba" of 31 March, 1949, remainder of their tobacco. 'Borba' of 31 March, 1949, printed the following fact: while it cost Yugoslavia 500,000 dinars to produce one ton of molybdenum—the essential ingredient of steel—Russia before the Stalin-Tito rift, paid only 45,000 dinars a ton.

The 'Advantage' of being a Colony of an Industrially Backward Imperialist Power

The industrial backwardness of the imperialist country can have one good result for the colonies which is not usually offered by a highly industrialized imperialist country. *Because* of her backwardness the imperialist country looks upon the colonies as an *additional source of industrial strength*, supporting

*To get some idea of this amount, it is worth mentioning that British capitalists never got such a large annual profit out of their investments in India.

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in manufacturing industry, the Czechoslovak Plan an increase of 250,000, the Bulgarian Plan an increase of 90,000 and the Hungarian Plan an increase of 300,000 (including industries other than manufacturing). The U.N. Survey that gives these facts, remarks: 'These figures, if related to present employment in manufacturing, indicate a substantial increase. If, however, the figures are related to the total populations of the countries, they are less striking. In the four countries mentioned, additional employment in industry over the plan period accounts for only 1 to 2 per cent of the total population, which in itself is expected to rise by some 5 per cent in the same period' (p. 206). 185 652

On many points the plans are silent. Unlike Russia's first Five Year Plan or the plans of the Organisation for European Economic Co-operation for Western Europe, the Plans of the 'People's Democracies' contain no information about foreign trade either among themselves or between each of them and Russia, or the West. They also blur over the question of how the total national income will be divided between consumption and accumulation (investment), but contain only some scattered information about the planned consumption of some particular goods. This silence speaks volumes. The non-publication of information about foreign trade is intended to cover up the exploitation of these countries by Russia; the non-publication of information about the division of the national income between consumption and accumulation is intended to cover up the exploitation of the masses under the banner of industrialisation. 185 439 434

This last point about the division of the national income between consumption and accumulation is of vital importance when we attempt to discover the factors determining the living conditions of the masses. Burdened with a terrible backwardness, an autocratic bureaucracy and the yoke of Russian imperialism, industrialisation will inevitably be carried out in such a way that compulsory savings will far surpass what the people themselves would be ready to save of their own free will. In such circumstances, consumption must be subordinated to accumulation, as the experience of Eastern Europe over the past few years (and of twenty years' planning in Russia) has clearly shown. The following table illustrates the 'capital 434

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241 rived from agriculture. National prosperity was dependent
434 on the outcome of harvests and on the possibility of agricultural exports.

439 In the interwar period, these countries were victims of the fluctuations of the world market and of the policy of autarky which resulted from them. The countries of Western Europe from 1930 to 1932 imposed high tariffs on food imports in order to ward off the effects of the international slump in agriculture. In doing so, they ruined the Eastern European peasant. Export of agricultural products from all Eastern European countries was reduced to a minimum and prevented these countries from balancing their trade. Thus, it was impossible for them to buy the industrial goods and manufactures on which they depended to maintain industrial employment and the standard of living of the peasants themselves.

This crisis further reduced the possibilities of export because the Eastern European states were unable to compete in prices with the overseas agricultural exporting countries that had technical aid at their disposal and because they could not afford the enormous sums necessary for subsidizing exports of agricultural products. Many attempts were made by agrarian conferences to alleviate the distress by asking a preferential tariff system for this region, which would have meant the almost complete abolition of the most-favored-nation clause in bilateral commercial agreements. Another remedy was seen in the creation of an interstate grain purchasing commission that would buy up the chief surpluses from the Eastern European countries and distribute them among the different European importing countries. These proposed methods arose from the primary need of Eastern Europe, which was to acquire some form of economic security in the world market in order to provide a stable basis for peasant society.

Everything was in vain. It was impossible to achieve

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stable, fair prices for agricultural products and to secure 439
them a market. The Czechoslovakian Grain State Monopoly, established in 1934, was the only institution to bring any real benefit to the farming population. In other Eastern European countries, the situation reduced even further both the internal market and the income per head of the rural population. Less money than ever was available for improvements or for educating the peasants in new methods and techniques.

The alleviation of this situation came from Nazi Germany. Since 1935 Germany had been buying the greatest proportion of this region's agricultural surpluses and, in return, had been sending its own industrial goods into that area. Eastern Europe, and the Balkan states especially, became so dependent upon Germany's buying that the term "economic conquest" became a reality. This conquest, which was later political and military, of course did not bring any remedy to the agricultural problem of this region.

III

The Second World War devastated whole countries. No- 728
where did the four horsemen of the Apocalypse reap a 167
greater harvest than in Poland and Yugoslavia. In their wake came a troubled period which brought with it all the miseries and hardships that have always attended political and social revolutions. Vast numbers of the population were killed during the war. In Poland alone these numbered six million. The unbalance which this caused was greatly aggravated by enormous shifts of population in many of the Eastern European countries. The Germans were expelled from Poland and Czechoslovakia in millions, and from Hungary, Yugoslavia, and Rumania in hundreds of thousands. The total number of Germans expelled from this region was estimated at over eleven million. Changes in state

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648 433 178 pirations mostly in order to develop a modern industry capable of meeting war needs.

The assumption that work invested in industrial development would improve economic conditions was a decisive factor in influencing states to industrialize. This assumption was particularly valid in regions with climatic extremities and little arable land. Some of the means used to foster industrialization were technical education, customs, embargoes, tax exemptions, monopolies, favorable credit policies, and provisions protecting the joint interests of domestic industries. The assembly line system, as influenced by the United States, was started in the industrial sector in the '30's.

Branches of industry requiring specialized skill were developed mainly in Czechoslovakia and Hungary, but they did not attract many from the surplus peasant population which still preferred unskilled jobs. The competition, such as it was, for unskilled jobs resulted in a low wage level. Therefore, the increase in purchasing power was gradual. Peasant poverty and the lack of skill and capital were the fundamental problems facing industrialization programs and the new governmental economic policies.

426 ● 439 The general poverty was further increased by the fact that the small Eastern European countries were debtor states. The solvency of Czechoslovakia was dependent on the export of industrial goods, while other states depended upon agricultural exports or, as in Rumania, upon mineral raw materials and lumber as well as on agricultural goods. Foreign debts, incurred before and after the First World War, weighed heavily on the budgets of the individual countries. Only one half of the debts were repaid during the interwar period. Foreign loans were given too often on the basis of political considerations. The boundaries erected by the 1920 peace treaties had already broken up natural economic and geographic areas, and the disproportionate lending policies of foreign powers hindered the uniform economic development of East-

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ern Europe. The individual states became more and more 626
antagonistic and trade within the Eastern European area 439
often took a course contrary to the requirements of reasonable economic policies. Free trade, cherished in the first postwar years, was soon abandoned for the sake of a policy of protective tariffs. Customs, duties, and foreign exchange restrictions to prevent speculation, were introduced to protect economic development and strength.

Both "economic nationalism" and "small power imperial- 186
ism" were features characteristic of this area in the period 433
between the wars. When the economic position of the new 648
states in the '20's is compared with the situation prior to the First World War, the problems of these states emerge clearly. The economic well-being of the old Austro-Hungarian empire lay in the regional character of its economic organization, which depended mostly on a coordinated internal market and a natural division of labor between the component parts of the empire. Although it was a social and cultural mosaic, the empire was organized in such a manner as to take advantage of the regional distribution of natural resources and the differing skills of the various populations.

The peace treaties ending the First World War, while meeting the political aspirations of various nationalities, did not provide a satisfactory solution to the economic problems of the region, and the newly created states were divided by serious political and economic differences. Political animosity soon led to economic warfare, and self-sufficiency, the driving motivation of the new states, precluded any real possibility of economic cooperation. The world depression of the early '30's led to the final economic and psychological collapse of Eastern European stability and opened the door wide to German economic penetration and the eventual conquest of the region.

The foreign trade of the Eastern European countries in 439
the years 1919-1944 was far smaller than it should have

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439 been, considering the size and population of these countries. Although they comprised roughly 25 per cent of Europe's area and population, excluding the European part of the Soviet Union, they handled no more than 10 or 11 per cent of Europe's exports and imports. About one third of the trade of the Eastern European area was purely regional. With the exception of Albania which traded mainly with Italy, Eastern Europe's trade list was headed by Germany, followed by the competing states of Austria, Great Britain, and the United States. The predominance of Germany became even greater during the war years. Trade was one of Germany's most important means of influencing the political, social, and cultural life of this region.

II

178 By 1918 the countries of Eastern Europe had reached different stages of social evolution. In Poland and Hungary the aristocracy had preserved considerable power in spite of a rising intellectual bourgeoisie. In Rumania and Croatia the power of the aristocracy had been wiped out by the land reforms and leadership had been taken over by a commercial middle class. In Czechoslovakia a strong bureaucratic and commercial element had risen to leadership. In the Baltic states, also, it was mainly the commercial class which had ascended to leading positions. Yugoslavia, Bulgaria, and Albania had no aristocracy and only a small intellectual bourgeoisie and commercial class.

369 It was generally from the rural stratum of village teachers, priests, station masters, and notaries that the new bourgeoisie and the ruling class arose. The children of an educated father, who was able to secure a better place in society, had a better chance of entering a university—the sanctuary as much of social position and status as of knowledge. However, those who succeeded in obtaining graduate and other degrees in

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general were slow to learn and to develop their abilities. 578
They did not cooperate with regulations and laws even when such were to their own benefit, an attitude that stems from many centuries of oppression.

IV

It is difficult to say what turn the development of Eastern 648
Europe might have taken if, after gaining full freedom and independence in the twentieth century, the countries of this region had been given the chance to progress in a peaceful era. The countries of Eastern Europe, immediately after recovering from the traumatic depression of the 1930's, were confronted with German and Russian imperialism without even a chance to settle down for a period of healthy evolution. Unhappily, the Western European powers, after their unfortunate appeasement policy towards Hitler which completely confused the Eastern European nations, joined hands too tightly with communist Russia. The Eastern European states, semidemocratic, semidictatorial, balancing between bankruptcy and future recovery, between socialism and aristocratic-bourgeois traditions, were a brutally realistic mirror of Europe's modern revolution.

Germany used all means possible to influence and to domi- 648
nate the area. Basing its actions upon meticulous studies of 439
the history, geography, politics, economics, social life, and cultural habits of the respective countries, Germany gained influence through the use of economic penetration, anti-semitism, social-revolutionary propaganda, antibolshevism, and diplomacy. The Eastern European states could not very well defend themselves against such brilliantly conducted infiltration. Nor could their economics develop satisfactorily when American, British, French, and Swiss businessmen were completely disinterested in trade and investment in Eastern Europe since the prospects for profit were not great in that

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648 area. It is unjust to accuse the Eastern European states of
439 favoring Germany when this country alone was willing to trade with them and did not demand hard currency payments. Germany bought large quantities of Eastern European products and forced the sellers to buy from her various articles, including gadgets, luxury goods, and many other products, the prices of which were beyond the purchasing power of the buyers.

668 578 Antisemitic movements in Eastern Europe often received aid in the form of money from Nazi Germany which practice increased dependence upon that country. Through the various Nazi-supported parties in almost every country and through fifth column organizations, the Germans instigated conflicts between the ruling classes and the dissatisfied social elements. At the same time antibolshevik propaganda was strongly and successfully supported by German diplomacy.

648 Czechoslovakia, in 1938, was the first to lose her independence. Poland fell in 1939, and Yugoslavia followed in 1941. The years 1939 through 1944 were truly critical for Eastern Europe. The German-Russian imperialistic pincers tightened steadily. Nazi Germany won easy diplomatic victories over the Western European powers whose conciliatory policies were astounding. Even more astounding was their sudden turn to anti-German propaganda and war. Squeezed between the arbitrary policy of the Western powers and the expanding German and Soviet giants, the Eastern European nations had no other choice than to muddle through. Apprehensively watching an alliance of giants and often impressed by the achievements of these powers, they tried to appease them, aid them, or fight them.

722 Peace economy was turned into war economy. This decreased unemployment, and war losses decreased it even further. The most active age group, already reduced by the slump in birth rate after the First World War, was thinned even more. Youth, accustomed to tackling problems in terms

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produce many substitutes. Today, shortages of raw materials 433
are covered by imports from abroad, most of these from the 135
Soviet Union. Economic autarky is not possible in Eastern Europe alone, but the Soviet bloc, including Russia and China, is almost self-sufficient in raw materials.

Under the unrelenting pressure of Moscow, the output 402
of machinery and plant equipment in this area is making 439
steady and rapid progress. The period when most of these countries must depend on importation of machinery from the West is almost over. Were all Western sources of industrial machinery to be completely closed to the captive area, its industrialization would be slowed and delayed but not halted. As things stand now, much industrial equipment is still imported from Western Europe, legally or illegally, and the Soviet Union can take care of the other shortages. Czechoslovakia, Eastern Germany, and, to a lesser degree, Hungary produce machinery above their home requirements, and part of the surplus goes to other captive countries, to the Soviet Union, and to China.

According to United Nations data,[2] the 1951 indices of 433
industrial production in the single countries of this area in comparison to 1938 were as follows: Eastern Germany, 115 per cent; Czechoslovakia, 168; Rumania, 206; Hungary, 267; Poland, 270; and Bulgaria, 345 per cent. In considering these figures, it is necessary to bear in mind that 1938 was not the peak production year in Eastern Europe. Between 1938 and 1943-44, the industrial output of Czechoslovakia and Hungary rose noticeably owing to the erection of many new industrial plants, so that only a part of their industrial expansion since 1938 can be attributed to the efforts of their present governments. Poland's industrial potential increased in 1945 by at least one third, due to the acquisition of ex-German Silesia. Bulgaria's industrial po-

[2] *Economic Survey of Europe Since the War* (Geneva: United Nations, 1953), p. 239, Table 1.

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produce litt'e, if anything, and the vast apparatus of standing 185
armed forces, of police and poli ical supervision, of party 471
machinery and propaganda, does not create wealth but con- 511
sumes it. The onetime waste of unemployment has been partly 464
supplanted by the waste of the immense state machinery of control and compulsion inherent in all totalitarian systems and particularly odious under Communism.

In addition to this costly political overhead, there are three 185
other burdens to the national economies of these countries. One is the cost of planning both on a national scale and in minute detail, an economically unlikely proposition, resulting in duplication of work, omissions, bottlenecks, and other forms of economic confusion. This has been one of the main reasons why the Yugoslav Five Year Plan has never been fully realized. This type of waste can only be eliminated very gradually, if at all. The second type of waste is directly due to Communism. In the free world, private property is fairly 471
generally respected and cared for by its owners and by the public at large. Public property, being the exception rather than the rule, also enjoys respect and cases of vandalism are few. In Eastern Europe, state property is the rule, and very few people give it proper respect. The Communists are aware of this general neglect and the ensuing injury to the economy but believe that in time society will be taught to take care of what is defined as people's wealth. However, during thirty-five years of Communism in Russia, there has been little progress in this direction. The third burden on the state 648
economy is a specific feature of the countries of Eastern 439
Europe. All of them have to pay heavy tribute to the Russian big brother. Russia exploits the captive nations in many ways: by reparations in kind, mixed companies, trade agreements, high prices for imports from Russia and low prices for exports to Russia, maintenance costs for Soviet troops, high salaries for Russian experts and advisers, and the like. These nations cannot express themselves on this topic, but

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648 there is overwhelming evidence that they are aware of being
439 fleeced by the Russians to the extent of hundreds of millions of dollars annually.

III

439 One of the main results of the existence of the Iron Curtain
185 is the gradual integration of Eastern Europe into the Soviet economy. Under the present circumstances, Soviet Russia lays hands on many of the raw materials and industrial goods, both capital and consumer, that are put out by the captive countries. The realization of its economic plans depends in no small way upon these goods. The industrialization of this area also depends on imports and could not proceed at its present rapid rate without the importation of machinery and, more important, of raw materials from the Soviet Union, in particular from the Ukraine. These countries are meeting with restrictions on the importation of so-called strategic goods from the United States and from some other Western countries. However, even if there were no such restrictions, these countries would have difficulty in paying for imported goods, since they do not produce sufficient surpluses of goods that interest several of the most important Western markets, for instance, the United States, the British dominions, France, and possibly Western Germany. On the other hand, the capacity of the Soviet Union and China to consume goods produced by the states of Eastern Europe is practically limitless.

For all these reasons, in addition to political expediency, trade between this area and the Soviet Union has been increasing rapidly from year to year. Were it not for Soviet iron and manganese ore, colored metals, phosphate rock and sulphur, cotton, wool, and, in certain parts of the area, coke and pig iron, many metallurgical, chemical, and textile plants in the area would have to close down. Indeed, they will do

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so if for some reason, general mobilization in Russia, for example, freight traffic with Russia is interrupted. To sum up, links have been created between these states and Russia which, because of the self-isolation of the latter, did not exist before the war and which would be difficult to sever in the future.

439 185

At the same time that economic links are being established between Eastern Europe and Russia, the individual states, in particular Eastern Germany, Czechoslovakia, Poland, and Hungary, are being economically integrated with each other. This is an inevitable result of the present process of the industrialization of these countries. Trade among them is also expanding constantly, and many plants are being erected by the technically more advanced states of the area on the territory of the less advanced. To quote but one example, the Czechs are building many electric and chemical plants in Poland, Hungary, Rumania, and Bulgaria. There are other forms of this interregional economic collaboration which is, for the most part, better justified economically and more natural than collaboration with the Soviet Union.

The two movements toward integration, one with Russia and the other interregional, are developing in a parallel way. It is difficult to say which of the two trends is more intensive, although possibly that with Russia is. They can be judged by the data, published several months ago in Moscow, on this area's foreign trade for 1951. When checked with United Nations information on the same subject, the following table appears to be substantially correct.

The table shows that the northern part of the area conducts more trade with other states than with the Soviet Union, while the contrary is true of the south of the area. Soviet Russia does as much trade with Rumania and Bulgaria as Nazi Germany used to do around 1940. Because of their geographical position and the rural structure of their economies, these two countries are on their way toward being drawn into

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● 439
185

Foreign Trade of Poland, Czechoslovakia, Hungary, Rumania, Bulgaria, and Albania—1951 [4]

(IN PERCENTAGE OF TRADE WITH)

	USSR	Other Communist Countries (including Eastern Germany and China)	Free World
Poland	25	33	42
Czechoslovakia	28	32	40
Hungary	29	38	33
Rumania	51	28	21
Bulgaria	58	34	8
Albania	57	43	0

the economic system of the Soviet Union. The remaining four countries are less economically dependent on Russia. The place of Eastern Germany in interregional trade is very important. It is able to supply the rest of this area with much heavy and precision machinery, as well as potash and other fertilizers, in exchange for fuel, foodstuffs, and raw materials.

IV

185 661 642 The social policies of the satellite governments follow in their general outlines those practiced by the Soviet Union but may be described as somewhat more moderate, if only because the respect for human values has been more deeply ingrained in the westernized societies of Eastern Europe than they have in Russia.

The principle dominating these policies is that the Soviet-type revolution was made in the Eastern European countries in the interest of the people and that it continues to serve their interests. There is no speech made or publication issued be-

[4] P. Suslin, "The Consolidation of the Democratic World Market," *New Times* (Moscow), No. 5 (January 28, 1953), p. 10.

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vious shortages of consumer goods and to increase substantially the standard of living of the Soviet population. This announcement was followed by similar declarations in the captive countries. Their governments bound themselves to increase investments in agriculture, housing and light industries producing consumer goods. In Eastern Germany, Hungary, Czechoslovakia and Rumania, and somewhat later in Poland, qualified promises were made to the effect that the hitherto very rapid rate of heavy industrial expansion would be slowed down. At the same time two of the greatest works under construction in the area have been interrupted if not abandoned: the Danube-Black Sea canal in Rumania and, to all appearances, the huge HUKO iron and steel 'combinat' in Eastern Slovakia. These public statements were in themselves equivalent to an official admission that the condition of the population was miserable.

Time alone will show whether, and to what extent, these new policies will be realized. The bumper 1953 harvest in most of the key provinces of the area would undoubtedly relieve its food scarcity if it were not for the fact that a great deal of this harvest has been earmarked for export. The Soviet government stated recently that it would import food and consumer goods from Eastern Europe to the extent of some 660 million dollars, and Eastern Germany expects to import similar goods from this area, as well as from China which has little to export, in the amount of 125 million dollars. The captive area proper, suffering itself from an acute shortage of consumer goods, would thus be forced to contribute to the betterment of the Soviet and Eastern German economies at the rate of more than eleven dollars per capita of its population. Even if the governments of the area do their best to increase the standard of living of the working masses, much time must inevitably pass between the inauguration of the new policy and the actual increase in the production of consumer goods. For example, the present insufficient produc-

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the ultimate responsibility for the collapse of Czechoslovakia 648
must rest with the Western powers, yet it is conceivable that had the Eastern European states, above all Poland and Czechoslovakia, stood together, it might have been possible to stiffen the French spine at this fatal juncture. From Munich the road led to the crises of 1939, and eventually to the German-Soviet pact of August, which spelt the end of independent Eastern Europe.

Germany's economic penetration of Eastern Europe after 648
1933 was not a primary factor in the breakup of this region. 439
While the reality of the penetration cannot be denied, for it meant much more than foisting aspirin and cameras on the Eastern European states, its importance may be questioned. This penetration did not really impair the political independence of these states until after the diplomatic situation had deteriorated greatly, and some of the German trade agreements which really bound the economies of the area were a result rather than a cause of the shift in the balance of power.

One may ask at this point about the influence of the 648
domestic political and social problems of Eastern Europe on 642
international relations. A good deal has been written about the failure of parliamentary and constitutional regimes in Eastern Europe, and their replacement by authoritarian regimes. Some have concluded from this that there was a tendency on the part of these regimes to gravitate toward Hitler and to refuse to have anything to do with the Soviet Union at a time when Litvinov was loudly calling, at the League and elsewhere, for collective security against aggression.

The relationship between foreign and domestic policy is always a complex and debatable one. In the case of Eastern Europe, however, one must steer a course between two inadequate interpretations of this relationship, which may be called the Popular Frontist and the Retrospective Vindica-

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As early as 1945, the Soviet Union began to negotiate trade agreements with all the Eastern European countries. 648 In the beginning these trade agreements were limited to the 439 determination of goods to be mutually delivered during a specific period of time. In time these trade agreements were replaced by more elaborate documents which established definite goals to be achieved in the exchange of commodities between the countries concerned. If the new treaties and agreements indicate anything, they indicate the primacy of economics in the Soviet outlook. This was but one means by which the preponderance of the Soviet Union in the area was assured.

Although the Council on Mutual Economic Assistance (Comecon) was announced to the world in 1949, it is not yet clear that complete economic integration exists. What is clear is a trend to make the various captive countries of the orbit dependent upon the Soviet Union, since the area does not possess half the basic raw materials that it needs. Thus while there is no economic integration of the satellites as a regional bloc, there is a tendency because of their need for raw materials for them to become part of one centralized Soviet system.

This system is best evidenced by the existence of joint or 315 mixed companies. In Rumania, the oil fields are owned by 439 a mixed Soviet-Rumanian company. In effect this means that the Soviets control Rumanian petroleum production. The Russian representatives on the company board control the majority of votes and are in a position to decide policies and production norms. In addition, the companies operate rent free, receive the highest priorities in labor, equipment and resources.

The extent of Soviet parasitism in Eastern Europe might 648 have remained a "state secret" had not the Yugoslavs di- 439 vulged it to the world. As the Yugoslav *White Book* so well documents, one of their major criticisms of the Soviet behavior arose from the negotiations over the so-called Soviet-

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648 Yugoslav joint companies. The Yugoslav experience is of
●439 particular interest since it reflects that of the rest of the orbit. The Soviet Union and the Federated People's Republic of Yugoslavia signed an economic agreement on April 11, 1945. The communiqué released after the negotiations stated that the Soviet government agreed to supply the Yugoslav army with arms and ammunition on long-term credits and to aid in the restoration of the Yugoslav war industry. At the same time both sides agreed on mutual deliveries of goods. The Soviet government was to meet the requirements of the Yugoslav economy as to raw materials, technical advice and other services.

The signatories have never made public the details of this agreement, but the Yugoslav-Cominform differences threw some light on Soviet trading techniques. On March 31, 1949, *Borba*, the official newspaper of the Communist Party of Yugoslavia, charged that the Soviet government had violated the agreement for the financial support of Yugoslav students attending Soviet schools by forcing the Yugoslav government to pay for their upkeep in dollars instead of dinars. It also charged that the Soviet Union unilaterally reduced the volume of trade and that the Soviet government forced the Yugoslavs to sell their raw materials at prices below world market prices.

In his description on October 7, 1949, of the operations of Soviet-Yugoslav joint companies, Dr. Vilfan, permanent Yugoslav delegate to the United Nations, branded Russia as an exploiter. Speaking before the Economic and Financial Committee of the United Nations, Dr. Vilfan described Soviet imperialist practices. As an example, he cited the Joint Yugoslav-Soviet Steamship Company (Juspad). Russia, he claimed, had among other things rigged the transportation charges, causing a loss of $19,000,000 to Yugoslavia in 1948. Vilfan further observed that "the superiority of capi-

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talist monopoly has been replaced by the monopolistic position of the more developed Socialist country." 648 439

While Soviet economic policy had much to do with Yugoslavia's ultimate defection from the orbit, the causes lie deep in Yugoslavia's historical experience and that of Tito and his party's rise to political power. Many of the documents regarding the break have been published, yet much more has to be made available before a definitive judgment can be made and many questions answered.

IV

One fact that should be made clear regarding Yugoslavia 648 and its role in the Soviet orbit is that Tito never "broke" with Moscow. While it is true Tito declined the invitation to attend a Cominform meeting called to consider his case, his action cannot be described as a break. It was Moscow that gave Tito the *coup de main*. It was not until a year later that the Yugoslavs attacked Stalin openly.

For centuries, the geographical position of Yugoslavia has made the country a target for political and military pressures from all sides. Now, to the struggle for the control of Yugoslavia's land and sea positions and her resources, the break between Moscow and Belgrade adds a contest for the control of the minds and unquestioned obedience of men. Since Yugoslav Partisans based their National Liberation Movement on the principle of unconditional loyalty to the Soviet Union, prior to the break the Soviet Union had a privileged and controlling position in Yugoslavia's domestic and foreign policy, resources, and manpower.

The institutional system of Yugoslavia fully indicated the allegiance the Partisan leaders had pledged to the Kremlin, and faithfully reflected the structure of the Soviet Union. The People's Front, with the Communist Party of Yugoslavia

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FOOTNOTES

[1] Hilary Minc, *A Fruitful Collaboration of Free Peoples*, quoted after *Pravda*, Moscow, by *Zycie Gospodarcze* (Economic Life), Warsaw, 1951, No. 19. Minc states that, in comparison with 1938, the total industrial output in the first half of 1951 reached 165 percent in Czechoslovakia, 208 percent in Rumania, 268 percent in Poland, 273 percent in Hungary and 335 percent in Bulgaria, while that of Albania reached 423 percent in 1950. The 1938 level of the industrial output in the Soviet zone of Germany was exceeded towards the end of 1950, and by the middle of 1951 might have reached 115 percent of the 1938 production. 113 121

[2] Jean Chardonnet, *Les conséquences économiques de la guerre*, Paris, Hachette, 1947. [113]

[3] No detailed exact figures of the coal output in the Silesian-Ostravan basin can be given. It is not easy to distinguish it statistically from the global data of output in Poland and Czechoslovakia, both of which have coal mines outside of that basin. The annual and long-range plans of all captive countries are based only upon such global data and do not make distinction between the productions of individual basins. 316 443

[4] Hungarian, Rumanian and Bulgarian statistics do not make sufficient distinction between black and brown coal. Figures concerning the coal output in these three countries are estimated according to the ratio between the output of the two kinds of coal as known from previous statistics. That ratio is supposed to be constant.

[5] During the third quarter of 1951 the plan for coal extraction in Eastern Germany was not entirely fulfilled, yet output increased by 11.5 percent in comparison with the corresponding quarter of 1950 (*Wirtschaft*, Berlin, 1951, No. 43). The minor Czech coal basins were by the end of September 1951, about 150,000 tons, *i.e.*, some 3 or 4 percent behind the prescribed target (speech by Premier Zápotocký, *Rude Pravo*, Prague, 1 November 1951). The Hungarian coal and lignite mines were 6 percent behind the plan for the second quarter of 1951, and 10 percent behind that for the third quarter (*Nepszava*, Budapest, 23 October 1951); yet an official report claimed that in the second quarter of 1951 the output of both black and brown coal exceeded by 22 percent that of the second quarter of 1950 (*Gospodarka Planowa*, Warsaw, 1951, No. 9); the Tatabánya black coal mines were responsible for almost half the coal deficit (speech by Rakosi, *Nepszava*, 23 October 1951). In Rumania the situation was apparently somewhat

316 443

more favorable: although the output of black and brown coal was also lagging behind schedule, its extraction in the second quarter of 1951 was claimed to have exceeded that of the second quarter of 1950 by 26 percent (*Gospodarka Planowa*, 1951, No. 10). No detailed data are known for coal extraction in Bulgaria.

[6] 100 million tons (according to some indirect indices, 103 million) in Poland, 25 million in Czechoslovakia, 3.5 million in Eastern Germany, about 3 million in Hungary, about one million in Rumania, and about 0.5 million in Bulgaria. The Eastern German target, originally set at 4 million tons, was subsequently reduced to 3.5 million tons (the Law of 1 November 1951, *Wirtschaft*, Berlin, 1951, No. 44) — the only known instance of this kind. Yet various utterances of the chief planners in Poland and Rumania, and of Eastern Germany as well, leave little doubt that the long-range economic plans of these countries, supposed to terminate by the end of 1955, will be accelerated by one year, as has already happened with the Czechoslovak and Hungarian plans. In anticipation of that step, the writer assumes throughout his study that the figures of planned output in Eastern Germany, Poland, and Rumania in 1955 in fact pertain to 1954. An arbitrary but plausible figure of one million tons increase in the coal output in Czechoslovakia has been accepted for 1954 in comparison with the output planned for 1953.

[7] London *Economist*, 24 February 1951. According to the Soviet Fourth Five Year Plan, that figure should have been 86 million tons. Since the plan was overfulfilled, it was probably larger.

135 403

[8] Most of the descriptive data on lignite comes from an exhaustive study by Sir Richard Redmayne, *Encyclopædia Britannica*, 1943, Vol. V. p. 878 ff.

[9] United Nations, Geneva, 1950, p. 231.

[10] Redmayne, *op. cit.*

[11] In its original version of 1950 the Eastern German Five Year Plan foresaw a production of 205 million tons of lignite by 1955. The new figure of 225.2 million tons in 1955 comes from the revised version of the plan as adoped in the law of 1 November 1951, (*Wirtschaft*, Berlin, No. 44, 2 November 1951).

[12] The first figure is based on the indices of the coal production in 1951 in comparison with the preceding years, as published by the Soviet press. The second comes from Stalin's speech of 9 February 1946.

[13] In his speech of 7 November 1951, Beria stated that in the course of the past several years the output of coal in the Soviet Union has been growing on the average of 24 million tons per year. (*Pravda*, 7 November 1951).

[14] The vast Lauchhammer lignite coking plant now under construction (and possibly some other new plants) is expected to produce 300,000

economic conditions and the special requirements of the first Five Year Plan. Indeed, the first collectivization drive was expected to bring only 14 per cent of the land into the "socialist sector". The overwhelming success of the drive was as much a surprise to the Communist leadership as to the peasants themselves. And it was only when the drive turned out to be so phenomenally successful that the Communist planners stepped up the targets and pace of the Five Year Plan itself.

The agricultural crisis which inspired the collectivization drive of the first Five Year Plan had its origins in two situations: First, the acute grain shortage of 1927-28, and second, and more important, the post-Revolutionary structure of the land (see Chart I). As a result of the peasant revolution of 1917-18, the small and medium peasantry occupied almost all the arable land in the Soviet Union. Where they had produced only 50 per cent of nation's grain in pre-war times, they produced 85 per cent in 1926-27. Since the poor and middle peasants marketed a far smaller percentage of the grain they produced than had the great landowners and kulaks of pre-war times, their domination of the land produced a serious drop in marketed commodities.

Thus, while total grain production had declined by only five per cent below pre-Revolutionary levels, marketed grain had declined by *more than 50 per cent* – from 26 per cent of five billion poods in 1913 to 13.3 per cent of 4.749 billion poods in 1926-27.[20] The cities received far less grain than they had received in pre-war times; and due to a number of factors (among them the competition between various State purchasing agencies), the cities were paying a higher price for the grain they could obtain. One of the most serious consequences of this new relationship was the fact that little grain was available for foreign export to pay for desperately needed capital equipment.

The basic problem for the regime was to create an agricultural structure which would enable the State to siphon off a *far greater proportion of the total product,* at a price it wished to pay, than was possible under the conditions of NEP. While it is true that the regime wished to increase total agricultural production, and may have expected to achieve the goal through increased mechanization of the farms, this target was secondary. For achieving the primary goal – extraction of a greater *proportion* of the produce –

[20] A pood equals 36 pounds.

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471 private hands. In practice, nationalisation was carried out without legal sanction and under cover of a law passed on 24th November, 1944, for the expropriation of the property of the national enemy and his collaborators. On 19th January, 1946, *The Economist* estimated that the proportion of state and co-operative industry in Yugoslavia was 70-80 per cent, and the Moscow journal *New Times* of 15th March, 1946, wrote: 'The Government is in possession of 82 per cent of all industry, while private establishments account for only 18%'.

474 After this survey of the ownership of industry in Poland,
655 Czechoslovakia and Yugoslovia, a brief examination is
443 necessary of the control of trade. In all three countries private property lingers on to a large extent in one sphere besides agriculture, that of retail trade. In his speech mentioned above, Roman Zambrowski pointed out that in Poland the state and the co-operatives handle only 25-30 per cent of retail trade (in wholesale trade private ownership is negligible, the state taking 59 per cent of the turnover, the co-operatives 36.6 per cent, a total of 95.6 per cent). A similar situation exists in Czechoslovakia. Of the situation in Yugoslavia, B. Kidrić, said: 'Whereas in 1945, 85% of trade was still carried on through private shops, 12% through co-operatives and only 3% through state shops, in 1946 state shops already participated in trade with 19.2%, cooperative with 32% and the private shops dropped to 48.8%' (B. Kidrić, op. cit. p. 29).

'. . . on March 31st, 1948, private shops still participated with only 1.78%, the state shops with 39.91% and the co-operative with 58.31%'. (Ibid. p. 31).

In May, 1948, a new law nationalised all the remaining private trade in Yugoslavia.

In these three countries, the proportion of the economy in private hands was no greater than in Soviet Russia during the N.E.P.*

Hungary and Rumania

In Hungary and Rumania, Russia's demand for reparations and her schemes for the building of mixed companies which

*According to the Comintern weekly, *International Press Correspondence*, of 26th November, 1927, the percentage of private industry in the total industrial production of Russia in 1925/6 was 18.7 per cent. The proportion of wholesale trade in private hands was 9.4 per cent of the turnover and of retail trade 38.8 per cent (In 1927/8 the figures were respectively 1.5 and 27.0).

000 the battle map. Data from each country then aid the supreme command in Moscow to establish an over-all strategy.

Different groups of people are the main object of study.* The least important is the propertied class which was dispossessed by the nationalization of factories and mines and by the agricultural reform. Their number is insignificant; their way of thinking amusingly old-fashioned. They are no problem. In time they will die off—if need be, with a little help.

The petty bourgeoisie, that is the small merchants and craftsmen, cannot be taken so lightly. They constitute a powerful force, one that is deeply rooted in the masses. Hardly is one clandestine workshop or store liquidated in one neighborhood or city than another springs up elsewhere. Restaurants hide behind a sliding wall of a private house; shoemakers and tailors work at home for their friends. In fact, everything that comes under the heading of speculation sprouts up again and again. And no wonder! State and municipal stores consistently lack even the barest essentials. In the summer, one can buy winter clothes; in the winter, summer wear—but usually of the wrong size and of poor quality. The purchase of a spool of thread or a needle is a major problem, for the one state store in the town may not carry them for a year. Clothes that are given to be mended are held by the local crafts' cooperative for six months. The inns ("Points of Collective Nourishment") are so crowded that people lose the desire to drink with their friends. They know they will have to sit down at a table with strangers and wait, sometimes as long as an hour, before the waiter appears.

[444] 565 432

All this creates a field for private services. A worker's wife goes to a nearby town, buys needles and thread, brings them back and sells them: the germ of capitalism.

* [By men in the capitals of Central & East Europe --Analyst]

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had been distributed equally among the peasants, the main result would have been the equalization of poverty. It was obvious that redistribution of the national income and wealth could not, by itself, greatly improve the condition of the people. The surplus agricultural population which was estimated, on the basis of the system of cultivation prevailing in that area, to be about fifteen million persons had to be absorbed, and that was an insoluble problem. This problem was heightened by the fact that between 1919 and 1939 the natural increase of population in this area remained almost three times as high as that in the West.

Some alleviation of the situation was sought in the development of industries. However, industrialization was a long-term measure, and the expense only added to the peasants' burden. The fiscal policy of the Eastern European states was to accumulate the national capital necessary for industrialization by taxes, tariffs, and prices. No money, or very little, was left for the peasants.

II

It would be unjust, however, to say that nothing was done to improve the lot of the peasantry. The governments were well aware that the land reforms should be supplemented by economic measures such as agrarian credits, modern cooperatives, development of transport, cheaper farm machinery, technical education and training. A great deal was accomplished by these measures.

The supply of credit was particularly important to the peasants. The need for capital to begin operations and to finance certain family needs, especially the weddings of daughters, made borrowing necessary. As banks would not make advances, money had to come from moneylenders who charged very high rates of interest. Often, the moneylender was the middleman who bought the peasant's produce

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452 and supplied him with goods. Frequently he had a strong
185 and pernicious hold on the peasant.

Therefore, the cooperative movement began with the
474 foundation of credit societies which formed a very large
668 proportion of all cooperatives. Besides these, there were co-
656 operative societies which supplied agricultural needs such as tools and seeds, traded agricultural products, and processed all sorts of produce. In Bulgaria, Hungary, and Rumania the cooperative movements were state-controlled. In Czechoslovakia the movement was independent but favored by the state; in Poland, beginning with the economic depression of the 1930's it was state-supported and therefore dependent.

The cooperative problem was a difficult one. On the one hand, cooperation among economically weak peasants could not succeed unless there was some collaboration with, or help from, the central authorities. On the other hand, such a relationship between strong and weak tended to develop into state domination of the cooperative movement.

474 The administrators of the cooperatives sometimes abused
452 their prerogatives. They would occasionally grant government loans, not in response to genuine needs or because of commercial considerations, but with a view to the substantial number of votes which one cooperative society could guarantee at election time. In some instances, cooperatives served only well-to-do peasants because some governments were opposed to the social revolutionary ideology of the smaller peasants. In Rumania the cooperative societies were forced to assume the function of the tax collector. In Hungary the cooperatives belonged to the peasants in appearance only. In reality, they were capitalist enterprises and were not in peasant hands.

Except in Czechoslovakia, agricultural cooperation did not play any decisive role in the economic life of the peasantry, nor was it able to alleviate the existing adverse

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conditions. Credit was no real help unless the peasant had a reasonable expectation of being able to pay back what he had borrowed. In many cases this hope was negligible. A large proportion of the money which the peasants, particularly the small peasants, borrowed went to buy consumer goods. Thus, greater indebtedness did not point to a higher degree of investment, but to the extreme poverty of the small farm.

There was some state help for this situation, especially during the world-wide depression of the 1930's. In Bulgaria and Rumania agricultural debts were converted by government action. In 1934 some two hundred thousand Bulgarian peasants benefited by reductions in their debts and in the rate of interest and by a prolongation of the time allowed for settlement. In Rumania some two and one-half million peasants were assisted by similar legislation. Other measures, although not so far-reaching, were put into practice elsewhere in Eastern Europe to alleviate peasant indebtedness. But the credit problem was only mitigated, and not solved. The peasants' need for cash remained, and the lack of capital still prevented them from improving their farming techniques or increasing their earning capacity.

The governments promoted intensive cultivation of noncereals. Grain production was not appropriate to an overpopulated region, and a change to the production of livestock, livestock products, fruit, and vegetables was necessary. In Bulgaria and in some parts of Yugoslavia, intensive cultivation of garden crops, such as tobacco, tomatoes, wine, fruit, and roses was introduced. In Rumania, the cultivation of soya and other oil plants was introduced. These measures were, of course, just a beginning, and could not bring any substantial remedy.

Agriculture played the most important role of any single factor in all the Eastern European countries except Czechoslovakia. The largest part of the national incomes was de-

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'In addition to the outright confiscation of Jewish property and the acquisition of important Czechoslovak financial claims and capital assets in southeastern Europe, the Germans assumed control and ownership of the main financial and industrial establishments in Bohemia-Moravia. 471

'Czech banks were forced to merge,[1] so that finally only four banks remained. German capital (Creditanstalt, Dresdner Bank and Deutsche Bank) owned roughly 18 billion of the total capital of 33.6 billion crowns (Koruny) invested in the banks. [463]

'Most of the industrial property and interests came under control of the Hermann Goering Werke (Vitkobice Works, Mining and Foundry Company, the Podbrezova foundry in Slovakia, the armament factories of Skoda and Brno, the steel mills and coal mines of the Poldihuette A.G.). I.G. Farben took over the chemical works of the former Aussiger Verein and the Bratislava plants of Dynamit Nobel.

'In the Sudetenland, which was incorporated into the Reich, a specially-created firm, Sudetenlaendischer Bergbau, controlled by the Hermann Goering Werke, took over the former property of the Czech state, of the Zivnostenska Banca and of the Petschek family interests.' (op. cit. pp. 6-7).

At the same time the Germans developed certain industries for war purposes, because Czechoslovakia was relatively immune from air attack. For instance, the aircraft industry which before the war employed about 5,000 workers, in 1944 employed more than 100,000. This increased the proportion of industry in Czechoslovakia controlled by Germans. [463]

Since even before Munich, 40 per cent of the industry of Czechoslovakia was owned by German citizens, it is clear that the proportion of German capital at the end of the war was not less than 60 per cent of industry and almost 100 per cent of financial institutions (banks, insurance, etc.).

Of Poland, Mr. Sharp writes: 'Polish banks in the incorporated areas were swallowed by the Ostbank A.G., a subsidiary of the Dresdner Bank. A special organization was set up to take over industrial property, either outright or in the form of compulsory administration by the Haupttreuhandstelle Ost. Coal mines were taken over by the Hermann Goering Werke in Silesia and by the Pruessische Bergwerks- und Huetten A.G. in the Dombrowa basin. The Schlesische [453]

[1] [In early 1940's -- Analyst]

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178 iron as well as consumer goods and benefited by the large
433 market that the empire provided. Significant industrial development also took place in Hungary and in other parts of the empire. Similarly, in Russian Poland important industries were developed, but these suffered from the discriminatory policy of the Russian government and from the lack of communications.

•457 Capital for the economic development of this region came
471 chiefly from France until the 1890's, when German and Austrian capital became increasingly active. In Eastern Europe in general, and particularly in the Balkans, loans had as much a political as an economic incentive. Since the credit of Serbia, Bulgaria, and Rumania was poor, the bondholders were able to insist on a variety of controls to assure payment. Although a substantial amount of this capital was used to finance armament and eventually wars, investments of permanent value were also made. Notable among these was the railroad from Vienna to Constantinople, completed in 1888, which with its branches formed the backbone of the transportation system of Southeastern Europe.

III

186 Collective security and economic interdependence, as
631 these terms are understood today, were certainly among the motives of the various plans for regional organization proposed for Eastern Europe in the century before the First World War. Yet the nineteenth century was for Europe an age in which war was the exception rather than the rule and national frontiers were not the barriers to trade and to the movements of peoples that they have since become. Although motives of power politics in the modern sense were always present, regionalism in this era was also concerned

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15.4 per cent to 34.9 per cent, and of the net yield from 18.5 per cent to 42.4 per cent. 423 474

The obligatory deliveries are virtually direct taxes, as the prices paid by the government for the products delivered is only a small percentage (not even 5 per cent) of the price which the government charges the consumer. 241

It is interesting to note that Lenin writes in his book, *The Agrarian Question in Russia at the End of the Nineteenth Century* (1908): 'The horseless and one-horse peasants (i.e., the very poor peasants—Y.G.) pay in the form of taxes *one-seventh and one-tenth* respectively of their *gross* expenditure. It is doubtful whether serf dues were as high as that . . . ' The agricultural toilers in the 'Socialist Fatherland' pay much more than that!* [651]

Collectivisation not only transformed into proletarians those who came into industry, but also those who remained in agriculture. The overwhelming majority of agriculturists are in reality, if not in theory, people who do not own any of the means of production: they are compelled to work an ever-increasing number of days on the kolkhozes for very low payment, below even that of the unskilled worker in the towns. The constant rise in the number of days that every household works in the kolkhoz compared with the quantity of grain per household remaining to it after the obligatory deliveries is shown in the following table : [461]

Year	*Average Number of 'Labour Days'† per Household*		*Grain Retained per Household after Obligatory Deliveries*	
	Number	*Index*	*Centners*	*Index*
1932 ..	257	100	15.8	100
1933 ..	315	122.5	19.3	122.1
1934 ..	354	133.4	20.1	127.2
1935 ..	378	147.1	20.5	129.7
1936 ..	393	152.8	17.3	109.5

†A 'Labour Day' is equivalent to the physical labour day of an unskilled kolkhoznik. The physical labour day of a skilled worker is equivalent to two, three or more 'Labour Days'.

(*Prokopovicz*, op. cit. pp. 136, 138, 164).

*Although the total quantity of products retained by the agriculturists in 1936/7 was lower than in 1927/8 (352.5 million centners and 493.7 million centners respectively) the quantity per household did not decline, and per capita of the agricultural population even rose. This happened because the number of households declined from 25.0 million in 1927/8 to 20.4 million in 1936/7, i.e., by 24 per cent, and the agricultural population decreased from 122.4 million to 78.6 million, i.e., a decline of 35.8 per cent. The fact that the per capita quantity of agricultural products retained by the peasants after making obligatory deliveries rose, does not mean that the conditions of the majority of agriculturists improved, because it was distributed more unevenly to the disadvantage of the masses. This cannot be dealt with here.

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461 To add to the difficulties of the poor agriculturists, not every-
241 one has to give the same number of labour days. The higher
423 strata of kolkhozniki give far fewer labour days than the poor
474 kolkhozniki. The reward for their labours, however, is in inverse proportion to the time contributed.

There is less justification in calling the Russian agriculturists of today owners of the means of production than the serfs of the nineteenth century.

Miss D. Warriner in 1940 noted as regards the productivity of Russian agriculture: 'Russia both before and after collectivisation had a lower productivity than Eastern Europe . . . Russian collectivisation has not really achieved much increase in productivity through reforming the peasant system. Yields are still lower in Russia than in every part of Eastern Europe, cattle density is still much lower . . .' (*Eastern Europe after Hitler*, London, 1940, p. 4). In another place Miss Warriner writes: '. . . the physical output per man in corn is slightly higher in Russia than in the very poorest regions of Eastern Europe, and the value in terms of industrial products certainly lower'. (*Economics of Peasant Farming*, London, 1939, p. 188). As
511 regards the standard of living of the Russian agriculturists in
423 relation to those of Europe Miss Warriner says: 'As things are
474 at present, on the basis of purchasing power, the Russian
241 farmer is certainly not so well off as the peasants in Poland'. 'On the Russian farms meat consumption must be much lower than in Poland, and milk consumption must be lower also'. (Ibid. pp. 188, 189).* To gain a rough idea of what the standard of living of the Polish peasant was before the war, we quote the following passage: The Polish peasants' 'poverty was proverbial. It was said that during the depression the peasant would split a match four or five times, and would boil potatoes over and over again in the same water to save the salt . . . According to the Polish Minister of Finance the average cash income of the peasant in 1934-5 was eleven groszy (about one penny) a day . . .' (Henryk Frankel, *Poland, The Struggle for Power 1772-1939*, London, 1946, p. 134).

Miss Warriner's analysis, based on Soviet statistics, conforms

*It is regrettable that Miss Warriner in her new book *Revolution in Eastern Europe* (London, 1950) in the chapter 'Collective Farming' overlooks what she herself wrote on the question of collectivisation in Russia in *Economics of Peasant Farming* and also in *Eastern Europe After Hitler*.

THE EAST EUROPEAN REGIMES HAVE

brought great pressure to bear upon the urban technicians to go 665
to the villages to improve the technical facilities available for the 369
farms; and simultaneously, strenuous efforts have been made to 463
strengthen the Party organization in the villages. "The situation cannot be tolerated," complained the Hungarian Party organ, *Szabad Nep* in December 1953, "in which skilled and well-educated agricultural experts work in agriculture only in small numbers, and the greater part is engaged in administrative work."[26]

The administrative weakness of the State in the countryside was also evident from the inferior quality of the personnel employed in rural posts. "Not one of the managers of the Machine and Tractor Stations," the Czechoslovak Minister of Agriculture, Jindrich Uher, revealed, "has a higher-school education and only 3.5 per cent have had a secondary education." Moreover, only 10 per cent of the senior agronomists at the MTS had a higher education, and only three per cent of the State Farm workers had completed work at technical schools.[27] Such were conditions in the most modernized of the Satellite nations; undoubtedly, they were much worse elsewhere.

In Poland, for example, an official analysis, based on "incomplete data," revealed that in its 402 Machine and Tractor Stations there were 76 directors, 72 political leaders, 101 senior agronomists, and 101 senior mechanics who had no qualifications for their jobs whatsoever![28] No doubt it was this wretched situation which explains the recent feverish efforts of the Polish Government to train vast numbers of agricultural experts for immediate service as part of its New Course for Agriculture.

But even if the Communists succeed in increasing the output of farm technicians, two serious problems inherent in the system remain. First of all, there is the tendency of these technicians to attach themselves to the central ministerial apparatus from which so much wealth and prestige is derived in the totalitarian state. Secondly, the technicians who have been dispatched to the countryside are burdened with a host of responsibilities unrelated to the task for which they were trained — that is, the endless paper work of Communist bureaucracy. Resolutions, orders, decrees, receipts, dossiers follow each other in an endless succession, requiring immense expenditure of time and effort, and multiplying as the farm

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[26] *Szabad Nep* (Budapest), December 4, 1953.
[27] *Rude Pravo* (Prague), December 19, 1953.
[28] *Nowe Drogi* (Warsaw), January, 1954, p. 73.

666 apparatus grows. When the introduction of the New Course in 1953
369 made agricultural improvement imperative, the seriousness of this
463 bureaucratic delay and confusion became the subject of frequent attack by Communist orators, confirming the judgment of a prominent American student of Communist agricultural life who wrote:

> When you read . . . of the remarkable increase in the number of agronomists and other agricultural specialists and technicians in the Soviet Union, remember that many of them are not engaged, or do not spend much of their time, in research or extension or other technical work, but are trying to cope with the vast amount of bureaucratic paper work required by the Soviet system.[29]

The recurrent drives to "deflate the ranks of the farm bureaucracy" have not generally, according to this same expert, proved successful.

407 An additional measure of the long-standing Communist reluc-
241 tance to divert national resources to agricultural development is to be found in the relatively lethargic pace of farm mechanization. While it is true (see Table 23) that an increase in the mechanization of the "Socialist sector" did accompany collectivization, the increase was by no means as great as popularly pictured, and was not even as great, proportionally, as the increase which accompanied Soviet collectivization in the early thirties. Since one of the stock justifications of large-scale collectivized farming was, and remains, its alleged capacity to exploit modern farm machinery, the failure of the Communists to supply the farms with adequate machinery indicated the degree to which this Communist argument was a rationalization for a policy of exploitation.

Since the broad Russian plains are more adaptable to use of farm machinery, especially large tractors and combines, comparisons with Eastern Europe and its more broken terrain are not altogether apt. However, it should be noted that the Soviet Union provides a higher proportion of tractors to its farms than do the East European Communist regimes. As indicated in Table 23, there were approximately 107,500 tractors in service in Eastern Europe in 1952-53, compared with approximately 45,000 four years earlier. During the four years of collectivization, then, the tractor park in Eastern Europe was increased by only 62,500. In the USSR, on the other hand, over 100,000 tractors were produced in the year 1936 alone,[30] far fewer than was needed, but far greater proportionately than in Eastern Europe.

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[29] Lazar Volin, "Russia's Agricultural Potential," *Foreign Agriculture*, October, 1953, p. 179.
[30] Harry Schwartz, p. 243.

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'In addition to the outright confiscation of Jewish property and the acquisition of important Czechoslovak financial claims and capital assets in southeastern Europe, the Germans assumed control and ownership of the main financial and industrial establishments in Bohemia-Moravia. 471

'Czech banks were forced to merge, so that finally only four banks remained. German capital (Creditanstalt, Dresdner Bank and Deutsche Bank) owned roughly 18 billion of the total capital of 33.6 billion crowns (Koruny) invested in the banks. [463]

'Most of the industrial property and interests came under control of the Hermann Goering Werke (Vitkobice Works, Mining and Foundry Company, the Podbrezova foundry in Slovakia, the armament factories of Skoda and Brno, the steel mills and coal mines of the Poldihuette A.G.). I.G. Farben took over the chemical works of the former Aussiger Verein and the Bratislava plants of Dynamit Nobel.

'In the Sudetenland, which was incorporated into the Reich, a specially-created firm, Sudetenlaendischer Bergbau, controlled by the Hermann Goering Werke, took over the former property of the Czech state, of the Zivnostenska Banca and of the Petschek family interests.' (op. cit. pp. 6-7).

At the same time the Germans developed certain industries for war purposes, because Czechoslovakia was relatively immune from air attack. For instance, the aircraft industry which before the war employed about 5,000 workers, in 1944 employed more than 100,000. This increased the proportion of industry in Czechoslovakia controlled by Germans. [463]

Since even before Munich, 40 per cent of the industry of Czechoslovakia was owned by German citizens, it is clear that the proportion of German capital at the end of the war was not less than 60 per cent of industry and almost 100 per cent of financial institutions (banks, insurance, etc.).

Of Poland, Mr. Sharp writes: 'Polish banks in the incorporated areas were swallowed by the Ostbank A.G., a subsidiary of the Dresdner Bank. A special organization was set up to take over industrial property, either outright or in the form of compulsory administration by the Haupttreuhandstelle Ost. Coal mines were taken over by the Hermann Goering Werke in Silesia and by the Pruessische Bergwerks- und Huetten A.G. in the Dombrowa basin. The Schlesische [453]

7 [In early 1940's -- Analyst]

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471 The production of pig-iron in the Western territories was about 50 per cent of the production of Old Poland, and of steel 70 per cent. An important chemical industry, with a wide range of products, came to Poland through the annexation of the Western Territories. The sugar refining capacity of the Western Territories was the same as that of Old Poland. In fact, 'The total capacity of this industrial belt (i.e., of the Western Territories—Y.G.) is equal to that of the whole of pre-war Poland'. (*The World Today*, May, 1948).

471 [463] Out of the two million people employed in 1937 in all the mines, industry and handicrafts of Poland, the majority, 1,177,858 people, worked in small-scale industry and handicrafts (employing fewer than 15 workers), while large and medium-sized industry (which includes all enterprises with more than 15 people) employed only 830,000 people. By contrast, the industries of the Western territories employed before the war over 1,000,000 workers, the great majority of them in large enterprises, hundreds of which employed more than a thousand workers each.

It is therefore clear that when, after the expulsion of the German population (the great majority of them workers and their families), the industry of the Western territories was declared state property, an important—if not the major—part of the industry of new Poland was by that act removed from private ownership. If this had been the only nationalisation undertaken, state ownership in industry proper, i.e., excluding handicrafts and industries employing less than fifteen people, would already have far outstripped private ownership. This was not immediately clear because a certain time-lag was inevitable before enough Polish workers could be found to man the industries of the Western territories. Thus, for some time after the war the nationalised industry of the Western Territories played a less important role in the total industry of the new Poland than would have been expected.

Of the territory of Old Poland Clarion writes: 'When we take into account the fact that large and medium industry in Old Poland mean medium and small industry in the West, the nationalisation measures left outside state property 45 per cent of the total number of industries, or at the very least 60

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living conditions improve considerably in the cities, the governments will have difficulty in procuring the hundreds of thousands of new industrial workers they require annually. However, manpower is still one of the principal assets of the captive countries.

The quality of this manpower is, generally speaking, better than is assumed in the West. First, there is a considerable industrial tradition, which goes back to the Middle Ages, in Saxony, Bohemia, and southern Poland. Second, the average intelligence of the people is fairly high; given time and education an average village boy or girl can become a skilled worker and, in many cases, a qualified technician, although of course such students lack the always evident association of American youth with motor vehicles and other machinery.

It might be interesting to quote here a relevant passage from the report of the mission of the U.N. Food and Agricultural Organization, which was composed mostly of American experts, after its return from Poland in 1948:

> It is the opinion of the Mission that if the Polish nation had an opportunity to be educated according to the standards of western Europe and to carry out a peaceful economic development, the world would be amazed by the result. Imperfectly developed resources of intelligence constitute the greatest potential wealth of the Polish people. It is a raw material of far greater value than [Polish] coal . . .[1]

Assuming that this is a sound judgment, there is no reason to doubt that it applies also to the other countries of this region.

The number of graduate engineers, chemists, and scientists in Eastern Europe declined greatly during the last war and during the postwar flight to the West, but is now increasing rapidly. The joint know-how of such technicians should not be underestimated, especially when Russian technical experience is added to it. Technical inventions and improve-

[1] *Report of the FAO Mission for Poland* (Washington, 1948), p. 18.

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463 ments made by single countries of the area are systematically exchanged with Russia and other captive countries, and many thousands of Soviet, Czech, Eastern German, and Hungarian experts, technical advisers, and skilled specialists are employed by the less advanced countries of the area. It is difficult, if at all feasible, to compare the sum of technical knowledge behind the Iron Curtain to that in the free world. Undoubtedly, the countries of Eastern Europe lag behind the free world in all technical respects, but it would be imprudent to believe that they are not making much technical progress.

433 377 The area as a whole and the single countries within it, except for Eastern Germany and Czechoslovakia, are, generally speaking, self-sufficient in foodstuffs. It also has sufficient reserves of solid and liquid fuel. Using both these reserves and their hydroelectric power, it can produce an in-
433 135 creasing amount of electric power. On the other hand, the area is poor in metallic ores. There is much bauxite in Hungary, and supplies of lead and zinc in Poland. Yugoslavia and Bulgaria are rich in many ores. However, there is not enough iron or manganese ore in Eastern Europe, far from enough copper, no tin, and a lack of many supplementary metals of significance to modern metallurgy. Chemical raw materials are abundant, especially in Poland and Rumania, but the area lacks phosphate rock and is poor in sulphur compounds. It has no jute, very little cotton, not enough wool, and no rubber. The resulting limitations to industrial expansion are obvious. They are offset to some extent by the existence of dormant resources and by the fact that the southern Balkan area has not yet been properly explored. It is possible that the Balkan mountains contain more mineral wealth than has been assumed hitherto. Soviet geologists are certain that this is so. Some deficiencies in raw materials can be met, as was the practice under Hitler, by using substitutes such as synthetic oil, rubber, yarn, and plastics. This area can

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ways served as a tool; their leaders, most often of non- 565
peasant origin have used them for their own ends. The power of the peasants lies in their number; it is a power only when a man like Lenin comes along and throws the weight of their numbers into the scale of events. Obviously, peasants can cause trouble in such moments of upheaval as wars. As long as a private peasant economy exists it acts as a natural base for partisan operations. A peasant hut is the ideal place for partisans to eat, sleep, and work out plans of action. Therefore, a collective farm, where a man's every step is easy to trace, guarantees a degree of control that is indispensable if one wants to preclude hostile underground activity.

Workers are far more important than peasants. Most 565
of them are antagonistic to the new system. That is under- 626
standable. They resent the norms they must fill. Those norms are constantly rising. Though the "solidarity of the workers" makes a fine slogan, it does not mean that the solidarity of the crews in a factory is to be tolerated. Their ranks are split by the institution of "shock-workers" which is fostered by an appeal to ambition and enforced by pressure from members of the Party cell. A man may at first refuse to become a shock-worker. But gradually he learns it does not pay to be stubborn; because when workers are being chosen for a course in bookkeeping, for instance, his application is rejected, or when his turn comes for a free vacation he is declared ineligible, etc.

The attitude of the workers toward the regime is ambiv- 464
alent. On the one hand, they prize its positive contribu- 565
tions. Unemployment is a thing of the past; in fact, there is a constant lack of skilled labor. Not only the head of a family but most of its members are employed. This accumulation of wages means that a family would be able to live better than ever before if only the stores were fairly

2: Milosz S-5 (no date)1953 El Europe El

464 565 well stocked; but given the shortage of food and consumer goods, this is rarely, if ever, the case. For workers' children, social advancement is easy because the Party must recruit the cadres of the new intelligentsia from their ranks. The worker can educate himself by attending countless evening courses. If he stands in good favor with the Party he can enjoy a vacation in a rest home, all expenses [466] paid. On the other hand, he cannot defend himself against exploitation by his employer, the state. His trade union representatives are Party tools. They team together with the factory managers for one purpose: to raise production. Workers are told that a strike is a crime. Against whom are they to strike? Against themselves? After all, the means of production belong to them, the state belongs to them. But such an explanation is not very convincing. The workers, who dare not state aloud what they want, know that the goals of the state are far from identical with their own.

565 433 475 Central and Eastern Europe produce in order to raise the military and economic potential of the Center[1] and to compensate for the industrial backwardness of Russia. Workers and their needs have no influence on production plans. Most of the goods produced ebb away to the East. Besides, every product of a worker's hands is the object of innumerable bookkeeping operations. A whole staff of functionaries sits in every factory, counting, writing reports, compiling statistics; the same thing happens on every rung of the state hierarchy, right through to the state wholesale houses and retail stores. If, at last, the article reaches the consumer, it is very expensive; into its cost are counted the salaries of the swarms of bureaucrats through whose hands it must pass. Factory machines are 565 466 over-aged; there is a scarcity of essential spare parts. So workers are ordered to replace broken parts by whatever

[1] [Moscow — Analyst]

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	Germans (%)	*Czechs and Slovaks* (%)
Independent	21.89	25.81
Tenants	0.40	0.28
Officials and clerks ..	16.60	18.24
Workers	61.11	55.67

467 In 1930 there were 476 thousand Sudeten Germans organised in trade unions. The Executive Committee of the Sudeten German Social Democratic Party stated: 'In their worst plight, on the eve of the Munich decision, our Trade Unions could still compare their strength with those of Switzerland, a country with four million inhabitants and with a functioning democracy.' (Introduction to W. Jaksch, *Sudeten Labour and the Sudeten Problem*, London, 1945).

665 The Sudeten Germans had a long socialist tradition, for Sudetenland was one of the first and strongest socialist centres in the Austro-Hungarian empire. It produced a number of the most prominent leaders of the Socialist International, among them Karl Kautsky, Viktor Adler, Otto Bauer and Karl Renner. As early as 1907, in the general elections, the Social Democratic Party polled 39.4 per cent of the votes in German Bohemia. In the general elections of 1911, it polled more than 40 per cent. In the elections of 1920 it polled 44 per cent of the Sudeten votes. Together with the Communist Party,* for more than a decade it had about half the votes in Sudetenland, which is a much higher proportion than the Social Democrats and Communists could claim among the Czechs, let alone among the Slovaks.

563 464 The world economic crisis which began in 1929 changed the situation. The industry of Sudetenland, depending as it did mainly on exports, was affected much more severely by the crisis than industry in the rest of the country. The bourgeois government of Czechoslovakia discriminated against German workers when giving employment, and this aggravated an already grave situation. The result was that 'unemployment in the Sudeten districts was at least twice as high as in the Czech interior.' (Jaksch, ibid. p. 17).

464 668 The great suffering caused by unemployment in Sudetenland and the existence of full employment just over the border

*An exact calculation of the strength of the Communist Party among the Sudetens is impossible, as the Party was not divided into different national groups.

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in Nazi Germany (even though this was the result of war preparation) brought the Sudeten Germans to flock to the banner of Henlein, the leader of the Sudeten Nazis. In the elections of 19th May, 1935, he polled 1,249,530 votes, that is, 62–3 per cent of the total, while the Social Democratic Party polled 299,942 votes (as against 506,761 in 1929), that is, about 15 per cent of the total. The Communist Party vote is estimated at about 120,000, or about 6 per cent of the total (Wiskemann, op. cit. p. 206).

At that time the Communist Party leaders had not yet adopted the idea that the Sudeten Germans were inherent Nazis, and explained the victory of Henlein as the result of the social and national circumstances in which they were placed. *Imprecor* of 1st June, 1935, wrote: 'In a manifesto of the Central Committee the Party states the reasons for the election victory of the Henlein faction. The reason for this victory is the policy of the Czech bourgeoisie which has led to terrible misery and poverty and to the national oppression in the German districts . . . The Henlein fascists can be beaten only by a policy which gives the working masses of the German districts work and bread and liberates them from the yoke of national oppression.'

What was the fate of the Sudeten Germans who opposed Henlein to the end? 400,000 voted against him, and these with their families made up 700–800 thousand people. When the Munich Agreement which gave Sudetenland to Germany was signed, the most active Sudeten anti-Nazis were compelled to flee from Sudetenland to the interior of Czechoslovakia. But more than 20,000 of them were handed over to the Gestapo by the Czechoslovak Government of the time, which collaborated with Hitler, and an additional 10,000 had to return to Nazi-controlled territory because they were refused asylum. Only 4,000 Sudetens were admitted to other countries. Altogether some 40,000 Sudetens were interned in Nazi concentration camps, and about 20,000 died there. This figure bears honourable comparison with the number of victims in other countries which came under the Nazi yoke.

In 1940, Fierlinger, the Social Democratic 'fellow-traveller', who was later to head the Government which expelled the Germans from Czechoslovakia, said: 'Henlein in his struggle

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423 cause the land was becoming exhausted. This was due to a
341 lack of manure and fertilizer and to the peasants' ignorance of land preservation techniques.

[464] Labor remained so cheap that the introduction of labor-saving devices did not pay. Overpopulation meant that there were more people living on holdings than were needed for the farm work. This situation caused underemployment. Since overpopulation decreased the output per man and with it the earnings per man, a very low standard of living resulted.

423 The size of the farms, which on the average was barely
656 ten acres, was a problem in itself, and the custom of dividing
185 land after the death of a peasant made the situation even more acute. The holdings consisted of many small and scattered strips so that it was impossible for the peasant to use machines, even when they were available. However, the land reforms, carried out after the First World War by the different governments, did have some success in equalizing the amounts of land held by the different peasants.

The land reforms grew out of political and national considerations rather than out of social and economic policy. The first and main objective of the agrarian parties was to expropriate the big landowners and to transfer their land to the peasants. The usual procedure was to fix a maximum acreage, usually about five hundred acres, and to decree that all land in excess of this amount should be sold to peasants, either to create new farms or to add to the area of peasant farms already in existence. Under these reforms, about twenty-five million acres were distributed, for the most part in quite small plots, averaging one hectare, or 2.4 acres. The smaller farms were given more land than the large, so that there was some leveling of the incomes derived from farming.

162 These reforms did not remedy the unhappy condition of
464 the peasantry, since they were unable to remove the main
51 causes for distress. If all the agricultural land of this region

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had been distributed equally among the peasants, the main result would have been the equalization of poverty. It was obvious that redistribution of the national income and wealth could not, by itself, greatly improve the condition of the people. The surplus agricultural population which was estimated, on the basis of the system of cultivation prevailing in that area, to be about fifteen million persons had to be absorbed, and that was an insoluble problem. This problem was heightened by the fact that between 1919 and 1939 the natural increase of population in this area remained almost three times as high as that in the West.

Some alleviation of the situation was sought in the development of industries. However, industrialization was a long-term measure, and the expense only added to the peasants' burden. The fiscal policy of the Eastern European states was to accumulate the national capital necessary for industrialization by taxes, tariffs, and prices. No money, or very little, was left for the peasants.

II

It would be unjust, however, to say that nothing was done to improve the lot of the peasantry. The governments were well aware that the land reforms should be supplemented by economic measures such as agrarian credits, modern co-operatives, development of transport, cheaper farm machinery, technical education and training. A great deal was accomplished by these measures.

The supply of credit was particularly important to the peasants. The need for capital to begin operations and to finance certain family needs, especially the weddings of daughters, made borrowing necessary. As banks would not make advances, money had to come from moneylenders who charged very high rates of interest. Often, the moneylender was the middleman who bought the peasant's produce

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185 with the Soviet master plans. The captive nations were al-
433 lowed to preserve the external attributes of sovereignty and their governments were granted an advisory voice in the preparation of these national plans. But the supreme control of the plans remained in the hands of Moscow, and their primary goal was, and is, rapid industrialization.

II

178 The possibilities of industrialization in Eastern Europe are considerable, but obviously not unlimited. They depend on the availability of manpower and its technical know-how, on industrial raw materials and machinery, on capital needed for investments, and on markets capable of absorbing the products of the new industries.

• 464 Before the last war, five million persons were employed in the mining and in the medium and large manufacturing industries of the six major countries of the area. Today this number exceeds nine million. There is a shortage of labor, both skilled and unskilled, in Eastern Germany and in the Czech part of Czechoslovakia. The reserves of manpower—land laborers, dwarf-farm owners, and married women—are limited in Hungary and the Slovak part of Czechoslovakia, large in Poland, and even larger in Rumania and in the three Balkan countries. The areas where labor is short coincide to a large degree with those of low natural increase of population, and vice versa. In the first period of reconstruction after
369 the war, there was in many parts of the area a movement of
464 the population from the villages to the towns in search of
166 urban, not necessarily industrial, employment. For instance, in Poland alone, two and one-half million persons moved into towns during the first seven postwar years. This movement is now over, as well as the postwar enthusiasm for reconstruction, and the governments have to recruit new workers by propaganda and sometimes by half-coercion. Unless

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living conditions improve considerably in the cities, the governments will have difficulty in procuring the hundreds of thousands of new industrial workers they require annually. However, manpower is still one of the principal assets of the captive countries. 166 369 464

The quality of this manpower is, generally speaking, better than is assumed in the West. First, there is a considerable industrial tradition, which goes back to the Middle Ages, in Saxony, Bohemia, and southern Poland. Second, the average intelligence of the people is fairly high; given time and education an average village boy or girl can become a skilled worker and, in many cases, a qualified technician, although of course such students lack the always evident association of American youth with motor vehicles and other machinery.

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[1] *Report of the FAO Mission for Poland* (Washington, 1948), p. 18.

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433 tential in 1938 was, and still is, insignificant. It is claimed that in 1952 the industrial output of the area rose again by about one fifth.

An estimate of the relative industrial strength of the individual captive countries was made recently in a United Nations publication.[3] If the total industrial output of the area at the end of 1952 is taken as 100, the output of Eastern Germany constitutes 34 per cent of this total, that of Poland 27, of Czechoslovakia 21, of Hungary 9, of Rumania 6, and of Bulgaria 3 per cent. The total industrial output of the entire captive area is equivalent, roughly speaking, to nearly 40 per cent of the total industrial output of the Soviet Union.

185 All this rapid, even violent, industrial expansion cannot
471 be smooth and is, in more ways than one, terribly expensive.
511 There are no miracles in economics, and wealth can be
464 created at different rates of speed, but not at will. The tremendous increase of the state-owned industrial plant in this area is only feasible because the citizens have been deprived of their individual capital, because the consumer demand is being systematically curtailed, and because more and more of the national income, siphoned off by taxation, inflation, and other methods, is being reinvested in industry. This reinvestment is being done at great cost to agriculture. Quantitative industrial progress is also speeded up by the fact that the police state has the means to make everyone work. The prewar urban unemployment and, to some extent, the huge peasant underemployment, caused by the extreme subdivision of rural property, are things of the past. Billions of man-hours which were wasted before the war in enforced idleness are now used for production or, at least, are on tap for production purposes. On the other hand, a large proportion of the men and women kept in concentration and labor camps

[3] *Economic Bulletin for Europe* (Geneva: United Nations, 1952), Vol. V, no. 2 (July, 1953), p. 84, Table 1.

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produce litt'e, if anything, and the vast apparatus of standing 185
armed forces, of police and poli ical supervision, of party 471
machinery and propaganda, does not create wealth but con- 511
sumes it. The onetime waste of unemployment has been partly 464
supplanted by the waste of the immense state machinery of control and compulsion inherent in all totalitarian systems and particularly odious under Communism.

In addition to this costly political overhead, there are three 185
other burdens to the national economies of these countries. One is the cost of planning both on a national scale and in minute detail, an economically unlikely proposition, resulting in duplication of work, omissions, bottlenecks, and other forms of economic confusion. This has been one of the main reasons why the Yugoslav Five Year Plan has never been fully realized. This type of waste can only be eliminated very gradually, if at all. The second type of waste is directly due to Communism. In the free world, private property is fairly 471
generally respected and cared for by its owners and by the public at large. Public property, being the exception rather than the rule, also enjoys respect and cases of vandalism are few. In Eastern Europe, state property is the rule, and very few people give it proper respect. The Communists are aware of this general neglect and the ensuing injury to the economy but believe that in time society will be taught to take care of what is defined as people's wealth. However, during thirty-five years of Communism in Russia, there has been little progress in this direction. The third burden on the state 648
economy is a specific feature of the countries of Eastern 439
Europe. All of them have to pay heavy tribute to the Russian big brother. Russia exploits the captive nations in many ways: by reparations in kind, mixed companies, trade agreements, high prices for imports from Russia and low prices for exports to Russia, maintenance costs for Soviet troops, high salaries for Russian experts and advisers, and the like. These nations cannot express themselves on this topic, but

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of their businesses for the purpose of retiring from business 433
themselves, rather than for expanding their productive equipment.

While productivity grew slowly, public health measures 464
were effective and birth rates remained high. Throughout 433
most of the region, the population pressed upon the limited supply of land and on the limited productivity of existing agricultural methods. At the same time, the lagging growth of towns and industries did not absorb completely the increases in population. The results were underemployment in the towns and industrial districts, hidden unemployment in the rural areas, and a general cheapness of human labor. While labor was thus abundant, and was often wastefully used, the skills of most workers remained low, and there was little incentive to improve them. Since capital goods and capital were scarce, there were fewer opportunities for engineers and applied scientists. And since universities, public administration, and banking had become modernized, there were ample employment opportunities for civil servants, clerks, lawyers, teachers, and research scientists.

The result was a startling precocity of Eastern European 178
intellectual life. First-rate university training was fairly widely available throughout the region. Food, land, and domestic services were relatively cheap. Civil servants, intellectuals, and members of the professions had high prestige socially, and they found no severe economic difficulty in maintaining their families and sending their children to universities. While the top-level jobs in commerce, civil service, 178
and universities under the Austro-Hungarian monarchy were 563
perhaps somewhat more easily accessible to persons recruited from the German or Jewish minorities, there were some opportunities for careers for men of outstanding talent from all national backgrounds. Czech scientists reminisce today about the remarkable generation of Czech and Slovak intellectuals and scientists who made their careers during the last thirty

186 be improved by secession. All of them thought that they could
178 improve their position by finding that exact size of political unit in which their own language and their own national culture could be made to predominate and in which their own nationality or ethnic group could be turned into the leading class or social and political elite.

Nationalism in Eastern Europe was thus a reaction to the rapid diffusion of Western claims and to the expectations of security and opportunity throughout a group of societies that were only slowly, if at all, acquiring the productive skill and equipment to satisfy them. National secession, national expansion, and the national state appeared to almost all nationalities in the region as plausible short cuts to the prosperity, power, and prestige they all desired.

178 In the course of events, the experiment was actually made.
433 The Austro-Hungarian monarchy was destroyed and a num-
641 ber of successor states arose from its remains. There is no doubt on the whole that the emergence of these national states represented a significant step forward toward higher levels of popular participation in public affairs, toward political democracy, toward popular education, and even, in some respects, toward greater economic opportunities. But at the same time it seems clear that the change in the size of political units did little or nothing to come to grips with the fundamental causes of the poverty and backwardness of the region, or with the fundamental sources of its peculiar psychological and political frustrations and resentments. National and regional markets and consumer preferences remained as small and as unfavorable to mass production in the new states as they had in the old. Capital remained as scarce and productive investment as uneven and erratic as before.
178 Tools, technologies, and work habits changed slowly if at
[935] all. Poverty persisted. Purchasing power remained low and
464 prices high. Production remained scattered over many small and inefficient factories. Innovations were accepted reluc-

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tantly or not at all. Unemployment became worse than it had ever been. 178 464

Thus social tensions persisted or grew worse. Sometimes they appeared as growing tensions between left and right, with the political middle-of-the-road parties increasingly threatened by fascists or by communists. Sometimes they appeared as tensions between different nationality groups, such as between Serbians and Croatians or between Czechs and Germans. Often the same angry and frustrated individuals could be found backing communism in one year, extreme nationalism in another, and some more or less supranational fascism in a third. Whole districts voted for right-wing radical candidates in one election and for left-wing radicals in another. Nationalism in Eastern Europe was thus the symptom of a more fundamental maladjustment, even though nationalistic policies, once adopted, often served to make this maladjustment worse. Nationalistic governments, as well as most other governments in this region, were becoming increasingly unpopular and during the 1930's showed increasing reluctance to face their own voters. By 1939, before the first German or Russian soldier stepped on their soil, every country of Eastern Europe, with the exceptions of Finland and Czechoslovakia, had succumbed to some form of dictatorship. Nationalism had thus failed to cure the fundamental maladjustments of Eastern European political and economic life. From some points of view its failure was hardly less shattering than the failure of the supranational empires that had preceded it. 186 578 642 208

It was nationalism which first undermined and in part destroyed the traditions of property and the respect for property in Eastern Europe. This attack against property began as early as the era of Prince Bismarck in Germany. The so-called Polish legislation sponsored by the German government and by the German nationalists during and after the Bismarck era showed scant respect for the property 642 423 563

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revealed that out of 900,000 members of the Party's factory organisation only 65,000 were listed as Stakhanovites. Their unpopularity becomes manifest from a perusal of *Rude Pravo*, the Communist Party daily, which finds it necessary constantly to repeat that Stakhanovites should be placed in more responsible positions and that they should be protected against attacks made on them by 'politically immature' workers. 'There are officials and directors who, being snugly ensconced in their jobs or afraid for their popularity among politically undeveloped elements, fail to defend Stakhanovites as they ought to'. In letters from Stakhanovites published in the press, a frequent complaint is the hostile attitude of the workers towards them. When a reporter of *Lidové Noviny* went to interview Marie Zemancová, a young Stakhanovite in the Prague radio factory 'Tesla' who had been included in the Czech delegation to the Paris 'Peace Congress' as a reward for her work, it turned out that she was completely unknown in her factory. 'This proves', comments the paper, 'that we have been unable to popularise our Stakhanovites and pioneer workers'. (Quoted by *News from Czechoslovakia*, No. 6, April, 1949, published by the Czechoslovak Social Democratic Party in Exile, London). In view of these facts, it is no wonder that at the 9th Congress of the Communist Party open war was declared on people 'who run down the work of Stakhanovites and who even try to put a spoke in their wheel'.

In Poland the piece-work system reached a stage at which the basic wage almost entirely disappeared. As Clarion describes it: 'It should be emphasized incidentally, that with regard to salaries the whole system rests upon the maintenance of basic salaries at an abnormally low level and upon a huge inequality in the bonuses both of money and in kind. The periodical *Études et Conjoncture* in this regard pointed out, in a study of the economic situation in Poland, published in November, 1946, that 'on the average for the whole of industry in May, 1946, the total benefits granted (to the workers) in Poland represented from 6.8 to 14.6 times the basic salary, which thus became a mere supplementary item instead of being the main element of the total remuneration'. (op. cit. pp. 106-7).

The hatred felt by the Polish workers for these extreme forms of piece-work was displayed openly in the spring of 1946 and

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people. This double vision sees the molehill as a mountain, and the mountain as a molehill! 471

All the experience of history in this connection points to the inescapable conclusion that if a group of people are in absolute control and ownership of the means of production they will inevitably take for themselves all the benefits they possibly can out of production.

The division of the national income among different income groups is kept strictly secret in the 'People's Democracies', although if the British Government did not publish such statistics the Communist Party would certainly, and justifiably, criticize it for keeping the truth from the people. Nevertheless from fragments of news in the press it is possible to get some idea of the great differentiation of incomes. 465

The official *Free Bulgaria* of 15th March, 1947, states that in Bulgaria the ratio between minimum and maximum salaries in Government employment is 1:5. 'New Yugoslavia, which had adopted a ratio of 1:3.2, is gradually introducing a greater differentiation. France has a ratio of 1:6, the United States—1:10, U.S.S.R.—1:11'. The U.S.S.R. leads all the rest, and is praised for it by the Bulgarian Communists!

Departmental chiefs in Bulgaria got 17,000 leva a year, counsellor-reporters 19,500, counsellor-specialists 21,000 and general secretaries 25,000. This was increased in many cases by a 'supplementary salary' of 13,200-22,800 a year, which raised their salaries to 30,000-47,000 leva a year. As against this the average worker's wage was 357.7 leva a month or 4,292.4 leva a year (*Free Bulgaria*, October 1st, 1947) and many unskilled workers earned 150-200 leva a month, or 1,800-2,400 leva a year (*Free Bulgaria*, April 1st, 1948), i.e., twenty times less than the *parvenu* rulers. There is, of course, no record of the value of the benefits the high bureaucrats get not in money but in kind, such as houses, cars and servants.

In Rumania the minimum salary of a civil servant is Lei 3,328 a month, the maximum Lei 42,600 (*Rumanian News*, 6th February, 1949). Many workers earn as little as Lei 2,000-2,500 a month.

Some information about income differentiation in Poland can be gained indirectly from the table giving the rate of income tax payable by people falling within the different 465 651

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465 income groups. This gives an insight into the difference
651 between maximum and minimum incomes, but does not reveal the number of people falling within each group. Incomes of persons or enterprises up to 72,000 zlotys are tax-free (there are many who earn even less than 36,000 zlotys). The rate of tax goes on :

72,000—	80,000 zlotys—	2	per cent income tax	
100,000—	110,000	„ — 3·5	„	„
150,000—	170,000	„ — 7	„	„
190,000—	210,000	„ — 9	„	„
250,000—	300,000	„ —13	„	„
500,000—	600,000	„ —23	„	„
1,000,000—	1,200,000	„ —33	„	„
1,400,000—	1,600,000	„ —37	„	„
2,400,000—	3,000,000	„ —43	„	„
3,600,000—	4,200,000	„ —47	„	„
over 4,200,000		„ —50	„	„

(H. W. Robinson, Chief, Division of Operational Analysis, U.N.R.R.A. European Regional Office, London, *Finance in Poland*, p. 21).

To paraphrase Orwell: all men are equal, but some men are more equal than others!*

465 In Czechoslovakia, as has already been mentioned, it was
511 not uncommon (in 1948) to find factory managers earning 40
565 thousand crowns a month, while two-thirds of the workers in 1948 got less than 2,900 crowns a month gross (i.e. before payment of taxes, dues, etc.). In addition, those earning 40,000 crowns were given the free use of a villa, a car with a chauffeur and other perquisites.

Beneš's bourgeois liberal paper, *Svobodné Slovo*, stated, not unjustifiably, that the bureaucracy were 'living in the style of millionaires . . . enjoy every comfort and luxury, thanks to the villas and limousines which they have been allocated by the authorities and to their high incomes'. These people, the paper continued, are 'propertyless—in form only . . . ' (6th September, 1947). The standard of living of the masses, on the other hand, is very low, as even the official statisticians have to admit. As early as June, 1946, the monthly average wage of an industrial worker was 2,540 while the *food ration alone* of a family of three cost 2,721 crowns. And many earned less than the average of 2,540 crowns! Since June, 1946, the condition of the masses has deteriorated. The correspondent of *Associated Press* in Prague, did not exaggerate when he said on 15 July,

*In Russia the scale of income-tax starts with taxes on less than 1,800 roubles a year and ends with taxes on more than 300,000 roubles. (*Izvestia*, 6th April, 1940).

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1948: 'Czechoslovakia today can fairly claim to be the hungriest country in Europe—hungrier than even Austria'. The Viennese Socialist paper *Arbeiter Zeitung* wrote on 23rd June, 1948: 'Travellers who often come from Prague to Vienna report that in the last few weeks, for the first time, they have not taken goods from Prague to Vienna, but on their return from Vienna to Prague'. The paper adds particulars of prices on the black market in Prague. It is possible to cite innumerable facts to the same effect.

There can be no doubt about who suffered from the shortages, which were the result partly, but only partly, of the drought of the winter of 1947-8. The drought fails to explain either the acute shortage of textiles, shoes (in the country of Bata!) and other consumer goods, or the duration of the shortages.

It is clear from official data that the portion of the social product going to the workers is decreasing. In January, 1946, the total product of Czechoslovakian industry was sold for 9.09 milliard crowns; wages and salaries in industry itself came to 2.83 milliard crowns, i.e. 31.6 per cent of the turnover. A year later, in January, 1947, the total sales amounted to 15.66 milliard crowns; wages and salaries came to 4.03 milliard or 25.7 per cent of the turnover. This decline in the portion of wages and salaries was accompanied by an increase in the turnover per hour of work from 50 crowns to 78 crowns, a rise of 56 per cent (*Statistical Bulletin of Czechoslovakia*, published by the State Statistical Office, Prague, July, 1947). If the statistics had included only wages and not salaries as well, the decline would have been even bigger.

The journal *Účetnictví a Kontrola*, issued by the trade union publishing house, Práce, submitted the state budget to a detailed analysis in order to get an approximate estimate of the cost of the bureaucracy. This reveals that the travelling expenses of the administration proper—that is, the ministries, not including the administration of the nationalised industries—amounted to not less than 780 million crowns, the maintenance of automobiles to 180 million. How large these amounts are is clear from the fact that the expenditure on travelling of these bureaucrats would cover the difference between the meagre wages of about 300,000 families and a minimum living

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465 standard. In summing up, the article states: 'The public
511 administration swallows 48 per cent of the national income.
434 How will it be possible to raise the standard of living of the
656 whole people, how will the wide layers of the toilers be satisfied, how will it be possible to pay proper salaries to government clerks?' (From an article, 'Let us think about the Figures', quoted by V. Salus in the theoretical paper of the Czech Social Democracy, *Cil*, August 15th, 1947, under the interesting heading, 'Economic Democracy and the New Nobility').*

511 The division of the national income in Yugoslavia is not less
565 unequal than in the other 'People's Democracies.' Vernon
434 Bartlett, when in Belgrade, described the situation in the

*For a time the Communist Party leaders tried to cushion the conflict between the workers and the 'new nobility' by directing the hostility of the masses exclusively against the bourgeoisie. For example in October, 1947, in connection with the relief to the peasants who were suffering from the drought, the Communist Party raised the slogan 'Let the millionaires pay', and proposed as a solution the imposition of a property levy. Of course the bureaucracy, being 'propertyless—in form' would not have to pay anything. The Communist Party tried to overlook the fact that the portion of the national income of Czechoslovakia in the hands of the bourgeoisie was so small, only a quarter of industry being left in their hands, that the only possibility of seriously improving the conditions of the masses was by 1. cutting into the income of the bureaucracy; 2. raising the general national income; 3. preventing Russia from taking her cut from the national income.

The Communist Party claimed that there were 35,000 millionaires in Czechoslovakia. This is a large number, but it is much less impressive when it is realised that they were not pound sterling or dollar millionaires, but crown millionaires. A million crowns in July, 1947, was equal to five thousand pounds sterling. Even according to the Communist Party estimate the wealth of these 35,000 'millionaires' was only 50 milliard (According to the bourgeois paper *Svobodné Slovo* there were only 12,000 millionaires with a property of 22 milliard crowns). 50 milliard crowns is only about a quarter of the *annual national income* of Czechoslovakia.

The conditions of the masses could not therefore be substantially improved at the expense of the bourgeoisie, but only by improvements in the nationalised sectors of the economy and at the expense of the bureaucracy. This is proved by the distribution of the national income:

Personal Income at Factor Cost (thousand million of crowns.)	1947
1. Entrepreneural profits in industry, trade and professions and private income from capital	22.0
2. Rentals and sub-rentals (including net rental value of owner-occupied dewllings	5.2
3. Independent agriculturists	25.4
4. Wages and salaries	125.9
5. Pensions of Government employees	5.7
6. Unfreezing of blocked accounts to people of limited means	6.3

In addition there were a number of other small items.

(Statistical Office of the United Nations, *National Income Statistics of Various Countries, 1938-1948*, Lake Success, New York, 1950, p. 59).

The figures speak for themselves. The possibility of increasing item 4 at the expense of item 1 is very limited indeed.

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511 small man. Reductions in prices for the higher-paid instead of
565 for those with smaller means . . .' (*Neue Zürcher Zeitung*, 30th
434 August, 1950)*

465 One aspect of the problem of the mode of distribution of the
565 social product is this: to what extent is the differentiation between
434 different income groups concomitant with national differences? How much of the cream of the milk produced in the satellites is in the form of higher personal incomes for Soviet officials? These facts are unfortunately covered by a veil of secrecy. Some facts, however, have emerged. A letter of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of Yugoslavia to the Central Committee of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union (dated 13th April, 1948) stated: 'The wages of the Soviet experts (working as advisers in Yugoslavia—Y.G.) were four times as high as the wages of the commanders of our armies and three times as high as the wages of our Federal Ministers. The commander of one of our armies, a lieutenant-general or a colonel-general, then had 9,000 to 11,000 dinars a month, and a Soviet military expert, lieutenant-colonel, colonel and general had from 30,000 to 40,000 dinars. At the same time our Federal Ministers had a salary of 12,000 dinars a month.' The reply of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union (dated 4th May, 1948) did not deny the correctness of these figures, but claimed as an extenuating circumstance the fact that the Yugoslav generals also got 'apartments, servants, food, etc.'

The paper *Glas*, the organ of the People's Front of Serbia, in its issue of 16th December, 1949, gave another example of the same thing. Near Sofia an automobile factory employing Russian, Czech and Bulgarian specialists was being built. The salary of the Russian specialists was 2,000 levas an hour, of the Czechs 2,000-3,000 levas a day, and of the Bulgarian 250-300 levas a day. These differences were certainly not due mainly to differences in skill.

*Since then a big change has taken place. On 14th October, 1950, Marshal Tito signed a decree abolishing special privileges in the supply and distribution of rations and consumer goods, doing away with the special shops of the upper bureaucracy, and transferring all villas and rest homes hitherto reserved for the privileged to the tourist industry. Whether this is a temporary measure resulting from the terrible drought and famine of the 1950-51 winter, it is too early to say.

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464 well stocked; but given the shortage of food and consumer
565 goods, this is rarely, if ever, the case. For workers' children, social advancement is easy because the Party must recruit the cadres of the new intelligentsia from their ranks. The worker can educate himself by attending countless evening courses. If he stands in good favor with the Party he can enjoy a vacation in a rest home, all expenses
• [466] paid. On the other hand, he cannot defend himself against exploitation by his employer, the state. His trade union representatives are Party tools. They team together with the factory managers for one purpose: to raise production. Workers are told that a strike is a crime. Against whom are they to strike? Against themselves? After all, the means of production belong to them, the state belongs to them. But such an explanation is not very convincing. The workers, who dare not state aloud what they want, know that the goals of the state are far from identical with their own.

565 Central and Eastern Europe produce in order to raise
433 the military and economic potential of the Center[1] and to
475 compensate for the industrial backwardness of Russia. Workers and their needs have no influence on production plans. Most of the goods produced ebb away to the East. Besides, every product of a worker's hands is the object of innumerable bookkeeping operations. A whole staff of functionaries sits in every factory, counting, writing reports, compiling statistics; the same thing happens on every rung of the state hierarchy, right through to the state wholesale houses and retail stores. If, at last, the article reaches the consumer, it is very expensive; into its cost are counted the salaries of the swarms of bureaucrats
565 through whose hands it must pass. Factory machines are
466 over-aged; there is a scarcity of essential spare parts. So workers are ordered to replace broken parts by whatever

[1] [Moscow — Analyst]

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homemade means they can devise. Production comes first, 565
even at the price of using up the machines. Discipline is 466
severe; negligence or even a few minutes' lateness are strictly punished. No wonder, then, that the bad side of the system outweighs the good in the worker's mind. Still, he dares not complain. If he betrays any signs of discontent the security police, whose secret agents are his co-workers and sometimes his friends, takes care of him.

The wildcat strikes that break out from time to time 565
are no threat in themselves, for peace returns quickly 468
after mass arrests of all participants. They are, however, ominous signs that discontentment has reached a tension that can find release only in desperate acts. A strike requires a certain minimum of organization. That is why nothing else makes Party dialecticians so uneasy. The workers are the only class capable of organized action—that Marxist principle has never been forgotten. No action, however, is possible without leaders. If the leaders reason correctly, that is, if they understand the necessities of the historic process, then the workers as a mass will be unable to protest.

Everything, thus, takes us back to the question of mas- 626
tery over the mind. Every possible opportunity for educa- 555
tion and advancement is offered to the more energetic and active individuals among the workers. The new, incredibly extensive bureaucracy is recruited from among the young people of working-class origin. The road before them is open, open but guarded: their thinking must be based on the firm principles of dialectical materialism. Schools, theaters, films, painting, literature, and the press all shape their thinking.

We should also call attention to a new institution, the 575
"club," whose significance is comparable to that of the 626
chapel in the middle ages. It exists in every factory, ev-

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316 tive Middle Europe can gradually increase their output of coal,
433 and thus can assure a constant growth of their basic source of industrial energy. Much progress in that direction can be made through high investments and multiple technical improvements, as well as by better organization of production. But the "normal" conditions presuppose that the targets for coal output remain within the range of feasibility and the miners are assured of a minimum acceptable standard of living. In the course of 1951, either one or both of these conditions were not kept by most of the satellite governments, and the planned output of coal is at present exposed to considerable danger.

In February-March 1951, under relentless pressure from Moscow, the Czechoslovak and Hungarian governments were forced to decree a notable speed-up of their long-range industrial plans, equivalent to boosting their annual quotas of production from the beginning of 1951. The Czech 1953 target for coal has been increased from 20.8 to 25 million tons and that of lignite from 32.2 to 38.6 million; the Hungarian 1954 target for both coal and lignite from 24.2 to 27.5 million tons. *Ipso facto*, the annual targets for 1951, 1952, and future years, have been boosted accordingly. Since the old targets were already high, it is perfectly legitimate to doubt whether these new plans can be fulfilled in time. In the light of recent statistical data, Czech coal mining is fulfilling the old plan but not the inflated new one. The same seems to be true in Hungary.

433 511 466 Quite apart from the real or apparent unfeasibility of the two coal plans in question, the recent acute food shortage in most of the captive area (except in Eastern Germany and possibly Bulgaria) has resulted, since the early fall of 1951, in an appreciable lowering of the standard of living of all industrial workers, and of coal miners in particular. The reasons for this food shortage are many: one of them is a long period of drought in most of the captive area and the consequent loss of much of the potato crop, the staple food of the population. Even if the bread grain crops were satisfactory, the shortage of potatoes would be a major calamity for men and animals alike, and by

itself would lead to a shortage of meat, especially pork. This current emergency caught the satellite governments unprepared, the more so because they had been stripping their countries of foodstuffs by military stockpiling, sending vast amounts of meat, sugar, and other staples to Russia and Red China, and antagonizing the peasant producers of food by ever increasing taxes, supply quotas, and other forms of persecution and chicanery. The net consequence of such policies and practices is that in many industrial areas of captive Middle Europe the people have had very little meat since the summer of 1951. Their supply of sugar, vegetables, and potatoes has also been very short. The Polish, Czech, Hungarian, and Rumanian coal miners were already badly housed, badly clothed, and overworked. Now they are also badly fed, and they may be — or actually are — incapable of working as much as is expected. The lowered efficiency of the miners means less coal and less coal means in turn less electric power, less machinery, and less chemicals. A shortage of fuel may be equivalent to a nonfulfillment of industrial targets all over the four countries in question.

Statistical data naturally lag behind the real situation in industry. At the end of 1951 the available statistical figures were not yet fully reflecting the most serious consequences of the food crisis. However, they were indicative of a trend toward a depression in coal mining.

In Poland the coal target for the third quarter of 1951 was not fulfilled, and the actual production was only 2 percent higher than a year before, instead of the expected 5 to 6 percent. During the first half of 1951 coal extraction in Rumania was nearly 8 percent behind the plan, although it was claimed to be 26 percent above the output during the corresponding period of 1950. In the same period in Hungary coal was 6 percent behind the schedule, although again production was claimed to be 22 percent higher than 1950. In Czechoslovakia the slump in coal production was much more pronounced. It began by a temporary failure of production towards the end of 1950; even though it was overcome, the Czech government found itself unable

316 to supply adequate supplementary manpower to the coal mines.
433 In the third quarter of 1951 the joint coal and lignite plan was fulfilled only by 91 percent. Lignite mining was more or less satisfactory, but coal mining (in particular in the important Ostrava-Karvinna coal basin) was actually on the verge of a possible breakdown; by the end of October 1951, Czech coal production was 1.3 million tons behind schedule. Eastern Germany alone was implementing its coal plan.

[466] Faced with a direct threat to their planning, the satellite governments took, towards the end of 1951, a series of harsh steps. Their object was to assure higher wages and a better diet for the coal miners and to prevent the increasing absenteeism and bad discipline in the mines, as well as the increasing fluidity of manpower (in particular in Czechoslovakia and Hungary). Under the impact of these measures, the production curve in the all-important Silesian-Ostravan coal basin went upwards again in November and December 1951. It is possible that the Polish coal target for 1951 (somewhat above 83 million tons) was reached before the end of the year. It is doubtful, however, that the Czech target was reached. In the first weeks of 1952 it is too early to say whether this new production rise is temporary or permanent. It depends very largely on the supply of foodstuffs. The police states have at their disposal many effective methods of dealing with critical situations, but they cannot produce foodstuffs at will. It took the Soviet government years to overcome a similar situation in the Donets basin coal mining.

316 The production of lignite in the captive area is far less difficult for the satellite governments, in particular for Eastern Germany, which mines several times more lignite than all the other countries of Middle Europe combined. The explanation lies in the technique of extraction. The deposits of lignite generally lie close to the surface of the ground and can be worked by stripping and scraping from open mines, or they are covered by a shallow overburden[77] that must be removed before the mineral can be mined, as is true of some coal deposits in the United States. Only one fortieth of the nearly unlimited reserves of lignite in Eastern

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chosen by lot. Then at the appointed hour in the night they pounce on their victim and hack him to pieces in a bestial fashion. 697

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Such is the situation in Russia. There are also concentration camps in the satellite countries, called in Communist language "People's Democracies." It has been estimated that more than 1,000,000 persons have been sent to such camps, and the number may be far greater. Not included in this figure, for example, are Eastern Germany and the former Baltic States. The existence of concentration camps has been widely advertised, and decrees establishing them are on the statute books of all the People's Democracies. The decrees merely apply to the country in question the provisions of Article 59 of the Criminal Code of U.S.S.R. The first Article of the Criminal Code of Rumania, for example, as reported by Albert K. Herling, reads as follows: 699 466 177. 69 671 687

> Criminal law has for its purpose defending the Rumanian People's Republic and its legal order against actions dangerous to society by enforcing legal measures of social defense against persons who commit such actions. In the meaning of the preceding paragraph any action and omission that brings harm to the economic, social and political structure, or to the security of the Rumanian People's Republic, or which disturbs the legal order established by the people under the leadership of the working class is to be considered dangerous to society. The actions which are considered dangerous for society can be punished even when they are not expressly prohibited by law. In such cases the extent and limit of criminal responsibility is to be determined in accordance with the legal provisions in force for similar crimes.*

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The number of camps in the area reported by persons who assert that they were present in them is so vast that the names by 466 697

* Statement issued on June 18, 1952, in behalf of the International League for the Rights of Man.

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466 which they go and the places where they are situated would fill
697 a small directory. Thus 179 have been reported from Czechoslovakia alone. If the information gathered is correct, there are at least six hundred slave-labor institutions in the People's Democracies. The use to which this labor is put, according to reports, is significant. In Rumania slave laborers, for example, work on farms, at power plants, on the construction of railroads and bridges, on the digging of canals, and in factories. Of interest also is the manner in which the system has been developed. Both Poland and Czechoslovakia witnessed the deportation to Russia, during the early stages of the occupation, of hundreds of thousands of people deemed hostile to Communism. Popular resentment of this brought about a temporary lull. What happened next, if one can judge by the experience of the Czechs and Slovaks, is that the government was authorized to compel workers to remain on jobs deemed to be in the national interest. This action was described as an emergency measure. The net result, however, was that young workers suspected of being hostile to the Communist regime were disciplined.

466 After the seizure of power by the Communists in 1948, several decrees were issued authorizing the government of Czechoslovakia to establish commissions of three to determine whether citizens should be sentenced to forced labor. Liability was very broadly defined. Thus one decree stipulated that "persons who are not less than eighteen and not more than sixty years of age, and are physically and mentally capable of working but evade work or threaten the establishment of the people's democratic order," might be sent to work camps for periods not less than three months and not longer than two years. In addition very stringent regulations were laid down concerning the supply of labor. No one was any longer to change his place of employment unless the responsible au-

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thorities had received the request and acceded to it. Perhaps the most stringent regulation was that which held the trade unions responsible for the production outlined in the Five-Year Plan but deprived them of every right to defend workers against the state. Boiled down to its essentials, the system compels every laboring man to expend the last ounce of his energy regardless of whether he is employed normally or under duress. In the circumstances, it is rather strange that while the forced laborer's dinner normally consists of coffee and three potatoes, it is followed by a lecture on the blessings of Marxism.

A social system of this character cannot tolerate sabotage, even if that is mere opposition to the aims and purposes of the rulers; for any thought, word, or deed which deprives the masters of even so much as an hour of a worker's time, or which places upon them the burden of defending any action they have taken, represents a loss of precious human energy. Sins are committed against the highest authority on earth (and of course there is no power beyond the world of appearance and matter), Stalin or his successors, by those who feel that the traditional forms of European living offer the greatest hope of human happiness. Therefore the Church was from the outset doomed, not only because it professed a spiritual view of life at odds with dialectical materialism but also because it was an obstacle to the full and unrestricted use of human beings. An American may find it hard to understand fanaticism of this sort, but every thoughtful churchman doomed to live under Communist domination knows the truth full well.

But how can a compact religious body be infiltrated? The answer is of course that, if the churches were not human but representative of every ideal which they purport to profess, the high tide of Communism would break at their doorsteps. So profoundly spiritual, however, they are not. Some of the clergy

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121 only conclusion possible would be that the Bureaucracy is the owner of the wealth of these countries, that as well as being the ruling class politically, it is the ruling class economically.

471 *The Abolition of all Elements of Democracy in the Factory*

466 The relations between the state-bureaucracy and the people in the economy as a whole permeate each sector of it down to the individual enterprise. The macrocosm and the microcosms are governed by the same rules.

In Russia from 1917 to 1928 the running of the industries was, formally at least, in the hands of what was called the Troika (that is, trio)—the workers' factory committee, the Party cell and the manager. With the disappearance of all democracy in the Party and trade unions, the Troika gradually lost its functions till it became a mere label. Nevertheless it did not cease to stand officially at the head of the plant, nominally running it, and even to show signs of life by acting as something of a brake on the high-handedness of the plant manager, until 1929. Thus Dr. A. Baykov, in *The Development of the Soviet Economic System* (London, 1946), states:

'*De facto*, during that period (before the Five Year Plan—Y.G.) the director was largely dependent on the works' trade union organ, the "Zavkom" (the factory trade union committee) and on the Party cell, the organ of the Communist Party at the enterprise. Representatives of these organizations considered it their duty to supervise the director's activities, and usually interfered with his decisions'. (p. 115).

But even the remnants of workers' democracy in the plants disappeared with the Five Year Plans, which were called . . . 'The Victory of Socialism'. A resolution of the Central Committee of the Party decided that the workers' committee of the factory 'may not intervene directly in the running of the plant or endeavour in any way to replace plant management. They shall by all means help to secure one-man control, increased production, plant development, and, thereby, improvement of the material conditions of the working class'. (*Pravda*, 7th September, 1929).

The manager is in full and sole charge of the plant. All his economic orders are unconditionally binding on all the workers. He alone shall select, promote and remove personnel

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'taking into consideration' 'the opinion of the Party and the trade union organizations', but he is not bound by them. (Quoted by A. Feiler and J. Marschak, editors, *Management in Russian Industry and Agriculture*, New York, 1944, p. 36). 471/466

The Troika was officially buried in 1937. At the Plenum of the Central Committee, Stalin's second-in-command at that time, Zhdanov, declared: '. . . the Troika is something quite impermissible . . . The Troika is a sort of administrative board, but our economic administration is constructed along totally different lines'. (*Pravda*, 11th March, 1937, Ibid. p. 44).

The new management of industry was very clearly defined by an official manual thus: 'Each plant has a leader endowed with full power of decision, hence fully responsible for everything: the plant manager' (Economic Institute of the Academy of Sciences, *Economics of Socialist Industry*, Moscow, 1940, p. 579, ibid. pp. 12-13). Further, 'one-man control implies strict demarcation between the administration, on the one hand, and Party and trade-union organisations on the other. This strict demarcation must be applied on all levels of industrial management. Current operations in fulfilment of Plan are the task of the administration. The chief of a workshop, the manager of the plant, the head of the Glavk, have full powers, each within his field, and the Party and trade-union organisations may not interfere with their orders'. (*Economics of Socialist Industry*, p. 563, Ibid. p. 19).

In the 'People's Democracies' the workers' committees never acquired the authority they had in Russia, and the Troika never existed at all. The tendency against *any* element of workers' democracy in the factory was more pronounced and its progress much quicker than in the 'vanguard' country.

In all the countries of Eastern Europe the overthrow of Hitler inspired many workers to strive to participate in the management of industry, and in many places they achieved their aim of having the plant management democratically elected by the employees. Thus, for instance, *The Economist* of February 9th, 1946, writes of Czechoslovakia: 'The Employees' Committees tried, in the first fine careless rapture of revolutionary enthusiasm, to dictate how the factories should be managed . . .'

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This could not be tolerated by the Communist Party leaders in the government and trade unions. The following process took place:

'. . . the Workers Councils were . . . in control of management for some months, indeed almost until the end of 1945.' 'The situation was transformed by the Government's Nationalisation Decree of 24th October, (1945), which provided for the appointment of National Managers of the public enterprises'. 'So at one step the management of the industries was taken out of the hands of the Works Councils, nor did they retain any semblance of control over the Manager. This was a radical change and brought with it the undisguised hostility of a number of Works Councils'. (*Czechoslovakia. Six Studies in Reconstruction*, The Fabian Society, London, 1947, p. 49).

To reduce still further any remaining efficacy of the Works Committees, every element of democracy in them was abolished. At the general meeting of the Central Trade Union Council of Czechoslovakia at the beginning of April, 1947, the General Secretary complained that in the first round of the elections 32 per cent of the official candidates (no other candidates were allowed) were voted down in the Czech lands and 26 per cent in Slovakia. The Social Democratic Party now came forward openly with a proposal that more than one list be allowed in the Works Council elections, and that each party be free to put forward its own list of candidates. Antonin Zapotocky, the Communist Chairman of the Trade Unions (today the Prime Minister of Czechoslovakia) decided on another tactic as a result of the elections. He proposed to prolong the term of office of the Works Councils from one to two years.

Having established one list of candidates for Works Council elections, the Communist Party not only increased the use of terror in the elections, but also employed various devices for falsifying their results. The Social Democratic daily *Pravo Lidu* of 9th January, 1948, carried across the front page the Party protest against the Communist Party's methods in the factories: 'It is impossible to be silent. Fanatics are breaking up the unity of labour unions. New wave of political oppression in factories'. Of the recent Works Council elections the paper said: 'As developments in the elections are reported to us,

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especially in the large industrial concerns, it is evident that all the questionable practices were used, which were calculated to upset the democratic form of election and to force on the voters a selection (of candidates-Y.G.) that is not free. The meetings are usually called after working hours when the majority of workers are leaving or have left. 471 466

'Furthermore, the methods of voting are controlled, which is practically equivalent to direct intimidation'. (Quoted by *The New York Times*, 10th January, 1948).

After the February coup the mouths of the Socialists were closed. The secret ballot too was abolished at that time, and elections to Works Committees were carried out by acclamation, candidates in many cases being trade union officials. Small wonder that at the May 1949 session of the Central Council of the Czechoslovak Trade Unions, Josef Kolský, Deputy General Secretary, could say that in recent Works Council elections 97.3 per cent of the official lists of candidates were accepted (the official *Czechoslovak News Letter*, 19th May, 1949).

After these steps were taken, nothing more stood in the way of complete one-man management in the plant. In place of the workers' management that had arisen in the first months after the liberation of Czechosovakia from the German occupation, came the Production Board (set up by the Decree of October 24th, 1945), only a third of whose members were elected by the workers. After the 'Democractic Victory of February', the Minister of Industry, A. Kliment, announced a new plan: 'We are abandoning the system of collective management and we are going to abolish the Production Boards, instead of which we are going to introduce the system of personal responsibility of the works director, the technicians, the foremen and the workers'. This harks right back to unadulterated capitalism.

In Hungary the 'iron' Minister Ernö Gerö declared in his report to the Central Committee of the Party (June, 1950): 'A factory . . . can only have one manager who in his own person is responsible for everything that happens in the factory.' In all the other satellites too one-man management is the rule.

Democracy having duly been stamped out, the governments could without further ado follow this up by imposing on the

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471 workers all the known methods of exploitation, old and new.
466 First of these was the introduction on an unprecedented scale of piece work in place of time work.

Piece Work

Marx once said that piece work is 'the most suitable to capitalist methods of production.' The leaders of the 'People's Democracies', however, teach otherwise. Thus *Scanteia*, the Rumanian Communist Party daily, of January 13th, 1949, says: 'Piece-work is a revolutionary (!) system that eliminates inertia and makes the labourer hustle. Under the capitalist system loafing and laziness are fostered. But now everyone has a chance to work harder and earn more' (Quoted by R. H. Markham in *Christian Science Monitor*, 31st January, 1949). 'Socialism', then, is superior to capitalism in that it uses the piece-work system!

The volume of work done at piece-work rates is continually increasing all the time.

In Czechoslovakia in February, 1946, 30.2 per cent of the total number of working hours came under the piece-work system, in January, 1947, 41.7 per cent, in June, 1947, 48 per cent, and the Two-Year Plan (1947-8) provided for the extension of piece-work so as to include 70 per cent of all working hours in industry. The aim is not 100 per cent only because in certain processes it is not possible to implement it. That this emphasis on piece-work was not welcomed by the workers is clear from the following attack made on 18 January, 1949, by the Minister of Justice, Alexej Čepička, on workers who show 'false solidarity' and a striving for 'equalisation of incomes' by opposing the piece-work system. 'Equalisation in wages hampers higher productivity. The piece-work system must be extended so as to give every worker an incentive. It is now used in only 58 per cent of our factories. To extend it to all is our task'. This was not all, for the workers were going slow to keep the norm low: 'Our workers have got to quit stalling and fight against equalitarianism in pay'. (*Christian Science Monitor*, 31st January, 1949).

The piece-workers par excellence, the Stakhanovites, are not loved by the workers. In his report to the 9th Congress of the Party (May, 1949), the General Secretary, Rudolf Slansky,

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revealed that out of 900,000 members of the Party's factory organisation only 65,000 were listed as Stakhanovites. Their unpopularity becomes manifest from a perusal of *Rude Pravo*, the Communist Party daily, which finds it necessary constantly to repeat that Stakhanovites should be placed in more responsible positions and that they should be protected against attacks made on them by 'politically immature' workers. 'There are officials and directors who, being snugly ensconced in their jobs or afraid for their popularity among politically undeveloped elements, fail to defend Stakhanovites as they ought to'. In letters from Stakhanovites published in the press, a frequent complaint is the hostile attitude of the workers towards them. When a reporter of *Lidové Noviny* went to interview Marie Zemancová, a young Stakhanovite in the Prague radio factory 'Tesla' who had been included in the Czech delegation to the Paris 'Peace Congress' as a reward for her work, it turned out that she was completely unknown in her factory. 'This proves', comments the paper, 'that we have been unable to popularise our Stakhanovites and pioneer workers'. (Quoted by *News from Czechoslovakia*, No. 6, April, 1949, published by the Czechoslovak Social Democratic Party in Exile, London). In view of these facts, it is no wonder that at the 9th Congress of the Communist Party open war was declared on people 'who run down the work of Stakhanovites and who even try to put a spoke in their wheel'.

In Poland the piece-work system reached a stage at which the basic wage almost entirely disappeared. As Clarion describes it: 'It should be emphasized incidentally, that with regard to salaries the whole system rests upon the maintenance of basic salaries at an abnormally low level and upon a huge inequality in the bonuses both of money and in kind. The periodical *Études et Conjoncture* in this regard pointed out, in a study of the economic situation in Poland, published in November, 1946, that 'on the average for the whole of industry in May, 1946, the total benefits granted (to the workers) in Poland represented from 6.8 to 14.6 times the basic salary, which thus became a mere supplementary item instead of being the main element of the total remuneration'. (op. cit. pp. 106-7).

The hatred felt by the Polish workers for these extreme forms of piece-work was displayed openly in the spring of 1946 and

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471 in September, 1947, when tens of thousands of workers went
● 466 on strike in Lodz, the biggest industrial city in Poland, in spite of the police terror, the mass arrests, the beatings, etc.

In Hungary, when the workers did not show sufficient enthusiasm for the piece-work system, they were accused by Rákosi of being 'lazy' (*N.Y. Herald Tribune*, Nov. 30th, 1948, reporting a speech delivered on November 27th); the factory directors were 'capitulating' to the lazy workers; the production quotas were too low. 'We cannot eat up the future of the nation', he declared. That Rákosi's speech was not effective enough can be seen from the continual harping on the theme of piece-work and its norms by the Hungarian leaders. Thus in the above-mentioned report to the Central Committee of June, 1950, Minister Ernö Gerö said: 'The enemy succeeded in opening a new front against the 'People's Democracy; that of wage and norm swindling'. 'That wage and norm swindling has spread among the masses can be attributed to a great degree to the underground work of right-wing social-democratic elements and to thei rallies, the clerical reactionaries . . .' It appears that Party members are also in league with 'right-wing social-democratic elements' who 'swindle' the norms: 'That such an unsavoury situation in the field of norms could arise is partly because in many cases the economic leaders of the factories, party functionaries and trade union members are among those who slacken the norms.' ' . . . in more than one case they go as far as to protect and support the wage swindlers'. This vituperation was followed by a considerable increase in the basic norm.

000 It is interesting to note that Stalinism is not the only system having extreme recourse to piece-work, Nazi Germany had too. Franz Neumann in his book *Behemoth* (London, 1942) writes: 'The class wage of the Socialist trade unions has been replaced by the "performance wage" (Leistungslohn) defined in Section 29 of the (Nazi-Y.G.) Charter of Labour. "It has been the iron principle of the National Socialist leadership", said Hitler at the Party Congress of Honour, "not to permit any rise in the hourly wage rates but to raise income solely by an increase in performance". The rule of the wage policy is a marked preference for piece-work and bonuses, even for juvenile workers. Such a policy is completely demoralizing,

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for it appeals to the most egoistic instincts and sharply increases industrial accidents'. (pp. 352-3). 000

Neumann explains why the Nazis went to such extremes in using the piece-work system (no more, however, than are resorted to in the Stakhanovite system): 'The preponderance of the performance wage brings the problem of wage differentials into the forefront of social policy. It is essential that this problem be understood not as an economic question but as the *crucial political problem of mass control* (my emphasis—Y.G.) . . . Wage differentiation is the very essence of National Socialist wage policy . . . the wage policy is consciously aimed at mass manipulation'. (p. 353).

The piece-work system 'is completely demoralising', 'it appeals to the most egoistic instincts,' it is a most important means of 'mass control', of 'mass manipulation', of atomization of the working class, of the creation of elite above elite even within the oppressed class. That is why the Nazis were so keen on its extension, and there is no other explanation of the enthusiasm of the Stalinist rulers for it.*

The Increasing Limitation of the Workers' Legal Freedom 466

In Russia, until the First Five-Year Plan every worker could freely change his place of work and could migrate unhindered from one part of the country to another.

On the right to change the place of work at that time, the Labour Code (1922) stated:

'The transfer of a hired person from one enterprise to another or his shipment from one locality to another, even when the enterprise or institution moves, can take place only with the

*As an indication of the purpose for which piece-work was so widely introduced, it is interesting to note that it was introduced even before the nationalisation of industry. It would be good, the Communist Party leaders thought, to discipline the workers in advance, in 'the interests of the nation'. In Rumania and Bulgaria, at the beginning of 1945, before the nationalisation decrees, production competitions were introduced, and 'labour heroes' were honoured with medals and money grants conferred by the heads of the governments. The 1st of May, 1946, was celebrated in Hungary as a production competition in the private industries. In these measures the Communist Party leaders got the whole-hearted support of the bourgeoisie. Then, after harassing them in this way, they used the same workers as their support in their onslaught on the bourgeoisie, which resulted in its expropriation. This shows the united attitude of the bourgeoisie and the Communist Party bureaucracy towards the exploitation of the masses (piece-work) and the united attitude of the bureaucracy and the working class towards private property (see Part II of the book). 466 471

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466 consent of the worker or employee concerned'. (Article 37, *Labour Code.*)*

On freedom of movement, the *Small Soviet Encyclopaedia* (1930 edition) wrote:

'. . . the custom of internal passports, instituted by the autocracy as an instrument of police oppression of the toiling masses, was suppressed by the October Revolution'.

But already in 1931 no worker was allowed to leave Leningrad without special permission, and in 1932 this system was adopted in all parts of Russia. An internal passport system much more oppressive than the Tsar's was introduced. Now no one could change his place of residence without permission.

As early as September, 1930, all industrial enterprises were prohibited from employing people who left their former place of work without permission. In 1932 Labour Books were introduced which every worker must give to the Director when he is taken on, and in which the director can write whatever remarks he likes when the worker leaves the job. No worker can be taken on at another job without showing his Labour Book. Victor Serge, who lived in Russia for many years as a prominent Communist and then was arrested, and who was finally allowed to leave Russia, writes:

'The passport is visaed at the place of work. With each change of employ, the reason for the change is entered into the passport. I have known of workers discharged for not having come on the day of rest to contribute a "voluntary" (and, naturally, gratuitous) day of work, in whose passports is written: "discharged for sabotage of the production plan" '. (*Russia Twenty Years After*, New York, 1937, p. 68).

On 4th December, 1932, the Government issued another decree designed to subjugate the workers. The factory's supplies of food and other necessities were put under the sole control of the Director 'in order to strengthen the powers of Directors of enterprises' (*Pravda*, 5th December, 1932).

Under a law of 26th June, 1940, a worker is prohibited from leaving his job, unless he is physically unfit to work, is accepted into an educational institution or is given special permission by higher authorities. Any absence without a satisfactory excuse,

*This article was abolished on 1 June, 1932. (Collection of Laws, "Labour Code," Moscow, 1937, p. 20.)

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even for a day, makes the culprit liable to six months' corrective labour—which means a cut of 25 per cent in his earnings during that time. It is symptomatic that a few months after the promulgation of this law a few women wrote a letter to *Izvestia* suggesting that domestic servants also be subject to this law. *Izvestia*, in its comment on this question (December 30th, 1940), although disagreeing with this suggestion, showed no astonishment as to its content in this period of the 'transition from Socialism to Communism'. 466

Not only are workers prohibited from calling strikes, but strikers are liable, according to law, to be sentenced to death for such an offence. (Item 14 of Article 58 of the Criminal Code. As capital punishment has now been abolished, twenty years penal servitude is given instead).* [681]

The Russian model is now being copied in the 'People's Democracies'. This time it will not take so many years to reach perfection. Until 1928, strikes in Russia were legal and were conducted without police intervention, even though the bureaucratic rulers opposed them more and more as their power grew.†

The 'People's Democracies', however, from the beginning avoided the mistake of allowing strikes. Not one of the new Constitutions includes the right to strike. The explanation is simple, and was put in a nutshell by the spokesman of the Yugoslav Government when he was replying to a proposal to include 'freedom to strike' in the Constitution: 'Now when our

*The following article is the only item in the "Collection of Laws" which touches on or covers any cases that can be interpreted by the courts as strikes: "Counter revolutionary sabotage, i.e., knowingly *omitting to discharge a given duty* or discharging it with deliberate carelessness, with the specific object of weakening the authority of the government or the operation of the government machine, entails—deprivations of liberty for a period of not less than one year, and confiscation of property in whole or in part, provided that where there are aggravating circumstances of a particularly serious nature the penalty shall be increased to the supreme measure of social defence: death by shooting, with confiscation of property". (My emphasis—Y.G. Criminal Code, Article 58 (14), June 6, 1927, "Collection of Laws", No. 49, Article 330, Moscow, 1937, p. 31).

†In 1922-3 there were 500 strikes with 150,000 participants in 1925, 196 strikes with 37,600 participants; in 1926, 337 strikes with 43,200 participants; in 1927, 396 strikes with 25,400 participants. More than 90 per cent of the participants in these strikes were workers employed by the State. Not only were strikes allowed, but at that time the Bolshevik leaders insisted on the active support of Party members for strikes whenever the majority of the workers of an enterprise took this step. (See, for instance, the speeches of Lozovsky and Tomsky to the 11th Congress of the Russian Communist Party, 1922).

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466 constitution fully guarantees the rights of the working class, such a proposal is outright reactionary and anti-national'. (20th January, 1946). In opposing strikes the Communist Party leaders showed themselves very willing to use the help of the bourgeois politicians, and these, on their side, did not hesitate to use the authority of the Communist Party leaders in opposing strikes. For instance, the Czechoslovak Minister of Justice, Dr. Drtina ('purged' in the coup of February, 1948) said on 17th March, 1947, about recent unofficial strikes: 'They were . . . in effect strikes against the Government and Premier Gottwald . . . What is more serious is the fact that these strikes against the legal order occurred after the Revolution. Therefore, they are of a terroristic and anarchic character'. (*East Europe*, 26th March, 1947). Of course, from the suppression of the 'anarchic' strikes, the real benefactors were not [687] Dr. Drtina and his friends, but Gottwald and his. In Rumania Decree No. 183 bans strikes, defining them as 'an economic offence'. Participation in strikes is punishable by imprisonment of 1 to 12 years and by fines of Lei 10,000 to 100,000. A member of the Communist Party of any of the Western countries, making use of the double thinking so common to him, will find it quite consistent to support the banning of strikes in Russia and the People's Democracies (except of course, Yugoslavia after 28 June, 1948—the day of the excommunication of Tito by the Cominform) and at the same time oppose any limitation of the right to strike in any enterprise owned by a democratically elected public body in his own country.

The first steps have also been taken to abolish the right of workers to change their place of work. On April 16th, 1948, a law was passed in Yugoslavia prohibiting any state employee from leaving his place of work without permission from a special government commission. On August 19th Sofia Radio reported that the Labour Directorate had decided that the workers 'have no longer the right to leave their working places without permission' of the factory administration. Permission to employ or to dismiss will be granted only in accordance with the needs of production. Workers who leave their employment without permission of the Labour Directorate must be sent back to their original jobs, in accordance with Cabinet Decree No. 7.

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If they do not return voluntarily, they can be called up by the branch labour office (that is, assigned to compulsory labour groups). In Hungary the government published a decree on January 9th, 1950, laying down severe penalties for workers who leave their place of employment without permission. In all the 'People's Democracies' the labour book was copied from Russia. In Yugoslavia an 'improvement' was introduced: every citizen has a *karakteristika*, a record of his political reliability which has to be shown every time he takes a new job. As it is sealed, he does not know its contents, and is not even able to appeal against what is written in it. 466

Slave Labour

An institution which is of paramount importance in Russia, which is beginning to appear in the satellites and is bound to increase in importance as time goes on, is slave labour.

Some figures regarding the number of slave labourers in Russia are given by D. J. Dallin in a book that he wrote with B. I. Nicolaevsky, *Forced Labor in Soviet Russia.* (London, 1948). 'Kiseliev-Gromov, himself a former G. P. U. official in the northern labor camps, states that in 1928 only 30,000 men were detained in the camps . . . The total number of prisoners in the entire network of camps in 1930 he gives as 662,257 . . . " (p. 52). Dallin comes to the conclusion on the basis of available evidence that the number of people in labour camps in 1931 was nearly 2 million, in 1933-35 about 5 million. He says that in 1942 there were from eight to fifteen million (pp. 53-62). The former Yugoslav Communist leader, Anton Ciliga, who was for many years in a Russian concentration camp, estimates that the number of prisoners was about 10 million (*The Russian Enigma,* London, 1940, p. 249).

A conclusive proof of the existence of slave labour on a big scale in Russia can be gained from the following quotations from *Pravda.* On June 4, 1947, the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of the U.S.S.R. passed a decree on 'Protection of Citizens' Private Property' the first article of which reads: 'Theft—that is, covert or open appropriation of the private property of citizens—is punishable by confinement in a reformatory labour camp for a period of five to six years. Theft committed by a gang of thieves or for a second time is punishable 685 466

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685 by confinement at a reformatory labour camp for a period of
466 six to ten years.' (*Pravda*, 5th June, 1947).

On the same day another decree was passed on 'Embezzlement of State and Public Property' which includes the following articles:

'(1) Theft, appropriation, defalcation or other embezzlement of state property is punishable by confinement in a reformatory labour camp for 7 to 10 years, with or without confiscation of property.

'(2) Embezzlement of state property for a second time, as well as when committed by an organized group or on a large scale, is punishable by confinement in a reformatory labour camp for 10 to 25 years, with confiscation of property.

'(3) Theft, appropriation, defalcation or other embezzlement of collective farm, cooperative or other public property is punishable by confinement in a reformatory labour camp for 5 to 8 years, with or without confiscation of property.

'(4) Embezzlement of collective farm, cooperative or other public property for a second time, as well as that committed by an organised group or gang or on a large scale, is punishable by confinement in a reformatory labour camp for 8 to 20 years, with confiscation of property.' (Ibid.).

A month after these decrees were passed the U.S.S.R. Public Prosecutor's Office gave ten examples showing how the decrees were carried out in practice (*Pravda* July 9th, 1947):

'(1) In the city of Saratov, V. F. Yudin, who had been previously convicted for theft . . . stole fish from a smoke factory. On June 24th, 1947, . . . Yudin was sentenced to fifteen years' imprisonment in corrective-labour camps . . .

'(2) On June 11th, 1947, an electrician on the power lines of the Moscow-Ryazan railroad, D. A. Kiselev, stole fur goods from a railroad car . . . On June 24th, 1947, the war tribunal of the Moscow-Ryazan railroad sentenced D. A. Kiselev to ten years' imprisonment in the corrective-labour camps.

'(3) In the town of Pavlov-Posad in the Moscow region, L. N. Markelov . . . stole clothing from the Pavlov-Posad textile factory. On June 20th, 1947 . . . Markelov was sentenced to eight years' imprisonment in corrective-labour camps.

'(4) In the Rodnikov district of the Ivanov region, Y. V. Smirnov and V. V. Smirnov . . . stole 375 pounds of oats from

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a collective farm. On June 26th, 1947 . . . both were sentenced to eight years' imprisonment in corrective-labour camps. 685 466

'(5) In the Kirov district of Moscow, E. K. Smirnov, a chauffeur, was arrested for stealing 22 pounds of bread from a bakery. The people's court . . . sentenced E. K. Smirnov to seven years' imprisonment in corrective-labour camps.

'(6) In Saratov, E. I. Gordeyev . . . stole various products from a warehouse. On June 21st, 1947 . . . Gordeyev was sentenced to seven years' imprisonment in corrective-labour camps.

'(7) In Kuibyshev, E. T. Poluboyarov stole a wallet from a train traveller . . . On 4th July he was sentenced to 5 years' imprisonment in corrective-labour camps.

'(8) On June 7th, 1947, in Kazan at the collective farm market, V. E. Bukin snatched money from the hand of Citizeness Pustinsky . . . On June 20th, 1947 . . . Bukin was sentenced to eight years' imprisonment in corrective-labour camps.

'(9) On June 6th, 1947, in the village of Subovka in the Kutuzovsk district of the Kuibyshev region, A. A. Chubarkin and V. G. Morozov stole from a cellar 88 pounds of potatoes belonging to Citizeness Presnyakov. On June 17th, 1947 . . . both were sentenced to five years' imprisonment in corrective-labour camps.

'(10) On June 5th, 1947, in Moscow . . . K. V. Greenwald, who had been previously convicted for theft, took advantage of the absence of his neighbour, entered the room of Citizeness Kovalev and stole various household articles . . . Greenwald was sentenced . . . to ten years' imprisonment in corrective-labour camps.'

That people steal bread and other elementary necessities of life under the cruel threat of a minimum of five years' slave labour if caught, shows what dire provery they are suffering.[1] [735]

That slave labour in U.S.S.R. is very widespread is clear not only from the large amount of evidence given by former inmates of these camps (collected in the above-mentioned book of D. J. Dallin and B. I. Nicolaevsky) and from the facts published in the Russian Press of heavy punishments for the most elementary crimes—if the theft of bread can be so called. There is further evidence which is conclusive even if indirect. Soviet

1 [See examples, category 116, pp. 94-95 --Analyst]

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466 law grants the franchise to everyone above the age of 18 with the exception of the inmates of forced labour camps. In the 1946 elections 101.7 million people had the franchise. The population of U.S.S.R. was 193 million in the same year. The census of 1939 says that 58.4 per cent of the population were 18 and over. In 1946 the percentage of people above 18 was higher, as, firstly, the age distribution of the population in the new areas added to U.S.S.R. (Lithuania, Latvia, Estonia, etc.) was such that the percentage of children was lower than in the population of U.S.S.R. in its 1939 boundaries, and, secondly, the war caused a relatively greater decline in the birth rate and increase in the death rate of children as compared with the death rate of the adult population. If we assume that the proportion of people aged 18 and over was the same in 1946 as in 1939, there were altogether 112.7 million people in this category. Seeing that only 101.7 millian had the franchise, it is clear that at least 11 million were inmates of slave labour camps.

Up to now news from official sources of slave labour camps in the satellite countries has been very scarce. The Czechoslovak news agency reported on October 5th, 1948, that forced labour camps were to be set up under a Bill approved at the same day's meeting of the Cabinet.

In the debate on the new Penal Code, passed by Parliament on June 27th, 1950, the deputy Dr. Patchova said: 'The Law expressly states that convicts must be given useful employment which will, after their release, make it possible for them to join the ranks of the workers. On the other hand, a prisoner sentenced as an enemy of the People's Democracy, who, by his work and behaviour while serving his sentence, does not show improvement justifying the hope that he will lead the life of a decent working man, *can be sent to a forced labour camp after he has served his sentence*'. This speech alone proves the existence of the forced labour camps in Czechoslovakia. The best-known camps are at Joachimov and Kladno.

In Rumania a law of 14th January, 1949, fixes very severe sentences—as much as the death penalty—for negligence in fulfilling service obligations in industry. Many of those who are arrested under this law will of course not suffer the supreme penalty, but will supply recruits for the slave labour camps. That other 'crimes' besides economic negligence are paid for

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by forced labour, is illustrated by the fact that several thousand Jews, including some Zionist leaders, have been sent to forced labour camps in Rumania. (London *Jewish Chronicle*, 4th August, 1950). 466

Of forced labour in Yugoslavia *The Times* of 13 June, 1950, wrote: 'To root out Cominformist opposition within the Communist Party and to enforce the collection from the peasants of produce quotas the Government has made numerous arrests, which, although no doubt dwarfed by comparable figures in Russia, make the prison population far greater than anything found in the west. In Britain, with a population about three times as great as in Yugoslavia, the prison population is now about 20,000. Most observers estimate the number of persons now in prison in Yugoslavia at anything from 100,000 to 200,000.' 'Most of the prisoners are employed as a useful reserve of labour on public works . . .'

Indirect official confirmation appears from time to time of the existence of forced labour camps in Hungary, as well as of the pettiness of the 'crimes' that open the gates to them. Thus on 21st August, 1950, Radio Budapest announced that in the wagon factory of Gyöv, a worker, I. Olajos, had been sentenced to six years' compulsory labour for a wage swindle.

In Bulgaria the most notorious forced labour camps are at Kuznian near Pernik, and at Belene.

In Poland the camp at Milecin is the most well-known.

The fact that so little is known of slave labour in the 'People's Democracies' is primarily because the governments are doing their very best to hide the ugly truth which is such an outrage to the concept of 'Socialism' and 'Democracy' which the Communist Parties claim to have established. Another two factors must also be taken into account. To quote Juvenal, 'No one reached the climax of vice at one step'. It took Russia many years to establish camps with millions of inmates. If it is assumed that the proportion of prisoners in the population in all the 'People's Democracies' is about the same as in Yugoslavia, there must be ½-1 million prisoners altogether. The U.S.S.R. with a population double that of the 'People's Democracies' had less than a million slaves in 1930, and two million in 1931. Secondly, it is very probable that although slave labour will be more widespread in Eastern Europe than at

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466 present, it will not reach the Russian dimensions. It is, as Adam Smith clearly showed, very unproductive, being suitable mainly for manual labour which does not require modern industrial equipment, such as lumber work, road and rail construction, large-scale industrial construction, irrigation works, or canals. The more abundant the machinery and the supply of cultured and skilled workers, the less profitable the use of slave labour. Hence in all probability Czechoslovakia will have less slave labour than Bulgaria or Rumania, and the 'People's Democracies' as a whole less than Russia.

It is very difficult, if not impossible, to distinguish between voluntary and forced labour in a totalitarian regime. If it is not obvious in itself, the following declaration of Tito (to the Joint Congress of the Union of Communist Youth and the People's Youth, December, 1948) will make it plain: 'There are, of course, also such students who are not very keen on voluntary work, or who refuse to take part in voluntary work activities . . . Such was the case of a small number of students whom we had to expel from Belgrade University and other universities . . .'

The Distribution of the Social Product

471 Many Communists admit that the bureaucracy in Russia and the satellites have complete control of the state machine and thus of the running of the economy. But they claim that they act entirely in the interests of the people.

To assume that a group of people who are in absolute control of the means of production will not take as much as they can out of the national product for themselves, is tantamount to explaining man's economic conduct by his intentions—a strange method of argument for those who claim to hold the materialist conception of history. The more so when from the same lips we hear that in America and elsewhere, under capitalism based on private property, mere crumbs from the table of the bourgeoisie are a sufficient inducement to bribe and currupt the 'aristocracy of labour'—the trade union bureaucracy, and so forth—and alienate them from the working class. Stalin and his associates have all the food on the table within their reach, and their reach alone, but apparently they are incorruptible, and will remain forever loyal to the working

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468 percentage of waste in the Manfred Weiss iron foundry, the
475 second biggest metal factory in Hungary, had risen from 10.4 to 23.5 per cent. In Poland, in 1948, of 67 million tons of coal, 1,100,000 tons were stones; in 1949 the percentage of stones in the coal reached 5 per cent. In 1948 and 1949 a sizeable proportion of the exports of Czechoslovakia—the country with the reputation for products of good quality—was returned as below standard.

The admonitions of the leaders to the workers are often of such a character as to leave no doubt about their indocility. Istvan Kossa, Hungarian Minister of Industry, said in a speech at Debrecen on December 6th, 1948, that 'The workers have assumed a terrorist attitude to the directors of the nationalised industries', and he threatened them with forced labour.

Chivu Stoica, Rumanian Minister of Industry, addressing the workers of the Resita plant, the largest metallurgical establishment in the country, on December 25th, 1948, accused them of not having fulfilled the plan and of being 'capitalist agents'.

In Yugoslavia, Vice-Premier Edvard Kardelj, in his report to the Fifth Congress of the Communist Party (July, 1948), attacked those workers who showed 'resistance to realistic norms, against competition, and on the other hand—in exaggerated demands in regard to pay'. 'It is clear that the consequences of such a stand are a decrease in work discipline, insufficient aid to rationalisers and innovators in the realization and application of their proposals, an incorrect and unfriendly attitude toward the heads of the enterprise, an incorrect attitude toward competitions'. (*The Communist Party of Yugoslavia in the Struggle for New Yugoslavia, for People's Authority and for Socialism*, Belgrade, 1948, pp. 87-8).

● 466 That the workers nevertheless remain members of the Communist Parties—as the official statistics show—is not because of their enthusiasm for them, but because it is too dangerous to leave. Anyone who leaves the Party faces the threat of economic sanctions (at least). This is shown clearly by some figures issued in October, 1948, by József Révai, editor of *Szabad Nép*, the Hungarian Communist Party daily. He says that the paper is read by only 12 per cent of the Party members. At the big M.A.U.A.G. factories, for example, where 6,000

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out of the 8,000 workers are Party members, only 780 read the Party newspaper. (*For a Lasting Peace, For a People's Democracy*! 15th October, 1948). Thus a large number of workers are merely nominal members of the Party. 466

The large-scale 'purges' in the Parties also express the increasing hostility between the leaders and their 'supporters'. In the 'purge' in Hungary nearly half a million members were expelled from the Party. In Czechoslovakia, there was a 'purge' of a quarter of a million members in 1948 and the first half of 1949. In Rumania, 'over 192,000 hostile elements', that is, over a fifth of the total membership of the Party, were 'purged' between November, 1948, and May, 1950. In Bulgaria, 92,500 members and candidates, out of a total of 442,183, were expelled from the Party between June, 1949 and June, 1950. 468

While the workers within the 'People's Democracies' cannot express their dissatisfaction through the police-controlled plebiscites, miscalled general elections, those on the other side of the frontier, who are close enough to know the reality of the regime inside the 'People's Democracies', and free enough to express their opinion of it—as in Austria and Berlin—have decisively shown their disapproval.

The Expropriation of the Peasantry

The parvenu ruling class in Eastern Europe, in order to add to its wealth and comfort, devotes all its energy to increasing the number of workers employed in state industries. Hence it comes into conflict with the masses of the peasantry. 369

As has been pointed out, the progress of agriculture in the Eastern European countries depends on their industrialisation. Their inherited backwardness, their separation from Western Europe by the division of the Continent into two spheres of influence, Russian imperialist exploitation, the greed of the local bureaucracy—all these factors impede the accumulation of capital, necessary for industrialisation. Had industry already existed on a big scale, the countryside would voluntarily have supplied agricultural products to the urban population in exchange for industrial products, and would also have supplied the necessary labour power for industry, as the surplus population would have been attracted to the towns by their higher

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the Communist Party was in charge of the expulsion of the Germans from the Western territories, and the settlement of Poles in their place. There Gomulka, then General Secretary of the Party, was responsible). 186 661 563

Because in the popular view the Communist Party bore the greatest responsibility for the expulsion, there was a much higher percentage of Communist supporters among the new Czech settlers in the Sudeten areas than in any other part of the country, even than in the big towns where large numbers of workers were concentrated. In the 1946 general elections, in the districts of Jablonec and Turnov the Communist Party polled 70 per cent of the votes, in Kadaň 62 per cent, Falknov 59 per cent, in Aš over 50 per cent, and so on. (The situation in the Western Territories of Poland was similar, hence the Communist leaders insisted on giving highly disproportionate representation to these areas in the general elections of January, 1947).

The whole of the Sudeten population, except some tens of thousands of indispensable skilled workers, was expelled from the country. Those who remained had to do compulsory labour for a minimum of twelve hours a day, and, if the employer thought it necessary, fifteen hours. The National Committees organised this compulsory labour. According to their decrees, the German workers in Czechoslovakia were forbidden to belong to trade unions, were excluded from social benefits, had to give a quarter of their wages as reparations to the state, were not entitled to holidays, and their children were not allowed to attend school. 466 611 563

In the first few days after the defeat of the German army in Czechoslovakia, some cracks were made in the wall of national animosity by open fraternisation between Czech and German workers. For instance, a number of rank and file communists in Bodenbach began to publish a daily paper in Czech and German; it was called *Rudý Prapor—Rote Fahne.* It was short-lived, for Nosek immediately prohibited the publication of any German paper or of any paper in two languages one of which was German. 563 661

It is ironical to note that the excesses against the Germans in Czechoslovakia were taking place at the same time—with the Red Army's entry into Germany—as the Russian

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to the belief that human language is unable to express the whole truth about the greatest disgrace to mankind that the twentieth century will know—the Soviet forced labor camps. 697 661

A sentence to a forced labor camp amounts to a sentence of death because the enormous majority of the inmates in these camps cannot exist under the conditions prevailing there and die before they are released. The inmate of such a camp works beyond his strength, knowing that if his productivity falls his starvation-level food ration will be cut. The instinct for self-preservation urges him to defend himself from death, and his reactions become those of a hungry animal. All his human feelings disappear, even his attitude toward his fellow inmates. Degraded and humiliated as a human being, the prisoner works like an animal for his enemies only to prolong his life by a year or two and then inevitably to perish. [466]

Political freedom does not exist in the Communist countries either under law or in practice. Let us take for example Article 72 of the Polish constitution of July 1952. Similar provisions will be found in all other Communist constitutions. The first lines of Article 72 say that the citizens have the right of political organization, but the third paragraph of the same article says that organization of assemblies and participation in an organization which opposes the political and social system of People's Poland are forbidden. In other words, any party which does not recognize the Communist political system is forbidden, and membership in it is punishable. 641 665

Since membership in a political party presupposes some right to influence that party, the question arises whether the Communists find it advisable to allow every citizen to belong to his country's Communist Party. The answer is no. The official statistics of the Communist parties in the occupied countries as well as in the Soviet Union show that the number of members of these parties ranges from 5 to 10 per cent

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661 cal parties, legislation, courts, and the police who protect
565 the security of the citizens. The state authority is the mediator in the last resort in disagreements between labor and business.

661 The Moloch, which is the Communist state, has on its side the party, the police, and the courts. Special laws con-
466 stantly increase the penalties for the plunder and destruc-
641 tion of the nationalized public property. Because the state is a "people's state" and "does not do injustice to the people," the trade unions act as a tool of the state in raising the productivity and quality of production and fixing the norms of work. The Stakhanovite work system, based on high norms of production and granting starvation-level wages with no means of protection against these, destroys the strength and health of the worker. Strikes are punishable because they are crimes against the interests of the state, and special laws provide discipline of work, penalties for failure to fulfill norms, and forced labor camps for "idlers" and "loafers."

661 Communism deprives the peasant of his beloved land,
641 turns him into a Communist serf, and chains him to the
423 state or collective farm in which the Communist bureaucracy demands of him ever-increasing physical efforts to produce for the insatiable state. After the liquidation of the remnants of private initiative in small business and crafts, the *kulak* peasant, the biggest "capitalist blood-sucker," is dealt with. He is destroyed by tax levies and forced deliveries of agricultural products and is finally evicted from his own farm.

642 Thus, behind the façade of People's Democracy, Communism practices dictatorship in every sphere of life—personal, political, economic, religious, and social. The Communist system creates privileges for the party and makes the citizen economically dependent upon the state. It debases human dignity, wrests faith out of human hearts, kills

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369 ulation showed any tendency toward decentralization, with
162 30 per cent of her total industrial population living in the district of Sofia.

The industrial population of these countries was occupied as follows: 25 to 30 per cent in the textile and clothing industries; 18 to 21 per cent in heavy and metallurgy industries; 11 to 22 per cent in the food industry; and 7 to 17 per cent in the lumber industry. A variation in industrial goods and in producing plants was found only in Czechoslovakia and Hungary, in southern Poland and Transylvania, and in the areas of the former Austro-Hungarian Empire.

466 One of the major problems facing the new governments
745 in their industrialization programs was to equate the growth
185 of the industrial working populations with improvement in industrial working and social conditions. Social legislation in the interwar period attained considerable progress in this direction. Prior to 1914 there already existed in Eastern Europe various social insurance and pension plans, and these were expanded between 1919 and 1939. Compulsory workers' accident and health insurance plans were introduced whereby both employers and wage earners contributed to a central fund to provide coverage for accident, illness, maternity, disability, old age, death, and unemployment. Generally speaking, the working day was reduced to eight hours, with a maximum forty-eight hour week, and the age minimum for child and woman labor was fixed at fourteen years or, in the case of heavy and dangerous work, such as mining, at sixteen to eighteen years. However, rigid application of these measures was far from universal.

A notable innovation was the establishment by the agrarian regime in Bulgaria of a compulsory labor service for the development of public works in place of the traditional military service which had been prohibited by the peace treaty. Expenditures in 1937 for social services for the entire region averaged 3 per cent of the estimated national in-

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come. Once again, Czechoslovakia headed the list with 5.5 per cent while the Balkan countries devoted only 1.5 per cent of their national income to social services. In the same year the number of persons registered as unemployed in the various countries was as follows: Czechoslovakia, 408,000; Poland, 347,000; Hungary, 47,000; Yugoslavia, 21,600; and Rumania, 10,800.

A major consequence of industrialization and urbanization was the rapid growth both of an urban proletariat and of the bureaucracy. Those people who had been separated from their ancestral rural surroundings and traditions and often from the influence of their families became increasingly detached from spiritual matters and turned more and more towards materialistic and technical spheres. The number of bureaucrats grew rapidly and this resulted in political favoritism and in desk-level programs which very seldom touched the people of the countryside.

It cannot be said, however, that no progress was made or that standards of living were consistently low. It must be remembered that it was not until the First World War that many of these countries attained independence. A part of Poland had just emerged from Russian domination and certain areas of the Balkan states had just freed themselves from Ottoman rule. Even Hungary, Czechoslovakia, Croatia, and parts of Poland had been freed only recently from Austro-German political and economic controls. Under these circumstances, the progress made by these countries, notwithstanding failures and mistakes, was considerable indeed.

III

The states that had dominated this region before the First World War—Germany, Austria-Hungary, Russia, and the Ottoman empire—showed little interest in improving the educational standards of the large masses in Eastern Europe.

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In spite of the pressure exerted at the November, 1945, 665
Congress of the T.U.C., the P.P.S. had the support of two
thirds of all the delegates, and Kazimierz Rusinek of the pre- [467]
war P.P.S. was elected General Secretary of the new Central
Committee of the Trade Unions.

The workers' support for the official P.P.S. had its effect on the Party's leaders. When at the regional conferences of the P.P.S. in Cracow, Katowice and other towns there was almost unanimous opposition to fusion with the P.P.R. or even to a united front at the elections against Mikolajczyk's party (P.S.L.), even Osubka-Morawski had to support this policy, although of course with reservations. On August 6th, 1946, he wrote in *Robotnik*: 'It seems to me that the greatest difficulties (in the maintenance of a united front—Y.G.) arise from the fact that one partner operates too much under the slogan of "the leading party" . . . A united front may not be based on the principle that the one rules, while the other subordinates himself, that the one lays down the conditions while the other submissively nods his head . . .' Two days later the P.P.R. daily *Glos Ludu* countered this by implying that the 'difficulties' to which Osubka referred were, at least in part, due to 'elements inimical to democracy' in the P.P.S. (Quoted in the article 'The fate of Polish Socialism,' by R. in *Foreign Affairs*, October, 1949). A few weeks later, on August 29th, the P.P.S. and P.P.R. leaders were called to Moscow to discuss the question of the United Front. This meeting was followed by another, and at last on November 28th, 1946, the P.P.S. leadership yielded to the pressure of the Kremlin. It seems that the fate of Puzak, Pajdak and the others impressed Osubka even more than the pressure from the rank and file of his own party.

But the P.P.R. leaders nevertheless did not forget Osubka's 665
temerity in writing as he did on 6th August, 1946, and im- 661
mediately after the victory of the 'united front' in the sham elections of 19th January, 1947, he was removed from the Prime Ministership and from being Chairman of the P.P.S. Central Executive and replaced by Jozef Cyrankiewicz.

But the pressure of the rank and file members of the P.P.S. against capitulation to the P.P.R. continued unceasingly. On May Day, in 1947, the P.P.R. strongly urged a fusion of the

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565

	Germans (%)	*Czechs and Slovaks* (%)
Independent	21.89	25.81
Tenants	0.40	0.28
Officials and clerks ..	16.60	18.24
Workers	61.11	55.67

467 In 1930 there were 476 thousand Sudeten Germans organised in trade unions. The Executive Committee of the Sudeten German Social Democratic Party stated: 'In their worst plight, on the eve of the Munich decision, our Trade Unions could still compare their strength with those of Switzerland, a country with four million inhabitants and with a functioning democracy.' (Introduction to W. Jaksch, *Sudeten Labour and the Sudeten Problem*, London, 1945).

665 The Sudeten Germans had a long socialist tradition, for Sudetenland was one of the first and strongest socialist centres in the Austro-Hungarian empire. It produced a number of the most prominent leaders of the Socialist International, among them Karl Kautsky, Viktor Adler, Otto Bauer and Karl Renner. As early as 1907, in the general elections, the Social Democratic Party polled 39.4 per cent of the votes in German Bohemia. In the general elections of 1911, it polled more than 40 per cent. In the elections of 1920 it polled 44 per cent of the Sudeten votes. Together with the Communist Party,* for more than a decade it had about half the votes in Sudetenland, which is a much higher proportion than the Social Democrats and Communists could claim among the Czechs, let alone among the Slovaks.

563 464 The world economic crisis which began in 1929 changed the situation. The industry of Sudetenland, depending as it did mainly on exports, was affected much more severely by the crisis than industry in the rest of the country. The bourgeois government of Czechoslovakia discriminated against German workers when giving employment, and this aggravated an already grave situation. The result was that 'unemployment in the Sudeten districts was at least twice as high as in the Czech interior.' (Jaksch, ibid. p. 17).

464 668 The great suffering caused by unemployment in Sudetenland and the existence of full employment just over the border

*An exact calculation of the strength of the Communist Party among the Sudetens is impossible, as the Party was not divided into different national groups.

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homemade means they can devise. Production comes first, 565
even at the price of using up the machines. Discipline is 466
severe; negligence or even a few minutes' lateness are strictly punished. No wonder, then, that the bad side of the system outweighs the good in the worker's mind. Still, he dares not complain. If he betrays any signs of discontent the security police, whose secret agents are his co-workers and sometimes his friends, takes care of him.

The wildcat strikes that break out from time to time 565
are no threat in themselves, for peace returns quickly 468
after mass arrests of all participants. They are, however, ominous signs that discontentment has reached a tension that can find release only in desperate acts. A strike requires a certain minimum of organization. That is why nothing else makes Party dialecticians so uneasy. The workers are the only class capable of organized action—that Marxist principle has never been forgotten. No action, however, is possible without leaders. If the leaders reason correctly, that is, if they understand the necessities of the historic process, then the workers as a mass will be unable to protest.

Everything, thus, takes us back to the question of mas- 626
tery over the mind. Every possible opportunity for educa- 555
tion and advancement is offered to the more energetic and active individuals among the workers. The new, incredibly extensive bureaucracy is recruited from among the young people of working-class origin. The road before them is open, open but guarded: their thinking must be based on the firm principles of dialectical materialism. Schools, theaters, films, painting, literature, and the press all shape their thinking.

We should also call attention to a new institution, the 575
"club," whose significance is comparable to that of the 626
chapel in the middle ages. It exists in every factory, ev-

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Germany paid reparations to the extent of 9.8 milliard marks, or 1.7 per cent of the national income. In no year after the first world war did the reparations paid by Germany exceed 4 per cent of the national income. To calculate the burden of these reparations, other criteria besides the national income, such as budget revenue or exports, can be applied. The reparations Germany paid rose from 12.9 per cent of the budget revenue of Germany or 9.9 per cent of the value of its exports in 1924-5, to 25.7 per cent and 18.4 per cent respectively in 1928-9.

With regard to Germany's looting of Europe during the second world war, German official statistics admit that up to 1943 the Reich got from the occupied countries 'special incomes' amounting to 50 milliard marks. British official estimates give a figure of 12.8 milliard dollars for the same period. The two figures thus nearly tally. Nearly all the German robbery took place immediately after the occupation. If we, therefore, assume that the annual looting of the occupied countries by Germany after 1943 was the same as the annual average of 1939 to 1943, we shall certainly not underestimate it: on this basis the total German looting amounted to 20-25 milliard dollars.

A comparison between the reparations paid by Germany after the first world war—about 18 milliard marks or 3.6 milliard dollars—with the 'reparations' that Germany took from Europe in the second world war—20-25 milliard dollars—reveals the increasingly plunderous character of declining capitalism, as exemplified by the Hitler regime.

Russia's attitude to the question of reparations after the second world war was expressed clearly by Prof. Varga in an article published in *War and the Working Class*, 15th October, 1943. He concluded that Germany must pay reparations to the tune of 90 milliard marks or about 22 milliard dollars, and he stated that the Russian government asked in addition for ten million German workers to be sent to Russia for reconstruction work.

A claim for such large reparations, coupled with a demand for ten million workers, i.e., nearly a third of the total German working class, was incompatible with the existence of Germany as an important industrial country. At Yalta, consequently,

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It might yet be claimed that even these differences in income 000
are smaller than those prevailing in the countries of capitalism based on private property. There is not sufficient statistical information about income distribution in the 'People's Democracies' accurately to check this contention, but some general remarks may be made. To compare the ratio between the income of an American capitalist and his workers on the one hand, with the ratio between the incomes of a manager in the 'People's Democracies' and his workers is to compare two qualitatively different things. Let us assume that the American capitalist gets a million dollars' profit, of which he ploughs back into the enterprise 700 thousand dollars. For his personal consumption he thus takes 300,000 dollars. The boss in the enterprise in the 'People's Democracies', on the other hand, would claim that as he does not own the factory the profits ploughed back into the enterprise must not come out of what he gets, but out of the profit made by the whole of society. If the American capitalist argued that the 700,000 he ploughed back was in the interests of society, the communists would reply that he gets the main benefit from it. But it appears that the same argument must not be applied to bureaucratic state capitalism.

Since a group of people in control of the means of production will take for itself the biggest possible share of the national cake, and as under the rule of the Communist Parties the workers are faced with the most concentrated capital, while they lack the right to defend themselves through democratic organisations independent of their rulers or by strike action, the inequality in incomes will inevitably reach its most extreme forms.

The Workers' Resistance

Reference has already been made to the way in which the 468
workers of Czechoslovakia expressed their rising dissatisfaction 475
with the Communist Party leaders by rejecting the official list of candidates to Works Committees in 1947, thus driving the Party to abolish the secret ballot.[1] But the workers found other ways of expressing their dissatisfaction, the most important being greatly increased absenteeism, which reached the proportions of an epidemic in Czechoslovakian industry. At

[1] [See category 116, pp 84-85 -- Analyst]

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468 475 the 9th Congress of the Communist Party of Czechoslovakia, Slansky, the General Secretary, disclosed that whereas before the war absenteeism in the foundries totalled 2.4-3.5 per cent, it had risen in January, 1949, to 12 per cent and in March to 15 per cent. The position was even more critical in the building industry: in the four principal building undertakings in the Morawská Ostrawa district alone 53,420 working-shifts had been lost, while another building enterprise at Tábor registered 50 per cent of absentees. (Quoted by *News from Czechoslovakia*, May, 1949). On September 21st, 1949, Premier Zapotocky told the Czechoslovak Trade Union Council that absenteeism among the workers so far that year was already more than 37 per cent higher than in 1947. (*Lidové Noviny*, 22nd September, 1949). Even the National Assembly's decision of 24th March, 1950 to deduct from the holiday days missed without good reason would probably not altogether stop this expression of the increasing 'enthusiasm' of the workers for the regime.

It is not only the Czechoslovak workers who put up some resistance, however limited it must be by the totalitarian character of the regime. *The Times* of 5th September, 1949, gave a report from its correspondent in Budapest of a conference of the Communist Party of Greater Budapest—in which more than 60 per cent of Hungary's industry is concentrated—which was attended by all the foremost leaders of the Party. 'The report (of the Conference) says that productivity is stagnant in most industries and declining in some. Between February and July it fell throughout the manufacturing industry by 17 per cent . . .' 'Far too many workers were applying for sick relief—in a recent week in one factory 11 per cent, in another 12 per cent. Instances are given of self-inflicted wounds'. Rákosi in his speech claimed that in many factories the number of days missed for sick leave was two to three times higher than before the war. (*Neue Zürcher Zeitung*, 6th September, 1949). On August 31st, 1949, he said that in the previous few months productivity had fallen by 10-15 per cent.

In Poland an epidemic of absenteeism drove the government to adopt harsh measures. On April 19th, 1950, the Sejm passed a law concerning the 'Socialist discipline of labour.' Extremely heavy punishments are imposed on absentees. A worker who

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has been absent from his work for four or more days in a year 468 without a satisfactory excuse suffers a wage cut of 10-25 per 475 cent which may last for three months.

The Yugoslav workers also use the weapon of absenteeism in their struggle against their bad conditions. *The Times* of 1st November, 1950, quoting the Belgrade trade union paper *Rad*, said: '. . . absenteeism in the coal mines in Serbia reached 19%; Croatia—17½%; Slovenia—15%; and Bosnia-Herzegovina—14%. The plan allowed for a maximum absenteeism of 11%.' In his speech to the Federal Assembly on 17th April, 1950, Tito said:' In 1949, there was a 26.26% loss in working time. In Croatia, this percentage reached 33%, of which 21% was spent in holiday-taking and absenteeism. This proves the weak struggle for discipline . . . ' The workers also frequently change their place of work. In a speech to the Serbian parliament, Jovan Vesilinov, Vice-Premier of Serbia, reported that during ten months of 1949 state enterprises in Serbia took on 628,064 persons but lost 430,050 workers who had left their jobs. (*The New York Times*, 29th January, 1950). *Borba* of 21st August, 1950, stated that in the Trepcha lead mines and refinery—one of the largest in the world—some 11,000 workers were taken on in 1949, of whom 10,500 left before the end of the year because of very bad conditions, irregular pay 'usually between the fifteenth and twentieth of the month, often between the twenty-fifth and the thirtieth', and the irregular distribution of the rations (in August the rations were distributed ten days late, and in the meantime the workers had to do without bread).

The Government took strong measures to fight against absenteeism and the frequent changes in the place of work. On 26 January, 1950, it passed a decree stating that food ration cards would be withdrawn from persons leaving their place of employment without permission, and no new cards would be issued them. The decree further stated that a clause might be included in labour contracts obliging a worker to reimburse the enterprise for any loss in production resulting from his unjustifiable absenteeism.

Another symptom of the increasing dissatisfaction of the workers is the decline in the *quality* of what they produce. For example, in the speech quoted above, Rákosi stated that the

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468 475 percentage of waste in the Manfred Weiss iron foundry, the second biggest metal factory in Hungary, had risen from 10.4 to 23.5 per cent. In Poland, in 1948, of 67 million tons of coal, 1,100,000 tons were stones; in 1949 the percentage of stones in the coal reached 5 per cent. In 1948 and 1949 a sizeable proportion of the exports of Czechoslovakia—the country with the reputation for products of good quality—was returned as below standard.

The admonitions of the leaders to the workers are often of such a character as to leave no doubt about their indocility. Istvan Kossa, Hungarian Minister of Industry, said in a speech at Debrecen on December 6th, 1948, that 'The workers have assumed a terrorist attitude to the directors of the nationalised industries', and he threatened them with forced labour.

Chivu Stoica, Rumanian Minister of Industry, addressing the workers of the Resita plant, the largest metallurgical establishment in the country, on December 25th, 1948, accused them of not having fulfilled the plan and of being 'capitalist agents'.

In Yugoslavia, Vice-Premier Edvard Kardelj, in his report to the Fifth Congress of the Communist Party (July, 1948), attacked those workers who showed 'resistance to realistic norms, against competition, and on the other hand—in exaggerated demands in regard to pay'. 'It is clear that the consequences of such a stand are a decrease in work discipline, insufficient aid to rationalisers and innovators in the realization and application of their proposals, an incorrect and unfriendly attitude toward the heads of the enterprise, an incorrect attitude toward competitions'. (*The Communist Party of Yugoslavia in the Struggle for New Yugoslavia, for People's Authority and for Socialism*, Belgrade, 1948, pp. 87-8).

466 That the workers nevertheless remain members of the Communist Parties—as the official statistics show—is not because of their enthusiasm for them, but because it is too dangerous to leave. Anyone who leaves the Party faces the threat of economic sanctions (at least). This is shown clearly by some figures issued in October, 1948, by József Révai, editor of *Szabad Nép*, the Hungarian Communist Party daily. He says that the paper is read by only 12 per cent of the Party members. At the big M.A.U.A.G. factories, for example, where 6,000

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out of the 8,000 workers are Party members, only 780 read the Party newspaper. (*For a Lasting Peace, For a People's Democracy*! 15th October, 1948). Thus a large number of workers are merely nominal members of the Party. 466

The large-scale 'purges' in the Parties also express the increasing hostility between the leaders and their 'supporters'. In the 'purge' in Hungary nearly half a million members were expelled from the Party. In Czechoslovakia, there was a 'purge' of a quarter of a million members in 1948 and the first half of 1949. In Rumania, 'over 192,000 hostile elements', that is, over a fifth of the total membership of the Party, were 'purged' between November, 1948, and May, 1950. In Bulgaria, 92,500 members and candidates, out of a total of 442,183, were expelled from the Party between June, 1949 and June, 1950. 468

While the workers within the 'People's Democracies' cannot express their dissatisfaction through the police-controlled plebiscites, miscalled general elections, those on the other side of the frontier, who are close enough to know the reality of the regime inside the 'People's Democracies', and free enough to express their opinion of it—as in Austria and Berlin—have decisively shown their disapproval.

The Expropriation of the Peasantry

The parvenu ruling class in Eastern Europe, in order to add to its wealth and comfort, devotes all its energy to increasing the number of workers employed in state industries. Hence it comes into conflict with the masses of the peasantry. 369

As has been pointed out, the progress of agriculture in the Eastern European countries depends on their industrialisation. Their inherited backwardness, their separation from Western Europe by the division of the Continent into two spheres of influence, Russian imperialist exploitation, the greed of the local bureaucracy—all these factors impede the accumulation of capital, necessary for industrialisation. Had industry already existed on a big scale, the countryside would voluntarily have supplied agricultural products to the urban population in exchange for industrial products, and would also have supplied the necessary labour power for industry, as the surplus population would have been attracted to the towns by their higher

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their money, spend it on the latest whims of their benighted souls. 829 577

This order of things revolts a person from the East. In his country, anyone who displays any talent is used. In the West, the same man would have very little chance of success. Western economy squanders talent to an incredible degree; and the few who do succeed owe their success as often to pure luck as to native ability. In the countries of the New Faith, the counterpart to this waste lies in the fact that the capacity to follow the political line is a selective criterion by which the most mediocre often attain the greatest renown. Nevertheless, the artist or scholar in the East earns his living more easily than his colleague in the West. Even though the pressure of the Method is burdensome, its material compensations are not to be scorned. Many musicians, painters, and writers who had the opportunity to flee to the West did not do so because they felt it was better to compose, paint, or write somehow or other, rather than to teach or work in a factory, with no time or energy left in which to perfect their true craft. Many of those who were abroad returned to their own countries chiefly for this reason.

Fear of the indifference with which the economic system of the West treats its artists and scholars is widespread among Eastern intellectuals. They say it is better to deal with an intelligent devil than with a good-natured idiot. An intelligent devil understands their mutual interests and lets them live by a pen, a chisel, or a brush, caring for his clients and making his demands. A good-hearted idiot does not understand these interests, gives nothing and asks nothing—which in practice amounts to polite cruelty.

To the people of the East it is axiomatic that the basic means of production should belong to the State, that they 829 471

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829 should be regulated according to a planned economy, and
[471] that their proceeds should be used for hygienic, cultural, scientific, and artistic ends. It is naïve to seek partisans of capitalism in their midst. The *something* these people look for in the West is certainly not warmed-over watchwords of the French Revolution or the American War of Independence. They laugh at the argument that factories and mines should belong to private individuals. Their search for *something* springs from a more or less clear understanding of the fact that the New Faith is incapable of satisfying the spiritual needs of mankind, for its efforts in that direction have with inexorable regularity turned into caricature. If they were forced to formulate what they seek, they would undoubtedly reply that they want a system with a socialist economy, but one in which man need not struggle desperately in the snake-like embrace of the Method. So they seek some sign indicating that real cultural values can arise outside the scope of the Method. But they must be lasting values, geared to the future, and therefore not products of obsolete concepts. Anything less would serve merely to confirm the Method. The people in the countries of the New Faith know that *only* in the West can there appear works that will bear the seeds of hope for the future. Perhaps discoveries no less important than those of Marx or Darwin have already been perfected in the workrooms of isolated philosophers. But how does one find them?

The Eastern intellectual is a severe critic of everything that penetrates to him from the West. He has been deceived so often that he does not want cheap consolation which will eventually prove all the more depressing. The War left him suspicious and highly skilled in unmasking sham and pretense. He has rejected a great many books that he liked before the War, as well as a great many

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Party. Its more sensitive members secretly bow to the necessity of making concessions. They believe that collectivization should be preceded by cooperative use of machinery on private fields, and that it can come only after a long introductory phase of education, extending possibly over decades. This temporizing spirit breeds trouble; that is why the whispered slogans of the "national Communists" are always so popular. But the Center exacts a certain tempo. The structure of every dependent country must be brought to resemble that of Russia as quickly as possible.

This problem, in turn, affects the cities. Peasants are divided into three categories—"poor," "middle," and "kulak"—in an effort to break their solidarity by engendering mutual antagonisms. A peasant's wealth is rated not only by the amount of land he holds, but by how many horses, cows, and pigs he owns, how he lives, eats, and dresses. Lest he fall into an uncomfortable classification, he drops farming and flees to the city; or else he keeps only a minimum amount of livestock and pretends to be poor. As a result, the city suffers from a lack of provisions.

But the peasants are not dangerous. They may beat up a Party boss or even kill him in a burst of desperation, but nothing more. When the state is the sole buyer of their produce, and when they cannot voice their protest at the amount of tribute the state demands of them, they are powerless. The security police can easily handle recalcitrants, especially since it can complain of no lack of informers, now that informing has become an excellent means of saving oneself. The peasants are a leaderless mass. History shows few instances when they seriously threatened the rulers. The term "peasant revolt" sounds nice in textbooks and has a certain propaganda value, but only for the naïve. In reality, the peasants have almost al-

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2. *Agrarian Policy Under the Soviets* (1917-1945)

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The jerry-built alliance between proletariat and peasantry was put to severe strain almost immediately after its inception. The peasants parceled out the land and fought to hold their gains in the face of the "white" counter-revolution and foreign intervention. But the harsh, forced food requisitions demand by the Bolsheviks soon alienated the countryside, and the resignation of the Left Social Revolutionaries from the Soviet government soon made it clear that political control was entirely in the hands of the Bolsheviks.

The gulf dividing the peasants from their erstwhile comrades-in-arms was aptly symbolized by the law on nationalization of the land (February 19, 1918), decreeing that all land was the property of the State and was to be used only by those willing to till it. Though the law itself remained for a long time only a paper document, it presaged future conflicts. The Bolshevik experiments with collective forms of agriculture were another ominous sign for the future, although the early collectives, chiefly composed of landless peasants and romantic urban intellectuals, constituted no threat to the established rural order.[16] Indeed, in the first decade of the Revolution there were no suggestions of the full-scale onslaught of collectivization that was to come, and no talk of a "collectivization drive." Lenin's frequently repeated warnings against coercion of the middle peasants (*srednyaki*) were taken to reflect settled policy. "You cannot create anything here by coercion," he said, and added:

> Even in Europe, where [the middle peasantry] nowhere achieves such strength, where technology and culture, city life and railroads are tremendously developed, and where it would be easiest of all to think of such a thing, nobody, not even the most revolutionary of Socialists, has ever proposed adopting measures of coercion towards the middle peasantry.[17]

But events themselves were to force a harsher policy and the revolutionary alliance was soon cracked wide open. Heavy strains

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[16] Three types of communal farming were organized in the early period: 1) The Commune, a form in which all property was owned and all labor performed in common, where living itself was a cooperative venture. 2) The artel, a mixed form in which cooperative ownership and labor was found alongside private ownership and labor. 3) The TOZ, a "primitive" communal form in which cooperation was limited to the joint cultivation of the land. For a fuller description, see Harry Schwartz, *Russia's Soviet Economy* (New York, 1950), p. 259.

[17] Lenin, *Selected Works*, Vol. VIII, pp. 178-79.

were generated by the agricultural crisis and the ensuing famine 471
of 1920-21. To meet the needs of the urban population, the 565
Bolsheviks decreed a forced food levy (December 14, 1920) by which peasants were ordered to deliver their entire surplus to the State. The peasants, retaliating in kind, produced little more than their own needs demanded. Scattered peasant uprisings, together [669]
with the Kronstadt rebellion early in 1921, combined to force a change of policy on the new regime. The strict codes of "War Communism" were abrogated and the New Economic Policy (NEP) was launched. Delivery quotas were introduced (amounting to a tax-in-kind) and peasants were encouraged to produce for a flourishing free market.

Thus, for a time under NEP the peasants, who now controlled almost all the arable land, were permitted to enjoy the fruits of their revolutionary exertions. Agricultural production recovered rapidly and a degree of national prosperity resulted. But the Bolsheviks had paid a price for this prosperity — the restoration of free market relations between town and country.

The Leninist Dilemma

The unstable compromise of NEP postponed the inevitable 578
clash between the "proletarian dictatorship" and the victorious 185
peasant revolution. Two parallel developments were rapidly to hasten the impending struggle: throughout the NEP period (1921-28) the peasants tightened their hold on the land, many of them growing relatively prosperous, and thereby fortifying their gains. At the same time the Bolsheviks were tightening their hold on the political machinery of the State and turning their party into a monolithic organization capable of an outright offensive against the rest of the country. Thus, the stage was set for the gigantic economic struggle of the late twenties.

The issue at stake between the Bolsheviks and the peasantry was only partly ideological. The conflict between the Bolshevik belief in the superior efficacy of large-scale "socialist" farming and the peasants' allegiance to his traditional "way of life" was important, but this conflict was subordinated to another one which was economic in character. The peasants and the Bolshevik regime faced each other across the table on which the grain produce of Russia was negotiated. And it was, in fact, in the realm of economics

578 that the two antagonists met and clashed in the "war" which re-
185 sulted in collectivized agriculture.[18]

The problem which the Bolsheviks had to deal with may be briefly stated. NEP had insured the continued political existence of the regime; but salvation had been achieved at a great price. To obtain a sufficient supply of agricultural produce to feed the rising urban population and, if possible, to permit acceleration of industrial growth, it was necessary to provide increased incentives for the peasantry. But to provide incentives for an increased supply of produce to the cities, it was also necessary to create an industry capable of supplying peasants with the consumer goods and agricultural machinery they demanded in exchange. Without recourse to foreign capital, this, in turn, was impossible, unless a steadily increasing supply of agricultural produce was guaranteed.

The problem of breaking this vicious circle occupied the thoughts of the best Party theoreticians throughout the period of NEP. Some, like Bukharin, suggested a solution bearing some resemblance to the pre-Revolutionary policies of Witte and Stolypin – a "gradualist" approach to industrialization, encouragement of the more efficient middle peasant producers, and limited recourse to foreign capital. Trotsky, as the leader of the radical Left Wing, called for an immediate drive for industrialization in which the peasants would absorb the major shock. The theoretical debate rose to its climax in the late twenties, coinciding with the final victory of the Stalinist faction of the Bolshevik Party and the resurgence of the agricultural crisis in a new form.[19]

The Pre-collectivization Crisis

185 The Stalinist "solution" to the agricultural crisis (collectiviza-
● 471 tion) did not proceed according to a predetermined plan or theory.
423 Rather, it was developed pragmatically as a response to critical

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[18] Lazar Volin, a foremost American student of Soviet agriculture, also assigned priority to the practical, as opposed to the ideological basis of collectivization. He explained the Communist attachment to the *kolkhoz* in this way: "First, the practical or pragmatic reasons . . . [revolving] around the need for large supplies of cheap agricultural products to feed and clothe the growing industrial population and the army . . . Second, an ideological predilection for agrarian collectivism, rooted in the Marxist-Leninist-Stalinist dogma." Lazar Volin, "Agricultural Organization," *Soviet Economic Growth*, Abraham Bergson (editor), White Plains, N. Y., 1953, p. 286.

[19] A reliable account of the heated Party economic debate may be found in Maurice Dobb, *Soviet Economic Development since 1917* (New York, 1948), pp. 208-229, and of the political implications of the debate in Isaac Deutscher, *Stalin: A Political Biography* (Oxford, 1949), pp. 294-304.

economic conditions and the special requirements of the first Five Year Plan. Indeed, the first collectivization drive was expected to bring only 14 per cent of the land into the "socialist sector". The overwhelming success of the drive was as much a surprise to the Communist leadership as to the peasants themselves. And it was only when the drive turned out to be so phenomenally successful that the Communist planners stepped up the targets and pace of the Five Year Plan itself.

The agricultural crisis which inspired the collectivization drive of the first Five Year Plan had its origins in two situations: First, the acute grain shortage of 1927-28, and second, and more important, the post-Revolutionary structure of the land (see Chart I). As a result of the peasant revolution of 1917-18, the small and medium peasantry occupied almost all the arable land in the Soviet Union. Where they had produced only 50 per cent of nation's grain in pre-war times, they produced 85 per cent in 1926-27. Since the poor and middle peasants marketed a far smaller percentage of the grain they produced than had the great landowners and kulaks of pre-war times, their domination of the land produced a serious drop in marketed commodities.

Thus, while total grain production had declined by only five per cent below pre-Revolutionary levels, marketed grain had declined by *more than 50 per cent* — from 26 per cent of five billion poods in 1913 to 13.3 per cent of 4.749 billion poods in 1926-27.[30] The cities received far less grain than they had received in pre-war times; and due to a number of factors (among them the competition between various State purchasing agencies), the cities were paying a higher price for the grain they could obtain. One of the most serious consequences of this new relationship was the fact that little grain was available for foreign export to pay for desperately needed capital equipment.

The basic problem for the regime was to create an agricultural structure which would enable the State to siphon off a *far greater proportion of the total product*, at a price it wished to pay, than was possible under the conditions of NEP. While it is true that the regime wished to increase total agricultural production, and may have expected to achieve the goal through increased mechanization of the farms, this target was secondary. For achieving the primary goal — extraction of a greater *proportion* of the produce —

[30] A pood equals 36 pounds.

the vehicle of the large-scale collective farm, heretofore neglected, stood ready at hand.[21] 185 471 423

The very essence of the *kolkhoz* (collective farm) system lay in the ease with which it facilitated extraction of heavy tribute from the land in the form of extremely cheap supplies of foodstuffs and industrial crops. Thus, the rise of the Stalinist land system was closely connected with the Party's program of break-neck industrialization, massive capital investments, and strategic projects at the expense of consumption. The ever-tightening hold of the regime over the industrial working class made possible implementation of these policies without the development of consumer goods facilities; and therefore the regime could permit a drop in the levels of consumption without jeopardizing its plan. The new agricultural program – designed primarily to *redistribute* agricultural produce rather than to *increase* it – was consistent with this aspect of the plan. Moreover, the political hold collectivization afforded over the peasants assured State control of the rural labor supply and enabled the State to channel manpower into non-agricultural occupation as it deemed necessary.

This was the general rationale behind collectivization. The immediate cause for the first collectivization drive lay, however, in the mounting economic tensions of the late 1920s. As early as 1925-26 the regime had sought to reimpose many of the agrarian controls lifted in 1921, at the time of the inauguration of NEP. To implement this policy, agricultural prices were once again restricted and production itself subjected to heavy taxes. Retaliating in kind, the peasants drove production downward, hoarded again, and consumed what they could not hide or sell.[22] As a consequence State grain collections in 1928-29 dropped more than one-third below the level of two years before. Tension in the countryside mounted. The means by which the new monolithic party chose to meet this situation was of a magnitude equal to the challenge.

The Stalinist Solution to the Land Problem

The great offensive against the peasantry was launched late 423 185

[21] The *artel* was considered the best form of collective agriculture since it combined a sufficient number of communal features to guarantee State control with sufficient household autonomy to make it structurally feasible to the peasants. The State-appointed managers, supported by local party administrators, could enforce peasant cooperation with the Plan; and the continued existence of individual households offered the peasant that minimum of private incentive consistent with the cooperation.

[22] This crisis is well described in Dobb, p. 222.

241 produced more for the market per hectare of arable land than did
423 the private sector. In 1932, 60 per cent of all households in the
185 Soviet Union had been collectivized, embracing 66 per cent of the sown area. Yet the collective and State farms (*sovkhozy*) supplied 84 per cent of the marketed grain and 83 per cent of the cotton.[28]

With the reinforcement of the collective farm system the State
241 was in a position where it could force the peasants to serve as a
185 cushion for harvest shocks. In 1937, a bumper year, the peasants
● 471 received 35.9 per cent of the total grain crop for division among
423 themselves; but in 1938-39, mediocre crop years, the peasants received only 26.9 and 22.9 per cent of the total, despite the fact that a smaller gross volume was to be shared.[29] In each case primary State needs governed the division of the agricultural yield. The Soviet Government had created an administrative apparatus which insured, in the words of one observer, that "if anyone was to starve, [the peasants] would be the first to do so."[30]

The function of the State farms in the Soviet system is similarly linked to the problem of agricultural deliveries. Though accounting for no more than 10 per cent of the arable area in 1937, the *sovkhozy* delivered 30 per cent of the milk, 25 per cent of the wool, and 24 per cent of the meat delivered to the State in that year. Whereas the grain producing collectives delivered only one-third of their total product to the State in the late thirties, the *sovkhozy* contributed three-quarters of their crop.[31] Hence, it may be said that, from the point of view of the Soviet planner, the State farms bore a superiority over the collective farms similar to the superiority of the collectives over the private farms.

471 The case for collectivization was aptly summed up by N. A.
423 Voznesensky when he revealed that the Soviet government in World War II collected three times the annual amount of grain collected by the Czarist regime during World War I when "72 per cent of all marketed grain was concentrated in the hands of estate owners and kulaks." This threefold increase in marketable surplus

[28] Dobb, p. 249. There were, of course, other factors which accounted for the meagre quantity of goods placed on the market by the private sector, in particular, the amount of State discrimination against the private farms.
[29] Harry Schwartz, p. 265. Schwartz writes with regard to this question: "Only the government's complete domination of the peasantry through the collective farm system made this sharp change in the amount of grain collected possible." (p. 313).
[30] Leonard Hubbard, *The Economics of Soviet Agriculture* (London, 1939), p. 123.
[31] Harry Schwartz, p. 285.

became possible, he concluded, "only on the basis of large-scale mechanized Socialist agriculture."[22] 471 423

THE STALINIST SYSTEM DEVELOPED

Since its establishment during the first Five Year Plan the collective farm system has undergone a period of modification (1933-38), a period of intensified exploitation (1938-41), a period of wartime chaos and relaxation (1941-45), and a period of reimposed controls and further tightening (1945-53).

In the early phases of collectivization, deliveries were fixed by arbitrary "contracts" between the *kolkhozy* and the State — the contracts resembling the compulsory requisitions of War Communism. By 1933 peasant opposition, though generally weak and disorganized, forced the regime to grant minor concessions. Foremost among these was a system of fixed quotas to replace the contractual levies. By this device it was hoped to induce the individual *kolkhoznik* to cultivate more intensively, since any surplus beyond the fixed quota was retained by the collective farm and distributed among its members. The concessionary mood of this era was reflected finally in the Artel Statute of 1935 granting the collective farmer a household plot (one-quarter to one-half hectare) and the right to own a limited number of livestock, permission to sell surplus foodstuffs on the urban free market, a more equitable payment system, and a much restricted voice in *kolkhoz* management.

In the years immediately preceding World War II the Soviet regime had again begun to encroach on the rights granted under the Artel Statute. In 1939 the State decreed severe penalties for infractions of collective farm discipline and in 1940 the workday was lengthened. Similarly the method of computing delivery quotas was made stricter. Henceforth norms were computed not on the basis of actual area sown, but on the basis of arable land owned by the collective farm. Since yield estimates computed by State officials were generally arbitrary, the hardship worked by this new departure was severe.

The main direction of the government on the eve of World War II was thus to restrict further the private sector within the collective farms and to redirect attention to the communal land. The result was that an increasing proportion of the peasants' prod-

[22] Nikolai A. Voznesensky, *The Economy of the U.S.S.R. During World War II* (Public Affairs Press, Washington, D. C., 1948), p. 53.

471 423 act was taken by the State. The regime was still tightening controls when the German Army attacked in June of 1941.

World War II subjected the entire collective system to its severest strain and, as Voznesensky observed, the system continued to supply the minimum of foodstuffs necessary for the war, although the regime had to loosen its hold considerably to guarantee the supply. That this achievement was a tribute to the vitality of the State agricultural administration, rather than the morale of the peasants, is suggested by the fact that in those areas invaded by the Germans - particularly Byelorussia and the Ukraine - large masses of peasants greeted them as liberators with the traditional bread and salt. But the Germans, who were as interested as their predecessors in a high "marketable surplus," maintained the kolkhozy intact. This policy and the standard Hitlerian excesses in conquered Slavic territory soon alienated the peasants.

With the defeat of the Nazi invasion and the cessation of hostilities in Europe and Asia, the Soviet regime sought to reimpose the agrarian controls loosened in wartime. In line with this policy, [66] the government instituted a vast purge of collective farm directors and decreed a monetary reform in 1947 that wiped out at one stroke most of the savings accumulated by peasants during the war. [65] Taxes on incomes derived from the household plots were raised sharply in 1948, 1950, and 1951; delivery quotas on dairy products and meats produced in the household plots were also raised. The culmination of this development in the kolkhozy was the shift from the zveno (link, or small unit) work system to large-scale labor brigades. Under an amalgamation program the number of collective farms in the Soviet Union was reduced from 252,000 to 97,000. A further effort in this direction was the plan associated with Khrushchev's name to weld the collective farms into vast "agro-towns" (agrogoroda), in which the peasantry would suffer the final transformation into a rural proletarist. Although this effort met with acknowledged failure, the theory behind it was not abandoned. In Stalin's last published work, Economic Problems of Socialism in the U.S.S.R., he called for a program of "gradual" transformation of collective into public property - in short, the eventual conversion of all agricultural units into State farms." [33]

[33] Joseph Stalin, Economic Problems of Socialism in the U.S.S.R. (International Publishers, New York), p. 51. In the same work Stalin called for a "relatively higher rate of expansion of the production of the means of production." The two programs - further statification of the farms and the acceleration of investment - were, in fact, inseparable.

Stalin's last work represented the apex of the agricultural policies initiated under his leadership during the first Five Year Plan. In the period after his death the Communists lost the offensive for the first time since 1928 and began to restructure the system in terms of new realities.[34] But in all the revaluation of time-honored doctrines which followed Stalin's death, the essential necessity of the *kolkhoz* system to the Soviet way of life has never been disputed. For the Soviet leaders, at least, it had proved its worth. 471/ 423

This, then, was the system which the East European Communist Parties, drawing so heavily upon Soviet experience, attempted to introduce into the newly-conquered regions in the aftermath of World War II.

[34] See below, pp. 116-124.

423 661 munists, with the Russian experience guiding them closely, followed it. The decision to collectivize was essentially the decision to pursue this path, for the increased exploitation of the peasantry implicit in it was the only path consistent with "carrying forward of our Socialist projects." The basic preparation for collectivization was therefore in the seizure or creation of those organs of repression through which the Communists could exercise the necessary political control.

The groundwork for post-war collectivization was consequently not laid in the countryside, where Communist influence in these early years was small and generally limited to the new State Farms, but in the cities, where the Parties slowly extended their control over the State apparatus. Once the levers of governmental power were secured, the Communists were able to exert relentless pressure on the farms.

The tactics of the East European Parties in this "offensive" phase were never military, except perhaps in Yugoslavia, where political conditions most closely paralleled those of the Soviet Union in the early Stalinist era. And even in Yugoslavia the chief weapon was slow economic strangulation of the peasantry, an erosive process designed to break the will to resist and in the end leave the class disunited, despairing, and helpless. The offensive tactics of the bureaucratically-minded Satellite Parties deserve more detailed exposition.

Economic Pressure

661 471 This was the most direct means by which the Satellite Parties sought to destroy the independent peasant. Everywhere in the sphere compulsory tax and crop delivery schedules were promulgated, discriminating heavily against the independent sector, and particularly against middle and rich peasants. Collecting revenue was never a primary end of the tax decrees, though funds forced from the countryside were often considerable. Confiscatory delivery quotas served the additional and important function of guaranteeing supplies of foodstuffs for the urban-industrial centers. The primary economic end – the eventual bankruptcy of the individual producer, who in the early post-war years was still thriving by selling on the free and black markets–is well illustrated by the 1953 delivery schedules for Czechoslovakia. On the best land in the country a peasant with five hectares had to deliver three times as much grain to the State *per hectare* as a peasant owning two hec-

tares. On the poorest land in the country a peasant with five 661
hectares had to deliver almost twice as much per hectare as a 471
peasant with two hectares.[13] In Romania, a peasant with four hectares of land was required to deliver three-and-a-half times as much produce per hectare as a peasant holding two hectares of land.[14] This pattern was followed throughout the area.

Prices paid for produce were invariably low and insofar as com- 435
parison is possible, lower than pre-war prices, as manifest in the 471
huge discrepancies between free market prices and State prices. Moreover, the discrepancy between the prices paid to the peasantry and prices charged in retail shops for the same commodities far exceeded the cost of transportation and processing incurred by the State. In some cases a "coupon" system, ostensibly designed to compensate the peasant, was instituted. Under these terms, foodstuffs and industrial crops delivered to official collection centers were paid for by small sums in currency and coupons entitling the peasant to buy, at low controlled prices, in State shops. In practice, the system generally proved to be nothing more than a propaganda device. Since consumer goods were in short supply, and usually reserved for the urban market, the villages were frequently without such basic commodities as matches and kerosene.

Nevertheless, the confiscatory tax and delivery schedules were 471
seldom fully enforced. It has, in fact, been demonstrated that literal 661
enforcement was impossible, since in countless cases the State demands *exceeded* the individual peasant's capacity to produce. The quota levels and the severe legal punishments decreed for quota arrears were not, however, entirely unrealistic. The penalties prescribed for under-delivery were invoked only when it suited the regime purposes for a gradual extension of control over the agrarian economy. The effect of cumulative delivery failures was intended to reduce the independent peasant to the status of a tenant at sufferance, since he could be legally expropriated whenever the State chose.

The control the State exercised over industrial and financial sectors of East European economies was similarly an important weapon in the campaign against the peasant. As a result of heavy industrial emphasis, the agricultural sector was generally denied help from nationalized credit institutions. Insofar as credit was ex-

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[13] Decree of the Ministry of Bulk Purchasing, January 30, 1953.
[14] *Scanteia*, (Bucharest). May 18, 1950.

● 471 tended to agriculture at all, the State and collective farms received
661 a disproportionate share. In effect, this policy meant the gradual depreciation of the meager equipment still owned by the peasantry, and further impeded the free peasant's purchase of vitally needed fertilizers and improved seed. This policy, it should be stressed, was an integral part of the general Communist tendency of neglecting agriculture as a whole.[14]

ADMINISTRATIVE FORCE

661 It is impossible to determine exactly the degree to which Satellite collectivization drives depended upon application of administrative or police force. The testimony of escapees, the observations of outside observers, the frequent regime admonitions against administrative divergence from the "voluntary principle," and many statements by Communist leaders on the subject in 1953 New Course speeches, make it clear that the role of force was considerable.[15] At the same time the application of force in Eastern Europe did not approach in scale or intensity the frankly military offensive against the peasantry conducted in the Soviet Union in 1928-32.

Officially the Satellite regimes have always adhered to the "voluntary principle" of collectivization, invoking the principle whenever the regimes decided to decelerate collectivization. For example, when collectivization was halted in Bulgaria in mid-1950, the regime raised the "voluntary principle" to the level of a basic State doctrine.[16] Likewise, the halt in collectivization in Poland in mid-1951 was accompanied by a series of trials of low-echelon Communists alleged to have resorted to the use of violence against the peasantry.[17] In general, application of force—beatings, jailings, and occasional executions of "kulak terrorists"—was an important, but clearly secondary, collectivization method in the Satellites. Undoubtedly the intense scrutiny of international public opinion partly

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[14] See pp. 87-88 for a more extensive discussion of the investment schedules of the Satellite governments, and other issues relative to the balance between industry and agriculture.

[15] For example, Imre Nagy, speaking on July 4th, 1953, acknowledged that in collectivization "too much bullying was used," which "not only offended the peasants' sense of justice but also caused serious economic harm." (*Szabad Nep*, [Budapest], July 5, 1953.)

[16] An editorial in *Rabotnichesko Delo*, (Sofia), October 28th, 1950, stated, for example, that "The Communist Party has always stressed in the most categorical way that it is absolutely necessary to observe strictly the voluntary principle of entering collectives."

[17] See, for example, the reports on the trials held in Gryfice (*Trybuna Ludu*, [Warsaw], May 25th, 1951).

CHAPTER IV

THE BALANCE SHEET OF COLLECTIVIZATION

1. *General Factors*

Earlier in this study[1] it was pointed out that the Stalinist "solution" to the agricultural problem in the Soviet Union, despite its cost in human suffering, satisfied the basic agricultural needs of an expanding heavy industrial machine and the State which rested upon it. The new land structure was no more efficient or productive than the one it had replaced; but it was better suited to guarantee urban food supplies and the rapid accumulation of capital which was the prerequisite for the heavy industrial development upon which the new Soviet State was based. That certain readjustments in that land structure are being called for today, more than a quarter of a century after its initial establishment, does not indicate that, in terms of its original goals, the program was a total failure.[2]

In Eastern Europe, however, the agricultural picture is far more complex. A conclusive assessment of the results of collectivization in terms of the Communists' own goals is therefore more difficult. The extensive agricultural readjustment begun in the middle of 1953 has frequently been interpreted as proof of its failure. However, since the New Course in Eastern Europe was promulgated simultaneously with a similar program in the USSR, its origins may lie as much in the political crisis caused by Stalin's death as in a mounting economic crisis. Indeed, the vast economic disproportions which the New Course was designed to reduce had

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[1] See above pp. 21-2.

[2] These readjustments were announced in September 1953, by the Soviet leader Khrushchev in the same address in which he acknowledged the dismal condition of Soviet agriculture, and in particular the livestock inadequacies (*Pravda*, [Moscow], September 15, 1953).

tion had hardly reached pre-war levels by 1951, and the demands 231
of the urban population were rapidly increasing, the possibilities of increased livestock production were small. Indeed, the fodder supply was below the level necessary for maintaining *existing* livestock population. Therefore (see Table 25), the number of cattle in Eastern Europe had not, by 1952, quite achieved the pre-war levels.

But livestock failure is not recorded merely in terms of quantity, but in quality as well. Czechoslovak Premier Siroky furnished an interesting comment on this point:

> In the sphere of animal husbandry we must proceed from the fact that of late the head of cattle has increased without a corresponding extension of the fodder base. Consequently, the head of cattle has grown to the detriment of the quality of the stock and its productivity. Without a serious extension of the fodder base it will be impossible to ensure improvement of the productivity of the stock which, from the point of view of supplying the people with high-grade meat and other high-grade products of animal husbandry, is a most urgent matter.[55]

One of the chief causes of livestock deterioration is the reliance of 231
East European regimes upon the increasingly impoverished non- 471
collectivized sector for most livestock produce. As Table 26 makes clear, in each country the livestock in the socialist sector is proportionately less than the amount of land "socialized." Moreover, the major portion of the stock in the collectivized sector is not collective property, but belongs to the peasant households. In Poland, for example, 71 per cent of the cattle, 75.5 per cent of the sheep, and 75.8 per cent of the hogs in the collectivized land belongs to private household plots.[56]

Thus while the "Socialist sector" concentrates upon marketing 241
grain and industrial crops, the private sector and the collectivized households emphasize livestock products. However, as the private sector has been deprived of credits and resources with which to purchase fodder and other necessities, the quality of the livestock has inevitably deteriorated. In spite of the introduction of new "zootechnical methods" on certain model farms, most livestock con-

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[55] *For a Lasting Peace*, September 18, 1953. Remarks of a very similar character cropped up in the August 22nd address of the Romanian Premier, Gheorghiu-Dej, and in the September 8th address of the Bulgarian Premier Chervenkov.
[56] *Ekonomista* (Warsaw), III, 1953, p. 48.

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But in the end these possessions stirred the envy not merely 794
of ambitious and worldly men but also of the land-hungry 471
poor. To be sure the Abbot of a flourishing monastery might 578
correctly point out that the revenues did not enrich the monks, who normally lived under his guidance by an austere religious rule. These religious in their bare cells did not taste the fine vintages pressed from monastery grapes carefully tended by brothers who rose at four for Matins and then expended themselves zealously for the cause of God. Nevertheless the critics were not by any means only emancipated spirits who found moral discipline irksome and the Church old-fashioned. They were also earnest, weather-beaten peasants, with no soil to till, and often desperately poor, who understandably looked upon Church estates with a covetous eye. And of course everywhere the well applauded and sharp-tongued ideologies of the time—Marxism, Nationalism, Nihilism—were allied against the Church, often looked upon by the seemingly more enlightened folk of those days as the heritor of a creed outworn. And it must be admitted that sometimes a segment of the clergy, grown comfortable and worldly, acted as if they thought so, too.

Protestantism inside the old Empire clung to the enclaves 795
which had been established during the era of the Reformation and the Counter-Reformation. Despite the strife incident to the [162]
Thirty Years' War both Lutheranism and Calvinism maintained themselves resolutely in Hungary, for example, so that prior to the outbreak of World War II Catholics in that country constituted about 67 per cent of the population, while Protestants numbered nearly 27 per cent and adhered to both the Lutheran and the Calvinist tradition. In Czechoslovakia the situation was relatively the same, though the number of Protestant groups was greater. A considerable part of the population —6 per cent in 1932—professed no religion of any kind. Another characteristic of the old Empire was the presence of the

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CHAPTER II

CHANGES IN PROPERTY RELATIONS IN INDUSTRY, TRANSPORT, BANKING INSURANCE AND TRADE

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THE CHANGES in land ownership dealt with above had a relatively simple result—the predominance of small peasant ownership. By contrast, the property relations in industry, transport, etc., are much more complicated. In order to understand the present situation, it is necessary briefly to survey the property relations before the war, the influence of the Nazi occupation, and the immediate effects of the Red Army's victory. 000

State Ownership before World War II

In Eastern Europe the bourgeoisie developed late and, in comparison with its Western competitors, was weak and poorly equipped with capital. Thus there arose two antagonistic, but complementary, phenomena. On the one hand foreign capital infiltrated into the region, and on the other hand, in an attempt to avoid relying too much on foreign capital which tended to undermine national independence, the state became the owner of certain means of production, and not, as in the West, mainly a watchman or regulator of the activities of private capitalists. And between and under the pressure of the two—powerful foreign and state capital—private "national" capital managed somehow to keep alive. 471

The part played by the state in industry was greater in Poland than in any other Eastern European country: 471 655

GOVERNMENT-OWNED ENTERPRISES IN PRE-WAR POLAND (1938) AND THEIR PARTICIPATION IN INDUSTRIES

Per Cent	
100	production of potassium salts, alcohol; tobacco; aircraft; automobiles; air transportation; post; telegraph; radio.
97	maritime transportation

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655

95	production of dyestuff
93-3	railroads
91	fire insurance
84	production of common salt
73	telephones
70	smelting
52	insurance other than fire
50	spas and health resorts
45.8	financial institutions
30 (approx.)	production of tool-making machinery*
32	quarries, export of lumber†
25	production of natural gas, coal and chemicals‡
10 to 20	production of plywood, cotton goods, electrical implements, lumber, processed oil
7·9	production of electric power

(S.L. Sharp, *Nationalisation of Key Industries in Eastern Europe*, Washington, 1946, pp. 4-5)

There were many mixed enterprises owned partly by the state and partly by local authorities, private companies and individuals.

The value of state enterprises in Poland in 1930-31 was about 12½ milliard zloty, or 22.5 per cent of all the industrial-commercial wealth of Poland, and in the most important undertakings (heavy industry, metal, chemicals, transport), its share was even bigger, as the table shows.

In Yugoslavia the state owned the railways and the telephone and telegraph system. Public utilities were owned by the city authorities. In the very important timber and lumber industry, the state played a considerable part, owning 37.8 per cent of the forest area. A further 27.9 per cent was in the hands of the local authorities. The state owned thirteen coal mines and two iron mines yielding about 25 per cent and 90 per cent respectively of the country's total output of coal and iron. Tobacco, salt and raw silk were all state monopolies. The production of iron and steel (through the Yugoslav Steel Company), and of armaments, was state controlled and the state had a very large share in the cellulose and sugar industries.

State ownership in the other Eastern European countries was far less extensive, nevertheless it cannot be ignored. For instance, in Czechoslovakia, practically the whole railway system was state owned. Trams, electricity, gas and water,

*Another source gives the percentage of state ownership of the metal industry, as a whole, as 50 per cent (F. Zweig, *op. cit.* p.109).

†Zweig gives the following figure for the state ownership of forests: three-eighths (Ibid).

‡According to Zweig the larger part of the chemical industry was state owned (Ibid).

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were owned by the local authorities. State capital was of major importance in the powerful Zivnostenska Bank and in the Skoda Works. In industry as a whole, the state owned at least a tenth of all capital invested.

Similar conditions obtained, to a greater or less extent, in the other countries.

Foreign Capital before World War II

Before the War in all the countries nearly all the key positions in industry, transport and banking were controlled by foreign capital. Thus Zweig writes: 471

'The share of foreign capital in the total capital funds owned by all joint-stock companies in Poland amounted to 33 per cent. The share in the total capital of all active joint-stock companies is given as 44.8 per cent in 1935 and 40.1 in 1937' but '. . . the controlling power of this capital covered a much wider range than 40.1 per cent of productive capacity'. (Ibid. p. 121). This was because foreign capital, being concentrated in certain key positions, could control a much larger volume of capital. Companies in which foreign capital predominated constituted 63.1 per cent of the capital of all joint-stock companies. The preponderance of foreign capital was particularly great in certain branches of industry—in mining and foundries foreign capital controlled 63.6 of all joint-stock industry; in petroleum extraction, 89.9 per cent; in the chemical industry, about 80 per cent; in the electro-technical industry, about 90 per cent; in electricity and water-supply, about 95 per cent; in the textile industry, about 40 per cent (ibid. pp. 121-2); in insurance, 85.1 per cent; communication and transport, 68.9 per cent (L. Wellisz, *Foreign Capital in Poland*, London, 1938, p. 145). Only in light industries (foodstuffs, paper, glass, ceramics, etc.) and trade was foreign capital of small importance.

The other countries of Eastern Europe were in a similar position. Boris Kidrić, Chairman of the Planning Commision, at the Fifth Congress of the Communist Party of Yugoslavia, said of his country that foreign capital 'participated in the mining industry of the old Yugoslavia and in the building materials industry with 77.9%, in the metallurgical industry with 90.9%, in the processing of metals with 55.8 %, in the

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471 ceramics and glass industry with 28.3%, in the timber industry with 51.4%, in the paper industry with 15.1%, in the chemical industry with 73.6%, in the food and agricultural industry with 27.1%, in the textile industry with 61.4%, in the leather and fur industry with 40.9%, in the electric power industry with 43.5%, in the remaining industries with 32.3%, giving an average of 49.51%'. (B. Kidrič, *On the Construction of Socialist Economy in the FPRY*, Belgrade, 1948, p. 31).

The publication of the Royal Institute of International Affairs, *Agrarian Problems from the Baltic to the Aegean* (London, 1944), states: 'Only from 15 to 20 per cent of the capital in Roumanian industry was in Roumanian hands' (p. 81).

'In 1936 paid-up foreign capital in Bulgarian companies amounted to . . . 42.6 per cent of the total paid-up capital of companies'. (Royal Institute of International Affairs, *South-Eastern Europe. A Political and Economical Survey*, London, 1939, p. 173). The share of foreign capital in large manufacturing industry was 48.03 per cent, in wholesale trade 38 per cent, in insurance 24 per cent, in banking 22 per cent, and in transport 63 per cent. (According to Dobri Terpeshev's Report to the Fifth Congress of the Bulgarian Communist Party, Sofia, 1948).

Similar conditions prevailed in Hungary.

Czechoslovakia was the only country in which foreign capital in banking and industry was of relatively small importance.

The Influence of the German Occupation on Property Relations

So great was the influence of the German occupation that, in the words of S. Perlman: 'European capitalism was finally killed by Nazism', which 'so churned up all existing property rights that their restoration even approximately . . . is unthinkable.' ('Some Reflections on Russia', in *Problems of the Post-War World*, Symposium, New York and London, 1945, p. 334). That these words are no exaggeration is proved by the following passage in Mr. Sharp's book:

'The extent of the upheaval in property relations caused by the Germans in the Eastern European countries may be seen from a few examples of the acquisitions made by German capital since the Munich Agreement and the establishment of the Protectorate of Bohemia-Moravia.

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'In addition to the outright confiscation of Jewish property and the acquisition of important Czechoslovak financial claims and capital assets in southeastern Europe, the Germans assumed control and ownership of the main financial and industrial establishments in Bohemia-Moravia. 471

'Czech banks were forced to merge, so that finally only four banks remained. German capital (Creditanstalt, Dresdner Bank and Deutsche Bank) owned roughly 18 billion of the total capital of 33.6 billion crowns (Koruny) invested in the banks. [453]

'Most of the industrial property and interests came under control of the Hermann Goering Werke (Vitkobice Works, Mining and Foundry Company, the Podbrezova foundry in Slovakia, the armament factories of Skoda and Brno, the steel mills and coal mines of the Poldihuette A.G.). I.G. Farben took over the chemical works of the former Aussiger Verein and the Bratislava plants of Dynamit Nobel.

'In the Sudetenland, which was incorporated into the Reich, a specially-created firm, Sudetenlaendischer Bergbau, controlled by the Hermann Goering Werke, took over the former property of the Czech state, of the Zivnostenska Banca and of the Petschek family interests.' (op. cit. pp. 6-7).

At the same time the Germans developed certain industries for war purposes, because Czechoslovakia was relatively immune from air attack. For instance, the aircraft industry which before the war employed about 5,000 workers, in 1944 employed more than 100,000. This increased the proportion of industry in Czechoslovakia controlled by Germans. [463]

Since even before Munich, 40 per cent of the industry of Czechoslovakia was owned by German citizens, it is clear that the proportion of German capital at the end of the war was not less than 60 per cent of industry and almost 100 per cent of financial institutions (banks, insurance, etc.).

Of Poland, Mr. Sharp writes: 'Polish banks in the incorporated areas were swallowed by the Ostbank A.G., a subsidiary of the Dresdner Bank. A special organization was set up to take over industrial property, either outright or in the form of compulsory administration by the Haupttreuhandstelle Ost. Coal mines were taken over by the Hermann Goering Werke in Silesia and by the Pruessische Bergwerks- und Huetten A.G. in the Dombrowa basin. The Schlesische [453]

[In early 1940's -- Analyst]

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● 471 A.G. fuer Bergbau and Huettenbetriebe concentrated in its hands the zinc industry (with the exception of some interests left with the Giesche works). By April 1942 not less than 230,000 Polish industrial and commercial enterprises of all sizes were reported Germanized in the annexed part of Poland (this includes very small businesses and presumably also Jewish-owned undertakings).

'In the General Government, a state-managed organization, the Werke des Generalgouvernment, took over the largest industrial plants. Two artificial silk factories came under the control of Vereinigte Glanzstoff Fabriken of Wuppertal. Oil was exploited by Karpathen-Oel A.G. and electric power plants by Ost-Energie A.G.' (Ibid. pp. 7-8).

By taking possession of French, Belgian and Austrian capital (which in 1937 amounted to 56.9 per cent of all foreign capital), as well as Jewish-owned enterprises (constituting about 10 per cent of all industrial-commercial wealth) and the enterprises owned by the state before the war, the Germans gained control of more than half of all industrial and banking capital and nearly all industry, transport and banks of real importance.

Of Yugoslavia Mr. Sharp writes: 'Yugoslavia was dismembered after the German attack in 1941 and public and private property grabbed by the successor states in the detached provinces. In puppet Serbia the Germans controlled the state-owned railways and mines. Through possession of French interests they acquired the Bor copper mines. German capital infiltration in Serbia was estimated at about 45 million dollars and in Croatia at approximately 35 million'. (Ibid. p.9)

German capital also invaded the economy of the German allies, Hungary and Rumania. 'In Hungary, for instance, German investments were estimated in February, 1944, officially at about 692 million dollars and unofficially at more than twice the amount'. (Ibid. p. 8). Thus about a third of all Hungarian industry was controlled by German capital: six very large metal enterprises, nine mines, three transport companies, three food industries, ten textile enterprises, and thirteen miscellaneous industries. (N. Clarion, *Le Glacis Soviétique*, Paris, 1948, p. 89). German capital was especially active in the expansion of the aluminium and oil industries,

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which were practically new industries for Hungary. The extent to which German capital gained control of the Hungarian economy is revealed by the fact that while German capital was estimated at more than a milliard dollars, the total national wealth of Hungary, excluding land and buildings, was estimated in 1943 at 4.4 milliard dollars.

'In Rumania the Hermann Goering Werke came into possession of large shares in a number of industrial enterprises through the seizure of the Czech-owned stock. Similarly in banking and mining the Germans "bought" French and Belgian interests and some Dutch oil interests. One sixth of the capital invested in Rumanian banks and industries was German-owned or controlled, according to an estimate early in 1944. In the oil industry German interests rose from less than 0.5 per cent before the war to 38 per cent (1942). Jewish property was "Rumanized".' (Sharp, op. cit. pp. 8-9).

Before the war more than half the foreign capital invested in Rumania was invested in her oil industry, and foreign capital as a whole made up nearly 85 per cent of the capital of all Rumanian industry. Therefore German capital in the oil industry alone made up in 1942 nearly a fifth of all the capital in Rumanian industry, or a quarter of the foreign capital. Moreover, it controlled a few other, not unimportant, enterprises, such as the Malaxa metal enterprise and the mines of Resitza and Copsa Mica-Cugir companies, as well as another two hundred new medium-sized enterprises. (Clarion, op. cit. pp. 90-91).

Two countries practically escaped any large-scale infiltration of German capital during the war—Bulgaria and Finland, the former because it lacked the heavy industry needed for the German war effort, the latter because the foreign capital invested in it was not French or Belgian but English and American, and it was impossible for the Germans to buy British and American shares during the war.

The Effect of the Military Victory of Russia: Russian-Owned Enterprises

The military defeat of Germany left a very great part of industry, transport and banks of the East European countries ownerless. The larger part of German property in Czecho-

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slovakia, Poland and Yugoslavia passed into the hands of the national states, while in the countries which were formerly allies of Germany as well as in the Soviet Zone of Germany and Austria it was mostly taken over by the Russian government. Even Czechoslovakia and Poland did not escape having to contribute German booty to Russia. Yugoslavia was the only exception, because the Russian army never occupied the whole of the country, but merely a small part of it and for a few months only. Of the industries formerly owned by Germans and now claimed by Russia, some were dismantled and the rest left intact under Russian control.

The question of dismantling will be dealt with later. Here it is proposed to deal only with the ownership by Russia of certain industrial, transport and banking interests.

Rumania

Since during the war German capital had controlled 38 per cent of all investments in Rumanian oil (as well as a number of industries and banks), Russia was able to obtain almost complete control over a third of the Rumanian oil industry. She also became the owner of much of the metal industry and the banks. For various reasons, Russia found it preferable to build up in Rumania (and Hungary) enterprises in which she owned half, while the other half was in the hands of Rumanian (or Hungarian) private capitalists or the state (the latter from the nationalisation laws of 1948). This enables the Russian state to control a much greater sector of industry than if she had relied on companies with 100 per cent Russian capital. Thus in May, 1945, Russia and Rumania came to an agreement about the establishment of mixed companies in certain branches of industry, first of all the petroleum industry. Sovrompetrol was established which owns the lion's share of the oil fields and refineries of Rumania. The far-reaching law of nationalization passed on 11 June, 1948, did not apply to the mixed companies. In the significant words of *The World Today* (January, 1949) the monthly journal of the Royal Institute of International Affairs:

'. . . the only capitalist in Rumanian industry is Communist Russia. Only the Russian Government has the right to own private shares, and only the company in which Soviet Russia

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has private shares is allowed to make profits and distribute them to the shareholders. Sovrompetrol has now the best fields and concessions and the right to export in free currency areas. It is also officially subsidized by the Rumanian Government in the event of loss. Thus it can be seen that Sovrompetrol has the best of the bargain. The second sector belongs in principle to the Rumanian State. Its task will be to prospect for, and explore, new fields as well as to exploit the exhausted wells left by the expropriated companies. Its personnel is untrained. Its trade will be limited to the adverse one with Soviet Russia and the other satellites. Therefore, while both sectors are working for the benefit of Soviet Russia, it is not difficult to guess which has the best chance of successful working, which is doomed to failure'.

Although oil is the main industry of Rumania, and Russia directed her main attention to it, she did not overlook other industries. Because of the close fusion of industrial and banking capital in Rumania, the Sovrom Banco was established, as the best means of controlling industry—besides oil—as a whole. Fifty per cent of the shares of the bank are held directly by Russia, and fifty per cent by Rumanian companies. But since Russia, as the heir of the German owners, had part ownership of a number of the latter companies, she has, even formally, the majority of the shares.

In addition there were established Sovrom companies for shipping, air communications, timber, coal, steel, chemicals, gas, building materials, glass, and a few other industries. In all these enterprises the share of Russia has been paid solely by surrendering the claim to German assets in each industry.

Hungary

Under the Potsdam Agreement Russia was entitled to take over all German-owned property in Hungary, officially estimated in February, 1944, at 692 million dollars, and unofficially at double this sum, out of an estimated total wealth in 1943 of 4.4 milliard dollars. Russia exercised her rights partly by dismantlement and partly by taking control of industries which continued to operate in Hungary. By an economic agreement between Hungary and Russia in September, 1945, mixed Russian-Hungarian companies were to be established

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471 in fourteen branches of industry and transport: oil, bauxite-aluminium, coal, chemicals, the large metal industries Weiss-Manfred, Ganz and Rimamurany, electricity, railways, Danubian shipping, air transport. While their importance in the economy was great, it was considerably less than that of their counterparts in Rumania.

As a political weapon for the subjugation of Hungary to Russia, the mixed companies are of first-rate importance.

Bulgaria

471 In Bulgaria there are Soviet companies and mixed companies
651 in certain mines and transport undertakings. When the U.S.S.R. took over the assets of the German companies, they did not take over their liabilities, the biggest of which were their debts to the state. Thus while a large part of the assets which were transferred to Russia of the German companies came from open robbery of the Bulgarian people in the past, the liabilities were borne by the Bulgarian taxpayer. This was revealed in the Kostov Trial (December, 1949) during which Prof. Stefanov, former Minister of Finance, was accused of opposition to this state of affairs. He was accused further of wishing to impose the same taxes on the Soviet enterprises as the Bulgarian enterprises had to pay. The Prosecutor took it for granted that Russian enterprises in Bulgaria should enjoy special privileges in taxation.

Yugoslavia

471 In Yugoslavia there were two mixed Soviet-Yugoslav transport companies, 'Juspad' and 'Justa', formed on February 4, 1947, with the alleged intention of 'contributing to the recovery and development of productive possibilities of Yugoslavia'. They were liquidated after the rupture with Moscow. After this some light was thrown on the working of the companies. Joze Vilfan, Yugoslav delegate to the United Nations Economic and Social Council, referred to the two mixed companies in a speech before the Council. The participation of the two Governments in the companies was to have been equal, but in practice the companies did not do what they were intended to do. Thus, for example, although by May, 1948, the U.S.S.R. had paid up only 9.83 per cent of its participation

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in Juspad while Yugoslavia had paid up 76.25 per cent, only 40 per cent of the services of both companies went to Yugoslavia, the remainder going to other countries. Whereas Juspad charged Yugoslav industry 0.40 dinars per kilometre-ton, the U.S.S.R. was charged only 0.19 dinars, and other countries 0.28 dinars. With the liquidation of both companies, Yugoslavia took over all the liabilities, though the U.S.S.R. drew its share of the capital, as far as it was paid up, in full. (*Tanjug*, 11 October, 1949).

No Rent Paid for Natural Resources

This is an important aspect of the exploitation exercised by the Russian Government through the mixed companies. The prices of certain commodities whose production is dependent on natural resources which exist only in limited quantities and which are the property of individuals (or states)—such as grain, cotton, timber, coal, oil—always include not only wages for the workers, and profit for the owners of the capital, but also rent for the owners of the natural resources. When the Russian state takes from Sovrompetrol, for instance, half of what remains after the cost of production (wages, depreciation of machinery, etc.) is covered, it actually gets not only half the profit, properly so-called, but also half the rent of the oilfields. Thus it becomes part-owner of the natural wealth of Rumania. The enormous rent accruing from oilfields is well known. One example will be sufficient to show this. In 1946 the U.S.S.R. concluded an agreement with Iran to build a mixed Iran-Soviet oil company. It was agreed that the share that Iran would contribute to the company would be that of providing the oil-bearing soil, and for this alone she would get 49 per cent of all the shares of the company, i.e., 49 per cent of the profit and rent. In the case of the Sovrompetrol Company, Rumania had to supply half the capital and in addition to give the oil-bearing soil gratis. It would not be difficult to calculate what portion of the shares Rumania would have received had she had the same conditions as were granted Iran. She would have had 49 per cent of the profit as rent for the oilfields and half of the rest—i.e., 25½ per cent—for ownership of half the capital, making altogether 74½ per cent. Instead she gets 50 per cent. And the portion the U.S.S.R.

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● 471 would have received would have been 25½ per cent instead of 50 per cent. This would have been the case if the mixed companies were established on the principle of legal equality usually prevailing between capitalist partners. The extra profit the U.S.S.R. gets from the Sovrompetrol Co. and from a number of other mixed companies is the result of political pressure.

Nationalisation in the Russian Satellite States

The appropriation of industries, transport and banks by the Russian state has been described. Now it is necessary to deal with the transfer of industries to the 'national' states, states which are, at least formally, distinguished from the Russian state. This transfer is usually described as 'nationalisation', although the term is far from appropriate as it assumes that the state enjoys national independence and that it is identified with the nation, or the majority of it. But if these reservations are borne in mind, there is no danger in using this rather loose term.

As the national states of the satellites are subordinated to the Russian state, one would expect to find that the progress of the nationalisation of industry is subordinated to the needs of Russian infiltration into the national economies. And so in fact it is. In all Eastern Europe only three countries, Poland, Czechoslovakia and Yugoslavia, were allies of Russia during the war. Because of this, Russia could not exact any reparations from them or claim control over German assets in them. They were therefore encouraged to nationalise their industries, and as early as 1945 the majority of their industries were nationalised. (In two of these countries—Czechoslovakia and Poland—the nationalisation was accompanied by a wide-scale and chauvinistic expropriation of the 'Teutons' by the 'Slavs'.)

In the four countries which had been allied to Germany—Rumania, Hungary, Bulgaria, Finland—the course of events was different. There was no nationalisation in Finland, which was never occupied, nor was there much propaganda by the Communist Party for it. In Rumania and Hungary, Russia's interests in exacting reparations as well as in building up mixed companies (together with a number of socio-political factors which will be dealt with later) led to the postponement of nationalisation on a large scale until 1948, more than three

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years after the beginning of the Russian occupation. The fear that the revolutionary enthusiasm of the Bulgarian masses (which, except in Yugoslavia, was unparalleled in this region after the war) would lead to too much independence of Russia, and the Russian bureaucracy's confidence that nationalisation could be carried out whenever they wished, caused them to postpone it until the revolutionary wave had ebbed at the end of 1947.

The timing of nationalisation in Rumania, Hungary and Bulgaria was determined by another very important factor—the Marshall Plan. The urge to trade with Western Europe, as expressed in the *unanimous* decision of the Czechoslovak government on 4 July, 1947, to take part in the Marshall Conference (a decision revoked when Gottwald and Masaryk visited Moscow on 10th July) made it necessary for Russia to strengthen her control over the economy of Eastern Europe, and this could be done only through state ownership of industries in all these countries. Hence the nationalisations in Bulgaria, Rumania and Hungary.

Poland

It is impossible to understand the process of nationalisation in Poland without taking into account two factors, namely, in the area of pre-war Poland, the existence of many industries previously controlled by German capital now remaining ownerless, and, what is even more important, the changes in Polish industry brought about by the annexation of the German area east of the Oder-Neisse and the expulsion of the German population from it. This area will be referred to as the Western territories of Poland, and the area of pre-war Poland as Old Poland.

The importance of the industry of the Western territories compared with the industry of Old Poland is shown by the following table:

ACTUAL PRODUCTION IN 1937 (IN THOUSAND TONS)

	Pre-War Poland	*Western Territories*
Coal	36,218.0	29,793.0
Coke	2,328.0	3,229.0
Briquettes ..	17.4	568.6
Brown coal ..	18.4	7,594.0
Zinc and lead ..	200.0	722.1
Iron ore	791.6	73.1

(*The World Today*, March, 1947)

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471 The production of pig-iron in the Western territories was about 50 per cent of the production of Old Poland, and of steel 70 per cent. An important chemical industry, with a wide range of products, came to Poland through the annexation of the Western Territories. The sugar refining capacity of the Western Territories was the same as that of Old Poland. In fact, 'The total capacity of this industrial belt (i.e., of the Western Territories—Y.G.) is equal to that of the whole of pre-war Poland'. (*The World Today*, May, 1948).

471 [463] Out of the two million people employed in 1937 in all the mines, industry and handicrafts of Poland, the majority, 1,177,858 people, worked in small-scale industry and handicrafts (employing fewer than 15 workers), while large and medium-sized industry (which includes all enterprises with more than 15 people) employed only 830,000 people. By contrast, the industries of the Western territories employed before the war over 1,000,000 workers, the great majority of them in large enterprises, hundreds of which employed more than a thousand workers each.

It is therefore clear that when, after the expulsion of the German population (the great majority of them workers and their families), the industry of the Western territories was declared state property, an important—if not the major—part of the industry of new Poland was by that act removed from private ownership. If this had been the only nationalisation undertaken, state ownership in industry proper, i.e., excluding handicrafts and industries employing less than fifteen people, would already have far outstripped private ownership. This was not immediately clear because a certain time-lag was inevitable before enough Polish workers could be found to man the industries of the Western territories. Thus, for some time after the war the nationalised industry of the Western Territories played a less important role in the total industry of the new Poland than would have been expected.

Of the territory of Old Poland Clarion writes: 'When we take into account the fact that large and medium industry in Old Poland mean medium and small industry in the West, the nationalisation measures left outside state property 45 per cent of the total number of industries, or at the very least 60

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per cent of the total number of workers employed in industry'. 471 (op. cit. p. 94).*

Clarion would seem to exaggerate the part played by private industry in Old Poland. Even there at least half of all the workers in mining, industry and transport, are working in state enterprises, and so the *overwhelming majority* of all the industry of present-day Poland is state-owned.

Boleslaw Bierut, the President of the Polish Republic, emphasized in a speech on New Year's Eve, 1946, that the expropriation of the Germans was a key factor in making the Polish state the owner of the majority of the industry. He said: '. . . the war completely overturned the system of our pre-war production relations . . . ' 'After the expulsion of the occupant a huge majority of the industrial plants, even the smallest, had to be classified as abandoned property, taken over by the state, and reopened through the efforts of the state, territorial self-government, co-operatives and new private firms. After investing public money in the plants, the state feels compelled to regulate their judicial form and title of ownership. The only way out of the situation, especially in the case of large enterprises, is nationalisation'. Thus nationalisation is 'a legal act sanctioning already existing facts and procedures. It is an adaptation of the law to realities'. This was the situation in 1945 and the nationalisation law of 3 January, 1946, gave it legal sanction. First, all German property, both in the Western territories and in Old Poland, in industry, mines, transport, banking, insurance and trade was declared the property of the Polish state. Further, a number of other enterprises belonging to Polish citizens was taken over by the state: all firms with more than 50 workers were affected. The situation was summed up by Roman Zambrowski, Secretary of the Central Committee of the Polish Workers' Party (Communist Party) in a speech he made on July 12th, 1948, when he stated that 85 per cent of the total industrial output is produced by state and co-operatively owned enterprises (the latter not more than 5 per cent), the same proportion in communication and finance, and 100 per cent in banking. Only small-scale industry and

*Probably the ground for Clarion's estimate was the declaration of the Polish Minister of Industry, Hilary Minc, on January 2nd, 1946, that after the nationalisation bill, only 40 per cent of all industrial workers would be employed by the state, while 60 per cent would continue to work for private employers.

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471 handicrafts were in the hands of private owners. (*Glos Ludu*, 13th July, 1948).

Czechoslovakia

As a result of the defeat of the German army and the expulsion of the Sudeten Germans, the major part of industry, transport and banking was left without an owner. As President Beneš wrote in an article in the *Manchester Guardian* of 15th December, 1945: '. . . the Germans simply took control of all main industries, and of all banks . . . If they did not nationalise them directly, they at least put them in the hands of big German concerns . . . In this way they automatically prepared the economic and financial capital in our country for nationalisation . . . To return this property and the banks into the hands of Czech individuals or to consildidate them without considerable State assistance and without new financial guarantees was simply impossible. The State had to step in . . .'

Three decrees of October 24th, 1945, made all banks, insurance companies, joint stock companies, key industries and large-scale enterprises the property of the state. All the enterprises in the key industries (mines, iron and steel, electricity, etc.), whatever their size, were nationalised. In other industries, all the enterprises employing a certain number of workers, or with certain technical capacities, were nationalised.

The ownership of industry on November 1, 1946, in terms of percentage of total employment, was as follows:

	Czech Lands				Slovakia
	State owned (including communes)	*State administered*	*Co-operatives*	*Private*	*Nationalised industries*
Industries producing means of production	79.2	10.3	0.2	10.3	83.1
Industries producing means of consumption	44.2	14.3	1.0	39.5	52.9
Food processing industries	31.9	10.8	20.7	36.6	28.6
Industries not directly affected by nationalisation	11.9	13.2	2.0	72.9	18.9
Total industry ..	61.6	11.6	2.4	24.4	57.7

Between 24th October, 1945, and February, 1948, no new nationalisation laws were passed, so that it can be assumed that throughout this period not more than a quarter of industry

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(reckoned by the number employed) was privately owned. 471 Since private enterprises were small compared with state enterprises (on the average every industrial enterprise owned by the state employed eight times as many people as the private enterprises), their economic importance in the total industry of the country was even less.

After the establishment of the new government in February, 1948, further nationalisation took place, and the proportion of private industry decreased from about 25 per cent to 7 per cent of all industry, according to the number employed.

Thus the really large-scale state acquisitions took place in 1945 and were directed almost entirely against ownerless enterprises, i.e., formerly German-owned enterprises.

The 1945 nationalisation hardly touched the Czechoslovak bourgeoisie and did not affect the Czechoslovak owners of middle and small industry at all. After it the Communist leaders declared that no more nationalisation measures would be taken. Thus on March 27th, 1947, 'In an interview the Prime Minister of Czechoslovakia, Klement Gottwald, declared that from the programme of the present Government it is clear that it considers *the statification* in the field of production closed' (*Neue Zürcher Zeitung*, 29th March, 1947). A few weeks later, at a general meeting of the Central Trade Union Council, Antonin Zapotocky, the President, said: 'We agree that medium-sized, and even some big enterprises should remain in private hands, and we see no reason why we should change these views'.

But in February, 1948, Gottwald and Zapotocky 'forgot' all this, and for the first time the Czechoslovak bourgeoisie, including the owners of middle and small industry, was seriously affected by nationalisation. This second nationalisation was a relatively small operation after the big one of 1945.

Yugoslavia

No nationalisation law was published in Yugoslavia, until 5th December, 1946, when the two Houses of the National Assembly adopted a bill for the nationalisation of private enterprises which applied to 42 branches of industry, transport and banking, and wholesale trade. But it would be wrong to conclude that until then these sectors of the economy were in

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471 private hands. In practice, nationalisation was carried out without legal sanction and under cover of a law passed on 24th November, 1944, for the expropriation of the property of the national enemy and his collaborators. On 19th January, 1946, *The Economist* estimated that the proportion of state and co-operative industry in Yugoslavia was 70-80 per cent, and the Moscow journal *New Times* of 15th March, 1946, wrote: 'The Government is in possession of 82 per cent of all industry, while private establishments account for only 18%'.

474 After this survey of the ownership of industry in Poland,
655 Czechoslovakia and Yugoslovia, a brief examination is
443 necessary of the control of trade. In all three countries private property lingers on to a large extent in one sphere besides agriculture, that of retail trade. In his speech mentioned above, Roman Zambrowski pointed out that in Poland the state and the co-operatives handle only 25-30 per cent of retail trade (in wholesale trade private ownership is negligible, the state taking 59 per cent of the turnover, the co-operatives 36.6 per cent, a total of 95.6 per cent). A similar situation exists in Czechoslovakia. Of the situation in Yugoslavia, B. Kidrić, said: 'Whereas in 1945, 85% of trade was still carried on through private shops, 12% through co-operatives and only 3% through state shops, in 1946 state shops already participated in trade with 19.2%, cooperative with 32% and the private shops dropped to 48.8%' (B. Kidrić, op. cit. p. 29).

'. . . on March 31st, 1948, private shops still participated with only 1.78%, the state shops with 39.91% and the co-operative with 58.31%'. (Ibid. p. 31).

In May, 1948, a new law nationalised all the remaining private trade in Yugoslavia.

In these three countries, the proportion of the economy in private hands was no greater than in Soviet Russia during the N.E.P.*

Hungary and Rumania

In Hungary and Rumania, Russia's demand for reparations and her schemes for the building of mixed companies which

*According to the Comintern weekly, *International Press Correspondence*, of 26th November, 1927, the percentage of private industry in the total industrial production of Russia in 1925/6 was 18.7 per cent. The proportion of wholesale trade in private hands was 9.4 per cent of the turnover and of retail trade 38.8 per cent (In 1927/8 the figures were respectively 1.5 and 27.0).

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would give her direct control of certain key positions in their economies, resulted in the postponement of any nationalisation until requisitions, dismantling, etc., had been terminated, the reparations payments were nearly completed, and the mixed companies were already established. Then, in the first half of 1948, nationalisation was carried out on a large scale.

For the Russian government nationalisation is only a *means* to the end of the extraction of surplus value and the accumulation of capital, and the purpose of nationalisation is fundamentally no different from that of the mixed companies, whose function is openly that of the extraction of 'reparations'. This is illustrated by the following incident.

After the big defeat of the Hungarian Communist Party in the general elections (November, 1945) when it polled only 17 per cent of the votes, the Hungarian bourgeoisie felt self-confident, and the government, headed by the Smallholders' Party, tried to delay agreement to the Mixed Companies. Suddenly, the Communist Party began an intensive campaign for the nationalisation of industry on a large scale. The General Secretary of the Party, and Vice-Premier, Mátyas Rákosi, in a speech over Radio Budapest, on 4th March, 1946, demanded the nationalisation of exactly the *same* industries in which Russia demanded the establishment of Mixed Companies. To the demand for nationalisation was added a demand for the removal of reactionary elements from the Smallholders' Party. As a result the Hungarian Government gave way, the Mixed Companies were established, and the Communist Party forgot about the nationalisation (for the time being).

Nationalisation was introduced piecemeal into Hungary. The coal mines were nationalised in January, 1946, the power stations a little later in the year. Five big heavy industrial firms were brought under state control as a temporary measure, 'until the end of reparations', in November, 1946. In September, 1947, all the banks were nationalised. Even so, until the nationalisation law of March 25th, 1948, a quarter of heavy industry and four-fifths of the rest of industry remained private property. According to this law, all industrial enterprises employing more than 100 persons became state property. The state now owned 78 per cent of industry, according to the

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● 471 number employed. On December 28th, 1949, the Government decided to take over all enterprises employing more than ten workers and all those owned by foreign capital. Of course the nationalisation laws did not affect the property of the Mixed Companies.

The way the nationalisation was carried out in Hungary illustrates the tactical methods of the Hungarian Communist Party leaders and their view that the active participation of the workers in the nationalisation is unnecessary. Easter Monday, 1948, was declared a holiday, and when the workers were not in the factories, state officials came down and took them over. The next day the workers arrived to find a new master. (*Continental News Service*, April 16th, 1948).

In Rumania the first step towards the nationalisation of industry was the creation in the summer of 1947 of a number of industrial boards which grouped together the factories of different branches, controlled the allocation of raw materials and framed the production plans of the various factories. This prepared the ground for the first nationalisation law for industry of 11th June, 1948. On that date, without prior warning, the government introduced a bill in parliament which became law after only three hours discussion, providing for the nationalisation of the overwhelming majority of industries. A few months earlier at the Congress of the Rumanian Workers' Party (Communists) on February 21-23, 1948, which had to decide on the policy of Rumania for the immediate future, no mention was made of early nationalisation on a large scale. All oil companies, including those in which foreign capital was invested (except the Sovrompetrol Company) were nationalised, as well as all metallurgical factories employing more than 100 workers, textile factories using more than 100 horse power, timber plants using more than 20 horse power, all the shipping companies (except the Sovrom Shipping Company) and railroads, radio and telephone companies, and all the banks (except the Sovrombank).

Bulgaria

The Bulgarian State owned only 6 per cent of the total industry of the country until December 23rd, 1947, when, at one stroke, practically all industry was nationalised. 93 per

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cent of industry was taken over by the state (2 per cent owned by cooperatives and 5 per cent was in private hands), 100 per cent of the banks and insurance companies and 100 per cent of foreign trade. (*For a Lasting Peace, For a People's Democracy!* the Cominform organ, 15th December, 1948). Cyril Lazarov in *Rabotnichesko Delo* of October 31st, 1948, estimates the state share of wholesale trade at 64 per cent and of retail trade at 22.3 per cent.

Austria and Finland, although they are outside the region under review, throw valuable light on the motives determining the attitude of the Communist Parties to nationalisation.

In Austria Russia is the main impediment to nationalisation, while the Austrian bourgeoisie and the Western Powers appear as its enthusiastic supporters.

The Austrian parliament hoped, by a large-scale nationalisation of industry, to stop the dismantling of factories and the taking over of industries by Russia. In July, 1946, therefore, a bill was passed, which was based on the election programme of the three parties of the Coalition Government (including the Communist Party) and provided for the nationalisation of 71 major enterprises. The Soviet High Command protested against the law on the grounds that it would affect Russian reparation rights, and the Soviet vote prevented the law from coming into effect. Thereupon the Communist Party changed its policy to opposition to nationalisation.

In Finland, the Popular Democratic Party (Communist Party) was in a better tactical position, as the Russian Control Commission informed the Finnish Government at an early stage that 'nationalisation is contrary to Soviet interests', and the Popular Democratic Party was therefore warned in time to oppose nationalisation.

The difference between the nationalisation policies in the various countries shows how this policy has in every case been determined by the interests of the rulers of Russia. It is clear, therefore, that for Russia nationalisation is only a device for the transfer of industry into the hands of the state, which means the appropriation of the industry by the owners of that state —the Russian ruling class.

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CHAPTER VI

SOCIO-ECONOMIC RELATIONS IN THE SATELLITES

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State Ownership and Public Ownership

471 Article 6 of the Soviet Constitution states: 'The land, its deposits, waters, forests, mills, factories, mines, railways, water and air transport, means of communication, large state-organized farm enterprises (state farms, machine-tractor stations, etc.) and also the basic housing facilities in cities and industrial localities are state property, that is, the wealth of the whole people'.

The Constitutions of the People's Democracies all contain similar clauses with one difference, that the land is not, or rather, *not yet* included in the state-owned properties.

Part of the article quoted is self-evident—that the land, factories, railways, etc. are state-owned. Part of the clause, however, is not self-evident although it is proclaimed as if it were—'state property, that is, the wealth of the whole people'. The words 'that is' signify that state ownership can be nothing other than people's ownership. But this does not stand the test of logic or of history. From the standpoint of logic, the middle term is missing. The factories, railways, etc., are state owned; the people (or the workers and peasants and intellectuals) own the state; therefore the people own the factories, railways, etc.

000 From the standpoint of history, the article stands the test no better. There are numerous examples in the history of the East of economic systems with deep class differentiations, based not on private property but on state property. Such systems existed in Pharaonic Egypt, Moslem Egypt, Iraq, Persia and India. That the state owned the land was, it seems, mainly due to the fact that agriculture depended entirely on the irrigation system, which in turn was dependent on the activity of the state. The example of Arab feudalism under the Mamelukes (1250-1517) is sufficiently instructive to warrant the apparent digression.

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only conclusion possible would be that the Bureaucracy is the owner of the wealth of these countries, that as well as being the ruling class politically, it is the ruling class economically.

The Abolition of all Elements of Democracy in the Factory

The relations between the state-bureaucracy and the people in the economy as a whole permeate each sector of it down to the individual enterprise. The macrocosm and the microcosms are governed by the same rules.

In Russia from 1917 to 1928 the running of the industries was, formally at least, in the hands of what was called the Troika (that is, trio)—the workers' factory committee, the Party cell and the manager. With the disappearance of all democracy in the Party and trade unions, the Troika gradually lost its functions till it became a mere label. Nevertheless it did not cease to stand officially at the head of the plant, nominally running it, and even to show signs of life by acting as something of a brake on the high-handedness of the plant manager, until 1929. Thus Dr. A. Baykov, in *The Development of the Soviet Economic System* (London, 1946), states:

'*De facto*, during that period (before the Five Year Plan—Y.G.) the director was largely dependent on the works' trade union organ, the "Zavkom" (the factory trade union committee) and on the Party cell, the organ of the Communist Party at the enterprise. Representatives of these organizations considered it their duty to supervise the director's activities, and usually interfered with his decisions'. (p. 115).

But even the remnants of workers' democracy in the plants disappeared with the Five Year Plans, which were called . . . 'The Victory of Socialism'. A resolution of the Central Committee of the Party decided that the workers' committee of the factory 'may not intervene directly in the running of the plant or endeavour in any way to replace plant management. They shall by all means help to secure one-man control, increased production, plant development, and, thereby, improvement of the material conditions of the working class'. (*Pravda*, 7th September, 1929).

The manager is in full and sole charge of the plant. All his economic orders are unconditionally binding on all the workers. He alone shall select, promote and remove personnel

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'taking into consideration' 'the opinion of the Party and the trade union organizations', but he is not bound by them. (Quoted by A. Feiler and J. Marschak, editors, *Management in Russian Industry and Agriculture*, New York, 1944, p. 36). 471/ 466

The Troika was officially buried in 1937. At the Plenum of the Central Committee, Stalin's second-in-command at that time, Zhdanov, declared: '. . . the Troika is something quite impermissible . . . The Troika is a sort of administrative board, but our economic administration is constructed along totally different lines'. (*Pravda*, 11th March, 1937, Ibid. p. 44).

The new management of industry was very clearly defined by an official manual thus: 'Each plant has a leader endowed with full power of decision, hence fully responsible for everything: the plant manager' (Economic Institute of the Academy of Sciences, *Economics of Socialist Industry*, Moscow, 1940, p. 579, ibid. pp. 12-13). Further, 'one-man control implies strict demarcation between the administration, on the one hand, and Party and trade-union organisations on the other. This strict demarcation must be applied on all levels of industrial management. Current operations in fulfilment of Plan are the task of the administration. The chief of a workshop, the manager of the plant, the head of the Glavk, have full powers, each within his field, and the Party and trade-union organisations may not interfere with their orders'. (*Economics of Socialist Industry*, p. 563, Ibid. p. 19).

In the 'People's Democracies' the workers' committees never acquired the authority they had in Russia, and the Troika never existed at all. The tendency against *any* element of workers' democracy in the factory was more pronounced and its progress much quicker than in the 'vanguard' country.

In all the countries of Eastern Europe the overthrow of Hitler inspired many workers to strive to participate in the management of industry, and in many places they achieved their aim of having the plant management democratically elected by the employees. Thus, for instance, *The Economist* of February 9th, 1946, writes of Czechoslovakia: 'The Employees' Committees tried, in the first fine careless rapture of revolutionary enthusiasm, to dictate how the factories should be managed . . .'

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● 471 466 This could not be tolerated by the Communist Party leaders in the government and trade unions. The following process took place:

'. . . the Workers Councils were . . . in control of management for some months, indeed almost until the end of 1945.' 'The situation was transformed by the Government's Nationalisation Decree of 24th October, (1945), which provided for the appointment of National Managers of the public enterprises'. 'So at one step the management of the industries was taken out of the hands of the Works Councils, nor did they retain any semblance of control over the Manager. This was a radical change and brought with it the undisguised hostility of a number of Works Councils'. (*Czechoslovakia. Six Studies in Reconstruction*, The Fabian Society, London, 1947, p. 49).

To reduce still further any remaining efficacy of the Works Committees, every element of democracy in them was abolished. At the general meeting of the Central Trade Union Council of Czechoslovakia at the beginning of April, 1947, the General Secretary complained that in the first round of the elections 32 per cent of the official candidates (no other candidates were allowed) were voted down in the Czech lands and 26 per cent in Slovakia. The Social Democratic Party now came forward openly with a proposal that more than one list be allowed in the Works Council elections, and that each party be free to put forward its own list of candidates. Antonin Zapotocky, the Communist Chairman of the Trade Unions (today the Prime Minister of Czechoslovakia) decided on another tactic as a result of the elections. He proposed to prolong the term of office of the Works Councils from one to two years.

Having established one list of candidates for Works Council elections, the Communist Party not only increased the use of terror in the elections, but also employed various devices for falsifying their results. The Social Democratic daily *Pravo Lidu* of 9th January, 1948, carried across the front page the Party protest against the Communist Party's methods in the factories: 'It is impossible to be silent. Fanatics are breaking up the unity of labour unions. New wave of political oppression in factories'. Of the recent Works Council elections the paper said: 'As developments in the elections are reported to us,

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especially in the large industrial concerns, it is evident that all the questionable practices were used, which were calculated to upset the democratic form of election and to force on the voters a selection (of candidates-Y.G.) that is not free. The meetings are usually called after working hours when the majority of workers are leaving or have left. 471 466

'Furthermore, the methods of voting are controlled, which is practically equivalent to direct intimidation'. (Quoted by *The New York Times*, 10th January, 1948).

After the February coup the mouths of the Socialists were closed. The secret ballot too was abolished at that time, and elections to Works Committees were carried out by acclamation, candidates in many cases being trade union officials. Small wonder that at the May 1949 session of the Central Council of the Czechoslovak Trade Unions, Josef Kolský, Deputy General Secretary, could say that in recent Works Council elections 97.3 per cent of the official lists of candidates were accepted (the official *Czechoslovak News Letter*, 19th May, 1949).

After these steps were taken, nothing more stood in the way of complete one-man management in the plant. In place of the workers' management that had arisen in the first months after the liberation of Czechosovakia from the German occupation, came the Production Board (set up by the Decree of October 24th, 1945), only a third of whose members were elected by the workers. After the 'Democractic Victory of February', the Minister of Industry, A. Kliment, announced a new plan: 'We are abandoning the system of collective management and we are going to abolish the Production Boards, instead of which we are going to introduce the system of personal responsibility of the works director, the technicians, the foremen and the workers'. This harks right back to unadulterated capitalism.

In Hungary the 'iron' Minister Ernö Gerö declared in his report to the Central Committee of the Party (June, 1950): 'A factory . . . can only have one manager who in his own person is responsible for everything that happens in the factory.' In all the other satellites too one-man management is the rule.

Democracy having duly been stamped out, the governments could without further ado follow this up by imposing on the

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471 466 workers all the known methods of exploitation, old and new. First of these was the introduction on an unprecedented scale of piece work in place of time work.

Piece Work

Marx once said that piece work is 'the most suitable to capitalist methods of production.' The leaders of the 'People's Democracies', however, teach otherwise. Thus *Scanteia*, the Rumanian Communist Party daily, of January 13th, 1949, says: 'Piece-work is a revolutionary (!) system that eliminates inertia and makes the labourer hustle. Under the capitalist system loafing and laziness are fostered. But now everyone has a chance to work harder and earn more' (Quoted by R. H. Markham in *Christian Science Monitor*, 31st January, 1949). 'Socialism', then, is superior to capitalism in that it uses the piece-work system!

The volume of work done at piece-work rates is continually increasing all the time.

In Czechoslovakia in February, 1946, 30.2 per cent of the total number of working hours came under the piece-work system, in January, 1947, 41.7 per cent, in June, 1947, 48 per cent, and the Two-Year Plan (1947-8) provided for the extension of piece-work so as to include 70 per cent of all working hours in industry. The aim is not 100 per cent only because in certain processes it is not possible to implement it. That this emphasis on piece-work was not welcomed by the workers is clear from the following attack made on 18 January, 1949, by the Minister of Justice, Alexej Čepička, on workers who show 'false solidarity' and a striving for 'equalisation of incomes' by opposing the piece-work system. 'Equalisation in wages hampers higher productivity. The piece-work system must be extended so as to give every worker an incentive. It is now used in only 58 per cent of our factories. To extend it to all is our task'. This was not all, for the workers were going slow to keep the norm low: 'Our workers have got to quit stalling and fight against equalitarianism in pay'. (*Christian Science Monitor*, 31st January, 1949).

The piece-workers par excellence, the Stakhanovites, are not loved by the workers. In his report to the 9th Congress of the Party (May, 1949), the General Secretary, Rudolf Slansky,

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revealed that out of 900,000 members of the Party's factory organisation only 65,000 were listed as Stakhanovites. Their unpopularity becomes manifest from a perusal of *Rude Pravo*, the Communist Party daily, which finds it necessary constantly to repeat that Stakhanovites should be placed in more responsible positions and that they should be protected against attacks made on them by 'politically immature' workers. 'There are officials and directors who, being snugly ensconced in their jobs or afraid for their popularity among politically undeveloped elements, fail to defend Stakhanovites as they ought to'. In letters from Stakhanovites published in the press, a frequent complaint is the hostile attitude of the workers towards them. When a reporter of *Lidové Noviny* went to interview Marie Zemancová, a young Stakhanovite in the Prague radio factory 'Tesla' who had been included in the Czech delegation to the Paris 'Peace Congress' as a reward for her work, it turned out that she was completely unknown in her factory. 'This proves', comments the paper, 'that we have been unable to popularise our Stakhanovites and pioneer workers'. (Quoted by *News from Czechoslovakia*, No. 6, April, 1949, published by the Czechoslovak Social Democratic Party in Exile, London). In view of these facts, it is no wonder that at the 9th Congress of the Communist Party open war was declared on people 'who run down the work of Stakhanovites and who even try to put a spoke in their wheel'. 471 466

In Poland the piece-work system reached a stage at which the basic wage almost entirely disappeared. As Clarion describes it: 'It should be emphasized incidentally, that with regard to salaries the whole system rests upon the maintenance of basic salaries at an abnormally low level and upon a huge inequality in the bonuses both of money and in kind. The periodical *Études et Conjoncture* in this regard pointed out, in a study of the economic situation in Poland, published in November, 1946, that 'on the average for the whole of industry in May, 1946, the total benefits granted (to the workers) in Poland represented from 6.8 to 14.6 times the basic salary, which thus became a mere supplementary item instead of being the main element of the total remuneration'. (op. cit. pp. 106-7). [465]

The hatred felt by the Polish workers for these extreme forms of piece-work was displayed openly in the spring of 1946 and

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471 466 in September, 1947, when tens of thousands of workers went on strike in Lodz, the biggest industrial city in Poland, in spite of the police terror, the mass arrests, the beatings, etc.

In Hungary, when the workers did not show sufficient enthusiasm for the piece-work system, they were accused by Rákosi of being 'lazy' (*N.Y. Herald Tribune*, Nov. 30th, 1948, reporting a speech delivered on November 27th); the factory directors were 'capitulating' to the lazy workers; the production quotas were too low. 'We cannot eat up the future of the nation', he declared. That Rákosi's speech was not effective enough can be seen from the continual harping on the theme of piece-work and its norms by the Hungarian leaders. Thus in the above-mentioned report to the Central Committee of June, 1950, Minister Ernö Gerö said: 'The enemy succeeded in opening a new front against the 'People's Democracy; that of wage and norm swindling'. 'That wage and norm swindling has spread among the masses can be attributed to a great degree to the underground work of right-wing social-democratic elements and to thei rallies, the clerical reactionaries . . .' It appears that Party members are also in league with 'right-wing social-democratic elements' who 'swindle' the norms: 'That such an unsavoury situation in the field of norms could arise is partly because in many cases the economic leaders of the factories, party functionaries and trade union members are among those who slacken the norms.' ' . . . in more than one case they go as far as to protect and support the wage swindlers'. This vituperation was followed by a considerable increase in the basic norm.

000 It is interesting to note that Stalinism is not the only system having extreme recourse to piece-work, Nazi Germany had too. Franz Neumann in his book *Behemoth* (London, 1942) writes: 'The class wage of the Socialist trade unions has been replaced by the "performance wage" (Leistungslohn) defined in Section 29 of the (Nazi-Y.G.) Charter of Labour. "It has been the iron principle of the National Socialist leadership", said Hitler at the Party Congress of Honour, "not to permit any rise in the hourly wage rates but to raise income solely by an increase in performance". The rule of the wage policy is a marked preference for piece-work and bonuses, even for juvenile workers. Such a policy is completely demoralizing,

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for it appeals to the most egoistic instincts and sharply increases industrial accidents'. (pp. 352-3). 000

Neumann explains why the Nazis went to such extremes in using the piece-work system (no more, however, than are resorted to in the Stakhanovite system): 'The preponderance of the performance wage brings the problem of wage differentials into the forefront of social policy. It is essential that this problem be understood not as an economic question but as the *crucial political problem of mass control* (my emphasis—Y.G.) . . . Wage differentiation is the very essence of National Socialist wage policy . . . the wage policy is consciously aimed at mass manipulation'. (p. 353).

The piece-work system 'is completely demoralising', 'it appeals to the most egoistic instincts,' it is a most important means of 'mass control', of 'mass manipulation', of atomization of the working class, of the creation of elite above elite even within the oppressed class. That is why the Nazis were so keen on its extension, and there is no other explanation of the enthusiasm of the Stalinist rulers for it.*

The Increasing Limitation of the Workers' Legal Freedom 466

In Russia, until the First Five-Year Plan every worker could freely change his place of work and could migrate unhindered from one part of the country to another.

On the right to change the place of work at that time, the Labour Code (1922) stated:

'The transfer of a hired person from one enterprise to another or his shipment from one locality to another, even when the enterprise or institution moves, can take place only with the

*As an indication of the purpose for which piece-work was so widely introduced, it is interesting to note that it was introduced even before the nationalisation of industry. It would be good, the Communist Party leaders thought, to discipline the workers in advance, in 'the interests of the nation'. In Rumania and Bulgaria, at the beginning of 1945, before the nationalisation decrees, production competitions were introduced, and 'labour heroes' were honoured with medals and money grants conferred by the heads of the governments. The 1st of May, 1946, was celebrated in Hungary as a production competition in the private industries. In these measures the Communist Party leaders got the whole-hearted support of the bourgeoisie. Then, after harassing them in this way, they used the same workers as their support in their onslaught on the bourgeoisie, which resulted in its expropriation. This shows the united attitude of the bourgeoisie and the Communist Party bureaucracy towards the exploitation of the masses (piece-work) and the united attitude of the bureaucracy and the working class towards private property (see Part II of the book). 466 471

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466 present, it will not reach the Russian dimensions. It is, as Adam Smith clearly showed, very unproductive, being suitable mainly for manual labour which does not require modern industrial equipment, such as lumber work, road and rail construction, large-scale industrial construction, irrigation works, or canals. The more abundant the machinery and the supply of cultured and skilled workers, the less profitable the use of slave labour. Hence in all probability Czechoslovakia will have less slave labour than Bulgaria or Rumania, and the 'People's Democracies' as a whole less than Russia.

It is very difficult, if not impossible, to distinguish between voluntary and forced labour in a totalitarian regime. If it is not obvious in itself, the following declaration of Tito (to the Joint Congress of the Union of Communist Youth and the People's Youth, December, 1948) will make it plain: 'There are, of course, also such students who are not very keen on voluntary work, or who refuse to take part in voluntary work activities . . . Such was the case of a small number of students whom we had to expel from Belgrade University and other universities . . .'

The Distribution of the Social Product

● 471 Many Communists admit that the bureaucracy in Russia and the satellites have complete control of the state machine and thus of the running of the economy. But they claim that they act entirely in the interests of the people.

To assume that a group of people who are in absolute control of the means of production will not take as much as they can out of the national product for themselves, is tantamount to explaining man's economic conduct by his intentions—a strange method of argument for those who claim to hold the materialist conception of history. The more so when from the same lips we hear that in America and elsewhere, under capitalism based on private property, mere crumbs from the table of the bourgeoisie are a sufficient inducement to bribe and currupt the 'aristocracy of labour'—the trade union bureaucracy, and so forth—and alienate them from the working class. Stalin and his associates have all the food on the table within their reach, and their reach alone, but apparently they are incorruptible, and will remain forever loyal to the working

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people. This double vision sees the molehill as a mountain, and the mountain as a molehill! 471

All the experience of history in this connection points to the inescapable conclusion that if a group of people are in absolute control and ownership of the means of production they will inevitably take for themselves all the benefits they possibly can out of production.

The division of the national income among different income groups is kept strictly secret in the 'People's Democracies', although if the British Government did not publish such statistics the Communist Party would certainly, and justifiably, criticize it for keeping the truth from the people. Nevertheless from fragments of news in the press it is possible to get some idea of the great differentiation of incomes. 465

The official *Free Bulgaria* of 15th March, 1947, states that in Bulgaria the ratio between minimum and maximum salaries in Government employment is 1:5. 'New Yugoslavia, which had adopted a ratio of 1:3.2, is gradually introducing a greater differentiation. France has a ratio of 1:6, the United States—1:10, U.S.S.R.—1:11'. The U.S.S.R. leads all the rest, and is praised for it by the Bulgarian Communists!

Departmental chiefs in Bulgaria got 17,000 leva a year, counsellor-reporters 19,500, counsellor-specialists 21,000 and general secretaries 25,000. This was increased in many cases by a 'supplementary salary' of 13,200-22,800 a year, which raised their salaries to 30,000-47,000 leva a year. As against this the average worker's wage was 357.7 leva a month or 4,292.4 leva a year (*Free Bulgaria*, October 1st, 1947) and many unskilled workers earned 150-200 leva a month, or 1,800-2,400 leva a year (*Free Bulgaria*, April 1st, 1948), i.e., twenty times less than the *parvenu* rulers. There is, of course, no record of the value of the benefits the high bureaucrats get not in money but in kind, such as houses, cars and servants.

In Rumania the minimum salary of a civil servant is Lei 3,328 a month, the maximum Lei 42,600 (*Rumanian News*, 6th February, 1949). Many workers earn as little as Lei 2,000-2,500 a month.

Some information about income differentiation in Poland can be gained indirectly from the table giving the rate of income tax payable by people falling within the different 465 651

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728 642 669 for the maintenance of private property. Immediately after its establishment, the Communist leader, Anton Yugov, the Minister of the Interior, declared: 'This government, of which I am a member and on whose behalf I speak, categorically denies that it has any intention of establishing a Communist regime in Bulgaria. There is no truth in rumours that the government intends to nationalise any private enterprise in the country.' (*The New York Times*, 22nd September, 1944).

642 471 A few months later, at the national congress of the Fatherland Front in March, 1945, another Communist leader declared: 'We are building a democractic country based on private property and private initiative. Consequently the Government by its very nature is reformist.' He severely attacked those members of the Communist Party who opposed the Fatherland Front Government and wanted 'to establish a completely Communist government.' An article in the official paper of the Fatherland Front, *Otechestven Front* (9th March, 1945) described the programme of the Front in these words: 'It is the programme of the Bulgarian workers, peasants, craftsmen and women, honest, intellectual, patriotic individuals, industrialists, merchants and patriotic soldiers.' In a congress of the industrialists of Bulgaria on September 27th, 1945, a Communist Minister, Dobri Terpeshev, said on behalf of the Supreme Economic Council: 'Private initiative will not be handicapped but supported. The Communists intend to revive it because our economy needs your initiative . . . Let us all work without being led on by thought of gain alone.' A year later the Communist Prime Minister, Georgi Dimitrov, declared: 'The immediate task is neither the realisation of Socialism nor the introduction of the Soviet system but the consolidation of a truly democratic and Parliamentarian system.'

642 661 From September, 1944, to October, 1946, the Fatherland Front Government was headed by General Kimon Georgiev who not only played a leading part in the military, semi-fascist *coup d'etat* of Tsankov in 1923, as a result of which tens of thousands of workers and peasants were massacred, but was also the author of the military coup of 1934 which led to the immediate dismissal of Parliament, the terrible persecution of Communists, Agrarians and others, and, for the first time in

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642 471 Groza repeatedly stated that his government was against any socialisation and stood for the defence of private property. For instance, in an interview with the correspondent of *The New York Times* on 26th September, 1945, 'Premier Groza said his Government did not intend to apply either collectivization of land or nationalisation of banks or industries and that the mere question showed an ignorance of its program. Claiming to represent all social strata, he said, the program was to "concentrate all the forces of the nation for the reconstruction of the country and to consolidate a democratic regime" and "in the Government's program there is no nationalization of banks or industries and no collectivization of land"' (*The New York Times*, 30th September, 1945).

Radio Bucharest reported that in a description of his recent talks with Stalin, Premier Groza had said that it was Stalin who had advised him to 'keep the system of private enterprise and private property.'

Nearly three years after the advance of the Russian army into Rumania, Groza still openly opposed the nationalisation of any property belonging to either Rumanian or foreign capitalists, even though the nationalisation of foreign property is part of the program not only of socialists but even of many nationalist movements in countries in which a great deal of foreign capital is invested, such as Mexico, Argentine, India, etc. In a statement to the Bucharest paper *Timpul* he said: '. . . the Government and the Parliament will make every effort possible in order to realize a fruitful field of collaboration for foreign capital . . . (There will be—Y.G.) conditions intended to secure to this foreign capital a guarantee of investment and a just rentability.' (*International News*, Bucharest, 8th January, 1947).

642 661 Even capitalists who collaborated wholeheartedly with Germany were left untouched for more than three years, and the Communist Minister of Justice, Lucreţiu Pătrăşcanu went so far as to point out that Nazi collaborators were far more leniently dealt with in Rumania than, for instance, in France. *The New York Times* correspondent reported on 17th March, 1945: 'Industrialists, business men and bankers will escape punishment as war criminals, under a law being drawn up by Lucreţiu Pătrăşcanu, Minister of Justice, and Communist

[Premier of Rumania since March, 1945 -- Analyst]

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642 1947). A few weeks later the Communist leaders compelled
662 Michael to abdicate (30th December).
665

Hungary

642 The policy of the Communist Party in Hungary in the first
728 stage of Russian intervention was similar to their policy in
● 471 Rumania and it is therefore unnecessary to describe it in detail.[1] The following quotation from the report of Nagy Imre, a member of the Political Bureau of the Party, to its congress in September, 1946, is typical of many declarations: 'While the war was still being fought, we have determined, and this is one of the basic principles, that in Hungary this is not the time for transition from capitalism to socialism, for struggle between the two social systems, but for uprooting the powerful remants of feudalism. It is not a question then of struggle between the two social systems but of the struggle between democracy and reaction within capitalism.'

The connection between this policy and Russia's interest in gaining control of the Hungarian economy (through mixed companies) and in extorting reparations from her, has already been described.[2] Here it is only necessary to repeat that for three years the Communist Party leaders continued to harp upon the same theme, that they were against abandoning the capitalist structure of the country.

[1] [See category 116, pp. 136-141 -- Analyst]

[2] [See category 116, pp. 60-62 -- Analyst]

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668 important questions of social life and State organisation will be
185 settled by the people themselves through representatives who will be properly elected by the people after the end of the war.'

These aims were constantly reiterated by the Partisan press and radio during the remaining three years of the war.

To illustrate the conservative character of the Partisans' social programme, it is only necessary to quote the oath taken by the new Croat volunteers: 'I swear by God Almighty and by all I hold dear that on my word of honour I shall always be true to the traditions of my ancestors. I will always fulfil trust towards the Croat people and will defend with my blood my national home from the German, Italian and Hungarian oppressors, and the traitors of my people. So help me God'. (Radio Free Yugoslavia, 13th June, 1943).

To reinforce this appeal to tradition a confessor or chaplain (vjerski referent) was attached to all the large military units.

668 This policy met with opposition from some members of the Communist Party of Yugoslavia. An uprising in July, 1941, in Montenegro raised the banner of 'Soviet Montenegro', and in Herzegovina, deviations from the Party line by the Party organisation called forth harsh criticism from Aleksandar Ranković, one of the foremost leaders of the Party and today Minister of the Interior. (*Proleter*, December, 1942). In spite of some leftist deviations, however, the Bihać programme was consistently implemented until the liberation of all Yugoslavia.

668 Until the end of 1944, no social changes or changes in
● 471 property ownership were introduced. On 14th February, 1945, Vice-Premier Kardelj insisted in a broadcast that in her economic structure Yugoslavia had not abandoned and would not abandon the general framework of capitalism.

The Bihać programme could be adhered to with comparative ease because the areas in the hands of the Partisans were those to which social conservatism was most acceptable. Both the most industrialised parts of Yugoslavia, Slovenia and Northern Croatia, came into the Partisans' hands only at the end of 1944 or beginning of 1945. The area in which there was a considerable number of rich peasants and German settlers, whose land would have been suitable for redistribution among the poorer peasantry, was also in the North. Thus until the end of 1944 or beginning of 1945 there were not many capitalists

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or rich peasants under their control and therefore no obvious targets for social discontent. 668 471

After that the industrial bourgeoisie was expropriated, without a formal renunciation of the Bihać programme, by the legal confiscation of the property of traitors. It was not until 5th December, 1946, that a nationalisation law was passed and this simply registered what was already an accomplished fact.

Because the Partisans operated far from the industrial centres, they consisted almost entirely of peasants. Although the workers of Yugoslavia supported the Communist Party almost to a man, they played a very small part in the movement. In the words of Bogdan Raditsa, a former press service director of the Tito government: '. . . the working class was far from being a vital factor in the resistance, as the Communists allege in their propaganda. For the workers remained in the big-city factories or were sent into Hitler's labor camps'. (*New Republic*, September 16th, 1946). The peasant character of the Partisan movement explains its original plebeian and democratic character. It also explains why the Communist Party of Yugoslavia could easily impose its conservative programme upon it during 1941-44 and why the Partisan Army was easily transformed into a stratified army, a development common to many peasant guerillas, for instance, the Spanish guerillas fighting Napoleon. 668 701

In the beginning there was real democracy in the army. There were no ranks and no medals and after each operation meetings were held at which each partisan had the opportunity of making a public criticism of any aspect of the operation. For two years during the first four Offensives which put the Partisans to their severest test, this procedure was followed. But on May Day, 1943, the ranks of officers and N.C.O.'s were introduced, and in the next four months about 5,000 officers and 11 generals were created; Tito was raised to the rank of Marshal in November, 1943. In the state administration, the principle of electing People's Committees was rigorously adhered to in the countryside until the Partisans advanced from the mountainous and backward areas to the large towns, when they were no longer elected but *appointed*. When, as sometimes happened, elections were held, they were only a formality, as there was only one list of candidates. The

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668 701 471 The generals, colonels and other officers of the[1] army became the backbone of the new state administration and monopolised all political power. It was this new bureaucratic caste which carried out the nationalisation of industry, transferring all the industrial wealth of the country into its own hands.

Thus the Partisan movement passed from being a plebeian democracy with a progressive policy on the national question and a conservative social programme, to bureaucratic state capitalism.

[1] [Partisan army of Yugoslavia -- Analyst]

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CHAPTER V

LIQUIDATION OF THE PEASANT PARTIES

665 A VERY SEVERE and prolonged struggle took place between the Communist Parties and the Peasant Parties. The latter were neither as black as the Communist leaders painted them, nor as white as the majority of the western capitalist press tried to represent them. The peasant parties were of very diverse character and each of them was far from being homogeneous. Progressive and reactionary, democratic and totalitarian elements were mingled in the same parties. To follow the Communist Party policy towards them it is necessary first to understand the complex character of the peasant parties.

665 Since the economic, cultural and political leadership of a
565 country rests with the towns, and since the peasants of Eastern
471 Europe were dispersed in small, isolated villages, the leadership of the peasant parties mainly came from the towns. The urban population was divided into conflicting social and political groups, and so the question always arose of which class the peasantry would make its ally—the urban bourgeoisie or the workers' parties. The peasantry is divided amongst itself, the rich peasants naturally looking to one camp, and the poor, semi-proletarian majority, to the other. A whole series of socio-political problems is bound up with this. So long as the big estates were not divided up, the peasantry as a whole remained united in the fight for land reform. and their party had a more or less revolutionary character. But with the carrying out of large-scale land reforms after World War I in Rumania, Yugoslavia and Bulgaria (see pages 13-8), there was very little to hold the peasantry together and no common political platform. Another factor must be taken into account. For centuries, the peasants in many countries, as for instance in France at the time of the Great Revolution, wanted to get rid of

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their feudal overlords, take possession of their lands and thus gain the freedom to produce for themselves and sell their products in the towns. Such a programme would have been quite inadequate for the East European countries in the period between the two wars, because of the catastrophic fall in agricultural prices as a result of the world crisis and of the great agricultural over-population. The solution of the problems of the peasantry today is not in land distribution alone, but also in industrialisation which will absorb the surplus agricultural population and open up wide markets for agricultural products. There is a contradiction, at least temporarily, between these two factors and different layers of the peasantry have different attitudes towards industrialisation as well as towards the policy of keeping agricultural prices high (by tariffs).

665 565 471

The poor peasants who need to work at least partly for wages and do not produce enough food even for their own needs, have an interest in industrialisation and low prices for agricultural goods, while the rich peasants who want cheap labour do not care about industrialisation and support any policy which results in a rise in the cost of food. Large scale industrialisation is impossible under present conditions in Eastern Europe without State planning, so that the poor peasant naturally tends to support the socialist forces of the towns while the rich peasant looks in quite a different direction for leadership. After the land reform and in face of widespread unemployment, open and hidden, the rich peasants could not propose any positive programme to rally the mass of the peasantry to their side. Another factor contributed to the bankruptcy of the Peasant Parties of Eastern Europe. While on the whole they favoured democracy, the market for the agricultural products of Eastern Europe in the thirties was mainly fascist Germany. Hence the attitude of many of the leaders of the peasant parties to the pro-German policy of their governments was ambiguous, to say the least. To add to the contradictions in which many of the peasant parties found themselves, was the national question which the conservatism and narrow outlook of the peasantry, especially of its rich and well-satisfied section, precluded them from tackling. In Yugoslavia, Rumania and Czechoslovakia this factor was of the utmost importance in leading the official peasant parties into a blind

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665 alley. If any of the peasant parties succeeded at all in escaping
565 control by the wealthy townsmen or by the rich peasants,
471 capitulation to their semi-fascist government, entanglement in a hopeless and reactionary fight against other nations, as the peasant parties of Poland and Bulgaria did to a large extent, and the terrorism of the government rendered them powerless. Unlike the workers' parties, the peasant parties were loose organisations of widely scattered individuals with the control of the organisation concentrated in a few hands (in the towns) and so they were an easy target for the police.

665 Some facts about the peasant parties in East Europe before the end of World War II will illustrate these generalisations.

The Rumanian National Peasant Party came into being in 1926 by the fusion of the chauvinist, anti-Hungarian National Party of Transylvania led by Maniu, and the Peasant Party of the Old Kingdom of Rumania led by Ion Mihalache. The Party was led entirely by lawyers, journalists, etc.,and a small group of rich peasants. For years it was sharply opposed to the dictatorial King, and there were frequent and bloody clashes with the fascist organisations and the police. But a party under the leadership of rich peasants and their urban allies in a country where eighty per cent of the population was poverty-stricken could never consistently pursue a democratic policy. During his short periods of office between the two world wars, Maniu ruthlessly suppressed the strikes of the miners and railway workers in 1929 and 1933. Although he had been for years one of the leaders of the democratic opposition to King Carol and his agents, yet at a time when there were armed conflicts between the peasant members of his own party and the Iron Guard fascists, Maniu suddenly in 1937 declared an election pact with the Iron Guard, simply as a tactical manoeuvre against his old opponent Tătărescu and after the assassination of the Iron Guard leader, Codreanu, by the King, Maniu offered a refuge in his party to the Iron Guardists. The Peasant Party behaved with extreme brutality towards the Hungarian minority in Transylvania. During the 1930's when democracy in Rumania was reduced to a sham and when the dictatorship became increasingly open and brutal and millions were looking to Maniu for a call to rebel, he went no further than to writing some articles of protest in the press.

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The religious law in Rumania, enacted on 5th August, 1948, is similar to the Bulgarian law. 659

While the Orthodox Church is regimented as the *national Church*, as an agency of the state, the churches whose religious allegiance is not to Moscow, but to the West, inevitably become pariahs. Regimentation and persecution appear side by side.

The Communists' Attitude to the non-Orthodox Churches

The most glaring example of persecution is undoubtedly the treatment meted out to the Protestant priests by the Bulgarian Government. It is not necessary to enter into the details of the accusation made against the Protestant priests at their trial in Sofia in February, 1949, to be convinced that the whole trial was a political move by the State in its campaign to regiment religion. The Protestant Churches in Bulgaria had not the tarnished record of the Orthodox Church, which supported the monarchy in its alliance with Germany in the first and second world wars, blessed the militarists who carried out the *coups d'etat* of 1923 and 1934 and slaughtered tens of thousands of workers and peasants, abetted the semi-fascist dictatorships, and so on. The Protestant community is so small and uninfluential, constituting little more than 0,2 per cent of the whole population (15,744 out of 7,022,000) that it is inconceivable that it could cause serious harm to the people. Yet the Bulgarian Government put fourteen Protestant priests on trial and punished them severely, while it left the Orthodox Church hierarchy untouched.

The Catholic Church in Eastern Europe differs from both the Orthodox Church and the weak Protestant Church in Bulgaria. When Tsar Peter the Great was considering whether to ally the Russian Church with Rome, one factor finally decided him against doing so. This was, as one writer put it, that 'The Pope was a patriarch who would be unamenable to the Tsar and could not be deposed'. (R. P. Casey, op. cit. p. 13). Today this consideration is no less important in determining Stalin's attitude to the Vatican.

For a number of reasons the country in which the conflict between Moscow and Rome broke out in its most dramatic form was Hungary. The Achilles heel of the Catholic Church, 659 471

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659 which appeared to be so strong, lay in the fact that it was a
471 big landowner connected by many ties with the big landlords. This seriously weakened it at a time when the peasants were in revolt against this medieval heritage. In such circumstances the use of religious sanctions to defend secular vested interests is sure to recoil on the Church hierarchy. History has provided ample evidence of this from the time of the Great French Revolution to that of the Spanish Civil War. In the fight against parasitic feudalism during the French Revolution, the resistance of the Church was no stronger than that of the lay nobility. Where the peasants did rally around the priests against revolutionary France, as in the Vendée, it was not because their religious feeling was outraged by the revolutionaries, but because of their attachment to their feudal masters. Where the peasants fought the nobility they also fought openly against the priests. This does not mean that the peasants were not religious. The belief that God watches over man and that there is another life after death, had much deeper roots than attachment to the priests and to the Church which was a big feudal landowning institution. This explains why the same peasants who fought so consistently against the priests between 1789 and 1794 were quite happy to accept the restoration of the Church in 1795 and the Concordat with the Vatican in 1801. When the Kremlin decided to destroy the strongholds of the Catholic Church in Eastern Europe, commonsense, if not a study of the French Revolution, showed them that the priests would be least powerful where they were most completely identified with big land ownership. This was particularly the case in Hungary. When Cardinal Mindszenty, the head of the Hungarian Catholic hierarchy, preached against the land reform and the peasants nevertheless went forward unhesitatingly to take the land which they had worked for centuries without getting all its yield, it was clear that he had lost not only this single battle but the whole war. Cardinal Mindszenty's opposition to the abolition of all titles of nobility, his insistence on being called 'Prince', went against the grain of the poor, downtrodden and suffering peasants. He could not save the day by his appeals to 'democracy' against 'communist tyranny', and so forth, for such words rang false when uttered by a man who for more than two

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decades had supported the White Terror and Horthy's dictatorship, who had preached the extermination of Communists and Socialists, had fulminated as a Magyar nationalist against the Slovaks, Rumanians and other Danubian nations who acquired territory from Hungary after 1918, and had welcomed the extermination of millions of Jews by the Nazis. When the Hungarian Parliament in June, 1948, passed a bill nationalising all Church-sponsored schools, Cardinal Mindszenty, in excommunicating all the Catholic deputies who supported the bill, certainly did not stand on democratic ground. The educational systems in the United States and Britain go much farther in secularisation than this bill, which still maintained compulsory religious instruction in schools to be given by monks and nuns. 659 471

In Poland and Czechoslovakia, where the Church was not a large landowner or an ally of the feudal opposition to land reform,* the Communist Parties were much more cautious.

In Poland, where the main church is the Roman Catholic Church, the Communist leaders were forced to find a *modus vivendi* with it. In a completely opportunistic manner they pandered to the wishes of the Church to an extent which would horrify bourgeois liberals, particularly the French Radicals, to say nothing of atheists.

Polish Facts and Figures, issued by the Polish Embassy in London, reports (December 11th, 1948): 'In contrast to most countries where land reform starts with the division of church lands, Polish land reform left the large church estates amounting to 841,300 acres untouched. In addition to leaving the church's lands untouched, the government also returned lands and goods taken away from the church by the Germans.'

'Religious instruction by priests is provided in each school as part of the school curriculum (government directive of December, 1926). The only children who may be exempted from religious instruction in schools are those whose parents 659 872

*This does not mean that the heads of the Catholic Church, especially Poland, were progressive. We need but mention one of them, the late Primate Cardinal Hlond. He found the time after the Kielce pogrom of 4th July, 1946, in which 41 Jews were killed, to accuse the Jews of backing the present regime and implied that the absurd medieval tales of Jewish ritual murder of Christian children—which had played their part in the pogrom—may not have been without foundation. This was but one incident in the career of this politician-clergyman, an enthusiastic supporter of the rule of the 'Colonels'.

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178 iron as well as consumer goods and benefited by the large
433 market that the empire provided. Significant industrial development also took place in Hungary and in other parts of the empire. Similarly, in Russian Poland important industries were developed, but these suffered from the discriminatory policy of the Russian government and from the lack of communications.

457 Capital for the economic development of this region came
• 471 chiefly from France until the 1890's, when German and Austrian capital became increasingly active. In Eastern Europe in general, and particularly in the Balkans, loans had as much a political as an economic incentive. Since the credit of Serbia, Bulgaria, and Rumania was poor, the bondholders were able to insist on a variety of controls to assure payment. Although a substantial amount of this capital was used to finance armament and eventually wars, investments of permanent value were also made. Notable among these was the railroad from Vienna to Constantinople, completed in 1888, which with its branches formed the backbone of the transportation system of Southeastern Europe.

III

186 Collective security and economic interdependence, as
631 these terms are understood today, were certainly among the motives of the various plans for regional organization proposed for Eastern Europe in the century before the First World War. Yet the nineteenth century was for Europe an age in which war was the exception rather than the rule and national frontiers were not the barriers to trade and to the movements of peoples that they have since become. Although motives of power politics in the modern sense were always present, regionalism in this era was also concerned

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829 government under the control of parliament and of the free electorate. They hoped for a regime which would guarantee all the classical civil rights and which would preserve the independence of the courts. To achieve this, these liberals, regardless of political party, fought against authoritarian tendencies and dictatorial regimes.

829 ●471 Liberals in Eastern Europe, unlike those in the West, were not ardent supporters of the type of economic liberalism that is based on competition in a free market and admits only the least degree of state control. These liberals had in common with the supporters of the capitalist system a belief in the economic and social advantages of the principle of private ownership, but only a few among them had a clear-cut conception of the free enterprise system with its economic and social consequences, as it is accepted in the United States or in other Western countries. This difference of conception between Western and Eastern European liberals can be explained easily. In Eastern Europe, modern capitalistic enterprises (in this area predominantly agricultural), and particularly large-sized enterprises, were in an early stage of development. They were somewhat further developed in Czechoslovakia and Austria, and in the '30's began to attain some stature in Poland and Hungary. Under these circumstances and in the face of the limited resources of individual private entrepreneurs, it is understandable that the Eastern European liberals, desiring the industrialization of their countries, sought state support. They asked protection from the state in the form of high customs tariffs, financial subsidies, and currency, credit, and other protective measures. Thus, from an economic point of view, they were influenced far more by the German than by the Western European attitude. German liberalism, guided by the protectionist theories of G. F. List and by Bismarckian power politics, definitely favored building capitalism with the direct and permanent assistance of the state.

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Contrary to many Germans, Eastern European liberals remained true to political democracy but, in the field of economic policy, they were in accord with German views, giving preference to state interference and support rather than to free competition and individual initiative. 829 471

Differences in the economic development of Western Europe and the United States, on the one hand, and of Germany and Eastern Europe, on the other hand, influenced the thinking of socialists in these countries and account for the differences in their outlook and their method of political action. While Western socialists sought to realize their aims by their own concerted self-help action (in Anglo-Saxon countries and Scandinavia particularly through trade unionism and political influence exercised in parliaments, in Latin countries either through revolution or political infiltration of public institutions), German and Eastern European socialists tended more and more towards economic and political statism. Moreover, the agrarians of Eastern Europe, like the liberals, socialists, and Christian (Catholic) Democrats, also asked for state action to further their economic and social aims. This tendency to look towards the state for aid in economic matters explains why many liberals, particularly in Czechoslovakia, favored vast social reforms benefiting the working class. It is also worth mentioning that the representatives of the liberal-minded bourgeoisie in Czechoslovakia were always in favor of the highly progressive social legislation enacted in that country.

The tendency to ask the state for support in economic matters was a characteristic of the nationalism of Eastern European liberals. On the whole, however, the nationalism of liberals and of many others in this region was no more intense than the nationalism of similar groups in any of the Western countries, and among the liberals themselves there were great differences in interpreting liberalism. 186

In Eastern Europe, liberalism was more closely connected

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728 frontiers were another cause for great migrations. Four mil-
167 lion Poles moved from the territory which was incorporated into the U.S.S.R., and millions of Poles, Czechs, and Slovaks moved into districts formerly inhabited by the Germans. Although these changes alleviated the problem of rural overpopulation in Eastern Europe, there was still, at the end of the Second World War, a surplus population estimated at nine million.

665 The Communist parties in various Eastern European
423 states knew very well how to exploit this situation. They
656 knew that it was vital to the success of revolution that the peasantry should not be opposed to it. They knew that the Russian Revolution had been achieved only because Lenin was fully aware of the desire of the peasant for more land.

• 471 Orthodox Marxist theory required that the land be nation-
423 alized and that it be administered by the state. Land was
662 considered the most important means of production, and it
656 had to be treated as such. This dogma was abandoned by Lenin for tactical reasons. He nationalized land in the Soviet Union during the revolution of 1917, but distributed it under ninety-nine-year leases to small and medium peasants for private exploitation. It was the political pressure of the peasants which forced Lenin to change his political doctrine and implement the agrarian program of the Populists, his political opponents. Lenin and his followers did not approve of the peasant who, according to them, was a relic of the precapitalistic society. It was Lenin's view that "small, individual farming gives birth to capitalism and the bourgeoisie daily, hourly, spontaneously and on a mass scale," and that in the future classless society the peasant was to assume the status of a worker on the land as his fellow in town was a worker in industry.

Political expediency determined Lenin's change in tactics. He supported small agrarian property holders only because

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he regarded the peasant as indispensable to the success of his revolution and to the consolidation of his dictatorship. This policy was reversed by Stalin after 1928 when forced collectivization of land in the form of pseudo-cooperatives (collective farms) was introduced in the Soviet Union. 471 423 662 656

Lenin's agricultural policy was adopted by all Eastern European Communist parties after the end of the Second World War. Being minorities in power, they knew that this was the only attitude they could take to the peasantry, the largest social group in this region. Therefore, they supported small agrarian property holders in the first stage of the development of their agricultural policy. There was only one difference between the Communist agricultural policies of Eastern Europe and Russia. Nationalization of land was not a part of the Eastern European policy, as it had not proved expedient in the Soviet Union and therefore was not contained in the agrarian policy of the Comintern for Eastern Europe in the inter-war period.

The Comintern had taken much interest in the Eastern European agrarian question. In 1923 a Red Peasants International was formed in Moscow as an effort to rally the peasantry to the Communist ideal and to combat the influence of the peasant parties united in the Green International in Prague. The Soviet move to collectivization within the U.S.S.R. in 1929 was not followed by any shift in the agrarian policy of the Comintern. Any mention of collective farming was frowned upon and the whole emphasis was upon attracting or neutralizing the middle peasant by assisting the individual and by supporting with new land reforms the peasant's struggle for more land. This policy was not changed when the Cominform took over the role of the Comintern after the Second World War. 668 656 427

"The land to those who till it personally," was the slogan of all Eastern European Communist parties, and land reforms were carried out in all countries. In Hungary, Albania, 471 423 656

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471 423 656 and in parts of Poland, land reforms were overdue, while in other Eastern European states expropriation and expulsion of the Germans formed the main basis of land reforms. Some forty-eight million acres, including forest land, were expropriated by the governments of which thirty million acres were distributed to some three million peasant families. The remainder was retained by the state.

To dispel any doubts as to the ultimate outcome of these reforms, the distributed land was declared the private property of the new owners, and in most countries it was laid down in the constitutions that "the land belongs to those who till it." The price to be paid by the beneficiaries was low, usually the equivalent of one year's harvest payable in ten to twenty installments. No compensation was paid to the old owners for the expropriated land.

The attitude toward the church and its landed property was less uniform than toward the secular owners. However, after some hesitation, most of the church estates exceeding the maximum size laid down in the land reform laws were also expropriated. In this way the church was deprived of its financial independence and of its economic influence on the rural population.

Even in the Baltic States which were incorporated into the Soviet Union, Stalin's methods were not followed. All the land and its resources, as in Russia, were declared public property and nationalized, and all the land in excess of seventy-five acres was expropriated for distribution, but no collectives were formed. However, through a system of differential delivery and farm taxes, the way was paved for ultimate collectivization.

423 656 All these land reforms had done nothing to solve the old agricultural problem of Eastern Europe. On the contrary, they aggravated the situation. The land became more split up than ever, as larger farms were abolished. The reforms did not solve the problem of technical progress, and made the

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8 Industrial and Social Policies of the Communist Regimes

JAN H. WSZELAKI

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More than thirty years ago, Lenin defined Communism in Russia as Soviet power plus electrification. In our time, the essence of the situation in the countries of Eastern Europe is the Communist police state plus industrial revolution. Local or imported Communists, under the supervision of the Kremlin, have been for years in full control of all levers of power in these countries. Their basic aim in social and economic fields, just as it is in Soviet Russia, is a complete transformation of society through industrial revolution. To this supreme aim and supreme method, all other issues have been subordinated. The process of this industrial revolution with its many ramifications extends into all fields of human activity behind the Iron Curtain, influences the lives of all ninety million inhabitants of the captive countries proper, and will have profound consequences of moral, political, economic, social, and strategic character not only for these countries but for the world as a whole. From the European point of view, the industrial revolution of Eastern Europe is an outstanding historical event. comparable in its implications to the great wars of the present century. We are witnessing

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the gradual decline of the traditional rural and mainly peasant 185
structure of this part of Europe and the emergence of an in- 471
dustrial urbanized society. This transformation is now in full 661
swing and will continue until it runs its course—no one can say when or how—or until external factors end the Russian control of Eastern Europe and its nations rid themselves of their own Communists. Even then, the industrial development of that area will presumably continue, though for different reasons and with vastly different methods. The Communist regimes may go, but the results of the industrial revolution will remain.

This essay is concerned with the effects of these revolu- 121
tionary events on the social and economic development of the countries of Eastern Europe. To cover this involved subject adequately, much time and space would be necessary. The writer must limit himself here to the discussion of the few selected aspects of the problem that he regards as fundamental. Discussion of the industrial targets as established by the single countries in their long-range plans, half or more of which have already been achieved, cannot be included in this study.

Suffice it to say here that all over Eastern Europe the Com- 185
munist regimes are modernizing the existing mines and in- 433
dustrial plants and are building scores of new mines and thousands of large new plants, mostly supposed to produce capital goods as a basis for further industrial production. The anticipated result of the present first series of long-range plans, expected to terminate in less than two years, will be a large increase in the extraction of fuel and the doubling, in some cases tripling and quadrupling, of the heavy industrial potential of the individual nations of this region, some of which had a large industrial output before the last war. This vast operation requires that great numbers of peasants be transferred from agriculture to industry, mining, and construction. Once carried out, the first series of plans is to be

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433 tential in 1938 was, and still is, insignificant. It is claimed that in 1952 the industrial output of the area rose again by about one fifth.

An estimate of the relative industrial strength of the individual captive countries was made recently in a United Nations publication.[3] If the total industrial output of the area at the end of 1952 is taken as 100, the output of Eastern Germany constitutes 34 per cent of this total, that of Poland 27, of Czechoslovakia 21, of Hungary 9, of Rumania 6, and of Bulgaria 3 per cent. The total industrial output of the entire captive area is equivalent, roughly speaking, to nearly 40 per cent of the total industrial output of the Soviet Union.

195 All this rapid, even violent, industrial expansion cannot
• 471 be smooth and is, in more ways than one, terribly expensive.
511 There are no miracles in economics, and wealth can be
464 created at different rates of speed, but not at will. The tremendous increase of the state-owned industrial plant in this area is only feasible because the citizens have been deprived of their individual capital, because the consumer demand is being systematically curtailed, and because more and more of the national income, siphoned off by taxation, inflation, and other methods, is being reinvested in industry. This reinvestment is being done at great cost to agriculture. Quantitative industrial progress is also speeded up by the fact that the police state has the means to make everyone work. The prewar urban unemployment and, to some extent, the huge peasant underemployment, caused by the extreme subdivision of rural property, are things of the past. Billions of man-hours which were wasted before the war in enforced idleness are now used for production or, at least, are on tap for production purposes. On the other hand, a large proportion of the men and women kept in concentration and labor camps

[3] *Economic Bulletin for Europe* (Geneva: United Nations, 1952), Vol. V, no. 2 (July, 1953), p. 84, Table 1.

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produce litt'e, if anything, and the vast apparatus of standing 185
armed forces, of police and poli ical supervision, of party 471 511
machinery and propaganda, does not create wealth but con- 464
sumes it. The onetime waste of unemployment has been partly supplanted by the waste of the immense state machinery of control and compulsion inherent in all totalitarian systems and particularly odious under Communism.

In addition to this costly political overhead, there are three 185
other burdens to the national economies of these countries. One is the cost of planning both on a national scale and in minute detail, an economically unlikely proposition, resulting in duplication of work, omissions, bottlenecks, and other forms of economic confusion. This has been one of the main reasons why the Yugoslav Five Year Plan has never been fully realized. This type of waste can only be eliminated very gradually, if at all. The second type of waste is directly due to Communism. In the free world, private property is fairly 471
generally respected and cared for by its owners and by the public at large. Public property, being the exception rather than the rule, also enjoys respect and cases of vandalism are few. In Eastern Europe, state property is the rule, and very few people give it proper respect. The Communists are aware of this general neglect and the ensuing injury to the economy but believe that in time society will be taught to take care of what is defined as people's wealth. However, during thirty-five years of Communism in Russia, there has been little progress in this direction. The third burden on the state C48
economy is a specific feature of the countries of Eastern 439
Europe. All of them have to pay heavy tribute to the Russian big brother. Russia exploits the captive nations in many ways: by reparations in kind, mixed companies, trade agreements, high prices for imports from Russia and low prices for exports to Russia, maintenance costs for Soviet troops, high salaries for Russian experts and advisers, and the like. These nations cannot express themselves on this topic, but

423 either by the simple process of extending existing land reserves, or
311 by acquisition—sometimes outright expropriation—of "kulak" lands or communally-organized "model" farms. By the close of 1949, State farms in Czechoslovakia, for example, had increased by 600 percent. By and large, however, the areas controlled by the State farms—particularly in Hungary—contained a disproportionate share of non-cultivated land (see Chart V).

In Czechoslovakia, Poland, and Hungary, the State sector comprised an area of considerable importance, and it was on the State farms—theoretically, at least, the highest existing form of "Socialist agriculture"—that the chief Communist hopes rested. It is, in fact, the case that in the East European Satellites, State Farms achieved a higher level of development in general than in the Soviet Union at a comparable stage, since the initiative of the Russian peasantry in 1917-18 prevented the large-scale land seizures on which a State farming system could be based.

423 But in the Satellites, as in the Soviet Union, the primary effort
474 was devoted to the collective farm. In the Satellites, where the land offensive had a thoroughly bureaucratic character, the collective farms offered the additional advantage of *flexibility*. A variety of collectivized farms were created to facilitate the peasants' progress from independent farming to full collectivity. Even the terms used to describe the collective farms—"Agricultural Producers' Cooperatives" in Poland, for example—were designed to blur the true implications and to mask the ultimate purpose of collectivization. Similarly, in Yugoslavia and Bulgaria, the very name for collective farms—*zadrugi*—was a calculated attempt to evoke memories of the ancestral communal traditions of the southern Balkans.

Thus the regimes trod softly in the early years. In Czechoslovakia, for example, four types of "Uniform Agricultural Cooperatives" (UAC) were established from which the peasants—in accordance with the "voluntary" principle—might choose:

Type I Joint tillage of the land, but retention of title in real property contributed, as well as in draft animals, farm equipment, and the harvested crops.

Type II Joint tillage of the land, but title retained in real property, draft animals, and farm equipment; all boundaries plowed over, and plots grouped in "land

CHART V

GROWTH of STATE FARMS 1949 – 1952*

(percent of arable land)

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

* *Scinteia*, October 28, 1952; *Rocznik Statis.* 1949 (Warszawa, 1950; *For a Lasting Peace, for a People's Democracy!* (Bucharest), January 30, 1953; March 17, 1950; September 11, 1953; *Agerpres Milk Year* (Bucharest), No. 2, January 17, 1953; *Pari i Kredit* (Sofia), No. 2, 1948, p. 80.

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compounds"; rent received on land, livestock, and equipment contributed.

Type III Joint tillage of the land and joint care of livestock; basic means of production *purchased* by the cooperative; rent still recognized, but limited to 10-20 percent of the total farm income—the remainder of income distributed according to work done.

Type IV Land and means of production common property; land rent abolished as "unearned income," and each member paid according to work units.

Type I is little more than a peasant partnership. Type IV is the true *kolkhoz*, patterned after the Soviet *artel*.

Similarly, in Poland four types were created, in Hungary and Romania three, in Bulgaria only one. The form stressed at any one period might vary from country to country as the needs of the State and the local strategy of collectivization demanded.

The proportion of collectives which are of the most advanced, or kolkhoz, type varied from one country to another. (See Table 7). In Czechoslovakia and Yugoslavia the vast majority of collectives were of an intermediate character as late as 1951; in Romania and Poland, on the other hand, a majority were of the most advanced type.

TABLE 7

DISTRIBUTION OF KOLKHOZES IN COLLECTIVE SECTOR*
1949 - 1952

Countries	Number of Kolkhozy			% of Total Prod. Coop.		
	1950	1951	1952	1950	1951	1952
Czechoslov.	136	259	—	2.6	4.1	—
Poland	1,275	—	2,113	57.9	—	63.0
Romania	1,027	1,089	1,796	100.0	52.1	56.5
Yugoslav.	806	1,049	—	11.6	15.0	—

* *C:* 1950-1951, *Czech. Econ. Bull.*, Feb. 1, 1953, p. 264. 1952, *Rude Pravo* (Prague), Dec. 17, 1952.

* *P:* 1950, *Trybuna Ludu* (Warsaw), Jan. 7, 1951, 1952 (June), *Wies Liczbach. op. cit.*, p. 131.

* *R:* *Probleme Economice* (Econ. Problems), No. 5-6 (Bucharest), May-June 1953. Also: Gh Gh.-Dej in *For a Lasting Peace, etc.* (*Bucharest*), May 29, 1953.

* *Y:* G. J. Konrad, *op. cit.*

Though the multiplicity of collective forms might be taken to indicate a degree of concern for the individual predilections of the peasantry, the erratic course of Satellite collectivization—the fitful starts, jolts, and abrupt halts from year to year—indicates that the initiative always remained with the Bureaucratic Center. (See Chart VI. Had the peasants in fact ever desired collectivization, or had regime propaganda made appreciable headway in the countryside, a steady rise from 1948 through 1953 might have been expected. Instead, even a cursory study reveals a tendency toward "shock" collectivization and land massing in some years, and an equally abrupt levelling of the curve in other years. (See Table 8 and Chart VI). 423 474

BULGARIA

Cooperative farms, in rudimentary forms, existed in Bulgaria even before the First World War. With the advance of Soviet power into the Balkans, collectivization began afresh; with the exception of Yugoslavia, Bulgaria revealed itself as the most vulnerable of the Satellites. Thus, nationalization of basic industries, virtual suffocation of small enterprise, and firm establishment of a one-party regime were achieved by 1947. The political opposition was crushed, the people subjected to an oppressive State apparatus, and mass collectivization begun in earnest before the actual Communist seizure of power in Czechoslovakia had even begun.

Bulgarian collectivization may be characterized by three distinct stages: the first (1945-48) witnessed the rapid organization of the collective farm system and the establishment of at least one kolkhoz in each community; the second (1949-50), a period of "shock" collectivization without parallel elsewhere in the Satellite sphere, saw the expansion of existing collectives and the creation of hundreds of new collectives, and the third (1951-53) was a period of deliberate consolidation in which only slight efforts were made to extend agrarian control.

For Bulgaria the year 1950 was the turning point, the "spinal year" during which the pace of collectivization approached that of Soviet collectivization. More than 60 percent of the entire task of collectivization was completed in that brief 12 month period; the arable area controlled by the collectives rose from 11.3 to 40 percent of the total national land. The most striking feature of the 1950 Bulgarian offensive was not, however, the number of *new* farms added to the existing system, but the increase in *average size* of

5; Free Europe Committee U-4 (no date) 1954 El Europe El

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TABLE 8

PERCENT OF ARABLE LAND COLLECTIVIZED*
1945 - 1953

	1945	1946	1947	1948	1949	1950	1951	1952	June 1953	Dec. 1953
Bulgaria	3.0	3.5	3.7	6.0	11.8	43.0	47.5	51.0	51.7	51.7
Romania					0.1	2.7	3.1	7.2	7.5	7.5
Hungary					0.5	2.6	8.1	18.2	24.6	20.0
Czechoslovakia**					5.4	16.5	19.0	37.9	40.0	38.0†
Poland					0.3	2.2	3.5	4.8	6.7	6.7
Yugoslavia**		0.9	1.5	2.3	13.3	16.1	18.8	11.4	9.5†	—

* Sources for these figures are given in Tables 11 to 20.

** Agricultural land, not arable land.

† The exact dimensions of the kolkhoz dissolutions which have taken place in 1953 in Hungary, Czechoslovakia, and Yugoslavia have not been made public; the figures given above are based on scattered evidence and official hints *Szabad Nep* [Budapest], Dec. 30, 1953, *Rude Pravo* [Prague], 19 December 1953, and G. J. Conrad, *Die Wirtschaft Jugoslaviens*, [Berlin, 1952].)

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CHART VI

COLLECTIVIZATION IN EASTERN EUROPE*

(Percent of arable land collectivized)

1945-1953



* Data in tables 9 through 17.

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TABLE 9

COLLECTIVIZATION IN BULGARIA*

1944 - 1953

Year	Number of Collectives	Number Formed Yearly	Number Households	Households per Collective†	Average Size Collective†	Hectares per Household†	Number Hectares Collectivized	Percent of Farms	Percent Arable Land
1944	110								
1945	382	272	34,362	90	383	4.2	146,570	3.1	3.0
1946	480	98	41,027	85	359	4.2	172,498	3.7	3.5
1947	549	69	44,100	80	327	4.1	180,040	4.0	3.7
1948	1,100	551	78,900	72	265	3.7	292,380	6.7	6.0
1949	1,608	508	156,483	97	343	3.5	551,572	14.3	11.3
1950	2,587	979	525,628	203	809	4.0	2,092,215	48.0	43.0
1951	2,739	152						51.0	47.5
1952	2,739	0						52.0	51.0
1953	2,747	8	568,989	207	915	4.4	2,512,500	52.3	51.7**

* *Rabotnichesko Delo* (Sofia), May 29, 1950, January 1, 1951, October 28, 1951, January 6, 1953; *Zemedelsko Zname* (Sofia), December 3, 1952, December 2, 1953.

** The figure given by the regime since 1952 for the percentage of arable land is 60.5, and this figure has gained general acceptance among Communist theoreticians and many Western observers. However, it is clear that the figure 60.5 measures a different arable land area than was used in computing the earlier percentagewise figures. The percentages given for 1949 and 1950 indicate that the arable land at the time was approximately 4.9 million hectares; but the 1952 percentage indicates arable land of only 4.15 million hectares. Since the regime has frequently claimed a steadily expanding area of cultivation, this statistical juggling does not make any sense. Therefore, this chart bases its 1952 and 1953 percentagewise calculations upon the same arable land figure used by the regime prior to 1952.

† Calculated on the basis of official data.

the collectives themselves, a rise of some 200 per cent. In this respect 423
Bulgarian collectivization parallels subsequent events in Hungary, 474
where the creation of new farms was accompanied by the rapid growth in the size of the average unit.

Bulgarian collectivization was largely concentrated in the fertile plains north and south of the Balkan Mountains, particularly in the black-earth region of the Southern Dobrudja acquired from Romania after the Second World War. (See Chart IX). Nevertheless, the average size of the farms incorporated into the collectives appears to be little larger than the average of those poorer farms still free. On the face of it, the facts are difficult to explain since the regime continues to concentrate on the richer farms—those producing effectively for the market, though less vulnerable to economic attack—and these, in turn, might be expected to be the middle-sized farms, and larger, in accordance with the general rule throughout the area.[21] The explanation for this paradox is perhaps to be found in the special conditions of local agriculture. In Bulgaria, the most valuable farmlands are not necessarily the holdings of largest acreage.

Thus, in Bulgaria, variations above or below the average are seldom extreme. The uniform structure of the pre-war agrarian economy has impelled the regime to mass small *rich* units, rather than proceed against holdings of any one class.

Significantly, the country which has had the most success in collectivization was the one which found it unnecessary to resort to a wide range of collective forms. Bulgaria has only one form—approaching the Soviet *kolkhoz*.

Romania

To date collectivization in Romania has proceeded more cautiously than in any other Soviet Satellite, excepting only Poland. The paradox of Romanian collectivization is thus that the nation is geographically and politically subject to the most direct and ponderous of Soviet pressures. Yet the "Socialization" of agriculture is little advanced. It is clear from the Romanian evidence that Sovietization is in no sense a uniform process nor collectivization entirely a doctrinaire program; politically Romania fell to the Communists very early in the post-war struggle, but evidently the nation

[21] According to a Soviet source, "in Bulgaria the majority of the members of the . . . cooperatives are middle peasants." (V. Tikhomirov, *Voprosy Ekonomiki*, Nov. 10, 1953, p. 89).

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* Statistički Bilten Poljoprivrede Beograd, No. 6, 1951, p. 5.



* Svobodná Evropa, March 5, 1953.

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CHART IX

COLLECTIVIZATION IN BULGARIA BY DISTRICT*

[illegible]

(Percentage of Villages Joined)



* Statistics from Report on Bulgaria, Institute National d'Etudes et Economiques (Paris), November 1, 1950.

CHART X

COLLECTIVIZATION IN POLAND BY PROVINCE*

1953

(Percentage of Villages with Collective Farms)



* Economists (Warsaw) 3rd quarter, 1953.

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TABLE 10

COLLECTIVIZATION IN ROMANIA*

1949 - 1953

Year	Number of Collectives	Number Formed Yearly	Number Households	Households per Collective§	Average Size Collective§	Hectares per Household§	Number Hectares Collectivized	Percent of Arable Land
1949	56	56	4,058	72	—	—	12,500†	0.1
1950	1,027	971	67,719	66	261†	4.0	268,000	2.7
1951	1,069	42	75,065	70	277†	—	300,000†	3.1
1952	1,796	727	165,411	92	360†	—	700,000†	7.2
1953 (June)	1,980	184	185,000	90	369	4.1	732,000	7.5

* Speech of Minister of the Army Botnaras, *Scanteia* (Bucharest), December 31, 1953; *Scanteia*, April 12, 1953; Speech of Premier Gheorghiu-Dej, *Scanteia*, August 23, 1953; *Scanteia*, March 1, 1953; *Probleme Economice*, (Bucharest), No. 5-6, May-June, 1953; *Voprosy Ekonomiki*, (Moscow), No. 10, 1953.

† These are estimates, calculated on the basis of known ratios between number of collectives, number of hectares collectivized, and number of households.

§ Calculated on the basis of official data.

has presented its rulers with singular economic and organizational problems. 423 474

The two crucial years of Romanian collectivization were 1950 and 1952; these two offensive years alternated with periods of quiescence. In 1952, more than 50 percent of the total area collectivized to date was brought into the "Socialist sector," and in the same year the size of individual collective farms themselves increased rapidly. Though the number of new collectives increased by only 75 percent, the area brought into collectives increased by over 130 percent.

In accordance with the general East European patterns, the Romanian collectives were composed of a high percentage of medium farms, a percentage which increased each year (see Table 11). In 1953, the middle farmers comprised 57.8 percent of the total, the small farmers 35.2 percent, and landless farmers the remaining 7.0 percent. While the average size of all Romanian farms is 3.6 hectares, the average size of farms brought into collectives is 4.0 hectares.

TABLE 11

DISTRIBUTION OF FARMS WITHIN ROMANIAN COLLECTIVE SECTOR*
1949 - 1953

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	1949-50	1951	1952	1953
Medium farmers	32.0	29.4	53.0	57.8
Small farmers	62.4	39.0	37.4	35.2
Landless farmers	5.6	31.6	9.6	7.0

* *Problème Economice* (Bucharest) No. 5-6, May-June, 1953; *Nova Mysl* (Prague), No. 10, 1953.

A unique feature of Romanian collectivization is the establishment of a very "primitive" type of collective, the "Agricultural Associations." Whereas the other countries issue agricultural decrees with a single standard for the entire collective sector, the Romanian agricultural decrees usually distinguish between "Agricultural Associations" and collectives. Including the "Agricultural

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TABLE 12

COLLECTIVIZATION IN HUNGARY*

Year	Number of Collectives	Number Formed Yearly	Number Households	Households per Collective†	Average Size of Collective†	Hectares per Household†	Hectares Collectivized	Percent of Arable Land
1949	1,520	960	37,000	24	137	5.7	208,000	3.7
1950	2,500	1,233	90,000	36	176	4.1	440,000	8.2
1951	4,652	2,152	236,500	51	187	3.7	865,000	16.0
1952	5,315	663	318,500	59	258	4.3	1,374,000	24.6
1953 (April)	—	—	340,000	–	–	4.4	1,494,000	26.8
1953 (Dec.)	4,677	–638	238,000†	51	250	4.7	1,117,000**	20.0

* *Statisztikai Szemle* (Budapest) — various numbers, 1950; *Szabad Nep*, January 25, 1950, January 21, 1951, October 27, 1950, February 26, 1951, December 2, 1951; December 16, 1952, May 11, 1953; Radio Budapest, December 29, 1953.

** Estimated on the basis of the known arable land.

† Calculated on the basis of official data.

Associations", and the State Farms, the "Socialist sector" in Romania comprises 25 percent of the arable land. 423 474

HUNGARY

Collectivization in Hungary proceeded at a steadier pace than elsewhere. The tempo accelerated in 1952 and 1953, but land policy was not characterized by the abrupt twists and turns so pronounced in Romania and Czechoslovakia. Hungarian collectivization paralleled the Romanian and Bulgarian in that acceleration of the drive was accompanied by rapid expansion of the average size of the collectives themselves. Thus, the average collective organized in 1949 comprised an area of only 135 hectares; in 1952 the average new collective was 770 hectares — an increase of over 500 percent!

Again, in accordance with the general rule, the primary target of Hungarian collectivization was middle-sized farms. The average number of hectares per collectivized household (4.4) surpassed the national pre-collectivization average (2.8). Before the wholesale dissolutions attending the Hungarian New Course, the collectivized sector occupied 26.8 percent of the arable land. Three types of collective farms exist in Hungary; the highest class, however, is not as "advanced" as the Soviet artel.

CZECHOSLOVAKIA

In terms of pace at least, Czechoslovak collectivization represents a remarkable achievement—if East European rather than Soviet standards are applied. Despite a late start, the agricultural offensive proceeded more rapidly in Czechoslovakia than in any other Satellite, excepting only Bulgaria.

The land offensive was mounted in two waves, one in 1950 and the second in 1952. Unfortunately, reliable statistics on Czechoslovak collectivization are extremely sparse so no clear picture emerges. Only 1953 figures are available for the number of households collectivized, and these indicate that the land drive was aimed at absorbing the larger, more productive units. At the end of 1952, more than 56 percent of the middle farmers were in collectives of Types III and IV, while only 40 percent of the small farmers were members. For the actual distribution of farm-types in the collective sector as it changed between 1949 and 1953 see Table 14 and for the geographical distribution of the collectives see Chart VIII.

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TABLE 13

1949 - 1953

COLLECTIVIZATION IN CZECHOSLOVAKIA*

(Types II, III, and IV)

Year	Number of Collectives	Number Formed Yearly	Number Households	Households per Collective†	Average Size Collective†	Hectares per Household†	Number Hectares Collectivized	Percent of Agricultural Land
1949	1,700§	1,700	—	—	—	—	375,000	5.4
1950	3,760	2,060§	—	—	302	—	1,134,392	16.5
1951	4,452	682	—	—	293	—	1,305,610	19.0
1952	7,290	2,838	—	—	356	—	2,598,073	37.9
1953**	8,284	994	343,911	41	—	8.4	2,900,000§	40.0

* J. Nepomucky, *Rude Pravo* (Prague), February 15, 1953; *Czechoslovak Economic Bulletin* (Prague), February 1, 1953, pp. 15-16; *Rude Pravo*, December 17, 1952.

** This figure represents the high point in Czechoslovak collectivization; by the end of 1953 the number of collectivised households had fallen off slightly (see speech of Agricultural Minister Uher, printed in *Rude Pravo* (Prague), December 19, 1953).

† Calculated on the basis of official data.

TABLE 14

DISTRIBUTION OF FARMS WITHIN CZECHOSLOVAK COLLECTIVE SECTOR*

—1953—

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Farm Unit (in Hectares)	Percent of Total Farms Collectivized
0-0.5	10.8
0.5-2	22.4
2-5	26.9
5-10	23.5
10-15	13.0
Over 15	3.4
	100.0

* *Zemedelske Noviny* (Prague), May 1, 1953.

Poland

For a variety of reasons, the impact of collectivization in Poland has been slight. The State farms, organized immediately after the Second World War, controlled nearly twice as much arable land as all collectives formed by mid-1953. In central Poland—that is to say, in the regions of Poland's pre-war territories still remaining (excluding the formerly German districts in the West)—collectivization has hardly been invoked. The majority of Polish collective farms are situated in the old German regions of Silesia, Pomerania, and East Prussia—where the transfer of populations, confiscation of German properties, and firm Party political control made collectivization far easier. 423 474

Whether the vigorous land drive launched in early 1953 (and since slowed down in accordance with Satellite-wide political and economic policies) would have resulted in the rapid expansion of the collective sector is now impossible to say. In Poland, the average size of farms collectivized far exceeded the early post-war national average—approximately 7.5 hectares per holding as against 5.9. Thus, the weight of the Polish farm offensive was directed

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TABLE 15

COLLECTIVIZATION IN POLAND*
1949 - 1953

Year	Number of Collectives	Number Formed Yearly	Number Households	Households per Collective†	Average Size Collective†	Hectares per Household†	Number Hectares Collectivized	Percent of Farmers	Percent of Agricultural Land
1949	243	243	—	—	226	—	54,830	—	0.8
1950	2,199	1,946	49,500	23	218	9.4	467,611	1.4	2.2
1951	3,054	855	71,000	23	230	10.1	728,561	2.1	3.5
1952	4,900	1,846	100,000	20	204	10.0	1,000,000	3.1	4.8
1953§	7,982	3,082	189,000	24	175	7.4	1,400,000	5.9**	6.7

* Instytut Ekonimiki Rolnej, *Wies w Liczbach* (Warsaw, 1952); *Economista* (Warsaw), III, 1953; *Zycie Gospodarcze* (Warsaw), September 6, 1953.

§ Official collectivization statistics for 1953 are extremely confused and contradictory. The figures presented here are for June, 1953; in subsequent months different figures were released, but they were so inconsistent that the June estimates are employed here. During the summer of 1953 collectivization came to a halt in Poland, and hence the situation remained approximately static throughout the rest of the year.

** Estimate.

† Calculated on the basis of official data.

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CHART XI

COMPOSITION of COLLECTIVIZED and NON-COLLECTIVIZED SECTORS in POLAND 1953*

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

* Nowe Drogi, (Warsaw) No. 10, 1953, p. 183.

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423 474 against the efficient, surplus-producing farm units. A comparison of the collectivized and free sectors in 1953 is set out in Table 16. While only 40 percent of the independent farms were larger than five hectares, slightly more than 75 percent of those collectivized were drawn from this category.

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TABLE 16

DISTRIBUTION OF FARMS IN POLISH COLLECTIVE SECTOR*

— 1951 —

Farm Unit	Percent of Farms Collectivized
Landless	5.8
0 - 2	6.1
2 - 5	14.2
5 - 10	62.8
10 - 15	10.2
Over 15	0.9

* *Wieś w Liczbach* (Warsaw, 1951), p. 131.

423 474 In Poland the collective sector controls 6.7 percent of the total arable land, as against almost 12 percent organized into State Farms. Four types of collectives exist in Poland; the most developed type approaches the Soviet artel.

YUGOSLAVIA

Yugoslav collectivization is concentrated in two regions: the rich Vojvodina plain, north of Belgrade, traditionally the source of the greatest farm surpluses, and the poor mountainous regions of Macedonia in the South, where land hunger and poverty were extreme (see Chart VII). The collectivization of the Vojvodina was important precisely because of its capacity to produce a marketable surplus for the expanding cities. The collectivization of Macedonia was possible because peasant resistance was slight. In this two-pronged attack, the Yugoslav Communists adhered to the general lines of agrarian policy throughout the Soviet orbit. 423 474

Collectivization in Yugoslavia presents an interesting picture of paradoxical extremes. Prior to its 1948 expulsion from the Cominform, and for a short time thereafter, the Yugoslav regime was the most "advanced" of the Soviet Satellites, swiftly smashing the political opposition, launching a massive program of heavy industrial development, and nationalizing the major economic facilities at an early date. But in 1951, after an interval of indecision, the regime embarked on a program of concession and retrenchment which, in many significant respects, anticipated the New Course later adopted by the entire Soviet sphere.

In common with Bulgaria, the first organizational basis for collectivization was laid down immediately after the war, and the major offensive launched in 1948-49. Moreover, like Bulgaria, the first break in the offensive occurred in 1950. However, the pause in Bulgarian collectivization represented nothing more than a period of consolidation, while the Yugoslav halt grew into the first slow recognition that political and social conditions in Eastern Europe would not permit repetition of the Soviet experience.

The first reaction of the Yugoslav regime to the break with the Cominform was to accelerate the pace of collectivization. Virtually 60 percent of Yugoslav collectivization was achieved in 1949 alone (See Table 17). And if the tempo of collectivization did not reach the pitch attained in neighboring Bulgaria, the struggle between the regime and the peasantry was, if anything, more intense. But it is clear by now that the stubborn resistance of the Yugoslav peasantry—partly responsible for the catastrophic agricultural failure of 1950—was not the only factor working for revision of agrarian policy. A great deal of the dynamism which animated the East European Communists was derived from its Soviet connection.

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TABLE 17

COLLECTIVIZATION IN YUGOSLAVIA*
1946 - 1952

Year	Number of Collectives	Number Formed Yearly	Number Households	Households per Collective**	Average Size Collective**	Hectares per Household**	Number Hectares Collectivized	Percent of Agricultural Land
1946	494	494	25,062	51	246	4.8	121,518	0.9
1947	779	285	40,590	52	270	5.2	210,986	1.5
1948	1,318	539	60,158	46	246	5.4	323,98[illegible]	2.3
1949	6,625	5,307	340,739	52	278	5.4	1,839,978	13.3
1950	6,968	343	418,659	60	318	5.3	2,226,166	16.1
1951	6,994	26	429,784	62	371	6.0	2,595,000	18.8
1952	6,908	–86	—	—	267	—	1,580,000	11.4

*Informationi Priruenik, (Belgrade), Vol. I, p. 767; Review of International Affairs, (Belgrade), Sept. 16, 1952, pp. 16-18; October 1, 1952, pp. 17-18; G. F. Conrad, Die Wirschaft Jugoslawiens (Berlin, 1952).

**Calculated on the basis of official figures.

When these ties were severed in 1948, the Yugoslav Party began to lose much of its initial fanaticism and grew more complacent about its "historic tasks." 423 474

The revision of Yugoslav agarian policy in 1951-52 coincided with a relaxation of strenuous efforts to industrialize the country and a slight liberalization of the centralized dictatorship. When Tito stated in 1952 that long-neglected agriculture was to receive increased State assistance, the drive for collectivization inevitably lost much of its original meaning and force. The kolkhoz was primarily an administrative device to insure increased extraction of produce from the land at low State-determined prices, and if the State intended to increase investment in agriculture, the collectives were no longer a prime necessity.

5. *Summary*

A. This paper has made note of many of the important differences between collectivization in Eastern Europe and Soviet Russia —the greater reliance upon persuasion as opposed to force, the reluctance to open a full-scale offensive against the peasantry, the greater variety of collective forms and the greater flexibility of their usage. However, these were deviations from an historical norm to which the East European Communists were obligated for most of their inspiration. The enormous influence which the Soviet experience exercised upon them was evidenced not merely in the internal structure and organization of the emerging collective farms, but in their basic proportions (see Chart XII). With the exception of Bulgaria and Poland, the basic lines of the East European farms adhered to the pattern set by the Soviets. In the USSR the average collective covered 490 hectares of arable land; it was composed of 78 households; and each household tended 6.3 hectares of land.[22] The size of the Soviet collectives, and the area per household, slightly exceeds the average for Eastern Europe, but the proportions are so close to one another that the direct influence of the Soviet model cannot be doubted (except possibly in Bulgaria and Poland).

The peculiarity of the Bulgarian collective structure is explained by the centralization of each collective around one rural community with the subdivisions of control stemming from that community. The extremely small proportions of the Polish collec-

[22] Harry Schwartz, pp. 266-267.

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CHART XII

AVERAGE SIZE of COLLECTIVES 1953†



AVERAGE NUMBER of HOUSEHOLDS in a COLLECTIVE 1953



AVERAGE HECTARES per HOUSEHOLD in a COLLECTIVE 1953



* 1952
** 1951
† Data in tables 9 through 17.

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tives can only be explained by the great difficulties encountered in the whole Polish collectivization effort. 423 474

It should be noted that the countries with the largest average area per collectivized household are Poland and Czechoslovakia, while the countries with the smallest are Bulgaria, Romania, and finally, Hungary. The reason for this wide range does not lie in the original land structure, since the average collectivized property does not correspond to the average household area of the non-collectivized farms in the respective countries. The difference, then, probably reflects the success of the Polish and Czechoslovak regimes in collectivizing the larger, and more productive, holdings.

TABLE 18

SPHERE-WIDE COLLECTIVIZATION*

June, 1953

Country	Hectares of Arable Land	Hectares of Collectivized Land	Percent of Land Collectivized
Bulgaria	4,860,000	2,513,500	51.7
**Czechoslovakia	6,860,000	2,900,000	40.0
Hungary	5,550,000	1,500,000	26.8
**Yugoslavia	13,800,000	1,500,000***	10.9
Romania	9,750,000	732,000	7.5
Poland	20,760,000	1,400,000	6.7
Total	61,520,000	10,545,000	17.2

*Data in Tables 11 through 20.

**For both Czechoslovakia and Yugoslavia the figures are given in hectares of agricultural land, not arable land, because the most consistent and reliable data are given in these terms. The effect on the percentage figures in the right-hand column is slight, if any.

***Estimated on the basis of regime statements. See G. J. Conrad, *Die Wirschaft Jugoslawiens*, (Berlin, 1952).

B. In mid-1953, when collectivization was simultaneously halted throughout the Soviet sphere, approximately 1[illegible] percent of the arable land of Eastern Europe had been brought into the collectivized

423 sector (see Table 18). Roughly another 10 percent belonged to the
●474 State Farms, bringing the total arable land in the "Socialist sector" to approximately 27 percent.

In other words, in over four years of feverish effort the Communist governments of Eastern Europe had not achieved what the Soviet government had accomplished in less than four months of its collectivization drive in 1929. As Table 18 indicates, Bulgaria and Czechoslovakia achieved the most significant results; Romania and Poland lagged far behind. Yugoslavia and Hungary, which had done moderately well at one time, were to see the results of years of labor washed away in the onrushing New Course.

This failure was all the more notable for the fact that the Satellite governments had at their disposal not only the lessons of the Soviet experience but direct Soviet supervision as well. Certainly the bureaucratic methods employed by the Eastern European Communists, both in taking power over a silent people and in the process of collectivization itself, were partly responsible for this failure. In the next chapter some of the economic mechanics of the new agricultural order will be discussed and perhaps additional light will be thrown on the emerging debacle.

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7:Gluckstein S-4 (no date)1952 El Europe El

471 private hands. In practice, nationalisation was carried out without legal sanction and under cover of a law passed on 24th November, 1944, for the expropriation of the property of the national enemy and his collaborators. On 19th January, 1946, *The Economist* estimated that the proportion of state and co-operative industry in Yugoslavia was 70-80 per cent, and the Moscow journal *New Times* of 15th March, 1946, wrote: 'The Government is in possession of 82 per cent of all industry, while private establishments account for only 18%'.

● 474 After this survey of the ownership of industry in Poland,
655 Czechoslovakia and Yugoslovia, a brief examination is
443 necessary of the control of trade. In all three countries private property lingers on to a large extent in one sphere besides agriculture, that of retail trade. In his speech mentioned above, Roman Zambrowski pointed out that in Poland the state and the co-operatives handle only 25-30 per cent of retail trade (in wholesale trade private ownership is negligible, the state taking 59 per cent of the turnover, the co-operatives 36.6 per cent, a total of 95.6 per cent). A similar situation exists in Czechoslovakia. Of the situation in Yugoslavia, B. Kidrić, said: 'Whereas in 1945, 85% of trade was still carried on through private shops, 12% through co-operatives and only 3% through state shops, in 1946 state shops already participated in trade with 19.2%, cooperative with 32% and the private shops dropped to 48.8%' (B. Kidrić, op. cit. p. 29).

'. . . on March 31st, 1948, private shops still participated with only 1.78%, the state shops with 39.91% and the co-operative with 58.31%'. (Ibid. p. 31).

In May, 1948, a new law nationalised all the remaining private trade in Yugoslavia.

In these three countries, the proportion of the economy in private hands was no greater than in Soviet Russia during the N.E.P.*

Hungary and Rumania

In Hungary and Rumania, Russia's demand for reparations and her schemes for the building of mixed companies which

*According to the Comintern weekly, *International Press Correspondence*, of 26th November, 1927, the percentage of private industry in the total industrial production of Russia in 1925/6 was 18.7 per cent. The proportion of wholesale trade in private hands was 9.4 per cent of the turnover and of retail trade 38.8 per cent (In 1927/8 the figures were respectively 1.5 and 27.0).

7:Gluckstein S-4 (no date)1952 El Europe El

369 standard of life and culture. Conversely, if the village supplied the agricultural products and labour necessary for the towns, industrialisation would have been much accelerated. These two conditions are mutually dependent. But the bureaucracy cannot tolerate a gradual development of agriculture and industry, and prefers to try to escape from the vicious circle by forced 'collectivisation'.

423 All previous land reforms had, for a number of years at
● 474 least, the effect not only of not increasing the agricultural surpluses available for the towns, but actually of reducing them. This is because large estates, based either on tenants' or workers' labour, obviously have relatively larger surpluses than the small peasant farms, even if both have the same productivity. Land reform, by dividing the large estates into many small peasant farms has, as an immediate consequence, a decline in the marketable agricultural surpluses. The surpluses necessary for industrialisation could be obtained by the encouragement of *kulak* farming, but this would be unwise from the standpoint of the bureaucracy, as socially and politically it would raise a new ruling class clinging tenaciously to private property, and economically it would lead to a demand by the kulaks for industrial goods in exchange for their surpluses. The bureaucracy needs a cheaper way of getting this surplus. It might have recourse to taxation and requisitions. But this too can hardly be relied on to provide large enough quantities of agricultural products for quick industrialisation, for the disgruntled peasant can 'go on strike' and decrease his sowing area, or neglect his fields, so that the surplus available for requisition decreases, or he can hide part of his yield, for it is impossible to supervise millions of small peasants scattered in thousands of villages. These drawbacks are virtually eliminated and the obligatory deliveries much more easily secured if millions of peasants are concentrated in some tens of thousands of large farms. The peasants, it is true, may react to their expropriation and herding in semi-serf camps by slaughtering their livestock. This may reduce the total agricultural production for a number of years and famine may stalk the land bringing death in its train, but no matter. If the quantity of agricultural goods in the hands of the state increases, everything is satisfactory. 'Collectivisation' also enables the state

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to supervise the labour power in the countryside, and, if the wages in the towns are not high enough to attract people from the countryside, they will be drawn there by the mechanisation of agriculture and the elimination of superfluous mouths in the 'collective farms'. Further, if capital construction is being undertaken, which demands very little skill and can be done by a large number of workers with very little or no machinery (for the bureaucracy likes to 'waste' as little of the expensive machinary needed for industrialisation and militarisation as possible) the 'collective farms' can provide an ample supply of this cheap labour from the 'kulaks,' i.e. all who dare to show any resistance to the bureaucracy. As yet it is scarcely possible to prove from experience that this will be the fate of agriculture in the satellites, because the process is only in its early stages. That this is the tendency, however, is clear enough, from the developments so far and from the history of agriculture in Russia since 1928. 423 474

The Example of 'Collectivisation' in Russia

The influence of the collectivisation of agriculture on the agricultural output in Russia is clear from the following table: 423 474 241

Year	*Sown Area*			*Gross Output of Grain*	*Cattle*
	Total	*Grain*	*Technical Crops*		
	million hectares			million centners	million heads
1928	119.0	92.2	8.6	733.2	70.5
1929 ..	118.0	95.9	8.8	717.4	67.1
1930	127.2	101.8	10.5	835.4	53.9
1931	136.3	104.4	14.0	694.8	47.9
1932	134.4	99.7	14.9	698.7	40.7
1933	129.7	101.6	11.9	808.2	38.4
1934	131.4	104.7	10.7	804.6	42.4
1935	132.8	103.4	10.6	810.9	49.2
1936	133.8	102.4	10.8	744.6	56.7
1937	135.3	104.4	11.2	1,082.8	57.0
1938	136.9	102.4	11.0	854.9	63.2

(S. N. Prokopovicz, *Russlands Volkswirtschaft unter den Sowjets*, Zurich, 1944, p. 133).

This shows that, ten years after the drive towards 'collectivisation' began, the number of cattle was 10 per cent lower than before, while gross grain output was 16 per cent higher. The main reason for the rise was the cultivation of new steppe lands which required agricultural machinery. The total

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423 sown area rose by 21 per cent and the grain area by 11 per
474 cent.
241 That the productivity of labour in Russian agriculture, despite the mechanisation, was not higher in 1931-5 than in the countries of Eastern Europe is confirmed by the following calculation made by W. E. Moore:

AGRICULTURAL PRODUCTION PER PERSON DEPENDENT ON AGRICULTURE AND PER MALE ENGAGED IN AGRICULTURE, 1931-5 AVERAGE

	Per Person Dependent on Agriculture Crop Units	*Per Male Engaged in Agriculture* Crop Units
Czechoslovakia	45	146
Hungary	33	96
Poland	21	72
Rumania	21	67
Bulgaria	20	70
Yugoslavia	17	55
Albania	10	32
U.S.S.R.	17	53

(op. cit. p. 35)

Even if the improvement in Russian agricultural production after 1931-5 is taken into account, it is clear that her output per male engaged in agriculture was not more than that of Rumania, Bulgaria or Poland, and must have been far short of that of Hungary or Czechoslovakia.

Does this mean that the rulers of Russia failed to achieve what they aimed at by 'collectivisation'? This question can be answered by examining the proportion of the agricultural output taken by the state in the form of obligatory deliveries:

Year	*Total Yield*		*Obligatory Deliveries*			*Retained by Agriculturists after obligatory deliveries*	
			Quantity	*% of Total*	*% of Total*		
	gross	net*	million centners	gross	net	million centners	Index
1927/8	728.0	605.9	112.2	15.4	18.5	493.7	100
1932/3	698.7	570.1	185.2	26.5	32.5	384.9	77.9
1933/4	808.2	677.1	228.7	28.3	33.8	448.4	90.8
1934/5	804.6	669.5	226.6	28.1	33.8	442.9	89.7
1935/6	810.9	677.5	249.3	30.7	36.8	428.2	86.7
1936/7	744.6	612.5	260.0	34.9	42.4	352.5	71.4

*After deduction of seeds from gross yield.
(Prokopovicz, op. cit. pp. 136, 138).

From 1927/8 to 1936/7 these obligatory deliveries taken by the state from agriculture increased from 112.2 million centners to 260 million (i.e., by 131.8 per cent) and the proportion in the gross yield of agriculture which they represented from

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15.4 per cent to 34.9 per cent, and of the net yield from 18.5 per cent to 42.4 per cent. 423 474 241

The obligatory deliveries are virtually direct taxes, as the prices paid by the government for the products delivered is only a small percentage (not even 5 per cent) of the price which the government charges the consumer.

It is interesting to note that Lenin writes in his book, *The Agrarian Question in Russia at the End of the Nineteenth Century* (1908): 'The horseless and one-horse peasants (i.e., the very poor peasants—Y.G.) pay in the form of taxes *one-seventh and one-tenth* respectively of their *gross* expenditure. It is doubtful whether serf dues were as high as that . . . ' The agricultural toilers in the 'Socialist Fatherland' pay much more than that!* [651]

Collectivisation not only transformed into proletarians those who came into industry, but also those who remained in agriculture. The overwhelming majority of agriculturists are in reality, if not in theory, people who do not own any of the means of production: they are compelled to work an ever-increasing number of days on the kolkhozes for very low payment, below even that of the unskilled worker in the towns. The constant rise in the number of days that every household works in the kolkhoz compared with the quantity of grain per household remaining to it after the obligatory deliveries is shown in the following table : [461]

Year	*Average Number of 'Labour Days'† per Household*		*Grain Retained per Household after Obligatory Deliveries*	
	Number	*Index*	*Centners*	*Index*
1932 ..	257	100	15.8	100
1933 ..	315	122.5	19.3	122.1
1934 ..	354	133.4	20.1	127.2
1935 ..	378	147.1	20.5	129.7
1936 ..	393	152.8	17.3	109.5

†A 'Labour Day' is equivalent to the physical labour day of an unskilled kolkhornik. The physical labour day of a skilled worker is equivalent to two, three or more 'Labour Days'.

(*Prokopovicz*, op. cit. pp. 136, 138, 164).

*Although the total quantity of products retained by the agriculturists in 1936/7 was lower than in 1927/8 (352.5 million centners and 493.7 million centners respectively) the quantity per household did not decline, and per capita of the agricultural population even rose. This happened because the number of households declined from 25.0 million in 1927/8 to 20.4 million in 1936/7, i.e., by 24 per cent, and the agricultural population decreased from 122.4 million to 78.6 million, i.e., a decline of 35.8 per cent. The fact that the per capita quantity of agricultural products retained by the peasants after making obligatory deliveries rose, does not mean that the conditions of the majority of agriculturists improved, because it was distributed more unevenly to the disadvantage of the masses. This cannot be dealt with here.

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461 To add to the difficulties of the poor agriculturists, not every-
241 one has to give the same number of labour days. The higher
423 strata of kolkhozniki give far fewer labour days than the poor
●474 kolkhozniki. The reward for their labours, however, is in inverse proportion to the time contributed.

There is less justification in calling the Russian agriculturists of today owners of the means of production than the serfs of the nineteenth century.

Miss D. Warriner in 1940 noted as regards the productivity of Russian agriculture: 'Russia both before and after collectivisation had a lower productivity than Eastern Europe . . . Russian collectivisation has not really achieved much increase in productivity through reforming the peasant system. Yields are still lower in Russia than in every part of Eastern Europe, cattle density is still much lower . . .' (*Eastern Europe after Hitler*, London, 1940, p. 4). In another place Miss Warriner writes: '. . . the physical output per man in corn is slightly higher in Russia than in the very poorest regions of Eastern Europe, and the value in terms of industrial products certainly lower'.
511 (*Economics of Peasant Farming*, London, 1939, p. 188). As
423 regards the standard of living of the Russian agriculturists in
474 relation to those of Europe Miss Warriner says: 'As things are
241 at present, on the basis of purchasing power, the Russian farmer is certainly not so well off as the peasants in Poland'. 'On the Russian farms meat consumption must be mucn lower than in Poland, and milk consumption must be lower also'. (Ibid. pp. 188, 189).* To gain a rough idea of what the standard of living of the Polish peasant was before the war, we quote the following passage: The Polish peasants' 'poverty was proverbial. It was said that during the depression the peasant would split a match four or five times, and would boil potatoes over and over again in the same water to save the salt . . . According to the Polish Minister of Finance the average cash income of the peasant in 1934-5 was eleven groszy (about one penny) a day . . .' (Henryk Frankel, *Poland, The Struggle for Power 1772-1939*, London, 1946, p. 134).

Miss Warriner's analysis, based on Soviet statistics, conforms

*It is regrettable that Miss Warriner in her new book *Revolution in Eastern Europe* (London, 1950) in the chapter 'Collective Farming' overlooks what she herself wrote on the question of collectivisation in Russia in *Economics of Peasant Farming* and also in *Eastern Europe After Hitler*.

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with the conclusion Victor Serge reached from his direct [511] contact with Russian toilers: 'The vast majority of the peasants 241 live more poorly than before the collectivisation, that is, on 423 the whole, at a level lower than pre-war' (i.e., pre-World War I) 474 (op. cit. p. 37).

The peasants did not gain anything out of the 'collectivisation', but that does not detract one iota from the success of 'collectivisation' from the standpoint of bureaucratic state capitalism.

Miss D. Warriner was quite right when she said of the results of 'collectivisation' in Russia: 'Apparently, then, most of the increase in output could have been achieved by extending the State farms in the sparsely settled and uncultivated regions, without collectivizing the peasant villages in the already settled parts; had there been no collectivization, then all the loss of capital through livestock slaughter would have been avoided and corn production in 1931 and 1932 would have been maintained'. (*Economics of Peasant Farming*, op. cit. p. 174). This is true. But then the state would not have got such a large part of the agricultural output for nothing!

The Satellites Follow in the Footsteps of Russia

Undoubtedly the circumstances in which the collectiviza- 423 tion of agriculture is being and will be carried out in the 474 satellites are to some extent different from those in which it was carried out in Russia. In part they will moderate its results, and in part will render them more severe. The moderating influence will be the lesson learnt from the experience of Russia, which will prevent the Communist Party from making similar mistakes in the satellites; namely, rushing through 'collectivisation' at a feverish pace, far outstripping the development of the necessary technical basis for large-scale farming, and then hastily retreating;* and secondly taking all the livestock—cows, sheep, poultry—away from the peasants and putting them into the kolkhozes, and then reversing their policy after half the livestock had already been slaughtered.

*In October, 1929, 4.1 per cent of all the peasants were included in kolkhozes. Five months later, on 10th March, 1930, 58.0 per cent were. There followed a hasty retreat, and in September of the same year only 21 per cent of the peasants were in kolkhozes. Only after this mismanagement did the tempo of collectivization begin to be less erratic, even though the compulsion to enter the kolkhozes remained very strict for the peasants.

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423 The Eastern European governments will avoid such damag-
●474 ing twists and turns.[1] According to the Plans, the technical
[185] basis for collectivisation will be much better prepared than it was in Russia. In 1933 in Russia, when 65.6 per cent of the peasants were in kolkhozes, there was one tractor per 615 hectares of arable land. When the current Plans are completed, the *minority* of peasants in the satellite countries will be in co-operative farms while there will be one tractor per 290 hectares. The co-operative farms in the 'People's Democracies' are leaving the majority of the livestock to the peasants as their private property, and are even compromising with the private interests of the peasants on the question of co-operative cultivation of the land, as can be seen from an examination of the types of co-operative farms in these countries.

In Hungary there are three types of co-operative farms:

1. The lowest, in which ploughing and sowing alone are done collectively while further cultivation and harvesting are done by the individual peasants. Draught animals or machines for the ploughing and sowing are obtained from the members or from the nearest State Tractor Station. In the former case, the members who own the draught animals or machines are paid a customary rent for them. Each member pays the cost of ploughing and sowing according to the quantity and quality of land he owns.

2. The intermediary type is similar to the lowest type except for the fact that harvesting and threshing are also done collectively.

3. In the highest type all the land is pooled for common cultivation, except for about two acres which are kept by each member as his private plot. Members are paid wages according to the amount and quality of work they do and rent according to the quantity and quality of land they contributed. No more than 25 per cent of the profit may be set aside for rent.

In Russia the peasant belonging to the lowest form of 'co-operative farm'—the kolkhoz—is allowed less private property than members of the highest form in Hungary. In many districts no kolkhoznik is allowed to own more than 0.6 acres, in others 1.2 acres and, in a small number of districts,

[1] [See category 116, p. 115 -- Analyst]

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2.4 acres, and no rent is paid for the land contributed to the kolkhoz. 423 474

In Yugoslavia there are four types of co-operative farms. In the first and second types, the land remains the private property of the co-operative member, and rent is paid for it. In the third type the land remains private property but no rent is paid for it. The fourth type is like the Russian kolkhoz. At present the overwhelming majority of co-operatives belong to the first two types.

In the Bulgarian co-operative farms the net income is generally divided thus: 60 per cent is distributed among the members according to the number of working days they contribute, 30 per cent is paid out in rent in proportion to the quality and quantity of land brought by each peasant into the collective farm. The 'Model Statute of the Co-operative Farms' (adopted by the Second National Conference of Co-operative Farm Representatives, held on April 5–7, 1950) describes another mode of distribution of the income: '. . . a number of working days, from 1 to 5 per decare (1 decare= 1/10 hectare—Y.G.) of land, depending on the quality of the land, fixed by the General Meeting as rent is given as a bonus to every co-operative member. In this way the working days given to every co-operative member for his pooled land are added to the working days contributed by him with his labour, and for the sum of these working days he receives agricultural and animal products and cash'. (Article 17b). For a hectare the owner gets a rent of 10 to 50 days. Since the maximum amount of land permitted a person is 20 hectares (except for Dobrudja where it is 30 hectares), a peasant who gives 20 hectares to the co-operative farm will receive a rent equal to the wages of 200 to 1,000 working days. The co-operative farm thus does not equalise the peasants and abolish exploitation (even if we discount the exploitation of the co-operative as a collective by the state bureaucracy through obligatory deliveries, the fixing of prices for agricultural goods, etc.).

There is another important difference between the agricultural working co-operatives in Eastern Europe and the kolkhozes in Russia. When a peasant leaves the kolkhoz or is expelled from it he loses all rights to the kolkhoz's property;

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423 when a peasant leaves the agricultural co-operative, he is
● 474 allowed, at least according to the law, to detach or sell the property he contributed or the plot he received in exchange.

On the other hand there are two factors which will render the results of 'collectivisation' in the satellites more severe than in Russia: 1. As we have seen, the increase in the grain output which followed upon 'collectivisation' in Russia was due in the main to the great extension of the area cultivated; but such an extension is out of the question in the countries of Eastern Europe. 2. Although Eastern Europe is not as suitable for meat and milk production as Western Europe, but, like Russia, is much better for growing corn, it already has many more branches than Russia of intensive farming (milk, pork, vegetables, wines, tobacco, etc.) whose prosperity is dependent on the existence of an urban population with a high and rising standard of living. The present regimes do not augur well for such a development.

Peasant Resistance

423 Although 'collectivisation' has hardly begun in the 'People's
474 Democracies', the agricultural policy of the governments has
668 already met with a peasant resistance which is on the increase. It is partly resistance to requisitioning and a protest against the lack of industrial goods and partly resistance to 'collectivisation' (of course these two reasons cannot be separated in practice).

Just as it was natural that the resistance of the working class to the industrial policy of the governments of Eastern Europe appeared earliest and was strongest in Czechoslovakia, the most industrialised country in the region (except for the Soviet Zone of Germany and Austria), so is it natural that the peasant resistance to their agricultural policy is boldest in Bulgaria. The reasons for this are: first, Bulgaria is the country least affected by the land reform, so that the peasants have not much to thank the Government for on this score; secondly, Bulgaria has the highest percentage of peasants engaged in small-scale intensive farming—tobacco, grapes, roses—so that the inducement needed to break their opposition to

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'collectivisation' is the greatest; thirdly, the basis upon which the industrialisation of the country is taking place is the weakest (except for Albania), and the industrialisation plan is the most ambitious (except for Yugoslavia), so that the need to squeeze the peasant is the most desperate.* This last point is clearly illustrated by the targets of the various Plans, all of which aim at the 'collectivisation' of only a minority of the peasants—except the Bulgarian plan, which by 1953 aims to have 60 per cent of the peasants in co-operative farms.

The peasant resistance took the characteristic form of non-delivery of their quota of products. Despite the good harvest in 1948, by October 10th only one district had delivered its quota, 13 districts had delivered between 80 and 90 per cent, but many more had not even fulfilled half the quota. (*Rabotnichesko Delo*, organ of the Communist Party, October 15th and 17th, 1948). 1948 was bad enough, but 1949 was much worse. The sowing quotas were nowhere near completion on the final date, March 15th. Only 56 per cent of the wheat quota was completed, 45 per cent of the rye, 55 per cent of the barley, 51 per cent of the oat, and 14 per cent of the sunflower quotas. (*Otechestven Front*, 25th March, 1949). The Ministry of Agriculture reported that many villages met great obstacles in collecting grain. In the village of Dimitrievo, for instance, the Village Council showed no effort to fulfil its duty and barely 1,200 kilos of grain were turned in. The co-operative of Yaborovo village refused to give up its allocation. Many villages had very inadequate granaries, etc., etc. (*Otechestven Front*, 31st July, 1949).

That even members of the Communist Party were taking part in the resistance of the peasantry to the Government's agricultural policy was made clear in Dimitrov's speech at the Fifth Congress of the Bulgarian Communist Party (December 19th, 1948): 'In some villages there were "Party members" and even Party leaderships who did not head the campaign for ensuring food to the people and even de facto sabotaged the delivery of cereals. The same holds true for some village Communists who do not help and sometimes impede the creation

*Yugoslavia, too, did not undergo an extensive land reform, and its very ambitious plan for industrialisation is also based on a very low technical level. But there the peasants are much more tolerant towards the government, because of the threat of Moscow to it.

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423 of co-operative farms'. (G. Dimitrov, *Political Report to Fifth*
474 *Congress of the Bulgarian Communist Party*, Sofia, 1948, p. 80).*
668 The extent of the peasant resistance and its causes were admitted to at the Plenum of the Central Committee of the Bulgarian Communist Party on June 11th and 12th, 1949, where in an excess of 'Bold Self-Criticism', the Party laid bare its 'mistakes' and promised to relax its stringent policy towards the peasantry.

Shortly before the Plenum the Acting-Premier had said that 'no progress was registered since September 9th, 1944, in the output of cereals despite the import of tractors and other agricultural machinery and considerable agro-technical improvements'.

One of the reports to the Plenum says:

'We must admit that we have fastened the screw too tightly in our relations with the medium farmer . . . We must unloosen the screw and switch over to methods which will induce the farmer and especially the medium peasant, by an appeal to his self-interest, to improve and increase his production.'

The Plenum Resolution says:

'Excesses have occurred in the system of quota purchases, which have led to the requisitioning of practically the entire

*Two years later, in his report to the Plenum of the Central Committee (7th and 8th October, 1950) the new General Secretary, Vulko Chervenkov, gave many more details about the sabotage of the agricultural deliveries by Communist Party members and organisations. He said: ' . . . the former Minister of Home Trade last year, under pressure of various appeals from local organs, arbitrarily, quite irresponsibly, without the permission of the Central Committee of the Party and the Government, reduced three and a half times the plan for state grain deliveries. He was unable to grasp the fact that the appeals of the local organs reflected the pressure of private landowners and kulaks against the interests of the state.' ' . . . the party organisations in the districts of Bourgas, Gorna Oryakhovitsa, Rousse and Kolarovgrad . . . yielded to the pressure of a number of primary organisations which expressed private and kulak interests and attempted to wreck the plan for collecting the deliveries . . . ' The same crimes are attributed by Chervenkov to the first secretary of the Stalin District Party Committee, the vice-chairman of its People's Council and the representative of the Central Committee of the Party and Government whose special task was to inspect the collection of the state grain deliveries in the district. 'The District Party Committee and the District People's Council' of the Pleven district 'fell into the hands of the kulaks'; 'the inspector of the Central Committee of the Party attached to the Pleven district played an unenviable role'. In every possible way he supported the local leadership in its 'attempt to attain a reduction of the plan . . . ' The same crimes are attributed to the leadership of the Party and People's Council in Vratsa district and the representative of the Central Committee there, Dimiter Dimov, who was at the same time a secretary of the Central Committee of the Party and a member of the Political Bureau. And this happened after the big 'purge' of 'Kostovists' in 1949!

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marketable part of the produce at fixed low prices. This applies especially to grain farmers, who constitute the huge majority of our peasantry. In this way agricultural producers have been to a large extent deprived of their personal interest in developing and increasing production, improving its quality and generally raising the productivity of agricultural labour . . .'

'In the formation of the co-operative farms, instead of strict compliance with the laws, Government directives and Party instructions, throughout almost the whole country there have been irresponsbile requisitionings of the best and most favourably located land, which is incorporated in the co-operative areas, while the private farmers are given in exchange distant and barren plots. Farmers are not being compensated in accordance with the quantity and real value of the land.'

' . . . peasants are forced to join co-operative farms while they are still unconvinced of their advantages . . .

'To this end the Plenum decides:

'1. That fundamental changes be made in the system of quota purchases so that, while preserving the principle of progressive quotas, agricultural producers shall be left the greater quantity of their excess stocks to sell them freely to the state, cooperatives and consumers at free prices.

'2. That a real and fair correlation be established between the price of cereals and the price of other agricultural products, industrial goods and artisan services; that the prices of cereals be raised . . .

'5. That producers be guaranteed the freedom to sell their surpluses directly to consumers, after delivering their quota to the state . . .

'8. That the supply of the village with staple industrial products, both from local industry and from abroad, be improved . . .

'10 . . . . returning in certain places fields wrongly requisitioned from private farmers who received in exchange land of less value'. (Quoted by *Free Bulgaria*, 1st July, 1949).

The extent to which the Government overdid the exploitation of the peasantry was revealed even more clearly both by the evidence given during the Kostov Trial about the position of the agricultural population, and from the rise in the official prices for agricultural products after the June Plenum.

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423 In the Trial the defendant Nikola Pavlov stated that for
●474 some years up to the end of 1948 there had been 'a strict quota system which oppressed the peasants'. '. . . the quota system attained such proportions, that almost everything produced by the peasants was taken away from them, according to this order, and only such a part was left to them, which could only cover the current needs of their families. The quota system included almost all rural produce which served for direct consumption by the population, such as wool, eggs, meat, milk, potatoes, even including apples, chestnuts and peanuts . . . ' This produced a sharp reaction. 'The peasants not only did not sow all areas that they had sown till then, but began to diminish them'. The deposition of Kostov showed very clearly that the poor peasants suffered no less from the quota system than the rich and medium peasants, and were no less discontented. 'The discontent of the poor peasants was also caused by the decree for the collection of wool . . . according to which even peasants owning 1 or 2 sheep were not exempted from the delivery of wool'.*

435 The extreme hardship the quota deliveries imposed on the[1]
474 peasants is illustrated by the fact that in 1948 they totalled
423 about 11 milliard leva, while free market sales totalled only 715 million.

How low had been the prices paid for the products taken from the peasants is revealed by the extent to which they were raised after the June Plenum: hard wheat was raised from 19 leva per kilogram to 25 (31.6 per cent); ordinary wheat from 17 to 23 leva (35.3 per cent); rye and oats from 15 to 20 leva (33.3 per cent); barley, millet seed and corn from 13 to 18 leva (38.5 per cent); sunflower seed from 25 to 30 leva (20 per cent); dried beans from 30 to 60 leva (100 per cent); lentils from 44 to 55 leva (25 per cent). (*Otechestven Front*, 2nd July, 1949).

*The question arises why we accept this part of the evidence when we consider the Trial as a whole to be a frame-up. (See pp. 301-2). It is one thing to believe in the reality of the meat shortage, the obnoxious character of the quota system and so on—which are known to everyone who lives in the country—and another to believe that only Kostov and his co-defendants were responsible for it, while the rest of the leadership saw nothing of it for three or four years. If we look back at the 'trials' of 'witches' in the middle ages, we may disagree with the 'prosecutor' when he accused the 'witch' of causing the outbreak of a plague, but still accept the accusation as evidence of the existence of a plague at the time.

[1] [Bulgarian --- Analyst]

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The resistance of the peasantry has also compelled the government to slow down its drive for 'collectivisation'. On November 15th, 1949, *Otechestven Front* said that eighty-six government commissions had been set up to remedy mistakes in connection with the collective farms. They had to inquire into the activities of 1,264 co-operative farms (two-thirds of all the co-operative farms in the country) and examine 61,854 complaints of illegal requisition of land from peasants who had not joined the co-operatives. In 35,311 cases the land had been restored to its previous owners and those responsible for the mistakes punished.

The Bulgarian government is, it seems, compelled to go gently with the collectivisation drive, but it nevertheless does not renounce its aim. While on January 1st, 1950 there were 1,600 co-operative farms with 156,500 families and 1,377,050 acres, on October 1st, the number of co-operative farms reached 2,249, with 474,800 families and 4,707,700 acres. Thus 43.4 per cent of the agricultural population is in co-operative farms. (Vulko Chervenkov's Report to the Central Committee of the Communist Party, October 7th and 8th, 1950).

Bulgaria is not the only country to experience peasant resistence to government policy. There is a food shortage in Czechoslovakia. The Russians are not responsible for this, as they buy scarcely any agricultural products from Czechoslovakia. Nor does Czechoslovakia export much food to other countries. There was a drought, it is true, but that was two years ago, and even at that time the number of livestock compared with pre-war was better than in any of the other satellites. Moreover the population was much below its pre-war number owing to the expulsion of the Sudeten Germans. The reason for the shortage must therefore be ascribed, at least partly, to the resistance of the peasants to delivering their products to the Government. The peasant resistance also expresses itself in the slowness of the progress of collectivisation. The Minister of Agriculture, Julius Duriš, said at the 9th Congress of the Communist Party, that in only 208 villages out of 13,000 were farm co-operatives operating (*Lidové Noviny*, 28th May, 1949). There had been many cases of almost open revolt at village meetings convened by the Communist Party to launch

7:Gluckstein S-4 (no date)1952 El Europe El

423 cooperatives, while other meetings had been boycotted by the
474 peasants. The General Secretary of the Party, Rudolf Slansky,
668 went as far as to say: 'The Party has failed to organise an explanatory campaign within its own rank and file, with the result that some Party members, not having been made to understand the significance of the co-operatives and not having been persuaded of their usefulness, have begun to waver and to fall under reactionary influences.'

Poland has had its troubles too. The Government was obliged to supply the wheat growers with far more industrial products than it had planned to do, and at lower prices than were prevailing on the free market. (*Glos Ludu*, May 4th, 1948). Other manifestations of peasant resistance disturbed the countryside. According to *The Times* of 25 January, 1949: 'During the last few weeks of 1948 at least 20 cases were published in the Government-controlled newspapers of Communist organizers killed while on duty in country districts. Most people think the figure much higher'. The Government in alarm retreated, and instead of carrying out its ambitious plan of organising 7,400 co-operative farms in 1949, reduced its target to a mere 200. (*The World Today*, August, 1949). The peasant resistance, although strong enough to slow down the collectivisation drive, did not divert the Communist leaders from their aim. On April 1st, 1949, there were 40 producer co-operatives in Poland; by October 1st, 145; by February 1st, 1950, 332, and by March 5th, 590. Of these 590 co-operative farms, 345 have been founded on a statute similar to that of the Russian kolkhozes, 192 are of what is called the second lowest type: 30-40 per cent of their net income is distributed as rent for land and implements pooled in the co-operatives and 60-70 per cent as wages for labour. 53 were of the lowest type: common cultivation of privately-owned land. (Roman Zambrowski, Secretary of the Central Committee of the P.P.R., in *For a Lasting Peace, For a People's Democracy!* March 10th, 1950). We may assume that the tempo of 'collectivisation' will be accelerated after the first experiments have been completed. An important step in hastening the 'collectivisation' was the decree that put the zloty at par with the Russian rouble: every peasant had until 13th November, 1950 to give up 100 old zloty for one new one, while as regards workers'

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wages and prices three new zloty were changed for 100 old zloty. With their meagre savings swept away, the peasants' resistance to collectivisation will be weakened. 423 474 668

Rumania has also experienced great peasant resistance to 'collectivisation'. In June, 1949, the government had to take strong measures against a partisan movement in the countryside, strongest in the Banat region. The government called the resisting peasants 'kulak hooligans', but a mere glance at its extortionate demands from the peasants belies this accusation. Every farm, down to the very smallest, must deliver large amounts of grain for low prices. For example, a peasant who has a farm of only 3 hectares must deliver 22 per cent of the yield for less than 20 per cent of the free market price. (*Neue Zürcher Zeitung*, 7th April, 1949). No wonder the peasants rebel. The 'collectivisation' of Rumanian agriculture is still at its beginning: in September, 1949, the number of co-operative farms was only 55.

In Hungary the government was very careful in approaching the problem of 'collectivisation' and for a long time denied any intention of proceeding with it. Thus, for instance, in a speech before a peasant meeting in Debreczen on June 29th, 1947, Premier Lájos Dinnyes said: '. . . . if the Government had any intention of creating kolkhozy it would not have carried out the land reform. What is good in one country is no use in another. A Hungarian Government which aimed to give up the principle of private property would be digging its own grave and the nation's. We aim to fortify the new peasantry'. (*The Times*, 30th June, 1947). After a certain amount of manoeuvring, nevertheless, the Hungarian Government did proceed to 'collectivise' agriculture, but it did so carefully and slowly. Up to November 1st, 1949, co-operative farms made up only 3.5 per cent of all the arable land of the country, and state farms another 3.5 per cent. Since then it has advanced considerably. In May, 1950, co-operative and state farms made up 17.8 per cent of all the land under cultivation. 423 474

In general it can be said that the process of 'collectivisation' is full of contradictions. Its aim is to secure food supplies and agricultural raw materials for the towns and for export, in order to facilitate industrialisation, as well as to get the necessary supply of labour power for industry and public work.

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423 The greater the speed of industrialisation, and the smaller the
474 existing amount of capital relatively to labour, the greater the speed of 'collectivisation'. Hence Bulgaria and Yugoslavia have gone much further along this road than the other 'People's Democracies'. At the same time, the greater the tempo of industrialisation, and the greater the subordination of the people's consumption to the needs of capital accumulation, the less the readiness to wait for the establishment of 'collectives' until the technical conditions for large-scale agricultural production (sufficient tractors, combines, etc.) exist, and until the peasants are convinced that large-scale agricultural production is superior, a conviction which depends largely on the readiness or otherwise of the government to supply the peasantry with industrial consumption goods. Social-political factors—the fear of the government, first of all, that it will be isolated or strongly opposed by the peasants—can modify the extent, the speed and the ruthlessness of the 'collectivisation' process.*

The Primitive Accumulation of Capital

000 When the British bourgeoisie first arose it had to drive the peasants off the land in order to get the surplus agricultural produce for the towns as well as the reserves of labour it needed for its growing enterprises. Britain went through this phase of development mainly in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries, of which Marx wrote: 'The history of this . . . is written in the annals of mankind in letters of blood and fire'. (*Capital*, Vol I, p. 786). In its rise the Stalinist bureaucracy must repeat the same process so as to get the wealth of the country under its control.

But much more blood flowed in Russia during this 'primitive accumulation' than in Britain. Stalin accomplished in a few hundred days what it took Britain a few hundred years to accomplish. The scale on which he did it and the success with which he carried it out completely dwarf the actions of the English landlords who let the 'sheep devour man'. They bear grim witness to the superiority of modern industrial economy concentrated in the hands of the state, under the direction of a ruthless bureaucracy.

*See pp. 246-8

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452 and supplied him with goods. Frequently he had a strong
185 and pernicious hold on the peasant.

Therefore, the cooperative movement began with the
474 foundation of credit societies which formed a very large
668 proportion of all cooperatives. Besides these, there were co-
656 operative societies which supplied agricultural needs such as tools and seeds, traded agricultural products, and processed all sorts of produce. In Bulgaria, Hungary, and Rumania the cooperative movements were state-controlled. In Czechoslovakia the movement was independent but favored by the state; in Poland, beginning with the economic depression of the 1930's it was state-supported and therefore dependent.

The cooperative problem was a difficult one. On the one hand, cooperation among economically weak peasants could not succeed unless there was some collaboration with, or help from, the central authorities. On the other hand, such a relationship between strong and weak tended to develop into state domination of the cooperative movement.

474 The administrators of the cooperatives sometimes abused
452 their prerogatives. They would occasionally grant government loans, not in response to genuine needs or because of commercial considerations, but with a view to the substantial number of votes which one cooperative society could guarantee at election time. In some instances, cooperatives served only well-to-do peasants because some governments were opposed to the social revolutionary ideology of the smaller peasants. In Rumania the cooperative societies were forced to assume the function of the tax collector. In Hungary the cooperatives belonged to the peasants in appearance only. In reality, they were capitalist enterprises and were not in peasant hands.

Except in Czechoslovakia, agricultural cooperation did not play any decisive role in the economic life of the peasantry, nor was it able to alleviate the existing adverse

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conditions. Credit was no real help unless the peasant had 474 ●
a reasonable expectation of being able to pay back what 452
he had borrowed. In many cases this hope was negligible. A large proportion of the money which the peasants, particularly the small peasants, borrowed went to buy consumer goods. Thus, greater indebtedness did not point to a higher degree of investment, but to the extreme poverty of the small farm.

There was some state help for this situation, especially 474
during the world-wide depression of the 1930's. In Bulgaria 452
and Rumania agricultural debts were converted by govern- 241
ment action. In 1934 some two hundred thousand Bulgarian 656
peasants benefited by reductions in their debts and in the rate of interest and by a prolongation of the time allowed for settlement. In Rumania some two and one-half million peasants were assisted by similar legislation. Other measures, although not so far-reaching, were put into practice elsewhere in Eastern Europe to alleviate peasant indebtedness. But the credit problem was only mitigated, and not solved. The peasants' need for cash remained, and the lack of capital still prevented them from improving their farming techniques or increasing their earning capacity.

The governments promoted intensive cultivation of non-cereals. Grain production was not appropriate to an overpopulated region, and a change to the production of livestock, livestock products, fruit, and vegetables was necessary. In Bulgaria and in some parts of Yugoslavia, intensive cultivation of garden crops, such as tobacco, tomatoes, wine, fruit, and roses was introduced. In Rumania, the cultivation of soya and other oil plants was introduced. These measures were, of course, just a beginning, and could not bring any substantial remedy.

Agriculture played the most important role of any single 241
factor in all the Eastern European countries except Czecho- 434
slovakia. The largest part of the national incomes was de-

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reorganization of agriculture even more necessary than it had been before. 423 656

Land reform was a political measure. Its aim was not the reorganization of production, but the redistribution of income. Its aim was to win the small peasant for the Communists, and to weaken the political influence of the agrarian parties. Therefore, the Communists stole the programs of the agrarian parties and publicized them as their own. Beside private ownership, these programs called for mechanization, consolidation of scattered strips, good and guaranteed prices for agricultural products, expansion of credit, reduction of taxes, and social insurance for all peasants. 661

The smallholders felt quite happy, generally speaking, on their new land. It may have produced less than it had in the hands of its former owners, but the smallholders' income was larger than it had been when they were employed as agricultural laborers. Many of them started believing the Communists and joined the Communist parties. One of the Communist aims was fulfilled.

IV

It should have been obvious to all that the Communists were preparing a program of land collectivization, and that the second stage of their agricultural policy would be similar to what it had been in the Soviet Union. But sufficient attention was not paid to these trends. Practically all forests and large stretches of arable land and pastures became state property and were organized as Communist state farms. District cooperative or state stations were established and equipped with heavy agricultural machinery, which was not practical for use on small fields. The Communists favored the allocation of equipment to cooperatives rather than to private persons. The cooperatives, which performed many public functions such as bulk purchasing of food and supplies, began to 474 423

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474 423 be controlled by the state machine and not by their members, the peasants. At the same time, the independence of the church and its economic influence on the rural population was broken.

Once the Communists were established safely in power, they shifted their agricultural policy. Except in the Baltic States where the Communists resorted to deportations and in Rumania where they evicted some seventeen thousand Rumanian families from their homes, collectivization was started smoothly and was not recognized as such. The Communists did not speak about collectivization, but about transforming uneconomical small-scale enterprise to large-scale cooperative farming. They are still making great efforts to convince the small peasants that as members of production cooperatives they till their own land and manage their own affairs.

Collectivization is being instituted by a clever transformation of the cooperatives. This process begins with a number of peasants being instructed to form some such organization as a communal laundry, a chick hatchery, or a calf station. Then, usually before sowing or harvest time, the members are persuaded to share their labor, teams, and farm machinery, which sounds like nothing more than neighborly cooperation. The farms continue to be made up of separate private parcels. The next type of cooperative eliminates boundaries and plows out border strips. The expanded fields are worked by the cooperative, with systematic planning for crops, fodder, and hay. Thus, collective mass production is introduced, but the land still belongs to the members.

Collective management is a function of the third type of cooperative. In this type the crops belong to the cooperative, not to its members. The owners of the land give up all their rights of disposal and of management. The members contribute their livestock and most of their agricultural equipment to the organization. Cattle are kept in common barns,

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but a member may retain one cow and a calf, some pigs, 474
sheep, goats, and poultry. He also retains a garden plot of one 423
and one-fourth acres which he can cultivate according to his own wishes. Ten to 20 per cent of a season's profit is deducted from the whole profit and distributed as separate compensation to those members who contributed land for the use of the cooperative.

In the fourth type, no percentage is paid for use of land although the fields still belong to the farmers in the title registers. All profits are divided according to the labor units of the members. This is the real Soviet collective farm, in which private property has become a fiction. Members receive advances in money or supplies during the year for their work. At the end of the year their accounts are balanced on the basis of production and sales.

Collectivization is proceeding at a rapid pace in all the countries of this region. According to the latest news, over 40 per cent of the agricultural land has been collectivized or, in other words, is in the hands either of state farms or of production cooperatives.

Production cooperatives are not genuine cooperatives according to the Western definition of the term. The communist philosophy of subservience rather than freedom, class hatred rather than understanding, aggression rather than tolerance, coercion rather than mutuality, is against all genuine, fundamental cooperative principles. True cooperatives can be founded only on the initiative of their members. Those instigated by authority cannot be considered true cooperatives, nor can those which are under the domination of outside influences. There can be no true cooperatives in Communist countries, because the will of the members cannot be expressed.

Production cooperatives are excellent examples of the Communist pseudo-cooperative. They are created by the government and are dependent upon it. They must accept a

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474 423 government-dictated constitution. Cooperative members, instead of being the masters of their cooperatives, are their servants. They have to perform tasks which have been fixed without their knowledge or consent. In higher type Communist cooperatives, the members assume the status of landless laborers.

If the complete dependency of the cooperatives on the State Tractor and Machine Stations and on the Communist Party is taken into consideration, it is clear that production cooperatives are no more than state enterprises under the disguise of cooperatives. There is only one difference between a state farm and a production cooperative: the members of a cooperative have to bear all production risks. It is true that *de jure* they remain owners of their land, but *de facto* they cease to be owners as they cannot be sure of getting their fields back when they leave the cooperative. According to the constitution of these cooperatives, a member must accept other fields, if return of his own fields would disrupt the cooperative.

474 661 565 The Communists declare they prefer that peasants join cooperatives voluntarily. However, they are not above persuading private farmers to join by such methods as higher taxes and higher delivery quotas, less fertilizers and other production means at higher prices, and charges for all services higher than those paid by cooperative members. At the same time, they give private farmers no credit, no field hands, and no opportunity to use agricultural machines, while collectives enjoy almost unlimited credit and other facilities. Members of production cooperatives are rewarded by the government with free vacations in the best hotels at winter resorts and with free group travel to the Soviet Union; they are a privileged class in every respect.

In contrast, well-to-do peasants who used hired labor in free times are denounced as being "village rich," a term which is used in Eastern Europe to describe the equivalent of the

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Russian *kulak*. The village rich are not allowed to enter a collective or are expelled if they become members. A merciless battle is being waged to ruin them. They are being liquidated as peasants, removed from villages, and sent to mines or to industry or concentration camps. There are roughly thirteen million peasant families in Eastern Europe, more than one million of which are *kulaks*. The children of all these families must lose the individualistic traits of their peasant heritage: that is the Communist aim.

Large-scale industrialization plans, for military purposes rather than for consumer production, are being pushed forward with great vigor in all Eastern European states and new labor is required in great numbers. *Kulaks* and other class enemies are an obvious source for this labor. By tapping this source, the surplus agricultural population will be disposed of and the people with individualist outlook gradually destroyed. If there is a shortage of workers in agriculture, as for instance in Czechoslovakia now, industrial workers already persuaded to the collective way of thinking can be utilized.

The term *kulak* has come to mean anyone who is against collectivization, and all *kulaks* are to be destroyed. The process of destruction is quickly changing the status of the agrarian population in this region. The agricultural population is decreasing and, according to estimate, does not amount today to more than 45 per cent of the total population. This decrease is the political consequence of collectivization and not its economic or social result. The collectivization policy itself cannot solve the old problem of rural overpopulation but can only aggravate it. The real aim of Communist collectivization is not to solve this problem but rather to destroy the peasantry.

Agriculture, like the other divisions of economic life, has been dictated by state plans which prescribe to the peasant what crops are to be grown and what animals are to be bred.

2: Milosz S-5 (no date)1953 El Europe El

464 well stocked; but given the shortage of food and consumer
565 goods, this is rarely, if ever, the case. For workers' children, social advancement is easy because the Party must recruit the cadres of the new intelligentsia from their ranks. The worker can educate himself by attending countless evening courses. If he stands in good favor with the Party he can enjoy a vacation in a rest home, all expenses
[466] paid. On the other hand, he cannot defend himself against exploitation by his employer, the state. His trade union representatives are Party tools. They team together with the factory managers for one purpose: to raise production. Workers are told that a strike is a crime. Against whom are they to strike? Against themselves? After all, the means of production belong to them, the state belongs to them. But such an explanation is not very convincing. The workers, who dare not state aloud what they want, know that the goals of the state are far from identical with their own.

565 Central and Eastern Europe produce in order to raise
433 the military and economic potential of the Center[1] and to
● 475 compensate for the industrial backwardness of Russia. Workers and their needs have no influence on production plans. Most of the goods produced ebb away to the East. Besides, every product of a worker's hands is the object of innumerable bookkeeping operations. A whole staff of functionaries sits in every factory, counting, writing reports, compiling statistics; the same thing happens on every rung of the state hierarchy, right through to the state wholesale houses and retail stores. If, at last, the article reaches the consumer, it is very expensive; into its cost are counted the salaries of the swarms of bureaucrats
565 through whose hands it must pass. Factory machines are
466 over-aged; there is a scarcity of essential spare parts. So workers are ordered to replace broken parts by whatever

[1] [Moscow — Analyst]

231 times to be bred and raised by the traditionally backward East European methods.

TABLE 26

PERCENTAGE OF TOTAL LIVESTOCK IN SOCIALIST SECTOR IN 1952*

Country	Percent of Land in Socialist Sector	Cattle	Sheep	Hogs	Horses
Czechoslovakia	48.0	33.0	39.7	38.0	—
Poland	17.0	7.8	—	9.2	7.1
Bulgaria	53.0	25.2	29.9	17.6	43.5

* Sources: Czechoslovakia, Nepomucky, *Rude Pravo*, February 5, 1953; Poland, *Wies w Liczbach*, p. 25 (Warsaw, 1951); Bulgaria, Chervenkov, *For a Lasting Peace*, September 11, 1953.

241 While animal husbandry lagged, industrial crops crept ahead. Even in this realm, despite increased investments, results have not been spectacular. Few reliable production statistics are available. Table 27 shows only the increase in area given over to industrial crops.[37]

2. *The Return on the Investment*

423 In its basic features the picture thus far drawn of East European agriculture resembles the one drawn earlier of Soviet agri-
658 culture: a strenuous effort to force the peasantry into a farm system
475 over which the State could exercise direct administrative control; a feverish effort to build modernized industry at a pace which precluded much investment in agriculture; a resultant stagnation of and, in some instances, a deterioration of, agricultural production; and a constant tension between State and the peasants arising from their unending struggle over the fruits of the peasants' labors.

In the USSR, however, the victory of the State over the peasantry was concluded with far greater finality than in Satellite Eastern Europe; the system held together over a quarter of a century which included the most severe war-time trials. Collectivization in the USSR possesses stability because it has managed to provide the State with the minimum of foodstuffs necessary for its economic

[37] It is significant that among the many steps taken to implement the New Course in several East European countries was the reduction of the area sown with industrial crops.

TABLE 27

AREA UNDER INDUSTRIAL CROPS 1949 - 1951/52*

(1000 hectares)

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	1949						1951/52					
	C	P	H	R	B	Y	C	P	H	R	B	Y
Cotton	—	—	37	60	—	42	—	—	40	150	—	16
Flax	28	109	22	—	—	14	—	—	—	—	—	10
Hemp	5	13	28	—	—	108	—	19	—	—	—	50
Sugar beets	194	250	113	62	31	89	219	275	115	81	32	100
Tobacco	6	14	22	9	30	35	—	20	—	—	—	37

* Data from unpublished manuscript of Dr. Nicholas Spulber (Massachusetts Institute of Technology).

program. The question with respect to Eastern Europe is whether collectivization has provided the same agricultural cushion as it did for the USSR. Specifically, does the collectivized sector in the Satellites provide the State with a higher proportion of the total produce marketed per hectare than the private sector? As was shown, the capacity of the Soviet collectivized sector to produce for the market was its very reason for existence. 423 656 475

The evidence available from Eastern Europe is too scattered and unreliable to justify the type of definite conclusion drawn from the Soviet materials.[38] However, on the basis of an examination of each country in Eastern Europe, some tentative conclusions can be reached.

Throughout the following comparison of the "Socialist" and private sectors, the variety of advantages which the "Socialist sector" enjoys should be kept in mind. First, on the whole the "Socialist sector" comprises better and more fertile land. It is composed of larger farms, capable of supporting more people. In particular, State Farms are frequently, though not always, located on the prosperous lands once belonging to nobles, aristocrats, or German landholders. Second, the "Socialist sector" has at its dis-

[38] The transformation of statistics from an objective science into an arm of State propaganda occurred in the USSR in 1930-31, but several years were necessary for the completion of the task. As a result, there is a great deal more information available concerning the first and second Five Year Plans in the USSR than concerning the Satellite economic developments after 1947. The Satellite Communists, after all, borrowed their techniques of falsification when they had been thoroughly developed in the USSR.

423 posal most of the available farm machinery, either confiscated or
656 purchased after the Second World War and also what has since been manufactured. In Poland in 1951, for example, the "Socialist sector," comprising some 17 per cent of the arable land, had at its disposal 98 per cent of the nation's tractor supply.[39] In Bulgaria in 1948 the "Socialist sector," then comprising only eight per cent of the arable land, already had at its disposal 81 per cent of the tractors and threshing machines.[40] Third, the "Socialist sector" received a high portion of the meager State credits extended to the farm population for constructing new buildings, purchasing fertilizers, seed, and fodder. And fourth, the "Socialist sector" generally received more favorable trade terms from government agencies, and benefited from official tax and delivery quota discrimination against the private sector. The agricultural structure of each country will be analyzed in terms of the above-stated criteria.

Bulgaria

241 As everywhere, pertinent information is sparse and only sug-
● 475 gestive. The State Farms, occupying 2.5 per cent of the arable land,
423 market 1.5 per cent of the nation's grain crop. The "Socialist sector," occupying 52.0 per cent of the arable land, markets 65 per cent of the grain; and the private farms, composing 45.5 per cent of the arable land, market 33.5 per cent of the grain crop.[41] In the light of the aforementioned advantages accruing to the "Socialist sector," and considering the fact that in Bulgaria the "Socialist sector" is concentrated in the fertile valleys (See Chart IX), this division is not altogether surprising. The proportion of marketed grain derived from the "Socialist sector" is greater than its arable land, and almost as much greater as that which the USSR achieved when approximately half of its arable land was collectivized.[42] It should be noted, however, that, as in the USSR, the modest success of the "Socialist sector" as a grain producer was achieved at the cost of neglecting animal husbandry, since a high percentage of the nation's livestock remained in the private sector. But if the "Socialist sector" neglected animal husbandry, it emphasized a few semi-

[39] *Wieś w Liczbach* (Warsaw, 1951), p. 25.

[40] *Pari i Kredit* (Sofia), No. 2, 1948, p. 8.

[41] *Rabotnichesko Delo*, (Sofia) February 28, 1953.

[42] In the Soviet Union in 1932, 66 per cent of the arable land was in the "Socialist sector"; and it supplied 84 per cent of the marketed grain. (Maurice Dobb, *Soviet Economic Development Since 1917*, New York, 1948, p. 249).

industrial crops. In 1953, 75 per cent of the nation's cotton and 84 per cent of its sugar beets were produced in the "Socialist sector."[43] 241 475 423

POLAND

Communist authorities in Poland have frequently asserted the superior productivity of the "Socialist sector" of agriculture. But since the claims so frequently contradict each other and contradict general claims concerning the productive capacity of the entire sector, they must be treated cautiously. For example, although the Communists have, at various times, claimed from 15 to 20 per cent greater yield per hectare for collective farms, they do not claim a higher proportionate yield for the sector as a whole.[44]

On the central question of the deliveries made by the two sectors, statistics are equally uncertain. In the year 1950, the Communists seemed confident of the superior capacity of the "Socialist sector" to market its grain. The statistics in Table 28 seem to bear out this confidence.

TABLE 28

PROPORTION OF GRAIN MARKETED IN POLAND IN 1950*

	Winter Wheat	Spring Wheat	Rye
Production Cooperatives	67.0	49.0	31.4
Private Farms	34.3	34.3	28.7

* *Wies w Liczbach* (Warsaw, 1952), p. 132.

And in 1951 the regime claimed that the "Socialist sector," comprising only 15 per cent of the land, accounted for 23.2 per cent of the marketed grain, while the private sector, comprising 85 per cent of the land, accounted for only 76.8 per cent of the marketed grain. According to these reports, both State Farms and collectives contributed far more than their proportionate share to the market.[45]

However, there is reason to doubt the validity of these statistics. The marketing report in 1953 shows the "Socialist sector" in a

[43] *Zemedelsko Zname* (Sofia), December 2, 1953.
[44] For example, according to *Wies w Liczbach* (1952), the productive cooperatives have an approximately 20 per cent higher yield than the individual holdings. But other regime statistics indicate that the total produce of the productive cooperatives is no greater — per hectare — than the individual holdings.
[45] *Wies w Liczbach* (1952).

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TABLE 29

PROPORTION OF GRAIN MARKETED IN POLAND BY SECTOR IN 1953*

Sector	Percent of Marketed Grain	Percent of Arable Land
State Farms	17.0	11.9
Production Cooperatives	6.5	6.5
Small Peasants	7.5	11.5
Middle Peasants	50.0	59.0
Kulaks	19.0	11.1
	100.0	100.0

* *Trybuna Ludu* (Warsaw), December 31, 1953.

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much less flattering light (see Table 29). However, even in 1953 the "Socialist sector" contributed more than its share to the market, and thus economically justified itself. Holding 18.4 per cent of the arable land, the "Socialist sector" contributed 23.5 per cent of the marketed grain. It should be noted, however, that the superiority was confined solely to State Farms. The collective farms, which comprised six per cent of the countryside, marketed no more than six per cent of the total grain.

The important role the State Farms play is made clear in Table 30, where it is demonstrated that, despite the low productivity per hectare, the State Farms outdid others in marketed production.

TABLE 30

PRODUCTION AND MARKETING OF POLISH STATE FARMS 1949 – 1952*

	1949	1950	1951	1952 *(Planned)*
Percent of Total Production (in current prices)	5.4	6.1	7.5	9.6
Percent of Total Marketing	–	6.8	10.5	15.1

* *Wieś w Liczbach*, (Warsaw, 1952), p. 116.

5: Free Europe Committee U-4 (no date) 1954 E1 Europe E1

FARM PRODUCTION and MARKETING IN POLAND – BY SECTOR*

– 1952 –

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Percent of arable land (L)



Percent of marketed grain (G)



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But if the State Farms exceed independent farms in grain marketing, the so-called kulaks exceed even the State Farms. With only 11.1 per cent of the arable land, they account for 19 per cent of the marketed grain. Precisely for this reason the Polish economist, Jerzy Tepicht, in an article published in December 1953, warned against the "irresponsible policy of destroying the productive capacity" of the kulaks.[46] If the kulaks cannot be broken, the regime must cooperate with them or risk an agricultural crisis such as occurred in Hungary in 1953.

The same Tepicht, in an article on the general problem of marketing, tried to establish the thesis that State Farms had come to play the same role in marketing that had formerly been held by large landowners.[47] In pre-war times the large landowners, holding 18.1 per cent of the land, contributed 29.9 per cent of the total marketed grain. Today, the State Farms, holding 12 per cent of the arable land, deliver 21.2 per cent of the marketed grain. Tepicht concludes that the marketing ability of the State Farms equals that of the pre-war landed estates, and thereby justifies the existence of the State Farms. The only flaw in his argument – aside from the peculiarity of such a justification on the part of a Communist! – lies in the fact that the majority of the State Farms (73.7 per cent) are in the Western territories where private farms also deliver high grain surpluses to the market. Holding only 31.1 per cent of the arable land, private farmers in the Western territories market 65.4 per cent of the grain delivered by the private sector in all Poland.[48] It seems likely, therefore, that the superior marketing power of the State Farms is due as much to their geographical location as to their internal structure.

In addition, it should be noted that the State Farms have established their grain marketing record at the cost of a very poorly developed livestock, a condition which they have in common with the collectives. Whereas the small farmers, with 11.5 per cent of the arable land, possess 20 per cent of the pigs and cows, and all the independent farms, with 76.5 per cent of the arable land, raise 93.1 per cent of the cattle and 90.1 per cent of the pigs, the State Farms, with 12 per cent of the land, raise only 9.2 per cent of the

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[46] *Trybuna Ludu*, (Warsaw) December 31, 1953.
[47] *Ekonomista*, III, 1953, pp. 31-2.
[48] *Ibid*, p. 35. Tepicht's figures differ from those given above (Table 29) but the difference is slight, and either set would support his argument.

pigs and six per cent of the cows. The kolkozes, with over six per cent of the land, raise less than one per cent of the cattle, pigs, and sheep.[49] The neglect of livestock is evidently characteristic of large-scale farming in Poland since the kulaks, who also produce a high marketable surplus, have also had negligible success in animal husbandry.

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Despite these modifications, the State Farms have played a sizeable role in establishing the Communist-desired relationship between the town and country. It is also clear that, up to this point, the collectivized sector has played a very limited role.

Czechoslovakia

The data relating to sector-by-sector marketing in Czechoslovakia is, unfortunately, even more scattered than in Poland, and permits less conclusive inferences. For example, it is known that in 1950 the State purchased 46 per cent of the grain production of both sectors, collective and private. It is also known that in 1949 the farms of less than 10 hectares—virtually all the private sector—contributed only 33 per cent of their production to the State.[50] Therefore, it can be assumed that the "Socialist sector"—mostly State Farms in 1949, but including a large number of collectives in 1950—contributed a higher portion of its produce than did the private farms. Furthermore, in 1951 farms of under 10 hectares accounted for only 39 per cent of grain deliveries, so that presumably the larger farms contributed more than their proportionate share of the market.[51]

In 1953, according to official Czechoslovak statistics, the "Socialist sector," comprising over 50 per cent of the land, accounted for 51 per cent of the marketed grain, 46 per cent of the marketed cattle, 57 per cent of the marketed pigs, and 43 per cent of the marketed milk.[52] These figures suggest that the market benefits gained by the Czechoslovak State are quite modest, and frequent claims that the collectives fulfill quotas more fully than the private

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[49] *Trybuna Ludu*, December 31, 1953; Jan Wyrozebski, Radio Warsaw, January 22, 1954.

[50] *Rude Pravo*, (Prague) February 22, 1951.

[51] *Nova Mysl* (Prague), November, 1953. The farms under 10 hectares, comprising 51 per cent of the arable land, contributed only 39 per cent of the marketed grain while the collective farms in 1951, holding 19 per cent of the land, contributed 20.7 per cent of the marketed grain.

[52] *Zprava Statniho Uradu Statistickeho* (Prague), January 31, 1954.

433 farms are not altogether true.[53] At the same time, the greater con-
231 fidence the regime has in the capacity of the collectives to fulfill
475 quotas is not altogether unjustified.

[231] Although the bulk of livestock in Poland is in the private sector, a sizeable portion of the livestock in Czechoslovakia is in the "Socialist sector." In 1952, 33.8 per cent of the cattle, 37.7 per cent of the hogs, and 38.7 per cent of the sheep were in the "Socialist sector."[54]

Although the Czechoslovak regime may have gained some market advantages from collectivization, its victory remains quite inconclusive. With the New Course, the regime, in turning to the private sector for agricultural reinforcement, acknowledged that the advantage gained was insufficient for its purposes.[55]

HUNGARY

423 The transformation of the agricultural structure in Hungary in
433 1945-46 was the most drastic of the post-war land reforms; and there is unquestionably a connection between the semi-revolutionary character of that agrarian reform and the special gravity of the Hungarian farm crisis in mid-1953. Whether this crisis had its roots in peasant hyper-sensitivity to the imposition of an overlordship resembling former conditions, or to the destruction of traditional trade relationships between town and country is not altogether clear; but that a close connection exists between the 1945-46 reform and the 1953 crisis is difficult to doubt.[56]

The impact of the 1945-46 reforms on the traditional trade

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[53] For example, *Rude Pravo* (December 4, 1953), asserted that the collective farms had fulfilled their quotas for grain by 103 per cent while the private farms had fulfilled their quota by only 77 per cent. A similar differential held for the fulfillment of meat, pork, and milk quotas.

[54] Cited in *Zycie Gospodarcze* (Warsaw), April 19, 1953, p. 484.

[55] As in Poland, the Czechoslovak New Course placed special emphasis upon protecting the productive capacity of the kulaks while at the same time, of course, limiting his alleged urge to engage in speculation and exploitation. "It would harm our agricultural economy," said Minister of Agriculture Uher, if the land which the kulaks occupied was not "fully utilized by them" (*Rude Pravo*, November 10, 1953).

[56] A subjective factor such as the peasants' degree of class consciousness is difficult to incorporate into an analysis of this type. However, without some recourse to this factor, it is difficult to explain the special depth of the 1953 Hungarian crisis, so much more pronounced was it than similar crises in the sphere. The series of articles in the Hungarian press during the fall and summer of 1953 portraying the countryside during the period of kolkhoz dissolutions certainly suggested that the Hungarian peasantry felt a hatred for their oppressors of an intensity hardly rivaled in the Sphere. It should not be forgotten that the strongest of the post-World War II peasant parties in the sphere was the Smallholders' Party of Hungary, which received 57 per cent of the vote in 1947 elections.

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TABLE 31

PRE-WAR AGRARIAN TRADE PATTERNS IN HUNGARY*

Sector	Percent of Holdings	Percent of Arable Land	Percent of Total Crop	Percent of Own Crop Marketed	Percent of Total Marketed
Small Holdings (Under 25 cad. acres)	94.0	48	51.6	47.2	43.6
Medium Holdings (25-200 cad. acres)	5.5	28	24.2	63.6	27.4
Large Holdings (Over 200 cad. acres)	0.5	24	24.2	67.0	29.0
TOTAL	100.0	100.0	100.0	55.9	100.0

* *Magyar Statisztikai Zsebkonyv*, (Budapest, 1948), p. 103; *Tarsadalmi Szemle*, April-May, 1953; *Hungarian State Yearbook*, Special Agricultural Issue (Budapest, 1935).

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TABLE 32

POST-WAR AGRARIAN TRADE PATTERNS IN HUNGARY*
1949 - 1952

Sector	Percent of Arable Land	Percent of Total Grain Crop Produced	Percent of Crop Delivered to State	Percent of Total Grain Delivery
1949				
Working peasants' farms	75.5	82.1	38.3	75.3
Kulak farms	17.0	16.4	59.9	23.5
Socialist sector	7.5	1.5	81.7	1.2
TOTAL	100.0	100.0	41.7	100.0
1951				
Working peasants' farms	**	72.5	46.9	66.9
Kulak farms	**	10.1	66.2	13.2
Socialist sector	26.0	17.4	58.2	19.9
TOTAL	100.0	100.0	50.8	100.0
1952				
Working peasants' farms	**	69.6	41.7	61.4
Kulak farms	**	5.5	61.0	7.2
Socialist sector	34.5	24.9	59.6	31.4
TOTAL	100.0	100.0	47.4	100.0

* *Tarsadalmi Szemle*, April-May, 1953.
** Data unavailable.

greater trade with the cities. The drastic economic reforms initiated during the summer of 1953 were part of a frantic effort to correct this imbalance, an imbalance pronounced in Hungary and terribly aggravated by the disastrous 1952 harvest.

Romania

The Romanian Government has been more secretive about internal market relations than any other Satellite, making conclusions even more difficult to draw. The "Socialist sector," including the "primitive" agricultural associations, comprise 25 per cent of the arable land. According to Premier Gheorghiu-Dej, this sector produces no more than 25 per cent of the total crop,[60] no more than its proportionate share of the arable land. This suggests that the

[60] Gheorghiu-Dej, *Scanteia*, August 23, 1953.

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"Socialist sector," despite its advantages, has given little benefit to the State in terms of marketed produce. The Romanian Council of Ministers frequently complains, as it did on January 28, 1952, that "in spite of all the important benefits given to the peasantry by the State . . . the market was not sufficiently supplied with agricultural products necessary to consumers and to industrial production."[21] 475 423 433

YUGOSLAVIA

The history of collectivization in Yugoslavia is so complex, and differs in so many respects from the course followed elsewhere in Eastern Europe, that comparisons are difficult. However, in certain fundamental respects, the initial collectivization drive (1948-1950) had the same goals as those guiding the Cominform bloc. No data on produce marketed are available; but production data indicate that in the years of collectivizing, the Government was successful at least in obtaining higher yields on its State and collective farms than from the private sector, and presumably was able to extract a large portion of that yield from the farms. Undoubtedly, this result was due in part to the ability of the Yugoslav regime to collectivize the fertile Vojvodina region (see Chart VII), where yield per hectare was traditionally high. But the "Socialist sector" also included a good deal of the poor and relatively unproductive land of Macedonia, and therefore Table 33, in which the proportion of grain produced by each sector is compared with the proportion of land held, is significant.

OVERALL MARKET PERSPECTIVE

Despite the sparseness and frequent unreliability of the statistical data employed in this analysis, some conclusions may be drawn.

1. In varying degrees, depending upon the country, collectivization in Eastern Europe has actually expedited extraction of agricultural produce from the countryside at the low price consistent with Communist industrial designs. While the system of compulsory deliveries at State-regulated prices was effective to this end, it left enough initiative and power in the hands of the peasantry to hamper the development of industry.

In Bulgaria collectivization results are the most impressive; in Czechoslovakia the gains are less impressive, but still significant. In Poland the regime has had to rely a great deal upon the surplus

[21] *Scanteia*, January 29, 1952.

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TABLE 33

GRAIN PRODUCTION IN YUGOSLAVIA – 1948 - 1951*
BY ECONOMIC SECTOR

(In percent of total production)

Year	Sector	Wheat	Rye	Barley	Oats	Total**	Percent of Arable Land***
1948/49	State	2.3	1.8	7.4	8.5	3.4	3.0
	Cooperative	14.2	11.6	15.1	16.4	14.4	10.0
	Private	83.5	86.6	77.5	75.1	82.2	87.0
1949/50	State	3.2	2.0	14.5	12.4	5.0	4.0
	Cooperative	23.2	24.0	25.4	28.7	23.9	16.0
	Private	73.6	74.0	60.1	58.9	71.1	80.0
1950/51	State	2.8	2.4	17.4	14.5	5.5	4.0
	Cooperative	25.3	28.4	28.3	30.0	26.3	19.0
	Private	71.9	69.2	54.3	55.5	68.2	77.0

* *Bulletin of Information and Documents*, (Belgrade), Vol. 1, No. 4, 1952, pp. 21-26.

** The total is derived from the combined tonnage of the wheat, rye, barley, and oats. Since the caloric value of a ton of wheat is greater than a ton of barley or oats, combining them all in one sum is deceptive. However, for the purposes of the above comparison the rough approximation of the "total" given, based entirely on tonnage, is sufficient. If potato production had been included in this table, then a caloric measurement such as the FAO used in establishing its "Wheat Equivalent Unit" (See Chart XIII) might have been employed, since the caloric content of a given weight of potatoes is only one-fifth that of an equivalent weight of wheat, whereas barley and oats are three-fifths.

*** The figures given for arable land in this table are estimates. Since grain production is given according to the agricultural year and the progress of collectivization according to the calendar year, it was necessary to interpolate the latter figures to accord with the former.

production of State Farms rather than the collectives, and, as in Hungary, kulaks and middle farmers continue to constitute a major source of marketable produce. In Romania the positive results of collectivization appear to be negligible, and, consistently enough, its industrial expansion has been quite modest. And in Hungary collectivization seems to have aggravated an already critical town-country relationship. But even in Hungary, and to a lesser extent Romania, the degree of peasant exploitation was sufficient to insure considerable urban development.

2. At the same time, it must be stressed, the evidence indicates that collectivization was by no means as successful as it was in the Soviet Union. This seems to be true both quantitatively (in terms of percentage of arable land absorbed) and qualitatively (in terms of reorientation of the market). It was not sufficiently comprehensive or intensive to facilitate the rapid increase in peasant exploitation which, from the regimes' viewpoint, justified the bloodshed and brutality of Communist agrarian policy.

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It might yet be claimed that even these differences in income 000
are smaller than those prevailing in the countries of capitalism based on private property. There is not sufficient statistical information about income distribution in the 'People's Democracies' accurately to check this contention, but some general remarks may be made. To compare the ratio between the income of an American capitalist and his workers on the one hand, with the ratio between the incomes of a manager in the 'People's Democracies' and his workers is to compare two qualitatively different things. Let us assume that the American capitalist gets a million dollars' profit, of which he ploughs back into the enterprise 700 thousand dollars. For his personal consumption he thus takes 300,000 dollars. The boss in the enterprise in the 'People's Democracies', on the other hand, would claim that as he does not own the factory the profits ploughed back into the enterprise must not come out of what he gets, but out of the profit made by the whole of society. If the American capitalist argued that the 700,000 he ploughed back was in the interests of society, the communists would reply that he gets the main benefit from it. But it appears that the same argument must not be applied to bureaucratic state capitalism.

Since a group of people in control of the means of production will take for itself the biggest possible share of the national cake, and as under the rule of the Communist Parties the workers are faced with the most concentrated capital, while they lack the right to defend themselves through democratic organisations independent of their rulers or by strike action, the inequality in incomes will inevitably reach its most extreme forms.

The Workers' Resistance

Reference has already been made to the way in which the 468
workers of Czechoslovakia expressed their rising dissatisfaction 475
with the Communist Party leaders by rejecting the official list of candidates to Works Committees in 1947, thus driving the Party to abolish the secret ballot.[1] But the workers found other ways of expressing their dissatisfaction, the most important being greatly increased absenteeism, which reached the proportions of an epidemic in Czechoslovakian industry. At

[1] [See category 11c, pp 84-85 -- Analyst]

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468 475 the 9th Congress of the Communist Party of Czechoslovakia, Slansky, the General Secretary, disclosed that whereas before the war absenteeism in the foundries totalled 2.4-3.5 per cent, it had risen in January, 1949, to 12 per cent and in March to 15 per cent. The position was even more critical in the building industry: in the four principal building undertakings in the Morawská Ostrawa district alone 53,420 working-shifts had been lost, while another building enterprise at Tábor registered 50 per cent of absentees. (Quoted by *News from Czechoslovakia*, May, 1949). On September 21st, 1949, Premier Zapotocky told the Czechoslovak Trade Union Council that absenteeism among the workers so far that year was already more than 37 per cent higher than in 1947. (*Lidové Noviny*, 22nd September, 1949). Even the National Assembly's decision of 24th March, 1950 to deduct from the holiday days missed without good reason would probably not altogether stop this expression of the increasing 'enthusiasm' of the workers for the regime.

It is not only the Czechoslovak workers who put up some resistance, however limited it must be by the totalitarian character of the regime. *The Times* of 5th September, 1949, gave a report from its correspondent in Budapest of a conference of the Communist Party of Greater Budapest—in which more than 60 per cent of Hungary's industry is concentrated—which was attended by all the foremost leaders of the Party. 'The report (of the Conference) says that productivity is stagnant in most industries and declining in some. Between February and July it fell throughout the manufacturing industry by 17 per cent . . .' 'Far too many workers were applying for sick relief—in a recent week in one factory 11 per cent, in another 12 per cent. Instances are given of self-inflicted wounds'. Rákosi in his speech claimed that in many factories the number of days missed for sick leave was two to three times higher than before the war. (*Neue Zürcher Zeitung*, 6th September, 1949). On August 31st, 1949, he said that in the previous few months productivity had fallen by 10-15 per cent.

In Poland an epidemic of absenteeism drove the government to adopt harsh measures. On April 19th, 1950, the Sejm passed a law concerning the 'Socialist discipline of labour.' Extremely heavy punishments are imposed on absentees. A worker who

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has been absent from his work for four or more days in a year 468
without a satisfactory excuse suffers a wage cut of 10-25 per 475
cent which may last for three months.

The Yugoslav workers also use the weapon of absenteeism in their struggle against their bad conditions. *The Times* of 1st November, 1950, quoting the Belgrade trade union paper *Rad*, said: '. . . absenteeism in the coal mines in Serbia reached 19%; Croatia—17½%; Slovenia—15%; and Bosnia-Herzegovina—14%. The plan allowed for a maximum absenteeism of 11%.' In his speech to the Federal Assembly on 17th April, 1950, Tito said:' In 1949, there was a 26.26% loss in working time. In Croatia, this percentage reached 33%, of which 21% was spent in holiday-taking and absenteeism. This proves the weak struggle for discipline . . . ' The workers also frequently change their place of work. In a speech to the Serbian parliament, Jovan Vesilinov, Vice-Premier of Serbia, reported that during ten months of 1949 state enterprises in Serbia took on 628,064 persons but lost 430,050 workers who had left their jobs. (*The New York Times*, 29th January, 1950). *Borba* of 21st August, 1950, stated that in the Trepcha lead mines and refinery—one of the largest in the world—some 11,000 workers were taken on in 1949, of whom 10,500 left before the end of the year because of very bad conditions, irregular pay 'usually between the fifteenth and twentieth of the month, often between the twenty-fifth and the thirtieth', and the irregular distribution of the rations (in August the rations were distributed ten days late, and in the meantime the workers had to do without bread).

The Government took strong measures to fight against absenteeism and the frequent changes in the place of work. On 26 January, 1950, it passed a decree stating that food ration cards would be withdrawn from persons leaving their place of employment without permission, and no new cards would be issued them. The decree further stated that a clause might be included in labour contracts obliging a worker to reimburse the enterprise for any loss in production resulting from his unjustifiable absenteeism.

Another symptom of the increasing dissatisfaction of the workers is the decline in the *quality* of what they produce. For example, in the speech quoted above, Rákosi stated that the

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468 475 percentage of waste in the Manfred Weiss iron foundry, the second biggest metal factory in Hungary, had risen from 10.4 to 23.5 per cent. In Poland, in 1948, of 67 million tons of coal, 1,100,000 tons were stones; in 1949 the percentage of stones in the coal reached 5 per cent. In 1948 and 1949 a sizeable proportion of the exports of Czechoslovakia—the country with the reputation for products of good quality—was returned as below standard.

The admonitions of the leaders to the workers are often of such a character as to leave no doubt about their indocility. Istvan Kossa, Hungarian Minister of Industry, said in a speech at Debrecen on December 6th, 1948, that 'The workers have assumed a terrorist attitude to the directors of the nationalised industries', and he threatened them with forced labour.

Chivu Stoica, Rumanian Minister of Industry, addressing the workers of the Resita plant, the largest metallurgical establishment in the country, on December 25th, 1948, accused them of not having fulfilled the plan and of being 'capitalist agents'.

In Yugoslavia, Vice-Premier Edvard Kardelj, in his report to the Fifth Congress of the Communist Party (July, 1948), attacked those workers who showed 'resistance to realistic norms, against competition, and on the other hand—in exaggerated demands in regard to pay'. 'It is clear that the consequences of such a stand are a decrease in work discipline, insufficient aid to rationalisers and innovators in the realization and application of their proposals, an incorrect and unfriendly attitude toward the heads of the enterprise, an incorrect attitude toward competitions'. (*The Communist Party of Yugoslavia in the Struggle for New Yugoslavia, for People's Authority and for Socialism*, Belgrade, 1948, pp. 87-8).

466 That the workers nevertheless remain members of the Communist Parties—as the official statistics show—is not because of their enthusiasm for them, but because it is too dangerous to leave. Anyone who leaves the Party faces the threat of economic sanctions (at least). This is shown clearly by some figures issued in October, 1948, by József Révai, editor of *Szabad Nép*, the Hungarian Communist Party daily. He says that the paper is read by only 12 per cent of the Party members. At the big M.A.U.A.G. factories, for example, where 6,000

316 tive Middle Europe can gradually increase their output of coal,
433 and thus can assure a constant growth of their basic source of industrial energy. Much progress in that direction can be made through high investments and multiple technical improvements, as well as by better organization of production. But the "normal" conditions presuppose that the targets for coal output remain within the range of feasibility and the miners are assured of a minimum acceptable standard of living. In the course of 1951, either one or both of these conditions were not kept by most of the satellite governments, and the planned output of coal is at present exposed to considerable danger.

In February-March 1951, under relentless pressure from Moscow, the Czechoslovak and Hungarian governments were forced to decree a notable speed-up of their long-range industrial plans, equivalent to boosting their annual quotas of production from the beginning of 1951. The Czech 1953 target for coal has been increased from 20.8 to 25 million tons and that of lignite from 32.2 to 38.6 million; the Hungarian 1954 target for both coal and lignite from 24.2 to 27.5 million tons. *Ipso facto,* the annual targets for 1951, 1952, and future years, have been boosted accordingly. Since the old targets were already high, it is perfectly legitimate to doubt whether these new plans can be fulfilled in time. In the light of recent statistical data, Czech coal mining is fulfilling the old plan but not the inflated new one. The same seems to be true in Hungary.

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466 Quite apart from the real or apparent unfeasibility of the two coal plans in question, the recent acute food shortage in most of the captive area (except in Eastern Germany and possibly Bulgaria) has resulted, since the early fall of 1951, in an appreciable lowering of the standard of living of all industrial workers, and of coal miners in particular. The reasons for this food shortage are many: one of them is a long period of drought in most of the captive area and the consequent loss of much of the potato crop, the staple food of the population. Even if the bread grain crops were satisfactory, the shortage of potatoes would be a major calamity for men and animals alike, and by

itself would lead to a shortage of meat, especially pork. This 433
current emergency caught the satellite governments unprepared, 511
the more so because they had been stripping their countries of 466
foodstuffs by military stockpiling, sending vast amounts of meat, sugar, and other staples to Russia and Red China, and antagonizing the peasant producers of food by ever increasing taxes, supply quotas, and other forms of persecution and chicanery. The net consequence of such policies and practices is that in many industrial areas of captive Middle Europe the people have had very little meat since the summer of 1951. Their supply of sugar, vegetables, and potatoes has also been very short. The Polish, Czech, Hungarian, and Rumanian coal miners were already badly housed, badly clothed, and overworked. Now they are also badly fed, and they may be — or actually are — incapable of working as much as is expected. The lowered efficiency of the miners means less coal and less coal means in turn less electric power, less machinery, and less chemicals. A shortage of fuel may be equivalent to a nonfulfillment of industrial targets all over the four countries in question.

Statistical data naturally lag behind the real situation in industry. At the end of 1951 the available statistical figures were not yet fully reflecting the most serious consequences of the food crisis. However, they were indicative of a trend toward a depression in coal mining.

In Poland the coal target for the third quarter of 1951 was 316
not fulfilled, and the actual production was only 2 percent higher 433
than a year before, instead of the expected 5 to 6 percent. During the first half of 1951 coal extraction in Rumania was nearly 8 percent behind the plan, although it was claimed to be 26 percent above the output during the corresponding period of 1950. In the same period in Hungary coal was 6 percent behind the schedule, although again production was claimed to be 22 percent higher than 1950. In Czechoslovakia the slump in coal production was much more pronounced. It began by a temporary failure of production towards the end of 1950; even though it was overcome, the Czech government found itself unable

TABLE 2

●611 **ANNUAL CONSUMPTION OF BASIC FOODSTUFFS IN PRE-WAR EASTERN EUROPE**

(in lbs.)

	Wheat & Rye	Maize	Potatoes	Sugar	Meat	Milk	Fats	Eggs (No.)
Poland	382	—	550	27	50	260	21	90
Czechoslovakia	275	25	260	47	63	290	40	169
Hungary	550	—	220	26	57	240	30	95
Romania	245	400	110	15	55	140	25	90
Yugoslavia	265	340	130	12	44	160	18	45
Bulgaria	440	—	35	12	45	150	19	80
Denmark	265	Nil	250	117	124	410	67	115

* *Agrarian Problems from the Baltic to the Aegean*, pp. 44.

241 The land, some of it rich, but most of it poor, was exploited
311 in a backward fashion — in Bulgaria and Yugoslav Macedonia many of the peasants worked with a wooden plow not very different in design from one described by Virgil in the *Georgics* 19 hundred years before. The inevitable subdivision of the land among the peasant's sons made application of modern agricultural techniques virtually impossible, and the accumulation of sufficient capital to purchase such equipment out of question. In addition, growing rural over-population kept farm wages low, and made the use of modern machinery uneconomical from the peasants' point of view.
[435] Above all, the peasantry was oppressed by the traditional "price scissors," or the disparity between the prices received for their crops on the urban market and prices paid for industrial products, a relationship which arose from the "small domestic market for agricultural products and the small supply of manufactured goods produced by domestic industry."[19]

But the trouble lay not merely in the backwardness of the peasant agricultural system. The political structure of the country, either conservative or semi-fascist, tended to favor urban groups. In the allotment of national resources such projects as peasant

[19] Moore, p. 89.

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CHAPTER III

SCARCITY OF CAPITAL

Problems of Agricultural Development

241 AN EXAMINATION of the economic situation of the countries of
●511 Eastern and South-Eastern Europe will make it obvious that no
433 redistribution of the national income and wealth will by itself radically improve the condition of the people. For example, if the total agricultural land of the countries (and not, as has been the case, merely the large estates) were distributed equally among the peasants ('Black Distribution' in the phrase of the Russian revolutionaries under the Tsar), the main result would be the equalisation of poverty. As long as the majority of the people are engaged in agriculture and the producivity of labour in agriculture is as low as it is today, no real improvement of their condition is possible.

The level of output of agriculture per head of the agricultural population in Eastern Europe is very low, as can be illustrated by comparing it with other regions. It is, of course, difficult to compare the agricultural productivity of different countries, which produce various products in differing proportions. Fortunately Wilbert E. Moore has undertaken an important statistical work, attempting to fulfil this task for different European countries (op. cit.). He weighs the quantities of agricultural goods produced according to a uniform set of value rations which he calls the Crop Unit (C.U.). For the years 1931-5 on the average, the results were as follows (see top of page 45) (the index calculation has been made from Moore's absolute figures).

Although there are differences in the productivity of agriculture as between the different countries of Eastern Europe, there is a much greater *inequality* between Western Europe as a whole and Eastern Europe as a whole, the latter's productivity being 4-5 times lower than the former's.

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AGRICULTURAL PRODUCTION PER PERSON DEPENDENT ON AGRICULTURE AND PER MALE ENGAGED IN AGRICULTURE

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	Per Person Dependent on Agriculture		*Per Male Engaged in Agriculture*	
	Crop Units	*Index* Denmark=100	*Crop Units*	*Index* Denmark=100
Denmark	152	100	411	100
England and Wales	137	90	306	74
Netherlands ..	114	75	302	73
Switzerland	84	55	213	52
Belgium	95	62	230	56
France	75	49	204	50
Germany	84	55	244	59
Czechoslovakia ..	45	30	146	36
Hungary	33	22	96	23
Poland	21	14	72	17
Rumania	21	14	67	16
Bulgaria	20	13	70	17
Yugoslavia ..	17	11	55	13
Albania	10	7	32	8

(p. 35).

The large extent to which this is the *direct* result of the greater density of the agricultural population in Eastern than Western Europe becomes clear if the number of hectares of agricultural land per person dependent on agriculture in the different countries is compared. Taking the number in Denmark as 100, the comparative figures are:

Denmark	100	Czechoslovakia ..	54
England and Wales ..	112	Hungary	59
Netherlands	47	Poland	44
Switzerland	35	Rumania	46
Belgium	57	Bulgaria	20
France	108	Yugoslavia	37
Germany	71	Albania	22

It is clear that there is no exact correlation between countries arranged according to productivity per person dependent on agriculture and according to the quantity of agricultural land per person dependent on agriculture. But that there is a certain correlation can be seen by comparing the countries of Western Europe as a group and the countries of Eastern Europe as a group. In the first group there is twice as much agricultural land per person dependent on agriculture as in the second.

The great density of the agricultural population in Eastern Europe compared with Western Europe goes some way to explaining the low productivity per head of the agricultural population in the former compared with the latter. There is another factor that must be mentioned if the explanation is to be complete, namely, that the agricultural output per unit of

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241 area is much smaller in Eastern Europe than in Western
●511 Europe. This is shown clearly in the following table:
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AGRICULTURAL PRODUCTION PER HECTARE OF AGRICULTURAL LAND

	Crop Units	Index		Crop Units	Index
Denmark	57	100	Czechoslovakia	31	54
England and Wales	46	81	Hungary ..	21	37
Netherlands ..	91	160	Bulgaria ..	19	33
Switzerland ..	89	156	Poland.. ..	18	32
Belgium	63	111	Rumania ..	17	30
France	26	46	Yugoslavia ..	17	30
Germany	44	79	Albania ..	17	30

If the agricultural population of Eastern Europe is to have the same quantity of agricultural products per head as in Western Europe, not only must half of them be removed, but the agricultural output must be doubled.

The low productivity in Eastern Europe is not the result of
[134] infertility of the soil. On the contrary, the soil of Eastern Europe, and especially the excellent black soil of the Danube Plain, is on the whole much richer than the naturally poor soil of Western Europe. The low productivity is due to three main causes, the scarcity of livestock, the scanty use of fertilizers and the lack of agricultural implements and machinery.

LIVESTOCK DENSITY (1938)

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	Cattle per 100 ha. Agricultural Area	Pigs per 100 ha. Arable Land
Czechoslovakia ..	59.1	65.3
Hungary	24.9	55.3
Poland	41.3	40.6
Rumania	23.5	23.5
Bulgaria	41.0	22.1
Yugoslavia	29.8	46.0
Germany	69.8	122.5
France	45.2	34.4
Denmark	103.1	106.1

(PEP—Political and Economic Planning-*Economic Development in S.E. Europe*, 1945, p. 34).

In this table the figures for the countries of Eastern Europe include a large number of oxen and buffaloes which are used mainly as draught animals. In the quality of its livestock Eastern Europe compares even more unfavourably with Western Europe than in the quantity.

407 On the question of agricultural implements and machinery,
241 the PEP study states :

'The value of all agricultural equipment used per hectare of arable land was estimated by a Roumanian source at Lei 1,000

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(about £1) for Roumania, Lei 2,000 for Bulgaria, Lei 3,000 for 407
Poland; as against Lei 15,000 for Germany and Lei 42,000 for 241
Switzerland. So far as mechanical equipment is concerned, the disparity was even greater. According to a German source, taking the mechancial equipment per hectare of farm land (in terms of weight) as 100 for Germany, the figure for Bulgaria would be 14, for Yugoslavia 5, for Roumania 3.' (Ibid. p. 32).

A comparison of the extent to which fertilizers are used is 241
equally unfavourable, as can be seen from the following table :

USE OF ARTIFICIAL FERTILIZERS, 1930-1940
(KILOS PER HECTARE OF ARABLE LAND)

	Nitrates	*Phosphates*	*Potash*
Czechoslovakia ..	4.4	8.9	5.0
Poland	1.1	2.3	1.4
Hungary	0.1	0.9	0.1
Yugoslavia ..	0.1	0.4	0.1
Roumania ..	0.02	0.06	0.01
Bulgaria	0.01	0.00	0.00
Germany	18.0	21.4	31.3
France	7.0	17.6	8.7
Denmark	10.7	24.1	7.9

(Ibid. p. 31)

There are a number of other factors which influence the 511
welfare of the agricultural population. The Eastern European 435
peasants suffered from the bad organisation of the marketing of their produce. Two examples will suffice. In Zürich 63 per cent of the retail price of milk went to the milk producer (the rest was divided between wholesale trade, retail and transport), and in Copenhagen 65 per cent; even in the United States where milk is delivered over very great distances the farmer got 46.8 per cent. As against this in Warsaw he got only 30 per cent, and in Belgrade 37.5 per cent (Ibid. pp. 94-5). The Survey of the Royal Institute of International Affairs, *World Agriculture* (1932), tells of a typical Rumanian barley farm, from which barley to the value of Lei 1,006 was sold. But the middlemen's profits and transport charges before the grain left Rumania amounted to Lei 1,202 (p.106).

The high prices of essential industrial goods further militated against the prosperity of the peasants.

The expensiveness of industrial compared with agricultural products in the period before the second world war is revealed by the following index figures of the variation of agricultural and industrial prices in Hungary (July figures):

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	1913	1925	1929	1933	1936	1937
Agricultural ..	100	125	114	57	71	80
Industrial ..	100	138	133	107	117	123

(E. Hertz, *The Economic Problem of the Danubian States*, London, 1947, p. 194)

The same phenomenon was expressed some time before World War II by a Croatian peasant speaking thus to an English investigator:

'Life is getting more and more difficult. The prices we can obtain are so very low. Look, before 1914 I could get two pair of boots for a hundredweight of wheat. Today I must give two hundredweights of wheat in exchange for one pair of boots. For one kilogram of nails, I must give one kilogram of wool. When I sold a sheep before 1914, I could buy fifty metres of cottons in exchange. Now I cannot get fifty metres of cotton-stuff even for four sheep.

'Things are no better on the coast of Dalmatia either. Before 1914 they could get a suit of clothes for a hectolitre of wine. Today they must give three hectolitres of wine for a suit. Before 1914 they could get ten boxes of matches for a litre of wine, today they must give a litre of wine for every single box.' (P. Lamartine Yates and D. Warriner, *Food and Farming in Post-War Europe*, London, 1943, p. 28).

High taxation added to the difficulties of the mass of peasants in Eastern Europe.

Last but not least, there was the burden of debts, a result of the poverty of the peasants and a very important contribution to it.

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There are two main groups of countries today whose agricultural populations enjoy a relatively high standard of living—on the one hand the corn and meat producing countries with large, highly mechanized farms (U.S.A., Canada and Australia), and on the other hand, countries like Denmark, Switzerland, Holland and Belgium which go in for intensive production of dairy products, meat and vegetables. In both cases only 20-30 per cent of the whole population is engaged in agriculture, the well-organised and highly developed agriculture being the accompaniment of an advanced industrial organization. The highly mechanized, extensive producers are dependent on a huge, world-wide market, the intensive producers are dependent on the existence of an urban population

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with a high standard of living which is able to pay good prices 511
for the dairy products, meat, eggs, etc. (Thus the prosperity of 438
Holland and Denmark depends on the prosperity of the urban population in Britain). In Eastern Europe the growth of grass and root crops is made difficult by the dry climate, and so, intensive production of meat, as in Denmark, Holland, Eire, England, etc., is impossible. But this does not preclude the production of milk and the raising of pigs. In some areas, there are excellent natural conditions for specialised crops, e.g., in Bulgaria and Serbia for tobacco and grapes. Other areas—and these form the greater part of Eastern Europe—are more suitable for growing corn, which could be done on the American model with tractors and combine harvesters, instead of with draught animals whose feeding takes up a lot of the arable land. In many places the best results could be achieved by mixed farming, combining mechanized corn growing with intensive production of milk, pigs, vegetables and fruits. But however agriculture develops in this area, experience has shown that the decisive factor in raising the standard of living in the countryside is the accessibility of expanding urban markets. No raising of the rate of agricultural production, no improvement in the standard of living is possible without rapid industrialisation, which will enable the surplus agricultural population to be absorbed, will provide a market for agricultural products and will supply agricultural implements and machinery as well as industrial consumption goods for the peasants. In addition the peasants need 'cheap government' and a cheap marketing system.

Problems of Industrial Development

If Eastern Europe is to be industrialised, large amounts of 162
capital will be needed, which can be estimated by considering the number of people to be absorbed into industry. Obviously any such calculation can be only approximate and be put forward by way of illustration.

First there is the surplus population in agriculture. W. E. Moore calculated this by estimating what was a 'reasonable' European standard of agricultural population. The result was as follows :

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465 income groups. This gives an insight into the difference
651 between maximum and minimum incomes, but does not reveal the number of people falling within each group. Incomes of persons or enterprises up to 72,000 zlotys are tax-free (there are many who earn even less than 36,000 zlotys). The rate of tax goes on :

72,000—	80,000 zlotys—	2	per cent	income tax
100,000—	110,000	„— 3·5	„	„
150,000—	170,000	„— 7	„	„
190,000—	210,000	„— 9	„	„
250,000—	300,000	„—13	„	„
500,000—	600,000	„—23	„	„
1,000,000—	1,200,000	„—33	„	„
1,400,000—	1,600,000	„—37	„	„
2,400,000—	3,000,000	„—43	„	„
3,600,000—	4,200,000	„—47	„	„
over 4,200,000		„—50	„	„

(H. W. Robinson, Chief, Division of Operational Analysis, U.N.R.R.A. European Regional Office, London, *Finance in Poland*, p. 21).

To paraphrase Orwell: all men are equal, but some men are more equal than others!*

465 In Czechoslovakia, as has already been mentioned, it was
511 not uncommon (in 1948) to find factory managers earning 40
565 thousand crowns a month, while two-thirds of the workers in 1948 got less than 2,900 crowns a month gross (i.e. before payment of taxes, dues, etc.). In addition, those earning 40,000 crowns were given the free use of a villa, a car with a chauffeur and other perquisites.

Beneš's bourgeois liberal paper, *Svobodné Slovo*, stated, not unjustifiably, that the bureaucracy were 'living in the style of millionaires . . . enjoy every comfort and luxury, thanks to the villas and limousines which they have been allocated by the authorities and to their high incomes'. These people, the paper continued, are 'propertyless—in form only . . . ' (6th September, 1947). The standard of living of the masses, on the other hand, is very low, as even the official statisticians have to admit. As early as June, 1946, the monthly average wage of an industrial worker was 2,540 while the *food ration alone* of a family of three cost 2,721 crowns. And many earned less than the average of 2,540 crowns! Since June, 1946, the condition of the masses has deteriorated. The correspondent of *Associated Press* in Prague, did not exaggerate when he said on 15 July,

*In Russia the scale of income-tax starts with taxes on less than 1,800 roubles a year and ends with taxes on more than 300,000 roubles. (*Izvestia*, 6th April, 1940).

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1948: 'Czechoslovakia today can fairly claim to be the hungriest country in Europe—hungrier than even Austria'. The Viennese Socialist paper *Arbeiter Zeitung* wrote on 23rd June, 1948: 'Travellers who often come from Prague to Vienna report that in the last few weeks, for the first time, they have not taken goods from Prague to Vienna, but on their return from Vienna to Prague'. The paper adds particulars of prices on the black market in Prague. It is possible to cite innumerable facts to the same effect.

There can be no doubt about who suffered from the shortages, which were the result partly, but only partly, of the drought of the winter of 1947-8. The drought fails to explain either the acute shortage of textiles, shoes (in the country of Bata!) and other consumer goods, or the duration of the shortages.

It is clear from official data that the portion of the social product going to the workers is decreasing. In January, 1946, the total product of Czechoslovakian industry was sold for 9.09 milliard crowns; wages and salaries in industry itself came to 2.83 milliard crowns, i.e. 31.6 per cent of the turnover. A year later, in January, 1947, the total sales amounted to 15.66 milliard crowns; wages and salaries came to 4.03 milliard or 25.7 per cent of the turnover. This decline in the portion of wages and salaries was accompanied by an increase in the turnover per hour of work from 50 crowns to 78 crowns, a rise of 56 per cent (*Statistical Bulletin of Czechoslovakia*, published by the State Statistical Office, Prague, July, 1947). If the statistics had included only wages and not salaries as well, the decline would have been even bigger.

The journal *Účetnictví a Kontrola*, issued by the trade union publishing house, Práce, submitted the state budget to a detailed analysis in order to get an approximate estimate of the cost of the bureaucracy. This reveals that the travelling expenses of the administration proper—that is, the ministries, not including the administration of the nationalised industries—amounted to not less than 780 million crowns, the maintenance of automobiles to 180 million. How large these amounts are is clear from the fact that the expenditure on travelling of these bureaucrats would cover the difference between the meagre wages of about 300,000 families and a minimum living

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465 standard. In summing up, the article states: 'The public
511 administration swallows 48 per cent of the national income.
434 How will it be possible to raise the standard of living of the
656 whole people, how will the wide layers of the toilers be satisfied, how will it be possible to pay proper salaries to government clerks?' (From an article, 'Let us think about the Figures', quoted by V. Salus in the theoretical paper of the Czech Social Democracy, *Cil*, August 15th, 1947, under the interesting heading, 'Economic Democracy and the New Nobility').*

511 The division of the national income in Yugoslavia is not less
565 unequal than in the other 'People's Democracies.' Vernon
434 Bartlett, when in Belgrade, described the situation in the

*For a time the Communist Party leaders tried to cushion the conflict between the workers and the 'new nobility' by directing the hostility of the masses exclusively against the bourgeoisie. For example in October, 1947, in connection with the relief to the peasants who were suffering from the drought, the Communist Party raised the slogan 'Let the millionaires pay', and proposed as a solution the imposition of a property levy. Of course the bureaucracy, being 'propertyless—in form' would not have to pay anything. The Communist Party tried to overlook the fact that the portion of the national income of Czechoslovakia in the hands of the bourgeoisie was so small, only a quarter of industry being left in their hands, that the only possibility of seriously improving the conditions of the masses was by 1. cutting into the income of the bureaucracy; 2. raising the general national income; 3. preventing Russia from taking her cut from the national income.

The Communist Party claimed that there were 35,000 millionaires in Czechoslovakia. This is a large number, but it is much less impressive when it is realised that they were not pound sterling or dollar millionaires, but crown millionaires. A million crowns in July, 1947, was equal to five thousand pounds sterling. Even according to the Communist Party estimate the wealth of these 35,000 'millionaires' was only 50 milliard (According to the bourgeois paper *Svobodné Slovo* there were only 12,000 millionaires with a property of 22 milliard crowns). 50 milliard crowns is only about a quarter of the *annual national income* of Czechoslovakia.

The conditions of the masses could not therefore be substantially improved at the expense of the bourgeoisie, but only by improvements in the nationalised sectors of the economy and at the expense of the bureaucracy. This is proved by the distribution of the national income:

Personal Income at Factor Cost (thousand million of crowns.)	1947
1. Entrepreneural profits in industry, trade and professions and private income from capital	22.0
2. Rentals and sub-rentals (including net rental value of owner-occupied dewllings	5.2
3. Independent agriculturists	25.4
4. Wages and salaries	125.9
5. Pensions of Government employees	5.7
6. Unfreezing of blocked accounts to people of limited means	6.3

In addition there were a number of other small items.

(Statistical Office of the United Nations, *National Income Statistics of Various Countries, 1938-1948*, Lake Success, New York, 1950, p. 59).

The figures speak for themselves. The possibility of increasing item 4 at the expense of item 1 is very limited indeed.

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following terms: 'Here, as in Moscow during the war, I am shocked that leaders who boast so much of the dictatorship of the proletariat should enjoy privileges that are relatively far greater than those enjoyed by any privileged class in Britain or in most of the other countries condemned by Moscow as Fascist and imperialist'. (*News Chronicle*, 26th April, 1949). 511 565 434

The situation was described sixteen months later by the correspondent of the *Neue Zürcher Zeitung* in the following terms: 'The social revolution in the eastern countries, which pretended to have the abolition of exploitation and inequality as its aim, leads in actuality to the erection of a *hierarchically ranked social order* with a whole number of privileged layers. This can be observed daily in Yugoslavia in the same way as in the Cominform countries and one will always be astonished at the way in which the bearers of the system take the privileges they enjoy for granted. The proletarians who stand in the queues near the bus stops look with greedy eyes at the lit-up American cars of the state leaders, resplendent in chrome and coloured varnish, which pass swiftly by them. The higher-ups of the State and Party travel in the latest model cabriolets, the great ones of second rank travel in limousines. Skoda and Opeldienst cars are at the disposal of high officers and officials.

'In the entrance to the People's Front Street in Marshal Tito Boulevard stands a big warehouse. Men in khaki or white uniforms with gold epaulettes go in and out. The *warehouse* is reserved *for officers* and their families. There they can buy clothes, shoes, furniture, carpets and other goods of better quality and cheaper price than the common mortal can buy. The officers get their food rations there too—far larger rations than those of workers and clerks. So large are these rations, that in the spring, at the time of the great food scarcity, peasants came to town in order to buy from the officers their surplus fat and flour at black market prices.

'It is obvious that the police and high officials also have their own store. The *warehouse of the political police* is even better supplied than that of the officers. Naturally these categories of the population also have their special rations. It is the same here as in the other Eastern countries: one who has a higher post and a higher salary also gets larger food rations and is less directed to the expensive free market than the poorly-salaried

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511 small man. Reductions in prices for the higher-paid instead of
565 for those with smaller means . . . ' (*Neue Zürcher Zeitung*, 30th
434 August, 1950)*

465 One aspect of the problem of the mode of distribution of the
565 social product is this: to what extent is the differentiation between
434 different income groups concomitant with national differences? How much of the cream of the milk produced in the satellites is in the form of higher personal incomes for Soviet officials? These facts are unfortunately covered by a veil of secrecy. Some facts, however, have emerged. A letter of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of Yugoslavia to the Central Committee of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union (dated 13th April, 1948) stated: 'The wages of the Soviet experts (working as advisers in Yugoslavia—Y.G.) were four times as high as the wages of the commanders of our armies and three times as high as the wages of our Federal Ministers. The commander of one of our armies, a lieutenant-general or a colonel-general, then had 9,000 to 11,000 dinars a month, and a Soviet military expert, lieutenant-colonel, colonel and general had from 30,000 to 40,000 dinars. At the same time our Federal Ministers had a salary of 12,000 dinars a month.' The reply of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union (dated 4th May, 1948) did not deny the correctness of these figures, but claimed as an extenuating circumstance the fact that the Yugoslav generals also got 'apartments, servants, food, etc.'

The paper *Glas*, the organ of the People's Front of Serbia, in its issue of 16th December, 1949, gave another example of the same thing. Near Sofia an automobile factory employing Russian, Czech and Bulgarian specialists was being built. The salary of the Russian specialists was 2,000 levas an hour, of the Czechs 2,000-3,000 levas a day, and of the Bulgarian 250-300 levas a day. These differences were certainly not due mainly to differences in skill.

*Since then a big change has taken place. On 14th October, 1950, Marshal Tito signed a decree abolishing special privileges in the supply and distribution of rations and consumer goods, doing away with the special shops of the upper bureaucracy, and transferring all villas and rest homes hitherto reserved for the privileged to the tourist industry. Whether this is a temporary measure resulting from the terrible drought and famine of the 1950-51 winter, it is too early to say.

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461 To add to the difficulties of the poor agriculturists, not every-
241 one has to give the same number of labour days. The higher
423 strata of kolkhozniki give far fewer labour days than the poor
474 kolkhozniki. The reward for their labours, however, is in inverse proportion to the time contributed.

There is less justification in calling the Russian agriculturists of today owners of the means of production than the serfs of the nineteenth century.

Miss D. Warriner in 1940 noted as regards the productivity of Russian agriculture: 'Russia both before and after collectivisation had a lower productivity than Eastern Europe . . . Russian collectivisation has not really achieved much increase in productivity through reforming the peasant system. Yields are still lower in Russia than in every part of Eastern Europe, cattle density is still much lower . . .' (*Eastern Europe after Hitler*, London, 1940, p. 4). In another place Miss Warriner writes: '. . . the physical output per man in corn is slightly higher in Russia than in the very poorest regions of Eastern Europe, and the value in terms of industrial products certainly lower'.
● 511 (*Economics of Peasant Farming*, London, 1939, p. 188). As
423 regards the standard of living of the Russian agriculturists in
474 relation to those of Europe Miss Warriner says: 'As things are
241 at present, on the basis of purchasing power, the Russian farmer is certainly not so well off as the peasants in Poland'. 'On the Russian farms meat consumption must be much lower than in Poland, and milk consumption must be lower also'. (Ibid. pp. 188, 189).* To gain a rough idea of what the standard of living of the Polish peasant was before the war, we quote the following passage: The Polish peasants' 'poverty was proverbial. It was said that during the depression the peasant would split a match four or five times, and would boil potatoes over and over again in the same water to save the salt . . . According to the Polish Minister of Finance the average cash income of the peasant in 1934-5 was eleven groszy (about one penny) a day . . .' (Henryk Frankel, *Poland, The Struggle for Power 1772-1939*, London, 1946, p. 134).

Miss Warriner's analysis, based on Soviet statistics, conforms

*It is regrettable that Miss Warriner in her new book *Revolution in Eastern Europe* (London, 1950) in the chapter 'Collective Farming' overlooks what she herself wrote on the question of collectivisation in Russia in *Economics of Peasant Farming* and also in *Eastern Europe After Hitler*.

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with the conclusion Victor Serge reached from his direct [511] contact with Russian toilers: 'The vast majority of the peasants 241 live more poorly than before the collectivisation, that is, on 423 the whole, at a level lower than pre-war' (i.e., pre-World War I) 474 (op. cit. p. 37).

The peasants did not gain anything out of the 'collectivisation', but that does not detract one iota from the success of 'collectivisation' from the standpoint of bureaucratic state capitalism.

Miss D. Warriner was quite right when she said of the results of 'collectivisation' in Russia: 'Apparently, then, most of the increase in output could have been achieved by extending the State farms in the sparsely settled and uncultivated regions, without collectivizing the peasant villages in the already settled parts; had there been no collectivization, then all the loss of capital through livestock slaughter would have been avoided and corn production in 1931 and 1932 would have been maintained'. (*Economics of Peasant Farming*, op. cit. p. 174). This is true. But then the state would not have got such a large part of the agricultural output for nothing!

The Satellites Follow in the Footsteps of Russia

Undoubtedly the circumstances in which the collectiviza- 423 tion of agriculture is being and will be carried out in the 474 satellites are to some extent different from those in which it was carried out in Russia. In part they will moderate its results, and in part will render them more severe. The moderating influence will be the lesson learnt from the experience of Russia, which will prevent the Communist Party from making similar mistakes in the satellites; namely, rushing through 'collectivisation' at a feverish pace, far outstripping the development of the necessary technical basis for large-scale farming, and then hastily retreating;* and secondly taking all the livestock—cows, sheep, poultry—away from the peasants and putting them into the kolkhozes, and then reversing their policy after half the livestock had already been slaughtered.

*In October, 1929, 4.1 per cent of all the peasants were included in kolkhozes. Five months later, on 10th March, 1930, 58.0 per cent were. There followed a hasty retreat, and in September of the same year only 21 per cent of the peasants were in kolkhozes. Only after this mismanagement did the tempo of collectivization begin to be less erratic, even though the compulsion to enter the kolkhozes remained very strict for the peasants.

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member of the Government, it was learned today. Rumania could not afford to lose the services of merchants and industrialists, M. Pătrăscanu said. He expressed the opinion that the country would pursue a more liberal policy toward this class than the French have.' What an outcry there would have been in the Communist press if a similar announcement had been made by a non-Communist Minister in the West! 642 661

Tătărescu did not hestitate to attack 'anarchists' (i.e., workers). In an interview with *The New York Times* correspondent in Bucharest on 21st October, 1945, he declared that a strenuous discipline must be introduced in industry and an end brought to the 'excesses' of the workers' committees.

It was hardly surprising that the capitalists faced the future with perhaps a little anxiety even if they were satisfied with the existing state of affairs. There was great optimism among businessmen, as the serious Swiss paper *Neue Zürcher Zeitung* pointed out (10th February, 1947) giving this illustration: 'As the Bucharest economic journal *Finantze si Industrie* reports, in the last year (1946—Y.G.) in Rumania there were established 355 new stock companies with a total capital of 20.3 milliard Lei.'

For years business continued to be good and speculation in the free market active, although the conditions of the working people were appalling and, after the drought of 1946-7, starvation stared them in the face. Some idea of the conditions of the people at this time can be got from '*A Survey of the Health of the People in Several European Countries affected by the War* published on November 19th, 1948, by *La Documentation Francaise* and consisting of reports of the International Committee of the Red Cross which describes the dreadful tragedy which overtook Rumania, the country most affected by the drought: 'It is difficult to convey the misery of the Rumanian population in 1947: famine prevailed in whole sections of the country, in some regions people were eating grass and the bark of trees and even clay. It is estimated that 6,000,000 persons were dependent on the government in 1947-48. Here are some of the consequences of the famine and misery which prevailed in this country: 1. The complete disappearance of little children in some districts . . . infant mortality actually reached a rate of 80% . . . 2. An increase of 511 262 165

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511 all kinds of diseases and a steep rise of the mortality rate;
262 corpses were thrown into sewers adjacent to the houses.
165 3. Universal poverty conducive to the spread of venereal diseases . . . one out of twelve persons is syphilitic according to recent reports furnished by the Minister of Health . . .'

All this time the fortunes of the capitalists were not touched as they were working for reparations for Russia. They and the new state bureaucracy flourished, while the lion's share of the surplus value produced in Rumania was taken, of course, by the Kremlin.*

642 The bureaucratic and militarist character of the Rumanian
693 state was not altered and many of the former officials remained in office. Of the legal system, Pătrăşcanu could say: 'The
645 procedures, methods, traditions and structure of Rumanian jurisprudence have remained unchanged since a Communist became Minister of Justice. No more than 20 new judges out of 2,000 have been appointed. About a quarter of the old staff have been purged or pensioned'. (*Christian Science Monitor*, 12th December, 1945). This policy is symbolised by the fact that 'Just two weeks before the start of the trial of Iuliu Maniu . . . a discreet announcement was published in Bucharest newspapers recording the appointment of a new chief of the military tribunal of the second army corps district (the one to preside over Maniu's trial—Y.G.) . . . the wartime director general of all prisons and concentration camps in Rumania'. (*New York Herald Tribune*, 7th November, 1947).

701 The structure of the army remained hierarchical, with the
645 complete subordination of the soldiers to their officers, and with no soldiers' committees. For three years even the composition of its personnel showed a marked continuity with the past. For instance, Lieutenant-Colonel Nicolae Cambrea, commander of the Rumanian units fighting against Russia at Stalingrad, was promoted by the Groza government to the rank of General, and appointed Assistant Chief of Staff. Major Popescu-Argetoia, an active Fascist in the past, was put at the head of the secret police. General Vasiliu Rascanu, Chief of Military Police during the war against Russia, was appointed Minister of War. Another old general, Pretorian, was appointed Chief of Staff at the same time. General Lascar,

*See above pp.

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ism with socialism, in the belief that political democracy should be accompanied by "economic democracy." 829 565

The importance and influence of liberalism in this region did not, therefore, rest with any particular political parties or social groupings which gave themselves the liberal label or which explicitly professed liberal principles. The influence of liberalism lay in the force of the liberal ideology which exercised influence on the whole national community.

It is often held today, due to the conception of liberalism held in Anglo-Saxon countries and, to some extent, in other countries of Western Europe, that the influence of liberalism in the Eastern European countries was not of great importance. This is accounted for by a theory that the so-called middle classes were weak and that the popular masses, predominantly peasant, had a low social and cultural standing. Czechoslovakia is cited as an example to support this analysis. It is said that Czechoslovakia was able to maintain her democracy because she had an influential and prosperous middle class and because the cultural level of her population was approximately the same as the cultural level of the West. There is no doubt that a weak middle class and a low social standard among the popular masses were serious handicaps to the development of liberal democracy in the agricultural countries of this region. Liberal democracy required, from the social and economic points of view, not uniformity and equalization, but a diversified and well-balanced social structure and an economy with a fair degree of balance between industry and agriculture. Above all, liberal democracy required the "liberal spirit," a combination of a desire for freedom, a devotion to political and social rights, and an eagerness for justice. The existence of liberal democracy, therefore, cannot be defined in terms of social and economic requirements alone. 829 565 511

In support of this premise, several examples can be cited. Before the First World War, in the small Serbia of King 829 511

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829 Peter I, there was much more freedom, in spite of the social
● 571 and cultural backwardness of the people, than there had been under the dictatorship of the Crown in the '30's when the economic and social level of the country was much higher than in prewar years. It is sufficient to compare the liberal Radical, Nikola Pašić, with the unprincipled opportunist Milan Stojadinović (whom Ciano praised as a "true fascist") to realize that the betterment of economic conditions did not prevent the disintegration of democracy in Yugoslavia. Between the two world wars, Poland progressed economically and made great strides in industrialization, yet from 1926 on she was subjected to the semidictatorship of Pilsudski.

[433] In Hungary, after the First World War, the economic situation was not much better than it was in Austria. Yet, in spite of both this and the reactionary regime of Admiral Horthy in Budapest, some vestiges of liberalism survived even the Second World War. In Austria, in spite of the substantial influence exercised in Vienna by the Social Democrats and by the liberal bourgeoisie, a semidictatorial regime was installed in 1934. Germany's economic and social structure was more advanced than that of Czechoslovakia. The grave economic crisis of the '30's caused wide unemployment in both these countries, yet the small Czechoslovakian Republic remained faithful to liberal democracy until she fell before Nazi aggression, while in Germany Hitler was already in power in 1933.

829 These examples are surely sufficient to show that the strength or weakness of liberalism in Eastern Europe did not depend solely, or even mostly, upon economic and social conditions. These were certainly very important factors, but of more importance were the psychological climate and the political tradition within each individual nation. Czechoslovakia remained democratic until her fall because, ever since the Hussite revolution in the fifteenth century, the substantial majority of both Czechs and Slovaks had been

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423 cause the land was becoming exhausted. This was due to a
241 lack of manure and fertilizer and to the peasants' ignorance of land preservation techniques.

[464] Labor remained so cheap that the introduction of labor-saving devices did not pay. Overpopulation meant that there were more people living on holdings than were needed for the farm work. This situation caused underemployment. Since overpopulation decreased the output per man and with it the earnings per man, a very low standard of living resulted.

423 The size of the farms, which on the average was barely
656 ten acres, was a problem in itself, and the custom of dividing
185 land after the death of a peasant made the situation even more acute. The holdings consisted of many small and scattered strips so that it was impossible for the peasant to use machines, even when they were available. However, the land reforms, carried out after the First World War by the different governments, did have some success in equalizing the amounts of land held by the different peasants.

The land reforms grew out of political and national considerations rather than out of social and economic policy. The first and main objective of the agrarian parties was to expropriate the big landowners and to transfer their land to the peasants. The usual procedure was to fix a maximum acreage, usually about five hundred acres, and to decree that all land in excess of this amount should be sold to peasants, either to create new farms or to add to the area of peasant farms already in existence. Under these reforms, about twenty-five million acres were distributed, for the most part in quite small plots, averaging one hectare, or 2.4 acres. The smaller farms were given more land than the large, so that there was some leveling of the incomes derived from farming.

162 These reforms did not remedy the unhappy condition of
464 the peasantry, since they were unable to remove the main
511 causes for distress. If all the agricultural land of this region

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had been distributed equally among the peasants, the main result would have been the equalization of poverty. It was obvious that redistribution of the national income and wealth could not, by itself, greatly improve the condition of the people. The surplus agricultural population which was estimated, on the basis of the system of cultivation prevailing in that area, to be about fifteen million persons had to be absorbed, and that was an insoluble problem. This problem was heightened by the fact that between 1919 and 1939 the natural increase of population in this area remained almost three times as high as that in the West.

Some alleviation of the situation was sought in the development of industries. However, industrialization was a long-term measure, and the expense only added to the peasants' burden. The fiscal policy of the Eastern European states was to accumulate the national capital necessary for industrialization by taxes, tariffs, and prices. No money, or very little, was left for the peasants.

II

It would be unjust, however, to say that nothing was done to improve the lot of the peasantry. The governments were well aware that the land reforms should be supplemented by economic measures such as agrarian credits, modern cooperatives, development of transport, cheaper farm machinery, technical education and training. A great deal was accomplished by these measures.

The supply of credit was particularly important to the peasants. The need for capital to begin operations and to finance certain family needs, especially the weddings of daughters, made borrowing necessary. As banks would not make advances, money had to come from moneylenders who charged very high rates of interest. Often, the moneylender was the middleman who bought the peasant's produce

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178 per cent; and Czechoslovakia, 41 per cent. Thus it can be
162 easily seen that, with the exception of Czechoslovakia whose
241 industry was the most developed in the region, the countries of Eastern Europe were predominantly agricultural and peasant in nature. Yet despite the predominantly peasant character of these countries, the peasants as such had relatively little political influence.

178 Although there was an increase in the output of agricul-
241 tural goods in all these countries between 1918 and 1945,
• 511 the competition offered by overseas cereals strongly affected the agriculture of Eastern Europe. Cereals, one of the major products of the region, had to be undersold to Germany. Added to this unfortunate situation, the world depression of 1929 came as a terrible blow to the economy of Eastern Europe, the most disastrous years lasting from 1931 until 1934. Industry, with its frequent cartels, was better able to defend itself than was agriculture, and thus the "price scissors," or the disparity between agricultural and industrial prices, cut mostly into the income of the agricultural population. This resulted in a general lowering of both the purchasing power and the standard of living. Loans at high rates of interest were frequent and taxation increased the poverty of the peasants. These, as the major element of the population, pressed heavily for reforms and spread malcontent in their respective countries.

185 Soon after the First World War, some states realized that
167 the solution to this situation was industrialization. Emigra-
433 tion, as a possible solution, was not favored in any of the Eastern European states as it would have decreased manpower. Since war was considered more or less imminent after 1933, military and industrial groups were especially opposed to any large-scale loss of population, although emigration was never prohibited by actual government order.

185 Bohemia, which had been in a highly advantageous posi-
433 tion in the industrialization program of Austria before the

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433 tential in 1938 was, and still is, insignificant. It is claimed that in 1952 the industrial output of the area rose again by about one fifth.

An estimate of the relative industrial strength of the individual captive countries was made recently in a United Nations publication.[3] If the total industrial output of the area at the end of 1952 is taken as 100, the output of Eastern Germany constitutes 34 per cent of this total, that of Poland 27, of Czechoslovakia 21, of Hungary 9, of Rumania 6, and of Bulgaria 3 per cent. The total industrial output of the entire captive area is equivalent, roughly speaking, to nearly 40 per cent of the total industrial output of the Soviet Union.

195 All this rapid, even violent, industrial expansion cannot
471 be smooth and is, in more ways than one, terribly expensive.
● 511 There are no miracles in economics, and wealth can be
464 created at different rates of speed, but not at will. The tremendous increase of the state-owned industrial plant in this area is only feasible because the citizens have been deprived of their individual capital, because the consumer demand is being systematically curtailed, and because more and more of the national income, siphoned off by taxation, inflation, and other methods, is being reinvested in industry. This reinvestment is being done at great cost to agriculture. Quantitative industrial progress is also speeded up by the fact that the police state has the means to make everyone work. The prewar urban unemployment and, to some extent, the huge peasant underemployment, caused by the extreme subdivision of rural property, are things of the past. Billions of man-hours which were wasted before the war in enforced idleness are now used for production or, at least, are on tap for production purposes. On the other hand, a large proportion of the men and women kept in concentration and labor camps

[3] *Economic Bulletin for Europe* (Geneva: United Nations, 1952), Vol. V, no. 2 (July, 1953), p. 84, Table 1.

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produce litt'e, if anything, and the vast apparatus of standing 185
armed forces, of police and poli ical supervision, of party 471 511
machinery and propaganda, does not create wealth but con- 464
sumes it. The onetime waste of unemployment has been partly supplanted by the waste of the immense state machinery of control and compulsion inherent in all totalitarian systems and particularly odious under Communism.

In addition to this costly political overhead, there are three 185
other burdens to the national economies of these countries. One is the cost of planning both on a national scale and in minute detail, an economically unlikely proposition, resulting in duplication of work, omissions, bottlenecks, and other forms of economic confusion. This has been one of the main reasons why the Yugoslav Five Year Plan has never been fully realized. This type of waste can only be eliminated very gradually, if at all. The second type of waste is directly due to Communism. In the free world, private property is fairly 471
generally respected and cared for by its owners and by the public at large. Public property, being the exception rather than the rule, also enjoys respect and cases of vandalism are few. In Eastern Europe, state property is the rule, and very few people give it proper respect. The Communists are aware of this general neglect and the ensuing injury to the economy but believe that in time society will be taught to take care of what is defined as people's wealth. However, during thirty-five years of Communism in Russia, there has been little progress in this direction. The third burden on the state C48
economy is a specific feature of the countries of Eastern 439
Europe. All of them have to pay heavy tribute to the Russian big brother. Russia exploits the captive nations in many ways: by reparations in kind, mixed companies, trade agreements, high prices for imports from Russia and low prices for exports to Russia, maintenance costs for Soviet troops, high salaries for Russian experts and advisers, and the like. These nations cannot express themselves on this topic, but

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hind the Iron Curtain that does not emphasize the eternal dedication of the People's Democracies to this fundamental concept. It is likely that some members in the lower echelons of the party are sincerely persuaded that this indeed is the case. Not so the ruthless social engineers among the top Communists. These experienced pupils of Moscow realize, of course, that in the Communist system there is a very definite hierarchy of goals, that first things have to come first, and that the expansion of industry comes before the welfare of the people. The two cannot be sought at the same time with the same intensity since the Communist state has not the means to proceed in both directions at once. There is reliable evidence that the four northern satellite governments opposed, insofar as they were able, the imposition on their countries of the immense goals and back-breaking burdens of industrial expansion. They regarded the enormously revised targets of 1950 and 1951 as burdens too heavy on their economies. Nevertheless, they had to yield to Moscow's pressure, which was probably connected with the outbreak of the Korean war. The relatively poor nations of Eastern Europe cannot afford both guns and butter. Since it had to be guns, butter has had to be delayed to a more or less distant future. If this is the case in the Soviet Union, it must be even more so in Eastern Europe. The result is a gradual, though uneven, lowering or at least stagnation of standards of living in Eastern Europe as compared to what they were during the first years after the recent war.

Such a generalization would, of course, be vehemently denied by the satellite governments. They publish statistical data to the effect that much new housing is being built, that more food is being produced and therefore consumed, and that the population is better clad with every passing year. A trained researcher will not accept these claims at their face value. The extremely generalized social statistics from this area are even less reliable than statistics on agricultural out-

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262 cause of the fuel shortage, makes a bitter joke of the Communist pledge to liberate the housewife from drudgery. There [545] are a few brighter spots in this picture. The soldiers and policemen are well fed and so are the privileged classes of senior government and party workers, and of artists and writers. The numerical strength of these new, privileged strata of society is less than that of the pre-war middle class, and their standard of living is undoubtedly lower.

262 Data have been published lately that illustrate the low
• 511 level of consumption of food behind the Iron Curtain. These data concern the increase of sales of certain staples in Czechoslovakia in 1952 over those in 1951, and, for once, they are disclosed not in meaningless percentages, as is the rule behind the Iron Curtain, but in absolute figures. An analysis of these figures shows the increase in sales of sugar and butter to the extent, respectively, of two ounces and less than half an ounce per capita per month. The alleged increase in sales of coffee actually lags behind the increase in the population. Only the amount of tea sold has really increased. However, the Czechoslovakians are not tea but coffee drinkers. They used to produce more sugar than they could consume before the war. Yet the text in question continues: "The above figures show that the standard of living of the Czechoslovak people is irresistibly on the upward trend." Another example is a long letter from a coal miner in Poland, whose only subject was a detailed description of how he tried in vain for weeks in the fall of 1952 to buy a piece of sausage. In his fury with the regime and "the Russkis" behind it, the humble writer rose to the rhetoric of a Patrick Henry and declared that since there was no sausage life was not worth living. "And to think that I actually used to grumble against the pre-war government!" was his final confession. It should be noted that pre-war Poland had a large surplus of pork.

656 In the summer of 1953, the Soviet government announced
511 that it would take many measures to relieve the all too ob-

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vious shortages of consumer goods and to increase substantially the standard of living of the Soviet population. This announcement was followed by similar declarations in the captive countries. Their governments bound themselves to increase investments in agriculture, housing and light industries producing consumer goods. In Eastern Germany, Hungary, Czechoslovakia and Rumania, and somewhat later in Poland, qualified promises were made to the effect that the hitherto very rapid rate of heavy industrial expansion would be slowed down. At the same time two of the greatest works under construction in the area have been interrupted if not abandoned: the Danube-Black Sea canal in Rumania and, to all appearances, the huge HUKO iron and steel 'combinat' in Eastern Slovakia. These public statements were in themselves equivalent to an official admission that the condition of the population was miserable.

Time alone will show whether, and to what extent, these new policies will be realized. The bumper 1953 harvest in most of the key provinces of the area would undoubtedly relieve its food scarcity if it were not for the fact that a great deal of this harvest has been earmarked for export. The Soviet government stated recently that it would import food and consumer goods from Eastern Europe to the extent of some 660 million dollars, and Eastern Germany expects to import similar goods from this area, as well as from China which has little to export, in the amount of 125 million dollars. The captive area proper, suffering itself from an acute shortage of consumer goods, would thus be forced to contribute to the betterment of the Soviet and Eastern German economies at the rate of more than eleven dollars per capita of its population. Even if the governments of the area do their best to increase the standard of living of the working masses, much time must inevitably pass between the inauguration of the new policy and the actual increase in the production of consumer goods. For example, the present insufficient produc-

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511 tion capacity of cement plants and brick factories would have to be increased before there can be any question of more housing. This is but one example out of many of its kind. There is a manifest contradiction between the present Russian-enforced armament production in the area, which has not been curtailed, and the intended mass production of consumer goods. The two cannot be carried on simultaneously. For these reasons alone, the recent statements of the Communist governments should be regarded with much scepticism.

288 295 433 The situation as regards clothing and footwear is even worse. The problem of obtaining it is nearly insoluble for the average family. It is far more difficult than in Russia where millions wear Polish textiles and Czech shoes. To discuss this question in detail is beyond the scope of this essay. Suffice it is to say that, according to the present long-range plans, Eastern Germany expects to produce in 1955 only 1.3 pairs of leather shoes per capita, Rumania 1.2 pairs, Hungary 1 pair, and Poland 0.7 pairs. No one can say what proportion of this footwear will be earmarked for export to Russia and China or assigned in advance to the army and security police and what will be left for the population. It is for such reasons that behind the Iron Curtain it is illegal to photograph the people on the streets or to export abroad such documentary evidence of their poor garb.

657 745 In contrast to the situation regarding food, housing, and clothing, the number and range of social services have been considerably extended, and these state services should in all fairness be regarded as significant steps taken to offset the low standard of living. It is little known that prewar Poland and Czechoslovakia, not to speak of Germany, had state-operated systems of social insurance and public health more advanced than any existing at the time in France or the United States. These systems have been enlarged under Communism. The quality of their services is too often insufficient, but the

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177 were needed. Large parts of the area were exposed to Western methods of tax collecting, accounting, and fiscal policy, as well as public administration. They were exposed to the activities of modern bankers, and to a considerable extent to the practices of modern commerce, newspapers, and advertising. They were also exposed in large part to compulsory elementary public education.

177 As a result of these exposures in the nineteenth century, the peoples of Eastern Europe learned to accept completely 571 the prevailing Western standards of theoretical science, as well as of intellectual and artistic life. They accepted to a considerable extent Western ideals of living standards, standards of consumption, wage levels, working conditions, and social welfare. Finally, many of them came to expect Western standards of farm prosperity, rural welfare, and peasant independence and cooperation. In sum, a large part of the populations of Eastern Europe accepted Western living standards as their goal, or at least as a pattern of their claims and expectations.

433 This rapid diffusion of Western-style claims and expectations was not matched by any comparable diffusion of Western-style work habits, savings and investment patterns, levels of productivity, or propensities to technological innovations. Land reforms in Eastern Europe were not only slow in coming, but they did little to increase productivity. The consolidation of separate strips of land, long accomplished in Scandinavia and Western Europe, was still not completed in Eastern Europe by the time of the Second World War. The tools and implements of artisans and peasants changed their traditional shape much more slowly in Eastern Europe than they did in Germany or England and pathetically more slowly than they did in the United States. Throughout most of the regions organized labor feared that increases in productivity would only lead to losses of employment. Employers and businessmen aspired to use the profits

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The gravest reproach leveled against Western culture is
829 that it is exclusive and inaccessible to the masses. This re-
517 proach is largely valid. Poetry, painting, and even music, shutting themselves up in ivory towers, become susceptible to numerous stylistic maladies. At the same time, however, their link with the everyday life of the people is considerably stronger than it seems to be at first glance. For example, avant-garde painting which is so "difficult" and "obscure" reaches a tremendous number of people through its influence on advertising, dress design, stage sets, interior decoration, and most important of all, perhaps, on the shape of universally used machines. In comparison with this, the "Soviet Empire" style, which is based on the painting on huge canvases of groups of dignitaries standing about in various positions and poses, is completely severed from everyday life. By destroying all experimentation in art, the Center confined its applied art (if one can speak of its existence at all) to a clumsy imitation of Western applied art which, however, is constantly renewed under the influence of experimental easel painting. When the cult of ugliness reigns in painting or sculpture and any daring passes as formalism, then applied art, cut off from its roots, is bound to prove sterile.

The multi-colored setting of Western life is subject to the law of osmosis. The average citizen of the West has no idea that a painter in a garret, a little-known musician, or a writer of "unintelligible" verse is a magician who shapes all those things in life which he prizes. Government officials give little thought to such matters for they consider them a waste of time. Since it is not a planned economy, the Western state cannot come to the aid of people working in the various arts. They go on, each pursuing his own chimera, sometimes dying of hunger; while nearby, wealthy men, not knowing what to do with

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their money, spend it on the latest whims of their be- 829
nighted souls. 517

This order of things revolts a person from the East. In his country, anyone who displays any talent is used. In the West, the same man would have very little chance of success. Western economy squanders talent to an incredible degree; and the few who do succeed owe their success as often to pure luck as to native ability. In the countries of the New Faith, the counterpart to this waste lies in the fact that the capacity to follow the political line is a selective criterion by which the most mediocre often attain the greatest renown. Nevertheless, the artist or scholar in the East earns his living more easily than his colleague in the West. Even though the pressure of the Method is burdensome, its material compensations are not to be scorned. Many musicians, painters, and writers who had the opportunity to flee to the West did not do so because they felt it was better to compose, paint, or write somehow or other, rather than to teach or work in a factory, with no time or energy left in which to perfect their true craft. Many of those who were abroad returned to their own countries chiefly for this reason.

Fear of the indifference with which the economic system of the West treats its artists and scholars is widespread among Eastern intellectuals. They say it is better to deal with an intelligent devil than with a good-natured idiot. An intelligent devil understands their mutual interests and lets them live by a pen, a chisel, or a brush, caring for his clients and making his demands. A good-hearted idiot does not understand these interests, gives nothing and asks nothing—which in practice amounts to polite cruelty.

To the people of the East it is axiomatic that the basic 829
means of production should belong to the State, that they 471

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186 other man would dare undertake such measures? After
626 all, Russia stood firm against Hitler; the Revolution weathered the attack of enemy armies. In this perspective, His acts seem effective and even justified, perhaps, by an exceptional historical situation. If He had not instituted an exceptional terror in the year 1937, wouldn't there have been more people willing to help Hitler than there actually were? For example, doesn't the present-day line in scholarship and art, no matter how at odds it may be at times with common sense, effectually raise Russian morale in the face of the war that threatens? He is an infamous blot on the bright New Faith, but a blemish we must tolerate for the moment. And indeed we must even support Him. The "sacred fire" has not gone out. When victory is achieved, it will burst forth again with its old strength, the bonds He imposed will fall away, and relations between nations will operate on new and better principles. This variety of Ketman was widespread if not universal in Russia during the Second World War, and its present form is a rebirth of an already once-deceived hope.

626 *Aesthetic Ketman*[1] is born of the disparity between man's
517 longings and the sense-satisfactions the New Faith offers. A man of taste cannot approve the results of official pressure in the realm of culture no matter how much he applauds the latest verses, how many flattering reviews he writes of current art expositions, nor how studiously he pretends that the gloomy new buildings coincide with his personal preferences in architecture. He changes completely within the four walls of his home. There one finds (if he is a well-situated intellectual) reproductions of works of art officially condemned as bourgeois, records of modern music, and a rich collection of ancient authors in various languages. This luxury of splendid isolation is pardoned him so long as his creative work is effective prop-

[1] [For a definition of "ketman", see cat. 116, pp. 57-60 -- Analyst]

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aganda. To protect his position and his apartment (which he has by the grace of the State), the intellectual is prepared to make any sacrifice or compromise; for the value of privacy in a society that affords little if any isolation is greater than the saying "my home is my castle" can lead one to surmise. Two-way television screens installed in private homes to observe the behavior of citizens in seclusion belong as yet to the future. Hence, by listening to foreign radio stations and reading good books, he profits from a moment of relaxation; that is, of course, if he is alone, for as soon as guests arrive the play begins anew.

Never has there been a close study of how necessary to a man are the experiences which we clumsily call aesthetic. Such experiences are associated with works of art for only an insignificant number of individuals. The majority find pleasure of an aesthetic nature in the mere fact of their existence within the stream of life. In the cities, the eye meets colorful store displays, the diversity of human types. Looking at passers-by, one can guess from their faces the story of their lives. This movement of the imagination when a man is walking through a crowd has an erotic tinge; his emotions are very close to physiological sensations. He rejoices in dresses, in the flash of lights; while, for instance, Parisian markets with their heaps of vegetables and flowers, fish of every shape and hue, fruits, sides of meat dripping with every shade of red offer delights, he need not go seeking them in Dutch or Impressionist painting. He hears snatches of arias, the throbbing of motors mixed with the warble of birds, called greetings, laughter. His nose is assailed by changing odors: coffee, gasoline, oranges, ozone, roasting nuts, perfumes.

Those who have sung of the large cities have consecrated many pages to the description of this joyous immersion in the reservoir of universal life. The swimmer who trusts

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himself to the wave, and senses the immensity of the element that surrounds him lives through a like emotion. I am thinking of such great singers of the city as Balzac, Baudelaire, and Whitman. It would seem that the exciting and invigorating power of this participation in mass life springs from the feeling of *potentiality,* of constant unexpectedness, of a mystery one ever pursues.

Even the life of the peasants, though it be dulled by brutalizing hand labor, allows for aesthetic expression in the rhythm of custom, the rites of the church, holy pictures, country fairs, native costumes, paper flower decorations, folk sculptures, music, and dances.

In the countries of the New Faith the cities lose their former aspect. The liquidation of small private enterprises gives the streets a stiff and institutional look. The chronic lack of consumer goods renders the crowds uniformly gray and uniformly indigent. When consumer products do appear, they are of a single second-rate quality. Fear paralyzes individuality and makes people adjust themselves as much as possible to the average type in their gestures, clothing, and facial expressions. Cities become filled with the racial type well-regarded by the rulers: short, square men and women, with short legs and wide hips. This is the proletarian type, cultivated to an extreme, thanks to binding aesthetic standards. (We know that these same dumpy women and stocky men could change completely under the influence of films, painting, and fashion, for America has proved that mass communication is at least as important as diet in determining physical appearance.) Streets, factories, and meeting places sport the inevitable red flags and painted slogans. The new buildings are monumental and oppressive, lightness and charm in architecture being condemned as formalistic. The number of aesthetic experiences accessible to a city-dweller in the

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countries of the New Faith is uncommonly limited. The only place of magic is the theater, for the spell of the theater exists even though confined by the commands of socialist realism which define both the contents of a play and stage décor. The tremendous popular success of authors like Shakespeare is due to the fact that their fantasy triumphs even within the bounds of naturalistic stage setting. The hunger for *strangeness* that is so great inside the Imperium should give the rulers pause; yet in all probability it does not, for they consider such longings derelicts from the past.

In the villages, where the entire former pattern of custom is to be abolished through the transformation of peasants into agricultural workers, there still remain survivals of the individual peasant cultures which slowly stratified over the centuries. Still, let us speak frankly, the main supports of this culture were usually the wealthier peasants. The battle against them, and their subsequent need to hide, must lead to the atrophy of peasant dress, decoration of huts, cultivation of private gardens, etc. There is a definite contradiction between the official protection of folklore (as a harmless form of national culture designed to satisfy patriotic tendencies) and the necessities of the new economic structure.

In these conditions aesthetic Ketman has every possibility of spreading. It is expressed not only in that unconscious longing for strangeness which is channeled toward controlled amusements like theater, film, and folk festivals, but also into various forms of escapism. Writers burrow into ancient texts, comment upon and re-edit ancient authors. They write children's books so that their fancy may have slightly freer play. Many choose university careers because research into literary history offers a safe pretext for plunging into the past and for converse

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626 with works of great aesthetic value. The number of trans-
● 517 lators of former prose and poetry multiplies. Painters seek an outlet for their interests in illustrations for children's books, where the choice of gaudy colors can be justified by an appeal to the "naïve" imagination of children. Stage managers, doing their duty by presenting bad contemporary works, endeavor to introduce into their repertoires the plays of Lope de Vega or Shakespeare—that is, those of their plays which are approved by the Center.

Some representatives of the plastic arts are so daring that they reveal their Ketman to no small degree by proclaiming the need of an aesthetic of everyday life, and by establishing special institutes to design fabrics, furniture, glass, and ceramics for industry. There is money for such enterprises, and they find support among the most intelligent dialecticians of the upper circles of the Party. Such efforts deserve respect when one considers that before the Second World War Poland and Czechoslovakia were, aside from Sweden and Finland, the leading countries in interior decoration. Nevertheless, there is no reason why that which passes as formalism in painting and architecture should be tolerated for any length of time in the applied arts.

The rationalization of aesthetic Ketman is obvious: since everything is planned in a socialist economy, why not proceed to a planned satisfaction of the aesthetic needs of human beings? Here, however, we trespass upon the treacherous territory of the demon, Psychology. To admit that a man's eye has need of exultant colors, harmonious forms, or light sunny architecture is to affirm that the taste of the Center is bad. However, even there one can see some progress. They are already erecting skyscrapers patterned after the buildings raised in Chicago about the year 1900. It is possible that in the year 2000 they will officially introduce art forms that today are considered

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modern in the West. But how can one still the thought 626
that aesthetic experiences arise out of something organic, 517
and that the union of color and harmony with fear is as difficult to imagine as brilliant plumage on birds living in the northern tundras?

Professional Ketman[1] is reasoned thus: since I find my- 626
self in circumstances over which I have no control, and 155
since I have but one life and that is fleeting, I should strive to do my best. I am like a crustacean attached to a crag on the bottom of the sea. Over me storms rage and huge ships sail; but my entire effort is concentrated upon clinging to the rock, for otherwise I will be carried off by the waters and perish, leaving no trace behind. If I am a scientist I attend congresses at which I deliver reports strictly adhering to the Party line. But in the laboratory I pursue my research according to scientific methods, and in that alone lies the aim of life. If my work is successful, it matters little how it will be presented and toward whose glory. Discoveries made in the name of a disinterested search for truth are lasting, whereas the shrieks of politicians pass. I must do all they demand, they may use my name as they wish, as long as I have access to a laboratory and money for the purchase of scientific instruments.

If I am a writer, I take pride in my literary achievements. Here, for example, is my treatise on Swift, a Marxist analysis. This type of analysis, which is not synonymous with the Method or the New Faith, makes possible a keen penetration into historical events. Marx had a genius for observation. In following him one is secure against attack, for he is, after all, the prophet; and one can proclaim one's belief in the Method and the New Faith in a preface fulfilling much the same function as dedications to kings or tsars in times past. Here is my translation of a sixteenth-century poem, or my novel

[1] [For a definition of "Ketman", see cat. 116, pp. 57-60 - Analyst]

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626 cause the tragedy of human fate leads to thoughts about
779 the mystery of human destiny. One forgives certain writers like Shakespeare these predispositions, but there is no question of permitting any contemporary author to harbor them. It is for this reason that Greek tragedies are not deemed suitable for theater repertoires. Marx loved the Greek tragedians, but let us not forget that the connection between the New Faith and Marx is rather superficial.

● 517 The New Faith is a Russian creation, and the Russian
626 intelligentsia which shaped it had developed the deepest contempt for all art that does not serve social ends directly. Other social functions of art, probably the most important ones, consistently escaped its understanding. As for poetry, since its sources are hard to differentiate from the sources of all religion, it is singularly exposed to persecution. True, the poet is free to describe hills, trees, and flowers, but if he should feel that boundless exaltation in the face of nature that seized Wordsworth on his visit to Tintern Abbey, he is at once suspect. This is an excellent means of eliminating the legions of bad poets who like to confess their pantheistic flights publicly, but it is also a means of exterminating poetry as a whole and replacing it by jingles little better than the singing commercials broadcast over the radio in America. A painter, in turn, may be attacked quite as easily for using abbreviated and synthesized forms (formalism), as for an excessive love of the beauty of the world, i.e. a contemplative attitude which signifies that he is a metaphysicist by temperament. A musician should see to it that his compositions are easy to translate into the language of common activities (enthusiasm for work, folk festivities, etc.), and that no element remains which is difficult to grasp and hence dangerous. If metaphysical Ketman is tolerated in the "savages," i.e. those who profess the Christian religion, in the artists

who are considered the educators of society, it is severely punished. 517 626

Ethical Ketman[1] results from opposition to the ethics of the New Faith, which is based on the principle that good and evil are definable solely in terms of service or harm to the interests of the Revolution. Since exemplary behavior of citizens in their inter-relations aids the cause of socialism, great emphasis is placed upon individual morality. 626 577

"The development of a new man" is the key point in the New Faith's program. Demands made upon Party members are exceedingly harsh. One exacts of them no small degree of abstinence. As a result, admission to the Party is not unlike entrance into a religious order; and the literature of the New Faith treats this act with a gravity equal to that with which Catholic literature speaks of the vows of young nuns. The higher one stands in the Party hierarchy, the more attentively is one's private life supervised. Love of money, drunkenness, or a confused love-life disqualify a Party member from holding important offices. Hence the upper brackets of the Party are filled by ascetics devoted to the single cause of Revolution. As for certain human tools, deprived of real influence but useful because of their names, even if they belong to the Party one tolerates or sometimes encourages their weaknesses, for they constitute a guarantee of obedience. The general ethical ideal of the New Faith is puritanical. If it were feasible to lodge all the citizens in cells and release them only for work or for political meetings, that would undoubtedly be most desirable. But alas, one must make concessions to human nature. Procreation is possible only as a result of sexual relations between men and women, and one must take this inconvenience into account.

The "new man" is conditioned to acknowledge the

1 [For a definition of "Ketman, see cat. 116, pp. 57-60.--Analyst]

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626 the people's democracies because the new ethic is of re-
517 cent inculcation, whereas the ethic vanquished by the New Faith was ensconced there for centuries. One can never foresee when and in whom this Ketman will appear, which makes for an element of surprise. Individuals who give one every reason to suppose that they do not denounce others turn out to be inveterate informers; individuals who are apparently most indifferent to "prejudices," show themselves inexplicably loyal toward their friends and even toward strangers. Since this Ketman augments the difficulties of controlling the citizens' thoughts, it is diligently sought out and penalized; yet the number of situations to which it can be applied is so great that it often eludes all manner of pressure.

The inhabitants of Western countries little realize that millions of their fellow-men, who seem superficially more or less similar to them, live in a world as fantastic as that of the men from Mars. They are unaware of the perspectives on human nature that Ketman opens. Life in constant internal tension develops talents which are latent in man. He does not even suspect to what heights of cleverness and psychological perspicacity he can rise when he is cornered and must either be skillful or perish. The survival of those best adapted to mental acrobatics creates a human type that has been rare until now. The necessities which drive men to Ketman sharpen the intellect.

626 Whoever would take the measure of intellectual life in
517 the countries of Central or Eastern Europe from the monotonous articles appearing in the press or the stereotyped speeches pronounced there, would be making a grave error. Just as theologians in periods of strict orthodoxy expressed their views in the rigorous language of the Church, so the writers of the people's democracies make use of an accepted special style, terminology, and linguis-

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tic ritual. What is important is not what someone said but what he wanted to say, disguising his thought by removing a comma, inserting an "and," establishing this rather than another sequence in the problems discussed. Unless one has lived there one cannot know how many titanic battles are being fought, how the heroes of Ketman are falling, what this warfare is being waged over. Obviously, people caught up in this daily struggle are rather contemptuous of their compatriot political émigrés. A surgeon cannot consider a butcher his equal in dexterity; just so a Pole, Czech, or Hungarian practiced in the art of dissimulation smiles when he learns that someone in the emigration has called him a traitor (or a swine) at the very moment when this traitor (or swine) is engaged in a match of philosophical chess on whose outcome the fate of fifteen laboratories or twenty ateliers depends. They do not know how one pays—those abroad do not know. They do not know what one buys, and at what price.

Ketman as a social institution is not entirely devoid of advantages. In order to evaluate them, one need only look at life in the West. Westerners, and especially Western intellectuals, suffer from a special variety of *taedium vitae;* their emotional and intellectual life is too dispersed. Everything they think and feel evaporates like steam in an open expanse. Freedom is a burden to them. No conclusions they arrive at are binding: it may be so, then again it may not. The result is a constant uneasiness. The happiest of them seem to be those who become Communists. They live within a wall which they batter themselves against, but which provides them with a resistance that helps them define themselves. Steam that once evaporated into the air becomes a force under pressure. An even greater energy is generated in those who must hide their Communist convictions, that is, who must practice Ketman, a

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[For information concerning the life histories of four unidentified Polish poets, see category 116, pp. 82-191]

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CHAPTER I

The Pill of Murti-Bing

829 IT was only toward the middle of the twentieth century that the inhabitants of many European countries came, in general unpleasantly, to the realization that their fate could be influenced directly by intricate and abstruse books of philosophy. Their bread, their work, their private lives began to depend on this or that decision in disputes on principles to which, until then, they had never paid any attention. In their eyes, the philosopher had always been a sort of dreamer whose divagations had no effect on reality. The average human being, even if he had once been exposed to it, wrote philosophy off as utterly impractical and useless. Therefore the great intellectual work of the Marxists could easily pass as just one more variation on a sterile pastime. Only a few individuals understood the causes and probable consequences of this general indifference.

● 538 829 A curious book appeared in Warsaw in 1932. It was a novel, in two volumes, entitled *Insatiability*. Its author was Stanislaw Ignacy Witkiewicz, a painter, writer, and philosopher, who had constructed a philosophical system akin to the monadology of Leibnitz. As in his earlier novel, *Farewell to Autumn*, his language was difficult, full of neologisms. Brutal descriptions of erotic scenes al-

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ternated with whole pages of discussions on Husserl, Carnap, and other contemporary philosophers. Besides, one could not always tell whether the author was serious or joking; and the subject matter seemed to be pure fantasy.

The action of the book took place in Europe, more precisely in Poland, at some time in the near future or even in the present, that is, in the thirties, forties, or fifties. The social group it portrayed was that of musicians, painters, philosophers, aristocrats, and higher-ranking military officers. The whole book was nothing but a study of decay: mad, dissonant music; erotic perversion; widespread use of narcotics; dispossessed thinking; false conversions to Catholicism; and complex psychopathic personalities. This decadence reigned at a time when western civilization was said to be threatened by an army from the East, a Sino-Mongolian army that dominated all the territory stretching from the Pacific to the Baltic.

Witkiewicz's heroes are unhappy in that they have no faith and no sense of meaning in their work. This atmosphere of decay and senselessness extends throughout the entire country. And at that moment, a great number of hawkers appear in the cities peddling Murti-Bing pills. Murti-Bing was a Mongolian philosopher who had succeeded in producing an organic means of transporting a "philosophy of life." This Murti-Bing "philosophy of life," which constituted the strength of the Sino-Mongolian army, was contained in pills in an extremely condensed form. A man who used these pills changed completely. He became serene and happy. The problems he had struggled with until then suddenly appeared to be superficial and unimportant. He smiled indulgently at those who continued to worry about them. Most affected were all questions pertaining to unsolvable ontological difficulties. A man who swallowed Murti-Bing pills became imper-

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vious to any metaphysical concerns. The excesses into which art falls when people vainly seek in form the wherewithal to appease their spiritual hunger were but outmoded stupidities for him. He no longer considered the approach of the Sino-Mongolian army as a tragedy for his own civilization. He lived in the midst of his compatriots like a healthy individual surrounded by madmen. More and more people took the Murti-Bing cure, and their resultant calm contrasted sharply with the nervousness of their environment.

The epilogue, in a few words: the outbreak of the war led to a meeting of the armies of the West with those of the East. In the decisive moment, just before the great battle, the leader of the Western army surrendered to the enemy; and in exchange, though with the greatest honors, he was beheaded. The Eastern army occupied the country and the new life, that of Murti-Bingism, began. The heroes of the novel, once tormented by philosophical "insatiety," now entered the service of the new society. Instead of writing the dissonant music of former days, they composed marches and odes. Instead of painting abstractions as before, they turned out socially useful pictures. But since they could not rid themselves completely of their former personalities, they became schizophrenics.

So much for the novel. Its author often expressed his belief that religion, philosophy, and art are living out their last days. Yet he found life without them worthless. On September 17, 1939, learning that the Red Army had crossed the eastern border of Poland, he committed suicide by taking veronal and cutting his wrists.

Today, Witkiewicz's vision is being fulfilled in the minutest detail throughout a large part of the European continent. Perhaps sunlight, the smell of the earth, little everyday pleasures, and the forgetfulness that work brings

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beer. He would hire a hack, order it to stop at a main intersection and, after delivering a speech to an astonished crowd, he would throw off his coat and phlegmatically relieve himself on it. Or he would come to his friends complaining that he had had trouble in finding their homes because, as he said, "his people," whom he had stationed throughout the city to point him the way, had so disguised themselves that he could not recognize them. Such extravagances indicated that alcohol plunged him into the world of Hoffmann or Edgar Allan Poe. He became a legendary figure whose latest escapades were the talk of the literary cafés. 159*

Delta's poetry was an added source of legend. It was unlike anything written in Europe in the first half of the twentieth century. No literary school influenced him. He dwelt in the aura of the Italo-Latin civilization whose mark was still deeply graven on our country. The accessories he borrowed from the poetry of the past he then put together in a manner reminiscent of his drunken fantasies. His poetry was a kaleidoscope of chubby baroque angels, magicians carried off through the window by some unknown power (they are retained, at the last moment by a wifely bite on the ear), falconry, astrologists prophesying the end of the world. Interspersed in it were phonograph records playing the music of Bach or Mozart, potatoes in the soil dreaming of the vodka that would be made of them, planets in the shape of young women dressed in blue pants, and folk dances in the suburbs. His poetry was tragic and comic, senseless yet full of sense. This alogical hodgepodge of disparate elements differed from confessedly decadent types of modern poetry in one respect: despite the peculiar assemblage of images it presented, it was not unintelligible. The reader surrendered to its musical charm, swallowed portions of abstraction that annoyed 159* 538

[An unidentified poet of the 1930's and 1940's -- Analyst]

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159* him in other poets, laughed at the sudden twists of the
● 538 author, in short, unsuspectingly entered a realm ruled by laws unlike those of everyday life.

He published much humorous verse, signing it with a variety of pseudonyms. His inventiveness in finding subjects seemed inexhaustible. Among other things, he wrote a cycle entitled *Little Songs of the Chief of the Office of Graves*. He liked to include a fictitious list of his works in each book; I remember such a title as "An Introduction to Cannibalism—stenographed university lectures: Troilus Drug Store, Publisher, out of print." Because he was popular with the readers, he never lacked offers from publishers and the radio. His pen, which was his sole means of support, could have earned him a good living; but he constantly needed money because he immediately drank up his fees.

159* When he was sober, no one could have guessed that he was the author of poems that made the public laugh. Taciturn, gloomy, sly, he became animated only at the sight of money. In bargaining, he was inexorable. Once he named a sum, no argument could induce him to make a concession. What was worse, he demanded payment at once, which posed a terrible dilemma for his editors. They wanted his poems; but giving him money involved the risk that he would begin his drinking cycle and forget his commitments. Some editors found a solution: they would give him the money, then refuse to leave him for a single second until he handed them a manuscript. Such transactions often occurred in coffee-houses. The banknote would lie on the table between the two contracting parties. Delta, after fruitless efforts to soften his opponent, would take out his pen, write the poem (which, depending on his mood, might be excellent or mediocre), and picking up his note go off to drink.

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Sometimes he landed in a sanatorium for alcoholics. 159*
The results of the "cures" were not good. His victories in his battles against the medical profession were widely recounted. In one of the sanatoriums, story has it, his triumph was so absolute that both patients and doctors, equally drunk, held bicycle races through the corridors.

Charlatan, drunkard—and yet he was an outstanding and, despite appearances, tragic poet. He began his literary career in years of economic crisis. Unemployment, universal hopelessness, the growth of Nazism in neighboring Germany all shaped the character of his writing. He was 159*
rightly called the "king of nonsense." Yet readers who 538
were not deceived by his superficial buffoonery saw in his poetry an ominous vision of the end of civilization, of an approaching "iron age," of catastrophe. He spoke as if everything were lost years before Europe plunged into darkness and cruelty. The dread and beauty of past ages lived again in his work, but there was no hope of rest in them. The concepts and images he used had the consistency of dreams; they chased one another with the speed of a hurtling train. The Madonna who often figured in his poems was not the Madonna of the pious but merely a stylistic ornament. Fascists and Communists killed each other off in his verse with the gory ardor of actors in the Grand Guignol, while he mockingly cried: "O reality! O my sweet mother! For you killing flies is the same kind of bother!" He defined himself exactly when he said: "Braced on my Waterman/ I go off to the abyss/ of eternal doubt."

The End of the World is his title for a poem in which scholars and politicians, revolutionists, lovers and drunkards, canaries and cats are all swept away in the end by a cosmic catastrophe—to the satisfaction of the author, and the fulfillment of the "vanity of vanities" theme of *Ecclesi-*

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159x *astes.* And all this is described by a pen that is playing. In
● 538 another of his poems, *Folk Fair,* there are carrousels, young pairs sitting on the grass, lawns littered with empty bottles, seesaws. Suddenly the sky clouds over, rain begins to fall, and the darkened heavens—in a manner that is a secret of Delta's art—merge into a sad eclogue by Virgil punctuated by the bark of machine-guns.

His most unusual poem was *Solomon's Ball.* Why does King Solomon give a ball? Why is he living in the twentieth century? Perhaps it is not King Solomon after all, simply Solomon? Why do the unemployed enter the ballroom selling butterflies? Who keeps singing Persian songs about Gulistan, the garden of roses? Where do the hordes of policemen come from who suddenly start performing wild dances? It is pointless to pause over such questions. The special logic of the dream does exist, but only such a poet as he can use it freely. "In the room the women come and go talking of Michelangelo" was T. S. Eliot's expression for nonsense. Delta raised the conversations that took place at Solomon's ball one degree higher, into the realm of delirium and "eternal doubt."

The world as reflected in his poetry was oppressive; yet his poems—and here is one more inner contradiction of this queer man—were free of sadness and despair. On the contrary, they said a vigorous "yes" to life. With every word he praised the world as he saw it, a tangle of absurd pleasures, drives, words, and wars. He loved his phantas-
159x magory. He loved carrousels, dancing gypsies, crowded Sunday excursion boats on the Vistula, his wife to whom he addressed his odes, cats sleeping on parapets, blooming apple trees. He loved enthusiasm and joyousness for their own sake. Whatever he touched changed into a scene of movement, color, and music. Subjects were merely a pretext for him. Like a silkworm, he spun out of himself a

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managed to survive there for two years. When the Red Army drew near, he and the other prisoners were transported to Dachau, and there they were eventually set free by the Americans. We learned of all this only, after the War, when he published a volume of stories recounting his experiences. 159*

Immediately after his release he settled in Munich. It was there in 1946 that the book, *We Were in Auschwitz*, written by him and two of his fellow-prisoners, appeared. It was dedicated to "The American Seventh Army which brought us liberation from the Dachau-Allach concentration camp." On his return to Poland, he published his volume of short stories. 159* 539

I have read many books about concentration camps, but not one of them is as terrifying as his stories because he never moralizes, he relates. A special social hierarchy comes into being in a "concentration universe." At the top stand the camp authorities; after them come prisoners trusted by the administration; next come the prisoners clever enough to find means of getting sufficient food to keep up their strength. At the bottom stand the weak and clumsy, who daily tumble lower as their undernourished organisms fail to bear up under the work. In the end they die, either in the gas chamber or from an injection of phenol. Obviously this hierarchy does not include the masses of people killed immediately upon their arrival, i.e. the Jews, except for those who were single and especially fit for work. In his stories, Beta clearly defines his social position. He belonged to the caste of clever and healthy prisoners, and he *brags* about his cunning and agility. Life in a concentration camp requires constant alertness; every moment can decide one's life or death. In order to react appropriately at all times, one must know where danger lies and how to escape it: sometimes by

[Unidentified Polish author -- Analysis]

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159* blind obedience, sometimes by calculated negligence,
● 539 sometimes by blackmail or bribery. One of his stories consists of an account of a series of dangers he dodges in the course of a single day:

1. A guard offers him some bread. To get it he has to jump a ditch that constitutes the line of watch. Guards, under orders to shoot prisoners who cross it, receive three days' leave plus five marks for everyone they kill beyond this limit. Beta, understanding the guard's intentions, refuses the bait.

2. A guard overhears him telling another prisoner the news of the fall of Kiev. Beta forestalls a report of the offense by giving the guard, through an intermediary, an old watch as a bribe.

3. He slips out of the hands of a dangerous camp overseer, or kapo, by a quick execution of an order. The fragment I quote below concerns some Greek prisoners who were too weak to march properly. As a punishment, sticks were tied to their legs. They are supervised by a Russian, Andrej.

I leap back, struck from behind by a bicycle. I whip off my cap. The Unterscharführer, a landlord from Harmenze, jumps off the bicycle red with irritation.

"What's happening in this crazy unit? Why are those people walking around with sticks tied to their legs? It's time for work!"

"They don't know how to walk!"

"If they don't know how to walk, kill them! And you, do you know another goose has disappeared?"

"Why are you standing there like a dumb dog?" the kapo screamed at me. "Tell Andrej to settle with them. Los!"

I ran down the path . . .

"Andrej, finish them off! Kapo's orders!"

Andrej seized a stick and struck with all his might. The

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Greek shielded himself with his arm, howled, and fell. Andrej put the stick across his throat, stepped on it and rocked himself. I went on my way quickly. 159* 539

His day is filled not only with escapes from danger, but also with the intricate game waged between him and his Russian co-prisoner Ivan. Ivan has stolen a piece of soap from him. He decides to avenge himself and patiently seeks his opportunity. He observes that Ivan has stolen a goose; an artfully arranged report (so that he won't be stigmatized as an informer) occasions a search. The goose is found and Ivan is beaten by an SS man. The score is settled.

He is proud to succeed when others, less clever, perish. There is no small amount of plain sadism in his repeated emphasis of the fact that he is well-dressed, well-fed, and healthy.

"They keep moving to avoid a beating; they eat grass and slimy mud so they won't feel hungry; they walk dejectedly, still-living corpses," he says of his fellow-inmates. But of himself: "It's good to work after one has eaten a breakfast of a rasher of bacon with bread and garlic, and washed it down with a can of condensed milk." A detail concerning his clothes (all about him are half-naked wretches): "I go into the shade and place my jacket under me *so that I won't soil my silk shirt* [the italics are mine, C. M.] and settle down comfortably to sleep. Each of us rests however he can afford to." And here is a scene of "class" contrast. Beker, another prisoner, is to be burned in the crematorium because he is too weak to be useful.

At that moment, a huge gray skull emerged out of the depths, over the edge of the wooden bunk and embarrassed, blinking eyes peered at us. Then Beker's face appeared, crumpled and more aged than ever.

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159* "Teddy, I have something to ask you."

● 539 "Talk," I said, leaning down to him.

"Teddy, I'm going to the chimney."

I leaned down a little more, and looked into his eyes at close range. They were calm and empty.

"Teddy, I've been hungry for so long. Give me something to eat. For this last evening."

Kazik slapped me on the knee.

"Do you know this Jew?"

"It's Beker," I answered softly.

"You, Jew, get up there on the bunk and stuff yourself. When you're full, you can take the rest with you to the chimney. Go on! I don't sleep there so you can take along your lice."

"Teddy," he took me by the arm, "come. In the barrack I've got a wonderful apple pie, straight from my mother."

The strong and clever were used by the camp authorities for special work, which gave them the opportunity to procure food and clothing. One of the most sought-after jobs was that of unloading the box-cars that brought Jews from all the cities of Europe to Auschwitz. These Jews brought suitcases full of clothes, gold, jewels, and food with them because they had been told they were leaving for "re-settlement." When the train entered the gates of the camp, the frightened crowd was immediately chased out of the cars. Those who were young and strong enough to work were separated out, while old people and women with children were sent at once to the gas chambers and crematoriums. The work of the prisoners was to carry out the baggage that was destined to enrich the Reich and the camp administration. Beta describes his work around the transport. He has gotten into this brigade through a French friend, Henri.

In the abundant literature of atrocity of the twentieth century, one rarely finds an account written from the

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point of view of an accessory to the crime. Authors are usually ashamed of this role. But collaboration is an empty word as applied to a concentration camp. The machine is impersonal; responsibility shifts from those who carry out orders to those higher, always higher. Beta's stories about the "transport" should, I believe, be included in all anthologies of literature dealing with the lot of man in totalitarian society, if ever such anthologies are compiled.

159* 539 ●

The arrival of a "transport" is spread out, like a play, over several acts. A few quotations will give a better picture of his literary method than any amount of description:

PROLOGUE, *or anticipation of the "transport"*

Greeks are sitting around us, moving their jaws voraciously like huge inhuman insects, greedily eating moldy clods of bread. They are uneasy; they don't know what they'll be doing. Rails and planks worry them. They don't like heavy hauling.

"Was wir arbeiten?" they ask.

"Niks. Transport kommen, alles Krematorium, compris?"

"Alles verstehen," they answer in crematorium esperanto. They calm down; they won't be loading rails on trucks, or carrying planks.

ACT I, *or the arrival of the "transport"*

A striped crowd lay near the tracks in the long strips of shade. It breathed heavily and unevenly, spoke lazily in its own tongues and gazed indifferently at the majestic people in green uniform, at the green of the trees, near and unattainable, at the steeple of a distant little church which at that moment was tolling a late angelus.

"The transport is coming," someone said, and everyone stood up in expectation. Freight cars appeared around the curve as the train backed in. The trainman standing in the caboose

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leaned out, waved his hand, whistled. The locomotive screeched, wheezed and the train trundled slowly along the station. Behind the tiny barred windows one could see human faces, pale, crumpled, disheveled, as if they were sleepy—frightened women, and men who, exotically, had hair. They passed slowly, gazing at the station in silence. Then something started to boil inside the wagons and to beat against their wooden walls.

"Water! Air!" Despairing, hollow cries burst out.

Human faces pressed to the windows, lips desperately gasping for air sucked in a few gulps, vanished; others struggled into their place, then they too vanished The shrieks and moans grew steadily louder.

Act II, *or the segregation* (a few scenes will suffice)

Here comes a woman walking briskly, hurrying almost imperceptibly yet feverishly. A small child with the plump, rosy face of a cherub runs after her, fails to catch up, stretches out its hands, crying, "Mama, mama!"

"Woman, take this child in your arms!"

"Sir, it isn't my child, it isn't mine!" the woman shouts hysterically, and runs away covering her face with her hands. She wants to hide; she wants to reach those who won't leave in a truck, who will leave on foot, who will live. She is young, healthy, pretty, she wants to live.

But the child runs after her, pleading at the top of its voice, "Mama, mama, don't run away!"

"It's not mine, not mine, not . . . !"

Until Andrej, the sailor from Sevastopol, overtook her. His eyes were troubled by vodka and the heat. He reached her, knocked her off her feet with a single powerful blow and, as she fell, caught her by the hair and dragged her up again. His face was distorted with fury.

"Why you lousy fucking Jew-bitch! Jebit twoju mat'! You'd run away from your own child! I'll show you, you whore!" He grabbed her in the middle, one paw throttling her throat which

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wanted to shout, and flung her into the truck like a heavy sack of grain.

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"Here! Take this with you, you slut!" And he threw her child at her feet.

"Gut gemacht. That's how one should punish unnatural mothers," said an SS man standing near the van.

A pair of people fall to the ground entangled in a desperate embrace. He digs his fingers into her flesh convulsively, tears at her clothes with his teeth. She screams hysterically, curses, blasphemes until, stifled by a boot, she chokes and falls silent. They split them apart like a tree; and herd them into the car like animals.

Others are carrying a young girl with a missing leg; they hold her by her arms and by her one remaining leg. Tears are streaking down her face as she whispers sadly, "Please, please, it hurts, it hurts . . ." They heave her into a truck, among the corpses. She will be burned alive, together with them.

Act III, *or the conversation of the witnesses*

A cool and starry evening falls. We are lying on the tracks. It is infinitely silent. Anemic lamps burn on high poles behind the circles of light.

"Did you exchange shoes?" Henri asks me.

"No."

"Why not?"

"Man, I have enough, absolutely enough!"

"Already? After the first transport? Just think, me—since Christmas maybe a million people have passed through my hands. The worst are the transports from Paris: a man always meets friends."

"And what do you say to them?"

"That they're going to take a bath, and that we'll meet later in the camp. What would you say?"

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169* EPILOGUE (many trains came to Auschwitz that evening.
● 539 The transport totaled 15,000 people)

As we return to the camp, the stars begin to fade, the sky becomes ever more translucent and lifts above us, the night grows light. A clear, hot day announces itself.

From the crematoriums, broad columns of smoke rise steadily and merge above into a gigantic, black river that turns exceedingly slowly in the sky over Birkenau and disappears beyond the forests, in the direction of Trzebinia. The transport is already burning.

We pass an SS squad, moving with mechanized weapons to relieve the guard. They march evenly, shoulder to shoulder, one mass, one will.

"Und Morgen die ganze Welt . . ." they sing at the top of their lungs.

Beta is a nihilist in his stories, but by that I do not mean that he is amoral. On the contrary, his nihilism results from an ethical passion, from disappointed *love* of the world and of humanity. He wants to go the limit in describing what he saw; he wants to depict with complete accuracy a world in which there is no longer any place for indignation. The human species is *naked* in his stories, stripped of those tendencies toward good which last only so long as the habit of civilization lasts. But the habit of civilization is fragile; a sudden change in circumstances, and humanity reverts to its primeval savagery. How deluded are those respectable citizens who, striding along the streets of English or American cities, consider themselves men of virtue and goodness! Of course, it is easy to condemn a woman who would abandon her child in order to save her own life. This is a monstrous act. Yet a woman who, while reading on her comfortable sofa, judges her unfortunate sister should pause to consider whether fear

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homemade means they can devise. Production comes first, 565
even at the price of using up the machines. Discipline is 466
severe; negligence or even a few minutes' lateness are strictly punished. No wonder, then, that the bad side of the system outweighs the good in the worker's mind. Still, he dares not complain. If he betrays any signs of discontent the security police, whose secret agents are his co-workers and sometimes his friends, takes care of him.

The wildcat strikes that break out from time to time 565
are no threat in themselves, for peace returns quickly 468
after mass arrests of all participants. They are, however, ominous signs that discontentment has reached a tension that can find release only in desperate acts. A strike requires a certain minimum of organization. That is why nothing else makes Party dialecticians so uneasy. The workers are the only class capable of organized action—that Marxist principle has never been forgotten. No action, however, is possible without leaders. If the leaders reason correctly, that is, if they understand the necessities of the historic process, then the workers as a mass will be unable to protest.

Everything, thus, takes us back to the question of mas- 626
tery over the mind. Every possible opportunity for educa- 555 ●
tion and advancement is offered to the more energetic and active individuals among the workers. The new, incredibly extensive bureaucracy is recruited from among the young people of working-class origin. The road before them is open, open but guarded: their thinking must be based on the firm principles of dialectical materialism. Schools, theaters, films, painting, literature, and the press all shape their thinking.

We should also call attention to a new institution, the 575
"club," whose significance is comparable to that of the 626
chapel in the middle ages. It exists in every factory, ev-

6: Shuster S-4 (no date) 1954 El Europe El

121 beds. All these lands will never again become what they once
727 were—regions of constant struggle and short-lived serenity, of poverty and its exploitation, of poetry, fervor, and sadness. Those of us who have, for example, seen peasant women trudging for many miles through the omnipresent dust to kneel for an hour at the shrines of Silesia will never forget either the fact or its meaning.

781 There is not a foot of the old soil of Central Europe which
156 has not been consecrated by endurance for the sake of the things of the spirit and the mind. Indeed, I have sometimes wondered, reading the Polish and Silesian poets and novelists, why the longing to hold out should have persisted during many difficult centuries—why, for instance, Polish forests in thrall to the Czars should have hidden priest and ritual with such fidelity. Perhaps the explanation, in so far as it is of this world, can be found in the deep human urge for the preservation of identity. Custom and language were vital symbols of the self, and without them men felt they could not live. But stronger than all else was the deep, primitive, mystical desire for identification with Eternal Righteousness, manifest to the believer in the life of the Redeemer. To give up the faith was to surrender not merely one's self but the world as well.

798 To be sure these men and women were very human, often
563 poverty-stricken and untutored, sometimes intolerant and oppressive. The effort to conserve themselves and their identity spilled over into moments of vengeful outrage inflicted upon others because they were different. Thus anti-Semitism has a long history in Eastern Europe studded with bloody pogroms. Although curbed in Austro-Hungarian regions it was latent there, too, as the shameful events of 1938 proved, but manifest elsewhere continuously with varying intensity. Or who can forget the repression of the Ukrainians in Poland under the Pilsudski government, the conflict between Czechs and Slovaks,

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or the expulsion of the Sudeten Germans from their homes during 1945, an action flagrantly in violation of the principles for which the war against Nazism had been fought? 738 563

Against this background one must set the figures of those who, whether of the clergy or of the laity, lived and preached the law of charity. Nowhere more than amongst such men—Princes of the Church, professors, men of affairs, labor leaders, simple religious, and common people—was this law manifest. It is imperative that their memory be not obscured, now that so mighty an army of the mean and servile has arisen. Let us note what we shall have mournful occasion to repeat again and again. Marxism, which had its rise in the concern of intellectuals for the worker, and which formulated that concern in terms of a materialist version of the Hegelian dialectic, has come round with Stalin to the view that the laboring man must have no intellectuals on his side. To suppress élites has become the cornerstone of the totalitarian theory of practical politics. That is why the peoples in chains retain their passions and their weaknesses, their hatreds and their greed, while those who might give them counsel or reasons for constraint are dead or silent. 829

Then, too, there was the presence and also the example of the Ghetto. Place of reputed ignominy, of poverty, of rasping and grasping humanity, it was nevertheless awesomely, breathtakingly beautiful when the Sabbath eve descended upon it. Prayer became not so much what was engaged in but rather that which swept the world aside and created a wonderland of peace and holiness. One knew that in all the shabby little rooms which sheltered human beings in their wretchedness a fire had been lighted which had gleamed for thousands of years—the same leaping flame which had set the bush ablaze for Moses and had kindled the light that danced before the Ark of the Covenant. And though the vision of sanctification which now 000

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	Before the Reform		After the Reform	
	Less than 100 ha.	*More than 100 ha.*	*Less than 100 ha.*	*More than 100 ha.*
Ancient Kingdom	4,593,148	3,397,851	7,369,549	621,450
Bessarabia ..	2,337,811	1,844,539	3,829,731	352,619
Transylvania ..	4,689,855	2,751,457	6,363,664	1,087,648
Bucovina ..	405,000	115,000	480,967	39,033
Total ..	12,025,814	8,108,847	18,033,911	2,100,750
In %	59.77	40.23	89.56	10.44

(O.S. Morgan, ibid. p. 323).

In the provinces annexed to Rumania after the first World War, social and national differences were largely identical, since the landlords were Hungarians and most of the peasants Rumanians. The peasants belonging to the national minorities were not excluded from the land distribution carried out by the Rumanian governments, even though these governments were far from internationalist in outlook. In Transylvania, Bessarabia and Bucovina 206,165 peasant families belonging to national minorities received land in the redistribution side by side with 532,700 Rumanians. 663 423

After the first world war a considerable amount of land again changed hands: the poor peasants lost a lot of their land to the rich peasants. But even so landownership was much less concentrated than before 1918. 423

The second World War resulted in the loss of Bessarabia and Bucovina to Russia. Within the new boundaries of Rumania, estates of more than 100 hectares (calculated from the table given above) comprised an area of 1,709,098 hectares, or 11.07 per cent of all the land. Properties of more than 50 hectares, (about 1,970,300 hectares in all) comprised 17.5 per cent of all the agricultural land. (Rumania, Ministère de l'Information, *La Réforme Agraire en Roumanie*, 1946, p.16).

The land reform law of 22 March, 1945, fixed the maximum land holding allowed at 50 hectares. People owning more than 50 hectares had to give up all land over this amount. Church property, state property and the royal estates were excluded, but the last-named, an area of 132,112 hectares, was expropriated after the abdication of King Michael (December, 1947). All German owners (the German peasant colonies of Transylvania) were expropriated, as well as all 'traitors and war criminals'. [663]

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423 Up to September, 1947, land reform affected about 1.4 million hectares, and afterwards, with the distribution of the royal estates, etc., altogether 1.6 million hectares, i.e., about 10 per cent of the agricultural area of Rumania, or a third of the relative extent of the land reform after World War I.

Czechoslovakia

423 563 656 As a result of the Battle of the White Mountain (1620) the Czech nobility was almost completely wiped out and replaced by German Catholic landlords. Thus, when the Czechoslovak Republic was established, there were German landlords and Czech peasants in the Czech areas, and in the Sudetenland—the Border area — mainly German peasants and German landlords. In Slovakia (taken from the Hungarian part of the Hapsburg Empire) there were Magyar landlords and Slovak peasants, and, in the region bordering on Hungary, Hungarian peasants and Hungarian landlords. So that here, the land question and the national question were one, as in other parts of the former Austro-Hungarian Empire: Magyar landlords exploited Slovak, Rumanian, Croat and Ruthenian peasants; German landlords exploited Czech, Ruthenian, Slovene and Polish peasants.

In 1919 the Land Reform Act was passed. It provided for the dividing up of all large estates of more than 100 hectares. But this law was only partially and half-heartedly carried out. Yet, as a result of the land reform, 1.7 million hectares, or 12 per cent of the area of Czechoslovakia, were expropriated, and by 1 January, 1937, 1,272,934 hectares had been redistributed. At the same time in 1930, 13.8 per cent of the agricultural area still remained in properties of over 100 hectares. It was mainly Hungarian and German landlords who were expropriated, but the German and Hungarian peasants, tenants and agricultural workers not only were not excluded, but even benefited from the redistribution. As Miss L. E. Texter writes: 'The German farmer received land even from a Czech landowner'. (*Land Reform in Czechoslovakia*, London, 1923, quoted by E. Wiskemann, *Czechs and Germans*, London, 1938, p. 152).

In 1945 (as a result of the decrees of 19.5.45, 21.6.45, 20.7.45 and 3.9.45) an area of 2.6 million hectares was taken from Germans, landlords and peasants alike. Practically no

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land belonging to non-Germans was touched in Bohemia and Moravia. As a result of the agrarian reform in Slovakia, three hundred thousand hectares were expropriated, of which two-thirds belonged to Hungarians and Germans. 423 563 656

For two years the property of Czech and Slovak landowners was left untouched by the government. Land reform was identified with the national struggle of all the Slavs—Czechs and Slovaks alike—against all the Germans and Hungarians.

Later on it was necessary to reduce the maximum holding in order to pave the way for the total annihilation of the bourgeoisie in Czechoslovakia, and the integration of Czechoslovakia in the Russian Empire. On July 11, 1947, the maximum of 100 hectares fixed in 1919 was reduced to 50 hectares, and as a result another 919 thousand hectares were redistributed.

Thus until July, 1947, land redistribution was aimed at achieving an internal colonisation by the expropriation of 'foreign' proprietors, and the extent of the second wave of land redistribution was only about a quarter of the first.

Poland

After the First World War, Polish governments carried out, if somewhat timidly, certain land reforms. A maximum holding of 180 hectares of arable land was fixed with two exceptions—in suburbs the area allowed to a household was 60 hectares and in the Eastern districts it was 300 hectares. The landlords in the Eastern districts were treated gently because their peasants belonged to the national minorities—Ukrainians and White Russians. The administration was empowered to decide annually what estates should be divided. In fact, Polish landlords were able, by pulling strings, to escape the land reform, and in general only the estates of Russian landlords in Eastern Poland were redistributed. Altogether between 1919 and 1938, 2,654,000 hectares were divided up. (F. Zweig, *Poland between Two Wars*, London, 1944, p. 133). 423 [563]

In spite of this measure of land reform, a not inconsiderable proportion of land remained in the hands of big landowners. In 1931, about 4.6 million hectares, 18.0 per cent of all agricultural land, belonged to farms of more than 50 hectares. But as a single owner might own several farms, each of less than 50 hectares but totalling more than 50 hectares, the area

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CHAPTER III

YUGOSLAVIA— THE EXCEPTIONAL CASE

UNLIKE THE Communist Parties in the rest of Eastern Europe, the Yugoslav Communist Party took power not through the agency of the Russian army of occupation, but through the support of the masses who had rallied round it during the years of struggle against the German and Italian invaders and their collaborators. 668

The invasion of Yugoslavia by the Axis armies led to the complete collapse of the old state structure. Croatia and Bosnia split off and formed an 'independent' Croat state headed by Ante Pavelić; Slovenia was absorbed into the German Reich; Dalmatia was occupied by the Italians; south-eastern Serbia and eastern Macedonia were annexed by Bulgaria; Baranya, Bačka and Medjumurje were taken over by Hungary; and the province of Banat and Serbia proper were ruled by a quisling government under General Milan Nedić.

It was obvious that there had not been much love lost between the non-Serbs of Yugoslavia and the old chauvinistic Serbian rulers. The fascist elements among the non-Serbs used this hostility to divert the hatred felt for the Belgrade administration into a general national hatred of the Serbs, and one of the most sordid incidents in Yugoslav history ensued. The Ustashe—the Croat fascists—began a pogrom on a huge scale against the Serbs, during which 810 thousand Serbs, men, women and children, were callously murdered and whole villages razed to the ground. Moslem fascists in Bosnia also took part in the carnage. Some villages saved themselves from annihilation at the hands of the Croats by renouncing the Greek Orthodox Church and embracing Catholicism. The Catholic hierarchy of Croatia and Bosnia undertook an 563 668 661

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563 energetic crusade against Serb 'infidels.' Serb fascists retaliated
668 by murdering Croats and Moslems *en masse* in Bosnia, Herze-
661 govina, Dalmatia and elsewhere. While engaged in this communal slaughter, the quislings of each nation—Croats, Slovenes, Moslems and Serbs—collaborated with Berlin or Rome or with both.

642 Unlike them General Draža Mihailović, the military com-
668 mander of King Peter and his government in exile, stood for a united Yugoslavia including all the nations, but united under the rule of Serbia. His Chetniks were ready to take an active part in the massacre of Croats and Moslems, and Mihailović himself called upon the Allies to bomb Zagreb, the Croat capital, in revenge for their treachery. He even circulated propaganda maps of a future Yugoslavia in which Croatia was reduced to a small strip of land. To the Croatian, Montenegrin, Slovenian and also Serbian peasants and workers the old centralised administration symbolised by Mihailović represented the tax-collector, the gendarme and the corrupt local official. Mihailović's policy condemned him to increasing isolation and so to impotency, and finally to collaboration with the Germans and Italians against Tito's Partisans.

668 The only Party which fought for the unity of Yugoslavia on
186 the basis of the equality of all its component nations was the
563 Communist Party. The refugees from the pogroms constituted the first Partisan units, and the communal conflicts faced Tito's movement squarely with the problem whose solution proved to be decisive for its successes in the struggle for the liberation of the country from Axis occupation.

By a policy of national equality and of opposition to all communal conflicts, whether led by Ustashe and Moslem pogromists or Nedić and the Chetnik 'avengers', the Communist Party of Yugoslavia succeeded in welding the different peoples together. As Lieutenant-General Svetozar Vukmanović (better known as 'Tempo') said in his speech on the occasion of the celebration of 'Yugoslav Army Day' on 22nd December, 1947: 'The fighting of the Serbian and Montenegrin proletarian and shock brigades in Bosnia and Croatia; the fighting of Bosnian, Croatian and Montenegrin units in Serbia; the fighting of Serbian, Croatian, Bosnian, Macedonian, Montenegrin and Slovene units on the Srem front and beyond, for

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the ultimate liberation of Croatia, Bosnia, Slovenia, etc.—all this was an enormous contribution of the Yugoslav Army in the struggle for the establishment of unity among the peoples of Yugoslavia.' The unity of the peoples and their equality was symbolised in the fact that a Croat (Tito) led the revolt in Serbia, a Serbian Jew (Moše Pijade) led the rising in Montenegro, and a Montenegrin (Vukmanović) led the partisans in Macedonia. 668 186 563

This policy explains the phenomenon that military units of Italians, Hungarians and even German partisans fought in Tito's army. A large number of Italian soldiers joined the Partisans after the fall of Mussolini and formed the Garibaldi Volunteer units which were large enough to consist of a number of divisions. In the Slovene littoral, where Slovenes and Italians live side by side, Italian and Slovene Partisans formed common units, and Italians took an active and equal part in the work of the People's Committees, the embryonic administration of the new state. In spite of the cruelty displayed by the Hungarian occupation armies in the zone which they annexed, a cruelty greater even than that of the German armies, Tito succeeded in recruiting a battalion of Hungarian volunteers, the Petöfi Sandor battalion. There was also a Czech battalion in the Partisan Army. In July, 1943, a campaign was launched to enlist members of the German minority living in Yugoslavia in the Partisan army and this campaign met with some success, a Volksdeutsche battalion being organized to fight with the Partisans.

The social programme of Tito's Partisans was conservative. The Anti-Fascist Council of National Liberation (A.V.N.O.J.) —the Partisans' parliament—at its first meeting in Bihać on 26th November, 1942, proclaimed a programme, two of whose points were: 668 185

'The inviolability of private property and the providing of every possibility for individual initiative in industry, trade and agriculture.

'No radical changes whatsoever in the social life and activities of the people except for the replacement of reactionary village authorities and gendarmes who may have gone over to the service of the invaders by popularly elected representatives truly democratic and popular in character. All the most

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CHAPTER VII

SLAV AGAINST TEUTON

ONE OF THE MOST appalling deeds of the Communist Parties of Eastern Europe—especially in Czechoslovakia and Poland—was the brutal expulsion of millions of people, both men and women, young and old, from their homes, for no reason but that they were Germans and not Slavs. As V. Gollancz says, the expulsion of the Germans is 'among the greatest crimes since Genghis Khan.'

The Kremlin hoped to derive many advantages from this expulsion. The Slavs of Eastern Europe would naturally look for leadership to the greatest Slav nation, Russia. Moreover, the threat of the return of the millions of Germans who had been expelled would create a barrier of suspicion and hatred between Eastern Europe and the Western Powers who control Western Germany where the majority of those expelled found refuge. As a result of the expropriation of the Germans, most of the industry of Czechoslovakia and Poland—the two most industrialised countries of Eastern Europe—could be transferred to the state (i.e., to the control of the Communist Party) while 'national unity' and 'order' were maintained. The inhuman explusion of the Germans would inevitably demoralise the Slavs, both morally and intellectually, as it would accustom them to the most brutal crimes and would involve them as accomplices in these crimes. (Of course, with its usual unscrupulousness, the Kremlin now appeals to German nationalism. Instead of Slavs against Teutons, the Russians and Germans, the two greatest peoples, as Stalin said in his message of October 13th, 1949, must stand together against the imperialist West.)

Let us begin with a description of the persecution and expulsion of the Germans in Eastern Europe after the war.

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Number of Germans Expelled

167 R. H. M. Worsley, in an article called 'Mass Expulsion', in
● 563 *Nineteenth Century* (December, 1945) gives the following sum-
661 mary of the expulsion of Germans:

Country of Permanent Residence	*Number Involved*	*Statistical Source*
East Prussia	2,333,301	*Statistisches Jahrbuch fuer das Deutches Reich*, census for 1933.
Pomerania	1,920,897	
West Prussia	337,578	
Lower Silesia	3,204,004	
Upper Silesia	1,482,765	
Total	9,278,545	
German minorites in the Baltic States	200,000	Estonian, Latvian, Lithuanian data.
War-time German immigration to:—		
Poland	800,000	I.L.O., *Displacement of Population in Europe* p. 38
Occupied Eastern Territories ..	300,000	
German minority in Poland ..	1,059,000	Polish census, 1921.
War-time immigration to Czechoslovakia	480,000	I.L.O., *Displacement of Population in Europe*, p. 38
Sudeten	3,231,688	Czechoslovakian census, 1930.
German minorities in:—		
Hungary	520,000	Hungarian census, 1920.
Rumania	740,000	Royal Inst. of International Affairs, *South-Eastern Europe*. p. 8.
Yugoslavia	513,472	
Grand Total	17,062,716	

This table somewhat exaggerates the extent of the expulsions, for it is based on pre-war statistics, and during the war a considerable proportion of the populations of these areas was killed, and before the end of the war many had fled from the areas. In addition a number of Germans remain in Eastern Europe: 500 thousand in Rumania, 250–300 thousand in Hungary, 200 thousand in Czechoslovakia—altogether about a million. E. M. Kulischer, in his book *Europe on the Move* (New York, 1949) says that the total number of Germans expelled after the war was 11,200,000 (p. 302). (This does not include the 4 million Germans who fled in 1945–6 from the Soviet zone of Germany to the Western zone, nor those who fled after this date). Whichever figure is taken of the number of Germans who were expelled or who fled from the East, it exceeded even the number expelled and recruited for labour by Hitler during the war. On this point Kulischer writes: 'The

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total number of foreign workers in Germany, including prisoners of war and foreign civilian workers officially recognized as foreigners, but excluding workers from Alsace-Lorraine and Sudetenland, exceeded six million in 1943. In 1944 the high mark of eight million was reached (of whom nearly 2 million were p.o.w.'s—Y.G.)' (p. 264). He adds: 'Altogether, it can be estimated that the displacement of 30 million or more people during Hitler's rule over Europe has resulted in the permanent shifting of 2–3 million. The final redistribution of Europe's population was due to Germany's defeat, which opened the way for a new and in this case permanent migration of another twenty-five million*, probably the greatest in European history' (p. 305).

Considerations of space make it necessary to choose between alternative methods of describing the character of the expulsions, either by relating more or less in detail the fate of the Germans in one of the East European countries, or briefly surveying the fate of the Germans in them all. The former method is preferable, and the treatment of the Germans in Czechoslovakia will be taken as the example.

The Sudeten Germans

The Sudeten Germans were not new inhabitants of Sudetenland. They came there about 700 years ago, when Spain was still in the hands of the Arabs, and some centuries before America was discovered. They were as numerous as the populations of some of Europe's small states. The 1930 census put their number at 3.2 million, as compared with Norway's 2.8 million, Finland's 3.6 million, Denmark's 3.7 million and Switzerland's 4.1 million.

The social structure of the Sudeten German community was not very different from that of the Czechs or Slovaks except that the percentage of workers was higher (a little higher than among the Czechs, and much higher than among the Slovaks). According to the 1930 census, the national communities comprised different social groups in the following proportions:—

*In this is included some millions of non-Germans: Poles who had migrated from the area annexed by Russia (about 4 million) to the Western territories taken from Germany, Czechs and Slovaks who migrated to Sudetenland, displaced persons who returned to their countries, Jewish refugees who migrated to Palestine and other countries, etc.

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	Germans (%)	Czechs and Slovaks (%)
Independent	21.89	25.81
Tenants	0.40	0.28
Officials and clerks ..	16.60	18.24
Workers	61.11	55.67

467 In 1930 there were 476 thousand Sudeten Germans organised in trade unions. The Executive Committee of the Sudeten German Social Democratic Party stated: 'In their worst plight, on the eve of the Munich decision, our Trade Unions could still compare their strength with those of Switzerland, a country with four million inhabitants and with a functioning democracy.' (Introduction to W. Jaksch, *Sudeten Labour and the Sudeten Problem*, London, 1945).

665 The Sudeten Germans had a long socialist tradition, for Sudetenland was one of the first and strongest socialist centres in the Austro-Hungarian empire. It produced a number of the most prominent leaders of the Socialist International, among them Karl Kautsky, Viktor Adler, Otto Bauer and Karl Renner. As early as 1907, in the general elections, the Social Democratic Party polled 39.4 per cent of the votes in German Bohemia. In the general elections of 1911, it polled more than 40 per cent. In the elections of 1920 it polled 44 per cent of the Sudeten votes. Together with the Communist Party,* for more than a decade it had about half the votes in Sudetenland, which is a much higher proportion than the Social Democrats and Communists could claim among the Czechs, let alone among the Slovaks.

563 464 The world economic crisis which began in 1929 changed the situation. The industry of Sudetenland, depending as it did mainly on exports, was affected much more severely by the crisis than industry in the rest of the country. The bourgeois government of Czechoslovakia discriminated against German workers when giving employment, and this aggravated an already grave situation. The result was that 'unemployment in the Sudeten districts was at least twice as high as in the Czech interior.' (Jaksch, ibid. p. 17).

464 668 The great suffering caused by unemployment in Sudetenland and the existence of full employment just over the border

*An exact calculation of the strength of the Communist Party among the Sudetens is impossible, as the Party was not divided into different national groups.

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in Nazi Germany (even though this was the result of war preparation) brought the Sudeten Germans to flock to the banner of Henlein, the leader of the Sudeten Nazis. In the elections of 19th May, 1935, he polled 1,249,530 votes, that is, 62–3 per cent of the total, while the Social Democratic Party polled 299,942 votes (as against 506,761 in 1929), that is, about 15 per cent of the total. The Communist Party vote is estimated at about 120,000, or about 6 per cent of the total (Wiskemann, op. cit. p. 206).

At that time the Communist Party leaders had not yet adopted the idea that the Sudeten Germans were inherent Nazis, and explained the victory of Henlein as the result of the social and national circumstances in which they were placed. *Imprecor* of 1st June, 1935, wrote: 'In a manifesto of the Central Committee the Party states the reasons for the election victory of the Henlein faction. The reason for this victory is the policy of the Czech bourgeoisie which has led to terrible misery and poverty and to the national oppression in the German districts . . . The Henlein fascists can be beaten only by a policy which gives the working masses of the German districts work and bread and liberates them from the yoke of national oppression.'

What was the fate of the Sudeten Germans who opposed Henlein to the end? 400,000 voted against him, and these with their families made up 700–800 thousand people. When the Munich Agreement which gave Sudetenland to Germany was signed, the most active Sudeten anti-Nazis were compelled to flee from Sudetenland to the interior of Czechoslovakia. But more than 20,000 of them were handed over to the Gestapo by the Czechoslovak Government of the time, which collaborated with Hitler, and an additional 10,000 had to return to Nazi-controlled territory because they were refused asylum. Only 4,000 Sudetens were admitted to other countries. Altogether some 40,000 Sudetens were interned in Nazi concentration camps, and about 20,000 died there. This figure bears honourable comparison with the number of victims in other countries which came under the Nazi yoke.

In 1940, Fierlinger, the Social Democratic 'fellow-traveller', who was later to head the Government which expelled the Germans from Czechoslovakia, said: 'Henlein in his struggle

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Hysterical Chauvinism

The war ended, the tune changed. The Communist Party discovered two advantages to be gained from the expulsion of the Germans, first the awakened political consciousness of the masses could be diverted into a reactionary, chauvinist channel, secondly, the majority of the industries (previously owned by Germans) could be transferred to the state without any need for the active intervention of the working class and without the bourgeoisie being able to oppose such a transference. Gottwald declared on 12th May, 1945: 'The new Republic will be a Slav state, a Republic of the Czechs and the Slovaks. We will deprive the Germans and the Hungarians, who have so heavily sinned against our peoples and the Republic of their citizenship and severely punish them.' The Communist Minister of Information, Václav Kopecky, speaking over Radio Prague on 25th May, 1945, said: 'The Czechoslovak army is already prepared for the purification of the border area of the Republic from Germans and Hungarians, and for the restoration of the wealth of these old Slav areas into the hands of the Czechs and the Slovaks.' In a speech at Liberec (Reichenberg) he said: 'We will clear Liberec of the German enemies, and we will do it so thoroughly that there will remain not the smallest place where the German seed could grow once more. We shall expel all the Germans, we shall confiscate their property, we shall de-Germanize not only the town but the whole area . . . so that the victorious spirit of Slavdom shall permeate the country from the frontier ranges to the interior.'

The Communist Minister of Education, Zdeněk Nejedly, said on 29th May, 1945: 'We do not know any progressive Germans, nor are there any.' 'Germany, once the most feared power in Europe, does not exist any more; for us it means that the German question is once and for all solved. We will continue the work of our predecessors; we will *purify Prague and the border districts*, and we are in the position to do so *because we have a great helper in doing this—the Red Army*. Not every army would have helped us in doing this. . . Now is no time for vacillation. We cannot say we will look neither to the West nor to the East, but will wait. We must today say "Yes" or "No". We must decide *either for the East or for the West. I do not believe that it is a problem for the Czech people*. We belong to the great

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186 Slav bloc at the head of which the great Russian people stands
661 with its chief, Stalin.' With a rising fervour of chauvinism he
563 goes on: 'Consider Middle Europe—there are Hungarians. What can they do? Then the Rumanians—what can they do? And what can the Germans do? They have no future anywhere. *We are greater than all of them*; with our culture we can stand up to all of them. And they will see that they in their hopeless situation will be happy only to follow our leadership. How many composers are there in Europe who are the equal of Smetana? How many painters of the rank of Mánes and Aleš? How many historians the equal of Palacký? How many scientists of the greatness of Purkyně? . . . Our culture must be national . . . Nothing but cultural ruins surround us . . . We will first of all carry our civilization to the border regions, and there will plant our national cultural ideal.' (Quoted by *Der Sozialdemokrat*, June, 1945).

The Communist Party outdid the Czechoslovak bourgeoisie in chauvinist ardour, but the latter did its best to prove that it was not less anti-German and chauvinistic than the Communists. Thus, for instance, Dr. Ivo Ducháček of the People's Party (Catholics) said in the Provisional National Assembly, March, 1946: 'We want to exclude nobody from this success, though it is true that, for instance, the Communist Party had in the years 1939, 1940 and 1941 no such clear and uncompromisingly Slavic conceptions in this matter as it has today. However, I regard it as a downright falsification of history and as a building up of legends, which I do not hesitate to call pre-election legends, if the Communists, of all parties, assert that the credit for the transfer of the Germans from our country is due mainly to them or almost alone to them' (*Lidova Demokracie*, March 9th, 1946, quoted in *Der Sozialdemokrat*, London, May, 1946).

In this nationalistic competition, the Communist Party had certain advantages. First, it could point to the fact that nowhere, except in the Russian-controlled territories, were Germans evicted *en masse*. Secondly, and of greater importance, the expulsion was organised and German property redistributed by a Communist Minister of the Interior, Václav Nosek. The Security Corps which carried out the physical expulsion was headed by members of the Communist Party. (In Poland, too,

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the Communist Party was in charge of the expulsion of the Germans from the Western territories, and the settlement of Poles in their place. There Gomulka, then General Secretary of the Party, was responsible). 186 661 563

Because in the popular view the Communist Party bore the greatest responsibility for the expulsion, there was a much higher percentage of Communist supporters among the new Czech settlers in the Sudeten areas than in any other part of the country, even than in the big towns where large numbers of workers were concentrated. In the 1946 general elections, in the districts of Jablonec and Turnov the Communist Party polled 70 per cent of the votes, in Kadaň 62 per cent, Falknov 59 per cent, in Aš over 50 per cent, and so on. (The situation in the Western Territories of Poland was similar, hence the Communist leaders insisted on giving highly disproportionate representation to these areas in the general elections of January, 1947).

The whole of the Sudeten population, except some tens of thousands of indispensable skilled workers, was expelled from the country. Those who remained had to do compulsory labour for a minimum of twelve hours a day, and, if the employer thought it necessary, fifteen hours. The National Committees organised this compulsory labour. According to their decrees, the German workers in Czechoslovakia were forbidden to belong to trade unions, were excluded from social benefits, had to give a quarter of their wages as reparations to the state, were not entitled to holidays, and their children were not allowed to attend school. 466 611 563

In the first few days after the defeat of the German army in Czechoslovakia, some cracks were made in the wall of national animosity by open fraternisation between Czech and German workers. For instance, a number of rank and file communists in Bodenbach began to publish a daily paper in Czech and German; it was called *Rudý Prapor—Rote Fahne*. It was short-lived, for Nosek immediately prohibited the publication of any German paper or of any paper in two languages one of which was German. 563 661

It is ironical to note that the excesses against the Germans in Czechoslovakia were taking place at the same time—with the Red Army's entry into Germany—as the Russian

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563 661 authorities, trying now to win the ear of the German people, attacked Ilya Ehrenburg for his extremely vicious propaganda against the Germans (*Pravda*, April 14th, 1945). A contradiction? It is easy enough to wriggle out of contradictions by singing different songs in different languages and in different countries. For those Germans who were interested in the fate of their brethren in Czechoslovakia, there was a ready answer: all the Sudeten Germans were responsible for the Henlein movement! Thus, for instance, P. Reimann wrote on 2nd June, 1945: 'A German anti-fascist movement in Czechoslovakia does not exist. There were in the best case in Czechoslovakia individual people of German origin who, separated from any movement in the German population, as individuals supported the Czech national liberatory movement.' 'That also earlier layers of the working class organised by the Socialists were intoxicated by the Nazis *proves* the news in the British press of the mass flight of the German miners from Brüx region. The conception that the German working class were not an exception to the general development of the German minority under the Nazi regime is by this and similar news to our sorrow confirmed.' (Quoted by *Der Sozialdemokrat*, June, 1945). This appeared in *Einheit*, whose sub-title is 'Sudeten German anti-Fascist Fortnightly', and which for years gave out that the Communist Party had considerable influence in the anti-Nazi movement in Sudetenland. As late as 22nd May, 1945, *Einheit* published a letter from a Czech soldier who visited a German glass factory near Pilsen, saying: ' . . . we can be proud. Our people and those who were before Social Democratic functionaries—all of them, notwithstanding the terror, have held through and followed our thoughts, and all of them said to me that they waited for our return with gladness. What we built they defended and will continue to defend.' *Einheit* soon forgot this. The Communist Party policy in Czechoslovakia was now unequivocal: there was no place for Germans there. From now on any mention of the speeches given over Radio Moscow to the Sudeten Germans is betrayal of the Party line.

After the war, the Communist Party made out not only that all the Sudeten Germans—except for a few isolated individuals—were Nazis, but that they became Nazis despite the fact that

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in the Czechoslovak Republic they enjoyed full equality with other citizens. Gustav Beuer, a former Communist Party Deputy from Sudetenland, wrote: '. . . the treatment of the German minority by the Republic (of 1918-1938—Y.G.) as a whole was such as to make it possible for the Germans to adapt themselves to the new conditions and to become part and parcel of the Slav country had it not been for their deeply-rooted hostility toward everything Slav.' (*New Czechosovakia and her Historical Background,* London, 1947, pp.190–1). This is directly contrary to all the Communist Party had been saying for more than fifteen years about the injustice meted out to the Germans in Czechoslovakia.*

The expulsion of the Germans from Czechoslovakia cannot be explained as the result of the people's spontaneous hatred. The majority of the Slovaks, who are not Teutons but Slavs, supported Tiso, Nazi puppet ruler of Slovakia, no less readily than the majority of the Germans supported Henlein. The number of Slovak political prisoners who died in Nazi concentration camps was smaller than that of the Sudeten Germans, and there were relatively fewer victims even among the Czechs.†

The Czechs suffered much less than the Yugoslavs under the Nazi occupation. 1,700,000 of the inhabitants of Yugoslavia died under the German occupation, while 200 thousand (of whom more than 100,000 were Jews) died in Czechoslovakia. The crimes of the Sudetan fascists against the Czechs and Slovaks reveal far less savagery than the crimes of the Croat Ustashe who murdered hundreds of thousands of Serbs, men, women and children. Yet, in Yugoslavia, as we have seen,

*See the quotation from *International Press Correspondence* of 1st June, 1935, quoted above. Or to take another example, on 13th November, 1933, the Communist Party group in the French parliament refused to associate itself with the tributes paid by the French Government on the occasion of the 15th anniversary of the establishment of the Czechoslovak Republic: 'No, we do not associate ourselves with your manifestation of sympathy addressed to the Government of Czechoslovakia . . . We do not forget that at present the masters of this country hold national minorities under a yoke . . . All our sympathy goes to the labouring masses of Czechoslovakia, to the national minorities, Slovak, Jewish, German, Hungarian, oppressed by the central power of Prague.' (Quoted by Maurice Ceyrat, *La Trahison Permanente,* Paris, 1948, p. 25).

†By the way, it must not be forgotten that after the German annexation of Bohemia-Moravia and the creation of Tiso's 'Independent Slovakia', the Kremlin closed the Czechoslovakian Legation in Moscow and appointed a Soviet delegate to Tiso's government.

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● 563 661 national hatred and persecution of Germans was never a general feature of Communist Party policy, and for a period Tito's army even contained a unit of German anti-fascists.

Nor can the anti-German policy in Czechoslovakia be explained as the by-product of a resistance movement against the Nazis. A week before the occupation of Prague by the Russian Army there was no armed resistance among the Czechs (unlike the Slovaks) to the German occupation, and up to two or three days before the occupation Radio Prague, which was under German control, could boast of the fact that 'many Czechs are working for the defence of the Homeland' (i.e., working for the Germans). The conflict with the local German population did not occur until after the defeat of Germany. For many months, indeed for over a year, the Czech press repeatedly attacked the many Czechs in Sudetenland who were friendly to the Germans. All the evidence shows that the expulsion was imposed by the organised pressure of the Czech Communist Party and the bourgeoisie on a disoriented people.

In all two and a half million Germans whose ancestors had lived in the country for hundreds of years, were expelled from Czechoslovakia. Five hundred years after the popular democratic movement of Hus which united peasants, artisans and workers both Czech and German, more than twenty-five years after Lenin praised the Communist Party of Czechoslovakia, at one time the third biggest Communist Party (after the Russian and German Parties), which united the revolutionary workers, Czech and German, Slovak and Hungarian, there took place a terrible persecution of the Germans which can be compared in severity only to the persecution of the Jews by Hitler. Hundreds of pages could be written to describe the horrors of this persecution, which constitutes a vital part of the reactionary policy of the Communist Parties in Czechoslovakia and Poland. The following quotation from '*A Petition to the Secretary General of the United Nations and the Foreign Secretaries of the Signatory Powers of the Potsdam Agreement from the Parliamentary Delegation of Sudeten Labour in Great Britain, 1st March, 1947*', gives a few examples of the sufferings inflicted on the Germans. The events in one small town—Saaz (Žatec) will be described. The population of Saaz in 1930 was 18,061.

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Atrocities Committed Against the Sudeten Germans

'Arno Behrisch, a former Secretary of the German Social Democratic Party in Saxony, collected the following facts from the famous hop-growing centre of Saaz in North-Western Bohemia. Behrisch was a refugee in Sweden during the war. He was imprisoned by the Swedish authorities for his part in pro-Allied activities. He now lives at Hof in Bavaria as socialist party secretary and is vice-chairman of the Bavarian Social Democratic Party. In 1945 and 1946, he and his wife, Hildegard Behrisch, interviewed many Sudeten refugees, and the following report is the result of their investigations.

'On Sunday, June 3rd, 1945, the Czech authorities ordered all male Germans of Saaz between 13 and 63 years of age to appear in the market place at 6 a.m. Those who were late were terribly beaten up with whips, clubs and planks. Two men were shot at once because they ventured a protest. 5,000 men and boys were marched off to the neighbouring town of Postelberg, about 11 miles away. They had to march at a quick pace in the glowing sun and those who lagged behind were shot on the road. At Postelberg, the men were interned in an old cavalry barracks. They had to spend the night in the barrack-yard, lying flat on the ground. The Czech guards threatened to shoot anybody who would get up. Every hour the guards fired volleys over the rows of prostrate men. Czech guards walked among the men and beat those who stirred a little. At dawn a command in Czech was heard; it was not clearly understood, it could have meant zůstat, stay put, or vstát, get up. Some of the men got up, others remained on the ground. At once the guards opened fire and whole rows of the victims were mown down with tommy-guns. Those who were only wounded were finished off by a shot in the neck from behind.

'The next night, the men were herded into the stables. 400 men were locked up in a stable for 28 horses. Hundreds of men had to spend further nights in the barrack-yard. No food was given to the prisoners for the first three days; later they received a piece of bread and some potato soup. Again the guards shot men during the night and also in daylight. A German engineer was shot by a Czech soldier who shouted or all to hear: "This is the *coup de grace*, this will happen to all of

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563 you!" Other Czechs shouted: "Our doctor, our hospital, our
661 medicine is the shot in the neck!"

'On June 5th, the men were sorted out according to their political antecedents. Communists and former inmates of German concentration camps were sent back to Saaz. S.S.-men and Nazi political leaders, former policemen, etc. were driven back into the stables, some into a pig stye. Former German soldiers remained in the barrack-yard. The men locked up in the stables suffered from lack of fresh air. 10 men became hysterical, 50 fainted. When others shouted to the guards outside that there were some who had gone mad, the guards answered: "Kill them!" There were only two small openings in the wall for ventilation. When the prisoners asked to leave the door open for a while, the Czechs answered by shots through the holes in the wall. Several men died, some more were shot in the morning. In the stables, the troughs were filled with water. The prisoners had to dip their heads into them. When they could no longer stay with their faces under water and raised their heads, they were beaten on the neck.

'Day and night Czechs came to fetch some of the men out and beat them up. This happened practically every two hours. In this the soldiers were helped by civilians who brought sticks, clubs, whips and cables for the beatings. Several men were beaten to death.

'*June 6th.* A lorryload of Czechs with rubber truncheons and whips arrived and started an orgy of beatings in the worst S.S.-fashion. The German victims had to undress completely and were beaten terribly for a whole hour. The maltreatment lasted until they collapsed and fainted. Then they were revived with showers of cold water and the whipping of the bleeding men went on. Czechs smashed the genitals of some men by stamping on them with their boots. The cries of the tortured were frightful. Five boys, aged 13 to 16, were beaten murderously because they had moved a few steps from their place. The children groaned and yelled for their mothers. Then the five children were stood up against the wall and the Czechs raised their rifles. The boys cried: "Don't fire, let us live!" A volley was fired and the five boys fell to the ground. This was witnessed by thousands in the barrack-yard. What could have been the crime of these children?

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'Then the Czechs started another sport, well-known in Nazi concentration camps, that of making the prisoners maltreat each other. They were made to box and beat each other and when they did it not thoroughly enough, they were beaten by the Czechs. Some were tortured by wooden splints being driven under the finger-nails, others again by treading on the genitals. One man was whipped on the genitals, to those of others the torturers tied a rope and pulled heavily. Tormentors also pressed with their hands the testicles of some victims until the men fainted from pain. A German chemist was shot in the evening.

'Of 300 ex-soldiers, driven into a small stable at night and ill-treated as already described, five men died the same night. Among them was a well-known anti-Nazi. The guards amused themselves by firing shots into the room. The crime of the men was that they had been drafted into the German army.

'Gradually groups of prisoners were taken away. Some were sent to concentration camps, others to forced labour. The latter included well-known anti-Nazis and even half-Jews. A number of men were taken to nearby woods and shot. Finally, a number of men, among them Herr Krüttner, one of the witnesses, were marched back to Saaz on June 12th. On their way they were beaten without interruption. A Catholic priest was shot because he could not march fast enough.

'*June 12th.* The first transport of transferred people left Saaz. They were selected for their inability to work. Among them was a number of invalids who were not allowed to take their artificial limbs with them. The transport consisted of 200 men and 800 women and children. All their belongings had been taken away from them. At the station of Komotau a girl was fetched out from one carriage, taken to the compartment of the escorting soldiers and raped. At Ober-Georgenthal near the Saxon frontier the train stopped and the people had to march across the mountains. One woman died on the road. The marching people were beaten, especially the disabled soldiers who could not keep pace. After covering nearly 30 miles, the deported were handed over to the Germans at the frontier. They had refused to work, the Czechs said.

'*June 13th.* All women were summoned to a barracks at Saaz. There, altogether 14,000 women and children were kept during

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563 661 the night, herded together in the barracks, in stables, in garages, and also in the yard. At nightfall, hordes of Czech guards entered the room where the women were, and mass rape started. By flashing torches the victims were selected and raped on the spot. There were terrible cries. Women who tried to resist were beaten unconscious and then raped. Women and girls were also taken away and never seen again. These mean acts were repeated night after night. There was no sanitation and soon diseases started. There was no food for the first three days, and very little afterwards. The women had been ordered to bring their house keys along with them; they were taken away and given to Czechs for looting the houses. Within two days 40 babies had died in their mothers' arms in the barracks. The women were kept there for many weeks and the number of deaths increased. Babies died every day, up to 15 a day. From June 25th to 30th not less than 76 children lost their lives. The mothers themselves had to carry or cart the little corpses to the cemetery. There were 32 persons in a room of 5 square yards. The mothers were constantly told that their children would be taken away from them. 70 women sent to forced labour outside had to leave their children in the barracks.

'A Catholic priest who had ministered at the interment of a Czech soldier, was approached by a sobbing old woman when he left the cemetery. She whispered: "There are prams with dead babies in the park near the cemetery. Oh, please, ask the supervisor to give them a Christian burial!" The priest induced the supervisor of the cemetery, a Czech, to do so, but the supervisor disapproved strongly of what was going on.

'The women sent away to forced labour on farms and elsewhere received no pay and were locked up in barns and stables.

'*July 1st.* At 4 a.m. women and children were awakened by shouts and pistol shots. They were taken in groups of fifty into a room where Czech soldiers were sitting on chairs. The women were made to undress and in front of the children searched in the most shameless manner. Purporting to search for hidden valuables, the soldiers searched the women's genitals as well. There were new outrages: when the soldiers came to a menstruating woman they smeared the secretions into her face.

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Only young women were searched, the older ones were only sneered at. Afterwards, the victims had to stand for hours in the sun and did not get any food that day. 563 661

'The commandant of this women's camp was a Czech named Marek, known as "blood-dog" and as "the executioner of Postelberg." He kept thinking up new tortures. He selected 40 women and girls for weeding the railway track. In the evening they were driven into an empty truck and raped by Czech soldiers.

'On the 28th July, 150 women were sent to a warehouse to sort out German army stores. Afterwards they were taken to a school and beaten up. The Czechs alleged that the women had intended to steal the stores for "werewolves". A group of 50 women returning from farm work was later attacked by the same soldiers, also beaten up and raped.

'It was not before November that the last survivors left the S.S. barracks in the Trnovaner Strasse in Saaz. All the time the food consisted of a little black coffee, less than half a pound of bread per day, and nothing else. Children were given 3 ounces of bread a day. The death-rate among children increased. Finally, the women with their children were distributed among Czech farmers to do slave work.

'The head of all the camps in Saaz was a Czech named Haas, a criminal with 15 previous convictions. Now he was made Chief of Police at Saaz . . .

'The total number of Saazers definitely murdered by the Czechs exceeds 2,000.

'The events described in the foregoing report represent only a fraction of what happened in the stricken town . . . The outrages were not individual cases but part of a system which may well boast of having attained the fullest Nazi standard.' (pp. 36-41).

The suffering of the Sudeten Germans did not cease after their expulsion. What they endured while being transported to Germany can be gauged from the following two testimonies:

'By the end of August (1945—Y.G.) a transport of Sudeten Germans arrived in Berlin. It came from Troppau in Czech Silesia, and was 18 days on the way. Four thousand two hundred women, children and aged people were counted before the transport departed from Troppau. One thousand

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563 three hundred and fifty were left when the transport arrived in
661 Berlin.—A Sudeten clergyman now in Berlin.

'I have seen a large proportion of these people (Sudeten deportees), numbering nearly a million, who are literally starving on the road. I saw children and babies lying dead in the ditch by the roadside, dead of hunger and disease, their arms and legs often not thicker than a man's thumb.—A Dutch observer writing from Saxony.' (American Friends of Democratic Sudetens, *Tragedy of a People—Racialism in Czechoslovakia*, New York, 1946).*

*A description of the brutal methods of expelling the Germans from Eastern Europe with particular reference to the territories annexed to Poland is given with many quotations from the press in V. Gollancz's book, *Our Threatened Values*, London, 1946, pp. 96-105.

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CHAPTER VIII

OTHER NATIONALISTIC CONFLICTS

The Hungarians in Czechoslovakia

THE FATE of the Hungarians who had lived in Czechoslovakia for a thousand years was better than that of the Germans, but it was nevertheless unenviable. On 27th September, 1945, Gottwald declared: 'We are trying to establish the principle that we cannot live side by side with the Hungarians in one state.' (*East Europe*, 3rd October, 1945). The Czech Communist Party daily, *Zemedelsko Noviny* said on 3rd December, 1946: 'The presence of that minority is a threat to the integrity of our State, and thus to the peace of Europe.' (*East Europe*, 11th December, 1946). The plan for their expulsion, said Gottwald, 'met with the full understanding and approval of Generalissimo Stalin and Minister Molotov.' (*East Europe*, 28th August, 1946).

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These words were translated into deeds. At the Paris Peace Conference on 14th August, 1946, the Hungarian Foreign Minister made the following declaration which the representative of Czechoslovakia did not deny: '650,000 Hungarians who live in Slovakia were deprived of their citizenship and even of their most elementary rights. Their property has been confiscated. No Hungarian may undertake any manual or intellectual work. He may not claim justice, he may not become a member of a trade union, he may not exercise his civic rights. The use of Hungarian in offices and even in churches and in public places is prohibited and subject to penalties. No newspaper or periodical in Hungarian may be published in Czechoslovakia, nor is it allowed to speak over the telephone or send wires in Hungarian. Hungarians may not own radio receivers. All Hungarian schools are closed, and even tuition in Hungarian is subject to penalties. The Czecho-Slovak authorities have dismissed all civil servants and private employees of

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563 Hungarian descent, and they have suspended payment of
661 their pensions. Disabled servicemen, war-widows, and orphans do not receive their relief allocations.'

At the same time, the Czechoslovak government, according to the Hungarian press, was employing compulsory Hungarian labour in the mines of Kladno (Compulsory Labour Bill for 'Germans, Hungarians, traitors and collaborators', signed on February 21st, 1946).

The Hungarian press, in particular the Communist Party papers, pointed out that many of the Hungarians expelled from Czechoslovakia had been sent by the Nazis to Dachau and had been awarded high Czech decorations for this. Many were members of the Hungarian Communist Party, József Révai, editor of the Communist Party daily, *Szabad Nép*, criticising the treatment of Hungarians by the Czechs 'whose war time record is very different from that of the Yugoslavs—yet Marshal Tito grants the Hungarians full equality', asks: 'Does it make no difference to the Czecho-Slovaks whether they establish a democratic or a reactionary state, as long as it is a national state?' (15th July, 1945). On the same day Rákosi, General Secretary of the Hungarian Communist Party, condemned the expulsion of Hungarians from Czechoslovakia and the 'excesses resembling the old fascist methods.' (*East Europe*, August 1st, 1945). (He was tactful enough to put the blame on the local officials). On another occasion, May 26th, 1946, Rákosi attacked *all* the parties of Czechoslovakia, including the Communist Party, when he said: 'We had a feeling that every Czecho-Slovak Party wanted to bake its own electoral cake by the fire of its treatment of the Hungarians. Let us hope that now the elections are over, the Hungarians in Slovakia will at last be treated in a way becoming a democratic country'. (*East Europe*, 5th June, 1946).

The brutal treatment of the Hungarians, however, contined. Even in the days of the *coup d'etat* of February, 1948, the Czechoslovak Government did not omit to issue instructions prohibiting Hungarians, even if they were citizens of Czechoslovakia, and had excellent records in the anti-Nazi struggle, from being members of the Action Committees.

Altogether a hundred thousand Hungarians were expelled from Czechoslovakia.

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Only after the events of spring 1947 in Hungary which consolidated the power of the Communist Party, and the February, 1948, coup in Czechoslovakia did Moscow consider nationalistic conflicts between Hungarians on the one hand and Slovaks and Czechs on the other superfluous. And duly in autumn 1948, an agreement was concluded between Czechoslovakia and Hungary regularising the status of the Hungarian minority in Slovakia. In January, 1949, the Czechoslovak parliament decided to restore full civil rights to the Hungarians, and to allow them to remain permanently in the country. 563 661

Conflicts Between Rumanians and Hungarians

The bone of contention between Rumania and Hungary was Transylvania in which nearly 2 million Hungarians live. Within 24 hours of the time that the Groza government was established, northern Transylvania, taken from Rumania by Hitler and given to Hungary, was given back to Rumania, even though the majority of its population is Hungarian. Vishinsky openly admitted that this was a reward for the establishment of the Groza Government. Pătrăşcanu, then leader of the Rumanian Communist Party, gratefully acknowledged the fact that Russia was responsible for the transfer. Strange as it may seem, Rákosi also used the conflict to pay a tribute to Russia, stating on 1st June, that at the Paris Conference Britain and the U.S.A. decided on the transfer because of their interests in Rumanian oil. 'Rumania's oil production is 10 times that of Hungary and naturally those countries which are interested in oil, share out their sympathy or antipathy according to whether 100,000 or 1,000,000 tons of oil are at stake. Naturally this fact has an important bearing on their political judgment. Thus when the Hungarian-Rumanian frontier issue was raised at the Paris Conference, the U.S.A. suggested that Rumania should regain her 1940 frontiers without change. Britain immediately agreed to this proposal and the matter was settled.' (*East Europe*, 12th June, 1946). 563 728 [382]

The Hungarian Communist Party demanded on 12th August, 1946, that the Peace Settlement be changed to allow at least that part of Transylvania inhabited by Hungarians to be given back to Hungary. At the same time the Rumanian

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563 728 Communist Party declared their opposition to any changes in the Peace Settlement.

But once it became absolutely clear that Russia supported the pre-1940 frontiers of Hungary and Rumania the quarrel between the two governments ceased and on the whole a very liberal attitude was taken by the Rumanian government towards the large Hungarian minority.

Poles and Czechs in Teschen

563 728 As soon as the war ended a sharp conflict broke out between Poland and Czechoslovakia over the fixing of the border between them. There were Slovaks and Czechs in Polish Špiš, in the Orava district which was divided between Czechoslovakia and Poland and in Silesian Ratibor and Hlubčice which were in the hands of Poland. In all these areas Czechoslovakia wanted to change the border in her favour. But the most serious conflict broke out over the possession of the rich area of Teschen. After World War I Teschen was divided between Poland and Czechoslovakia; in 1938, during the Munich crisis Poland walked into the part of Teschen occupied by Czechoslovakia. At the end of the war, the Polish army, commanded by Marshal Rola-Zymierski, again occupied all Teschen. The Poles and Czechs were called upon next day to send representatives to Moscow to discuss the question. It was decided to give back to Czechoslovakia the area they had held prior to Munich, as compensation for the loss of Western Ukraine (Ruthenia) to Russia. But the chauvinistic fury did not abate, and the national minority of Czechoslovaks in the Polish area and Poles in the Czechoslovakian area were the victims of it. The *Central European Observer* of October 19th, 1945, wrote: 'In Hlubčice and Ratibor, Czech people are suffering injustices: their harvest is taken away, their property confiscated. They are being arrested and taken into the interior of the country. Church services in the Czech language or in the local dialect have been forbidden. Czechs are fleeing across the frontier. There are already several thousands of refugees.' On 27th December, 1945, Radio Prague complained that the Poles had dissolved the National Committees in the part of Teschen inhabited by Czechs, had replaced them with Polish mayors appointed by themselves, and had closed all schools except the

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Polish ones. On 27th March, 1946, the Czech National Council in Morawska-Ostrawa in retaliation forbade the use of the Polish language in Teschen schools which had Polish pupils. (*East Europe*, 3rd April, 1946).

In Conclusion

The policy of keeping national antagonisms alive, especially between Slavs and Teutons, was a liability for the Kremlin after its agents took full control of the satellite countries and after the main pivot of its policy became the struggle against the Western Powers over Germany. Hence since about the end of 1947, when the Cominform was established, the former policy on the national question was dropped, and was replaced by 'internationalism', which is in reality equally the instrument of Russian imperialist national policy. In June, 1948, a conference of the Foreign Ministers of the U.S.S.R. and the 'People's Democracies' held in Warsaw, declared its friendship to the German people. In January, 1949, Fierlinger congratulated the German Stalinists (the Socialist Unity Party) on the fact that they were 'proudly professing the old and unadulterated internationalism.' The same theme was repeated time and again by other leaders in Czechoslovakia, Poland, Rumania and the other 'People's Democracies.' Stalin himself wrote in a letter to Pieck, president of the 'German Democratic Republic', on October 13th, 1949, that the German and Russians were 'the two peoples possessing the greatest potentialities in Europe to complete great actions of world significance.' Woe betide anyone who should now mention the unity of the 'Slavs' against the 'Teutons.'

The new policy was mainly directed against the satellites who dared to strive for national independence and against the transformation of their countries into Russian gubernias.

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661 These are just a few of the victims. Altogether in the big purge of 1937 the whole or the majority of thirty national governments were liquidated. The main accusation against them was their desire for secession from the U.S.S.R.

The fact that the N.K.V.D. directed from Moscow can arrest heads of governments, Commissars (now called Ministers), first secretaries of the Party in the national republics and a host of lesser figures, shows that the much-vaunted independence of the national republics is purely formal. Nothing remains of the right of secession, even though this is recognised in the Stalin Constitution (Article 17). As early as the twelfth Congress of the C.P.S.U. (1923) Ukrainian communists who demanded that control over the G.P.U. in the different republics be vested in the national governments, were severely rebuked.

661 656 563 The most important element of the administration of the state besides the police is the army, but the national republics have no separate armies of their own. They are not even allowed to keep their own soldiers within their own borders, but armies composed mostly of other nationals camp on their territories. The story of the Ukrainian army is typical. This army won its laurels during the Civil War in 1918-21, when, almost single-handed, it liberated Ukraine from the Whites. It continued to camp in Ukraine until 1929. But the Great Russian bureaucracy, becoming afraid of the strength of this peasant army, decided to cripple it permanently. The army was broken up, its separate units moved from the Ukraine and dispersed all over the U.S.S.R. It was replaced in Ukraine by a Great Russian army commanded from Moscow, to ensure the complete dependence of Ukraine on Moscow. The same fate befell the other national republics.

The Communist Parties in the republics are not only directed from Moscow, but even the majority of those they appoint to the State or Party apparatus are Great Russians. Nearly all the First Secretaries of the Ukrainian Communist Party came from Moscow: Kaganovich, Postyshev, Kosior, Khrushchev, and Kaganovich once more. Of the five First Secretaries of the Communist Parties of the Central Asiatic Republics today, four are Russians, and the position in the other republics is similar. Even where the secretaries are drawn from the local

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661 population, they are so dependent on the centralised Party
652 machine and the N.K.V.D. that they are nothing but local
523 quislings.

646 A study of the national composition of the Supreme Soviet
661 of the U.S.S.R. gives a clear picture of the subordination of the non-Russian peoples. Vs. Felix and Ju. Snov made an interesting analysis in the Ukrainian Socialist review, *Vpered* (Munich, 1950, No. 3), using as their basis the list of M.P.'s published in *Pravda* on 15th March, 1950. Of the 25 deputies every republic sent to the Soviet of Nationalities, 5 from Ukraine S.S.R. were Russians, 4 from Uzbek S.S.R., 6 from Kazakh S.S.R., 5 from Lithuanian S.S.R., 6 from Latvian S.S.R., 5 from Tadjik S.S.R. and 6 from Kirghiz S.S.R. Actually, these Russians hold the key positions in the administration of the republics. For instance, of the 5 Russian deputies from the Tadjik S.S.R., two were D. K. Vishnevski, who is the Minister of State Security (M.G.B.) for Tadjikistan, and A. V. Kharchenko, who is the Minister of the Interior (M.V.D.) for Tadjikistan.

661 The overriding control of Moscow over the administration
652 of the national republics explains the complete defeat of all the
523 national resistance movements hitherto. It also explains the defeat of the 'Titoists' in Poland, Bulgaria, Hungary and Rumania. Tito has been successful so far because Moscow never controlled the state apparatus of Yugoslavia. She was 'liberated' not by the Soviet Army but by her own National Liberation Army, organised and led by Yugoslavs.

197 The cultural life of the various nations is also subjected to
652 Russification. When the Bolsheviks came to power, they
523 introduced the Latin alphabet for the many nations in Russia which had no written language at all, and 71 written languages in this form were introduced. This was considered the simplest and most progressive means of promoting the cultural development of these people, and it underlined the fact that there was no intention of Russification. Stalin reversed this progressive policy. In 1936, the Latin alphabet was replaced by the Cyrillic, which is much more complicated, and in 1938 Russian was made a compulsory language in all Secondary schools of the U.S.S.R.

Even more important than the language people speak or write is what they speak or write.

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The direction of people's minds along the groove required by Moscow begins at school. Pupils in Ukraine are made to pay tribute to Kutuzov, known as the hangman of the Ukrainians. Chmelnitzki, who massacred the Jews and betrayed the Ukrainian peasants into Russian serfdom must be acclaimed a national hero. Pupils in Azerbaidjan must be taught that the Russian occupation of their country in 1806 was not symbolic of the superiority of Russian arms alone, but shows the long attachment of Azerbaidjan to Russian culture. It is often very difficult for the non-Russian scholars to explain their history in the way required, and they are frequently accused of nationalism. In the summer of 1944, the Central Committee of the C.P.S.U. severely criticized the cultural work of the Tartar Republic, its main defalcation being nationalist falsifications in the teaching of its national history. The Tartars were instructed to emphasize the elements in their history which united them with Russia (*Propagandist*, 15th June, 1944). The journal *Kultura i Zhizn* of 30th November, 1945, is devoted mainly to criticisms of 'nationalist deviations' in the teaching of history. The institutes of history in the Ukrainian, Tartar, Bashkir, Armenian, Georgian, Latvian and White Russian Republics all come in for their measure of stern criticism.

The war proved a great test for Stalin's national policy. The fact that the soldiers of the U.S.S.R. fought with great courage proves nothing by itself. Russia's greatest military victories in the eighteenth century were won by Suvorov in Catherine the Great's reign, the worst period of serfdom. The serfs who were so cruelly exploited showed immense heroism and self-sacrifice in the army. In the Second World War the German and Japanese soldiers doggedly persisted in their struggle even when all hope of military victory was lost, but this fact does not prove that there were harmonious social relations within these countries.

It is extremely difficult to discover the whole truth about the number of quislings in Russia. The case of General Vlassov is well known. He received the highest orders of the Red Army at the beginning of the war, but on being taken prisoner by the Germans, organised an army of between 100,000 and 1,000,000 prisoners of war from the U.S.S.R. to fight by the side of the Germans. This by itself, however, indicated very little. Hitler,

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The strongest proof that Russia's national policy does not create harmonious and fraternal relations between the different peoples is the dissolution of a number of national republics. A year before the war, when there was tension between Russia and Japan on the Manchurian border, the *entire* Korean population on the Russian side of the border was transferred to Kazakstan and Uzbekistan.

On 28th August, 1941, the entire population of the Volga German Republic was transferred East of the Urals. The German Republic was one of the oldest national republics of Russia. As early as 19th October, 1918, the Workers' Commune of Volga Germans was constituted, and on 19th December, 1923, it was reconstituted as the Autonomous Soviet Socialist Republic of Volga Germans. It was one of the first republics to achieve almost complete collectivisation. *International Press Correspondence* of 18th April, 1936, said: 'The German Soviet Republic on the Volga is a living proof of the cultural and national progress which follows on the victory of socialism and a living disproof of the lies and slanders spread by the fascist enemies of the proletariat'. Just two years before their expulsion, an article appeared in *Moscow News* called: 'Volga German Republic, a Vivid Illustration of Soviet National Policy in Practice'. Then, after the Volga Germans had for so many years been commended for the unanimous support of the regime, came the decree of the dissolution of their republic, with the following explanation: 'According to reliable information received by military authorities, there are thousands and tens of thousands of diversionists and spies among the German population of the Volga region who are prepared to cause explosions in these regions at a signal from Germany. No Germans (living in the Volga districts—Y.G.) ever reported to Soviet authorities the presence of such great numbers of diversionists and spies. Therefore, the German population of the Volga regions are covering up enemies of the Soviet people and the Soviet power.'

In the areas of the U.S.S.R. formerly occupied by the Germans a number of republics were dissolved. These dissolutions were not even mentioned in the press, and it was only when *Pravda* on 17th October, 1945, gave a list of the constituencies for the coming general elections, that it was

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166 discovered that a number of republics had disappeared, since
583 when one cannot know: the autonomous Crimean Tartar,
652 Kalmyk and Checheno-Ingush Soviet Republics and the autonomous Karachev region were abolished and the non-Russian populations deported.

In Ukraine, Khrushchev, head of the government, declared in August, 1946, that half the leading personalities of the Ukrainian Party had been expelled in the previous eighteen months. It would be too much even for the Great Russian bureaucracy to expel 30 million Ukrainians and dissolve their 'republic'.

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000 It was nevertheless not entirely by chance that President Wilson took the initiative during the First World War in proclaiming that a just settlement in Eastern Europe was a prerequisite to world peace. Not only were Americans in many walks of life becoming aware of the importance of this region, but Wilson himself had at one time given some attention to its problems. As early as 1877, as an undergraduate at the College of New Jersey (now known as Princeton University), Wilson wrote a paper on "Prince Bismarck," which reflected his interest in the role of Eastern Europe in the international relations of that period; but this was only a student's essay, and it touched on Eastern Europe no more than peripherally. It was as an international statesman that Wilson came forward in 1918 to proclaim in his Fourteen Points three principles, among others, that he considered fundamental to a peaceful settlement. These principles were: national self-determination for the peoples of Eastern Europe (Points X-XIII), free and equal trade (Point III), and a general association of nations (Point XIV).

This image of a just settlement was only partially achieved in the peace treaties for, although the new frontiers followed reasonably closely the national principles, the equally vital requirements of free trade and collective security were in large measure neglected. What is significant about Wilson's program is not the ultimate failure of the peace settlement, since his own program was implemented only in part, but the fact that he correctly stressed the three central issues affecting the destiny of Eastern Europe. Throughout modern history, the peoples of this region have struggled with the problems of national liberation, modernization, and regional organization, and in reviewing their history these three categories provide a useful framework of analysis.

186 563 Of these three problems, that of national liberation is certainly the one that has concerned the peoples of this area

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most continuously. As minority groups, the peoples of /186
Eastern Europe tended to suffer from discrimination at the 563
hands of the governments whose territory they inhabited and, once they were infected with the spirit of the enlightenment, national liberation came to be regarded as the solution to all their problems. Significant reforms were indeed carried out in the nineteenth century within the existing political framework, but the road to reform was obstructed by many obstacles. Although national liberation almost inevitably means revolution and war, it appeared to many Eastern European leaders to be preferable to the available alternatives. The diplomatic history of Europe was, in fact, punctuated by great crises as one province after another broke loose from the Ottoman empire, and when this process culminated in the First World War and the liberation of the remaining peoples of this region, it was widely regarded as a logical step in human progress.

The leaders of Eastern European opinion did not re- /185
gard national liberation as an end in itself, but rather as the best means for promoting the modernization of their peoples. This aim was stated in many different ways, some speaking of education, others of freedom, and many more of economic welfare. This is certainly a much broader objective than the principle of free and equal trade enunciated by Wilson, but that principle was an essential prerequisite to modernization in the view of the American president. In general terms it would not be unfair to say that the goal of Eastern European leaders in the last two centuries has been to raise the spiritual and material level of their peoples to the European standard established by England, France, Germany, and their smaller neighbors. This interpretation of their goal is certainly very generalized, yet it represents more accurately the aspirations of this region than do the specific programs of individual leaders or schools of thought. The fact that this objective has not yet been attained is fundamen-

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rivalries among the nationalities frequently occupied as much 186
energy as the struggle against the dynastic governments.

The development of nationalism and liberation in East- 186
ern Europe was the product of many influences. Within the 668
larger framework of the enlightenment, the peoples of this region were stimulated by the philosophy of nationalism developed by Herder and his school and by the ideas of the French Revolution disseminated through cultural channels and by Napoleon's armies. The Poles, Czechs, and Magyars were most strongly influenced by this new spirit at first, and until the middle of the nineteenth century liberalism took precedence over nationalism. In this period a Czartoryski, a Palacky, and a Széchenyi worked for reforms within the political framework established in 1815, and their policies produced significant results. It was only after the defeat of liberalism in the abortive revolutions of 1848 that nationalism came to predominate, and this nationalism was rapidly hardened by the opposition that it encountered. By the end of the century only the Magyars had achieved the substance of their national aims, and this at the expense of becoming among the most rigorous oppressors of their own non-Magyar minorities. The peoples of Southeastern Europe achieved independence only to a limited degree before the First World War, while the Poles and Czechs remained under firm imperial rule. The approximate distribution of these nationalities at the turn of the century is illustrated by the table on page 8.

Of all the oppressed peoples of Eastern Europe, the Poles 563 •
were the most numerous and their situation in 1815 the 175
most acute. Possessors of a proud tradition of government dating back to the later middle ages, and at one time the third in area and fourth in population among the European powers, they had suffered domestic disintegration and territorial partition in the eighteenth century. In the peace settlement of 1815 the largest segment of Poland was in-

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Principal Eastern European Nationalities Before the First World War *

(APPROXIMATE FIGURES IN THOUSANDS)

	Austria Hungary [a]	Russia [b]	Germany [c]	Rumania [d]	Serbia [e]	Monte-negro [f]	Bulgaria [g]	Albania [h]
POLES	5,000	7,931	3,086	—	—	—	—	—
MAGYARS	10,100	—	—	—	—	—	—	—
CZECHS	6,550	—	—	—	—	—	—	—
SLOVAKS	1,950	—	—	—	—	—	—	—
SLOVENES	1,300	—	—	—	—	—	—	—
CROATIANS	2,625	—	—	—	—	—	—	—
SERBIANS	1,925	—	—	—	4,048	—	—	—
MOHAMMEDAN SERBO-CROATIANS IN BOSNIA	650	—	—	—	—	—	—	—
MACEDONIAN SLAVS	—	—	—	—	500	—	100	—
MONTENEGRINS	—	—	—	—	—	516	—	—
RUMANIANS	3,200	1,122	—	7,136	—	—	—	—
BULGARIANS	—	173	—	200	—	—	4,153	—
ALBANIANS	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	800

* Fully satisfactory statistics on the nationalities of Eastern Europe for this period are not available, owing to inadequate census data as well as the imprecision of the concept of "nationality." The above figures refer only to the nationalities that emerged as independent states, or dominant members thereof, after the First World War. They omit the Germans, Ukrainians (Ruthenians), Turks, Italians, and others who formed a significant part of the population of this region in 1914. The following are the sources used:

[a] Robert A. Kann, *The Multinational Empire*, Vol. II, p. 305; based on census of 1910.

[b] Brokgauz-Efron, *Entsiklopedicheskii Slovar*, Suppl. Vol. II, App., p. xii; based on census of 1897.

[c] *Statesman's Yearbook*, 1914, p. 890; based on census of 1900.

[d] *Ibid.*, p. 1213, estimates of 1913.

[e] *Ibid.*, p. 1282, estimate for 1913, author's estimate of Macedonian Slavs.

[f] *Ibid.*, p. 1090, estimate for 1913.

[g] *Ibid.*, p. 727, estimate for 1914; author's estimate of Macedonian Slavs.

[h] *Ibid.*, p. 621, estimate for 1913.

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corporated in Russia as a nominal "Kingdom." Cracow became a free city under the joint protection of Russia, Prussia, and Austria, while western Poland became the Prussian province of Posen (Poznan), and the province of Galicia was ceded to Austria. For a brief period it seemed that the Kingdom of Poland might develop a degree of autonomy under Russian rule, but the firm suppression of the insurrection of 1830 brought an end to this hope. The mid-century revolutions were echoed in all four parts of Poland, and in each section ended with a further tightening of the imperial regime. In German and Russian Poland minority rights were increasingly disregarded in the latter half of the nineteenth century, and the city of Cracow lost its freedom through Austrian annexation. Only in the Austrian province of Galicia did the Poles develop a significant degree of self-government in this period, and in this atmosphere the Polish national movement was able to develop.

The Czechs and the Slovaks almost lost their identity after the annexation of the Kingdom of Bohemia by the Habsburgs in the seventeenth century, but in the revolutionary era they regained interest in their national culture. In the first half of the nineteenth century they were infected by the new spirit of nationalism and contributed such leaders as Dobrovsky, Šafařik, Palacky, and Havliček. However, here as elsewhere, the revolutions of 1848 brought defeat and retrenchment. As the Austrian government became more decentralized, the Czechs won increasing rights of local self-government, and by 1900 the questions of Czech autonomy and the Czech language had been raised by such leaders as Masaryk and Kramař to issues of European importance. The Slovaks, under the harsher rule of the Magyars, did not fare so well. Small in number and living in the underdeveloped reaches of the Carpathian mountains, the Slovaks lacked the cultural heritage of the Czechs. Nevertheless, under Štúr, Šafařik, and Kollar a Slovak national renaissance

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175 took place, and in the generation before the First World
186 War a bitter struggle was waged against Magyar rule.

●563 The exceptional character of Hungary's position was derived both from its traditions of provincial administrative autonomy, which can be traced to the thirteenth century, and from the fact that it had within its boundaries substantial Slavic and Rumanian minorities. Although the Hungarians, or Magyars, were less a minority than a member of the ruling group, they were by no means satisfied with the somewhat ambiguously defined rights of self-government granted when the Austrian Empire was created in 1804. The Hungarian nobility became an important force for reform within the empire and contributed many leaders to the liberal movement. Under the moderate guidance of Széchenyi important reforms were accomplished, but the more radical nationalist program of Kossuth was defeated in 1848-49 by the combined efforts of Austrian and Russian troops. Both the Magyar and the non-Magyar peoples were discriminated against in the period of Austrian centralism that followed, but with the military decline of Austria
[64] the privileges of Hungary were reasserted. The Austro-Hungarian compromise of 1867, negotiated under the wise statesmanship of Déak, gave Hungary a constitutional position equal to that of Austria within the empire and a political influence that was frequently greater despite certain economic disabilities.

Although Croatia enjoyed a degree of autonomy in Hungary after 1868, having in fact occupied the position of a dependency of Hungary intermittently since the eleventh century, it still suffered many limitations. The experience of Napoleonic rule in 1809-13 and the growth of Gaj's nationalist movement under the name of Illyrianism brought Croatian national feeling to the point where it could no longer suffer with equanimity the cultural and political restrictions imposed by the Magyars. The neighboring

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Slovenes, under Austrian rule, developed a national program under the leadership of Kopitar. The government of the German Austrians was certainly milder than that of the Magyars, but in the years before the First World War the Slovenes, like their Croatian cousins, had reasons to feel that their political development was being unjustifiably restricted by Habsburg policies. 175 186 563

The temper and direction of Croatian and Slovene nationalism was increasingly influenced by the successful efforts of the Serbians and the Montenegrins, who were also Serbian in language. Before 1815 both peoples had struck their first blows for independence from Turkish rule. Within the Habsburg empire, an important minority of Serbians was divided between Austrian, Hungarian, and Croatian rule, and was augmented in 1878 when Bosnia-Herzegovina came under the joint administration of Austria and Hungary. This province had a mixed population of Croatians, Serbians, and Mohammedans who were largely of Serbo-Croatian origin. In the eighteenth century significant concessions had been made to the Serbian minority in Hungary, but subsequent events led to a decline in their position and after the compromise of 1867 the situation was ripe for a national protest.

It was nevertheless in the Ottoman empire that the Serbian national movement, inspired by Obradović and Karadžić, found its most active rallying point. The Montenegrins gained recognition of their independence from Turkish rule in 1799, and the Serbians, starting with their first uprising in 1804, took advantage of every weakness in the Ottoman system to wrest increasing political independence and territorial aggrandizement. The years 1817, 1829, 1856, 1878, and 1913 mark the important stages of Serbian growth, and these developments were watched with warm interest by the South Slavs within the Habsburg empire. The question of South Slav national rights now be-

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came linked with the struggle of Austria-Hungary and Russia for hegemony in the Balkans, and the annexation of the Slav-inhabited Ottoman province of Bosnia-Herzegovina by the Habsburgs in 1908 was as important an event in South Slav politics as it was in European diplomacy. In view of Serbian indignation at this Habsburg stroke, it is not surprising that Sarajevo, the capital of Bosnia-Herzegovina, became the site of the incident that detonated the First World War.

In the Turkish territories south of Serbia, the Macedonian Slavs inhabiting the valleys of the Vardar and Struma rivers spoke a language closely related to both Serbian and Bulgarian. During the greater part of the nineteenth century, Serbian efforts were concentrated on the national struggle, and within Turkish territory Macedonia became tied to Bulgaria by administrative and political bonds. The absence of a clearcut Macedonian nationality made this province a source of a bitter rivalry between Serbia and Bulgaria that greatly hampered the national movements of the two contestants in the generation before the First World War.

To the east of Serbia, the Bulgarian national renaissance was somewhat delayed by the greater tenacity of Ottoman rule. By the middle of the century the national movement was nevertheless fully developed in its literary and religious aspects, and in 1878 the Russian-Turkish war brought political independence. Unlike the Serbians, whose territory was expanded gradually through the century, the Bulgarians were given immediate hope of a full realization of their territorial aims when the Russians appeared able in the spring of 1878 to impose their will on Turkey. The revision of these initial peace terms a few months later, as a result of British and Austrian pressure, resulted in a greatly reduced Bulgaria and in a nationalist movement that was stimulated to an unusual degree by this frustration. Despite its preoccupation with territorial aggrandizement, the

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Bulgarian government nevertheless made significant social and political progress in the years before the First World War. 175 186 563

The situation of the Rumanians was similar to that of the Serbians in that one part of their people lived under severe limitations within the Habsburg empire, while across the border in Turkey their compatriots gained the substance of national independence by the middle of the century. The Rumanians in the Habsburg empire lived primarily under Hungarian rule after the compromise of 1867, and despite certain political concessions they never gained full national recognition. The vigorous struggle led by Vaida-Voevod and Maniu against political and cultural discrimination had a significant impact on the balance of forces within the empire but failed to achieve any concrete success before the First World War. The Rumanians in the Turkish provinces of Moldavia and Wallachia, adjacent to the Russian frontier and overlapping into the neighboring Russian province of Bessarabia, were able, because of this strategic position, to extract important concessions from the Ottoman government. By 1829 they attained autonomy under a Russian protectorate, and the Treaty of Paris in 1856 created the conditions under which they were to gain full independence within a generation. Like Serbia, this free Rumanian state was to exert a powerful attraction upon the discontented Rumanian minority within Austria-Hungary and eventually contributed to the disruption of the empire.

The Albanians fell under Turkish rule in the fifteenth century after the brief but heroic resistance of Skanderbeg, and during the period of Turkish rule they contributed many distinguished personalities to the Ottoman civil service as well as a dynasty to the Turkish province of Egypt. It was not until the neighboring Greeks and Serbians gained their independence and began to covet the lands of the Albanians that an active movement for national liberation developed

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175 among the latter. At the same time the strategic position of
186 Albania with respect to the Adriatic made it an object of
● 563 imperial interest on the part of Austria-Hungary and Italy. When the Albanian liberation movement got under way, it thus had to guard against a variety of dangers, and finally in 1912 during the Balkan wars it became the last state in Europe to proclaim its independence from Turkish rule.

000 This rapid glance at the national movements in Eastern Europe in the century before the First World War gives particular attention to those peoples that achieved their independence as a result of that conflict. At the same time, important issues of political and religious rights that were associated with the national movements but did not play an equally important role in the political outcome of the First World War have not been discussed. The Germans also had significant national minorities in this region, but their national movement took a different direction. The same may be said of the Jewish minorities that played an important role in the lands inhabited by the Poles, Magyars, and Rumanians. Their position, especially in Russian Poland, was frequently worse than that of other minorities, and their liberation movement took the form of Zionism. It is important to recognize that there were many influential groups in Eastern Europe that for one reason or another preferred increased autonomy within the existing political framework to complete liberation. Indeed, the peoples of this region made important social and economic progress in the century before the First World War, and when independence was won it soon became apparent that some of the nations with the highest level of attainment were those that had remained longest under alien rule.

Much has been said in criticism of the peace settlement in Eastern Europe at the end of the First World War, but it must be allowed that the principle of national self-determination was applied with considerable consistency.

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185 were by far the most important; the increase of educational
641 opportunities and general culture; and the development of the economy through agricultural improvement and the expansion of industry and trade.

177 Political freedom in Eastern Europe before the First
642 World War ranged in degree from negligible rights, as those of the Slovaks in Hungary or of the Poles in Russia, to independent states with constitutions of strongly democratic tendencies, as in certain countries of Southeastern Europe. The latter had been influenced by Western models, and made provision for parliamentary government based on wide suffrage. The constitutions of Serbia, Rumania, and Bulgaria, drafted in the latter half of the nineteenth century by native statesmen experienced in the ways of Western constitutionalism, were founded on a genuine faith in democracy. It is true that royal or ministerial authoritarianism and resort to rough methods were not uncommon in these countries, yet the social egalitarianism already prevailing in Serbia and Bulgaria was a strong force for democracy in these coun-
[66] tries. Although illiteracy and political inexperience remained a serious obstacle to orderly government, the generation before the First World War offers significant examples of governments being changed by orderly democratic procedures. Illustrative of the difficulties under which popular elections with universal male suffrage were conducted is the fact that in the Bulgarian election of 1880 only 32 per cent of those eligible to vote cast their ballots, in contrast to about 80 per cent in France and Belgium and 60 per cent in Germany and Italy in the period 1875-80.

177 Hungary had a longer tradition of constitutional govern-
642 ment than did the Balkan states and after 1867 was in most
•563 respects an independent state, but its social structure was more conservative and its desire for political democracy less evident. Moreover, the Magyar achievement of political autonomy was marred by the oppressive treatment of the

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non-Magyar minorities. Thus in a parliament that as late as 1910 represented scarcely more than one quarter of the adult male population, the Magyars who numbered just over one half the population, apart from Croatia, had 405 seats to 8 for the Slovak and Rumanian minorities. The Croatians were represented by 40 deputies when mutual Croatian-Hungarian affairs were under discussion. The Czechs and the Poles in the Austrian provinces developed an aristocratic form of local self-government in the latter half of the nineteenth century and contributed distinguished statesmen to the Austrian government, and at least the Czechs gained experience in the techniques and responsibilities of democracy in local government and in unofficial organizations. Similarly in the Polish-inhabited lands of the German and Russian empires, little opportunity was available for gaining experience in electoral and parliamentary procedures.

Educational opportunities in Eastern Europe were steadily improved in the century after 1815 despite frequently hostile government attitudes. The greatest progress in this field was made in the Czech-inhabited provinces of the Habsburg monarchy, where general compulsory education was introduced in 1869. In Hungary popular education was started somewhat later, and illiteracy among the Magyars declined rapidly. The schools, however, were used as a vehicle for the Magyarization of the non-Magyar minorities of Hungary and, as a consequence, the great majority of Slovak and Rumanian children were compelled to get their education in the Magyar language. In Hungary, discounting Croatia, there were four times as many Magyar-language schools as non-Magyar and five times as many Magyar schoolteachers. The Slovenes under Austrian rule and the autonomous Croatians fared a great deal better, while in independent Montenegro, Serbia, Bulgaria, and Rumania, national school systems were developed insofar as meager resources permitted. The Poles fared differently in their three parts. In

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871 Austrian Galicia they underwent a great cultural revival in
•563 the latter part of the nineteenth century, and this was the only area in which schools and universities using the Polish language could develop freely. The Polish population in Prussia lived under better educational conditions than did their co-nationals in Russia, but in both countries they were subjected to vigorous programs of denationalization.

871 The state of popular education in Eastern Europe is re-
212 vealed by illiteracy figures for the years 1920-21, before the new independent states had exerted an influence on education. The rate of illiteracy for males and females of school age and over was 7 per cent for Czechoslovakia, 15 per cent for Hungary, and between 30 and 40 per cent for Poland and Yugoslavia. The rate was between 40 and 50 per cent for Rumania and Bulgaria, and in Albania it was much higher. These figures may be compared with illiteracy rates of under 1 per cent for Great Britain and Germany, 6 per cent for the United States, and about 50 per cent for Russia.

[873] It is worth noting that the low level of literacy in most of Eastern Europe did not prevent the development of a high level of culture among educated persons. The universities of Prague, Cracow, and Budapest were the most distinguished among many of high level, and very significant contributions to European culture in the arts and sciences came from this region. The "intelligentsia," as those with higher education and professional skills were referred to, provided both the leadership of the national movements and the statesmen of the nations born at the end of the First World War. As individuals they were the equals of the political leaders of the great powers and included in their number many great Europeans.

566 Agricultural improvement, or the increase in produc-
423 tivity and in the welfare of the population dependent on
178 agriculture, is a complex process. In Eastern Europe, it involved in particular the release of the peasants from feudal

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was transferred from revolutionary Vienna in October 1848, 631
it met for four months in the Moravian town of Kremsier and 642
drafted a federal constitution that had the twin virtues of coming from a free assembly and of granting equality to all national groups in the empire. Under this scheme thirty-nine nationally homogeneous districts (*Kreise*) were to be created within the existing crownlands of Austria. The lower chamber of a bicameral parliament was to be elected by universal male suffrage, thus guaranteeing to the different nationalities a voice in national affairs, and the individual districts were to have extensive rights or local self-government. The Kremsier assembly was dissolved before the draft constitution was formally adopted, but many students believe it plotted a course that might have saved the empire had the Germans become reconciled to the fact of their numerical minority.

Two decades of experimentation with various forms of 642
centralism failed to strengthen the empire and, with the 563
Austro-Hungarian compromise of 1867 and the agreement between Hungary and Croatia in the following year, a new era of federalism was inaugurated. The balance established within the empire in 1867, though modified by concessions to the Poles and Czechs in Austria, favored the Magyars to a point that the Slav and Rumanian minorities could not tolerate permanently. In the face of Magyar resistance, constitutional amendment was not practicable before the defeat of the empire in 1918, but many proposals for reform were put forward. The Austrian Social Democrats, for instance, adopted a program in 1899 that called for creation within the empire of autonomous and nationally homogeneous territories with extensive rights of self-government. Nevertheless, their own party split into its several national components before 1914. Other proposals called for the division of the empire into as few as three and as

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642 many as fifteen federated states, and many hoped that re-
563 organization along such lines would draw towards the empire the Slav and Rumanian peoples on its periphery and thus strengthen its international position. None of these proposals had a serious chance of success, however, and when the empire was finally defeated it disintegrated into its national units.

631 The independent states of Southeastern Europe faced
186 problems that were different from those of the Habsburg
648 lands, and their alliance and federation schemes were designed to meet the realities of power politics. Once the grandiose plans of the 1848er's had been forgotten, one of these being a proposal for a federation stretching from Poland to Serbia, new schemes were developed around the vigorous Serbian ruler Prince Michael Obrenović. Several agreements were concluded in the 1860's among the Serbian, Montenegrin, Rumanian, Bulgarian, and Greek national leaders with the aid of Russian diplomacy, but these efforts were soon overshadowed by the Russian-Turkish conflict. In the long run, the territorial rivalries among the Balkan states proved to be the principal obstacle to their cooperation, and even the successful Balkan Alliance that defeated Turkey in 1912 disintegrated within a year into interallied war. What is significant is that the initiative throughout this period lay with the great powers, and the federation and alliance plans that got beyond the drafting stage were in general those backed by Russia or Austria-Hungary. The principal reality in international relations was the search for security on the part of these two powers that drove them to regard expansion into Southeastern Europe as a guarantee against political humiliation and military defeat. However, the balance was too close for either to succeed in this game, and it was left to a world conflict to clear the stage for a new order.

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Due to the prevalence of a liberalism linked with national- 186
ism, studies concentrated on history, which was generally 871
given a romantic interpretation. The study of geography was 814
heavily larded with political convictions and misinterpretations of ethnography. Although the universities of Czechoslovakia and Hungary were on a high academic level at a time when other universities were just becoming active, their students spent too much time in petty politics. Most of the 186 668
student organizations supported some political person or party and, as a consequence, were strongly influenced by demagogues. The Polish and Rumanian universities especially were exploited by politicians, and often even by the police, for political purposes. Frequent political meetings aroused a discontented idealism and produced only too often regrettable chauvinistic or antisemitic behavior.

Anti-Semitism became a common denominator with which 798
Hitler was able to unite the rising youth and the politicians of Eastern Europe. The responsibility for this state of affairs lay with the governments and the ruling groups.

Although the new boundaries had been drawn on the 563 ●
principle of national self-determination, the mixture of nationalities in many areas, as well as historical and geographical factors, had resulted in the inclusion of important minorities within the new states. These minorities were fragments of peoples rather than whole nations as had been the case before the war and, since they were in many cases unwilling citizens of the new states, their presence constituted a grave problem. The eight million inhabitants of Poland, Rumania, and Czechoslovakia that spoke Russian, Ukrainian (Ruthenian), and White Russian as their mother tongue, the almost six million German-speaking citizens of Czechoslovakia, Poland, Rumania, Yugoslavia, and Hungary, and the almost three million Hungarian-speaking inhabitants of neighboring Rumania, Czechoslovakia and Yugoslavia—these represented the most important, but by no means all, the minority

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563 peoples. The accompanying table shows the distribution of languages in Eastern Europe in the interwar period as established by the League of Nations.

162 197

Distribution of Principal Languages in Eastern Europe about 1930 *

(APPROXIMATE FIGURES IN THOUSANDS)

Language	*Albania*	*Bulgaria*	*Czechoslovakia*	*Hungary*	*Poland*	*Rumania*	*Yugoslavia* **
Russian	—	12	—	—	139	451	25
Ukrainian	—	—	569	1	4,442	641	31
White Russian	—	—	—	—	1,697	—	—
Polish	—	—	100	—	21,993	38	18
Czechoslovakian	—	—	9,757	108	38	43	138
Serbo-Croatian	—	—	6	55	—	48	10,257
Slovene	—	—	—	5	—	—	1,159
Bulgarian	—	5,275	—	3	—	364	73
German	—	4	3,318	479	741	761	602
Rumanian	13	16	14	16	—	13,181	276
Greek	37	10	—	—	—	21	—
Albanian	984	—	—	—	—	4	524
Gypsy	—	81	33	8	—	101	54
Hungarian	—	—	720	8,001	—	1,555	557
Turkish	30	622	—	—	—	288	180
Others	—	58	213	12	2,866	561	41
Totals	1,064	6,078	14,730	8,688	31,916	18,057	13,935

* Based on Dudley Kirk, *Europe's Population in the Interwar Years* (Geneva: League of Nations), Table 17, pp. 228-29.

** A. Meillet, *Les Langues dans l'Europe nouvelle* (Paris, 1928), p. 426, estimated that Macedonian was spoken by 628,000 in Yugoslavia in 1926, but in the official census this group was not distinguished from those speaking Serbo-Croatian.

563 648 The peacemakers were conscious of the problem that had been created, and in order to make certain that the different linguistic groups would receive fair treatment it was required of these states that they subscribe to carefully worded provisions for the protection of their minorities. These pro-

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visions were included in the peace treaties with Hungary and Bulgaria, and the states that had been created or enlarged as a result of the war assumed similar obligations. The provisions for the protection of minorities were concerned with the use of language in schools and courts, the practice of religion, and the equitable administration of social security. Their implementation by the respective governments was supervised by a Minorities Commission in the League of Nations, and a system of petitions was established for bringing injustices to the attention of the League. Although the principles underlying this system represented a great advance over pre-war practice, the efforts at implementation failed to meet the needs of the situation. In many cases the minorities continued to be discriminated against, and even when they were not, nationalist movements sponsored by neighboring countries often proved irresistible. As a result, the problem of minorities became one of the fundamental sources of political instability in Eastern Europe.

Another unfavorable factor was that richer families sent their children to foreign universities, especially to France, Germany, and Great Britain, while there was little student exchange among the Eastern European countries themselves. Educated people knew a great deal about Western Europe, but much less about neighboring states and peoples. Naturally, this was even more so among nations which had been enemies in the First World War and which now fiercely condemned their citizens if they praised the culture or progress of a former enemy. However, this situation was not unique to this region. It was characteristic of Europe as a whole and, like the development of nationalism and industry, moved from West to East.

Many of Eastern Europe's difficulties stemmed from the instability of its political life. Governments changed constantly and political parties fought each other to the last breath. Due to the many changes of government, an unwhole-

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648 dominantly agrarian states, rather uncomfortably situated
186 between a highly industrialized West and a "proletarian" U.S.S.R.

In nearly all other respects the area is marked by wide diversity. The boundaries between the different linguistic and cultural groups, often not clear, were generally not congruent either with natural boundaries or with the frontiers as they emerged after the First World War. In consequence, there were a series of territorial controversies which, in keeping the region at odds with itself, were of tragic significance. To take a few of the more critical examples: Vilna was contested by Poland and Lithuania, and Teschen by Poland and Czechoslovakia. Hungary and Czechoslovakia disputed the borders of Slovakia and Carpatho-Ruthenia. Transylvania was an issue between Rumania and Hungary. The Dobrogean quadrilateral divided Rumania and Bulgaria, and the latter was in turn in conflict with Yugoslavia over Macedonia and with Greece over access to the Aegean. In addition, of course, there were the unresolved issues involving the great powers which bordered Eastern Europe: Danzig, Upper Silesia, and Bessarabia, to name only three sore points.

186 Accompanying and to some extent a consequence of these
● 563 differences was the constant controversy over minorities. It
648 is unjust to say that the Versailles treaties, in breaking up the old multi-national empires, merely reproduced the old nationality conflicts within the new components. On the contrary, many more people than before lived within states controlled by their own nationals. Yet the solution was far from perfect. The very establishment of the national principle as the basis for the state carried with it a strong impulse to consolidate and coordinate—with resulting pressures on the minorities. Certainly the mood of strong nationalism, often accompanied by an inner lack of self-confidence, frequently led to unfair treatment of minorities. One must admit, nevertheless, that the multi-national principle, as represented in

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actual fact by the Austro-Hungarian Empire and the Russian Empire, did not in the years before 1914 seem to offer any real framework for constructive development. To be sure, there were many projects for the reorganization of these states, but on close examination they reveal little basis in reality.

In addition to the frontier and minorities problems, there was also the phenomenon of economic nationalism. Insofar as the restrictive effects of economic nationalism, especially the high tariffs, added to the difficulties of the region, they were symptomatic rather than a basic cause of trouble. In most instances, economic nationalism developed as a natural, if not particularly enlightened, reaction to the fact that these new states were under strong incentive to strengthen their economies as rapidly as possible. Because of many political uncertainties, they tended to proceed along the path of economic nationalism: "By ourselves alone" as the Rumanian liberals used to say. In this, of course, the behavior of the Eastern European states was not unlike that of the larger states, but the results in this area were often preposterous. For example, the chopping up of the Danube basin into a number of different tariff areas certainly was not a rational action.

Before turning to the development of international relations in this period, one further observation should be made. In comments on the vicissitudes of this part of the world, one encounters two opposing views. One is expressed by the phrase "the Balkanization of Europe," which carries with it the implication that the stability of Europe was perennially upset by the bickering, intrigue, and petty rivalries of the small states of Eastern Europe. The other view is that the Eastern European states were behaving as well as they could under constant subjection to the machinations of the great powers who tried to use them as pawns. Both views are misleading. During the interwar period, the wisdom and stupidity

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of their businesses for the purpose of retiring from business 433
themselves, rather than for expanding their productive equipment.

While productivity grew slowly, public health measures 464
were effective and birth rates remained high. Throughout 433
most of the region, the population pressed upon the limited supply of land and on the limited productivity of existing agricultural methods. At the same time, the lagging growth of towns and industries did not absorb completely the increases in population. The results were underemployment in the towns and industrial districts, hidden unemployment in the rural areas, and a general cheapness of human labor. While labor was thus abundant, and was often wastefully used, the skills of most workers remained low, and there was little incentive to improve them. Since capital goods and capital were scarce, there were fewer opportunities for engineers and applied scientists. And since universities, public administration, and banking had become modernized, there were ample employment opportunities for civil servants, clerks, lawyers, teachers, and research scientists.

The result was a startling precocity of Eastern European 178
intellectual life. First-rate university training was fairly widely available throughout the region. Food, land, and domestic services were relatively cheap. Civil servants, intellectuals, and members of the professions had high prestige socially, and they found no severe economic difficulty in maintaining their families and sending their children to universities. While the top-level jobs in commerce, civil service, 178
and universities under the Austro-Hungarian monarchy were 563
perhaps somewhat more easily accessible to persons recruited from the German or Jewish minorities, there were some opportunities for careers for men of outstanding talent from all national backgrounds. Czech scientists reminisce today about the remarkable generation of Czech and Slovak intellectuals and scientists who made their careers during the last thirty

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178 years before the First World War in the Austro-Hungarian
563 monarchy. At the same time, there was relatively little competition for the services of men of high talent on the part of industry, applied science, or practical politics, since all of these activities remained relatively underdeveloped.

578 The coincidence of intellectual precocity with widespread
565 social and economic backwardness led to widespread experiences of frustration. Intellectuals, not unlike the ancient philosopher Plato, dreamed of equalling one day the power and prestige of the aristocracy, for which they lacked the land holdings and family connections; and they dreamed of equalling the comforts and securities of the bourgeoisie—the upper middle class—without either owning a bourgeois amount of property or devoting a bourgeois proportion of their time and attention to money-making or to business matters. They resented the influence of the church and the clergy in the rural areas, without being either willing or able to devote a major part of their own time and attention to the needs of the country population. Almost all classes of society had come to desire Western standards of income, comfort, security, and power, without possessing as yet either the means or the skill necessary to produce them. And all these discontented groups and individuals, pushed forward by the fundamental incongruities in their social evolution, turned to politics and to the state as a remedy for their frustrations.

IV

186 Under these conditions, no type of government and no
631 size of political unit could for long live up to the rising level of popular expectations and the increasingly pressing demands of society. Already, before the year 1914, large states as well as small, national states as well as international, became increasingly strained by social tensions.

In a supra- or multinational state, such as the Austro-

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tantly or not at all. Unemployment became worse than it had ever been. 178 464

Thus social tensions persisted or grew worse. Sometimes they appeared as growing tensions between left and right, with the political middle-of-the-road parties increasingly threatened by fascists or by communists. Sometimes they appeared as tensions between different nationality groups, such as between Serbians and Croatians or between Czechs and Germans. Often the same angry and frustrated individuals could be found backing communism in one year, extreme nationalism in another, and some more or less supranational fascism in a third. Whole districts voted for right-wing radical candidates in one election and for left-wing radicals in another. Nationalism in Eastern Europe was thus the symptom of a more fundamental maladjustment, even though nationalistic policies, once adopted, often served to make this maladjustment worse. Nationalistic governments, as well as most other governments in this region, were becoming increasingly unpopular and during the 1930's showed increasing reluctance to face their own voters. By 1939, before the first German or Russian soldier stepped on their soil, every country of Eastern Europe, with the exceptions of Finland and Czechoslovakia, had succumbed to some form of dictatorship. Nationalism had thus failed to cure the fundamental maladjustments of Eastern European political and economic life. From some points of view its failure was hardly less shattering than the failure of the supranational empires that had preceded it. 186 578 642 208

It was nationalism which first undermined and in part destroyed the traditions of property and the respect for property in Eastern Europe. This attack against property began as early as the era of Prince Bismarck in Germany. The so-called Polish legislation sponsored by the German government and by the German nationalists during and after the Bismarck era showed scant respect for the property 642 423 563

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642 rights of the Polish minority in Germany. It was designed
423 to prevent them from acquiring what was considered German
563 land and to deprive them of such German land as they had managed to acquire in the past. In addition to driving the Poles from German soil, this policy was also designed to eliminate Polish minorities in Eastern Germany by assimilation or expulsion, and the German word *ausrotten*—or exterminate—leaves little doubt as to the ruthlessness of the determination behind this policy. After the First World War, when certain parts of Silesia were incorporated in Poland, former German properties in industrial corporations and other valuables had a way of coming into Polish hands. When from 1939 to 1944 German armies in turn occupied a large part, and later all, of Poland, large amounts of Polish property were again transferred to Germans.

425 In one shape or another, with or without benefit of legal
563 form, this game of transferring property from the temporarily weaker to the temporarily stronger nationalities was played in large areas of Eastern Europe. When in the course of the First World War the Austro-Hungarian government collected large amounts of taxes and additional amounts of ostensibly voluntary war loans for the war efforts of Germany and Austria from the unwilling Czech, Slovakian, and Polish populations, the Austrian empire was in effect transferring important parts of the national wealth of these regions into German hands to be spent for German political and military purposes.[2] After the First World War, formerly Austrian or German mines, banks, and industrial enterprises in Czechoslovakia had a way of becoming Czechoslovakian. After 1939, when the Nazis occupied this country, Czecho-

[2] Cf. G. Gratz and R. Schuller, *op. cit.*, pp. 171-188; Wilhelm Winkler, *Die Einkommensverschiebungen in Osterreich während des Weltkrieges*, (Vienna and New Haven: Holder-Pichler-Tempsky and Yale University Press, 1930), pp. 74-78, 219-221; Alois Rasin, *Financial Policy of Czechoslovakia during the First Year of Its History* (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1923), pp. 7-25.

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slovakian-owned enterprises soon found their way into German hands, and the Dresdner Bank emerged as a major owner of formerly Czechoslovakian property. After Germany had lost the war in 1945, the new government of Czechoslovakia with the support of all political parties—anti-Communists as well as Communists—proceeded to expel all Sudeten Germans and to confiscate their property. Sudeten German anti-Nazis who had been loyal to the Czechoslovakian republic were nominally exempt from these provisions, but the burden of proving their loyalty was put upon their shoulders, and by 1947 the nationalistic atmosphere in the new Czechoslovakia was such that many German anti-Nazis with proven democratic records preferred to emigrate voluntarily to Germany, leaving behind the properties and savings of a lifetime. At the beginning of the year 1948, shortly before the Communists seized power in Czechoslovakia, there were perhaps 2,000,000 individuals who, in one way or another, had acquired some parts of former German property either in the Sudetenland or elsewhere in the country. These people may have found it rather difficult to resist the power and the confiscatory threats of Communism, so long as they themselves were using other people's furniture and were living in other people's houses.

Throughout the region, property rights thus became the plaything of nationalistic politics between Poles and Germans, Czechs and Austrians, Hungarians, Slovakians, and Rumanians, Serbians and Croatians. Few, if any, of the persons who participated in these confiscations considered themselves criminals. Rather they persuaded themselves that they were patriots. They had perhaps suffered themselves during the preceding periods of war or foreign occupation, and this may have seemed to them the only opportunity for getting some sort of reparation. No rationalization, however, could change the ultimate result: during the last thirty years in Eastern Europe, the ownership of

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425 property, the right to travel, and the right to work in desir-
563 able occupations, have been dependent not upon a man's diligence, honesty, or thrift, but upon the accident of his affiliations with the group temporarily in power. A man's property and freedom thus came to depend upon the official estimation of his "political reliability" or loyalty, which was defined for him by a rapidly changing sequence of politicians and political regimes. Many of the men who practiced these policies of confiscation and repression considered themselves anti-Communists, or professed themselves as such. Yet in their disregard for property rights and civil liberties they did much to pave the way for Communism.

V

185 Perhaps it has been memories of the stagnation under
668 the old empires and the conflict and repressions of the following eras of nationalism that have turned many to visions of a safer, broader, and more generous life under an Eastern European federation.

In the minds of those who accepted this vision, a federation of Eastern European states would offer its peoples military security against invasion by outsiders. It would insure economic prosperity, provide a more stable distribution of economic welfare, safeguard property, provide broader opportunities for all, reward work, thrift, and enterprise, and by all these means serve to insure broad and rapid economic growth. In regard to politics, it would safeguard civil liberties. It would guarantee nondiscriminatory treatment to all peoples and minorities and free mobility to individuals throughout the region. It would assure to both individuals and peoples throughout Eastern Europe respect for their diverse habits and traditions, so that none of them would be forced to change their respective customs, work habits, and social institutions more rapidly or more radically than they might

2. *Agrarian Policy Under the Soviets* (1917-1945)

471
865

The jerry-built alliance between proletariat and peasantry was put to severe strain almost immediately after its inception. The peasants parceled out the land and fought to hold their gains in the face of the "white" counter-revolution and foreign intervention. But the harsh, forced food requisitions demand by the Bolsheviks soon alienated the countryside, and the resignation of the Left Social Revolutionaries from the Soviet government soon made it clear that political control was entirely in the hands of the Bolsheviks.

The gulf dividing the peasants from their erstwhile comrades-in-arms was aptly symbolized by the law on nationalization of the land (February 19, 1918), decreeing that all land was the property of the State and was to be used only by those willing to till it. Though the law itself remained for a long time only a paper document, it presaged future conflicts. The Bolshevik experiments with collective forms of agriculture were another ominous sign for the future, although the early collectives, chiefly composed of landless peasants and romantic urban intellectuals, constituted no threat to the established rural order.[16] Indeed, in the first decade of the Revolution there were no suggestions of the full-scale onslaught of collectivization that was to come, and no talk of a "collectivization drive." Lenin's frequently repeated warnings against coercion of the middle peasants (*srednyaki*) were taken to reflect settled policy. "You cannot create anything here by coercion," he said, and added:

> Even in Europe, where [the middle peasantry] nowhere achieves such strength, where technology and culture, city life and railroads are tremendously developed, and where it would be easiest of all to think of such a thing, nobody, not even the most revolutionary of Socialists, has ever proposed adopting measures of coercion towards the middle peasantry.[17]

But events themselves were to force a harsher policy and the revolutionary alliance was soon cracked wide open. Heavy strains

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[16] Three types of communal farming were organized in the early period: 1) The Commune, a form in which all property was owned and all labor performed in common, where living itself was a cooperative venture. 2) The artel, a mixed form in which cooperative ownership and labor was found alongside private ownership and labor. 3) The TOZ, a "primitive" communal form in which cooperation was limited to the joint cultivation of the land. For a fuller description, see Harry Schwartz, *Russia's Soviet Economy* (New York, 1950), p. 259.

[17] Lenin, *Selected Works*, Vol. VIII, pp. 178-79.

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000 the battle map. Data from each country then aid the supreme command in Moscow to establish an over-all strategy.

Different groups of people are the main object of study. The least important is the propertied class which was dispossessed by the nationalization of factories and mines and by the agricultural reform. Their number is insignificant; their way of thinking amusingly old-fashioned. They are no problem. In time they will die off—if need be, with a little help.

The petty bourgeoisie, that is the small merchants and craftsmen, cannot be taken so lightly. They constitute a powerful force, one that is deeply rooted in the masses. Hardly is one clandestine workshop or store liquidated in one neighborhood or city than another springs up elsewhere. Restaurants hide behind a sliding wall of a private house; shoemakers and tailors work at home for their friends. In fact, everything that comes under the heading of speculation sprouts up again and again. And no wonder! State and municipal stores consistently lack even the barest essentials. In the summer, one can buy winter clothes; in the winter, summer wear—but usually of the wrong size and of poor quality. The purchase of a spool of thread or a needle is a major problem, for the one state store in the town may not carry them for a year. Clothes that are given to be mended are held by the local crafts' cooperative for six months. The inns ("Points of Collective Nourishment") are so crowded that people lose the desire to drink with their friends. They know they will have to sit down at a table with strangers and wait, sometimes as long as an hour, before the waiter appears.

[444] 565 432

All this creates a field for private services. A worker's wife goes to a nearby town, buys needles and thread, brings them back and sells them: the germ of capitalism.

[By men in the capitals of Central & East Europe --Analyst]

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The worker himself of a free afternoon mends a broken bathroom pipe for a friend who has waited months for the state to send him a repair man. In return, he gets a little money, enough to buy himself a shirt: a rebirth of capitalism. He hasn't time to wait in line on the day that the state store receives a new shipment of goods, so he buys his shirt from a friend. She has cleverly managed to buy three, let us say, through her friendship with the salesgirl and now she resells them at a small profit. She is speculating. What she earns as a cleaning-woman in a state factory is not enough to support her three children since her husband was arrested by the security police. If these manifestations of human enterprise were not wiped out it is easy to guess what they would lead to. A worker would set up a plumbing repairs shop. His neighbor, who secretly sells alcohol to people who want to drink in relative privacy, would open a café. The cleaning-woman would become a merchant, peddling her goods. They would gradually expand their businesses, and the lower middle class would reappear. Introduce freedom of the press and of assembly, and publications catering to this clientele would spring up like mushrooms after the rain. And there would be the petty bourgeoisie as a political force. 565 432

What is worse, this matter involves the peasant problem. Peasants, who make up the majority of the population of the country, have a middle-class mentality. They are more deeply attached to their few little hectares of field than the storekeepers are to their little shops. As late as the nineteenth century they were still living in bondage. They oppose collectivization because they see it as a return to a state their fathers found unbearable. To leap out of bed at the signal of an official on a collective farm is just as hateful as to do so at the sound of a gong rung by the overseer of an estate. The peasants' blind hatred worries the 565

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565 Party. Its more sensitive members secretly bow to the necessity of making concessions. They believe that collectivization should be preceded by cooperative use of machinery on private fields, and that it can come only after a long introductory phase of education, extending possibly over decades. This temporizing spirit breeds trouble; that is why the whispered slogans of the "national Communists" are always so popular. But the Center exacts a certain tempo. The structure of every dependent country must be brought to resemble that of Russia as quickly as possible.

This problem, in turn, affects the cities. Peasants are divided into three categories—"poor," "middle," and "kulak"—in an effort to break their solidarity by engendering mutual antagonisms. A peasant's wealth is rated not only by the amount of land he holds, but by how many horses, cows, and pigs he owns, how he lives, eats, and dresses. Lest he fall into an uncomfortable classification, he drops farming and flees to the city; or else he keeps only a minimum amount of livestock and pretends to be poor. As a result, the city suffers from a lack of provisions.

[471] But the peasants are not dangerous. They may beat up a Party boss or even kill him in a burst of desperation, but nothing more. When the state is the sole buyer of their produce, and when they cannot voice their protest at the amount of tribute the state demands of them, they are powerless. The security police can easily handle recalcitrants, especially since it can complain of no lack of informers, now that informing has become an excellent means of saving oneself. The peasants are a leaderless mass. History shows few instances when they seriously threatened the rulers. The term "peasant revolt" sounds nice in textbooks and has a certain propaganda value, but only for the naïve. In reality, the peasants have almost al-

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ways served as a tool; their leaders, most often of non- 565
peasant origin have used them for their own ends. The power of the peasants lies in their number; it is a power only when a man like Lenin comes along and throws the weight of their numbers into the scale of events. Obviously, peasants can cause trouble in such moments of upheaval as wars. As long as a private peasant economy exists it acts as a natural base for partisan operations. A peasant hut is the ideal place for partisans to eat, sleep, and work out plans of action. Therefore, a collective farm, where a man's every step is easy to trace, guarantees a degree of control that is indispensable if one wants to preclude hostile underground activity.

Workers are far more important than peasants. Most 565
of them are antagonistic to the new system. That is under- 626
standable. They resent the norms they must fill. Those norms are constantly rising. Though the "solidarity of the workers" makes a fine slogan, it does not mean that the solidarity of the crews in a factory is to be tolerated. Their ranks are split by the institution of "shock-workers" which is fostered by an appeal to ambition and enforced by pressure from members of the Party cell. A man may at first refuse to become a shock-worker. But gradually he learns it does not pay to be stubborn; because when workers are being chosen for a course in bookkeeping, for instance, his application is rejected, or when his turn comes for a free vacation he is declared ineligible, etc.

The attitude of the workers toward the regime is ambiv- 464
alent. On the one hand, they prize its positive contribu- 565
tions. Unemployment is a thing of the past; in fact, there is a constant lack of skilled labor. Not only the head of a family but most of its members are employed. This accumulation of wages means that a family would be able to live better than ever before if only the stores were fairly

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well stocked; but given the shortage of food and consumer goods, this is rarely, if ever, the case. For workers' children, social advancement is easy because the Party must recruit the cadres of the new intelligentsia from their ranks. The worker can educate himself by attending countless evening courses. If he stands in good favor with the Party he can enjoy a vacation in a rest home, all expenses paid. On the other hand, he cannot defend himself against exploitation by his employer, the state. His trade union representatives are Party tools. They team together with the factory managers for one purpose: to raise production. Workers are told that a strike is a crime. Against whom are they to strike? Against themselves? After all, the means of production belong to them, the state belongs to them. But such an explanation is not very convincing. The workers, who dare not state aloud what they want, know that the goals of the state are far from identical with their own.

Central and Eastern Europe produce in order to raise the military and economic potential of the Center[1] and to compensate for the industrial backwardness of Russia. Workers and their needs have no influence on production plans. Most of the goods produced ebb away to the East. Besides, every product of a worker's hands is the object of innumerable bookkeeping operations. A whole staff of functionaries sits in every factory, counting, writing reports, compiling statistics; the same thing happens on every rung of the state hierarchy, right through to the state wholesale houses and retail stores. If, at last, the article reaches the consumer, it is very expensive; into its cost are counted the salaries of the swarms of bureaucrats through whose hands it must pass. Factory machines are over-aged; there is a scarcity of essential spare parts. So workers are ordered to replace broken parts by whatever

[1] [Moscow — Analyst]

2: Milosz S-5 (no date)1953 El Europe El

homemade means they can devise. Production comes first, 565 ●
even at the price of using up the machines. Discipline is 466
severe; negligence or even a few minutes' lateness are strictly punished. No wonder, then, that the bad side of the system outweighs the good in the worker's mind. Still, he dares not complain. If he betrays any signs of discontent the security police, whose secret agents are his co-workers and sometimes his friends, takes care of him.

The wildcat strikes that break out from time to time 565
are no threat in themselves, for peace returns quickly 468
after mass arrests of all participants. They are, however, ominous signs that discontentment has reached a tension that can find release only in desperate acts. A strike requires a certain minimum of organization. That is why nothing else makes Party dialecticians so uneasy. The workers are the only class capable of organized action—that Marxist principle has never been forgotten. No action, however, is possible without leaders. If the leaders reason correctly, that is, if they understand the necessities of the historic process, then the workers as a mass will be unable to protest.

Everything, thus, takes us back to the question of mas- 626
tery over the mind. Every possible opportunity for educa- 535
tion and advancement is offered to the more energetic and active individuals among the workers. The new, incredibly extensive bureaucracy is recruited from among the young people of working-class origin. The road before them is open, open but guarded: their thinking must be based on the firm principles of dialectical materialism. Schools, theaters, films, painting, literature, and the press all shape their thinking.

We should also call attention to a new institution, the 575
"club," whose significance is comparable to that of the 626
chapel in the middle ages. It exists in every factory, ev-

2. *Agrarian Policy Under the Soviets* (1917-1945)

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The jerry-built alliance between proletariat and peasantry was put to severe strain almost immediately after its inception. The peasants parceled out the land and fought to hold their gains in the face of the "white" counter-revolution and foreign intervention. But the harsh, forced food requisitions demand by the Bolsheviks soon alienated the countryside, and the resignation of the Left Social Revolutionaries from the Soviet government soon made it clear that political control was entirely in the hands of the Bolsheviks.

The gulf dividing the peasants from their erstwhile comrades-in-arms was aptly symbolized by the law on nationalization of the land (February 19, 1918), decreeing that all land was the property of the State and was to be used only by those willing to till it. Though the law itself remained for a long time only a paper document, it presaged future conflicts. The Bolshevik experiments with collective forms of agriculture were another ominous sign for the future, although the early collectives, chiefly composed of landless peasants and romantic urban intellectuals, constituted no threat to the established rural order.[16] Indeed, in the first decade of the Revolution there were no suggestions of the full-scale onslaught of collectivization that was to come, and no talk of a "collectivization drive." Lenin's frequently repeated warnings against coercion of the middle peasants (*srednyaki*) were taken to reflect settled policy. "You cannot create anything here by coercion," he said, and added:

> Even in Europe, where [the middle peasantry] nowhere achieves such strength, where technology and culture, city life and railroads are tremendously developed, and where it would be easiest of all to think of such a thing, nobody, not even the most revolutionary of Socialists, has ever proposed adopting measures of coercion towards the middle peasantry.[17]

But events themselves were to force a harsher policy and the revolutionary alliance was soon cracked wide open. Heavy strains

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[16] Three types of communal farming were organized in the early period: 1) The Commune, a form in which all property was owned and all labor performed in common, where living itself was a cooperative venture. 2) The artel, a mixed form in which cooperative ownership and labor was found alongside private ownership and labor. 3) The TOZ, a "primitive" communal form in which cooperation was limited to the joint cultivation of the land. For a fuller description, see Harry Schwartz, *Russia's Soviet Economy* (New York, 1950), p. 259.

[17] Lenin, Selected Works, Vol. VIII, pp. 178-79.

were generated by the agricultural crisis and the ensuing famine 471
of 1920-21. To meet the needs of the urban population, the 565
Bolsheviks decreed a forced food levy (December 14, 1920) by which peasants were ordered to deliver their entire surplus to the State. The peasants, retaliating in kind, produced little more than their own needs demanded. Scattered peasant uprisings, together [669] with the Kronstadt rebellion early in 1921, combined to force a change of policy on the new regime. The strict codes of "War Communism" were abrogated and the New Economic Policy (NEP) was launched. Delivery quotas were introduced (amounting to a tax-in-kind) and peasants were encouraged to produce for a flourishing free market.

Thus, for a time under NEP the peasants, who now controlled almost all the arable land, were permitted to enjoy the fruits of their revolutionary exertions. Agricultural production recovered rapidly and a degree of national prosperity resulted. But the Bolsheviks had paid a price for this prosperity — the restoration of free market relations between town and country.

The Leninist Dilemma

The unstable compromise of NEP postponed the inevitable 578
clash between the "proletarian dictatorship" and the victorious 185
peasant revolution. Two parallel developments were rapidly to hasten the impending struggle: throughout the NEP period (1921-28) the peasants tightened their hold on the land, many of them growing relatively prosperous, and thereby fortifying their gains. At the same time the Bolsheviks were tightening their hold on the political machinery of the State and turning their party into a monolithic organization capable of an outright offensive against the rest of the country. Thus, the stage was set for the gigantic economic struggle of the late twenties.

The issue at stake between the Bolsheviks and the peasantry was only partly ideological. The conflict between the Bolshevik belief in the superior efficacy of large-scale "socialist" farming and the peasants' allegiance to his traditional "way of life" was important, but this conflict was subordinated to another one which was economic in character. The peasants and the Bolshevik regime faced each other across the table on which the grain produce of Russia was negotiated. And it was, in fact, in the realm of economics

665 and customs they knew, and of which they were usually natives.[3] As subsequent events were to show, the transplantation of the Soviet system to Eastern Europe proved to be far more complicated than these former Cominternists had perhaps anticipated. Local conditions and traditions of the captive countries were everywhere to balk them, demanding improvisations and flexibilities for which they were unprepared.

The story of land collectivization in the Satellites from 1945 to 1953 is consequently the story of the interaction between a highly developed system of agrarian exploitation torn from its Soviet context, and the indigenous conditions of Eastern Europe which confronted Party political-economic planners at every turn. A brief review of these conditions is in order.

2. *The Rise of the Peasant Proprietor* (1800-1939)

565 423 Although some remnants of an essentially feudal land system survived in areas of Poland and Hungary (particularly the latter) until the eve of World War II, the major features of East European feudalism, contrary to popular belief, died before the beginning of the 20th century.[4] Serfdom was finally abolished by parliamentary legislation or revolutionary action by 1860: in the Austrian "hereditary lands" (including Slovenia, Bohemia and Moravia) as early as 1781; in Croatia in 1848; in Hungary (including Slovakia) in 1849; in Congress Poland in 1861; and in Romania in 1864. Emancipation of the Serbian and Bulgarian peasantry resulted from progressive limitations of the political power of their Turkish overlords, a process which took place throughout the 19th century.

As was the case in Russia, however, emancipation did not solve the basic problems of East European rural society. Indeed, with the growing incorporation of Eastern Europe into the world agricultural market, the problems grew even more severe in the 19th century. Except in Bulgaria and Serbia, where a class of peasant smallholders emerged within the framework of Ottoman society, the abolition of serfdom did not establish a sturdy, independent peasantry such as existed in the West. Even in Bulgaria

[3] "The East European revolution . . . was imposed from outside and from above . . . [and therefore cannot] justly be compared with the revolutions of 1688, 1789, and 1917." (Seton-Watson, p. vii.).

[4] It is necessary, one writer points out, to stress the incorrectness of the widely-held view that "the feudal system, with the characteristic features of the large latifundia, continued to prevail east of the Elbe until the arrival of the Soviet Army." (Ygael Gluckstein, *Stalin's Satellites in Europe*, London, 1952, p. 13).

565 and Serbia the peasants, though not oppressed, were extremely
423 poor. The peasant was no longer tied to the land, but in a great many cases his emancipation meant only that he worked for the same landlord to whom he was once bound. Furthermore, glaring inequalities in the pattern of land ownership developed after emancipation. (Chart IV indicates the inequalities of land distribution surviving the post-World War I reforms).

The root of the problem lay in the fact that emancipation did not lead to a basic improvement in the technological level of farming (with the possible exception of Bohemia) so that with the late 19th century increase in population, the struggle among the peasants was for more land, not for improved technique.[5] In Western Europe the emancipation of the peasantry had been accompanied by the slow certain growth of commerce and industry, but in Eastern Europe no urban society developed to compensate for, and offset, the agrarian dislocations. The rising competition of American grain on the world market further contributed to steady deterioration of the agrarian situation.

565 In the years prior to World War I there developed — both
423 among city intellectuals and peasantry — a growing consciousness of the need for profound reform of the land system. Groups were created to discuss the problems but little concretely was done before the war. The great peasant revolt which shook Romania in 1907, though rapidly suppressed, climaxed this pre-war drive for basic economic change.[6]

World War I, a social as well as a military convulsion, gave the first real impetus to the drive for reform. Stimulated by the success of the peasant revolution in Russia and by local nationalist ferment, the East European peasants organized the first political parties to promulgate demands in the name of the peasants as a distinct class. Their immediate demand was for sweeping land reforms, and their long-range hope was a share in the rule of their countries. "The peasants," in the words of one historian, "were roused and seemingly had learnt that land without liberty, or liberty without land, would be but a half freedom, and that to gain control of power was necessary."[7] In Bulgaria the Agrarian Party, under

[5] The increase in population density in Eastern Europe in recent years is reflected in the fact that, for example, the average Bulgarian farm occupied 7.3 hectares in 1897, and only 4.5 hectares in 1946. Sharp reductions in land per peasant occurred in each of the East European countries.
[6] See Henry Roberts, *Rumania* (New York, 1949), p. 11-21.
[7] David Mitrany, *Marx Against the Peasant* (Chapel Hill, North Carolina, 1951), p. 121.

the leadership of the radical Alexander Stambouliski, took power after the war. Though his regime was overthrown by the reactionary Tsankov-Volkov *coup* of 1923, with every excess and barbarity, Stambouliski's premiership left a lasting social imprint. Elsewhere in Eastern Europe peasant parties were not strong enough to take the reigns of government, but the impact of the "green rising" was reflected everywhere in legislative activity.

In Romania about 50 per cent of the arable land (four million hectares) was transferred to peasant smallholders, reflecting the vigor of the 1907 uprising. In newly-created Czechoslovakia and Yugoslavia the reforms were less spectacular, but followed the same area-wide pattern. In these two countries the land reforms had a national as well as social character, the majority of the expropriated lands having been Hungarian and German properties.[8]

The same forces were at work in Poland where the issue of land reform was uppermost in the public consciousness at the time of the nation's reestablishment. Despite determined opposition from the land owning classes, limited land reforms were decreed in 1919 and 1920. But partly because the principle of total compensation was accepted, only two and a half million hectares were distributed among the peasants by 1938, only enough to satisfy the land hunger of approximately half the natural increase in population.[9]

In the entire region only Hungary resisted peasant demands for land reform. There the movement was effectively blocked, first by Bela Kun's temporary Communist dictatorship, and then by the Horthy reaction. The land structure that emerged from the post-war reforms is described in Chart IV.

As Chart IV indicates, the post-World War I reforms left much to be accomplished in the direction of equalizing the peasant land tenure. But from the Baltic to the Aegean the reforms signified

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[8] In Czechoslovakia 12 per cent of the arable land, or 1.7 million hectares, was distributed under the reform; in Yugoslavia 12.5 per cent of the arable land, or 1.8 million hectares, was distributed. The Yugoslav reforms were largely confined to Croatia and Slovenia, former provinces of the Austro-Hungarian Empire.

[9] Ferdynand Zweig, *Poland Between the Wars* (London, 1944), p. 130. Zweig's analysis of the national discussion of reform in the early 1920s is interesting, partly because so many of the arguments employed by those who opposed breaking up the large estates are those which are today used to justify the modern *kolkhoz*! This is true particularly of the argument that "self-sufficient small holdings are supposed to be unsuitable for compulsory deliveries in wartime." (p. 134).

Satellite industrial program. The oustanding case in point is, of course, Hungary, whose extremely poor harvest of 1952 provided the impetus which paved the way for the crisis of 1953.[19] 423 668

2. The reliance upon slow economic strangulation rather than direct administrative force in collectivization inevitably meant greater reliance on the voluntary will of the peasantry than was necessary in the Soviet collectivization drive. Therefore, the regimes had to take some account of the individual tastes of the peasantry. The variety of intermediate types of collective, the special privileges granted kolkhoz members, reflect the Communist desire to soften the impact of collectivization.[20] The strenuous efforts made to demonstrate to the peasant the economic superiority of collectivism were also part of this effort.

This policy made collectivization possible but at the same time detracted from the very usefulness originally intended for the collectivized farms; that is, the effort to render the collectives attractive to the independent peasant (limited as they were) did not facilitate exploitation of the peasants which was their major economic justification. As was evident from the analysis presented in Chapted IV, the degree of exploitation of the "Socialist sector" was not much greater than the exploitation of the private sector. The difference was, in any case, smaller than that achieved in the Soviet Union, where a prolonged period of persuasion and intra-peasantry discrimination had been unnecessary.

4. *The East European Peasant*

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Peasant resistance is a social force extremely difficult to measure either quantitatively or qualitatively. It expresses itself in many forms and guises, both in open revolt and passive resistance. This is partly because peasant sentiment rarely expresses itself in organizational form but more commonly in individual economic acts. In modern history, governments have found it difficult to elicit fanatical loyalty from the peasant; at best he is obedient. For the same reasons, the peasant has rarely been drawn into the organized revolutionary movements of the time. He has succumbed to few

[19] There was, of course, other factors involved in the Hungarian agricultural crisis of 1953 (see above pp. 109-10).

[20] Mention should be made here of Communist efforts throughout the sphere to flatter the peasant by a superficial glorification of his traditional dance, costumes, handiwork, and other expressions of the peasant culture which once graced the covers of pre-World War II East European tourist guides.

565 of the sophisticated slogans of modern politics and tends to judge
829 governments in terms of provincial and pragmatic considerations
668 which cannot be encompassed in the romantic slogans of either the State or the Revolution. For a fleeting moment in 1917, the peasants of Russia involved themselves in the maelstrom of a proletarian revolution. Between the wars they gave occasional support to genuinely peasant parties, but invariably their interest lagged or the parties betrayed them. Otherwise, the peasants have in general been passive rather than active participants in 20th Century political history.

The vast uprising of the Russian peasants in 1917-18 was probably their greatest show of strength in the 20th century, and certainly absorbed more peasant energies and resentments than either the 1907 Romanian rebellion or the Bulgarian peasant victories of the early 1920s. But their victory was short-lived, and was achieved at a tremendous price. The cataclysmic forces of the Russian Revolution so shattered the old structure of both countryside and city that the gains the peasant made remained at the mercy of terrible forces. The destruction of traditional institutions which occurred in 1917-21 in defense of the Revolution prepared the land for the collectivization onslaught 10 years later.

The peasants of Eastern Europe have not participated in such a revolution, and their institutions knew no such cataclysmic overturn. Furthermore, East European peasants have had a longer tradition of private property and as a result were less capable of revolutionary opposition to their oppressors but more capable of that type of passive resistance which in the long run is most effective. Russian peasants might destroy the livestock in defiance of the Bolshevik cadres but East European peasants could more easily sabotage the plan by day-to-day non-cooperation. The revolutionary traditions of the Russian peasantry made possible greater heroism, but no greater improvement of their economic situation. The less militant traditions of the East European peasantry (in part the consequence of more humane governments) guaranteed that there would be no repetition of the victories of 1917-18, nor any exact repetition of the terrible defeats of 1929-32.

There are many national factors affecting the total picture: the proximity of peasant victory in Hungary of 1945-46; the power of the Catholic Church in rural Poland; the relative prosperity of the Czech farmers; the communal traditions of the Bulgarian and

Yugoslav peasants; the special position which Romania occupies in the Soviet empire. These differences are important, and explain many of the variations within the framework of agricultural policy. But these variations fall into that historical experience which distinguishes East European peasantry from its Russian counterpart. These historical differences are of the utmost importance in explaining the failure of the East European Communists to emulate successfully the Soviet example. 565 829 668

5. *The Communist Role in Eastern Europe*

The Communist Parties of Eastern Europe consider themselves progressive forces of the area. In agriculture, they assert that by lifting the backward peasantry out of its traditional lethargy and provincialism, they are performing a service for the peasants and the entire society. The opposition of the peasantry to Communist plans for the rationalization of the land stems from stubborn allegiance to outmoded customs and habits. Vulko Chervenkov, the Bulgarian Premier, gave the classical formulations on this point: 829 668

> The Bulgarian peasant has two souls. One is the love of work and the other is the sense of private ownership. His spirit of private ownership brings him close to the capitalist. His spirit of work brings him close to the working class. Therefore the peasant is hesitant. We Communists, through our tactics and by the collective method, should kill their spirit of private ownership and build our socialist world.[19]

It is precisely this conception of the Communist role in Eastern Europe which the material gathered together here calls into question.

No doubt it is partly true that peasant resistance to collectivization is based on their passionate attachment to the land they till and own. But as has been pointed out, the major issue in the struggle between the Communists and the peasants was the question of the *distribution* of the fruits of the land, rather than the more abstract question of conflicting ideologies. 423 829

The peasants fight not only to protect their ancient traditions but even more to protect their economic rights, and they frequently employ the ancient traditions in defense of their own economic interests. The Communists, for their part, struggle against these traditions not merely out of doctrinaire antagonism but because these customs stand in the way of further exploitation of the

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[21] *Rabotnicheско Delo* (Sofia) September 9, 1953.

6: Shuster S-4 (no date) 1954 El Europe El

795 Greek Orthodox Church, which though united in its Uniate form with Rome, preserved its old language and customs. This Church became the target of special Russian propagandistic and repressive efforts as soon as the Iron Curtain was established.

●565 Elsewhere outside the former realm of the Habsburgs the
795 situation was comparable. In Poland a Catholic peasantry
369 whose loyalty was deeply moving lived confidently though primitively in the light of a mystical faith, while worldliness and skepticism were prevalent among the upper classes. It was commonly said there, after World War I, that the most religious of peoples was governed by the most morally lax of bureaucrats; and that may well have been the case. Nor could the coming of industrialism to such mushroom cities as Lodz, so bitterly lamented by Ladislas Reymont, bring about the immediate solution of any grave social problem. Nevertheless, as we shall see, there existed in Poland religious elites of extraordinary quality and dedication. In eastern Germany, overwhelmingly Protestant despite certain vigorous centers of Catholic activity such as the Ermland in East Prussia and the border districts west of Poznan (Silesia was a province apart, its culture having been developed under the Habsburgs), one could go from the old conservative, rural Church communities of the landed estates along the Baltic Sea to the liberal atmosphere of Saxony, where the social problems inherent in modern industrial society dominated thought and action. Concerning the Balkans one need say here only that, though they suffered from the normal diseases of feudalism, they offered much of vital and absorbing interest to the student of religious life.

175 These observations will help to explain the situation which
186 followed the First World War. The old Austro-Hungarian Empire was dissolved, and dissident nationalist sentiment, supported by the will of the victorious Allies, demanded the crea-

7:Gluckstein S-4 (no date)1952 El Europe El

465 income groups. This gives an insight into the difference
651 between maximum and minimum incomes, but does not reveal the number of people falling within each group. Incomes of persons or enterprises up to 72,000 zlotys are tax-free (there are many who earn even less than 36,000 zlotys). The rate of tax goes on :

72,000—	80,000 zlotys—	2	per cent income tax	
100,000—	110,000	„ — 3·5	„	„
150,000—	170,000	„ — 7	„	„
190,000—	210,000	„ — 9	„	„
250,000—	300,000	„ —13	„	„
500,000—	600,000	„ —23	„	„
1,000,000—	1,200,000	„ —33	„	„
1,400,000—	1,600,000	„ —37	„	„
2,400,000—	3,000,000	„ —43	„	„
3,600,000—	4,200,000	„ —47	„	„
over 4,200,000		„ —50	„	„

(H. W. Robinson, Chief, Division of Operational Analysis, U.N.R.R.A. European Regional Office, London, *Finance in Poland*, p. 21).

To paraphrase Orwell: all men are equal, but some men are more equal than others!*

465 In Czechoslovakia, as has already been mentioned, it was
511 not uncommon (in 1948) to find factory managers earning 40
● 565 thousand crowns a month, while two-thirds of the workers in 1948 got less than 2,900 crowns a month gross (i.e. before payment of taxes, dues, etc.). In addition, those earning 40,000 crowns were given the free use of a villa, a car with a chauffeur and other perquisites.

Beneš's bourgeois liberal paper, *Svobodné Slovo*, stated, not unjustifiably, that the bureaucracy were 'living in the style of millionaires . . . enjoy every comfort and luxury, thanks to the villas and limousines which they have been allocated by the authorities and to their high incomes'. These people, the paper continued, are 'propertyless—in form only . . . ' (6th September, 1947). The standard of living of the masses, on the other hand, is very low, as even the official statisticians have to admit. As early as June, 1946, the monthly average wage of an industrial worker was 2,540 while the *food ration alone* of a family of three cost 2,721 crowns. And many earned less than the average of 2,540 crowns! Since June, 1946, the condition of the masses has deteriorated. The correspondent of *Associated Press* in Prague, did not exaggerate when he said on 15 July,

*In Russia the scale of income-tax starts with taxes on less than 1,800 roubles a year and ends with taxes on more than 300,000 roubles. (*Izvestia*, 6th April, 1940).

7:Gluckstein S-4 (no date)1952 El Europe El

1948: 'Czechoslovakia today can fairly claim to be the hungriest country in Europe—hungrier than even Austria'. The Viennese Socialist paper *Arbeiter Zeitung* wrote on 23rd June, 1948: 'Travellers who often come from Prague to Vienna report that in the last few weeks, for the first time, they have not taken goods from Prague to Vienna, but on their return from Vienna to Prague'. The paper adds particulars of prices on the black market in Prague. It is possible to cite innumerable facts to the same effect. 465 511 565

There can be no doubt about who suffered from the shortages, which were the result partly, but only partly, of the drought of the winter of 1947-8. The drought fails to explain either the acute shortage of textiles, shoes (in the country of Bata!) and other consumer goods, or the duration of the shortages.

It is clear from official data that the portion of the social product going to the workers is decreasing. In January, 1946, the total product of Czechoslovakian industry was sold for 9.09 milliard crowns; wages and salaries in industry itself came to 2.83 milliard crowns, i.e. 31.6 per cent of the turnover. A year later, in January, 1947, the total sales amounted to 15.66 milliard crowns; wages and salaries came to 4.03 milliard or 25.7 per cent of the turnover. This decline in the portion of wages and salaries was accompanied by an increase in the turnover per hour of work from 50 crowns to 78 crowns, a rise of 56 per cent (*Statistical Bulletin of Czechoslovakia*, published by the State Statistical Office, Prague, July, 1947). If the statistics had included only wages and not salaries as well, the decline would have been even bigger. 465 511 434 565

The journal *Účetnictví a Kontrola*, issued by the trade union publishing house, Práce, submitted the state budget to a detailed analysis in order to get an approximate estimate of the cost of the bureaucracy. This reveals that the travelling expenses of the administration proper—that is, the ministries, not including the administration of the nationalised industries—amounted to not less than 780 million crowns, the maintenance of automobiles to 180 million. How large these amounts are is clear from the fact that the expenditure on travelling of these bureaucrats would cover the difference between the meagre wages of about 300,000 families and a minimum living

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465 standard. In summing up, the article states: 'The public
511 administration swallows 48 per cent of the national income.
434 How will it be possible to raise the standard of living of the
656 whole people, how will the wide layers of the toilers be satisfied, how will it be possible to pay proper salaries to government clerks?' (From an article, 'Let us think about the Figures', quoted by V. Salus in the theoretical paper of the Czech Social Democracy, *Cil*, August 15th, 1947, under the interesting heading, 'Economic Democracy and the New Nobility').*

511 The division of the national income in Yugoslavia is not less
565 unequal than in the other 'People's Democracies.' Vernon
434 Bartlett, when in Belgrade, described the situation in the

*For a time the Communist Party leaders tried to cushion the conflict between the workers and the 'new nobility' by directing the hostility of the masses exclusively against the bourgeoisie. For example in October, 1947, in connection with the relief to the peasants who were suffering from the drought, the Communist Party raised the slogan 'Let the millionaires pay', and proposed as a solution the imposition of a property levy. Of course the bureaucracy, being 'propertyless—in form' would not have to pay anything. The Communist Party tried to overlook the fact that the portion of the national income of Czechoslovakia in the hands of the bourgeoisie was so small, only a quarter of industry being left in their hands, that the only possibility of seriously improving the conditions of the masses was by 1. cutting into the income of the bureaucracy; 2. raising the general national income; 3. preventing Russia from taking her cut from the national income.

The Communist Party claimed that there were 35,000 millionaires in Czechoslovakia. This is a large number, but it is much less impressive when it is realised that they were not pound sterling or dollar millionaires, but crown millionaires. A million crowns in July, 1947, was equal to five thousand pounds sterling. Even according to the Communist Party estimate the wealth of these 35,000 'millionaires' was only 50 milliard (According to the bourgeois paper *Svobodné Slovo* there were only 12,000 millionaires with a property of 22 milliard crowns). 50 milliard crowns is only about a quarter of the *annual national income* of Czechoslovakia.

The conditions of the masses could not therefore be substantially improved at the expense of the bourgeoisie, but only by improvements in the nationalised sectors of the economy and at the expense of the bureaucracy. This is proved by the distribution of the national income:

Personal Income at Factor Cost (thousand million of crowns.)	1947
1. Entrepreneural profits in industry, trade and professions and private income from capital	22.0
2. Rentals and sub-rentals (including net rental value of owner-occupied dewllings	5.2
3. Independent agriculturists	25.4
4. Wages and salaries	125.9
5. Pensions of Government employees	5.7
6. Unfreezing of blocked accounts to people of limited means	6.3

In addition there were a number of other small items.

(Statistical Office of the United Nations, *National Income Statistics of Various Countries, 1938-1948*, Lake Success, New York, 1950, p. 59).

The figures speak for themselves. The possibility of increasing item 4 at the expense of item 1 is very limited indeed.

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following terms: 'Here, as in Moscow during the war, I am shocked that leaders who boast so much of the dictatorship of the proletariat should enjoy privileges that are relatively far greater than those enjoyed by any privileged class in Britain or in most of the other countries condemned by Moscow as Fascist and imperialist'. (*News Chronicle*, 26th April, 1949). 511 565 434

The situation was described sixteen months later by the correspondent of the *Neue Zürcher Zeitung* in the following terms: 'The social revolution in the eastern countries, which pretended to have the abolition of exploitation and inequality as its aim, leads in actuality to the erection of a *hierarchically ranked social order* with a whole number of privileged layers. This can be observed daily in Yugoslavia in the same way as in the Cominform countries and one will always be astonished at the way in which the bearers of the system take the privileges they enjoy for granted. The proletarians who stand in the queues near the bus stops look with greedy eyes at the lit-up American cars of the state leaders, resplendent in chrome and coloured varnish, which pass swiftly by them. The higher-ups of the State and Party travel in the latest model cabriolets, the great ones of second rank travel in limousines. Skoda and Opeldienst cars are at the disposal of high officers and officials.

'In the entrance to the People's Front Street in Marshal Tito Boulevard stands a big warehouse. Men in khaki or white uniforms with gold epaulettes go in and out. The *warehouse* is reserved *for officers* and their families. There they can buy clothes, shoes, furniture, carpets and other goods of better quality and cheaper price than the common mortal can buy. The officers get their food rations there too—far larger rations than those of workers and clerks. So large are these rations, that in the spring, at the time of the great food scarcity, peasants came to town in order to buy from the officers their surplus fat and flour at black market prices.

'It is obvious that the police and high officials also have their own store. The *warehouse of the political police* is even better supplied than that of the officers. Naturally these categories of the population also have their special rations. It is the same here as in the other Eastern countries: one who has a higher post and a higher salary also gets larger food rations and is less directed to the expensive free market than the poorly-salaried

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small man. Reductions in prices for the higher-paid instead of for those with smaller means . . . ' (*Neue Zürcher Zeitung*, 30th August, 1950)*

One aspect of the problem of the mode of distribution of the social product is this: to what extent is the differentiation between different income groups concomitant with national differences? How much of the cream of the milk produced in the satellites is in the form of higher personal incomes for Soviet officials? These facts are unfortunately covered by a veil of secrecy. Some facts, however, have emerged. A letter of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of Yugoslavia to the Central Committee of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union (dated 13th April, 1948) stated: 'The wages of the Soviet experts (working as advisers in Yugoslavia—Y.G.) were four times as high as the wages of the commanders of our armies and three times as high as the wages of our Federal Ministers. The commander of one of our armies, a lieutenant-general or a colonel-general, then had 9,000 to 11,000 dinars a month, and a Soviet military expert, lieutenant-colonel, colonel and general had from 30,000 to 40,000 dinars. At the same time our Federal Ministers had a salary of 12,000 dinars a month.' The reply of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union (dated 4th May, 1948) did not deny the correctness of these figures, but claimed as an extenuating circumstance the fact that the Yugoslav generals also got 'apartments, servants, food, etc.'

The paper *Glas*, the organ of the People's Front of Serbia, in its issue of 16th December, 1949, gave another example of the same thing. Near Sofia an automobile factory employing Russian, Czech and Bulgarian specialists was being built. The salary of the Russian specialists was 2,000 levas an hour, of the Czechs 2,000-3,000 levas a day, and of the Bulgarian 250-300 levas a day. These differences were certainly not due mainly to differences in skill.

*Since then a big change has taken place. On 14th October, 1950, Marshal Tito signed a decree abolishing special privileges in the supply and distribution of rations and consumer goods, doing away with the special shops of the upper bureaucracy, and transferring all villas and rest homes hitherto reserved for the privileged to the tourist industry. Whether this is a temporary measure resulting from the terrible drought and famine of the 1950-51 winter, it is too early to say.

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CHAPTER V

LIQUIDATION OF THE PEASANT PARTIES

665 A VERY SEVERE and prolonged struggle took place between the Communist Parties and the Peasant Parties. The latter were neither as black as the Communist leaders painted them, nor as white as the majority of the western capitalist press tried to represent them. The peasant parties were of very diverse character and each of them was far from being homogeneous. Progressive and reactionary, democratic and totalitarian elements were mingled in the same parties. To follow the Communist Party policy towards them it is necessary first to understand the complex character of the peasant parties.

665 Since the economic, cultural and political leadership of a
● 565 country rests with the towns, and since the peasants of Eastern
471 Europe were dispersed in small, isolated villages, the leadership of the peasant parties mainly came from the towns. The urban population was divided into conflicting social and political groups, and so the question always arose of which class the peasantry would make its ally—the urban bourgeoisie or the workers' parties. The peasantry is divided amongst itself, the rich peasants naturally looking to one camp, and the poor, semi-proletarian majority, to the other. A whole series of socio-political problems is bound up with this. So long as the big estates were not divided up, the peasantry as a whole remained united in the fight for land reform. and their party had a more or less revolutionary character. But with the carrying out of large-scale land reforms after World War I in Rumania, Yugoslavia and Bulgaria (see pages 13-8), there was very little to hold the peasantry together and no common political platform. Another factor must be taken into account. For centuries, the peasants in many countries, as for instance in France at the time of the Great Revolution, wanted to get rid of

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their feudal overlords, take possession of their lands and thus gain the freedom to produce for themselves and sell their products in the towns. Such a programme would have been quite inadequate for the East European countries in the period between the two wars, because of the catastrophic fall in agricultural prices as a result of the world crisis and of the great agricultural over-population. The solution of the problems of the peasantry today is not in land distribution alone, but also in industrialisation which will absorb the surplus agricultural population and open up wide markets for agricultural products. There is a contradiction, at least temporarily, between these two factors and different layers of the peasantry have different attitudes towards industrialisation as well as towards the policy of keeping agricultural prices high (by tariffs).

The poor peasants who need to work at least partly for wages and do not produce enough food even for their own needs, have an interest in industrialisation and low prices for agricultural goods, while the rich peasants who want cheap labour do not care about industrialisation and support any policy which results in a rise in the cost of food. Large scale industrialisation is impossible under present conditions in Eastern Europe without State planning, so that the poor peasant naturally tends to support the socialist forces of the towns while the rich peasant looks in quite a different direction for leadership. After the land reform and in face of widespread unemployment, open and hidden, the rich peasants could not propose any positive programme to rally the mass of the peasantry to their side. Another factor contributed to the bankruptcy of the Peasant Parties of Eastern Europe. While on the whole they favoured democracy, the market for the agricultural products of Eastern Europe in the thirties was mainly fascist Germany. Hence the attitude of many of the leaders of the peasant parties to the pro-German policy of their governments was ambiguous, to say the least. To add to the contradictions in which many of the peasant parties found themselves, was the national question which the conservatism and narrow outlook of the peasantry, especially of its rich and well-satisfied section, precluded them from tackling. In Yugoslavia, Rumania and Czechoslovakia this factor was of the utmost importance in leading the official peasant parties into a blind

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665 alley. If any of the peasant parties succeeded at all in escaping
565 control by the wealthy townsmen or by the rich peasants,
471 capitulation to their semi-fascist government, entanglement in a hopeless and reactionary fight against other nations, as the peasant parties of Poland and Bulgaria did to a large extent, and the terrorism of the government rendered them powerless. Unlike the workers' parties, the peasant parties were loose organisations of widely scattered individuals with the control of the organisation concentrated in a few hands (in the towns) and so they were an easy target for the police.

665 Some facts about the peasant parties in East Europe before the end of World War II will illustrate these generalisations.

The Rumanian National Peasant Party came into being in 1926 by the fusion of the chauvinist, anti-Hungarian National Party of Transylvania led by Maniu, and the Peasant Party of the Old Kingdom of Rumania led by Ion Mihalache. The Party was led entirely by lawyers, journalists, etc.,and a small group of rich peasants. For years it was sharply opposed to the dictatorial King, and there were frequent and bloody clashes with the fascist organisations and the police. But a party under the leadership of rich peasants and their urban allies in a country where eighty per cent of the population was poverty-stricken could never consistently pursue a democratic policy. During his short periods of office between the two world wars, Maniu ruthlessly suppressed the strikes of the miners and railway workers in 1929 and 1933. Although he had been for years one of the leaders of the democratic opposition to King Carol and his agents, yet at a time when there were armed conflicts between the peasant members of his own party and the Iron Guard fascists, Maniu suddenly in 1937 declared an election pact with the Iron Guard, simply as a tactical manoeuvre against his old opponent Tătărescu and after the assassination of the Iron Guard leader, Codreanu, by the King, Maniu offered a refuge in his party to the Iron Guardists. The Peasant Party behaved with extreme brutality towards the Hungarian minority in Transylvania. During the 1930's when democracy in Rumania was reduced to a sham and when the dictatorship became increasingly open and brutal and millions were looking to Maniu for a call to rebel, he went no further than to writing some articles of protest in the press.

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total number of foreign workers in Germany, including prisoners of war and foreign civilian workers officially recognized as foreigners, but excluding workers from Alsace-Lorraine and Sudetenland, exceeded six million in 1943. In 1944 the high mark of eight million was reached (of whom nearly 2 million were p.o.w.'s—Y.G.)' (p. 264). He adds: 'Altogether, it can be estimated that the displacement of 30 million or more people during Hitler's rule over Europe has resulted in the permanent shifting of 2–3 million. The final redistribution of Europe's population was due to Germany's defeat, which opened the way for a new and in this case permanent migration of another twenty-five million*, probably the greatest in European history' (p. 305).

Considerations of space make it necessary to choose between alternative methods of describing the character of the expulsions, either by relating more or less in detail the fate of the Germans in one of the East European countries, or briefly surveying the fate of the Germans in them all. The former method is preferable, and the treatment of the Germans in Czechoslovakia will be taken as the example.

The Sudeten Germans

The Sudeten Germans were not new inhabitants of Sudetenland. They came there about 700 years ago, when Spain was still in the hands of the Arabs, and some centuries before America was discovered. They were as numerous as the populations of some of Europe's small states. The 1930 census put their number at 3.2 million, as compared with Norway's 2.8 million, Finland's 3.6 million, Denmark's 3.7 million and Switzerland's 4.1 million.

The social structure of the Sudeten German community was not very different from that of the Czechs or Slovaks except that the percentage of workers was higher (a little higher than among the Czechs, and much higher than among the Slovaks). According to the 1930 census, the national communities comprised different social groups in the following proportions:—

*In this is included some millions of non-Germans: Poles who had migrated from the area annexed by Russia (about 4 million) to the Western territories taken from Germany, Czechs and Slovaks who migrated to Sudetenland, displaced persons who returned to their countries, Jewish refugees who migrated to Palestine and other countries, etc.

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565

	Germans (%)	Czechs and Slovaks (%)
Independent	21.89	25.81
Tenants	0.40	0.28
Officials and clerks ..	16.60	18.24
Workers	61.11	55.67

467 In 1930 there were 476 thousand Sudeten Germans organised in trade unions. The Executive Committee of the Sudeten German Social Democratic Party stated: 'In their worst plight, on the eve of the Munich decision, our Trade Unions could still compare their strength with those of Switzerland, a country with four million inhabitants and with a functioning democracy.' (Introduction to W. Jaksch, *Sudeten Labour and the Sudeten Problem*, London, 1945).

665 The Sudeten Germans had a long socialist tradition, for Sudetenland was one of the first and strongest socialist centres in the Austro-Hungarian empire. It produced a number of the most prominent leaders of the Socialist International, among them Karl Kautsky, Viktor Adler, Otto Bauer and Karl Renner. As early as 1907, in the general elections, the Social Democratic Party polled 39.4 per cent of the votes in German Bohemia. In the general elections of 1911, it polled more than 40 per cent. In the elections of 1920 it polled 44 per cent of the Sudeten votes. Together with the Communist Party,* for more than a decade it had about half the votes in Sudetenland, which is a much higher proportion than the Social Democrats and Communists could claim among the Czechs, let alone among the Slovaks.

563 464 The world economic crisis which began in 1929 changed the situation. The industry of Sudetenland, depending as it did mainly on exports, was affected much more severely by the crisis than industry in the rest of the country. The bourgeois government of Czechoslovakia discriminated against German workers when giving employment, and this aggravated an already grave situation. The result was that 'unemployment in the Sudeten districts was at least twice as high as in the Czech interior.' (Jaksch, ibid. p. 17).

464 668 The great suffering caused by unemployment in Sudetenland and the existence of full employment just over the border

*An exact calculation of the strength of the Communist Party among the Sudetens is impossible, as the Party was not divided into different national groups.

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665 Czechs and the Slovaks, but also neighboring peoples, par-
829 ticularly the Yugoslavs. A large proportion of the Croatian, Serbian, and Slovene politicians from the Yugoslav provinces that had formerly formed a part of Austria-Hungary were educated before the First World War in the school of Masaryk's liberal thought. Among these men was Stjepan Radić, who later was to become leader of the Croatian Peasant Party.

829 Liberalism in Eastern Europe, and this is true for other
●565 countries as well, cannot be identified only with the so-called middle classes or with supporters of the free enterprise system. The middle classes, with the exception of those in Czechoslovakia and Austria, were not numerically or economically strong or influential. The capitalistic economic order was strongly defended, not only by the liberals, but by pronounced conservatives among whom were those who began to support authoritarian regimes in the 'thirties. The peasants, insofar as they did not adhere politically to parties of the conservative right, were usually very devoted and often even radical supporters of democracy. Similarly, a great number of socialistically oriented workers and intelligentsia, in supporting political democracy, were influenced by ideas of liberalism. Many liberals, usually those belonging to the intelligentsia, were sympathetic to socialistic tendencies. This socialistically-minded liberalism, which had its counterpart in France among the Radical Socialists or the so-called "Independent" Socialists, and in Britain among the British Fabians, was best represented in Czechoslovakia by T. G. Masaryk and his disciple, Eduard Beneš. Both men, although they rejected Marxism, accepted many ideas of the socialistic school of thought. This liberal socialistic orientation was the basis of the Czechoslovakian party of National Socialists whose adherents were chiefly recruited from the small bourgeoisie, the intelligentsia, and the workers. The National Socialists endeavored to combine liberal-

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ism with socialism, in the belief that political democracy should be accompanied by "economic democracy." 829 565

The importance and influence of liberalism in this region did not, therefore, rest with any particular political parties or social groupings which gave themselves the liberal label or which explicitly professed liberal principles. The influence of liberalism lay in the force of the liberal ideology which exercised influence on the whole national community.

It is often held today, due to the conception of liberalism held in Anglo-Saxon countries and, to some extent, in other countries of Western Europe, that the influence of liberalism in the Eastern European countries was not of great importance. This is accounted for by a theory that the so-called middle classes were weak and that the popular masses, predominantly peasant, had a low social and cultural standing. Czechoslovakia is cited as an example to support this analysis. It is said that Czechoslovakia was able to maintain her democracy because she had an influential and prosperous middle class and because the cultural level of her population was approximately the same as the cultural level of the West. There is no doubt that a weak middle class and a low social standard among the popular masses were serious handicaps to the development of liberal democracy in the agricultural countries of this region. Liberal democracy required, from the social and economic points of view, not uniformity and equalization, but a diversified and well-balanced social structure and an economy with a fair degree of balance between industry and agriculture. Above all, liberal democracy required the "liberal spirit," a combination of a desire for freedom, a devotion to political and social rights, and an eagerness for justice. The existence of liberal democracy, therefore, cannot be defined in terms of social and economic requirements alone. 829 565 511

In support of this premise, several examples can be cited. Before the First World War, in the small Serbia of King 829 511

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cate the workers to respect the rule of socialist communal 692
life." The Polish and Rumanian constitutions of 1952 pro- 641
vide that "The courts defend the system of People's Democracy and the gains of the working people, and ensure the people's law, social property and citizens' rights."

In practice it is always the duty of the judge and the 692
prosecutor to take the side of the Communist State—that 661
is, of the Communist Party. It is always the duty of the defense to help the state prosecute the accused and to help him to accuse himself. The defendant's duty is to prove his guilt. The courts are a tool of the Communist regimes and are not independent institutions for the administration of justice. Communism introduces not only the judicial murder of innocent people but a debasement of man unparalleled in the history of mankind. The innocent defendant is forced to accuse himself of crimes which he has never committed, to accuse other innocent people, to trample upon his own dignity, to humiliate himself in the eyes of his friends and family, to spit upon the ideals in which he has believed, and to praise the loathsome practices of his enemy and prosecutor as he awaits death by the hands of his oppressor or by slow agony in a prison or forced labor camp.

V

Although it proclaims the liberation of the masses, the 641
communist system has created unprecedented privilege for 565
the ruling Communist elite. Everyone who has seen the living conditions of the highest Communist dignitaries in Russia as well as in the captive countries knows that these men enjoy a very high standard of living. They have privileges in all spheres of life—political, economic, social, and cultural. The life of the Communist elite is, however, not to be envied. Generally, the members of this group are hated. They are constantly threatened, even by the members of

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641 their own party. They live a life of fear in a golden cage,
565 from which they cannot withdraw, even if they wish to do so.

In a democratic state a president elected to office lives like any free and private citizen. Under the Communist system this is unthinkable. The system of privileges finds support even in Communist theory. "It is time it was understood that Marxism is an enemy of equalization," Stalin stated in his report to the Seventeenth Communist Congress in January of 1934. "By equality Marxism means, not equalization of individual requirements and individual life, but abolition of classes. . . ." In the same connection he quoted Lenin's statement that "the claim that we want to make all men equal to one another is an empty phrase and a stupid invention of intellectuals."[4]

641 Freedom of religion and of faith under the Communist system does not exist, either in theory or in practice. The first articles of Communist constitutions always proclaim many civil liberties. But, when we analyze more closely the following passages of these articles, we see that as a rule they contradict and abolish the provisions contained in the first lines. Let us take for example, Article 70 of the constitution of the Polish People's Republic, which appears to guarantee the citizens freedom of conscience and of faith. It also says, however, that abuse of freedom of faith for purposes detrimental to the interest of the Polish People's Republic is punishable. In practice, of course, this means that every pronouncement against the atheistic and materialistic principles of the Communist system is detrimental to the People's Republic and is therefore punishable.

641 But that is not all. The Communists who proclaim the
793 division between the church and the state do not intend to leave any freedom to the church. They demand the clergy's help in the building of socialism and consider any refusal to be detrimental to the interests of the People's State. In

[4] Joseph Stalin, *Problems of Leninism*, pp. 521-522.

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practice, church organizations and the clergy are meant to have no function but that of a helpful tool in the communization of the nation. 641 793

The function of education is the same. The Communists do not even pretend to support freedom of knowledge and bluntly state in their legislation that the duty of higher schools is to educate the younger generation in the spirit of socialist dialectics and materialistic doctrines. Theoretically, the Communist system assures the youth of education. In practice, an individual's right to education is not determined by intellectual ability and progress but by membership in the Young Communist League (Komsomol), by informing on "unorthodox" professors, and by success in examinations on Communist politics and doctrines. 641 871

The articles of the Communist constitutions that deal with the rights of the citizens stress above all the rights to work, rest, and medical treatment. The Communist attitude toward the individual is like that of the horse-owner when he thinks that the main duty of his animal is to work and believes that it must be assured of rest and medical treatment only to insure the fulfillment of this duty. Actually, most farmers in the free countries treat their animals better than the Communists treat the people. Out of hatred, the Communists destroy whole social groups and even perpetrate the genocide of whole nations. 641

The Communists claimed that when they had freed the working man from capitalist exploitation they would not allow the exploitation of one man by another. Is this claim realized in practice? Again, the answer is no. The Communist state created the worst kind of exploitation by giving the rule of the people to the Communist elite and by providing this elite with the formidable weapons of both police and army. In a democratic state, even where large industries and sources of raw materials are nationalized, the interests of the people are guarded by trade unions, politi- 661 565

661 cal parties, legislation, courts, and the police who protect
565 the security of the citizens. The state authority is the mediator in the last resort in disagreements between labor and business.

661 The Moloch, which is the Communist state, has on its side the party, the police, and the courts. Special laws con-
466 stantly increase the penalties for the plunder and destruc-
641 tion of the nationalized public property. Because the state is a "people's state" and "does not do injustice to the people," the trade unions act as a tool of the state in raising the productivity and quality of production and fixing the norms of work. The Stakhanovite work system, based on high norms of production and granting starvation-level wages with no means of protection against these, destroys the strength and health of the worker. Strikes are punishable because they are crimes against the interests of the state, and special laws provide discipline of work, penalties for failure to fulfill norms, and forced labor camps for "idlers" and "loafers."

661 Communism deprives the peasant of his beloved land,
641 turns him into a Communist serf, and chains him to the
423 state or collective farm in which the Communist bureaucracy demands of him ever-increasing physical efforts to produce for the insatiable state. After the liquidation of the remnants of private initiative in small business and crafts, the *kulak* peasant, the biggest "capitalist blood-sucker," is dealt with. He is destroyed by tax levies and forced deliveries of agricultural products and is finally evicted from his own farm.

642 Thus, behind the façade of People's Democracy, Communism practices dictatorship in every sphere of life—personal, political, economic, religious, and social. The Communist system creates privileges for the party and makes the citizen economically dependent upon the state. It debases human dignity, wrests faith out of human hearts, kills

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474 government-dictated constitution. Cooperative members, in-
423 stead of being the masters of their cooperatives, are their servants. They have to perform tasks which have been fixed without their knowledge or consent. In higher type Communist cooperatives, the members assume the status of landless laborers.

If the complete dependency of the cooperatives on the State Tractor and Machine Stations and on the Communist Party is taken into consideration, it is clear that production cooperatives are no more than state enterprises under the disguise of cooperatives. There is only one difference between a state farm and a production cooperative: the members of a cooperative have to bear all production risks. It is true that *de jure* they remain owners of their land, but *de facto* they cease to be owners as they cannot be sure of getting their fields back when they leave the cooperative. According to the constitution of these cooperatives, a member must accept other fields, if return of his own fields would disrupt the cooperative.

474 The Communists declare they prefer that peasants join
661 cooperatives voluntarily. However, they are not above per-
● 565 suading private farmers to join by such methods as higher taxes and higher delivery quotas, less fertilizers and other production means at higher prices, and charges for all services higher than those paid by cooperative members. At the same time, they give private farmers no credit, no field hands, and no opportunity to use agricultural machines, while collectives enjoy almost unlimited credit and other facilities. Members of production cooperatives are rewarded by the government with free vacations in the best hotels at winter resorts and with free group travel to the Soviet Union; they are a privileged class in every respect.

In contrast, well-to-do peasants who used hired labor in free times are denounced as being "village rich," a term which is used in Eastern Europe to describe the equivalent of the

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Russian *kulak*. The village rich are not allowed to enter a collective or are expelled if they become members. A merciless battle is being waged to ruin them. They are being liquidated as peasants, removed from villages, and sent to mines or to industry or concentration camps. There are roughly thirteen million peasant families in Eastern Europe, more than one million of which are *kulaks*. The children of all these families must lose the individualistic traits of their peasant heritage: that is the Communist aim.

Large-scale industrialization plans, for military purposes rather than for consumer production, are being pushed forward with great vigor in all Eastern European states and new labor is required in great numbers. *Kulaks* and other class enemies are an obvious source for this labor. By tapping this source, the surplus agricultural population will be disposed of and the people with individualist outlook gradually destroyed. If there is a shortage of workers in agriculture, as for instance in Czechoslovakia now, industrial workers already persuaded to the collective way of thinking can be utilized.

The term *kulak* has come to mean anyone who is against collectivization, and all *kulaks* are to be destroyed. The process of destruction is quickly changing the status of the agrarian population in this region. The agricultural population is decreasing and, according to estimate, does not amount today to more than 45 per cent of the total population. This decrease is the political consequence of collectivization and not its economic or social result. The collectivization policy itself cannot solve the old problem of rural overpopulation but can only aggravate it. The real aim of Communist collectivization is not to solve this problem but rather to destroy the peasantry.

Agriculture, like the other divisions of economic life, has been dictated by state plans which prescribe to the peasant what crops are to be grown and what animals are to be bred.

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178 voked political and social movements, such as had never been known in the West, and which expressed the distinctive socio-economic programs and political and social philosophies of the area.

565 Before any analysis of these peasant movements can be undertaken, it will be necessary to examine their human element, the peasantry. There are three points which are of most significance to this discussion: first, what is a peasantry; second, what are the differences between a peasantry and the rural population of the West, usually known as farmers; and third, what are the special characteristics of the Eastern European peasantry which have justified and made possible its separate political organization.

565 829 Despite the fact that the peasantry still represents a considerable majority of the world's population, a uniform definition for it cannot be found. The reason for this is the different approach of various social and economic schools to the peasant problem. While the Marxists consider the peasantry from a purely economic point of view, evaluating this group only in the system of socialist production, liberals believe that there are aspects to the peasantry besides the economic which should be considered. The liberals point out the importance of the peasant's relationship to his land and the influence of his environment upon him. They realize that there are two elements, the sociological and the cultural, which are of great and equal significance in appraising the peasant society. The sociological element includes the individual's family life, the customs, traits, and trends of neighborhood and village communities, and the peasant's attachment to religious and other traditions. These traditions are upheld by a special type of "progressive conservatism." The cultural element includes all such features as folk songs, folk customs and habits, and so forth, which have developed independent of the cosmopolitan civilization.

In view of the foregoing, the peasantry may be defined

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tentatively as a group settled on a determined territory, having its principal source of livelihood in a cultivation of the soil that is based on the system of the small farm, and possessing its own way of life and its own indigenous culture.

This definition will help us answer our second question; namely, what are the differences between the peasants and the farmers. For a long time the rural sociologists of the West made no distinction between these two groups, and it is only recently that adequate attention has been given to this problem. Today it is generally recognized that between these two rural societies there exist essential dissimilarities which result from a permanent infiltration by the cosmopolitan civilization into the rural orbit. This process has been far more intense in the European and American rural groups, the farmers, than in the genuine peasant population.

With this distinction in mind, the farmers and the genuine peasantry may be contrasted. Economically speaking, the farmers produce primarily for the market, abiding by the established norms of offer and demand. Although they are attached to the land, they consider it almost impersonally and from an economic point of view. Therefore, they are willing to move from one area to another when there are economic reasons. The peasants, on the other hand, produce primarily for home consumption. Because their land is a part of their heritage, they consider it personally, as a part of their life and of their family tradition.

Socially, life in the rural communities of the West has become increasingly urbanized. The peasant society of Eastern Europe has been infiltrated by urban ideas to a far lesser degree and has preserved, generally speaking, many of its original aspects.

Culturally, the indigenous traditions of the farmer population, if not completely vanished, are disappearing rapidly. In the genuine peasant society, cultural traits are still clearly

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565 182 visible and constitute an outstanding characteristic of this group.

The third point in this discussion of the peasantry concerns the special characteristics of the Eastern European peasantry which have enabled it to maintain a separate political organization. It can be said safely that nowhere in Europe have the characteristics peculiar to peasant society been so well preserved as in this region. Although numerical supremacy has been a factor in the preservation of peasant society, more important is the fact that the peasants of Eastern Europe have manifested in recent history a tremendous self-consciousness, political maturity, and determined will to create political and social organizations of their own, which, so far, have not been emulated by the peasantry in other parts of the globe. The peasantry of Western European countries, such as Spain, Portugal, or Italy, often comprises over 50 per cent of the rural population. However, this Western peasantry has never been able to generate powerful and influential peasant political organizations, nor has it been able to play an outstanding role in national life as has the peasantry of Eastern Europe.

II

566 The greater part of the peasantry in Eastern Europe was liberated from the bondages of serfdom in the year of revolutions, 1848. In that part of Poland which was included in the Russian Empire, the abolition of serfdom was proclaimed in 1861, and in Old Rumania, in 1864. The peasants of the Balkans, subjected to a special type of land tenure relations and vassalage as practiced in the Ottoman empire, were freed gradually with the withdrawal of the Turkish political power, especially after the arrangements made at the Congress of Berlin in 1878.

000 The liberation of the peasantry was a consequence of

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The liberation of the peasantry was a consequence of the demands of the new liberal movement and was one of the achievements of the liberal regimes which gained momentum on the Continent after the Napoleonic era. This European liberalism had been a result of the struggle of the bourgeoisie against the old political and economic order upheld previously by the aristocracy. It originated in the theory of natural rights, as interpreted by French political philosophers of the eighteenth century, and included in its doctrine the postulate of political, economic, and social freedom and equality for all individuals. 668 641 565

However, it would be wrong to assume that the formal liberation of the peasantry was an immediate result of its emulation of other classes of society, in particular, of the bourgeoisie. On the contrary, the struggle for the realization of peasant rights had still to be fought.

The ruling regimes imposed political restrictions that were usually based on the tax census system and barred large masses of the peasant population from their right to vote in parliamentary elections. In many of the countries, it was not until the end of the First World War that complete franchise was granted to the peasantry. 641 565 178

Economic freedom, as advocated and practiced by liberalism, soon began to undermine the foundations of the peasant economy. The peasantry, which under feudalism had paid most of its rents and other fees to the landlord in natural produce, was placed suddenly in the midst of a complicated money-economy in which the autarkic arrangements of the peasant familistic economy were no longer valid. Peasant land, which throughout centuries had changed little in price or in value, was suddenly submitted to wide fluctuations in value as a consequence of the rapid development of the communication system and the erection of industrial plants. The appearance of a money-economy created the necessity of establishing an appropriate credit system which heretofore had been lacking completely in the peasant orbit. The state,

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641 however, following its policy of economic freedom, did not
565 deem it necessary to intervene in this problem, and left the
178 peasants open to the merciless exploitation of private banks and usurers. Economic individualism, accentuated by liberalism, induced individual members of the large peasant family groups, known among the Southern Slavs as *zadrugas*, to seek their economic independence. This process provoked a hasty and uncontrolled parcellation of the peasant land and contributed further to the economic weakness and inefficiency of the peasant system of farming.

The solemnly proclaimed social equality of the peasant was a farce. The ruling groups, derived from the bourgeoisie, the newly created bureaucracy, and the remnants of the aristocratic elements, looked upon the peasants with contempt and mistrust, considering them, although necessary to agrarian production, neither fitted nor qualified to take part in politics or public affairs. Social inequality was expressed both by the attitude of dominant ethnical groups to the "peoples of lower categories" and by the division within these groups between intelligentsia and the common people, or peasants.

Obviously, remedies were sought to correct the adverse conditions created in the liberal era, but before these are discussed, it is necessary to credit liberalism for those ideas and measures which, in principle, were universally accepted by the masses and which made possible their political organization. Generally speaking, the ideas of political freedom and of general education and a belief in the individual's capabilities were the stimulating forces behind the organization of the people. However, these ideas did not save liberalism, but prepared the road for its destruction.

829 The first reaction to the flaws in liberalism was the appearance of the "scientific socialism" of Karl Marx. It is important to note that this philosophy was conceived exclusively for the newly created industrial proletariat. The peasants, if

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considered at all, were reviewed and evaluated only from the 829
point of view of production with no attention paid to the human side of their problems. Moreover, the contempt of Marx for the peasantry is well known. He called them a "class of barbarians," and proclaimed his desire to save humanity from the "idiocy of rural life."

The reaction to scientific socialism and a simultaneous opposition to liberalism brought about the birth of Christian democracy which attempted to formulate a middle-road policy between the economic freedom of liberalism and the socialist doctrine of the total negation of the absolute truth, of private property, and of human dignity. Being primarily a reaction to the liberal-socialist dispute on capital-labor relations, this new doctrine was concerned very little, if at all, with the peasant problem which "remained the stepchild of public opinion and of the social policy."

The first attempt to use the contemporary social and eco- 668
nomic ideas for the organization of the peasant masses was 565
partly accountable for the appearance of Populism in Russia in the 1870's. More specifically, Populism was an endeavor to create an ideal agrarian peasant community by applying the theories of scientific socialism. This very fact converted the effort into a unique social and economic movement sharply in conflict with the orthodox Marxism. It became clear very soon to the promoters of Populism that the formulas conceived by Marx were inefficient in a rural society and that diversified methods must be sought if the needs and hopes of the peasants were to be satisfied. This new movement, although peasant, was of revolutionary character, not only demanding the land for the peasants but also advocating its collective ownership under a particular form of Russian organization known as the *mir*. It pointed out that the essence of the Populist program must be the institutions and desires inherent in the people and that it must not represent scientific formulas imported from abroad.

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829 Although Populism exerted some influence on the establishment of the Rumanian peasant movement, it had very little influence upon the other peasant movements in Eastern Europe. At the time when Populism was already an organized political force in Russia, the peasantry in Eastern Europe was still politically inactive. When the peasant mobilization began, more than two decades later, it was influenced little, if at all, by the Populist ideas.

668 565 423 The main reason for the relatively late organization of the peasantry in Eastern Europe was the presence of political and economic conditions essentially different from those prevailing in Tsarist Russia. Whereas regular political life was unknown in Russia, European liberalism favored the formation of political parties which would try to win the sympathies of the peasants by promising them the realization of their desires. Collective ownership of land was not a common institution in Eastern Europe. However, the prediction of Marx relating to the accumulation of capital and further expansion of large estates proved to be incorrect. On the contrary, many large land holdings, unable to accommodate themselves to modern capitalist management, commenced to disintegrate. The land was usually bought, in spite of heavy material sacrifices, by land-hungry neighboring peasants, and thus many new independent peasant holdings were created, which contributed considerably to the strengthening of the peasantry.

Hence, the establishment of a revolutionary peasant movement was checked by existing political conditions: the traditions of the Eastern European peasantry were opposed to collective forms of land ownership and to the socialist tenets of Populism. However, none of the existing political groups was fit to meet the increased desire of the peasantry for an organized action of their own, and, at the turn of the century, on an independent basis and in opposition to the contemporary political and social groups, peasant organization began.

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The common source of the peasant movements resided in the political, social, and economic evils of the liberal regimes, but immediate motives varied slightly in the different countries. In some countries, the emphasis on the necessity for peasant organization was a reaction to the adverse economic conditions to which the peasantry was exposed. In other countries, this move was a political and economic reaction to political and national oppression, economic exploitation, and the contempt of the ruling ethnical groups for the peasantry of subordinated nations. Finally, the Croatian peasants had special motives. Their peasant movement was organized chiefly to struggle for the social and political equality of the peasants against the dominating bourgeoisie and the bureaucracy. The latter, although it represented an insignificant minority in the nation, had monopolized Croatian political life. 668 565 423

The first to outline the philosophical principles of a peasant movement was Ante Radić in Croatia. Influenced by French Romantic philosophers, especially Michelet, Radić published, in 1896, his work, *Osnova*, in which he set forth his concept of the people (in peasant countries this meant the peasantry), and indicated their significance in the political and economic life of the nation. 668 565

The first coherent peasant organizations were those of the Bulgarians and the Czechs who both founded their first peasant political organizations in 1896. They were followed shortly by the Croatians in 1904, and by the Serbians and the Poles in 1905. The first steps for a peasant movement in Rumania were initiated in 1907, while in Hungary the appearance of a genuine peasant movement was retarded by political and socio-economic conditions until 1908. In the Baltic States, true political life started only with the independence gained after the First World War. Subsequently, powerful peasant political organizations were founded in Estonia and Latvia. In Albania the initiative for a peasant political or-

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668 ganization did not exist until the Second World War; the
565 organization itself was established after the war by exiled political leaders.

In Slovenia, Slovakia, and Lithuania, on the other hand, truly peasant political organizations have never developed fully. In these Catholic countries the peasantry was influenced from the beginning by the Catholic political thought and subsequently organized on the principles of Christian democracy.

Although the immediate motives for peasant organization in different countries were varied, its demands were everywhere identical because of its common general source—its ideological basis. The programs made the following demands for the peasants: full political rights, proportional participation in public affairs, agrarian reform and distribution of the land to the peasants, social justice, and rights for the peasants in educational facilities equal to the rights of other classes in the state.

829 To understand better the peasant movements and their
668 aims, three elements of their ideological and organizational
565 structure must be discussed: first, their ideological basis; second, the dogmatic differences between these and other contemporary political and socio-economic trends; and third, the effective points of their practical programs.

829 The peasant ideology, or peasantism, is the outlook of the
665 peasantry on the complex of political and socio-economic issues in which the peasants are interested and for whose solution they are fighting. The organizational forms of peasantism, established for the purposes of current political struggle, are the various peasant political parties. Unlike scientific socialism or Christian democracy, peasantism is not the artificial creation of an individual or group of individuals; it contains only those ideas which are inherent in the peasant soul and character. Consequently, the peasant leaders do not conceive the political soul of peasantism but merely interpret

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come. Once again, Czechoslovakia headed the list with 5.5 per cent while the Balkan countries devoted only 1.5 per cent of their national income to social services. In the same year the number of persons registered as unemployed in the various countries was as follows: Czechoslovakia, 408,000; Poland, 347,000; Hungary, 47,000; Yugoslavia, 21,600; and Rumania, 10,800.

A major consequence of industrialization and urbanization was the rapid growth both of an urban proletariat and of the bureaucracy. Those people who had been separated from their ancestral rural surroundings and traditions and often from the influence of their families became increasingly detached from spiritual matters and turned more and more towards materialistic and technical spheres. The number of bureaucrats grew rapidly and this resulted in political favoritism and in desk-level programs which very seldom touched the people of the countryside.

It cannot be said, however, that no progress was made or that standards of living were consistently low. It must be remembered that it was not until the First World War that many of these countries attained independence. A part of Poland had just emerged from Russian domination and certain areas of the Balkan states had just freed themselves from Ottoman rule. Even Hungary, Czechoslovakia, Croatia, and parts of Poland had been freed only recently from Austro-German political and economic controls. Under these circumstances, the progress made by these countries, notwithstanding failures and mistakes, was considerable indeed.

III

The states that had dominated this region before the First World War—Germany, Austria-Hungary, Russia, and the Ottoman empire—showed little interest in improving the educational standards of the large masses in Eastern Europe.

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871 Illiteracy in the prewar era was extremely prevalent except in
212 Bohemia, Slovenia, a part of Hungary, and the formerly German-ruled section of Poland. Following the various educational reforms and the expansion of facilities during the '20's, the illiteracy rates were: 31.4 per cent (1934) for Bulgaria, 4.1 per cent (1930) for Czechoslovakia, 6.0 per cent (1941) for Hungary, 23.1 per cent (1931) for Poland, 23.1 per cent (1948) for Rumania, and 45.2 per cent (1931) for Yugoslavia. In spite of the notable progress attained within a decade and a half of liberation, the problem of achieving literacy and education for the masses remained a considerable one.

658 In the interwar period, a vast number of schools were built and many universities were founded or enlarged. National statistics show that on the average 3 per cent of the estimated national incomes was devoted to education for the region as a whole. Czechoslovakia, with 3.5 per cent, had the largest budgetary provision for education, spending in 1937 the
871 equivalent of eighty-four million dollars. Universal compulsory elementary education was introduced widely in this area. However, the number and quality of teachers did not increase
● [565] as rapidly as did the buildings. Therefore, especially in the eastern and southern regions, semieducated or semiskilled individuals were numerous, and anyone who had been exposed to education considered himself an "intellectual." Under such circumstances, this term very often stood for mere prestige, and the "intellectuals" exerted influence out of proportion to their training. A poor system of communication, a dispersed settlement pattern, mediocre teachers and, last but not least, the rather uncooperative behavior of the peasants impeded the possibilities of an adequate education for the peasant class, which represented the majority of Eastern Europe's population.

000 Due to the prevalence of a liberalism linked with national-

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262 cause of the fuel shortage, makes a bitter joke of the Communist pledge to liberate the housewife from drudgery. There
•[565] are a few brighter spots in this picture. The soldiers and policemen are well fed and so are the privileged classes of senior government and party workers, and of artists and writers. The numerical strength of these new, privileged strata of society is less than that of the pre-war middle class, and their standard of living is undoubtedly lower.

262 Data have been published lately that illustrate the low
511 level of consumption of food behind the Iron Curtain. These data concern the increase of sales of certain staples in Czechoslovakia in 1952 over those in 1951, and, for once, they are disclosed not in meaningless percentages, as is the rule behind the Iron Curtain, but in absolute figures. An analysis of these figures shows the increase in sales of sugar and butter to the extent, respectively, of two ounces and less than half an ounce per capita per month. The alleged increase in sales of coffee actually lags behind the increase in the population. Only the amount of tea sold has really increased. However, the Czechoslovakians are not tea but coffee drinkers. They used to produce more sugar than they could consume before the war. Yet the text in question continues: "The above figures show that the standard of living of the Czechoslovak people is irresistibly on the upward trend." Another example is a long letter from a coal miner in Poland, whose only subject was a detailed description of how he tried in vain for weeks in the fall of 1952 to buy a piece of sausage. In his fury with the regime and "the Russkis" behind it, the humble writer rose to the rhetoric of a Patrick Henry and declared that since there was no sausage life was not worth living. "And to think that I actually used to grumble against the pre-war government!" was his final confession. It should be noted that pre-war Poland had a large surplus of pork.

656 In the summer of 1953, the Soviet government announced
511 that it would take many measures to relieve the all too ob-

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874 both of graduates and of schools are several times larger than
185 before the war and are still increasing. The educational level is much lower than it was either before the war or in the free West, but it tallies with the Communist conception of superior education which aims at mass production of technicians specialized in one limited field and not instructed in general culture. Here again, these countries have to follow Soviet precedents, and narrow specialization is the method and the aim of education.

874 The emergence before long of thousands of newly gradu-
565 ated engineers, chemists, and the like, will have a profound effect on the economic and social structure of the area. These young people will be the managerial class of the future. Their lives will be dependent on the industrial trend of the economy of the captive nations. Unlike the new teachers, lawyers, writers, and other intellectuals, who will have to be agents of the Communist political machine, the new technicians will be allowed to serve both their own and national interests without being associated day in and day out with the sinister doings of the police state. Technology, like medicine, is one of the very few fields of creative activity open to non-Communists. When this is taken into consideration, it will be seen that the young men and women who besiege institutes of technology and other technical schools behind the Iron Curtain are very largely those who wish to preserve some independence of spirit. In their own domain, they will be able to dedicate themselves to creating national material wealth without paying more than lip service to the political framework in which they exist. This kind of work, where there is much less political supervision, may possibly come to be
565 considered the closest thing to individual initiative. In contrast to the 'Commissar' group of the new middle class, the new managerial stratum of these societies is, or may become, aware of the superiority of life in the free world and thus be a potential ally of the West. There seems to be, however, a

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condition attached to such a speculation. Were the West to deny the principle of industrial transformation of these countries and to envisage their 'return to pastoral status,' the new managerial class together with the working class would range itself automatically against the West.

VI

The economic and social revolution which these countries have undergone has been imposed on them very largely from the outside. It has been successful because it was backed by the whole strength of a great military empire but also because the material and moral ravages of war and German occupation had shattered the prewar fabric of society and exposed its structural weaknesses. The society which is emerging from this revolution will be very different from the former one. Even if a true liberation of this part of Europe were to occur, the restitution of many old forms of life would not be feasible. The greatest harm that the captive nations have suffered and will suffer through the imposed revolution are the inflictions upon the souls and the minds of the people. Gradual de-Christianization, loosening of family ties, fear and distrust of political authorities and of the neighbor, Russification and falsification of national past, coarsening of manners, and the awful deposit of lies and prejudices of propaganda and non-technical schooling: all these are weapons which are levelled upon the minds and souls of the people. The undoing of these moral effects of Communist policies could only be gradual, and it would take a long time.

In the social and economic fields, the effects of Communism have not been so uniformly somber. That goods can be produced under Communism has been learned from Russian precedents. That Communism cannot assure to the people a decent standard of living is a fact that cannot be denied by any amount of propaganda, and it is also true that

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178 years before the First World War in the Austro-Hungarian
563 monarchy. At the same time, there was relatively little competition for the services of men of high talent on the part of industry, applied science, or practical politics, since all of these activities remained relatively underdeveloped.

578 The coincidence of intellectual precocity with widespread
565 social and economic backwardness led to widespread experiences of frustration. Intellectuals, not unlike the ancient philosopher Plato, dreamed of equalling one day the power and prestige of the aristocracy, for which they lacked the land holdings and family connections; and they dreamed of equalling the comforts and securities of the bourgeoisie—the upper middle class—without either owning a bourgeois amount of property or devoting a bourgeois proportion of their time and attention to money-making or to business matters. They resented the influence of the church and the clergy in the rural areas, without being either willing or able to devote a major part of their own time and attention to the needs of the country population. Almost all classes of society had come to desire Western standards of income, comfort, security, and power, without possessing as yet either the means or the skill necessary to produce them. And all these discontented groups and individuals, pushed forward by the fundamental incongruities in their social evolution, turned to politics and to the state as a remedy for their frustrations.

IV

186 Under these conditions, no type of government and no
631 size of political unit could for long live up to the rising level of popular expectations and the increasingly pressing demands of society. Already, before the year 1914, large states as well as small, national states as well as international, became increasingly strained by social tensions.

In a supra- or multinational state, such as the Austro-

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[For further information on Peasant groups and organizations see pages 109-131 in category 116.]

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871 Austrian Galicia they underwent a great cultural revival in
563 the latter part of the nineteenth century, and this was the only area in which schools and universities using the Polish language could develop freely. The Polish population in Prussia lived under better educational conditions than did their co-nationals in Russia, but in both countries they were subjected to vigorous programs of denationalization.

871 The state of popular education in Eastern Europe is re-
212 vealed by illiteracy figures for the years 1920-21, before the new independent states had exerted an influence on education. The rate of illiteracy for males and females of school age and over was 7 per cent for Czechoslovakia, 15 per cent for Hungary, and between 30 and 40 per cent for Poland and Yugoslavia. The rate was between 40 and 50 per cent for Rumania and Bulgaria, and in Albania it was much higher. These figures may be compared with illiteracy rates of under 1 per cent for Great Britain and Germany, 6 per cent for the United States, and about 50 per cent for Russia.

[873] It is worth noting that the low level of literacy in most of Eastern Europe did not prevent the development of a high level of culture among educated persons. The universities of Prague, Cracow, and Budapest were the most distinguished among many of high level, and very significant contributions to European culture in the arts and sciences came from this region. The "intelligentsia," as those with higher education and professional skills were referred to, provided both the leadership of the national movements and the statesmen of the nations born at the end of the First World War. As individuals they were the equals of the political leaders of the great powers and included in their number many great Europeans.

•566 Agricultural improvement, or the increase in produc-
423 tivity and in the welfare of the population dependent on
178 agriculture, is a complex process. In Eastern Europe, it involved in particular the release of the peasants from feudal

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servitude, the adoption of improved techniques of agricultural production and marketing, and the improvement of the lot of the individual peasant through land reform and the combined efforts of the landlords and the state. Most of European Turkey had never known feudalism in the Western sense, and the peasants of Serbia and Bulgaria emerged early as independent landowners with a sound understanding of their own interests. In many areas of Rumania, Austria-Hungary, and the Polish sections of Germany and Russia, however, the peasants were freed from feudal restrictions only to sink into a deeper misery, sometimes called "neo-serfdom," that stemmed from lack of capital and the resultant economic dependency on the landlords. As a consequence, while independent peasant political parties began to develop among the Czechs and southern Slavs shortly after the turn of the century, the peasants in Russia in 1905 and in Rumania in 1907 resorted to the desperate method of revolution.

The agrarian backwardness that characterized the greater part of Eastern Europe was a great challenge to social and political philosophers, and it was not surprising that the First World War left in its wake attempts at radical solutions by leaders acting in the name of the proletariat or the peasantry. The recommendation of the economists, in the presence of this agrarian poverty and overpopulation, was that agricultural improvement be accompanied by the extension of industry and trade. In the areas where large landowners exercised full political control, this recommendation was not welcomed as the landowners tended to favor fiscal policies that kept the price of grain high and the peasant poor. In other areas, however, important industrial development took place. Thus, the Austrian provinces of Bohemia and Moravia, with their preponderant Czech population, accounted for a little over one half the entire industrial output of Austria-Hungary. This production included coal and

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565 -182 visible and constitute an outstanding characteristic of this group.

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II

566 The greater part of the peasantry in Eastern Europe was liberated from the bondages of serfdom in the year of revolutions, 1848. In that part of Poland which was included in the Russian Empire, the abolition of serfdom was proclaimed in 1861, and in Old Rumania, in 1864. The peasants of the Balkans, subjected to a special type of land tenure relations and vassalage as practiced in the Ottoman empire, were freed gradually with the withdrawal of the Turkish political power, especially after the arrangements made at the Congress of Berlin in 1878.

000 The liberation of the peasantry was a consequence of

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homemade means they can devise. Production comes first, 565
even at the price of using up the machines. Discipline is 466
severe; negligence or even a few minutes' lateness are strictly punished. No wonder, then, that the bad side of the system outweighs the good in the worker's mind. Still, he dares not complain. If he betrays any signs of discontent the security police, whose secret agents are his co-workers and sometimes his friends, takes care of him.

The wildcat strikes that break out from time to time 565
are no threat in themselves, for peace returns quickly 468
after mass arrests of all participants. They are, however, ominous signs that discontentment has reached a tension that can find release only in desperate acts. A strike requires a certain minimum of organization. That is why nothing else makes Party dialecticians so uneasy. The workers are the only class capable of organized action—that Marxist principle has never been forgotten. No action, however, is possible without leaders. If the leaders reason correctly, that is, if they understand the necessities of the historic process, then the workers as a mass will be unable to protest.

Everything, thus, takes us back to the question of mas- 626
tery over the mind. Every possible opportunity for educa- 555
tion and advancement is offered to the more energetic and active individuals among the workers. The new, incredibly extensive bureaucracy is recruited from among the young people of working-class origin. The road before them is open, open but guarded: their thinking must be based on the firm principles of dialectical materialism. Schools, theaters, films, painting, literature, and the press all shape their thinking.

We should also call attention to a new institution, the 575 •
"club," whose significance is comparable to that of the 626
chapel in the middle ages. It exists in every factory, ev-

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575 626 ery school, every office. On its walls hang portraits of Party leaders draped with red bunting. Every few days, meetings following pre-arranged agendas take place, meetings that are as potent as religious rites. The Catholic Church wisely recognized that faith is more a matter of collective suggestion than of individual conviction. Collective religious ceremonies induce a state of belief. Folding one's hands in prayer, kneeling, singing hymns *precede* faith, for faith is a psycho-physical and not simply a psychological phenomenon. Edward Gibbon, describing the effects of Theodosius's decrees forbidding pagan rites (*The Decline and Fall of the Roman Empire*, Chapter XXVIII), says: "The devotion of the poet, or the philosopher, may be secretly nourished by prayer, meditation, and study; but the exercise of public worship appears to be the only solid foundation of the religious sentiments of the people, which derive their force from imitation and habit. The interruption of that public exercise may consummate, in the period of a few years, the important work of a national revolution. The memory of theological opinions cannot long be preserved, without the artificial helps of priests, of temples, and of books. The ignorant vulgar, whose minds are still agitated by the blind hopes and terrors of superstition, will be soon persuaded by their superiors to direct their vows to the reigning deities of the age; and will insensibly imbibe an ardent zeal for the support and propagation of the new doctrine, which spiritual hunger at first compelled them to accept." The Party has learned this wise lesson from the Church. People who attend a "club" submit to a collective rhythm, and so come to feel that it is absurd to think differently from the collective. The collective is composed of units that doubt; but as these individuals pronounce the ritual phrases and sing the ritual songs, they create a collective aura to which they

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in turn surrender. Despite its apparent appeal to reason, 575 the "club's" activity comes under the heading of collec- 626 tive magic. The rationalism of the doctrine is fused with sorcery, and the two strengthen each other. Free discussion is, of course, eliminated. If what the doctrine proclaims is as true as the fact that 2 × 2 equals 4, to tolerate the opinion that 2 × 2 equals 5 would be indecent.

From his first day in school, the young citizen receives 626 an education based on this truth. There is a great differ- 876 ence between schools in the people's democracies and schools in the West, for example the schools I attended in pre-war Poland. My friends and I were exposed to a dual 829 system of values. Mathematics, physics, and biology taught us scientific laws, and inculcated respect for a materialistic outlook inherited from the nineteenth century. History and Letters seemed to elude scientific laws, while the history of the Catholic Church and Apologetics cast doubt, though often naïvely, on what physics and biology taught. In the people's democracies, the materialistic outlook of the nineteenth century has been extended consistently to every subject; history and every branch of human creativity are presented as governed by unshakeable and *already known* laws.

In the nineteenth century, with the rise of literacy, brochures popularizing scientific theories made their appearance. Regardless of the intrinsic worth of these theories, we must grant that from the moment they take on a popular form they become something other than what they were as hypotheses of scientific research. For example, the simplified and vulgarized version of Darwin's theory of the origin of species and the struggle for existence is not the same concept that it was for Darwin or for his scholarly opponents. It takes on emotional coloration, and changes into an important sociological element.

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who are considered the educators of society, it is severely punished. 517 626

Ethical Ketman results from opposition to the ethics of the New Faith, which is based on the principle that good and evil are definable solely in terms of service or harm to the interests of the Revolution. Since exemplary behavior of citizens in their inter-relations aids the cause of socialism, great emphasis is placed upon individual morality. 626 577

"The development of a new man" is the key point in the New Faith's program. Demands made upon Party members are exceedingly harsh. One exacts of them no small degree of abstinence. As a result, admission to the Party is not unlike entrance into a religious order; and the literature of the New Faith treats this act with a gravity equal to that with which Catholic literature speaks of the vows of young nuns. The higher one stands in the Party hierarchy, the more attentively is one's private life supervised. Love of money, drunkenness, or a confused love-life disqualify a Party member from holding important offices. Hence the upper brackets of the Party are filled by ascetics devoted to the single cause of Revolution. As for certain human tools, deprived of real influence but useful because of their names, even if they belong to the Party one tolerates or sometimes encourages their weaknesses, for they constitute a guarantee of obedience. The general ethical ideal of the New Faith is puritanical. If it were feasible to lodge all the citizens in cells and release them only for work or for political meetings, that would undoubtedly be most desirable. But alas, one must make concessions to human nature. Procreation is possible only as a result of sexual relations between men and women, and one must take this inconvenience into account.

The "new man" is conditioned to acknowledge the

[For a definition of "Ketman, see cat. 116, pp. 57-60.--Analyst]

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626 good of the whole as the sole norm of his behavior. He
• 577 thinks and reacts like others; is modest, industrious, satisfied with what the state gives him; limits his private life to nights spent at home, and passes all the rest of his time amidst his companions at work or at play, observing them carefully and reporting their actions and opinions to the authorities. Informing was and is known in many civilizations, but the New Faith declares it a cardinal virtue of the good citizen (though the name itself is carefully avoided). It is the basis of each man's fear of his fellow-men. Work in an office or factory is hard not only because of the amount of labor required, but even more because of the need to be on guard against omnipresent and vigilant eyes and ears. After work one goes to political meetings or special lectures, thus lengthening a day that is without a moment of relaxation or spontaneity. The people one talks with may seem relaxed and careless, sympathetic and indignant, but if they appear so, it is only to arouse corresponding attitudes and to extract confidences which they can report to their superiors.

In effect this cult of the community produces something which poisons the community itself. The mentality of the Party's sages is, indeed, rather strange. They make concessions to physiological human weaknesses, but they refuse to admit that man has other foibles as well: that he feels fine when he can relax, and unhappy when he is afraid, that lying is bad for him because it creates internal tension. These weaknesses, together with others like the desire to better one's own lot at the expense of one's fellow-men, transform the ethic which was originally founded on cooperation and brotherhood into an ethic of a war pitting all men against all others, and granting the greatest chances of survival to the craftiest. Victory in this new struggle seems to belong to a breed different

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from that which was favored to win in the battle for money in the early days of industrial capitalism. If biting dogs can be divided into two main categories, noisy and brutal, or silent and slyly vicious, then the second variety would seem most privileged in the countries of the New Faith. Forty or fifty years of education in these new ethical maxims must create a new and irretrievable species of mankind. The "new man" is not merely a postulate. He is beginning to become a reality.

Ethical Ketman is not rare among highly placed figures in the Party. These persons, no matter how capable they are of murdering millions of people in the name of Communism, try to compensate for their professional severity and are often more honorable in their personal relations than people who affect individualistic ethics. Their capacity to sympathize and help is almost unlimited. Indeed this very feeling of compassion pushed them onto the road of revolution in their youth, and in this they reiterated the experience of Marx himself. One finds this Ketman chiefly among the old Communists. Conflicts between friendship and the interests of the Revolution are matters they weigh at length in their conscience; and they are pitiless only when completely convinced that, in shielding a friend or in refraining from denouncing him, they are injuring that cause which is most precious to them. Though they are usually esteemed as people of crystalline righteousness, they are not safe from frequent accusations of "intellectuality," a contemptuous epithet for those who are blameless as theoreticians, but hampered in action by an over-sensitivity to ethical considerations. A revolutionary should be without scruples. It is better to cut down human trees blindly than to wonder which among them are really rotten.

This variety of Ketman is one of the most prevalent in

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626 the people's democracies because the new ethic is of re-
517 cent inculcation, whereas the ethic vanquished by the New Faith was ensconced there for centuries. One can never foresee when and in whom this Ketman will appear, which makes for an element of surprise. Individuals who give one every reason to suppose that they do not denounce others turn out to be inveterate informers; individuals who are apparently most indifferent to "prejudices," show themselves inexplicably loyal toward their friends and even toward strangers. Since this Ketman augments the difficulties of controlling the citizens' thoughts, it is diligently sought out and penalized; yet the number of situations to which it can be applied is so great that it often eludes all manner of pressure.

The inhabitants of Western countries little realize that millions of their fellow-men, who seem superficially more or less similar to them, live in a world as fantastic as that of the men from Mars. They are unaware of the perspectives on human nature that Ketman opens. Life in constant internal tension develops talents which are latent in man. He does not even suspect to what heights of cleverness and psychological perspicacity he can rise when he is cornered and must either be skillful or perish. The survival of those best adapted to mental acrobatics creates a human type that has been rare until now. The necessities which drive men to Ketman sharpen the intellect.

626 Whoever would take the measure of intellectual life in
517 the countries of Central or Eastern Europe from the monotonous articles appearing in the press or the stereotyped speeches pronounced there, would be making a grave error. Just as theologians in periods of strict orthodoxy expressed their views in the rigorous language of the Church, so the writers of the people's democracies make use of an accepted special style, terminology, and linguis-

were generated by the agricultural crisis and the ensuing famine of 1920-21. To meet the needs of the urban population, the Bolsheviks decreed a forced food levy (December 14, 1920) by which peasants were ordered to deliver their entire surplus to the State. The peasants, retaliating in kind, produced little more than their own needs demanded. Scattered peasant uprisings, together with the Kronstadt rebellion early in 1921, combined to force a change of policy on the new regime. The strict codes of "War Communism" were abrogated and the New Economic Policy (NEP) was launched. Delivery quotas were introduced (amounting to a tax-in-kind) and peasants were encouraged to produce for a flourishing free market.

Thus, for a time under NEP the peasants, who now controlled almost all the arable land, were permitted to enjoy the fruits of their revolutionary exertions. Agricultural production recovered rapidly and a degree of national prosperity resulted. But the Bolsheviks had paid a price for this prosperity — the restoration of free market relations between town and country.

The Leninist Dilemma

The unstable compromise of NEP postponed the inevitable clash between the "proletarian dictatorship" and the victorious peasant revolution. Two parallel developments were rapidly to hasten the impending struggle: throughout the NEP period (1921-28) the peasants tightened their hold on the land, many of them growing relatively prosperous, and thereby fortifying their gains. At the same time the Bolsheviks were tightening their hold on the political machinery of the State and turning their party into a monolithic organization capable of an outright offensive against the rest of the country. Thus, the stage was set for the gigantic economic struggle of the late twenties.

The issue at stake between the Bolsheviks and the peasantry was only partly ideological. The conflict between the Bolshevik belief in the superior efficacy of large-scale "socialist" farming and the peasants' allegiance to his traditional "way of life" was important, but this conflict was subordinated to another one which was economic in character. The peasants and the Bolshevik regime faced each other across the table on which the grain produce of Russia was negotiated. And it was, in fact, in the realm of economics

578 185 that the two antagonists met and clashed in the "war" which resulted in collectivized agriculture.[18]

The problem which the Bolsheviks had to deal with may be briefly stated. NEP had insured the continued political existence of the regime; but salvation had been achieved at a great price. To obtain a sufficient supply of agricultural produce to feed the rising urban population and, if possible, to permit acceleration of industrial growth, it was necessary to provide increased incentives for the peasantry. But to provide incentives for an increased supply of produce to the cities, it was also necessary to create an industry capable of supplying peasants with the consumer goods and agricultural machinery they demanded in exchange. Without recourse to foreign capital, this, in turn, was impossible, unless a steadily increasing supply of agricultural produce was guaranteed.

The problem of breaking this vicious circle occupied the thoughts of the best Party theoreticians throughout the period of NEP. Some, like Bukharin, suggested a solution bearing some resemblance to the pre-Revolutionary policies of Witte and Stolypin — a "gradualist" approach to industrialization, encouragement of the more efficient middle peasant producers, and limited recourse to foreign capital. Trotsky, as the leader of the radical Left Wing, called for an immediate drive for industrialization in which the peasants would absorb the major shock. The theoretical debate rose to its climax in the late twenties, coinciding with the final victory of the Stalinist faction of the Bolshevik Party and the resurgence of the agricultural crisis in a new form.[19]

The Pre-collectivization Crisis

185 471 423 The Stalinist "solution" to the agricultural crisis (collectivization) did not proceed according to a predetermined plan or theory. Rather, it was developed pragmatically as a response to critical

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[18] Lazar Volin, a foremost American student of Soviet agriculture, also assigned priority to the practical, as opposed to the ideological basis of collectivization. He explained the Communist attachment to the *kolkhoz* in this way: "First, the practical or pragmatic reasons . . . [revolving] around the need for large supplies of cheap agricultural products to feed and clothe the growing industrial population and the army . . . Second, an ideological predilection for agrarian collectivism, rooted in the Marxist-Leninist-Stalinist dogma." Lazar Volin, "Agricultural Organization," *Soviet Economic Growth*, Abraham Bergson (editor), White Plains, N. Y., 1953, p. 286.

[19] A reliable account of the heated Party economic debate may be found in Maurice Dobb, *Soviet Economic Development since* 1917 (New York, 1948), pp. 208-229, and of the political implications of the debate in Isaac Deutscher, *Stalin: A Political Biography* (Oxford, 1949), pp. 294-304.

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But in the end these possessions stirred the envy not merely 794
of ambitious and worldly men but also of the land-hungry 471
poor. To be sure the Abbot of a flourishing monastery might 578
correctly point out that the revenues did not enrich the monks,
who normally lived under his guidance by an austere religious
rule. These religious in their bare cells did not taste the fine
vintages pressed from monastery grapes carefully tended by
brothers who rose at four for Matins and then expended them-
selves zealously for the cause of God. Nevertheless the critics
were not by any means only emancipated spirits who found
moral discipline irksome and the Church old-fashioned. They
were also earnest, weather-beaten peasants, with no soil to till,
and often desperately poor, who understandably looked upon
Church estates with a covetous eye. And of course everywhere
the well applauded and sharp-tongued ideologies of the time—
Marxism, Nationalism, Nihilism—were allied against the
Church, often looked upon by the seemingly more enlightened
folk of those days as the heritor of a creed outworn. And it must
be admitted that sometimes a segment of the clergy, grown
comfortable and worldly, acted as if they thought so, too.

Protestantism inside the old Empire clung to the enclaves 795
which had been established during the era of the Reformation
and the Counter-Reformation. Despite the strife incident to the [162]
Thirty Years' War both Lutheranism and Calvinism main-
tained themselves resolutely in Hungary, for example, so that
prior to the outbreak of World War II Catholics in that country
constituted about 67 per cent of the population, while Protes-
tants numbered nearly 27 per cent and adhered to both the
Lutheran and the Calvinist tradition. In Czechoslovakia the
situation was relatively the same, though the number of Protes-
tant groups was greater. A considerable part of the population
—6 per cent in 1932—professed no religion of any kind. An-
other characteristic of the old Empire was the presence of the

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visions were included in the peace treaties with Hungary and Bulgaria, and the states that had been created or enlarged as a result of the war assumed similar obligations. The provisions for the protection of minorities were concerned with the use of language in schools and courts, the practice of religion, and the equitable administration of social security. Their implementation by the respective governments was supervised by a Minorities Commission in the League of Nations, and a system of petitions was established for bringing injustices to the attention of the League. Although the principles underlying this system represented a great advance over pre-war practice, the efforts at implementation failed to meet the needs of the situation. In many cases the minorities continued to be discriminated against, and even when they were not, nationalist movements sponsored by neighboring countries often proved irresistible. As a result, the problem of minorities became one of the fundamental sources of political instability in Eastern Europe.

Another unfavorable factor was that richer families sent their children to foreign universities, especially to France, Germany, and Great Britain, while there was little student exchange among the Eastern European countries themselves. Educated people knew a great deal about Western Europe, but much less about neighboring states and peoples. Naturally, this was even more so among nations which had been enemies in the First World War and which now fiercely condemned their citizens if they praised the culture or progress of a former enemy. However, this situation was not unique to this region. It was characteristic of Europe as a whole and, like the development of nationalism and industry, moved from West to East.

Many of Eastern Europe's difficulties stemmed from the instability of its political life. Governments changed constantly and political parties fought each other to the last breath. Due to the many changes of government, an unwhole-

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642 somely large proportion of state funds was used for political
578 competition. Taxes were high and the entire taxation system was geared to make the poor people pay for the political and economic program of the government or of the ruling classes.
647 Planning was poor and administration far from efficient. Bohemia-Moravia had inherited from Austria a relatively competent administrative machinery, and Hungary's was organized along nineteenth-century lines. Administrative systems in former Russian and Turkish areas were a continuation of the previous imperial regimes, and were considered
[687] definitely the worst in Eastern Europe. Inefficiency and corruption mitigated somewhat the dictatorial character of these administrations. Bribery was customary and necessary on every level and affected the poor and the minorities. The problem of corruption was most serious in high official circles. Often the biggest fortunes were made in politics through embezzling discretionary funds that were left at the disposal of government members. Selling protective tariffs to industrialists in order to receive shares from foreign companies for concessions was a prevalent practice. Administrative officials were endowed with the nickname "bicyclists," which carried the implication that these officials trampled upon their subordinates and bowed before their bosses.

578 This attitude and the belief that the masses should support all projects of the ruling circles produced a harsh conflict of interests between the bourgeoisie, the mixed aristocratic and middle class, and the industrial workers and peasants. The fundamental conflict, however, was between the bureaucracy and the peasantry. The great differences in the cultural levels in many of the Eastern European countries made things worse. Different religious and ethnic groups and contrasting social standards contributed to regional hostilities and did nothing to facilitate the task of the administrators. The fault lay not alone with the rulers and administrators as is so often supposed by Western authors and statesmen. The people in

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general were slow to learn and to develop their abilities. 578 ● They did not cooperate with regulations and laws even when such were to their own benefit, an attitude that stems from many centuries of oppression.

IV

It is difficult to say what turn the development of Eastern 648 Europe might have taken if, after gaining full freedom and independence in the twentieth century, the countries of this region had been given the chance to progress in a peaceful era. The countries of Eastern Europe, immediately after recovering from the traumatic depression of the 1930's, were confronted with German and Russian imperialism without even a chance to settle down for a period of healthy evolution. Unhappily, the Western European powers, after their unfortunate appeasement policy towards Hitler which completely confused the Eastern European nations, joined hands too tightly with communist Russia. The Eastern European states, semidemocratic, semidictatorial, balancing between bankruptcy and future recovery, between socialism and aristocratic-bourgeois traditions, were a brutally realistic mirror of Europe's modern revolution.

Germany used all means possible to influence and to domi- 648 nate the area. Basing its actions upon meticulous studies of 439 the history, geography, politics, economics, social life, and cultural habits of the respective countries, Germany gained influence through the use of economic penetration, anti-semitism, social-revolutionary propaganda, antibolshevism, and diplomacy. The Eastern European states could not very well defend themselves against such brilliantly conducted infiltration. Nor could their economics develop satisfactorily when American, British, French, and Swiss businessmen were completely disinterested in trade and investment in Eastern Europe since the prospects for profit were not great in that

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648 area. It is unjust to accuse the Eastern European states of
439 favoring Germany when this country alone was willing to trade with them and did not demand hard currency payments. Germany bought large quantities of Eastern European products and forced the sellers to buy from her various articles, including gadgets, luxury goods, and many other products, the prices of which were beyond the purchasing power of the buyers.

668 Antisemitic movements in Eastern Europe often received
578 aid in the form of money from Nazi Germany which practice increased dependence upon that country. Through the various Nazi-supported parties in almost every country and through fifth column organizations, the Germans instigated conflicts between the ruling classes and the dissatisfied social elements. At the same time antibolshevik propaganda was strongly and successfully supported by German diplomacy.

648 Czechoslovakia, in 1938, was the first to lose her independence. Poland fell in 1939, and Yugoslavia followed in 1941. The years 1939 through 1944 were truly critical for Eastern Europe. The German-Russian imperialistic pincers tightened steadily. Nazi Germany won easy diplomatic victories over the Western European powers whose conciliatory policies were astounding. Even more astounding was their sudden turn to anti-German propaganda and war. Squeezed between the arbitrary policy of the Western powers and the expanding German and Soviet giants, the Eastern European nations had no other choice than to muddle through. Apprehensively watching an alliance of giants and often impressed by the achievements of these powers, they tried to appease them, aid them, or fight them.

722 Peace economy was turned into war economy. This decreased unemployment, and war losses decreased it even further. The most active age group, already reduced by the slump in birth rate after the First World War, was thinned even more. Youth, accustomed to tackling problems in terms

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178 years before the First World War in the Austro-Hungarian
563 monarchy. At the same time, there was relatively little competition for the services of men of high talent on the part of industry, applied science, or practical politics, since all of these activities remained relatively underdeveloped.

578 The coincidence of intellectual precocity with widespread
565 social and economic backwardness led to widespread experiences of frustration. Intellectuals, not unlike the ancient philosopher Plato, dreamed of equalling one day the power and prestige of the aristocracy, for which they lacked the land holdings and family connections; and they dreamed of equalling the comforts and securities of the bourgeoisie—the upper middle class—without either owning a bourgeois amount of property or devoting a bourgeois proportion of their time and attention to money-making or to business matters. They resented the influence of the church and the clergy in the rural areas, without being either willing or able to devote a major part of their own time and attention to the needs of the country population. Almost all classes of society had come to desire Western standards of income, comfort, security, and power, without possessing as yet either the means or the skill necessary to produce them. And all these discontented groups and individuals, pushed forward by the fundamental incongruities in their social evolution, turned to politics and to the state as a remedy for their frustrations.

IV

186 Under these conditions, no type of government and no
631 size of political unit could for long live up to the rising level of popular expectations and the increasingly pressing demands of society. Already, before the year 1914, large states as well as small, national states as well as international, became increasingly strained by social tensions.

In a supra- or multinational state, such as the Austro-

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tantly or not at all. Unemployment became worse than it had ever been. 178 464

Thus social tensions persisted or grew worse. Sometimes they appeared as growing tensions between left and right, with the political middle-of-the-road parties increasingly threatened by fascists or by communists. Sometimes they appeared as tensions between different nationality groups, such as between Serbians and Croatians or between Czechs and Germans. Often the same angry and frustrated individuals could be found backing communism in one year, extreme nationalism in another, and some more or less supranational fascism in a third. Whole districts voted for right-wing radical candidates in one election and for left-wing radicals in another. Nationalism in Eastern Europe was thus the symptom of a more fundamental maladjustment, even though nationalistic policies, once adopted, often served to make this maladjustment worse. Nationalistic governments, as well as most other governments in this region, were becoming increasingly unpopular and during the 1930's showed increasing reluctance to face their own voters. By 1939, before the first German or Russian soldier stepped on their soil, every country of Eastern Europe, with the exceptions of Finland and Czechoslovakia, had succumbed to some form of dictatorship. Nationalism had thus failed to cure the fundamental maladjustments of Eastern European political and economic life. From some points of view its failure was hardly less shattering than the failure of the supranational empires that had preceded it. 186 578 642 208

It was nationalism which first undermined and in part destroyed the traditions of property and the respect for property in Eastern Europe. This attack against property began as early as the era of Prince Bismarck in Germany. The so-called Polish legislation sponsored by the German government and by the German nationalists during and after the Bismarck era showed scant respect for the property 642 423 563

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the Communist Party was in charge of the expulsion of the Germans from the Western territories, and the settlement of Poles in their place. There Gomulka, then General Secretary of the Party, was responsible). 186 661 563

Because in the popular view the Communist Party bore the greatest responsibility for the expulsion, there was a much higher percentage of Communist supporters among the new Czech settlers in the Sudeten areas than in any other part of the country, even than in the big towns where large numbers of workers were concentrated. In the 1946 general elections, in the districts of Jablonec and Turnov the Communist Party polled 70 per cent of the votes, in Kadaň 62 per cent, Falknov 59 per cent, in Aš over 50 per cent, and so on. (The situation in the Western Territories of Poland was similar, hence the Communist leaders insisted on giving highly disproportionate representation to these areas in the general elections of January, 1947).

The whole of the Sudeten population, except some tens of thousands of indispensable skilled workers, was expelled from the country. Those who remained had to do compulsory labour for a minimum of twelve hours a day, and, if the employer thought it necessary, fifteen hours. The National Committees organised this compulsory labour. According to their decrees, the German workers in Czechoslovakia were forbidden to belong to trade unions, were excluded from social benefits, had to give a quarter of their wages as reparations to the state, were not entitled to holidays, and their children were not allowed to attend school. 466 611 563

In the first few days after the defeat of the German army in Czechoslovakia, some cracks were made in the wall of national animosity by open fraternisation between Czech and German workers. For instance, a number of rank and file communists in Bodenbach began to publish a daily paper in Czech and German; it was called *Rudý Prapor—Rote Fahne.* It was short-lived, for Nosek immediately prohibited the publication of any German paper or of any paper in two languages one of which was German. 563 661

It is ironical to note that the excesses against the Germans in Czechoslovakia were taking place at the same time—with the Red Army's entry into Germany—as the Russian

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CHAPTER IV

THE COMMUNISTS TAKE CONTROL OF POLICE AND ARMY

AT THE END of the war, the Communist Parties were participating in governments with bourgeois parties not only in the 'Peoples Democracies,' but in France, Italy, Belgium, Austria and Finland. For about two years the Communist leaders called for 'national unity' and 'order' against strikes and workers' struggles in general. In France, Italy, Belgium, Austria and Finland, at the end of the honeymoon period, the Communist Party representatives left the governments or were thrown out of them and went over to the opposition, while in the 'Peoples Democracies' they took full control into their hands. This difference was due to the fact that the Communist Party did not take control of the police and army in any of the Western European countries as they did in the East. In none of the first group of countries did the Communists succeed in getting control of the Ministry of War and only in Austria and Finland did they for a time hold the portfolio of Minister of the Interior and hence control of the police. Even in Finland they did not completely succeed in 'purging' the police of 'unreliable' elements and introducing their agents, so that when the Communist Minister of the Interior—Leino—lost his position in the government, his power to use the police as a means of resistance was very limited.

The situation in all the satellite states was very different. Almost from the beginning, the Ministers of the Interior were Communists. They used their positions to recruit the old police officers into the Communist Party, or to replace them by new Communist Party members. As there are, of course, no statistics to show the changes in the party composition of the police in these countries, one can only rely for information on fragments of news in the press. However, in the case of Czechoslovakia there is the evidence of Hubert Ripka, who was the

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66/ Minister of Foreign Trade in Czechoslovakia until February,
625 1948, and who is now in exile. He states that on the eve of the Communist coup of February 'All the important posts in the Ministry of the Interior were occupied by Communists; in the division of the security police, of nine departmental heads, five were Communists. At the head of the three branches of the Corps of National Security Police (S.N.B.) there were only militant Communists: Colonel Krystof, Dr. Hora and Dr. Goerner. In one of the particularly important sections of the security police (Section III–2), of nineteen officers, fourteen were Communists. In the directing office of the Corps of the National Security Police, of thirteen officers, nine were Communists. At Central headquarters of the political police, the three chief posts were in Communist hands. In the intelligence services the Communists dominated, even in the lower ranks. In the Prague headquarters of the provincial S.N.B., of five high officers, four were members of the Communist Party. Of seventeen regional directors of the S.N.B. in Bohemia, twelve were Communists. Of a total of seventy high officers of the S.N.B., about sixty were members of the Communist Party'. (*Czechoslovakia Enslaved*, London, 1950, p. 195). In the other satellites, there is no doubt that the Communist infiltration into key positions in the police was even more thorough. It is an apt comment that Andrássy Ut in Budapest, in which the dreaded headquarters of the Special Security Police is found, now bears instead the name of Stalin!

661 A similar situation existed in the army. A symbol of the
701 complete control of the Kremlin over the armies of the satellite countries was the appointment of the Soviet Army Marshal, Constantin Rokossovsky, as Polish Minister of National Defence (7th November, 1949) in place of Marshal Michal Rola-Zymierski.* Rokossovsky was born in Warsaw when it was part of Russian Poland, but has had as much to do with Poland as the Irish-born Field-Marshal Montgomery with his native country. He became famous, or more exactly notorious, in Poland, at the time of the Warsaw uprising, as the commander

*Rola-Zymierski was one of the few of Pilsudski's Legionnaires who took an oath of allegiance to the Germans in World War I. He was a commander of the Polish Army in the war against Russia in 1920. In 1927 he was tried and convicted on a charge of bribery, degraded, cashiered and sentenced to five years' imprisonment. The Kremlin raised him to the position of Commander-in-Chief of the Polish forces and Minister of National Defence.

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661 although the present Prime Minister is a member of this party, he is rarely mentioned in the Hungarian press and his name, István Dóbi, is hardly known to the people.

The peasant parties of Yugoslavia, which in the past were very strong, apparently exist officially even today, but none of them has a daily, weekly, or any other paper and none of them is represented in Parliament. Their last representative was Dragoljub Jovanović, whose record included years of imprisonment under King Alexander's dictatorship. He was a secretary of the People's Front and a Minister in Tito's Government. But how could Tito forgive him when he declared in Parliament: 'The Communists are wonderful. They liberated us from the King and the Church; it only remains for them to liberate us from the Communist Party'? He was immediately expelled from the Government, from the People's Front, from his own Serbian Peasant Party and from his position as a professor at the University of Belgrade. Thus he became the one-man opposition to the Government in Parliament. But Tito could not tolerate any dissentient voice and steps were taken to close his mouth. In February, 1947, he was beaten up and severely wounded by hooligans. (The Yugoslav press did not mention this incident). Immediately afterwards he was tried and sentenced to nine years' imprisonment.

The fate of Stalin's quislings in the sham peasant parties was often grim. Thus, for instance, Romulus Zăroni, Minister of Agriculture in the first Groza Government, and Moga and Belea, the people who had led the Ploughman's Front since its foundation in 1934 in South Transylvania, when it was a small organisation with genuine peasant suppport at least locally, were removed from any positions they held after Moscow found they had served their purpose. The two most prominent leaders of the Hungarian 'village explorers' (after the war renamed the National Peasant Party) were Imre Kovács and Péter Veres: the former resigned his post as General Secretary and succeeded in escaping abroad; the latter was driven out of public life.

687 The important part played by the Communist-controlled
625 police in the liquidation of the peasant parties not only in Yugoslavia but also in the other 'People's Democracies' is clear from the following testimony of Peter Koev, an M.P. and a

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close friend of Petkov's. As Koev himself was too weak after his 'interrogation' to read his own statement in Parliament, Petkov read it for him: 687 625

'I shall first describe to you how the interrogation at the Militia Prison was carried out, so that you may have an idea of how "confessions" are produced, and of how Communist charges are built up. You reach a state of utter physical and moral collapse. You become completely indifferent towards your own life and fate, and you long only for an end, any end, which will bring a reprieve from suffering. But the complete collapse comes only at the moment when you realize that you are defenceless, that there is no law and no authority to protect you, and that you are in the hands of your interrogators for ever. This is actually what they try to make you believe right from the very beginning.

'The procedure is different from the one we have known so far. Now they first explain your guilt and then they ask confessions to prove it. The methods to obtain the confessions are mainly three: physiological—hunger, thirst, and lack of sleep; physical—torture; psychological—hints that your family have been arrested, will be tortured, etc.

'But let me tell you exactly what happened to me. For two days after my arrest I was confined to a small dark cell and given no food whatever. On the third day I was taken to the office of the chief of the Department of State Security. There I met Ganev, the chief of the Department "A" and the militia inspector, Zeev. They told me that I had been found guilty of an act of sabotage—the burning of Russian cotton stocks at the port of Burgas, in 1945, and that I had also taken part in the organization of a planned *coup d'etat* against the Government by Generals Velchev and Stanchev. They told me that I was the link between General Velchev and General Stanchev. Then they read confessions written by several officers giving details of their own guilt as well as of my own "participation" in the conspiracy.

'Immediately after that I was sent back to my cell and was not bothered with any interrogations for twenty-one days. I was left to "ripen". The first method used to achieve this was hunger—I was given only a little bread and water every day On the twenty-second day, a Saturday, at eight o'clock in the

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687 625 morning, I was taken up to the fourth floor for the second interrogation. It lasted without a break until eleven o'clock of the following Thursday morning. The interrogation went on, day and night, for twenty-four hours round the clock, without a stop, the interrogators themselves being changed every three hours. During all this time I was left standing, without any sleep, without any bread and, what is worse, without any water. I was handcuffed and I was not allowed to lean either on the wall or on the table. Every three hours the new interrogators asked the same identical questions, so that in the end I knew every question by heart. After the first twenty-four hours I did not feel any hunger. The lack of sleep makes your head feel hollow, and then it starts making funny noises. The interrogators insist that you repeat the same dates, the same names, the same hours, etc. On the fifth day I collapsed and was taken back to my cell, where I immediately fell asleep and slept for twelve hours.

'Waking up I thought the interrogation was over, but the same night, at eleven o'clock, they took me upstairs again into a bigger room. The Inspector Zeev, who was in charge of my interrogation said my obstinacy had obliged him to change his methods to something really tough. At his orders I was put on the floor. My hands were tied behind my back, and I was gagged. Then, for about two hours, I was beaten on the feet with a thick rubber whip. During the beating Inspector Zeev asked the same questions. The interrogations and the beatings were repeated four nights in succession. During the last night, besides many inspectors and militiamen, the Chief of the Sofia Militia, Veselin Georgiev, was also present. I was then thrown back into my cell, and I was not disturbed until 4th November, at half-past ten in the evening, when I was set free. After ninety days under arrest I was not asked any more questions, nor have I been given notice of any official charge against me.

(Signed) PETER KOEV.

Sofia, 29th November, 1946, National Assembly.'

(Michael Padev, *Dimitrov Wastes no Bullets*, London, 1948, pp. 93–4).

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character of the army and police in the 'People's Democracies'. 661
These statements doubtless contain more truth than most of the other confessions, as they are based not on hearsay, but on the actual developments in Hungary, which can be checked by many Hungarians and by students. They show the continuity of the army and police institutions from the time of Horthy, and so give the lie to the Communist propaganda that since the 'revolution of 1944' they have an altogether new, democratic character. Pálffy stated: 'I sabotaged the drawing of working class cadres into the army, and I not only did not support the few workers who were nevertheless already there, or managed to get in, but pushed them back, relegating them to a secondary position. I was the chief of the military political department for three years and during these years not a single worker managed to get into a leading position even of a lower grade. On the contrary, in the interests of the aim previously mentioned, I brought back former officers of the Horthy army who were partly of pro-western convictions, partly of fascist, chauvinist sympathies, in great numbers; I promoted and supported them to high posts . . . My further destructive activities I carried out within the military political department where, in my capacity as president of the Party organisation, I consciously introduced such a dictatorial system'.

And Korondy,[7] said: 'To build up this anti-democratic spirit 661
we even published text-books for the police, copying the text-625
books of the old gendarmerie and police and at the beginning of 1948 compiling the material of the basic examination which was compulsory for all police officers from the old text-books, so that the new police officers could not pass the examination and could be removed from the police force. Through our activities we succeeded in making the training units of the police into an important armed force and because of their convictions they could at any time be utilised against the democracy and the democratic regime'.

It is obvious that Rákosi, Gerö and the other leaders must have known that for nearly five years workers were prevented from gaining high positions in the army and police and that the new text-books for police officers were copies of those used in the old gendarmerie. Pálffy and Korondy, and of course Rajk, merely took upon themselves to be the scapegoats, but in so

[7] [Colonel of Police in testimony at Rajk trial in Budapest.—Analyst]

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[625] doing they revealed the real situation in the army and police.
661 The Rajk trial shows once again that no man or movement can stray from blind obedience to Moscow without being branded as a 'fascist spy'. Two particularly glaring instances were brought out in the trial. One concerned Earl Browder, who for sixteen years was General Secretary of the American Communist Party and was 'unanimously' supported and applauded by all the Communist Parties in the world. Suddenly, without ceremony, when Moscow's line changed, he was removed from the leadership (July, 1945), then expelled from the Party (February, 1946). Szönyi blamed his influence for his own degeneration into an American and Yugoslav spy. He said: 'In this influence the theory of Browder, then leader of the Communist Party of the U.S.A., played a great part. Printed copies of Browder's books in French and German were distributed in great number by Lompar and Field both in Switzerland and in France, on behalf of the American secret service'. And later: 'In 1944 I openly professed views serving the interests of American imperialism. The treacherous theory of Browder played a great part in this.'

The second instance concerns the Zionist movement. This too comes very badly out of the trial, as an agent of American imperialism. The People's Prosecutor, with no relevance to the course of the trial, asks Szönyi: 'You were a member of the Zionist movement?' Szönyi replies: 'As far as I know, Ferenc Vági and György Demeter were members of the Zionist movement. In this connection it is known to me, and I also experienced it in Switzerland, that in general the Zionist movement maintained very close co-operation with the American secret sevrice'.

The defendent Szalai makes an odd amalgam that implicates the Zionist movement. He says: 'I was connected with the Horthy police. Detective Inspector Réti, the head of the political section of the Pécs police, enrolled me in 1933. Since 1930 I had participated in a Trotskyist Zionist movement, in which I received the sort of anti-working-class education that helped Réti's attempt to enroll me'.

The President asks the accused Pál Justus if he was a Zionist; and in case someone should forget that Szalai had been a Zionist, the question is repeated to him.

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642 have been made to the peasants, state cooperatives are still maintained in the heavy grain producing areas by forces other than the peasants' love of the soil and its products.

If the Yugoslav government will learn the meaning of Lord Acton's axiom on the nature of power, and if the West pursues an intelligent, long-range foreign policy supporting Yugoslavia against Soviet aggression, it may be possible to revive in Yugoslavia and hence in the Balkans as a whole the elements of an independent political life.

V

000 The months following the death of Premier Stalin in March 1953, saw a number of internal changes in the various people's democracies. The principal means of coercion and political control nevertheless remained unchanged: the army and the police forces. These were still bound tightly to Russian controls.

177, 70 701 625 The total number of men in the satellite armies available for service with the Soviet army has been estimated at a million and one-half. Since they are not only trained under Soviet commanders, but operate under the Soviet military code, it is possible to state that the Sovietization of the satellite armies has been completed. Together with the armies, the satellite police form the backbone of the Soviet instruments of coercion. Estimated at a total of 700,000 men, police units organized in military formations range in function from the well-known secret police to People's Militia, Frontier Guards, and Railway Guards. Like the satellite armies, the satellite police are governed by Soviet regulations. Together they enforce a system of order which has been designed to conform with the Soviet model.

241 656 In common with Yugoslavia, certain states in the orbit are strengthening the weakest sector of the economy: agriculture. It is not certain that the Yugoslav experience compelled the

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000 the weapons of the dialectician and those of his adversary. A match between the two is like a duel between a foot soldier and a tank. Not that every dialectician is so very intelligent or so very well educated, but all his statements are enriched by the cumulated thought of the masters and their commentators. If every sentence he speaks is compact and effective, that is not due to his own merits, but to those of the classics he has studied. His listeners are defenseless. They could, it is true, resort to arguments derived from their observations of life, but such arguments are just as badly countenanced as any questioning of fundamental methodology. The dialectician rubs up against his public at innumerable meetings of professional organizations and youth groups in clubs, factories, office buildings, and village huts throughout the entire converted area of Europe. And there is no doubt that he emerges the victor in these encounters.

156 It is no wonder that a writer or painter doubts the wis-
626 dom of resistance. If he were sure that art opposed to the official line could have a lasting value, he probably would not hesitate. He would earn his living through some more menial job within his profession, write or paint in his spare time, and never worry about publishing or exhibiting his work. He believes, however, that in most cases such work would be artistically poor, and he is not far wrong. As we have already said, the objective conditions he once knew have disappeared. The objective conditions necessary to the realization of a work of art are, as we know, a highly complex phenomenon, involving one's public, the possibility of contact with it, the general atmosphere, and above all freedom from involuntary subjective control. "I can't write as I would like to," a young Polish poet admitted to me. "My own stream of thought has so many tributaries, that I barely succeed in damming

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off one, when a second, third, or fourth overflows. I get halfway through a phrase, and already I submit it to Marxist criticism. I imagine what X or Y will say about it, and I change the ending."

Paradoxical as it may seem, it is this subjective impotence that convinces the intellectual that the one Method is right. Everything proves it is right. Dialectics: I predict the house will burn; then I pour gasoline over the stove. The house burns; my prediction is fulfilled. Dialectics: I predict that a work of art incompatible with socialist realism will be worthless. Then I place the artist in conditions in which such a work *is* worthless. My prediction is fulfilled.

Let us take poetry as an example. Obviously, there is poetry of political significance. Lyric poetry is permitted to exist on certain conditions. It must be: 1) serene; 2) free of any elements of thought that might trespass against the universally accepted principles (in practice, this comes down to descriptions of nature and of one's feelings for friends and family); 3) understandable. Since a poet who is not allowed to *think* in his verse automatically tends to perfect his form, he is accused of formalism.

It is not only the literature and painting of the people's democracies that prove to the intellectual that *things cannot be different*. He is strengthened in this belief by the news that seeps through from the West. The Western world is the world of Witkiewicz's novel. The number of its aesthetic and philosophical aberrations is myriad. Disciples imitate disciples; the past imitates the past. This world lives as if there had never been a Second World War. Intellectual clans in Eastern Europe know this life, but know it as a stage of the past that isn't worth looking back on. Even if the new problems are so oppressive that they can break a great many people, at least they are con-

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000 try living on remembered glories, be imitated in Prague or Warsaw? Why should English plays, written for a completely different public, be played in these Eastern capitals? One must break that habit of imitation which was inevitable as long as French, English, or Belgian capital, investing in the mines, railroads, and factories of the "Eastern Marches," pushed its books, films, and styles upon them. Just as nationalized industry now stands on its own feet, so Eastern European cultures must learn to stand by their own strength.

626 Unhappily, in freeing themselves from the spell of the West, the literature, science, and art of these Marches[3] became totally dependent on the new metropolis. Once imitation was spontaneous and voluntary, but now it is obligatory. Any attempt to find one's own way is denounced as Titoism. Any attempt to reach into one's own national past is possible only to the extent that that past parallels the development of the Russian nation. One may turn to folklore, obviously, and to the realistic plays of the nineteenth century. But, for example, Poland has a tradition of romantic drama which does not lend itself to realistic representation. It also possesses a tradition of stage production which is known as "monumental theater." To continue such traditions would smack of dangerous heresy. The fight against "cosmopolitanism" is in reality nothing more than the act of emptying a retort and refilling it with a different fluid. In the past, a particular substance was created in this retort through the interaction of native and imported elements. Today the imported element appears in much purer form, for a sufficient number of laboratory workers are eager to maintain the necessary respect for the formula.

186 In the last century, the "decadent West" was condemned by patriotic Russian historians because it was liberal, and

[3] [The "Eastern Marches" --Analyst]

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ever, to proceed somewhat in the manner of a naturalist determining major groups and families.

National Ketman is broadly diffused throughout the masses, and even the upper brackets of the Party in the various dependent states are not free of it. Because Tito, like Sadra, announced his heresy to all the world, millions of human beings in the people's democracies must employ exceedingly ingenious means of masking themselves. Instructive displays of condemnation of those who wished to follow the national road to socialism in individual Eastern capitals taught the public what kind of phrases and reflexes can expose one to reproach for harboring this fatal tendency. The surest safeguard is to manifest loudly one's awe at Russia's achievements in every field of endeavor, to carry Russian books under one's arm, to hum Russian songs, to applaud Russian actors and musicians enthusiastically, etc. A writer who has not consecrated a single work to outstanding Russian figures or to Russian life, but has confined himself to national themes, cannot consider himself entirely safe. The chief characteristic of the people who practice this Ketman is an unbounded contempt for Russia as a barbaric country. Among the workers and peasants it is most often purely emotional, and based on observation of either the soldiers of the liberating army, or (since during the war a great many were in areas directly administered by the Russians) of Russians in their daily life.

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Because until now the living standard of the masses in Russia was so much lower than that of the so-called people's democracies, national Ketman finds abundant nourishment. It cannot be defined simply as nationalism. For many centuries hatred existed between the Central European Slavs and the Germans, still it was colored

[For a definition of "Ketman", see cat. 116, pp. 57-60 -- analyst.]

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186 among the Slavs by a respect for Germany's material
● 626 achievements. On the other hand, perceiving by comparison the greater refinement of his own customs, his greater organizational ability (be it only in respect to transportation or the handling of machinery), the Central European would express his attitude toward Russia, if he could, by a disdainful shrug of his shoulders—which, however, doesn't prevent him from shuddering in fear before the countless hordes pouring out of the Euro-Asian continent.

But this Ketman is not exclusively emotional in its appeal. Amid the young intelligentsia of working-class origin the overwhelming opinion can be summed up shortly as "Socialism—yes, Russia—no"; and this is where the subtleties of doctrinal differences arise. The countries of Europe, this line of reasoning begins, are infinitely more prepared to realize socialism than Russia. Their population is more intelligent; most of their land is under cultivation; their systems of communication and their industry are more highly developed. Measures based on absolute cruelty are unnecessary and even pointless since there exists a greater degree of social discipline. Nevertheless, "the national road to socialism" has been condemned and many efforts made to prove that whoever is opposed to total adaptation to Russian models and to surrendering to Russian dictatorship is a traitor who must share the fate of Tito—that is, must come out against the Center,[1] and thus weaken its war potential without which there can be no revolution on a world scale. To pronounce oneself against this thesis would be to deny the New Faith and to introduce in its place a different faith, for example one directly linked to Marx and Engels. Many do so. Others, seeing in the alliance between Tito and the West an example of historical fatality, and rejecting the idea that this fatality

[1] [i.e. Moscow — Analyst]

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may be due simply to the Center's policy toward dependent nations, shut themselves up in a Ketman which does not hamper the Center in its external acts. A true Moslem, even though he be deeply attached to his Ketman, never seeks to injure Islam in those areas where it is fighting for its life against unbelievers. Such Ketman expresses itself only in practical moves which do no harm in the world struggle, but which on the other hand safeguard national interests whenever possible.

The Ketman of Revolutionary Purity is a rare variety, more common in the large cities of Russia than in the people's democracies. It is based on a belief in the "sacred fire of the revolutionary epoch of Lenin" which burns in such a poet as Mayakovski. Mayakovski's suicide in 1930 marked the end of an era distinguished by the flowering of literature, the theater, and music. The "sacred fire" was dampened, collectivization was introduced mercilessly, millions of Soviet citizens perished in slave labor camps, a ruthless policy toward non-Russian nations was established. Literature became flat and colorless under the influence of imposed theories; Russian painting was destroyed; Russian theater, then the foremost in the world, was deprived of freedom to experiment; science was subjected to directives from Party chiefs. A man who reasons thus hates Him with all his heart, holding Him responsible for the terrible lot of the Russian people and for the hatred they inspire in other nations.

Still, he is not altogether sure whether He is necessary or not. Perhaps in extraordinary periods such as the present the appearance of a tyrant must be considered desirable. Mass purges in which so many good communists died, the lowering of the living standard of the citizens, the reduction of artists and scholars to the status of yes-men, the extermination of entire national groups—what

186 other man would dare undertake such measures? After
● 626 all, Russia stood firm against Hitler; the Revolution weathered the attack of enemy armies. In this perspective, His acts seem effective and even justified, perhaps, by an exceptional historical situation. If He had not instituted an exceptional terror in the year 1937, wouldn't there have been more people willing to help Hitler than there actually were? For example, doesn't the present-day line in scholarship and art, no matter how at odds it may be at times with common sense, effectually raise Russian morale in the face of the war that threatens? He is an infamous blot on the bright New Faith, but a blemish we must tolerate for the moment. And indeed we must even support Him. The "sacred fire" has not gone out. When victory is achieved, it will burst forth again with its old strength, the bonds He imposed will fall away, and relations between nations will operate on new and better principles. This variety of Ketman was widespread if not universal in Russia during the Second World War, and its present form is a rebirth of an already once-deceived hope.

626 *Aesthetic Ketman*[1] is born of the disparity between man's
517 longings and the sense-satisfactions the New Faith offers. A man of taste cannot approve the results of official pressure in the realm of culture no matter how much he applauds the latest verses, how many flattering reviews he writes of current art expositions, nor how studiously he pretends that the gloomy new buildings coincide with his personal preferences in architecture. He changes completely within the four walls of his home. There one finds (if he is a well-situated intellectual) reproductions of works of art officially condemned as bourgeois, records of modern music, and a rich collection of ancient authors in various languages. This luxury of splendid isolation is pardoned him so long as his creative work is effective prop-

[1] [For a definition of "ketman", see cat. 116, pp. 57-60 -- Analyst]

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aganda. To protect his position and his apartment (which he has by the grace of the State), the intellectual is prepared to make any sacrifice or compromise; for the value of privacy in a society that affords little if any isolation is greater than the saying "my home is my castle" can lead one to surmise. Two-way television screens installed in private homes to observe the behavior of citizens in seclusion belong as yet to the future. Hence, by listening to foreign radio stations and reading good books, he profits from a moment of relaxation; that is, of course, if he is alone, for as soon as guests arrive the play begins anew.

Never has there been a close study of how necessary to a man are the experiences which we clumsily call aesthetic. Such experiences are associated with works of art for only an insignificant number of individuals. The majority find pleasure of an aesthetic nature in the mere fact of their existence within the stream of life. In the cities, the eye meets colorful store displays, the diversity of human types. Looking at passers-by, one can guess from their faces the story of their lives. This movement of the imagination when a man is walking through a crowd has an erotic tinge; his emotions are very close to physiological sensations. He rejoices in dresses, in the flash of lights; while, for instance, Parisian markets with their heaps of vegetables and flowers, fish of every shape and hue, fruits, sides of meat dripping with every shade of red offer delights, he need not go seeking them in Dutch or Impressionist painting. He hears snatches of arias, the throbbing of motors mixed with the warble of birds, called greetings, laughter. His nose is assailed by changing odors: coffee, gasoline, oranges, ozone, roasting nuts, perfumes.

Those who have sung of the large cities have consecrated many pages to the description of this joyous immersion in the reservoir of universal life. The swimmer who trusts

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himself to the wave, and senses the immensity of the element that surrounds him lives through a like emotion. I am thinking of such great singers of the city as Balzac, Baudelaire, and Whitman. It would seem that the exciting and invigorating power of this participation in mass life springs from the feeling of *potentiality*, of constant unexpectedness, of a mystery one ever pursues.

Even the life of the peasants, though it be dulled by brutalizing hand labor, allows for aesthetic expression in the rhythm of custom, the rites of the church, holy pictures, country fairs, native costumes, paper flower decorations, folk sculptures, music, and dances.

In the countries of the New Faith the cities lose their former aspect. The liquidation of small private enterprises gives the streets a stiff and institutional look. The chronic lack of consumer goods renders the crowds uniformly gray and uniformly indigent. When consumer products do appear, they are of a single second-rate quality. Fear paralyzes individuality and makes people adjust themselves as much as possible to the average type in their gestures, clothing, and facial expressions. Cities become filled with the racial type well-regarded by the rulers: short, square men and women, with short legs and wide hips. This is the proletarian type, cultivated to an extreme, thanks to binding aesthetic standards. (We know that these same dumpy women and stocky men could change completely under the influence of films, painting, and fashion, for America has proved that mass communication is at least as important as diet in determining physical appearance.) Streets, factories, and meeting places sport the inevitable red flags and painted slogans. The new buildings are monumental and oppressive, lightness and charm in architecture being condemned as formalistic. The number of aesthetic experiences accessible to a city-dweller in the

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countries of the New Faith is uncommonly limited. The only place of magic is the theater, for the spell of the theater exists even though confined by the commands of socialist realism which define both the contents of a play and stage décor. The tremendous popular success of authors like Shakespeare is due to the fact that their fantasy triumphs even within the bounds of naturalistic stage setting. The hunger for *strangeness* that is so great inside the Imperium should give the rulers pause; yet in all probability it does not, for they consider such longings derelicts from the past.

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In the villages, where the entire former pattern of custom is to be abolished through the transformation of peasants into agricultural workers, there still remain survivals of the individual peasant cultures which slowly stratified over the centuries. Still, let us speak frankly, the main supports of this culture were usually the wealthier peasants. The battle against them, and their subsequent need to hide, must lead to the atrophy of peasant dress, decoration of huts, cultivation of private gardens, etc. There is a definite contradiction between the official protection of folklore (as a harmless form of national culture designed to satisfy patriotic tendencies) and the necessities of the new economic structure.

In these conditions aesthetic Ketman has every possibility of spreading. It is expressed not only in that unconscious longing for strangeness which is channeled toward controlled amusements like theater, film, and folk festivals, but also into various forms of escapism. Writers burrow into ancient texts, comment upon and re-edit ancient authors. They write children's books so that their fancy may have slightly freer play. Many choose university careers because research into literary history offers a safe pretext for plunging into the past and for converse

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626 with works of great aesthetic value. The number of trans-
517 lators of former prose and poetry multiplies. Painters seek an outlet for their interests in illustrations for children's books, where the choice of gaudy colors can be justified by an appeal to the "naïve" imagination of children. Stage managers, doing their duty by presenting bad contemporary works, endeavor to introduce into their repertoires the plays of Lope de Vega or Shakespeare—that is, those of their plays which are approved by the Center.[1]

Some representatives of the plastic arts are so daring that they reveal their Ketman to no small degree by proclaiming the need of an aesthetic of everyday life, and by establishing special institutes to design fabrics, furniture, glass, and ceramics for industry. There is money for such enterprises, and they find support among the most intelligent dialecticians of the upper circles of the Party. Such efforts deserve respect when one considers that before the Second World War Poland and Czechoslovakia were, aside from Sweden and Finland, the leading countries in interior decoration. Nevertheless, there is no reason why that which passes as formalism in painting and architecture should be tolerated for any length of time in the applied arts.

The rationalization of aesthetic Ketman is obvious: since everything is planned in a socialist economy, why not proceed to a planned satisfaction of the aesthetic needs of human beings? Here, however, we trespass upon the treacherous territory of the demon, Psychology. To admit that a man's eye has need of exultant colors, harmonious forms, or light sunny architecture is to affirm that the taste of the Center is bad. However, even there one can see some progress. They are already erecting skyscrapers patterned after the buildings raised in Chicago about the year 1900. It is possible that in the year 2000 they will officially introduce art forms that today are considered

[1] [Moscow -- Analyst]

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modern in the West. But how can one still the thought 626 that aesthetic experiences arise out of something organic, 517 and that the union of color and harmony with fear is as difficult to imagine as brilliant plumage on birds living in the northern tundras?

Professional Ketman[1] is reasoned thus: since I find myself in circumstances over which I have no control, and 626 155 since I have but one life and that is fleeting, I should strive to do my best. I am like a crustacean attached to a crag on the bottom of the sea. Over me storms rage and huge ships sail; but my entire effort is concentrated upon clinging to the rock, for otherwise I will be carried off by the waters and perish, leaving no trace behind. If I am a scientist I attend congresses at which I deliver reports strictly adhering to the Party line. But in the laboratory I pursue my research according to scientific methods, and in that alone lies the aim of life. If my work is successful, it matters little how it will be presented and toward whose glory. Discoveries made in the name of a disinterested search for truth are lasting, whereas the shrieks of politicians pass. I must do all they demand, they may use my name as they wish, as long as I have access to a laboratory and money for the purchase of scientific instruments.

If I am a writer, I take pride in my literary achievements. Here, for example, is my treatise on Swift, a Marxist analysis. This type of analysis, which is not synonymous with the Method or the New Faith, makes possible a keen penetration into historical events. Marx had a genius for observation. In following him one is secure against attack, for he is, after all, the prophet; and one can proclaim one's belief in the Method and the New Faith in a preface fulfilling much the same function as dedications to kings or tsars in times past. Here is my translation of a sixteenth-century poem, or my novel

[1] [For a definition of "Ketman," see cat. 116, pp. 57-60 - Analyst]

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• 626 whose scene is laid in the distant past. Aren't they of per-
155 manent value? Here are my translations from Russian. They are viewed with approbation and have brought me a large sum of money, but certainly Pushkin is a great poet, and his worth is not altered by the fact that today his poems serve Him as a means of propaganda. Obviously I must pay for the right to practice my profession with a certain number of articles and odes in the way of tribute. Still one's life on earth is not judged by transitory panegyrics written out of necessity.

These two examples of professional Ketman should demonstrate how little discomfort it creates for the rulers. It is the source of considerable dynamic force and one cause of the tremendous impetus toward education. The object is to establish some special field in which one can release one's energies, exploit one's knowledge and sensibility, and at the same time escape the fate of a functionary entirely at the mercy of political fluctuations. The son of a worker who becomes a chemist makes a *permanent* advance. The son of a worker who becomes a member of the security police rises to the surface, where large ships sail but where the sea is changeable and stormy. But most important of all, chemical experiments, bridges, translations of poetry, and medical care are exceptionally free of falsity. The State, in its turn, takes advantage of this Ketman because it needs chemists, engineers, and doctors. From time to time, it is true, there come from above muffled grumbles of hatred against those who practice Ketman in the realm of humanistic studies. Fadeyev, Moscow's literary overseer, attacked the University of Leningrad because one of its students had written a dissertation on the English poet, Walter Savage Landor. "Who needs Landor? Who ever heard of him?" cried Fadeyev. So it would

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seem that moderation and watchfulness are indicated for those who espouse this form of Ketman. 626 155

Sceptical Ketman is widely disseminated throughout intellectual circles. One argues that humanity does not know how to handle its knowledge or how to resolve the problems of production and division of goods. The first scientific attempts to solve social problems, made in the nineteenth century, are interesting but not precise enough. They happened, however, into the hands of the Russians who, unable to think otherwise than dogmatically, raised these first attempts to the dignity of dogma. What is happening in Russia and the countries dependent upon her bespeaks a kind of insanity, but it is not impossible that Russia will manage to impose her insanity upon the whole world and that the return to reason will occur only after two or three hundred years. Finding oneself in the very midst of an historical cyclone, one must behave as prudently as possible, yielding externally to forces capable of destroying all adversaries. This does not prevent one from taking pleasure in one's observations, since what one beholds is indeed unprecedented. Surely man has never before been subjected to such pressure, never has he had to writhe and wriggle so to adapt himself to forms constructed according to the books but obviously not to his size. All his intellectual and emotional capacities are put to the test.

Whoever contemplates this daily sight of repudiation and humiliation knows more about man than an inhabitant of the West who feels no pressure other than that of money. The accumulating of this store of observations is the activity of a miser who counts his treasure in secret. Since this Ketman is based on a total lack of belief in the Method, it helps one conform externally to the obligatory

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626 155 line by allowing for complete cynicism, and therefore for elasticity in adjusting oneself to changing tactics.

626 779 *Metaphysical Ketman*[1] occurs generally in countries with a Catholic past. Most examples of it within the Imperium are found in Poland. This Ketman depends upon a *suspended* belief in a metaphysical principle of the world. A man attached to this Ketman regards the epoch in which he lives as anti-metaphysical, and hence as one in which no metaphysical faith can emerge. Humanity is learning to think in rationalistic and materialistic categories; it is burdened with immediate problems and entangled in a class war. Other-worldly religions are crumbling, living through a period of crisis and, what is worse, serving to defend the obsolete order. This does not mean that mankind will not return to a better and purified religion in the future. Perhaps the New Faith is an indispensable purgatory; perhaps God's purpose is being accomplished through the barbarians, i.e. the Center,[2] who are forcing the masses to awaken out of their lethargy. The spiritual fare these masses receive from the New Faith is inferior and insufficient. Still one must commend the Center for breaking new ground and for demolishing externally splendid but internally rotten façades. One should cooperate in this task without betraying one's attachment to the Mystery. All the more so because the Mystery has no possibility of appearing in literature, for example, and because neither the language nor the ideas at the disposal of contemporary man are ripe enough to express it.

This metaphysical Ketman in its turn has a number of varieties. Certain practicing Catholics serve even in the security police, and *suspend* their Catholicism in executing their inhumane work. Others, trying to maintain a Christian community in the bosom of the New Faith, come out publicly as Catholics. They often succeed in preserving

[1] [For a definition of Ketman, see cat 116, no 5760 Analyst]
[2] [Moscow — Analyst]

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Catholic institutions, because the dialecticians are ready to accept so-called "progressive" and "patriotic" Catholics who comply in political matters. The mutual game is rather ambiguous. The rulers tolerate such Catholics as a temporary and necessary evil, reasoning that the stage has not yet arrived at which one can utterly wipe out religion, and that it is better to deal with accommodating bigots than with refractory ones. "Progressive Catholics" are, however, conscious of being relegated to a not particularly honorable place, that of shamans or witch-doctors from savage tribes whom one humors until one can dress them in trousers and send them to school. They appear in various state spectacles and are even sent abroad as shining testimonials to the Center's tolerance toward uncivilized races. One can compare their function to that of "noble savages" imported to the metropolis by colonial powers for state occasions. Their defense against total degradation is metaphysical Ketman: they swindle the devil who thinks he is swindling them. But the devil knows what they think and is satisfied.

What holds for such Catholics can be applied to members of other religions, as well as to persons outside any denomination. One of the most ominous reproaches leveled against writers is the suspicion that their verses, plays, or novels contain a "metaphysical residue." Since a writer is a civilizer who dares not be a shaman or a sorcerer, the slightest signs of a metaphysical tendency in him are unforgivable. The literature of the countries which, until the Second World War, were free from Moscow's domination betrayed especially strong inclinations in that direction, so that metaphysical deviation is of constant and imperative concern to the rulers. For instance, a play that introduces "strangeness," revealing the author's interest in the tragedy of life, has no chance of being produced be-

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626 cause the tragedy of human fate leads to thoughts about
779 the mystery of human destiny. One forgives certain writers like Shakespeare these predispositions, but there is no question of permitting any contemporary author to harbor them. It is for this reason that Greek tragedies are not deemed suitable for theater repertoires. Marx loved the Greek tragedians, but let us not forget that the connection between the New Faith and Marx is rather superficial.

517 The New Faith is a Russian creation, and the Russian
636 intelligentsia which shaped it had developed the deepest contempt for all art that does not serve social ends directly. Other social functions of art, probably the most important ones, consistently escaped its understanding. As for poetry, since its sources are hard to differentiate from the sources of all religion, it is singularly exposed to persecution. True, the poet is free to describe hills, trees, and flowers, but if he should feel that boundless exaltation in the face of nature that seized Wordsworth on his visit to Tintern Abbey, he is at once suspect. This is an excellent means of eliminating the legions of bad poets who like to confess their pantheistic flights publicly, but it is also a means of exterminating poetry as a whole and replacing it by jingles little better than the singing commercials broadcast over the radio in America. A painter, in turn, may be attacked quite as easily for using abbreviated and synthesized forms (formalism), as for an excessive love of the beauty of the world, i.e. a contemplative attitude which signifies that he is a metaphysicist by temperament. A musician should see to it that his compositions are easy to translate into the language of common activities (enthusiasm for work, folk festivities, etc.), and that no element remains which is difficult to grasp and hence dangerous. If metaphysical Ketman is tolerated in the "savages," i.e. those who profess the Christian religion, in the artists

who are considered the educators of society, it is severely punished. 517 626

Ethical Ketman[1] results from opposition to the ethics of the New Faith, which is based on the principle that good and evil are definable solely in terms of service or harm to the interests of the Revolution. Since exemplary behavior of citizens in their inter-relations aids the cause of socialism, great emphasis is placed upon individual morality. 626 577

"The development of a new man" is the key point in the New Faith's program. Demands made upon Party members are exceedingly harsh. One exacts of them no small degree of abstinence. As a result, admission to the Party is not unlike entrance into a religious order; and the literature of the New Faith treats this act with a gravity equal to that with which Catholic literature speaks of the vows of young nuns. The higher one stands in the Party hierarchy, the more attentively is one's private life supervised. Love of money, drunkenness, or a confused love-life disqualify a Party member from holding important offices. Hence the upper brackets of the Party are filled by ascetics devoted to the single cause of Revolution. As for certain human tools, deprived of real influence but useful because of their names, even if they belong to the Party one tolerates or sometimes encourages their weaknesses, for they constitute a guarantee of obedience. The general ethical ideal of the New Faith is puritanical. If it were feasible to lodge all the citizens in cells and release them only for work or for political meetings, that would undoubtedly be most desirable. But alas, one must make concessions to human nature. Procreation is possible only as a result of sexual relations between men and women, and one must take this inconvenience into account.

The "new man" is conditioned to acknowledge the

[1] [For a definition of "Ketman, see cat. 116, pp. 57-60.--Analyst]

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626 577 good of the whole as the sole norm of his behavior. He thinks and reacts like others; is modest, industrious, satisfied with what the state gives him; limits his private life to nights spent at home, and passes all the rest of his time amidst his companions at work or at play, observing them carefully and reporting their actions and opinions to the authorities. Informing was and is known in many civilizations, but the New Faith declares it a cardinal virtue of the good citizen (though the name itself is carefully avoided). It is the basis of each man's fear of his fellow-men. Work in an office or factory is hard not only because of the amount of labor required, but even more because of the need to be on guard against omnipresent and vigilant eyes and ears. After work one goes to political meetings or special lectures, thus lengthening a day that is without a moment of relaxation or spontaneity. The people one talks with may seem relaxed and careless, sympathetic and indignant, but if they appear so, it is only to arouse corresponding attitudes and to extract confidences which they can report to their superiors.

In effect this cult of the community produces something which poisons the community itself. The mentality of the Party's sages is, indeed, rather strange. They make concessions to physiological human weaknesses, but they refuse to admit that man has other foibles as well: that he feels fine when he can relax, and unhappy when he is afraid, that lying is bad for him because it creates internal tension. These weaknesses, together with others like the desire to better one's own lot at the expense of one's fellow-men, transform the ethic which was originally founded on cooperation and brotherhood into an ethic of a war pitting all men against all others, and granting the greatest chances of survival to the craftiest. Victory in this new struggle seems to belong to a breed different

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from that which was favored to win in the battle for money in the early days of industrial capitalism. If biting dogs can be divided into two main categories, noisy and brutal, or silent and slyly vicious, then the second variety would seem most privileged in the countries of the New Faith. Forty or fifty years of education in these new ethical maxims must create a new and irretrievable species of mankind. The "new man" is not merely a postulate. He is beginning to become a reality.

Ethical Ketman is not rare among highly placed figures in the Party. These persons, no matter how capable they are of murdering millions of people in the name of Communism, try to compensate for their professional severity and are often more honorable in their personal relations than people who affect individualistic ethics. Their capacity to sympathize and help is almost unlimited. Indeed this very feeling of compassion pushed them onto the road of revolution in their youth, and in this they reiterated the experience of Marx himself. One finds this Ketman chiefly among the old Communists. Conflicts between friendship and the interests of the Revolution are matters they weigh at length in their conscience; and they are pitiless only when completely convinced that, in shielding a friend or in refraining from denouncing him, they are injuring that cause which is most precious to them. Though they are usually esteemed as people of crystalline righteousness, they are not safe from frequent accusations of "intellectuality," a contemptuous epithet for those who are blameless as theoreticians, but hampered in action by an over-sensitivity to ethical considerations. A revolutionary should be without scruples. It is better to cut down human trees blindly than to wonder which among them are really rotten.

This variety of Ketman is one of the most prevalent in

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626 517 the people's democracies because the new ethic is of recent inculcation, whereas the ethic vanquished by the New Faith was ensconced there for centuries. One can never foresee when and in whom this Ketman will appear, which makes for an element of surprise. Individuals who give one every reason to suppose that they do not denounce others turn out to be inveterate informers; individuals who are apparently most indifferent to "prejudices," show themselves inexplicably loyal toward their friends and even toward strangers. Since this Ketman augments the difficulties of controlling the citizens' thoughts, it is diligently sought out and penalized; yet the number of situations to which it can be applied is so great that it often eludes all manner of pressure.

The inhabitants of Western countries little realize that millions of their fellow-men, who seem superficially more or less similar to them, live in a world as fantastic as that of the men from Mars. They are unaware of the perspectives on human nature that Ketman opens. Life in constant internal tension develops talents which are latent in man. He does not even suspect to what heights of cleverness and psychological perspicacity he can rise when he is cornered and must either be skillful or perish. The survival of those best adapted to mental acrobatics creates a human type that has been rare until now. The necessities which drive men to Ketman sharpen the intellect.

626 517 Whoever would take the measure of intellectual life in the countries of Central or Eastern Europe from the monotonous articles appearing in the press or the stereotyped speeches pronounced there, would be making a grave error. Just as theologians in periods of strict orthodoxy expressed their views in the rigorous language of the Church, so the writers of the people's democracies make use of an accepted special style, terminology, and linguis-

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tic ritual. What is important is not what someone said but 626 ●
what he wanted to say, disguising his thought by remov- 517
ing a comma, inserting an "and," establishing this rather than another sequence in the problems discussed. Unless one has lived there one cannot know how many titanic battles are being fought, how the heroes of Ketman are falling, what this warfare is being waged over. Obviously, people caught up in this daily struggle are rather contemptuous of their compatriot political émigrés. A surgeon cannot consider a butcher his equal in dexterity; just so a Pole, Czech, or Hungarian practiced in the art of dissimulation smiles when he learns that someone in the emigration has called him a traitor (or a swine) at the very moment when this traitor (or swine) is engaged in a match of philosophical chess on whose outcome the fate of fifteen laboratories or twenty ateliers depends. They do not know how one pays—those abroad do not know. They do not know what one buys, and at what price.

Ketman as a social institution is not entirely devoid of 000
advantages. In order to evaluate them, one need only look at life in the West. Westerners, and especially Western intellectuals, suffer from a special variety of *taedium vitae;* their emotional and intellectual life is too dispersed. Everything they think and feel evaporates like steam in an open expanse. Freedom is a burden to them. No conclusions they arrive at are binding: it may be so, then again it may not. The result is a constant uneasiness. The happiest of them seem to be those who become Communists. They live within a wall which they batter themselves against, but which provides them with a resistance that helps them define themselves. Steam that once evaporated into the air becomes a force under pressure. An even greater energy is generated in those who must hide their Communist convictions, that is, who must practice Ketman, a

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ways served as a tool; their leaders, most often of non- 565
peasant origin have used them for their own ends. The power of the peasants lies in their number; it is a power only when a man like Lenin comes along and throws the weight of their numbers into the scale of events. Obviously, peasants can cause trouble in such moments of upheaval as wars. As long as a private peasant economy exists it acts as a natural base for partisan operations. A peasant hut is the ideal place for partisans to eat, sleep, and work out plans of action. Therefore, a collective farm, where a man's every step is easy to trace, guarantees a degree of control that is indispensable if one wants to preclude hostile underground activity.

Workers are far more important than peasants. Most 565
of them are antagonistic to the new system. That is under- 626
standable. They resent the norms they must fill. Those norms are constantly rising. Though the "solidarity of the workers" makes a fine slogan, it does not mean that the solidarity of the crews in a factory is to be tolerated. Their ranks are split by the institution of "shock-workers" which is fostered by an appeal to ambition and enforced by pressure from members of the Party cell. A man may at first refuse to become a shock-worker. But gradually he learns it does not pay to be stubborn; because when workers are being chosen for a course in bookkeeping, for instance, his application is rejected, or when his turn comes for a free vacation he is declared ineligible, etc.

The attitude of the workers toward the regime is ambiv- 464
alent. On the one hand, they prize its positive contribu- 565
tions. Unemployment is a thing of the past; in fact, there is a constant lack of skilled labor. Not only the head of a family but most of its members are employed. This accumulation of wages means that a family would be able to live better than ever before if only the stores were fairly

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homemade means they can devise. Production comes first, 565
even at the price of using up the machines. Discipline is 466
severe; negligence or even a few minutes' lateness are strictly punished. No wonder, then, that the bad side of the system outweighs the good in the worker's mind. Still, he dares not complain. If he betrays any signs of discontent the security police, whose secret agents are his co-workers and sometimes his friends, takes care of him.

The wildcat strikes that break out from time to time 565
are no threat in themselves, for peace returns quickly 468
after mass arrests of all participants. They are, however, ominous signs that discontentment has reached a tension that can find release only in desperate acts. A strike requires a certain minimum of organization. That is why nothing else makes Party dialecticians so uneasy. The workers are the only class capable of organized action—that Marxist principle has never been forgotten. No action, however, is possible without leaders. If the leaders reason correctly, that is, if they understand the necessities of the historic process, then the workers as a mass will be unable to protest.

Everything, thus, takes us back to the question of mas- 626
tery over the mind. Every possible opportunity for educa- 535
tion and advancement is offered to the more energetic and active individuals among the workers. The new, incredibly extensive bureaucracy is recruited from among the young people of working-class origin. The road before them is open, open but guarded: their thinking must be based on the firm principles of dialectical materialism. Schools, theaters, films, painting, literature, and the press all shape their thinking.

We should also call attention to a new institution, the 575
"club," whose significance is comparable to that of the 636
chapel in the middle ages. It exists in every factory, ev-

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575 ery school, every office. On its walls hang portraits of
● 626 Party leaders draped with red bunting. Every few days, meetings following pre-arranged agendas take place, meetings that are as potent as religious rites. The Catholic Church wisely recognized that faith is more a matter of collective suggestion than of individual conviction. Collective religious ceremonies induce a state of belief. Folding one's hands in prayer, kneeling, singing hymns *precede* faith, for faith is a psycho-physical and not simply a psychological phenomenon. Edward Gibbon, describing the effects of Theodosius's decrees forbidding pagan rites (*The Decline and Fall of the Roman Empire*, Chapter XXVIII), says: "The devotion of the poet, or the philosopher, may be secretly nourished by prayer, meditation, and study; but the exercise of public worship appears to be the only solid foundation of the religious sentiments of the people, which derive their force from imitation and habit. The interruption of that public exercise may consummate, in the period of a few years, the important work of a national revolution. The memory of theological opinions cannot long be preserved, without the artificial helps of priests, of temples, and of books. The ignorant vulgar, whose minds are still agitated by the blind hopes and terrors of superstition, will be soon persuaded by their superiors to direct their vows to the reigning deities of the age; and will insensibly imbibe an ardent zeal for the support and propagation of the new doctrine, which spiritual hunger at first compelled them to accept." The Party has learned this wise lesson from the Church. People who attend a "club" submit to a collective rhythm, and so come to feel that it is absurd to think differently from the collective. The collective is composed of units that doubt; but as these individuals pronounce the ritual phrases and sing the ritual songs, they create a collective aura to which they

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in turn surrender. Despite its apparent appeal to reason, 515
the "club's" activity comes under the heading of collec- 626
tive magic. The rationalism of the doctrine is fused with sorcery, and the two strengthen each other. Free discussion is, of course, eliminated. If what the doctrine proclaims is as true as the fact that 2 × 2 equals 4, to tolerate the opinion that 2 × 2 equals 5 would be indecent.

From his first day in school, the young citizen receives 626
an education based on this truth. There is a great differ- 816
ence between schools in the people's democracies and schools in the West, for example the schools I attended in pre-war Poland. My friends and I were exposed to a dual 829
system of values. Mathematics, physics, and biology taught us scientific laws, and inculcated respect for a materialistic outlook inherited from the nineteenth century. History and Letters seemed to elude scientific laws, while the history of the Catholic Church and Apologetics cast doubt, though often naïvely, on what physics and biology taught. In the people's democracies, the materialistic outlook of the nineteenth century has been extended consistently to every subject; history and every branch of human creativity are presented as governed by unshakeable and *already known* laws.

In the nineteenth century, with the rise of literacy, brochures popularizing scientific theories made their appearance. Regardless of the intrinsic worth of these theories, we must grant that from the moment they take on a popular form they become something other than what they were as hypotheses of scientific research. For example, the simplified and vulgarized version of Darwin's theory of the origin of species and the struggle for existence is not the same concept that it was for Darwin or for his scholarly opponents. It takes on emotional coloration, and changes into an important sociological element.

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reflexes, was a deeply religious man. Moscow caused him 779
no trouble over this because he was an eminent scientist and because he was old. The creator of the theory of conditioned reflexes—the very theory that constitutes one of the strongest arguments against the existence of some sort of constant called "human nature"! The defenders of religion maintain that this "human nature" cannot change completely; that gods and churches have existed over thousands of years and in all kinds of civilizations, and that one can expect this to be true of the future as well. What went on in Professor Pavlov's head if two systems of concepts, one scientific and one religious, existed simultaneously there?

The Party teaches that "existence shapes consciousness," 659
that circumstances alter men. But it matters little whether religious drives result from "human nature" or from centuries of conditioning; they exist. During the war against Hitler, the Soviet Union had to dust off its priests as well as appeal to nationalistic feelings. When imminent death brings that moment of absurd revelation that *everything is senseless,* dialectical materialism suddenly discloses its mathematical structure. Man falls from the industriously built bridges. He prefers to surrender to the magic of icons.

In its own fashion, the Party too is a church. Its dictator- 626 •
ship over the earth and its transformation of the human 779
species depend on the success with which it can channel 659
irrational human drives and use them to its own ends. No, logical arguments are not enough. "Club" ceremonies, poetry, novels, films are so important because they reach deeper into the stratum on which the emotional conflict rages. No other church can be tolerated; Christianity is 779
Public Enemy No. 1. It fosters all the skepticism of the 829
masses as to the radical transformation of mankind. If,

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exist, how can he gaze indifferently at the suffering of 779
people whose only sin was that they blocked the path of 829
"historical processes"? To lull his conscience he resorts to the thesis that a reactionary cannot be a good man.

Who is the reactionary? Everyone who opposes the in- 626 ●
evitable historical processes, i.e. the Politburo police. The thesis of the "sin of the reactionary" is argued very cleverly: every perception is "oriented," i.e. at the very moment of perceiving we introduce our ideas into the material of our observations; only he sees reality truly who evaluates it in terms of the interests of the class that is the lever of the future, i.e. the proletariat. The writings of Lenin and Stalin teach us what the interests of the proletariat are. Whoever sees reality otherwise than as the proletariat sees it falsely; in other words, his picture of reality is deformed by the pressure of the interests of classes that are backward and so destined to disappear. Whoever sees the world falsely necessarily acts badly; whoever acts badly is a bad man; therefore the reactionary is a bad man, and one should not feel sorry for him.

This line of reasoning has at least one flaw—it ignores the facts. The pressure of an all-powerful totalitarian state creates an emotional tension in its citizens that determines their acts. When people are divided into "loyalists" and "criminals" a premium is placed on every type of conformist, coward, and hireling; whereas among the "criminals" one finds a singularly high percentage of people who are direct, sincere, and true to themselves. From the social point of view these persons would constitute the best guarantee that the future development of the social organism would be toward good. From the Christian point of view they have no other sin on their conscience save their contempt for Caesar, or their incorrect evaluation of his might.

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what to say. Logically, everything is as it should be. From 156
the philosophical premises to the collectivization of the farms, everything makes up a single closed whole, a solid and imposing pyramid. The lone individual inevitably asks himself if his antagonism is not wrong; all he can oppose to the entire propaganda apparatus are simply his irrational desires. Should he not, in fact, be ashamed of them?

The Party is vigilantly on guard lest these longings 626 •
be transmuted into new and vital intellectual formulas adapted to new conditions and therefore capable of winning over the masses. Neither the reaction nor the Church are as great a menace as is *heresy*. If men familiar with dialectics and able to present dialectical materialism in a new light appear, they must be rendered harmless at once. A professor of philosophy who clings to obsolete "idealistic" concepts is not particularly dangerous. He loses his lectureship, but he is allowed to earn a living by editing texts, etc. Whereas a professor who, using the names of Marx and Engels, permits himself departures from orthodoxy sows seeds from which alarming crops may grow.

Only the bourgeois persists in thinking that nothing results from these nuances of thought. The Party knows that much can come of them: there was a time when the Revolution was merely a nuance in the thinking of a little group of theoreticians led by Lenin, quarreling around a café table in Switzerland. The most neuralgic points of the doctrine are philosophy, literature, the history of art, and literary criticism; those are the points where man in his unfortunate complexity enters the equation. The difference of a tiny fraction in the premises yields dizzying differences after the calculation is completed. A deviation from the line in the evaluation of some work of art may

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626 become the leaven of a political upheaval. The Party rightly and logically condemned the foremost Marxist literary scholar of the twentieth century, the Hungarian professor Lukacs. Deep, hidden reasons lay behind the enthusiasm his works aroused in the Marxists of the people's democracies. They saw in him the harbinger of a new philosophy and a new literature. The dislike of "socialist realism" that he betrayed corresponded to the belief, prevalent in the first years after the Second World War, that in the people's democracies the science of Marx and Engels would blaze new paths, unknown in Russia. Because Lukacs expressed this belief in his books, the Party had no course but to stigmatize him.

When one considers the matter logically, it becomes obvious that intellectual terror is a principle that Leninism-Stalinism can never forsake, even if it should achieve victory on a world scale. The enemy, in a potential form, will *always* be there; the only friend will be the man who accepts the doctrine 100 per cent. If he accepts only 99 per cent, he will necessarily have to be considered a foe, for from that remaining 1 per cent a new church can arise. The explanation Stalinists often advance, that this is only a *stage* resulting from "capitalist encirclement," is self-contradictory. The concept of a *stage* presupposes planning from the top, absolute control now and always. Eastern rulers are aware of this contradiction. If they were not, they would not have to present forced participation in clubs and parades, forced voting for a single list, forced raising of production norms, etc. as spontaneous and voluntary acts. This is a dark, unpleasant point for even the most passionate believers.

This way of posing the problem discloses the madness of the doctrines. Party dialecticians know that similar attempts on the part of other orthodoxies have always

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178 iron as well as consumer goods and benefited by the large
433 market that the empire provided. Significant industrial development also took place in Hungary and in other parts of the empire. Similarly, in Russian Poland important industries were developed, but these suffered from the discriminatory policy of the Russian government and from the lack of communications.

457 Capital for the economic development of this region came
471 chiefly from France until the 1890's, when German and Austrian capital became increasingly active. In Eastern Europe in general, and particularly in the Balkans, loans had as much a political as an economic incentive. Since the credit of Serbia, Bulgaria, and Rumania was poor, the bondholders were able to insist on a variety of controls to assure payment. Although a substantial amount of this capital was used to finance armament and eventually wars, investments of permanent value were also made. Notable among these was the railroad from Vienna to Constantinople, completed in 1888, which with its branches formed the backbone of the transportation system of Southeastern Europe.

III

186 Collective security and economic interdependence, as
•631 these terms are understood today, were certainly among the motives of the various plans for regional organization proposed for Eastern Europe in the century before the First World War. Yet the nineteenth century was for Europe an age in which war was the exception rather than the rule and national frontiers were not the barriers to trade and to the movements of peoples that they have since become. Although motives of power politics in the modern sense were always present, regionalism in this era was also concerned

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with the reconciliation of national differences through federal arrangements and with the broader cultural relationships of peoples with a common linguistic heritage. The most readily identifiable of these proposals are those associated with the Panslav movement, the plans for the reorganization of the Habsburg empire, and the federation schemes of the independent Danubian states None of these projects embraced the entire region of Eastern Europe as it is understood today, but all were inspired by ideas relevant to the problems faced by this region in the twentieth century. /86 631

The many-sided Panslav movement in its modern form can be traced to the new interest in Slavic history and languages shown by German scholars at the end of the eighteenth century. A realization of their cultural heritage was soon aroused among Slavic intellectual leaders, and it exerted a powerful stimulus to nationalism among the Poles, Czechs, and Croatians. Certain Polish thinkers in the first hopeful years after the settlement of 1815 favored Polish-Russian cooperation as a basis for Slavic unity, but in a few decades the Poles were seeking the aid of their fellow Slavs in the West against Russian oppression. The map and statistics of Slavic peoples published by the Slovak scholar, Šafařik, in 1842 were widely greeted as a revelation of Slavic strength, and in the revolutionary year of 1848 a congress was held in Prague to rally the peoples of the Slavic world. This rather haphazard gathering revealed the political weakness of Panslavism, but it produced some noble statements of individual and national rights and strengthened the self-confidence of the Slavic peoples as to their contribution to European civilization. In publicizing the views of the non-Russian Slavic leaders at the height of their liberal phase, the congress thus served a purpose. Although Slavic nationalism took precedence over liberalism in the latter half of the century, the ideas expounded at Prague in 1848 were never entirely forgotten. /86 648

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186 668 648 Much more was heard about Panslavism between 1848 and 1914, but during this period it was used primarily as a weapon of Russian expansionism. The Slavic movement evolved in Russia early in the century under the name of Slavophilism and, with the founding of a Slavic committee in Moscow in 1857, it entered a Panslav phase. In 1867 non-Russian Slavs were summoned to a congress in Moscow in connection with a Slav ethnographic exhibition, and at this meeting it was not difficult to discern the expansionist tendencies of Russian Panslavism. During the Russian-Turkish war of 1876-78, this movement developed into an outburst of emotional imperialism, and much was said of bringing all Slavs together under Russian rule. European power politics prevented an undue extension of Russian influence in 1878, but Panslavism came to serve Russian policy and was directed increasingly against the Habsburg empire. This trend was particularly evident at the third Panslav Congress held in Prague in 1908. Although the Russian constitutional reforms of 1905-06 made a favorable impression on non-Russian Slavs and brought about some real concessions to the Polish minority, Russian foreign policy never gave up the idea of pushing the Russian frontier to the West. Had the Tsarist regime survived the First World War it would certainly have demanded that large parts of Eastern Europe be annexed or brought into a satellite relationship, and a liberal Russian government might also have favored the Westward expansion of Russian influence.

•631 642 The multinational empire of the Habsburgs offered the most challenging problem to the federalists, and the proposals for its constitutional reorganization were varied and ingenious, Of the many ideas arising out of the revolution of 1848, the most comprehensive was the constitution drafted by the freely elected Austrian assembly. After this assembly

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was transferred from revolutionary Vienna in October 1848, 631
it met for four months in the Moravian town of Kremsier and 642
drafted a federal constitution that had the twin virtues of coming from a free assembly and of granting equality to all national groups in the empire. Under this scheme thirty-nine nationally homogeneous districts (*Kreise*) were to be created within the existing crownlands of Austria. The lower chamber of a bicameral parliament was to be elected by universal male suffrage, thus guaranteeing to the different nationalities a voice in national affairs, and the individual districts were to have extensive rights or local self-government. The Kremsier assembly was dissolved before the draft constitution was formally adopted, but many students believe it plotted a course that might have saved the empire had the Germans become reconciled to the fact of their numerical minority.

Two decades of experimentation with various forms of 642
centralism failed to strengthen the empire and, with the 563
Austro-Hungarian compromise of 1867 and the agreement between Hungary and Croatia in the following year, a new era of federalism was inaugurated. The balance established within the empire in 1867, though modified by concessions to the Poles and Czechs in Austria, favored the Magyars to a point that the Slav and Rumanian minorities could not tolerate permanently. In the face of Magyar resistance, constitutional amendment was not practicable before the defeat of the empire in 1918, but many proposals for reform were put forward. The Austrian Social Democrats, for instance, adopted a program in 1899 that called for creation within the empire of autonomous and nationally homogeneous territories with extensive rights of self-government. Nevertheless, their own party split into its several national components before 1914. Other proposals called for the division of the empire into as few as three and as

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642 563 many as fifteen federated states, and many hoped that reorganization along such lines would draw towards the empire the Slav and Rumanian peoples on its periphery and thus strengthen its international position. None of these proposals had a serious chance of success, however, and when the empire was finally defeated it disintegrated into its national units.

•631 186 648 The independent states of Southeastern Europe faced problems that were different from those of the Habsburg lands, and their alliance and federation schemes were designed to meet the realities of power politics. Once the grandiose plans of the 1848er's had been forgotten, one of these being a proposal for a federation stretching from Poland to Serbia, new schemes were developed around the vigorous Serbian ruler Prince Michael Obrenović. Several agreements were concluded in the 1860's among the Serbian, Montenegrin, Rumanian, Bulgarian, and Greek national leaders with the aid of Russian diplomacy, but these efforts were soon overshadowed by the Russian-Turkish conflict. In the long run, the territorial rivalries among the Balkan states proved to be the principal obstacle to their cooperation, and even the successful Balkan Alliance that defeated Turkey in 1912 disintegrated within a year into interallied war. What is significant is that the initiative throughout this period lay with the great powers, and the federation and alliance plans that got beyond the drafting stage were in general those backed by Russia or Austria-Hungary. The principal reality in international relations was the search for security on the part of these two powers that drove them to regard expansion into Southeastern Europe as a guarantee against political humiliation and military defeat. However, the balance was too close for either to succeed in this game, and it was left to a world conflict to clear the stage for a new order.

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11 Problems and Prospects of Federation

KARL W. DEUTSCH

I

The distribution of sovereign states in Central and in Eastern Europe has undergone some striking changes during the last one hundred years. A century ago, in 1853, there were six sovereign states between the Baltic Sea and the Aegean: the empires of Austria, Prussia, Russia, and Turkey, the kingdom of Greece, and the small principality of Montenegro. Two generations later, in 1913, there were ten states in the area, for by then Serbia, Bulgaria, Rumania, and Albania had all become sovereign states. Another ten years later, the number of states had increased to sixteen. Serbia and Montenegro had merged into Yugoslavia, but Hungary, Czechoslovakia, Poland, Latvia, Estonia, Lithuania, and Finland had all been added as sovereign states. After the convulsions of the Second World War, thirteen sovereign states remained in what was now called Eastern Europe. They were the same states which had existed there during the 1920's and 1930's, with the exception of the three small Baltic states of Latvia, Estonia and Lithuania, which had become incorporated under the Soviet dictatorships in the style of the federal republics of the Soviet Union.

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177 By 1949, Soviet-style dictatorships had been established in
.64 seven of these thirteen sovereign states. In these "Iron Cur-
642 tain" states, dictatorship was and is exercised through a native
• 631 minority who could not have won power without the support of the Soviet Union and the Soviet armies, and who—with the conspicuous exception of Yugoslavia—could not retain this power if Soviet support were withdrawn. The indirect rule thus exercised by the Soviet dictatorship, with the help of native personnel, over six of the Eastern European states —Poland, Czechoslovakia, Hungary, Rumania, Bulgaria, and Albania—might remind the observer at first glance of the indirect rule exercised in past centuries by the empires of Turkey and Russia over some of the principalities then existing in the region. Upon this superficial view, it might seem that despite all the violent changes in political sovereignty and national allegiance during the last one hundred years, the fundamental dependence of the peoples of this region upon foreign powers had remained essentially unchanged.

175 This impression would be quite deceptive. In 1853, the government of Eastern Europe by only six powers had endured for more than two hundred years, with Sweden and Poland rather than Greece and Montenegro playing the roles of the fifth and sixth power at the side of Prussia, Russia, Austria, and Turkey. With the single exception of Poland, which by the end of the eighteenth century had become the victim of her neighbors, the administrative services of these powers were generally based upon foreign personnel drawn from peoples outside the region. Austria and Prussia depended upon the military and administrative services of Germans, Russia upon those of Great Russians, and Turkey in the last analysis had to rely upon the support of the Ottoman Turks. Natives of the different regions supplemented the personnel of these administrative services but did not dominate it. The rule of these foreign or semiforeign empires over the peoples of Eastern Europe was based upon this region's

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178 years before the First World War in the Austro-Hungarian
563 monarchy. At the same time, there was relatively little competition for the services of men of high talent on the part of industry, applied science, or practical politics, since all of these activities remained relatively underdeveloped.

578 The coincidence of intellectual precocity with widespread
565 social and economic backwardness led to widespread experiences of frustration. Intellectuals, not unlike the ancient philosopher Plato, dreamed of equalling one day the power and prestige of the aristocracy, for which they lacked the land holdings and family connections; and they dreamed of equalling the comforts and securities of the bourgeoisie—the upper middle class—without either owning a bourgeois amount of property or devoting a bourgeois proportion of their time and attention to money-making or to business matters. They resented the influence of the church and the clergy in the rural areas, without being either willing or able to devote a major part of their own time and attention to the needs of the country population. Almost all classes of society had come to desire Western standards of income, comfort, security, and power, without possessing as yet either the means or the skill necessary to produce them. And all these discontented groups and individuals, pushed forward by the fundamental incongruities in their social evolution, turned to politics and to the state as a remedy for their frustrations.

IV

186 Under these conditions, no type of government and no
● 631 size of political unit could for long live up to the rising level of popular expectations and the increasingly pressing demands of society. Already, before the year 1914, large states as well as small, national states as well as international, became increasingly strained by social tensions.

In a supra- or multinational state, such as the Austro-

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Hungarian monarchy, an obvious reaction of the population to prolonged social and political disappointment was an increasing demand for national freedom. The sovereign nation-state would give the Czechs a fuller opportunity for careers for their young people and a more worthy share in determining their own destiny. A nation-state centered on Hungary would give Hungarian industries the protection they wanted and would free Hungarians from the delays and frustrations of the imperial relationship to Austria. The national state uniting Slovenes and Croatians with Serbia would help these peoples at long last to make real headway in escaping from their backwardness. During these same years, the peoples in the small national states of the region dreamed of escaping from the compromises and frustrations of their own small-scale political existence by national expansion into some greater and victorious power in their own area. Serbians and Montenegrins came to hope that their lives would somehow improve once Bosnia, Herzegovina, Slovenia, and Croatia had been joined to their own territories in a new Yugoslavia. Bulgarians, Greeks, and Serbians all came to believe that somehow their own lives would improve significantly if all or most of the territory of Macedonia were added to their respective countries.

Throughout large parts of Eastern Europe, the burdens and demands put upon the existing governments thus exceeded the capabilities of those governments and of the states they represented. The Eastern European states, large and small, were thus becoming overcommitted politically, economically, militarily, and socially. Among their peoples this situation encouraged the belief that things would become better once the size of political units in their region was changed. Citizens of small national states such as Serbia hoped for improvement from expansion. Citizens of large states, such as some of the Hungarians or Czechs in Austria-Hungary, began to wonder whether their position could not

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'Freedom of Press, Speech, Assembly, Meetings and Demonstrations'

Like the provisions for 'free elections', these rights exist only on paper. A comparison of the papers published in the different 'People's Democracies', the contents of the speeches made and so on, proves this. The extent to which the 'freedoms' exist is particularly obvious when there is any abrupt change of policy. For instance, up to the day on which Rajk was arrested, all the papers in Hungary competed in singing his praises, at meetings his name was mentioned side by side with Rákosi's and at demonstrations—the last, that of 1st May, 1949—his picture was very prominent and, according to the Hungarian press, the cheers he drew from the crowd were second only to Rákosi. When on 15th June, 1949, it was announced that Rajk had been arrested as a 'Titoist-fascist', all the press, without exception, attacked him in a most vicious manner. Within a week, the press was full of telegrams from meetings all over the country demanding 'punishment without mercy' for Rajk, and workers demanded 'A rope for traitors like Rajk', even before the date of his trial was announced. Not *one* of the thousands who had voted for him a month earlier when he headed the list of candidates in the Parliamentary elections made use of their 'freedom of the press and speech' (Article 55 of the Constitution) to propose to withhold judgment until the trial, far less to defend him. Furthermore, the people knew exactly what punishment would be meted out months before the trial. The rope was repeatedly demanded and he was indeed hanged. The mass meetings before Mindszenty's trial never demanded the death sentence but severe punishment; Mindszenty received a long prison sentence. Freedom of the press, speech, assembly, meetings and demonstrations amounts to the 'freedom' of the people to say exactly what the Government wants them to say.

To enhance 'freedom' of the press, the sale of books dating from before the rule of the 'People's Democracies' is prohibited by Government decree. The Czechoslovak Government on January 10th, 1950, banned the sale of all books published in Czechoslovakia before May 5th, 1945, with the exception of certain specified text-books for schools and scientific journals, ordered all booksellers to clear their shelves of them within

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With certain notable exceptions involving injustice to new German, Magyar, and Ruthenian minorities, the boundaries were drawn about as close to linguistic frontiers as economic and geographic viability permitted. The trouble lay less with the peacemakers than with the principle of national self-determination, especially when applied without the two compensating factors stipulated in Wilson's program: free trade and international organization. The shortcomings of this un-Wilsonian settlement were serious, and cast a long shadow over the next generation. Central among these shortcomings was the exaggerated emphasis on the spirit of exclusive state nationalism, a natural but in the end disastrous consequence of the prolonged concern with national liberation. This spirit, in its postwar manifestations, became an obstacle to the solution of the many boundary disputes, raised protective trade barriers around the new states to the point of self-strangulation, and prevented the organization of a sound system of collective security.

II

Although the hope of the Eastern European leaders for the spiritual and material development of their peoples was placed increasingly in national liberation, it should not be forgotten that in the century after 1815 the peoples of this region made significant gains in the process of modernization. This process, considered as the expansion of human rights within a framework of increasing productivity and distribution in all branches of the economy, developed at an uneven rate in the different parts of Eastern Europe. In the broadest sense, modernization may be considered as the transition from a feudal and agrarian to a democratic and industrialized society, and in this region it involved certain characteristic steps. The most important of these steps were: the growth in human rights, of which the political

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185 were by far the most important; the increase of educational
641 opportunities and general culture; and the development of the economy through agricultural improvement and the expansion of industry and trade.

177 Political freedom in Eastern Europe before the First
642 World War ranged in degree from negligible rights, as those of the Slovaks in Hungary or of the Poles in Russia, to independent states with constitutions of strongly democratic tendencies, as in certain countries of Southeastern Europe. The latter had been influenced by Western models, and made provision for parliamentary government based on wide suffrage. The constitutions of Serbia, Rumania, and Bulgaria, drafted in the latter half of the nineteenth century by native statesmen experienced in the ways of Western constitutionalism, were founded on a genuine faith in democracy. It is true that royal or ministerial authoritarianism and resort to rough methods were not uncommon in these countries, yet the social egalitarianism already prevailing in Serbia and Bulgaria was a strong force for democracy in these coun-
[66] tries. Although illiteracy and political inexperience remained a serious obstacle to orderly government, the generation before the First World War offers significant examples of governments being changed by orderly democratic procedures. Illustrative of the difficulties under which popular elections with universal male suffrage were conducted is the fact that in the Bulgarian election of 1880 only 32 per cent of those eligible to vote cast their ballots, in contrast to about 80 per cent in France and Belgium and 60 per cent in Germany and Italy in the period 1875-80.

177 Hungary had a longer tradition of constitutional govern-
642 ment than did the Balkan states and after 1867 was in most
563 respects an independent state, but its social structure was more conservative and its desire for political democracy less evident. Moreover, the Magyar achievement of political autonomy was marred by the oppressive treatment of the

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to the belief that human language is unable to express the whole truth about the greatest disgrace to mankind that the twentieth century will know—the Soviet forced labor camps. 697 661

A sentence to a forced labor camp amounts to a sentence of death because the enormous majority of the inmates in these camps cannot exist under the conditions prevailing there and die before they are released. The inmate of such a camp works beyond his strength, knowing that if his productivity falls his starvation-level food ration will be cut. The instinct for self-preservation urges him to defend himself from death, and his reactions become those of a hungry animal. All his human feelings disappear, even his attitude toward his fellow inmates. Degraded and humiliated as a human being, the prisoner works like an animal for his enemies only to prolong his life by a year or two and then inevitably to perish. [466]

Political freedom does not exist in the Communist countries either under law or in practice. Let us take for example Article 72 of the Polish constitution of July 1952. Similar provisions will be found in all other Communist constitutions. The first lines of Article 72 say that the citizens have the right of political organization, but the third paragraph of the same article says that organization of assemblies and participation in an organization which opposes the political and social system of People's Poland are forbidden. In other words, any party which does not recognize the Communist political system is forbidden, and membership in it is punishable. 641 665

Since membership in a political party presupposes some right to influence that party, the question arises whether the Communists find it advisable to allow every citizen to belong to his country's Communist Party. The answer is no. The official statistics of the Communist parties in the occupied countries as well as in the Soviet Union show that the number of members of these parties ranges from 5 to 10 per cent

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641 665 of the population of the given country. Finally, even the internal structure of the Communist Party is dictatorial. The delegates of the local organizations accept only the projects and decisions of the party elite or of the chief dictator.

641 The Rumanian constitution, just like the others, appears to guarantee freedom of speech, freedom of the press, freedom of assembly, freedom of public processions and manifestations. Article 85 states that "These rights are ensured by placing at the disposal of the working masses and their organizations printing presses, stocks of paper, public buildings, the streets, communications facilities and other material requisites." In practice, the printing presses, paper mills, public buildings, radio, and so forth are owned by the state and are completely controlled by the leadership of the Communist Party. Even religious processions and manifestations require the consent of the state.

641 666 In theory, under the Communist system, every citizen over eighteen years of age has the right to vote. In practice, the elections are a tragic farce. They do not mean the right to select a candidate, to participate in the adoption of a party program, or even to defend social or national interests. They signify a compulsion to vote for one's hated enemies. The elector is forced to march to the polls to the accompaniment of music played by his foes while pain wrenches his heart and his fists clench in hatred and anger. The official results of the elections always show that the candidates of the Communist Party have received 99 per cent of the votes.

602 641 Does the administration of justice stand guard over civil liberties? No, it definitely does not, either in practice or in theory. The constitutions of the People's Republics have clear provisions in this respect. Article 41 of the Hungarian constitution states: "The courts shall punish the enemies of the people, defend and secure the political, economic and social order of the People's Democracy . . . they shall edu-

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cate the workers to respect the rule of socialist communal 692
life." The Polish and Rumanian constitutions of 1952 pro- 641
vide that "The courts defend the system of People's Democracy and the gains of the working people, and ensure the people's law, social property and citizens' rights."

In practice it is always the duty of the judge and the 692
prosecutor to take the side of the Communist State—that 661
is, of the Communist Party. It is always the duty of the defense to help the state prosecute the accused and to help him to accuse himself. The defendant's duty is to prove his guilt. The courts are a tool of the Communist regimes and are not independent institutions for the administration of justice. Communism introduces not only the judicial murder of innocent people but a debasement of man unparalleled in the history of mankind. The innocent defendant is forced to accuse himself of crimes which he has never committed, to accuse other innocent people, to trample upon his own dignity, to humiliate himself in the eyes of his friends and family, to spit upon the ideals in which he has believed, and to praise the loathsome practices of his enemy and prosecutor as he awaits death by the hands of his oppressor or by slow agony in a prison or forced labor camp.

V

Although it proclaims the liberation of the masses, the 641
communist system has created unprecedented privilege for 565
the ruling Communist elite. Everyone who has seen the living conditions of the highest Communist dignitaries in Russia as well as in the captive countries knows that these men enjoy a very high standard of living. They have privileges in all spheres of life—political, economic, social, and cultural. The life of the Communist elite is, however, not to be envied. Generally, the members of this group are hated. They are constantly threatened, even by the members of

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641 their own party. They live a life of fear in a golden cage,
565 from which they cannot withdraw, even if they wish to do so.

In a democratic state a president elected to office lives like any free and private citizen. Under the Communist system this is unthinkable. The system of privileges finds support even in Communist theory. "It is time it was understood that Marxism is an enemy of equalization," Stalin stated in his report to the Seventeenth Communist Congress in January of 1934. "By equality Marxism means, not equalization of individual requirements and individual life, but abolition of classes. . . ." In the same connection he quoted Lenin's statement that "the claim that we want to make all men equal to one another is an empty phrase and a stupid invention of intellectuals."[4]

641 Freedom of religion and of faith under the Communist system does not exist, either in theory or in practice. The first articles of Communist constitutions always proclaim many civil liberties. But, when we analyze more closely the following passages of these articles, we see that as a rule they contradict and abolish the provisions contained in the first lines. Let us take for example, Article 70 of the constitution of the Polish People's Republic, which appears to guarantee the citizens freedom of conscience and of faith. It also says, however, that abuse of freedom of faith for purposes detrimental to the interest of the Polish People's Republic is punishable. In practice, of course, this means that every pronouncement against the atheistic and materialistic principles of the Communist system is detrimental to the People's Republic and is therefore punishable.

641 But that is not all. The Communists who proclaim the
793 division between the church and the state do not intend to leave any freedom to the church. They demand the clergy's help in the building of socialism and consider any refusal to be detrimental to the interests of the People's State. In

[4] Joseph Stalin, *Problems of Leninism*, pp. 521-522.

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practice, church organizations and the clergy are meant to have no function but that of a helpful tool in the communization of the nation. 641 793

The function of education is the same. The Communists do not even pretend to support freedom of knowledge and bluntly state in their legislation that the duty of higher schools is to educate the younger generation in the spirit of socialist dialectics and materialistic doctrines. Theoretically, the Communist system assures the youth of education. In practice, an individual's right to education is not determined by intellectual ability and progress but by membership in the Young Communist League (Komsomol), by informing on "unorthodox" professors, and by success in examinations on Communist politics and doctrines. 641 871

The articles of the Communist constitutions that deal with the rights of the citizens stress above all the rights to work, rest, and medical treatment. The Communist attitude toward the individual is like that of the horse-owner when he thinks that the main duty of his animal is to work and believes that it must be assured of rest and medical treatment only to insure the fulfillment of this duty. Actually, most farmers in the free countries treat their animals better than the Communists treat the people. Out of hatred, the Communists destroy whole social groups and even perpetrate the genocide of whole nations. 641

The Communists claimed that when they had freed the working man from capitalist exploitation they would not allow the exploitation of one man by another. Is this claim realized in practice? Again, the answer is no. The Communist state created the worst kind of exploitation by giving the rule of the people to the Communist elite and by providing this elite with the formidable weapons of both police and army. In a democratic state, even where large industries and sources of raw materials are nationalized, the interests of the people are guarded by trade unions, politi- 661 565

661 cal parties, legislation, courts, and the police who protect
665 the security of the citizens. The state authority is the mediator in the last resort in disagreements between labor and business.

661 The Moloch, which is the Communist state, has on its side the party, the police, and the courts. Special laws con-
466 stantly increase the penalties for the plunder and destruc-
641 tion of the nationalized public property. Because the state is a "people's state" and "does not do injustice to the people," the trade unions act as a tool of the state in raising the productivity and quality of production and fixing the norms of work. The Stakhanovite work system, based on high norms of production and granting starvation-level wages with no means of protection against these, destroys the strength and health of the worker. Strikes are punishable because they are crimes against the interests of the state, and special laws provide discipline of work, penalties for failure to fulfill norms, and forced labor camps for "idlers" and "loafers."

661 Communism deprives the peasant of his beloved land,
641 turns him into a Communist serf, and chains him to the
423 state or collective farm in which the Communist bureaucracy demands of him ever-increasing physical efforts to produce for the insatiable state. After the liquidation of the remnants of private initiative in small business and crafts, the *kulak* peasant, the biggest "capitalist blood-sucker," is dealt with. He is destroyed by tax levies and forced deliveries of agricultural products and is finally evicted from his own farm.

642 Thus, behind the façade of People's Democracy, Communism practices dictatorship in every sphere of life—personal, political, economic, religious, and social. The Communist system creates privileges for the party and makes the citizen economically dependent upon the state. It debases human dignity, wrests faith out of human hearts, kills

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The liberation of the peasantry was a consequence of the demands of the new liberal movement and was one of the achievements of the liberal regimes which gained momentum on the Continent after the Napoleonic era. This European liberalism had been a result of the struggle of the bourgeoisie against the old political and economic order upheld previously by the aristocracy. It originated in the theory of natural rights, as interpreted by French political philosophers of the eighteenth century, and included in its doctrine the postulate of political, economic, and social freedom and equality for all individuals. 668 641 565

However, it would be wrong to assume that the formal liberation of the peasantry was an immediate result of its emulation of other classes of society, in particular, of the bourgeoisie. On the contrary, the struggle for the realization of peasant rights had still to be fought.

The ruling regimes imposed political restrictions that were usually based on the tax census system and barred large masses of the peasant population from their right to vote in parliamentary elections. In many of the countries, it was not until the end of the First World War that complete franchise was granted to the peasantry. 641 565 178

Economic freedom, as advocated and practiced by liberalism, soon began to undermine the foundations of the peasant economy. The peasantry, which under feudalism had paid most of its rents and other fees to the landlord in natural produce, was placed suddenly in the midst of a complicated money-economy in which the autarkic arrangements of the peasant familistic economy were no longer valid. Peasant land, which throughout centuries had changed little in price or in value, was suddenly submitted to wide fluctuations in value as a consequence of the rapid development of the communication system and the erection of industrial plants. The appearance of a money-economy created the necessity of establishing an appropriate credit system which heretofore had been lacking completely in the peasant orbit. The state,

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641 565 178 however, following its policy of economic freedom, did not deem it necessary to intervene in this problem, and left the peasants open to the merciless exploitation of private banks and usurers. Economic individualism, accentuated by liberalism, induced individual members of the large peasant family groups, known among the Southern Slavs as *zadrugas*, to seek their economic independence. This process provoked a hasty and uncontrolled parcellation of the peasant land and contributed further to the economic weakness and inefficiency of the peasant system of farming.

The solemnly proclaimed social equality of the peasant was a farce. The ruling groups, derived from the bourgeoisie, the newly created bureaucracy, and the remnants of the aristocratic elements, looked upon the peasants with contempt and mistrust, considering them, although necessary to agrarian production, neither fitted nor qualified to take part in politics or public affairs. Social inequality was expressed both by the attitude of dominant ethnical groups to the "peoples of lower categories" and by the division within these groups between intelligentsia and the common people, or peasants.

Obviously, remedies were sought to correct the adverse conditions created in the liberal era, but before these are discussed, it is necessary to credit liberalism for those ideas and measures which, in principle, were universally accepted by the masses and which made possible their political organization. Generally speaking, the ideas of political freedom and of general education and a belief in the individual's capabilities were the stimulating forces behind the organization of the people. However, these ideas did not save liberalism, but prepared the road for its destruction.

829 The first reaction to the flaws in liberalism was the appearance of the "scientific socialism" of Karl Marx. It is important to note that this philosophy was conceived exclusively for the newly created industrial proletariat. The peasants, if

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has no preference for any particular religious denomination and is for this reason better adapted to the peasantry. 829 668

Finally, peasantism rejects definitely the political and social concepts of modern totalitarianism. Totalitarian and undemocratic regimes in Eastern Europe during the interwar period were always upheld by military cliques, aristocratic and bureaucratic groups, or by the ruling dynasties whose aims were to keep the power at all costs and whose political methods and social views were diametrically opposed to the fundamental principles of peasantism.

Politically, peasantism advocates a system of parliamentarianism with two additional features: accentuation of local self-government and direct participation in the government of the greatest number of people. Economically, peasantism favors free cooperatives because it believes that cooperation preserves the principles of private property and permits the exercise of private initiative. The latter is favored when cooperative arrangements are not adequate to meet economic requirements.

III

Although the peasant movements and parties were initiated before the First World War, they achieved their full strength and political significance only after the war was over. There were three causes for this postwar rise of peasant political organizations: the formation of the national states, the universal franchise, and the agrarian reforms. 668 641

The formation of national states in Eastern Europe contributed enormously to the development of political life. While the people of this area had heretofore directed most of their political endeavors against the oppression of the ruling nations, in the new era they directed their efforts toward the solution of vital economic and social issues. 641

Universal franchise enabled the peasant population to

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641 participate in national elections and thus intensified the activities of the peasant political organizations. Only a decade earlier, because of the tax census system, none but a limited number of the peasants were entitled to vote, but in the national democratic states this right was granted to every male citizen over twenty-one years of age.

423 In Bulgaria, Rumania, Yugoslavia, Czechoslovakia, and Poland, a considerable number of agrarian reforms were accomplished which distributed large surfaces of arable land to individual peasants. They thus became economically independent and from then on were valiant champions of the peasant program. No substantial land reform was carried out in Hungary until 1945.

642 Unfortunately, the initial success of the peasant parties was not given political effect everywhere and, where peasant regimes were established, they were not of long duration. The advances of the peasant parties were neutralized soon by the counter actions of totalitarian elements which were opposed to democratic principles in general, and to peasant political and social concepts in particular. The peasant parties, faithful to their programs, favored and supported genuinely democratic systems and cooperated with other democratic groups but, with the disappearance of the democratic order, their own position became precarious. It must be admitted that the complicated machinery of a democratic regime was unable to run smoothly at all times in the newly established national states, except in Czechoslovakia. However, this deficiency should not be interpreted as a lack of interest in democratic institutions nor as a disapproving attitude toward the principles of freedom which symbolize Western political thought. The democratic regimes came up against a complex of problems whose complete, satisfactory, and early settlement was somewhat unreasonably expected by the newly created national states. Profiting from these adverse and interrelated domestic conditions, the totalitarian elements found inter-

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people accept them as their due and can no longer visualize 657
life without them. A large and, according to official claims, 745
growing part of national income is being spent on social insurance, public health, family allowances, maternity and children care, workers' vacations, so-called physical culture, and the like. There is no comparison between the philosophy of the welfare state in Britain and that of Communism in Eastern Europe, but there are some similar functions in both systems. For much the same reasons that the Conservative government in London could never think of taking back the social reforms of the Labor government, no post-Communist government in Eastern Europe will be able to consider curtailing the privileges accorded to the working class by the present regimes.

V

The most important and politically the most decisive of 641
the privileges granted by the State is education, understood 208
always strictly in the Communist sense of the term. The Communist regimes are aware that they cannot seriously expect to win the minds of the majority of the adult population. Anyone who was twenty years old in 1938 in Bohemia or Moravia, in 1939 in Poland, in 1941 in Serbia, and as late as 1944 in Hungary or Rumania, can contrast his present situation as an individual and as a part of his nation to his situation under a non-Communist government, however imperfect the latter may have been. There is no way of knowing how many of these men and women regret the past and hate the present, but they undoubtedly constitute a large majority of the adult population of the area. From the Communist point of view, these men and women are incurable. The future of the Red regimes depends on the youngsters who know nothing about the past, are isolated from the freedoms of the West, and are daily taught that Russia is their shin-

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641 ing example. The regime knows that it cannot assure a decent
208 standard of living to the adult population and probably realizes that the coming generation will not live much better. However, it hopes that the young ones will be more pliable. Since they will not know that life can be better, they will not grumble. In the political and moral field, the desire to capture the minds of the youth is what industrialization is in the economic domain—the primary goal to which all others
185 must be subordinated. From another angle, education, especially technical education, is the necessary counterpart and precondition of the fully industrialized, urbanized, and mechanized socialist society.

168 The first point of the Communist program for the young
185 generation is to insure its numerical strength. Before the last war, the populations of Poland, Rumania, Yugoslavia, Bulgaria, and Slovakia were increasing with great though gradually diminishing rapidity. In the Czech lands proper and in Hungary, the natural increase was low with a trend towards demographic standstill. Some economists believed that the key problem of Eastern Europe, that of rural poverty due to overpopulation, could not be solved unless the population ceased to multiply so rapidly. From the strictly economic point of view, there was much truth in that assertion. The Communist regimes, including that of Yugoslavia, have taken the opposite stand. Their publications wage a war against the prewar theory which they say is born of despondency characteristic of capitalism. Communism, they claim, will solve all problems. But to prosper, People's Democracies need many children. Whether because of these social policies or because of other reasons, the prewar trend toward low natality has been reversed in most countries of the area. No demographic data on Rumania have been published for some years, which may mean that the policy of high natality has not been successful there. Elsewhere, data show that many more children are being born now than before the war and

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overwhelmingly peasant character, its political apathy and 175
military weakness.

Today, in the middle of the twentieth century, most of 176
these conditions have been transformed. All the peoples of Eastern Europe have literate majorities. They have native professional and middle classes. All of them have at least some more or less modern industries and transportation systems. All of them have had two or three generations of broad national and political development, a flourishing of national languages and literatures, and a vigorous growth in native political participation. They have memories of national independence and skills of political organization and action. They can no longer be ruled by alien rulers, and even the Russian dictatorship must deal with them by indirect methods. The peoples of Eastern Europe today can be governed stably only by native political administrations, by native civil services and school systems, and by the appeal—however distorted—to native symbols and traditions, or they cannot be governed at all.

All these changes seem to be irreversible. It would be as difficult to restore illiteracy, apathy, and fundamental ignorance to the peoples of Eastern Europe as it would be to restore the economic and social institutions of 1853. If history teaches us anything, it is at the very least that the distribution of political and military power is subject to rapid change and that every submerged people that has preserved its identity and its capacity to think and act may well expect to find again some opportunity to determine its own destiny in freedom.

II

Yet all was not well with the growth of sovereign states 641
in Eastern Europe. Perhaps the most characteristic feature of the political institutions of the area was the widespread

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641 discontent with them. If people had resented the oppressiveness of the old large empires, many now chafed under the smallness and divisiveness of the national states that had come to succeed them. Eastern European states, large or small, seemed to have a way of frustrating the hopes and ambitions of significant numbers of their citizens. Where men had complained about the lack of national freedom in the past, many now complained about the "balkanization" of the region. It is this underlying restlessness, this *malaise* of Eastern European politics, that gave a peculiar appeal to the demand for Eastern European federation. If we are to understand the prospects and the problems of a federal union in this region, we must first turn our attention to the fundamental needs and discontents that gave rise to the proposal.

175 433 Eastern Europe was a relatively backward area in terms of economic development. Even some of its most highly developed regions, such as the countries of Austria, Hungary, and the Russian-held parts of Poland, had lagged in economic development during the two crucial generations between 1815 and 1875, during which time most Western countries went through decades of tremendous economic growth.[1] In 1850

[1] Cf. Paul Muller, "Osterreich seit 1848," in Hans Mayer, ed., *Hundert Jahre Osterreichischer Wirtschaftsentwicklung*, 1848-1948, (Vienna: Springer Verlag, 1949), pp. 1-20, esp. p. 8; and in the same volume, for the old monopolistic traditions of business at Vienna from 1221 to 1848, and "conditions bordering on lethargy" during the decades preceding 1848, see Otto Gruss, "Ein Jahrhundert Osterreichischer Binnenhandel (1848-1948)," pp. 310-358, esp. pp. 311-317; for figures on the slow introduction of steam engines, the lag in the growth of towns, the slow relative growth of the population occupied in industry, the lack of capital, the national fragmentation of markets, etc., see Karl Heinz Werner, "Osterreichs Industrie und Aussenhandelspolitik 1848 bis 1948," *ibid.*, pp. 359, 479, esp. pp. 624-678, esp. p. 659. See also J. Slokar, *Geschichte der osterreichischen Industrie* (Vienna: Tempsky, 1949), pp. 16-19, 46-54, 177-179; Richard Schuller, "Die Entstehung des osterreichisch-ungarischen Wirtschaftsgebietes," in G. Gratz and R. Schuller, *Der wirtschaftliche Zusammenbruch Osterreich-Ungarns* (Vienna and New Haven: Holder-Pichler-Tempsky and Yale University Press, 1930), pp. 1-35, esp. pp. 23-24; Oscar Jaszi, *The Dissolution of the Habsburg Monarchy* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1929), pp. 185-212.

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186 be improved by secession. All of them thought that they could
178 improve their position by finding that exact size of political unit in which their own language and their own national culture could be made to predominate and in which their own nationality or ethnic group could be turned into the leading class or social and political elite.

Nationalism in Eastern Europe was thus a reaction to the rapid diffusion of Western claims and to the expectations of security and opportunity throughout a group of societies that were only slowly, if at all, acquiring the productive skill and equipment to satisfy them. National secession, national expansion, and the national state appeared to almost all nationalities in the region as plausible short cuts to the prosperity, power, and prestige they all desired.

178 In the course of events, the experiment was actually made.
433 The Austro-Hungarian monarchy was destroyed and a num-
●641 ber of successor states arose from its remains. There is no doubt on the whole that the emergence of these national states represented a significant step forward toward higher levels of popular participation in public affairs, toward political democracy, toward popular education, and even, in some respects, toward greater economic opportunities. But at the same time it seems clear that the change in the size of political units did little or nothing to come to grips with the fundamental causes of the poverty and backwardness of the region, or with the fundamental sources of its peculiar psychological and political frustrations and resentments. National and regional markets and consumer preferences remained as small and as unfavorable to mass production in the new states as they had in the old. Capital remained as scarce and productive investment as uneven and erratic as before.
178 Tools, technologies, and work habits changed slowly if at
[735] all. Poverty persisted. Purchasing power remained low and
464 prices high. Production remained scattered over many small and inefficient factories. Innovations were accepted reluc-

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CHAPTER I

THE INITIAL SOVIET INTERVENTION: BULGARIA, RUMANIA, HUNGARY

★

648 661 NAPOLEON'S WORDS, 'Une armée dehors c'est l'État qui voyage', apply very well to the Russian armies which overran the countries of Eastern Europe as a result of the Second World War. If the Russian state had been a liberating democracy where power was in the hands of the people, the entry of the Red Army into the Eastern Europen countries would have inspired their populations to take their fate into their own hands, put an end to the military police dictatorships that terrorized them and establish the full sovereignty of the people. But the policy of the Russian occupation authorities was entirely different. For the first two or three years their primary objective was to preserve as strong an army and police force as possible under the control of the Communist Parties. With this task in mind the Communist leaders skilfully manipulated the pressure of the masses to introduce 'loyal' elements into the army and police and at the same time allied themselves with reactionary, even ex-fascist, heads of the old army and police. The second aim of the Kremlin was to call a halt to any action of the peoples which bore a really democratic and spontaneous character and which might therefore impede the Gleichshaltung of all public life. To achieve this, the same method was adopted of making alliances with the most right-wing, reactionary elements against the authentic Socialist Parties, Peasant Parties and, above all, against the peoples themselves.

A study of political life in the satellite states must begin with an analysis of this policy.

Pre-War Political Regime in Eastern Europe

642 661 728 Before the war, all the countries dealt with (except Czechoslovakia) had lived under a military dictatorship camouflaged

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642 661 728 by a parliamentary facade. Workers' parties, peasant parties and trade unions were all persecuted or forbidden, strikes were suppressed in blood, and brutal mass executions were not unknown. To give only one example, 20-30 thousand workers and peasants lost their lives after the overthrow of the Peasant Government of Alexander Stamboliisky in Bulgaria in 1923. The secret police of Rumania, Yugoslavia and Bulgaria could boast of rivalling the Gestapo in all the refinements of torture. The press was gagged. Parliamentary elections were a farce, as votes were bought, electors were terrorized, and voting was open, although the counting of the votes was secret. It was no accident that in only one out of the many national elections held in Rumania between the two world wars, did the government that was called upon by the king to arrange the elections fail to get the expected majority! The corruption and depravity of the public administration was immense. Symbolical of this corruption was King Carol's notorious mistress, Magda Lupescu, who appointed and dismissed Ministers and high officials, distributed government contracts, etc. National minorities in general, and the Jews in particular, suffered from official oppression and from 'spontaneous' outbursts of hooliganism organised by government agents. The alliance with Hitlerite Germany of Rumania, Hungary, Bulgaria and many of the rulers of Yugoslavia seemed natural.

In view of these facts, it is not surprising that the collapse of the German military machine was greeted with joy by the overwhelming majority of the peoples of Eastern Europe, who hoped to get rid of the previous shameful political and social order. The breakdown of the Gestapo unleashed a tremendous. independent upsurge of the people. The first task of the Russian occupation authorities was to grapple with this mass activity.

Bulgaria

669 642 728 In Sofia and other towns armed workers arrested fascists *en masse*, held mass demonstrations, set up elected people's tribunals, disarmed the police and established a workers' militia. Local committees took over the administration and the red flag was hoisted over all public buildings. The ferment was equally great in the Bulgarian army. Thus *The Economist* of October 7th, 1944, could write:

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'Reports on the Bulgarian forces of occupation in Western Thrace and Macedonia vividly recall the picture of the Russian army in 1917. Soldiers' councils have been set up, officers have been degraded, red flags hoisted, and normal saluting has been abolished.' 728 669 642

But the Russian and Bulgarian Communist leaders did not welcome the initiative of the masses. On the contrary, they did everything to stop 'anarchy' and restore 'order'. When Molotov met the Bulgarian armistice delegation, he made the following declaration: 'If certain Communists continue their present conduct, we will bring them to reason. Bulgaria will remain with her democractic Government and her present order . . . You must retain all valuable army officers from before the *coup d'etat*. You should reinstate in service all officers who have been dismissed for various reasons'. (*The New York Times*, January 16th, 1945). And earlier, on September 21st, 1944, *The New York Times* correspondent in Sofia reported that 'Communist leaders are doing everything they can to prevent extremists in the party from agitating for sovietization of the country'. Of the Red Army he said: 'On several occasions when local Communists in the provinces tried to displace city officials and take matters into their own hands they were ordered by the Russian military authorities to return the jobs to the old officials until orders were received from the Fatherland Front Government in Sofia'. The Fatherland Front government hastened to establish order.

As regards the restoration of 'order' in the Bulgarian Army, the same article in *The Economist* states: 'M. Velchev (Minister of War in the Fatherland Front Government—Y.G.) has issued a stern order to the troops to return immediately to normal discipline, to abolish Soldiers' Councils and to hoist no more red flags. Now Sofia reports that the Bulgarian army has been placed under the supreme command of Marshal Tolbukhin. Apparently, the Soviet commander has no patience with Balkan repetitions of 1917 . . . The Bulgarian Left seems to be ready to accept this policy, but it may be questioned whether it would have agreed to it so easily if its author had been Colonel Velchev and not Marshal Tolbukhin.'

In its programme, the Fatherland Front Government was careful to emphasize that it stood for the social *status quo* and

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728 642 669 for the maintenance of private property, Immediately after its establishment, the Communist leader, Anton Yugov, the Minister of the Interior, declared: 'This government, of which I am a member and on whose behalf I speak, categorically denies that it has any intention of establishing a Communist regime in Bulgaria. There is no truth in rumours that the government intends to nationalise any private enterprise in the country.' (*The New York Times*, 22nd September, 1944).

642 471 A few months later, at the national congress of the Fatherland Front in March, 1945, another Communist leader declared: 'We are building a democractic country based on private property and private initiative. Consequently the Government by its very nature is reformist.' He severely attacked those members of the Communist Party who opposed the Fatherland Front Government and wanted 'to establish a completely Communist government.' An article in the official paper of the Fatherland Front, *Otechestven Front* (9th March, 1945) described the programme of the Front in these words: 'It is the programme of the Bulgarian workers, peasants, craftsmen and women, honest, intellectual, patriotic individuals, industrialists, merchants and patriotic soldiers.' In a congress of the industrialists of Bulgaria on September 27th, 1945, a Communist Minister, Dobri Terpeshev, said on behalf of the Supreme Economic Council: 'Private initiative will not be handicapped but supported. The Communists intend to revive it because our economy needs your initiative . . . Let us all work without being led on by thought of gain alone.' A year later the Communist Prime Minister, Georgi Dimitrov, declared: 'The immediate task is neither the realisation of Socialism nor the introduction of the Soviet system but the consolidation of a truly democratic and Parliamentarian system.'

642 661 From September, 1944, to October, 1946, the Fatherland Front Government was headed by General Kimon Georgiev who not only played a leading part in the military, semi-fascist *coup d'etat* of Tsankov in 1923, as a result of which tens of thousands of workers and peasants were massacred, but was also the author of the military coup of 1934 which led to the immediate dismissal of Parliament, the terrible persecution of Communists, Agrarians and others, and, for the first time in

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Bulgarian history, the dissolution of the trade unions and their illegalisation.* Georgiev's supporters wielded such power in the Fatherland Front Government that *The Observer* of 10th September, 1944, could remark: 'The composition of the Government suggests that the group that has now taken over in Sofia is the famous Military League which took power by a *coup d'etat* in 1934.' But *The Observer* did not mention one very important exception. The Minister of the Interior, who controls the police, was the Communist leader, Anton Yugov. The Communist leaders joined hands with the old Military League in order to keep 'order', the first victims of which were any workers who demanded an improvement in their condition, or—even worse—dared to press for immediate steps in the direction of socialism. Thus Constantine Poulos, writing from Sofia on June 2nd, 1945, said: 'Bulgarian Socialists (are) far to the left of the Communists . . . The Greek workers who demanded "bread and work" last fall are now dead, in jail or terrorized into silence. The Bulgarian workers who recently made similar demands were publicly denounced by the Communists as diversionists and enemies of the state; a handful of coal miners who struck for higher wages in March were castigated as "anarchists" and rushed off to jail by the Communist-controlled militia.' (*The Nation*, June 23rd, 1945).

In spite of these precautions, the transfer of Bulgaria from the German side to the Russian was not carried out as smoothly as the transfer of Finland, Rumania and Hungary, because Bulgaria does not belong geographically to the Russian sphere proper, but is on the border between the Russian and Anglo-American zones. Hence when the Germans retreated, many members of the ruling strata of Bulgaria hoped to switch over from the side of Germany, not to Russia, but to England and the United States. Russia therefore could not rely implicitly on the Bulgarian state machine, and between September, 1944, and March, 1945, a large-scale purge was carried out by

*This is what *Imprecor*, the official Comintern paper, wrote about the 1934 coup: 'A new military-fascist *coup d'etat* has been carried out in Bulgaria. In the night prior to May 19th the Muchanov-Gitchev government was overthrown and a military-fascist dictatorship established under the leadership of *Kimon Georgiev*, a Lieutenant-Colonel of the Reserve'. 'The leading elements in the present coup also played a leading role in the 1923 coup'. (*Imprecor*, 1st June, 1934). Now the official *Free Bulgaria* describes Georgiev's role in the 1934 coup in these words: 'In 1934 he took the post of Prime Minister and re-established diplomatic relations between Bulgaria and the Soviet Union.' (August 1st, 1949).

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661 the law courts. As a result, two thousand people were con-
728 demned to death and executed and another few thousands sentenced to very long terms of imprisonment.

That the Bulgarian people were successfully 'kept quiet' is illustrated by the fact that until April, 1948, the Communists did not find it necessary to hold even sham elections to local authorities; heads of villages and members of local councils were officially appointed by the Minister of the Interior!

Rumania

728 Rumania was the first of the Eastern European countries
642 reached by the Red Army, and Russia hastened to declare its intention of non-intervention in her internal regime. On April 2nd, 1944, Molotov declared: 'The Soviet Government declares that it does not pursue the aim of acquiring any part of Rumanian territory or of changing the existing social order in Rumania. It equally declares that the entry into Rumania of Soviet troops is solely the consequence of military necessities and of the continuation of resistance by the enemy forces.'

Russia's intention of keeping 'order' was reciprocated by the willingness of the Rumanian King and governing circles to collaborate with her. With scarcely a ripple Rumania changed her allegiance from Germany to Russia, the whole state apparatus—army, police and administration—going over to the Russian side when King Michael on 23rd August, 1944, arrested the Prime Minister, Marshal Ion Antonescu and appointed General Sănătescu in his place.

In March, 1945, after a number of changes in the Rumanian government, brought about by direct threats and pressure from the Russian army of occupation numbering a million men, Petru Groza became Premier, supported by Vice-Premier Gheorghe Tătărescu and four of his friends from the so-called 'Liberal Party', an equal number of Communists, and a number of individuals representing nobody.

728 Of Tătărescu, the Comintern paper, *Imprecor*, of December
642 8th, 1933, had said: 'In 1907 the Liberal Party, at that time led
661 by Sturdza, caused no less than 11,000 peasants to be murdered. The bloody suppression of the peasant insurrection in Tatar-Bunar was also the work of the Liberals, under the leadership of *Tătărescu*, who is now the Minister for Trade and

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Industry. The Liberal Party is also responsible for the volleys fired on the 13th of December against striking workers, as a result of which over 100 were killed. 728 661 642

'In December, 1927, it was the Liberal Party which organised the bloody anti-Jewish pogroms. Bands of students roamed through the streets beating up passers-by. The Minister of the Interior at the time was Duca, and the Secretary of State, Tătărescu. Under Liberal government corruption and jobbery reached their culminating point. The same Liberal Party exercised a brutal repressive terror against the revolutionary organisations; it suppressed all revolutionary newspapers and caused numerous workers to be murdered. Under Liberal government the class courts of the Rumanian bourgeoisie have sentenced many of the best leaders of the working class to long years of hard labour or to long terms of banishment in the salt mines.'

Tătărescu represented the extreme authoritarian wing of the Liberal Party and helped King Carol to establish his dictatorship. His foreign policy was oriented towards Hitler Germany. The British Communist weekly *World News and Views* of November 19th, 1938, described him thus: 'Tătărescu, the leader of the Right pro-Hitler wing of the National Liberal Party.' 728 642

Mihail Ralea, Minister of Culture in the March, 1945, Cabinet, was formerly a Minister under King Carol and an open admirer of the Hitler regime. Today he is Rumanian Ambassador to Washington. Father Burducea, the Minister of Cults in the March, 1945, Government, was one of the most notorious Iron Guardists (he had the decoration of the Buna Vestire, which was awarded to only thirty-two Guardists). Lotar Radaceanu, the Minister of Labour, was in Carol's totalitarian 'Renaissance Front.' One of the chiefs of the Propaganda Ministry, responsible for controlling the press, was Gheorghe Macovescu. Under Antonescu's fascist regime he held the same position, writing articles hailing the German-Rumanian alliance against Russia. Groza himself, the Premier since March, 1945, was before the war a very rich man, an owner of a big estate, factories and large hotels, and with big banking interests. He had been a Minister in two extremely right-wing governments under General Averescu (1920-1, 1926-7).

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642 471 Groza[4] repeatedly stated that his government was against any socialisation and stood for the defence of private property. For instance, in an interview with the correspondent of *The New York Times* on 26th September, 1945, 'Premier Groza said his Government did not intend to apply either collectivization of land or nationalisation of banks or industries and that the mere question showed an ignorance of its program. Claiming to represent all social strata, he said, the program was to "concentrate all the forces of the nation for the reconstruction of the country and to consolidate a democratic regime" and "in the Government's program there is no nationalization of banks or industries and no collectivization of land"' (*The New York Times*, 30th September, 1945).

Radio Bucharest reported that in a description of his recent talks with Stalin, Premier Groza had said that it was Stalin who had advised him to 'keep the system of private enterprise and private property.'

Nearly three years after the advance of the Russian army into Rumania, Groza still openly opposed the nationalisation of any property belonging to either Rumanian or foreign capitalists, even though the nationalisation of foreign property is part of the program not only of socialists but even of many nationalist movements in countries in which a great deal of foreign capital is invested, such as Mexico, Argentine, India, etc. In a statement to the Bucharest paper *Timpul* he said: '. . . the Government and the Parliament will make every effort possible in order to realize a fruitful field of collaboration for foreign capital . . . (There will be—Y.G.) conditions intended to secure to this foreign capital a guarantee of investment and a just rentability.' (*International News*, Bucharest, 8th January, 1947).

642 661 Even capitalists who collaborated wholeheartedly with Germany were left untouched for more than three years, and the Communist Minister of Justice, Lucreţiu Pătrăşcanu went so far as to point out that Nazi collaborators were far more leniently dealt with in Rumania than, for instance, in France. *The New York Times* correspondent reported on 17th March, 1945: 'Industrialists, business men and bankers will escape punishment as war criminals, under a law being drawn up by Lucreţiu Pătrăşcanu, Minister of Justice, and Communist

4 [Premier of Rumania since March, 1945 -- Analyst]

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member of the Government, it was learned today. Rumania could not afford to lose the services of merchants and industrialists, M. Pătrăscanu said. He expressed the opinion that the country would pursue a more liberal policy toward this class than the French have.' What an outcry there would have been in the Communist press if a similar announcement had been made by a non-Communist Minister in the West! 642 661

Tătărescu did not hestitate to attack 'anarchists' (i.e., workers). In an interview with *The New York Times* correspondent in Bucharest on 21st October, 1945, he declared that a strenuous discipline must be introduced in industry and an end brought to the 'excesses' of the workers' committees.

It was hardly surprising that the capitalists faced the future with perhaps a little anxiety even if they were satisfied with the existing state of affairs. There was great optimism among businessmen, as the serious Swiss paper *Neue Zürcher Zeitung* pointed out (10th February, 1947) giving this illustration: 'As the Bucharest economic journal *Finantze si Industrie* reports, in the last year (1946—Y.G.) in Rumania there were established 355 new stock companies with a total capital of 20.3 milliard Lei.'

For years business continued to be good and speculation in the free market active, although the conditions of the working people were appalling and, after the drought of 1946-7, starvation stared them in the face. Some idea of the conditions of the people at this time can be got from '*A Survey of the Health of the People in Several European Countries affected by the War* published on November 19th, 1948, by *La Documentation Francaise* and consisting of reports of the International Committee of the Red Cross which describes the dreadful tragedy which overtook Rumania, the country most affected by the drought: 'It is difficult to convey the misery of the Rumanian population in 1947: famine prevailed in whole sections of the country, in some regions people were eating grass and the bark of trees and even clay. It is estimated that 6,000,000 persons were dependent on the government in 1947-48. Here are some of the consequences of the famine and misery which prevailed in this country: 1. The complete disappearance of little children in some districts . . . infant mortality actually reached a rate of 80% . . . 2. An increase of 511 262 165

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511 all kinds of diseases and a steep rise of the mortality rate;
262 corpses were thrown into sewers adjacent to the houses.
165 3. Universal poverty conducive to the spread of venereal diseases . . . one out of twelve persons is syphilitic according to recent reports furnished by the Minister of Health . . .'

All this time the fortunes of the capitalists were not touched as they were working for reparations for Russia. They and the new state bureaucracy flourished, while the lion's share of the surplus value produced in Rumania was taken, of course, by the Kremlin.*

642 The bureaucratic and militarist character of the Rumanian
693 state was not altered and many of the former officials remained in office. Of the legal system, Pătrăşcanu could say: 'The
645 procedures, methods, traditions and structure of Rumanian jurisprudence have remained unchanged since a Communist became Minister of Justice. No more than 20 new judges out of 2,000 have been appointed. About a quarter of the old staff have been purged or pensioned'. (*Christian Science Monitor*, 12th December, 1945). This policy is symbolised by the fact that 'Just two weeks before the start of the trial of Iuliu Maniu . . . a discreet announcement was published in Bucharest newspapers recording the appointment of a new chief of the military tribunal of the second army corps district (the one to preside over Maniu's trial—Y.G.) . . . the wartime director general of all prisons and concentration camps in Rumania'. (*New York Herald Tribune*, 7th November, 1947).

701 The structure of the army remained hierarchical, with the
645 complete subordination of the soldiers to their officers, and with no soldiers' committees. For three years even the composition of its personnel showed a marked continuity with the past. For instance, Lieutenant-Colonel Nicolae Cambrea, commander of the Rumanian units fighting against Russia at Stalingrad, was promoted by the Groza government to the rank of General, and appointed Assistant Chief of Staff. Major Popescu-Argetoia, an active Fascist in the past, was put at the head of the secret police. General Vasiliu Rascanu, Chief of Military Police during the war against Russia, was appointed Minister of War. Another old general, Pretorian, was appointed Chief of Staff at the same time. General Lascar,

*See above pp.

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Brigadier-General on the anti-Soviet Front in 1941, who 701
received the Knight Cross of the Iron Cross from Hitler, was, 645
after joining the Communist Party, considered 'loyal' enough to be appointed Minister of War!

The enthusiasm of the Communist Party for 'law and order' 642
is illustrated by their ardour for the monarchy. On November 662
3rd, 1946, Premier Groza declared: 'The King, the Church, 665
the Army, the People and the Government are one'. A few days later, at a meeting of the Communist-controlled Front organisation, the National Democratic Bloc, Vice-Premier Tătărescu said: 'From Gheorghiu Dej (leader of the Communist Party—Y.G.) to myself we shall all fight together for the consolidation of the Monarchy, because we are convinced that the King is the strongest factor that rallies all Rumanians. We shall fight for the consolidation of the National Church and of private property, the source of all creative enterprise'. (*East Europe*, an informative London weekly, 13th November, 1946). On November 8th, King Michael's birthday, the Communist daily *Era Noua* said: 'The people of Rumania have faith in their King.' (*East Europe*, 20th November, 1946). In the election demonstrations of the National Democratic Bloc, a constantly repeated slogan was 'Trăiască Regele!'—'Long live the King!' On 17th November, 1946, at an army electoral meeting in Bucharest, Gheorghiu Dej concluded his speech appealing for a vote for the 'King's Government': 'Long live the King!' 'Long live his commanders and soldiers! Long live the Army which is his and the people's!' The monarchist enthusiasm of the Communist Party reached such heights that they attacked the Peasant Party leader, Maniu as . . . anti-monarchist. Thus *Era Noua* of December 3rd, 1946, referring to the withdrawal of Maniu and his followers from parliament, suggested that 'in fact, Maniu's unparliamentary attitude is only a guise for his anti-dynastic policy. Maniu has already tried his first obstructive move in King Michael's reign . . . Neither Ferdinand nor King Carol were exempt from Maniu's political tactics'! (*East Europe*, 18th December, 1946). To crown the hypocrisy of the leaders of the Communist Party, on November 8th, 1947, their paper, *Scanteia*, wrote: 'The people wish to His Majesty the King a long life, good health, and a reign rich in democratic achievements' (*The New York Times*, November 9th,

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642 662 665 1947). A few weeks later the Communist leaders compelled Michael to abdicate (30th December).

Hungary

642 728 471 The policy of the Communist Party in Hungary in the first stage of Russian intervention was similar to their policy in Rumania and it is therefore unnecessary to describe it in detail.[1] The following quotation from the report of Nagy Imre, a member of the Political Bureau of the Party, to its congress in September, 1946, is typical of many declarations: 'While the war was still being fought, we have determined, and this is one of the basic principles, that in Hungary this is not the time for transition from capitalism to socialism, for struggle between the two social systems, but for uprooting the powerful remants of feudalism. It is not a question then of struggle between the two social systems but of the struggle between democracy and reaction within capitalism.'

The connection between this policy and Russia's interest in gaining control of the Hungarian economy (through mixed companies) and in extorting reparations from her, has already been described.[2] Here it is only necessary to repeat that for three years the Communist Party leaders continued to harp upon the same theme, that they were against abandoning the capitalist structure of the country.

1 [See category 116, pp. 136-141 -- Analyst]

2 [See category 116, pp. 60-62 -- Analyst]

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563 energetic crusade against Serb 'infidels.' Serb fascists retaliated
668 by murdering Croats and Moslems *en masse* in Bosnia, Herze-
661 govina, Dalmatia and elsewhere. While engaged in this communal slaughter, the quislings of each nation—Croats, Slovenes, Moslems and Serbs—collaborated with Berlin or Rome or with both.

642 Unlike them General Draža Mihailović, the military com-
668 mander of King Peter and his government in exile, stood for a united Yugoslavia including all the nations, but united under the rule of Serbia. His Chetniks were ready to take an active part in the massacre of Croats and Moslems, and Mihailović himself called upon the Allies to bomb Zagreb, the Croat capital, in revenge for their treachery. He even circulated propaganda maps of a future Yugoslavia in which Croatia was reduced to a small strip of land. To the Croatian, Montenegrin, Slovenian and also Serbian peasants and workers the old centralised administration symbolised by Mihailović represented the tax-collector, the gendarme and the corrupt local official. Mihailović's policy condemned him to increasing isolation and so to impotency, and finally to collaboration with the Germans and Italians against Tito's Partisans.

668 The only Party which fought for the unity of Yugoslavia on
186 the basis of the equality of all its component nations was the
563 Communist Party. The refugees from the pogroms constituted the first Partisan units, and the communal conflicts faced Tito's movement squarely with the problem whose solution proved to be decisive for its successes in the struggle for the liberation of the country from Axis occupation.

By a policy of national equality and of opposition to all communal conflicts, whether led by Ustashe and Moslem pogromists or Nedić and the Chetnik 'avengers', the Communist Party of Yugoslavia succeeded in welding the different peoples together. As Lieutenant-General Svetozar Vukmanović (better known as 'Tempo') said in his speech on the occasion of the celebration of 'Yugoslav Army Day' on 22nd December, 1947: 'The fighting of the Serbian and Montenegrin proletarian and shock brigades in Bosnia and Croatia; the fighting of Bosnian, Croatian and Montenegrin units in Serbia; the fighting of Serbian, Croatian, Bosnian, Macedonian, Montenegrin and Slovene units on the Srem front and beyond, for

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CHAPTER X

'PEOPLE'S DEMOCRACIES'— DICTATORSHIP OVER THE PEOPLE

★

642 ALL THE COUNTRIES of 'People's Democracy' have very fine constitutions. Article 2, of the 'Constitution of the People's Republic of Bulgaria' (approved by the Grand National Assembly on December 4th, 1947) states:

'In the People's Republic of Bulgaria all power emanates from the people and belongs to the people.

'This power is exercised through freely elected representative organs and through referenda.

'All representative organs of the State power are elected by the citizens, by a general, direct, and secret ballot.'

Article 88 states: 'The citizens of the People's Republic are guaranteed freedom of the press, of speech, of assembly, of meetings and demonstrations'. Articles similar to these two appear in all the constitutions of the 'People's Democracies.'*

How do these fine institutions work in practice? What is the actual interpretation of 'free elections' or 'freedom of the press, speech, of assembly, of meetings and demonstrations'?

'Free Elections'

666 Formally all the governments of Eastern Europe are responsible to parliaments, which are made up of representatives of the people democratically elected. In all elections the overwhelming majority of the electorate is stated to have voted and an overwhelming majority of the votes to have been given for the existing M.P's. In the Rumanian general elections of March 28th, 1948, 91 per cent of the electorate voted, of whom 90.8 per cent voted for the list of candidates supporting the present government. In the Czechoslovakian elections of May 30th, 1948, the corresponding figures were 90 per cent

*For a comparative analysis of the Constitutions of the 'People's Democracies' see Samuel L. Sharp, *New Constitutions in the Soviet Sphere*, Washington, 1948, and A. Gyorgy, *Governments of Danubian Europe*, New York, 1949.

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'Freedom of Press, Speech, Assembly, Meetings and Demonstrations'

Like the provisions for 'free elections', these rights exist only 641
on paper. A comparison of the papers published in the different 'People's Democracies', the contents of the speeches made and so on, proves this. The extent to which the 'freedoms' exist is particularly obvious when there is any abrupt change of policy. For instance, up to the day on which Rajk was arrested, all the papers in Hungary competed in singing his praises, at meetings his name was mentioned side by side with Rákosi's and at demonstrations—the last, that of 1st May, 1949—his picture was very prominent and, according to the Hungarian press, the cheers he drew from the crowd were second only to Rákosi. When on 15th June, 1949, it was announced that Rajk had been arrested as a 'Titoist-fascist', all the press, without exception, attacked him in a most vicious manner. Within a week, the press was full of telegrams from meetings all over the country demanding 'punishment without mercy' for Rajk, and workers demanded 'A rope for traitors like Rajk', even before the date of his trial was announced. Not *one* of the thousands who had voted for him a month earlier when he headed the list of candidates in the Parliamentary elections made use of their 'freedom of the press and speech' (Article 55 of the Constitution) to propose to withhold judgment until the trial, far less to defend him. Furthermore, the people knew exactly what punishment would be meted out months before the trial. The rope was repeatedly demanded and he was indeed hanged. The mass meetings before Mindszenty's trial never demanded the death sentence but severe punishment; Mindszenty received a long prison sentence. Freedom of the press, speech, assembly, meetings and demonstrations amounts to the 'freedom' of the people to say exactly what the Government wants them to say.

To enhance 'freedom' of the press, the sale of books dating 642
from before the rule of the 'People's Democracies' is prohibited by Government decree. The Czechoslovak Government on January 10th, 1950, banned the sale of all books published in Czechoslovakia before May 5th, 1945, with the exception of certain specified text-books for schools and scientific journals, ordered all booksellers to clear their shelves of them within

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642 10 days, and required them to make a return of such books to the Minister of Education, and to keep them in a place 'inaccessible to the public'. Previously (November 22nd, 1949) all booksellers had had to make a list of all second-hand books in stock and not to sell them until they got permission from the Ministry of Information.

Even private correspondence is not immune from government interference. The Czechoslovak Government declared that from February 1st, 1950, anyone corresponding with persons abroad must deliver his letters personally to the post office, produce an identity card when handing it to the postal official and write his name and address on the envelope.

A very good description of 'freedom of demonstration' in Yugoslavia was given in the Royal Institute of International Affairs monthly journal *The World Today* (November, 1946). 'On the eve of the day fixed for the demonstration, instructions are given to the workers and civil servants, the trade unions, the ward committees, and the anti-Fascist organizations to get ready for action. They receive orders to report to fixed assembly points in the city at a stated time. Mimeographed lists of the slogans to be used are produced, and reliable persons appointed to direct the marching columns . . . The route and timing of the mass procession is carefully planned, and the school-children get busy painting the banners inscribed with the appropriate words, and decking the giant pictures of Stalin and Tito with flowers and wreaths of greenery'.

Democracy—The Only Way to Socialism

100 The leaders of the Communist Parties declare that the 'People's Democracies' are a stage on the path towards Socialism. To evaluate the correctness or otherwise of this assertion it is necessary to make clear the relation between the economic supremacy of the working class, its political rule and democracy.

In all previous history the class struggle has reached its climax in a fight for political power as the decisive weapon for the defence of the economic interests of the ruling class. This was the case in the bourgeois revolutions of the 16–18 centuries in Holland, England and France, and in the War of Independence in the United States. The bourgeoisie, which once

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175 took place, and in the generation before the First World
186 War a bitter struggle was waged against Magyar rule.
563 The exceptional character of Hungary's position was derived both from its traditions of provincial administrative autonomy, which can be traced to the thirteenth century, and from the fact that it had within its boundaries substantial Slavic and Rumanian minorities. Although the Hungarians, or Magyars, were less a minority than a member of the ruling group, they were by no means satisfied with the somewhat ambiguously defined rights of self-government granted when the Austrian Empire was created in 1804. The Hungarian nobility became an important force for reform within the empire and contributed many leaders to the liberal movement. Under the moderate guidance of Széchenyi important reforms were accomplished, but the more radical nationalist program of Kossuth was defeated in 1848-49 by the combined efforts of Austrian and Russian troops. Both the Magyar and the non-Magyar peoples were discriminated against in the period of Austrian centralism that followed, but with the military decline of Austria
[64] the privileges of Hungary were reasserted. The Austro-Hungarian compromise of 1867, negotiated under the wise statesmanship of Déak, gave Hungary a constitutional position equal to that of Austria within the empire and a political influence that was frequently greater despite certain economic disabilities.

Although Croatia enjoyed a degree of autonomy in Hungary after 1868, having in fact occupied the position of a dependency of Hungary intermittently since the eleventh century, it still suffered many limitations. The experience of Napoleonic rule in 1809-13 and the growth of Gaj's nationalist movement under the name of Illyrianism brought Croatian national feeling to the point where it could no longer suffer with equanimity the cultural and political restrictions imposed by the Magyars. The neighboring

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185 were by far the most important; the increase of educational
641 opportunities and general culture; and the development of the economy through agricultural improvement and the expansion of industry and trade.

177 Political freedom in Eastern Europe before the First
● 642 World War ranged in degree from negligible rights, as those of the Slovaks in Hungary or of the Poles in Russia, to independent states with constitutions of strongly democratic tendencies, as in certain countries of Southeastern Europe. The latter had been influenced by Western models, and made provision for parliamentary government based on wide suffrage. The constitutions of Serbia, Rumania, and Bulgaria, drafted in the latter half of the nineteenth century by native statesmen experienced in the ways of Western constitutionalism, were founded on a genuine faith in democracy. It is true that royal or ministerial authoritarianism and resort to rough methods were not uncommon in these countries, yet the social egalitarianism already prevailing in Serbia and Bulgaria was a strong force for democracy in these coun-
[66] tries. Although illiteracy and political inexperience remained a serious obstacle to orderly government, the generation before the First World War offers significant examples of governments being changed by orderly democratic procedures. Illustrative of the difficulties under which popular elections with universal male suffrage were conducted is the fact that in the Bulgarian election of 1880 only 32 per cent of those eligible to vote cast their ballots, in contrast to about 80 per cent in France and Belgium and 60 per cent in Germany and Italy in the period 1875-80.

177 Hungary had a longer tradition of constitutional govern-
642 ment than did the Balkan states and after 1867 was in most
563 respects an independent state, but its social structure was more conservative and its desire for political democracy less evident. Moreover, the Magyar achievement of political autonomy was marred by the oppressive treatment of the

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non-Magyar minorities. Thus in a parliament that as late as 1910 represented scarcely more than one quarter of the adult male population, the Magyars who numbered just over one half the population, apart from Croatia, had 405 seats to 8 for the Slovak and Rumanian minorities. The Croatians were represented by 40 deputies when mutual Croatian-Hungarian affairs were under discussion. The Czechs and the Poles in the Austrian provinces developed an aristocratic form of local self-government in the latter half of the nineteenth century and contributed distinguished statesmen to the Austrian government, and at least the Czechs gained experience in the techniques and responsibilities of democracy in local government and in unofficial organizations. Similarly in the Polish-inhabited lands of the German and Russian empires, little opportunity was available for gaining experience in electoral and parliamentary procedures.

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Educational opportunities in Eastern Europe were steadily improved in the century after 1815 despite frequently hostile government attitudes. The greatest progress in this field was made in the Czech-inhabited provinces of the Habsburg monarchy, where general compulsory education was introduced in 1869. In Hungary popular education was started somewhat later, and illiteracy among the Magyars declined rapidly. The schools, however, were used as a vehicle for the Magyarization of the non-Magyar minorities of Hungary and, as a consequence, the great majority of Slovak and Rumanian children were compelled to get their education in the Magyar language. In Hungary, discounting Croatia, there were four times as many Magyar-language schools as non-Magyar and five times as many Magyar schoolteachers. The Slovenes under Austrian rule and the autonomous Croatians fared a great deal better, while in independent Montenegro, Serbia, Bulgaria, and Rumania, national school systems were developed insofar as meager resources permitted. The Poles fared differently in their three parts. In

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186 668 648 Much more was heard about Panslavism between 1848 and 1914, but during this period it was used primarily as a weapon of Russian expansionism. The Slavic movement evolved in Russia early in the century under the name of Slavophilism and, with the founding of a Slavic committee in Moscow in 1857, it entered a Panslav phase. In 1867 non-Russian Slavs were summoned to a congress in Moscow in connection with a Slav ethnographic exhibition, and at this meeting it was not difficult to discern the expansionist tendencies of Russian Panslavism. During the Russian-Turkish war of 1876-78, this movement developed into an outburst of emotional imperialism, and much was said of bringing all Slavs together under Russian rule. European power politics prevented an undue extension of Russian influence in 1878, but Panslavism came to serve Russian policy and was directed increasingly against the Habsburg empire. This trend was particularly evident at the third Panslav Congress held in Prague in 1908. Although the Russian constitutional reforms of 1905-06 made a favorable impression on non-Russian Slavs and brought about some real concessions to the Polish minority, Russian foreign policy never gave up the idea of pushing the Russian frontier to the West. Had the Tsarist regime survived the First World War it would certainly have demanded that large parts of Eastern Europe be annexed or brought into a satellite relationship, and a liberal Russian government might also have favored the Westward expansion of Russian influence.

631 642 The multinational empire of the Habsburgs offered the most challenging problem to the federalists, and the proposals for its constitutional reorganization were varied and ingenious, Of the many ideas arising out of the revolution of 1848, the most comprehensive was the constitution drafted by the freely elected Austrian assembly. After this assembly

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was transferred from revolutionary Vienna in October 1848, 631
it met for four months in the Moravian town of Kremsier and 642
drafted a federal constitution that had the twin virtues of coming from a free assembly and of granting equality to all national groups in the empire. Under this scheme thirty-nine nationally homogeneous districts (*Kreise*) were to be created within the existing crownlands of Austria. The lower chamber of a bicameral parliament was to be elected by universal male suffrage, thus guaranteeing to the different nationalities a voice in national affairs, and the individual districts were to have extensive rights or local self-government. The Kremsier assembly was dissolved before the draft constitution was formally adopted, but many students believe it plotted a course that might have saved the empire had the Germans become reconciled to the fact of their numerical minority.

Two decades of experimentation with various forms of 642
centralism failed to strengthen the empire and, with the 563
Austro-Hungarian compromise of 1867 and the agreement between Hungary and Croatia in the following year, a new era of federalism was inaugurated. The balance established within the empire in 1867, though modified by concessions to the Poles and Czechs in Austria, favored the Magyars to a point that the Slav and Rumanian minorities could not tolerate permanently. In the face of Magyar resistance, constitutional amendment was not practicable before the defeat of the empire in 1918, but many proposals for reform were put forward. The Austrian Social Democrats, for instance, adopted a program in 1899 that called for creation within the empire of autonomous and nationally homogeneous territories with extensive rights of self-government. Nevertheless, their own party split into its several national components before 1914. Other proposals called for the division of the empire into as few as three and as

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642 563 many as fifteen federated states, and many hoped that reorganization along such lines would draw towards the empire the Slav and Rumanian peoples on its periphery and thus strengthen its international position. None of these proposals had a serious chance of success, however, and when the empire was finally defeated it disintegrated into its national units.

631 186 648 The independent states of Southeastern Europe faced problems that were different from those of the Habsburg lands, and their alliance and federation schemes were designed to meet the realities of power politics. Once the grandiose plans of the 1848er's had been forgotten, one of these being a proposal for a federation stretching from Poland to Serbia, new schemes were developed around the vigorous Serbian ruler Prince Michael Obrenović. Several agreements were concluded in the 1860's among the Serbian, Montenegrin, Rumanian, Bulgarian, and Greek national leaders with the aid of Russian diplomacy, but these efforts were soon overshadowed by the Russian-Turkish conflict. In the long run, the territorial rivalries among the Balkan states proved to be the principal obstacle to their cooperation, and even the successful Balkan Alliance that defeated Turkey in 1912 disintegrated within a year into interallied war. What is significant is that the initiative throughout this period lay with the great powers, and the federation and alliance plans that got beyond the drafting stage were in general those backed by Russia or Austria-Hungary. The principal reality in international relations was the search for security on the part of these two powers that drove them to regard expansion into Southeastern Europe as a guarantee against political humiliation and military defeat. However, the balance was too close for either to succeed in this game, and it was left to a world conflict to clear the stage for a new order.

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829 History clearly proves the accuracy of this analysis. In the second half of the nineteenth century, a "liberal" climate prevailed in Europe. At that time liberalism penetrated even into Tsarist Russia. The belief that Russia has an inherent tendency toward despotism and slavery leads one to forget that liberal ideas found excellent propagandists and defenders there; to mention but a few: Radishchev, Pestel, Herzen, Soloviev, Milyukov, Chernov, and the Decembrists. In the nineteenth century, liberal tendencies were growing in strength and influence in Eastern Europe and contributed considerably to the struggle for national liberation. The victory of the liberal Western democracies in 1918 led to the liberal democratization of almost all Eastern Europe.

III

668 The obstacles faced by liberalism in Eastern Europe in-
●642 cluded both the threat of Communist, and later of fascist and Nazi, interference and the efforts of domestic authoritarian groups that saw in dictatorship the answer to the problems of this region. In spite of these highly unfavorable circumstances, democratic liberalism maintained itself even when dictatorial governments were formed. A courageous opposition fought these regimes without fearing the persecution to which it was exposed. It is easy to prove that Pilsudski and, later, Beck in Poland, Horthy in Hungary, Carol in Rumania, Boris in Bulgaria, Alexander and Paul in Yugoslavia, and Dolfuss and Schuschnigg in Austria, were opposed by democratic forces stronger than, or at least as strong as, the forces which Hitler, Mussolini, and Stalin were meeting in their respective countries. In Germany and Russia and, to a large extent, in Italy, the dictatorial regimes were totalitarian and therefore opposition was almost impossible. But the fact that in Eastern Europe only limited dictatorships were established shows that antiliberal, antidemocratic trends were hampered by the opposition of democratic forces. In

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this great struggle, many liberals, especially in Yugoslavia, 668
Rumania, and Austria, were lured into the services of dic- 642
tatorial regimes, and thus doomed themselves to failure.

It would be unjust to discount the actions of either Constantin Bratianu or Titulescu because of the opportunist Tatarescu who placed himself at the disposal of King Carol, or to forget the courageous Ion Duca who, for his uncompromising liberal principles, was assassinated in 1933 by the fascist terrorists of the Iron Guard. In Yugoslavia, there were a number of radicals and democrats enlisted in the service of the royal dictatorship. They thus distinctly deviated from the radical democratic tradition which, especially before the First World War, was represented by Nikola Pašić, famous for his revolutionary struggle against the dictatorial desires of the Obrenović rulers. Pašić was influenced not only by Western liberalism, in which the democratic Serbian King Peter I was educated, but by the revolutionism of the Russian Populists. The influence of the Russian revolutionaries was also strong in Bulgaria, especially in her agrarian movement. For some of those who associated with King Alexander's dictatorship, Foreign Minister Marinković for instance, there may have been extenuating circumstances, for those men were led by fear of the decomposition of Yugoslavia.

Nevertheless, as in Rumania, some earnest liberals in Yugoslavia courageously opposed the royal dictatorship. Because of Stoyadinović, who put a shame on the liberal tradition of the Radical Party, one must not forget Aca Stanojević, a friend of Pašić, or Miša Trifunović who did not fear imprisonment and refused any collaboration with the dictatorship. In the opposition remained also Slobodan Jovanović, an influential professor of Belgrade University, who in the Second World War became the Premier of the Yugoslavian government in London. Against the royal dictatorship were also leaders of the Democratic Party: Ljuba

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668 Davidović and Božidar Vlajić among the Serbians, Večeslav
642 Vilder, a disciple of Masaryk, among the Croatians, and Milan Grol among the Slovenes. The famous Svetozar Pribičević distinguished himself for his courageous opposition to the Alexander dictatorship; he may be counted justly among the founders of Yugoslavia. He also was under Masaryk's influence, and it was through Masaryk's personal intervention with King Alexander that the interned Pribičević was allowed to go into exile. Pribičević gave an example to many others by repudiating his devotion to the Karadjordjević dynasty and becoming a radical republican. The royal dictatorship was opposed also by the Croatian Peasant Party, headed by Vladko Maček, and by the Serbian Agrarian Party, headed by Dragoljub Jovanović. The democratic opposition to the royal dictatorship has been cited in order to point out that when Titoist communism calls itself an "organic" result of the Yugoslav internal development, it does not make any allowance for the strong liberal tradition of Yugoslavia. In Hungary, C. Rassay was the most distinguished defender of liberalism.

The Bulgarian liberals played a prominent role in their country before the First World War but, in compromising with King Ferdinand, they were partly responsible for the unfortunate policies that led to the defeat of 1918. In the period between the two wars they were pushed into the background by nationalists and reactionaries such as Tsankov. Nevertheless, some Bulgarian liberals tried to preserve their own tradition. In 1924 Genadiev paid for his courageous devotion to liberal ideas with his life. Through the efforts of Malinov and Mušanov, the democratic regime was resumed at the beginning of the 'thirties, but the military *coup d'état* in 1934 installed a "progressive dictatorship." King Boris took advantage of this in order to establish his own dictatorship. The opposition of the liberals to this dictatorship was

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weak in comparison with that of the Agrarian Party which still followed Stambolisky's tradition. 668 642

The Agrarian and the Socialist parties and some Catholics, as well as the liberals, carried on the struggle against dictatorship in Bulgaria, Rumania, Poland, and Hungary. They fought for real democracy in the sense of the best liberal tradition. In Austria the Social Democrats were the main force opposing clerical fascism. It is interesting that in Hungary the conservative aristocrats opposed fascist trends. Szálasi, who led the important Arrow-Cross movement, was the most conspicuous of these men. Count Bethlen and Count Teleki also opposed the Nazi pressure, and the latter's efforts were climaxed by his symbolic suicide in 1941.

The opposition to dictatorship and to fascism or Nazism was motivated differently in the individual Eastern European countries and was carried on by different political parties. Notwithstanding these differences, the original inspiration to opposition lay in two main ideas: a longing for freedom and a patriotic devotion to national independence. Pure democratic liberalism is the expression of these two ideas, both of which prove convincingly that the love of freedom was deeply rooted in these countries. Internal antiliberal forces alone would not have been able to crush democratic aspirations. Whenever the elections were more liberal than usual, for instance, in Rumania in 1928 or in Bulgaria in 1931, the democratic parties won. In Poland, Pilsudski's followers, who represented only a small minority of the nation, were well aware that the only means by which they could maintain their regime was political terror. In spite of the pressure of the reactionaries and the influence of fascists and Nazis, the remnants of liberalism in Hungary survived until nearly the end of the Second World War. In view of these facts, it is clear that the liberal democratic forces could have mastered internal difficulties successfully 186 668 829

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In the case of Eastern Europe, authoritarian forms of 642
government were generally established as a result of a *coup d'état* carried out by groups already possessing power. In some cases, royal authority provided the basis for the seizure of power. Thus in the modified authoritarian regime set up in Hungary in 1920, Admiral Horthy served as regent on the vacant Habsburg throne, while in Yugoslavia and Rumania, royal authority was implemented by the existing bureaucracy and military establishment. In Bulgaria, on the other hand, the *coups* of 1923 and 1934 were carried out by military and civilian leaders without royal authority and only in 1935 was King Boris able to gain control of the government. The regimes of Zogu in Albania and Pilsudski in Poland were likewise the result of civil-military collaboration, and the former did not proclaim himself king as Zog I until he had held power for three years.

Thus the *coups* in these nations were largely the actions of court camarilla or military cliques. They reflected relative inexperience with the techniques of parliamentary government and weak social structures. In part, they may also be attributed to the immense difficulties experienced by political leaders in their attempts to solve the complex domestic and international problems which existed in these states after the First World War. In any case, the resulting authoritarian regimes were essentially of the limited type; they did not, at least at the outset, approximate the totalitarian thoroughness of the succeeding dictatorships which came with the advance of fascist or Communist power.

In the expansion of totalitarian control, war and external aggrandizement have also played their parts; that is, whenever a dictatorial system managed to entrench itself in a major center of national power, it immediately sought to create an area of satellite states. Upon these the dictatorial system was imposed in order that they might be the more effectively controlled. Such was the history of Italian Fascist

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642 and German Nazi imperialism; such, also, is the story of Russian Communist totalitarianism. A whole ring of states in Europe and Asia have lost their independence and have been added to the totalitarian area because Soviet Russia and its instruments have so willed it, and because they have used force and sabotage to achieve it.

III

000 The immediate origins of contemporary dictatorships are thus clearly traditional. Like most tyrannies of the past, our twentieth-century tyrannies are the product of usurpation and conquest, of the *coup d'état*, and of military aggrandizement. But in reminding ourselves of this rather obvious fact, questions arise as to why the usurper and the tyrant have been so successful in our age and why free institutions have proven so vulnerable to their attack. That question can probably never be answered satisfactorily; nevertheless, it is possible to point to various unique circumstances and conditions which weakened or discredited free institutions or otherwise aided the would-be usurpers.

Of these the most obvious has been the fondness of this century for global war. In almost all belligerent countries, and especially in those that were defeated or unprepared to wage war, the economic and social disruption wrought by war produced social tensions and political extremism for which the normal integrative processes of free government often proved inadequate. War, moreover, eroded the integrity of the popular institutions of government. Constant emergencies, the need for decisive action at any cost, and the emphasis upon secrecy, caused men to discount the legislative and normal deliberative functions of such government if, indeed, it did not cause them to hold such functions in contempt; as a consequence, it was an easy step from

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000 might have been, aggravated the popular suspicion that democracy and representative institutions were inadequate to deal with the elementary problem of economic security, if, indeed, these institutions did not themselves bring on this problem.

The talking point most used by the Communist and other total dictatorships today is the wholly unjustified assertion that representative democracy cannot cope with the problem of guaranteeing elementary economic security, and that, if this problem is to be solved, mankind must suffer the harsh tyranny and arbitrary discretion of dictatorship. Until we succeed in extirpating from the minds of men the association of dictatorship and security, born largely of the depression and the aftermath of war and appealing especially to countries with little technological development, the future of representative institutions will be none too bright.

What has just been said does not apply directly to the earlier authoritarian regimes of Eastern Europe since these, as already pointed out, came into being for the most part in the 1920's and hence antedated the depression. Nevertheless, this economic debacle aggravated the trend toward authoritarianism in these parts. In the cases of the second Bulgarian *coup d'état* in 1934 and King Carol's assumption of power in Rumania in 1938, economic influences can be discerned. The decline in trade and employment in the early '30's bore a distinct relationship to the weakening of the democratic regime in Bulgaria, and the incoming authoritarian regime adopted statist methods to meet these problems. Moreover, the depression weakened the resistance of the region as a whole to Nazi economic penetration, and the influence of the Western democracies declined as the world markets for the exports of Eastern Europe disappeared.

● 642 186 Another factor that paralyzed the democratic will and advanced the cause of reaction, especially in Eastern Europe,

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was the extreme nationalism that characterized many political and military leaders. In this region, diversion of state expenditures from armaments to social welfare and gestures of friendship to neighboring countries were regarded by many as a form of treason. The schools and the press preached incessantly that the vindication of a nation's territorial aspirations was a value of the highest order, and authoritarian leaders, acting in the name of such doctrines, generally met with little resistance. It was frequently only a small group of liberal-minded professional men, and in some cases the peasant parties, that placed a high value on social and economic improvement and resisted the authoritarian trend. Thus nationalism, which a century earlier had formed the vanguard of liberalism, now became its most treacherous enemy.

Any account of the vulnerability of free institutions must also comment on the peculiar and often fatal tolerance which democratic governments have exhibited during the past two or three decades towards those who have overtly threatened its existence. Those who governed free states hesitated to deny traditional rights to Communists, fascists, and others even though these groups clearly intended to use such rights to facilitate their own seizure of power. Many pages of recent history have chronicled this dismal story, especially those which tell of the success of German and Italian fascism and of Lenin's bid for power in Russia. Not until 1930 did the political leadership of the Weimar Republic muster the courage to ban street demonstrations, uniforms, vigilantism, and other abuses of the traditional rights of association and expression. By that time, however, Hitler had already sealed the fate of the Republic. He triumphed, even as Mussolini and Lenin had done before him, because the legal regime failed to deny him the opportunity of perverting the privileges of a free state. Among the narrower and more tangible causes of the great reaction, the paralysis

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665 actions a triple objective: to mislead the people, to prevent the postwar restoration of political parties by their original leaders and members or to break them up if they had been restored already, and to beguile foreign opinion into believing that multiparty systems still existed in the Eastern European countries.

The lack of popular support of the Communist parties is visible even today in the countries behind the Iron Curtain. For this reason, in the last elections in Poland and in Rumania in 1952, and in Hungary in 1953, the lists of candidates, made out completely by the Communists, were presented to the people under the disguise of a "National Front." The National Front is represented as a coalition of political parties, trade unions, youth organizations, scientific societies and so forth, and is highlighted by the names of "patriot-priests" and "progressive Catholics." The Communist press in Poland admits that the institution of the National Front was necessary in the elections of 1952 because in 60 per cent of the voting localities, especially in the villages, there were "white spots," that is, areas where there did not exist a single cell of the Communist Party.

665 In summary, it can be said that the Communist dictator-
177 ship was imposed upon the countries behind the Iron Cur-
● 692 tain under the name of People's Democracy through the following means: Moscow's strategic and political machinations during the war; the direct intervention of the Red Army and the NKVD in the internal affairs of these countries both at the end of and after the war; either the falsification of the will of these nations in the elections or the *coup d'état*, as in Hungary in 1947, and in Czechoslovakia in 1948.

665 An analysis of Communist strength clearly shows that the Communists could not have expected in a single case to assume power in a democratic and parliamentary manner. And, it must be added, the peoples of the Eastern Euro-

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665 tanism" of the West was introduced, and the Communists vigorously went about the destruction of the remaining private property, the collectivization of agriculture, and the transformation of the remaining independent cooperatives into a sector of the Communist state economy. It was therefore, in theory and practice a period of the establishment of socialist states, ruled by the dictatorship of the proletariat and disguised by the name of People's Democracy. This period was marked by the accelerated tempo of the communization of all spheres of national life, by the integration of the economies of the People's Democracy into the Soviet economy, and by political and legislative preparations for the incorporation of these countries into the Soviet Union.

177 Analysis of the constitutions imposed upon the captive
•642 countries shows that the People's Democracies are dictatorships of the proletariat different in form but not in substance from the Soviet system. No matter when the constitutions of the People's Democracies were imposed or whether there were differences in their wording, the most important provisions are the same in each constitution. More light can be cast on these constitutions by the political circumstances in which they were imposed and by their preambles than by a dry analysis of their provisions.

[643] In Bulgaria in 1946 the Communists falsified the elections, and in 1947 they introduced in the Parliament the draft of a new constitution. According to this draft, the president was still to be the head of the state and not the Chairman of the Presidium of the Parliament as in Soviet Russia. On September 23, 1947, the leader of the opposition, Petkov, was hanged by the Communists, and on December 4, 1947, a revised constitution was imposed upon Bulgaria. This new constitution went further in its provisions than the constitutions imposed several years later in the other captive countries. The office of the president

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was abolished and the office of the President of the National Assembly was established. Article 1 does not speak of a "socialist state governed by the dictatorship of the proletariat" but neither does it mention "People's Democracy." It only proclaims that Bulgaria is a "People's Republic with a representative Government . . . where all power derives from the people and belongs to the people." 177 642

The Albanian Constitution of March 15, 1946, also proclaims that "Albania is a People's Republic in which all powers are derived from and belong to the people." It provides also that the "President of the Presidium of the People's Convention is the head of the State." The constitutions of both countries faithfully reflect the Soviet system and, in the event of the incorporation of these countries into the U.S.S.R., no significant constitutional changes would be necessary. [643]

In Hungary on August 31, 1947, after the *coup d'état* of May 1947 against the government of Premier Nagy, new elections were held, and in August 1949 a new constitution was introduced. One section of the preamble to this constitution states the following:

> Our people under the leadership of the working class, steeled in the battles during the last decades, enriched by the experience of the revolution of 1919, and relying on the USSR laid the foundation of socialism and our country now is going forward by means of the people's democracy, toward socialism.

Hungary became a People's Republic (Article 1) and was proclaimed "a state of the workers and of the working peasantry" (Article 2). The constitution further stated that "The close union of the workers and working peasantry shall be accomplished in the Hungarian People's Republic under the leadership of the workers" (Article 3), and that "The working people shall gradually oust the capitalist elements and consistently build the socialist economic order" (Ar-

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642 177 ticle 4). The Presidium of the People's Republic with its President was established and the post of the President abolished.

In Czechoslovakia on May 9, 1948, following the *coup d'état* of February 1948, a new constitution was enacted. The preamble reads: "We, the Czechoslovakian People, declare that we are firmly resolved to build up our liberated State as a People's democracy which will ensure to us a [643] peaceful road to socialism." Article 1 states that "The Czechoslovakian State is a People's democratic Republic. The people are the sole source of all power in the State." According to this constitution, the President of the Republic remained the head of the state and Czechoslovakia still differs from the other captive countries in this respect.

In Yugoslavia, Tito introduced at the very beginning the most advanced form of a Soviet-style system; he recently reassumed the title of President of the Republic in place of the title of President of the National Assembly.

In Poland, after the falsification of the elections in 1947, a so-called Little Constitution, based on the Soviet system of councils, was introduced. It established a Council of State whose "chairman" was also the President of the Republic. On July 22, 1952, a new constitution was imposed upon Poland. The preamble to this constitution states:

> The Polish People's Republic is a republic of the working people. . . .
>
> As a result of the revolutionary struggles and changes, the power of the capitalists and landlords has been overthrown and the state of People's democracy has been established. The basis of the present people's power constitutes the alliance of the working class with the working peasantry. In this alliance the leading role belongs to the working class, the leading class of the society, basing itself on the revolutionary achievements of the Polish and international working movement, on the historical experiences of the victorious building of socialism in the USSR, the first state of workers and peasants. . . .

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> The Polish People's Republic is a state of People's democracy. In the Polish People's Republic power belongs to the working people of town and country. (Article 1)

642 177

The office of the President of the Republic was abolished and the office of the Chairman of the Council of State became the highest post in the state. Poland is no longer the Republic of Poland. It is now called the Polish People's Republic. [643]

In Rumania, the constitution of 1948 was replaced by a new constitution forced upon Rumania on July 18, 1952. The preamble to the new constitution declares that "The Rumanian People's Republic is a state of working people of town and countryside," and that "The present Constitution of the Rumanian People's Republic embodies the results so far obtained by the working people headed by the working class, in building a socialist society in our country." The highest organ of state power is the General National Assembly and its Presidium, while the highest executive and administrative organ of state power is the Council of Ministers. The organs of state power in regions, districts, towns, and rural localities are the people's councils of the working people of town and country.

The examples cited from the texts and preambles of the constitutions of the captive countries show clearly that, although the Communist dictatorship in the Soviet Union has achieved the first phase in the development of communism —"the socialist state based on the dictatorship of the proletariat"—and is now on the way to the higher phase, the People's Democracies, according to communist theory, are still on the road to the first phase. This theoretical distinction made by the Communists has no great importance in practice particularly inasmuch as constitutional changes in all these People's Republics have made complete political and legal preparations for incorporation into the U.S.S.R.

As far as Yugoslavia is concerned, in the period of friendly

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642 Stalin-Tito relations her communist system was much fur-
177 ther advanced than that of any other Iron Curtain country, and since the break with Stalin only insignificant changes have been made in the structure of the highest organs of government. Tito still declares clearly and without any reservation that he intends to maintain the communist system in that country at any price.

IV

208 When communist propaganda speaks of the liberation of
661 the oppressed masses from the slavery of the privileged and the rich, it stresses the term, People's Democracy. But does this term really signify freedom? Does it respect human dignity? Does it recognize equality among the people? Does it abolish undue privileges and the exploitation of the working people? It does not. In practice, it does not even provide personal freedom or personal security.

697 The overcrowded prisons and the many thousands of peo-
661 ple in the forced labor camps bear witness to this. The Soviet Union and all the countries occupied by it are a large prison from which the majority of the people would escape if they only could. They would flee from the "Communist paradise" partly because of the difficult economic conditions, but mostly because of the unbearable atmosphere created by the insecurity and complete lack of freedom which are part of this system.

The majority of the people escaping today are average people—workers, peasants, craftsmen, small merchants, and others who have never belonged to any privileged or exploiting class. I have read a number of books on the living conditions in the Soviet forced labor camps; I have studied thousands of reports of Poles who have passed through Soviet camps and prisons; I have had hundreds of talks with the victims of the Soviet regime. And I have come

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661 cal parties, legislation, courts, and the police who protect
665 the security of the citizens. The state authority is the mediator in the last resort in disagreements between labor and business.

661 The Moloch, which is the Communist state, has on its side the party, the police, and the courts. Special laws con-
466 stantly increase the penalties for the plunder and destruc-
641 tion of the nationalized public property. Because the state is a "people's state" and "does not do injustice to the people," the trade unions act as a tool of the state in raising the productivity and quality of production and fixing the norms of work. The Stakhanovite work system, based on high norms of production and granting starvation-level wages with no means of protection against these, destroys the strength and health of the worker. Strikes are punishable because they are crimes against the interests of the state, and special laws provide discipline of work, penalties for failure to fulfill norms, and forced labor camps for "idlers" and "loafers."

661 Communism deprives the peasant of his beloved land,
& 641 turns him into a Communist serf, and chains him to the
423 state or collective farm in which the Communist bureaucracy demands of him ever-increasing physical efforts to produce for the insatiable state. After the liquidation of the remnants of private initiative in small business and crafts, the *kulak* peasant, the biggest "capitalist blood-sucker," is dealt with. He is destroyed by tax levies and forced deliveries of agricultural products and is finally evicted from his own farm.

642 Thus, behind the façade of People's Democracy, Communism practices dictatorship in every sphere of life—personal, political, economic, religious, and social. The Communist system creates privileges for the party and makes the citizen economically dependent upon the state. It debases human dignity, wrests faith out of human hearts, kills

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one's father, mother, brother, and sister in prisons and in forced labor camps, poisons the hearts of the young, and prepares them for participation in an imperialistic war against the interests of their own countries. 642

Moscow-controlled Communism also serves Soviet imperialism. It is the Soviets that occupied and imposed the Communist dictatorships upon the countries of Eastern Europe. If there had been no Soviet aggression or interference, not one of these countries would have a Communist dictatorship today. The basis for the exploitation of these countries and their systematic economic integration into the framework of the Soviet Union consists of secret trade agreements, so-called technical advisers, and economic plans for each country carefully adjusted to the plans for the Soviet economy. These Moscow-directed devices also determine the quantity of production and trade exchange in accordance with the political and economic objectives of the dictators in the Kremlin. In these countries Soviet generals and lower-ranking officers hold the posts of commanders, and prepare the younger generation for the betrayal of their own national interests and for service to their enemies. 648

For these reasons Communism, manifested as a dictatorship of the proletariat or as People's Democracy, constitutes, in theory and practice, a mortal danger to the existence of freedom, democracy, and peace in the world.

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641 participate in national elections and thus intensified the activities of the peasant political organizations. Only a decade earlier, because of the tax census system, none but a limited number of the peasants were entitled to vote, but in the national democratic states this right was granted to every male citizen over twenty-one years of age.

423 In Bulgaria, Rumania, Yugoslavia, Czechoslovakia, and Poland, a considerable number of agrarian reforms were accomplished which distributed large surfaces of arable land to individual peasants. They thus became economically independent and from then on were valiant champions of the peasant program. No substantial land reform was carried out in Hungary until 1945.

642 Unfortunately, the initial success of the peasant parties was not given political effect everywhere and, where peasant regimes were established, they were not of long duration. The advances of the peasant parties were neutralized soon by the counter actions of totalitarian elements which were opposed to democratic principles in general, and to peasant political and social concepts in particular. The peasant parties, faithful to their programs, favored and supported genuinely democratic systems and cooperated with other democratic groups but, with the disappearance of the democratic order, their own position became precarious. It must be admitted that the complicated machinery of a democratic regime was unable to run smoothly at all times in the newly established national states, except in Czechoslovakia. However, this deficiency should not be interpreted as a lack of interest in democratic institutions nor as a disapproving attitude toward the principles of freedom which symbolize Western political thought. The democratic regimes came up against a complex of problems whose complete, satisfactory, and early settlement was somewhat unreasonably expected by the newly created national states. Profiting from these adverse and interrelated domestic conditions, the totalitarian elements found inter-

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vention possible. They usually claimed that this intervention was necessary "to save the country from the total chaos in which it was driven by the unsatisfactory operating of democratic institutions." What was even worse, new regimes were supported often by the Western democracies who used the unjustifiable excuse that "no other solutions were possible." 642

Despite the mistakes and failures of the democratic regimes, today even the most bitter opponents of peasantism must admit that the peasant parties, as political organizations, were stalwart champions of democratic government and did not, in general, support the established dictatorships or their undemocratic methods.

The greatest achievement of all the peasant groups was that of the Bulgarian Agrarian Union. From its modest beginnings in 1896, the Union grew steadily. In the first postwar elections it received a strong relative majority in the National Assembly, and in the elections of April 1923, 212 deputies out of 245 were allotted to the Agrarian Union. At the relatively early date of October 1919, the first Bulgarian peasant government of Aleksander Stambolisky was formed. The most significant of its numerous political and economic achievements was the agrarian reform based on the principles that the land should be the property of those who till it and that every peasant is entitled to only as much land as he and his family are able to cultivate. In spite of the certain weaknesses and deficiencies of this peasant government which contributed to its downfall, its democratic basis cannot be denied. Its reforms converted Bulgaria into a country of small and medium peasant holdings which, despite the forcible overthrow of the peasant regime in June 1923, remained unchanged until the end of the Second World War. 665 642 423 185

In Czechoslovakia, the Republican Agrarian Party was the strongest party in the Parliament and the most important pillar of the Czechoslovakian democracy. After the political 665 642

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665 liberation of the Czechs and the Slovaks in 1918, the party's
● 642 main goal was to secure economic and social prosperity for the Czech and Slovak peasants, chiefly by promoting cooperative organizations and by defending the interests of the peasant populations. The party averaged forty-five deputies on all national elections and cooperated with other democratic parties in the governments of the Republic. The President of the Party, Antonin Švehla and his successor, Milan Hodža, were for many years Prime Ministers of the Czechoslovakian governments.

665 The Croatian Peasant Party, established in 1904 by the
185 brothers Ante and Stjepan Radić, reached its full political importance in the first postwar elections in Yugoslavia. This was in November 1920, and at that time the party became the undisputed choice of the Croatian people. In all free parliamentary elections since then, the Croatians, and especially the Croatian peasantry, have cast their votes in overwhelming majority for this political group. The principal aims of the party's program were Croatian national independence and social and economic justice. When the president of the party, Stjepan Radić, was assassinated in June 1928, Vladko Maček, who heads the party today, was elected president. In its political struggle, the party has opposed violently the Yugoslav centralism favored by the majority of Serbian political groups, and has been outlawed twice as "dangerous for the interests of the state." In August 1939, a compromise that opened the door for a just settlement of the Serbo-Croatian dispute was reached with the Regency of the Kingdom of Yugoslavia and with certain of the Serbian political parties.

The beginnings of the Polish peasant movements date back to 1905, when the first Polish peasant associations were organized in Galicia under the leadership of Wincenty Witos. With this as an initiative, the Polish peasant party, *Piast*, was founded in Cracow in 1913. During the First World War,

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in the Russian part of Poland, another peasant party, *Liberation*, was born. Its leader was Stanislaw Thugutt. This party emphasized the solution of social and economic problems, demanding primarily an extensive land reform and distribution of the land to the peasants. In liberated and united Poland, these two peasant groups united in 1920 to become the strongest individual Polish political group, but later, in May 1923, one faction dissented. Witos was repeatedly elected Prime Minister and was holding this position in 1926 when the military *coup d'état*, executed by Pilsudski, put an end to democratic government in Poland. In 1928, during the dictatorship, all peasant political groups fused in a united peasant party under the leadership of Witos and Mikolajczyk, but, because of the undemocratic regime, this group was never permitted to take part in Poland's political life.

665 /185 [642]

Although it may be argued that the embryonic stage of peasant organization in Serbia started in 1882 under the influence of the socialist ideas of Svetozar Marković, it is more correct to say that the first truly peasant movement in Serbia began in 1905 with the actions of Milislav Kurtović. In 1920, in the new state, Yugoslavia, the Agrarian Union of the Serbians, Croatians, and Slovenes was established, under the leadership of Joca Jovanović. The Union had little success among the Croatian and Slovenian peasantry, and was later known as the Serbian Agrarian Party. It recruited its followers mainly from the Serbian peasants in Serbia, Bosnia, and northern Dalmatia. The party was in the difficult position of being obliged to compete politically with two well-established Serbian parties, the Radicals and the Democrats. The provisions of the electoral law were unfavorable to the smaller political formations and, for this reason, the party was hindered from obtaining a proportional number of deputies in national elections. In June 1938, after the death of Joca Jovanović, Milan Gavrilović was elected the new president of the party.

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665 The initiative for a peasant organization in Rumania was
185 given in 1907, in Jassy, Bessarabia, by Constantine Stere,
● 642 who was influenced by Russian Populism. The Rumanian Peasant Party was formally founded in 1919, and Ion Mihalache was elected its President. In 1926, the Rumanian National Party from Transylvania, led by Iuliu Maniu, and the Peasant Party of the Old Kingdom fused into one political group known as the Rumanian National Peasant Party, which became the strongest political organization of the country. In the elections of 1928, the overwhelming majority of votes were cast for this united peasant front, and a peasant government was formed with Maniu as Prime Minister. This party brought about some administrative, economic, and social reforms which aimed at the assurance of the progress of the Rumanian state. Unfortunately, the peasant rule was definitely handicapped by the international agrarian crisis which was at its peak during the period of the peasant government. The party's position was further aggravated by its continuous struggle with the liberals and by numerous intrigues of the Crown calculated to destroy the unity and vigor of the peasant group.

665 Because of specific conditions which existed in Hungary, the organization of the peasantry commenced relatively late. Sandor Czismadia made the first attempt to organize the landless peasants on the principles of agrarian socialism in 1896, but the genuine peasant movement was initiated by István Nagyatádi-Szabó in 1908. The movement grew in strength after the collapse of the first Communist regime of Béla Kun, but its original success and its hopes for the future were skilfully suppressed by the Hungarian ruling class. It was not until 1930 that Zoltan Tildy and Ferenc Nagy undertook the revival of a truly peasant political organization. As a consequence, the Hungarian Smallholders Party was founded. This party fought valiantly against all the odds of the authoritarian Hungarian regime, but was not able to at-

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visions were included in the peace treaties with Hungary and 563
Bulgaria, and the states that had been created or enlarged 648
as a result of the war assumed similar obligations. The provisions for the protection of minorities were concerned with the use of language in schools and courts, the practice of religion, and the equitable administration of social security. Their implementation by the respective governments was supervised by a Minorities Commission in the League of Nations, and a system of petitions was established for bringing injustices to the attention of the League. Although the principles underlying this system represented a great advance over pre-war practice, the efforts at implementation failed to meet the needs of the situation. In many cases the minorities continued to be discriminated against, and even when they were not, nationalist movements sponsored by neighboring countries often proved irresistible. As a result, the problem of minorities became one of the fundamental sources of political instability in Eastern Europe.

Another unfavorable factor was that richer families sent 177
their children to foreign universities, especially to France, .87
Germany, and Great Britain, while there was little student 871
exchange among the Eastern European countries themselves. Educated people knew a great deal about Western Europe, but much less about neighboring states and peoples. Naturally, this was even more so among nations which had been enemies in the First World War and which now fiercely condemned their citizens if they praised the culture or progress of a former enemy. However, this situation was not unique to this region. It was characteristic of Europe as a whole and, like the development of nationalism and industry, moved from West to East.

Many of Eastern Europe's difficulties stemmed from the 642
instability of its political life. Governments changed con- 578
stantly and political parties fought each other to the last breath. Due to the many changes of government, an unwhole-

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642 somely large proportion of state funds was used for political
578 competition. Taxes were high and the entire taxation system was geared to make the poor people pay for the political and economic program of the government or of the ruling classes.
647 Planning was poor and administration far from efficient. Bohemia-Moravia had inherited from Austria a relatively competent administrative machinery, and Hungary's was organized along nineteenth-century lines. Administrative systems in former Russian and Turkish areas were a continuation of the previous imperial regimes, and were considered
[687] definitely the worst in Eastern Europe. Inefficiency and corruption mitigated somewhat the dictatorial character of these administrations. Bribery was customary and necessary on every level and affected the poor and the minorities. The problem of corruption was most serious in high official circles. Often the biggest fortunes were made in politics through embezzling discretionary funds that were left at the disposal of government members. Selling protective tariffs to industrialists in order to receive shares from foreign companies for concessions was a prevalent practice. Administrative officials were endowed with the nickname "bicyclists," which carried the implication that these officials trampled upon their subordinates and bowed before their bosses.

578 This attitude and the belief that the masses should support all projects of the ruling circles produced a harsh conflict of interests between the bourgeoisie, the mixed aristocratic and middle class, and the industrial workers and peasants. The fundamental conflict, however, was between the bureaucracy and the peasantry. The great differences in the cultural levels in many of the Eastern European countries made things worse. Different religious and ethnic groups and contrasting social standards contributed to regional hostilities and did nothing to facilitate the task of the administrators. The fault lay not alone with the rulers and administrators as is so often supposed by Western authors and statesmen. The people in

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Foreign Trade of Poland, Czechoslovakia, Hungary, Rumania, Bulgaria, and Albania—1951 [4]

(IN PERCENTAGE OF TRADE WITH)

	USSR	Other Communist Countries (including Eastern Germany and China)	Free World
Poland	25	33	42
Czechoslovakia	28	32	40
Hungary	29	38	33
Rumania	51	28	21
Bulgaria	58	34	8
Albania	57	43	0

the economic system of the Soviet Union. The remaining four countries are less economically dependent on Russia. The place of Eastern Germany in interregional trade is very important. It is able to supply the rest of this area with much heavy and precision machinery, as well as potash and other fertilizers, in exchange for fuel, foodstuffs, and raw materials.

IV

185 661 642

The social policies of the satellite governments follow in their general outlines those practiced by the Soviet Union but may be described as somewhat more moderate, if only because the respect for human values has been more deeply ingrained in the westernized societies of Eastern Europe than they have in Russia.

The principle dominating these policies is that the Soviet-type revolution was made in the Eastern European countries in the interest of the people and that it continues to serve their interests. There is no speech made or publication issued be-

[4] P. Suslin, "The Consolidation of the Democratic World Market," *New Times* (Moscow), No. 5 (January 28, 1953), p. 10.

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hind the Iron Curtain that does not emphasize the eternal dedication of the People's Democracies to this fundamental concept. It is likely that some members in the lower echelons of the party are sincerely persuaded that this indeed is the case. Not so the ruthless social engineers among the top Communists. These experienced pupils of Moscow realize, of course, that in the Communist system there is a very definite hierarchy of goals, that first things have to come first, and that the expansion of industry comes before the welfare of the people. The two cannot be sought at the same time with the same intensity since the Communist state has not the means to proceed in both directions at once. There is reliable evidence that the four northern satellite governments opposed, insofar as they were able, the imposition on their countries of the immense goals and back-breaking burdens of industrial expansion. They regarded the enormously revised targets of 1950 and 1951 as burdens too heavy on their economies. Nevertheless, they had to yield to Moscow's pressure, which was probably connected with the outbreak of the Korean war. The relatively poor nations of Eastern Europe cannot afford both guns and butter. Since it had to be guns, butter has had to be delayed to a more or less distant future. If this is the case in the Soviet Union, it must be even more so in Eastern Europe. The result is a gradual, though uneven, lowering or at least stagnation of standards of living in Eastern Europe as compared to what they were during the first years after the recent war.

Such a generalization would, of course, be vehemently denied by the satellite governments. They publish statistical data to the effect that much new housing is being built, that more food is being produced and therefore consumed, and that the population is better clad with every passing year. A trained researcher will not accept these claims at their face value. The extremely generalized social statistics from this area are even less reliable than statistics on agricultural out-

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the ultimate responsibility for the collapse of Czechoslovakia must rest with the Western powers, yet it is conceivable that had the Eastern European states, above all Poland and Czechoslovakia, stood together, it might have been possible to stiffen the French spine at this fatal juncture. From Munich the road led to the crises of 1939, and eventually to the German-Soviet pact of August, which spelt the end of independent Eastern Europe.

Germany's economic penetration of Eastern Europe after 1933 was not a primary factor in the breakup of this region. While the reality of the penetration cannot be denied, for it meant much more than foisting aspirin and cameras on the Eastern European states, its importance may be questioned. This penetration did not really impair the political independence of these states until after the diplomatic situation had deteriorated greatly, and some of the German trade agreements which really bound the economies of the area were a result rather than a cause of the shift in the balance of power.

One may ask at this point about the influence of the domestic political and social problems of Eastern Europe on international relations. A good deal has been written about the failure of parliamentary and constitutional regimes in Eastern Europe, and their replacement by authoritarian regimes. Some have concluded from this that there was a tendency on the part of these regimes to gravitate toward Hitler and to refuse to have anything to do with the Soviet Union at a time when Litvinov was loudly calling, at the League and elsewhere, for collective security against aggression.

The relationship between foreign and domestic policy is always a complex and debatable one. In the case of Eastern Europe, however, one must steer a course between two inadequate interpretations of this relationship, which may be called the Popular Frontist and the Retrospective Vindica-

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648 tionist. The first, which is roughly the one described above,
642 is not tenable. Documentary evidence which has appeared since the war makes it difficult to consider the Popular Front as anything but an instrument of Communist advance. It is quite evident that the Communists were not renouncing their ultimate aims either in Eastern Europe or elsewhere. It is also clear that the U.S.S.R. was not seriously prepared to stand up for the collective security it was calling for, although admittedly it was never required to do so. At the time of Munich, the Germans were not particularly anxious about the danger from the Soviet side. Moreover, it appears from the diplomatic memoirs of the Eastern European statesmen that they tended, as a group, to view the Soviet danger in the traditional terms of the "colossus of the East" as a perennial threat, whether or not it had a Communist regime. Thus their suspicions of the U.S.S.R. cannot be reduced to a reflection of the "class conflict."

Regarding the second interpretation, it should be recognized that there was a special antipathy to the U.S.S.R. on the part of the Eastern European countries, which led to certain misjudgments of the relative dangers existing in the 1930's. Pilsudski, for example, after ordering an intelligence survey of his two powerful neighbors in 1933-34, concluded that, while both were dangerous from the Polish point of view, in the short run the Soviet Union was more likely than Germany to follow an erratic and aggressive course. This proved to be a miscalculation. One nevertheless gains the impression that a similar mood was prevalent in the diplomatic circles of Eastern Europe. This served to reduce the area of maneuverability in the final crisis and did not afford any way out of the tragic impasse of 1939.

648 During the war years, Eastern Europe disappeared as a
722 region of independent states. Germany and the Soviet Union divided most of the area into spheres of influence and, with the German attack on Russia in June 1941, the whole region

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main body of interallied agreements—particularly those of Moscow, Teheran, Yalta, and Potsdam, along with the armistice agreements and the subsequent peace treaties—as their authority to impress the Soviet system of controls over the territories newly taken from the Germans.

By the end of 1945, the Soviet Union was in a position to control the political destinies of Rumania, Hungary, and Bulgaria under the sanctions provided by the armistice terms. However, the process of coordination into the Soviet sphere was anything but smooth and gave little evidence of the much-vaunted Russian planning. Although Rumania was under the Russian thumb within twelve days after the signing of the Yalta agreement, that unhappy country remained a monarchy until December 1947. Czechoslovakia did not fall completely into the Soviet net until 1948, while Hungary fought a losing battle until 1947. Controlled elections elsewhere facilitated the extension of Communist power, so that between the period 1945 and the end of the year 1947 the process of political assimilation was completed. Local Communist parties were installed in all countries—save Yugoslavia where political control had been in the hands of the Communist Party since 1944—by the grace of the Soviet power. In this period the Soviet pattern of inculcating obedience through terror was rapidly imposed. 727 177 .64 642 S.U. 648

From the Soviet point of view this revolution was but an action on the part of sovereign states, rather than of satellite states as that term is used in the West. Not only were the states of Eastern Europe sovereign, according to Communist doctrine, but the Communist parties that controlled the political life of their respective countries held that their major function was to protect the national independence of their states against the imperialism of the West. This theory had expression in the basic document of the Communist Information Bureau—the resolution on world affairs which appeared on October 5, 1947.

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international position.

First, the policies of the Soviet Union and the ideas of Stalin himself were attacked as marked departures from the true path of Socialism. Second, in contradistinction to the 642
policies of "bureaucratic state capitalism" evolved by the 646
Kremlin and followed in slavish pattern by the satellites, Yugoslavia decentralized its machinery of economic planning, gave greater power to workers' councils, reorganized local government, and re-wrote the national constitution. An interesting feature of the recently amended constitution is the provision for a Council of Producers, as one of the two parliamentary bodies. In this council industrial workers are disproportionately represented by 135 deputies, while only 67 represent agriculture. Under this arrangement, the agricultural population has one representative for every 150,825 peasants, while the urban is represented by one deputy for every 30,239 workers.

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In any event, the character of the power structure—that is, 642
the structure of social power focused on the state—has not changed. Decentralized though the power may be, the Communist party still controls the councils where important decisions are made. Effective opposition to the regime is still unknown. Democrats who have opposed Tito and his policies still remain imprisoned and, while important concessions

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642 have been made to the peasants, state cooperatives are still maintained in the heavy grain producing areas by forces other than the peasants' love of the soil and its products.

If the Yugoslav government will learn the meaning of Lord Acton's axiom on the nature of power, and if the West pursues an intelligent, long-range foreign policy supporting Yugoslavia against Soviet aggression, it may be possible to revive in Yugoslavia and hence in the Balkans as a whole the elements of an independent political life.

V

000 The months following the death of Premier Stalin in March 1953, saw a number of internal changes in the various people's democracies. The principal means of coercion and political control nevertheless remained unchanged: the army and the police forces. These were still bound tightly to Russian controls.

177, 70 701 625 The total number of men in the satellite armies available for service with the Soviet army has been estimated at a million and one-half. Since they are not only trained under Soviet commanders, but operate under the Soviet military code, it is possible to state that the Sovietization of the satellite armies has been completed. Together with the armies, the satellite police form the backbone of the Soviet instruments of coercion. Estimated at a total of 700,000 men, police units organized in military formations range in function from the well-known secret police to People's Militia, Frontier Guards, and Railway Guards. Like the satellite armies, the satellite police are governed by Soviet regulations. Together they enforce a system of order which has been designed to conform with the Soviet model.

241 656 In common with Yugoslavia, certain states in the orbit are strengthening the weakest sector of the economy: agriculture. It is not certain that the Yugoslav experience compelled the

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By 1949, Soviet-style dictatorships had been established in seven of these thirteen sovereign states. In these "Iron Curtain" states, dictatorship was and is exercised through a native minority who could not have won power without the support of the Soviet Union and the Soviet armies, and who—with the conspicuous exception of Yugoslavia—could not retain this power if Soviet support were withdrawn. The indirect rule thus exercised by the Soviet dictatorship, with the help of native personnel, over six of the Eastern European states —Poland, Czechoslovakia, Hungary, Rumania, Bulgaria, and Albania—might remind the observer at first glance of the indirect rule exercised in past centuries by the empires of Turkey and Russia over some of the principalities then existing in the region. Upon this superficial view, it might seem that despite all the violent changes in political sovereignty and national allegiance during the last one hundred years, the fundamental dependence of the peoples of this region upon foreign powers had remained essentially unchanged.

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This impression would be quite deceptive. In 1853, the government of Eastern Europe by only six powers had endured for more than two hundred years, with Sweden and Poland rather than Greece and Montenegro playing the roles of the fifth and sixth power at the side of Prussia, Russia, Austria, and Turkey. With the single exception of Poland, which by the end of the eighteenth century had become the victim of her neighbors, the administrative services of these powers were generally based upon foreign personnel drawn from peoples outside the region. Austria and Prussia depended upon the military and administrative services of Germans, Russia upon those of Great Russians, and Turkey in the last analysis had to rely upon the support of the Ottoman Turks. Natives of the different regions supplemented the personnel of these administrative services but did not dominate it. The rule of these foreign or semiforeign empires over the peoples of Eastern Europe was based upon this region's

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tantly or not at all. Unemployment became worse than it had ever been. 178 464

Thus social tensions persisted or grew worse. Sometimes they appeared as growing tensions between left and right, with the political middle-of-the-road parties increasingly threatened by fascists or by communists. Sometimes they appeared as tensions between different nationality groups, such as between Serbians and Croatians or between Czechs and Germans. Often the same angry and frustrated individuals could be found backing communism in one year, extreme nationalism in another, and some more or less supranational fascism in a third. Whole districts voted for right-wing radical candidates in one election and for left-wing radicals in another. Nationalism in Eastern Europe was thus the symptom of a more fundamental maladjustment, even though nationalistic policies, once adopted, often served to make this maladjustment worse. Nationalistic governments, as well as most other governments in this region, were becoming increasingly unpopular and during the 1930's showed increasing reluctance to face their own voters. By 1939, before the first German or Russian soldier stepped on their soil, every country of Eastern Europe, with the exceptions of Finland and Czechoslovakia, had succumbed to some form of dictatorship. Nationalism had thus failed to cure the fundamental maladjustments of Eastern European political and economic life. From some points of view its failure was hardly less shattering than the failure of the supranational empires that had preceded it. 186 578 642 208

It was nationalism which first undermined and in part destroyed the traditions of property and the respect for property in Eastern Europe. This attack against property began as early as the era of Prince Bismarck in Germany. The so-called Polish legislation sponsored by the German government and by the German nationalists during and after the Bismarck era showed scant respect for the property 642 423 563

642 rights of the Polish minority in Germany. It was designed
423 to prevent them from acquiring what was considered German
563 land and to deprive them of such German land as they had managed to acquire in the past. In addition to driving the Poles from German soil, this policy was also designed to eliminate Polish minorities in Eastern Germany by assimilation or expulsion, and the German word *ausrotten*—or exterminate—leaves little doubt as to the ruthlessness of the determination behind this policy. After the First World War, when certain parts of Silesia were incorporated in Poland, former German properties in industrial corporations and other valuables had a way of coming into Polish hands. When from 1939 to 1944 German armies in turn occupied a large part, and later all, of Poland, large amounts of Polish property were again transferred to Germans.

425 In one shape or another, with or without benefit of legal
563 form, this game of transferring property from the temporarily weaker to the temporarily stronger nationalities was played in large areas of Eastern Europe. When in the course of the First World War the Austro-Hungarian government collected large amounts of taxes and additional amounts of ostensibly voluntary war loans for the war efforts of Germany and Austria from the unwilling Czech, Slovakian, and Polish populations, the Austrian empire was in effect transferring important parts of the national wealth of these regions into German hands to be spent for German political and military purposes.[2] After the First World War, formerly Austrian or German mines, banks, and industrial enterprises in Czechoslovakia had a way of becoming Czechoslovakian. After 1939, when the Nazis occupied this country, Czecho-

[2] Cf. G. Gratz and R. Schuller, *op. cit.*, pp. 171-188; Wilhelm Winkler, *Die Einkommensverschiebungen in Osterreich während des Weltkrieges*, (Vienna and New Haven: Holder-Pichler-Tempsky and Yale University Press, 1930), pp. 74-78, 219-221; Alois Rasin, *Financial Policy of Czechoslovakia during the First Year of Its History* (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1923), pp. 7-25.

665 tanism" of the West was introduced, and the Communists vigorously went about the destruction of the remaining private property, the collectivization of agriculture, and the transformation of the remaining independent cooperatives into a sector of the Communist state economy. It was therefore, in theory and practice a period of the establishment of socialist states, ruled by the dictatorship of the proletariat and disguised by the name of People's Democracy. This period was marked by the accelerated tempo of the communization of all spheres of national life, by the integration of the economies of the People's Democracy into the Soviet economy, and by political and legislative preparations for the incorporation of these countries into the Soviet Union.

177 642 Analysis of the constitutions imposed upon the captive countries shows that the People's Democracies are dictatorships of the proletariat different in form but not in substance from the Soviet system. No matter when the constitutions of the People's Democracies were imposed or whether there were differences in their wording, the most important provisions are the same in each constitution. More light can be cast on these constitutions by the political circumstances in which they were imposed and by their preambles than by a dry analysis of their provisions.

[643] In Bulgaria in 1946 the Communists falsified the elections, and in 1947 they introduced in the Parliament the draft of a new constitution. According to this draft, the president was still to be the head of the state and not the Chairman of the Presidium of the Parliament as in Soviet Russia. On September 23, 1947, the leader of the opposition, Petkov, was hanged by the Communists, and on December 4, 1947, a revised constitution was imposed upon Bulgaria. This new constitution went further in its provisions than the constitutions imposed several years later in the other captive countries. The office of the president

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was abolished and the office of the President of the National Assembly was established. Article 1 does not speak of a "socialist state governed by the dictatorship of the proletariat" but neither does it mention "People's Democracy." It only proclaims that Bulgaria is a "People's Republic with a representative Government . . . where all power derives from the people and belongs to the people."

The Albanian Constitution of March 15, 1946, also proclaims that "Albania is a People's Republic in which all powers are derived from and belong to the people." It provides also that the "President of the Presidium of the People's Convention is the head of the State." The constitutions of both countries faithfully reflect the Soviet system and, in the event of the incorporation of these countries into the U.S.S.R., no significant constitutional changes would be necessary.

In Hungary on August 31, 1947, after the *coup d'état* of May 1947 against the government of Premier Nagy, new elections were held, and in August 1949 a new constitution was introduced. One section of the preamble to this constitution states the following:

> Our people under the leadership of the working class, steeled in the battles during the last decades, enriched by the experience of the revolution of 1919, and relying on the USSR laid the foundation of socialism and our country now is going forward by means of the people's democracy, toward socialism.

Hungary became a People's Republic (Article 1) and was proclaimed "a state of the workers and of the working peasantry" (Article 2). The constitution further stated that "The close union of the workers and working peasantry shall be accomplished in the Hungarian People's Republic under the leadership of the workers" (Article 3), and that "The working people shall gradually oust the capitalist elements and consistently build the socialist economic order" (Ar-

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642 ticle 4). The Presidium of the People's Republic with its
177 President was established and the post of the President abolished.

In Czechoslovakia on May 9, 1948, following the *coup d'état* of February 1948, a new constitution was enacted. The preamble reads: "We, the Czechoslovakian People, declare that we are firmly resolved to build up our liberated State as a People's democracy which will ensure to us a [643] peaceful road to socialism." Article 1 states that "The Czechoslovakian State is a People's democratic Republic. The people are the sole source of all power in the State." According to this constitution, the President of the Republic remained the head of the state and Czechoslovakia still differs from the other captive countries in this respect.

In Yugoslavia, Tito introduced at the very beginning the most advanced form of a Soviet-style system; he recently reassumed the title of President of the Republic in place of the title of President of the National Assembly.

In Poland, after the falsification of the elections in 1947, a so-called Little Constitution, based on the Soviet system of councils, was introduced. It established a Council of State whose "chairman" was also the President of the Republic. On July 22, 1952, a new constitution was imposed upon Poland. The preamble to this constitution states:

> The Polish People's Republic is a republic of the working people. . . .
>
> As a result of the revolutionary struggles and changes, the power of the capitalists and landlords has been overthrown and the state of People's democracy has been established. The basis of the present people's power constitutes the alliance of the working class with the working peasantry. In this alliance the leading role belongs to the working class, the leading class of the society, basing itself on the revolutionary achievements of the Polish and international working movement, on the historical experiences of the victorious building of socialism in the USSR, the first state of workers and peasants. . . .

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> The Polish People's Republic is a state of People's democracy. In the Polish People's Republic power belongs to the working people of town and country. (Article 1)

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The office of the President of the Republic was abolished and the office of the Chairman of the Council of State became the highest post in the state. Poland is no longer the Republic of Poland. It is now called the Polish People's Republic. [643]

In Rumania, the constitution of 1948 was replaced by a new constitution forced upon Rumania on July 18, 1952. The preamble to the new constitution declares that "The Rumanian People's Republic is a state of working people of town and countryside," and that "The present Constitution of the Rumanian People's Republic embodies the results so far obtained by the working people headed by the working class, in building a socialist society in our country." The highest organ of state power is the General National Assembly and its Presidium, while the highest executive and administrative organ of state power is the Council of Ministers. The organs of state power in regions, districts, towns, and rural localities are the people's councils of the working people of town and country.

The examples cited from the texts and preambles of the constitutions of the captive countries show clearly that, although the Communist dictatorship in the Soviet Union has achieved the first phase in the development of communism —"the socialist state based on the dictatorship of the proletariat"—and is now on the way to the higher phase, the People's Democracies, according to communist theory, are still on the road to the first phase. This theoretical distinction made by the Communists has no great importance in practice particularly inasmuch as constitutional changes in all these People's Republics have made complete political and legal preparations for incorporation into the U.S.S.R.

As far as Yugoslavia is concerned, in the period of friendly

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511 all kinds of diseases and a steep rise of the mortality rate;
262 corpses were thrown into sewers adjacent to the houses.
165 3. Universal poverty conducive to the spread of venereal diseases . . . one out of twelve persons is syphilitic according to recent reports furnished by the Minister of Health . . .'

All this time the fortunes of the capitalists were not touched as they were working for reparations for Russia. They and the new state bureaucracy flourished, while the lion's share of the surplus value produced in Rumania was taken, of course, by the Kremlin.*

642 The bureaucratic and militarist character of the Rumanian
693 state was not altered and many of the former officials remained in office. Of the legal system, Pătrăşcanu could say: 'The
●645 procedures, methods, traditions and structure of Rumanian jurisprudence have remained unchanged since a Communist became Minister of Justice. No more than 20 new judges out of 2,000 have been appointed. About a quarter of the old staff have been purged or pensioned'. (*Christian Science Monitor*, 12th December, 1945). This policy is symbolised by the fact that 'Just two weeks before the start of the trial of Iuliu Maniu . . . a discreet announcement was published in Bucharest newspapers recording the appointment of a new chief of the military tribunal of the second army corps district (the one to preside over Maniu's trial—Y.G.) . . . the wartime director general of all prisons and concentration camps in Rumania'. (*New York Herald Tribune*, 7th November, 1947).

701 The structure of the army remained hierarchical, with the
645 complete subordination of the soldiers to their officers, and with no soldiers' committees. For three years even the composition of its personnel showed a marked continuity with the past. For instance, Lieutenant-Colonel Nicolae Cambrea, commander of the Rumanian units fighting against Russia at Stalingrad, was promoted by the Groza government to the rank of General, and appointed Assistant Chief of Staff. Major Popescu-Argetoia, an active Fascist in the past, was put at the head of the secret police. General Vasiliu Rascanu, Chief of Military Police during the war against Russia, was appointed Minister of War. Another old general, Pretorian, was appointed Chief of Staff at the same time. General Lascar,

*See above pp.

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Brigadier-General on the anti-Soviet Front in 1941, who 701
received the Knight Cross of the Iron Cross from Hitler, was, 645
after joining the Communist Party, considered 'loyal' enough to be appointed Minister of War!

The enthusiasm of the Communist Party for 'law and order' 642
is illustrated by their ardour for the monarchy. On November 662
3rd, 1946, Premier Groza declared: 'The King, the Church, 665
the Army, the People and the Government are one'. A few days later, at a meeting of the Communist-controlled Front organisation, the National Democratic Bloc, Vice-Premier Tătărescu said: 'From Gheorghiu Dej (leader of the Communist Party—Y.G.) to myself we shall all fight together for the consolidation of the Monarchy, because we are convinced that the King is the strongest factor that rallies all Rumanians. We shall fight for the consolidation of the National Church and of private property, the source of all creative enterprise'. (*East Europe,* an informative London weekly, 13th November, 1946). On November 8th, King Michael's birthday, the Communist daily *Era Noua* said: 'The people of Rumania have faith in their King.' (*East Europe*, 20th November, 1946). In the election demonstrations of the National Democratic Bloc, a constantly repeated slogan was 'Trăiască Regele!'—'Long live the King!' On 17th November, 1946, at an army electoral meeting in Bucharest, Gheorghiu Dej concluded his speech appealing for a vote for the 'King's Government': 'Long live the King!' 'Long live his commanders and soldiers! Long live the Army which is his and the people's!' The monarchist enthusiasm of the Communist Party reached such heights that they attacked the Peasant Party leader, Maniu as . . . anti-monarchist. Thus *Era Noua* of December 3rd, 1946, referring to the withdrawal of Maniu and his followers from parliament, suggested that 'in fact, Maniu's unparliamentary attitude is only a guise for his anti-dynastic policy. Maniu has already tried his first obstructive move in King Michael's reign . . . Neither Ferdinand nor King Carol were exempt from Maniu's political tactics'! (*East Europe*, 18th December, 1946). To crown the hypocrisy of the leaders of the Communist Party, on November 8th, 1947, their paper, *Scanteia*, wrote: 'The people wish to His Majesty the King a long life, good health, and a reign rich in democratic achievements' (*The New York Times*, November 9th,

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661 population, they are so dependent on the centralised Party
652 machine and the N.K.V.D. that they are nothing but local
523 quislings.

●646 A study of the national composition of the Supreme Soviet
661 of the U.S.S.R. gives a clear picture of the subordination of the non-Russian peoples. Vs. Felix and Ju. Snov made an interesting analysis in the Ukrainian Socialist review, *Vpered* (Munich, 1950, No. 3), using as their basis the list of M.P.'s published in *Pravda* on 15th March, 1950. Of the 25 deputies every republic sent to the Soviet of Nationalities, 5 from Ukraine S.S.R. were Russians, 4 from Uzbek S.S.R., 6 from Kazakh S.S.R., 5 from Lithuanian S.S.R., 6 from Latvian S.S.R., 5 from Tadjik S.S.R. and 6 from Kirghiz S.S.R. Actually, these Russians hold the key positions in the administration of the republics. For instance, of the 5 Russian deputies from the Tadjik S.S.R., two were D. K. Vishnevski, who is the Minister of State Security (M.G.B.) for Tadjikistan, and A. V. Kharchenko, who is the Minister of the Interior (M.V.D.) for Tadjikistan.

661 The overriding control of Moscow over the administration
652 of the national republics explains the complete defeat of all the
523 national resistance movements hitherto. It also explains the defeat of the 'Titoists' in Poland, Bulgaria, Hungary and Rumania. Tito has been successful so far because Moscow never controlled the state apparatus of Yugoslavia. She was 'liberated' not by the Soviet Army but by her own National Liberation Army, organised and led by Yugoslavs.

197 The cultural life of the various nations is also subjected to
652 Russification. When the Bolsheviks came to power, they
523 introduced the Latin alphabet for the many nations in Russia which had no written language at all, and 71 written languages in this form were introduced. This was considered the simplest and most progressive means of promoting the cultural development of these people, and it underlined the fact that there was no intention of Russification. Stalin reversed this progressive policy. In 1936, the Latin alphabet was replaced by the Cyrillic, which is much more complicated, and in 1938 Russian was made a compulsory language in all Secondary schools of the U.S.S.R.

Even more important than the language people speak or write is what they speak or write.

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642 somely large proportion of state funds was used for political
578 competition. Taxes were high and the entire taxation system was geared to make the poor people pay for the political and economic program of the government or of the ruling classes.
• 647 Planning was poor and administration far from efficient. Bohemia-Moravia had inherited from Austria a relatively competent administrative machinery, and Hungary's was organized along nineteenth-century lines. Administrative systems in former Russian and Turkish areas were a continuation of the previous imperial regimes, and were considered
[687] definitely the worst in Eastern Europe. Inefficiency and corruption mitigated somewhat the dictatorial character of these administrations. Bribery was customary and necessary on every level and affected the poor and the minorities. The problem of corruption was most serious in high official circles. Often the biggest fortunes were made in politics through embezzling discretionary funds that were left at the disposal of government members. Selling protective tariffs to industrialists in order to receive shares from foreign companies for concessions was a prevalent practice. Administrative officials were endowed with the nickname "bicyclists," which carried the implication that these officials trampled upon their subordinates and bowed before their bosses.

578 This attitude and the belief that the masses should support all projects of the ruling circles produced a harsh conflict of interests between the bourgeoisie, the mixed aristocratic and middle class, and the industrial workers and peasants. The fundamental conflict, however, was between the bureaucracy and the peasantry. The great differences in the cultural levels in many of the Eastern European countries made things worse. Different religious and ethnic groups and contrasting social standards contributed to regional hostilities and did nothing to facilitate the task of the administrators. The fault lay not alone with the rulers and administrators as is so often supposed by Western authors and statesmen. The people in

316 tivity of the basin achieved a level which has not been equalled since. It must be admitted, however, that during the last war the Nazis wantonly exploited the coal mines under martial law, with little regard for their future maintenance.

The Silesian coal basin, as such, suffered less damage from direct military action in 1944-1945 than from the strain on manpower, machinery, and installations during the years of war. In 1945 the whole of Upper Silesia was reunited with Poland. Its German population fled or was expelled westwards, while one million minority Poles were recognized as "autochthones" and stayed in Silesia. Since most of the coal miners in the formerly German western part of Upper Silesia belonged to that category, the mines could be worked without interruption. In 1945, too, the Kremlin adjudged the disputed eastern Karvinna mines to Czechoslovakia along the 1937 boundary. There are no Germans left either in Polish Silesia or in the Ostrava basin where they used to be numerous, but there are many Polish miners employed in the latter area. It should be stressed that the former German coal mines in Upper Silesia were situated not more than twenty miles from the prewar boundary, and that the Polish and Czech coal fields are not immediately contiguous. As a matter of course, the present division of the Silesian coal basin between the two Slav neighbors has far more justification from the technical point of view and may be regarded as stable.

[648] In 1947 the Warsaw and Prague governments agreed, in principle, to some measure of collaboration in coal mining, but no joint administration of the nationalized coal mines was created. It is possible that one of the difficulties was that the Poles produce in their part of the basin nearly four times as much coal as the Czechs in theirs, while any joint controlling body would have to be based on parity. In the last analysis, the coal policy of both Poland and Czechoslovakia in Silesia and elsewhere has been conducted since 1948 from Moscow, and there are Russian "advisers" with controlling power in Silesia as well as in all secondary coal basins of the captive area.

The level and character of the coal output in Silesia has always

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of the State, to an extent undreamed of in Czarist Russia. We were wont, many of us, to make uncomplimentary references to the clergy of the old regime. Some of the strictures were too sweeping. But, alas, what we must be prepared to say about the Russian Church under the Soviets is far more devastating. It has become an institution which all but blesses the concentration camp system, and escorts slave labor to its doom with a kind of liturgical brass band.

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The Soviet objective is to reduce religious organizations outside Russia to the status of the Orthodox Church at home. The formula is always and everywhere the same, though it may be applied with greater or lesser rigor. Therefore inevitably the Vatican becomes the great antagonist, to be fought with every means. The Holy See, pledged to the profession of the Christian Gospels without dilution of the ethical obligations which they impose upon everyone who accepts them in the Catholic sense, cannot agree that the Church is to be an instrument of the State —even, indeed, a benign and merciful instrument. The Vatican is therefore the ignoble Fascist Beast of the Bolshevik Apocalypse. Upon the heads of persons who remain loyal to the ancient See of Catholic Christendom, blows have rained in constant succession. This is the direst persecution the Church has suffered since the days of the Caesars.

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Because most of what may be reported concerns the Catholic Church, a brief review of its history and endeavors in Eastern Europe will help to bring events into perspective. The cleavage of the Roman Empire, establishing the rivalry between the emperors of Rome and Byzantium, begot two Churches also, each claiming for itself the charisma of Apostolic Christianity. With the passing of time, profound differences of a dogmatic, moral, and canonical kind developed. The organizational character of religion was also modified radically, so that, while in the East the ties binding the religious nations to the historic pa-

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175 795 649 The great Councils to which we have referred opened in a spirit of optimism, despite the nationalistic bickering to which Europe was then subject. The Greeks were in a conciliatory mood, due largely to their need of Western allies against the followers of Mohammed, but they arrived in Europe at a time of bitter conflict over whether a Council took precedence over the Pope. The Decree of Union did not satisfy the great mass of the Greeks, even though the overwhelming majority of their ecclesiastical representatives assented to it in accordance with the wishes of the Emperor. The only positive result was the formation of the Greek Churches in union with Rome, usually called the Uniate Churches. In Russia, as we have seen, the Czar vetoed any plan of reunion.

But the great dream of reunion did not die, and after World War I it was revived especially by Pope Pius XI, who had intimate personal knowledge of conditions in Eastern Europe from the high vantage point of the Holy See. Institutions under the auspices of the Papacy were established to promote the achievement of One Fold and One Shepherd. At the same time the Protestant Ecumenical Council likewise began to search for ways in which to draw the Eastern Churches into union, with the Churches bound together under its roof. These efforts were not wholly useless, but it was again obvious that the disunity of the Christian West had puzzled and confused rather than attracted the East.

175 829 795 Meanwhile great changes had taken place. The Papacy was compelled to reckon with the rise of secularism, which swept across Eastern Europe from the West during the nineteenth century. Medieval ecclesiastical institutions were widely identified with feudalism; and in addition new intellectual and scientific movements gave rise to a widespread conviction that religion was in itself a barrier to the development of the good, or at least the prosperous, society. The attack on feudalism

[1. Councils of Ferrara and Florence, 15th cent. - Analyst.]

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incapacity of Russia to supply their needs made it more and more pressing for them to try to get equipment from Western Europe. This need expressed itself in the case of Yugoslavia in a revolt against the Moscow ukase (see Part III, *The Rebellious Satellite*) and in the case of the other satellites in an appeal to the West to supply the goods—an appeal that, because of its expediency, was not vetoed by Moscow. At the Conference of the Economic Commission for Europe of the United Nations, the Polish and Czech delegates asked for trade with Western Europe, by which they could obtain capital goods. The Bulgarian delegate stated that his country could not improve her economic position to any extent without increasing her imports, especially of machines, from the West. (United Nations Documents, E/ECE/SR4/1-25). #39

Russia, with the majority of her population engaged in agriculture, is faced with the same problem as her satellites (apart from the Czech lands of Czechoslovakia and the Soviet Zones of Germany and Austria)—large-scale industrialisation. The terrible destruction suffered by the U.S.S.R. in World War II, as well as the preparations for World War III, which require the same materials as industrialisation—steel, coal, machinery, etc.—render Russia even less able to help the countries of Eastern Europe.

Dismantling, Looting, Requisitioning

When the populations of Eastern Europe, mainly of the ex-enemy countries, first met the Russian Army and State officials, they did not see them bringing gifts, supplying machinery, locomotives, etc., but looting their country. 648 128

Stalin forgot that the Communist International had preached for years against the reparation articles of the Versailles Treaty, and had reiterated that the German workers bore the real burden of reparations, although they did not profit in any way from the war. In World War II the crimes of the Nazi Army were incomparably worse than those of the Kaiser Army in World War I, yet the German people drew no benefit at all from this. On the contrary, the first victim of the Hitler terror was the German people itself. The 800 thousand German Communists, Socialists, trade unionists, Catholics, etc. (not including the German Jews) who passed through prisons and

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648 concentration camps in the twelve years of Hitler's rule are 728 testimony to this. What magnificent heroism on the part of unarmed and helpless people to challenge the brutal state machine with its all-seeing eye and unlimited terror!

The Communist Parties knew all this very well. Immediately after June 1941 they emphasised that this time, because of Russia's part in the war, no new Versailles Treaty with reparations clauses would be imposed and that the German people would not be made to pay for the crimes of their rulers. The German proletariat, they said, was not more responsible for the war than the English or the French, and they repeated the same views on the question of reparations as the Communist International had after World War I. At that time the leaders of the French Communist Party explained why the French workers should oppose the exaction of reparations from Germany. Thus Gabriel Peri wrote in an article entitled 'On the Eve of the Reparations Conference': '. . . the workers of France and Germany have only *one* interest, viz., that of forming a revolutionary front against financial capital and the heavy industries in both countries. For the enormous sums at stake (the reparations—YG) will naturally be squeezed out of the working masses'. (*International Press Correspondence*, February 1st, 1929).

But all this changed with the hope of Russian victory. With Russia becoming the Power able to extract reparations, her opposition in principle to reparations vanished. Instead she decided to take reparations on a far larger scale than ever the French Government had dared after World War I.

648 728 434 Edward Charles in his article 'Reparations, 1919-31', in *The Banker* of April, 1945, writes on the reparations that Germany paid after the first world war: 'Reparations before the Dawes Plan brought in some 8 milliard gold marks. From September, 1924, to the end they yielded a further 10 milliards'. There is no reliable calculation of the national income of Germany between the end of the first world war and the introduction of the Dawes Plan. It is therefore impossible to calculate what proportion of the national income reparations made up. But for the years 1924-32 this figure is available. The total national income of Germany for these 9 years was calculated at 564.3 milliard marks, and in the same period

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Germany paid reparations to the extent of 9.8 milliard marks, or 1.7 per cent of the national income. In no year after the first world war did the reparations paid by Germany exceed 4 per cent of the national income. To calculate the burden of these reparations, other criteria besides the national income, such as budget revenue or exports, can be applied. The reparations Germany paid rose from 12.9 per cent of the budget revenue of Germany or 9.9 per cent of the value of its exports in 1924-5, to 25.7 per cent and 18.4 per cent respectively in 1928-9.

With regard to Germany's looting of Europe during the second world war, German official statistics admit that up to 1943 the Reich got from the occupied countries 'special incomes' amounting to 50 milliard marks. British official estimates give a figure of 12.8 milliard dollars for the same period. The two figures thus nearly tally. Nearly all the German robbery took place immediately after the occupation. If we, therefore, assume that the annual looting of the occupied countries by Germany after 1943 was the same as the annual average of 1939 to 1943, we shall certainly not underestimate it: on this basis the total German looting amounted to 20-25 milliard dollars.

A comparison between the reparations paid by Germany after the first world war—about 18 milliard marks or 3.6 milliard dollars—with the 'reparations' that Germany took from Europe in the second world war—20-25 milliard dollars—reveals the increasingly plunderous character of declining capitalism, as exemplified by the Hitler regime.

Russia's attitude to the question of reparations after the second world war was expressed clearly by Prof. Varga in an article published in *War and the Working Class*, 15th October, 1943. He concluded that Germany must pay reparations to the tune of 90 milliard marks or about 22 milliard dollars, and he stated that the Russian government asked in addition for ten million German workers to be sent to Russia for reconstruction work.

A claim for such large reparations, coupled with a demand for ten million workers, i.e., nearly a third of the total German working class, was incompatible with the existence of Germany as an important industrial country. At Yalta, consequently,

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648 728 Stalin had to demand that 80 per cent of German industry should be dismantled within two years of the cease-fire. (James F. Byrnes, *Speaking Frankly*, London, 1948, pp. 26-7).

In view of the division of Germany between East and West, Russia did not want to exclude the possibility of the Communist Party's influencing the German people, and so she did not press her claim for ten million slave labourers or the dismantling of 80 per cent of German industry. Nevertheless the total sum lost by Germany directly and indirectly under the post-war arrangements in the East exceeded the total sum for which Varga asked.

It is difficult to get a full picture of this looting, as it was carried out in many guises, and those responsible for it were of course extremely anxious to conceal what was happening. But the following facts are incontestable.

First, millions of Germans were expelled from their homes and lost their property. The President of Poland, Bierut, estimated that Poland's gains in the West, i.e., from Germany, have an investment value of 9½ milliard dollars. The property of the Sudeten Germans of Czechoslovakia was estimated at 4 milliard dollars. If we assume that the rest of the Germans who inhabited the former territory of Poland, Hungary, Rumania, etc., were on the average as wealthy as the inhabitants of the portion of Eastern Germany that was annexed to Poland and the Sudetan region, their property must be evaluated at about 6 milliard dollars. Therefore the expulsion of the Germans alone brought in 'reparations' amounting to about 20 milliard dollars.

The Yalta Agreement decided in principle that Germany would pay reparations amounting to 20 milliard dollars, half of which would go to Russia.

Unlike what happened after the first world war, after this war no figures were published of the quantity of reparations taken or the form in which they were taken.

Reparations from Rumania

648 728 434 The armistice imposed on Rumania required payment to Russia of reparations in the form of goods amounting in value to 300 million dollars in 1938 world market prices, or 700-800 million dollars today. The reparations were made up as

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follows :—petroleum products, 50 per cent; ships, barges, locomotives and industrial equipment, 32 per cent; agricultural goods and timber 18 per cent. The second group did not make up even as much as 10 per cent of Rumanian exports before the war.

There are no estimates of the proportion of the national income which these reparations represent. The only clue is that given in June 1947 by the vice-Premier, Tatarescu, who gave the proportion as 50 per cent of the total production of Rumanian industry. It would be very unwise to accept this figure uncritically, as it was given on the eve of Tătărescu's conflict with the Communist Party which ended in his expulsion from the Government. Even if it were accurate, this figure would not be very useful as it relates only to industrial production, and not to the whole national product.

In addition to the reparations, Rumania had to give as restitution for goods looted from Russia 100,000 wagon loads of cereals, 260,000 head of cattle, 5,500 wagon loads of sugar, 250 tractors. (Of course, most of the loot taken from Russia by the Rumanians when they occupied it had already been destroyed and lost, and 'restitution' meant taking new products or those in good condition.)

The most important machinery of the Ploesti Oil Refineries was dismantled by the Russian military authorities, and the Rumanians also had to hand over a fifth of the machinery of the textile and metallurgical industries. It must also be remembered that the Russian army lived off the land. There are no statistics of the total cost thus incurred by the country, but it was certainly very great. According to the estimate made in February, 1946, by La Guardia, who was the head of U.N.R.R.A. at the time, the four occupation armies in Austria cost the country 200 million dollars a year. For three years the Russian army in Rumania was not smaller than all the four occupation armies in Austria put together at the beginning of 1946. In view of the complete silence of the Russian authorities about the amount of reparations they took from Rumania, it is impossible to ignore the estimate given by the U.S. delegate to the Paris Peace Conference, Willard L. Thorp, who said on September 23rd, 1946, that Rumania paid in reparations of all kinds 1,050 million dollars and that he estimated that

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648 950 million dollars remained to be paid. E. D. Tappe wrote:
728 'It has been estimated that in fact Roumania, from the armistice to 1 June 1948, paid the U.S.S.R. $1,785 million in goods, etc.; a figure which would represent 84 per cent of Roumania's national income for that period.' (R. R. Betts, editor, *Central and South East Europe, 1945-1948*, London, 1950, pp. 20-21).

Reparations from Hungary

Hungary had to pay reparations in goods amounting to 300 million dollars at 1938 prices, 200 million to U.S.S.R., 50 million to Czechoslovakia and 50 million to Yugoslavia. Industrial goods constituted 83 per cent and agricultural goods 17 per cent of this total. Yet in 1936-7, the proportion of agricultural goods in the total exports of Hungary was 62 per cent, while industrial goods did not make up even a third of all the exports. From this it is clear that Hungarian industry had to make a tremendous effort to supply the reparation goods, especially in view of the terrible devastation her industry suffered in the war, and her own great needs.

An U.N.R.R.A. estimate shows that in 1945, 94 per cent of
648 the working capacity of the metal and engineering industries in
728 Hungary was being used for reparation-goods for Russia. The
434 British parliamentary delegation which visited Hungary in the spring of 1946 estimated that reparation demands amounted to 18 per cent of the national income.

The Hungarian budget for the year 1946-7 set aside for reparations a sum eight times bigger than that allocated to reconstruction (and we must not forget that a large part of the Russian loot is not even included in the budget as it was taken from industries officially in Russian hands). On 23 July, 1946, in a note to the Soviet Government, the U.S. Ambassador in Moscow pointed out that half the current industrial production of Hungary was absorbed in meeting Russia's demands. In some industries, including coal, iron and machine production the proportion was 80-90 per cent. At the Peace Conference in Paris in October, 1946, the U.S. representatives claimed that in the year since the armistice about 35 per cent of the national income of Hungary was spent on the costs of Soviet reparations, occupation and requisitions. The British parliamentary delega-

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tion mentioned above estimated the occupation costs at 12 per cent of the national income of Hungary, making with reparations a total of 30 per cent. Now that the Russian Army has been very much reduced and production has passed the pre-war level, the importance of reparations, acquisitions, etc., in the national income has very much declined. According to T. Mende, who was not unsympathetic to the post-war regime in Hungary, they amounted to 7-11 per cent of the national income (*Fortnightly Review*, July, 1948). When Ernö Gerö, the Minister of Finance, introduced the budget for 1949 in the Hungarian parliament on December 15th, 1948, he said that in 1948, 25.4 per cent of the total expenditure went to pay the reparations, while in 1949, 9.8 per cent of the budget would be allocated for this purpose. This reduction is due largely to the fact that Russia cancelled 50 per cent of the remainder of the reparations from July, 1948. 648 728 434

The value of dismantled machinery, locomotives, wagons, etc., taken by the Russian army in Hungary was estimated at 124 million dollars, and the requisitions of the Russian army that lived on the country were very great. According to the American note of 23rd July, 1946, the Soviet forces had up to June, 1945, taken out of Hungary four million tons of wheat, rye, barley, maize and oats (the total pre-war annual production of these grains was a little over 7 million tons). Of the foodstuffs available for the urban population in the second half of 1945 the Soviet army had appropriated nearly all the meat, one-sixth of the wheat and rye, one-quarter of the legumes, nearly three-quarters of the lard, a tenth of the vegetable oils and a fifth of the milk and dairy products. The note added that extensive requisitioning of food was going on as late as April, 1946. And we must not forget that at the same time the food shortage in Hungary was so serious that not more than 850 calories a day per person were provided, which was even fewer than in Germany and Austria. The death rate, especially among babies, reached alarming proportions. 648 728 [262]

Even countries which were not allies of Germany during the war did not escape the Russian appetite for loot. 60 big industrial enterprises in the Sudeten region and a number of enterprises in other parts of Czechoslovakia were dismantled by the Russian army. In the part of Germany annexed to

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648 Poland the Russian army dismantled, according to the estimates
728 of the Communist Minister of Industry, Hilary Minc, 25-30 per cent of all the industrial equipment of the area. (Speech delivered in Warsaw on 20th October, 1945). In Old Poland too, the Russian army dismantled machinery, notably in the Lodz and Bialystok textile works.*

Trade Between Russia and her Satellites

439 An important feature of the foreign trade policy of Russia and her satellites is the tendency towards self-sufficiency or autarchy. The following table illustrates this as far as Russia herself is concerned:

U.S.S.R. FOREIGN TRADE (IN MILLION PRE-1914 GOLD RUBLES)

Year	*Export*	*Import*
1913†	1520.1	1375.0
1924/5..	577.8	723.4
1927/8..	791.6	945.5
1932	574.9	704.0
1937	377.2	294.2
1938	287.8	300.4

The tendency towards economic isolation from the West on the part of the satellites is shown by the following table dealing with the foreign trade of Czechoslovakia, Hungary, Poland, Rumania, Yugoslavia and Bulgaria: (see top of page 63).

As Yugoslavia did not publish figures of foreign trade for the years 1947 and 1948 it was not possible to take them into consideration in drawing up this table. Otherwise the tendency of these countries to trade mainly among themselves and with Russia and to restrict trade relations with countries independent of Russia would have been even more pronounced.

It would of course be one-sided to conclude that this tendency is entirely the result of the choice of these countries them-

000 *Incidentally, even backward China was not left untouched by the greed of the Russian bureaucracy. In June, 1946, Edwin Pauley, U.S. Reparations Commissioner, visited Manchuria and inspected 80 per cent of the Japanese war industry. In his report he stated that the Russian removal of equipment was on such a scale as to retard Manchuria's development by a generation and reduce the country to an agricultural economy. The principal items of equipment removed were machine tools and electrical equipment, although in some cases whole plants were completely stripped. Steel production was reduced by more than 50 per cent. Pauley estimated that altogether the machinery dismantled by the Russians was worth 850 million dollars. (*The World Today*, August, 1946). That this was a very heavy burden for Manchuria is clear from the fact that in 1932-1943 the total Japanese investments in Manchuria were evaluated at 5,393 million yen (about 1,200 million dollars).

†In the pre-1914 boundaries.

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CHAPTER I

THE INITIAL SOVIET INTERVENTION: BULGARIA, RUMANIA, HUNGARY

★

● 648 NAPOLEON'S WORDS, 'Une armée dehors c'est l'État qui
661 voyage', apply very well to the Russian armies which overran the countries of Eastern Europe as a result of the Second World War. If the Russian state had been a liberating democracy where power was in the hands of the people, the entry of the Red Army into the Eastern Europen countries would have inspired their populations to take their fate into their own hands, put an end to the military police dictatorships that terrorized them and establish the full sovereignty of the people. But the policy of the Russian occupation authorities was entirely different. For the first two or three years their primary objective was to preserve as strong an army and police force as possible under the control of the Communist Parties. With this task in mind the Communist leaders skilfully manipulated the pressure of the masses to introduce 'loyal' elements into the army and police and at the same time allied themselves with reactionary, even ex-fascist, heads of the old army and police. The second aim of the Kremlin was to call a halt to any action of the peoples which bore a really democratic and spontaneous character and which might therefore impede the Gleichshaltung of all public life. To achieve this, the same method was adopted of making alliances with the most right-wing, reactionary elements against the authentic Socialist Parties, Peasant Parties and, above all, against the peoples themselves.

A study of political life in the satellite states must begin with an analysis of this policy.

Pre-War Political Regime in Eastern Europe

642 661 728 Before the war, all the countries dealt with (except Czechoslovakia) had lived under a military dictatorship camouflaged

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Polish ones. On 27th March, 1946, the Czech National 563
Council in Morawska-Ostrawa in retaliation forbade the use 728
of the Polish language in Teschen schools which had Polish pupils. (*East Europe*, 3rd April, 1946).

In Conclusion

The policy of keeping national antagonisms alive, especially 648
between Slavs and Teutons, was a liability for the Kremlin after its agents took full control of the satellite countries and after the main pivot of its policy became the struggle against the Western Powers over Germany. Hence since about the end of 1947, when the Cominform was established, the former policy on the national question was dropped, and was replaced by 'internationalism', which is in reality equally the instrument of Russian imperialist national policy. In June, 1948, a conference of the Foreign Ministers of the U.S.S.R. and the 'People's Democracies' held in Warsaw, declared its friendship to the German people. In January, 1949, Fierlinger congratulated the German Stalinists (the Socialist Unity Party) on the fact that they were 'proudly professing the old and unadulterated internationalism.' The same theme was repeated time and again by other leaders in Czechoslovakia, Poland, Rumania and the other 'People's Democracies.' Stalin himself wrote in a letter to Pieck, president of the 'German Democratic Republic', on October 13th, 1949, that the German and Russians were 'the two peoples possessing the greatest potentialities in Europe to complete great actions of world significance.' Woe betide anyone who should now mention the unity of the 'Slavs' against the 'Teutons.'

The new policy was mainly directed against the satellites who dared to strive for national independence and against the transformation of their countries into Russian gubernias.

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185 tal to an understanding of the problems of Eastern Europe, and much of the political extremism of this region can be traced to the frustrations resulting from this failure.

The most obvious reason for the failure to achieve a European standard, and probably also the most important, has been the persistent necessity of giving priority to national security over human welfare. This problem has, of course, been faced by all modern states, but it has affected the peoples of Eastern Europe to an unusual degree. It would not be too much to say that the insecurity of these states, due more to regional factors than to size, has been the source of most of their difficulties. Of the various solutions that have been attempted, including national opportunism, alliances with great powers, regional pacts, and participation in the League of Nations, none has met the special needs of the situation.

I

186 175 The European wars resulting from the French Revolution and the Napoleonic conquests infected the leaders of the Eastern European peoples with the modern spirit of nationalism and liberalism, but the peace settlement concluded in 1815 did little to satisfy the hopes that had been aroused. The peoples of this region remained under the firm rule of the Romanov, Habsburg, Hohenzollern, and Ottoman dynasties, and before long the process of national liberation came to occupy their principal energies. Of the many national groups in this region, only the Serbians and the Montenegrins achieved any measure of independence before 1815, although the Magyars occupied within the Austrian monarchy a position of special influence. The remaining nationalities in this region had not yet taken the first steps towards independence. The struggle for freedom lasted for a full century, and was a complex process in which the

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with the reconciliation of national differences through federal arrangements and with the broader cultural relationships of peoples with a common linguistic heritage. The most readily identifiable of these proposals are those associated with the Panslav movement, the plans for the reorganization of the Habsburg empire, and the federation schemes of the independent Danubian states None of these projects embraced the entire region of Eastern Europe as it is understood today, but all were inspired by ideas relevant to the problems faced by this region in the twentieth century. 186 631

The many-sided Panslav movement in its modern form can be traced to the new interest in Slavic history and languages shown by German scholars at the end of the eighteenth century. A realization of their cultural heritage was soon aroused among Slavic intellectual leaders, and it exerted a powerful stimulus to nationalism among the Poles, Czechs, and Croatians. Certain Polish thinkers in the first hopeful years after the settlement of 1815 favored Polish-Russian cooperation as a basis for Slavic unity, but in a few decades the Poles were seeking the aid of their fellow Slavs in the West against Russian oppression. The map and statistics of Slavic peoples published by the Slovak scholar, Šafařik, in 1842 were widely greeted as a revelation of Slavic strength, and in the revolutionary year of 1848 a congress was held in Prague to rally the peoples of the Slavic world. This rather haphazard gathering revealed the political weakness of Panslavism, but it produced some noble statements of individual and national rights and strengthened the self-confidence of the Slavic peoples as to their contribution to European civilization. In publicizing the views of the non-Russian Slavic leaders at the height of their liberal phase, the congress thus served a purpose. Although Slavic nationalism took precedence over liberalism in the latter half of the century, the ideas expounded at Prague in 1848 were never entirely forgotten. 186 648

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186 Much more was heard about Panslavism between 1848
668 and 1914, but during this period it was used primarily as a
weapon of Russian expansionism. The Slavic movement
• 648 evolved in Russia early in the century under the name of Slavophilism and, with the founding of a Slavic committee in Moscow in 1857, it entered a Panslav phase. In 1867 non-Russian Slavs were summoned to a congress in Moscow in connection with a Slav ethnographic exhibition, and at this meeting it was not difficult to discern the expansionist tendencies of Russian Panslavism. During the Russian-Turkish war of 1876-78, this movement developed into an outburst of emotional imperialism, and much was said of bringing all Slavs together under Russian rule. European power politics prevented an undue extension of Russian influence in 1878, but Panslavism came to serve Russian policy and was directed increasingly against the Habsburg empire. This trend was particularly evident at the third Panslav Congress held in Prague in 1908. Although the Russian constitutional reforms of 1905-06 made a favorable impression on non-Russian Slavs and brought about some real concessions to the Polish minority, Russian foreign policy never gave up the idea of pushing the Russian frontier to the West. Had the Tsarist regime survived the First World War it would certainly have demanded that large parts of Eastern Europe be annexed or brought into a satellite relationship, and a liberal Russian government might also have favored the Westward expansion of Russian influence.

631 The multinational empire of the Habsburgs offered the
642 most challenging problem to the federalists, and the proposals for its constitutional reorganization were varied and ingenious. Of the many ideas arising out of the revolution of 1848, the most comprehensive was the constitution drafted by the freely elected Austrian assembly. After this assembly

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642 many as fifteen federated states, and many hoped that re-
563 organization along such lines would draw towards the empire the Slav and Rumanian peoples on its periphery and thus strengthen its international position. None of these proposals had a serious chance of success, however, and when the empire was finally defeated it disintegrated into its national units.

631 The independent states of Southeastern Europe faced
186 problems that were different from those of the Habsburg
●648 lands, and their alliance and federation schemes were designed to meet the realities of power politics. Once the grandiose plans of the 1848er's had been forgotten, one of these being a proposal for a federation stretching from Poland to Serbia, new schemes were developed around the vigorous Serbian ruler Prince Michael Obrenović. Several agreements were concluded in the 1860's among the Serbian, Montenegrin, Rumanian, Bulgarian, and Greek national leaders with the aid of Russian diplomacy, but these efforts were soon overshadowed by the Russian-Turkish conflict. In the long run, the territorial rivalries among the Balkan states proved to be the principal obstacle to their cooperation, and even the successful Balkan Alliance that defeated Turkey in 1912 disintegrated within a year into interallied war. What is significant is that the initiative throughout this period lay with the great powers, and the federation and alliance plans that got beyond the drafting stage were in general those backed by Russia or Austria-Hungary. The principal reality in international relations was the search for security on the part of these two powers that drove them to regard expansion into Southeastern Europe as a guarantee against political humiliation and military defeat. However, the balance was too close for either to succeed in this game, and it was left to a world conflict to clear the stage for a new order.

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liberalism, was opposed from the start to chauvinistic nationalism. All his life he advocated and pursued, to use his own expression, "European and world politics." He attempted to reach an agreement with Germany as to the problem of the German minority within Czechoslovakia and to solve other nationality problems to the satisfaction of all. He hoped that Czechoslovakia would become another Switzerland. 186

Kramář, on the other hand, linked Czechoslovakian national interests with Tsarist Russia. He persistently defended the concept of Czechoslovakia as a "national state" in which the Czechoslovakians would be the leading people and minorities would be delegated to a secondary position. His policy was openly anti-German. He envisaged, in the terms of romantic Pan-Slavism, a great Slav federation headed by a "democratic Russia." Viewing the League of Nations and all international institutions with skepticism, he warned the nation to rely on its own strength. Basically, Kramář's theories were defensive. In practice, they would have served as protection against German imperialism.

A similar difference existed in Rumania between the Bratianu brothers, the leaders of the Liberal Party, and Titulescu, the famous Rumanian Minister of Foreign Affairs. Titulescu did not belong to any political party, but his philosophy was definitely liberal. Politically, the Bratianu brothers were liberals in the sense that they defended parliamentary freedom against constitutional monarchy and opposed autocratic ambitions of the prince, later King Carol. Economically, they linked liberalism with the interests of the commercial and banking class. They strove to industrialize the country but, at the same time, they barred foreign capital. In this regard, their economic nationalism was most apparent. 648 186 665

Titulescu, unlike the Bratianu brothers, combined his

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648 genuine patriotism with sincere internationalism. He was
186 an ardent supporter of the League of Nations. He advocated
665 the principle of collective security. He tried to establish better relations with Soviet Russia. It was he who coined the phrase, "the spiritualization of boundaries." However, he was unable to win sufficient following in the ruling circles, and King Carol, who opposed his broad-minded policy, forced him to resign in 1936.

186 Poland serves as a clear example of the dominance of
665 nationalism over other political and social trends. In the nineteenth century liberalism attracted many of the Poles who were living in exile, especially those in France. Polish liberals worked enthusiastically with Mazzini in the "Young Europe" movement, and many of them took part unselfishly in the revolution of 1848. However, the great national struggle for the liberation and unification of Poland came to assume first place in the interests of all Polish patriots. Roman Dmowski, a prominent Polish statesman, had been devoted to the principles of liberalism in his youth but, during the national political struggle, he became a passionate nationalist of very conservative leanings. After the re-establishment of Polish independence, liberalism strongly influenced certain small Polish groups, for instance the Democratic and Labor Parties. In the latter, the Catholic influence was strongly felt. Ignace Paderewski, the famous pianist, who contributed greatly to the liberation of Poland in the First World War, belonged to the liberals.

The absence of a pronounced liberal trend and tradition in Poland was undoubtedly one of the reasons why Polish democracy, despite the liberal constitution of 1921, succumbed to the nationalistic pressure of Marshal Pilsudski, who established a semidictatorial regime in 1926 which lasted until the fall of Poland in 1939. The principal defenders of Polish democracy were the Agrarian Party, the Socialists, and the Christian Democrats. Naturally, nation-

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665 cial Democratic Party of the Kingdom of Poland and Lithuania, which party opposed the idea of an independent Poland. During the Bolshevik invasion of Poland in 1920, a Communist government of Poland was created at the rear of the Red Army at a time when the whole Polish nation, united under the leadership of Premier Witos of the Peasant Party and Vice-Premier Daszynski of the Socialist Party, was fighting against the Bolsheviks. In independent Poland after 1921 the Communist Party declared itself in opposition to the independence of Poland and advocated the incorporation of the Republic of Poland into the Soviet Union.

In 1926 the Communists supported Pilsudski's *coup d'état* against the democratic president and government. Only later did they announce that this had been a "mistake of the leadership of the party." When the Comintern attempted to provoke a Communist revolution in Germany in 1932, the Polish Communist Party declared that they favored granting to Germany both Silesia, which had been ceded to Poland after the First World War, and complete control over the Free City of Gdansk (Danzig).

The weakness of the Communist Party of Poland on the eve of the Second World War is proved by the fact that in 1938 it was dissolved by the Comintern on the pretext that it was completely infiltrated by the secret police of the Polish government. After the conclusion of the Molotov-Ribbentrop pact the Polish and German Communists considered the line of division between the German and Soviet spheres of influence to be the future frontier between the Communist Republic of Germany and the Soviet Union. Under these circumstances, Poland, of course, would be completely erased from the map.

648 The Soviet invasion of Poland, undertaken in agreement with Nazi Germany, the incorporation into the Soviet Union of almost half of the eastern territory of Poland, and the deportation of a million and half Poles to Russia were pre-

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sented by the Communists as the liberation of the Ukrainian, 648
Byelorussian, and Lithuanian peoples from the yoke of the Polish landlords; Hitler's war against France and England were presented as a battle against Anglo-Saxon imperialism. After the fall of France the Polish Communists, together with those sent from France, assumed a neutral attitude toward the Nazi occupation and terror in Poland. They did not take part in the underground struggle of the Polish nation. They were tolerated by the Gestapo and moved about freely. Only after Hitler's attack on Russia in 1941 did they regain the "spirit of patriotism" and join the Polish underground struggle against Hitler.

Various events greatly discredited the reputation of the 665
Polish Workers' Party (one of the guises under which the 661
Polish Communists masqueraded during the war years). 208
Such events were the massacre of the Polish war prisoners at Katyn, the death of hundreds of thousands of people deported to Soviet forced labor camps in the years 1939-1941, the deportation in 1944 of over 40,000 members of the underground Home Army who had been fighting against the Germans and aiding the entering Red Army, and the return to Poland of a number of Poles who had experienced the Soviet reality. Further discredit was brought to the Polish Workers' Party by the presence of the Communist Lublin Committee. The Committee seized power in Poland with the aid of the Soviet army and the NKVD and nominated as ministers of the government persons who had been in the German concentration camps and had served the Gestapo faithfully.

According to its reports in 1937, the Communist Party 665
of Poland had 6,000 regular members and 12,000 members in the Communist Association of Polish Youth. Experts are of the opinion, however, that these figures were exaggerated by the leadership of the party which was afraid of presenting to Moscow a true report of the extent of its influence. *New*

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one's father, mother, brother, and sister in prisons and in 642
forced labor camps, poisons the hearts of the young, and prepares them for participation in an imperialistic war against the interests of their own countries.

Moscow-controlled Communism also serves Soviet im- 648
perialism. It is the Soviets that occupied and imposed the Communist dictatorships upon the countries of Eastern Europe. If there had been no Soviet aggression or interference, not one of these countries would have a Communist dictatorship today. The basis for the exploitation of these countries and their systematic economic integration into the framework of the Soviet Union consists of secret trade agreements, so-called technical advisers, and economic plans for each country carefully adjusted to the plans for the Soviet economy. These Moscow-directed devices also determine the quantity of production and trade exchange in accordance with the political and economic objectives of the dictators in the Kremlin. In these countries Soviet generals and lower-ranking officers hold the posts of commanders, and prepare the younger generation for the betrayal of their own national interests and for service to their enemies.

For these reasons Communism, manifested as a dictatorship of the proletariat or as People's Democracy, constitutes, in theory and practice, a mortal danger to the existence of freedom, democracy, and peace in the world.

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tain its full strength until after the First World War in the November elections of 1945.

The first international agreement among various peasant groups was reached in 1921, subsequent to the visit of the Bulgarian Premier Stambolisky to Prague. This agreement was between the Bulgarian Agrarian Union and the Czechoslovak Republican Agrarian Party, and was later joined by the Polish Peasant Party. The agreement was, however, of a short duration and of little significance in international relations. In 1923 Stambolisky was overthrown and assassinated, and in 1926 the Prime Minister, Witos, was ousted following the military putsch of Pilsudski.

In 1928 efforts were renewed to achieve an international peasant understanding, and in 1929 the International Agrarian Bureau in Prague was established. The Bureau was presided over by Švehla, and nineteen different peasant organizations from all parts of Europe participated in its work. The Bureau stood for the principles of cooperation, mutual aid, friendship, democracy, and peace. Unfortunately, international conditions did not favor such an association. Except in Czechoslovakia, democratic political movements throughout Eastern Europe were either already outlawed or under heavy pressure of the authoritarian regimes. Moreover, the international agrarian crisis and other unsolved international problems were considerable hindrances to the good will and honest endeavors of the peasant leaders. Nevertheless, the International Agrarian Bureau has contributed considerably to the presentation and defense of the peasant cause in the world. Its activities were discontinued only with the total occupation of Czechoslovakia in March 1939.

IV

As might have been expected, the main efforts of the Communists, when they formed the People's Democracies

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First World War, was the only well-developed industrial 185
region and provided the foundations of the industrial econ- 433
omy of Czechoslovakia. Poland and Hungary had some valuable industries which aided their development considerably. In the other states, industrialization made slow progress and often operated on an unsound basis. Many plants were erected, the products of which were not related to the needs of the respective countries. National welfare was often neglected and industries were built for the enrichment of a few individuals. Not even mining was efficient. Mines were exhausted or were reopened mainly on the basis of sudden export needs and with no thought that the industries might convert the mineral raw materials into consumer goods. Hungary, where bauxite was sold to Germany and aluminum was repurchased at a high price, offers an excellent example.

Mining, metallurgy, heavy industry, and textiles were 433
favored but they were not related to the purchasing power of the masses or to the production of raw materials. Because of the low production of textile raw material, large textile plants were run on imports. Cereals, livestock, and other agricultural goods were exported to balance the budget. Thus, much of the capital had to be spent on transportation expenses. The attention paid to agricultural industry was insufficient despite the fact that mineral raw materials, agricultural products, and timber were assets upon which a satisfactory program of industrialization could have been based.

The causes for this situation are to be found in the politi- 648 ●
cal instability of Eastern Europe and in the lack of suf- 433
ficient skills and resources. It was a region of wars and in- 178
security where little nations faced each other with mistrust and fought each other as fiercely as they did the outside powers. Industrial policy between the two world wars was dependent on power politics. The policy of economic self-sufficiency, or autarky, was engendered by nationalistic as-

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648 433 178 pirations mostly in order to develop a modern industry capable of meeting war needs.

The assumption that work invested in industrial development would improve economic conditions was a decisive factor in influencing states to industrialize. This assumption was particularly valid in regions with climatic extremities and little arable land. Some of the means used to foster industrialization were technical education, customs, embargoes, tax exemptions, monopolies, favorable credit policies, and provisions protecting the joint interests of domestic industries. The assembly line system, as influenced by the United States, was started in the industrial sector in the '30's.

Branches of industry requiring specialized skill were developed mainly in Czechoslovakia and Hungary, but they did not attract many from the surplus peasant population which still preferred unskilled jobs. The competition, such as it was, for unskilled jobs resulted in a low wage level. Therefore, the increase in purchasing power was gradual. Peasant poverty and the lack of skill and capital were the fundamental problems facing industrialization programs and the new governmental economic policies.

426 439 The general poverty was further increased by the fact that the small Eastern European countries were debtor states. The solvency of Czechoslovakia was dependent on the export of industrial goods, while other states depended upon agricultural exports or, as in Rumania, upon mineral raw materials and lumber as well as on agricultural goods. Foreign debts, incurred before and after the First World War, weighed heavily on the budgets of the individual countries. Only one half of the debts were repaid during the interwar period. Foreign loans were given too often on the basis of political considerations. The boundaries erected by the 1920 peace treaties had already broken up natural economic and geographic areas, and the disproportionate lending policies of foreign powers hindered the uniform economic development of East-

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ern Europe. The individual states became more and more 426
antagonistic and trade within the Eastern European area 439
often took a course contrary to the requirements of reasonable economic policies. Free trade, cherished in the first postwar years, was soon abandoned for the sake of a policy of protective tariffs. Customs, duties, and foreign exchange restrictions to prevent speculation, were introduced to protect economic development and strength.

Both "economic nationalism" and "small power imperial- 186
ism" were features characteristic of this area in the period 433
between the wars. When the economic position of the new 648
states in the '20's is compared with the situation prior to the First World War, the problems of these states emerge clearly. The economic well-being of the old Austro-Hungarian empire lay in the regional character of its economic organization, which depended mostly on a coordinated internal market and a natural division of labor between the component parts of the empire. Although it was a social and cultural mosaic, the empire was organized in such a manner as to take advantage of the regional distribution of natural resources and the differing skills of the various populations.

The peace treaties ending the First World War, while meeting the political aspirations of various nationalities, did not provide a satisfactory solution to the economic problems of the region, and the newly created states were divided by serious political and economic differences. Political animosity soon led to economic warfare, and self-sufficiency, the driving motivation of the new states, precluded any real possibility of economic cooperation. The world depression of the early '30's led to the final economic and psychological collapse of Eastern European stability and opened the door wide to German economic penetration and the eventual conquest of the region.

The foreign trade of the Eastern European countries in 439
the years 1919-1944 was far smaller than it should have

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563 peoples. The accompanying table shows the distribution of languages in Eastern Europe in the interwar period as established by the League of Nations.

162 197

Distribution of Principal Languages in Eastern Europe about 1930 *

(APPROXIMATE FIGURES IN THOUSANDS)

Language	*Albania*	*Bulgaria*	*Czechoslovakia*	*Hungary*	*Poland*	*Rumania*	*Yugoslavia* **
Russian	—	12	—	—	139	451	25
Ukrainian	—	—	569	1	4,442	641	31
White Russian	—	—	—	—	1,697	—	—
Polish	—	—	100	—	21,993	38	18
Czechoslovakian	—	—	9,757	108	38	43	138
Serbo-Croatian	—	—	6	55	—	48	10,257
Slovene	—	—	—	5	—	—	1,159
Bulgarian	—	5,275	—	3	—	364	73
German	—	4	3,318	479	741	761	602
Rumanian	13	16	14	16	—	13,181	276
Greek	37	10	—	—	—	21	—
Albanian	984	—	—	—	—	4	524
Gypsy	—	81	33	8	—	101	54
Hungarian	—	—	720	8,001	—	1,555	557
Turkish	30	622	—	—	—	288	180
Others	—	58	213	12	2,866	561	41
Totals	1,064	6,078	14,730	8,688	31,916	18,057	13,935

* Based on Dudley Kirk, *Europe's Population in the Interwar Years* (Geneva: League of Nations), Table 17, pp. 228-29.

** A. Meillet, *Les Langues dans l'Europe nouvelle* (Paris, 1928), p. 426, estimated that Macedonian was spoken by 628,000 in Yugoslavia in 1926, but in the official census this group was not distinguished from those speaking Serbo-Croatian.

563 The peacemakers were conscious of the problem that had
648 been created, and in order to make certain that the different linguistic groups would receive fair treatment it was required of these states that they subscribe to carefully worded provisions for the protection of their minorities. These pro-

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visions were included in the peace treaties with Hungary and Bulgaria, and the states that had been created or enlarged as a result of the war assumed similar obligations. The provisions for the protection of minorities were concerned with the use of language in schools and courts, the practice of religion, and the equitable administration of social security. Their implementation by the respective governments was supervised by a Minorities Commission in the League of Nations, and a system of petitions was established for bringing injustices to the attention of the League. Although the principles underlying this system represented a great advance over pre-war practice, the efforts at implementation failed to meet the needs of the situation. In many cases the minorities continued to be discriminated against, and even when they were not, nationalist movements sponsored by neighboring countries often proved irresistible. As a result, the problem of minorities became one of the fundamental sources of political instability in Eastern Europe.

Another unfavorable factor was that richer families sent their children to foreign universities, especially to France, Germany, and Great Britain, while there was little student exchange among the Eastern European countries themselves. Educated people knew a great deal about Western Europe, but much less about neighboring states and peoples. Naturally, this was even more so among nations which had been enemies in the First World War and which now fiercely condemned their citizens if they praised the culture or progress of a former enemy. However, this situation was not unique to this region. It was characteristic of Europe as a whole and, like the development of nationalism and industry, moved from West to East.

Many of Eastern Europe's difficulties stemmed from the instability of its political life. Governments changed constantly and political parties fought each other to the last breath. Due to the many changes of government, an unwhole-

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general were slow to learn and to develop their abilities. 578
They did not cooperate with regulations and laws even when such were to their own benefit, an attitude that stems from many centuries of oppression.

IV

It is difficult to say what turn the development of Eastern 648 ●
Europe might have taken if, after gaining full freedom and independence in the twentieth century, the countries of this region had been given the chance to progress in a peaceful era. The countries of Eastern Europe, immediately after recovering from the traumatic depression of the 1930's, were confronted with German and Russian imperialism without even a chance to settle down for a period of healthy evolution. Unhappily, the Western European powers, after their unfortunate appeasement policy towards Hitler which completely confused the Eastern European nations, joined hands too tightly with communist Russia. The Eastern European states, semidemocratic, semidictatorial, balancing between bankruptcy and future recovery, between socialism and aristocratic-bourgeois traditions, were a brutally realistic mirror of Europe's modern revolution.

Germany used all means possible to influence and to domi- 648
nate the area. Basing its actions upon meticulous studies of 439
the history, geography, politics, economics, social life, and cultural habits of the respective countries, Germany gained influence through the use of economic penetration, anti-semitism, social-revolutionary propaganda, antibolshevism, and diplomacy. The Eastern European states could not very well defend themselves against such brilliantly conducted infiltration. Nor could their economics develop satisfactorily when American, British, French, and Swiss businessmen were completely disinterested in trade and investment in Eastern Europe since the prospects for profit were not great in that

648 area. It is unjust to accuse the Eastern European states of
439 favoring Germany when this country alone was willing to trade with them and did not demand hard currency payments. Germany bought large quantities of Eastern European products and forced the sellers to buy from her various articles, including gadgets, luxury goods, and many other products, the prices of which were beyond the purchasing power of the buyers.

668 Antisemitic movements in Eastern Europe often received
578 aid in the form of money from Nazi Germany which practice increased dependence upon that country. Through the various Nazi-supported parties in almost every country and through fifth column organizations, the Germans instigated conflicts between the ruling classes and the dissatisfied social elements. At the same time antibolshevik propaganda was strongly and successfully supported by German diplomacy.

648 Czechoslovakia, in 1938, was the first to lose her independence. Poland fell in 1939, and Yugoslavia followed in 1941. The years 1939 through 1944 were truly critical for Eastern Europe. The German-Russian imperialistic pincers tightened steadily. Nazi Germany won easy diplomatic victories over the Western European powers whose conciliatory policies were astounding. Even more astounding was their sudden turn to anti-German propaganda and war. Squeezed between the arbitrary policy of the Western powers and the expanding German and Soviet giants, the Eastern European nations had no other choice than to muddle through. Apprehensively watching an alliance of giants and often impressed by the achievements of these powers, they tried to appease them, aid them, or fight them.

722 Peace economy was turned into war economy. This decreased unemployment, and war losses decreased it even further. The most active age group, already reduced by the slump in birth rate after the First World War, was thinned even more. Youth, accustomed to tackling problems in terms

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produce litt'e, if anything, and the vast apparatus of standing 185
armed forces, of police and poli ical supervision, of party 471
machinery and propaganda, does not create wealth but con- 511
sumes it. The onetime waste of unemployment has been partly 464
supplanted by the waste of the immense state machinery of control and compulsion inherent in all totalitarian systems and particularly odious under Communism.

In addition to this costly political overhead, there are three 185
other burdens to the national economies of these countries. One is the cost of planning both on a national scale and in minute detail, an economically unlikely proposition, resulting in duplication of work, omissions, bottlenecks, and other forms of economic confusion. This has been one of the main reasons why the Yugoslav Five Year Plan has never been fully realized. This type of waste can only be eliminated very gradually, if at all. The second type of waste is directly due to Communism. In the free world, private property is fairly 471
generally respected and cared for by its owners and by the public at large. Public property, being the exception rather than the rule, also enjoys respect and cases of vandalism are few. In Eastern Europe, state property is the rule, and very few people give it proper respect. The Communists are aware of this general neglect and the ensuing injury to the economy but believe that in time society will be taught to take care of what is defined as people's wealth. However, during thirty-five years of Communism in Russia, there has been little progress in this direction. The third burden on the state C48
economy is a specific feature of the countries of Eastern 439
Europe. All of them have to pay heavy tribute to the Russian big brother. Russia exploits the captive nations in many ways: by reparations in kind, mixed companies, trade agreements, high prices for imports from Russia and low prices for exports to Russia, maintenance costs for Soviet troops, high salaries for Russian experts and advisers, and the like. These nations cannot express themselves on this topic, but

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648 439 there is overwhelming evidence that they are aware of being fleeced by the Russians to the extent of hundreds of millions of dollars annually.

III

439 185 One of the main results of the existence of the Iron Curtain is the gradual integration of Eastern Europe into the Soviet economy. Under the present circumstances, Soviet Russia lays hands on many of the raw materials and industrial goods, both capital and consumer, that are put out by the captive countries. The realization of its economic plans depends in no small way upon these goods. The industrialization of this area also depends on imports and could not proceed at its present rapid rate without the importation of machinery and, more important, of raw materials from the Soviet Union, in particular from the Ukraine. These countries are meeting with restrictions on the importation of so-called strategic goods from the United States and from some other Western countries. However, even if there were no such restrictions, these countries would have difficulty in paying for imported goods, since they do not produce sufficient surpluses of goods that interest several of the most important Western markets, for instance, the United States, the British dominions, France, and possibly Western Germany. On the other hand, the capacity of the Soviet Union and China to consume goods produced by the states of Eastern Europe is practically limitless.

For all these reasons, in addition to political expediency, trade between this area and the Soviet Union has been increasing rapidly from year to year. Were it not for Soviet iron and manganese ore, colored metals, phosphate rock and sulphur, cotton, wool, and, in certain parts of the area, coke and pig iron, many metallurgical, chemical, and textile plants in the area would have to close down. Indeed, they will do

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reflect that, had their country had a sufficient industrial basis in 1939 to equip ten armored divisions for which she had enough trained manpower, her loss of independence and many other events in modern history could have been prevented.

The present industrialization of Eastern Europe is gradually eliminating this handicap of the past. To be sure, the increase of the industrial potential of these countries lies in the interest of the Soviet Union in its own military preparations. The men in the Kremlin may dispose as they wish of this area's industrial plants together with all its human and material resources with the single exception of the spirit of its peoples. From the standpoint of both the immediate and long-range interests of the West, any addition to the wealth or the strength of Eastern Europe is unwelcome so long as the latter remains a part of the Soviet bloc. These countries are of course aware of this situation, but they have to think also about their future. They hope that one day the Iron Curtain will be lifted and they know that at that time they will need all their new industrial wealth in order to cease being an area of social unrest and a target for exploitation by powerful neighbors as well as a hotbed for world wars. Nobody has disputed the right of Russia to evolve into an industrial power. No one can expect the countries of Eastern Europe to relinquish their hopes of freedom and their rights to prosperity which, in the light of their past, are linked to the modernization of their economic structure. Wendell Willkie said during the last war that "Only the productive can be strong, and only the strong can be free." His words apply to all nations alike. The nations of Eastern Europe are potential allies of the West. Those who earnestly desire a better world should bear in mind that the lasting interests of these friendly nations transcend their temporary position as Russia's enforced associates.

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9 International Relations Between the Wars

HENRY L. ROBERTS

I

000 The most striking aspect of the constellation of states in Eastern Europe after 1918 was that it should have come into existence at all. It is not that these states were "artificial" creations. It is rather that the appearance at that time of a zone of independent nation-states, from the Baltic to the Aegean, was largely the consequence of the simultaneous collapse, through war and revolution, of both Germany and Russia, an eventuality not anticipated in 1914. One cannot say what would have been the picture in Eastern Europe had either Germany or Russia emerged victorious, but certainly it would have been very unlike that which actually came about.

648 186 The continued independence of the area was dependent upon preventing either of the two great powers from gaining ascendency or from working with the other to control the non-Germanic and non-Russian peoples of the area, as they had done during much of the nineteenth century. This was a common burden of all the states of Eastern Europe after 1918. Unfortunately, it was almost their only real point of unity. The other unifying factor was that they were pre-

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648 dominantly agrarian states, rather uncomfortably situated
186 between a highly industrialized West and a "proletarian" U.S.S.R.

In nearly all other respects the area is marked by wide diversity. The boundaries between the different linguistic and cultural groups, often not clear, were generally not congruent either with natural boundaries or with the frontiers as they emerged after the First World War. In consequence, there were a series of territorial controversies which, in keeping the region at odds with itself, were of tragic significance. To take a few of the more critical examples: Vilna was contested by Poland and Lithuania, and Teschen by Poland and Czechoslovakia. Hungary and Czechoslovakia disputed the borders of Slovakia and Carpatho-Ruthenia. Transylvania was an issue between Rumania and Hungary. The Dobrogean quadrilateral divided Rumania and Bulgaria, and the latter was in turn in conflict with Yugoslavia over Macedonia and with Greece over access to the Aegean. In addition, of course, there were the unresolved issues involving the great powers which bordered Eastern Europe: Danzig, Upper Silesia, and Bessarabia, to name only three sore points.

186 Accompanying and to some extent a consequence of these
563 differences was the constant controversy over minorities. It
648 is unjust to say that the Versailles treaties, in breaking up the old multi-national empires, merely reproduced the old nationality conflicts within the new components. On the contrary, many more people than before lived within states controlled by their own nationals. Yet the solution was far from perfect. The very establishment of the national principle as the basis for the state carried with it a strong impulse to consolidate and coordinate—with resulting pressures on the minorities. Certainly the mood of strong nationalism, often accompanied by an inner lack of self-confidence, frequently led to unfair treatment of minorities. One must admit, nevertheless, that the multi-national principle, as represented in

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actual fact by the Austro-Hungarian Empire and the Russian Empire, did not in the years before 1914 seem to offer any real framework for constructive development. To be sure, there were many projects for the reorganization of these states, but on close examination they reveal little basis in reality.

In addition to the frontier and minorities problems, there was also the phenomenon of economic nationalism. Insofar as the restrictive effects of economic nationalism, especially the high tariffs, added to the difficulties of the region, they were symptomatic rather than a basic cause of trouble. In most instances, economic nationalism developed as a natural, if not particularly enlightened, reaction to the fact that these new states were under strong incentive to strengthen their economies as rapidly as possible. Because of many political uncertainties, they tended to proceed along the path of economic nationalism: "By ourselves alone" as the Rumanian liberals used to say. In this, of course, the behavior of the Eastern European states was not unlike that of the larger states, but the results in this area were often preposterous. For example, the chopping up of the Danube basin into a number of different tariff areas certainly was not a rational action.

Before turning to the development of international relations in this period, one further observation should be made. In comments on the vicissitudes of this part of the world, one encounters two opposing views. One is expressed by the phrase "the Balkanization of Europe," which carries with it the implication that the stability of Europe was perennially upset by the bickering, intrigue, and petty rivalries of the small states of Eastern Europe. The other view is that the Eastern European states were behaving as well as they could under constant subjection to the machinations of the great powers who tried to use them as pawns. Both views are misleading. During the interwar period, the wisdom and stupidity

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000 their opposition to German pressure on Austria, but later Italy usually sided with Germany, although not without certain uneasy doubts.

In general, then, France was the one great power really committed to support the *status quo* in Eastern Europe, and France, as it proved, was not enough.

648 Within the area itself, all the Eastern European states had a common interest in avoiding great power control, an interest whose object became tragically apparent when the whole area was dominated by Hitler after 1941. The First World War had brought into being several formations or groupings of the Eastern European states. However, the beneficiaries of the war must be distinguished from the losers. Some states were new creations, or had greatly added to their prewar territory. Others—Bulgaria, Hungary, and Austria—had been in the camp of the Central Powers. Bulgaria's losses date both from the First World War and from the Second Balkan War of 1913, in which it had lost territory to Rumania, Yugoslavia, Greece, and Turkey. In the case of Hungary, a strong case could be made that it, too, was a successor state, but as a defeated power it was obliged to sign the Treaty of Trianon. One can, perhaps, justify each of Hungary's territorial losses to Czechoslovakia, Rumania, and Yugoslavia, on either ethnic, economic, or strategic grounds—though not all three at once—but the cumulative effect of all these detachments was such as to make the Hungarian cry, "No, no, never," a justifiable response. This meant, of course, that in Danubian and Balkan Europe, there was a profound disunity, which served to block efforts at extended common action.

North of the Carpathians a somewhat different situation prevailed. Finland, the Baltic States, and Poland were all beneficiaries of the new settlement. Unhappily, Vilna and Teschen provided, or at least symbolized, disputes which inhibited common action in that region.

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III

Despite this disunity, important efforts were made to bring greater cohesiveness and unity to Eastern Europe. Of these the most important was the Little Entente, formed through a series of treaties between Czechoslovakia, Yugoslavia, and Rumania in 1920-1921. The sponsors of these treaties had as a broader and eventual aim the establishment of a great entente extending, as expressed by Take Ionescu, the Rumanian statesman, from the Baltic to the Aegean. Nevertheless, the immediate and specific objective was more limited: the defense of the territorial settlement of the Treaty of Trianon against Hungary and opposition to any effort to bring back the Habsburgs. In the case of the Yugoslav-Rumanian treaty, provision was also made for the defense of the Treaty of Neuilly against Bulgaria.

In the course of time a fairly extensive philosophy of the meaning of the Little Entente was formulated. The Entente became active in the League of Nations, of which the Entente members were ardent supporters. By 1926, the Entente became linked with France through a series of understandings and agreements. The statutes of the Entente were gradually enlarged to include agreements for the settlement of mutual disputes by arbitration, and later, in 1933-34, for the creation of a Permanent Council, an Economic Council, and a permanent secretariat. All these steps were aimed at coordinating and unifying the foreign policies of the three members and at increasing their efficacy in the world as a whole.

Seen in retrospect, the Little Entente had certain shortcomings. It was directed against Hungary and, despite various efforts, the rift between the Entente and Hungarian revisionism was never overcome. Perhaps too great emphasis was placed on Hungary which was, after all, a very secondary power in these years, and probably weaker militarily than any

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648 single Entente power. At the same time, the treaties had nothing to say about meeting threats arising from great powers. There was no immediate community of interests in this regard, since each of the three members was potentially threatened by a different great power: Czechoslovakia by Germany, Rumania by Soviet Russia, and Yugoslavia by Italy. The Czechoslovakians had no direct conflicts with the Russians, the Rumanians had no direct conflicts with the Germans, and neither were at odds with Italy. This meant that the Entente was overprotected from internal, but underprotected from external, danger. This flaw became evident in the later half of the 1930's.

To the south of the Little Entente, a Balkan grouping also came into being. The idea of a Balkan confederation was not a new one. Programs for achieving South Slav unity had been in the air from the time the Balkan states began to emerge from Turkish control. But a series of quarrels, especially concerning Macedonia, had always blocked these efforts. In the early 1930's a number of Balkan conferences were held. While significant achievements could be listed—the creation of machinery for the settlement of disputes, projects for intellectual cooperation, and even a project for a customs union—these achievements were largely procedural and technical. They did not extend to real political innovations. The Balkan Entente, formed in 1934, comprised Greece, Turkey, Rumania, and Yugoslavia, but not Bulgaria, which was not willing to accept the premise of no territorial revision. The Bulgarian position was not as intense as the Hungarian, and in certain political groups there was a real desire for South Slav unity. But it should be noted that a reconciliation on such lines would have had a doubtful reception in such a state as Rumania which was very sensitive about being an island of Latinity in a sea of Slavs, as the phrase went. The terms of the Balkan Entente provided for defense against a Balkan aggressor only, not against a great power. The Balkan

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Entente was linked by two of its members to the Little Entente, but one cannot say that this association measurably increased the unity of Eastern Europe. 648

An extension of the Little Entente to the north was blocked by the Polish-Czechoslovakian conflict, by Poland's unwillingness to enter a grouping directed against its traditional Hungarian friends, and by a certain Polish reluctance to become committed to the preservation of the *status quo* south of the Carpathians. The one real link here was the Polish-Rumanian joint defense agreement which, unlike the other arrangements, was directed against a great power, the Soviet Union.

As for the Baltic region, no great achievement can be recorded. Finland tended to orient itself toward the Scandinavian states. Poland and Lithuania did not even establish diplomatic relations until 1938, and then only under a Polish ultimatum. There was an alliance between Latvia and Estonia in 1923, and in 1934 a modest Baltic Entente covering the three Baltic states was signed, but it was not of great moment.

In general, looking from north to south, one sees the appearance of a number of groups aiming at the preservation of stability and independence in the area. Nevertheless, there were ominous gaps between and within the groups, and no sufficient measures for threats from without. The key connections, of course, were the Little Entente and the French ties with it and with Poland.

Apart from these alignments, which stood for the *status quo* and the Versailles system, there were certain other combinations which should be mentioned. Italy, which was in competition with France, attempted to counter the French ties with the Little Entente by the Rome Protocols of 1934 with Austria and Hungary—a clear example of the dangers of the reciprocal interplay of great and small power differences. Poland, under Colonel Beck, had some rather ambi-

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648 tious plans for achieving a bridge to the West via the Scandinavian states, and to create a great Baltic bloc. But the Scandinavian states, at this time, were not entering into the power combinations of Central and Eastern Europe, and the project never got beyond some goodwill tours. Finally, in 1938, Beck, with Ciano, discussed the formation of a Rome-Belgrade-Budapest-Warsaw axis, with the intent of checking German eastward expansion which was now clearly in the offing. But it was very late in the day for such a project, and it never came to any practical fulfillment.

Perhaps the most extensive, although abortive, effort to increase the security of Eastern Europe, this time in conjunction with the great powers, was the French attempt to achieve a so-called Eastern Locarno agreement. The states of Eastern Europe had been understandably disturbed by the Locarno agreements of 1925 which had seemed to settle, by international guarantee, Germany's western frontiers but which had done this at the cost of inviting German revisionism on its eastern frontiers. In 1934-35 France tried to achieve an agreement on the Eastern territorial settlement; Germany, Russia, Poland, Czechoslovakia, and the Baltic states were to be signatories with France as a guarantor of the treaty. Germany, however, refused to participate. This led to a Polish refusal to underwrite what would then have been an anti-German combination. Eventually the project was reduced to the French-Soviet-Czechoslovakian mutual assistance agreements of 1935, which were clearly something other than a regional organization.

648 668 Apart from these various diplomatic combinations, certain other efforts were made to increase the unity of Eastern Europe. Of some interest in this respect is the International Agrarian Bureau, also known as the Green International, founded by leaders of peasant or agrarian parties in a number of Eastern European states in 1921. In its heyday in the 1920's it included peasant parties from Czechoslovakia, Bul-

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garia, Yugoslavia, Rumania, Austria, Switzerland, Poland, France, the Baltic States, and Finland. The literature of the late 1920's concerning Eastern Europe shows that this peasantist or agrarian movement was widely regarded as the hope of the future. Here was a movement representing a basic common interest of the area and transcending national frontiers. 648 668

Unhappily the promise in this movement was never realized, and the movement eventually collapsed. The agrarian parties were not able to dominate the domestic political scene in most of these countries, and the whole position of agriculture was undermined by the advent of the depression in 1929. A governmental effort to organize some defense of agricultural interests was made in 1930 in the form of an agrarian bloc, including Bulgaria, Estonia, Hungary, Latvia, Poland, Czechoslovakia, Yugoslavia, and Rumania. At a number of international conferences and at the League of Nations, this movement attempted to coordinate economic policy and to gain preferential treatment for agricultural exports from the industrial states of Western Europe. This effort achieved nothing tangible, and under the lash of the depression, these states were driven to a policy of *sauve qui peut.*

IV

The depression and the rise of Hitler were undoubtedly the major factors in starting the breakup of whatever cohesion had been achieved in the calmer years of the 1920's. For a time, to be sure, even after Hitler came to power, the Eastern European states showed a good deal of ability to act together. The Little Entente, together with Poland, was largely effective in protesting against the Four-Power Pact of 1933. The extension of the powers of the Little Entente in 1934 and the creation of the Balkan Entente in the same year also showed a positive response to the new dangers. In the false calm of 1934 a number of voices could be heard saying that 648

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648 at last the Balkans had come of age and were no longer a source of European trouble. This was partly true, but somewhat irrelevant.

Unhappily, the breakdown was not far off. In 1934 Poland signed its non-aggression pact with Nazi Germany. Poland was clearly in a very difficult position and it is not hard to understand the attraction of an offer which seemed to promise an alleviation of the German revisionist campaign. The pact served, however, to increase the disunity of Eastern Europe. Although it was the basic intention of Polish policy to maintain an even balance between its two great neighbors, this agreement served in effect to bring Poland increasingly to a position paralleling that of Germany. This tendency was heightened when Czechoslovakia, by its 1935 pact with the Soviet Union, came to look eastward for support. Here again the local Polish-Czechoslovakian conflict became involved in a more extensive and dangerous diplomatic issue.

The other states whose interests lay in the preservation of the *status quo* also engaged in an increasing amount of fence-mending. The Stoyadinovic government in Yugoslavia moved to improve its relations with Germany. In Rumania, Titulescu, who had favored a cautious *rapprochement* with the Soviet Union, was replaced in 1936, and King Carol tried with increasing difficulty to follow a policy of balance. This was a hard job since he was being pressed domestically by the growing threat of the pro-German Iron Guard.

The events that led to the disintegration of Eastern Europe are too familiar to require more than the listing of a few of the more important: The failure of France and Britain to challenge the German remilitarization of the Rhineland left Hitler relatively free to turn eastward. The formation of the Axis and Mussolini's withdrawal of support from Austria paved the way for the Anschluss. And finally, of course, the Munich crisis was followed by the breakup of Czechoslovakia, in which Hungary and Poland participated. Certainly

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the ultimate responsibility for the collapse of Czechoslovakia 648 ●
must rest with the Western powers, yet it is conceivable that had the Eastern European states, above all Poland and Czechoslovakia, stood together, it might have been possible to stiffen the French spine at this fatal juncture. From Munich the road led to the crises of 1939, and eventually to the German-Soviet pact of August, which spelt the end of independent Eastern Europe.

Germany's economic penetration of Eastern Europe after 648
1933 was not a primary factor in the breakup of this region. 439
While the reality of the penetration cannot be denied, for it meant much more than foisting aspirin and cameras on the Eastern European states, its importance may be questioned. This penetration did not really impair the political independence of these states until after the diplomatic situation had deteriorated greatly, and some of the German trade agreements which really bound the economies of the area were a result rather than a cause of the shift in the balance of power.

One may ask at this point about the influence of the 648
domestic political and social problems of Eastern Europe on 642
international relations. A good deal has been written about the failure of parliamentary and constitutional regimes in Eastern Europe, and their replacement by authoritarian regimes. Some have concluded from this that there was a tendency on the part of these regimes to gravitate toward Hitler and to refuse to have anything to do with the Soviet Union at a time when Litvinov was loudly calling, at the League and elsewhere, for collective security against aggression.

The relationship between foreign and domestic policy is always a complex and debatable one. In the case of Eastern Europe, however, one must steer a course between two inadequate interpretations of this relationship, which may be called the Popular Frontist and the Retrospective Vindica-

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648 tionist. The first, which is roughly the one described above,
642 is not tenable. Documentary evidence which has appeared since the war makes it difficult to consider the Popular Front as anything but an instrument of Communist advance. It is quite evident that the Communists were not renouncing their ultimate aims either in Eastern Europe or elsewhere. It is also clear that the U.S.S.R. was not seriously prepared to stand up for the collective security it was calling for, although admittedly it was never required to do so. At the time of Munich, the Germans were not particularly anxious about the danger from the Soviet side. Moreover, it appears from the diplomatic memoirs of the Eastern European statesmen that they tended, as a group, to view the Soviet danger in the traditional terms of the "colossus of the East" as a perennial threat, whether or not it had a Communist regime. Thus their suspicions of the U.S.S.R. cannot be reduced to a reflection of the "class conflict."

Regarding the second interpretation, it should be recognized that there was a special antipathy to the U.S.S.R. on the part of the Eastern European countries, which led to certain misjudgments of the relative dangers existing in the 1930's. Pilsudski, for example, after ordering an intelligence survey of his two powerful neighbors in 1933-34, concluded that, while both were dangerous from the Polish point of view, in the short run the Soviet Union was more likely than Germany to follow an erratic and aggressive course. This proved to be a miscalculation. One nevertheless gains the impression that a similar mood was prevalent in the diplomatic circles of Eastern Europe. This served to reduce the area of maneuverability in the final crisis and did not afford any way out of the tragic impasse of 1939.

648 During the war years, Eastern Europe disappeared as a
722 region of independent states. Germany and the Soviet Union divided most of the area into spheres of influence and, with the German attack on Russia in June 1941, the whole region

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fell directly or indirectly under German domination. There was, nevertheless, some continuity. Among the governments-in-exile, the struggle for future independence was clear and explicit. Likewise, among the German satellites, there was a persistent attempt to maintain a degree of independence. The extent of the resistance of Hungary to Hitler has come out quite clearly since the war in the memoirs of the statesmen involved. Even such an active and cooperative Eastern European satellite leader as Marshal Antonescu seems finally to have placed his hopes on a German defeat from the West, while he continued in the effort to keep Russia at bay in the East.

It should also be noted, however, that the old frictions did not disappear. One major motive for Antonescu's entering the war, apart from the desire to recover Bessarabia, was his wish to put himself in a favorable position vis-à-vis Germany to press for the return of Northern Transylvania, which had been lost to Hungary in 1940. This old conflict continued unabated throughout the war.

It is worth noting, finally, the importance to Eastern Europe of the fact that Russia did not emerge victorious in the First World War. We do not know what such a Russian regime would have been like or how it would have treated Eastern Europe, but we do have some clues from the secret treaties and arrangements made by the Entente powers during the war. Poland, including the German and Austrian sections, would probably have been incorporated into Russia. By an agreement in 1915 Russia was to obtain Constantinople and the Turkish territory in Europe. In a Russian-French exchange of notes in February 1917, Russia was given complete freedom to determine its own western frontiers. Thus the intrusion of Russia far into Eastern Europe was a likelihood in 1914-18, and was staved off in 1919-21 only to reappear as a reality in 1945 under new and decidedly more dangerous circumstances. In this sense there had been

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186 liberation struggle to admiration for communism itself, and
208 so to the Soviet Union.

Thus the Soviet myth—the supposed victories of the ideals of social reform of the Bolshevik revolution over police and bureaucratic persecutions of the Tsars—went hand in hand with the ties of race of the old Slav mystique. But by 1946, the emphasis of Pan-Slavism shifted to a position reminiscent of the "Slavophile" doctrines of the nineteenth century. Danilevski's prophecies in his *Russia and Europe* (1869) were in the process of realization. Using the language of peace and love, which seemed to him two typical Slav qualities, he had predicted a federation under Russian leadership, as the outcome of a war between Russia and Europe. The federation would consist of Russia (including Galicia, northern Bukovina and Carpatho-Ukraine), the territory of the South Slavs with Istria and Trieste, Rumania, the Czech and Slovak territories, Hungary, Bulgaria, Greece, and Constantinople, as well as sections of Turkey. Many of his prophecies, which at the time undoubtedly seemed fantastic, have come true in the last five years.

● 648 The triumph of Russia over Eastern Europe set the tone
186 for the great Slav Congress which was held in Belgrade on December 8, 1946. That the permanent headquarters of the Pan-Slav movement was to be located in this city, as was the headquarters of the Cominform newspaper—*For a Lasting Peace, For a People's Democracy*—is hardly surprising. The speeches and the program of the Congress proclaimed that the Slav peoples lead the world both in the struggle against war, for peace and democracy, and in cultural achievements. Finally, the Congress created the usual organizational methods to further Slavic cultural cooperation. A serious blow was dealt by Tito's defection from the orbit to this attempt at empire building through the Pan-Slav idea, but nevertheless the flow of propaganda continued.

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II

The reality of Soviet political control over Eastern Europe, implemented by the Communist parties in each country, has been supplemented by a network of political and economic treaties. During the period between December 12, 1943 and April 6, 1948, the Soviet Union concluded "treaties of friendship, cooperation and mutual assistance" with each of its present satellites—Czechoslovakia, Poland, Rumania, Hungary and Bulgaria—as well as with the then satellite Yugoslavia and with a neutralized Finland. Each instrument is a treaty of military alliance defining the *casus foederis* which brings it into operation and prohibits the satellite from joining in coalitions directed against the Soviet Union.

The conclusion of these treaties formalized an already existing reduction of the status of the Eastern European countries in the field of international policy to the rank of camp-followers of the Soviet Union. The treaties were only a screen behind which political control, military planning and rearmament were exercised. The Eastern European satellites are linked with each other by a network of seventeen bilateral treaties bearing the same title, concluded between March 18, 1946 and April 16, 1949. It seems that thereafter no further alliances were signed inside the Soviet bloc.

After Tito's revolt and excommunication in June 1948, the Soviet Union and its satellites unilaterally denounced their alliances with Yugoslavia during September and October 1949 in violation of the pertinent treaty provisions. Nevertheless the network of the Soviet bloc was almost completed after Yugoslavia's defection by the conclusion of four other inter-satellite alliances. The present state of the structure must naturally be evaluated in the light of the Yugoslav gap, of Tito's still precarious ties with the West, and of

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648 the recent Ankara treaty of friendship and collaboration of February 28, 1953 linking Yugoslavia with Greece and Turkey against "non-provoked aggression" from the north.

A detailed analysis and comparison of the provisions of these treaties as a method of arriving at conclusions of some political significance is obviously open to serious objections. The instruments of alliance are a symptom of complete subservience rather than a reflection of actual legal relations prevailing between the contracting parties, and must be reinterpreted in the light of the changed political situation. It must nevertheless be recalled that the first four inter-satellite treaties were concluded before the creation of the Cominform and the following nine, including all but one in the Balkan-Danube region, before Tito's revolt at a time when Soviet control was not yet absolute.

The first obvious fact that emerges from a tabulation of a total of twenty-four military alliances is that Albania is not linked officially by such a treaty to the Soviet Union, and together with East Germany remains without a formal guarantee of Soviet military assistance in case of attack. Such a situation was not unreasonable so long as Tito was the Kremlin's staunchest ally. A treaty of July 9, 1946 linked Albania to Yugoslavia, and Albania's status was one of a sub-satellite, practically under the control and supervision of the Yugoslav government and Communist Party. The ultimate transformation of Albania into a federal state of Yugoslavia or the Balkan Federation was privately discussed.

Albania is now formally linked only to Bulgaria. The alliance signed December 16, 1947 ironically and without precedent stresses Albania's ties to Yugoslavia. The Soviet Union probably was and still is reluctant to commit itself formally to defend such an isolated and exposed position, preserving complete freedom of action depending on actual circumstances. The lack of formal Soviet pledges may prove

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to be fallacious, but an ostensibly Bulgarian airlift and sea 648 supply of Soviet arms is more probably envisaged.

East Germany, in the legally paradoxical position of an occupied part of an ex-enemy country and at the same time a Soviet satellite representing in Malenkov's recent words "a bulwark in the struggle for a united, peace-loving and democratic Germany," has so far concluded no alliance treaties either with the Soviet Union or with any of its satellites. Its treaty with Poland of July 6, 1950, recognizing the Oder-Neisse boundary as definitive, contains no military alliance clauses. However, the joint German-Polish, German-Czechoslovakian and German-Hungarian declarations of June 6, June 23 and June 24, 1950, respectively, represent an accession on the part of East Germany to the Soviet "peace" camp and a pledge to "use all its forces in order to foil the plans of the imperialist war incendiaries and to strengthen peace." In Soviet semantics this may create almost the same obligations as a formal alliance.

The alliances concluded by the Soviet Union with its six (now five) Eastern European satellites represent a consistent pattern. In these treaties the *casus foederis* bringing military assistance into operation does not consist in an overt act of aggression, but typically: "Should one of the . . . parties be involved in armed conflict with Germany, attempting to renew her policy of aggression, or with any other State allying itself with Germany, directly or in any other way, in her aggressive policy. . . . " (Art. 2, USSR-Rumania, and Art. 3, USSR-Czechoslovakia). The term "policy of aggression" was substituted and therefore probably means policy of "Drang nach Osten," and consequently may be applied to any official statement directed against the Oder-Neisse boundary, considered by the Soviet bloc as "the boundary of peace."

The Soviet alliances have two major characteristics: First, they are operative regardless of whether the attack originates from Germany or its allies, or from a member of the Soviet

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648 bloc. Of special importance in connection with the latter eventuality is the typical obligation preceding the *casus foederis* "to take jointly all measures in their power to remove any threat of repeated aggression on the part of Germany, or of any State allying itself with Germany directly or in any other way" (Art. I, par. 1, USSR-Rumania). The involvement may well arise from such "measures." Secondly, they are directed not only against Germany but also against any state allying itself directly or in any other way with Germany in its aggressive policy. This vague language may cover any kind of endorsement of the revision of Germany's present eastern border.

So far as Germany itself is concerned, such a *casus foederis* is based in part on the language of Article 53, paragraph 1 of the United Nations Charter which stipulates that the authorization of the Security Council is not required for "measures against any enemy state . . . provided for . . . in regional arrangements directed against renewal of aggressive policy on the part of any such state. . . ." This provision, absent from the Dumbarton Oaks proposals, was introduced in the joint amendments submitted by the Big Four to the San Francisco Conference on May 5, 1945. This formula was used by the Soviet Union even before that date. The Soviet Union has repeatedly declared that the satellite alliances are based on Article 53 of the United Nations Charter, although insofar as they are directed against the Western Powers they violate the Charter. The possibility of a pseudo-legal alibi for a unilateral Soviet military action against Germany and the North Atlantic powers after a ratification of the European Defense Community Pact should therefore be recognized.

A detailed analysis of the original sixteen (now only ten) inter-satellite alliances reveals roughly two separate types covering different though partially overlapping geographical sectors of the Soviet bloc. The links connecting countries

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located in different sectors belong to one or the other type 648 apparently at random.

The first group includes the Balkan and Danubian states (Bulgaria, Albania, Hungary, Rumania and, formerly, Yugoslavia), which are bound together by treaties manifesting a consistent pattern. They are operative only in case of formal military aggression, and not in cases of aggression by means short of war. A typical provision reads: "In the event . . . [of] attack . . . [on] one of the . . . Parties threatening its independence, or to enslave it or sever part of its territory." Moreover they are directed not only nominally against Germany but more generally against "Germany or any third power," which in practice means against any state outside the Soviet bloc. Greece was mentioned by name together with "American and British imperialists" when some of the treaties were signed. Italy is also a possibility in connection with Albania. Obviously the name of Germany is used here as a transparent camouflage and the Balkan-Danubian bloc is a military alliance clearly directed against the Western powers and their allies in the region, although it is cast in the form of a defensive alliance.

The second, or northern group embracing Poland and Czechoslovakia—to which Hungary and Rumania are separately linked—forms a bloc partially overlapping with the first. They are connected by the type of alliances linking all satellites to the Soviet Union. The familiar provisions regarding "joint measures" against any threat of aggression by Germany or her allies, the "aggressive policy" of Germany as the *casus foederis*, and the direction of the treaties against states "joining Germany's aggressive policy directly or in any other way," are also to be found here, as well as the reference to Article 53 of the United Nations Charter.

The fact that the political and military alliances within the Soviet orbit are exclusively bilateral, has more than legal

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648 significance. It represents the application of the old Russian distrust and fear of multilateral groupings formed by neighbor states along Russia's borders. This traditional attitude has been applied by the Kremlin to its satellites in the Soviet orbit to prevent federation schemes and especially closer economic and ultimately political ties between Communist Poland and Communist Czechoslovakia, that might eventually give groups of these countries bargaining power with the Soviet Union.

III

648 In any discussion of the Soviet orbit—particularly during
727 the developments of the first postwar years—a clear distinction must be made by the reader between two types of states. The first includes the former enemy countries: Rumania, Hungary, and Bulgaria. In the second are the countries that were in the Allied camp: Albania, Czechoslovakia, Poland, and Yugoslavia.

The former Axis satellites were required by the peace treaties to pay reparations not only to the Soviet Union but to certain allied countries as well. Thus Hungary was to pay reparations to Yugoslavia and to Czechoslovakia while Bulgaria was to pay Yugoslavia and Greece. Since payments were made in goods, they represented a budget item rather than items in international trade. The armistice agreements further established the right of the Soviet Union to charge Bulgaria, Hungary, and Rumania with the costs of occupation. The Potsdam Agreement also recognized the right of the Soviet Union to the so-called German and Italian assets located in the territories in these three countries. In this period the orbit served as a source of raw materials and a processor of finished and semifinished goods for the Soviet Union.

As early as 1945, the Soviet Union began to negotiate

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As early as 1945, the Soviet Union began to negotiate trade agreements with all the Eastern European countries. 648 439 In the beginning these trade agreements were limited to the determination of goods to be mutually delivered during a specific period of time. In time these trade agreements were replaced by more elaborate documents which established definite goals to be achieved in the exchange of commodities between the countries concerned. If the new treaties and agreements indicate anything, they indicate the primacy of economics in the Soviet outlook. This was but one means by which the preponderance of the Soviet Union in the area was assured.

Although the Council on Mutual Economic Assistance (Comecon) was announced to the world in 1949, it is not yet clear that complete economic integration exists. What is clear is a trend to make the various captive countries of the orbit dependent upon the Soviet Union, since the area does not possess half the basic raw materials that it needs. Thus while there is no economic integration of the satellites as a regional bloc, there is a tendency because of their need for raw materials for them to become part of one centralized Soviet system.

This system is best evidenced by the existence of joint or 315 mixed companies. In Rumania, the oil fields are owned by 439 a mixed Soviet-Rumanian company. In effect this means that the Soviets control Rumanian petroleum production. The Russian representatives on the company board control the majority of votes and are in a position to decide policies and production norms. In addition, the companies operate rent free, receive the highest priorities in labor, equipment and resources.

The extent of Soviet parasitism in Eastern Europe might 648 have remained a "state secret" had not the Yugoslavs di- 439 vulged it to the world. As the Yugoslav *White Book* so well documents, one of their major criticisms of the Soviet behavior arose from the negotiations over the so-called Soviet-

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● 648 Yugoslav joint companies. The Yugoslav experience is of
439 particular interest since it reflects that of the rest of the orbit. The Soviet Union and the Federated People's Republic of Yugoslavia signed an economic agreement on April 11, 1945. The communiqué released after the negotiations stated that the Soviet government agreed to supply the Yugoslav army with arms and ammunition on long-term credits and to aid in the restoration of the Yugoslav war industry. At the same time both sides agreed on mutual deliveries of goods. The Soviet government was to meet the requirements of the Yugoslav economy as to raw materials, technical advice and other services.

The signatories have never made public the details of this agreement, but the Yugoslav-Cominform differences threw some light on Soviet trading techniques. On March 31, 1949, *Borba*, the official newspaper of the Communist Party of Yugoslavia, charged that the Soviet government had violated the agreement for the financial support of Yugoslav students attending Soviet schools by forcing the Yugoslav government to pay for their upkeep in dollars instead of dinars. It also charged that the Soviet Union unilaterally reduced the volume of trade and that the Soviet government forced the Yugoslavs to sell their raw materials at prices below world market prices.

In his description on October 7, 1949, of the operations of Soviet-Yugoslav joint companies, Dr. Vilfan, permanent Yugoslav delegate to the United Nations, branded Russia as an exploiter. Speaking before the Economic and Financial Committee of the United Nations, Dr. Vilfan described Soviet imperialist practices. As an example, he cited the Joint Yugoslav-Soviet Steamship Company (Juspad). Russia, he claimed, had among other things rigged the transportation charges, causing a loss of $19,000,000 to Yugoslavia in 1948. Vilfan further observed that "the superiority of capi-

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talist monopoly has been replaced by the monopolistic position of the more developed Socialist country." 648 439

While Soviet economic policy had much to do with Yugoslavia's ultimate defection from the orbit, the causes lie deep in Yugoslavia's historical experience and that of Tito and his party's rise to political power. Many of the documents regarding the break have been published, yet much more has to be made available before a definitive judgment can be made and many questions answered.

IV

One fact that should be made clear regarding Yugoslavia 648 and its role in the Soviet orbit is that Tito never "broke" with Moscow. While it is true Tito declined the invitation to attend a Cominform meeting called to consider his case, his action cannot be described as a break. It was Moscow that gave Tito the *coup de main*. It was not until a year later that the Yugoslavs attacked Stalin openly.

For centuries, the geographical position of Yugoslavia has made the country a target for political and military pressures from all sides. Now, to the struggle for the control of Yugoslavia's land and sea positions and her resources, the break between Moscow and Belgrade adds a contest for the control of the minds and unquestioned obedience of men. Since Yugoslav Partisans based their National Liberation Movement on the principle of unconditional loyalty to the Soviet Union, prior to the break the Soviet Union had a privileged and controlling position in Yugoslavia's domestic and foreign policy, resources, and manpower.

The institutional system of Yugoslavia fully indicated the allegiance the Partisan leaders had pledged to the Kremlin, and faithfully reflected the structure of the Soviet Union. The People's Front, with the Communist Party of Yugoslavia

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648 at its head, differed only slightly from Russia's one-party state. In external affairs, too, Yugoslavia supported the Soviet Union's aims in Eastern Europe by doing its part to make that area safe for Russia. It participated in the Soviet network of political alliances, it maintained close economic relations with the Soviet Union, it voted in unison with the Soviet bloc in the United Nations General Assembly and its agencies, it participated in the establishment of the Cominform, it sponsored the Pan-Slav Congresses in Eastern Europe and it acted as a supply and training base for violations of the frontiers of the Greek state.

Neither before nor since the dispute have the Yugoslavs given the Western powers opportunities similar to those afforded the Russians, despite the fact that the present regime relied heavily during the Second World War on British technical assistance and on American Lend-Lease.

During the war, the Anglo-Americans supported Tito and his followers solely on grounds of military necessity, and only the British gave some thought to the political consequences of their actions. The two Western powers based their policy on the fact that Tito's Partisans were killing Germans more effectively than their countrymen, the Royalist and anti-Communist Chetniks, who committed political suicide by confusing the main issue of fighting the Nazi invader with their secondary aim of carrying on a civil war with the Partisans and non-Serbian groups. From the start, Tito demanded Western aid not only for military reasons but also for the ultimate purpose of imposing his own political and economic system upon Yugoslavia.

It seems in retrospect that the Western powers made two mistaken assumptions in regard to the Partisans. They believed that the Soviet Union would permit a "representative" government in Yugoslavia after the termination of hostilities, and that Tito and the Partisans would repay their military obligations in acceptable political tender. Once the Commu-

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nist Party in Yugoslavia seized power, at the end of the war, 648 the thin veneer of friendship for the West disappeared. In unison with its neighbors, Yugoslavia directed its controlled press and radio to speak in diatribes and strictures against the "capitalistic and warmongering Western democracies," and, at the same time, to speak in glowing terms of their brother Slavs and comrades-in-arms, the people of the Soviet Union.

The rupture between Belgrade and Moscow has not [208] changed this picture in its essentials. Soviet pressure on Tito has not caused him to alter the existing one-party political or economic structure of his country. Just as Tito has demanded that the socialist countries base their relationships on the principle of equality because he is aware of the Soviet Union's aims in Europe, so too he will resist Western demands for the modification of his policies in return for economic and military support.

The Soviet Union erred in trying arbitrarily to mold the Balkan area to the Kremlin pattern. It failed, in the manner of dictatorships, to take into account the long South Slav tradition of opposition to tyranny and conquest. Unfortunately for the Soviet Union's expansionist plans, the pattern did not allow for the forces of human nature, of which there seem to be more in the Balkans than elsewhere in the world. Only if one recognizes that this is a problem in power relations rather than an ideological dispute, can one grasp the full implications of this dispute.

The shift of Yugoslavia at this juncture is best described 648 by what has been termed "integral nationalism," which ex- 186 presses itself in totalitarian terms. Integral nationalism is totalitarian not only in domestic affairs, but in foreign affairs as well. The nation attempts to make itself feared or "respected" by pursuing firm and bold policies. The nature of Tito's rise to power, the geographical characteristics of Yugoslavia, and Tito's power position relative to the Balkan states

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648 186 have all contributed to the making of Titoism. Specifically, Titoism can be defined as a form of nationalism which conceives of Yugoslavia as an end in itself, and the rulers of that country are concerned only with the exclusive pursuit of national policies. It is thus not unique in political history nor does it contribute anything new to the diplomatic techniques available to the Western democracies. Titoism is then but a matter of lack of loyalty to a higher power center outside the national state itself.

648 Tito and his colleagues in the Communist Party of Yugoslavia exhibited the utmost faith and loyalty to Stalin and the Soviet Union throughout the war and in the immediate postwar years. Certainly in this period Tito was a marked Stalinist "internationalist." That is, one "who is ready to serve the Soviet Union unreservedly, unhesitatingly, unconditionally. . . ." The Communist Party of Yugoslavia was the sole Communist Party to engage in partisan warfare in the days immediately after the invasion of the Soviet Union by Germany. Up to 1948 the Yugoslav government was completely servile to the Soviet programs in the world diplomatic forums.

The Soviet Union had undoubtedly cast another role for Tito than that of a mere extra on the diplomatic stage. In May of 1946, Tito arrived in Moscow for a number of discussions regarding armament. How important this meeting was is best indicated by the rank of the individuals he took with him. Not only was he accompanied by Alexander Rankovich, who as Minister of Interior is also head of the secret police, but also the chiefs of staff of all the armed services. While it is not known what Tito promised in return for Soviet arms, one is able to speculate from the series of events which began the following month.

In July, Yugoslavia and Albania signed a military alliance, and in August two American planes were shot down in the vicinity of the Austrian-Yugoslavian border. Aid to the Greek Communists began in September; in the following month

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British destroyers were struck by mines in the Corfu Channel, 648 and at the same time the wave of imprisonment of individuals who might prove dangerous to the regime rose even higher than heretofore. By Christmas of 1947, Radio Belgrade announced the existence of the Greek Communist guerrillas as a "free and democratic" government. But this was not recognition. What the Greek Communists required was that very act, and open resistance which would go beyond that already granted by Tito and which was vigorously criticized by the United Nations Special Committee on the Balkans.

Who then was to recognize the Greek Communists first? Certainly not Stalin, but Tito who occupied the central position. Undoubtedly Tito was impressed by the counter measures issued by the Western Powers: the immediacy of American air and sea power then in the Mediterranean, and the announcement of the Truman Doctrine on aid to Greece and Turkey. It is almost mathematically certain that if Tito had recognized the Greek Communists, the war would have been fought on the streets of Belgrade and not on the bare mountains of Greece. How Stalin tried to bribe Tito into recognition is implicit in the negotiations on the Balkan federation in Moscow in February 1948. Stalin proposed that Yugoslavia and Bulgaria unite, and in so doing bring Albania into their fold. Although Tito's representatives did not accept this proposal, Kardelj signed an agreement with Molotov agreeing to mutual consultation on matters relating to foreign policy. Stalin was seemingly now in a position to control Tito and Soviet advisers were serving with the Yugoslav army. Tito's rejection of the invitation to participate in the Marshall Plan made the success of the Yugoslav Five Year Plan contingent upon Stalin's generosity, and the signing of the articles on mutual consultation on foreign affairs closed the circle.

Yet the fact remains that Tito did not recognize the Greek Communist guerrillas. For between the pressures exerted by the Kremlin on one hand and the West on the other, Tito

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648 chose to keep Yugoslavia intact by refusing to become a mere instrument of Soviet policy. He undoubtedly saw clearly that the Kremlin took no risks and would certainly get all of the benefits accruing from these political adventures. In the light of Stalin's definition of a true internationalist, this is what the Cominform communiqué meant when it denounced the Communist party of Yugoslavia as identifying "the foreign policy of the Soviet Union with the foreign policy of the imperialist powers," a policy "appropriate only to nationalists."

668 665 What effect has Tito's departure from the table of "brotherly Communist parties" had on those parties? Titoism is primarily a matter of loyalties. In Yugoslavia, there was no higher loyalty than to the state personified by Tito himself. Consequently, the party, the army, and the new bureaucracy could and did remain faithful to Tito. If Titoism is to spread, similar conditions and a similar concept of limited loyalty must exist in the people's democracies. To date there is no evidence that Titoism has taken root in the effective leadership circles of the satellite states, since both Western-minded and Moscow-trained Communists have been affected by the purges. Certainly the purges of Communist leaders in satellite Europe which have occurred since 1948 afford no index as to the extent of Titoism. The purgees had no machinery for independence of action available to Tito. Even if they had, it is not sure they would have acted as Tito did if faced with the choice.

648 What effect has the break had on Yugoslavia itself—on its policies and political philosophy? From the time of the break in June 1948 until November 1949, the Yugoslavs inveighed against the Communist parties of the satellites but not against the sacrosanct personage of Joseph Stalin. The second Cominform meeting held in November 1949 proved quite conclusively to Tito that there were no longer any grounds for conciliation, and he prepared a new political

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dialectic which would reflect the changes in his country's 648
international position.

First, the policies of the Soviet Union and the ideas of Stalin himself were attacked as marked departures from the true path of Socialism. Second, in contradistinction to the 642
policies of "bureaucratic state capitalism" evolved by the 646
Kremlin and followed in slavish pattern by the satellites, Yugoslavia decentralized its machinery of economic planning, gave greater power to workers' councils, reorganized local government, and re-wrote the national constitution. An interesting feature of the recently amended constitution is the provision for a Council of Producers, as one of the two parliamentary bodies. In this council industrial workers are disproportionately represented by 135 deputies, while only 67 represent agriculture. Under this arrangement, the agricultural population has one representative for every 150,825 peasants, while the urban is represented by one deputy for every 30,239 workers.

In its organization, the Council of Producers is strikingly 177
similar to another proposal advanced by another state that .64
adopted the philosophy of integral nationalism, Mussolini's 642
Corporative Italy. According to the latter, the corporations were instruments responsible for "the regulation of the productive forces, with a view to the development of the wealth, the political power and the well-being of the Italian people." This statement of purpose does not differ greatly from the ideology advanced by Kardelj on behalf of the new constitution.

In any event, the character of the power structure—that is, 642
the structure of social power focused on the state—has not changed. Decentralized though the power may be, the Communist party still controls the councils where important decisions are made. Effective opposition to the regime is still unknown. Democrats who have opposed Tito and his policies still remain imprisoned and, while important concessions

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freely choose. To ease the complex and subtle problems of 185
culture, emotions, and psychology, it was hoped that the 668
federation would insure widespread opportunities for education. It was hoped that it would give to the inhabitants of the region both social and international prestige. It was hoped that it would bring them to a status of equality with the reference groups which they had chosen as yardsticks for comparison, or that in some way an Eastern European federation would make its citizens the equals not only of the French and German peoples but perhaps in time even of the English and American peoples, who have now become the reference groups for standards of achievement throughout the world. Finally it was hoped that such a federation would give rise to inspiring common enterprises that would unite the peoples of Eastern Europe in a new sense of their own identity, as in past centuries the monarchies of Western Europe, according to the philosopher José Ortega y Gasset, have united their own peoples into a sense of dignity and nationhood.

In striking contrast to the splendor of these visions was 648 ●
their relative poverty in specific detail. None of the larger projects for federation in this region were ever negotiated by governments or even by responsible political leaders from the different areas. There was a negotiated project of the Polish-Czechoslovakian federation, worked out by Czechoslovakian and Polish leaders-in-exile during the Second World War, but this project which included only two states in the region was not followed up by the established governments or by the major political organizations after the war.[3]

[3] Cf. United States Department of State, Division of Library and Reference Services, *Danubian Federation: An Annotated Bibliography* (*Bibliography No. 66*), Washington, D.C., October 28, 1952 (multigraphed); Felikas Gross, *Crossroads of Two Continents: A Democratic Federation of East-Central Europe* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1945), pp. 28-34, and for the text of the Polish-Czechoslovakian Declaration, signed in London on January 25, 1942, by representatives of the two

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•648 Projects for a Balkan union usually failed to include even the Danubian states and practically never reached out toward Poland and the Baltic. Projects for a Baltic union usually remained limited to Poland and the small Baltic states, leaving the latter faced with the prospect of becoming a minority in what would become in practice a greater Poland.

000 Perhaps most of the substance behind the projects for federation did not consist so much in plans for the future as in memories of the past, and in particular of the Austro-Hungarian monarchy. A reconstituted and enlarged Austria-Hungary, reaching in the North through the accession of Poland and the Baltic states to the shores of the Baltic Sea and including in the South all the Balkan states down to the border perhaps of Turkey, would sum up the many projects for uniting Eastern Europe which have been discussed so often during the last thirty years. It is the general project of a federation of the Danubian countries, enlarged by the addition of Poland to the north, and conceivably by that of Albania and Greece in the south, which needs closer examination.

It is true that such a federation would carry a certain amount of international prestige by virtue of the sheer numbers of its inhabitants, the enormous sums of productive capacities, natural resources, and miles of railroad track scattered throughout the area. Any more fundamental and lasting prestige, however, might well depend upon the effective military capabilities and the actual levels of economic prosperity and growth, and of educational progress and political democracy which the federation could maintain.

The obvious military task for such a federation would be to form a counterweight to Germany or Russia, or to both of them together. Many of these military tasks, how-

governments-in-exile, pp. 102-104; Antoni Plutynski, *We Are 115 Millions* (London: Eyre and Spottiswoode, 1944), pp. 33-36, 114-122; etc.

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that were used to bypass Congress on delicate issues of foreign policy. Moreover, the prospect of a prolonged struggle with Japan after the defeat of Germany served only to increase this caution regarding commitments in Europe. That this assumption regarding American opinion was soundly based became evident as soon as the war was over, when the rapid demobilization of the armed forces and the abrupt termination of Lend-Lease reflected the belief of the American voter that with the military defeat of the enemy a stable peace had been established.

In addition to these considerations, it should be noted that President Roosevelt apparently left the Tehran Conference convinced that Stalin's promises and statements of policy could be taken at face value. Although the President would have been quick to recognize the fallacy of this assumption once the evidence became available, as is clear from his reaction to events in Poland during the last weeks of his life, he spoke and acted during the period in which the determining decisions were made as though the extension of Soviet and Communist influence were matters of no serious concern. In his Fourth Inaugural Address, in what was intended to be a summary of his political philosophy, President Roosevelt conveyed to the American public his views on foreign policy in a manner that was characteristic of his thinking during this period:

> We have learned to be citizens of the world, members of the human community.
>
> We have learned the simple truth, as Emerson said, that, 'The only way to have a friend is to be one.'
>
> We can gain no lasting peace if we approach it with suspicion and mistrust—or with fear. We can gain it only if we proceed with the understanding and the courage which flow from conviction.

In view of the predominant American influence in the war councils of the Western allies, the major dispositions made in the last year of the war all tended to leave Eastern Europe

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646 to the Russians. The decision to weaken the campaign in Italy—with the possibility of pressing on into the Danubian region—in order to invade southern France in the summer of 1944, followed from this attitude, as did the granting to the Soviet High Command of overriding powers in the armistice terms concluded with Rumania, Bulgaria, and Hungary. Under the circumstances, the only limitations placed on Soviet influence in Eastern Europe were those created by the advance of the allied armies in the West and by the prompt British occupation of Greece. By the time of the Yalta conference this tendency to accept a Soviet orbit in Eastern Europe was in full swing. It followed logically that the provisional postwar governments of Poland and Yugoslavia should be based on the Communist regimes already on the spot and that full confidence should be placed in the Soviet agreement to assist "the earliest possible establishment through free elections of governments responsive to the will of the people."

In the immediate postwar period, the American and British foreign ministers made some effort through diplomacy to reduce Soviet influence in Eastern Europe. By this time, however, their bargaining power had been largely dissipated, since neither their own governments nor public opinion gave them strong support, and the U.S.S.R. found it necessary to make few concessions to win the Western signatures to the peace treaties concluded with the former Axis satellites in 1947. By the end of that year the governments of Albania, Bulgaria, Hungary, Poland, and Rumania were in Soviet hands, and that of Czechoslovakia was within easy reach. Exceptional circumstances limited Soviet influence in Yugoslavia and permitted Tito to break loose in 1948, but after this incident the Soviet hold on the other countries in Eastern Europe was tightened and these countries were soon consolidated into a closely knit political and economic orbit.

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701, 648

[For military organization in Czechoslovakia, Poland, Hungary, and Romania and for the Russian domination of the military in these satellite countries see category 116, pp. 1-117, 147-154]

471 act was taken by the State. The regime was still tightening con-
423 trols when the German Army attacked in June of 1941.

World War II subjected the entire collective system to its severest strain and, as Voznesensky observed, the system continued to supply the minimum of foodstuffs necessary for the war, although the regime had to loosen its hold considerably to guarantee the supply. That this achievement was a tribute to the vitality of the State agricultural administration, rather than the morale of the peasants, is suggested by the fact that in those areas invaded by the Germans - particularly Byelorussia and the Ukraine - large masses of peasants greeted them as liberators with the traditional bread and salt. But the Germans, who were as interested as their predecessors in a high "marketable surplus," maintained the kolkhozy intact. This policy and the standard Hitlerian excesses in conquered Slavic territory soon alienated the peasants.

With the defeat of the Nazi invasion and the cessation of hostilities in Europe and Asia, the Soviet regime sought to reimpose the agrarian controls loosened in wartime. In line with this policy,
[66] the government instituted a vast purge of collective farm directors and decreed a monetary reform in 1947 that wiped out at one stroke most of the savings accumulated by peasants during the war.
[65] Taxes on incomes derived from the household plots were raised sharply in 1948, 1950, and 1951; delivery quotas on dairy products and meats produced in the household plots were also raised. The culmination of this development in the kolkhozy was the shift from the zveno (link, or small unit) work system to large-scale labor brigades. Under an amalgamation program the number of collective farms in the Soviet Union was reduced from 252,000 to 97,000. A further effort in this direction was the plan associated with Khrushchev's name to weld the collective farms into vast "agro-towns" (agrogoroda), in which the peasantry would suffer the final transformation into a rural proletarist. Although this effort met with acknowledged failure, the theory behind it was not abandoned. In Stalin's last published work, Economic Problems of Socialism in the U.S.S.R., he called for a program of "gradual" transformation of collective into public property - in short, the eventual conversion of all agricultural units into State farms." [33]

[33] Joseph Stalin, Economic Problems of Socialism in the U.S.S.R. (International Publishers, New York), p. 51. In the same work Stalin called for a "relatively higher rate of expansion of the production of the means of production." The two programs - further statification of the farms and the acceleration of investment - were, in fact, inseparable.

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471 in fourteen branches of industry and transport: oil, bauxite-aluminium, coal, chemicals, the large metal industries Weiss-Manfred, Ganz and Rimamurany, electricity, railways, Danubian shipping, air transport. While their importance in the economy was great, it was considerably less than that of their counterparts in Rumania.

As a political weapon for the subjugation of Hungary to Russia, the mixed companies are of first-rate importance.

Bulgaria

471 In Bulgaria there are Soviet companies and mixed companies
651 in certain mines and transport undertakings. When the U.S.S.R. took over the assets of the German companies, they did not take over their liabilities, the biggest of which were their debts to the state. Thus while a large part of the assets which were transferred to Russia of the German companies came from open robbery of the Bulgarian people in the past, the liabilities were borne by the Bulgarian taxpayer. This was revealed in the Kostov Trial (December, 1949) during which Prof. Stefanov, former Minister of Finance, was accused of opposition to this state of affairs. He was accused further of wishing to impose the same taxes on the Soviet enterprises as the Bulgarian enterprises had to pay. The Prosecutor took it for granted that Russian enterprises in Bulgaria should enjoy special privileges in taxation.

Yugoslavia

471 In Yugoslavia there were two mixed Soviet-Yugoslav transport companies, 'Juspad' and 'Justa', formed on February 4, 1947, with the alleged intention of 'contributing to the recovery and development of productive possibilities of Yugoslavia'. They were liquidated after the rupture with Moscow. After this some light was thrown on the working of the companies. Joze Vilfan, Yugoslav delegate to the United Nations Economic and Social Council, referred to the two mixed companies in a speech before the Council. The participation of the two Governments in the companies was to have been equal, but in practice the companies did not do what they were intended to do. Thus, for example, although by May, 1948, the U.S.S.R. had paid up only 9.83 per cent of its participation

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people. This double vision sees the molehill as a mountain, and the mountain as a molehill! 471

All the experience of history in this connection points to the inescapable conclusion that if a group of people are in absolute control and ownership of the means of production they will inevitably take for themselves all the benefits they possibly can out of production.

The division of the national income among different income groups is kept strictly secret in the 'People's Democracies', although if the British Government did not publish such statistics the Communist Party would certainly, and justifiably, criticize it for keeping the truth from the people. Nevertheless from fragments of news in the press it is possible to get some idea of the great differentiation of incomes. 465

The official *Free Bulgaria* of 15th March, 1947, states that in Bulgaria the ratio between minimum and maximum salaries in Government employment is 1:5. 'New Yugoslavia, which had adopted a ratio of 1:3.2, is gradually introducing a greater differentiation. France has a ratio of 1:6, the United States—1:10, U.S.S.R.—1:11'. The U.S.S.R. leads all the rest, and is praised for it by the Bulgarian Communists!

Departmental chiefs in Bulgaria got 17,000 leva a year, counsellor-reporters 19,500, counsellor-specialists 21,000 and general secretaries 25,000. This was increased in many cases by a 'supplementary salary' of 13,200-22,800 a year, which raised their salaries to 30,000-47,000 leva a year. As against this the average worker's wage was 357.7 leva a month or 4,292.4 leva a year (*Free Bulgaria*, October 1st, 1947) and many unskilled workers earned 150-200 leva a month, or 1,800-2,400 leva a year (*Free Bulgaria*, April 1st, 1948), i.e., twenty times less than the *parvenu* rulers. There is, of course, no record of the value of the benefits the high bureaucrats get not in money but in kind, such as houses, cars and servants.

In Rumania the minimum salary of a civil servant is Lei 3,328 a month, the maximum Lei 42,600 (*Rumanian News*, 6th February, 1949). Many workers earn as little as Lei 2,000-2,500 a month.

Some information about income differentiation in Poland can be gained indirectly from the table giving the rate of income tax payable by people falling within the different 465 651

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465 income groups. This gives an insight into the difference
651 between maximum and minimum incomes, but does not reveal the number of people falling within each group. Incomes of persons or enterprises up to 72,000 zlotys are tax-free (there are many who earn even less than 36,000 zlotys). The rate of tax goes on :

72,000—	80,000 zlotys—	2	per cent	income tax
100,000—	110,000	„— 3.5	„	„
150,000—	170,000	„— 7	„	„
190,000—	210,000	„— 9	„	„
250,000—	300,000	„—13	„	„
500,000—	600,000	„—23	„	„
1,000,000—	1,200,000	„—33	„	„
1,400,000—	1,600,000	„—37	„	„
2,400,000—	3,000,000	„—43	„	„
3,600,000—	4,200,000	„—47	„	„
over 4,200,000		„—50	„	„

(H. W. Robinson, Chief, Division of Operational Analysis, U.N.R.R.A. European Regional Office, London, *Finance in Poland*, p. 21).

To paraphrase Orwell: all men are equal, but some men are more equal than others!*

465 In Czechoslovakia, as has already been mentioned, it was
511 not uncommon (in 1948) to find factory managers earning 40
565 thousand crowns a month, while two-thirds of the workers in 1948 got less than 2,900 crowns a month gross (i.e. before payment of taxes, dues, etc.). In addition, those earning 40,000 crowns were given the free use of a villa, a car with a chauffeur and other perquisites.

Beneš's bourgeois liberal paper, *Svobodné Slovo*, stated, not unjustifiably, that the bureaucracy were 'living in the style of millionaires . . . enjoy every comfort and luxury, thanks to the villas and limousines which they have been allocated by the authorities and to their high incomes'. These people, the paper continued, are 'propertyless—in form only . . . ' (6th September, 1947). The standard of living of the masses, on the other hand, is very low, as even the official statisticians have to admit. As early as June, 1946, the monthly average wage of an industrial worker was 2,540 while the *food ration alone* of a family of three cost 2,721 crowns. And many earned less than the average of 2,540 crowns! Since June, 1946, the condition of the masses has deteriorated. The correspondent of *Associated Press* in Prague, did not exaggerate when he said on 15 July,

*In Russia the scale of income-tax starts with taxes on less than 1,800 roubles a year and ends with taxes on more than 300,000 roubles. (*Izvestia*, 6th April, 1940).

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15.4 per cent to 34.9 per cent, and of the net yield from 18.5 per cent to 42.4 per cent. 423 474 241

The obligatory deliveries are virtually direct taxes, as the prices paid by the government for the products delivered is only a small percentage (not even 5 per cent) of the price which the government charges the consumer.

It is interesting to note that Lenin writes in his book, *The Agrarian Question in Russia at the End of the Nineteenth Century* (1908): 'The horseless and one-horse peasants (i.e., the very poor peasants—Y.G.) pay in the form of taxes *one-seventh and one-tenth* respectively of their *gross* expenditure. It is doubtful whether serf dues were as high as that . . . ' The agricultural toilers in the 'Socialist Fatherland' pay much more than that!* [651]

Collectivisation not only transformed into proletarians those who came into industry, but also those who remained in agriculture. The overwhelming majority of agriculturists are in reality, if not in theory, people who do not own any of the means of production: they are compelled to work an ever-increasing number of days on the kolkhozes for very low payment, below even that of the unskilled worker in the towns. The constant rise in the number of days that every household works in the kolkhoz compared with the quantity of grain per household remaining to it after the obligatory deliveries is shown in the following table : [461]

Year	*Average Number of 'Labour Days'† per Household*		*Grain Retained per Household after Obligatory Deliveries*	
	Number	*Index*	*Centners*	*Index*
1932 ..	257	100	15.8	100
1933 ..	315	122.5	19.3	122.1
1934 ..	354	133.4	20.1	127.2
1935 ..	378	147.1	20.5	129.7
1936 ..	393	152.8	17.3	109.5

†A 'Labour Day' is equivalent to the physical labour day of an unskilled kolkhoznik. The physical labour day of a skilled worker is equivalent to two, three or more 'Labour Days'.

(*Prokopovicz*, op. cit. pp. 136, 138, 164).

*Although the total quantity of products retained by the agriculturists in 1936/7 was lower than in 1927/8 (352.5 million centners and 493.7 million centners respectively) the quantity per household did not decline, and per capita of the agricultural population even rose. This happened because the number of households declined from 25.0 million in 1927/8 to 20.4 million in 1936/7, i.e., by 24 per cent, and the agricultural population decreased from 122.4 million to 78.6 million, i.e., a decline of 35.8 per cent. The fact that the per capita quantity of agricultural products retained by the peasants after making obligatory deliveries rose, does not mean that the conditions of the majority of agriculturists improved, because it was distributed more unevenly to the disadvantage of the masses. This cannot be dealt with here.

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not taken into account, can be misleading. If the owner of a factory does not renew its machinery, buildings, and so forth, but instead builds a new factory which is equal in value to the depreciation of the old, then the *immediate* result is that two factories are producing instead of one, and the output rises, although the amount of his capital remains unchanged, and after the total depreciation of his old factory, output will decline to the level of only one factory. The same principle holds good for the countries of Eastern Europe, where the rise in output over the past few years has not been accompanied by a parallel increase in the investment of capital. In some cases, it has even been accompanied by disinvestment, as the following table, dealing with agriculture, shows:

	Level of Agricultural Production			Estimated Net Investment in Fixed Capital in Agriculture and Fisheries (in million dollars, 1938 prices)	
	Index numbers. 1934-8=100				
	1946/7	1947/8	1948/9	1947	1948
Bulgaria ..	67	71	—	−13	−11
Czechoslovakia	80	62	80	−21	−19
Hungary ..	57	67	85	−11	−5
Poland ..	46	59	70	−5	11

(U.N. *Economic Survey of Europe in 1948*, Geneva, 1949, pp. 17, 51)

(In order not to get a false picture one should bear in mind that the negative balance of investments in agriculture in fixed capital may have been offset by an increase in livestock, which is not included in the figures).

Another example of the same phenomenon is the textile and clothing industry of Poland. This showed a big rise in output in 1947, and at the same time a net disinvestment of 10 million dollars in 1938 prices (Ibid. p. 53).

Another factor must be taken into account. In the backward conditions of Eastern Europe, even a small addition to the net investment may bring about a disproportionately large addition to the output, the more so—in the short run—if certain whole new industries are built while other plants or branches of industry are starved of capital.

Even with these reservations, the investment plans of the countries of Eastern Europe should not be underestimated, though the statistics are really related to gross new investments (without depreciation being taken into account). In absolute figures the targets were:

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CAPITAL EXPENDITURE
(MILLION DOLLARS 1948 PRICES)

Country	Period	Total	Yearly
Poland	1947-9	1,950	650
	1950-5	—	—
Czechoslovakia	1947-8	1,340	670
	1949-53	5,800	1,160
Hungary ..	1947-9	570	190
	1950-4	2,200	440
Rumania ..	1949	450	450
Yugoslavia ..	1947-51	2,900	580
Bulgaria	1947-8	221	111
	1949-53	850	170

(Ibid. p. 203)

Thus every year a gross investment is planned of about 4 thousand million dollars in 1948 prices. This is a tremendous figure, making up about 20-25 per cent of the national incomes of these countries. Such a large investment, of course, places a heavy burden on the shoulders of the population.

How do these investment targets compare with actual investments in other countries? The gross annual investment, according to the Plans, will be about 45 dollars (at 1948 prices) per head of population. As against this in 1948 the *net* investment *at 1938 prices* (which are about half of 1948 prices) in the countries of Western Europe was: Norway 55 dollars, Sweden 42, United Kingdom 36, Denmark 32, Netherlands 27, France 16, Belgium (1947) 16, Italy 10. (Ibid. p. 48). Thus compared with investments in Western Europe the investments planned in Eastern Europe are not very spectacular.* To realise them will require great sacrifices on the part of the populations and yet are far too small to help, in the foreseeable future, to bridge the gap between the levels of development of Western and Eastern Europe.

The magnitude of the investments planned fall short of these countries' needs of rapid industrialisation. This is clearly revealed by considering the question of how many people will be absorbed in industry in proportion with the agricultural overpopulation and the natural increase of population. The Polish Plan fixes a total increase of 300,000 in the number of people

*This was reflected most clearly in a comparison of the actual net investments in fixed capital per head of population in 1949 (dollars in 1938 prices): Norway 59, U.K. 41, Sweden 36, Denmark 32, Netherlands 31, France 24; the corresponding figures for the countries of Eastern Europe were: Yugoslavia 12, Hungary 12, Poland 9, Czechoslovakia 8. (United Nations, *Economic Survey of Europe in 1949*, Geneva, 1950, p. 39).

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in manufacturing industry, the Czechoslovak Plan an increase of 250,000, the Bulgarian Plan an increase of 90,000 and the Hungarian Plan an increase of 300,000 (including industries other than manufacturing). The U.N. Survey that gives these facts, remarks: 'These figures, if related to present employment in manufacturing, indicate a substantial increase. If, however, the figures are related to the total populations of the countries, they are less striking. In the four countries mentioned, additional employment in industry over the plan period accounts for only 1 to 2 per cent of the total population, which in itself is expected to rise by some 5 per cent in the same period' (p. 206).

On many points the plans are silent. Unlike Russia's first Five Year Plan or the plans of the Organisation for European Economic Co-operation for Western Europe, the Plans of the 'People's Democracies' contain no information about foreign trade either among themselves or between each of them and Russia, or the West. They also blur over the question of how the total national income will be divided between consumption and accumulation (investment), but contain only some scattered information about the planned consumption of some particular goods. This silence speaks volumes. The non-publication of information about foreign trade is intended to cover up the exploitation of these countries by Russia; the non-publication of information about the division of the national income between consumption and accumulation is intended to cover up the exploitation of the masses under the banner of industrialisation.

This last point about the division of the national income between consumption and accumulation is of vital importance when we attempt to discover the factors determining the living conditions of the masses. Burdened with a terrible backwardness, an autocratic bureaucracy and the yoke of Russian imperialism, industrialisation will inevitably be carried out in such a way that compulsory savings will far surpass what the people themselves would be ready to save of their own free will. In such circumstances, consumption must be subordinated to accumulation, as the experience of Eastern Europe over the past few years (and of twenty years' planning in Russia) has clearly shown. The following table illustrates the 'capital

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CHAPTER II

CHANGES IN PROPERTY RELATIONS IN INDUSTRY, TRANSPORT, BANKING INSURANCE AND TRADE

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THE CHANGES in land ownership dealt with above had a relatively simple result—the predominance of small peasant ownership. By contrast, the property relations in industry, transport, etc., are much more complicated. In order to understand the present situation, it is necessary briefly to survey the property relations before the war, the influence of the Nazi occupation, and the immediate effects of the Red Army's victory. 000

State Ownership before World War II

In Eastern Europe the bourgeoisie developed late and, in comparison with its Western competitors, was weak and poorly equipped with capital. Thus there arose two antagonistic, but complementary, phenomena. On the one hand foreign capital infiltrated into the region, and on the other hand, in an attempt to avoid relying too much on foreign capital which tended to undermine national independence, the state became the owner of certain means of production, and not, as in the West, mainly a watchman or regulator of the activities of private capitalists. And between and under the pressure of the two—powerful foreign and state capital—private "national" capital managed somehow to keep alive. 471

The part played by the state in industry was greater in Poland than in any other Eastern European country: 471 655

GOVERNMENT-OWNED ENTERPRISES IN PRE-WAR POLAND (1938) AND THEIR PARTICIPATION IN INDUSTRIES

Per Cent	
100	production of potassium salts, alcohol; tobacco; aircraft; automobiles; air transportation; post; telegraph; radio.
97	maritime transportation

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95	production of dyestuff
93-3	railroads
91	fire insurance
84	production of common salt
73	telephones
70	smelting
52	insurance other than fire
50	spas and health resorts
45-8	financial institutions
30 (approx.)	production of tool-making machinery*
32	quarries, export of lumber†
25	production of natural gas, coal and chemicals‡
10 to 20	production of plywood, cotton goods, electrical implements, lumber, processed oil
7-9	production of electric power

(S.L. Sharp, *Nationalization of Key Industries in Eastern Europe*, Washington, 1946, pp. 4-5)

There were many mixed enterprises owned partly by the state and partly by local authorities, private companies and individuals.

The value of state enterprises in Poland in 1930-31 was about 12½ milliard zloty, or 22.5 per cent of all the industrial-commercial wealth of Poland, and in the most important undertakings (heavy industry, metal, chemicals, transport), its share was even bigger, as the table shows.

In Yugoslavia the state owned the railways and the telephone and telegraph system. Public utilities were owned by the city authorities. In the very important timber and lumber industry, the state played a considerable part, owning 37.8 per cent of the forest area. A further 27.9 per cent was in the hands of the local authorities. The state owned thirteen coal mines and two iron mines yielding about 25 per cent and 90 per cent respectively of the country's total output of coal and iron. Tobacco, salt and raw silk were all state monopolies. The production of iron and steel (through the Yugoslav Steel Company), and of armaments, was state controlled and the state had a very large share in the cellulose and sugar industries.

State ownership in the other Eastern European countries was far less extensive, nevertheless it cannot be ignored. For instance, in Czechoslovakia, practically the whole railway system was state owned. Trams, electricity, gas and water,

*Another source gives the percentage of state ownership of the metal industry, as a whole, as 50 per cent (F. Zweig, *op. cit.* p.109).

†Zweig gives the following figure for the state ownership of forests: three-eighths (Ibid).

‡According to Zweig the larger part of the chemical industry was state owned (Ibid).

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were owned by the local authorities. State capital was of major importance in the powerful Zivnostenska Bank and in the Skoda Works. In industry as a whole, the state owned at least a tenth of all capital invested.

Similar conditions obtained, to a greater or less extent, in the other countries.

Foreign Capital before World War II

Before the War in all the countries nearly all the key positions in industry, transport and banking were controlled by foreign capital. Thus Zweig writes: 471

'The share of foreign capital in the total capital funds owned by all joint-stock companies in Poland amounted to 33 per cent. The share in the total capital of all active joint-stock companies is given as 44.8 per cent in 1935 and 40.1 in 1937' but '... the controlling power of this capital covered a much wider range than 40.1 per cent of productive capacity'. (Ibid. p. 121). This was because foreign capital, being concentrated in certain key positions, could control a much larger volume of capital. Companies in which foreign capital predominated constituted 63.1 per cent of the capital of all joint-stock companies. The preponderance of foreign capital was particularly great in certain branches of industry—in mining and foundries foreign capital controlled 63.6 of all joint-stock industry; in petroleum extraction, 89.9 per cent; in the chemical industry, about 80 per cent; in the electro-technical industry, about 90 per cent; in electricity and water-supply, about 95 per cent; in the textile industry, about 40 per cent (ibid. pp. 121-2); in insurance, 85.1 per cent; communication and transport, 68.9 per cent (L. Wellisz, *Foreign Capital in Poland*, London, 1938, p. 145). Only in light industries (foodstuffs, paper, glass, ceramics, etc.) and trade was foreign capital of small importance.

The other countries of Eastern Europe were in a similar position. Boris Kidrić, Chairman of the Planning Commision, at the Fifth Congress of the Communist Party of Yugoslavia, said of his country that foreign capital 'participated in the mining industry of the old Yugoslavia and in the building materials industry with 77.9%, in the metallurgical industry with 90.9%, in the processing of metals with 55.8 %, in the

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471 private hands. In practice, nationalisation was carried out without legal sanction and under cover of a law passed on 24th November, 1944, for the expropriation of the property of the national enemy and his collaborators. On 19th January, 1946, *The Economist* estimated that the proportion of state and co-operative industry in Yugoslavia was 70-80 per cent, and the Moscow journal *New Times* of 15th March, 1946, wrote: 'The Government is in possession of 82 per cent of all industry, while private establishments account for only 18%'.

474 After this survey of the ownership of industry in Poland,
● 655 Czechoslovakia and Yugoslovia, a brief examination is
443 necessary of the control of trade. In all three countries private property lingers on to a large extent in one sphere besides agriculture, that of retail trade. In his speech mentioned above, Roman Zambrowski pointed out that in Poland the state and the co-operatives handle only 25-30 per cent of retail trade (in wholesale trade private ownership is negligible, the state taking 59 per cent of the turnover, the co-operatives 36.6 per cent, a total of 95.6 per cent). A similar situation exists in Czechoslovakia. Of the situation in Yugoslavia, B. Kidrić, said: 'Whereas in 1945, 85% of trade was still carried on through private shops, 12% through co-operatives and only 3% through state shops, in 1946 state shops already participated in trade with 19.2%, cooperative with 32% and the private shops dropped to 48.8%' (B. Kidrić, op. cit. p. 29).

'. . . on March 31st, 1948, private shops still participated with only 1.78%, the state shops with 39.91% and the co-operative with 58.31%'. (Ibid. p. 31).

In May, 1948, a new law nationalised all the remaining private trade in Yugoslavia.

In these three countries, the proportion of the economy in private hands was no greater than in Soviet Russia during the N.E.P.*

Hungary and Rumania

In Hungary and Rumania, Russia's demand for reparations and her schemes for the building of mixed companies which

*According to the Comintern weekly, *International Press Correspondence*, of 26th November, 1927, the percentage of private industry in the total industrial production of Russia in 1925/6 was 18.7 per cent. The proportion of wholesale trade in private hands was 9.4 per cent of the turnover and of retail trade 38.8 per cent (In 1927/8 the figures were respectively 1.5 and 27.0).

231 tinues to be bred and raised by the traditionally backward East European methods.

TABLE 26

PERCENTAGE OF TOTAL LIVESTOCK IN SOCIALIST SECTOR IN 1952*

Country	Percent of Land in Socialist Sector	Cattle	Sheep	Hogs	Horses
Czechoslovakia	48.0	33.0	39.7	38.0	—
Poland	17.0	7.8	—	9.2	7.1
Bulgaria	53.0	25.2	29.9	17.6	43.5

* Sources: Czechoslovakia, Nepomucky, *Rude Pravo*, February 5, 1953; Poland, *Wies w Liczbach*, p. 25 (Warsaw, 1951); Bulgaria, Chervenkov, *For a Lasting Peace*, September 11, 1953.

241 While animal husbandry lagged, industrial crops crept ahead. Even in this realm, despite increased investments, results have not been spectacular. Few reliable production statistics are available. Table 27 shows only the increase in area given over to industrial crops.[27]

2. *The Return on the Investment*

423 In its basic features the picture thus far drawn of East European agriculture resembles the one drawn earlier of Soviet agriculture: a strenuous effort to force the peasantry into a farm system over which the State could exercise direct administrative control; a feverish effort to build modernized industry at a pace which precluded much investment in agriculture; a resultant stagnation of and, in some instances, a deterioration of, agricultural production; and a constant tension between State and the peasants arising from their unending struggle over the fruits of the peasants' labors.

In the USSR, however, the victory of the State over the peasantry was concluded with far greater finality than in Satellite Eastern Europe; the system held together over a quarter of a century which included the most severe war-time trials. Collectivization in the USSR possesses stability because it has managed to provide the State with the minimum of foodstuffs necessary for its economic

[27] It is significant that among the many steps taken to implement the New Course in several East European countries was the reduction of the area sown with industrial crops.

TABLE 27

AREA UNDER INDUSTRIAL CROPS 1949 - 1951/52*

(1000 hectares)

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	1949						1951/52					
	C	P	H	R	B	Y	C	P	H	R	B	Y
Cotton	—	—	37	60	—	42	—	—	40	150	—	18
Flax	28	109	22	—	—	14	—	—	—	—	—	10
Hemp	5	13	28	—	—	108	—	19	—	—	—	50
Sugar beets	194	250	113	62	31	89	219	275	115	81	32	100
Tobacco	6	14	22	9	30	35	—	20	—	—	—	37

* Data from unpublished manuscript of Dr. Nicholas Spulber (Massachusetts Institute of Technology).

program. The question with respect to Eastern Europe is whether collectivization has provided the same agricultural cushion as it did for the USSR. Specifically, does the collectivized sector in the Satellites provide the State with a higher proportion of the total produce marketed per hectare than the private sector? As was shown, the capacity of the Soviet collectivized sector to produce for the market was its very reason for existence. 423 656 475

The evidence available from Eastern Europe is too scattered and unreliable to justify the type of definite conclusion drawn from the Soviet materials.[88] However, on the basis of an examination of each country in Eastern Europe, some tentative conclusions can be reached.

Throughout the following comparison of the "Socialist" and private sectors, the variety of advantages which the "Socialist sector" enjoys should be kept in mind. First, on the whole the "Socialist sector" comprises better and more fertile land. It is composed of larger farms, capable of supporting more people. In particular, State Farms are frequently, though not always, located on the prosperous lands once belonging to nobles, aristocrats, or German landholders. Second, the "Socialist sector" has at its dis-

[88] The transformation of statistics from an objective science into an arm of State propaganda occurred in the USSR in 1930-31, but several years were necessary for the completion of the task. As a result, there is a great deal more information available concerning the first and second Five Year Plans in the USSR than concerning the Satellite economic developments after 1947. The Satellite Communists, after all, borrowed their techniques of falsification when they had been thoroughly developed in the USSR.

423 posal most of the available farm machinery, either confiscated or
656 purchased after the Second World War and also what has since been manufactured. In Poland in 1951, for example, the "Socialist sector," comprising some 17 per cent of the arable land, had at its disposal 98 per cent of the nation's tractor supply.[39] In Bulgaria in 1948 the "Socialist sector," then comprising only eight per cent of the arable land, already had at its disposal 81 per cent of the tractors and threshing machines.[40] Third, the "Socialist sector" received a high portion of the meager State credits extended to the farm population for constructing new buildings, purchasing fertilizers, seed, and fodder. And fourth, the "Socialist sector" generally received more favorable trade terms from government agencies, and benefited from official tax and delivery quota discrimination against the private sector. The agricultural structure of each country will be analyzed in terms of the above-stated criteria.

BULGARIA

241 As everywhere, pertinent information is sparse and only sug-
475 gestive. The State Farms, occupying 2.5 per cent of the arable land,
423 market 1.5 per cent of the nation's grain crop. The "Socialist sector," occupying 52.0 per cent of the arable land, markets 65 per cent of the grain; and the private farms, composing 45.5 per cent of the arable land, market 33.5 per cent of the grain crop.[41] In the light of the aforementioned advantages accruing to the "Socialist sector," and considering the fact that in Bulgaria the "Socialist sector" is concentrated in the fertile valleys (See Chart IX), this division is not altogether surprising. The proportion of marketed grain derived from the "Socialist sector" is greater than its arable land, and almost as much greater as that which the USSR achieved when approximately half of its arable land was collectivized.[42] It should be noted, however, that, as in the USSR, the modest success of the "Socialist sector" as a grain producer was achieved at the cost of neglecting animal husbandry, since a high percentage of the nation's livestock remained in the private sector. But if the "Socialist sector" neglected animal husbandry, it emphasized a few semi-

[39] *Wieś w Liczbach* (Warsaw, 1951), p. 25.
[40] *Pari i Kredit* (Sofia), No. 2, 1948, p. 8.
[41] *Rabotnichesko Delo*, (Sofia) February 26, 1953.
[42] In the Soviet Union in 1932, 66 per cent of the arable land was in the "Socialist sector"; and it supplied 84 per cent of the marketed grain. (Maurice Dobb, *Soviet Economic Development Since 1917*, New York, 1948, p. 249).

CHAPTER V

OLD FAILURE AND NEW COURSE (1953)

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178 1. *The System in Crisis*

● 66 The year 1953 constituted a major turning point in the development of agricultural policy throughout the Soviet sphere. Repercussions were felt from the most remote *kolkhoz* in Siberia to the most backward mountain farm in Albania. For the first time since 1928, when the initial Communist collectivization drive was launched, the powerful Communist mechanism for intensifying exploitation of the peasantry was halted and a period of concession, retrenchment, and cautious retreat was ushered in.

Unlike previous pauses in the Communist offensive against the peasantry — in 1930, 1935, and 1941-5 — the 1953 "readjustment" was acompanied by a revaluation of the entire relationship between agrarian policy and industrial expansion. The 1930 Stalin "Dizziness With Success" speech signified only a temporary pause in the first Five Year Plan; the 1935 decree enlarging private household plots represented only a slight reorganization of the still fluid *kolkhoz* structure; and the relaxation of 1941-45 was due largely to the special exigencies of World War II. None of the concessions made during these periods (with the possible exception of the wartime years) were as broad in scope as those of 1953; and none were offered as an integral part of a concern for mounting disproportions afflicting the entire economic life.

The elaboration of post-Stalin agricultural policies serves not merely as a climax to the indictment of the Communist land program, but as a sharp cleavage in the history of collectivization through which its inner character might be most acutely analyzed. This study has therefore, drawn heavily upon the flood of frank speeches made by Communist leaders in the second half of 1953. Their candor, like the correspondence which attended the Tito-Stalin

dispute in 1948, illumine areas of conflict and difficulty hitherto only guessed at. 185 198

The causes of argicultural retrenchment were various and a full exploration of them is not appropriate here. But from the multiplicity of probable causes, two basic facts may be singled out: First, the poltical readjustment which took place following Stalin's death brought about a number of organic changes in the Communist movement. The precise nature of the changes generated by the sudden loss of Stalin is little known, and even less understood; but clearly they had very important social and economic implications. Some of the most oppressive and aggressive features of Communism, feasible when Stalin was at the helm, were evidently not feasible when in the hands of a "collective leadership." Stalinist policies had resulted in the growing economic disproportions described above: the hysterical drive for industrialization, the steady decline of the standard of living, and the stagnation of agriculture, conditions which may be considered the secondary causes of the New Course, insofar as the death of Stalin made it imperative that drastic steps be taken to alter them. 656

To the very eve of the New Course in 1953, the traditional Stalinist agricultural offensive was in full swing. Indeed, in Czechoslovakia, Hungary, and especially in Poland, collectivization drives were reaching their greatest pitch in the spring of 1953. The slogan, "liquidation of the kulaks," was generally accepted, and the entire peasantry subjected to ceaseless harassment. In the Soviet Union the decline of livestock population between 1950 and 1953 reflected the harsh spirit of the last years of Stalin's life. The basic measure of success was heavy industrial production; the keynote was the increasing obedience and discipline demanded at the 19th Party Congress; and the tone was set by the Slansky trial in Prague at the end of 1952, and the arrest of the Kremlin doctors in Moscow at the beginning of 1953.

The New Course therefore represented a sudden break in the rising curve revealed by these events. Between Stalin's death in March and Imre Nagy's astounding New Course address in Hungary in July, the governments of almost every Communist country made various minor concessions which presaged the more drastic

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[1] For a detailed exposition of the events of 1953 leading up to promulgation of the New Course, together with an analysis of current trends, see "New Policies in the Soviet Sphere" (Free Europe Press: New York, November 1953).

185 178 656 reforms to come. Amnesties were declared in Soviet Russia and Romania, the imprisoned American correspondent, William Oatis, was released in Czechoslovakia, the aggressive anti-Tito line of the preceding years was modified everywhere, and in East Germany reforms were announced which, because they communicated regime indecision to the people, touched off the famous June 17th revolt. This revolt, and an earlier, perhaps more significant one in Czechoslovakia, seem only to have accelerated the pace of change in the sphere. By October 1953 New Course policies had been announced by all of the Communist countries (with the exception, of course, of China). "We must note, and we must state frankly before the whole country," said the new Hungarian Premier Imre Nagy, "that the objectives of the augmented Five Year Plan are beyond our strength"[2] "We must adopt . . . a considerably reduced tempo of industrialization which will enable us to step up output of consumer goods and ensure a still greater development of agriculture," the Bulgarian Premier Vulko Chervenkov said on September 8th.[3] "It has become clear," said Czechoslovak Premier Viliam Siroky on September 15th, "that certain targets of the extended Five-Year Plan for heavy industry were too high."[4]

The agricultural policy pattern that emerged in the middle of 1953 varied from one country of the Soviet sphere to the next. Yet everywhere, with the possible exception of Hungary, where the crisis assumed a special severity, the new policies were essentially the same. Polish Premier Bierut explained in his New Course address in October that it was:

> . . . no mere coincidence that the . . . problem of what the emphasis of our future economic development should be . . . has appeared today with equal force and timeliness in all countries of the Socialist camp.

These similarities in pace and timing, he explained, arise,

> not only from the identical character of social changes taking place in these countries but also from the basic similarity — in spite of certain differences — in the class structure of the countries which are engaged in Socialist construction.[5]

The "social changes" of which Bierut spoke were the growing economic disproportions, the vast expansion of an industrial plant at the expense of living standards and agricultural prosperity. The

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[2] *Szabad Nep* (Budapest), July 5, 1953.
[3] *Rabotnichesko Delo* (Sofia), September 9, 1953.
[4] *Rude Pravo* (Prague), September 16, 1953.
[5] Quoted by S. Jedrychowski, *Nowe Drogi* (Warsaw), No. 10, 1953.

"problem" the New Course had to grapple with, as Bierut stated it, was to determine "what the emphasis of our future economic development should be." Clearly the "problem" could only be solved by modifying past emphases, and this meant, first of all, a new policy toward agriculture.

In Bulgaria, where over half the land is in the "Socialist sector," the New Course has had the least impact; in East Germany, on the other hand, where capitalist elements are still plentiful, the post-Stalin reorientation had its most pronounced effect. In Poland, where collectivization had proceeded very slowly and cautiously up to 1953, the New Course signified only an abrupt halt in the land offensive, but little retreat. In Romania, where collectivization had also been modest in scope, the reforms were broader, producing a plethora of decrees and resolutions. In Czechoslovakia and Hungary, where the pace of collectivization had been rapid and stormy, the New Course brought about a reversal of the aggressive policies, a sharp reversal in Hungary, a slighter one in Czechoslovakia.

The national variations were great; but the basic features of the New Course were areawide:

1. An attempt is being made to increase the proportion of national resources alloted to agriculture. "We must teach our people," said Polish theoretician Jacob Berman, "after this long period of concentration on heavy industry, to achieve a balance between heavy and light industry."[6] The State budgets for the year 1954 announced in Bulgaria, Czechoslovakia and Hungary reflected this shift in emphasis.[7]

2. The effort to increase the agricultural produce available to the cities by further peasant exploitation has been halted. Greater emphasis is to be placed upon the use of material incentives, rather than on administrative pressure, in increasing total agricultural yield. "We must," said Berman, "put on the market goods which the peasant is interested in purchasing," since, as he explained, the increased supply of goods for the cities was to be partially the result of an "increased supply of consumer goods to the countryside."[8]

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[6] *Trybuna Ludu* (Warsaw), November 6, 1953.
[7] In Hungary, for example, the 1954 State budget plans for doubling the proportion of total investment allocated to agriculture (Report of Bela Szalai to the Hungarian National Assembly, January 22, 1954). Elsewhere, the increase is more modest but nevertheless significant.
[8] *Trybuna Ludu* (Warsaw), November 6, 1953.

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3. Consequently, the policy of collectivization, designed to insure a steady supply of goods to the cities without much payment in return, loses a large part of its meaning, and the collectivization drive itself is halted. While it is true that collectivized farming is still officially considered the highest form of agrarian organization,[9] the revised economic plans of the Satellite regimes do not intend appreciable extension of the "Socialist sector." Indeed, the goal of increasing the standard of living precludes, for some time, the resumption of any Communist land offensive.

4. Similarly, the New Course has made something of an anomaly of the traditional practices of the Communist land offensive: the division of the peasantry into antagonistic groups, the discrimination against the independent peasantry as a whole, the compilation of "kulak lists." These techniques, which were so well adapted to the collectivization campaign, lose much of their meaning in the new atmosphere. Again and again Communist leaders admonish their bureaucracy to cease treating the peasant as an "enemy" and everywhere but in Bulgaria it is now openly declared that the independent peasantry must be relied upon for the major portion of the agricultural produce.[10] Violent anti-kulak campaigns must also be relinquished as long as the regimes are interested in agricultural production and not merely in agricultural redistribution. Therefore, the post-Stalin regimes call for "limitation" of the "kulak" rather than his "elimination."[11]

5. Since increased agricultural production is the urgent and immediate necessity, and since increased administrative force cannot be used to obtain it, incentives for the peasant must be broadened. Delivery quotas are reduced; delivery prices are increased; taxes and fees of all sorts are lowered; and arrears in many categories are canceled. The pattern is nowhere identical; but in each country most of the same devices were employed.

"We must understand," said Berman, [that the new policy] "is going to cost a large sum of money. If the peasant gets this money but doesn't get any goods for it, including those which he

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[9] See, for example, the Bierut speech at the 2nd Congress of the Polish Workers Party (PZPR), March 10, 1954.

[10] "We shall not and must not force anybody to join agricultural cooperatives, and we also do not think that the private farmer represents our enemy, we consider him our ally" (Czechoslovak President Antonin Zapotocky, *Rude Pravo*, February 23, 1954).

[11] See, for example, Gheorghiu-Dej, *For a Lasting Peace*, November 6, 1953.

really wants . . . there will be no increase in [agricultural] production." Therefore, a dual policy of increased payment for agricultural goods and increased production of vitally needed farmers' commodities is instituted. 656 178 185 423

6. An attempt is being made to redress the balance so far as the concentration of techniques is concerned. A vigorous effort to detach technicians from cities and urban industries and to send them to farms for whose direction and assistance they were ostensibly trained, is being made in conjunction with the new plan.[12] This is true everywhere in the Soviet sphere, especially in Poland the USSR, and Romania.

7. If the New Course is designed partly to consolidate the existing agricultural structure, it must be revaluated in terms of long-range perspectives. Hence, those collective farms which have the least social stability and economic viability are permitted to return to the private sector. In Czechoslovakia, where some 40 per cent of the farms were not paying their own way, according to Premier Siroky, a small percentage of the farms were permitted to disband in the fall of 1953.[13] In Yugoslavia, where hundreds of collectives in mountainous areas produced very little and served only as a drain on the State treasury, almost half of these farms have been dissolved since 1951.[14] And in Hungary, where peasant dissatisfaction was so great that, even with a police-State normally equipped to handle discontent, it constituted an element of such basic instability that almost half of the collectivized households have left the "Socialist sector."[15]

Above all, the New Course represents an effort to stabilize and consolidate the system of relationships carved out by the East European regimes. The next few years are likely to witness a concentrated Communist effort to make a smoothly-functioning economic order out of the conquests already gained, rather than sweeping away present problems by posing future challenges, as they have done in the past.

The New Course does not, by any stretch of the imagination,

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[12] The program of reinforcing the technical assistance to the countryside has encountered considerable resistance from the technicians themselves, and, indeed, in the USSR, the government complains that many technicians who go to the countryside refuse to take their families with them, so convinced are they that the new assignments are temporary (*Pravda*, November 27, 1953).
[13] *Rude Pravo* (Prague), November 10, 1953.
[14] *Borba* (Belgrade), February 29, 1953.
[15] *Szabad Nep* (Budapest), December 31, 1953.

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represent a repudiation of the agricultural organization pioneered by the Soviet planners in the early 1930s and brought to Eastern Europe in the late 1940s. The basic characteristics of this organization cannot be abandoned without the most thoroughgoing reorientation of the whole economy. The New Course cannot therefore be compared with the New Economic Policy of early Soviet history. The NEP was declared before the Soviet industrial and bureaucratic system had been built, and a retreat to a relatively free market system was possible. The New Course, on the other hand, has been promulgated within the framework of an already fully-elaborated industrial and bureaucratic system, and the regimes can no longer rely upon the free market for agricultural produce.

Having built this social system and enclosed themselves within it, the East European Communists have lost much of the freedom of choice and flexibility which aided them so greatly in their post-war assumption of power. Therefore, they are subject to the internal laws of the system, and it is doubtful whether they can make a success of their efforts to reorient its basic relationships. The authoritarian order is well adapted to the leadership of a rapidly expanding heavy industrial, semi-military economy, but it is badly equipped to handle the problems of small-scale agriculture and consumer demand. In nine months of operation, the New Course has already made it clear that the greatest obstacle to stabilization of the Stalinist social order comes from the social order itself, and its voracious demands.[16]

Prior to the introduction of the New Course, it was widely assumed that the East European Communist drive to emulate Soviet achievements was inexorable, and required only time for completion. In particular, it was assumed that the Satellite regimes could not rest until collectivization was completed, as if the Communists could not face themselves ideologically with one independent farm remaining. But the events of 1953 have highlighted the degree to which Communist agricultural policy has been, from the start, conditioned by the bedrock economic needs of a developing social structure, rather than by the abstract demands of rigid doctrine. Indeed, even the Soviets, whose collectivized agriculture had attained the state of "near-perfection" and completion toward which

[16] For an extensive discussion of internal bureaucratic resistance to the New Course see "The Bureaucracy Wavers," *News from Behind the Iron Curtain* (Free Europe Press, New York), January, 1953.

the East European Communists were striving, are in the process of readjusting the structure in line with the new political relationships. 656 178 185

No doubt the present *modus vivendi* between the peasantry and the Communist regimes is precarious and unstable, at best an uneasy truce between essentially antagonistic social forces. But there is good reason to believe that the Communists are determined to keep this mid-way course for some time to come, with only minor wavering within the ranks. 423

3. *"Salami Tactics" and the New Course* 423

The development of East European Communism since World War II has been dominated by the pragmatic methods of "salami tactics," the theory expounded by Hungarian ex-Premier Rakosi, which justified pursuit of any social or economic program that reinforces Communist political power. The advocacy of land reform facilitated Communist absorption of the State machine in 1945-46, and therefore became approved Communist "agrarian policy." Similarly, since advocacy of a productive middle peasantry may help to facilitate Communist retention of power in 1953-54, it has become approved Communist "agrarian policy." At each stage, the Communists speak as if no other policy had ever been considered, and as if no other policy could possibly be.[17] As always, however, their primary concern is with power, and their ideological pronouncements tailored to suit it. The New Course is a development very much within the spirit of the "salami tactics" philosophy.

The success and failure of Communist agriculture policy in Eastern Europe may be attributable to these same "salami tactics." This strategem of slow suffocation made possible the seizure of power under circumstances unsuited to "classic" revolutionary forms; and it was well suited to a political apparatus incapable of a frontal revolutionary attack. The policy of slow, piecemeal land collectivization made possible the extension of the "Socialist sector" at a pace which did not arouse the united antagonism of the peasantry at any one time, thus avoiding the type of militant resist-

[17] See above 91-2 for a brief discussion of official explanations of change in policy. Considering the importance of changes in policy emphasis in 1953, it is remarkable that the Communists have made so few attempts to analyze their past performances. The official definition of "Socialism" itself was altered during 1953 (see Fogarasi, *Tarsadalmi Szemle* (Budapest), September-October, 1953), and to this date not a single Communist theoretician has acknowledged the fact.

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000 War II were the least, and ending with those in which the changes were the greatest. This order illustrates the course of historical development, since the countries in which the changes were very small after World War II were those in which the greatest changes had been wrought in the past, and those where big changes took place had known but few before.

Bulgaria

423 The national uprising of the Bulgarians in 1878 destroyed feudalism. The Turkish beys fled for their lives and left the Bulgarian serfs in full and free ownership of the land they tilled. [656] The few feudal remnants that were not eliminated in 1878 were swept away by the Agrarian Union Government of Alexander Stamboliisky (1920–23). This government fixed a maximum of 30 hectares of land for any one household (i.e., an area smaller than that fixed as a maximum by the land reforms in any country except Bulgaria herself after World War II). The political instability of this government, ending in its overthrow by a military *coup d'état* and the murder of its leader as well as of tens of thousands of peasants and workers, resulted in the law of the maximum not being fully applied, so that a certain concentration of ownership took place after 1923. Nevertheless, Bulgaria remained a country with very few 'estates' of more than 30 hectares, a country of small peasant ownership par excellence:

LAND OWNERSHIP IN BULGARIA BEFORE THE 1944 REFORM
(IN PERCENTAGES)

	*Below 5 ha.**	*5-10 ha.*	*10-30 ha.*	*30-50 ha.*	*50 ha. and over*
Number of Owners	63.1	26.2	10.3	0.3	0.1
Area	30.0	36.9	29.5	2.0	1.6

(L. Bojkoff, *Bulgaria is not the Land of Roses Only*, Sofia, 1946, p. 69.)

Wilbert E. Moore, in *Economic Demography of Eastern and Southern Europe* (League of Nations, Geneva, 1945), gives an even lower percentage for the big properties: in 1934 only 2.7 per cent of the land was in the hands of people owning more than 30 hectares each (p. 251).

There were very few tenants in Bulgaria. According to an official report of 31st December, 1926, the cultivated rented

*ha. = hectare = 2.4711 acres.

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land comprised only 1 per cent of all privately owned land. 423
(O. S. Morgan, editor, *Agricultural Systems of Middle Europe. A Symposium*, New York, 1933, p. 50). The number of agricultural workers was also negligible.

After World War II the Communist government fixed a new [656] maximum of 20 ha. for all parts of the country except Dobrudja where the maximum fixed by Stamboliisky was in force. But although the government hoped to increase its influence among the peasants, the real results of this land reform were not considerable. In his Report to the Second Fatherland Front Congress (Feb. 2-3, 1948) Premier Georgi Dimitrov said that '127,000 families received 1,258,000 decares of land (1 decare = 1/10 hectare—Y.G.) in compliance with the agrarian reform, while 7,863 families were housed and given about 12,000 decares of land. 71,000 decares of land were distributed among 381 State farms, establishments and institutions'. (*Second Fatherland Front Congress*, Sofia, 1948, p.42). Thus altogether 1,341,000 decares, or 134,100 hectares, were distributed. Since the total arable land in 1947 was 7.8 million hectares, the redistribution was relatively small. The land reform affected only about three per cent of the agricultural land.

The limited extent of the last land reform in Bulgaria is shown by the statistics of land ownership before and after it:

	Cultivated Land (in Percentage)		
	1926	1934	1946
Small farms	28.62	28.90	30.70
Medium "	41.63	41.13	40.60
Large "	29.75	29.97	28.70

Professor Petko Spirkov, who cites this table, draws the obvious conclusion from it: '. . . during the period 1926-1946 there are practically no changes in the distribution of land'. ('Class Structure of our Village,' *Free Bulgaria*, Sofia, March 15, 1949).

Yugoslavia

Serbia achieved virtual national independence in 1830 and full sovereignty in 1877. Then the Turkish feudal lords fled from the country and as in Bulgaria the land remained the property of the former serfs, so that many years before World

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423 Up to September, 1947, land reform affected about 1.4 million hectares, and afterwards, with the distribution of the royal estates, etc., altogether 1.6 million hectares, i.e., about 10 per cent of the agricultural area of Rumania, or a third of the relative extent of the land reform after World War I.

Czechoslovakia

423 563 ●656 As a result of the Battle of the White Mountain (1620) the Czech nobility was almost completely wiped out and replaced by German Catholic landlords. Thus, when the Czechoslovak Republic was established, there were German landlords and Czech peasants in the Czech areas, and in the Sudetenland—the Border area — mainly German peasants and German landlords. In Slovakia (taken from the Hungarian part of the Hapsburg Empire) there were Magyar landlords and Slovak peasants, and, in the region bordering on Hungary, Hungarian peasants and Hungarian landlords. So that here, the land question and the national question were one, as in other parts of the former Austro-Hungarian Empire: Magyar landlords exploited Slovak, Rumanian, Croat and Ruthenian peasants; German landlords exploited Czech, Ruthenian, Slovene and Polish peasants.

In 1919 the Land Reform Act was passed. It provided for the dividing up of all large estates of more than 100 hectares. But this law was only partially and half-heartedly carried out. Yet, as a result of the land reform, 1.7 million hectares, or 12 per cent of the area of Czechoslovakia, were expropriated, and by 1 January, 1937, 1,272,934 hectares had been redistributed. At the same time in 1930, 13.8 per cent of the agricultural area still remained in properties of over 100 hectares. It was mainly Hungarian and German landlords who were expropriated, but the German and Hungarian peasants, tenants and agricultural workers not only were not excluded, but even benefited from the redistribution. As Miss L. E. Texter writes: 'The German farmer received land even from a Czech landowner'. (*Land Reform in Czechoslovakia*, London, 1923, quoted by E. Wiskemann, *Czechs and Germans*, London, 1938, p. 152).

In 1945 (as a result of the decrees of 19.5.45, 21.6.45, 20.7.45 and 3.9.45) an area of 2.6 million hectares was taken from Germans, landlords and peasants alike. Practically no

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land belonging to non-Germans was touched in Bohemia and Moravia. As a result of the agrarian reform in Slovakia, three hundred thousand hectares were expropriated, of which two-thirds belonged to Hungarians and Germans. 423 563 656

For two years the property of Czech and Slovak landowners was left untouched by the government. Land reform was identified with the national struggle of all the Slavs—Czechs and Slovaks alike—against all the Germans and Hungarians.

Later on it was necessary to reduce the maximum holding in order to pave the way for the total annihilation of the bourgeoisie in Czechoslovakia, and the integration of Czechoslovakia in the Russian Empire. On July 11, 1947, the maximum of 100 hectares fixed in 1919 was reduced to 50 hectares, and as a result another 919 thousand hectares were redistributed.

Thus until July, 1947, land redistribution was aimed at achieving an internal colonisation by the expropriation of 'foreign' proprietors, and the extent of the second wave of land redistribution was only about a quarter of the first.

Poland

After the First World War, Polish governments carried out, if somewhat timidly, certain land reforms. A maximum holding of 180 hectares of arable land was fixed with two exceptions—in suburbs the area allowed to a household was 60 hectares and in the Eastern districts it was 300 hectares. The landlords in the Eastern districts were treated gently because their peasants belonged to the national minorities—Ukrainians and White Russians. The administration was empowered to decide annually what estates should be divided. In fact, Polish landlords were able, by pulling strings, to escape the land reform, and in general only the estates of Russian landlords in Eastern Poland were redistributed. Altogether between 1919 and 1938, 2,654,000 hectares were divided up. (F. Zweig, *Poland between Two Wars*, London, 1944, p. 133). 423 [563]

In spite of this measure of land reform, a not inconsiderable proportion of land remained in the hands of big landowners. In 1931, about 4.6 million hectares, 18.0 per cent of all agricultural land, belonged to farms of more than 50 hectares. But as a single owner might own several farms, each of less than 50 hectares but totalling more than 50 hectares, the area

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423 comprised by properties over 50 hectares after the land reform was even greater than 4.6 million hectares. The lack of statistics on the subject (resulting from the Polish government's attempt to gloss over the reactionary and half-hearted way in which the land distribution was carried out) makes it impossible to estimate more exactly what area was covered by properties of more than 50 hectares. It is, however, evident that the redistribution of land carried out between the two world wars affected 2.6 million hectares, and left about twice that area untouched.

The frontier alterations resulting from World War II fundamentally changed property relations. Eastern Poland, an area of big estates, was lost to Poland, and a new area was gained in the west which—after the expulsion of 8.5 million Germans—was only very sparsely populated.

● 656 By the decrees of 6 September, 1944, and 17 January, 1945,
423 all Germans and traitors were expropriated, and 50 hectares of arable land was fixed as a maximum individual holding in Old Poland and 100 hectares in the 'Regained Territories'. The Church land was not affected. Polish landlords who had more than 50 hectares received very little compensation for the area they ceded—the equivalent of one year's yield of grain. According to the terms of these decrees, in Old Poland the area to be redistributed was more than 3 million hectares, of which agricultural land (excluding forests) made up 2,131,285 hectares. About 1,256,000 hectares of this belonged to Polish landlords, and 875,000 hectares belonged to Germans. In the Western Territories more than 5 million hectares of agricultural land was taken from Germans and either distributed to Polish peasants (4.5 million) or converted into state farms, agricultural schools, etc.

Thus internal colonization, or expropriation on a nationalist basis, is the key to the change in land ownership in Poland, even more than in Czecholslovakia.

Hungary

423 Unlike her neighbours, Hungary did not undergo any land reform after World War I. The communist government of Béla Kun (1919) did not divide the large estates among the peasants —one of their serious mistakes which made the victory of the

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White Terror easier. If the land had been divided, it would have remained peasant property even after Béla Kun had been overthrown. No power on earth could have changed this. But by a paradox of history, the only country of Eastern and South Eastern Europe that had a Communist government at that period was the only one in which the feudal land structure remained intact. 423

The pattern of land distribution in Hungary is revealed by the following table:

DISTRIBUTION OF HOLDINGS ACCORDING TO AREA, 1930

Groups of holdings according to area	*Number of Farms*		*Total Area*		*Average area of holdings*
	Thousands	*% of total*	*Thousands of yokes**	*% of total*	*yokes*
Up to 1 yoke	552	34.5	287	1.8	0.52
1-2 yokes	278	17.4	428	2.7	1.54
2-5 "	313	19.6	1,034	6.5	3.30
5-10 "	200	12.5	1,460	9.2	7.30
10-20 "	157	9.8	2,241	14.0	14.27
20-100 "	84	5.3	3,093	19.4	36.82
100 and more yokes	14	0.9	7,390	46.4	527.88
Total	1,598	100	15,933	100	10.00

(International Agrarian Institute, *Six Years of the Agrarian Crisis*, Moscow, 1935, p. 109)

Thus, on the one hand there were 1,143,000 lilliputian holdings (71.5 per cent of all the farms), each less than 5 yokes, making up 11.0 per cent of the total area, and on the other hand, 14,000 large estates (0.9 per cent of all the farms), making up 46.4 per cent of the area.

After World War II the time was overripe for the abolition of large estates oppressing the mass of agricultural workers and tenants.

On 17th March, 1945, the Hungarian government passed a law confiscating the land of gentry with estates of more than 50 hectares, as well as the estates of the Church bodies of more than 50 hectares, and of peasant land over 100 hectares. The maximum individual land holding was fixed at 100 hectares, except for those who distinguished themselves in the war against Germany, in which case the maximum was 150 hectares. The so-called 'model farms', that is, vineyards, orchards and other intensive cultures, were exempt from redistribution. As a result, an area of 5.7 million yokes,† i.e., 423 656

*yoke = 0.575 hectares = 1.422 acres

†Of this area, only 456 thousand yokes were expropriated from Germans who were expelled from the country. The rest was the property of big Hungarian landlords.

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423 more than a third of all the cultivated land of Hungary, was
● 656 distributed among 640,000 families. Thus in Hungary there was a real revolution in agricultural property relations.

To sum up the changes in land ownership brought about
423 since the end of World War II: in Hungary the transformation of property relations in land by the elimination of large estates was tremendous, and a progressive step; the land reform in Rumania, which was the completion of a much wider land reform after World War I, was less extensive but of the same character; in Czechoslovakia and Poland the changes constituted in the main an act of internal colonisation and of the expropriation of millions of Germans and Hungarians; in Yugoslavia and Bulgaria the changes were very small indeed.

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465 standard. In summing up, the article states: 'The public
511 administration swallows 48 per cent of the national income.
434 How will it be possible to raise the standard of living of the
656 whole people, how will the wide layers of the toilers be satisfied, how will it be possible to pay proper salaries to government clerks?' (From an article, 'Let us think about the Figures', quoted by V. Salus in the theoretical paper of the Czech Social Democracy, *Cil*, August 15th, 1947, under the interesting heading, 'Economic Democracy and the New Nobility').*

511 The division of the national income in Yugoslavia is not less
565 unequal than in the other 'People's Democracies.' Vernon
434 Bartlett, when in Belgrade, described the situation in the

*For a time the Communist Party leaders tried to cushion the conflict between the workers and the 'new nobility' by directing the hostility of the masses exclusively against the bourgeoisie. For example in October, 1947, in connection with the relief to the peasants who were suffering from the drought, the Communist Party raised the slogan 'Let the millionaires pay', and proposed as a solution the imposition of a property levy. Of course the bureaucracy, being 'propertyless—in form' would not have to pay anything. The Communist Party tried to overlook the fact that the portion of the national income of Czechoslovakia in the hands of the bourgeoisie was so small, only a quarter of industry being left in their hands, that the only possibility of seriously improving the conditions of the masses was by 1. cutting into the income of the bureaucracy; 2. raising the general national income; 3. preventing Russia from taking her cut from the national income.

The Communist Party claimed that there were 35,000 millionaires in Czechoslovakia. This is a large number, but it is much less impressive when it is realised that they were not pound sterling or dollar millionaires, but crown millionaires. A million crowns in July, 1947, was equal to five thousand pounds sterling. Even according to the Communist Party estimate the wealth of these 35,000 'millionaires' was only 50 milliard (According to the bourgeois paper *Svobodné Slovo* there were only 12,000 millionaires with a property of 22 milliard crowns). 50 milliard crowns is only about a quarter of the *annual national income* of Czechoslovakia.

The conditions of the masses could not therefore be substantially improved at the expense of the bourgeoisie, but only by improvements in the nationalised sectors of the economy and at the expense of the bureaucracy. This is proved by the distribution of the national income:

Personal Income at Factor Cost (thousand million of crowns.)	1947
1. Entrepreneural profits in industry, trade and professions and private income from capital	22.0
2. Rentals and sub-rentals (including net rental value of owner-occupied dewllings	5.2
3. Independent agriculturists	25.4
4. Wages and salaries	125.9
5. Pensions of Government employees	5.7
6. Unfreezing of blocked accounts to people of limited means	6.3
In addition there were a number of other small items.	

(Statistical Office of the United Nations, *National Income Statistics of Various Countries, 1938-1948*, Lake Success, New York, 1950, p. 59).

The figures speak for themselves. The possibility of increasing item 4 at the expense of item 1 is very limited indeed:

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661 These are just a few of the victims. Altogether in the big purge of 1937 the whole or the majority of thirty national governments were liquidated. The main accusation against them was their desire for secession from the U.S.S.R.

The fact that the N.K.V.D. directed from Moscow can arrest heads of governments, Commissars (now called Ministers), first secretaries of the Party in the national republics and a host of lesser figures, shows that the much-vaunted independence of the national republics is purely formal. Nothing remains of the right of secession, even though this is recognised in the Stalin Constitution (Article 17). As early as the twelfth Congress of the C.P.S.U. (1923) Ukrainian communists who demanded that control over the G.P.U. in the different republics be vested in the national governments, were severely rebuked.

661 656 563 The most important element of the administration of the state besides the police is the army, but the national republics have no separate armies of their own. They are not even allowed to keep their own soldiers within their own borders, but armies composed mostly of other nationals camp on their territories. The story of the Ukrainian army is typical. This army won its laurels during the Civil War in 1918-21, when, almost single-handed, it liberated Ukraine from the Whites. It continued to camp in Ukraine until 1929. But the Great Russian bureaucracy, becoming afraid of the strength of this peasant army, decided to cripple it permanently. The army was broken up, its separate units moved from the Ukraine and dispersed all over the U.S.S.R. It was replaced in Ukraine by a Great Russian army commanded from Moscow, to ensure the complete dependence of Ukraine on Moscow. The same fate befell the other national republics.

The Communist Parties in the republics are not only directed from Moscow, but even the majority of those they appoint to the State or Party apparatus are Great Russians. Nearly all the First Secretaries of the Ukrainian Communist Party came from Moscow: Kaganovich, Postyshev, Kosior, Khrushchev, and Kaganovich once more. Of the five First Secretaries of the Communist Parties of the Central Asiatic Republics today, four are Russians, and the position in the other republics is similar. Even where the secretaries are drawn from the local

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661 population, they are so dependent on the centralised Party
652 machine and the N.K.V.D. that they are nothing but local
523 quislings.

646 A study of the national composition of the Supreme Soviet
661 of the U.S.S.R. gives a clear picture of the subordination of the non-Russian peoples. Vs. Felix and Ju. Snov made an interesting analysis in the Ukrainian Socialist review, *Vpered* (Munich, 1950, No. 3), using as their basis the list of M.P.'s published in *Pravda* on 15th March, 1950. Of the 25 deputies every republic sent to the Soviet of Nationalities, 5 from Ukraine S.S.R. were Russians, 4 from Uzbek S.S.R., 6 from Kazakh S.S.R., 5 from Lithuanian S.S.R., 6 from Latvian S.S.R., 5 from Tadjik S.S.R. and 6 from Kirghiz S.S.R. Actually, these Russians hold the key positions in the administration of the republics. For instance, of the 5 Russian deputies from the Tadjik S.S.R., two were D. K. Vishnevski, who is the Minister of State Security (M.G.B.) for Tadjikistan, and A. V. Kharchenko, who is the Minister of the Interior (M.V.D.) for Tadjikistan.

661 The overriding control of Moscow over the administration
652 of the national republics explains the complete defeat of all the
523 national resistance movements hitherto. It also explains the defeat of the 'Titoists' in Poland, Bulgaria, Hungary and Rumania. Tito has been successful so far because Moscow never controlled the state apparatus of Yugoslavia. She was 'liberated' not by the Soviet Army but by her own National Liberation Army, organised and led by Yugoslavs.

197 The cultural life of the various nations is also subjected to
652 Russification. When the Bolsheviks came to power, they
523 introduced the Latin alphabet for the many nations in Russia which had no written language at all, and 71 written languages in this form were introduced. This was considered the simplest and most progressive means of promoting the cultural development of these people, and it underlined the fact that there was no intention of Russification. Stalin reversed this progressive policy. In 1936, the Latin alphabet was replaced by the Cyrillic, which is much more complicated, and in 1938 Russian was made a compulsory language in all Secondary schools of the U.S.S.R.

Even more important than the language people speak or write is what they speak or write.

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The direction of people's minds along the groove required by Moscow begins at school. Pupils in Ukraine are made to pay tribute to Kutuzov, known as the hangman of the Ukrainians. Chmelnitzki, who massacred the Jews and betrayed the Ukrainian peasants into Russian serfdom must be acclaimed a national hero. Pupils in Azerbaidjan must be taught that the Russian occupation of their country in 1806 was not symbolic of the superiority of Russian arms alone, but shows the long attachment of Azerbaidjan to Russian culture. It is often very difficult for the non-Russian scholars to explain their history in the way required, and they are frequently accused of nationalism. In the summer of 1944, the Central Committee of the C.P.S.U. severely criticized the cultural work of the Tartar Republic, its main defalcation being nationalist falsifications in the teaching of its national history. The Tartars were instructed to emphasize the elements in their history which united them with Russia (*Propagandist*, 15th June, 1944). The journal *Kultura i Zhizn* of 30th November, 1945, is devoted mainly to criticisms of 'nationalist deviations' in the teaching of history. The institutes of history in the Ukrainian, Tartar, Bashkir, Armenian, Georgian, Latvian and White Russian Republics all come in for their measure of stern criticism. 876 652 523

The war proved a great test for Stalin's national policy. The fact that the soldiers of the U.S.S.R. fought with great courage proves nothing by itself. Russia's greatest military victories in the eighteenth century were won by Suvorov in Catherine the Great's reign, the worst period of serfdom. The serfs who were so cruelly exploited showed immense heroism and self-sacrifice in the army. In the Second World War the German and Japanese soldiers doggedly persisted in their struggle even when all hope of military victory was lost, but this fact does not prove that there were harmonious social relations within these countries. 000

It is extremely difficult to discover the whole truth about the number of quislings in Russia. The case of General Vlassov is well known. He received the highest orders of the Red Army at the beginning of the war, but on being taken prisoner by the Germans, organised an army of between 100,000 and 1,000,000 prisoners of war from the U.S.S.R. to fight by the side of the Germans. This by itself, however, indicated very little. Hitler, 186 668

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The strongest proof that Russia's national policy does not create harmonious and fraternal relations between the different peoples is the dissolution of a number of national republics. A year before the war, when there was tension between Russia and Japan on the Manchurian border, the *entire* Korean population on the Russian side of the border was transferred to Kazakstan and Uzbekistan.

On 28th August, 1941, the entire population of the Volga German Republic was transferred East of the Urals. The German Republic was one of the oldest national republics of Russia. As early as 19th October, 1918, the Workers' Commune of Volga Germans was constituted, and on 19th December, 1923, it was reconstituted as the Autonomous Soviet Socialist Republic of Volga Germans. It was one of the first republics to achieve almost complete collectivisation. *International Press Correspondence* of 18th April, 1936, said: 'The German Soviet Republic on the Volga is a living proof of the cultural and national progress which follows on the victory of socialism and a living disproof of the lies and slanders spread by the fascist enemies of the proletariat'. Just two years before their expulsion, an article appeared in *Moscow News* called: 'Volga German Republic, a Vivid Illustration of Soviet National Policy in Practice'. Then, after the Volga Germans had for so many years been commended for the unanimous support of the regime, came the decree of the dissolution of their republic, with the following explanation: 'According to reliable information received by military authorities, there are thousands and tens of thousands of diversionists and spies among the German population of the Volga region who are prepared to cause explosions in these regions at a signal from Germany. No Germans (living in the Volga districts—Y.G.) ever reported to Soviet authorities the presence of such great numbers of diversionists and spies. Therefore, the German population of the Volga regions are covering up enemies of the Soviet people and the Soviet power.'

In the areas of the U.S.S.R. formerly occupied by the Germans a number of republics were dissolved. These dissolutions were not even mentioned in the press, and it was only when *Pravda* on 17th October, 1945, gave a list of the constituencies for the coming general elections, that it was

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166 discovered that a number of republics had disappeared, since
563 when one cannot know: the autonomous Crimean Tartar,
● 656 Kalmyk and Checheno-Ingush Soviet Republics and the autonomous Karachev region were abolished and the non-Russian populations deported.

In Ukraine, Khrushchev, head of the government, declared in August, 1946, that half the leading personalities of the Ukrainian Party had been expelled in the previous eighteen months. It would be too much even for the Great Russian bureaucracy to expel 30 million Ukrainians and dissolve their 'republic'.

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1947 but not to the years following. The period of the New Economic Policy in Russia was called "the period of a certain revival of capitalism"; in reality, it was a kind of retreat of communism from economic difficulties. 656

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In the captive countries there was no "period of revival of capitalism." Since the very inception of communism, there has been a systematic liquidation of all private property, carried out in premeditated fashion within the limits of existing conditions and possibilities. In the beginning, the question of private property arose only in regard to small trade, dwelling houses, building, crafts, and, in a larger degree to peasant farming. Hence, the Communists advocated the principle of a three-sector economy, composed of state economy—after an immediate nationalization of medium and heavy industries, landlords' estates, and forests—of co-operative economy, and of private economy. 656 185 423

The fact that this period, the traces of which we still find in the constitutions of the captive countries, was planned from above as no more than a transitional period, is best proved by the accusation leveled against the former Communist Vice-Premier of Poland, Gomulka, at the meeting of the Central Committee of the Communist Party in Warsaw, in 1948. Gomulka was told then that his main guilt was not that he agreed to the principles of the three-sector economy but that he acted according to these principles. It was explained to him then that he had proceeded as though he wanted to keep the system although he knew that it was transitional. 665 661

In 1947, after the falsification of the elections and the destruction of the opposition of the independent peasant parties in Bulgaria, Rumania, Hungary, Yugoslavia, and Poland, the Cominform was established and Communist policy abandoned its nationalist line and adopted the line of internationalism. A special declaration of the differences between Communist internationalism and the "cosmopoli- 665

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423 cause the land was becoming exhausted. This was due to a
241 lack of manure and fertilizer and to the peasants' ignorance of land preservation techniques.

[444] Labor remained so cheap that the introduction of labor-saving devices did not pay. Overpopulation meant that there were more people living on holdings than were needed for the farm work. This situation caused underemployment. Since overpopulation decreased the output per man and with it the earnings per man, a very low standard of living resulted.

423 The size of the farms, which on the average was barely
656 ten acres, was a problem in itself, and the custom of dividing
185 land after the death of a peasant made the situation even more acute. The holdings consisted of many small and scattered strips so that it was impossible for the peasant to use machines, even when they were available. However, the land reforms, carried out after the First World War by the different governments, did have some success in equalizing the amounts of land held by the different peasants.

The land reforms grew out of political and national considerations rather than out of social and economic policy. The first and main objective of the agrarian parties was to expropriate the big landowners and to transfer their land to the peasants. The usual procedure was to fix a maximum acreage, usually about five hundred acres, and to decree that all land in excess of this amount should be sold to peasants, either to create new farms or to add to the area of peasant farms already in existence. Under these reforms, about twenty-five million acres were distributed, for the most part in quite small plots, averaging one hectare, or 2.4 acres. The smaller farms were given more land than the large, so that there was some leveling of the incomes derived from farming.

162 These reforms did not remedy the unhappy condition of
464 the peasantry, since they were unable to remove the main
51 causes for distress. If all the agricultural land of this region

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452 and supplied him with goods. Frequently he had a strong
185 and pernicious hold on the peasant.

Therefore, the cooperative movement began with the
474 foundation of credit societies which formed a very large
668 proportion of all cooperatives. Besides these, there were co-
656 operative societies which supplied agricultural needs such as tools and seeds, traded agricultural products, and processed all sorts of produce. In Bulgaria, Hungary, and Rumania the cooperative movements were state-controlled. In Czechoslovakia the movement was independent but favored by the state; in Poland, beginning with the economic depression of the 1930's it was state-supported and therefore dependent.

The cooperative problem was a difficult one. On the one hand, cooperation among economically weak peasants could not succeed unless there was some collaboration with, or help from, the central authorities. On the other hand, such a relationship between strong and weak tended to develop into state domination of the cooperative movement.

474 The administrators of the cooperatives sometimes abused
452 their prerogatives. They would occasionally grant government loans, not in response to genuine needs or because of commercial considerations, but with a view to the substantial number of votes which one cooperative society could guarantee at election time. In some instances, cooperatives served only well-to-do peasants because some governments were opposed to the social revolutionary ideology of the smaller peasants. In Rumania the cooperative societies were forced to assume the function of the tax collector. In Hungary the cooperatives belonged to the peasants in appearance only. In reality, they were capitalist enterprises and were not in peasant hands.

Except in Czechoslovakia, agricultural cooperation did not play any decisive role in the economic life of the peasantry, nor was it able to alleviate the existing adverse

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conditions. Credit was no real help unless the peasant had 474
a reasonable expectation of being able to pay back what 452
he had borrowed. In many cases this hope was negligible. A large proportion of the money which the peasants, particularly the small peasants, borrowed went to buy consumer goods. Thus, greater indebtedness did not point to a higher degree of investment, but to the extreme poverty of the small farm.

There was some state help for this situation, especially 474
during the world-wide depression of the 1930's. In Bulgaria 452
and Rumania agricultural debts were converted by govern- 241
ment action. In 1934 some two hundred thousand Bulgarian 656
peasants benefited by reductions in their debts and in the rate of interest and by a prolongation of the time allowed for settlement. In Rumania some two and one-half million peasants were assisted by similar legislation. Other measures, although not so far-reaching, were put into practice elsewhere in Eastern Europe to alleviate peasant indebtedness. But the credit problem was only mitigated, and not solved. The peasants' need for cash remained, and the lack of capital still prevented them from improving their farming techniques or increasing their earning capacity.

The governments promoted intensive cultivation of non-cereals. Grain production was not appropriate to an overpopulated region, and a change to the production of livestock, livestock products, fruit, and vegetables was necessary. In Bulgaria and in some parts of Yugoslavia, intensive cultivation of garden crops, such as tobacco, tomatoes, wine, fruit, and roses was introduced. In Rumania, the cultivation of soya and other oil plants was introduced. These measures were, of course, just a beginning, and could not bring any substantial remedy.

Agriculture played the most important role of an single 241
factor in all the Eastern European countries except Czecho- 434
slovakia. The largest part of the national incomes was de-

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728 frontiers were another cause for great migrations. Four mil-
167 lion Poles moved from the territory which was incorporated into the U.S.S.R., and millions of Poles, Czechs, and Slovaks moved into districts formerly inhabited by the Germans. Although these changes alleviated the problem of rural overpopulation in Eastern Europe, there was still, at the end of the Second World War, a surplus population estimated at nine million.

665 The Communist parties in various Eastern European
423 states knew very well how to exploit this situation. They
656 knew that it was vital to the success of revolution that the peasantry should not be opposed to it. They knew that the Russian Revolution had been achieved only because Lenin was fully aware of the desire of the peasant for more land.

471 Orthodox Marxist theory required that the land be nation-
423 alized and that it be administered by the state. Land was
662 considered the most important means of production, and it
656 had to be treated as such. This dogma was abandoned by Lenin for tactical reasons. He nationalized land in the Soviet Union during the revolution of 1917, but distributed it under ninety-nine-year leases to small and medium peasants for private exploitation. It was the political pressure of the peasants which forced Lenin to change his political doctrine and implement the agrarian program of the Populists, his political opponents. Lenin and his followers did not approve of the peasant who, according to them, was a relic of the precapitalistic society. It was Lenin's view that "small, individual farming gives birth to capitalism and the bourgeoisie daily, hourly, spontaneously and on a mass scale," and that in the future classless society the peasant was to assume the status of a worker on the land as his fellow in town was a worker in industry.

Political expediency determined Lenin's change in tactics. He supported small agrarian property holders only because

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he regarded the peasant as indispensable to the success of his 471
revolution and to the consolidation of his dictatorship. This 423
policy was reversed by Stalin after 1928 when forced col- 662
lectivization of land in the form of pseudo-cooperatives (col- 656
lective farms) was introduced in the Soviet Union.

Lenin's agricultural policy was adopted by all Eastern European Communist parties after the end of the Second World War. Being minorities in power, they knew that this was the only attitude they could take to the peasantry, the largest social group in this region. Therefore, they supported small agrarian property holders in the first stage of the development of their agricultural policy. There was only one difference between the Communist agricultural policies of Eastern Europe and Russia. Nationalization of land was not a part of the Eastern European policy, as it had not proved expedient in the Soviet Union and therefore was not contained in the agrarian policy of the Comintern for Eastern Europe in the inter-war period.

The Comintern had taken much interest in the Eastern 668
European agrarian question. In 1923 a Red Peasants Inter- 656
national was formed in Moscow as an effort to rally the 427
peasantry to the Communist ideal and to combat the influence of the peasant parties united in the Green International in Prague. The Soviet move to collectivization within the U.S.S.R. in 1929 was not followed by any shift in the agrarian policy of the Comintern. Any mention of collective farming was frowned upon and the whole emphasis was upon attracting or neutralizing the middle peasant by assisting the individual and by supporting with new land reforms the peasant's struggle for more land. This policy was not changed when the Cominform took over the role of the Comintern after the Second World War.

"The land to those who till it personally," was the slogan 471
of all Eastern European Communist parties, and land re- 423
forms were carried out in all countries. In Hungary, Albania, 656

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471 and in parts of Poland, land reforms were overdue, while in
423 other Eastern European states expropriation and expulsion
656 of the Germans formed the main basis of land reforms. Some forty-eight million acres, including forest land, were expropriated by the governments of which thirty million acres were distributed to some three million peasant families. The remainder was retained by the state.

To dispel any doubts as to the ultimate outcome of these reforms, the distributed land was declared the private property of the new owners, and in most countries it was laid down in the constitutions that "the land belongs to those who till it." The price to be paid by the beneficiaries was low, usually the equivalent of one year's harvest payable in ten to twenty installments. No compensation was paid to the old owners for the expropriated land.

The attitude toward the church and its landed property was less uniform than toward the secular owners. However, after some hesitation, most of the church estates exceeding the maximum size laid down in the land reform laws were also expropriated. In this way the church was deprived of its financial independence and of its economic influence on the rural population.

Even in the Baltic States which were incorporated into the Soviet Union, Stalin's methods were not followed. All the land and its resources, as in Russia, were declared public property and nationalized, and all the land in excess of seventy-five acres was expropriated for distribution, but no collectives were formed. However, through a system of differential delivery and farm taxes, the way was paved for ultimate collectivization.

423 All these land reforms had done nothing to solve the old
656 agricultural problem of Eastern Europe. On the contrary, they aggravated the situation. The land became more split up than ever, as larger farms were abolished. The reforms did not solve the problem of technical progress, and made the

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reorganization of agriculture even more necessary than it had been before.

Land reform was a political measure. Its aim was not the reorganization of production, but the redistribution of income. Its aim was to win the small peasant for the Communists, and to weaken the political influence of the agrarian parties. Therefore, the Communists stole the programs of the agrarian parties and publicized them as their own. Beside private ownership, these programs called for mechanization, consolidation of scattered strips, good and guaranteed prices for agricultural products, expansion of credit, reduction of taxes, and social insurance for all peasants.

The smallholders felt quite happy, generally speaking, on their new land. It may have produced less than it had in the hands of its former owners, but the smallholders' income was larger than it had been when they were employed as agricultural laborers. Many of them started believing the Communists and joined the Communist parties. One of the Communist aims was fulfilled.

IV

It should have been obvious to all that the Communists were preparing a program of land collectivization, and that the second stage of their agricultural policy would be similar to what it had been in the Soviet Union. But sufficient attention was not paid to these trends. Practically all forests and large stretches of arable land and pastures became state property and were organized as Communist state farms. District cooperative or state stations were established and equipped with heavy agricultural machinery, which was not practical for use on small fields. The Communists favored the allocation of equipment to cooperatives rather than to private persons. The cooperatives, which performed many public functions such as bulk purchasing of food and supplies, began to

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262 cause of the fuel shortage, makes a bitter joke of the Communist pledge to liberate the housewife from drudgery. There [545] are a few brighter spots in this picture. The soldiers and policemen are well fed and so are the privileged classes of senior government and party workers, and of artists and writers. The numerical strength of these new, privileged strata of society is less than that of the pre-war middle class, and their standard of living is undoubtedly lower.

262 511 Data have been published lately that illustrate the low level of consumption of food behind the Iron Curtain. These data concern the increase of sales of certain staples in Czechoslovakia in 1952 over those in 1951, and, for once, they are disclosed not in meaningless percentages, as is the rule behind the Iron Curtain, but in absolute figures. An analysis of these figures shows the increase in sales of sugar and butter to the extent, respectively, of two ounces and less than half an ounce per capita per month. The alleged increase in sales of coffee actually lags behind the increase in the population. Only the amount of tea sold has really increased. However, the Czechoslovakians are not tea but coffee drinkers. They used to produce more sugar than they could consume before the war. Yet the text in question continues: "The above figures show that the standard of living of the Czechoslovak people is irresistibly on the upward trend." Another example is a long letter from a coal miner in Poland, whose only subject was a detailed description of how he tried in vain for weeks in the fall of 1952 to buy a piece of sausage. In his fury with the regime and "the Russkis" behind it, the humble writer rose to the rhetoric of a Patrick Henry and declared that since there was no sausage life was not worth living. "And to think that I actually used to grumble against the pre-war government!" was his final confession. It should be noted that pre-war Poland had a large surplus of pork.

656 511 In the summer of 1953, the Soviet government announced that it would take many measures to relieve the all too ob-

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vious shortages of consumer goods and to increase substantially the standard of living of the Soviet population. This announcement was followed by similar declarations in the captive countries. Their governments bound themselves to increase investments in agriculture, housing and light industries producing consumer goods. In Eastern Germany, Hungary, Czechoslovakia and Rumania, and somewhat later in Poland, qualified promises were made to the effect that the hitherto very rapid rate of heavy industrial expansion would be slowed down. At the same time two of the greatest works under construction in the area have been interrupted if not abandoned: the Danube-Black Sea canal in Rumania and, to all appearances, the huge HUKO iron and steel 'combinat' in Eastern Slovakia. These public statements were in themselves equivalent to an official admission that the condition of the population was miserable.

Time alone will show whether, and to what extent, these new policies will be realized. The bumper 1953 harvest in most of the key provinces of the area would undoubtedly relieve its food scarcity if it were not for the fact that a great deal of this harvest has been earmarked for export. The Soviet government stated recently that it would import food and consumer goods from Eastern Europe to the extent of some 660 million dollars, and Eastern Germany expects to import similar goods from this area, as well as from China which has little to export, in the amount of 125 million dollars. The captive area proper, suffering itself from an acute shortage of consumer goods, would thus be forced to contribute to the betterment of the Soviet and Eastern German economies at the rate of more than eleven dollars per capita of its population. Even if the governments of the area do their best to increase the standard of living of the working masses, much time must inevitably pass between the inauguration of the new policy and the actual increase in the production of consumer goods. For example, the present insufficient produc-

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642 have been made to the peasants, state cooperatives are still maintained in the heavy grain producing areas by forces other than the peasants' love of the soil and its products.

If the Yugoslav government will learn the meaning of Lord Acton's axiom on the nature of power, and if the West pursues an intelligent, long-range foreign policy supporting Yugoslavia against Soviet aggression, it may be possible to revive in Yugoslavia and hence in the Balkans as a whole the elements of an independent political life.

V

000 The months following the death of Premier Stalin in March 1953, saw a number of internal changes in the various people's democracies. The principal means of coercion and political control nevertheless remained unchanged: the army and the police forces. These were still bound tightly to Russian controls.

177, 70 701 625 The total number of men in the satellite armies available for service with the Soviet army has been estimated at a million and one-half. Since they are not only trained under Soviet commanders, but operate under the Soviet military code, it is possible to state that the Sovietization of the satellite armies has been completed. Together with the armies, the satellite police form the backbone of the Soviet instruments of coercion. Estimated at a total of 700,000 men, police units organized in military formations range in function from the well-known secret police to People's Militia, Frontier Guards, and Railway Guards. Like the satellite armies, the satellite police are governed by Soviet regulations. Together they enforce a system of order which has been designed to conform with the Soviet model.

241 656 In common with Yugoslavia, certain states in the orbit are strengthening the weakest sector of the economy: agriculture. It is not certain that the Yugoslav experience compelled the

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changes in agricultural policy in the people's democracies. 241
The only causal factor common to both areas is a very prac- 656
tical one: agricultural production has not been in a position to supply the needs of the growing industrial population. The socialist objective of complete nationalization of agriculture has nevertheless not been retracted or withdrawn. On the contrary, the satellites are acting within the orthodox pattern of Soviet experience.

In the economic sphere, the orbit is passing through a 185
period comparable to the Russian New Economic Policy. In the words of Stalin this is a "special policy of the proletarian state counting on the tolerations of capitalist elements, the commanding heights being in the hands of the proletarian state. . . .", in short a policy which aims "at overcoming capitalist elements and building a socialist economy by the method of a direct exchange of products. . . ." As if the Soviet experience itself did not suffice as a guide, there is the advice of Stalin on the proper agricultural policy required to prepare the transition to communism: continued development of the country's industrial resources, the gradual adjustment of collective farming to the nationalized sector of the economy, and the raising of the standards of living and culture. All these the satellite states are in the process of attempting to accomplish. There may be compromises in the short run, but there will be no compromise regarding the ultimate objective—the complete socialization of agriculture.

Changes in agricultural policy are particularly marked in those countries which have been heretofore heavily agricultural: Yugoslavia, Hungary, Albania, and Bulgaria. The restiveness of the population arising from the social and economic consequences of enforced industrialization made these changes necessary. The changes are short-run changes. While budgets for agricultural development will be increased, prices lowered for industrial goods and increased for farm products, establishment of producer cooperatives delayed,

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511 tion capacity of cement plants and brick factories would have to be increased before there can be any question of more housing. This is but one example out of many of its kind. There is a manifest contradiction between the present Russian-enforced armament production in the area, which has not been curtailed, and the intended mass production of consumer goods. The two cannot be carried on simultaneously. For these reasons alone, the recent statements of the Communist governments should be regarded with much scepticism.

288 295 433 The situation as regards clothing and footwear is even worse. The problem of obtaining it is nearly insoluble for the average family. It is far more difficult than in Russia where millions wear Polish textiles and Czech shoes. To discuss this question in detail is beyond the scope of this essay. Suffice it is to say that, according to the present long-range plans, Eastern Germany expects to produce in 1955 only 1.3 pairs of leather shoes per capita, Rumania 1.2 pairs, Hungary 1 pair, and Poland 0.7 pairs. No one can say what proportion of this footwear will be earmarked for export to Russia and China or assigned in advance to the army and security police and what will be left for the population. It is for such reasons that behind the Iron Curtain it is illegal to photograph the people on the streets or to export abroad such documentary evidence of their poor garb.

• 657 745 In contrast to the situation regarding food, housing, and clothing, the number and range of social services have been considerably extended, and these state services should in all fairness be regarded as significant steps taken to offset the low standard of living. It is little known that prewar Poland and Czechoslovakia, not to speak of Germany, had state-operated systems of social insurance and public health more advanced than any existing at the time in France or the United States. These systems have been enlarged under Communism. The quality of their services is too often insufficient, but the

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people accept them as their due and can no longer visualize 657
life without them. A large and, according to official claims, 745
growing part of national income is being spent on social insurance, public health, family allowances, maternity and children care, workers' vacations, so-called physical culture, and the like. There is no comparison between the philosophy of the welfare state in Britain and that of Communism in Eastern Europe, but there are some similar functions in both systems. For much the same reasons that the Conservative government in London could never think of taking back the social reforms of the Labor government, no post-Communist government in Eastern Europe will be able to consider curtailing the privileges accorded to the working class by the present regimes.

V

The most important and politically the most decisive of 641
the privileges granted by the State is education, understood 208
always strictly in the Communist sense of the term. The Communist regimes are aware that they cannot seriously expect to win the minds of the majority of the adult population. Anyone who was twenty years old in 1938 in Bohemia or Moravia, in 1939 in Poland, in 1941 in Serbia, and as late as 1944 in Hungary or Rumania, can contrast his present situation as an individual and as a part of his nation to his situation under a non-Communist government, however imperfect the latter may have been. There is no way of knowing how many of these men and women regret the past and hate the present, but they undoubtedly constitute a large majority of the adult population of the area. From the Communist point of view, these men and women are incurable. The future of the Red regimes depends on the youngsters who know nothing about the past, are isolated from the freedoms of the West, and are daily taught that Russia is their shin-

871 Illiteracy in the prewar era was extremely prevalent except in
212 Bohemia, Slovenia, a part of Hungary, and the formerly German-ruled section of Poland. Following the various educational reforms and the expansion of facilities during the '20's, the illiteracy rates were: 31.4 per cent (1934) for Bulgaria, 4.1 per cent (1930) for Czechoslovakia, 6.0 per cent (1941) for Hungary, 23.1 per cent (1931) for Poland, 23.1 per cent (1948) for Rumania, and 45.2 per cent (1931) for Yugoslavia. In spite of the notable progress attained within a decade and a half of liberation, the problem of achieving literacy and education for the masses remained a considerable one.

• 658 In the interwar period, a vast number of schools were built and many universities were founded or enlarged. National statistics show that on the average 3 per cent of the estimated national incomes was devoted to education for the region as a whole. Czechoslovakia, with 3.5 per cent, had the largest budgetary provision for education, spending in 1937 the
871 equivalent of eighty-four million dollars. Universal compulsory elementary education was introduced widely in this area. However, the number and quality of teachers did not increase
[565] as rapidly as did the buildings. Therefore, especially in the eastern and southern regions, semieducated or semiskilled individuals were numerous, and anyone who had been exposed to education considered himself an "intellectual." Under such circumstances, this term very often stood for mere prestige, and the "intellectuals" exerted influence out of proportion to their training. A poor system of communication, a dispersed settlement pattern, mediocre teachers and, last but not least, the rather uncooperative behavior of the peasants impeded the possibilities of an adequate education for the peasant class, which represented the majority of Eastern Europe's population.

000 Due to the prevalence of a liberalism linked with national-

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reflexes, was a deeply religious man. Moscow caused him 779
no trouble over this because he was an eminent scientist and because he was old. The creator of the theory of conditioned reflexes—the very theory that constitutes one of the strongest arguments against the existence of some sort of constant called "human nature"! The defenders of religion maintain that this "human nature" cannot change completely; that gods and churches have existed over thousands of years and in all kinds of civilizations, and that one can expect this to be true of the future as well. What went on in Professor Pavlov's head if two systems of concepts, one scientific and one religious, existed simultaneously there?

The Party teaches that "existence shapes consciousness," 659 ●
that circumstances alter men. But it matters little whether religious drives result from "human nature" or from centuries of conditioning; they exist. During the war against Hitler, the Soviet Union had to dust off its priests as well as appeal to nationalistic feelings. When imminent death brings that moment of absurd revelation that *everything is senseless,* dialectical materialism suddenly discloses its mathematical structure. Man falls from the industriously built bridges. He prefers to surrender to the magic of icons.

In its own fashion, the Party too is a church. Its dictator- 626
ship over the earth and its transformation of the human 779
species depend on the success with which it can channel 659
irrational human drives and use them to its own ends. No, logical arguments are not enough. "Club" ceremonies, poetry, novels, films are so important because they reach deeper into the stratum on which the emotional conflict rages. No other church can be tolerated; Christianity is 779
Public Enemy No. 1. It fosters all the skepticism of the 829
masses as to the radical transformation of mankind. If,

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000 The assertion that historical guilt is individual guilt *per se* is nothing more than the subterfuge of a guilty and lying conscience. This does not mean that one can put off the problem of historical guilt with easy generalizations. Stupidity, i.e. inability to understand the mechanism of events, can cause tremendous suffering. In this sense, the Polish commanders who gave the order to start the Warsaw uprising in 1944 are guilty of stupidity, and their guilt has an individual character. Another individual guilt, however, weighs upon the command of the Red Army which refused to aid the insurgents—not out of stupidity, but on the contrary out of a full understanding of "historical processes," i.e. a correct evaluation of power.

One more example of guilt through stupidity is the attitude of various societies toward thinkers, writers, or artists whose vision reached into the future and whose works were largely incomprehensible to their contemporaries. The critic who denied the value of these works might have acted in good faith, but by his stupidity he condemned men of incomparably greater worth than himself to poverty, even persecution. The specific trick of the Christian-Stalinists is to lump these two concepts of guilt, individual and historical, together, while it is only in a few instances that these concepts coincide.

156 Catholics who accept the Party line gradually lose every-
● 659 thing except the phraseology of their Christian metaphysics. The true content of their faith becomes the Method by a psychological process well-known to Christians in the people's democracies. The existence of a large number of loyal half-Christians in the subjugated part of Europe could have a tremendous effect on the Imperium's political plans. Toleration and even support of these "Christian-patriots," as they are called, enables the Center to avoid a dangerous conflict. The transition from Chris-

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tianity to a cult of History takes place imperceptibly. 156
Without doubt, the greatest success of the Imperium 659
would come if it could install a Party-line pope in the Vatican. A mass in the Basilica of St. Peter in Rome, performed by such a pope, with the assistance of dignitaries from those subjugated countries which are predominately Catholic, would be one of the most important steps toward the consolidation of the world empire.

Christians who serve the Eastern Imperium ingeniously resolve the problem posed by Jesus' words "Render therefore unto Caesar the things that are Caesar's; and unto God the things that are God's." Until now the contrast between the ordinary man and Caesar has never been effaced. Christianity guaranteed this division by teaching that every man had his own history, distinct from the history of the social group or the nation to which he belonged. If, as is taught today from the Elbe to Vladivostok, the history of every man is nothing more than the reflection of the history of his class, and if his class is personified in Caesar, then it is clear that the man who rebels against Caesar rebels against himself. Christians who agree to this thesis prove they no longer believe in God's judgment of each man's acts. Fear that History will damn them eternally motivates their submission.

The Party knows that the conflict between true Chris- 185
tianity and the Revolution is fundamental. The Revolu- 65
tion aims at the highest goal the human species has ever 659
set for itself on earth, the end of "man's exploitation of man." To do this, it must replace man's desire for profit with a feeling of collective responsibility as a motive for action. This is a distant and honorable goal. Probably it will not be reached quickly; and probably, too, for a long period it will be necessary to maintain a constant terror in order to instill that feeling of responsibility by force.

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156 But Christianity contains a dual set of values; it recognizes man to be a "child of God" and also a member of society. As a member of society, he must submit to the established order so long as that order does not hinder him in his prime task of saving his soul. Only by effacing this dualism, i.e. raising man as a purely social creature, can the Party release the forces of hatred in him that are necessary to the realization of the new world.

156 The masses in highly industrialized countries like England, the United States, or France are largely de-Christianized. Technology, and the way of life it produces, undermines Christianity far more effectively than do violent measures. The erosion of religious beliefs is also taking place in Central and Eastern Europe. There, the core of the problem is to avoid galvanizing the forces of Christianity by some careless misstep. It would be an act of unforgivable carelessness, for example, to close the churches suddenly and prohibit all religious practice. Instead, one should try to split the Church in two. Part of the clergy must be compromised as reactionaries and "foreign agents"—a rather easy task, given the utterly conservative mentality of many priests. The other part must be bound to the state as closely as the Orthodox Church is in Russia, so that it becomes a tool of the government. A completely submissive Church—one that may on occasion collaborate with the security police—loses authority in the eyes of the pious. Such a Church can be preserved for decades, until the moment when it dies a natural death due to a lack of adherents.

So there are measures that can be taken even against
156 the Church, this last stronghold of opposition. Nevertheless, the masses in the people's democracies behave like a man who wants to cry out in his sleep and cannot find his voice. They not only dare not speak, they do not know

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of the State, to an extent undreamed of in Czarist Russia. We were wont, many of us, to make uncomplimentary references to the clergy of the old regime. Some of the strictures were too sweeping. But, alas, what we must be prepared to say about the Russian Church under the Soviets is far more devastating. It has become an institution which all but blesses the concentration camp system, and escorts slave labor to its doom with a kind of liturgical brass band.

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The Soviet objective is to reduce religious organizations outside Russia to the status of the Orthodox Church at home. The formula is always and everywhere the same, though it may be applied with greater or lesser rigor. Therefore inevitably the Vatican becomes the great antagonist, to be fought with every means. The Holy See, pledged to the profession of the Christian Gospels without dilution of the ethical obligations which they impose upon everyone who accepts them in the Catholic sense, cannot agree that the Church is to be an instrument of the State —even, indeed, a benign and merciful instrument. The Vatican is therefore the ignoble Fascist Beast of the Bolshevik Apocalypse. Upon the heads of persons who remain loyal to the ancient See of Catholic Christendom, blows have rained in constant succession. This is the direst persecution the Church has suffered since the days of the Caesars.

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Because most of what may be reported concerns the Catholic Church, a brief review of its history and endeavors in Eastern Europe will help to bring events into perspective. The cleavage of the Roman Empire, establishing the rivalry between the emperors of Rome and Byzantium, begot two Churches also, each claiming for itself the charisma of Apostolic Christianity. With the passing of time, profound differences of a dogmatic, moral, and canonical kind developed. The organizational character of religion was also modified radically, so that, while in the East the ties binding the religious nations to the historic pa-

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797 tive in Russia at the request of the government, bringing food,
659 clothing, and medicine to many tens of thousands. Yet even while this work of charity was in progress, priests and prelates
798 were sentenced to death and executed, churches were looted
648 and closed, and many of the faithful were exiled. The Bolsheviks insisted that, until the Vatican recognized the regime as a lawfully constituted government, clergymen professing allegiance to Rome must be regarded as enemies; Russian émigré circles were just as vehement in demanding that no such recognition be accorded; and circles representative of the Orthodox Church opposed even the Papal Relief Mission, on the ground that its directors were in reality proselytizers. In the circumstances, the Vatican tried to carry on its relief work as long as possible, and to use whatever influence it could muster to save the persecuted bishops and priests. In the end, however, the isolated remnants of Roman Catholicism in Russia lost even
E the remotest hope that Rome could do anything for them.

659 The countries west of Russia, most of them newly estab-
186 lished, presented less formidable obstacles to the mission of
795 the Church; but in not a few of them conditions were turbulent enough. In Czechoslovakia, for example, insurgent nationalism combined with anticlericalism to create within the Catholic clergy a sizable group who not only wished to rid the Church of every vestige of association with the Habsburgs but also strove to "reform" the ecclesiastical organization itself and to do away with such constraints as celibacy. However, the secession and subsequent excommunication of this group led to a great strengthening of the loyal majority. Catholics were collectively more resolute, and by 1925 the fever had abated, and relations between Church and State were established on a solid foundation. Elsewhere the story was similar, though perhaps less stormy and tawdry.

000 In attempting to visualize the complex continuous effort by

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In attempting to visualize the complex continuous effort by the Church in these lands to educate the people and to meet their physical and spiritual needs we deal not with an island in the stream of modern life—as we should if, for example, we set out to evaluate the influence of religion on the art, music, and architecture of present-day America—but verily with that stream itself. For example, the press that appeared under Catholic auspices in Poland, Hungary, and Czechoslovakia was a mighty force, in all its ramifications from the daily newspaper to the monthly periodical, for the shaping of public opinion. On the other hand, hospitals and refuges, schools and day nurseries, conducted for the most part under the supervision of religious orders, were almost the only institutions of such character to be found in some countries. Therefore the Communist onslaught upon this manifold activity was not merely against tradition but verily against action. It could not have succeeded unless its directors were safely established behind a dense array of Russian machine guns. It was an invasion resembling in some respects the earlier inroads from the East under which all these lands had suffered not once but many times. Assuredly the men in the Vatican, pondering the news each day, must often have let their thought return to times when Turk and Tartar bombarded the ancient citadels of once Christian Europe.

We shall now summarize, though of necessity far too briefly, Protestant efforts to establish ecumenical union with the Russian Orthodox Church. On the one hand they resulted to some extent from the failure during the Pontificate of Pope Leo XIII to prepare the way for the union of the Anglican Church with Rome. This failure, it will be recalled, was in large measure due to Rome's decision that Anglican Orders were not valid. On the other hand, Protestant Churches in Eastern Europe often felt that the attitude of Russian Orthodoxy toward the State was more compatible with the traditional views of

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795 Protestantism than were those of Roman Catholicism. Luther-
659 ans, for example, were not averse to identifying their Church with a political power; but their belief that the Kingdom of God and the kingdoms of this world are radically different also led to the conclusion that the Church could accept responsibility for approving or opposing actions by the State only when these controverted directly the moral and religious truths which had been made explicit in the teachings of the Lord Jesus. Thus a section of the German Lutheran Church opposed Nazism with sublime courage because Hitler had repudiated in principle such central teachings as that of the validity of Christian baptism when administered to persons of Jewish origin.

795 But Protestants viewed with uneasiness the Catholic practice
668 of creating organizations of the faithful for political and social action—which led in Germany to the creation of the Center Party on the basis of organizational efforts that had their origin in 1840. This was by no means merely an opportunistic reaction, even though upon occasion ecclesiastical rivalry may have played a part. While some loyal Protestants cooperated with and even voted for the Center Party, even as did a number of Jews, the great majority felt—no doubt, upon occasion, quite properly—that partisan activity brought the Church into realms where religious teaching was compromised for the sake of political expediency. This cleavage was intensified after Karl Barth and his associates formulated a neo-orthodox theology whose profound influence extended beyond Germany to Calvinism and Lutheranism in the whole of Eastern Europe. How strongly this criticism affected Catholic practice cannot be discussed here; but it may be pointed out that, during much of the Pontificate of Pius XI, Rome contemplated withdrawing the faithful completely from organizations of a political and social character, and building up instead the groups which received the generic name Catholic Action. Only toward the close of his

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Antireligioznik declared that half the industrial proletariat 771
believed in God and it was almost impossible to find atheists in the villages.

According to Timasheff: 'In 1938, the official paper of the Militant Atheists League acknowledged that churches in rural districts were well attended and that young people often observed religious holidays. According to the same journal, a large number of children were seen in the churches of Moscow at the Easter service in 1939; and at Christmas, in the Tambov and Voronezh provinces, many children took part during school hours in processions in honour of the Nativity. In the Tambov province, seven tenths of the children were absent from school on Christmas day and celebrated the Feast in their homes. In Moscow and Tiflis, children with candles in their hands prayed in the churches. In Kursk many children were absent from school during Lent, and attended church and received Holy Communior. In the province of Riazan, many received Holy Communion at the Easter mass, and in the Smolensk province, they took an active part in ceremonies linked with Easter'. (Ibid. p. 67).

It is very natural that Yaroslavski met the situation with a despairing cry: 'It is impossible to build up Communism in a society half of which believes in God and the other half fears the devil.' (*Bezbozhnik*, 1939, No. 14).

The defeat of the 'Five Year Plan of Atheism' cannot be explained only, or even mainly, by opposition of the pre-revolutionary generation, as four-fifths of the present population of U.S.S.R. was either born after the October Revolution or were not yet adult when it broke out, so that they were educated in the schools of the new regime; moreover, the Communist Party had limitless means of propaganda, while the priests did not publish a single paper or book.

The 'Five Year Plan of Atheism' failed because the 'real 659 ●
misery' of the people did not abate. The logic of reality was stronger than all the ukazes of the Kremlin and, confronted with this, Stalin made a complete *volte face*, from the persecution of religion to its regimentation.

By 1935 it had already become clear to the Government that the policy of suppression had failed and the turn began then. At Easter, 1935, religious tokens began to be sold in both state

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659 and co-operative shops, and at Christmas of the same year Christmas trees were to be found even in the trade union clubs. Such a thing could not happen in Russia unless a special government order were made to that effect. Such an order contradicts the principle of the separation of Church and State no less than the persecution of religion.

The war greatly accelerated the process of the regimentation of the Church. On August 21st, 1941, Radio Moscow appealed to 'all God-loving inhabitants of the occupied countries' to rise in defence of religious freedom. It charged the Nazi regime with menacing 'the very existence of Christianity and seeking the overthrow of Christ the King, to instal instead the myth of the twentieth century of Alfred Rosenberg'. On November 18th, 1941, at a banquet in honour of American and British guests, Stalin said: 'May God help President Roosevelt in his task'. The papers of the Militant Atheists League, *Bezbozhnik* and *Antireligioznik*, were closed because of 'paper shortage' (September 30th and October 6th, 1941) and at the same time, from the same press which formerly printed these papers, religious literature began to pour out. It is, incidentally, an example of the 'democracy' prevailing in Russia that although there were over three million members of the League, not one letter of protest or of doubt about the wisdom of the decision to stop the publication of their paper, appeared in the press. Who knows but that the very same officials who wrote *Bezbozhnik* and *Antireligioznik* may then have been the authors of the religious literature?

On October 8th, 1943, the Russian Government established a Soviet Council on Orthodox Affairs, which, by August 1st, 1945, had opened ten theological seminaries. Its chairman, Karpov, a Party bureaucrat, who had no previous connection with the Church, stated that there were now more churches and more priests in Russia than before the war. He declared that the Orthodox Church might 'print whatever it wishes', and stated that his Council had given 'explicit permission for the Church to order any quantity of Testaments, prayer books and liturgical books, and are ready to facilitate this step in every way.' (R. P. Casey, *Religion in Russia*, New York, 1946, p. 187).

After this it is hardly to be wondered at that the calendar of the Russian Orthodox Church includes among the saints no

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other than Lenin, who wrote of that very Church: 'That shameful and accursed past when the Church was in feudal dependence on the State and Russian citizens were in feudal dependence on the established Church'. The Church, however, conveniently forgets Lenin's words and rewrites its past. Thus Karpov said: 'The Russian Orthodox Church in the days of hard trial, which our Fatherland repeatedly underwent in the past, did not break its link with the people, it lived with their needs, their hopes, their wishes and contributed its mite to the common struggle . . .' 659

Religious Denominations in Eastern Europe

The experience of Russia has served the Kremlin as a pattern for its handling of the religious question in the satellite countries. 162 779

In these countries there are two main religious denominations, the Roman Catholic and the Greek Orthodox.

The available statistics on the distribution of population according to religion are pre-war censuses. Since then changes in boundaries, the migration of populations, and the annihilation of many people during the war, including nearly the whole of the Jewish population of these countries (of nearly 5 million Jews only 700 thousand remained) have made these statistics obsolete. But for lack of more recent data they will have to be used, and if care is taken the margin of error need not be too big.

There are big Roman Catholic communities in all the satellite countries except Bulgaria. In Poland, Roman Catholics comprise more than 90 per cent of the population, in Czechoslovakia 73 per cent, in Hungary 64 per cent, in Yugoslavia 37 per cent and in Rumania 6 per cent. In three of these countries there are considerable Greek Orthodox communities: in Bulgaria, 86 per cent of the population, in Rumania 70 per cent and in Yugoslavia 49 per cent. In Hungary and Czechoslovakia there are important Protestant minorities (26 per cent and 8 per cent of the population respectively). In Bulgaria, Moslems form 13 per cent of the population and in Yugoslavia 11 per cent.

The Communists' Attitude to the Orthodox Church

From the beginning the Communist Parties and Governments showed entirely different attitudes towards the Greek Orthodox 659

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659 and the Roman Catholic Churches. The Greek Orthodox Church was regimented, but at the same time it was supported as a loyal upholder of the Government. Numerous delegations came from the Greek Orthodox Church of Russia to the Greek Orthodox Churches of Bulgaria, Rumania and Yugoslavia.

In April, 1945, the Archbishop of Moscow, Gregory, who visited Bulgaria as a representative of the Russian Orthodox Church said (April 16th): 'The Bulgarian people are under the mighty protection of the Soviet Union . . . With the Orthodox religion and Slav feeling we must strengthen the friendship and unity between our peoples.' (*East Europe*, April 24th, 1945).

Dimitrov made an equally unambiguous pronouncement. On 28th May, 1946, he said: 'The Fatherland Front and the Communists in particular pay tribute to the patriots of our national Church. They are proud of a Church which gave to the people such faithful and honourable servants as Ivan Rilski . . . Today we have the right to demand that our Church shall continue to follow the traditions of a thousand years and that it shall indeed be a republican Church . . . Let them follow the example of the present heads of the Russian Church . . . ' (*East Europe*, 5th June, 1946).

A few days earlier the Central Committee of the Bulgarian Trade Unions ordered all branches to take an active part in the celebrations in honour of the Slav apostles, Cyril and Methodius on 24th May, 'to demonstrate the unbreakable unity between all Slav peoples in their fight against reaction and for the strengthening of democracy.'

After this it was not surprising that the Bulgarian Orthodox Church called upon the public in every election to vote for the Fatherland Front lists, nor that a special trade union (Orthodox Priests' Union) was formed, nor that the Fatherland Front Government introduced the following oath for a couple of years into the Bulgarian army: 'I swear before God, my conscience and my people . . . '

The Church in Rumania followed a similar course. On 17th March, 1945, Patriarch Nicodim gave the blessing of the Rumanian Orthodox Church to the Kremlin-appointed government of Groza. In a pastoral letter he urged the clergy and the faithful to give unreserved support to the King and the Government: 'Obey your superiors for the good of all

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concerned . . . cease domestic quarrels.' (*The New York Times*, 659 20th March, 1945).

The same Patriarch visited Russia and according to Premier Groza 'returned radiant with Christian joy at what he had seen in Russia.' (From a speech on November 10th, 1945, at the consecration of a Church in Brasov).

From then on the Rumanian Orthodox Church paid allegiance to the Moscow Patriarchate and supported the Government in every election, in every propaganda campaign.

In Yugoslavia, as many of the Orthodox Church hierarchy during the war supported General Nedić, the Serb quisling, Tito could not but punish a number of them severely. Thus, for instance, the Orthodox Bishop Nastić of Bosnia, was condemned to 11 years' imprisonment. Tito was even more severe towards the Catholic hierarchy who collaborated with the German and Italian Occupation Forces. Archbishop Stepinac, who openly collaborated with the quisling Pavelić, blessed his soldiers who murdered 800 thousand Serbs and received a high medal for his services, was condemned to 16 years' imprisonment. Another Archbishop and two Bishops were imprisoned. Because the religious division of Yugoslavia is almost identical with the national (the Croats and Slovenes being Catholics and the Serbs Orthodox) Tito could not show favouritism to the Orthodox Church without endangering the newly-won unity of the different peoples. Tito's government was the only one in Eastern Europe which passed an educational law abolishing *all* church schools and a land reform law confiscating nearly all the Church lands.

The Orthodox Church of Czechoslovakia, although incomparably weaker than in Bulgaria, Rumania or Yugoslavia, is not less vociferous in its enthusiasm for the Communist Government. Thus on New Year's Day, 1946, it gave its blessing to the establishment of socialism, Slav solidarity and the 'full eviction of all Germans without reservation'. A first-class Stalinist amalgam! After the February coup, on March 3rd, 1948, the Czech Orthodox Church issued a proclamation, welcoming the formation of the new Government as implying 'the return of the Czech nation to the Slav idea and the strengthening of our people's democracy, which is a guarantee of a happy future both for the State and the Church'.

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659 The policy of mutual support of the Orthodox Church and the state in Bulgaria and Rumania, does not mean that the two are coming together as equal and free agents, for the state subordinates the Church to itself. This is clearly shown by the new, reactionary and totalitarian Religious Laws of Bulgaria and Rumania.

Vassil Kolarov, the Foreign Minister at the time, introduced the Religious Law into the Bulgarian Parliament on 17th February, 1949. It asserts as a basic tenet that 'The Bulgarian Orthodox Church is the traditional church of the Bulgarian people and being inseparable from their history, is in form, substance and spirit a People's Democratic Church'. (Article 3). This cuts across the concept of the equality of all denominations (as well as of agnostics and atheists) before the law. There follows a whole series of regulations whose purport is to turn the Churches into state departments. *The Economist* of May 28th, 1949, sums up these regulations very well: 'The aim of the law is briefly to hand over the governance of the church to the state—through "a governing board responsible to the state"—and ensure the complete allegiance of pastors and priests (Article 9); to give the state power to remove all ministers who "work against the democratic regulations of the state" (Article 13); to stop all church appeals and addresses contrary to state regulations (Article 16); to forbid the mention of all state authorities or leaders in church services except in forms permitted by the Minister for Religion (Article 19); to transfer all hospitals, welfare centres, kindergartens or other charitable properties to the state (Article 22); to forbid all communications with lay or religious officials and institutions outside the country except by permission of the Minister (Article 24); to prevent any religious body with its centre outside the country from maintaining missions or churches in the country (Article 25); to impose penal servitude on all who use churches for political propaganda (of course, calling for support of the Communist Party is not political propaganda—Y.G.) (Article 30); and to submit all church statutes and regulations to the Minister (Article 32).'

The Orthodox Church is totally dependent financially on its benefactor, the State. In 1948, of its total expenses of 418 million leva, 370 million were met by state subsidies.

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The religious law in Rumania, enacted on 5th August, 1948, is similar to the Bulgarian law. 659

While the Orthodox Church is regimented as the *national Church*, as an agency of the state, the churches whose religious allegiance is not to Moscow, but to the West, inevitably become pariahs. Regimentation and persecution appear side by side.

The Communists' Attitude to the non-Orthodox Churches

The most glaring example of persecution is undoubtedly the treatment meted out to the Protestant priests by the Bulgarian Government. It is not necessary to enter into the details of the accusation made against the Protestant priests at their trial in Sofia in February, 1949, to be convinced that the whole trial was a political move by the State in its campaign to regiment religion. The Protestant Churches in Bulgaria had not the tarnished record of the Orthodox Church, which supported the monarchy in its alliance with Germany in the first and second world wars, blessed the militarists who carried out the *coups d'etat* of 1923 and 1934 and slaughtered tens of thousands of workers and peasants, abetted the semi-fascist dictatorships, and so on. The Protestant community is so small and uninfluential, constituting little more than 0,2 per cent of the whole population (15,744 out of 7,022,000) that it is inconceivable that it could cause serious harm to the people. Yet the Bulgarian Government put fourteen Protestant priests on trial and punished them severely, while it left the Orthodox Church hierarchy untouched.

The Catholic Church in Eastern Europe differs from both the Orthodox Church and the weak Protestant Church in Bulgaria. When Tsar Peter the Great was considering whether to ally the Russian Church with Rome, one factor finally decided him against doing so. This was, as one writer put it, that 'The Pope was a patriarch who would be unamenable to the Tsar and could not be deposed'. (R. P. Casey, op. cit. p. 13). Today this consideration is no less important in determining Stalin's attitude to the Vatican.

For a number of reasons the country in which the conflict between Moscow and Rome broke out in its most dramatic form was Hungary. The Achilles heel of the Catholic Church, 659 471

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659 471 which appeared to be so strong, lay in the fact that it was a big landowner connected by many ties with the big landlords. This seriously weakened it at a time when the peasants were in revolt against this medieval heritage. In such circumstances the use of religious sanctions to defend secular vested interests is sure to recoil on the Church hierarchy. History has provided ample evidence of this from the time of the Great French Revolution to that of the Spanish Civil War. In the fight against parasitic feudalism during the French Revolution, the resistance of the Church was no stronger than that of the lay nobility. Where the peasants did rally around the priests against revolutionary France, as in the Vendée, it was not because their religious feeling was outraged by the revolutionaries, but because of their attachment to their feudal masters. Where the peasants fought the nobility they also fought openly against the priests. This does not mean that the peasants were not religious. The belief that God watches over man and that there is another life after death, had much deeper roots than attachment to the priests and to the Church which was a big feudal landowning institution. This explains why the same peasants who fought so consistently against the priests between 1789 and 1794 were quite happy to accept the restoration of the Church in 1795 and the Concordat with the Vatican in 1801. When the Kremlin decided to destroy the strongholds of the Catholic Church in Eastern Europe, commonsense, if not a study of the French Revolution, showed them that the priests would be least powerful where they were most completely identified with big land ownership. This was particularly the case in Hungary. When Cardinal Mindszenty, the head of the Hungarian Catholic hierarchy, preached against the land reform and the peasants nevertheless went forward unhesitatingly to take the land which they had worked for centuries without getting all its yield, it was clear that he had lost not only this single battle but the whole war. Cardinal Mindszenty's opposition to the abolition of all titles of nobility, his insistence on being called 'Prince', went against the grain of the poor, downtrodden and suffering peasants. He could not save the day by his appeals to 'democracy' against 'communist tyranny', and so forth, for such words rang false when uttered by a man who for more than two

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decades had supported the White Terror and Horthy's 659 ●
dictatorship, who had preached the extermination of Com- 471
munists and Socialists, had fulminated as a Magyar nationalist against the Slovaks, Rumanians and other Danubian nations who acquired territory from Hungary after 1918, and had welcomed the extermination of millions of Jews by the Nazis. When the Hungarian Parliament in June, 1948, passed a bill nationalising all Church-sponsored schools, Cardinal Mindszenty, in excommunicating all the Catholic deputies who supported the bill, certainly did not stand on democratic ground. The educational systems in the United States and Britain go much farther in secularisation than this bill, which still maintained compulsory religious instruction in schools to be given by monks and nuns.

In Poland and Czechoslovakia, where the Church was not a large landowner or an ally of the feudal opposition to land reform,* the Communist Parties were much more cautious.

In Poland, where the main church is the Roman Catholic Church, the Communist leaders were forced to find a *modus vivendi* with it. In a completely opportunistic manner they pandered to the wishes of the Church to an extent which would horrify bourgeois liberals, particularly the French Radicals, to say nothing of atheists.

Polish Facts and Figures, issued by the Polish Embassy in London, reports (December 11th, 1948): 'In contrast to most countries where land reform starts with the division of church lands, Polish land reform left the large church estates amounting to 841,300 acres untouched. In addition to leaving the church's lands untouched, the government also returned lands and goods taken away from the church by the Germans.'

'Religious instruction by priests is provided in each school 659
as part of the school curriculum (government directive of 872
December, 1926). The only children who may be exempted from religious instruction in schools are those whose parents

*This does not mean that the heads of the Catholic Church, especially Poland, were progressive. We need but mention one of them, the late Primate Cardinal Hlond. He found the time after the Kielce pogrom of 4th July, 1946, in which 41 Jews were killed, to accuse the Jews of backing the present regime and implied that the absurd medieval tales of Jewish ritual murder of Christian children—which had played their part in the pogrom—may not have been without foundation. This was but one incident in the career of this politician-clergyman, an enthusiastic supporter of the rule of the 'Colonels'.

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659 or guardians forward a written statement to the school that
872 they do not wish their children to participate.

'The programme and text-books for teaching religion are prepared by church organs and submitted to the Ministry of Education. The text-books for all grades of elementary schools were prepared by a special commission attached to the Metropolitan Curia of Cracow.

'Children who attend religious classes participate in the following religious practices:—(a) On Sundays, holidays, and the beginning and end of the school year, they attend church services; (b) They participate in "recollections"; (c) A prayer is recited at the beginning and end of each school day.'

'A network of Catholic theological seminaries which prepare for priesthood and missionary work is spread throughout Poland.'

659 Another issue of *Polish Facts and Figures*, dated August
873 6th, 1949, gives the following facts about religion in Poland: 'Catholic clergymen enjoy many personal privileges which have long ago been abolished or restricted in other countries . . .

'Ecclesiastical seminaries have nearly 18,000 students. Three hundred children's homes, 15,000 pupils, 600 kindergartens with 22,000 children and 40 secondary schools with 9,000 students are under monastic management. The Catholic school system is crowned by the Lublin Catholic University.

659 'Poland is one of those few countries where religious teaching
793 exists in schools. The 6,300 priests teaching religion are paid by the State.

'The number of religious orders has grown during the existence of the People's Poland. While in 1939 there were 1,742 monasteries and convents in Poland, there are now 2,010. The number of nuns has grown from 17,000 to nearly 19,000. Despite the housing shortage, nuns enjoy such privileges as enable them to live in comfortable, big houses.

'Poland holds first place in Europe for the number of Catholic periodicals. Their circulation amounts to 6,387,000.

' . . . 62 Catholic journals were published in Poland as compared with 20 such journals in France.'

659 In all the Army and police units of Poland there are official chaplains.

To demonstrate the devotion of the Communists to Catholicism, General Karol Swierczewski, commander of the

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International Brigade in Spain and an old Communist leader, was buried on 1st April, 1947, according to Roman Catholic rite and his coffin lowered to the sound of *De Profundis* chanted by Catholic clergy! (*Glos Ludu* 2nd April, 1947). 659

In Czechoslovakia the Government passed a bill by which all pastors were to become salaried officials of the State. The Church hierarchy, headed by Archbishop Beran, could not prevent nearly all the priests from accepting this, for lack of any large estates or other source of income made them financially dependent on the state. (The same fact—that the poverty of the Church secures its dependence on the state—led Catherine II, who was certainly not an atheist, to confiscate most of the lands of the Russian Orthodox Church). To facilitate the transference of the clergy's allegiance from the Pope in Rome to the Government in Prague, the Communist leaders pretended to behave like devout Catholics. Thus, for instance, Gottwald, immediately after being elected President, with his wife attended 'a special *Te Deum* service in the Cathedral at St. Vitus at which Archbishop Beran officiated. Neither President Masaryk nor President Beneš did this' (*The Times*, 15th June, 1948).

In Rumania, the Government used yet another method to subordinate the Catholic Church to itself. There were two Catholic Churches in the country, the Roman Catholic Church embracing about 1,200,000 people, and the Uniate Catholic Church embracing about 1,426,000 people. The Uniates are Christians of the Byzantine rite—which is almost identical with the Orthodox rite—who owe allegiance to the Pope. The Uniate Church was founded in Poland at the end of the sixteenth century and was introduced into Transylvania about a century later. It became a focal point for Ukrainian and Rumanian nationalism; hence it was a constant thorn in the Tsar's side. In the seventies of last century Tsar Alexander II, on the advice of the arch-reactionary Count Dimitri Tolstoy, suppressed the Uniate Church in the western provinces of the Russian empire. In 1945 the Uniates of Eastern Galicia (taken from Poland by Russia) were forced to join the Orthodox Church. Three years later the Uniates in Rumania suffered the same fate. The Rumanian Government arrested all the Bishops and many of the priests of the Uniate Church, as a

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659 result of which some priests convened a conference and decided to join the Orthodox Church. The property of the Uniate Church was also transferred to the Orthodox Church and the Uniate Church ceased to exist. The Roman Catholic Church, being very weak in Rumania (embracing not more than 6 per cent of the population) had to agree to the Government's Religious Law of August, 1948, making all priests state officials. The higher ranks of the Orthodox Church can only be filled 'after approval by the Presidium of the Grand National Assembly, given by decree, at the proposal of the government, following the recommendation of the Minister of Religion.'

The following extract from a broadcast by Radio Rumania on December 14th, 1948, symbolizes the limitation of 'religious freedom' in Rumania by police control: 'The Bucharest Police informs those whom it may concern in connection with carol singing at Christmas and the New Year that children under 12 can sing carols without authorization. Choirs and all other associations which sing carols must obtain authorization from the Bucharest Police Adminstrative Department. Applications must state, on the responsibility of the association's head, the name, age and occupation of each member and the part he takes in the choir. All members must carry identity cards.' (Quoted by *The Economist*, 25th December, 1948).

In Conclusion

From the review given above it is clear that while the regimentation of the Orthodox Churches in the satellites by the State was a simple and straightforward undertaking that has already been completed, the regimentation of the Catholic Church has been much more complicated, demanding undermining tactics instead of frontal attack, and it is not yet finished. To complete it, it will be necessary, it seems, either to include the Vatican in the Great Russian Empire, or to make the Catholics of Eastern Europe pay allegiance to another Pope (and thus repeat the case of the Popes of Avignon) or to turn the Churches into National Churches.

So far two inter-related reasons have been given for the policy of regimentation of religion in the satellites: 1. the impossibility of uprooting religious feeling in the people as long

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as the 'real misery' of poverty and oppression continues unmitigated; this became clear to the Kremlin, if not from a reading of Marx, from their own experience in trying to carry out the 'Five Year Plan of Atheism'; 2. The necessity under a totalitarian regime of leaving no field of social life free of State control. A third possible reason suggests itself. 659

Until the French Revolution the French bourgeoisie, on the whole, supported a materialistic philosophy, it was atheistic. Here and there were some deists among them, but there were hardly any supporters of the Church. After the victory of the Revolution they changed. The Church lost its feudal property, and the priests, convinced that the old regime had gone for good, were ready to accommodate themselves to the new rulers of France. At the same time the bourgeoisie began to fear its allies of yesterday, the sansculottes, even more than its enemies, the nobility, and it began to look upon the materialist philosophy as a danger and upon religion as a shield. Thus the bourgeoisie went over very quickly from materialism to deism (1793 to 1795) and then embraced the Catholic Church (the Concordat of 1801). Napoleon Bonaparte, the exponent *par excellence* of the desires of the *nouveaux riches* explained this new devotion to religion very succinctly: 'As far as I am concerned, I do not see in religion the mystery of the incarnation, but the mystery of the social order; it attaches to heaven an idea of equality which prevents the rich from being massacred by the poor.'

It is possible that this consideration accounts to some extent for the attitude to religion of the 'new aristocracy' of Stalin's empire also.

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failed. In fact, History itself exploded one after another the formulas that have been considered binding. This time, however, the rulers have mastered dialectics so, they assert, they will know how to modify the doctrine as new necessities arise. The judgments of an individual man can always be wrong; the only solution is to submit unreservedly to an authority that claims to be unerring.

But what can the doctrine do about the unformulated longings of men? Why does a good Communist, without any apparent reason, suddenly put a pistol to his head? Why does he escape abroad? Isn't this one of those chasms over which the scientifically constructed bridges pass? People who flee from the people's democracies usually give as their chief motive the fact that life in these countries is psychically unbearable. They stammer out their efforts to explain: "The dreadful sadness of life over there"; "I felt I was turning into a machine." It is impossible to communicate to people who have not experienced it the undefinable menace of total rationalism.

To forestall doubt, the Party fights any tendency to delve into the depths of a human being, especially in literature and art. Whoever reflects on "man" in general, on his inner needs and longings, is accused of bourgeois sentimentality. Nothing must ever go beyond the description of man's behavior as a member of a social group. This is necessary because the Party, treating man exclusively as the by-product of social forces, believes that he becomes the type of being he pictures himself to be. He is a social monkey. *What is not expressed does not exist.* Therefore if one forbids men to explore the depths of human nature, one destroys in them the urge to make such explorations; and the depths in themselves slowly become unreal.

I should like to clear up in advance a possible misunderstanding. Personally, I am not in favor of art that is too

47 act was taken by the State. The regime was still tightening con-
423 trols when the German Army attacked in June of 1941.

World War II subjected the entire collective system to its severest strain and, as Voznesensky observed, the system continued to supply the minimum of foodstuffs necessary for the war, although the regime had to loosen its hold considerably to guarantee the supply. That this achievement was a tribute to the vitality of the State agricultural administration, rather than the morale of the peasants, is suggested by the fact that in those areas invaded by the Germans - particularly Byelorussia and the Ukraine - large masses of peasants greeted them as liberators with the traditional bread and salt. But the Germans, who were as interested as their predecessors in a high "marketable surplus," maintained the kolkhozy intact. This policy and the standard Hitlerian excesses in conquered Slavic territory soon alienated the peasants.

With the defeat of the Nazi invasion and the cessation of hostilities in Europe and Asia, the Soviet regime sought to reimpose the agrarian controls loosened in wartime. In line with this policy,
[66] the government instituted a vast purge of collective farm directors and decreed a monetary reform in 1947 that wiped out at one stroke most of the savings accumulated by peasants during the war.
[65] Taxes on incomes derived from the household plots were raised sharply in 1948, 1950, and 1951; delivery quotas on dairy products and meats produced in the household plots were also raised. The culmination of this development in the kolkhozy was the shift from the zveno (link, or small unit) work system to large-scale labor brigades. Under an amalgamation program the number of collective farms in the Soviet Union was reduced from 252,000 to 97,000. A further effort in this direction was the plan associated with Khrushchev's name to weld the collective farms into vast "agro-towns" (agrogoroda), in which the peasantry would suffer the final transformation into a rural proletarist. Although this effort met with acknowledged failure, the theory behind it was not abandoned. In Stalin's last published work, Economic Problems of Socialism in the U.S.S.R., he called for a program of "gradual" transformation of collective into public property - in short, the eventual conversion of all agricultural units into State farms." [33]

[33] Joseph Stalin, Economic Problems of Socialism in the U.S.S.R. (International Publishers, New York), p. 51. In the same work Stalin called for a "relatively higher rate of expansion of the production of the means of production." The two programs - further statification of the farms and the acceleration of investment - were, in fact, inseparable.

Indeed, there is considerable evidence to show that the Communists preferred to take power without the aid of genuinely revolutionary movements. The calculated policy of permitting the Nazis to destroy the powerful non-Communist but leftist Polish underground in Warsaw was one indication of the Communist fear of spontaneous and deeply rooted reform movements. As Mitrany points out, "When the Soviet armies first occupied territory in Eastern peasant countries, they did not attempt to use the peasants against the existing regime";[4] instead they concentrated on seizing the centers of political power through which, in time, they were to introduce land reform by official fiat. 668

This wide divergence in revolutionary tactics between 1917 and 1944-45 arose from two factors. First, the spontaneous revolutionary forces in Eastern Europe were so weak that the Communists, with the aid of onrushing armies, could either defeat them or take them over. Second, the internal bureaucratization of the Communist movement which has occurred since Lenin's day made it imperative that the Communists rely primarily upon their own organization to affect events rather than upon the power of mass human forces. Consequently, they eschewed raising revolutionary slogans and adopted only those slogans which would help ease the path to organizational control.

These differences are of crucial importance in understanding the general course which the "East European Revolution" took, and the particular character of its agricultural policy.

Although Lenin's seizure of political power in 1917 was accompanied by a vast peasant-made reform of the Russian land system, he did not sanctify it with affirmations of his belief in independent peasant farming, as his more cynical East European successors were to do nearly 30 years later. Indeed, by decreeing nationalization of the land immediately after assuming power, Lenin made it clear that he considered individual peasant management of the land a transitional stage.[5] Consequently, Bolshevik policy shifts in the 661 423

[4] Mitrany, p. 179.

[5] Theoretical opposition to the land reform as a serious solution to the agrarian problem remained a part of the international Communist policy throughout the twenties, and was abandoned only after the policy shift to the Popular Front (1934-35). Even in the Far East, where the urban proletariat was very small, Comintern agents adhered to this general line. Only in the early thirties, under Mao Tse-tung's leadership, did the Communists in the Far East begin to appreciate the revolutionary potential in the slogan of land reform. During the Popular Front era, when the Communists allied themselves with a variety of previously prohibited groups in Europe and elsewhere, they accustomed themselves to the demagogic opportunism they practiced with such skill after the Second World War. (See Franz Borkenau, *World Communism*, New York, 1939).

●661 423 early years did not require the radical reorientations of the official attitude toward the peasantry and the land so characteristic of later policy in Eastern Europe. The concessionary New Economic Policy itself introduced in 1921, was invariably labeled a "retreat" imposed by circumstances, and Lenin left little doubt that "two steps forward" would follow this "one step backward." However, the post-war Communist Parties of Eastern Europe, empirical and opportunistic, swung with the political tides, professing convenient belief in any economic measures which would increase their political control.

661 These differences are not merely in the *tactics* of revolution, but rather in the changing character of Communism itself. In his volume, Mitrany emphasizes the increasing degree to which contemporary Stalinist Communists were preoccupied with the question of power.[6] Whereas Bela Kun's dictatorship in Hungary in 1919 sacrificed political power partly because it refused to permit or encourage land reforms, Rakosi's post-war dictatorship appealed to popular support by expediting the reform of the land.[7] Indeed, it was Rakosi himself who gave classic elaboration of the new political methods and spirit of Communism in his famous 1952 discussion of "salami tactics." Rather than defeating the Smallholders Party by frontal attack, he explained, they were defeated by ceaseless internal manipulations:

> This gradual, day-by-day 'slicing off' of the reaction lurking within the Smallholders' Party was . . . termed 'salami tactics.' In the course of our incessant struggle against the enemy, its strength was gradually frittered away, and its impact on the working class was waning.[8]

"Salami tactics," then, describe the method by which opposition was suffocated by slow strangulation rather than by outright struggle. This policy demanded a degree of hypocrisy rarely required by Lenin's more forthright methods. Thus, the Bulgarian Communist, Anton Yugov, could declare in 1944 that "this Government, of which I am a member, and on whose behalf I speak, categorically

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[6] Mitrany, p. 170: "Whatever the theoretical pretenses that still surrounded" the Communist movement, he writes, "the issue [had] narrowed down to a question of sheer power."

[7] *Ibid.*, p. 188: "In 1919 the Socialist groups victorious in Munich, Vienna, and Budapest had proclaimed the Marxist agrarian program and, so, quickly lost power; the new regimes controlled by the Communists after 1945 elaborately buried the program so as to retain power."

[8] *Tarsadalmi Szemle* (Budapest), March-April, 1952.

denies that it has any intention of establishing a Communist regime in Bulgaria." And Imre Nagy, the Hungarian Communist, was able to state in 1946 that the main struggle was not between "capitalism and socialism," but between "democracy and reaction *within* capitalism."[9] Within a year or two both Yugov and Nagy were to repudiate these statements completely; but repudiation was impossible until the necessary maneuvers had taken place within the Government which made the Communists no longer dependent upon a minimum of popular acceptance. 661

This policy of revolution *from above* and *by degrees* influenced every aspect of East European Communist policy, and distinguished it from the earlier Soviet experience. It reflected the degree to which the East European Communist Parties were not indigenous groupings of revolutionary idealists, but agents of an expanding imperial system, bureaucratically organized, and highly regimented. Even in Czechoslovakia, where the Communists had important working class support, the seizure of power was engineered from the Ministry of Interior rather than fought in the streets. Elsewhere, working class support was either non-existent, as in Romania, or minimal, as in Poland, where 1946 shop elections showed the Socialists three times as popular among the workers as the Communists.

This absence of any genuine national support, and the close attachment of these bureaucratized parties to the Soviet military apparatus, made the use of "salami tactics" in the political realm absolutely necessary. The same factors applied to the Communist land policy. The Satellite Parties were no more capable of a Stalinist "offensive on the land," a frontal attack on peasant economy and society, than they had been of a Leninist assault on the centers of governmental power. The same process of "slow suffocation" which had brought the Communists to political power was the only weapon by which the Communists could alter the land structure.

2. *The Pattern and Pace of Collectivization*

The transfer of the Soviet agricultural system to Eastern Europe is a complex and many-sided story, the details of which vary greatly from one country to the next. In Yugoslavia and Bulgaria, for example, efforts to impose the Soviet pattern were begun immediately after the close of the Second World War, while in Poland and 423 661

[9] See Gluckstein, pp. 131-142, for a full account of the Communist attempt to pose as defenders of the *status quo* in 1944-45.

423 661 Czechoslovakia no serious attempts were made until four years later. In Bulgaria, Czechoslovakia, and Hungary, collectivization has profoundly altered the structure of agrarian economy, while in Poland the pre-Communist land system still remains substantially intact. In Yugoslavia and Bulgaria the collectivization drive, or at least the major effort, was compressed into a relatively short period of time, though elsewhere in the Satellite sphere the land offensive was diffused over several years. In Hungary, and to a lesser degree in Czechoslovakia, the 1953 agrarian crisis has forced the dissolution of an appreciable number of collective farms; but in Poland and Bulgaria the effects of this area-wide crisis, though real, are scarcely as inclusive. These variations in pattern are a reflection of the degree to which Satellite collectivization is a function, not primarily of Communist doctrinal predilections, but of specific local forces and conditions. The general goal was everywhere the same—subordination of free agriculture to the demand of urban-industrial Communist society—but in practice agrarian policies have never been entirely uniform. Among those forces and conditions affecting the pace and intensity of Satellite collectivization were such variables as the strength of the peasant traditions of independent farming, the position of the individual Satellite in the over-all Soviet economic design, the structure of the prevailing land system, the degree of planned industrialization, and the size and dynamism of the national party.

The intimate connection between Communist agricultural policy and the demands of a totalitarian industrial economy was first elaborated by Stalin himself in 1928, when he acknowledged indirectly that the primary goal of collectivization was the increased State share in agricultural production. The Satellite theoreticians were not as blunt as Stalin and usually clothed their economic designs in elaborate ideological terminology. Perhaps the most direct statement on the subject, however, was made by the Yugoslav economic planner, Boris Kidric, in 1947, at a time when his country was the most orthodox and militant of the Satellite states. "The business of agriculture in a Socialist society," he stated, "is to supply the towns and industrial centers with food."[10]

The variety of policies put forward in the ensuing years were derived from this basic goal. Much as the Communists attempted

[10] *Borba*, (Belgrade), April 25, 1947.

to demonstrate that their policies were motivated by concern for the peasantry, it was clear that the question of ensuring "supply" of "food" for the cities remained the cornerstone of Communist agrarian policy. And though Kidric argued that to achieve this goal the Party was faced with the "categorical imperative of undertaking urgent measures to raise work productivity in agriculture," the hypocrisy of this statement was revealed by the simultaneous decision to allocate the barest minimum of national funds for the effort. Indeed, as the policy itself unfolded, it became clear that what Kidric meant was that it was the "business of agriculture in a Socialist society" to supply goods to the city at a price which the new urban bureaucracy was willing to pay, and that price was very low. Kidric's superior, Tito, was quite frank with regard to this problem:

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> In the same way as we must do our best to make ourselves independent of weather conditions in agriculture, so we must never allow ourselves the luxury of depending on the good will of private food producers. We must undertake measures to secure the necessary food for our industrial population and for carrying forward our Socialist projects. We must protect our food supply against chaos in production and distribution caused by the existence of tens of thousands of small and independent farms.[11]

It was precisely to this extent that the Communists were interested in agriculture. If, in the process of "protecting" themselves from the "chaos" of "tens of thousands of small and independent farms," the level of argicultural production increased, the Communists would indeed be overjoyed; but such an improvement would be peripheral to the basic goal, which was redistribution of the crop rather than its improvement.

To implement this redistribution two courses were open to the State, only one of which was consistent with power realities in Eastern Europe and Communist industrial plans. 1) By increasing the flow of industrial goods from the city to the country, the Communists could stimulate the peasantry to place a greater share of their produce on the market. 2) By creating an agricultural structure through which the State could exercise direct administrative control, the Communists could force the peasantry to increase the share of goods marketed. It was the latter course which was consistent with the Eastern European political situation; and the Com-

[11] *Ibid.*, November 4, 1952.

423 munists, with the Russian experience guiding them closely, followed
661 it. The decision to collectivize was essentially the decision to pursue this path, for the increased exploitation of the peasantry implicit in it was the only path consistent with "carrying forward of our Socialist projects." The basic preparation for collectivization was therefore in the seizure or creation of those organs of repression through which the Communists could exercise the necessary political control.

The groundwork for post-war collectivization was consequently not laid in the countryside, where Communist influence in these early years was small and generally limited to the new State Farms, but in the cities, where the Parties slowly extended their control over the State apparatus. Once the levers of governmental power were secured, the Communists were able to exert relentless pressure on the farms.

The tactics of the East European Parties in this "offensive" phase were never military, except perhaps in Yugoslavia, where political conditions most closely paralleled those of the Soviet Union in the early Stalinist era. And even in Yugoslavia the chief weapon was slow economic strangulation of the peasantry, an erosive process designed to break the will to resist and in the end leave the class disunited, despairing, and helpless. The offensive tactics of the bureaucratically-minded Satellite Parties deserve more detailed exposition.

Economic Pressure

661 This was the most direct means by which the Satellite Parties
471 sought to destroy the independent peasant. Everywhere in the sphere compulsory tax and crop delivery schedules were promulgated, discriminating heavily against the independent sector, and particularly against middle and rich peasants. Collecting revenue was never a primary end of the tax decrees, though funds forced from the countryside were often considerable. Confiscatory delivery quotas served the additional and important function of guaranteeing supplies of foodstuffs for the urban-industrial centers. The primary economic end – the eventual bankruptcy of the individual producer, who in the early post-war years was still thriving by selling on the free and black markets—is well illustrated by the 1953 delivery schedules for Czechoslovakia. On the best land in the country a peasant with five hectares had to deliver three times as much grain to the State *per hectare* as a peasant owning two hec-

tares. On the poorest land in the country a peasant with five hectares had to deliver almost twice as much per hectare as a peasant with two hectares.[12] In Romania, a peasant with four hectares of land was required to deliver three-and-a-half times as much produce per hectare as a peasant holding two hectares of land.[13] This pattern was followed throughout the area. 661 471

Prices paid for produce were invariably low and insofar as comparison is possible, lower than pre-war prices, as manifest in the huge discrepancies between free market prices and State prices. Moreover, the discrepancy between the prices paid to the peasantry and prices charged in retail shops for the same commodities far exceeded the cost of transportation and processing incurred by the State. In some cases a "coupon" system, ostensibly designed to compensate the peasant, was instituted. Under these terms, foodstuffs and industrial crops delivered to official collection centers were paid for by small sums in currency and coupons entitling the peasant to buy, at low controlled prices, in State shops. In practice, the system generally proved to be nothing more than a propaganda device. Since consumer goods were in short supply, and usually reserved for the urban market, the villages were frequently without such basic commodities as matches and kerosene. 435 471

Nevertheless, the confiscatory tax and delivery schedules were seldom fully enforced. It has, in fact, been demonstrated that literal enforcement was impossible, since in countless cases the State demands *exceeded* the individual peasant's capacity to produce. The quota levels and the severe legal punishments decreed for quota arrears were not, however, entirely unrealistic. The penalties prescribed for under-delivery were invoked only when it suited the regime purposes for a gradual extension of control over the agrarian economy. The effect of cumulative delivery failures was intended to reduce the independent peasant to the status of a tenant at sufferance, since he could be legally expropriated whenever the State chose. 471 661

The control the State exercised over industrial and financial sectors of East European economies was similarly an important weapon in the campaign against the peasant. As a result of heavy industrial emphasis, the agricultural sector was generally denied help from nationalized credit institutions. Insofar as credit was ex-

[12] Decree of the Ministry of Bulk Purchasing, January 30, 1953.
[13] *Scanteia*, (Bucharest). May 18, 1950.

471 tended to agriculture at all, the State and collective farms received
661 a disproportionate share. In effect, this policy meant the gradual depreciation of the meager equipment still owned by the peasantry, and further impeded the free peasant's purchase of vitally needed fertilizers and improved seed. This policy, it should be stressed, was an integral part of the general Communist tendency of neglecting agriculture as a whole.[14]

Administrative Force

661 It is impossible to determine exactly the degree to which Satellite collectivization drives depended upon application of administrative or police force. The testimony of escapees, the observations of outside observers, the frequent regime admonitions against administrative divergence from the "voluntary principle," and many statements by Communist leaders on the subject in 1953 New Course speeches, make it clear that the role of force was considerable.[15] At the same time the application of force in Eastern Europe did not approach in scale or intensity the frankly military offensive against the peasantry conducted in the Soviet Union in 1928-32.

Officially the Satellite regimes have always adhered to the "voluntary principle" of collectivization, invoking the principle whenever the regimes decided to decelerate collectivization. For example, when collectivization was halted in Bulgaria in mid-1950, the regime raised the "voluntary principle" to the level of a basic State doctrine.[16] Likewise, the halt in collectivization in Poland in mid-1951 was accompanied by a series of trials of low-echelon Communists alleged to have resorted to the use of violence against the peasantry.[17] In general, application of force—beatings, jailings, and occasional executions of "kulak terrorists"—was an important, but clearly secondary, collectivization method in the Satellites. Undoubtedly the intense scrutiny of international public opinion partly

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[14] See pp. 87-88 for a more extensive discussion of the investment schedules of the Satellite governments, and other issues relative to the balance between industry and agriculture.

[15] For example, Imre Nagy, speaking on July 4th, 1953, acknowledged that in collectivization "too much bullying was used," which "not only offended the peasants' sense of justice but also caused serious economic harm." (*Szabad Nep*, [Budapest], July 5, 1953.)

[16] An editorial in *Rabotnichesko Delo*, (Sofia), October 28th, 1950, stated, for example, that "The Communist Party has always stressed in the most categorical way that it is absolutely necessary to observe strictly the voluntary principle of entering collectives."

[17] See, for example, the reports on the trials held in Gryfice (*Trybuna Ludu*, [Warsaw], May 25th, 1951).

accounts for the reluctance to apply force. Undoubtedly, too, the stern memories of the horrors of Soviet collectivization, which nearly cost the Stalinist regime its life, influenced developments in Eastern Europe and led to the refusal to take such risks once again. 661

But the basic cause lay in the nature of the Communist Parties of Eastern Europe. The East European Communist Parties did not possess the necessary reserves of mass fanaticism to draw upon in a frankly military onslaught; the cadres of experienced and zealous workers upon whom Stalin relied to enforce his campaign in 1928-32 simply did not exist. In addition, a blunt attack would have been entirely inconsistent with the slow and cautious approach embodied in the concept of "salami tactics."

Social Pressure and Propaganda

In the early post-war years the East European Parties sought to identify their own cause with the economic advancement of the peasant masses. Consequently, until 1948, militant propaganda in the countryside was confined to attacks on "Fascist collaborators," estate owners, and the "village rich."

With the consolidation of Communist power, the tenor of Party propaganda changed. The "kulak" was singled out for increasingly bitter treatment foreshadowing an offensive against the peasantry as a whole.

With the consolidation of political power in 1948-49, the tone of Party propaganda changed radically. Under the guise of purging the countryside of the "kulaks", it assumed an essentially anti-peasant tone. Vulko Chervenkov flatly stated that the peasants' "sense of private property" had to be eradicated, betraying the fact that collectivization was aimed at the entire peasantry, not merely at the "kulak."[18] While the statistics indicate that a small class of

[18] The term "kulak" as first applied in the Soviet Union denoted a specific group — those enterprising peasants whose growth the Czarist Minister Stolypin had encouraged before the war. The size of this group was greatly diminished by the egalitarianism of the 1917-18 peasant revolution, so that, even with the resurgence of the kulak in the NEP period of the twenties, the kulaks produced less than a third as much grain as they had produced before the war. Consequently, when Stalin raised the slogan, "the liquidation of the kulaks as a class," he was trying to capitalize on the traditional enmity toward a class whose significance no longer merited such wide attention. Clearly he was attempting to use the "anti-kulakism" of the peasantry as a blind under which a policy directed at a much larger group could be conducted. The term "kulak" no longer designated a specific group, but was directed against any group obstructing Communist land policy. The East European Communist picked up where Stalin had left off, and wielded the term even more demagogically.

661 well-to-do peasants had survived the post-war reforms, the size of this group was minuscule compared to the propaganda concentrated upon it. As the collectivization drive gained momentum, it became increasingly clear that the slogan of the "struggle to liquidate the kulaks" was largely an ideological cover under which a general onslaught against the entire peasantry was being waged.

"The distinguishing feature of this [agricultural] revolution," Stalin once said concerning Soviet collectivization, "is that it was accomplished *from above*, on the initiative of the State, directly supported *from below* by the millions of peasants."[19] His formula was designed to distinguish the "agricultural revolution" from the "socialist revolution" of 1917, which presumably took its initiative *from below*. Therefore, one may assume that the emphasis in his formula is to be placed on its first clause (from above) rather than on the second (from below). The constant state of tension between the peasantry and the State in the years of collectivization is testimony to the reluctance of the peasantry to believe that the drive to "liquidate the kulaks" was being waged in their favor.

[668] The means by which the peasants expressed their antagonism to the agricultural policy were varied and the material on them is voluminous. The Romanian Party organ, *Scanteia*, described the forms which peasant resistance took in this fashion:

> At the present time, the resistance of the capitalist elements [the peasantry] in our country takes various forms: the sabotage of the cultivation and sowing plan, the refusal to complete compulsory delivery quotas and to pay taxes, plotting against the collective farms and peasant partnerships, black market operations and artificially raising prices — going so far as the communication of rumors of the criminal character of arson and murder.[20]

But the most direct evidence of the failure of Communist propaganda to win peasant support for collectivization was the economic apathy of the peasants and the continued impatience and fury of Communist propaganda. Since the regimes did not themselves resort to outright violence, neither did the peasants. But to the policy of slow economic suffocation the peasants countered a policy of passive resistance traditional among the backward peasantry of Eastern Europe.

3. *The Economic Strategy of Collectivization*

423 The effort to transform the East European countryside was

[19] *History of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union (Short Course)*. (International Publishers, New York, 1939), p. 305.
[20] Scanteia (Bucharest), April 12, 1953.

423 311 The "producing-consuming" units generally comprised one-quarter to one-third of the farmland throughout the region, but in Hungary almost one-half the total.

The medium units, of five to 10 hectares, occupied between one-quarter and one-third of the farm area.

The medium-large holdings controlled 20 percent, or less, of the farmland in Yugoslavia, Hungary, and Bulgaria, and approximately 25 percent in Poland and Czechoslovakia.

Finally, the large holdings—upwards of 15-20 hectares—totaled 10-15 percent of the private farmlands, except in Bulgaria where they did not exist, and in Yugoslavia where they formed close to 20 percent.

● 661 423 Since the Communists' primary problem was the extraction of agricultural produce from the countryside, the focus of the contemplated agrarian reorganization had to be those viable, surplus-producing farms which traditionally supplied the cities with the produce necessary to their existence. And because it was precisely these farms which were best able to withstand the slow economic pressures of the State, and least interested in economic reform, the Communists had to prepare for a formidable struggle. In order to impose collective structure on these farms, it was necessary to discriminate against them in favor of the collectives. But this very discrimination—the refusal to supply credits, mechanical equipment, and fertilizers, and the collection of higher taxes and delivery quotas—tended to destroy their vitality and decrease the surplus produce in which the Communists were interested. So long, therefore, as these farms remained outside the collective structure, their value to the Communists was decreased as collectivization progressed. Similarly, the favorable treatment afforded the collective farms tended to decrease their basic value to the State. It was difficult to extract a high surplus of produce from farms with lower delivery quotas. These internal contradictions would inevitably continue so long as the *process* of collectivization itself was not completed, and the use of discriminatory tactics was necessary.

It is not altogether surprising that the Satellite planners never pursued an entirely consistent policy in this regard. In the early years, they tended to concentrate on absorbing the poorer farms into the collectives because they were most vulnerable to Communist pressure and appeal. Later, they tended to concentrate on those larger farms whose collectivization was crucial to the success

of their land policy. But no matter how they proceeded—and the 661
pattern differed from one country to another—they could not re- 423
solve the dilemmas posed by a slow paced collectivization. Had they been able to follow the Soviet model of full collectivization in several rapid and brutal campaigns, they might conceivably have avoided some of these pitfalls.

The chief surplus producing sector—the middle farms between 423
10 and 20 hectares—comprised some 900,000 units (See Table 6). 311
The systematic dissociation of this stratum from the upper stratum of owners holding over 20 hectare holdings, and its methodical "fractionalization" represented one of the essential characteristics of the collectivization drive. It was *this* stratum of the farm population which the regime frequently labeled "kulak," adjusting its definition as it became necessary in each situation. By 1950 it was clear that this stratum represented a challenge to the Communists not—as it was alleged—because its members hired farm labor to help work their lands, but because it constituted the producing backbone of the nation, a source of productive strength which the Communists were determined to turn to their own ends.

4. *The Strategy Unfolded*

The post-war expulsions of the *Volksdeutsche* and other German minority groups from Eastern Europe and the expropriation of their lands, together with those of Nazi collaborators, gave the early Communist-dominated regimes their first hold over the agrarian economy. Particularly in Poland, Czechoslovakia, and Yugoslavia the former German holdings formed the nucleus of the State Farms. Confiscation of the great latifundia in Hungary and of royal lands in Romania similarly created a reserve land fund on which the State could draw. In general, forest lands throughout the region were nationalized and administered by managerial panels created for that purpose. In addition, much pasture and meadowland was expropriated by a variety of legal devices, the over-all total equalling some two million hectares of first quality land. The State share in the combined forests, pasturage, and arable land of Eastern Europe ranged from 17 percent in Yugoslavia to 36 percent in Poland, and to as much as 41 percent in Czechoslovakia. Until 1949, the State farms still continued to play a minor role, except in Poland and Czechoslovakia where experiments along these lines were pushed very early.

During 1949-50 the State sector of agriculture expanded rapidly,

423 ance to collectivization which only a party of the strong Soviet type could have withstood.

However, those factors which made "salami tactics" suitable for the seizure of power and the beginning of collectivization made them inappropriate for completion of the task and the final subjugation of the independent peasantry. These disadvantages may be summarized as follows:

423 668 1. Piecemeal collectivization encouraged a type of peasant resistance which, it turned out, was more effective than Soviet peasant resistance. In the USSR collectivization took place so rapidly, and with such tremendous force, that the vast majority of peasants were already well enclosed within the "Socialist sector" by the time a full-scale counter-attack could be prepared. Leonard Hubbard, the English authority, described the Soviet victory in this way:

> The struggle over collectivization ended distinctly in favour of the Soviet Government, unlike the conflict [between the Government and the peasantry] that brought War Communism to a close. The peasants were no longer able to starve the Government into yielding, because the Government had now created an efficient organisation for obtaining the foodstuffs necessary for subsistence of the urban and industrial population.[18]

While it is true that the Soviet peasantry, in retaliation, destroyed a good portion of the nation's livestock, their bargaining power was not improved as a result. The vital shipments of surplus grain were insured, and all means of resistance had been thoroughly destroyed. The famine of 1932-33, mainly affecting the grain-growing regions of Ukraine and South Russia, demonstrated beyond doubt that, in Hubbard's words, "if anybody was to starve, [the peasants] would be the first to do so."

423 661 In Eastern Europe, however, the slow, cautious collectivization precluded the possibility of so calculated and brutal a policy. A sufficient proportion of the peasantry remained outside of the "Socialist sector" to wreak havoc with the Government's general economic plan. The East European regimes could not gain a strong enough position in relation to the peasantry to withstand the tremendous pressures which would be generated by rapid collectivization or a disastrous drought such as 1933. One poor harvest was, consequently, a sufficient jolt to destroy the entire rhythm of the

[18] Leonard Hubbard, *The Economics of Soviet Agriculture*, London, 1939, p. 123.

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CHAPTER I

THE INITIAL SOVIET INTERVENTION: BULGARIA, RUMANIA, HUNGARY

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648 NAPOLEON'S WORDS, 'Une armée dehors c'est l'État qui
661 voyage', apply very well to the Russian armies which overran the countries of Eastern Europe as a result of the Second World War. If the Russian state had been a liberating democracy where power was in the hands of the people, the entry of the Red Army into the Eastern Europen countries would have inspired their populations to take their fate into their own hands, put an end to the military police dictatorships that terrorized them and establish the full sovereignty of the people. But the policy of the Russian occupation authorities was entirely different. For the first two or three years their primary objective was to preserve as strong an army and police force as possible under the control of the Communist Parties. With this task in mind the Communist leaders skilfully manipulated the pressure of the masses to introduce 'loyal' elements into the army and police and at the same time allied themselves with reactionary, even ex-fascist, heads of the old army and police. The second aim of the Kremlin was to call a halt to any action of the peoples which bore a really democratic and spontaneous character and which might therefore impede the Gleichshaltung of all public life. To achieve this, the same method was adopted of making alliances with the most right-wing, reactionary elements against the authentic Socialist Parties, Peasant Parties and, above all, against the peoples themselves.

A study of political life in the satellite states must begin with an analysis of this policy.

642 *Pre-War Political Regime in Eastern Europe*

661 Before the war, all the countries dealt with (except Czecho-
728 slovakia) had lived under a military dictatorship camouflaged

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642 by a parlimentary facade. Workers' parties, peasant parties
661 and trade unions were all persecuted or forbidden, strikes were
728 suppressed in blood, and brutal mass executions were not unknown. To give only one example, 20-30 thousand workers and peasants lost their lives after the overthrow of the Peasant Government of Alexander Stamboliisky in Bulgaria in 1923. The secret police of Rumania, Yugoslavia and Bulgaria could boast of rivalling the Gestapo in all the refinements of torture. The press was gagged. Parliamentary elections were a farce, as votes were bought, electors were terrorized, and voting was open, although the counting of the votes was secret. It was no accident that in only one out of the many national elections held in Rumania between the two world wars, did the government that was called upon by the king to arrange the elections fail to get the expected majority! The corruption and depravity of the public administration was immense. Symbolical of this corruption was King Carol's notorious mistress, Magda Lupescu, who appointed and dismissed Ministers and high officials, distributed government contracts, etc. National minorities in general, and the Jews in particular, suffered from official oppression and from 'spontaneous' outbursts of hooliganism organised by government agents. The alliance with Hitlerite Germany of Rumania, Hungary, Bulgaria and many of the rulers of Yugoslavia seemed natural.

In view of these facts, it is not surprising that the collapse of the German military machine was greeted with joy by the overwhelming majority of the peoples of Eastern Europe, who hoped to get rid of the previous shameful political and social order. The breakdown of the Gestapo unleashed a tremendous. independent upsurge of the people. The first task of the Russian occupation authorities was to grapple with this mass activity.

Bulgaria

669 In Sofia and other towns armed workers arrested fascists
642 *en masse*, held mass demonstrations, set up elected people's
728 tribunals, disarmed the police and established a workers' militia. Local committees took over the administration and the red flag was hoisted over all public buildings. The ferment was equally great in the Bulgarian army. Thus *The Economist* of October 7th, 1944, could write:

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for the maintenance of private property, Immediately after its establishment, the Communist leader, Anton Yugov, the Minister of the Interior, declared: 'This government, of which I am a member and on whose behalf I speak, categorically denies that it has any intention of establishing a Communist regime in Bulgaria. There is no truth in rumours that the government intends to nationalise any private enterprise in the country.' (*The New York Times*, 22nd September, 1944).

A few months later, at the national congress of the Fatherland Front in March, 1945, another Communist leader declared: 'We are building a democractic country based on private property and private initiative. Consequently the Government by its very nature is reformist.' He severely attacked those members of the Communist Party who opposed the Fatherland Front Government and wanted 'to establish a completely Communist government.' An article in the official paper of the Fatherland Front, *Otechestven Front* (9th March, 1945) described the programme of the Front in these words: 'It is the programme of the Bulgarian workers, peasants, craftsmen and women, honest, intellectual, patriotic individuals, industrialists, merchants and patriotic soldiers.' In a congress of the industrialists of Bulgaria on September 27th, 1945, a Communist Minister, Dobri Terpeshev, said on behalf of the Supreme Economic Council: 'Private initiative will not be handicapped but supported. The Communists intend to revive it because our economy needs your initiative . . . Let us all work without being led on by thought of gain alone.' A year later the Communist Prime Minister, Georgi Dimitrov, declared: 'The immediate task is neither the realisation of Socialism nor the introduction of the Soviet system but the consolidation of a truly democratic and Parliamentarian system.'

From September, 1944, to October, 1946, the Fatherland Front Government was headed by General Kimon Georgiev who not only played a leading part in the military, semi-fascist *coup d'etat* of Tsankov in 1923, as a result of which tens of thousands of workers and peasants were massacred, but was also the author of the military coup of 1934 which led to the immediate dismissal of Parliament, the terrible persecution of Communists, Agrarians and others, and, for the first time in

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Bulgarian history, the dissolution of the trade unions and their illegalisation.* Georgiev's supporters wielded such power in the Fatherland Front Government that *The Observer* of 10th September, 1944, could remark: 'The composition of the Government suggests that the group that has now taken over in Sofia is the famous Military League which took power by a *coup d'etat* in 1934.' But *The Observer* did not mention one very important exception. The Minister of the Interior, who controls the police, was the Communist leader, Anton Yugov. The Communist leaders joined hands with the old Military League in order to keep 'order', the first victims of which were any workers who demanded an improvement in their condition, or—even worse—dared to press for immediate steps in the direction of socialism. Thus Constantine Poulos, writing from Sofia on June 2nd, 1945, said: 'Bulgarian Socialists (are) far to the left of the Communists . . . The Greek workers who demanded "bread and work" last fall are now dead, in jail or terrorized into silence. The Bulgarian workers who recently made similar demands were publicly denounced by the Communists as diversionists and enemies of the state; a handful of coal miners who struck for higher wages in March were castigated as "anarchists" and rushed off to jail by the Communist-controlled militia.' (*The Nation*, June 23rd, 1945).

In spite of these precautions, the transfer of Bulgaria from the German side to the Russian was not carried out as smoothly as the transfer of Finland, Rumania and Hungary, because Bulgaria does not belong geographically to the Russian sphere proper, but is on the border between the Russian and Anglo-American zones. Hence when the Germans retreated, many members of the ruling strata of Bulgaria hoped to switch over from the side of Germany, not to Russia, but to England and the United States. Russia therefore could not rely implicitly on the Bulgarian state machine, and between September, 1944, and March, 1945, a large-scale purge was carried out by

*This is what *Imprecor*, the official Comintern paper, wrote about the 1934 coup: 'A new military-fascist *coup d'etat* has been carried out in Bulgaria. In the night prior to May 19th the Muchanov-Gitchev government was overthrown and a military-fascist dictatorship established under the leadership of *Kimon Georgiev*, a Lieutenant-Colonel of the Reserve'. 'The leading elements in the present coup also played a leading role in the 1923 coup'. (*Imprecor*, 1st June, 1934). Now the official *Free Bulgaria* describes Georgiev's role in the 1934 coup in these words: 'In 1934 he took the post of Prime Minister and re-established diplomatic relations between Bulgaria and the Soviet Union.' (August 1st, 1949).

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661 the law courts. As a result, two thousand people were con-
728 demned to death and executed and another few thousands sentenced to very long terms of imprisonment.

That the Bulgarian people were successfully 'kept quiet' is illustrated by the fact that until April, 1948, the Communists did not find it necessary to hold even sham elections to local authorities; heads of villages and members of local councils were officially appointed by the Minister of the Interior!

Rumania

728 Rumania was the first of the Eastern European countries
642 reached by the Red Army, and Russia hastened to declare its intention of non-intervention in her internal regime. On April 2nd, 1944, Molotov declared: 'The Soviet Government declares that it does not pursue the aim of acquiring any part of Rumanian territory or of changing the existing social order in Rumania. It equally declares that the entry into Rumania of Soviet troops is solely the consequence of military necessities and of the continuation of resistance by the enemy forces.'

Russia's intention of keeping 'order' was reciprocated by the willingness of the Rumanian King and governing circles to collaborate with her. With scarcely a ripple Rumania changed her allegiance from Germany to Russia, the whole state apparatus—army, police and administration—going over to the Russian side when King Michael on 23rd August, 1944, arrested the Prime Minister, Marshal Ion Antonescu and appointed General Sănătescu in his place.

In March, 1945, after a number of changes in the Rumanian government, brought about by direct threats and pressure from the Russian army of occupation numbering a million men, Petru Groza became Premier, supported by Vice-Premier Gheorghe Tătărescu and four of his friends from the so-called 'Liberal Party', an equal number of Communists, and a number of individuals representing nobody.

728 Of Tătărescu, the Comintern paper, *Imprecor*, of December
642 8th, 1933, had said: 'In 1907 the Liberal Party, at that time led
661 by Sturdza, caused no less than 11,000 peasants to be murdered. The bloody suppression of the peasant insurrection in Tatar-Bunar was also the work of the Liberals, under the leadership of *Tătărescu*, who is now the Minister for Trade and

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Industry. The Liberal Party is also responsible for the volleys fired on the 13th of December against striking workers, as a result of which over 100 were killed. 728 661 642

'In December, 1927, it was the Liberal Party which organised the bloody anti-Jewish pogroms. Bands of students roamed through the streets beating up passers-by. The Minister of the Interior at the time was Duca, and the Secretary of State, Tătărescu. Under Liberal government corruption and jobbery reached their culminating point. The same Liberal Party exercised a brutal repressive terror against the revolutionary organisations; it suppressed all revolutionary newspapers and caused numerous workers to be murdered. Under Liberal government the class courts of the Rumanian bourgeoisie have sentenced many of the best leaders of the working class to long years of hard labour or to long terms of banishment in the salt mines.'

Tătărescu represented the extreme authoritarian wing of the Liberal Party and helped King Carol to establish his dictatorship. His foreign policy was oriented towards Hitler Germany. The British Communist weekly *World News and Views* of November 19th, 1938, described him thus: 'Tătărescu, the leader of the Right pro-Hitler wing of the National Liberal Party.' 728 642

Mihail Ralea, Minister of Culture in the March, 1945, Cabinet, was formerly a Minister under King Carol and an open admirer of the Hitler regime. Today he is Rumanian Ambassador to Washington. Father Burducea, the Minister of Cults in the March, 1945, Government, was one of the most notorious Iron Guardists (he had the decoration of the Buna Vestire, which was awarded to only thirty-two Guardists). Lotar Radaceanu, the Minister of Labour, was in Carol's totalitarian 'Renaissance Front.' One of the chiefs of the Propaganda Ministry, responsible for controlling the press, was Gheorghe Macovescu. Under Antonescu's fascist regime he held the same position, writing articles hailing the German-Rumanian alliance against Russia. Groza himself, the Premier since March, 1945, was before the war a very rich man, an owner of a big estate, factories and large hotels, and with big banking interests. He had been a Minister in two extremely right-wing governments under General Averescu (1920-1, 1926-7).

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642 471 Groza[1] repeatedly stated that his government was against any socialisation and stood for the defence of private property. For instance, in an interview with the correspondent of *The New York Times* on 26th September, 1945, 'Premier Groza said his Government did not intend to apply either collectivization of land or nationalisation of banks or industries and that the mere question showed an ignorance of its program. Claiming to represent all social strata, he said, the program was to "concentrate all the forces of the nation for the reconstruction of the country and to consolidate a democratic regime" and "in the Government's program there is no nationalization of banks or industries and no collectivization of land"' (*The New York Times*, 30th September, 1945).

Radio Bucharest reported that in a description of his recent talks with Stalin, Premier Groza had said that it was Stalin who had advised him to 'keep the system of private enterprise and private property.'

Nearly three years after the advance of the Russian army into Rumania, Groza still openly opposed the nationalisation of any property belonging to either Rumanian or foreign capitalists, even though the nationalisation of foreign property is part of the program not only of socialists but even of many nationalist movements in countries in which a great deal of foreign capital is invested, such as Mexico, Argentine, India, etc. In a statement to the Bucharest paper *Timpul* he said: '. . . the Government and the Parliament will make every effort possible in order to realize a fruitful field of collaboration for foreign capital . . . (There will be—Y.G.) conditions intended to secure to this foreign capital a guarantee of investment and a just rentability.' (*International News*, Bucharest, 8th January, 1947).

642 661 Even capitalists who collaborated wholeheartedly with Germany were left untouched for more than three years, and the Communist Minister of Justice, Lucreţiu Pătrăşcanu went so far as to point out that Nazi collaborators were far more leniently dealt with in Rumania than, for instance, in France. *The New York Times* correspondent reported on 17th March, 1945: 'Industrialists, business men and bankers will escape punishment as war criminals, under a law being drawn up by Lucreţiu Pătrăşcanu, Minister of Justice, and Communist

1 [Premier of Rumania since March, 1945 -- Analyst]

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member of the Government, it was learned today. Rumania could not afford to lose the services of merchants and industrialists, M. Pătrăscanu said. He expressed the opinion that the country would pursue a more liberal policy toward this class than the French have.' What an outcry there would have been in the Communist press if a similar announcement had been made by a non-Communist Minister in the West! 642 661

Tătărescu did not hestitate to attack 'anarchists' (i.e., workers). In an interview with *The New York Times* correspondent in Bucharest on 21st October, 1945, he declared that a strenuous discipline must be introduced in industry and an end brought to the 'excesses' of the workers' committees.

It was hardly surprising that the capitalists faced the future with perhaps a little anxiety even if they were satisfied with the existing state of affairs. There was great optimism among businessmen, as the serious Swiss paper *Neue Zürcher Zeitung* pointed out (10th February, 1947) giving this illustration: 'As the Bucharest economic journal *Finantze si Industrie* reports, in the last year (1946—Y.G.) in Rumania there were established 355 new stock companies with a total capital of 20.3 milliard Lei.'

For years business continued to be good and speculation in the free market active, although the conditions of the working people were appalling and, after the drought of 1946-7, starvation stared them in the face. Some idea of the conditions of the people at this time can be got from '*A Survey of the Health of the People in Several European Countries affected by the War* published on November 19th, 1948, by *La Documentation Francaise* and consisting of reports of the International Committee of the Red Cross which describes the dreadful tragedy which overtook Rumania, the country most affected by the drought: 'It is difficult to convey the misery of the Rumanian population in 1947: famine prevailed in whole sections of the country, in some regions people were eating grass and the bark of trees and even clay. It is estimated that 6,000,000 persons were dependent on the government in 1947-48. Here are some of the consequences of the famine and misery which prevailed in this country: 1. The complete disappearance of little children in some districts . . . infant mortality actually reached a rate of 80% . . . 2. An increase of 511 262 165

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CHAPTER III

YUGOSLAVIA— THE EXCEPTIONAL CASE

UNLIKE THE Communist Parties in the rest of Eastern Europe, the Yugoslav Communist Party took power not through the agency of the Russian army of occupation, but through the support of the masses who had rallied round it during the years of struggle against the German and Italian invaders and their collaborators. 668

The invasion of Yugoslavia by the Axis armies led to the complete collapse of the old state structure. Croatia and Bosnia split off and formed an 'independent' Croat state headed by Ante Pavelić; Slovenia was absorbed into the German Reich; Dalmatia was occupied by the Italians; south-eastern Serbia and eastern Macedonia were annexed by Bulgaria; Baranya, Bačka and Medjumurje were taken over by Hungary; and the province of Banat and Serbia proper were ruled by a quisling government under General Milan Nedić.

It was obvious that there had not been much love lost between the non-Serbs of Yugoslavia and the old chauvinistic Serbian rulers. The fascist elements among the non-Serbs used this hostility to divert the hatred felt for the Belgrade administration into a general national hatred of the Serbs, and one of the most sordid incidents in Yugoslav history ensued. The Ustashe—the Croat fascists—began a pogrom on a huge scale against the Serbs, during which 810 thousand Serbs, men, women and children, were callously murdered and whole villages razed to the ground. Moslem fascists in Bosnia also took part in the carnage. Some villages saved themselves from annihilation at the hands of the Croats by renouncing the Greek Orthodox Church and embracing Catholicism. The Catholic hierarchy of Croatia and Bosnia undertook an 563 668 661

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563 energetic crusade against Serb 'infidels.' Serb fascists retaliated
668 by murdering Croats and Moslems *en masse* in Bosnia, Herze-
661 govina, Dalmatia and elsewhere. While engaged in this communal slaughter, the quislings of each nation—Croats, Slovenes, Moslems and Serbs—collaborated with Berlin or Rome or with both.

642 Unlike them General Draža Mihailović, the military com-
668 mander of King Peter and his government in exile, stood for a united Yugoslavia including all the nations, but united under the rule of Serbia. His Chetniks were ready to take an active part in the massacre of Croats and Moslems, and Mihailovič himself called upon the Allies to bomb Zagreb, the Croat capital, in revenge for their treachery. He even circulated propaganda maps of a future Yugoslavia in which Croatia was reduced to a small strip of land. To the Croatian, Montenegrin, Slovenian and also Serbian peasants and workers the old centralised administration symbolised by Mihailović represented the tax-collector, the gendarme and the corrupt local official. Mihailović's policy condemned him to increasing isolation and so to impotency, and finally to collaboration with the Germans and Italians against Tito's Partisans.

668 The only Party which fought for the unity of Yugoslavia on
186 the basis of the equality of all its component nations was the
563 Communist Party. The refugees from the pogroms constituted the first Partisan units, and the communal conflicts faced Tito's movement squarely with the problem whose solution proved to be decisive for its successes in the struggle for the liberation of the country from Axis occupation.

By a policy of national equality and of opposition to all communal conflicts, whether led by Ustashe and Moslem pogromists or Nedić and the Chetnik 'avengers', the Communist Party of Yugoslavia succeeded in welding the different peoples together. As Lieutenant-General Svetozar Vukmanović (better known as 'Tempo') said in his speech on the occasion of the celebration of 'Yugoslav Army Day' on 22nd December, 1947: 'The fighting of the Serbian and Montenegrin proletarian and shock brigades in Bosnia and Croatia; the fighting of Bosnian, Croatian and Montenegrin units in Serbia; the fighting of Serbian, Croatian, Bosnian, Macedonian, Montenegrin and Slovene units on the Srem front and beyond, for

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CHAPTER IV

THE COMMUNISTS TAKE CONTROL OF POLICE AND ARMY

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AT THE END of the war, the Communist Parties were participating in governments with bourgeois parties not only in the 'Peoples Democracies,' but in France, Italy, Belgium, Austria and Finland. For about two years the Communist leaders called for 'national unity' and 'order' against strikes and workers' struggles in general. In France, Italy, Belgium, Austria and Finland, at the end of the honeymoon period, the Communist Party representatives left the governments or were thrown out of them and went over to the opposition, while in the 'Peoples Democracies' they took full control into their hands. This difference was due to the fact that the Communist Party did not take control of the police and army in any of the Western European countries as they did in the East. In none of the first group of countries did the Communists succeed in getting control of the Ministry of War and only in Austria and Finland did they for a time hold the portfolio of Minister of the Interior and hence control of the police. Even in Finland they did not completely succeed in 'purging' the police of 'unreliable' elements and introducing their agents, so that when the Communist Minister of the Interior—Leino—lost his position in the government, his power to use the police as a means of resistance was very limited.

The situation in all the satellite states was very different. Almost from the beginning, the Ministers of the Interior were Communists. They used their positions to recruit the old police officers into the Communist Party, or to replace them by new Communist Party members. As there are, of course, no statistics to show the changes in the party composition of the police in these countries, one can only rely for information on fragments of news in the press. However, in the case of Czechoslovakia there is the evidence of Hubert Ripka, who was the

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66/ 625 Minister of Foreign Trade in Czechoslovakia until February, 1948, and who is now in exile. He states that on the eve of the Communist coup of February 'All the important posts in the Ministry of the Interior were occupied by Communists; in the division of the security police, of nine departmental heads, five were Communists. At the head of the three branches of the Corps of National Security Police (S.N.B.) there were only militant Communists: Colonel Krystof, Dr. Hora and Dr. Goerner. In one of the particularly important sections of the security police (Section III–2), of nineteen officers, fourteen were Communists. In the directing office of the Corps of the National Security Police, of thirteen officers, nine were Communists. At Central headquarters of the political police, the three chief posts were in Communist hands. In the intelligence services the Communists dominated, even in the lower ranks. In the Prague headquarters of the provincial S.N.B., of five high officers, four were members of the Communist Party. Of seventeen regional directors of the S.N.B. in Bohemia, twelve were Communists. Of a total of seventy high officers of the S.N.B., about sixty were members of the Communist Party'. (*Czechoslovakia Enslaved*, London, 1950, p. 195). In the other satellites, there is no doubt that the Communist infiltration into key positions in the police was even more thorough. It is an apt comment that Andrássy Ut in Budapest, in which the dreaded headquarters of the Special Security Police is found, now bears instead the name of Stalin!

661 701 A similar situation existed in the army. A symbol of the complete control of the Kremlin over the armies of the satellite countries was the appointment of the Soviet Army Marshal, Constantin Rokossovsky, as Polish Minister of National Defence (7th November, 1949) in place of Marshal Michal Rola-Zymierski.* Rokossovsky was born in Warsaw when it was part of Russian Poland, but has had as much to do with Poland as the Irish-born Field-Marshal Montgomery with his native country. He became famous, or more exactly notorious, in Poland, at the time of the Warsaw uprising, as the commander

*Rola-Zymierski was one of the few of Pilsudski's Legionnaires who took an oath of allegiance to the Germans in World War I. He was a commander of the Polish Army in the war against Russia in 1920. In 1927 he was tried and convicted on a charge of bribery, degraded, cashiered and sentenced to five years' imprisonment. The Kremlin raised him to the position of Commander-in-Chief of the Polish forces and Minister of National Defence.

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of the Russian armies which passively looked on while the Nazis massacred the rebels. After the war he was groomed for command of the Polish Army by being kept in Poland as Commander-in-Chief of the Soviet troops guarding Russia's lines of communication with the Soviet Zone of Germany. 661● 701

The Chief of Staff of the Polish Army, General Korczyc, and the Vice-Minister of Defence, General Poplawski, are also former commanders of the Soviet Army. On April 24th, 1950, the emigre Hungarian Communist monthly *Magyar Kommunista* reported that Soviet Commander General Mensikov, had been appointed 'Supervisor of the Hungarian Army.'

Besides controlling the 'national' armies the Kremlin keeps troops in four of the satellite countries, officially to protect the lines of communication leading to the Soviet Zones of Germany and Austria. These are Rumania, Hungary, Bulgaria and Poland. The only two countries with no Russian army are Czechoslovakia and Yugoslavia. The former, bordering on the U.S.S.R. and squeezed between Poland, Hungary, the Soviet Zone of Germany and the Soviet Zone of Austria (with a short frontier with the American Zone of Germany) is from the military point of view well 'looked after'. In Yugoslavia, the non-existence of a Russian army and the fact that there is no frontier with the U.S.S.R. were of no small importance in the daring revolt of Tito against the Kremlin.

Secure in their control over army and police, the Communists could proceed to the elimination of all other parties. ½ ½ [See category 116, pp. 160 - 182 -- Analyst]

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little doubt that if war had not threatened, the stuggles of the peasants and workers would have resulted in the overthrow of the dictatorial regime. 666

In Bulgaria the peasant party—the Agrarian Union—took many years to recover from the overthrow of Stamboliisky in 1923. The majority of its leaders were either assassinated or forced into exile and it was not until 1933 that the government, in response to popular pressure, allowed the uncompromising Agrarian leaders to return. Opposition developed between the right wing Agrarian leaders such as Dimiter Gitchev and Alexander Obbov who were ready to collaborate with the Government, and the left wing Agrarians, the most important of whom were G. M. Dimitrov and Nikola Petkov. Because of their radicalism, these two were called 'fellow-travellers' of the Communist Party. The *Central European Observer* of 12th January, 1945, wrote of their party that it 'has always made friendship with Russia and Yugoslavia its chief aim.' (See also *International Press Correspondence* of November 13th, 1937, praising G. M. Dimitrov as the leader of the left wing of the Agrarian League, the 'Pladne' group, called after its paper).*

There were two other very small radical peasant groups, the Hugarian 'village explorers' (now united in the National Peasant Party) and the Rumanian Ploughmen's Front.

Without taking into account the internal contradiction in the peasant parties between their progressive, democratic and reactionary chauvinistic elements and the consequent splits, it is impossible to understand how the Communist Parties destroyed such big movements so easily and quickly.

An important feature of the Communist Party policy towards the peasant parties was that of 'divide and rule.' They split each peasant party into different wings, so that they could play one off against the other. The Communists did not necessarily co-operate with the more progressive and democratic group against the other. Their policy was determined solely by expediency and not principle. For instance, in Bulgaria, 661

*Ten years later the Communist-controlled Agrarian Union paper, *Zemedelsko Zname* wrote: Nikola Petkov 'In 1931 belonged to the agrarian "Pladne" group, whose connections with foreign reactionary circles were all too well known.' (Quoted in *Free Bulgaria*, 1st October, 1947). It seems it was only to *International Press Correspondence* that this was not well known.

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● 66/ Nikola Petkov* was very popular, and so could be more independent than the Communist Party liked. This objection did not apply to Kimon Georgiev, who, as stated above, was one of the leaders of the 1923 and 1934 *coups* and, after 9th September, 1944, was an influential member of the Bulgarian Government. Similarly Obbov, the leader of the right wing of the Agrarian Union, was so unpopular as a reactionary that the Communist Party felt safe in establishing around him a National Agrarian Union. To have some idea of how restricted was the popularity of Obbov and Co. compared with that of Petkov, we need but compare the circulation of the official paper of the Agrarian Union *Zemedelsko Zname* with the paper of the Opposition Agrarian Union *Narodno Zemedelsko Zname*: on November 1st, 1945, the circulation of the former in Sofia was 1,900 copies, and of the latter 35,250 copies. To 'ally' with the publishers of *Zemedelsko Zname* rather than with those of *Narodno Zemedelsko Zname* was therefore more convenient for the Communist leaders. (Of course, when this 'coalition' ceased to be necessary for Moscow's agents, it could easily be dismissed; and since December, 1947, Obbov has disappeared from public life and according to repeated rumours is under house arrest).

Black as his record was, Maniu was a progressive and consistent democrat compared with Tătărescu. To prove this, Maniu had only to quote some of the declarations of the Rumanian Communist Party before the war, such as that of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of Rumania, on November 18th, 1937:

'The Tătărescu Government is a Government hostile to the people and hated not only by the masses of the workers and peasants but also by great sections of the middle class. Its domestic policy, consisting in a fascist transformation of the country coupled with the starvation of the masses and its foreign policy, consisting in preparation for war and for a gradual steering of Rumania into the wake of Hitler Germany, have given rise to considerable discontent among the broad masses of all sections of the population.'

'In consideration of the growing menace of fascism and war, the *Communist Party of Rumania* again appeals to all democratic

*Nikola Petkov's brother, Petko Petkov, a minister in Stamboliisky's government and after the latter's assassination the general secretary of the Agrarian League, was murdered in 1924 by Georgiev's supporters.

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parties and organisations to concentrate all forces for the mobilisation of the masses. The Party appeals to the Social Democratic Party, the trade unions and all other working-class organisations to bring about immediately unity of action and trade union unity. The Party appeals to all democratic forces of Rumania to act in concert for the immediate mobilisation of the workers, peasants and all other sections of the labouring masses of the Rumanian people and of all other nations living in Rumania in order to prevent the interference of Nazi Germany in the internal affairs of Rumania, in order to achieve the dissolution of all Nazi agencies in Rumania (the fascist and Trotskyist parties and organisations), the prohibition of their propaganda and the arrest of their leaders, and in order to set up in place of the pro-fascist Tătărescu Government a government which would adopt the slogan "for peace, liberty, bread and land" and would unite all democratic parties and organisations with the national Zaranist Party (Maniu's Party—Y.G.) in the lead.' (*International Press Correspondence*, 27th November, 1937).

In defending himself against the Communist Party's attack, Maniu tried to quote such statements as this, but of course the Communist-controlled censorship and police were on the alert. On January, 1946, the censor of the Russian Occupation Authorities struck out an item in the Opposition paper *Ardealul* which gave a verbatim quotation from the 1938 edition of the *Small Soviet Encyclopaedia* in which Maniu's party was described as anti-Fascist, democratic and pro-Soviet. (*Manchester Guardian*, 14th January, 1946). The Communists obviously could not allow Maniu to quote what they had repeatedly said about him in the years 1936-39. Now the slogan of their alliance with Tătărescu in the General Elections of 1946 (which allotted 75 seats in the new Parliament to Tătărescu's party as against 68 to the Communists) was: 'Do not vote for Maniu, who shot the workers in 1933.'

When the Russian Army entered Poland, a group headed by Andrzej Witos, Wladyslaw Kowalski, Wincenty Baranowski, Antoni Korzycki, Jozef Putek, Bronislaw Drzewiecki and Stanislaw Banczyk proclaimed themselves the leaders of Stronnictwo Ludowe, (S.L.), the Peasant Party. Some of them, like Kowalski, Korzycki, or Baranowski were simply Communists in

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661 disguise. Banczyk left the group at the end of 1945 when Mikolajczyk, the genuine leader of the S.L., came to Poland, and he joined Mikolajczyk's new Party. The choice of Andrzej Witos to be the Chairman of the S.L. was a clever step from the Kremlin's point of view. He was the brother of the old popular Peasant Party leader Wincenty Witos. He had been a member of the Peasant Party 'Piast'. When he was expelled from the party in 1928 he joined the 'Colonels', who suppressed the movement of the workers and peasants and condemned Wincenty Witos to a long period of exile. After a time, when it became clear that the peasants did not fall for the trick, and recognized the difference between the two brothers, Andrzej Witos was dropped from the S.L. leadership. To assure success to Kowalski and his friends, the authentic leadership of the old S.L. had to be removed from any political activity. Consequently the Soviet Army arrested the General Secretary of the real Peasant Party, Kazimierz Baginski, and two members of its Central Council, Stanislaw Mierzwa and Adam Bien; Baginski and Mierzwa belonged to the left wing of the Party. They were later released after having obviously been ill-treated in prison. But the threat of arrest still hung over the heads of the real leaders of the Peasant Party. When Mikolajczyk was allowed to come back to Poland (the Kremlin had to keep up an appearance of 'democracy'), he organised the old Peasant Party under the name 'Polish Peasant Party' —P.S.L. In a short time, the Party had hundreds of thousands of members and its strength was revealed in the general elections of January, 1947. In preparation for the election, the Polish security police (Urzad Bezpieczenstwa, headed by the Communist official, Stanislaw Radkiewicz) arrested tens of thousands of P.S.L. supporters. In Cracow alone, for instance 15,000 P.S.L. supporters were arrested on January 18th and released on January 19th, too late to vote. Of 864 P.S.L. candidates only 428 were allowed to stand. At 97 per cent of all the polling stations—6,430 out of 6,726—the P.S.L. was not allowed any representatives. Of the 296 polling stations which admitted scrutineers from the P.S.L., in only 35 were they allowed to be present at the count itself; at these 35 the official results gave the P.S.L. 62 per cent of the votes and the Government bloc 38 per cent.* When

*For a full report on the elections see L. M. Oak's articles in the American weekly *New Leader* of February 15th and 22nd, 1947.

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this failed to break the morale of the P.S.L., the security police began to arrest more and more regional leaders of the Party. Mikolajczyk had to flee the country, and the P.S.L. offices and papers were transferred to the subservient S.L. which could thus declare, without fear of opposition, that there was a 'unanimous' will in the two parties for fusion.* 661

The liquidation of the P.S.L. was not a difficult task for the Kremlin's agents, as the P.S.L. had the characteristics of the other peasant parties mentioned above which made it an easy prey for anyone seeking its destruction—the atomisation of the peasantry, its dispersal in small villages, its lack of a positive programme after the land reform was instituted, the influence of the division of the peasantry into different and antagonistic layers, etc. In its hopelessness the P.S.L. resorted to opportunism. This was illustrated by the position it took in a referendum held on 28th July, 1946. The Communist leaders decided to put three issues before the country aiming at a demonstration of unity: the abolition of the Second Chamber (Senate), the land reform and nationalisation and the new western frontier. Mikolajczyk called upon his supporters to approve the second and third issues, but to vote against the first. The peasant movement had always been against a Second Chamber, and it was the sheer opportunism of 'Realpolitik' which made Mikolajczyk flout the tradition of the movement. The same opportunism revealed itself in another, much more dangerous tendency, a readiness to accept the support of fascists and semi-fascists who opposed the Communists and looked for a legal framework for their activity. The P.S.L. was not very much strengthened by this, and it lost many of its more progressive supporters among the peasantry, the intellectuals, and of course the workers, because of it. Its disintegration was facilitated by such policies.

In Hungary the once powerful Smallholders' Party which in the general elections of November, 1945, won 59 per cent of all the votes, was transformed by 'purges', arrests and suppression of free speech at meetings and in the press, into a mere sham of a party. The spurious character of the present Smallholders' Party is most clearly revealed by the fact that

*For very detailed reports on the regimentation of the Polish Peasant Party see the series of articles of A. Rudzienski in the American weekly *Labor Action*.

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661 although the present Prime Minister is a member of this party, he is rarely mentioned in the Hungarian press and his name, István Dóbi, is hardly known to the people.

The peasant parties of Yugoslavia, which in the past were very strong, apparently exist officially even today, but none of them has a daily, weekly, or any other paper and none of them is represented in Parliament. Their last representative was Dragoljub Jovanović, whose record included years of imprisonment under King Alexander's dictatorship. He was a secretary of the People's Front and a Minister in Tito's Government. But how could Tito forgive him when he declared in Parliament: 'The Communists are wonderful. They liberated us from the King and the Church; it only remains for them to liberate us from the Communist Party'? He was immediately expelled from the Government, from the People's Front, from his own Serbian Peasant Party and from his position as a professor at the University of Belgrade. Thus he became the one-man opposition to the Government in Parliament. But Tito could not tolerate any dissentient voice and steps were taken to close his mouth. In February, 1947, he was beaten up and severely wounded by hooligans. (The Yugoslav press did not mention this incident). Immediately afterwards he was tried and sentenced to nine years' imprisonment.

The fate of Stalin's quislings in the sham peasant parties was often grim. Thus, for instance, Romulus Zăroni, Minister of Agriculture in the first Groza Government, and Moga and Belea, the people who had led the Ploughman's Front since its foundation in 1934 in South Transylvania, when it was a small organisation with genuine peasant suppport at least locally, were removed from any positions they held after Moscow found they had served their purpose. The two most prominent leaders of the Hungarian 'village explorers' (after the war renamed the National Peasant Party) were Imre Kovács and Péter Veres: the former resigned his post as General Secretary and succeeded in escaping abroad; the latter was driven out of public life.

687 The important part played by the Communist-controlled
625 police in the liquidation of the peasant parties not only in Yugoslavia but also in the other 'People's Democracies' is clear from the following testimony of Peter Koev, an M.P. and a

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CHAPTER VI

THE LIQUIDATION OF THE SOCIALIST PARTIES

BEFORE THEIR LIQUIDATION by the Communist Parties, the different Socialist Parties of Eastern Europe varied greatly in strength, both absolutely and relatively to the national Communist Parties. The Polish Socialist Party was incomparably stronger than its Communist rival; the Hungarian Socialist Party was much stronger than the Communist Party; in Rumania they were of about equal strength; in Czechoslovakia the Socialist Party was much weaker than the Communist Party and in Bulgaria it was weaker still; in Yugoslavia a Socialist Party scarcely existed. It is, therefore, most instructive to examine in detail the fight of Moscow against the Polish Socialist Party, while referring only briefly to the fate of the Socialist Parties in the other countries. 665

For various reasons the Communist Party of Poland (K.P.P.) was never as strong as the Socialist Party (P.P.S.) The forerunner of the K.P.P. was the Social Democracy of the Kingdom of Poland and Lithuania (S.D.K.P.i.L.) whose founder and teacher was Rosa Luxemburg. This great Marxist thinker had one very mistaken conception which proved to be a serious impediment to the Polish Party; this was her opposition to any fight for Poland's independence from Russia, Germany and Austria. The ill-fated invasion of the Red Army in 1920 further convinced the masses that the K.P.P. was indifferent to Poland's independence. Karl Radek, who knew Poland well, told the Bolshevik leaders that the Red Army's advance on Warsaw would only isolate the K.P.P. and advised against it. Although he was supported by Trotsky, his warning was ignored by the Bolshevik Party leadership. This was an important cause of the failure of the K.P.P. to gain the support of the majority of the Polish workers. Since the S.D.K.P.i.L. 661 665

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was older than the Russian Social Democracy, and hence older than the Bolshevik Party which was originally a faction of the Russian Social Democracy, it had traditions of independent thought that inevitably clashed with the rising absolutist bureaucracy in Russia. In 1923 the majority of the Central Committee of the K.P.P. supported Trotsky against Stalin in the internal Party fight, and after his triumph, Stalin liquidated the Luxemburgist-Trotskyist leadership. Later he had to liquidate the supporters of Bukharin, the President of the Comintern. Later still even the new leadership of the K.P.P. appointed in 1930, did not conform to the 'Line' and had to be liquidated. As Poland lay on the Russian border and the K.P.P. was illegal, the most important leaders of the Party were usually in U.S.S.R., and were thus involved in the big purges of the thirties. Many of them were executed or perished in forced labour camps—Domski, Sofia Unschlicht, Warski-Warszawski, Kostrzewa-Koszutska, Prochniak, Huberman (brother of the violinist), Winiarski, Sochacki, Lenski, Rval, Zarski, Wandurski and Jasienski. (For full details of the fate of the Polish Communist leaders in Russia see the article of P. Olchovski in *Narodnaya Pravda,* Paris, September, 1950). Apparently the purge so decimated the K.P.P. leadership that the Russians found it necessary officially to dissolve the Party (1938). (Their excuse that a large number of police spies had infiltrated into the Party would have been a reason for reorganising, not abolishing it). Shortly after the liquidation of the K.P.P. an event occurred which made any Kremlin supporter hateful to the Poles—the Stalin-Hitler Pact which laid Poland open to invasion. No Pole could forget Molotov's glee when he said before the Supreme Soviet on October 31st, 1939: 'Instead of the enmity that was fostered in every way by certain European powers, we now have a rapprochement and the establishment of friendly relations between the U.S.S.R. and Germany . . . One swift blow to Poland, first by the German Army and then by the Red Army, and nothing was left of the ugly offspring of the Versailles Treaty . . . ' Nor could any Pole forget or forgive Molotov's message to the German ambassador in Moscow at the end of the invasion of Poland by Germany and Russia: 'I have received your communication regarding the entry of German troops into Warsaw. Please convey my congratulations

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668 The war was a great test of strength, moral and physical, for the P.P.S. The Party was mainly responsible for the decision to defend encircled Warsaw in September, 1939. The 'Colonels' recognised this and their spokesman said: 'The workers' defence smacks of socialist revolution'. Having had long experience in illegal work since the time of Tsarism, the P.P.S. quickly accommodated itself to the new conditions of struggle under the German heel. For conspiratorial purposes, the Party adopted the name 'The Movement of the Working Masses of Poland', and was generally called the W.R.N. from the initial letters of its slogan: 'Freedom (Wolność) Equality (Równość) Independence (Niepodległość).' The following quotation describes the activity of the W.R.N. under the German occupation: '. . . a large secret organisational network of the W.R.N. comprised, already at the end of 1940, over 2,000 units. The underground Socialist Press and pamphlets reached, in the course of the war, the amazing figure of 2 million copies. A Socialist military organisation was created under the name of O.W.P.P.S. (Socialist Insurgent Military Detachments), which was included, as a separate and distinct organisation, in the national scheme of the Underground Home Army (A.K.). There was, besides, a Socialist Militia, organised both on a territorial and on a factory basis. All these organisations played an outstanding role, *inter alia* in the Warsaw Uprising of 1944.' (A. Ciolkosz, *The Expropriation of a Socialist Party*, New York, September-October, 1946, p.3). The price paid by the P.P.S. for this resistance to the German occupation was high. 'Notwithstanding the strict observance of all conspiratorial rules—in which the P.P.S., owing to her old revolutionary tradition excelled anyone else—heavy losses could not be avoided. Three members of the Central Executive Committee of the Party (Niedziałkowski, Czapiński, Topinek) and 28 other members of the Supreme Council of the Party, perished at the hands of the invaders. Altogether about 700 prominent leaders of the Party met their death under the occupation. From these figures the losses amongst the rank and file can be imagined.' (Ibid. p. 4).

661 When the Soviet Army entered Poland in 1944, one of the main objectives of the Russians was to destroy the P.P.S.[1] and, to achieve this, they used the same technique as they used

[1] [The Socialist Party -- Analyst]

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against the Peasant Party. While the major part of Poland was still under German occupation, a congress was held at Lublin, in the Russian Zone of Occupation on 10–11th September, 1944, which called itself the 25th Congress of the P.P.S. A new Party executive was elected. Edward Osubka-Morawski was elected chairman of the Central Executive Committee, Boleslaw Drobner Chairman of the Supreme Council of the Party, and Stefan Matuszewski, Secretary of the Central Executive Committee. Their friends filled the other places in the leading committees. Osubka-Morawski became Chairman of the Lublin Committee and afterwards of the Provisional Polish Government in the name of the P.P.S.

But the credentials of Osubka-Morawski and his friends were forged. Before the war Osubka-Morawski was a minor co-operative official and a member of the P.P.S. but by no means one of its leaders. During the war, he left the P.P.S. and joined a tiny new group called Polish Socialist Workers' Party (R.P.P.S.). Drobner joined the P.P.S.—after having been excluded from it in 1936—on the same day as he was appointed Chairman of the Supreme Council of the Party. In the so-called 25th Congress of the P.P.S. there was not one member of the authentic Central Executive Committee or the Supreme Council of the Party and not one Socialist member of the former Polish Parliaments.

The leaders of the authentic P.P.S. were prevented from claiming their right to reconstitute the Party or from building a new party. Instead they were cruelly persecuted. The General Secretary of the old P.P.S., Kazimierz Puzak, had given a lifetime of service to the Party. He joined it in 1903. In 1911 a Tsarist court condemned him to eight years' hard labour to be followed by lifelong exile in Siberia; he spent six years in irons and in solitary confinement in the fortress of Schlüsselburg, the most notorious of all the Tsarist prisons. He was released in March, 1917, by the Russian Revolution and became General Secretary of the P.P.S. in 1921. During the war he was chairman of the Underground Parliament, and thus one of the main leaders of the Resistance. Later he was arrested by the Russian Army, released, and then re-arrested; he died in prison in April, 1950. Antoni Zdanowski was a prominent leader of the P.P.S. between the wars, was Assistant

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General Secretary of the Polish T.U.C. and editor of its paper. He too was a leader of the resistance movement during the war, and in spite of Osubka-Morawski and the P.P.R. was elected chairman of the Warsaw official P.P.S. Council in 1945 by the members of the Warsaw branch of the official P.P.S. After leaving the official P.P.S., he was arrested and was eventually murdered in prison. Cohn, another leader of the P.P.S., who was for six years in a German prisoner-of-war camp, was once more imprisoned. The same fate has befallen Antoni Pajdak, Tadeusz Szturm de Sztrem, Josef Dziegielewski, Wiktor Krawczyk, Wladyslaw Wilczynski, Stanislaw Sobolewski, Adam Obarski, Boleslaw Galaj and others. One of the most popular P.P.S. leaders was Zygmunt Zulawski, leader of the Party for forty years, for many years the chairman of its Supreme Council and General Secretary of the T.U.C. To keep up the appearance of democracy, the P.P.R. leaders allowed him to become a member of Parliament while preventing all his friends from standing for election as Independent Socialists. Single handed he fought a bitter struggle till his death in September 1949.

But even after the elimination of the real P.P.S., the official P.P.S. was a threat to the P.P.R., since of the two, the Polish workers preferred the former. For example, in 63 elections to shop committees held at the end of 1945 in the largest industrial district of Poland, out of a total of 928 seats the P.P.R. gained only 193 (21 per cent) while the Socialists gained 556 (64 per cent); the rest were divided thus: official trade union common lists of P.P.S. and P.P.R., 117 (12.6 per cent); Democratic Party, 14; Christian Labour Party, 10; Polish Peasant Party, 2; others (non-party), 36.* In many cases even members of the P.P.R. did not vote for their Party lists in the shop committee elections. This is clear from the complaint made on December 8th, 1945, by Gomulka, then General Secretary of the P.P.R.: 'There were elections to the Shop Committee of the "Fablok" factory (in Cracow). Our Party cell in that factory comprises 250—270 people. And in these elections we have not gained a single seat'. If people join a party from fear of being victimised, they will take the first opportunity of showing their real attitude to it.

*For particulars see *Robotnik Polski*, London, January, 1946.

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In spite of the pressure exerted at the November, 1945, 665
Congress of the T.U.C., the P.P.S. had the support of two thirds of all the delegates, and Kazimierz Rusinek of the pre- [467]
war P.P.S. was elected General Secretary of the new Central Committee of the Trade Unions.

The workers' support for the official P.P.S. had its effect on the Party's leaders. When at the regional conferences of the P.P.S. in Cracow, Katowice and other towns there was almost unanimous opposition to fusion with the P.P.R. or even to a united front at the elections against Mikolajczyk's party (P.S.L.), even Osubka-Morawski had to support this policy, although of course with reservations. On August 6th, 1946, he wrote in *Robotnik*: 'It seems to me that the greatest difficulties (in the maintenance of a united front—Y.G.) arise from the fact that one partner operates too much under the slogan of "the leading party" . . . A united front may not be based on the principle that the one rules, while the other subordinates himself, that the one lays down the conditions while the other submissively nods his head . . .' Two days later the P.P.R. daily *Glos Ludu* countered this by implying that the 'difficulties' to which Osubka referred were, at least in part, due to 'elements inimical to democracy' in the P.P.S. (Quoted in the article 'The fate of Polish Socialism,' by R. in *Foreign Affairs*, October, 1949). A few weeks later, on August 29th, the P.P.S. and P.P.R. leaders were called to Moscow to discuss the question of the United Front. This meeting was followed by another, and at last on November 28th, 1946, the P.P.S. leadership yielded to the pressure of the Kremlin. It seems that the fate of Puzak, Pajdak and the others impressed Osubka even more than the pressure from the rank and file of his own party.

But the P.P.R. leaders nevertheless did not forget Osubka's 665
temerity in writing as he did on 6th August, 1946, and im- 661
mediately after the victory of the 'united front' in the sham elections of 19th January, 1947, he was removed from the Prime Ministership and from being Chairman of the P.P.S. Central Executive and replaced by Jozef Cyrankiewicz.

But the pressure of the rank and file members of the P.P.S. against capitulation to the P.P.R. continued unceasingly. On May Day, in 1947, the P.P.R. strongly urged a fusion of the

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665 two parties. It also acted; in all factories, members of the
661 P.P.S. who opposed fusion began to be 'purged'. On 7th May, Adam Kurylowicz, a member of the P.P.S. who had been General Secretary of the Trade Unions since 1947, and previously, from 1918 to 1939, President of the All-Polish Railway Workers' Union, wrote an article in *Robotnik* called 'The Defence of the Workers against Abuses and Arbitrary Measures', in which he accused the P.P.R. of setting up a regime of terror in the factories. 'From all parts of the country, he wrote, 'fresh reports keep coming of injustices suffered by the workers. The elements alien to the working class behave in arbitrary fashion, and act "like bosses". They fire and hire workers without taking into account the opinion of the workers of the plant, scorning the laws, conquests, and social rights of the workers. A clique of self-seeking politicians is being formed. These new dignitaries have discovered that a party book is more important than technical qualifications'.

The reply to the impertinence of the P.P.S. was a political trial staged by the security police. One of the defendants, accused of membership of W.R.N., 'confessed' that there were 'no actual differences between the W.R.N. and the (official) Socialist Party'. The threat to the official P.P.S. was all too clear, and although the Party Congress of 14—17 December, 1947, did not welcome the P.P.R. call for a merger, the P.P.S. leadership knew that the game was up and on March 17th, 1948, Cyrankiewicz declared that the merger would be carried out. 82,000 members of the P.P.S. out of the total of 800,000 were expelled from the Party and many of the recalcitrant leaders were removed. Kurylowicz was removed from his post as General Secretary of the trade unions and replaced by Tadeusz Cwik, an old Communist Party agent. Rusinek, Osubka-Morawski, Stanislaw Piaskowski, Drobner and another eight members were removed from the Central Executive Committee of the Party and Szwalbe and another eleven members were removed from the Supreme Council (meeting of the P.P.S. National Council, Warsaw, September 18–22, 1948). The whole executive committee of the P.P.S. in Lodz was removed and other local committees followed suit. The heresy-hunting of Gomulka* occurred at the same time, and

* See pp. 281-3.

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this increased the opposition of the rank and file members of the P.P.S. to unity with the dictatorial P.P.R. and also led to more stringent measures against oppositionists. But by December, 1948, the fusion was an accomplished fact and the 'United Polish Workers' Party' (Z.P.P.R.) was born. The quisling Cyrankiewicz said of the Unity Congress: 'This congress is the greatest event in Poland since Kościuszko's rising'. Cyrankiewicz is probably thus aspiring to get from Stalin the Order of Suvorov—the hangman of Kościuszko's rising!

The liquidation of the Socialist Parties in the other satellites followed a roughly similar course. But because these Socialist Parties were relatively weaker than the Polish Socialist Party, their collapse was due not only to police pressure and the presence in some of them of Russian armies, but to the feeling of many of the rank and file members that the parties were not strong enough to stand up to the pressure of the Communist Parties without allying with the bourgeoisie, and yet that such an alliance would be too dangerous, because a victory of the bourgeoisie over the Communist Parties which had the support of the majority of the workers, would lead to a defeat of the workers themselves and a bourgeois terroristic dictatorship, in short to fascism. The members of the P.P.S. felt confident that if it were not for the Russian army of occupation, they could get rid of the Communist Party dictatorship, and suppress any fascist elements. But many socialists in the other satellite countries thought it would be impossible to oppose at one and the same time the Communist Party dictatorship and a nascent fascist dictatorship. Hence there were different tendencies within the Socialist Parties of Czechoslovakia, Hungary, Rumania and Bulgaria—on the one hand, the followers of right wing conservative leaders like Károly Peyer, Kosta Lulchev or C. Titel Petrescu, who collaborated with the bourgeois parties, on the other, those who worked with the Communist Party under such leaders as Zdeněk Fierlinger, Árpád Szakasits and Dimitri Neikov.* The third tendency,

*The fate of these 'fellow-travellers' in Czechoslovakia, Hungary and Bulgaria was not better than that of Osubka-Morawski and Co. in Poland. After they had served their purpose they were pushed aside. Fierlinger, who had been given the post of Vice-Premier as a reward for his services in the February coup, was on April 25th, 1950, relegated to the Ministry of Church Affairs. Szakasits on April 24th, resigned his post as President of the Hungarian Republic on the

(cont. overleaf)

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661 favouring an independent socialist policy, which predominated
665 in the P.P.S., was very weak in the other Socialist Parties. The greater the feeling of impotence, the weaker was this wing.

661 The Communist Party leaders did their best to identify every opposition to themselves with resurgent fascism. This was not difficult, as remnants of the fascist bourgeoisie existed and it was always possible either to reveal or invent a fascist plot. The secret police can always keep in reserve some of the 'lunatic' fringe of fascists in order to use them at a suitable moment.

The knowledge that the Kremlin would not abdicate its authority without using all the forces at its disposal, the belief that the people of the satellites themselves could not put up a successful opposition, the conviction that their 'liberation' in a Third World War would mean in reality the destruction of the population and civilization, all these factors contributed to produce a feeling of hopelessness, and hence capitulation.

This was particularly true of the serious and thoughtful workers in the Socialist Parties. The Communist leaders are well aware of this and not only rely on the demonstration of the military strength of the U.S.S.R. but play on the real fear of war.

665 After years of pressure on all sides from Moscow agents of the Kremlin, there is not one Socialist Party today in the whole of Eastern Europe. All of them have been merged with the Communist Parties.

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grounds of ill-health; this looks very much like an excuse as a fortnight later his son-in-law, Deputy Paul Schiffer, was expelled from Parliament. Neikov had better luck; he died on February 16th, 1948. (At the time of his death he held a relatively unimportant position, that of Vice-President of the Presidium of the National Assembly). The fate of other 'fellow-travellers' was also grim. Thus for instance in Hungary György Marosan, Deputy Secretary of the united Party and Minister of Light Industry, disappeared during a visit to Russia (his resignation was announced on August 5, 1950); Istvan Riesz, a former Social Democrat and Minister of Justice, was arrested in June, 1950, and died in prison; Pál Justus, a former Social Democrat and member of the Central Committee of the united Party, was condemned to imprisonment for life at the Rajk Trial. Similar cases from the other 'People's Democracies' can be quoted by the dozen.

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CHAPTER VII

SLAV AGAINST TEUTON

ONE OF THE MOST appalling deeds of the Communist Parties of Eastern Europe—especially in Czechoslovakia and Poland—was the brutal expulsion of millions of people, both men and women, young and old, from their homes, for no reason but that they were Germans and not Slavs. As V. Gollancz says, the expulsion of the Germans is 'among the greatest crimes since Genghis Khan.'

The Kremlin hoped to derive many advantages from this expulsion. The Slavs of Eastern Europe would naturally look for leadership to the greatest Slav nation, Russia. Moreover, the threat of the return of the millions of Germans who had been expelled would create a barrier of suspicion and hatred between Eastern Europe and the Western Powers who control Western Germany where the majority of those expelled found refuge. As a result of the expropriation of the Germans, most of the industry of Czechoslovakia and Poland—the two most industrialised countries of Eastern Europe—could be transferred to the state (i.e., to the control of the Communist Party) while 'national unity' and 'order' were maintained. The inhuman explusion of the Germans would inevitably demoralise the Slavs, both morally and intellectually, as it would accustom them to the most brutal crimes and would involve them as accomplices in these crimes. (Of course, with its usual unscrupulousness, the Kremlin now appeals to German nationalism. Instead of Slavs against Teutons, the Russians and Germans, the two greatest peoples, as Stalin said in his message of October 13th, 1949, must stand together against the imperialist West.)

Let us begin with a description of the persecution and expulsion of the Germans in Eastern Europe after the war.

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Number of Germans Expelled

167 R. H. M. Worsley, in an article called 'Mass Expulsion', in
563 *Nineteenth Century* (December, 1945) gives the following sum-
661 mary of the expulsion of Germans:

Country of Permanent Residence	*Number Involved*	*Statistical Source*
East Prussia	2,333,301	*Statistisches Jahrbuch fuer das Deutches Reich*, census for 1933.
Pomerania	1,920,897	
West Prussia	337,578	
Lower Silesia	3,204,004	
Upper Silesia	1,482,765	
Total	9,278,545	
German minorites in the Baltic States	200,000	Estonian, Latvian, Lithuanian data.
War-time German immigration to:—		
Poland	800,000	I.L.O., *Displacement of Population in Europe* p. 38
Occupied Eastern Territories	300,000	
German minority in Poland	1,059,000	Polish census, 1921.
War-time immigration to Czechoslovakia	480,000	I.L.O., *Displacement of Population in Europe*, p. 38
Sudeten	3,231,688	Czechoslovakian census, 1930.
German minorities in:—		
Hungary	520,000	Hungarian census, 1920.
Rumania	740,000	Royal Inst. of International Affairs, *South-Eastern Europe*. p. 8.
Yugoslavia	513,472	
Grand Total	17,062,716	

This table somewhat exaggerates the extent of the expulsions, for it is based on pre-war statistics, and during the war a considerable proportion of the populations of these areas was killed, and before the end of the war many had fled from the areas. In addition a number of Germans remain in Eastern Europe: 500 thousand in Rumania, 250–300 thousand in Hungary, 200 thousand in Czechoslovakia—altogether about a million. E. M. Kulischer, in his book *Europe on the Move* (New York, 1949) says that the total number of Germans expelled after the war was 11,200,000 (p. 302). (This does not include the 4 million Germans who fled in 1945–6 from the Soviet zone of Germany to the Western zone, nor those who fled after this date). Whichever figure is taken of the number of Germans who were expelled or who fled from the East, it exceeded even the number expelled and recruited for labour by Hitler during the war. On this point Kulischer writes: 'The

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total number of foreign workers in Germany, including prisoners of war and foreign civilian workers officially recognized as foreigners, but excluding workers from Alsace-Lorraine and Sudetenland, exceeded six million in 1943. In 1944 the high mark of eight million was reached (of whom nearly 2 million were p.o.w.'s—Y.G.)' (p. 264). He adds: 'Altogether, it can be estimated that the displacement of 30 million or more people during Hitler's rule over Europe has resulted in the permanent shifting of 2–3 million. The final redistribution of Europe's population was due to Germany's defeat, which opened the way for a new and in this case permanent migration of another twenty-five million*, probably the greatest in European history' (p. 305).

Considerations of space make it necessary to choose between alternative methods of describing the character of the expulsions, either by relating more or less in detail the fate of the Germans in one of the East European countries, or briefly surveying the fate of the Germans in them all. The former method is preferable, and the treatment of the Germans in Czechoslovakia will be taken as the example.

The Sudeten Germans

The Sudeten Germans were not new inhabitants of Sudetenland. They came there about 700 years ago, when Spain was still in the hands of the Arabs, and some centuries before America was discovered. They were as numerous as the populations of some of Europe's small states. The 1930 census put their number at 3.2 million, as compared with Norway's 2.8 million, Finland's 3.6 million, Denmark's 3.7 million and Switzerland's 4.1 million.

The social structure of the Sudeten German community was not very different from that of the Czechs or Slovaks except that the percentage of workers was higher (a little higher than among the Czechs, and much higher than among the Slovaks). According to the 1930 census, the national communities comprised different social groups in the following proportions:—

*In this is included some millions of non-Germans: Poles who had migrated from the area annexed by Russia (about 4 million) to the Western territories taken from Germany, Czechs and Slovaks who migrated to Sudetenland, displaced persons who returned to their countries, Jewish refugees who migrated to Palestine and other countries, etc.

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in Nazi Germany (even though this was the result of war preparation) brought the Sudeten Germans to flock to the banner of Henlein, the leader of the Sudeten Nazis. In the elections of 19th May, 1935, he polled 1,249,530 votes, that is, 62–3 per cent of the total, while the Social Democratic Party polled 299,942 votes (as against 506,761 in 1929), that is, about 15 per cent of the total. The Communist Party vote is estimated at about 120,000, or about 6 per cent of the total (Wiskemann, op. cit. p. 206).

At that time the Communist Party leaders had not yet adopted the idea that the Sudeten Germans were inherent Nazis, and explained the victory of Henlein as the result of the social and national circumstances in which they were placed. *Imprecor* of 1st June, 1935, wrote: 'In a manifesto of the Central Committee the Party states the reasons for the election victory of the Henlein faction. The reason for this victory is the policy of the Czech bourgeoisie which has led to terrible misery and poverty and to the national oppression in the German districts . . . The Henlein fascists can be beaten only by a policy which gives the working masses of the German districts work and bread and liberates them from the yoke of national oppression.'

What was the fate of the Sudeten Germans who opposed Henlein to the end? 400,000 voted against him, and these with their families made up 700–800 thousand people. When the Munich Agreement which gave Sudetenland to Germany was signed, the most active Sudeten anti-Nazis were compelled to flee from Sudetenland to the interior of Czechoslovakia. But more than 20,000 of them were handed over to the Gestapo by the Czechoslovak Government of the time, which collaborated with Hitler, and an additional 10,000 had to return to Nazi-controlled territory because they were refused asylum. Only 4,000 Sudetens were admitted to other countries. Altogether some 40,000 Sudetens were interned in Nazi concentration camps, and about 20,000 died there. This figure bears honourable comparison with the number of victims in other countries which came under the Nazi yoke.

In 1940, Fierlinger, the Social Democratic 'fellow-traveller', who was later to head the Government which expelled the Germans from Czechoslovakia, said: 'Henlein in his struggle

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Hysterical Chauvinism

The war ended, the tune changed.[1] The Communist Party discovered two advantages to be gained from the expulsion of the Germans, first the awakened political consciousness of the masses could be diverted into a reactionary, chauvinist channel, secondly, the majority of the industries (previously owned by Germans) could be transferred to the state without any need for the active intervention of the working class and without the bourgeoisie being able to oppose such a transference. Gottwald declared on 12th May, 1945: 'The new Republic will be a Slav state, a Republic of the Czechs and the Slovaks. We will deprive the Germans and the Hungarians, who have so heavily sinned against our peoples and the Republic of their citizenship and severely punish them.' The Communist Minister of Information, Václav Kopecky, speaking over Radio Prague on 25th May, 1945, said: 'The Czechoslovak army is already prepared for the purification of the border area of the Republic from Germans and Hungarians, and for the restoration of the wealth of these old Slav areas into the hands of the Czechs and the Slovaks.' In a speech at Liberec (Reichenberg) he said: 'We will clear Liberec of the German enemies, and we will do it so thoroughly that there will remain not the smallest place where the German seed could grow once more. We shall expel all the Germans, we shall confiscate their property, we shall de-Germanize not only the town but the whole area . . . so that the victorious spirit of Slavdom shall permeate the country from the frontier ranges to the interior.'

The Communist Minister of Education, Zdeněk Nejedly, said on 29th May, 1945: 'We do not know any progressive Germans, nor are there any.' 'Germany, once the most feared power in Europe, does not exist any more; for us it means that the German question is once and for all solved. We will continue the work of our predecessors; we will *purify Prague and the border districts,* and we are in the position to do so *because we have a great helper in doing this—the Red Army.* Not every army would have helped us in doing this. . . Now is no time for vacillation. We cannot say we will look neither to the West nor to the East, but will wait. We must today say "Yes" or "No". We must decide *either for the East or for the West. I do not believe that it is a problem for the Czech people.* We belong to the great

[1] [See category 116, p. 188 -- Analyst]

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186 Slav bloc at the head of which the great Russian people stands
661 with its chief, Stalin.' With a rising fervour of chauvinism he
563 goes on: 'Consider Middle Europe—there are Hungarians. What can they do? Then the Rumanians—what can they do? And what can the Germans do? They have no future anywhere. *We are greater than all of them*; with our culture we can stand up to all of them. And they will see that they in their hopeless situation will be happy only to follow our leadership. How many composers are there in Europe who are the equal of Smetana? How many painters of the rank of Mánes and Aleš? How many historians the equal of Palacký? How many scientists of the greatness of Purkyně? . . . Our culture must be national . . . Nothing but cultural ruins surround us . . . We will first of all carry our civilization to the border regions, and there will plant our national cultural ideal.' (Quoted by *Der Sozialdemokrat*, June, 1945).

The Communist Party outdid the Czechoslovak bourgeoisie in chauvinist ardour, but the latter did its best to prove that it was not less anti-German and chauvinistic than the Communists. Thus, for instance, Dr. Ivo Ducháček of the People's Party (Catholics) said in the Provisional National Assembly, March, 1946: 'We want to exclude nobody from this success, though it is true that, for instance, the Communist Party had in the years 1939, 1940 and 1941 no such clear and uncompromisingly Slavic conceptions in this matter as it has today. However, I regard it as a downright falsification of history and as a building up of legends, which I do not hesitate to call pre-election legends, if the Communists, of all parties, assert that the credit for the transfer of the Germans from our country is due mainly to them or almost alone to them' (*Lidova Demokracie*, March 9th, 1946, quoted in *Der Sozialdemokrat*, London, May, 1946).

In this nationalistic competition, the Communist Party had certain advantages. First, it could point to the fact that nowhere, except in the Russian-controlled territories, were Germans evicted *en masse*. Secondly, and of greater importance, the expulsion was organised and German property redistributed by a Communist Minister of the Interior, Václav Nosek. The Security Corps which carried out the physical expulsion was headed by members of the Communist Party. (In Poland, too,

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the Communist Party was in charge of the expulsion of the Germans from the Western territories, and the settlement of Poles in their place. There Gomulka, then General Secretary of the Party, was responsible).

Because in the popular view the Communist Party bore the greatest responsibility for the expulsion, there was a much higher percentage of Communist supporters among the new Czech settlers in the Sudeten areas than in any other part of the country, even than in the big towns where large numbers of workers were concentrated. In the 1946 general elections, in the districts of Jablonec and Turnov the Communist Party polled 70 per cent of the votes, in Kadaň 62 per cent, Falknov 59 per cent, in Aš over 50 per cent, and so on. (The situation in the Western Territories of Poland was similar, hence the Communist leaders insisted on giving highly disproportionate representation to these areas in the general elections of January, 1947).

The whole of the Sudeten population, except some tens of thousands of indispensable skilled workers, was expelled from the country. Those who remained had to do compulsory labour for a minimum of twelve hours a day, and, if the employer thought it necessary, fifteen hours. The National Committees organised this compulsory labour. According to their decrees, the German workers in Czechoslovakia were forbidden to belong to trade unions, were excluded from social benefits, had to give a quarter of their wages as reparations to the state, were not entitled to holidays, and their children were not allowed to attend school.

In the first few days after the defeat of the German army in Czechoslovakia, some cracks were made in the wall of national animosity by open fraternisation between Czech and German workers. For instance, a number of rank and file communists in Bodenbach began to publish a daily paper in Czech and German; it was called *Rudý Prapor—Rote Fahne.* It was short-lived, for Nosek immediately prohibited the publication of any German paper or of any paper in two languages one of which was German.

It is ironical to note that the excesses against the Germans in Czechoslovakia were taking place at the same time—with the Red Army's entry into Germany—as the Russian

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563 661 authorities, trying now to win the ear of the German people, attacked Ilya Ehrenburg for his extremely vicious propaganda against the Germans (*Pravda*, April 14th, 1945). A contradiction? It is easy enough to wriggle out of contradictions by singing different songs in different languages and in different countries. For those Germans who were interested in the fate of their brethren in Czechoslovakia, there was a ready answer: all the Sudeten Germans were responsible for the Henlein movement! Thus, for instance, P. Reimann wrote on 2nd June, 1945: 'A German anti-fascist movement in Czechoslovakia does not exist. There were in the best case in Czechoslovakia individual people of German origin who, separated from any movement in the German population, as individuals supported the Czech national liberatory movement.' 'That also earlier layers of the working class organised by the Socialists were intoxicated by the Nazis *proves* the news in the British press of the mass flight of the German miners from Brüx region. The conception that the German working class were not an exception to the general development of the German minority under the Nazi regime is by this and similar news to our sorrow confirmed.' (Quoted by *Der Sozialdemokrat*, June, 1945). This appeared in *Einheit*, whose sub-title is 'Sudeten German anti-Fascist Fortnightly', and which for years gave out that the Communist Party had considerable influence in the anti-Nazi movement in Sudetenland. As late as 22nd May, 1945, *Einheit* published a letter from a Czech soldier who visited a German glass factory near Pilsen, saying: ' . . . we can be proud. Our people and those who were before Social Democratic functionaries—all of them, notwithstanding the terror, have held through and followed our thoughts, and all of them said to me that they waited for our return with gladness. What we built they defended and will continue to defend.' *Einheit* soon forgot this. The Communist Party policy in Czechoslovakia was now unequivocal: there was no place for Germans there. From now on any mention of the speeches given over Radio Moscow to the Sudeten Germans is betrayal of the Party line.

After the war, the Communist Party made out not only that all the Sudeten Germans—except for a few isolated individuals—were Nazis, but that they became Nazis despite the fact that

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in the Czechoslovak Republic they enjoyed full equality with other citizens. Gustav Beuer, a former Communist Party Deputy from Sudetenland, wrote: '. . . the treatment of the German minority by the Republic (of 1918-1938—Y.G.) as a whole was such as to make it possible for the Germans to adapt themselves to the new conditions and to become part and parcel of the Slav country had it not been for their deeply-rooted hostility toward everything Slav.' (*New Czechosovakia and her Historical Background,* London, 1947, pp.190–1). This is directly contrary to all the Communist Party had been saying for more than fifteen years about the injustice meted out to the Germans in Czechoslovakia.*

The expulsion of the Germans from Czechoslovakia cannot be explained as the result of the people's spontaneous hatred. The majority of the Slovaks, who are not Teutons but Slavs, supported Tiso, Nazi puppet ruler of Slovakia, no less readily than the majority of the Germans supported Henlein. The number of Slovak political prisoners who died in Nazi concentration camps was smaller than that of the Sudeten Germans, and there were relatively fewer victims even among the Czechs.†

The Czechs suffered much less than the Yugoslavs under the Nazi occupation. 1,700,000 of the inhabitants of Yugoslavia died under the German occupation, while 200 thousand (of whom more than 100,000 were Jews) died in Czechoslovakia. The crimes of the Sudetan fascists against the Czechs and Slovaks reveal far less savagery than the crimes of the Croat Ustashe who murdered hundreds of thousands of Serbs, men, women and children. Yet, in Yugoslavia, as we have seen,

*See the quotation from *International Press Correspondence* of 1st June, 1935, quoted above. Or to take another example, on 13th November, 1933, the Communist Party group in the French parliament refused to associate itself with the tributes paid by the French Government on the occasion of the 15th anniversary of the establishment of the Czechoslovak Republic: 'No, we do not associate ourselves with your manifestation of sympathy addressed to the Government of Czechoslovakia . . . We do not forget that at present the masters of this country hold national minorities under a yoke . . . All our sympathy goes to the labouring masses of Czechoslovakia, to the national minorities, Slovak, Jewish, German, Hungarian, oppressed by the central power of Prague.' (Quoted by Maurice Ceyrat, *La Trahison Permanente,* Paris, 1948, p. 25).

†By the way, it must not be forgotten that after the German annexation of Bohemia-Moravia and the creation of Tiso's 'Independent Slovakia', the Kremlin closed the Czechoslovakian Legation in Moscow and appointed a Soviet delegate to Tiso's government.

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national hatred and persecution of Germans was never a general feature of Communist Party policy, and for a period Tito's army even contained a unit of German anti-fascists.

Nor can the anti-German policy in Czechoslovakia be explained as the by-product of a resistance movement against the Nazis. A week before the occupation of Prague by the Russian Army there was no armed resistance among the Czechs (unlike the Slovaks) to the German occupation, and up to two or three days before the occupation Radio Prague, which was under German control, could boast of the fact that 'many Czechs are working for the defence of the Homeland' (i.e., working for the Germans). The conflict with the local German population did not occur until after the defeat of Germany. For many months, indeed for over a year, the Czech press repeatedly attacked the many Czechs in Sudetenland who were friendly to the Germans. All the evidence shows that the expulsion was imposed by the organised pressure of the Czech Communist Party and the bourgeoisie on a disoriented people.

In all two and a half million Germans whose ancestors had lived in the country for hundreds of years, were expelled from Czechoslovakia. Five hundred years after the popular democratic movement of Hus which united peasants, artisans and workers both Czech and German, more than twenty-five years after Lenin praised the Communist Party of Czechoslovakia, at one time the third biggest Communist Party (after the Russian and German Parties), which united the revolutionary workers, Czech and German, Slovak and Hungarian, there took place a terrible persecution of the Germans which can be compared in severity only to the persecution of the Jews by Hitler. Hundreds of pages could be written to describe the horrors of this persecution, which constitutes a vital part of the reactionary policy of the Communist Parties in Czechoslovakia and Poland. The following quotation from '*A Petition to the Secretary General of the United Nations and the Foreign Secretaries of the Signatory Powers of the Potsdam Agreement from the Parliamentary Delegation of Sudeten Labour in Great Britain, 1st March, 1947*', gives a few examples of the sufferings inflicted on the Germans. The events in one small town—Saaz (Žatec) will be described. The population of Saaz in 1930 was 18,061.

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Atrocities Committed Against the Sudeten Germans

'Arno Behrisch, a former Secretary of the German Social Democratic Party in Saxony, collected the following facts from the famous hop-growing centre of Saaz in North-Western Bohemia. Behrisch was a refugee in Sweden during the war. He was imprisoned by the Swedish authorities for his part in pro-Allied activities. He now lives at Hof in Bavaria as socialist party secretary and is vice-chairman of the Bavarian Social Democratic Party. In 1945 and 1946, he and his wife, Hildegard Behrisch, interviewed many Sudeten refugees and the following report is the result of their investigations.

'On Sunday, June 3rd, 1945, the Czech authorities ordered all male Germans of Saaz between 13 and 63 years of age to appear in the market place at 6 a.m. Those who were late were terribly beaten up with whips, clubs and planks. Two men were shot at once because they ventured a protest. 5,000 men and boys were marched off to the neighbouring town of Postelberg, about 11 miles away. They had to march at a quick pace in the glowing sun and those who lagged behind were shot on the road. At Postelberg, the men were interned in an old cavalry barracks. They had to spend the night in the barrack-yard, lying flat on the ground. The Czech guards threatened to shoot anybody who would get up. Every hour the guards fired volleys over the rows of prostrate men. Czech guards walked among the men and beat those who stirred a little. At dawn a command in Czech was heard; it was not clearly understood, it could have meant zůstat, stay put, or vstát, get up. Some of the men got up, others remained on the ground. At once the guards opened fire and whole rows of the victims were mown down with tommy-guns. Those who were only wounded were finished off by a shot in the neck from behind.

'The next night, the men were herded into the stables. 400 men were locked up in a stable for 28 horses. Hundreds of men had to spend further nights in the barrack-yard. No food was given to the prisoners for the first three days; later they received a piece of bread and some potato soup. Again the guards shot men during the night and also in daylight. A German engineer was shot by a Czech soldier who shouted or all to hear: "This is the *coup de grace*, this will happen to all of

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563 you!" Other Czechs shouted: "Our doctor, our hospital, our
661 medicine is the shot in the neck!"

'On June 5th, the men were sorted out according to their political antecedents. Communists and former inmates of German concentration camps were sent back to Saaz. S.S.-men and Nazi political leaders, former policemen, etc. were driven back into the stables, some into a pig stye. Former German soldiers remained in the barrack-yard. The men locked up in the stables suffered from lack of fresh air. 10 men became hysterical, 50 fainted. When others shouted to the guards outside that there were some who had gone mad, the guards answered: "Kill them!" There were only two small openings in the wall for ventilation. When the prisoners asked to leave the door open for a while, the Czechs answered by shots through the holes in the wall. Several men died, some more were shot in the morning. In the stables, the troughs were filled with water. The prisoners had to dip their heads into them. When they could no longer stay with their faces under water and raised their heads, they were beaten on the neck.

'Day and night Czechs came to fetch some of the men out and beat them up. This happened practically every two hours. In this the soldiers were helped by civilians who brought sticks, clubs, whips and cables for the beatings. Several men were beaten to death.

'*June 6th.* A lorryload of Czechs with rubber truncheons and whips arrived and started an orgy of beatings in the worst S.S.-fashion. The German victims had to undress completely and were beaten terribly for a whole hour. The maltreatment lasted until they collapsed and fainted. Then they were revived with showers of cold water and the whipping of the bleeding men went on. Czechs smashed the genitals of some men by stamping on them with their boots. The cries of the tortured were frightful. Five boys, aged 13 to 16, were beaten murderously because they had moved a few steps from their place. The children groaned and yelled for their mothers. Then the five children were stood up against the wall and the Czechs raised their rifles. The boys cried: "Don't fire, let us live!" A volley was fired and the five boys fell to the ground. This was witnessed by thousands in the barrack-yard. What could have been the crime of these children?

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'Then the Czechs started another sport, well-known in Nazi concentration camps, that of making the prisoners [illegible] each other. They were made to box and beat each other and when they did it not thoroughly enough, they were beaten by the Czechs. Some were tortured by wooden splints being driven under the finger-nails, others again by treading on the genitals. One man was whipped on the genitals, to those of others the torturers tied a rope and pulled heavily. Torturers also pressed with their hands the testicles of some victims until the men fainted from pain. A German chemist was shot in the evening.

'Of 300 ex-soldiers, driven into a small stable at night and ill-treated as already described, five men died the same night. Among them was a well-known anti-Nazi. The guards [illegible] themselves by firing shots into the room. The crime of the men was that they had been drafted into the German army.

'Gradually groups of prisoners were taken away. Some were sent to concentration camps, others to forced labour. The latter included well-known anti-Nazis and even half Jews. A number of men were taken to nearby woods and shot. Finally, a number of men, among them Herr Kotrasse, one of the witnesses, were marched back to Saxe on June 10th. On their way they were beaten without interruption. A Catholic priest was shot because he could not march fast enough.

'*June 12th.* The first transport of transferred people left Saxe. They were selected for their inability to work. Among them was a number of invalids who were not allowed to take their artificial limbs with them. The transport consisted of 200 men and 800 women and children. All their belongings had been taken away from them. At the station of Kamenz a girl was fetched out from one carriage, taken to the compartment of the escorting soldiers and raped. At Ober-Georgenthal near the Saxon frontier the train stopped and the people had to march across the mountains. One woman died on the road. The marching people were beaten, especially the disabled soldiers who could not keep pace. After covering nearly 30 miles, the deported were handed over to the Germans at the frontier. They had refused to work, the Czechs said.

'*June 13th.* All women were summoned to a barracks at Saxe. There, altogether 14,000 women and children were kept during

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563 661 the night, herded together in the barracks, in stables, in garages, and also in the yard. At nightfall, hordes of Czech guards entered the room where the women were, and mass rape started. By flashing torches the victims were selected and raped on the spot. There were terrible cries. Women who tried to resist were beaten unconscious and then raped. Women and girls were also taken away and never seen again. These mean acts were repeated night after night. There was no sanitation and soon diseases started. There was no food for the first three days, and very little afterwards. The women had been ordered to bring their house keys along with them; they were taken away and given to Czechs for looting the houses. Within two days 40 babies had died in their mothers' arms in the barracks. The women were kept there for many weeks and the number of deaths increased. Babies died every day, up to 15 a day. From June 25th to 30th not less than 76 children lost their lives. The mothers themselves had to carry or cart the little corpses to the cemetery. There were 32 persons in a room of 5 square yards. The mothers were constantly told that their children would be taken away from them. 70 women sent to forced labour outside had to leave their children in the barracks.

'A Catholic priest who had ministered at the interment of a Czech soldier, was approached by a sobbing old woman when he left the cemetery. She whispered: "There are prams with dead babies in the park near the cemetery. Oh, please, ask the supervisor to give them a Christian burial!" The priest induced the supervisor of the cemetery, a Czech, to do so, but the supervisor disapproved strongly of what was going on.

'The women sent away to forced labour on farms and elsewhere received no pay and were locked up in barns and stables.

'*July 1st.* At 4 a.m. women and children were awakened by shouts and pistol shots. They were taken in groups of fifty into a room where Czech soldiers were sitting on chairs. The women were made to undress and in front of the children searched in the most shameless manner. Purporting to search for hidden valuables, the soldiers searched the women's genitals as well. There were new outrages: when the soldiers came to a menstruating woman they smeared the secretions into her face.

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Only young women were searched, the older ones were only sneered at. Afterwards, the victims had to stand for hours in the sun and did not get any food that day. 563 661

'The commandant of this women's camp was a Czech named Marek, known as "blood-dog" and as "the executioner of Postelberg." He kept thinking up new tortures. He selected 40 women and girls for weeding the railway track. In the evening they were driven into an empty truck and raped by Czech soldiers.

'On the 28th July, 150 women were sent to a warehouse to sort out German army stores. Afterwards they were taken to a school and beaten up. The Czechs alleged that the women had intended to steal the stores for "werewolves". A group of 50 women returning from farm work was later attacked by the same soldiers, also beaten up and raped.

'It was not before November that the last survivors left the S.S. barracks in the Trnovaner Strasse in Saaz. All the time the food consisted of a little black coffee, less than half a pound of bread per day, and nothing else. Children were given 3 ounces of bread a day. The death-rate among children increased. Finally, the women with their children were distributed among Czech farmers to do slave work.

'The head of all the camps in Saaz was a Czech named Haas, a criminal with 15 previous convictions. Now he was made Chief of Police at Saaz . . .

'The total number of Saazers definitely murdered by the Czechs exceeds 2,000.

'The events described in the foregoing report represent only a fraction of what happened in the stricken town . . . The outrages were not individual cases but part of a system which may well boast of having attained the fullest Nazi standard.' (pp. 36-41).

The suffering of the Sudeten Germans did not cease after their expulsion. What they endured while being transported to Germany can be gauged from the following two testimonies:

'By the end of August (1945—Y.G.) a transport of Sudeten Germans arrived in Berlin. It came from Troppau in Czech Silesia, and was 18 days on the way. Four thousand two hundred women, children and aged people were counted before the transport departed from Troppau. One thousand

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563 three hundred and fifty were left when the transport arrived in
661 Berlin.—A Sudeten clergyman now in Berlin.

'I have seen a large proportion of these people (Sudeten deportees), numbering nearly a million, who are literally starving on the road. I saw children and babies lying dead in the ditch by the roadside, dead of hunger and disease, their arms and legs often not thicker than a man's thumb.—A Dutch observer writing from Saxony.' (American Friends of Democratic Sudetens, *Tragedy of a People—Racialism in Czechoslovakia*, New York, 1946).*

*A description of the brutal methods of expelling the Germans from Eastern Europe with particular reference to the territories annexed to Poland is given with many quotations from the press in V. Gollancz's book, *Our Threatened Values*, London, 1946, pp. 96-105.

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CHAPTER VIII

OTHER NATIONALISTIC CONFLICTS

The Hungarians in Czechoslovakia

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THE FATE of the Hungarians who had lived in Czechoslovakia for a thousand years was better than that of the Germans, but it was nevertheless unenviable. On 27th September, 1945, Gottwald declared: 'We are trying to establish the principle that we cannot live side by side with the Hungarians in one state.' (*East Europe*, 3rd October, 1945). The Czech Communist Party daily, *Zemedelsko Noviny* said on 3rd December, 1946: 'The presence of that minority is a threat to the integrity of our State, and thus to the peace of Europe.' (*East Europe*, 11th December, 1946). The plan for their expulsion, said Gottwald, 'met with the full understanding and approval of Generalissimo Stalin and Minister Molotov.' (*East Europe*, 28th August, 1946).

These words were translated into deeds. At the Paris Peace Conference on 14th August, 1946, the Hungarian Foreign Minister made the following declaration which the representative of Czechoslovakia did not deny: '650,000 Hungarians who live in Slovakia were deprived of their citizenship and even of their most elementary rights. Their property has been confiscated. No Hungarian may undertake any manual or intellectual work. He may not claim justice, he may not become a member of a trade union, he may not exercise his civic rights. The use of Hungarian in offices and even in churches and in public places is prohibited and subject to penalties. No newspaper or periodical in Hungarian may be published in Czechoslovakia, nor is it allowed to speak over the telephone or send wires in Hungarian. Hungarians may not own radio receivers. All Hungarian schools are closed, and even tuition in Hungarian is subject to penalties. The Czecho-Slovak authorities have dismissed all civil servants and private employees of

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563 Hungarian descent, and they have suspended payment of
661 their pensions. Disabled servicemen, war-widows, and orphans do not receive their relief allocations.'

At the same time, the Czechoslovak government, according to the Hungarian press, was employing compulsory Hungarian labour in the mines of Kladno (Compulsory Labour Bill for 'Germans, Hungarians, traitors and collaborators', signed on February 21st, 1946).

The Hungarian press, in particular the Communist Party papers, pointed out that many of the Hungarians expelled from Czechoslovakia had been sent by the Nazis to Dachau and had been awarded high Czech decorations for this. Many were members of the Hungarian Communist Party, József Révai, editor of the Communist Party daily, *Szabad Nép*, criticising the treatment of Hungarians by the Czechs 'whose war time record is very different from that of the Yugoslavs—yet Marshal Tito grants the Hungarians full equality', asks: 'Does it make no difference to the Czecho-Slovaks whether they establish a democratic or a reactionary state, as long as it is a national state?' (15th July, 1945). On the same day Rákosi, General Secretary of the Hungarian Communist Party, condemned the expulsion of Hungarians from Czechoslovakia and the 'excesses resembling the old fascist methods.' (*East Europe*, August 1st, 1945). (He was tactful enough to put the blame on the local officials). On another occasion, May 26th, 1946, Rákosi attacked *all* the parties of Czechoslovakia, including the Communist Party, when he said: 'We had a feeling that every Czecho-Slovak Party wanted to bake its own electoral cake by the fire of its treatment of the Hungarians. Let us hope that now the elections are over, the Hungarians in Slovakia will at last be treated in a way becoming a democratic country'. (*East Europe*, 5th June, 1946).

The brutal treatment of the Hungarians, however, contined. Even in the days of the *coup d'etat* of February, 1948, the Czechoslovak Government did not omit to issue instructions prohibiting Hungarians, even if they were citizens of Czechoslovakia, and had excellent records in the anti-Nazi struggle, from being members of the Action Committees.

Altogether a hundred thousand Hungarians were expelled from Czechoslovakia.

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Only after the events of spring 1947 in Hungary which consolidated the power of the Communist Party, and the February, 1948, coup in Czechoslovakia did Moscow consider nationalistic conflicts between Hungarians on the one hand and Slovaks and Czechs on the other superfluous. And duly in autumn 1948, an agreement was concluded between Czechoslovakia and Hungary regularising the status of the Hungarian minority in Slovakia. In January, 1949, the Czechoslovak parliament decided to restore full civil rights to the Hungarians, and to allow them to remain permanently in the country. 563 661

Conflicts Between Rumanians and Hungarians

The bone of contention between Rumania and Hungary was Transylvania in which nearly 2 million Hungarians live. Within 24 hours of the time that the Groza government was established, northern Transylvania, taken from Rumania by Hitler and given to Hungary, was given back to Rumania, even though the majority of its population is Hungarian. Vishinsky openly admitted that this was a reward for the establishment of the Groza Government. Pătrăşcanu, then leader of the Rumanian Communist Party, gratefully acknowledged the fact that Russia was responsible for the transfer. Strange as it may seem, Rákosi also used the conflict to pay a tribute to Russia, stating on 1st June, that at the Paris Conference Britain and the U.S.A. decided on the transfer because of their interests in Rumanian oil. 'Rumania's oil production is 10 times that of Hungary and naturally those countries which are interested in oil, share out their sympathy or antipathy according to whether 100,000 or 1,000,000 tons of oil are at stake. Naturally this fact has an important bearing on their political judgment. Thus when the Hungarian-Rumanian frontier issue was raised at the Paris Conference, the U.S.A. suggested that Rumania should regain her 1940 frontiers without change. Britain immediately agreed to this proposal and the matter was settled.' (*East Europe*, 12th June, 1946). 563 728 [382]

The Hungarian Communist Party demanded on 12th August, 1946, that the Peace Settlement be changed to allow at least that part of Transylvania inhabited by Hungarians to be given back to Hungary. At the same time the Rumanian

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CHAPTER V

THE EPIDEMIC OF TITOISM IN EASTERN EUROPE

SINCE TITO's excommunication his ghost has haunted Eastern Europe, and a large number of leaders of the Communist Parties have been accused of being bewitched by it, and have been 'purged.'

Poland

In September, 1948, Warsaw announced the 'unanimous resolution of the Central Committee of the Polish Workers' Party' and the 'unanimous approval' of this resolution by the All-Polish Conference of the active members of the Party to remove from office Wladislaw Gomulka, the General Secretary of the Party. Gomulka was vice-Premier and the real head of the administration (the Premier, a member of the P.P.S., being merely a figurehead). He was also Minister of the Regained Territories, the industrial heart of the country. Within the space of a few months Gomulka was removed from all these positions, as well as from membership of the Political Bureau, and even of the Central Committee. Some light was thrown on the technique of the 'purge' in the speech of Boleslaw Bierut, who replaced Gomulka as General Secretary of the Party. The main—if not the only—proof of Gomulka's 'deviation' which was cited, was an article which appeared in the *Trybuna Wolnosti*, the central organ of the P.P.R. on . . . 1st July, 1944. It might be thought that this criticism appeared four years too late, or that the article was criticized previously. No. But at least one would assume that the article was written by Gomulka. No. It was written by another leader of the Party, Benkowski. But it is a warning to Gomulka and the other leaders of the Party that if they do not toe the line, their deviations will be ante-dated

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66/ to 1944, or even earlier, and the 'mistakes' of one leader will be used to implicate others.

Gomulka was perhaps singled out for attack because he was not one of the P.P.R. leaders who came to Poland from Moscow at the end of the war—in Pijade's phrase—'in planes with pipes in their mouths.'

A few days after the disgrace of Gomulka, Warsaw announced that nearly all the leaders of the P.P.S. (which was on the verge of merging with the P.P.R.) were also removed: Kazimierz Rusinek 'resigned' the chairmanship of the Central Executive Committee—the highest body—of the P.P.S.; Edward Osubka-Morawski, Prime Minister for the years 1945-6, Stanislaw Piaskowski, Drobner and another eight members, were removed from the Central Executive Committee. The Chairman, Stanislaw Szwalbe and eleven members 'resigned' from the National Council of the P.P.S. The new leadership, in true Machiavellian style, allotted the task of denouncing Gomulka, who did not recant abjectly enough for his 'nationalism' to his closest collaborator, Zenon Kliszko, a member of the Political Bureau, Secretary of the Party, and the man in charge of the Party cadres from 1944 until September, 1948. His attack was loudly applauded by the Congress. Later Kliszko himself was disgraced for 'nationalist deviations.'

On 7th September, 1949, after a silence of more than a year, the Warsaw daily, *Trybuna Ludu* published an article by Gomulka attacking Tito. One might have thought this the end of the 'Gomulka affair'; but far from it. With the political degradation of being attacked by his former collaborator and being made to denounce the 'nationalist' Tito, the stage was set for physical liquidation as a warning to anyone else who might dare to deviate. The attack of Kliszko on Gomulka, and of Gomulka on Tito follow the same pattern as the letters of Radek and other future victims of the Moscow Trials to *Pravda* at the time of the Zinoviev-Kamenev Trial, in which they called their former friends in the leadership of the Party 'mad dogs', a 'counter-revolutionary Fascist Band', and appealed to 'our beloved leader, Stalin' to have 'no mercy' on 'the contemptible murderers and traitors.'

A few weeks after his attack on Tito, the *coup de grace* was administered to Gomulka. This happened four days after the

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announcement of the appointment of the Soviet Marshal Rokossovsky as Poland's Minister of Defence. At a plenary meeting of the Central Committee of the Polish United Workers' Party, held on 11–13th November, 1949, Bierut accused many members of the Dombrowski Brigade—the Polish unit of the International Brigade in Spain—of being fascist police spies who had taken leading positions in the new administration of Poland. Those responsible for this situation were Gomulka, Kliszko and General Marian Spychalski. The last-named had been commander of the Dombrowski Brigade, head of the Information Department (i.e., the Political Department) of the P.P.R. military organization under the Nazis, and then of the Armia Ludowa, the P.P.R.-controlled Polish army, and was, until recently, Deputy Minister of Defence and a member of the Political Bureau. In the report of the Unity Congress at which Gomulka was the only object of attack and Kliszko his main denouncer, Spychalski's speech and a photograph of him take a prominent place, second only to those of Bierut and Berman. Now the three, Gomulka, Kliszko and Spychalski, are in prison for 'aiding and shielding fascists'. At the same time Lechowitz, former Minister of Food Supply, Dr. Stanislaw Kowalewski, former Vice-Minister of Agriculture, Ryszard Borowy, Vice-Minister of Forestry, and Tadeusz Kachanowitz, Vice-Minister of Labour and Social Welfare, were arrested.

This is by no means the end of the 'purge' of 'Titoists' in Poland, and Bierut, in an article published just after the Plenum, indicated that the net would be spread more widely still. He said: 'It is sufficient to analyse a little more deeply our specific conditions in Poland to conclude that the dangers of subversive work in the form of espionage, sabotage, conspiracy and terror, has, in our country, both objectively and subjectively, a wider basis than anywhere else'. (*For a Lasting Peace, For a People's Democracy!* 9th December, 1949).

Bulgaria

In Bulgaria the 'Titoists' were led by Traicho Kostov, who was not a friend of Tito, having come into conflict with him on the question of Balkan Federation, but was also not a completely obedient lackey of Stalin.

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661 Before his dismissal (and later arrest, trial and execution), Kostov was the Political Secretary of the Central Committee of the Party, Acting Prime Minister and President of the Government Committee of Economic and Financial Affairs. The Bulgarian Communist press, on Kostov's fiftieth birthday, described his long struggle for the Party and the high posts he held in it, having been a foundation member in 1919, a member of the Central Committee in 1924, leader of the Communist Parliamentary Group (officially called 'Workers' Party' at the time), and editor of its paper in 1931-2, a member of the Balkan Secretariat of the Comintern in 1932-4, a member of the Political bureau of the Party since 1935, its secretary since 1940, and General Secretary since 1944. He spent more than ten years in prison, and was one of the most prominent martyrs of the Bulgarian working class between the world wars; in 1924, he was tortured so badly that, fearing he might betray his comrades, he tried to commit suicide by throwing himself from the fourth floor of the Police Headquarters in Sofia; he remained alive but with both legs broken and a hunchback. The Central Committee of the Party addressed him with these words: 'Great are your achievements, Comrade Kostov, as the builder of the party, as the teacher and instructor of the party members. Under your leadership and inspired by your heroic life, thousands of Communists were educated into unquestionable loyalty to the party. Your deep Marxist-Leninist theoretical knowledge, your great culture, your famous industry and steadfastness, your modesty, your iron will, your unquestionable loyalty towards the party and the working class are those Bolshevik characteristics which beautify your whole fighting life, for ever united with the struggle of the party. A loyal colleague of Comrade Dimitrov and his first assistant, you are today one of the most loved and respected leaders of the party, a great statesman and builder of new Bulgaria.' (Quoted by *The World Today*, April, 1950).

It was generally expected that when Dimitrov died, his mantle would naturally fall on Kostov's shoulders.

When, on 5th April, 1949, he was removed from his post as Acting Prime Minister and member of the Political Bureau, the official explanation was: 'Traicho Kostov has pursued an insincere and unfriendly policy toward the U.S.S.R. during

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the trade negotiations and on the question of furnishing economic information to Soviet representatives. He has tolerated nationalistic tendencies within the state apparatus and, in fact, has encouraged them . . .' A few months later he was indicted and executed for having been a spy of the Bulgarian police since 1942 and of the British, American and Yugoslav Intelligence services since 1944.

Many other high officials were 'purged' together with Kostov. Actually the 'purge' was so extensive as to suggest that the whole state and Party administration was in a critical position. The large majority of the senior officials 'purged' were declared to be 'fascist spies'. Some idea of the extent of the 'purge' may be gained by a scrutiny of the list of their names. To avoid the possible error of including anyone removed simply as part of administrative routine, those officially declared fascist spies will be marked with *.

*Prof. Ivan Stefanov, Minister of Finance.

*Nikola Pavlov, Deputy Minister of Construction, Cadre Secretary of the Central Committee and Chairman of the Central Commission of the Party.

*Prof. Petko Kunin, Member of the Political Bureau up to 8th January, 1948, and since an alternate member; Minister of Industry (also Minister of Finance for two months after the arrest of Stefanov).

*M. Sakelarov, Minister of Public Works.

*S. Tonchev, Minister of Transport and former Secretary of the Fatherland Front.

General Dobri Terpeshev, Vice-Premier and President of the State Planning Commission. (He was in prison for fourteen years, and was twice condemned to death; during the war he was Commander in Chief of the Bulgarian Partisans), expelled from all his posts 'for failure to cope with work and blunted vigilance.'

*Yordan Bozhilov, formerly Minister of Foreign Trade.

*Ljubomir Kairakov, formerly Minister of Electrification.

M. Gochev, formerly Minister of Industry, member of the Central Committee of the Party, expelled from the Central Committee.

*Nikola Nachev, Assistant President of the Government Committee for Economic and Financial Affairs.

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661 *Lulcho Chervenkov, Deputy Minister of Transport.
*Vasil Markov, Deputy Minister of Transport.
*Georgi Petrov, Deputy Minister of Finance.
*Boris Simov, Deputy Minister of Industry.
*Nikola Govedarsky, Deputy Minister of Internal Trade.
*Dimiter Kochemidov, Deputy Minister of Internal Trade.
*Bonyu Petrovsky, Deputy Minister of Foreign Trade.
*Ivan Tutev, Director of the Ministry of Foreign Trade.
*Georgi Andreichin, Foreign Under-Secretary.

Popencharov, Deputy Foreign Minister and Director of Communist Propaganda Services.

General Ivan Kinov, Chief of the General Staff, 'relieved of his post' and expelled from the Central Committee of the Party. He was a commander in the International Brigade during the Spanish Civil War.

General Boyan Balgaranov, Chief of the Army Political Department, 'relieved of his post' and expelled from the Central Committee of the Party.

*Peter Vranchev, Head of Army Intelligence.

*Lev Glavinchev, Deputy Commander of the Frontier Guards.

*Stefan Bogdanov, Director of the State Security Police.

*Georgi Ganev, Director of the State Security Police and Member of the Political Bureau.

*Nikolai Zadgorsky, Director of the State Security Police.

*Tsanyu Tsonchev, Governor of the Bulgarian National Bank, head of the Government Office of Statistics.

Grosev, former General Secretary of the Fatherland Front, expelled from the Central Committee of the Party.

B. Kopchev, K. Dobrev, I. Bacharov, K. Stoychev, expelled from the Central Committee of the Party.

It is yet difficult to judge what is the significance of the removal of Anton Yugov from his key position as Minister of the Interior after he had held it for five years. He was also removed from his position as vice-Premier. His removal may be the prelude to his complete disappearance.

Of the sixteen Ministers who were members of the Communist Party before the 'purge', only six (including Anton Yugov) have retained their positions. Of the nine members of the Political Bureau, the highest body of the Party, only

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Vulko Chervenkov and Vladimir Poptomov (and possibly Georgi Chankov) are left.

But the axe did not stop here, for in the Kostov trial alone, another 55 Bulgarian 'Kostov agents' besides the defendants, were mentioned, the majority of them high officials of the Party and state; these too were 'purged'. After the trial another few dozen high officials were removed, and thousands of smaller officials followed suit. On 16th June, 1950, a government spokesman announced that in the previous twelve months 92,500 members and candidates had been expelled from the Communist Party (in June, 1950, there were 428,876 members and 13,307 candidates). And even after this mass purge, G. Grozev, the Chairman of the Central Committee of the Dimitrov Union of People's Youth declared that the Party was still suffering from 'nationalism, cosmopolitanism, Kostovism and Titoism'. (*East Europe*, 29th June, 1950).*

Hungary

The 'purge' in Hungary was extensive, but incomparably smaller than in Bulgaria. The first and most important person to be 'purged' was László Rajk.

Rajk, like so many of the others who were liquidated, had a fine record. He joined the Hungarian Communist Party in 1931 at the age of twenty-two, and was arrested a year later. After a year's imprisonment he continued his work under the very difficult illegal conditions then prevailing. In 1936 he went to Spain and became the secretary of the Hungarian unit of the International Brigade (the Rákosi Battalion), a position which he kept until the disbandment of the Brigade. He was badly wounded in Spain and retreated with the other members of the Brigade to France, where he was interned for more than two years. In February, 1941, he was released from the internment camp, and went back to Hungary. In October of the same year he was arrested again, and this time spent three years in prison, whence he continued to direct the activities of the Communist Party. With the retreat of the German army from

*It is interesting to compare these facts with the attack of the *Daily Worker* of 7th May, 1949, on the Western press, for reporting such 'lies' as the removal from the Central Committee and arrest of Kostov. Unable at that time to stomach such a 'calumny', now it cannot understand why such a fuss is made about the liquidation of the majority of the leaders of the Government and Party.

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661 Hungary in October, 1944, he, with other political prisoner was taken to Germany, where he was interned in a concen tration camp. Hitler's fall gained him his release. Back i Hungary he soon became prominent, being acclaimed by th Party as 'the organiser of the Hungarian Resistance'. H became the Secretary of the Budapest organisation whic included the great majority of the members of the Hungaria Communist Party (after fusion with the Social Democrat called the Hungarian Working People's Party), a member o its Central Committee and Political Bureau, the Secretary o the Party and the General Secretary of the Independen Front (the mass front organisation of the Communist Party) During the two years 1946–8, when the Communist Party wa striving to take full control of the state apparatus, Rajk hel the key position in the Government, that of the Minister of th Interior. He later became Minister of Foreign Affairs. Accord ing to *Szabad Nép*, the Communist daily, he drew rousing cheer on May Day, 1949, from the Budapest crowd who acclaime only Rákosi more vociferously. An official edition of Rákosi' speeches which appeared a few days later referred to Rajk a one of the most popular of Hungary's leaders and an uncom-promising fighter for People's Democratic Hungary. In the General Elections of 15th May, he stood at the head of the list of candidates in his constituency and was elected to Parliament.

Barely a month later, with no previous warning, Rajk was once more imprisoned, and the whole press, recently so lavish in its praise, was clamouring against this 'fascist spy,' nor could one person be found who protested against this treatment in the press, or even proposed that judgment be withheld till the trial!

There were other important defendants at the trial. Dr. Tibor Szönyi was, until his arrest, secretary of the Hungarian Communist Party (and of its successor the Hungarian Working People's Party), a member of the Central Committee of the Party and of its Central Control Commission, and an M.P. Szönyi's deputy, András Szalai, was a member of the Central Committee of the Party. Dr. Pál Justus was a member of the Executive of the Social Democratic Party and then a member of the Central Committee of the Hungarian Working People's

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Party, an M.P. and Vice-President of the Hungarian Radio Corporation. General György Pálffy was Chief of Staff of the Army, Deputy Minister of Defence, the head of the Party Organisation in the Army, a member of the Central Committee, and an M.P.*

Czechoslovakia

The last country to consolidate the 'People's Democracy', Czechoslovakia, was also the last in which the epidemic of Titoism rose to the surface.

At a meeting of the Central Committee of the Communist Party on 24–26th February, 1950, Vilém Novy, the Editor-in-Chief of the Communist Party's most important paper, the daily *Rude Pravo* was 'exposed as an agent of imperialism', then removed from the Central Committee, expelled from the Party, and arrested. At the same meeting, Milan Reiman, the Department Chief in the Prime Minister's Office, was also accused of being an 'imperialist spy' and it was announced that he committed suicide while his case was under investigation. On 14th March, it was announced that Dr. Vládo Clementis had resigned his post as Foreign Minister. On 24th May, at the 9th Congress of the Communist Party of Slovakia, Vilém Široký, who replaced Clementis as the Foreign Minister of Czechoslovakia said: 'Comrade Clementis emigrated after the occupation of the republic in 1939. After the conclusion of the Soviet-German pact, which had such great importance for progressive humanity because it crossed the low and treacherous plans of the Anglo-American Imperialists, he stood up against the Soviet Union and adopted the attitude of a class enemy.

'He maintained this attitude of a class enemy during the Soviet-Finnish conflict and during the liberation of the

*Since this book has been at the printers, new 'purges' have taken place in Hungary. Kádár, who replaced Rajk as Minister of the Interior, was arrested a few months after the trial of his predecessor. On 21st April, 1951, Radio Budapest announced that Dr. Sandor Zold, who replaced Kádár, was removed, no reason for this being given. Kádár and Zold had both been leaders of the Communist Party. On 18th July, 1950, Dr. Istvan Riesz, Minister of Justice, resigned. On 5th August, Marosán, Minister of Light Industry, resigned. Both of them had been members of the Social Democratic party that fused with the Communist Party. On 29th August they were both arrested. The Chief of Staff of the Army, General László Solyom, was arrested. On 27th May, 1951, it was reported from Budapest that the Kremlin had sent General Cvetaiev, the war-time commander of Moscow, to take over the command of the Hungarian Army.

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661 Western Ukraine and Western White Russia by the Soviet Armies.

'In London, Comrade Clementis was associated with the bourgeois emigrants surrounding President Beneš, and his activities and his broadcasts were all on the bourgeois line. He also maintained this attitude as Under-Secretary and as Minister of Foreign Affairs. This deviationist did not consider future developments after the war in terms of class warfare'. The accusation repeatedly hurled against him at the Congress was that of the 'Titoist' evil of nationalism.

At the same Congress Široký attacked a number of other very high Communist leaders. First of all there was Dr. Gustav Husak. He had remained in Czechoslovakia throughout the German occupation, and was the chief Communist leader of the Slovak uprising against Germany in 1944. He was the chairman of the Slovak Board of Commissioners—that is, head of the Slovak local Government—up to 5th May, 1950. Now he is attacked as a 'nationalist' and a 'follower of Clementis'. With him another member of the Slovak Board of Commissioners, Dr. Ladislav Novomésky, and Dr. Karol Smidke, President of the Slovak National Assembly and of the Slovak Association of Partisans, were attacked.

In addition, the following people were arrested: Dr. Evžen Loebl, Deputy Minister for Foreign Trade, and a group of high officials of the Ministry who 'oriented Czechoslovak foreign trade towards the West to the detriment of extended trade with the U.S.S.R. and the People's Democracies'; Dr. Klinger, head of the Information Department of the Foreign Ministry; Bohdan Benda, former military secretary of the Prague regional committee of the Communist Party, an 'agent of the fascist Tito clique'; Josef Stavinoha, secretary of the Olomouc regional committee of the Communist Party, 'a Gestapo agent'; and three M.P.'s, Andrew Roba, Jan Lorko and Dr. Josef Bruha.

There is a hint of the possible removal of the Minister of the Interior, Vaclav Nosek, a close friend of Clementis and Novy, with whom he was in London during the war, and the only survivor of the emigrant Communist group in London who still holds an important position. On 23rd May, the establishment of a special Ministry of Public Security was announced;

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up to then the Security Department was part of the Ministry of the Interior under Nosek. The head of the new Ministry is Ladislav Kopriva, one of the three or four most important people in Czechoslovakia and a reliable Kremlin agent, who is more vocal than anybody else in denunciation of the 'Titoists'. 661

It is not clear what is the significance of the removal of General Ludvik Svoboda from his position as Minister of Defence (25th April, 1950), and General Drgac from his position as Chief of Staff (5th May, 1950).

That the end of 'Titoism' in Czechoslovakia is not yet in sight, is clear from a recent criticism of *Rude Pravo* published in the Cominform paper: '*Rude Pravo*, in particular, shows a falling-off on the questions of the struggle against the fascist Tito clique'. (*For a Lasting Peace, For a People's Democracy!* 8th December, 1950).*

Rumania

In Rumania the attack against 'bourgeois nationalism' in the leadership of the Party began four months before the Cominform-Tito rift. There the victim was Lucretiu Pătrăscanu, who for more than three years was Minister of Justice, and for many years Chairman of the Central Committee of the Party. He, too, has an impressive past, to which *International Press Correspondence*, the official organ of the Comintern, on

*Since the book has been at the printers, a new anti-Titoist "purge" has taken place in Czechoslovakia. On 22 February, 1951, Gottwald, in a speech to the Central Committee of the Party, named Otto Sling and Mrs. Marie Svermova as the leaders of a conspiracy of "traitors and plotters" which had planned to seize power and follow in the footsteps of Tito. Otto Sling had been the secretary of the Czechoslovakian Communist Party unit of the International Brigade in Spain, an M.P. and the Secretary of the regional Party Committee of Brno, the second biggest city in the country. Mrs. Svermova, the widow of Jan Sverma, a war-time Resistance martyr, was a member of the Presidium of the Central Committee of the Communist Party, head of the Organisational Department of the Secretariat of the Central Committee and Deputy General Secretary of the Party. On 27th February it was announced that Clementis, Novomesky, Husak and Mrs. Svermova were arrested. On 9 March, Dr. Čepička, the Minister of Defence, declared that Dr. Clementis had many accomplices in the army ranging from 'generals to privates' and included General Rejcin, deputy Minister of Defence and General Kopold of the General Staff.

The wide compass of the "purges" is shown by the fact that up to 9 February, when the *third* wave of "purges" in the Party since it has been in power was taking place, of 1,846,957 members and candidate members examined, 143,590 had been struck off the membership lists and 25,954 had been expelled, which is tantamount to being handed over to the police. Of the 19 regional committees of the Party, the Chairmen or senior officials of six had been arrested for complicity in the Clementis "plot". One cannot but agree with what "Borba" said of the "purges" on 1 March, 1951: 'Hundreds of thousands of expelled members cannot all be labelled "spies, traitors, bourgeois nationalists".'

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661 14th November, 1936, paid tribute, speaking of his 'eighteen years of active struggle in the Rumanian working-class movement', and paying homage to him as the 'leader of the first Communist group in the Rumanian parliament'. He was the editor of the Party paper *Scanteia* and the recognised theoretician of the Party, was one of the leaders of the Party as early as 1921, and continued so for the following twenty-eight years. But he had one great fault in the eyes of Moscow—he did not live there for a long time. Anna Pauker, the Foreign Minister, was there during the 'purges' of the thirties, and showed her mettle by not flinching when her husband was executed as a 'Trotskyist', so she is a more trustworthy leader in the eyes of the Kremlin.

After the Tito-Stalin rift, the only prominent Rumanian leader to be 'purged' was the Vice-Mayor of Bucharest, Constantin Doncea. Doncea had been a comrade-in-arms of the General Secretary of the Party, Gheorghiu-Dej, in the great railway strike of 1933, and had been his principal defender in court. Now he is accused of 'bourgeois deviations.'

Albania

Here five members of the Central Committee were removed from their positions for pro-Tito tendencies. Koçi Xoxe, who was Vice-Premier, Minister of the Interior and General Secretary of the Central Committee of the Party was executed. Pandi Kristo, President of the State Control Commission, member of the Politbureau and Minister without Portfolio; Nosti Kerentyi, President of the State Planning Commission and member of the Political Bureau; Vaske Koletzki, Deputy Minister of the Interior; Vargo Mitrojorji, one of the Chiefs of the State Security Police, and Huri Nota, a member of the propaganda section of the Central Committee, were all tried and condemned to long terms of imprisonment (May, 1949). A year later another group of leaders of the Party was 'purged', led by another secretary of the Party and member of the Political Bureau, Abedin Shehu.

'Free Greece'

000 An early victim was Markos Vafiades, the head of the Government of 'Free Greece', and the Commander-in-Chief of

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CHAPTER VI

ANTI-TITOIST SHOW TRIALS

661 EAST EUROPE has had two important show trials with the aim of vilifying Titoism: the Rajk trial in Budapest and the Kostov trial in Sofia. The technique of all such trials is basically the same, so that a description of the main lines of one illustrates the general character of them all. The course of the Rajk trial will be described, and the Kostov trial touched on briefly.*

During the whole interrogation of the eight defendants and the nineteen witnesses in the Rajk trial, the Counsels for the Defence did not ask a single question, and spoke altogether only three times: once the Counsel for the Defence of Pálffy requested that the accused be given 'permission to use his notes when making his statement'; once the Counsel for the Defence of Brankov requested the same for his client; and once Korondy's lawyer remarked, after the interrogation of his client, that he did not wish to ask a question, but reserved the right to do so when the witnesses were interrogated. (He forgot this afterwards, and asked the witnesses no questions.) The explanation that the defendants were so exposed as to make any effort at defending them hopeless hardly holds water; it may be remembered that at the Nuremberg trials of the Nazi leaders, where the guilt of the defendants was never for a moment in doubt, the Counsel for the Defence behaved quite differently.

Of the nineteen witnesses, twelve are mentioned in the Indictment or in the trial as 'fascist-Titoist' collaborators of Rajk and Co., and five as ex-officials of the Horthy police, that is, people who are dependent for life or death on the authorities. What value can the testimonies of such witnesses have? Vishinsky, himself a jurist, gave his answer in a similar case.

*Full verbatim reports of the Trials exist in English: *Laszlo Rajk and his Accomplices before the People's Court*, Budapest, 1949; and *The Trial of Traicho Kostov and his Group*, Sofia, 1949.

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When the Balkan Commission of U.N.O. reported that Yugoslavia, Bulgaria and Albania were helping the partisans against the Royalist Greek Government, Vishinsky denied the validity of the report, as it was based on the testimony of 'men condemned to capital punishment, or were under the threat of capital punishment during their interrogation'. This criterion, it seems, holds good when others sit in judgment, but not when Vishinsky himself or any of his disciples does. 661

This in itself is enough to expose the real character of the trial. But an examination of some of the confessions of the defendants and the testimony of the witnesses, which contained absurd contradictions and pure fabrications, condemns it utterly.

Rajk confessed that he had been a spy of the Horthy police since 1931. In the International Brigade, he said, it became known that he was a 'Trotskyist spy', and so he was expelled from the Communist Party in June, 1938. This date was cleverly chosen: at the beginning of July, 1938, the International Brigade was officially dissolved, so that it is difficult to check exactly what happened in the Rákosi Battalion at the time.* The French 'Deuxieme Bureau' knew that he was a fascist spy at least since 1939, the Gestapo since 1941. It became known to the American and Yugoslav Intelligence Services in 1945. Rajk collaborated with all these. Thus while he was known to the intelligence services of five countries as well as to the International Brigade as a spy, the Communists responsible for the International Brigade, who expelled Rajk as a 'Trotskyist spy' omitted, it seems, to mention the fact to Moscow, so that the N.K.V.D. knew nothing of it. This is supposed to explain how he was permitted to gain so important a position in Hungary. In his own words: 'When I came home to Budapest the Hungarian Communist Party was then, of course, working legally in the liberated country. My activities were not

*The same care as regards dates was shown by the organisers of the trial in another case. A number of witnesses described an alleged secret meeting in Hungary between Rajk and the Yugoslav Minister of the Interior, Ranković. Many particulars of this meeting were given, but no exact date—the danger of a *faux pas* was too great. If a date were given it might have been proved that Ranković could not possibly just then have been at the place mentioned. There had been just such an instance at the Trial of Mensheviks (1931) in Moscow, where it had been alleged that R. Abramovich, the Menshevik leader, had been on a secret visit to Russia on a certain date. It was, however, proved that he took part on the very *same day* in a conference in Brussels, and his picture was shown in the Belgian press.

661 known to the leadership of the Communist Party. They know me as the best member of the Communist Party. That is why immediately upon my return home I was given an important position in the Party . . . '*

Further, the Hungarian, French and German intelligence services knew, so he said, that he was a spy. Why did his defence counsel not ask how this is compatible with the fact that between 1932 and 1945 he spent nearly four years in Hungarian prisons, two years in a French concentration camp and nearly a year in a German concentration camp? Surely an odd way of paying a spy or using his services.

Another absurd fabrication concerned a certain Ljubitsa Hribar who testified that the Yugoslav and the British intelligence services co-operate in Hungary. Her story was that the Yugoslav Legation in Budapest tried to recruit her as a spy for Yugoslavia. When she refused, some of the Legation officials kidnapped her and smuggled her over the border into Yugoslav territory. She 'was kept there from about 15th December, 1947, until 5th January, 1948'. Then these Government agents 'instructed me that I must do intelligence work in Hungary against the Hungarian government and at the same time they wanted me to act as liaison between the Yugoslav and British intelligence agents. When I did not want to give my consent, they threatened that I, too, would be liquidated. After this they made me sign a statement in which I bound myself to work for the Yugoslav U.D.B.'. A person who does not want to be a spy for Yugoslavia and is only newly recruited, becomes the liaison between the 'Yugoslav and British intelligence agents'! What was hidden for years from the N.K.V.D.—that Tito was linked with the British Intelligence Service—is told to Ljubitsa Hribar. So simple!

The connection between Tito's Intelligence Service and that of the United States is testified to by Salayi and a number of witnesses, who tell a story as ingenuous as Hribar's. In order to get from Switzerland to the part of Hungary which was occupied by the Russian Army in November, 1944, Salayi and

* It is interesting to note that this bizarre character is very difficult to 'sell', and the British Communist, Derek Kartun, in *Tito's Plot Against Europe* (London, [illegible]), a 'thriller' of the Rajk Trial, which claims to be based on the official Report of the Trial, omits altogether the fact that Rajk was expelled from the Federal Secretariat or the Communist Party in Spain, or that anybody in the Communist movement suspected him of being a 'Trotskyist' prior to 1948.

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five other leading Hungarian Communist Party members were introduced to a large number of Yugoslav and American intelligence officers—all in order to get one aeroplane to fly them! The Russian authorities alone could not help them. An aeroplane could be acquired only by implicating Tito and the F.B.I. 661

Stories about the people chiefly accused—Tito and his friends—are of the same type. The present intentions of the Tito clique were told to Rajk by Ranković, the Yugoslav Minister of the Interior: 'We have to strive to overthrow the peoples' democratic regimes of the peoples' democratic countries which came into being after the Liberation, to prevent their socialist development, partly to win over the democratic revolutionary forces, to separate them from the side of the Soviet Union and partly, where there is no other way, to annihilate them. Instead of the peoples' democratic regimes in all these countries, that is, in the peoples' democracies, bourgeois democratic regimes must be set up; that is, instead of development towards socialism, capitalism must be restored. These bourgeois democratic governments would turn towards the United States instead of towards the Soviet Union . . . '

Long ago sinister plots were already being hatched in Yugoslavia. Most, if not all, of the volunteers to the International Brigade were Gestapo agents; in the internment camp of the International Brigade in France where Rajk was there were alone 150 Yugoslav Gestapo agents.

Here the *regiseur* of the Trial made a grave mistake. Five days before it began, Radio Budapest read the indictment (also printed in *Szabad Nép* and in the official report of the Trial) which mentioned that the following Yugoslavs were in the International Brigade, were in reality fascists, and were together with Rajk in a French detention camp: Bebler, Kosta-Nadj, Gošnjak, Maslarić, Mrazović. When, immediately after the publication of the indictment, a meeting of Yugoslav volunteers to the International Brigade made it clear that neither Bebler, Maslarić nor Mrazović had been in a detention camp in France, the *regiseur* of the Trial arranged it so that during the hearing Rajk should not mention the above three names. Instead Rajk spoke about Vukmanović (called Tempo)

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661 as one of the volunteers to Spain he met in a French camp. Bad luck again! Vukmanović was not a volunteer in Spain and therefore could also not be in a French camp!*

As regards Tito himself Rajk says during the Trial: '. . . probably the Americans were in possession of some compromising evidence against Tito dating from the fascist era in Yugoslavia by which they hold in their power both him and the other Yugoslav statesmen now in leading positions'—a gentle hint that Tito and Co. were police spies even before the war. Why, then, did Tito lead the Partisan movement and expel the Nazi enemy and King Peter, the bankers and the industrialists? Actually he was devoted to them, but the pressure of the masses compelled him to eliminate them. (By the same logic Hitler might have loved the Jews, and been compelled only by anti-semitic mass pressure to murder six million of their number). Even so, Tito tried to wriggle out of this compulsion to his own advantage. Brankov searches his memory: '. . . there was much talk during the war that in 1941, '42 and at the beginning of '43, Tito had carried on negotiations with the Germans to discontinue the fight, provided the Germans would consent that he set up a government in Yugoslavia'. According to Brankov, this was known at the time to many in Yugoslavia, but apparently neither Hebrang nor Žujović, the Moscow agents then in the leadership of the Communist Party of Yugoslavia, nor the Soviet Ambassador, consuls, military advisers and so forth had any inkling of this treachery, till 28th June, 1948, the date of the Tito-Stalin rift.

Rajk also said that Tito was an ally of the Vatican and 'counted most' on Cardinal Mindszenty—Tito, who condemned Archibishop Stepinac to 16 years' imprisonment and expropriated nearly all the land of the Catholic Church (which the Polish, Hungarian, Czech and Rumanian governments did not do).

Two confessions, those of Pálffy, the Chief of Staff of the Army, and Korondy, the Colonel of Police, throw light on the

*An interesting event in the aftermath of the Rajk Trial showed clearly what little conviction it carried for all except the religious believers in the Kremlin About two months after the trial a large number of Yugoslav members of the International Brigade, who were mentioned in the trial as Nazi spies, received high decorations from the Spanish Republican Government for services in the cause of the Spanish Civil War. What a moral defeat for those who organised the frame-up!

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character of the army and police in the 'People's Democracies'. 661
These statements doubtless contain more truth than most of the other confessions, as they are based not on hearsay, but on the actual developments in Hungary, which can be checked by many Hungarians and by students. They show the continuity of the army and police institutions from the time of Horthy, and so give the lie to the Communist propaganda that since the 'revolution of 1944' they have an altogether new, democratic character. Pálffy stated: 'I sabotaged the drawing of working class cadres into the army, and I not only did not support the few workers who were nevertheless already there, or managed to get in, but pushed them back, relegating them to a secondary position. I was the chief of the military political department for three years and during these years not a single worker managed to get into a leading position even of a lower grade. On the contrary, in the interests of the aim previously mentioned, I brought back former officers of the Horthy army who were partly of pro-western convictions, partly of fascist, chauvinist sympathies, in great numbers; I promoted and supported them to high posts . . . My further destructive activities I carried out within the military political department where, in my capacity as president of the Party organisation, I consciously introduced such a dictatorial system'.

And Korondy[7] said: 'To build up this anti-democratic spirit 661
we even published text-books for the police, copying the text- 625
books of the old gendarmerie and police and at the beginning of 1948 compiling the material of the basic examination which was compulsory for all police officers from the old text-books, so that the new police officers could not pass the examination and could be removed from the police force. Through our activities we succeeded in making the training units of the police into an important armed force and because of their convictions they could at any time be utilised against the democracy and the democratic regime'.

It is obvious that Rákosi, Gerö and the other leaders must have known that for nearly five years workers were prevented from gaining high positions in the army and police and that the new text-books for police officers were copies of those used in the old gendarmerie. Pálffy and Korondy, and of course Rajk, merely took upon themselves to be the scapegoats, but in so

[7] [Colonel of Police in testimony at Rajk trial in Budapest.—Analyst]

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[625] doing they revealed the real situation in the army and police.

661 The Rajk trial shows once again that no man or movement can stray from blind obedience to Moscow without being branded as a 'fascist spy'. Two particularly glaring instances were brought out in the trial. One concerned Earl Browder, who for sixteen years was General Secretary of the American Communist Party and was 'unanimously' supported and applauded by all the Communist Parties in the world. Suddenly, without ceremony, when Moscow's line changed, he was removed from the leadership (July, 1945), then expelled from the Party (February, 1946). Szönyi blamed his influence for his own degeneration into an American and Yugoslav spy. He said: 'In this influence the theory of Browder, then leader of the Communist Party of the U.S.A., played a great part. Printed copies of Browder's books in French and German were distributed in great number by Lompar and Field both in Switzerland and in France, on behalf of the American secret service'. And later: 'In 1944 I openly professed views serving the interests of American imperialism. The treacherous theory of Browder played a great part in this.'

The second instance concerns the Zionist movement. This too comes very badly out of the trial, as an agent of American imperialism. The People's Prosecutor, with no relevance to the course of the trial, asks Szönyi: 'You were a member of the Zionist movement?' Szönyi replies: 'As far as I know, Ferenc Vági and György Demeter were members of the Zionist movement. In this connection it is known to me, and I also experienced it in Switzerland, that in general the Zionist movement maintained very close co-operation with the American secret sevrice'.

The defendent Szalai makes an odd amalgam that implicates the Zionist movement. He says: 'I was connected with the Hörthy police. Detective Inspector Réti, the head of the political section of the Pécs police, enrolled me in 1933. Since 1930 I had participated in a Trotskyist Zionist movement, in which I received the sort of anti-working-class education that helped Réti's attempt to enroll me'.

The President asks the accused Pál Justus if he was a Zionist; and in case someone should forget that Szalai had been a Zionist, the question is repeated to him.

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Szabad Nép, the Hungarian Workers' Party daily, wrote: 661 'The familiar surroundings and ideological morass out of which grew Rajk and his accomplices consisted of Trotskyism, Fascism, Zionism and anti-Semitism'. (19th June, 1949). The crowning amalgam was made by a writer in *Pravda* (20th September, 1949) who spoke of the collective from which Tito and American imperialism drew their agents as 'professional traitors, mean spies, murderers, gendarmes, Trotskyists and Zionists'.

The Kostov trial was conducted in the same way as the Rajk trial. But the unexpected happened. At the beginning of the trial Kostov withdrew his written confession. After a 'rest' of half an hour to 'refresh his memory', he repeated the same plea of 'not guilty'. He did so again at the end of the trial even though his very 'counsel of defence' argued his guilt in an angry attack, saying that 'in a Socialist country it is the duty of the defence counsel to aid the Public Prosecutor'. Not once did any of the defendants, witnesses or counsel refer to the fact that Kostov had withdrawn his 'confession', and they made extensive use of the statements made in the 'confession'. Seeing that he remained obdurate, he was interrogated for only a few minutes, while far less important defendants were interrogated for ten or more times as long. When he spoke his 'last words' he was booed and hissed by the spectators, who acted spontaneously, of course.

The official commentators in Bulgaria as well as the Communist commentators elsewhere did not know what to make of Kostov's denial of his 'written confession'. (There had been one precedent to this, when, in the Moscow trials of the thirties, the defendant, Krestinsky, denied his 'confession'. Next day, however, he repented his stubbornness and affirmed everything Vishinsky desired). For two days no paper or radio station in Russia or the 'People's Democracies' dared to comment upon it. On the third day *Pravda* gave the 'line', describing Kostov as 'a shrewd, experienced and determined enemy' with a 'soft and oily voice' and 'the cunning eyes of a thief'. The paper poked fun at his 'bent back', which he had received in 1924, when, as an organiser of the Party, he had jumped from the top floor of the Sofia police headquarters, where he had been tortured.

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66/ A few hours after he was hanged, the Communist press published a 'confession' written by him, in which he praised his death sentence, saying that it was 'absolutely correct and corresponding to the interests and peaceful development of Bulgaria in its struggle against Anglo-American imperialists and their agent, Tito'. The machine is working more quickly in the 'People's Democracies' now, for after the Petkov trial it took three weeks before a similar 'posthumous confession' was published.*

*By the way, it is interesting to note that one of the gravest accusations brought against Kostov was that he was a friend of Béla Kun, the head of the Communist Government of Hungary in 1919; since it was 'proved' that Béla Kun was a 'Trotskyist-fascist'.

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CHAPTER VII

'TITOISTS' BEFORE TITO

★

TITOISM expresses the struggle of a small nation led by its bureaucracy against oppression by the Great Russian bureaucracy. The Tito-Stalin conflict throws light not only on the Rajk-Stalin, Gomulka-Stalin or Kostov-Stalin conflicts, where the issue is the national oppression of the peoples of Stalin's new vassal states, but also on the national question in the U.S.S.R. herself. It is instructive to survey this little-known aspect of Russian policy.

The most numerous non-Russian people in the U.S.S.R. are the Ukrainians. Their national aspirations have constantly been suppressed by a series of purges. In 1930 the Ukrainian Academy of Sciences was dissolved and members of it arrested for 'national deviations'. In 1933, Skrypnik, the most prominent leader of the Ukrainian Communist Party and a member of its Central Committee and Political Bureau, committed suicide in order to avoid arrest. At the same time Kostubinsky, the Vice-President of the Council of People's Commissars of the Ukraine (the Ukrainian Government), Kovnar, the Commissar of Agriculture, and a few score of high officials were shot as nationalists. To prevent further deviations, Postyshev was sent to Ukraine from Moscow in 1933 to reorganise the party and the state administration. He was given dictatorial powers. At the 12th Congress of the Ukrainian Communist Party in 1933, he said: 'In Ukraine our leading Party members and Comrade Stalin himself are specially hated. The class enemy has been to a good school in this country and has learned how to struggle against Soviet rule. In Ukraine have settled the remnants of many counter-revolutionary parties and organizations. Kharkov has gradually become the centre of attraction for all sorts of nationalistic and other counter-revolutionary organizations. They have all been drawn to this centre and they have spread their webs all over the Ukraine, making use of our Party system for their own ends. You remember, Comrades,

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661 186 687

when twenty Secretaries of Party Regional Committees dared to declare that it was impossible to fulfil the Harvest Plan (Nos. 15–21 of *Proletarian*, Kharkov, 1934, quoted by W. E. D. Allen, *The Ukraine*, Cambridge, 1940, p. 326). Postyshev expelled more than a quarter of the members of the Ukrainian Communist Party. Three years later he himself suffered a similar fate, being expelled and arrested. In his place came Kosior, from Moscow. He, in due course, was also arrested. In 1937, Lyubchenko, Chairman of the Council of People's Commissars of Ukraine, committed suicide in order to avoid arrest. The Commissars Petrovski and Eiche were liquidated.

Other republics have a similar history. In the Republic of White Russia, Goloded, who for ten years was Chairman of the Council of People's Commissars, was in 1937 arrested as a Trotskyist. Some months later his successor as chairman, Cherviakov, committed suicide to avoid arrest He had been Chairman of the Central Executive Committee of White Russia (i.e., President of the Republic) for seventeen years.

In Tadjikistan, the Chairman of the Executive Committee was purged as a nationalist in 1934. His successor held the position for three years and then suffered a similar fate. Walter Padley, in his article 'Empire or Free Union?' in *Politics*, New York, Spring, 1948, gives the following list of some of the foremost people in the national republics who were purged in 1937:

Presidents	*Republic*
Cherviakov	White Russia
Rahkhimbayev	Tadjikistan
Arkupov	Karelian
Shotemur	Tadjikistan
Lordkipanide	Adjar
Dolgat	Daghestan
Kunz	Volga-German
Prime-Ministers	*Republic*
Goloded	White Russia
Mgalobishvili	Georgia
Khodjaev	Uzbekistan
Rakhinov	Tadjikistan
Bondarenko	Ukraine
Ovakabelashvili	Transcaucasia.

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661 These are just a few of the victims. Altogether in the big purge of 1937 the whole or the majority of thirty national governments were liquidated. The main accusation against them was their desire for secession from the U.S.S.R.

The fact that the N.K.V.D. directed from Moscow can arrest heads of governments, Commissars (now called Ministers), first secretaries of the Party in the national republics and a host of lesser figures, shows that the much-vaunted independence of the national republics is purely formal. Nothing remains of the right of secession, even though this is recognised in the Stalin Constitution (Article 17). As early as the twelfth Congress of the C.P.S.U. (1923) Ukrainian communists who demanded that control over the G.P.U. in the different republics be vested in the national governments, were severely rebuked.

661 656 563 The most important element of the administration of the state besides the police is the army, but the national republics have no separate armies of their own. They are not even allowed to keep their own soldiers within their own borders, but armies composed mostly of other nationals camp on their territories. The story of the Ukrainian army is typical. This army won its laurels during the Civil War in 1918-21, when, almost single-handed, it liberated Ukraine from the Whites. It continued to camp in Ukraine until 1929. But the Great Russian bureaucracy, becoming afraid of the strength of this peasant army, decided to cripple it permanently. The army was broken up, its separate units moved from the Ukraine and dispersed all over the U.S.S.R. It was replaced in Ukraine by a Great Russian army commanded from Moscow, to ensure the complete dependence of Ukraine on Moscow. The same fate befell the other national republics.

The Communist Parties in the republics are not only directed from Moscow, but even the majority of those they appoint to the State or Party apparatus are Great Russians. Nearly all the First Secretaries of the Ukrainian Communist Party came from Moscow: Kaganovich, Postyshev, Kosior, Khrushchev, and Kaganovich once more. Of the five First Secretaries of the Communist Parties of the Central Asiatic Republics today, four are Russians, and the position in the other republics is similar. Even where the secretaries are drawn from the local

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661 population, they are so dependent on the centralised Party
652 machine and the N.K.V.D. that they are nothing but local
523 quislings.

646 A study of the national composition of the Supreme Soviet
661 of the U.S.S.R. gives a clear picture of the subordination of the non-Russian peoples. Vs. Felix and Ju. Snov made an interesting analysis in the Ukrainian Socialist review, *Vpered* (Munich, 1950, No. 3), using as their basis the list of M.P.'s published in *Pravda* on 15th March, 1950. Of the 25 deputies every republic sent to the Soviet of Nationalities, 5 from Ukraine S.S.R. were Russians, 4 from Uzbek S.S.R., 6 from Kazakh S.S.R., 5 from Lithuanian S.S.R., 6 from Latvian S.S.R., 5 from Tadjik S.S.R. and 6 from Kirghiz S.S.R. Actually, these Russians hold the key positions in the administration of the republics. For instance, of the 5 Russian deputies from the Tadjik S.S.R., two were D. K. Vishnevski, who is the Minister of State Security (M.G.B.) for Tadjikistan, and A. V. Kharchenko, who is the Minister of the Interior (M.V.D.) for Tadjikistan.

661 The overriding control of Moscow over the administration
652 of the national republics explains the complete defeat of all the
523 national resistance movements hitherto. It also explains the defeat of the 'Titoists' in Poland, Bulgaria, Hungary and Rumania. Tito has been successful so far because Moscow never controlled the state apparatus of Yugoslavia. She was 'liberated' not by the Soviet Army but by her own National Liberation Army, organised and led by Yugoslavs.

197 The cultural life of the various nations is also subjected to
652 Russification. When the Bolsheviks came to power, they
523 introduced the Latin alphabet for the many nations in Russia which had no written language at all, and 71 written languages in this form were introduced. This was considered the simplest and most progressive means of promoting the cultural development of these people, and it underlined the fact that there was no intention of Russification. Stalin reversed this progressive policy. In 1936, the Latin alphabet was replaced by the Cyrillic, which is much more complicated, and in 1938 Russian was made a compulsory language in all Secondary schools of the U.S.S.R.

Even more important than the language people speak or write is what they speak or write.

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sented by the Communists as the liberation of the Ukrainian, 648
Byelorussian, and Lithuanian peoples from the yoke of the Polish landlords; Hitler's war against France and England were presented as a battle against Anglo-Saxon imperialism. After the fall of France the Polish Communists, together with those sent from France, assumed a neutral attitude toward the Nazi occupation and terror in Poland. They did not take part in the underground struggle of the Polish nation. They were tolerated by the Gestapo and moved about freely. Only after Hitler's attack on Russia in 1941 did they regain the "spirit of patriotism" and join the Polish underground struggle against Hitler.

Various events greatly discredited the reputation of the 665
Polish Workers' Party (one of the guises under which the 661
Polish Communists masqueraded during the war years). 208
Such events were the massacre of the Polish war prisoners at Katyn, the death of hundreds of thousands of people deported to Soviet forced labor camps in the years 1939-1941, the deportation in 1944 of over 40,000 members of the underground Home Army who had been fighting against the Germans and aiding the entering Red Army, and the return to Poland of a number of Poles who had experienced the Soviet reality. Further discredit was brought to the Polish Workers' Party by the presence of the Communist Lublin Committee. The Committee seized power in Poland with the aid of the Soviet army and the NKVD and nominated as ministers of the government persons who had been in the German concentration camps and had served the Gestapo faithfully.

According to its reports in 1937, the Communist Party 665
of Poland had 6,000 regular members and 12,000 members in the Communist Association of Polish Youth. Experts are of the opinion, however, that these figures were exaggerated by the leadership of the party which was afraid of presenting to Moscow a true report of the extent of its influence. *New*

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Soviet Union R1

1947 but not to the years following. The period of the New Economic Policy in Russia was called "the period of a certain revival of capitalism"; in reality, it was a kind of retreat of communism from economic difficulties. S.U. 656

In the captive countries there was no "period of revival of capitalism." Since the very inception of communism, there has been a systematic liquidation of all private property, carried out in premeditated fashion within the limits of existing conditions and possibilities. In the beginning, the question of private property arose only in regard to small trade, dwelling houses, building, crafts, and, in a larger degree to peasant farming. Hence, the Communists advocated the principle of a three-sector economy, composed of state economy—after an immediate nationalization of medium and heavy industries, landlords' estates, and forests—of cooperative economy, and of private economy. E. 656 185 423

The fact that this period, the traces of which we still find in the constitutions of the captive countries, was planned from above as no more than a transitional period, is best proved by the accusation leveled against the former Communist Vice-Premier of Poland, Gomulka, at the meeting of the Central Committee of the Communist Party in Warsaw, in 1948. Gomulka was told then that his main guilt was not that he agreed to the principles of the three-sector economy but that he acted according to these principles. It was explained to him then that he had proceeded as though he wanted to keep the system although he knew that it was transitional. 665 661

In 1947, after the falsification of the elections and the destruction of the opposition of the independent peasant parties in Bulgaria, Rumania, Hungary, Yugoslavia, and Poland, the Cominform was established and Communist policy abandoned its nationalist line and adopted the line of internationalism. A special declaration of the differences between Communist internationalism and the "cosmopoli- 665

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642 Stalin-Tito relations her communist system was much fur-
177 ther advanced than that of any other Iron Curtain country, and since the break with Stalin only insignificant changes have been made in the structure of the highest organs of government. Tito still declares clearly and without any reservation that he intends to maintain the communist system in that country at any price.

IV

208 When communist propaganda speaks of the liberation of
661 the oppressed masses from the slavery of the privileged and the rich, it stresses the term, People's Democracy. But does this term really signify freedom? Does it respect human dignity? Does it recognize equality among the people? Does it abolish undue privileges and the exploitation of the working people? It does not. In practice, it does not even provide personal freedom or personal security.

697 The overcrowded prisons and the many thousands of peo-
661 ple in the forced labor camps bear witness to this. The Soviet Union and all the countries occupied by it are a large prison from which the majority of the people would escape if they only could. They would flee from the "Communist paradise" partly because of the difficult economic conditions, but mostly because of the unbearable atmosphere created by the insecurity and complete lack of freedom which are part of this system.

The majority of the people escaping today are average people—workers, peasants, craftsmen, small merchants, and others who have never belonged to any privileged or exploiting class. I have read a number of books on the living conditions in the Soviet forced labor camps; I have studied thousands of reports of Poles who have passed through Soviet camps and prisons; I have had hundreds of talks with the victims of the Soviet regime. And I have come

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o the belief that human language is unable to express the whole truth about the greatest disgrace to mankind that the wentieth century will know—the Soviet forced labor camps. 697 661

A sentence to a forced labor camp amounts to a sentence of death because the enormous majority of the inmates in these camps cannot exist under the conditions prevailing here and die before they are released. The inmate of such a camp works beyond his strength, knowing that if his productivity falls his starvation-level food ration will be cut. The instinct for self-preservation urges him to defend himself from death, and his reactions become those of a hungry animal. All his human feelings disappear, even his attitude toward his fellow inmates. Degraded and humiliated as a human being, the prisoner works like an animal for his enemies only to prolong his life by a year or two and then inevitably to perish. [466]

Political freedom does not exist in the Communist countries either under law or in practice. Let us take for example Article 72 of the Polish constitution of July 1952. Similar provisions will be found in all other Communist constitutions. The first lines of Article 72 say that the citizens have the right of political organization, but the third paragraph of the same article says that organization of assemblies and participation in an organization which opposes the political and social system of People's Poland are forbidden. In other words, any party which does not recognize the Communist political system is forbidden, and membership in it is punishable. 641 665

Since membership in a political party presupposes some right to influence that party, the question arises whether the Communists find it advisable to allow every citizen to belong to his country's Communist Party. The answer is no. The official statistics of the Communist parties in the occupied countries as well as in the Soviet Union show that the number of members of these parties ranges from 5 to 10 per cent

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cate the workers to respect the rule of socialist communal 692
life." The Polish and Rumanian constitutions of 1952 pro- 641
vide that "The courts defend the system of People's Democracy and the gains of the working people, and ensure the people's law, social property and citizens' rights."

In practice it is always the duty of the judge and the 692
prosecutor to take the side of the Communist State—that 661
is, of the Communist Party. It is always the duty of the defense to help the state prosecute the accused and to help him to accuse himself. The defendant's duty is to prove his guilt. The courts are a tool of the Communist regimes and are not independent institutions for the administration of justice. Communism introduces not only the judicial murder of innocent people but a debasement of man unparalleled in the history of mankind. The innocent defendant is forced to accuse himself of crimes which he has never committed, to accuse other innocent people, to trample upon his own dignity, to humiliate himself in the eyes of his friends and family, to spit upon the ideals in which he has believed, and to praise the loathsome practices of his enemy and prosecutor as he awaits death by the hands of his oppressor or by slow agony in a prison or forced labor camp.

V

Although it proclaims the liberation of the masses, the 641
communist system has created unprecedented privilege for 565
the ruling Communist elite. Everyone who has seen the living conditions of the highest Communist dignitaries in Russia as well as in the captive countries knows that these men enjoy a very high standard of living. They have privileges in all spheres of life—political, economic, social, and cultural. The life of the Communist elite is, however, not to be envied. Generally, the members of this group are hated. They are constantly threatened, even by the members of

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practice, church organizations and the clergy are meant to have no function but that of a helpful tool in the communization of the nation. 641 793

The function of education is the same. The Communists do not even pretend to support freedom of knowledge and bluntly state in their legislation that the duty of higher schools is to educate the younger generation in the spirit of socialist dialectics and materialistic doctrines. Theoretically, the Communist system assures the youth of education. In practice, an individual's right to education is not determined by intellectual ability and progress but by membership in the Young Communist League (Komsomol), by informing on "unorthodox" professors, and by success in examinations on Communist politics and doctrines. 641 871

The articles of the Communist constitutions that deal with the rights of the citizens stress above all the rights to work, rest, and medical treatment. The Communist attitude toward the individual is like that of the horse-owner when he thinks that the main duty of his animal is to work and believes that it must be assured of rest and medical treatment only to insure the fulfillment of this duty. Actually, most farmers in the free countries treat their animals better than the Communists treat the people. Out of hatred, the Communists destroy whole social groups and even perpetrate the genocide of whole nations. 641

The Communists claimed that when they had freed the working man from capitalist exploitation they would not allow the exploitation of one man by another. Is this claim realized in practice? Again, the answer is no. The Communist state created the worst kind of exploitation by giving the rule of the people to the Communist elite and by providing this elite with the formidable weapons of both police and army. In a democratic state, even where large industries and sources of raw materials are nationalized, the interests of the people are guarded by trade unions, politi- 661 565

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661 cal parties, legislation, courts, and the police who protect
565 the security of the citizens. The state authority is the mediator in the last resort in disagreements between labor and business.

661 The Moloch, which is the Communist state, has on its side the party, the police, and the courts. Special laws con-
466 stantly increase the penalties for the plunder and destruc-
641 tion of the nationalized public property. Because the state is a "people's state" and "does not do injustice to the people," the trade unions act as a tool of the state in raising the productivity and quality of production and fixing the norms of work. The Stakhanovite work system, based on high norms of production and granting starvation-level wages with no means of protection against these, destroys the strength and health of the worker. Strikes are punishable because they are crimes against the interests of the state, and special laws provide discipline of work, penalties for failure to fulfill norms, and forced labor camps for "idlers" and "loafers."

661 Communism deprives the peasant of his beloved land,
641 turns him into a Communist serf, and chains him to the
423 state or collective farm in which the Communist bureaucracy demands of him ever-increasing physical efforts to produce for the insatiable state. After the liquidation of the remnants of private initiative in small business and crafts, the *kulak* peasant, the biggest "capitalist blood-sucker," is dealt with. He is destroyed by tax levies and forced deliveries of agricultural products and is finally evicted from his own farm.

642 Thus, behind the façade of People's Democracy, Communism practices dictatorship in every sphere of life—personal, political, economic, religious, and social. The Communist system creates privileges for the party and makes the citizen economically dependent upon the state. It debases human dignity, wrests faith out of human hearts, kills

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reorganization of agriculture even more necessary than it had been before. 423 656

Land reform was a political measure. Its aim was not the reorganization of production, but the redistribution of income. Its aim was to win the small peasant for the Communists, and to weaken the political influence of the agrarian parties. Therefore, the Communists stole the programs of the agrarian parties and publicized them as their own. Beside private ownership, these programs called for mechanization, consolidation of scattered strips, good and guaranteed prices for agricultural products, expansion of credit, reduction of taxes, and social insurance for all peasants. 661

The smallholders felt quite happy, generally speaking, on their new land. It may have produced less than it had in the hands of its former owners, but the smallholders' income was larger than it had been when they were employed as agricultural laborers. Many of them started believing the Communists and joined the Communist parties. One of the Communist aims was fulfilled.

IV

It should have been obvious to all that the Communists were preparing a program of land collectivization, and that the second stage of their agricultural policy would be similar to what it had been in the Soviet Union. But sufficient attention was not paid to these trends. Practically all forests and large stretches of arable land and pastures became state property and were organized as Communist state farms. District cooperative or state stations were established and equipped with heavy agricultural machinery, which was not practical for use on small fields. The Communists favored the allocation of equipment to cooperatives rather than to private persons. The cooperatives, which performed many public functions such as bulk purchasing of food and supplies, began to 474 423

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474 government-dictated constitution. Cooperative members, in-
423 stead of being the masters of their cooperatives, are their servants. They have to perform tasks which have been fixed without their knowledge or consent. In higher type Communist cooperatives, the members assume the status of landless laborers.

If the complete dependency of the cooperatives on the State Tractor and Machine Stations and on the Communist Party is taken into consideration, it is clear that production cooperatives are no more than state enterprises under the disguise of cooperatives. There is only one difference between a state farm and a production cooperative: the members of a cooperative have to bear all production risks. It is true that *de jure* they remain owners of their land, but *de facto* they cease to be owners as they cannot be sure of getting their fields back when they leave the cooperative. According to the constitution of these cooperatives, a member must accept other fields, if return of his own fields would disrupt the cooperative.

474 The Communists declare they prefer that peasants join
●661 cooperatives voluntarily. However, they are not above per-
565 suading private farmers to join by such methods as higher taxes and higher delivery quotas, less fertilizers and other production means at higher prices, and charges for all services higher than those paid by cooperative members. At the same time, they give private farmers no credit, no field hands, and no opportunity to use agricultural machines, while collectives enjoy almost unlimited credit and other facilities. Members of production cooperatives are rewarded by the government with free vacations in the best hotels at winter resorts and with free group travel to the Soviet Union; they are a privileged class in every respect.

In contrast, well-to-do peasants who used hired labor in free times are denounced as being "village rich," a term which is used in Eastern Europe to describe the equivalent of the

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Russian *kulak*. The village rich are not allowed to enter a collective or are expelled if they become members. A merciless battle is being waged to ruin them. They are being liquidated as peasants, removed from villages, and sent to mines or to industry or concentration camps. There are roughly thirteen million peasant families in Eastern Europe, more than one million of which are *kulaks*. The children of all these families must lose the individualistic traits of their peasant heritage: that is the Communist aim.

Large-scale industrialization plans, for military purposes rather than for consumer production, are being pushed forward with great vigor in all Eastern European states and new labor is required in great numbers. *Kulaks* and other class enemies are an obvious source for this labor. By tapping this source, the surplus agricultural population will be disposed of and the people with individualist outlook gradually destroyed. If there is a shortage of workers in agriculture, as for instance in Czechoslovakia now, industrial workers already persuaded to the collective way of thinking can be utilized.

The term *kulak* has come to mean anyone who is against collectivization, and all *kulaks* are to be destroyed. The process of destruction is quickly changing the status of the agrarian population in this region. The agricultural population is decreasing and, according to estimate, does not amount today to more than 45 per cent of the total population. This decrease is the political consequence of collectivization and not its economic or social result. The collectivization policy itself cannot solve the old problem of rural overpopulation but can only aggravate it. The real aim of Communist collectivization is not to solve this problem but rather to destroy the peasantry.

Agriculture, like the other divisions of economic life, has been dictated by state plans which prescribe to the peasant what crops are to be grown and what animals are to be bred.

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tain its full strength until after the First World War in the November elections of 1945. 665

The first international agreement among various peasant groups was reached in 1921, subsequent to the visit of the Bulgarian Premier Stambolisky to Prague. This agreement was between the Bulgarian Agrarian Union and the Czechoslovak Republican Agrarian Party, and was later joined by the Polish Peasant Party. The agreement was, however, of a short duration and of little significance in international relations. In 1923 Stambolisky was overthrown and assassinated, and in 1926 the Prime Minister, Witos, was ousted following the military putsch of Pilsudski. 648 665

In 1928 efforts were renewed to achieve an international peasant understanding, and in 1929 the International Agrarian Bureau in Prague was established. The Bureau was presided over by Švehla, and nineteen different peasant organizations from all parts of Europe participated in its work. The Bureau stood for the principles of cooperation, mutual aid, friendship, democracy, and peace. Unfortunately, international conditions did not favor such an association. Except in Czechoslovakia, democratic political movements throughout Eastern Europe were either already outlawed or under heavy pressure of the authoritarian regimes. Moreover, the international agrarian crisis and other unsolved international problems were considerable hindrances to the good will and honest endeavors of the peasant leaders. Nevertheless, the International Agrarian Bureau has contributed considerably to the presentation and defense of the peasant cause in the world. Its activities were discontinued only with the total occupation of Czechoslovakia in March 1939.

IV

As might have been expected, the main efforts of the Communists, when they formed the People's Democracies 661 661

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665 in Eastern Europe, were directed against the peasant po-
661 litical groups. Besides the unbridgeable ideological differences between peasantism and communism, and the proverbial intolerance of the latter, there were specific reasons why the violence of the Communist regimes reached its climax during the suppression of the peasant political opposition.

First, the peasantry forms a substantial majority in the greater part of the area. The Communists are unscrupulous in their methods, but they are not brainless when considering the accomplishment of their targets. They know that the peasantry can be temporarily intimidated but never permanently quashed if it maintains political organizations of its own. Hence, these organizations had to be crushed before the Communists could expect any success.

Second, the peasant parties constituted the strongest democratic force in the area. The totalitarian elements had been destroyed for the most part by the Second World War, but the peasants, who could not be reproached with either collaboration or totalitarianism and could not be labeled as "fascist reactionaries," remained the greatest danger to the Communists—the self-imposed "liberators and people's friends." Hence, these groups had to be liquidated before the Communist power could be effective and its program carried out.

Third, the peasant parties possessed a vigorous program, and nothing infuriates the Communists more than a challenge to their alleged monopoly on the solution of current issues. It is obvious that those who advocate outgrown ideas in a peasant country have little chance for success, but the political platforms of the peasant parties had far more to offer the peasant population than the forcibly implemented, nebulous formulas and strange institutions imported by the Communists. However, in Communist controlled countries

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no alternatives are permitted, and hence, the peasant leaders had to be eliminated. 665 661

In view of the foregoing, it is not surprising that the formal disappearance of genuine peasant political organizations in this region is today an accomplished fact. Various procedures were used to achieve this. In Yugoslavia, the Croatian Peasant Party and the Serbian Agrarian Union were banned, together with all other democratic parties, at the very beginning of the Communist era. Several fake peasant groups were established whose tasks were to support the proletarization of the country and to demonstrate to the outside world that the "progressive and thinking peasantry" greeted the new reforms enthusiastically.

In Czechoslovakia, some political parties were active in the postwar period preceding the Communist coup in February 1948, but the Czechoslovakian Agrarian Party was deliberately banned at the close of the war, and its leaders arrested and tried for alleged collaboration with the Germans. Today it is obvious that these collaboration charges were a skillful maneuver of the Communists to eliminate their most dangerous opponents.

The Agrarian Union in Bulgaria was at first in the coalition government with the Communists, who held the key positions in the army and in the administration. Through direct Soviet intervention and the political violence of the Communists, the Agrarians were first reduced to one third of their actual strength, and subsequently liquidated with the trial of their leader, Petkov, in September 1947.

In Rumania the situation was similar. Hopes for the promised free elections were not realized and, in August 1947, the peasant leaders, Maniu and Mihalache, were sentenced to life imprisonment as "foreign agents and enemies of the people." This meant the end of organized peasant opposition in Rumania. In Poland Mikolajczyk attempted in vain to secure

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665 the rights of the Peasant Party, but in the controlled elections
● 661 of January 1947, the party was reduced to twenty-seven deputies which completely paralyzed it in its further political struggle.

The situation was different in Hungary. In the elections of November 1945, the Hungarian Smallholders Party polled 59 per cent of all the votes and subsequently formed the government under the premiership of Ferenc Nagy. However, only eighteen months later, after numerous Communist plots, the party was crushed, and in subsequent developments it was politically liquidated.

When it became impossible for the peasantry to continue its struggle within the respective countries, the exiled peasant leaders founded the International Peasant Union in Washington, D.C., on July 4th, 1947. The Union, in which all peasant groups are represented, issued a program founded on the basic principles of peasant ideology. Its primary purpose is to interest the democratic West in the peasant struggle and to offer hope to the enslaved peasantry for its eventual liberation.

V

000 This brief analysis of peasantism in Eastern Europe is not intended to be a glorification of the peasantry and its movement. The peasants are not a God-chosen group, neither are their leaders without faults and errors. Mistakes have been committed by the peasant parties in the past, and many more may be committed in the future. But who does not err in politics and public affairs? Surely these imperfections are not sufficient reason for disfavoring the peasantry or for rejecting the idea of an active support of peasant political organizations. The purpose of this essay has been to indicate the importance of the peasantry in the struggle of the free world with the Communists.

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It is clear that the peasants, as a group, represent the greatest obstacle to Communist victory. The immediate goal of the Communists is to crush the peasant resistance, to destroy their political power, and to convert them into an amorphous, subservient mass. Hence, the free world must aim to preserve the peasantry as a separate and dynamic group, and to strengthen its political formations.

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8 Industrial and Social Policies of the Communist Regimes

JAN H. WSZELAKI

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More than thirty years ago, Lenin defined Communism in Russia as Soviet power plus electrification. In our time, the essence of the situation in the countries of Eastern Europe is the Communist police state plus industrial revolution. Local or imported Communists, under the supervision of the Kremlin, have been for years in full control of all levers of power in these countries. Their basic aim in social and economic fields, just as it is in Soviet Russia, is a complete transformation of society through industrial revolution. To this supreme aim and supreme method, all other issues have been subordinated. The process of this industrial revolution with its many ramifications extends into all fields of human activity behind the Iron Curtain, influences the lives of all ninety million inhabitants of the captive countries proper, and will have profound consequences of moral, political, economic, social, and strategic character not only for these countries but for the world as a whole. From the European point of view, the industrial revolution of Eastern Europe is an outstanding historical event. comparable in its implications to the great wars of the present century. We are witnessing

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the gradual decline of the traditional rural and mainly peasant structure of this part of Europe and the emergence of an industrial urbanized society. This transformation is now in full swing and will continue until it runs its course—no one can say when or how—or until external factors end the Russian control of Eastern Europe and its nations rid themselves of their own Communists. Even then, the industrial development of that area will presumably continue, though for different reasons and with vastly different methods. The Communist regimes may go, but the results of the industrial revolution will remain.

This essay is concerned with the effects of these revolutionary events on the social and economic development of the countries of Eastern Europe. To cover this involved subject adequately, much time and space would be necessary. The writer must limit himself here to the discussion of the few selected aspects of the problem that he regards as fundamental. Discussion of the industrial targets as established by the single countries in their long-range plans, half or more of which have already been achieved, cannot be included in this study.

Suffice it to say here that all over Eastern Europe the Communist regimes are modernizing the existing mines and industrial plants and are building scores of new mines and thousands of large new plants, mostly supposed to produce capital goods as a basis for further industrial production. The anticipated result of the present first series of long-range plans, expected to terminate in less than two years, will be a large increase in the extraction of fuel and the doubling, in some cases tripling and quadrupling, of the heavy industrial potential of the individual nations of this region, some of which had a large industrial output before the last war. This vast operation requires that great numbers of peasants be transferred from agriculture to industry, mining, and construction. Once carried out, the first series of plans is to be

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Foreign Trade of Poland, Czechoslovakia, Hungary, Rumania, Bulgaria, and Albania—1951 [4]

(IN PERCENTAGE OF TRADE WITH)

	USSR	*Other Communist Countries (including Eastern Germany and China)*	*Free World*
Poland	25	33	42
Czechoslovakia	28	32	40
Hungary	29	38	33
Rumania	51	28	21
Bulgaria	58	34	8
Albania	57	43	0

the economic system of the Soviet Union. The remaining four countries are less economically dependent on Russia. The place of Eastern Germany in interregional trade is very important. It is able to supply the rest of this area with much heavy and precision machinery, as well as potash and other fertilizers, in exchange for fuel, foodstuffs, and raw materials.

IV

185 The social policies of the satellite governments follow in
●661 their general outlines those practiced by the Soviet Union
642 but may be described as somewhat more moderate, if only because the respect for human values has been more deeply ingrained in the westernized societies of Eastern Europe than they have in Russia.

The principle dominating these policies is that the Soviet-type revolution was made in the Eastern European countries in the interest of the people and that it continues to serve their interests. There is no speech made or publication issued be-

[4] P. Suslin, "The Consolidation of the Democratic World Market," *New Times* (Moscow), No. 5 (January 28, 1953), p. 10.

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hind the Iron Curtain that does not emphasize the eternal 185
dedication of the People's Democracies to this fundamental 661
concept. It is likely that some members in the lower echelons 642
of the party are sincerely persuaded that this indeed is the case. Not so the ruthless social engineers among the top Communists. These experienced pupils of Moscow realize, of course, that in the Communist system there is a very definite hierarchy of goals, that first things have to come first, and that the expansion of industry comes before the welfare of the people. The two cannot be sought at the same time with the same intensity since the Communist state has not the means to proceed in both directions at once. There is reliable evidence that the four northern satellite governments opposed, insofar as they were able, the imposition on their countries of the immense goals and back-breaking burdens of industrial expansion. They regarded the enormously revised targets of 1950 and 1951 as burdens too heavy on their economies. Nevertheless, they had to yield to Moscow's pressure, which was probably connected with the outbreak of the Korean war. The relatively poor nations of Eastern Europe [511] cannot afford both guns and butter. Since it had to be guns, butter has had to be delayed to a more or less distant future. If this is the case in the Soviet Union, it must be even more so in Eastern Europe. The result is a gradual, though uneven, lowering or at least stagnation of standards of living in Eastern Europe as compared to what they were during the first years after the recent war.

Such a generalization would, of course, be vehemently de- 511
nied by the satellite governments. They publish statistical data to the effect that much new housing is being built, that more food is being produced and therefore consumed, and that the population is better clad with every passing year. A 000
trained researcher will not accept these claims at their face value. The extremely generalized social statistics from this area are even less reliable than statistics on agricultural out-

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reflect that, had their country had a sufficient industrial basis 178
in 1939 to equip ten armored divisions for which she had 433
enough trained manpower, her loss of independence and 369
many other events in modern history could have been prevented.

The present industrialization of Eastern Europe is gradu- 178
ally eliminating this handicap of the past. To be sure, the 661
increase of the industrial potential of these countries lies in 185
the interest of the Soviet Union in its own military prepara- 648
tions. The men in the Kremlin may dispose as they wish of this area's industrial plants together with all its human and material resources with the single exception of the spirit of its peoples. From the standpoint of both the immediate and long-range interests of the West, any addition to the wealth or the strength of Eastern Europe is unwelcome so long as the latter remains a part of the Soviet bloc. These countries are of course aware of this situation, but they have to think also about their future. They hope that one day the Iron Curtain will be lifted and they know that at that time they will need all their new industrial wealth in order to cease being an area of social unrest and a target for exploitation by powerful neighbors as well as a hotbed for world wars. Nobody has disputed the right of Russia to evolve into an industrial power. No one can expect the countries of Eastern Europe to relinquish their hopes of freedom and their rights to prosperity which, in the light of their past, are linked to the modernization of their economic structure. Wendell Willkie said during the last war that "Only the productive can be strong, and only the strong can be free." His words apply to all nations alike. The nations of Eastern Europe are potential allies of the West. Those who earnestly desire a better world should bear in mind that the lasting interests of these friendly nations transcend their temporary position as Russia's enforced associates.

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NOTES

000 1. Protokoll des II. Welt Kongresses der Kommunistischen Internationale (Hamburg: 1921), p. 390.

1a. "The Role of Brains in the Total State," Commentary, August 1953, pp. 167-173.

2. Quoted in Reuben H. Markham, Rumania Under the Soviet Yoke (Boston: Meador Publishing Co., 1949), p. 407.

Cf. also the following statement from the Kosice program of the new Czech government, March 27, 1945: "Commissioning and promoting of officers shall not be based on formal rules only; extraordinary faster advancement (or commissioning) of the ablest . . . shall be supported." Za novou lidovou demokratickou armádu (Prague: Svoboda, 1945), pp. 7-11.

*701 *648 661 3. These were originally one. They were separated in Russia so the satellites followed suit. In 1950 Czechoslovakia, in November 1951 Poland, and September 1952 Romania, for example, separated them. Under the Malenkov regime in Russia, however, they were recombined under Beria. The satellites imitated and recombined them (e.g. the Czechs) in September 1953. After Beria was purged in Russia, they too were purged.

3a. But cf. Hans Speur, "Psychological Warfare Reconsidered" in Daniel Lerner and Harold Lasswell, The Policy Sciences (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1951) p. 266.

3b. Cf. Morris Janowitz, Working Paper on the Professional Soldier and Political Power (Mimeographed), Bureau of Government, Institute of Public Administration, University of Michigan, July 1953.

4. Spencer Wilkinson, War and Policy: Essays (London: Constable and Co. Ltd., 1910), p. 361.

5. Edward Shils and Morris J. Janowitz, "Cohesion and Disintegration in the Wehrmacht" in Daniel Lerner, Propaganda — War and Crisis (New York: George W. Stewart, 1951), p. 373.

5a. There is some reason to believe that in Russia itself after the death of Stalin the desired monolithic control was shaken. In the period before the purge of Beria, at least, there was a jockeying for power. Some observers believe that the Russian Army even now retains some potential independent power as against Malenkov and the party.

* 6. Op. cit.

701 *648 874 7. The emphasis in the period since 1948 on military training was fully foreshadowed in the plans of the Russians as revealed in the Kosice program of the new Czech government in 1945. This announced that the government "shall request from the Red Army professors and instructors for instruction in the Czechoslovak military schools. It shall endeavor to send the largest possible number of the ablest officers to Soviet military schools, up to the highest military institutes and academies." Za novou lidovou demokratickou armádu pp. 7-11.

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He served with the 51st Artillery Regiment and with the Land Artillery Command in Prague. By 1935 he was a colonel and commander of the 51st Artillery Regiment. He became a brigadier general only in exile during World War II, during which he showed unusual capabilities of command.

11. We excluded from our sample those generals over sixty in 1945 who were not taken into active positions on the theory that this might conceivably have been due to age rather than political factors.

12. K. M. Smogorzewski, "Soviet Satellite Armies in Europe," The Fortnightly, MXVII N.S., September 1951, p. 602.

12a. Hubert Ripka, Czechoslovakia Enslaved: the Story of the Communist Coup d'Etat (London: Victor Gollancz, 1950), p. 30.

13. Op. cit.

14. Lidova Demokracie, July 12, 1950.

15. In addition there are in our sample two who returned and died of natural causes shortly after the war so that it is not possible to classify them as having been either purged or not purged.

16. It will be recalled that we are omitting from our sample of available officers those who were more than sixty on the theory that failure to incorporate them into the new armies might have been simply on the grounds of age.

17. "Glos Polski," Toronto, Canada, September, 1951.

17a. A glance at the table of organization of the Polish high command makes clear how small a role the career officers ever played and how completely they have been eliminated from leadership now.

Minister of National Defense: Zymierski (career officer) to 11/6/49; Rokossovski (Russian) since.

Deputy Minister and Chief of Staff: Korczyc (Russian) 1945 on.

Deputy Minister and Commander of Land Forces: Swierczewski (Russian) to 3/28/47; Poplawsky (Russian) since.

Deputy Minister and Chief of the Political Department: Several, all Polish C.P. militants.

Inspector Generals - all now Russian: Artillery, Engineers, Signal troops, Armored troops, etc.

Commander of the Air Force: Romeyko (Russian) to 1951; Turkel (Russian) since.

Commander in Chief of Navy: Steyer (career officer) to 1949; Cherokov (Russian) since.

Commanders of Military Districts

- Warsaw: Paszkiewicz (career officer) to 1948; Rotkevich (Russian) since.
- Bydgoszcz: Szylingowski (Russian) 1945; Poltuzycki (Russian) now.
- Wroclaw: Daniluk (career officer) to 1950; Strazhesky (Russian) since.
- Cracow: Mossor (career officer) 1945; Kieniewicz (Russian now.

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17b. These few old officers who remain have been reduced to minor positions. One is a military attaché, one in the general staff academy, one is curator of the state race horses, and the fourth in some unidentifiable minor position.

18. It is not clear whether the last of these men is still actually in the position to which we are assigning him. He was in that position in 1951, but there is some reason to believe that his position may have changed.

19. Colonel Jozef Jaklicz, "Armia," Kultura, II, special issue, Paris 1952, pp. 62-99.

19a. Franciszek Jarecki, "Flights for Freedom Pierce Iron Curtain," Life, April 6, 1953, p. 32. Alexander T. Jordan, "Why Jarecki Flew West," Readers Digest, October 1953, pp. 110-14.

19b. News from Behind the Iron Curtain, Vol. II, No. 7, July 1953, p. 16.

19c. The intelligence school is different from the others in that candidates cannot volunteer for it directly. Intelligence officers are picked from among the other programs during the training period.

19d. Jaklicz, op. cit.

20. Cf. Thomas, William I. and Znaniecki, Florian. The Polish Peasant in Europe and America. (New York: A. A. Knopf, 192

21. There are two journals of this name; one published in Poland and one in exile.

22. Bellona, 1948, Vol. 30 (1948) 2-3. London: Instytut Historyczny im. Gen. Sikorskiego.

23. Chief of the Governing Board of the Department of Political Education of the Polish Army.

24. Deputy Chairman for War Industry.

24a. It might be noted that the same focus on a limited number of highly political names occurs even in the officers training program. Lieutenant Jazwinski reported that for his political courses he had to learn the names and positions of Marshal Rokossovski and the four vice-ministers of national defense. Besides those he knew about Generals Swierczewski (Walter), Zymiersky, and Radkiewicz, all high-ranking political figures, past or current. In addition, he knew of General Romeyko, Commander of the Air Force at the time that Jazwinski was in school, and of General Turkel, his successor. For the rest he could not identify any of the Polish generals. This is merely one more indication of the severe limitation the Soviets put upon attention to broader political and military problems. Conversation focuses on divisional gossip concerning local people and events. The mass media focus on a few symbolic political figures. In between these two extremes there is a vast area about which communication and knowledge are severely restricted. This illustrates what Mr. Lerner has called the discipline of "limited perspectives."

25. Smogorzewski, op. cit., p. 597.

26. Markham, p. 413.

7:Gluckstein S-4 (no date)1952 El Europe El

Brigadier-General on the anti-Soviet Front in 1941, who received the Knight Cross of the Iron Cross from Hitler, was, after joining the Communist Party, considered 'loyal' enough to be appointed Minister of War!

The enthusiasm of the Communist Party for 'law and order' is illustrated by their ardour for the monarchy. On November 3rd, 1946, Premier Groza declared: 'The King, the Church, the Army, the People and the Government are one'. A few days later, at a meeting of the Communist-controlled Front organisation, the National Democratic Bloc, Vice-Premier Tătărescu said: 'From Gheorghiu Dej (leader of the Communist Party—Y.G.) to myself we shall all fight together for the consolidation of the Monarchy, because we are convinced that the King is the strongest factor that rallies all Rumanians. We shall fight for the consolidation of the National Church and of private property, the source of all creative enterprise'. (*East Europe*, an informative London weekly, 13th November, 1946). On November 8th, King Michael's birthday, the Communist daily *Era Noua* said: 'The people of Rumania have faith in their King.' (*East Europe*, 20th November, 1946). In the election demonstrations of the National Democratic Bloc, a constantly repeated slogan was 'Trăiască Regele!'—'Long live the King!' On 17th November, 1946, at an army electoral meeting in Bucharest, Gheorghiu Dej concluded his speech appealing for a vote for the 'King's Government': 'Long live the King!' 'Long live his commanders and soldiers! Long live the Army which is his and the people's!' The monarchist enthusiasm of the Communist Party reached such heights that they attacked the Peasant Party leader, Maniu as . . . anti-monarchist. Thus *Era Noua* of December 3rd, 1946, referring to the withdrawal of Maniu and his followers from parliament, suggested that 'in fact, Maniu's unparliamentary attitude is only a guise for his anti-dynastic policy. Maniu has already tried his first obstructive move in King Michael's reign . . . Neither Ferdinand nor King Carol were exempt from Maniu's political tactics'! (*East Europe*, 18th December, 1946). To crown the hypocrisy of the leaders of the Communist Party, on November 8th, 1947, their paper, *Scanteia*, wrote: 'The people wish to His Majesty the King a long life, good health, and a reign rich in democratic achievements' (*The New York Times*, November 9th,

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Hungary

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The connection between this policy and Russia's interest in gaining control of the Hungarian economy (through mixed companies) and in extorting reparations from her, has already been described.[2] Here it is only necessary to repeat that for three years the Communist Party leaders continued to harp upon the same theme, that they were against abandoning the capitalist structure of the country.

[1] [See category 116, pp. 136-141 -- Analyst]

[2] [See category 116, pp. 60-62 -- Analyst]

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728 frontiers were another cause for great migrations. Four mil-
167 lion Poles moved from the territory which was incorporated into the U.S.S.R., and millions of Poles, Czechs, and Slovaks moved into districts formerly inhabited by the Germans. Although these changes alleviated the problem of rural overpopulation in Eastern Europe, there was still, at the end of the Second World War, a surplus population estimated at nine million.

665 The Communist parties in various Eastern European
423 states knew very well how to exploit this situation. They
656 knew that it was vital to the success of revolution that the peasantry should not be opposed to it. They knew that the Russian Revolution had been achieved only because Lenin was fully aware of the desire of the peasant for more land.

471 Orthodox Marxist theory required that the land be nation-
423 alized and that it be administered by the state. Land was
•662 considered the most important means of production, and it
656 had to be treated as such. This dogma was abandoned by Lenin for tactical reasons. He nationalized land in the Soviet Union during the revolution of 1917, but distributed it under ninety-nine-year leases to small and medium peasants for private exploitation. It was the political pressure of the peasants which forced Lenin to change his political doctrine and implement the agrarian program of the Populists, his political opponents. Lenin and his followers did not approve of the peasant who, according to them, was a relic of the precapitalistic society. It was Lenin's view that "small, individual farming gives birth to capitalism and the bourgeoisie daily, hourly, spontaneously and on a mass scale," and that in the future classless society the peasant was to assume the status of a worker on the land as his fellow in town was a worker in industry.

Political expediency determined Lenin's change in tactics. He supported small agrarian property holders only because

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he regarded the peasant as indispensable to the success of his 471
revolution and to the consolidation of his dictatorship. This 423
policy was reversed by Stalin after 1928 when forced col- 662
lectivization of land in the form of pseudo-cooperatives (col- 656
lective farms) was introduced in the Soviet Union.

Lenin's agricultural policy was adopted by all Eastern European Communist parties after the end of the Second World War. Being minorities in power, they knew that this was the only attitude they could take to the peasantry, the largest social group in this region. Therefore, they supported small agrarian property holders in the first stage of the development of their agricultural policy. There was only one difference between the Communist agricultural policies of Eastern Europe and Russia. Nationalization of land was not a part of the Eastern European policy, as it had not proved expedient in the Soviet Union and therefore was not contained in the agrarian policy of the Comintern for Eastern Europe in the inter-war period.

The Comintern had taken much interest in the Eastern 668
European agrarian question. In 1923 a Red Peasants Inter- 656
national was formed in Moscow as an effort to rally the 427
peasantry to the Communist ideal and to combat the influence of the peasant parties united in the Green International in Prague. The Soviet move to collectivization within the U.S.S.R. in 1929 was not followed by any shift in the agrarian policy of the Comintern. Any mention of collective farming was frowned upon and the whole emphasis was upon attracting or neutralizing the middle peasant by assisting the individual and by supporting with new land reforms the peasant's struggle for more land. This policy was not changed when the Cominform took over the role of the Comintern after the Second World War.

"The land to those who till it personally," was the slogan 471
of all Eastern European Communist parties, and land re- 423
forms were carried out in all countries. In Hungary, Albania, 656

2: Milosz S-5 (no date)1953 El Europe El

Communists made no attempt to conceal that such was the Party program.

To renounce loyalty towards one's country and to eradicate patriotic feelings inculcated in school and in the University—this was the price of entrance upon the road of progress. Not everyone was prepared to pay this price. Our group disintegrated. "The most promising young government politicians," Stefan and Henryk, became Stalinists; George and I withdrew. Those who crossed the line thought the rest of us weak poets, bookworms incapable of action. Perhaps their opinion was not far from the truth. I am not sure, however, that cast-iron consistency is the greatest of human virtues.

Gamma became a Stalinist. I think he felt uneasy writing his passionless poetry. He was not made for literature. Whenever he settled down before a sheet of paper he sensed a void in himself. He was incapable of experiencing the intense joys of a writer, either those of the creative process or those of work accomplished. The period between his nationalism and his Stalinism was for him a limbo, a period of senseless trials and disillusionment.

The Communist Party was illegal in our country. Membership in it was punishable under a paragraph of the law that defined any attempt to deprive Poland of any part of her territory as a criminal offense. Party leaders, realizing they had nothing to gain at the time from illegal activity, tried to reach and sway public opinion through sympathizers not directly involved in the Party. A number of publications appeared in Poland which followed the Party line, adapting it to the level of unwary readers. The group in which Gamma found himself started to edit one such periodical. Contacts with Party messengers took place in secret, often on trips to the neighboring forests. By now, most of the members of our original group had completed

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tianity to a cult of History takes place imperceptibly. 156
Without doubt, the greatest success of the Imperium 159
would come if it could install a Party-line pope in the Vatican. A mass in the Basilica of St. Peter in Rome, performed by such a pope, with the assistance of dignitaries from those subjugated countries which are predominately Catholic, would be one of the most important steps toward the consolidation of the world empire.

Christians who serve the Eastern Imperium ingeniously resolve the problem posed by Jesus' words "Render therefore unto Caesar the things that are Caesar's; and unto God the things that are God's." Until now the contrast between the ordinary man and Caesar has never been effaced. Christianity guaranteed this division by teaching that every man had his own history, distinct from the history of the social group or the nation to which he belonged. If, as is taught today from the Elbe to Vladivostok, the history of every man is nothing more than the reflection of the history of his class, and if his class is personified in Caesar, then it is clear that the man who rebels against Caesar rebels against himself. Christians who agree to this thesis prove they no longer believe in God's judgment of each man's acts. Fear that History will damn them eternally motivates their submission.

The Party knows that the conflict between true Chris- 185
tianity and the Revolution is fundamental. The Revolu- 165 •
tion aims at the highest goal the human species has ever 159
set for itself on earth, the end of "man's exploitation of man." To do this, it must replace man's desire for profit with a feeling of collective responsibility as a motive for action. This is a distant and honorable goal. Probably it will not be reached quickly; and probably, too, for a long period it will be necessary to maintain a constant terror in order to instill that feeling of responsibility by force.

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CHAPTER II

THE EAST EUROPEAN SETTING

1. *General Factors*

175 In the early spring and summer of 1944 the Soviet armies breached the German defenses on the Dniester and the Bug and, advancing through the territories of pre-war Romania and Poland, entered a region which, for purposes of convenience, may be termed Eastern Europe.[1] By the time World War II had ended a year later Soviet power was established as far as the Elbe river in the west and the borders of Greece in the south. The path was cleared for the Communist reorganization of Eastern Europe.

In the first months the primary lever of political and social change was the Soviet Army itself. But the new imperial apparatus did not long depend solely upon direct military intervention. In the wake of the advancing armies a well-organized political apparatus moved which, though few in numbers, was endowed with much of the militancy and dynamism of the Soviet system.

● 665 Generally, post-war Communist leadership was Moscow-trained, had served long apprenticeships in the Comintern apparatus, and was familiar with the hierarchal operations of an organization which invested all initiative in the Moscow center.[2] Although some of the leaders had led a furtive underground existence between the wars, they were no longer genuine revolutionaries, but agents of an imperial power designated with imposing the developed Soviet political and economic system on countries whose languages

[1] The term Eastern Europe, as used here, includes what is often referred to as Central and Eastern Europe, but does not include Russia, which is frequently considered part of Eastern Europe. Certain German writers, seeing in the region a mosaic of under-developed and politically weak states, have sometimes used the phrase *Zwischen-Europa* ("Between Europe"). For the purposes of this paper, the term Eastern Europe is taken to be coextensive with the Soviet satellite sphere, excluding East Germany, but including Yugoslavia whose regime broke with Moscow in 1948.

[2] The character of the post-war seizure of power by the Communist Parties of Eastern Europe is treated more fully below, pp. 42-43. For a good general account of these events, see Hugh Seton-Watson, *The East European Revolution* (Oxford, 1950), pp. 187-229.

665 and customs they knew, and of which they were usually natives.[3] As subsequent events were to show, the transplantation of the Soviet system to Eastern Europe proved to be far more complicated than these former Cominternists had perhaps anticipated. Local conditions and traditions of the captive countries were everywhere to balk them, demanding improvisations and flexibilities for which they were unprepared.

The story of land collectivization in the Satellites from 1945 to 1953 is consequently the story of the interaction between a highly developed system of agrarian exploitation torn from its Soviet context, and the indigenous conditions of Eastern Europe which confronted Party political-economic planners at every turn. A brief review of these conditions is in order.

2. *The Rise of the Peasant Proprietor* (1800-1939)

565 Although some remnants of an essentially feudal land system
423 survived in areas of Poland and Hungary (particularly the latter) until the eve of World War II, the major features of East European feudalism, contrary to popular belief, died before the beginning of the 20th century.[4] Serfdom was finally abolished by parliamentary legislation or revolutionary action by 1860: in the Austrian "hereditary lands" (including Slovenia, Bohemia and Moravia) as early as 1781; in Croatia in 1848; in Hungary (including Slovakia) in 1849; in Congress Poland in 1861; and in Romania in 1864. Emancipation of the Serbian and Bulgarian peasantry resulted from progressive limitations of the political power of their Turkish overlords, a process which took place throughout the 19th century.

As was the case in Russia, however, emancipation did not solve the basic problems of East European rural society. Indeed, with the growing incorporation of Eastern Europe into the world agricultural market, the problems grew even more severe in the 19th century. Except in Bulgaria and Serbia, where a class of peasant smallholders emerged within the framework of Ottoman society, the abolition of serfdom did not establish a sturdy, independent peasantry such as existed in the West. Even in Bulgaria

[3] "The East European revolution . . . was imposed from outside and from above . . . [and therefore cannot] justly be compared with the revolutions of 1688, 1789, and 1917." (Seton-Watson, p. vii.).

[4] It is necessary, one writer points out, to stress the incorrectness of the widely-held view that "the feudal system, with the characteristic features of the large latifundia, continued to prevail east of the Elbe until the arrival of the Soviet Army." (Ygael Gluckstein, *Stalin's Satellites in Europe*, London, 1952, p. 13).

423 there were many indigenous forces which played a role as well. The war shook the fragile structure of East European society and made it vulnerable to rapid and drastic change.

Indeed, even in pre-war years the agitation for land reform had begun to take on serious character. By 1939 the rising peasant demands in Poland for further division of the landed estates had posed a critical challenge to the Sanacja regime and there were signs that the Hungarian ruling class were beginning to recognize the inevitability of land redistribution.

423 665 The impact of the war on the consciousness of the people was most dramatically expressed in the political reorientation which accompanied it. Tito's Partisan movement drew important support from the ranks of the impoverished peasantry. The sharp upward surge of the Czechoslovak Communist Party after the war may be taken, at least in part, as an indication of a more radical mood in the population as a whole. In Bulgaria, Romania and Hungary, the ruling classes, which contracted disastrous alliances with Hitler's New Order, had thereby discredited themselves, and gave way to spokesmen for radical action.

These changes were reflected politically in the fact that the main opposition to the Communists in the post-war era came, not from the remnants of the pre-war ruling classes, but from the more progressive peasant, and to a degree, from Social Democratic parties. The general framework of political and social thought had shifted to the left, and parties such as the Smallholders in Hungary and the Peasant Party in Poland assumed the dominant positions denied them in pre-war political life.[18]

423 Under these conditions the rapid conclusion of land reforms was inevitable and the Communists appeared, not as the instigators of reform, but as its overseer. Indeed, the reforms instituted in 1945-46 were not "socialist" in character, even in Hungary and

[18] The history of the non-Communist agrarian reform movements in Eastern Europe, prior to, and during World War II is yet to be written. The task is made somewhat difficult by present Communist efforts to blot out all evidence of the very existence of such movements outside the realm of the Communist Parties. The "Village Explorers" in Hungary, for example, who identified the high standards of peasant culture with an expected national renaissance, helped pave the way for the great reforms of 1945. Other groups, such as the Plowman's Front in Romania and the "Pladne" Agrarians in Bulgaria, also played, or might have played, important roles. The Polish Peasant Party is also worth considering in this respect because its role in the wartime resistance gave it roots among the peasantry sometimes lacking in the inter-war official "peasant" parties.

Poland where they were most extensive. On the contrary, like the 423
reforms of the 1920s, they signified a broadening of the property basis of society, not its limitation, and their aim was redistribution of property and wealth, not the reorganization of production.

Communist participation in the land reforms must be under- 423
stood as a part of their political program, not as a part of their 665
social program of "building socialism." The overriding concern of the East European Communist Parties in the post-war period was not the shape of the future economy, but the assumption of the political power. The Communists offered no opposition to the implementation of the reforms, and, in most cases, expedited them to curry favor with the population. The Communists attuned themselves to the popular mood, carefully concealing the focal point of their operations, which lay in the day-to-day process of consolidating power in the State apparatus, particularly in the Ministries of Interior, Justice, and Agriculture. To this end they worked, often obscurely, in minority positions, in the post-war governing coalitions and supported land programs which actually impeded their own subsequent collectivization drives.

The Communists went so far as to support, on countless occasions, the principle of private property. Thus, in 1945, the Hungarian Communist theoretician, Josef Revai, stated categorically: "There exists a material community of interest between the peasantry and labor: the preservation of the distributed land."[16] And two months later Matyas Rakosi echoed his words, declaring, "We do not want kolkhozes, but strong and prospering small farms."[17] And an organ of the Polish Communists, *Glos Ludu*, expressed itself very clearly in the same year:

> The development of the village economy can not and will not be a copy of the Russian development. Our conditions are different; our national traditions are different as well. The difference is in the psychology of the Pole, and without doubt our Polish way of progress will be different.[18]

The Substance of the Reforms

Assured of full Communist support, the reforms were rapidly 423
implemented throughout the region. The most radical land alterations occurred in Hungary, where the land structure had been least

[16] *Szabad Nep*, August 18, 1945.
[17] *Szabad Nep*, October 16, 1945.
[18] *Glos Ludu*. December 18, 1945.

493 to treat the growing economic disproportions as an *aberration* of
185 the Plans, or at least of the intention of the Plans, or an unfortunate and inexplicable oversight, Nagy clearly assigned responsibility for the failure to the leadership itself. Bierut and Gheorghiu-Dej phrased their announcements of the New Course in such a way as to hint that the agricultural failure had been the result of official policy, but they hedged considerably. The extremely critical economic situation in Hungary of 1953 forced Nagy to treat the past policy with a frankness which was not as apparent elsewhere. But despite the reticence elsewhere, it was clear that the growing disproportions were the result of deliberate Communist application, with slight variations, of the formula stated by Zapotocky in 1949.

● 665 The most striking proof of the secondary role which agricultural development played in Eastern Europe is the general weakness of the Communist political apparatus in the countryside. In this respect East European Communists followed closely in the Soviet footsteps, where approximately 85 per cent of the kolkhozes were without a Party organization in 1949.[23] In Poland, Jacob Berman admitted, 43 per cent of the *villages* were without a Party organization altogether,[24] and elsewhere in the block the situation was no better.[25]

The absence of strong and viable Party units in the countryside reflects the unwillingness of the Communist leadership to assign its best technical and administrative personnel outside heavy industry, as well as the natural gravitation of rising bureaucrats—many of them, after all, drawn from the countryside itself—to the comforts of city life. Throughout the Soviet sphere the composition of the Communist Parties has become increasingly identified with the new managerial bureaucracy and, consequently, the Party units tend to exist in those places where the concentration of technicians is greatest.

This partly explains why implementation of the New Course in 1953-54 has made it imperative that the Party organizations in the countryside be strengthened. The East European regimes have

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[23] Merle Fainsod, *How Russia Is Ruled* (Cambridge, 1953), p. 454. Fainsod also notes that only 17.7 per cent of the Party members in the predominantly agricultural Ukraine were engaged in agricultural pursuits.

[24] *Trybuna Ludu*, November 6, 1953.

[25] See the speeches of the Czechoslovak Minister of Agriculture, Jindrich Uher (*Rude Pravo*, December 19, 1953), and the Hungarian Minister of Agriculture, Andras Hegedus (*Szabad Nep*, December 31, 1953).

THE EAST EUROPEAN REGIMES HAVE

brought great pressure to bear upon the urban technicians to go 665
to the villages to improve the technical facilities available for the 369
farms; and simultaneously, strenuous efforts have been made to 463
strengthen the Party organization in the villages. "The situation cannot be tolerated," complained the Hungarian Party organ, *Szabad Nep* in December 1953, "in which skilled and well-educated agricultural experts work in agriculture only in small numbers, and the greater part is engaged in administrative work."[26]

The administrative weakness of the State in the countryside was also evident from the inferior quality of the personnel employed in rural posts. "Not one of the managers of the Machine and Tractor Stations," the Czechoslovak Minister of Agriculture, Jindrich Uher, revealed, "has a higher-school education and only 3.5 per cent have had a secondary education." Moreover, only 10 per cent of the senior agronomists at the MTS had a higher education, and only three per cent of the State Farm workers had completed work at technical schools.[27] Such were conditions in the most modernized of the Satellite nations; undoubtedly, they were much worse elsewhere.

In Poland, for example, an official analysis, based on "incomplete data," revealed that in its 402 Machine and Tractor Stations there were 76 directors, 72 political leaders, 101 senior agronomists, and 101 senior mechanics who had no qualifications for their jobs whatsoever![28] No doubt it was this wretched situation which explains the recent feverish efforts of the Polish Government to train vast numbers of agricultural experts for immediate service as part of its New Course for Agriculture.

But even if the Communists succeed in increasing the output of farm technicians, two serious problems inherent in the system remain. First of all, there is the tendency of these technicians to attach themselves to the central ministerial apparatus from which so much wealth and prestige is derived in the totalitarian state. Secondly, the technicians who have been dispatched to the countryside are burdened with a host of responsibilities unrelated to the task for which they were trained — that is, the endless paper work of Communist bureaucracy. Resolutions, orders, decrees, receipts, dossiers follow each other in an endless succession, requiring immense expenditure of time and effort, and multiplying as the farm

[26] *Szabad Nep* (Budapest), December 4, 1953.
[27] *Rude Pravo* (Prague), December 19, 1953.
[28] *Nowe Drogi* (Warsaw), January, 1954, p. 73.

666 369 463 apparatus grows. When the introduction of the New Course in 1953 made agricultural improvement imperative, the seriousness of this bureaucratic delay and confusion became the subject of frequent attack by Communist orators, confirming the judgment of a prominent American student of Communist agricultural life who wrote:

> When you read . . . of the remarkable increase in the number of agronomists and other agricultural specialists and technicians in the Soviet Union, remember that many of them are not engaged, or do not spend much of their time, in research or extension or other technical work, but are trying to cope with the vast amount of bureaucratic paper work required by the Soviet system.[29]

The recurrent drives to "deflate the ranks of the farm bureaucracy" have not generally, according to this same expert, proved successful.

407 241 An additional measure of the long-standing Communist reluctance to divert national resources to agricultural development is to be found in the relatively lethargic pace of farm mechanization. While it is true (see Table 23) that an increase in the mechanization of the "Socialist sector" did accompany collectivization, the increase was by no means as great as popularly pictured, and was not even as great, proportionally, as the increase which accompanied Soviet collectivization in the early thirties. Since one of the stock justifications of large-scale collectivized farming was, and remains, its alleged capacity to exploit modern farm machinery, the failure of the Communists to supply the farms with adequate machinery indicated the degree to which this Communist argument was a rationalization for a policy of exploitation.

Since the broad Russian plains are more adaptable to use of farm machinery, especially large tractors and combines, comparisons with Eastern Europe and its more broken terrain are not altogether apt. However, it should be noted that the Soviet Union provides a higher proportion of tractors to its farms than do the East European Communist regimes. As indicated in Table 23, there were approximately 107,500 tractors in service in Eastern Europe in 1952-53, compared with approximately 45,000 four years earlier. During the four years of collectivization, then, the tractor park in Eastern Europe was increased by only 62,500. In the USSR, on the other hand, over 100,000 tractors were produced in the year 1936 alone,[30] far fewer than was needed, but far greater proportionately than in Eastern Europe.

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[29] Lazar Volin, "Russia's Agricultural Potential," *Foreign Agriculture*, October, 1953, p. 179.
[30] Harry Schwartz, p. 243.

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CHAPTER IV

THE COMMUNISTS TAKE CONTROL OF POLICE AND ARMY

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AT THE END of the war, the Communist Parties were participating in governments with bourgeois parties not only in the 'Peoples Democracies,' but in France, Italy, Belgium, Austria and Finland. For about two years the Communist leaders called for 'national unity' and 'order' against strikes and workers' struggles in general. In France, Italy, Belgium, Austria and Finland, at the end of the honeymoon period, the Communist Party representatives left the governments or were thrown out of them and went over to the opposition, while in the 'Peoples Democracies' they took full control into their hands. This difference was due to the fact that the Communist Party did not take control of the police and army in any of the Western European countries as they did in the East. In none of the first group of countries did the Communists succeed in getting control of the Ministry of War and only in Austria and Finland did they for a time hold the portfolio of Minister of the Interior and hence control of the police. Even in Finland they did not completely succeed in 'purging' the police of 'unreliable' elements and introducing their agents, so that when the Communist Minister of the Interior—Leino—lost his position in the government, his power to use the police as a means of resistance was very limited.

The situation in all the satellite states was very different. Almost from the beginning, the Ministers of the Interior were Communists. They used their positions to recruit the old police officers into the Communist Party, or to replace them by new Communist Party members. As there are, of course, no statistics to show the changes in the party composition of the police in these countries, one can only rely for information on fragments of news in the press. However, in the case of Czechoslovakia there is the evidence of Hubert Ripka, who was the

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CHAPTER V

LIQUIDATION OF THE PEASANT PARTIES

665 A VERY SEVERE and prolonged struggle took place between the Communist Parties and the Peasant Parties. The latter were neither as black as the Communist leaders painted them, nor as white as the majority of the western capitalist press tried to represent them. The peasant parties were of very diverse character and each of them was far from being homogeneous. Progressive and reactionary, democratic and totalitarian elements were mingled in the same parties. To follow the Communist Party policy towards them it is necessary first to understand the complex character of the peasant parties.

665 565 471 Since the economic, cultural and political leadership of a country rests with the towns, and since the peasants of Eastern Europe were dispersed in small, isolated villages, the leadership of the peasant parties mainly came from the towns. The urban population was divided into conflicting social and political groups, and so the question always arose of which class the peasantry would make its ally—the urban bourgeoisie or the workers' parties. The peasantry is divided amongst itself, the rich peasants naturally looking to one camp, and the poor, semi-proletarian majority, to the other. A whole series of socio-political problems is bound up with this. So long as the big estates were not divided up, the peasantry as a whole remained united in the fight for land reform. and their party had a more or less revolutionary character. But with the carrying out of large-scale land reforms after World War I in Rumania, Yugoslavia and Bulgaria (see pages 13-8), there was very little to hold the peasantry together and no common political platform. Another factor must be taken into account. For centuries, the peasants in many countries, as for instance in France at the time of the Great Revolution, wanted to get rid of

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their feudal overlords, take possession of their lands and thus gain the freedom to produce for themselves and sell their products in the towns. Such a programme would have been quite inadequate for the East European countries in the period between the two wars, because of the catastrophic fall in agricultural prices as a result of the world crisis and of the great agricultural over-population. The solution of the problems of the peasantry today is not in land distribution alone, but also in industrialisation which will absorb the surplus agricultural population and open up wide markets for agricultural products. There is a contradiction, at least temporarily, between these two factors and different layers of the peasantry have different attitudes towards industrialisation as well as towards the policy of keeping agricultural prices high (by tariffs).

The poor peasants who need to work at least partly for wages and do not produce enough food even for their own needs, have an interest in industrialisation and low prices for agricultural goods, while the rich peasants who want cheap labour do not care about industrialisation and support any policy which results in a rise in the cost of food. Large scale industrialisation is impossible under present conditions in Eastern Europe without State planning, so that the poor peasant naturally tends to support the socialist forces of the towns while the rich peasant looks in quite a different direction for leadership. After the land reform and in face of widespread unemployment, open and hidden, the rich peasants could not propose any positive programme to rally the mass of the peasantry to their side. Another factor contributed to the bankruptcy of the Peasant Parties of Eastern Europe. While on the whole they favoured democracy, the market for the agricultural products of Eastern Europe in the thirties was mainly fascist Germany. Hence the attitude of many of the leaders of the peasant parties to the pro-German policy of their governments was ambiguous, to say the least. To add to the contradictions in which many of the peasant parties found themselves, was the national question which the conservatism and narrow outlook of the peasantry, especially of its rich and well-satisfied section, precluded them from tackling. In Yugoslavia, Rumania and Czechoslovakia this factor was of the utmost importance in leading the official peasant parties into a blind

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665 alley. If any of the peasant parties succeeded at all in escaping
565 control by the wealthy townsmen or by the rich peasants,
471 capitulation to their semi-fascist government, entanglement in a hopeless and reactionary fight against other nations, as the peasant parties of Poland and Bulgaria did to a large extent, and the terrorism of the government rendered them powerless. Unlike the workers' parties, the peasant parties were loose organisations of widely scattered individuals with the control of the organisation concentrated in a few hands (in the towns) and so they were an easy target for the police.

665 Some facts about the peasant parties in East Europe before the end of World War II will illustrate these generalisations.

The Rumanian National Peasant Party came into being in 1926 by the fusion of the chauvinist, anti-Hungarian National Party of Transylvania led by Maniu, and the Peasant Party of the Old Kingdom of Rumania led by Ion Mihalache. The Party was led entirely by lawyers, journalists, etc.,and a small group of rich peasants. For years it was sharply opposed to the dictatorial King, and there were frequent and bloody clashes with the fascist organisations and the police. But a party under the leadership of rich peasants and their urban allies in a country where eighty per cent of the population was poverty-stricken could never consistently pursue a democratic policy. During his short periods of office between the two world wars, Maniu ruthlessly suppressed the strikes of the miners and railway workers in 1929 and 1933. Although he had been for years one of the leaders of the democratic opposition to King Carol and his agents, yet at a time when there were armed conflicts between the peasant members of his own party and the Iron Guard fascists, Maniu suddenly in 1937 declared an election pact with the Iron Guard, simply as a tactical manoeuvre against his old opponent Tătărescu and after the assassination of the Iron Guard leader, Codreanu, by the King, Maniu offered a refuge in his party to the Iron Guardists. The Peasant Party behaved with extreme brutality towards the Hungarian minority in Transylvania. During the 1930's when democracy in Rumania was reduced to a sham and when the dictatorship became increasingly open and brutal and millions were looking to Maniu for a call to rebel, he went no further than to writing some articles of protest in the press.

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During the German-Soviet war, he supported the alliance of Marshal Antonescu with Germany. It was only after the Rumanian army reached the Dniester (the pre-war border of Rumania which Russia had violated by annexing Bessarabia—in which Rumanians constituted the majority—in 1940 and which many Rumanians still claimed as the boundary of Rumania) that Maniu called on Antonescu to stop the war. But he was content with publishing 'open letters' to Antonescu and made no appeal to the people for action. 665

The Croat Peasant Party under the leadership of Stepan Radić, and after his assassination, of Vladko Maček, had mass support, but the national question proved to be its Achilles heel. After the land reform in Croatia, the leadership of the Party was in the hands of rich people who were generally nationalistic and opposed to Belgrade. Most of the nationalist bourgeoisie of Croatia also joined the Party. Hence in the words of H. Seton-Watson: 'Originally a social revolutionary movement, the party became a nationalist organisation directed by the urban middle class'. (*Eastern Europe Between the Wars, 1918–1941*, Cambridge University Press, 1945, p. 227).* The Party became more and more chauvinistic and anti-Serbian in its propaganda, and when in 1941 the quisling Croat Pavelić massacred the Serbs, many of the leaders of the Croat Peasant Party collaborated with him. The Party as a whole, if not collaborationist, was at least a passive spectator of the German occupation.

The record of the Serbian Peasant Party was no better, but as it never had such a mass influence and revolutionary character it had a lower level from which to decline. H. Seton-Watson describes it in these words: 'It had its full complement of business men, small-town traders, urban intellectuals and public officials. It was a party of the peasantry only in the sense that it relied on peasant votes, and that its leaders possessed proficiency in a style of tavern oratory which commended itself to some, but increasingly few, peasants'. (Ibid. p. 241).

The Smallholders' Party of Hungary, headed by Tibor Eckhardt in the days of Horthy and later by Ferenc Nagy, had

*H. Seton-Watson's is by far the most objective and profound study of the politics of Eastern Europe between the two world wars that has been written, and I am very much indebted to it.

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665 an even worse record than the National Peasant Party of Rumania. Eckhardt himself took an active part in the White Terror against workers, peasants, communists, socialists and liberals, after the downfall of Béla Kun's Government (1919). For years he and his supporters clamoured for a revision of Hungary's frontiers at the expense of Rumania, Czechoslovakia and Yugoslavia. During the war, Eckhardt appeared in America and led an agitation for the restoration of the Austro-Hungarian Empire ruled by the Hapsburg dynasty. The Smallholders' Party was a rich peasants' party par excellence, not concerned to defend the poor and oppressed amongst the peasantry. On the contrary, it willingly collaborated with the Horthy regime in stifling any peasant resistance.

Between the wars the Czechoslovak Agrarian Party was so completely controlled by the rural and urban rich that it became the most important party of the ruling bourgeoisie which directed the state.

The two mass peasant parties in Poland and Bulgaria were of a somewhat different character. The peasant movement in Poland was split into three groups: on the right there was the conservative wing, Piast, and on the left there were the two organisations Wyzwolenie and Stronnictwo Chłopskie. In face of the strengthening dictatorship of Pilsudski the three organisations united in 1931 into one called Stronnictwo Ludowe (S.L.) The world economic crisis drove the members of the Stronnictwo Ludowe to more and more radical demands: the partition of all the large estates, the strengthening of the peasant co-operatives, drastic cuts in taxation and improvement of social services. The party co-operated with the Polish Socialist Party, which at that time was leading struggles with wide popular support against the Government of the Colonels and against the ruling classes generally. The co-operation between the Stronnictwo Ludowe and the P.P.S. reached its climax in the mass ten days' peasant strike of August, 1937, against the government, a strike in which the workers in many big towns joined as an expression of their solidarity. The police suppressed the strikes, killing many strikers (officially the casualties were 42 but actually they were much greater), and wounding an even greater number. There can be

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little doubt that if war had not threatened, the stuggles of the peasants and workers would have resulted in the overthrow of the dictatorial regime. 665

In Bulgaria the peasant party—the Agrarian Union—took many years to recover from the overthrow of Stamboliisky in 1923. The majority of its leaders were either assassinated or forced into exile and it was not until 1933 that the government, in response to popular pressure, allowed the uncompromising Agrarian leaders to return. Opposition developed between the right wing Agrarian leaders such as Dimiter Gitchev and Alexander Obbov who were ready to collaborate with the Government, and the left wing Agrarians, the most important of whom were G. M. Dimitrov and Nikola Petkov. Because of their radicalism, these two were called 'fellow-travellers' of the Communist Party. The *Central European Observer* of 12th January, 1945, wrote of their party that it 'has always made friendship with Russia and Yugoslavia its chief aim.' (See also *International Press Correspondence* of November 13th, 1937, praising G. M. Dimitrov as the leader of the left wing of the Agrarian League, the 'Pladne' group, called after its paper).*

There were two other very small radical peasant groups, the Hugarian 'village explorers' (now united in the National Peasant Party) and the Rumanian Ploughmen's Front.

Without taking into account the internal contradiction in the peasant parties between their progressive, democratic and reactionary chauvinistic elements and the consequent splits, it is impossible to understand how the Communist Parties destroyed such big movements so easily and quickly.

An important feature of the Communist Party policy towards the peasant parties was that of 'divide and rule.' They split each peasant party into different wings, so that they could play one off against the other. The Communists did not necessarily co-operate with the more progressive and democratic group against the other. Their policy was determined solely by expediency and not principle. For instance, in Bulgaria, 661

*Ten years later the Communist-controlled Agrarian Union paper, *Zemedelsko Zname* wrote: Nikola Petkov 'In 1931 belonged to the agrarian "Pladne" group, whose connections with foreign reactionary circles were all too well known.' (Quoted in *Free Bulgaria*, 1st October, 1947). It seems it was only to *International Press Correspondence* that this was not well known.

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CHAPTER VI

THE LIQUIDATION OF THE SOCIALIST PARTIES

BEFORE THEIR LIQUIDATION by the Communist Parties, the different Socialist Parties of Eastern Europe varied greatly in strength, both absolutely and relatively to the national Communist Parties. The Polish Socialist Party was incomparably stronger than its Communist rival; the Hungarian Socialist Party was much stronger than the Communist Party; in Rumania they were of about equal strength; in Czechoslovakia the Socialist Party was much weaker than the Communist Party and in Bulgaria it was weaker still; in Yugoslavia a Socialist Party scarcely existed. It is, therefore, most instructive to examine in detail the fight of Moscow against the Polish Socialist Party, while referring only briefly to the fate of the Socialist Parties in the other countries. 665

For various reasons the Communist Party of Poland (K.P.P.) was never as strong as the Socialist Party (P.P.S.) The forerunner of the K.P.P. was the Social Democracy of the Kingdom of Poland and Lithuania (S.D.K.P.i.L.) whose founder and teacher was Rosa Luxemburg. This great Marxist thinker had one very mistaken conception which proved to be a serious impediment to the Polish Party; this was her opposition to any fight for Poland's independence from Russia, Germany and Austria. The ill-fated invasion of the Red Army in 1920 further convinced the masses that the K.P.P. was indifferent to Poland's independence. Karl Radek, who knew Poland well, told the Bolshevik leaders that the Red Army's advance on Warsaw would only isolate the K.P.P. and advised against it. Although he was supported by Trotsky, his warning was ignored by the Bolshevik Party leadership. This was an important cause of the failure of the K.P.P. to gain the support of the majority of the Polish workers. Since the S.D.K.P.i.L. 661 665

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was older than the Russian Social Democracy, and hence older than the Bolshevik Party which was originally a faction of the Russian Social Democracy, it had traditions of independent thought that inevitably clashed with the rising absolutist bureaucracy in Russia. In 1923 the majority of the Central Committee of the K.P.P. supported Trotsky against Stalin in the internal Party fight, and after his triumph, Stalin liquidated the Luxemburgist-Trotskyist leadership. Later he had to liquidate the supporters of Bukharin, the President of the Comintern. Later still even the new leadership of the K.P.P. appointed in 1930, did not conform to the 'Line' and had to be liquidated. As Poland lay on the Russian border and the K.P.P. was illegal, the most important leaders of the Party were usually in U.S.S.R., and were thus involved in the big purges of the thirties. Many of them were executed or perished in forced labour camps—Domski, Sofia Unschlicht, Warski-Warszawski, Kostrzewa-Koszutska, Prochniak, Huberman (brother of the violinist), Winiarski, Sochacki, Lenski, Rval, Zarski, Wandurski and Jasienski. (For full details of the fate of the Polish Communist leaders in Russia see the article of P. Olchovski in *Narodnaya Pravda,* Paris, September, 1950). Apparently the purge so decimated the K.P.P. leadership that the Russians found it necessary officially to dissolve the Party (1938). (Their excuse that a large number of police spies had infiltrated into the Party would have been a reason for reorganising, not abolishing it). Shortly after the liquidation of the K.P.P. an event occurred which made any Kremlin supporter hateful to the Poles—the Stalin-Hitler Pact which laid Poland open to invasion. No Pole could forget Molotov's glee when he said before the Supreme Soviet on October 31st, 1939: 'Instead of the enmity that was fostered in every way by certain European powers, we now have a rapprochement and the establishment of friendly relations between the U.S.S.R. and Germany . . . One swift blow to Poland, first by the German Army and then by the Red Army, and nothing was left of the ugly offspring of the Versailles Treaty . . . ' Nor could any Pole forget or forgive Molotov's message to the German ambassador in Moscow at the end of the invasion of Poland by Germany and Russia: 'I have received your communication regarding the entry of German troops into Warsaw. Please convey my congratulations

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and greetings to the German Reich Government. Molotov.' (R. J. Sontag and J. S. Beddie, editors, *Nazi-Soviet Relations, 1939-41*. Documents from the Archives of the German Foreign Office, U.S. Department of State, Washington, 1948, p. 89). Or: 'Today our relations with the German State are based on friendly relations, on our readiness to support Germany's efforts for peace . . .' (Speech by Molotov on October 31st, 1939, *Soviet Peace Policy*, London, 1941, p. 33). Nor could any Pole forget how the responsibility for starting the German-Polish war was put on Poland. The *Small Soviet Encyclopaedia* (1941 edition) wrote: ' . . . in autumn 1939, the unwise leaders of a landlord *Poland*, ordered by Anglo-French imperialists, *started the war against Germany*.' (My emphasis). 000

Looking ahead to the time when Poland would be a Russian province the Kremlin decided in 1942 to establish a party for Poland, but in order to conceal its connections with the past, it was called the Polish Workers' Party (P.P.R.) instead of the Communist Party of Poland. 665

As we have seen, Russia allowed the Warsaw uprising to be crushed by the Nazis, because of the weakness of the Party among the insurgents. This, of course, further weakened it.

The position of the P.P.S.[1] was very different. Between the two world wars it enjoyed the support of the overwhelming majority of the Polish workers. On the eve of the war it led the general strikes in Cracow, Tarnow and other towns and supported the peasants' strike (August, 1937). The municipal elections of 1938 and 1939 resulted in a crushing defeat for the Government and victory for the P.P.S. There can be no disagreement with the evaluation of the election results by the P.P.S. leader Adam Ciolkosz, that 'were it not for the threat of the German invasion they would have a far-reaching result, similar to that of the municipal elections in Spain in 1931.' (Introduction to C. Poznanski, *The Flaming Border*, London, 1944). The left wing of the P.P.S. was so strengthened in the thirties that the Party included in its new official programme adopted at the Radom Congress, February, 1937) the slogan of social revolution and dictatorship of the toiling masses. Unlike the Kremlin, the P.P.S. did not identify the rule of the proletariat with a one-party system, but with consistent democracy.

[1] [The Socialist Party -- Analyst]

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661 General Secretary of the Polish T.U.C. and editor of its paper. He too was a leader of the resistance movement during the war, and in spite of Osubka-Morawski and the P.P.R. was elected chairman of the Warsaw official P.P.S. Council in 1945 by the members of the Warsaw branch of the official P.P.S. After leaving the official P.P.S., he was arrested and was eventually murdered in prison. Cohn, another leader of the P.P.S., who was for six years in a German prisoner-of-war camp, was once more imprisoned. The same fate has befallen Antoni Pajdak, Tadeusz Szturm de Sztrem, Josef Dziegielewski, Wiktor Krawczyk, Wladyslaw Wilczynski, Stanislaw Sobolewski, Adam Obarski, Boleslaw Galaj and others. One of the most popular P.P.S. leaders was Zygmunt Zulawski, leader of the Party for forty years, for many years the chairman of its Supreme Council and General Secretary of the T.U.C. To keep up the appearance of democracy, the P.P.R. leaders allowed him to become a member of Parliament while preventing all his friends from standing for election as Independent Socialists. Single handed he fought a bitter struggle till his death in September 1949.

● 665 But even after the elimination of the real P.P.S., the official P.P.S. was a threat to the P.P.R., since of the two, the Polish workers preferred the former. For example, in 63 elections to shop committees held at the end of 1945 in the largest industrial district of Poland, out of a total of 928 seats the P.P.R. gained only 193 (21 per cent) while the Socialists gained 556 (64 per cent); the rest were divided thus: official trade union common lists of P.P.S. and P.P.R., 117 (12.6 per cent); Democratic Party, 14; Christian Labour Party, 10; Polish Peasant Party, 2; others (non-party), 36.* In many cases even members of the P.P.R. did not vote for their Party lists in the shop committee elections. This is clear from the complaint made on December 8th, 1945, by Gomulka, then General Secretary of the P.P.R.: 'There were elections to the Shop Committee of the "Fablok" factory (in Cracow). Our Party cell in that factory comprises 250—270 people. And in these elections we have not gained a single seat'. If people join a party from fear of being victimised, they will take the first opportunity of showing their real attitude to it.

*For particulars see *Robotnik Polski*, London, January, 1946.

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In spite of the pressure exerted at the November, 1945, 665
Congress of the T.U.C., the P.P.S. had the support of two
thirds of all the delegates, and Kazimierz Rusinek of the pre- [467]
war P.P.S. was elected General Secretary of the new Central
Committee of the Trade Unions.

The workers' support for the official P.P.S. had its effect on the Party's leaders. When at the regional conferences of the P.P.S. in Cracow, Katowice and other towns there was almost unanimous opposition to fusion with the P.P.R. or even to a united front at the elections against Mikolajczyk's party (P.S.L.), even Osubka-Morawski had to support this policy, although of course with reservations. On August 6th, 1946, he wrote in *Robotnik*: 'It seems to me that the greatest difficulties (in the maintenance of a united front—Y.G.) arise from the fact that one partner operates too much under the slogan of "the leading party" . . . A united front may not be based on the principle that the one rules, while the other subordinates himself, that the one lays down the conditions while the other submissively nods his head . . .' Two days later the P.P.R. daily *Glos Ludu* countered this by implying that the 'difficulties' to which Osubka referred were, at least in part, due to 'elements inimical to democracy' in the P.P.S. (Quoted in the article 'The fate of Polish Socialism,' by R. in *Foreign Affairs*, October, 1949). A few weeks later, on August 29th, the P.P.S. and P.P.R. leaders were called to Moscow to discuss the question of the United Front. This meeting was followed by another, and at last on November 28th, 1946, the P.P.S. leadership yielded to the pressure of the Kremlin. It seems that the fate of Puzak, Pajdak and the others impressed Osubka even more than the pressure from the rank and file of his own party.

But the P.P.R. leaders nevertheless did not forget Osubka's 665
temerity in writing as he did on 6th August, 1946, and im- 661
mediately after the victory of the 'united front' in the sham elections of 19th January, 1947, he was removed from the Prime Ministership and from being Chairman of the P.P.S. Central Executive and replaced by Jozef Cyrankiewicz.

But the pressure of the rank and file members of the P.P.S. against capitulation to the P.P.R. continued unceasingly. On May Day, in 1947, the P.P.R. strongly urged a fusion of the

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665 two parties. It also acted; in all factories, members of the
661 P.P.S. who opposed fusion began to be 'purged'. On 7th May, Adam Kurylowicz, a member of the P.P.S. who had been General Secretary of the Trade Unions since 1947, and previously, from 1918 to 1939, President of the All-Polish Railway Workers' Union, wrote an article in *Robotnik* called 'The Defence of the Workers against Abuses and Arbitrary Measures', in which he accused the P.P.R. of setting up a regime of terror in the factories. 'From all parts of the country, he wrote, 'fresh reports keep coming of injustices suffered by the workers. The elements alien to the working class behave in arbitrary fashion, and act "like bosses". They fire and hire workers without taking into account the opinion of the workers of the plant, scorning the laws, conquests, and social rights of the workers. A clique of self-seeking politicians is being formed. These new dignitaries have discovered that a party book is more important than technical qualifications'.

The reply to the impertinence of the P.P.S. was a political trial staged by the security police. One of the defendants, accused of membership of W.R.N., 'confessed' that there were 'no actual differences between the W.R.N. and the (official) Socialist Party'. The threat to the official P.P.S. was all too clear, and although the Party Congress of 14–17 December, 1947, did not welcome the P.P.R. call for a merger, the P.P.S. leadership knew that the game was up and on March 17th, 1948, Cyrankiewicz declared that the merger would be carried out. 82,000 members of the P.P.S. out of the total of 800,000 were expelled from the Party and many of the recalcitrant leaders were removed. Kurylowicz was removed from his post as General Secretary of the trade unions and replaced by Tadeusz Cwik, an old Communist Party agent. Rusinek, Osubka-Morawski, Stanislaw Piaskowski, Drobner and another eight members were removed from the Central Executive Committee of the Party and Szwalbe and another eleven members were removed from the Supreme Council (meeting of the P.P.S. National Council, Warsaw, September 18–22, 1948). The whole executive committee of the P.P.S. in Lodz was removed and other local committees followed suit. The heresy-hunting of Gomulka* occurred at the same time, and

* See pp. 281-3.

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this increased the opposition of the rank and file members of the P.P.S. to unity with the dictatorial P.P.R. and also led to more stringent measures against oppositionists. But by December, 1948, the fusion was an accomplished fact and the 'United Polish Workers' Party' (Z.P.P.R.) was born. The quisling Cyrankiewicz said of the Unity Congress: 'This congress is the greatest event in Poland since Kościuszko's rising'. Cyrankiewicz is probably thus aspiring to get from Stalin the Order of Suvorov—the hangman of Kościuszko's rising!

The liquidation of the Socialist Parties in the other satellites followed a roughly similar course. But because these Socialist Parties were relatively weaker than the Polish Socialist Party, their collapse was due not only to police pressure and the presence in some of them of Russian armies, but to the feeling of many of the rank and file members that the parties were not strong enough to stand up to the pressure of the Communist Parties without allying with the bourgeoisie, and yet that such an alliance would be too dangerous, because a victory of the bourgeoisie over the Communist Parties which had the support of the majority of the workers, would lead to a defeat of the workers themselves and a bourgeois terroristic dictatorship, in short to fascism. The members of the P.P.S. felt confident that if it were not for the Russian army of occupation, they could get rid of the Communist Party dictatorship, and suppress any fascist elements. But many socialists in the other satellite countries thought it would be impossible to oppose at one and the same time the Communist Party dictatorship and a nascent fascist dictatorship. Hence there were different tendencies within the Socialist Parties of Czechoslovakia, Hungary, Rumania and Bulgaria—on the one hand, the followers of right wing conservative leaders like Károly Peyer, Kosta Lulchev or C. Titel Petrescu, who collaborated with the bourgeois parties, on the other, those who worked with the Communist Party under such leaders as Zdeněk Fierlinger, Árpád Szakasits and Dimitri Neikov.* The third tendency,

*The fate of these 'fellow-travellers' in Czechoslovakia, Hungary and Bulgaria was not better than that of Osubka-Morawski and Co. in Poland. After they had served their purpose they were pushed aside. Fierlinger, who had been given the post of Vice-Premier as a reward for his services in the February coup, was on April 25th, 1950, relegated to the Ministry of Church Affairs. Szakasits on April 24th, resigned his post as President of the Hungarian Republic on the

(cont. overleaf)

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661 favouring an independent socialist policy, which predominated
665 in the P.P.S., was very weak in the other Socialist Parties. The greater the feeling of impotence, the weaker was this wing.

661 The Communist Party leaders did their best to identify every opposition to themselves with resurgent fascism. This was not difficult, as remnants of the fascist bourgeoisie existed and it was always possible either to reveal or invent a fascist plot. The secret police can always keep in reserve some of the 'lunatic' fringe of fascists in order to use them at a suitable moment.

The knowledge that the Kremlin would not abdicate its authority without using all the forces at its disposal, the belief that the people of the satellites themselves could not put up a successful opposition, the conviction that their 'liberation' in a Third World War would mean in reality the destruction of the population and civilization, all these factors contributed to produce a feeling of hopelessness, and hence capitulation.

This was particularly true of the serious and thoughtful workers in the Socialist Parties. The Communist leaders are well aware of this and not only rely on the demonstration of the military strength of the U.S.S.R. but play on the real fear of war.

665 After years of pressure on all sides from Moscow agents of the Kremlin, there is not one Socialist Party today in the whole of Eastern Europe. All of them have been merged with the Communist Parties.

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grounds of ill-health; this looks very much like an excuse as a fortnight later his son-in-law, Deputy Paul Schiffer, was expelled from Parliament. Neikov had better luck; he died on February 16th, 1948. (At the time of his death he held a relatively unimportant position, that of Vice-President of the Presidium of the National Assembly). The fate of other 'fellow-travellers' was also grim. Thus for instance in Hungary György Marosan, Deputy Secretary of the united Party and Minister of Light Industry, disappeared during a visit to Russia (his resignation was announced on August 5, 1950); Istvan Riesz, a former Social Democrat and Minister of Justice, was arrested in June, 1950, and died in prison; Pál Justus, a former Social Democrat and member of the Central Committee of the united Party, was condemned to imprisonment for life at the Rajk Trial. Similar cases from the other 'People's Democracies' can be quoted by the dozen.

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	Germans (%)	Czechs and Slovaks (%)
Independent	21.89	25.81
Tenants	0.40	0.28
Officials and clerks ..	16.60	18.24
Workers	61.11	55.67

467 In 1930 there were 476 thousand Sudeten Germans organised in trade unions. The Executive Committee of the Sudeten German Social Democratic Party stated: 'In their worst plight, on the eve of the Munich decision, our Trade Unions could still compare their strength with those of Switzerland, a country with four million inhabitants and with a functioning democracy.' (Introduction to W. Jaksch, *Sudeten Labour and the Sudeten Problem*, London, 1945).

665 The Sudeten Germans had a long socialist tradition, for Sudetenland was one of the first and strongest socialist centres in the Austro-Hungarian empire. It produced a number of the most prominent leaders of the Socialist International, among them Karl Kautsky, Viktor Adler, Otto Bauer and Karl Renner. As early as 1907, in the general elections, the Social Democratic Party polled 39.4 per cent of the votes in German Bohemia. In the general elections of 1911, it polled more than 40 per cent. In the elections of 1920 it polled 44 per cent of the Sudeten votes. Together with the Communist Party,* for more than a decade it had about half the votes in Sudetenland, which is a much higher proportion than the Social Democrats and Communists could claim among the Czechs, let alone among the Slovaks.

563 464 The world economic crisis which began in 1929 changed the situation. The industry of Sudetenland, depending as it did mainly on exports, was affected much more severely by the crisis than industry in the rest of the country. The bourgeois government of Czechoslovakia discriminated against German workers when giving employment, and this aggravated an already grave situation. The result was that 'unemployment in the Sudeten districts was at least twice as high as in the Czech interior.' (Jaksch, ibid. p. 17).

464 668 The great suffering caused by unemployment in Sudetenland and the existence of full employment just over the border

*An exact calculation of the strength of the Communist Party among the Sudetens is impossible, as the Party was not divided into different national groups.

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political parties which profess liberalism or which, more precisely, adopt only those elements of liberalism which further their own political aims. Regarded in this light, England, where the Liberal Party is the weakest among the principal political parties, would not be a liberal country. Similarly, in France, Italy, and Belgium, liberalism has not been limited to the so-called liberal parties. The situation was the same in the countries of Eastern Europe. 829

In Czechoslovakia there were only two liberal parties (the National Democrats and the National Socialists), but liberal ideology greatly influenced the Agrarian Party, the Social Democrats and, to a large extent, the Czech Catholics. In Poland, the National Democratic Party was, at first, the only party to accept any of the liberal principles (it endorsed particularly economic liberalism), but the Polish Agrarian and Socialist parties were influenced strongly by liberalism. In Hungary, the Liberal Party was small and without any influence. A similar situation prevailed in Bulgaria, but liberal aspirations for greater freedom and for more civil rights were not limited to members of the Liberal Party. In Rumania, the Liberal Party was very strong, but it was hardly more "liberal" than Maniu's National Peasant Party. In Yugoslavia, the Radicals and the Democrats who found their support chiefly among the Serbians and the Slovene liberals stood for certain principles of political and economic liberalism, but it is a recognized fact that the Croatian and Serbian Agrarians, as well as the Radicals and the Democrats, fought in the name of liberal democracy against dictatorship. In Bulgaria, the Agrarians of Stambolisky represented a party devoted to democratic principles. 665 829

The position and influence of liberalism in Eastern Europe is best illustrated by T. G. Masaryk. His own political party was numerically insignificant but Masaryk, as the most prominent liberal in this region, influenced not only the

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665 829 Czechs and the Slovaks, but also neighboring peoples, particularly the Yugoslavs. A large proportion of the Croatian, Serbian, and Slovene politicians from the Yugoslav provinces that had formerly formed a part of Austria-Hungary were educated before the First World War in the school of Masaryk's liberal thought. Among these men was Stjepan Radić, who later was to become leader of the Croatian Peasant Party.

829 565 Liberalism in Eastern Europe, and this is true for other countries as well, cannot be identified only with the so-called middle classes or with supporters of the free enterprise system. The middle classes, with the exception of those in Czechoslovakia and Austria, were not numerically or economically strong or influential. The capitalistic economic order was strongly defended, not only by the liberals, but by pronounced conservatives among whom were those who began to support authoritarian regimes in the 'thirties. The peasants, insofar as they did not adhere politically to parties of the conservative right, were usually very devoted and often even radical supporters of democracy. Similarly, a great number of socialistically oriented workers and intelligentsia, in supporting political democracy, were influenced by ideas of liberalism. Many liberals, usually those belonging to the intelligentsia, were sympathetic to socialistic tendencies. This socialistically-minded liberalism, which had its counterpart in France among the Radical Socialists or the so-called "Independent" Socialists, and in Britain among the British Fabians, was best represented in Czechoslovakia by T. G. Masaryk and his disciple, Eduard Beneš. Both men, although they rejected Marxism, accepted many ideas of the socialistic school of thought. This liberal socialistic orientation was the basis of the Czechoslovakian party of National Socialists whose adherents were chiefly recruited from the small bourgeoisie, the intelligentsia, and the workers. The National Socialists endeavored to combine liberal-

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liberalism, was opposed from the start to chauvinistic nationalism. All his life he advocated and pursued, to use his own expression, "European and world politics." He attempted to reach an agreement with Germany as to the problem of the German minority within Czechoslovakia and to solve other nationality problems to the satisfaction of all. He hoped that Czechoslovakia would become another Switzerland. 186

Kramář, on the other hand, linked Czechoslovakian national interests with Tsarist Russia. He persistently defended the concept of Czechoslovakia as a "national state" in which the Czechoslovakians would be the leading people and minorities would be delegated to a secondary position. His policy was openly anti-German. He envisaged, in the terms of romantic Pan-Slavism, a great Slav federation headed by a "democratic Russia." Viewing the League of Nations and all international institutions with skepticism, he warned the nation to rely on its own strength. Basically, Kramář's theories were defensive. In practice, they would have served as protection against German imperialism.

A similar difference existed in Rumania between the Bratianu brothers, the leaders of the Liberal Party, and Titulescu, the famous Rumanian Minister of Foreign Affairs. Titulescu did not belong to any political party, but his philosophy was definitely liberal. Politically, the Bratianu brothers were liberals in the sense that they defended parliamentary freedom against constitutional monarchy and opposed autocratic ambitions of the prince, later King Carol. Economically, they linked liberalism with the interests of the commercial and banking class. They strove to industrialize the country but, at the same time, they barred foreign capital. In this regard, their economic nationalism was most apparent. 648 186 665

Titulescu, unlike the Bratianu brothers, combined his

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648 genuine patriotism with sincere internationalism. He was
186 an ardent supporter of the League of Nations. He advocated
665 the principle of collective security. He tried to establish better relations with Soviet Russia. It was he who coined the phrase, "the spiritualization of boundaries." However, he was unable to win sufficient following in the ruling circles, and King Carol, who opposed his broad-minded policy, forced him to resign in 1936.

186 Poland serves as a clear example of the dominance of
665 nationalism over other political and social trends. In the nineteenth century liberalism attracted many of the Poles who were living in exile, especially those in France. Polish liberals worked enthusiastically with Mazzini in the "Young Europe" movement, and many of them took part unselfishly in the revolution of 1848. However, the great national struggle for the liberation and unification of Poland came to assume first place in the interests of all Polish patriots. Roman Dmowski, a prominent Polish statesman, had been devoted to the principles of liberalism in his youth but, during the national political struggle, he became a passionate nationalist of very conservative leanings. After the re-establishment of Polish independence, liberalism strongly influenced certain small Polish groups, for instance the Democratic and Labor Parties. In the latter, the Catholic influence was strongly felt. Ignace Paderewski, the famous pianist, who contributed greatly to the liberation of Poland in the First World War, belonged to the liberals.

The absence of a pronounced liberal trend and tradition in Poland was undoubtedly one of the reasons why Polish democracy, despite the liberal constitution of 1921, succumbed to the nationalistic pressure of Marshal Pilsudski, who established a semidictatorial regime in 1926 which lasted until the fall of Poland in 1939. The principal defenders of Polish democracy were the Agrarian Party, the Socialists, and the Christian Democrats. Naturally, nation-

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alism was strong even in these parties. It must be remembered that even the ardor of Polish Catholicism had its roots in Polish nationalism: Catholicism was a defense against the Eastern Orthodox Russians as well as against the Protestant Prussians. 186 665

The Polish National Democratic Party, which represented the middle class and the intelligentsia, became chauvinistic and violently antisemitic in spite of its original liberal aspirations. It fought against Pilsudski's dictatorship more for reasons of power politics than for ideological reasons. From 1930 on, this party inclined, and especially its younger members, more and more towards fascism. Nationalism suppressed the liberal elements of this party almost entirely.

In Poland, where nationalism was more extreme than in the other Eastern European countries, liberalism was limited mostly to certain intellectual groups. One important group had its headquarters at the University of Cracow, with Professor Estreicher as its leader. Liberalism influenced the agrarians and socialists of Poland inasmuch as these groups much preferred democracy to dictatorship.

The case of Poland brings to mind very forcibly a factor which as a rule is not given its due: that is, the dependence of the nations of Eastern Europe upon the other nations of Europe and the rest of the world. The freedom of these nations is dependent on the freedom of all other European nations, including Russia.

It can be said, therefore, that liberalism can prosper in these countries only if the climate of Europe is favorable. As soon as a regime of any of the big powers on the European continent tends towards aggressive expansionism or becomes totalitarian, by definition imperialistic, the liberty of all European nations, great and small, is threatened, and liberalism finds itself in mortal danger.

History clearly proves the accuracy of this analysis. In 000

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people. All over Eastern Europe the land hunger of the peasants, the low wages of the workers, the great disproportion between the prices of industrial and agricultural products, the periods of unemployment, the practices of totalitarian regimes, the remnants of feudalism, tension between national groups, and intolerance played an important role. Knowing the skill with which the Communists usually exploit economic difficulties, social injustice, and national differences, it would seem that in these countries they would have found much greater support. However, despite conditions favorable to Communist propaganda, both in the countries that had always known Russia as an imperialistic conqueror and in Southeastern Europe where Russia had been considered an ally since the struggle for liberation from Turkey and where religious factors aroused no antagonism, the Communist parties did not attract a very large following before the war.

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Various circumstances explain this fact. Countries at a distance from Russia could not contrast Communist propaganda to Communist reality; they learned of Russia from tours organized by the Intourist or from the study of Communist writings. The peoples of Eastern Europe, on the other hand, caught glimpses of their neighbor even through a tightly closed frontier and observed the immensity of the misery, oppression, and terror that existed in the U.S.S.R. The sudden tactical maneuvers of Lenin and Stalin which often obliged the Communist parties to act against the vital interests of their respective countries further disillusioned Russia's immediate neighbors.

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It is difficult to cite exact figures concerning the Communist parties in Eastern Europe, because they operated under different names at different times and because they sometimes existed legally and sometimes illegally. Let us take for example the Communist Party of Poland. Before the First World War the Communists acted through the So-

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665 cial Democratic Party of the Kingdom of Poland and Lithuania, which party opposed the idea of an independent Poland. During the Bolshevik invasion of Poland in 1920, a Communist government of Poland was created at the rear of the Red Army at a time when the whole Polish nation, united under the leadership of Premier Witos of the Peasant Party and Vice-Premier Daszynski of the Socialist Party, was fighting against the Bolsheviks. In independent Poland after 1921 the Communist Party declared itself in opposition to the independence of Poland and advocated the incorporation of the Republic of Poland into the Soviet Union.

In 1926 the Communists supported Pilsudski's *coup d'état* against the democratic president and government. Only later did they announce that this had been a "mistake of the leadership of the party." When the Comintern attempted to provoke a Communist revolution in Germany in 1932, the Polish Communist Party declared that they favored granting to Germany both Silesia, which had been ceded to Poland after the First World War, and complete control over the Free City of Gdansk (Danzig).

The weakness of the Communist Party of Poland on the eve of the Second World War is proved by the fact that in 1938 it was dissolved by the Comintern on the pretext that it was completely infiltrated by the secret police of the Polish government. After the conclusion of the Molotov-Ribbentrop pact the Polish and German Communists considered the line of division between the German and Soviet spheres of influence to be the future frontier between the Communist Republic of Germany and the Soviet Union. Under these circumstances, Poland, of course, would be completely erased from the map.

648 The Soviet invasion of Poland, undertaken in agreement with Nazi Germany, the incorporation into the Soviet Union of almost half of the eastern territory of Poland, and the deportation of a million and half Poles to Russia were pre-

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sented by the Communists as the liberation of the Ukrainian, 648
Byelorussian, and Lithuanian peoples from the yoke of the Polish landlords; Hitler's war against France and England were presented as a battle against Anglo-Saxon imperialism. After the fall of France the Polish Communists, together with those sent from France, assumed a neutral attitude toward the Nazi occupation and terror in Poland. They did not take part in the underground struggle of the Polish nation. They were tolerated by the Gestapo and moved about freely. Only after Hitler's attack on Russia in 1941 did they regain the "spirit of patriotism" and join the Polish underground struggle against Hitler.

Various events greatly discredited the reputation of the 665
Polish Workers' Party (one of the guises under which the 661
Polish Communists masqueraded during the war years). 208
Such events were the massacre of the Polish war prisoners at Katyn, the death of hundreds of thousands of people deported to Soviet forced labor camps in the years 1939-1941, the deportation in 1944 of over 40,000 members of the underground Home Army who had been fighting against the Germans and aiding the entering Red Army, and the return to Poland of a number of Poles who had experienced the Soviet reality. Further discredit was brought to the Polish Workers' Party by the presence of the Communist Lublin Committee. The Committee seized power in Poland with the aid of the Soviet army and the NKVD and nominated as ministers of the government persons who had been in the German concentration camps and had served the Gestapo faithfully.

According to its reports in 1937, the Communist Party 665
of Poland had 6,000 regular members and 12,000 members in the Communist Association of Polish Youth. Experts are of the opinion, however, that these figures were exaggerated by the leadership of the party which was afraid of presenting to Moscow a true report of the extent of its influence. *New*

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665 *Roads*, the Communist organ published after the war in Warsaw, reported that before the Second World War the Communist Party of Poland never had more than 20,000 [666] members. In the elections for the Seym (the Polish parliament) in 1922, the Communists netted 130,000 votes or 1 per cent of the votes cast. In 1926 the Communists together with their various affiliates had 23 deputies. At the peak of the economic crisis in 1928 the Communists received 829,000 out of 11,758,000 votes, or about 7 per cent of the total number of votes cast. The Communist bloc, by 1946, consisted of the Polish Workers' Party (Communists), the Polish Socialist Party, the Democratic Party, and the Labor Party. This bloc, it was secretly reported to Stalin, did not receive more than 16 per cent of the votes either in the referendum of 1946 or in the elections of 1947, despite the presence of the Red Army in Poland and the use of terror and violence. These few samplings from the history of the Communist Party of Poland show how Communist tactics which required actions against the interests of the country and its various social classes and which contradicted the ideological theories of communism prevented a wider development of the Communist Party.

Czechoslovakia had a genuine democratic system before the war and gave the Communist Party full freedom of action. In the parliamentary election of 1925 the Communists gained 41 seats and in the elections of 1934 and 1935 they received only 30 seats out of the total number of 300 in the parliament. After the war, in May 1946, the Czech Communist Party won 31 per cent of the total Czechoslovakian vote and elected 93 deputies out of the total number of 300. In the same election the Slovak Communist Party, in a region that had already experienced the "blessing" of liberation by the Red Army, won a much smaller percentage of the total vote in proportion to the population.

In Bulgaria, before the Second World War, the number of

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Communist deputies ranged from 15 to 48 out of a total 665 number of 274 members of parliament. The highest Communist representation was gained directly after the First World War and the lowest, consisting of only 15 deputies, occurred under Stambolisky; in 1927 the Communists had 33 deputies. The phenomenon of the political opportunism of all Communist parties during the war, that is, their sudden switch to the support of Hitler, was particularly pronounced in Bulgaria. The political report of the Fifth Congress of the Bulgarian Communist Party of December 1948 shows that in August of 1944, that is, at the moment of the change of government toward the end of the Second World War, the Communist Party had only 25,000 members.

In Hungary, since the experience with Béla Kun in 1919, [666] the influence of communism has been very weak. It is significant that after the Second World War in the elections of 1945 the Hungarian Communists received only 17 per cent of the vote, despite the Russian methods of persuasion. Even in the elections of 1947 the Communists won only 18 per cent of the vote for their own party.

According to the reports of Anna Pauker and other Communist leaders, the Rumanian Communist Party had less than 2,000 members in the years 1944-45.

The Communists could never expect to assume power in any of the above mentioned countries by parliamentary and democratic methods because the Communist parties, even in the most favorable periods, had the support of only 5 to 15 per cent of the people. Neither were the Communists able to establish police systems in these countries in the period immediately following the Second World War. Therefore, they promulgated "People's Democracies." They organized within the individual countries by stealing the traditional names of prewar political parties, by filling the top posts in these parties with their own agents, and by creating fictitious coalitions of parties. The Communists had in their

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665 actions a triple objective: to mislead the people, to prevent the postwar restoration of political parties by their original leaders and members or to break them up if they had been restored already, and to beguile foreign opinion into believing that multiparty systems still existed in the Eastern European countries.

The lack of popular support of the Communist parties is visible even today in the countries behind the Iron Curtain. For this reason, in the last elections in Poland and in Rumania in 1952, and in Hungary in 1953, the lists of candidates, made out completely by the Communists, were presented to the people under the disguise of a "National Front." The National Front is represented as a coalition of political parties, trade unions, youth organizations, scientific societies and so forth, and is highlighted by the names of "patriot-priests" and "progressive Catholics." The Communist press in Poland admits that the institution of the National Front was necessary in the elections of 1952 because in 60 per cent of the voting localities, especially in the villages, there were "white spots," that is, areas where there did not exist a single cell of the Communist Party.

665 In summary, it can be said that the Communist dictator-
177 ship was imposed upon the countries behind the Iron Cur-
642 tain under the name of People's Democracy through the following means: Moscow's strategic and political machinations during the war; the direct intervention of the Red Army and the NKVD in the internal affairs of these countries both at the end of and after the war; either the falsification of the will of these nations in the elections or the *coup d'état*, as in Hungary in 1947, and in Czechoslovakia in 1948.

665 An analysis of Communist strength clearly shows that the Communists could not have expected in a single case to assume power in a democratic and parliamentary manner. And, it must be added, the peoples of the Eastern Euro-

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pean countries have declared themselves in overwhelming majority to be opposed to the Communist system despite the pressure of the Red Army and of the NKVD. Violence and fraud were the only means by which the Communists were able to seize power in these countries. E 665

III

In the Soviet Union strict ideological discipline became the order of the day after the wave of patriotic feeling that arose and was encouraged during the Second World War. It was during the period of the revival of this communist ideology that the Communist dictatorships in the captive countries were given the name of People's Democracy. The relation of this new doctrine to the theoretical foundations of the Soviet state should therefore be examined. S.U. 829

In the Constitution of 1936 the U.S.S.R. is clearly defined as a "socialist state based on the dictatorship of the proletariat" (Articles 1 and 2), and the exclusive role of the Communist Party is explicitly stressed (Articles 3 and 126). Moreover, Stalin himself wrote that "The proletariat needs the Party for the purpose of achieving and maintaining the dictatorship. The Party is an instrument of the dictatorship of the proletariat." [1] Speaking on the draft of the new constitution in November 1936, he further said: "I must admit that the draft of the new Constitution does preserve the regime of the dictatorship of the working class, just as it also preserves unchanged the present leading position of the Communist Party of the U.S.S.R." [2] 642 665

Soviet political theory assumes that socialist states must evolve from a phase in which the state continues to be used as an instrument of the dictatorship of the proletariat to a 185 829

[1] Joseph Stalin, *Problems of Leninism*, 11th ed. (Moscow, Foreign Languages Publishing House, 1940), p. 80.
[2] *Ibid.*, p. 578.

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1947 but not to the years following. The period of the New 656
Economic Policy in Russia was called "the period of a certain revival of capitalism"; in reality, it was a kind of retreat of communism from economic difficulties.

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In the captive countries there was no "period of revival 656
of capitalism." Since the very inception of communism, there 185
has been a systematic liquidation of all private property, 423
carried out in premeditated fashion within the limits of existing conditions and possibilities. In the beginning, the question of private property arose only in regard to small trade, dwelling houses, building, crafts, and, in a larger degree to peasant farming. Hence, the Communists advocated the principle of a three-sector economy, composed of state economy—after an immediate nationalization of medium and heavy industries, landlords' estates, and forests—of cooperative economy, and of private economy.

The fact that this period, the traces of which we still 665 ●
find in the constitutions of the captive countries, was planned 661
from above as no more than a transitional period, is best proved by the accusation leveled against the former Communist Vice-Premier of Poland, Gomulka, at the meeting of the Central Committee of the Communist Party in Warsaw, in 1948. Gomulka was told then that his main guilt was not that he agreed to the principles of the three-sector economy but that he acted according to these principles. It was explained to him then that he had proceeded as though he wanted to keep the system although he knew that it was transitional.

In 1947, after the falsification of the elections and the 665
destruction of the opposition of the independent peasant parties in Bulgaria, Rumania, Hungary, Yugoslavia, and Poland, the Cominform was established and Communist policy abandoned its nationalist line and adopted the line of internationalism. A special declaration of the differences between Communist internationalism and the "cosmopoli-

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665 tanism" of the West was introduced, and the Communists vigorously went about the destruction of the remaining private property, the collectivization of agriculture, and the transformation of the remaining independent cooperatives into a sector of the Communist state economy. It was therefore, in theory and practice a period of the establishment of socialist states, ruled by the dictatorship of the proletariat and disguised by the name of People's Democracy. This period was marked by the accelerated tempo of the communization of all spheres of national life, by the integration of the economies of the People's Democracy into the Soviet economy, and by political and legislative preparations for the incorporation of these countries into the Soviet Union.

177 642 Analysis of the constitutions imposed upon the captive countries shows that the People's Democracies are dictatorships of the proletariat different in form but not in substance from the Soviet system. No matter when the constitutions of the People's Democracies were imposed or whether there were differences in their wording, the most important provisions are the same in each constitution. More light can be cast on these constitutions by the political circumstances in which they were imposed and by their preambles than by a dry analysis of their provisions.

[643] In Bulgaria in 1946 the Communists falsified the elections, and in 1947 they introduced in the Parliament the draft of a new constitution. According to this draft, the president was still to be the head of the state and not the Chairman of the Presidium of the Parliament as in Soviet Russia. On September 23, 1947, the leader of the opposition, Petkov, was hanged by the Communists, and on December 4, 1947, a revised constitution was imposed upon Bulgaria. This new constitution went further in its provisions than the constitutions imposed several years later in the other captive countries. The office of the president

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to the belief that human language is unable to express the whole truth about the greatest disgrace to mankind that the twentieth century will know—the Soviet forced labor camps. 697 661

A sentence to a forced labor camp amounts to a sentence of death because the enormous majority of the inmates in these camps cannot exist under the conditions prevailing there and die before they are released. The inmate of such a camp works beyond his strength, knowing that if his productivity falls his starvation-level food ration will be cut. The instinct for self-preservation urges him to defend himself from death, and his reactions become those of a hungry animal. All his human feelings disappear, even his attitude toward his fellow inmates. Degraded and humiliated as a human being, the prisoner works like an animal for his enemies only to prolong his life by a year or two and then inevitably to perish. [466]

Political freedom does not exist in the Communist countries either under law or in practice. Let us take for example Article 72 of the Polish constitution of July 1952. Similar provisions will be found in all other Communist constitutions. The first lines of Article 72 say that the citizens have the right of political organization, but the third paragraph of the same article says that organization of assemblies and participation in an organization which opposes the political and social system of People's Poland are forbidden. In other words, any party which does not recognize the Communist political system is forbidden, and membership in it is punishable. 641 665

Since membership in a political party presupposes some right to influence that party, the question arises whether the Communists find it advisable to allow every citizen to belong to his country's Communist Party. The answer is no. The official statistics of the Communist parties in the occupied countries as well as in the Soviet Union show that the number of members of these parties ranges from 5 to 10 per cent

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641 of the population of the given country. Finally, even the
665 internal structure of the Communist Party is dictatorial. The delegates of the local organizations accept only the projects and decisions of the party elite or of the chief dictator.

641 The Rumanian constitution, just like the others, appears to guarantee freedom of speech, freedom of the press, freedom of assembly, freedom of public processions and manifestations. Article 85 states that "These rights are ensured by placing at the disposal of the working masses and their organizations printing presses, stocks of paper, public buildings, the streets, communications facilities and other material requisites." In practice, the printing presses, paper mills, public buildings, radio, and so forth are owned by the state and are completely controlled by the leadership of the Communist Party. Even religious processions and manifestations require the consent of the state.

641 In theory, under the Communist system, every citizen over
666 eighteen years of age has the right to vote. In practice, the elections are a tragic farce. They do not mean the right to select a candidate, to participate in the adoption of a party program, or even to defend social or national interests. They signify a compulsion to vote for one's hated enemies. The elector is forced to march to the polls to the accompaniment of music played by his foes while pain wrenches his heart and his fists clench in hatred and anger. The official results of the elections always show that the candidates of the Communist Party have received 99 per cent of the votes.

602 Does the administration of justice stand guard over civil
641 liberties? No, it definitely does not, either in practice or in theory. The constitutions of the People's Republics have clear provisions in this respect. Article 41 of the Hungarian constitution states: "The courts shall punish the enemies of the people, defend and secure the political, economic and social order of the People's Democracy . . . they shall edu-

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728 frontiers were another cause for great migrations. Four mil-
167 lion Poles moved from the territory which was incorporated into the U.S.S.R., and millions of Poles, Czechs, and Slovaks moved into districts formerly inhabited by the Germans. Although these changes alleviated the problem of rural overpopulation in Eastern Europe, there was still, at the end of the Second World War, a surplus population estimated at nine million.

665 The Communist parties in various Eastern European
423 states knew very well how to exploit this situation. They
656 knew that it was vital to the success of revolution that the peasantry should not be opposed to it. They knew that the Russian Revolution had been achieved only because Lenin was fully aware of the desire of the peasant for more land.

471 Orthodox Marxist theory required that the land be nation-
423 alized and that it be administered by the state. Land was
662 considered the most important means of production, and it
656 had to be treated as such. This dogma was abandoned by Lenin for tactical reasons. He nationalized land in the Soviet Union during the revolution of 1917, but distributed it under ninety-nine-year leases to small and medium peasants for private exploitation. It was the political pressure of the peasants which forced Lenin to change his political doctrine and implement the agrarian program of the Populists, his political opponents. Lenin and his followers did not approve of the peasant who, according to them, was a relic of the precapitalistic society. It was Lenin's view that "small, individual farming gives birth to capitalism and the bourgeoisie daily, hourly, spontaneously and on a mass scale," and that in the future classless society the peasant was to assume the status of a worker on the land as his fellow in town was a worker in industry.

Political expediency determined Lenin's change in tactics. He supported small agrarian property holders only because

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668 565 ganization did not exist until the Second World War; the organization itself was established after the war by exiled political leaders.

In Slovenia, Slovakia, and Lithuania, on the other hand, truly peasant political organizations have never developed fully. In these Catholic countries the peasantry was influenced from the beginning by the Catholic political thought and subsequently organized on the principles of Christian democracy.

Although the immediate motives for peasant organization in different countries were varied, its demands were everywhere identical because of its common general source—its ideological basis. The programs made the following demands for the peasants: full political rights, proportional participation in public affairs, agrarian reform and distribution of the land to the peasants, social justice, and rights for the peasants in educational facilities equal to the rights of other classes in the state.

829 668 565 To understand better the peasant movements and their aims, three elements of their ideological and organizational structure must be discussed: first, their ideological basis; second, the dogmatic differences between these and other contemporary political and socio-economic trends; and third, the effective points of their practical programs.

829 665 The peasant ideology, or peasantism, is the outlook of the peasantry on the complex of political and socio-economic issues in which the peasants are interested and for whose solution they are fighting. The organizational forms of peasantism, established for the purposes of current political struggle, are the various peasant political parties. Unlike scientific socialism or Christian democracy, peasantism is not the artificial creation of an individual or group of individuals; it contains only those ideas which are inherent in the peasant soul and character. Consequently, the peasant leaders do not conceive the political soul of peasantism but merely interpret

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and articulate its principles. Hence, considerable differences must exist between peasantism and other contemporary movements.

Between peasantism and scientific socialism, there are irreconcilable differences, reflected in philosophical, economic, social, and political concepts. Philosophically, scientific socialism advocates economic determinism, dialectic materialism, and the materialistic interpretation of history. Consequently, it repudiates the existence of a superior being, rejects religion and spiritual values as detrimental to human development, and minimizes the significance of tradition. Peasantism, on the contrary, relies on the idealistic principles of philosophical reasoning, stresses the existence of God, points out the necessity for religious beliefs, and indicates the importance of spiritual values. It emphasizes as of equal importance the significance of tradition in human development and reaffirms its position in the peasant society.

Economically, scientific socialism demands the collectivization of the means of production, including land, and the introduction of a planned socialist economy. It evaluates individuals and collective groups exclusively on the basis of their role in socialist production and repudiates economic individualism in any form. Peasantism, on the contrary, defends firmly the principle of private ownership of the means of production, especially of the peasant land, and teaches that the right to dispose of the fruits of one's own labor is sacred and inviolable. It rejects the planned economy of socialism and favors private initiative and the system of free cooperation.

Socially, scientific socialism teaches the necessity of a permanent class struggle and considers as inevitable the revolutionary overthrow of the existing social and economic order by the proletariat. Peasantism, on the contrary, rejects the idea of class struggle and believes in the possibility of a peaceful coexistence of all classes of society. It also rejects

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vention possible. They usually claimed that this intervention was necessary "to save the country from the total chaos in which it was driven by the unsatisfactory operating of democratic institutions." What was even worse, new regimes were supported often by the Western democracies who used the unjustifiable excuse that "no other solutions were possible." 642

Despite the mistakes and failures of the democratic regimes, today even the most bitter opponents of peasantism must admit that the peasant parties, as political organizations, were stalwart champions of democratic government and did not, in general, support the established dictatorships or their undemocratic methods.

The greatest achievement of all the peasant groups was that of the Bulgarian Agrarian Union. From its modest beginnings in 1896, the Union grew steadily. In the first postwar elections it received a strong relative majority in the National Assembly, and in the elections of April 1923, 212 deputies out of 245 were allotted to the Agrarian Union. At the relatively early date of October 1919, the first Bulgarian peasant government of Aleksander Stambolisky was formed. The most significant of its numerous political and economic achievements was the agrarian reform based on the principles that the land should be the property of those who till it and that every peasant is entitled to only as much land as he and his family are able to cultivate. In spite of the certain weaknesses and deficiencies of this peasant government which contributed to its downfall, its democratic basis cannot be denied. Its reforms converted Bulgaria into a country of small and medium peasant holdings which, despite the forcible overthrow of the peasant regime in June 1923, remained unchanged until the end of the Second World War. 665 642 423 185

In Czechoslovakia, the Republican Agrarian Party was the strongest party in the Parliament and the most important pillar of the Czechoslovakian democracy. After the political 665 642

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665 liberation of the Czechs and the Slovaks in 1918, the party's
642 main goal was to secure economic and social prosperity for the Czech and Slovak peasants, chiefly by promoting cooperative organizations and by defending the interests of the peasant populations. The party averaged forty-five deputies on all national elections and cooperated with other democratic parties in the governments of the Republic. The President of the Party, Antonin Švehla and his successor, Milan Hodža, were for many years Prime Ministers of the Czechoslovakian governments.

665 The Croatian Peasant Party, established in 1904 by the
185 brothers Ante and Stjepan Radić, reached its full political importance in the first postwar elections in Yugoslavia. This was in November 1920, and at that time the party became the undisputed choice of the Croatian people. In all free parliamentary elections since then, the Croatians, and especially the Croatian peasantry, have cast their votes in overwhelming majority for this political group. The principal aims of the party's program were Croatian national independence and social and economic justice. When the president of the party, Stjepan Radić, was assassinated in June 1928, Vladko Maček, who heads the party today, was elected president. In its political struggle, the party has opposed violently the Yugoslav centralism favored by the majority of Serbian political groups, and has been outlawed twice as "dangerous for the interests of the state." In August 1939, a compromise that opened the door for a just settlement of the Serbo-Croatian dispute was reached with the Regency of the Kingdom of Yugoslavia and with certain of the Serbian political parties.

The beginnings of the Polish peasant movements date back to 1905, when the first Polish peasant associations were organized in Galicia under the leadership of Wincenty Witos. With this as an initiative, the Polish peasant party, *Piast*, was founded in Cracow in 1913. During the First World War,

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In the Russian part of Poland, another peasant party, *Liberation*, was born. Its leader was Stanislaw Thugutt. This party emphasized the solution of social and economic problems, demanding primarily an extensive land reform and distribution of the land to the peasants. In liberated and united Poland, these two peasant groups united in 1920 to become the strongest individual Polish political group, but later, in May 1923, one faction dissented. Witos was repeatedly elected Prime Minister and was holding this position in 1926 when the military *coup d'état*, executed by Pilsudski, put an end to democratic government in Poland. In 1928, during the dictatorship, all peasant political groups fused in a united peasant party under the leadership of Witos and Mikolajczyk, but, because of the undemocratic regime, this group was never permitted to take part in Poland's political life.

Although it may be argued that the embryonic stage of peasant organization in Serbia started in 1882 under the influence of the socialist ideas of Svetozar Marković, it is more correct to say that the first truly peasant movement in Serbia began in 1905 with the actions of Milislav Kurtović. In 1920, in the new state, Yugoslavia, the Agrarian Union of the Serbians, Croatians, and Slovenes was established, under the leadership of Joca Jovanović. The Union had little success among the Croatian and Slovenian peasantry, and was later known as the Serbian Agrarian Party. It recruited its followers mainly from the Serbian peasants in Serbia, Bosnia, and northern Dalmatia. The party was in the difficult position of being obliged to compete politically with two well-established Serbian parties, the Radicals and the Democrats. The provisions of the electoral law were unfavorable to the smaller political formations and, for this reason, the party was hindered from obtaining a proportional number of deputies in national elections. In June 1938, after the death of Joca Jovanović, Milan Gavrilović was elected the new president of the party.

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665 185 642 The initiative for a peasant organization in Rumania was given in 1907, in Jassy, Bessarabia, by Constantine Stere, who was influenced by Russian Populism. The Rumanian Peasant Party was formally founded in 1919, and Ion Mihalache was elected its President. In 1926, the Rumanian National Party from Transylvania, led by Iuliu Maniu, and the Peasant Party of the Old Kingdom fused into one political group known as the Rumanian National Peasant Party, which became the strongest political organization of the country. In the elections of 1928, the overwhelming majority of votes were cast for this united peasant front, and a peasant government was formed with Maniu as Prime Minister. This party brought about some administrative, economic, and social reforms which aimed at the assurance of the progress of the Rumanian state. Unfortunately, the peasant rule was definitely handicapped by the international agrarian crisis which was at its peak during the period of the peasant government. The party's position was further aggravated by its continuous struggle with the liberals and by numerous intrigues of the Crown calculated to destroy the unity and vigor of the peasant group.

665 Because of specific conditions which existed in Hungary, the organization of the peasantry commenced relatively late. Sandor Czismadia made the first attempt to organize the landless peasants on the principles of agrarian socialism in 1896, but the genuine peasant movement was initiated by István Nagyatádi-Szabó in 1908. The movement grew in strength after the collapse of the first Communist regime of Béla Kun, but its original success and its hopes for the future were skilfully suppressed by the Hungarian ruling class. It was not until 1930 that Zoltan Tildy and Ferenc Nagy undertook the revival of a truly peasant political organization. As a consequence, the Hungarian Smallholders Party was founded. This party fought valiantly against all the odds of the authoritarian Hungarian regime, but was not able to at-

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tain its full strength until after the First World War in the November elections of 1945.

The first international agreement among various peasant groups was reached in 1921, subsequent to the visit of the Bulgarian Premier Stambolisky to Prague. This agreement was between the Bulgarian Agrarian Union and the Czechoslovak Republican Agrarian Party, and was later joined by the Polish Peasant Party. The agreement was, however, of a short duration and of little significance in international relations. In 1923 Stambolisky was overthrown and assassinated, and in 1926 the Prime Minister, Witos, was ousted following the military putsch of Pilsudski.

In 1928 efforts were renewed to achieve an international peasant understanding, and in 1929 the International Agrarian Bureau in Prague was established. The Bureau was presided over by Švehla, and nineteen different peasant organizations from all parts of Europe participated in its work. The Bureau stood for the principles of cooperation, mutual aid, friendship, democracy, and peace. Unfortunately, international conditions did not favor such an association. Except in Czechoslovakia, democratic political movements throughout Eastern Europe were either already outlawed or under heavy pressure of the authoritarian regimes. Moreover, the international agrarian crisis and other unsolved international problems were considerable hindrances to the good will and honest endeavors of the peasant leaders. Nevertheless, the International Agrarian Bureau has contributed considerably to the presentation and defense of the peasant cause in the world. Its activities were discontinued only with the total occupation of Czechoslovakia in March 1939.

IV

As might have been expected, the main efforts of the Communists, when they formed the People's Democracies

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665 661 in Eastern Europe, were directed against the peasant political groups. Besides the unbridgeable ideological differences between peasantism and communism, and the proverbial intolerance of the latter, there were specific reasons why the violence of the Communist regimes reached its climax during the suppression of the peasant political opposition.

First, the peasantry forms a substantial majority in the greater part of the area. The Communists are unscrupulous in their methods, but they are not brainless when considering the accomplishment of their targets. They know that the peasantry can be temporarily intimidated but never permanently quashed if it maintains political organizations of its own. Hence, these organizations had to be crushed before the Communists could expect any success.

Second, the peasant parties constituted the strongest democratic force in the area. The totalitarian elements had been destroyed for the most part by the Second World War, but the peasants, who could not be reproached with either collaboration or totalitarianism and could not be labeled as "fascist reactionaries," remained the greatest danger to the Communists—the self-imposed "liberators and people's friends." Hence, these groups had to be liquidated before the Communist power could be effective and its program carried out.

Third, the peasant parties possessed a vigorous program, and nothing infuriates the Communists more than a challenge to their alleged monopoly on the solution of current issues. It is obvious that those who advocate outgrown ideas in a peasant country have little chance for success, but the political platforms of the peasant parties had far more to offer the peasant population than the forcibly implemented, nebulous formulas and strange institutions imported by the Communists. However, in Communist controlled countries

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no alternatives are permitted, and hence, the peasant leaders had to be eliminated. 665 661

In view of the foregoing, it is not surprising that the formal disappearance of genuine peasant political organizations in this region is today an accomplished fact. Various procedures were used to achieve this. In Yugoslavia, the Croatian Peasant Party and the Serbian Agrarian Union were banned, together with all other democratic parties, at the very beginning of the Communist era. Several fake peasant groups were established whose tasks were to support the proletarization of the country and to demonstrate to the outside world that the "progressive and thinking peasantry" greeted the new reforms enthusiastically.

In Czechoslovakia, some political parties were active in the postwar period preceding the Communist coup in February 1948, but the Czechoslovakian Agrarian Party was deliberately banned at the close of the war, and its leaders arrested and tried for alleged collaboration with the Germans. Today it is obvious that these collaboration charges were a skillful maneuver of the Communists to eliminate their most dangerous opponents.

The Agrarian Union in Bulgaria was at first in the coalition government with the Communists, who held the key positions in the army and in the administration. Through direct Soviet intervention and the political violence of the Communists, the Agrarians were first reduced to one third of their actual strength, and subsequently liquidated with the trial of their leader, Petkov, in September 1947.

In Rumania the situation was similar. Hopes for the promised free elections were not realized and, in August 1947, the peasant leaders, Maniu and Mihalache, were sentenced to life imprisonment as "foreign agents and enemies of the people." This meant the end of organized peasant opposition in Rumania. In Poland Mikolajczyk attempted in vain to secure

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665 661 the rights of the Peasant Party, but in the controlled elections of January 1947, the party was reduced to twenty-seven deputies which completely paralyzed it in its further political struggle.

The situation was different in Hungary. In the elections of November 1945, the Hungarian Smallholders Party polled 59 per cent of all the votes and subsequently formed the government under the premiership of Ferenc Nagy. However, only eighteen months later, after numerous Communist plots, the party was crushed, and in subsequent developments it was politically liquidated.

When it became impossible for the peasantry to continue its struggle within the respective countries, the exiled peasant leaders founded the International Peasant Union in Washington, D.C., on July 4th, 1947. The Union, in which all peasant groups are represented, issued a program founded on the basic principles of peasant ideology. Its primary purpose is to interest the democratic West in the peasant struggle and to offer hope to the enslaved peasantry for its eventual liberation.

V

000 This brief analysis of peasantism in Eastern Europe is not intended to be a glorification of the peasantry and its movement. The peasants are not a God-chosen group, neither are their leaders without faults and errors. Mistakes have been committed by the peasant parties in the past, and many more may be committed in the future. But who does not err in politics and public affairs? Surely these imperfections are not sufficient reason for disfavoring the peasantry or for rejecting the idea of an active support of peasant political organizations. The purpose of this essay has been to indicate the importance of the peasantry in the struggle of the free world with the Communists.

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648 chose to keep Yugoslavia intact by refusing to become a mere instrument of Soviet policy. He undoubtedly saw clearly that the Kremlin took no risks and would certainly get all of the benefits accruing from these political adventures. In the light of Stalin's definition of a true internationalist, this is what the Cominform communiqué meant when it denounced the Communist party of Yugoslavia as identifying "the foreign policy of the Soviet Union with the foreign policy of the imperialist powers," a policy "appropriate only to nationalists."

668 What effect has Tito's departure from the table of "broth-
●665 erly Communist parties" had on those parties? Titoism is primarily a matter of loyalties. In Yugoslavia, there was no higher loyalty than to the state personified by Tito himself. Consequently, the party, the army, and the new bureaucracy could and did remain faithful to Tito. If Titoism is to spread, similar conditions and a similar concept of limited loyalty must exist in the people's democracies. To date there is no evidence that Titoism has taken root in the effective leadership circles of the satellite states, since both Western-minded and Moscow-trained Communists have been affected by the purges. Certainly the purges of Communist leaders in satellite Europe which have occurred since 1948 afford no index as to the extent of Titoism. The purgees had no machinery for independence of action available to Tito. Even if they had, it is not sure they would have acted as Tito did if faced with the choice.

648 What effect has the break had on Yugoslavia itself—on its policies and political philosophy? From the time of the break in June 1948 until November 1949, the Yugoslavs inveighed against the Communist parties of the satellites but not against the sacrosanct personage of Joseph Stalin. The second Cominform meeting held in November 1949 proved quite conclusively to Tito that there were no longer any grounds for conciliation, and he prepared a new political

10: Mehnert

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[For a discussion of the influence of the statute of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union of October 1952 on the party statutes in the states of the eastern bloc (i.e. Bulgaria, Hungary, Czechoslovakia, Poland and East Germany) and a reprint of the preambles to the respective party statutes, see El Europe, 10: Mehnert, category 116, entire source]

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CHAPTER X

'PEOPLE'S DEMOCRACIES'— DICTATORSHIP OVER THE PEOPLE

★

642 ALL THE COUNTRIES of 'People's Democracy' have very fine constitutions. Article 2, of the 'Constitution of the People's Republic of Bulgaria' (approved by the Grand National Assembly on December 4th, 1947) states:

'In the People's Republic of Bulgaria all power emanates from the people and belongs to the people.

'This power is exercised through freely elected representative organs and through referenda.

'All representative organs of the State power are elected by the citizens, by a general, direct, and secret ballot.'

Article 88 states: 'The citizens of the People's Republic are guaranteed freedom of the press, of speech, of assembly, of meetings and demonstrations'. Articles similar to these two appear in all the constitutions of the 'People's Democracies.'*

How do these fine institutions work in practice? What is the actual interpretation of 'free elections' or 'freedom of the press, speech, of assembly, of meetings and demonstrations'?

'Free Elections'

● 666 Formally all the governments of Eastern Europe are responsible to parliaments, which are made up of representatives of the people democratically elected. In all elections the overwhelming majority of the electorate is stated to have voted and an overwhelming majority of the votes to have been given for the existing M.P's. In the Rumanian general elections of March 28th, 1948, 91 per cent of the electorate voted, of whom 90.8 per cent voted for the list of candidates supporting the present government. In the Czechoslovakian elections of May 30th, 1948, the corresponding figures were 90 per cent

*For a comparative analysis of the Constitutions of the 'People's Democracies' see Samuel L. Sharp, *New Constitutions in the Soviet Sphere*, Washington, 1948, and A. Gyorgy, *Governments of Danubian Europe*, New York, 1949.

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and 89.2 per cent; in the Hungarian elections of May 15th, 1949, 94.6 per cent and 95.6 per cent; in Bulgaria (December 18th, 1949) 98.89 per cent and 97.66 per cent; and in Yugoslavia (March 26th, 1950) 93.23 per cent and 94.2 per cent.* 666

But the impression of such solid support for the governments is very much weakened by the fact that in all the elections there was only one list of candidates.

The Communist leaders tried to hide their intention of establishing such a system of 'elections,' which is a manifest negation of democratic procedure. For instance, Marshal Tito, the first to establish this system, said in an interview with *The Times* correspondent on November 13th, 1945: 'I should like to see our opposition leading a full political life. I certainly expect an opposition to crystallize out of the many parties which go to form the National Front in Parliament, for we shall have to settle many controversial issues.' At that time Tito insisted on the right to put up a number of electoral lists. The Communist leaders in the last country to adopt the system—Czechoslovakia—were also vehement in denying their intentions. Thus the *Daily Worker* of 24th March, 1948—two months before the one-list elections—said: 'It was confirmed yesterday that the Communists will go to the polls as an independent party. There will be lists of candidates from the four Czech and three Slovak parties.'

Lest the existence of only one list of candidates should be insufficient guarantee of the desired electoral victory, other precautions were taken. In some countries the secret ballot was abolished. In Czechoslovakia, for instance, where the secret ballot had previously obtained, it was announced before the elections of May, 1948, that no voter was to be compelled to observe secrecy when casting his vote. Nosek, the Communist Minister of the Interior, declared a few days before the elections: 'There can be no grounds for disapporoval if a voter of his own free will does not exercise the right to a secret vote

*As far as we know no candidate in any of the 'People's Democracies' polled more than 100 per cent. Stalin is the only one who can record such a 'miracle'. In the elections to the local Soviets that took place on 21st December, 1947, the constituency that 'elected' Stalin to the Moscow Soviet had 1,617 voters, but Stalin polled 2,122 votes. *Pravda* next day explained this extraordinary phenomenon thus: 'The extra ballot papers were put into the urns by citizens of neighbouring constituencies anxious to seize the opportunity to express their gratitude to their leader.'

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666 but votes openly'. The Communist Party followed this up by declaring that only reactionaries were ashamed of their policy and would vote secretly. At the polling booths a voter had to show his identification papers and state whether he wished to cast his ballot paper into the ballot boxes exposed to public view or into boxes in a secret booth. Even if he was bold enough to choose the latter course his ordeal was still not at an end. Two ballot papers, one with the government list of candidates *printed on both sides*, the other a blank slip, were issued to him, and after throwing one of them into the secret ballot box, he had to throw the discarded one into a waste paper basket more or less in full view of the election officers.

If the elector wished to show his disapproval of the government not by voting against it—a path fraught with dangers—but simply by abstaining, he could do so only if he were prepared to pay the penalty the law demands of all who do not vote—imprisonment for a month and a fine of 10 thousand crowns (£50).

Even if the elector was bold enough to vote against the government list, what assurance had he that his vote would be counted, as the only people on the electoral commissions are those who support the official list? When there is only one list of candidates, and when voting is open and counting secret instead of the other way about, the official list cannot possibly lose. Indeed in all the general elections that have taken place since 1948 in the 'People's Democracies' there has not been a *single* case of an official candidate not being elected.

Indirect testimony to the faking of the elections is given by the following fact. In all the Constitutions of the 'People's Democracies', the electoral laws declare the right of a very small group of electors to put up a list of candidates, or a single candidate, if they wish. In Bulgaria every group of *ten* citizens is allowed to do so, in Yugoslavia every group of a hundred, and so on. But although this fine democratic law exists, and although it was stated that thousands voted against the Government (for example, in Bulgaria, in the elections of December, 1949, 109,983 blank or invalid votes were cast and in Yugoslavia in March, 1950, 613,125 voted against the Government) not one case is recorded of a group of ten or a hundred citizens putting up any candidate against the official one.

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185 were by far the most important; the increase of educational
641 opportunities and general culture; and the development of the economy through agricultural improvement and the expansion of industry and trade.

177 Political freedom in Eastern Europe before the First
642 World War ranged in degree from negligible rights, as those of the Slovaks in Hungary or of the Poles in Russia, to independent states with constitutions of strongly democratic tendencies, as in certain countries of Southeastern Europe. The latter had been influenced by Western models, and made provision for parliamentary government based on wide suffrage. The constitutions of Serbia, Rumania, and Bulgaria, drafted in the latter half of the nineteenth century by native statesmen experienced in the ways of Western constitutionalism, were founded on a genuine faith in democracy. It is true that royal or ministerial authoritarianism and resort to rough methods were not uncommon in these countries, yet the social egalitarianism already prevailing in Serbia and Bulgaria was a strong force for democracy in these coun-
• [666] tries. Although illiteracy and political inexperience remained a serious obstacle to orderly government, the generation before the First World War offers significant examples of governments being changed by orderly democratic procedures. Illustrative of the difficulties under which popular elections with universal male suffrage were conducted is the fact that in the Bulgarian election of 1880 only 32 per cent of those eligible to vote cast their ballots, in contrast to about 80 per cent in France and Belgium and 60 per cent in Germany and Italy in the period 1875-80.

177 Hungary had a longer tradition of constitutional govern-
642 ment than did the Balkan states and after 1867 was in most
563 respects an independent state, but its social structure was more conservative and its desire for political democracy less evident. Moreover, the Magyar achievement of political autonomy was marred by the oppressive treatment of the

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665 *Roads*, the Communist organ published after the war in Warsaw, reported that before the Second World War the Communist Party of Poland never had more than 20,000 [666] members. In the elections for the Seym (the Polish parliament) in 1922, the Communists netted 130,000 votes or 1 per cent of the votes cast. In 1926 the Communists together with their various affiliates had 23 deputies. At the peak of the economic crisis in 1928 the Communists received 829,000 out of 11,758,000 votes, or about 7 per cent of the total number of votes cast. The Communist bloc, by 1946, consisted of the Polish Workers' Party (Communists), the Polish Socialist Party, the Democratic Party, and the Labor Party. This bloc, it was secretly reported to Stalin, did not receive more than 16 per cent of the votes either in the referendum of 1946 or in the elections of 1947, despite the presence of the Red Army in Poland and the use of terror and violence. These few samplings from the history of the Communist Party of Poland show how Communist tactics which required actions against the interests of the country and its various social classes and which contradicted the ideological theories of communism prevented a wider development of the Communist Party.

Czechoslovakia had a genuine democratic system before the war and gave the Communist Party full freedom of action. In the parliamentary election of 1925 the Communists gained 41 seats and in the elections of 1934 and 1935 they received only 30 seats out of the total number of 300 in the parliament. After the war, in May 1946, the Czech Communist Party won 31 per cent of the total Czechoslovakian vote and elected 93 deputies out of the total number of 300. In the same election the Slovak Communist Party, in a region that had already experienced the "blessing" of liberation by the Red Army, won a much smaller percentage of the total vote in proportion to the population.

In Bulgaria, before the Second World War, the number of

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Communist deputies ranged from 15 to 48 out of a total 665
number of 274 members of parliament. The highest Communist representation was gained directly after the First World War and the lowest, consisting of only 15 deputies, occurred under Stambolisky; in 1927 the Communists had 33 deputies. The phenomenon of the political opportunism of all Communist parties during the war, that is, their sudden switch to the support of Hitler, was particularly pronounced in Bulgaria. The political report of the Fifth Congress of the Bulgarian Communist Party of December 1948 shows that in August of 1944, that is, at the moment of the change of government toward the end of the Second World War, the Communist Party had only 25,000 members.

In Hungary, since the experience with Béla Kun in 1919, [666] •
the influence of communism has been very weak. It is significant that after the Second World War in the elections of 1945 the Hungarian Communists received only 17 per cent of the vote, despite the Russian methods of persuasion. Even in the elections of 1947 the Communists won only 18 per cent of the vote for their own party.

According to the reports of Anna Pauker and other Communist leaders, the Rumanian Communist Party had less than 2,000 members in the years 1944-45.

The Communists could never expect to assume power in any of the above mentioned countries by parliamentary and democratic methods because the Communist parties, even in the most favorable periods, had the support of only 5 to 15 per cent of the people. Neither were the Communists able to establish police systems in these countries in the period immediately following the Second World War. Therefore, they promulgated "People's Democracies." They organized within the individual countries by stealing the traditional names of prewar political parties, by filling the top posts in these parties with their own agents, and by creating fictitious coalitions of parties. The Communists had in their

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641 of the population of the given country. Finally, even the
665 internal structure of the Communist Party is dictatorial. The delegates of the local organizations accept only the projects and decisions of the party elite or of the chief dictator.

641 The Rumanian constitution, just like the others, appears to guarantee freedom of speech, freedom of the press, freedom of assembly, freedom of public processions and manifestations. Article 85 states that "These rights are ensured by placing at the disposal of the working masses and their organizations printing presses, stocks of paper, public buildings, the streets, communications facilities and other material requisites." In practice, the printing presses, paper mills, public buildings, radio, and so forth are owned by the state and are completely controlled by the leadership of the Communist Party. Even religious processions and manifestations require the consent of the state.

641 In theory, under the Communist system, every citizen over
666 eighteen years of age has the right to vote. In practice, the elections are a tragic farce. They do not mean the right to select a candidate, to participate in the adoption of a party program, or even to defend social or national interests. They signify a compulsion to vote for one's hated enemies. The elector is forced to march to the polls to the accompaniment of music played by his foes while pain wrenches his heart and his fists clench in hatred and anger. The official results of the elections always show that the candidates of the Communist Party have received 99 per cent of the votes.

602 Does the administration of justice stand guard over civil
641 liberties? No, it definitely does not, either in practice or in theory. The constitutions of the People's Republics have clear provisions in this respect. Article 41 of the Hungarian constitution states: "The courts shall punish the enemies of the people, defend and secure the political, economic and social order of the People's Democracy . . . they shall edu-

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114 matter for contempt. Those who thought that they might succeed, while remaining within the Eastern bloc, in keeping clear of total orthodoxy and maintaining some degree of freedom of thought, have been defeated. The peasants' leaders were defeated, Masaryk was defeated, the socialists who tried to collaborate were defeated, Rajk was defeated in Hungary, Gomulka in Poland.

My mother tongue, work in my mother tongue, is for me the most important thing in life. And my country, where what I wrote could be printed and could reach the public, lay within the Eastern Empire. My aim and purpose was to keep alive freedom of thought in my own special field; I sought in full knowledge and conscience to subordinate my conduct to the fulfillment of that aim. I served abroad because I was thus relieved from direct pressure and, in the material which I sent to my publishers, could be bolder than my colleagues at home. I did not want to become an émigré and so give up all chance of taking a hand in what was going on in my own country. The time was to come when I should be forced to admit myself defeated.

• 668 114 To understand the course of events in Eastern and Central Europe during the first post-war years, it must be realized that pre-war social conditions called for extensive reforms. It must further be understood that the Nazi rule had occasioned a profound disintegration of the existing order of things. In these circumstances, the only hope was to set up a social order which would be new, but would not be a copy of the Russian regime. So what was planned in Moscow as a stage on the road to servitude, was willingly accepted in the countries concerned as though it were true progress. Men will clutch at illusions when they have nothing else to hold to.

The Method, the Diamat—that is, dialectical materialism

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as interpreted by Lenin and Stalin—possesses a strong magnetic influence on the men of the present day. In the people's democracies, the communists speak of the "New Faith," and compare its growth to that of Christianity in the Roman Empire. There has been instituted in France a group of worker-priests, who do regular work in the factories and bring the Gospel to the laboring masses while sharing fully in their living conditions. A large proportion of these men have abandoned Catholicism and been converted to communism. This example illustrates the intensity of the ideological struggle which is going on today. And let it be remembered that in the people's democracies indoctrination is enforced by the whole power of the State. [668] 114

For several years I carried on a debate with those of my friends who were yielding, little by little, to the magic influence of the New Faith. The debate went on in my own mind also—more than a debate indeed, since that word gives no sense of the emotional stress which I experienced. As the nerve-centers of the country were mastered, one after the other, by the adherents of Moscow, I was forced to abandon my philosophic beliefs one after another, if I was to keep from throwing myself into the abyss. The abyss for me was exile, the worst of all misfortunes, for it meant sterility and inaction.

In the end, I found myself driven to the point where a final choice had to be made. This was when "socialist realism" was introduced into Poland. This is not, as some think, merely an esthetic theory to which the writer, the musician, the painter or the theatrical producer is obliged to adhere. On the contrary, it involves by implication the whole Leninist-Stalinist doctrine. If writers and painters are not forced to become members of the Party, that is because such a step is unnecessary. So long as they act in ac- 668 114

2: Milosz S-5 (no date)1953 El Europe El

114 [608] cordance with "socialist realism," they are automatically and inescapably enrolled among the followers of Stalin. "Socialist realism" is much more than a matter of taste, of preference for one style of painting or music rather than another. It is concerned with the beliefs which lie at the foundation of human existence. In the field of literature it forbids what has in every age been the writer's essential task—to look at the world from his own independent viewpoint, to tell the truth as he sees it, and so to keep watch and ward in the interest of society as a whole. It preaches a proper attitude of doubt in regard to a merely formal system of ethics but itself makes all judgment of values dependent upon the interest of the dictatorship. Human sufferings are drowned in the trumpet-blare: the orchestra in the concentration camp; and I, as a poet, had my place already marked out for me among the first violins.

Look, then, dispassionately at my problem. At home in Poland, my friends, my relatives, theaters where my translations of Shakespeare were being produced, publishers ready to print what I wrote. Above all, my own country and my own language—what is a poet who has no longer a language of his own? All these things were mine, if I would pay the price: obedience.

The actual moment of my decision to break with the Eastern bloc could be understood, from the psychological point of view, in more ways than one. From outside, it is easy to think of such a decision as an elementary consequence of one's hatred of tyranny. But in fact, it may spring from a number of motives, not all of them equally high-minded. My own decision proceeded, not from the functioning of the reasoning mind, but from a revolt of the stomach. A man may persuade himself, by the most logical reasoning, that he will greatly benefit his health by

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CHAPTER III

THE TRANSFER OF THE SYSTEM

1. *The Communist Seizure of Power*

The assumption of totalitarian power by the Communist Parties of Eastern Europe in the years immediately following the Second World War was characterized throughout by a degree of administrative caution and bureaucratic circumlocution contrasting sharply with the bold tactics of early Leninist Communism. Where Lenin advocated the forthright "smashing" of the old State apparatus, the new generation of Communist tacticians favored its piecemeal suffocation and gradual substitution of a new regime. Where Lenin's Party proudly proclaimed its victory as a sharp historical break with the past,[1] the East European Communists made painstaking efforts to represent themselves as the legitimate heirs of national tradition.[2] And while Lenin's Party seized power on the crest of a giant revolutionary wave—culminating in the "Ten Days that Shook the World"—the East European Parties, operating in a virtual revolutionary vacuum, gingerly infiltrated their way into State power by diplomatic pressures, police intrigues, bureaucratic manipulations, and the implied threat of a foreign army.[3]

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[1] The efforts these regimes made in the post-war years to maintain the fiction of legal and constitutional *continuity* with their predecessors also fit into this pattern. Indeed, with the possible exception of Czechoslovakia, it is impossible to establish a precise year—such as 1917 in Soviet history—when the Communists seized power.

[2] The East European Communist regimes frequently stress their *native* origins, and pose as the culmination of thousand-year-old national strivings. For example: the Czechoslovak Communist, Vaclav Kopecky, proclaimed at an ideological conference on February 27th, 1952, that "we Communists today are fulfilling the wishes of all true patriots of past generations. We are the heirs of the Hussite idea, and we are faithful to the highest traditions of the Czech and Slovak people." The very fact that the East European regimes were founded in the midst of intense Pan-Slavic and anti-Teuton demonstrations offers a key to their political psychology.

[3] The contrast may be put very succinctly: while the East European Communist Parties could not have seized power without the aid of the powerful Red Army, the Russian Bolsheviks retained power despite the intervention of several foreign armies.

Indeed, there is considerable evidence to show that the Communists preferred to take power without the aid of genuinely revolutionary movements. The calculated policy of permitting the Nazis to destroy the powerful non-Communist but leftist Polish underground in Warsaw was one indication of the Communist fear of spontaneous and deeply rooted reform movements. As Mitrany points out, "When the Soviet armies first occupied territory in Eastern peasant countries, they did not attempt to use the peasants against the existing regime";[4] instead they concentrated on seizing the centers of political power through which, in time, they were to introduce land reform by official fiat.

This wide divergence in revolutionary tactics between 1917 and 1944-45 arose from two factors. First, the spontaneous revolutionary forces in Eastern Europe were so weak that the Communists, with the aid of onrushing armies, could either defeat them or take them over. Second, the internal bureaucratization of the Communist movement which has occurred since Lenin's day made it imperative that the Communists rely primarily upon their own organization to affect events rather than upon the power of mass human forces. Consequently, they eschewed raising revolutionary slogans and adopted only those slogans which would help ease the path to organizational control.

These differences are of crucial importance in understanding the general course which the "East European Revolution" took, and the particular character of its agricultural policy.

Although Lenin's seizure of political power in 1917 was accompanied by a vast peasant-made reform of the Russian land system, he did not sanctify it with affirmations of his belief in independent peasant farming, as his more cynical East European successors were to do nearly 30 years later. Indeed, by decreeing nationalization of the land immediately after assuming power, Lenin made it clear that he considered individual peasant management of the land a transitional stage.[5] Consequently, Bolshevik policy shifts in the

[4] Mitrany, p. 179.

[5] Theoretical opposition to the land reform as a serious solution to the agrarian problem remained a part of the international Communist policy throughout the twenties, and was abandoned only after the policy shift to the Popular Front (1934-35). Even in the Far East, where the urban proletariat was very small, Comintern agents adhered to this general line. Only in the early thirties, under Mao Tse-tung's leadership, did the Communists in the Far East begin to appreciate the revolutionary potential in the slogan of land reform. During the Popular Front era, when the Communists allied themselves with a variety of previously prohibited groups in Europe and elsewhere, they accustomed themselves to the demagogic opportunism they practiced with such skill after the Second World War. (See Franz Borkenau, *World Communism*, New York, 1939).

661 well-to-do peasants had survived the post-war reforms, the size of this group was minuscule compared to the propaganda concentrated upon it. As the collectivization drive gained momentum, it became increasingly clear that the slogan of the "struggle to liquidate the kulaks" was largely an ideological cover under which a general onslaught against the entire peasantry was being waged.

"The distinguishing feature of this [agricultural] revolution," Stalin once said concerning Soviet collectivization, "is that it was accomplished *from above*, on the initiative of the State, directly supported *from below* by the millions of peasants."[19] His formula was designed to distinguish the "agricultural revolution" from the "socialist revolution" of 1917, which presumably took its initiative *from below*. Therefore, one may assume that the emphasis in his formula is to be placed on its first clause (from above) rather than on the second (from below). The constant state of tension between the peasantry and the State in the years of collectivization is testimony to the reluctance of the peasantry to believe that the drive to "liquidate the kulaks" was being waged in their favor.

[668] The means by which the peasants expressed their antagonism to the agricultural policy were varied and the material on them is voluminous. The Romanian Party organ, *Scanteia*, described the forms which peasant resistance took in this fashion:

> At the present time, the resistance of the capitalist elements [the peasantry] in our country takes various forms: the sabotage of the cultivation and sowing plan, the refusal to complete compulsory delivery quotas and to pay taxes, plotting against the collective farms and peasant partnerships, black market operations and artificially raising prices – going so far as the communication of rumors of the criminal character of arson and murder.[20]

But the most direct evidence of the failure of Communist propaganda to win peasant support for collectivization was the economic apathy of the peasants and the continued impatience and fury of Communist propaganda. Since the regimes did not themselves resort to outright violence, neither did the peasants. But to the policy of slow economic suffocation the peasants countered a policy of passive resistance traditional among the backward peasantry of Eastern Europe.

3. *The Economic Strategy of Collectivization*

423 The effort to transform the East European countryside was

[19] *History of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union (Short Course)*. (International Publishers, New York, 1939), p. 305.
[20] Scanteia (Bucharest), April 12, 1953.

423 ance to collectivization which only a party of the strong Soviet type could have withstood.

However, those factors which made "salami tactics" suitable for the seizure of power and the beginning of collectivization made them inappropriate for completion of the task and the final subjugation of the independent peasantry. These disadvantages may be summarized as follows:

423 1. Piecemeal collectivization encouraged a type of peasant
●668 resistance which, it turned out, was more effective than Soviet peasant resistance. In the USSR collectivization took place so rapidly, and with such tremendous force, that the vast majority of peasants were already well enclosed within the "Socialist sector" by the time a full-scale counter-attack could be prepared. Leonard Hubbard, the English authority, described the Soviet victory in this way:

> The struggle over collectivization ended distinctly in favour of the Soviet Government, unlike the conflict [between the Government and the peasantry] that brought War Communism to a close. The peasants were no longer able to starve the Government into yielding, because the Government had now created an efficient organisation for obtaining the foodstuffs necessary for subsistence of the urban and industrial population.[18]

While it is true that the Soviet peasantry, in retaliation, destroyed a good portion of the nation's livestock, their bargaining power was not improved as a result. The vital shipments of surplus grain were insured, and all means of resistance had been thoroughly destroyed. The famine of 1932-33, mainly affecting the grain-growing regions of Ukraine and South Russia, demonstrated beyond doubt that, in Hubbard's words, "if anybody was to starve, [the peasants] would be the first to do so."

423 In Eastern Europe, however, the slow, cautious collectivization
661 precluded the possibility of so calculated and brutal a policy. A sufficient proportion of the peasantry remained outside of the "Socialist sector" to wreak havoc with the Government's general economic plan. The East European regimes could not gain a strong enough position in relation to the peasantry to withstand the tremendous pressures which would be generated by rapid collectivization or a disastrous drought such as 1933. One poor harvest was, consequently, a sufficient jolt to destroy the entire rhythm of the

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[18] Leonard Hubbard, *The Economics of Soviet Agriculture*, London, 1939, p. 123.

Satellite industrial program. The oustanding case in point is, of course, Hungary, whose extremely poor harvest of 1952 provided the impetus which paved the way for the crisis of 1953.[19] 423 668

2. The reliance upon slow economic strangulation rather than direct administrative force in collectivization inevitably meant greater reliance on the voluntary will of the peasantry than was necessary in the Soviet collectivization drive. Therefore, the regimes had to take some account of the individual tastes of the peasantry. The variety of intermediate types of collective, the special privileges granted kolkhoz members, reflect the Communist desire to soften the impact of collectivization.[20] The strenuous efforts made to demonstrate to the peasant the economic superiority of collectivism were also part of this effort.

This policy made collectivization possible but at the same time detracted from the very usefulness originally intended for the collectivized farms; that is, the effort to render the collectives attractive to the independent peasant (limited as they were) did not facilitate exploitation of the peasants which was their major economic justification. As was evident from the analysis presented in Chapted IV, the degree of exploitation of the "Socialist sector" was not much greater than the exploitation of the private sector. The difference was, in any case, smaller than that achieved in the Soviet Union, where a prolonged period of persuasion and intra-peasantry discrimination had been unnecessary.

4. *The East European Peasant* 565 829 668

Peasant resistance is a social force extremely difficult to measure either quantitatively or qualitatively. It expresses itself in many forms and guises, both in open revolt and passive resistance. This is partly because peasant sentiment rarely expresses itself in organizational form but more commonly in individual economic acts. In modern history, governments have found it difficult to elicit fanatical loyalty from the peasant; at best he is obedient. For the same reasons, the peasant has rarely been drawn into the organized revolutionary movements of the time. He has succumbed to few

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[19] There was, of course, other factors involved in the Hungarian agricultural crisis of 1953 (see above pp. 109-10).

[20] Mention should be made here of Communist efforts throughout the sphere to flatter the peasant by a superficial glorification of his traditional dance, costumes, handiwork, and other expressions of the peasant culture which once graced the covers of pre-World War II East European tourist guides.

565 of the sophisticated slogans of modern politics and tends to judge
829 governments in terms of provincial and pragmatic considerations
668 which cannot be encompassed in the romantic slogans of either the State or the Revolution. For a fleeting moment in 1917, the peasants of Russia involved themselves in the maelstrom of a proletarian revolution. Between the wars they gave occasional support to genuinely peasant parties, but invariably their interest lagged or the parties betrayed them. Otherwise, the peasants have in general been passive rather than active participants in 20th Century political history.

The vast uprising of the Russian peasants in 1917-18 was probably their greatest show of strength in the 20th century, and certainly absorbed more peasant energies and resentments than either the 1907 Romanian rebellion or the Bulgarian peasant victories of the early 1920s. But their victory was short-lived, and was achieved at a tremendous price. The cataclysmic forces of the Russian Revolution so shattered the old structure of both countryside and city that the gains the peasant made remained at the mercy of terrible forces. The destruction of traditional institutions which occurred in 1917-21 in defense of the Revolution prepared the land for the collectivization onslaught 10 years later.

The peasants of Eastern Europe have not participated in such a revolution, and their institutions knew no such cataclysmic overturn. Furthermore, East European peasants have had a longer tradition of private property and as a result were less capable of revolutionary opposition to their oppressors but more capable of that type of passive resistance which in the long run is most effective. Russian peasants might destroy the livestock in defiance of the Bolshevik cadres but East European peasants could more easily sabotage the plan by day-to-day non-cooperation. The revolutionary traditions of the Russian peasantry made possible greater heroism, but no greater improvement of their economic situation. The less militant traditions of the East European peasantry (in part the consequence of more humane governments) guaranteed that there would be no repetition of the victories of 1917-18, nor any exact repetition of the terrible defeats of 1929-32.

There are many national factors affecting the total picture: the proximity of peasant victory in Hungary of 1945-46; the power of the Catholic Church in rural Poland; the relative prosperity of the Czech farmers; the communal traditions of the Bulgarian and

Yugoslav peasants; the special position which Romania occupies in the Soviet empire. These differences are important, and explain many of the variations within the framework of agricultural policy. But these variations fall into that historical experience which distinguishes East European peasantry from its Russian counterpart. These historical differences are of the utmost importance in explaining the failure of the East European Communists to emulate successfully the Soviet example. 565 829 668

5. *The Communist Role in Eastern Europe*

The Communist Parties of Eastern Europe consider themselves progressive forces of the area. In agriculture, they assert that by lifting the backward peasantry out of its traditional lethargy and provincialism, they are performing a service for the peasants and the entire society. The opposition of the peasantry to Communist plans for the rationalization of the land stems from stubborn allegiance to outmoded customs and habits. Vulko Chervenkov, the Bulgarian Premier, gave the classical formulations on this point: 829 668

> The Bulgarian peasant has two souls. One is the love of work and the other is the sense of private ownership. His spirit of private ownership brings him close to the capitalist. His spirit of work brings him close to the working class. Therefore the peasant is hesitant. We Communists, through our tactics and by the collective method, should kill their spirit of private ownership and build our socialist world.[19]

It is precisely this conception of the Communist role in Eastern Europe which the material gathered together here calls into question.

No doubt it is partly true that peasant resistance to collectivization is based on their passionate attachment to the land they till and own. But as has been pointed out, the major issue in the struggle between the Communists and the peasants was the question of the *distribution* of the fruits of the land, rather than the more abstract question of conflicting ideologies. 423 829

The peasants fight not only to protect their ancient traditions but even more to protect their economic rights, and they frequently employ the ancient traditions in defense of their own economic interests. The Communists, for their part, struggle against these traditions not merely out of doctrinaire antagonism but because these customs stand in the way of further exploitation of the

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[19] *Rabotnichesko Delo* (Sofia) September 9, 1953.

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161 These figures are subject to correction, but are adequate for the present purpose. They indicate that the population of Stamford, Connecticut, could be multiplied into this total subjected European population about fourteen hundred times. That is, every man, woman, and child in such a community has fourteen hundred counterparts over there. Fourteen hundred Stamfords with its schools and churches, its jails and railroad station, its doctors and lawyers, its butchers and bakers, its little children and its grandfathers—all of them, every day and every night, first under the heel of Hitler and then under the heel of Stalin. 668 And every living soul has been steeped in a bath of propaganda for twelve years, one version being that there exists a master race, and another that "Anglo-American imperialism" does an endless series of misdeeds, such as sending potato bugs to Eastern Germany and disease-spreading insects to Korea. He may not believe all this, but he must not say so even to himself.

For the nerve center of this propaganda is terror. The Communist always begins with the devices of infiltration. These he is taught to handle adroitly. He can take over a labor union almost before its members suspect that he has any desire to do so. In the presence of liberals he can be a boon companion, and discreetly assent to his neighbor's views about Whitehead or St. Thomas Aquinas. But when the Russian Army is on hand to support him he is camouflaged only moderately. Everyone knows that his bosses have arrived from Moscow after a period of intensive training. But so long as "imperialist powers" are in relative control he appreciates each and every opportunity to pretend that he is some one else.

668 697 He uses the radio and the newspaper, the friendly gathering of citizens, and the picture magazine. But the instrumentalities upon which he really relies are the secret police and the concentration camp. The police are not primarily there to ferret out plots. It is their business to cajole a vast army of informers

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into thinking that if they report the conversations and the past histories of others they themselves will be able to keep their skins relatively intact. The concentration camp is, however, the Communists' trump card. Anyone who causes trouble can be sent to one, and the supply is unlimited. The existence of such camps is, to be sure, so well known to the average person outside the Russian orbit that mention of them arouses relatively little interest. How many remember any longer the names of Dachau and Auschwitz?

Nevertheless the concentration camps operated by the Russians are very serious matters even to Americans, and may the Lord forbid that we ever get into them. But if we suppose that Thomas Murphy of Dubuque, Iowa, proprietor of a stationery store, were suddenly put into one before his wife could get much more than his toothbrush into his briefcase, we shall have a fairly good idea of what has been happening to hundreds of thousands of poor people in Eastern Europe for a long time and to all Central Europeans since 1945.

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We know rather less about Russia's slave-labor camps than, perhaps, we should; but even so the information is considerable. Some of what is known comes from sources which cannot be divulged. A good deal has also been supplied by persons who once resided in such camps. The system as such is thirty years old, though it has probably never been so extensive and well organized as it now is. Two purposes are served by it, which we may assume are those which the Nazis also posited as goals, even if their social objectives and methods were in some respects different from those of the Communists. Human beings can be used as beasts of burden in carrying out enterprises sponsored by the government. Secondly, if anyone is suspected of disloyalty, "sabotage," or difference of opinion, he can be removed from normal social life. Soviet society is a Gargantuan feat of human engineering. In the present state of tech-

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795 Protestantism than were those of Roman Catholicism. Luther-
659 ans, for example, were not averse to identifying their Church with a political power; but their belief that the Kingdom of God and the kingdoms of this world are radically different also led to the conclusion that the Church could accept responsibility for approving or opposing actions by the State only when these controverted directly the moral and religious truths which had been made explicit in the teachings of the Lord Jesus. Thus a section of the German Lutheran Church opposed Nazism with sublime courage because Hitler had repudiated in principle such central teachings as that of the validity of Christian baptism when administered to persons of Jewish origin.

795 But Protestants viewed with uneasiness the Catholic practice
668 of creating organizations of the faithful for political and social action—which led in Germany to the creation of the Center Party on the basis of organizational efforts that had their origin in 1840. This was by no means merely an opportunistic reaction, even though upon occasion ecclesiastical rivalry may have played a part. While some loyal Protestants cooperated with and even voted for the Center Party, even as did a number of Jews, the great majority felt—no doubt, upon occasion, quite properly—that partisan activity brought the Church into realms where religious teaching was compromised for the sake of political expediency. This cleavage was intensified after Karl Barth and his associates formulated a neo-orthodox theology whose profound influence extended beyond Germany to Calvinism and Lutheranism in the whole of Eastern Europe. How strongly this criticism affected Catholic practice cannot be discussed here; but it may be pointed out that, during much of the Pontificate of Pius XI, Rome contemplated withdrawing the faithful completely from organizations of a political and social character, and building up instead the groups which received the generic name Catholic Action. Only toward the close of his

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Pontificate did Pius XI reaffirm the desirability of the more 795
secular associations. And in Germany after World War II 668
Catholics elected to create an interconfessional party, the Christian Democratic Union, instead of resurrecting the old Center Party (which emerged as a small minority movement only).

In any event, wide circles of the clergy and the laity looked 795
upon the Russian Church with deep if sometimes nostalgic re- 779
spect, particularly when the yearning for the reunion of Christendom was spiritually motivated and sincere. Despite many efforts, the outlook for an eventual peace with the Roman See which would obliterate the divisive past seemed to be unpromising. And on the other hand the "Social Christianity" to which American Protestantism appeared to be irretrievably committed impressed the more traditional European theologians as being thin and relatively mundane. There remained the hope that by forging a bond with the Orthodox East a new Christian community, transcending national boundaries, could be established. The writings of Russian exiles were read with avidity; and the authors were of such talent, insight, and sometimes genius that they exerted a great influence. There can be no doubt that, if after victory in 1945 Stalin had adopted a conciliatory policy and had conceded genuine religious and social freedom, Central and Eastern Europe would have become strongly, even ardently pro-Russian. The response in Protestant communities would have been particularly sincere.

The hope for such a policy was at times as fervent as a 000
messianic dream, and it died hard. Pastor Martin Niemoeller has perhaps been its most eloquent exponent, but there have been many others. It is not possible to understand fully the situation that developed unless one bears these things in mind. Only with great difficulty could Europe resign itself to accepting the intellectual and cultural leadership of the United States. This sobering thought may also be a healing one.

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423 when a peasant leaves the agricultural co-operative, he is
474 allowed, at least according to the law, to detach or sell the property he contributed or the plot he received in exchange.

On the other hand there are two factors which will render the results of 'collectivisation' in the satellites more severe than in Russia: 1. As we have seen, the increase in the grain output which followed upon 'collectivisation' in Russia was due in the main to the great extension of the area cultivated; but such an extension is out of the question in the countries of Eastern Europe. 2. Although Eastern Europe is not as suitable for meat and milk production as Western Europe, but, like Russia, is much better for growing corn, it already has many more branches than Russia of intensive farming (milk, pork, vegetables, wines, tobacco, etc.) whose prosperity is dependent on the existence of an urban population with a high and rising standard of living. The present regimes do not augur well for such a development.

Peasant Resistance

423 Although 'collectivisation' has hardly begun in the 'People's
474 Democracies', the agricultural policy of the governments has
● 668 already met with a peasant resistance which is on the increase. It is partly resistance to requisitioning and a protest against the lack of industrial goods and partly resistance to 'collectivisation' (of course these two reasons cannot be separated in practice).

Just as it was natural that the resistance of the working class to the industrial policy of the governments of Eastern Europe appeared earliest and was strongest in Czechoslovakia, the most industrialised country in the region (except for the Soviet Zone of Germany and Austria), so is it natural that the peasant resistance to their agricultural policy is boldest in Bulgaria. The reasons for this are: first, Bulgaria is the country least affected by the land reform, so that the peasants have not much to thank the Government for on this score; secondly, Bulgaria has the highest percentage of peasants engaged in small-scale intensive farming—tobacco, grapes, roses—so that the inducement needed to break their opposition to

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'collectivisation' is the greatest; thirdly, the basis upon which the industrialisation of the country is taking place is the weakest (except for Albania), and the industrialisation plan is the most ambitious (except for Yugoslavia), so that the need to squeeze the peasant is the most desperate.* This last point is clearly illustrated by the targets of the various Plans, all of which aim at the 'collectivisation' of only a minority of the peasants—except the Bulgarian plan, which by 1953 aims to have 60 per cent of the peasants in co-operative farms.

The peasant resistance took the characteristic form of non-delivery of their quota of products. Despite the good harvest in 1948, by October 10th only one district had delivered its quota, 13 districts had delivered between 80 and 90 per cent, but many more had not even fulfilled half the quota. (*Rabotnichesko Delo*, organ of the Communist Party, October 15th and 17th, 1948). 1948 was bad enough, but 1949 was much worse. The sowing quotas were nowhere near completion on the final date, March 15th. Only 56 per cent of the wheat quota was completed, 45 per cent of the rye, 55 per cent of the barley, 51 per cent of the oat, and 14 per cent of the sunflower quotas. (*Otechestven Front*, 25th March, 1949). The Ministry of Agriculture reported that many villages met great obstacles in collecting grain. In the village of Dimitrievo, for instance, the Village Council showed no effort to fulfil its duty and barely 1,200 kilos of grain were turned in. The co-operative of Yaborovo village refused to give up its allocation. Many villages had very inadequate granaries, etc., etc. (*Otechestven Front*, 31st July, 1949).

That even members of the Communist Party were taking part in the resistance of the peasantry to the Government's agricultural policy was made clear in Dimitrov's speech at the Fifth Congress of the Bulgarian Communist Party (December 19th, 1948): 'In some villages there were "Party members" and even Party leaderships who did not head the campaign for ensuring food to the people and even de facto sabotaged the delivery of cereals. The same holds true for some village Communists who do not help and sometimes impede the creation

*Yugoslavia, too, did not undergo an extensive land reform, and its very ambitious plan for industrialisation is also based on a very low technical level. But there the peasants are much more tolerant towards the government, because of the threat of Moscow to it.

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423 of co-operative farms'. (G. Dimitrov, *Political Report to Fifth*
474 *Congress of the Bulgarian Communist Party*, Sofia, 1948, p. 80).*
● 668 The extent of the peasant resistance and its causes were admitted to at the Plenum of the Central Committee of the Bulgarian Communist Party on June 11th and 12th, 1949, where in an excess of 'Bold Self-Criticism', the Party laid bare its 'mistakes' and promised to relax its stringent policy towards the peasantry.

Shortly before the Plenum the Acting-Premier had said that 'no progress was registered since September 9th, 1944, in the output of cereals despite the import of tractors and other agricultural machinery and considerable agro-technical improvements'.

One of the reports to the Plenum says:

'We must admit that we have fastened the screw too tightly in our relations with the medium farmer . . . We must unloosen the screw and switch over to methods which will induce the farmer and especially the medium peasant, by an appeal to his self-interest, to improve and increase his production.'

The Plenum Resolution says:

'Excesses have occurred in the system of quota purchases, which have led to the requisitioning of practically the entire

*Two years later, in his report to the Plenum of the Central Committee (7th and 8th October, 1950) the new General Secretary, Vulko Chervenkov, gave many more details about the sabotage of the agricultural deliveries by Communist Party members and organisations. He said: '. . . the former Minister of Home Trade last year, under pressure of various appeals from local organs, arbitrarily, quite irresponsibly, without the permission of the Central Committee of the Party and the Government, reduced three and a half times the plan for state grain deliveries. He was unable to grasp the fact that the appeals of the local organs reflected the pressure of private landowners and kulaks against the interests of the state.' '. . . the party organisations in the districts of Bourgas, Gorna Oryakhovitsa, Rousse and Kolarovgrad . . . yielded to the pressure of a number of primary organisations which expressed private and kulak interests and attempted to wreck the plan for collecting the deliveries . . . ' The same crimes are attributed by Chervenkov to the first secretary of the Stalin District Party Committee, the vice-chairman of its People's Council and the representative of the Central Committee of the Party and Government whose special task was to inspect the collection of the state grain deliveries in the district. 'The District Party Committee and the District People's Council' of the Pleven district 'fell into the hands of the kulaks'; 'the inspector of the Central Committee of the Party attached to the Pleven district played an unenviable role'. In every possible way he supported the local leadership in its 'attempt to attain a reduction of the plan . . . ' The same crimes are attributed to the leadership of the Party and People's Council in Vratsa district and the representative of the Central Committee there, Dimiter Dimov, who was at the same time a secretary of the Central Committee of the Party and a member of the Political Bureau. And this happened after the big 'purge' of 'Kostovists' in 1949!

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marketable part of the produce at fixed low prices. This applies especially to grain farmers, who constitute the huge majority of our peasantry. In this way agricultural producers have been to a large extent deprived of their personal interest in developing and increasing production, improving its quality and generally raising the productivity of agricultural labour . . .' 423 474 668

'In the formation of the co-operative farms, instead of strict compliance with the laws, Government directives and Party instructions, throughout almost the whole country there have been irresponsbile requisitionings of the best and most favourably located land, which is incorporated in the co-operative areas, while the private farmers are given in exchange distant and barren plots. Farmers are not being compensated in accordance with the quantity and real value of the land.' '. . . peasants are forced to join co-operative farms while they are still unconvinced of their advantages . . .

'To this end the Plenum decides:

'1. That fundamental changes be made in the system of quota purchases so that, while preserving the principle of progressive quotas, agricultural producers shall be left the greater quantity of their excess stocks to sell them freely to the state, cooperatives and consumers at free prices.

'2. That a real and fair correlation be established between the price of cereals and the price of other agricultural products, industrial goods and artisan services; that the prices of cereals be raised . . .

'5. That producers be guaranteed the freedom to sell their surpluses directly to consumers, after delivering their quota to the state . . .

'8. That the supply of the village with staple industrial products, both from local industry and from abroad, be improved . . .

'10 . . . . returning in certain places fields wrongly requisitioned from private farmers who received in exchange land of less value'. (Quoted by *Free Bulgaria*, 1st July, 1949).

The extent to which the Government overdid the exploitation of the peasantry was revealed even more clearly both by the evidence given during the Kostov Trial about the position of the agricultural population, and from the rise in the official prices for agricultural products after the June Plenum.

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The resistance of the peasantry has also compelled the 474
government to slow down its drive for 'collectivisation'. On 423
November 15th, 1949, *Otechestven Front* said that eighty-six government commissions had been set up to remedy mistakes in connection with the collective farms. They had to inquire into the activities of 1,264 co-operative farms (two-thirds of all the co-operative farms in the country) and examine 61,854 complaints of illegal requisition of land from peasants who had not joined the co-operatives. In 35,311 cases the land had been restored to its previous owners and those responsible for the mistakes punished.

The Bulgarian government is, it seems, compelled to go gently with the collectivisation drive, but it nevertheless does not renounce its aim. While on January 1st, 1950 there were 1,600 co-operative farms with 156,500 families and 1,377,050 acres, on October 1st, the number of co-operative farms reached 2,249, with 474,800 families and 4,707,700 acres. Thus 43.4 per cent of the agricultural population is in co-operative farms. (Vulko Chervenkov's Report to the Central Committee of the Communist Party, October 7th and 8th, 1950).

Bulgaria is not the only country to experience peasant 423
resistence to government policy. There is a food shortage in 474
Czechoslovakia. The Russians are not responsible for this, as 668
they buy scarcely any agricultural products from Czechoslovakia. Nor does Czechoslovakia export much food to other countries. There was a drought, it is true, but that was two years ago, and even at that time the number of livestock compared with pre-war was better than in any of the other satellites. Moreover the population was much below its pre-war number owing to the expulsion of the Sudeten Germans. The reason for the shortage must therefore be ascribed, at least partly, to the resistance of the peasants to delivering their products to the Government. The peasant resistance also expresses itself in the slowness of the progress of collectivisation. The Minister of Agriculture, Julius Duriš, said at the 9th Congress of the Communist Party, that in only 208 villages out of 13,000 were farm co-operatives operating (*Lidové Noviny*, 28th May, 1949). There had been many cases of almost open revolt at village meetings convened by the Communist Party to launch

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423 cooperatives, while other meetings had been boycotted by the
474 peasants. The General Secretary of the Party, Rudolf Slansky,
668 went as far as to say: 'The Party has failed to organise an explanatory campaign within its own rank and file, with the result that some Party members, not having been made to understand the significance of the co-operatives and not having been persuaded of their usefulness, have begun to waver and to fall under reactionary influences.'

Poland has had its troubles too. The Government was obliged to supply the wheat growers with far more industrial products than it had planned to do, and at lower prices than were prevailing on the free market. (*Glos Ludu*, May 4th, 1948). Other manifestations of peasant resistance disturbed the countryside. According to *The Times* of 25 January, 1949: 'During the last few weeks of 1948 at least 20 cases were published in the Government-controlled newspapers of Communist organizers killed while on duty in country districts. Most people think the figure much higher'. The Government in alarm retreated, and instead of carrying out its ambitious plan of organising 7,400 co-operative farms in 1949, reduced its target to a mere 200. (*The World Today*, August, 1949). The peasant resistance, although strong enough to slow down the collectivisation drive, did not divert the Communist leaders from their aim. On April 1st, 1949, there were 40 producer co-operatives in Poland; by October 1st, 145; by February 1st, 1950, 332, and by March 5th, 590. Of these 590 co-operative farms, 345 have been founded on a statute similar to that of the Russian kolkhozes, 192 are of what is called the second lowest type: 30-40 per cent of their net income is distributed as rent for land and implements pooled in the co-operatives and 60-70 per cent as wages for labour. 53 were of the lowest type: common cultivation of privately-owned land. (Roman Zambrowski, Secretary of the Central Committee of the P.P.R., in *For a Lasting Peace, For a People's Democracy!* March 10th, 1950). We may assume that the tempo of 'collectivisation' will be accelerated after the first experiments have been completed. An important step in hastening the 'collectivisation' was the decree that put the zloty at par with the Russian rouble: every peasant had until 13th November, 1950 to give up 100 old zloty for one new one, while as regards workers'

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wages and prices three new zloty were changed for 100 old zloty. With their meagre savings swept away, the peasants' resistance to collectivisation will be weakened.

Rumania has also experienced great peasant resistance to 'collectivisation'. In June, 1949, the government had to take strong measures against a partisan movement in the countryside, strongest in the Banat region. The government called the resisting peasants 'kulak hooligans', but a mere glance at its extortionate demands from the peasants belies this accusation. Every farm, down to the very smallest, must deliver large amounts of grain for low prices. For example, a peasant who has a farm of only 3 hectares must deliver 22 per cent of the yield for less than 20 per cent of the free market price. (*Neue Zürcher Zeitung*, 7th April, 1949). No wonder the peasants rebel. The 'collectivisation' of Rumanian agriculture is still at its beginning: in September, 1949, the number of co-operative farms was only 55.

In Hungary the government was very careful in approaching the problem of 'collectivisation' and for a long time denied any intention of proceeding with it. Thus, for instance, in a speech before a peasant meeting in Debreczen on June 29th, 1947, Premier Lájos Dinnyes said: '. . . . if the Government had any intention of creating kolkhozy it would not have carried out the land reform. What is good in one country is no use in another. A Hungarian Government which aimed to give up the principle of private property would be digging its own grave and the nation's. We aim to fortify the new peasantry'. (*The Times*, 30th June, 1947). After a certain amount of manoeuvring, nevertheless, the Hungarian Government did proceed to 'collectivise' agriculture, but it did so carefully and slowly. Up to November 1st, 1949, co-operative farms made up only 3.5 per cent of all the arable land of the country, and state farms another 3.5 per cent. Since then it has advanced considerably. In May, 1950, co-operative and state farms made up 17.8 per cent of all the land under cultivation.

In general it can be said that the process of 'collectivisation' is full of contradictions. Its aim is to secure food supplies and agricultural raw materials for the towns and for export, in order to facilitate industrialisation, as well as to get the necessary supply of labour power for industry and public work.

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CHAPTER III

YUGOSLAVIA—
THE EXCEPTIONAL CASE

★

UNLIKE THE Communist Parties in the rest of Eastern Europe, 668
the Yugoslav Communist Party took power not through the agency of the Russian army of occupation, but through the support of the masses who had rallied round it during the years of struggle against the German and Italian invaders and their collaborators.

The invasion of Yugoslavia by the Axis armies led to the complete collapse of the old state structure. Croatia and Bosnia split off and formed an 'independent' Croat state headed by Ante Pavelić; Slovenia was absorbed into the German Reich; Dalmatia was occupied by the Italians; south-eastern Serbia and eastern Macedonia were annexed by Bulgaria; Baranya, Bačka and Medjumurje were taken over by Hungary; and the province of Banat and Serbia proper were ruled by a quisling government under General Milan Nedić.

It was obvious that there had not been much love lost 563
between the non-Serbs of Yugoslavia and the old chauvinistic 668
Serbian rulers. The fascist elements among the non-Serbs used 661
this hostility to divert the hatred felt for the Belgrade administration into a general national hatred of the Serbs, and one of the most sordid incidents in Yugoslav history ensued. The Ustashe—the Croat fascists—began a pogrom on a huge scale against the Serbs, during which 810 thousand Serbs, men, women and children, were callously murdered and whole villages razed to the ground. Moslem fascists in Bosnia also took part in the carnage. Some villages saved themselves from annihilation at the hands of the Croats by renouncing the Greek Orthodox Church and embracing Catholicism. The Catholic hierarchy of Croatia and Bosnia undertook an

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563 energetic crusade against Serb 'infidels.' Serb fascists retaliated
668 by murdering Croats and Moslems *en masse* in Bosnia, Herze-
661 govina, Dalmatia and elsewhere. While engaged in this communal slaughter, the quislings of each nation—Croats, Slovenes, Moslems and Serbs—collaborated with Berlin or Rome or with both.

642 Unlike them General Draža Mihailović, the military com-
668 mander of King Peter and his government in exile, stood for a united Yugoslavia including all the nations, but united under the rule of Serbia. His Chetniks were ready to take an active part in the massacre of Croats and Moslems, and Mihailović himself called upon the Allies to bomb Zagreb, the Croat capital, in revenge for their treachery. He even circulated propaganda maps of a future Yugoslavia in which Croatia was reduced to a small strip of land. To the Croatian, Montenegrin, Slovenian and also Serbian peasants and workers the old centralised administration symbolised by Mihailović represented the tax-collector, the gendarme and the corrupt local official. Mihailović's policy condemned him to increasing isolation and so to impotency, and finally to collaboration with the Germans and Italians against Tito's Partisans.

668 The only Party which fought for the unity of Yugoslavia on
186 the basis of the equality of all its component nations was the
563 Communist Party. The refugees from the pogroms constituted the first Partisan units, and the communal conflicts faced Tito's movement squarely with the problem whose solution proved to be decisive for its successes in the struggle for the liberation of the country from Axis occupation.

By a policy of national equality and of opposition to all communal conflicts, whether led by Ustashe and Moslem pogromists or Nedić and the Chetnik 'avengers', the Communist Party of Yugoslavia succeeded in welding the different peoples together. As Lieutenant-General Svetozar Vukmanović (better known as 'Tempo') said in his speech on the occasion of the celebration of 'Yugoslav Army Day' on 22nd December, 1947: 'The fighting of the Serbian and Montenegrin proletarian and shock brigades in Bosnia and Croatia; the fighting of Bosnian, Croatian and Montenegrin units in Serbia; the fighting of Serbian, Croatian, Bosnian, Macedonian, Montenegrin and Slovene units on the Srem front and beyond, for

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the ultimate liberation of Croatia, Bosnia, Slovenia, etc.—all this was an enormous contribution of the Yugoslav Army in the struggle for the establishment of unity among the peoples of Yugoslavia.' The unity of the peoples and their equality was symbolised in the fact that a Croat (Tito) led the revolt in Serbia, a Serbian Jew (Moše Pijade) led the rising in Montenegro, and a Montenegrin (Vukmanović) led the partisans in Macedonia.

This policy explains the phenomenon that military units of Italians, Hungarians and even German partisans fought in Tito's army. A large number of Italian soldiers joined the Partisans after the fall of Mussolini and formed the Garibaldi Volunteer units which were large enough to consist of a number of divisions. In the Slovene littoral, where Slovenes and Italians live side by side, Italian and Slovene Partisans formed common units, and Italians took an active and equal part in the work of the People's Committees, the embryonic administration of the new state. In spite of the cruelty displayed by the Hungarian occupation armies in the zone which they annexed, a cruelty greater even than that of the German armies, Tito succeeded in recruiting a battalion of Hungarian volunteers, the Petöfi Sandor battalion. There was also a Czech battalion in the Partisan Army. In July, 1943, a campaign was launched to enlist members of the German minority living in Yugoslavia in the Partisan army and this campaign met with some success, a Volksdeutsche battalion being organized to fight with the Partisans.

The social programme of Tito's Partisans was conservative. The Anti-Fascist Council of National Liberation (A.V.N.O.J.) —the Partisans' parliament—at its first meeting in Bihać on 26th November, 1942, proclaimed a programme, two of whose points were:

'The inviolability of private property and the providing of every possibility for individual initiative in industry, trade and agriculture.

'No radical changes whatsoever in the social life and activities of the people except for the replacement of reactionary village authorities and gendarmes who may have gone over to the service of the invaders by popularly elected representatives truly democratic and popular in character. All the most

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668 important questions of social life and State organisation will be
185 settled by the people themselves through representatives who will be properly elected by the people after the end of the war.'

These aims were constantly reiterated by the Partisan press and radio during the remaining three years of the war.

To illustrate the conservative character of the Partisans' social programme, it is only necessary to quote the oath taken by the new Croat volunteers: 'I swear by God Almighty and by all I hold dear that on my word of honour I shall always be true to the traditions of my ancestors. I will always fulfil trust towards the Croat people and will defend with my blood my national home from the German, Italian and Hungarian oppressors, and the traitors of my people. So help me God'. (Radio Free Yugoslavia, 13th June, 1943).

To reinforce this appeal to tradition a confessor or chaplain (vjerski referent) was attached to all the large military units.

668 This policy met with opposition from some members of the Communist Party of Yugoslavia. An uprising in July, 1941, in Montenegro raised the banner of 'Soviet Montenegro', and in Herzegovina, deviations from the Party line by the Party organisation called forth harsh criticism from Aleksandar Ranković, one of the foremost leaders of the Party and today Minister of the Interior. (*Proleter*, December, 1942). In spite of some leftist deviations, however, the Bihać programme was consistently implemented until the liberation of all Yugoslavia.

668 Until the end of 1944, no social changes or changes in
471 property ownership were introduced. On 14th February, 1945, Vice-Premier Kardelj insisted in a broadcast that in her economic structure Yugoslavia had not abandoned and would not abandon the general framework of capitalism.

The Bihać programme could be adhered to with comparative ease because the areas in the hands of the Partisans were those to which social conservatism was most acceptable. Both the most industrialised parts of Yugoslavia, Slovenia and Northern Croatia, came into the Partisans' hands only at the end of 1944 or beginning of 1945. The area in which there was a considerable number of rich peasants and German settlers, whose land would have been suitable for redistribution among the poorer peasantry, was also in the North. Thus until the end of 1944 or beginning of 1945 there were not many capitalists

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or rich peasants under their control and therefore no obvious targets for social discontent. 668 471

After that the industrial bourgeoisie was expropriated, without a formal renunciation of the Bihać programme, by the legal confiscation of the property of traitors. It was not until 5th December, 1946, that a nationalisation law was passed and this simply registered what was already an accomplished fact.

Because the Partisans operated far from the industrial centres, they consisted almost entirely of peasants. Although the workers of Yugoslavia supported the Communist Party almost to a man, they played a very small part in the movement. In the words of Bogdan Raditsa, a former press service director of the Tito government: '. . . the working class was far from being a vital factor in the resistance, as the Communists allege in their propaganda. For the workers remained in the big-city factories or were sent into Hitler's labor camps'. (*New Republic*, September 16th, 1946). The peasant character of the Partisan movement explains its original plebeian and democratic character. It also explains why the Communist Party of Yugoslavia could easily impose its conservative programme upon it during 1941-44 and why the Partisan Army was easily transformed into a stratified army, a development common to many peasant guerillas, for instance, the Spanish guerillas fighting Napoleon. 668 701

In the beginning there was real democracy in the army. There were no ranks and no medals and after each operation meetings were held at which each partisan had the opportunity of making a public criticism of any aspect of the operation. For two years during the first four Offensives which put the Partisans to their severest test, this procedure was followed. But on May Day, 1943, the ranks of officers and N.C.O.'s were introduced, and in the next four months about 5,000 officers and 11 generals were created; Tito was raised to the rank of Marshal in November, 1943. In the state administration, the principle of electing People's Committees was rigorously adhered to in the countryside until the Partisans advanced from the mountainous and backward areas to the large towns, when they were no longer elected but *appointed*. When, as sometimes happened, elections were held, they were only a formality, as there was only one list of candidates. The

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668 701 471 The generals, colonels and other officers of the[1] army became the backbone of the new state administration and monopolised all political power. It was this new bureaucratic caste which carried out the nationalisation of industry, transferring all the industrial wealth of the country into its own hands.

Thus the Partisan movement passed from being a plebeian democracy with a progressive policy on the national question and a conservative social programme, to bureaucratic state capitalism.

[1] [Partisan army of Yugoslavia -- Analyst]

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668 The war was a great test of strength, moral and physical, for the P.P.S. The Party was mainly responsible for the decision to defend encircled Warsaw in September, 1939. The 'Colonels' recognised this and their spokesman said: 'The workers' defence smacks of socialist revolution'. Having had long experience in illegal work since the time of Tsarism, the P.P.S. quickly accommodated itself to the new conditions of struggle under the German heel. For conspiratorial purposes, the Party adopted the name 'The Movement of the Working Masses of Poland', and was generally called the W.R.N. from the initial letters of its slogan: 'Freedom (Wolność) Equality (Równość) Independence (Niepodległość).' The following quotation describes the activity of the W.R.N. under the German occupation: '. . . a large secret organisational network of the W.R.N. comprised, already at the end of 1940, over 2,000 units. The underground Socialist Press and pamphlets reached, in the course of the war, the amazing figure of 2 million copies. A Socialist military organisation was created under the name of O.W.P.P.S. (Socialist Insurgent Military Detachments), which was included, as a separate and distinct organisation, in the national scheme of the Underground Home Army (A.K.). There was, besides, a Socialist Militia, organised both on a territorial and on a factory basis. All these organisations played an outstanding role, *inter alia* in the Warsaw Uprising of 1944.' (A. Ciolkosz, *The Expropriation of a Socialist Party*, New York, September-October, 1946, p.3). The price paid by the P.P.S. for this resistance to the German occupation was high. 'Notwithstanding the strict observance of all conspiratorial rules—in which the P.P.S., owing to her old revolutionary tradition excelled anyone else—heavy losses could not be avoided. Three members of the Central Executive Committee of the Party (Niedziałkowski, Czapiński, Topinek) and 28 other members of the Supreme Council of the Party, perished at the hands of the invaders. Altogether about 700 prominent leaders of the Party met their death under the occupation. From these figures the losses amongst the rank and file can be imagined.' (Ibid. p. 4).

661 When the Soviet Army entered Poland in 1944, one of the main objectives of the Russians was to destroy the P.P.S.[1] and, to achieve this, they used the same technique as they used

1 [The Socialist Party -- Analyst]

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	Germans (%)	*Czechs and Slovaks* (%)
Independent	21.89	25.81
Tenants	0.40	0.28
Officials and clerks ..	16.60	18.24
Workers	61.11	55.67

467 In 1930 there were 476 thousand Sudeten Germans organised in trade unions. The Executive Committee of the Sudeten German Social Democratic Party stated: 'In their worst plight, on the eve of the Munich decision, our Trade Unions could still compare their strength with those of Switzerland, a country with four million inhabitants and with a functioning democracy.' (Introduction to W. Jaksch, *Sudeten Labour and the Sudeten Problem*, London, 1945).

665 The Sudeten Germans had a long socialist tradition, for Sudetenland was one of the first and strongest socialist centres in the Austro-Hungarian empire. It produced a number of the most prominent leaders of the Socialist International, among them Karl Kautsky, Viktor Adler, Otto Bauer and Karl Renner. As early as 1907, in the general elections, the Social Democratic Party polled 39.4 per cent of the votes in German Bohemia. In the general elections of 1911, it polled more than 40 per cent. In the elections of 1920 it polled 44 per cent of the Sudeten votes. Together with the Communist Party,* for more than a decade it had about half the votes in Sudetenland, which is a much higher proportion than the Social Democrats and Communists could claim among the Czechs, let alone among the Slovaks.

563 The world economic crisis which began in 1929 changed the
464 situation. The industry of Sudetenland, depending as it did mainly on exports, was affected much more severely by the crisis than industry in the rest of the country. The bourgeois government of Czechoslovakia discriminated against German workers when giving employment, and this aggravated an already grave situation. The result was that 'unemployment in the Sudeten districts was at least twice as high as in the Czech interior.' (Jaksch, ibid. p. 17).

464 The great suffering caused by unemployment in Sudeten-
668 land and the existence of full employment just over the border

*An exact calculation of the strength of the Communist Party among the Sudetens is impossible, as the Party was not divided into different national groups.

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in Nazi Germany (even though this was the result of war preparation) brought the Sudeten Germans to flock to the banner of Henlein, the leader of the Sudeten Nazis. In the elections of 19th May, 1935, he polled 1,249,530 votes, that is, 62–3 per cent of the total, while the Social Democratic Party polled 299,942 votes (as against 506,761 in 1929), that is, about 15 per cent of the total. The Communist Party vote is estimated at about 120,000, or about 6 per cent of the total (Wiskemann, op. cit. p. 206).

At that time the Communist Party leaders had not yet adopted the idea that the Sudeten Germans were inherent Nazis, and explained the victory of Henlein as the result of the social and national circumstances in which they were placed. *Imprecor* of 1st June, 1935, wrote: 'In a manifesto of the Central Committee the Party states the reasons for the election victory of the Henlein faction. The reason for this victory is the policy of the Czech bourgeoisie which has led to terrible misery and poverty and to the national oppression in the German districts . . . The Henlein fascists can be beaten only by a policy which gives the working masses of the German districts work and bread and liberates them from the yoke of national oppression.'

What was the fate of the Sudeten Germans who opposed Henlein to the end? 400,000 voted against him, and these with their families made up 700–800 thousand people. When the Munich Agreement which gave Sudetenland to Germany was signed, the most active Sudeten anti-Nazis were compelled to flee from Sudetenland to the interior of Czechoslovakia. But more than 20,000 of them were handed over to the Gestapo by the Czechoslovak Government of the time, which collaborated with Hitler, and an additional 10,000 had to return to Nazi-controlled territory because they were refused asylum. Only 4,000 Sudetens were admitted to other countries. Altogether some 40,000 Sudetens were interned in Nazi concentration camps, and about 20,000 died there. This figure bears honourable comparison with the number of victims in other countries which came under the Nazi yoke.

In 1940, Fierlinger, the Social Democratic 'fellow-traveller', who was later to head the Government which expelled the Germans from Czechoslovakia, said: 'Henlein in his struggle

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The direction of people's minds along the groove required by Moscow begins at school. Pupils in Ukraine are made to pay tribute to Kutuzov, known as the hangman of the Ukrainians. Chmelnitzki, who massacred the Jews and betrayed the Ukrainian peasants into Russian serfdom must be acclaimed a national hero. Pupils in Azerbaidjan must be taught that the Russian occupation of their country in 1806 was not symbolic of the superiority of Russian arms alone, but shows the long attachment of Azerbaidjan to Russian culture. It is often very difficult for the non-Russian scholars to explain their history in the way required, and they are frequently accused of nationalism. In the summer of 1944, the Central Committee of the C.P.S.U. severely criticized the cultural work of the Tartar Republic, its main defalcation being nationalist falsifications in the teaching of its national history. The Tartars were instructed to emphasize the elements in their history which united them with Russia (*Propagandist*, 15th June, 1944). The journal *Kultura i Zhizn* of 30th November, 1945, is devoted mainly to criticisms of 'nationalist deviations' in the teaching of history. The institutes of history in the Ukrainian, Tartar, Bashkir, Armenian, Georgian, Latvian and White Russian Republics all come in for their measure of stern criticism.

The war proved a great test for Stalin's national policy. The fact that the soldiers of the U.S.S.R. fought with great courage proves nothing by itself. Russia's greatest military victories in the eighteenth century were won by Suvorov in Catherine the Great's reign, the worst period of serfdom. The serfs who were so cruelly exploited showed immense heroism and self-sacrifice in the army. In the Second World War the German and Japanese soldiers doggedly persisted in their struggle even when all hope of military victory was lost, but this fact does not prove that there were harmonious social relations within these countries.

It is extremely difficult to discover the whole truth about the number of quislings in Russia. The case of General Vlassov is well known. He received the highest orders of the Red Army at the beginning of the war, but on being taken prisoner by the Germans, organised an army of between 100,000 and 1,000,000 prisoners of war from the U.S.S.R. to fight by the side of the Germans. This by itself, however, indicated very little. Hitler,

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186 for instance, was more successful in finding quislings in France
● 668 than in Russia, but much less successful in Poland, where he could not get one general or military unit to fight on his side. Nevertheless, Vlassov's defaulting was disquieting to the Russian authorities, and they took care never to mention it in the press or over the radio.

At the end of the war, repeated attacks in the press on fascist influence in the areas of occupation—Ukraine, White Russia, Crimea and the Caucasus—serve as clear testimony to the apathy or even enmity of the populations to the Russian authorities. For instance, *Bolshevik* of 17th August, 1944, stated: '. . . the population of White Russia was for three years deprived of real Soviet information, and was under the influence of lying fascist propaganda. This applied also to other now freed areas. The Soviet people remained true to their Fatherland. (Examples follow—Y.G.) . . . This does not give us the right to quiescence. The treacherous enemy, with his lying propaganda, with his bloody terror, hitherto unparalleled in history, demoralised more than a few people, brought more than a little confusion in their consciousness. He strengthens his agency which conducts skilled undermining work . . .' In another issue of *Bolshevik* there occurs this statement: 'The existence and the vitality of vestiges of capitalism in the mind of people in our country is explained not only by the fact that people's minds are lagging behind economic conditions, but also by the influence of an alien ideology . . . The German fascist occupants endeavoured to implant the ideology of private property and of nationalism . . . (The enemy) did his utmost to demoralise them, to poison their consciousness and to sap their belief in the rightness of our great cause.' (Quoted by *The Economist*, 16th March, 1946).

The explanation is not convincing. The Nazi reign of terror would not sow doubts and breed hatred against the Russian regime, but on the contrary, would put it in a much better light in the eyes of the oppressed. This quotation reveals that, in spite of the German terror and oppression, anti-Russian 'nationalist deviations' occurred. To one who knows how to read the Communist Party press, such an admission, repeated in numerous articles, is a sure sign that an important fact is being touched on.

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rivalries among the nationalities frequently occupied as much 186
energy as the struggle against the dynastic governments.

The development of nationalism and liberation in East- 186
ern Europe was the product of many influences. Within the 668
larger framework of the enlightenment, the peoples of this region were stimulated by the philosophy of nationalism developed by Herder and his school and by the ideas of the French Revolution disseminated through cultural channels and by Napoleon's armies. The Poles, Czechs, and Magyars were most strongly influenced by this new spirit at first, and until the middle of the nineteenth century liberalism took precedence over nationalism. In this period a Czartoryski, a Palacky, and a Széchenyi worked for reforms within the political framework established in 1815, and their policies produced significant results. It was only after the defeat of liberalism in the abortive revolutions of 1848 that nationalism came to predominate, and this nationalism was rapidly hardened by the opposition that it encountered. By the end of the century only the Magyars had achieved the substance of their national aims, and this at the expense of becoming among the most rigorous oppressors of their own non-Magyar minorities. The peoples of Southeastern Europe achieved independence only to a limited degree before the First World War, while the Poles and Czechs remained under firm imperial rule. The approximate distribution of these nationalities at the turn of the century is illustrated by the table on page 8.

Of all the oppressed peoples of Eastern Europe, the Poles 563
were the most numerous and their situation in 1815 the 175
most acute. Possessors of a proud tradition of government dating back to the later middle ages, and at one time the third in area and fourth in population among the European powers, they had suffered domestic disintegration and territorial partition in the eighteenth century. In the peace settlement of 1815 the largest segment of Poland was in-

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186 Much more was heard about Panslavism between 1848
•668 and 1914, but during this period it was used primarily as a
648 weapon of Russian expansionism. The Slavic movement evolved in Russia early in the century under the name of Slavophilism and, with the founding of a Slavic committee in Moscow in 1857, it entered a Panslav phase. In 1867 non-Russian Slavs were summoned to a congress in Moscow in connection with a Slav ethnographic exhibition, and at this meeting it was not difficult to discern the expansionist tendencies of Russian Panslavism. During the Russian-Turkish war of 1876-78, this movement developed into an outburst of emotional imperialism, and much was said of bringing all Slavs together under Russian rule. European power politics prevented an undue extension of Russian influence in 1878, but Panslavism came to serve Russian policy and was directed increasingly against the Habsburg empire. This trend was particularly evident at the third Panslav Congress held in Prague in 1908. Although the Russian constitutional reforms of 1905-06 made a favorable impression on non-Russian Slavs and brought about some real concessions to the Polish minority, Russian foreign policy never gave up the idea of pushing the Russian frontier to the West. Had the Tsarist regime survived the First World War it would certainly have demanded that large parts of Eastern Europe be annexed or brought into a satellite relationship, and a liberal Russian government might also have favored the Westward expansion of Russian influence.

631 The multinational empire of the Habsburgs offered the
642 most challenging problem to the federalists, and the proposals for its constitutional reorganization were varied and ingenious. Of the many ideas arising out of the revolution of 1848, the most comprehensive was the constitution drafted by the freely elected Austrian assembly. After this assembly

829 History clearly proves the accuracy of this analysis. In the second half of the nineteenth century, a "liberal" climate prevailed in Europe. At that time liberalism penetrated even into Tsarist Russia. The belief that Russia has an inherent tendency toward despotism and slavery leads one to forget that liberal ideas found excellent propagandists and defenders there; to mention but a few: Radishchev, Pestel, Herzen, Soloviev, Milyukov, Chernov, and the Decembrists. In the nineteenth century, liberal tendencies were growing in strength and influence in Eastern Europe and contributed considerably to the struggle for national liberation. The victory of the liberal Western democracies in 1918 led to the liberal democratization of almost all Eastern Europe.

III

668 642 The obstacles faced by liberalism in Eastern Europe included both the threat of Communist, and later of fascist and Nazi, interference and the efforts of domestic authoritarian groups that saw in dictatorship the answer to the problems of this region. In spite of these highly unfavorable circumstances, democratic liberalism maintained itself even when dictatorial governments were formed. A courageous opposition fought these regimes without fearing the persecution to which it was exposed. It is easy to prove that Pilsudski and, later, Beck in Poland, Horthy in Hungary, Carol in Rumania, Boris in Bulgaria, Alexander and Paul in Yugoslavia, and Dolfuss and Schuschnigg in Austria, were opposed by democratic forces stronger than, or at least as strong as, the forces which Hitler, Mussolini, and Stalin were meeting in their respective countries. In Germany and Russia and, to a large extent, in Italy, the dictatorial regimes were totalitarian and therefore opposition was almost impossible. But the fact that in Eastern Europe only limited dictatorships were established shows that antiliberal, antidemocratic trends were hampered by the opposition of democratic forces. In

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this great struggle, many liberals, especially in Yugoslavia, Rumania, and Austria, were lured into the services of dictatorial regimes, and thus doomed themselves to failure. 668 642

It would be unjust to discount the actions of either Constantin Bratianu or Titulescu because of the opportunist Tatarescu who placed himself at the disposal of King Carol, or to forget the courageous Ion Duca who, for his uncompromising liberal principles, was assassinated in 1933 by the fascist terrorists of the Iron Guard. In Yugoslavia, there were a number of radicals and democrats enlisted in the service of the royal dictatorship. They thus distinctly deviated from the radical democratic tradition which, especially before the First World War, was represented by Nikola Pašić, famous for his revolutionary struggle against the dictatorial desires of the Obrenović rulers. Pašić was influenced not only by Western liberalism, in which the democratic Serbian King Peter I was educated, but by the revolutionism of the Russian Populists. The influence of the Russian revolutionaries was also strong in Bulgaria, especially in her agrarian movement. For some of those who associated with King Alexander's dictatorship, Foreign Minister Marinković for instance, there may have been extenuating circumstances, for those men were led by fear of the decomposition of Yugoslavia.

Nevertheless, as in Rumania, some earnest liberals in Yugoslavia courageously opposed the royal dictatorship. Because of Stoyadinović, who put a shame on the liberal tradition of the Radical Party, one must not forget Aca Stanojević, a friend of Pašić, or Miša Trifunović who did not fear imprisonment and refused any collaboration with the dictatorship. In the opposition remained also Slobodan Jovanović, an influential professor of Belgrade University, who in the Second World War became the Premier of the Yugoslavian government in London. Against the royal dictatorship were also leaders of the Democratic Party: Ljuba

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•668 642 Davidović and Božidar Vlajić among the Serbians, Večeslav Vilder, a disciple of Masaryk, among the Croatians, and Milan Grol among the Slovenes. The famous Svetozar Pribičević distinguished himself for his courageous opposition to the Alexander dictatorship; he may be counted justly among the founders of Yugoslavia. He also was under Masaryk's influence, and it was through Masaryk's personal intervention with King Alexander that the interned Pribičević was allowed to go into exile. Pribičević gave an example to many others by repudiating his devotion to the Karadjordjević dynasty and becoming a radical republican. The royal dictatorship was opposed also by the Croatian Peasant Party, headed by Vladko Maček, and by the Serbian Agrarian Party, headed by Dragoljub Jovanović. The democratic opposition to the royal dictatorship has been cited in order to point out that when Titoist communism calls itself an "organic" result of the Yugoslav internal development, it does not make any allowance for the strong liberal tradition of Yugoslavia. In Hungary, C. Rassay was the most distinguished defender of liberalism.

The Bulgarian liberals played a prominent role in their country before the First World War but, in compromising with King Ferdinand, they were partly responsible for the unfortunate policies that led to the defeat of 1918. In the period between the two wars they were pushed into the background by nationalists and reactionaries such as Tsankov. Nevertheless, some Bulgarian liberals tried to preserve their own tradition. In 1924 Genadiev paid for his courageous devotion to liberal ideas with his life. Through the efforts of Malinov and Mušanov, the democratic regime was resumed at the beginning of the 'thirties, but the military *coup d'état* in 1934 installed a "progressive dictatorship." King Boris took advantage of this in order to establish his own dictatorship. The opposition of the liberals to this dictatorship was

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weak in comparison with that of the Agrarian Party which still followed Stambolisky's tradition. 668 642

The Agrarian and the Socialist parties and some Catholics, as well as the liberals, carried on the struggle against dictatorship in Bulgaria, Rumania, Poland, and Hungary. They fought for real democracy in the sense of the best liberal tradition. In Austria the Social Democrats were the main force opposing clerical fascism. It is interesting that in Hungary the conservative aristocrats opposed fascist trends. Szálasi, who led the important Arrow-Cross movement, was the most conspicuous of these men. Count Bethlen and Count Teleki also opposed the Nazi pressure, and the latter's efforts were climaxed by his symbolic suicide in 1941.

The opposition to dictatorship and to fascism or Nazism was motivated differently in the individual Eastern European countries and was carried on by different political parties. Notwithstanding these differences, the original inspiration to opposition lay in two main ideas: a longing for freedom and a patriotic devotion to national independence. Pure democratic liberalism is the expression of these two ideas, both of which prove convincingly that the love of freedom was deeply rooted in these countries. Internal antiliberal forces alone would not have been able to crush democratic aspirations. Whenever the elections were more liberal than usual, for instance, in Rumania in 1928 or in Bulgaria in 1931, the democratic parties won. In Poland, Pilsudski's followers, who represented only a small minority of the nation, were well aware that the only means by which they could maintain their regime was political terror. In spite of the pressure of the reactionaries and the influence of fascists and Nazis, the remnants of liberalism in Hungary survived until nearly the end of the Second World War. In view of these facts, it is clear that the liberal democratic forces could have mastered internal difficulties successfully 186 668 829

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186 had they not been broken or dangerously weakened by the
668 foreign forces of fascism and Communism.
829

Czechoslovakia bears witness to this thesis. In Czecho-
829 slovakia, as in the other countries, there existed antiliberal,
178 reactionary, nationalist, and fascist trends which attracted certain of the bourgeoisie and rich farmers. These forces were held in check by the democratic thought and genuine patriotism of a great majority of the nation, including the so-called middle classes and the intelligentsia. Nearly everybody followed the principles of the great democrat, Masaryk. Conditions were more favorable to democratic liberalism in Czechoslovakia than in the other Eastern European countries, because this nation was highly industrialized, even in agriculture, because her social structure was happily balanced between industry, agriculture, and bureaucracy, or intelligentsia, and because the cultural level of her people was high. The middle classes, strong in numbers and in social value, and the progressive farmers, who owned middle-sized farms, were reliable support for the liberal democratic regime. The Social Democratic Party, headed by Hampl, Bechyně, Meissner, and Dérer, was influenced spiritually far more by Masaryk than by Marx. The Agrarian Party had liberal-minded leaders among whom Antonín Švehla and Milan Hodža proved to have statesmen's abilities. The Catholic Party, under the wise leadership of the great patriot Jan Šrámek, was progressive in social matters. In Slovakia the process of democratization met with greater difficulties. Slovakia, because of its agrarian structure, resembled the other Eastern European countries more than it did the industrialized Bohemia. However, the transformation of Slovakia into a democratically functioning part of Czechoslovakia proves that other Eastern European countries could have developed in a similar way had democracy been given enough time to exercise its influence upon them.

It is certainly to the credit of Czechoslovakia that she

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452 and supplied him with goods. Frequently he had a strong
185 and pernicious hold on the peasant.

Therefore, the cooperative movement began with the
474 foundation of credit societies which formed a very large
● 668 proportion of all cooperatives. Besides these, there were co-
656 operative societies which supplied agricultural needs such as tools and seeds, traded agricultural products, and processed all sorts of produce. In Bulgaria, Hungary, and Rumania the cooperative movements were state-controlled. In Czechoslovakia the movement was independent but favored by the state; in Poland, beginning with the economic depression of the 1930's it was state-supported and therefore dependent.

The cooperative problem was a difficult one. On the one hand, cooperation among economically weak peasants could not succeed unless there was some collaboration with, or help from, the central authorities. On the other hand, such a relationship between strong and weak tended to develop into state domination of the cooperative movement.

474 The administrators of the cooperatives sometimes abused
452 their prerogatives. They would occasionally grant government loans, not in response to genuine needs or because of commercial considerations, but with a view to the substantial number of votes which one cooperative society could guarantee at election time. In some instances, cooperatives served only well-to-do peasants because some governments were opposed to the social revolutionary ideology of the smaller peasants. In Rumania the cooperative societies were forced to assume the function of the tax collector. In Hungary the cooperatives belonged to the peasants in appearance only. In reality, they were capitalist enterprises and were not in peasant hands.

Except in Czechoslovakia, agricultural cooperation did not play any decisive role in the economic life of the peasantry, nor was it able to alleviate the existing adverse

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he regarded the peasant as indispensable to the success of his 471
revolution and to the consolidation of his dictatorship. This 423
policy was reversed by Stalin after 1928 when forced col- 662
lectivization of land in the form of pseudo-cooperatives (col- 656
lective farms) was introduced in the Soviet Union.

Lenin's agricultural policy was adopted by all Eastern European Communist parties after the end of the Second World War. Being minorities in power, they knew that this was the only attitude they could take to the peasantry, the largest social group in this region. Therefore, they supported small agrarian property holders in the first stage of the development of their agricultural policy. There was only one difference between the Communist agricultural policies of Eastern Europe and Russia. Nationalization of land was not a part of the Eastern European policy, as it had not proved expedient in the Soviet Union and therefore was not contained in the agrarian policy of the Comintern for Eastern Europe in the inter-war period.

The Comintern had taken much interest in the Eastern 668 •
European agrarian question. In 1923 a Red Peasants Inter- 656
national was formed in Moscow as an effort to rally the 427
peasantry to the Communist ideal and to combat the influence of the peasant parties united in the Green International in Prague. The Soviet move to collectivization within the U.S.S.R. in 1929 was not followed by any shift in the agrarian policy of the Comintern. Any mention of collective farming was frowned upon and the whole emphasis was upon attracting or neutralizing the middle peasant by assisting the individual and by supporting with new land reforms the peasant's struggle for more land. This policy was not changed when the Cominform took over the role of the Comintern after the Second World War.

"The land to those who till it personally," was the slogan 471
of all Eastern European Communist parties, and land re- 423
forms were carried out in all countries. In Hungary, Albania, 656

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The liberation of the peasantry was a consequence of the demands of the new liberal movement and was one of the achievements of the liberal regimes which gained momentum on the Continent after the Napoleonic era. This European liberalism had been a result of the struggle of the bourgeoisie against the old political and economic order upheld previously by the aristocracy. It originated in the theory of natural rights, as interpreted by French political philosophers of the eighteenth century, and included in its doctrine the postulate of political, economic, and social freedom and equality for all individuals. 668 641 565

However, it would be wrong to assume that the formal liberation of the peasantry was an immediate result of its emulation of other classes of society, in particular, of the bourgeoisie. On the contrary, the struggle for the realization of peasant rights had still to be fought.

The ruling regimes imposed political restrictions that were usually based on the tax census system and barred large masses of the peasant population from their right to vote in parliamentary elections. In many of the countries, it was not until the end of the First World War that complete franchise was granted to the peasantry. 641 565 178

Economic freedom, as advocated and practiced by liberalism, soon began to undermine the foundations of the peasant economy. The peasantry, which under feudalism had paid most of its rents and other fees to the landlord in natural produce, was placed suddenly in the midst of a complicated money-economy in which the autarkic arrangements of the peasant familistic economy were no longer valid. Peasant land, which throughout centuries had changed little in price or in value, was suddenly submitted to wide fluctuations in value as a consequence of the rapid development of the communication system and the erection of industrial plants. The appearance of a money-economy created the necessity of establishing an appropriate credit system which heretofore had been lacking completely in the peasant orbit. The state,

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considered at all, were reviewed and evaluated only from the 829
point of view of production with no attention paid to the human side of their problems. Moreover, the contempt of Marx for the peasantry is well known. He called them a "class of barbarians," and proclaimed his desire to save humanity from the "idiocy of rural life."

The reaction to scientific socialism and a simultaneous opposition to liberalism brought about the birth of Christian democracy which attempted to formulate a middle-road policy between the economic freedom of liberalism and the socialist doctrine of the total negation of the absolute truth, of private property, and of human dignity. Being primarily a reaction to the liberal-socialist dispute on capital-labor relations, this new doctrine was concerned very little, if at all, with the peasant problem which "remained the stepchild of public opinion and of the social policy."

The first attempt to use the contemporary social and eco- 668
nomic ideas for the organization of the peasant masses was 565
partly accountable for the appearance of Populism in Russia in the 1870's. More specifically, Populism was an endeavor to create an ideal agrarian peasant community by applying the theories of scientific socialism. This very fact converted the effort into a unique social and economic movement sharply in conflict with the orthodox Marxism. It became clear very soon to the promoters of Populism that the formulas conceived by Marx were inefficient in a rural society and that diversified methods must be sought if the needs and hopes of the peasants were to be satisfied. This new movement, although peasant, was of revolutionary character, not only demanding the land for the peasants but also advocating its collective ownership under a particular form of Russian organization known as the *mir*. It pointed out that the essence of the Populist program must be the institutions and desires inherent in the people and that it must not represent scientific formulas imported from abroad.

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829 Although Populism exerted some influence on the establishment of the Rumanian peasant movement, it had very little influence upon the other peasant movements in Eastern Europe. At the time when Populism was already an organized political force in Russia, the peasantry in Eastern Europe was still politically inactive. When the peasant mobilization began, more than two decades later, it was influenced little, if at all, by the Populist ideas.

668 565 423 The main reason for the relatively late organization of the peasantry in Eastern Europe was the presence of political and economic conditions essentially different from those prevailing in Tsarist Russia. Whereas regular political life was unknown in Russia, European liberalism favored the formation of political parties which would try to win the sympathies of the peasants by promising them the realization of their desires. Collective ownership of land was not a common institution in Eastern Europe. However, the prediction of Marx relating to the accumulation of capital and further expansion of large estates proved to be incorrect. On the contrary, many large land holdings, unable to accommodate themselves to modern capitalist management, commenced to disintegrate. The land was usually bought, in spite of heavy material sacrifices, by land-hungry neighboring peasants, and thus many new independent peasant holdings were created, which contributed considerably to the strengthening of the peasantry.

Hence, the establishment of a revolutionary peasant movement was checked by existing political conditions: the traditions of the Eastern European peasantry were opposed to collective forms of land ownership and to the socialist tenets of Populism. However, none of the existing political groups was fit to meet the increased desire of the peasantry for an organized action of their own, and, at the turn of the century, on an independent basis and in opposition to the contemporary political and social groups, peasant organization began.

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The common source of the peasant movements resided in the political, social, and economic evils of the liberal regimes, but immediate motives varied slightly in the different countries. In some countries, the emphasis on the necessity for peasant organization was a reaction to the adverse economic conditions to which the peasantry was exposed. In other countries, this move was a political and economic reaction to political and national oppression, economic exploitation, and the contempt of the ruling ethnical groups for the peasantry of subordinated nations. Finally, the Croatian peasants had special motives. Their peasant movement was organized chiefly to struggle for the social and political equality of the peasants against the dominating bourgeoisie and the bureaucracy. The latter, although it represented an insignificant minority in the nation, had monopolized Croatian political life. 668 565 423

The first to outline the philosophical principles of a peasant movement was Ante Radić in Croatia. Influenced by French Romantic philosophers, especially Michelet, Radić published, in 1896, his work, *Osnova*, in which he set forth his concept of the people (in peasant countries this meant the peasantry), and indicated their significance in the political and economic life of the nation. 668 565

The first coherent peasant organizations were those of the Bulgarians and the Czechs who both founded their first peasant political organizations in 1896. They were followed shortly by the Croatians in 1904, and by the Serbians and the Poles in 1905. The first steps for a peasant movement in Rumania were initiated in 1907, while in Hungary the appearance of a genuine peasant movement was retarded by political and socio-economic conditions until 1908. In the Baltic States, true political life started only with the independence gained after the First World War. Subsequently, powerful peasant political organizations were founded in Estonia and Latvia. In Albania the initiative for a peasant political or-

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668 565 ganization did not exist until the Second World War; the organization itself was established after the war by exiled political leaders.

In Slovenia, Slovakia, and Lithuania, on the other hand, truly peasant political organizations have never developed fully. In these Catholic countries the peasantry was influenced from the beginning by the Catholic political thought and subsequently organized on the principles of Christian democracy.

Although the immediate motives for peasant organization in different countries were varied, its demands were everywhere identical because of its common general source—its ideological basis. The programs made the following demands for the peasants: full political rights, proportional participation in public affairs, agrarian reform and distribution of the land to the peasants, social justice, and rights for the peasants in educational facilities equal to the rights of other classes in the state.

829 668 565 To understand better the peasant movements and their aims, three elements of their ideological and organizational structure must be discussed: first, their ideological basis; second, the dogmatic differences between these and other contemporary political and socio-economic trends; and third, the effective points of their practical programs.

829 665 The peasant ideology, or peasantism, is the outlook of the peasantry on the complex of political and socio-economic issues in which the peasants are interested and for whose solution they are fighting. The organizational forms of peasantism, established for the purposes of current political struggle, are the various peasant political parties. Unlike scientific socialism or Christian democracy, peasantism is not the artificial creation of an individual or group of individuals; it contains only those ideas which are inherent in the peasant soul and character. Consequently, the peasant leaders do not conceive the political soul of peasantism but merely interpret

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and articulate its principles. Hence, considerable differences must exist between peasantism and other contemporary movements.

Between peasantism and scientific socialism, there are irreconcilable differences, reflected in philosophical, economic, social, and political concepts. Philosophically, scientific socialism advocates economic determinism, dialectic materialism, and the materialistic interpretation of history. Consequently, it repudiates the existence of a superior being, rejects religion and spiritual values as detrimental to human development, and minimizes the significance of tradition. Peasantism, on the contrary, relies on the idealistic principles of philosophical reasoning, stresses the existence of God, points out the necessity for religious beliefs, and indicates the importance of spiritual values. It emphasizes as of equal importance the significance of tradition in human development and reaffirms its position in the peasant society.

Economically, scientific socialism demands the collectivization of the means of production, including land, and the introduction of a planned socialist economy. It evaluates individuals and collective groups exclusively on the basis of their role in socialist production and repudiates economic individualism in any form. Peasantism, on the contrary, defends firmly the principle of private ownership of the means of production, especially of the peasant land, and teaches that the right to dispose of the fruits of one's own labor is sacred and inviolable. It rejects the planned economy of socialism and favors private initiative and the system of free cooperation.

Socially, scientific socialism teaches the necessity of a permanent class struggle and considers as inevitable the revolutionary overthrow of the existing social and economic order by the proletariat. Peasantism, on the contrary, rejects the idea of class struggle and believes in the possibility of a peaceful coexistence of all classes of society. It also rejects

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the revolutionary methods advocated by scientific socialism, believing that the necessary changes in society can be achieved by peaceful means and evolutionary methods.

Politically, scientific socialism is totalitarian in its concept. It does not tolerate the existence of other political and social systems, nor is it willing to share power with other political groups. Peasantism, on the contrary, is genuinely democratic and ready to collaborate with other political and social forces provided they are democratically disposed and have their roots in the will of the people.

The differences between peasantism and other current ideologies, although existent, are less emphatic. Peasantism distinguishes itself from liberalism mainly in its economic ideas. While it agrees with liberalism on the concepts of political freedom and social equality, it rejects the ideas of the latter on uncontrolled economic liberties. Past experience has proved to the followers of peasantism that in peasant countries unrestricted economic liberties are detrimental to peasant farming and to national economies.

Ideological differences between peasantism and Christian democracy are more subtle. Both ideologies cherish the fundamental principles of human dignity and of individual freedom; both teach the existence of God, reject the materialistic interpretation of the world, and seek to establish a middle road between total economic freedom and complete submission of the individual to the community. Yet, there is an important structural element which has contributed essentially to a separate organization of the peasantry in Eastern Europe. Since 1891 when the papal encyclical, *Rerum Novarum*, was issued, and especially since 1931 with the appearance of the encyclical, *Quadragesimo Anno*, Christian democracy has been an eminently Catholic doctrine and, consequently, not best fitted to attract the peasantry which is made up of different religious denominations. Peasantism, on the contrary, while pointing out the necessity of religion,

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has no preference for any particular religious denomination and is for this reason better adapted to the peasantry. 829 668

Finally, peasantism rejects definitely the political and social concepts of modern totalitarianism. Totalitarian and undemocratic regimes in Eastern Europe during the interwar period were always upheld by military cliques, aristocratic and bureaucratic groups, or by the ruling dynasties whose aims were to keep the power at all costs and whose political methods and social views were diametrically opposed to the fundamental principles of peasantism.

Politically, peasantism advocates a system of parliamentarianism with two additional features: accentuation of local self-government and direct participation in the government of the greatest number of people. Economically, peasantism favors free cooperatives because it believes that cooperation preserves the principles of private property and permits the exercise of private initiative. The latter is favored when cooperative arrangements are not adequate to meet economic requirements.

III

Although the peasant movements and parties were initiated before the First World War, they achieved their full strength and political significance only after the war was over. There were three causes for this postwar rise of peasant political organizations: the formation of the national states, the universal franchise, and the agrarian reforms. 668 641

The formation of national states in Eastern Europe contributed enormously to the development of political life. While the people of this area had heretofore directed most of their political endeavors against the oppression of the ruling nations, in the new era they directed their efforts toward the solution of vital economic and social issues. 641

Universal franchise enabled the peasant population to

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Due to the prevalence of a liberalism linked with national- 186
ism, studies concentrated on history, which was generally 871
given a romantic interpretation. The study of geography was 814
heavily larded with political convictions and misinterpretations of ethnography. Although the universities of Czechoslovakia and Hungary were on a high academic level at a time when other universities were just becoming active, their students spent too much time in petty politics. Most of the 186 668
student organizations supported some political person or party and, as a consequence, were strongly influenced by demagogues. The Polish and Rumanian universities especially were exploited by politicians, and often even by the police, for political purposes. Frequent political meetings aroused a discontented idealism and produced only too often regrettable chauvinistic or antisemitic behavior.

Anti-Semitism became a common denominator with which 798
Hitler was able to unite the rising youth and the politicians of Eastern Europe. The responsibility for this state of affairs lay with the governments and the ruling groups.

Although the new boundaries had been drawn on the 563
principle of national self-determination, the mixture of nationalities in many areas, as well as historical and geographical factors, had resulted in the inclusion of important minorities within the new states. These minorities were fragments of peoples rather than whole nations as had been the case before the war and, since they were in many cases unwilling citizens of the new states, their presence constituted a grave problem. The eight million inhabitants of Poland, Rumania, and Czechoslovakia that spoke Russian, Ukrainian (Ruthenian), and White Russian as their mother tongue, the almost six million German-speaking citizens of Czechoslovakia, Poland, Rumania, Yugoslavia, and Hungary, and the almost three million Hungarian-speaking inhabitants of neighboring Rumania, Czechoslovakia and Yugoslavia—these represented the most important, but by no means all, the minority

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648 area. It is unjust to accuse the Eastern European states of
439 favoring Germany when this country alone was willing to trade with them and did not demand hard currency payments. Germany bought large quantities of Eastern European products and forced the sellers to buy from her various articles, including gadgets, luxury goods, and many other products, the prices of which were beyond the purchasing power of the buyers.

● 668 Antisemitic movements in Eastern Europe often received
578 aid in the form of money from Nazi Germany which practice increased dependence upon that country. Through the various Nazi-supported parties in almost every country and through fifth column organizations, the Germans instigated conflicts between the ruling classes and the dissatisfied social elements. At the same time antibolshevik propaganda was strongly and successfully supported by German diplomacy.

648 Czechoslovakia, in 1938, was the first to lose her independence. Poland fell in 1939, and Yugoslavia followed in 1941. The years 1939 through 1944 were truly critical for Eastern Europe. The German-Russian imperialistic pincers tightened steadily. Nazi Germany won easy diplomatic victories over the Western European powers whose conciliatory policies were astounding. Even more astounding was their sudden turn to anti-German propaganda and war. Squeezed between the arbitrary policy of the Western powers and the expanding German and Soviet giants, the Eastern European nations had no other choice than to muddle through. Apprehensively watching an alliance of giants and often impressed by the achievements of these powers, they tried to appease them, aid them, or fight them.

722 Peace economy was turned into war economy. This decreased unemployment, and war losses decreased it even further. The most active age group, already reduced by the slump in birth rate after the First World War, was thinned even more. Youth, accustomed to tackling problems in terms

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648 tious plans for achieving a bridge to the West via the Scandinavian states, and to create a great Baltic bloc. But the Scandinavian states, at this time, were not entering into the power combinations of Central and Eastern Europe, and the project never got beyond some goodwill tours. Finally, in 1938, Beck, with Ciano, discussed the formation of a Rome-Belgrade-Budapest-Warsaw axis, with the intent of checking German eastward expansion which was now clearly in the offing. But it was very late in the day for such a project, and it never came to any practical fulfillment.

Perhaps the most extensive, although abortive, effort to increase the security of Eastern Europe, this time in conjunction with the great powers, was the French attempt to achieve a so-called Eastern Locarno agreement. The states of Eastern Europe had been understandably disturbed by the Locarno agreements of 1925 which had seemed to settle, by international guarantee, Germany's western frontiers but which had done this at the cost of inviting German revisionism on its eastern frontiers. In 1934-35 France tried to achieve an agreement on the Eastern territorial settlement; Germany, Russia, Poland, Czechoslovakia, and the Baltic states were to be signatories with France as a guarantor of the treaty. Germany, however, refused to participate. This led to a Polish refusal to underwrite what would then have been an anti-German combination. Eventually the project was reduced to the French-Soviet-Czechoslovakian mutual assistance agreements of 1935, which were clearly something other than a regional organization.

648 668 Apart from these various diplomatic combinations, certain other efforts were made to increase the unity of Eastern Europe. Of some interest in this respect is the International Agrarian Bureau, also known as the Green International, founded by leaders of peasant or agrarian parties in a number of Eastern European states in 1921. In its heyday in the 1920's it included peasant parties from Czechoslovakia, Bul-

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garia, Yugoslavia, Rumania, Austria, Switzerland, Poland, France, the Baltic States, and Finland. The literature of the late 1920's concerning Eastern Europe shows that this peasantist or agrarian movement was widely regarded as the hope of the future. Here was a movement representing a basic common interest of the area and transcending national frontiers. 648 668

Unhappily the promise in this movement was never realized, and the movement eventually collapsed. The agrarian parties were not able to dominate the domestic political scene in most of these countries, and the whole position of agriculture was undermined by the advent of the depression in 1929. A governmental effort to organize some defense of agricultural interests was made in 1930 in the form of an agrarian bloc, including Bulgaria, Estonia, Hungary, Latvia, Poland, Czechoslovakia, Yugoslavia, and Rumania. At a number of international conferences and at the League of Nations, this movement attempted to coordinate economic policy and to gain preferential treatment for agricultural exports from the industrial states of Western Europe. This effort achieved nothing tangible, and under the lash of the depression, these states were driven to a policy of *sauve qui peut.*

IV

The depression and the rise of Hitler were undoubtedly the major factors in starting the breakup of whatever cohesion had been achieved in the calmer years of the 1920's. For a time, to be sure, even after Hitler came to power, the Eastern European states showed a good deal of ability to act together. The Little Entente, together with Poland, was largely effective in protesting against the Four-Power Pact of 1933. The extension of the powers of the Little Entente in 1934 and the creation of the Balkan Entente in the same year also showed a positive response to the new dangers. In the false calm of 1934 a number of voices could be heard saying that 648

648 chose to keep Yugoslavia intact by refusing to become a mere instrument of Soviet policy. He undoubtedly saw clearly that the Kremlin took no risks and would certainly get all of the benefits accruing from these political adventures. In the light of Stalin's definition of a true internationalist, this is what the Cominform communiqué meant when it denounced the Communist party of Yugoslavia as identifying "the foreign policy of the Soviet Union with the foreign policy of the imperialist powers," a policy "appropriate only to nationalists."

● 668 665 What effect has Tito's departure from the table of "brotherly Communist parties" had on those parties? Titoism is primarily a matter of loyalties. In Yugoslavia, there was no higher loyalty than to the state personified by Tito himself. Consequently, the party, the army, and the new bureaucracy could and did remain faithful to Tito. If Titoism is to spread, similar conditions and a similar concept of limited loyalty must exist in the people's democracies. To date there is no evidence that Titoism has taken root in the effective leadership circles of the satellite states, since both Western-minded and Moscow-trained Communists have been affected by the purges. Certainly the purges of Communist leaders in satellite Europe which have occurred since 1948 afford no index as to the extent of Titoism. The purgees had no machinery for independence of action available to Tito. Even if they had, it is not sure they would have acted as Tito did if faced with the choice.

648 What effect has the break had on Yugoslavia itself—on its policies and political philosophy? From the time of the break in June 1948 until November 1949, the Yugoslavs inveighed against the Communist parties of the satellites but not against the sacrosanct personage of Joseph Stalin. The second Cominform meeting held in November 1949 proved quite conclusively to Tito that there were no longer any grounds for conciliation, and he prepared a new political

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425 property, the right to travel, and the right to work in desir-
563 able occupations, have been dependent not upon a man's diligence, honesty, or thrift, but upon the accident of his affiliations with the group temporarily in power. A man's property and freedom thus came to depend upon the official estimation of his "political reliability" or loyalty, which was defined for him by a rapidly changing sequence of politicians and political regimes. Many of the men who practiced these policies of confiscation and repression considered themselves anti-Communists, or professed themselves as such. Yet in their disregard for property rights and civil liberties they did much to pave the way for Communism.

V

185 Perhaps it has been memories of the stagnation under
• 668 the old empires and the conflict and repressions of the following eras of nationalism that have turned many to visions of a safer, broader, and more generous life under an Eastern European federation.

In the minds of those who accepted this vision, a federation of Eastern European states would offer its peoples military security against invasion by outsiders. It would insure economic prosperity, provide a more stable distribution of economic welfare, safeguard property, provide broader opportunities for all, reward work, thrift, and enterprise, and by all these means serve to insure broad and rapid economic growth. In regard to politics, it would safeguard civil liberties. It would guarantee nondiscriminatory treatment to all peoples and minorities and free mobility to individuals throughout the region. It would assure to both individuals and peoples throughout Eastern Europe respect for their diverse habits and traditions, so that none of them would be forced to change their respective customs, work habits, and social institutions more rapidly or more radically than they might

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freely choose. To ease the complex and subtle problems of 185
culture, emotions, and psychology, it was hoped that the 668
federation would insure widespread opportunities for education. It was hoped that it would give to the inhabitants of the region both social and international prestige. It was hoped that it would bring them to a status of equality with the reference groups which they had chosen as yardsticks for comparison, or that in some way an Eastern European federation would make its citizens the equals not only of the French and German peoples but perhaps in time even of the English and American peoples, who have now become the reference groups for standards of achievement throughout the world. Finally it was hoped that such a federation would give rise to inspiring common enterprises that would unite the peoples of Eastern Europe in a new sense of their own identity, as in past centuries the monarchies of Western Europe, according to the philosopher José Ortega y Gasset, have united their own peoples into a sense of dignity and nationhood.

In striking contrast to the splendor of these visions was 648
their relative poverty in specific detail. None of the larger projects for federation in this region were ever negotiated by governments or even by responsible political leaders from the different areas. There was a negotiated project of the Polish-Czechoslovakian federation, worked out by Czechoslovakian and Polish leaders-in-exile during the Second World War, but this project which included only two states in the region was not followed up by the established governments or by the major political organizations after the war.[3]

[3] Cf. United States Department of State, Division of Library and Reference Services, *Danubian Federation: An Annotated Bibliography* (*Bibliography No. 66*), Washington, D.C., October 28, 1952 (multigraphed); Feliks Gross, *Crossroads of Two Continents: A Democratic Federation of East-Central Europe* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1945), pp. 28-34, and for the text of the Polish-Czechoslovakian Declaration, signed in London on January 25, 1942, by representatives of the two

were generated by the agricultural crisis and the ensuing famine of 1920-21. To meet the needs of the urban population, the Bolsheviks decreed a forced food levy (December 14, 1920) by which peasants were ordered to deliver their entire surplus to the State. The peasants, retaliating in kind, produced little more than their own needs demanded. Scattered peasant uprisings, together with the Kronstadt rebellion early in 1921, combined to force a change of policy on the new regime. The strict codes of "War Communism" were abrogated and the New Economic Policy (NEP) was launched. Delivery quotas were introduced (amounting to a tax-in-kind) and peasants were encouraged to produce for a flourishing free market.

Thus, for a time under NEP the peasants, who now controlled almost all the arable land, were permitted to enjoy the fruits of their revolutionary exertions. Agricultural production recovered rapidly and a degree of national prosperity resulted. But the Bolsheviks had paid a price for this prosperity — the restoration of free market relations between town and country.

The Leninist Dilemma

The unstable compromise of NEP postponed the inevitable clash between the "proletarian dictatorship" and the victorious peasant revolution. Two parallel developments were rapidly to hasten the impending struggle: throughout the NEP period (1921-28) the peasants tightened their hold on the land, many of them growing relatively prosperous, and thereby fortifying their gains. At the same time the Bolsheviks were tightening their hold on the political machinery of the State and turning their party into a monolithic organization capable of an outright offensive against the rest of the country. Thus, the stage was set for the gigantic economic struggle of the late twenties.

The issue at stake between the Bolsheviks and the peasantry was only partly ideological. The conflict between the Bolshevik belief in the superior efficacy of large-scale "socialist" farming and the peasants' allegiance to his traditional "way of life" was important, but this conflict was subordinated to another one which was economic in character. The peasants and the Bolshevik regime faced each other across the table on which the grain produce of Russia was negotiated. And it was, in fact, in the realm of economics

the leadership of the radical Alexander Stambouliski, took power after the war. Though his regime was overthrown by the reactionary Tsankov-Volkov *coup* of 1923, with every excess and barbarity, Stambouliski's premiership left a lasting social imprint. Elsewhere in Eastern Europe peasant parties were not strong enough to take the reigns of government, but the impact of the "green rising" was reflected everywhere in legislative activity.

In Romania about 50 per cent of the arable land (four million hectares) was transferred to peasant smallholders, reflecting the vigor of the 1907 uprising. In newly-created Czechoslovakia and Yugoslavia the reforms were less spectacular, but followed the same area-wide pattern. In these two countries the land reforms had a national as well as social character, the majority of the expropriated lands having been Hungarian and German properties.[8]

The same forces were at work in Poland where the issue of land reform was uppermost in the public consciousness at the time of the nation's reestablishment. Despite determined opposition from the land owning classes, limited land reforms were decreed in 1919 and 1920. But partly because the principle of total compensation was accepted, only two and a half million hectares were distributed among the peasants by 1938, only enough to satisfy the land hunger of approximately half the natural increase in population.[9]

In the entire region only Hungary resisted peasant demands for land reform. There the movement was effectively blocked, first by Bela Kun's temporary Communist dictatorship, and then by the Horthy reaction. The land structure that emerged from the post-war reforms is described in Chart IV.

As Chart IV indicates, the post-World War I reforms left much to be accomplished in the direction of equalizing the peasant land tenure. But from the Baltic to the Aegean the reforms signified

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[8] In Czechoslovakia 12 per cent of the arable land, or 1.7 million hectares, was distributed under the reform; in Yugoslavia 12.5 per cent of the arable land, or 1.8 million hectares, was distributed. The Yugoslav reforms were largely confined to Croatia and Slovenia, former provinces of the Austro-Hungarian Empire.

[9] Ferdynand Zweig, *Poland Between the Wars* (London, 1944), p. 130. Zweig's analysis of the national discussion of reform in the early 1920s is interesting, partly because so many of the arguments employed by those who opposed breaking up the large estates are those which are today used to justify the modern *kolkhoz*! This is true particularly of the argument that "self-sufficient small holdings are supposed to be unsuitable for compulsory deliveries in wartime." (p. 134).

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tion of separate states. Therewith a tide of Liberalism merged 175
with the currents of upsurging tribal nationalism to create the 186
pattern of conflict which was later to prove so advantageous to the totalitarians. Czech nationalism, having in Thomas Masaryk a brilliantly effective standard-bearer, seemed at first blush to usher in a new era of democratic and progressive social thought. It soon became obvious, however, that the autonomism of the Czechs—which led at the outset even to the establishment of a National Church—would of necessity engender comparable feelings in the breasts of the other peoples in the Czechoslovak Republic. The Slovaks rallied round their own traditions of language and culture, and swiftly but surely became committed to a quest for autonomy which found a temporary though unsatisfactory haven under Hitler. Among Sudeten Germans feeling was almost as strong and led ultimately to the fateful formation of a political party which advocated union with Germany. Nor was the situation different elsewhere. Yugoslavia was plagued from the beginning by deep and bitter conflict among the Serbs, the Croats, and the Slovenes.

In Hungary a violent Communist revolution, spearheaded in 175
late 1918 by Béla Kun, ruled for a time by bloodshed. But ere 669
long this uprising, which had very little popular support, was 794
put down; reaction set in, and a dictatorial government was established after it had compiled its own catalogue of excesses. Here was made manifest, probably for the first time, how significant the stability of religious groups could prove to be. Not only did they temper noticeably the excesses of extremists, but under the leadership of great churchmen they began to build organizations dedicated to social improvement. It is also true [829]
that bitter experience under the Béla Kun regime made Hungary one of the most anti-Communist countries of Europe.

And so, as the turbulence engendered by the war apparently 795
subsided, it seemed probable that a period of relative security

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642 by a parlimentary facade. Workers' parties, peasant parties
661 and trade unions were all persecuted or forbidden, strikes were
728 suppressed in blood, and brutal mass executions were not unknown. To give only one example, 20-30 thousand workers and peasants lost their lives after the overthrow of the Peasant Government of Alexander Stamboliisky in Bulgaria in 1923. The secret police of Rumania, Yugoslavia and Bulgaria could boast of rivalling the Gestapo in all the refinements of torture. The press was gagged. Parliamentary elections were a farce, as votes were bought, electors were terrorized, and voting was open, although the counting of the votes was secret. It was no accident that in only one out of the many national elections held in Rumania between the two world wars, did the government that was called upon by the king to arrange the elections fail to get the expected majority! The corruption and depravity of the public administration was immense. Symbolical of this corruption was King Carol's notorious mistress, Magda Lupescu, who appointed and dismissed Ministers and high officials, distributed government contracts, etc. National minorities in general, and the Jews in particular, suffered from official oppression and from 'spontaneous' outbursts of hooliganism organised by government agents. The alliance with Hitlerite Germany of Rumania, Hungary, Bulgaria and many of the rulers of Yugoslavia seemed natural.

In view of these facts, it is not surprising that the collapse of the German military machine was greeted with joy by the overwhelming majority of the peoples of Eastern Europe, who hoped to get rid of the previous shameful political and social order. The breakdown of the Gestapo unleashed a tremendous. independent upsurge of the people. The first task of the Russian occupation authorities was to grapple with this mass activity.

Bulgaria

● 669 In Sofia and other towns armed workers arrested fascists
642 *en masse*, held mass demonstrations, set up elected people's
728 tribunals, disarmed the police and established a workers' militia. Local committees took over the administration and the red flag was hoisted over all public buildings. The ferment was equally great in the Bulgarian army. Thus *The Economist* of October 7th, 1944, could write:

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'Reports on the Bulgarian forces of occupation in Western Thrace and Macedonia vividly recall the picture of the Russian army in 1917. Soldiers' councils have been set up, officers have been degraded, red flags hoisted, and normal saluting has been abolished.'

But the Russian and Bulgarian Communist leaders did not welcome the initiative of the masses. On the contrary, they did everything to stop 'anarchy' and restore 'order'. When Molotov met the Bulgarian armistice delegation, he made the following declaration: 'If certain Communists continue their present conduct, we will bring them to reason. Bulgaria will remain with her democractic Government and her present order . . . You must retain all valuable army officers from before the *coup d'etat*. You should reinstate in service all officers who have been dismissed for various reasons'. (*The New York Times*, January 16th, 1945). And earlier, on September 21st, 1944, *The New York Times* correspondent in Sofia reported that 'Communist leaders are doing everything they can to prevent extremists in the party from agitating for sovietization of the country'. Of the Red Army he said: 'On several occasions when local Communists in the provinces tried to displace city officials and take matters into their own hands they were ordered by the Russian military authorities to return the jobs to the old officials until orders were received from the Fatherland Front Government in Sofia'. The Fatherland Front government hastened to establish order.

As regards the restoration of 'order' in the Bulgarian Army, the same article in *The Economist* states: 'M. Velchev (Minister of War in the Fatherland Front Government—Y.G.) has issued a stern order to the troops to return immediately to normal discipline, to abolish Soldiers' Councils and to hoist no more red flags. Now Sofia reports that the Bulgarian army has been placed under the supreme command of Marshal Tolbukhin. Apparently, the Soviet commander has no patience with Balkan repetitions of 1917 . . . The Bulgarian Left seems to be ready to accept this policy, but it may be questioned whether it would have agreed to it so easily if its author had been Colonel Velchev and not Marshal Tolbukhin.'

In its programme, the Fatherland Front Government was careful to emphasize that it stood for the social *status quo* and

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728 for the maintenance of private property. Immediately after its
642 establishment, the Communist leader, Anton Yugov, the
669 Minister of the Interior, declared: 'This government, of which I am a member and on whose behalf I speak, categorically denies that it has any intention of establishing a Communist regime in Bulgaria. There is no truth in rumours that the government intends to nationalise any private enterprise in the country.' (*The New York Times*, 22nd September, 1944).

642 A few months later, at the national congress of the Father-
471 land Front in March, 1945, another Communist leader declared: 'We are building a democractic country based on private property and private initiative. Consequently the Government by its very nature is reformist.' He severely attacked those members of the Communist Party who opposed the Fatherland Front Government and wanted 'to establish a completely Communist government.' An article in the official paper of the Fatherland Front, *Otechestven Front* (9th March, 1945) described the programme of the Front in these words: 'It is the programme of the Bulgarian workers, peasants, craftsmen and women, honest, intellectual, patriotic individuals, industrialists, merchants and patriotic soldiers.' In a congress of the industrialists of Bulgaria on September 27th, 1945, a Communist Minister, Dobri Terpeshev, said on behalf of the Supreme Economic Council: 'Private initiative will not be handicapped but supported. The Communists intend to revive it because our economy needs your initiative . . . Let us all work without being led on by thought of gain alone.' A year later the Communist Prime Minister, Georgi Dimitrov, declared: 'The immediate task is neither the realisation of Socialism nor the introduction of the Soviet system but the consolidation of a truly democratic and Parliamentarian system.'

642 From September, 1944, to October, 1946, the Fatherland
661 Front Government was headed by General Kimon Georgiev who not only played a leading part in the military, semi-fascist *coup d'etat* of Tsankov in 1923, as a result of which tens of thousands of workers and peasants were massacred, but was also the author of the military coup of 1934 which led to the immediate dismissal of Parliament, the terrible persecution of Communists, Agrarians and others, and, for the first time in

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CHAPTER II

POLAND: THE WARSAW UPRISING

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THE OPPOSITION of Russia and its agents to any spontaneous, independent and democratic action by the masses was revealed in the most damning way when the people of Warsaw, organised and led in the main by the Polish Socialist Party (P.P.S.), rose in arms against the German Army of Occupation. Russia's attitude towards the heroic uprising shows up the sinister and anti-democratic character of her policy during the critical stages of the process by which the Communists took control of the state machine. 669

In July, 1944, the Soviet Army advanced towards Warsaw, and in the second half of the month, German troops began to be evacuated *en masse* from the city and its environs. On 29th July the Soviet Army under the command of Marshal Rokossovsky entered Otwock, 20 kilometres from Warsaw. The next day they reached Miłosna, 10 kilometres from Warsaw. On 31st July, mobile patrols of the Soviet Army had advanced as far as Praga, a suburb of Warsaw on the east bank of the Vistula. Every night military targets in Warsaw were bombed by the Soviet air force. The Germans continued to withdraw their exhausted troops, but held on to the eastern end of the bridges in Praga. Then the Russian artillery began to bombard Praga. The Vistula was crossed near its confluence with the Pilica and this threatened the German garrison from the south, while on 1st and 2nd August the Vistula was crossed higher up near Sandomierz.

The situation in Warsaw itself was described thus: 'The Germans were evacuating Warsaw at high speed. Railway installations and industrial plants were dismantled and removed . . . All the German offices in the city, including the Post Office, closed down. Newspapers published by the Germans ceased. The Gestapo burned documents in the

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669 greatest haste and prepared to decamp . . . German civilians besieged the railway stations. On account of the inadequate number of trains, they fled by all possible means of transport, offering sky-high prices for the hire of a horse and cart'. (T. Bor-Komorowski, *The Secret Army*, London, 1950, p. 206).

The Germans ordered the mobilization of 100,000 Poles for the fortification of the suburbs of Warsaw, but not a single Pole presented himself. A Soviet broadcast reported later that prior to the last week in July 'a tense atmosphere could be felt in Warsaw. The Germans, it was said, were obviously preparing a new massacre of the population'. (Statement by Colonel Tarnawa, a Polish officer, who was in Warsaw at that time, Soviet Home Service, September 2nd, 1944. Quoted by the Duchess of Atholl, *The Tragedy of Warsaw and its Documentation*, London, 1945).

During this period the Polish organisation which acted as the mouthpiece of the Kremlin—the Union of Polish Patriots—issued increasingly urgent appeals to the population of Warsaw to rise and fight the Germans. On July 29th, Radio Moscow broadcast an appeal of the Union: 'Appeal to Warsaw. Fight the Germans. No doubt Warsaw already hears the guns of the battle which is soon to bring her liberation. Those who have never bowed their heads to Hitlerite power will again, as in 1939, join battle with the Germans, this time for the decisive action.

'. . . For Warsaw, which did not yield but fought on, the hour of action has already arrived.

'The Germans will no doubt try to defend themselves in Warsaw. . . It is therefore a hundred times more necessary than ever to remember that in the flood of Hitlerite destruction all is lost that is not saved by active effort, that by direct active struggle in the streets of Warsaw, in its houses, factories, and stores we not only hasten the moment of final liberation but also save a nation's property and the lives of our brothers.'

On July, 30th, the radio station of the Union of Polish Patriots, Radio Kościuszko, declared: 'Warsaw trembles from the roar of guns. The Soviet armies are pushing forward and are near Praga. They come to us to bring us liberation. The Germans, when pushed out from Praga, will attempt to hold

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Warsaw and will try to destroy everything. In Bialystok they sacked everything for six days. They murdered thousands of our brothers. We must do everything to avoid a repetition of these horrors in Warsaw. People of Warsaw, to arms!''Attack the Germans . . . Assist the Red Army in crossing the Vistula'. (*Manchester Guardian*, 22nd August, 1944). 669 ●

On 1st August, Warsaw rose against the Germans. Women and children took their place among the fighters. Although poorly armed, with only home-made mortars and hand grenades, the people of Warsaw fought heroically, and by the 3rd the insurgents had control of the greater part of Warsaw.

On 2nd August, the Germans launched a counter-attack against the Soviet Army and on the eastern and north-eastern fronts drove it back to a distance of 50 miles from Warsaw (where the Soviet Army remained until 28th August). But on the south-east of Warsaw the Soviet Army maintained its position at a distance of some 15 miles from the city. The retreat of the Soviet Army made it impossible for it to give immediate direct support to the Warsaw insurgents. But it was in a position to do a great deal to help them. The Luftwaffe had been bombing the town incessantly since August 4th, and Soviet fighters could have intercepted the German bombers, and Soviet bombers could have bombed both the airfields from which the German bombers took off and the gun sites from which the Germans bombarded the city. Moreover, the U.S.S.R. could have supplied the insurgents with the arms they needed so desperately.

On 5th August, a Soviet officer of the Intelligence Service, Captain Constantin Kalugin, was sent to the insurgents' headquarters in Warsaw. He despatched the following telegram to Moscow (via the British authorities in London, reaching Moscow on 8th August):

'Comrade Marshal Stalin, Moscow. On 5th August, 1944, established personal contact with the commander of the Warsaw garrison who is leading the heroic struggle of the Polish nation against the Hitlerite bandits. After acquainting myself with the general military situation, have come to the conclusion that in spite of the heroism of the army and entire population, there are certain difficulties to be overcome if we are to hasten on the victory over our common foe. The needs

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669 are as follows: motorised weapons, ammunition, grenades and anti-tank guns.

'Places for dropping arms by parachute: Wilson Square, Invalids' Square, the Ghetto, Krasinskis' Square, Iron Gate Square, Napoleon Square, the Mokotow Field, the Light Cavalry barracks, Bielany.

'Recognition signals: white and red sheets.

'German aircraft are causing destruction in the town and among the civilian population. Bomb from the air the bridges over the Vistula in the Warsaw area, the Saxony Park and Jerusalem Avenue, Wolska Road, where the enemy troops are concentrated. Bomb the aerodromes of Okecie and of Bielany. The population of Warsaw hopes that you will come to their help within the next few hours. Help me to come in touch with Marshal Rokossovsky. Captain Constantin Kalugin of the Czarny Group, Warsaw, 66.804'. (Z. Zaremba, *Powstanie Sierpniowe*, London, 1946, pp. 30–32).

All the appeals of the insurgents to Moscow for arms, for fighter aircraft to be sent to defend Warsaw from the terrible bombardment, and for the German airfields and gun sites to be bombed were in vain. The Soviet Air Force which throughout August and September occupied airfields only a few minutes' flight from the city and which, until the insurrection, regularly bombed military targets in Warsaw, now completely ceased activity in and around Warsaw.

Moscow's very lame excuse for not sending arms to the insurgents was the danger that the arms dropped would fall into the hands of the Germans. At a foreign press conference in Lublin on August 28th, General Michal Rola-Zymierski, Commander of the Polish forces under the high command of the Red Army, said: 'If the insurgents had one entire district, it would be possible to help them, but when they held only isolated buildings, everything must fall into German hands'. (*The Daily Worker*, August 30th). This explanation is proved to be specious by Captain Kalugin's telegram cited above, by *The Times* statement that it was the Germans who held only 'widely scattered islands' and above all by the fact that in the middle of September, when the area in the hands of the insurgents was much smaller, Russian arms were dropped in Warsaw.

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Another excuse for the Kremlin's policy was put forward by Anna Louise Strong (for twenty-three years an apologist for Russian policy, but since 'purged' as an 'American spy') in an article in *The Nation* of September 2nd, 1944: 'The Red Army thus far has taken many cities, some by storm and more by outflanking, but the Red Army never took a city by the correlation of a frontal attack with an uprising within the city. The Red Army always discouraged such tactics'. That is the revolutionary Red Army! 669 ●

From 4th August, British and American planes based in Italy began to reach Warsaw—a flight there and back of 1,300 miles. Such a distance was beyond the range of fighter cover, so that the flights had to take place at night, thus increasing the number of casualties and detracting from their effectiveness. For only three days did the R.A.F. supply Warsaw adequately. After that only single planes reached the city from time to time. It was evident that 'if the (Allied) planes, after dropping their loads, could fly on the short distances to behind the Russian lines and "shuttle" back, the operation would be far easier, and the casualties far lighter'. (*Daily Herald*, 30th August, 1944). Such a 'shuttle' service already existed elsewhere. British and American planes bombing the Rumanian oilfields, Koenigsberg, Gdynia and other German centres, used to come down in Russian-held territory. But *forty days* elapsed before Moscow agreed to allow these planes to carry supplies to besieged Warsaw or to bomb German bases in the city and its surroundings, and then to fly behind the Russian lines and 'shuttle' back, or even to allow damaged British and American planes to land on Russian-held airfields.

On 14th September, the Soviet Army occupied Praga and in the next three days they forced the Germans back a number of miles to the north-west. Soviet planes cleared the sky above Warsaw of German planes, and began to drop arms and food. But after a few days there was another sudden change in Russian policy. The Soviet Army holding Praga halted, its artillery ceased fire, its aeroplanes disappeared almost entirely and the Luftwaffe reopened its murderous attacks. Occasional consignments of arms and food were the only help given by the Russians. The Soviet Army which occupied the eastern quarters

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●669 of Warsaw for another month stood by while the German army murdered the Warsaw rebels.

After a heroic and unequal struggle lasting 63 days Warsaw fell. 240,000 of its inhabitants were killed and 630,000 deported by the Germans. The city was destroyed systematically, house by house and street by street.

During the period of the uprising, any Polish partisans who tried to reach besieged Warsaw were stopped by the Soviet Army, disarmed and arrested. (Altogether the Russian army arrested 50,000 of the Polish partisans fighting the German army and deported them to Siberia).

The Communists use two main arguments to justify Russian policy towards the uprising: first, that it was ill-timed, and secondly, that it had a reactionary character.

The first argument is belied by the appeals, quoted above, sent out by Radio Moscow to the population of Warsaw to rise, and by the fact that the Soviet liaison officers who were sent to Warsaw at the beginning of the uprising (of whom Captain Kalugin was one) supported the rising unreservedly. Further, the small group of Communists in Warsaw itself declared in favour of the uprising. The official Communist organ *Armia Ludowa* stated on 15th August: 'The armed uprising has found the support of the broadest masses of Warsaw's people, quite independently of who started it and for what purpose, and that is its strength.' (This, incidentally, is in sharp contrast to the ridicule which the Communist papers in Moscow, London and New York heaped on the uprising). Seventeen days after the beginning of the uprising the Kościuszko radio station declared its support: 'Our camp, the camp of fighting democracy, has always welcomed any sign of fighting against the German invader. We have always called you to arms and have seen in an active struggle the surest means of saving men and national property. We see in the present rising in Warsaw a manifestation of the fighting spirit of the democratic camp and the Warsaw fighting is to us as sacred as any act of combat against the enemy'. Two days later the Lublin radio of the Union of Polish Patriots proclaimed: 'The Warsaw uprising proves the fighting spirit of the democratic camp. Our (Polish—Y.G.) infantry burns with the desire to help Warsaw. Also the soldiers of the Red Army are hurrying to assist the capital.

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Warsaw will be liberated . . . Polish soldiers and the Red Army are coming to assist you.' (Quoted by L. M. Oak in the American *New Leader*, November, 13th, 1944). 669

Even more monstrous than the description of the rising as untimely is its condemnation as reactionary and fascist in character. If the Warsaw uprising had really been reactionary the Kremlin's attitude to it would have been very different. It is enough to recall the goodwill manifested to General Béla Miklós of Hungary and King Michael of Rumania. Russia was hostile to the Warsaw uprising precisely because it was quite independent of Communist influence, was dominated by the P.P.S. and was a socially progressive movement.

After the military defeat of September, 1939, which marked the disintegration of the dictatorial semi-fascist regime of the 'Colonels', the workers and peasants, organised in the P.P.S. and in the Peasant Party, became the backbone of the underground army, called Armia Krajowa (A.K.), the Home Army. The extreme right did not belong to the A.K. but to the National Armed Forces (Narodowe Siły Zbrojne). Military units of the P.P.S. and the Polish Peasant Party joined the A.K. and retained their identity as autonomous units. The clandestine parliament—the Council of National Unity—relied mainly on the workers and peasants.

The programme of the Home Army was described in its underground organ, *Biuletyn Informacyjny* of 9th September, 1943, in an article entitled 'What Kind of Poland are we Fighting for?' This clearly stated that the future Poland must have 'freedom of speech, freedom of opinion, freedom of association; it will be a Poland of social justice and welfare for the wide masses, liberated from capitalistic chaos; a Poland which will nationalise its great factories and plants; a Poland which will fundamentally transform its agrarian regime, modernize its system of distributing goods, expand its network of co-operatives and industrialize the country'. 185 669

On 15th August, 1944, after the Warsaw Commune's 15 days' existence, the Council of National Unity issued a manifesto to the people which included the following statement:

'In this war, Poland is not only fighting for her existence and political independence, but also for loftier aims. The Atlantic Charter, which defined the military aims of the United Nations,

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185 assures to Poland its legitimate aspirations and its historic
● 669 needs. Threatened by repeated aggression of imperialist Powers, she must be certain of security and the possibility of working in peace for generations. She wants to be able to govern herself according to her own principles and laws. These principles have already been published in the declaration of 26th July, 1944. They guarantee the regime of the future Republic based on political liberty and social justice.

'The principles of the Polish democratic Republic are as follows:

'1. A constitution guaranteeing governments in accordance with the will of the people.

'2. A democratic electoral law faithfully reflecting public opinion through general and municipal elections.

'3. Agrarian reform covering all estates of over 50 hectares as well as German landed property determined by a preliminary decree; the surplus population being directed towards industry and handicrafts.

'4. Socialisation of key industries.

'5. Participation of the workers in the management of enterprise and control by the workers of industrial production.

'6. All citizens have the right to work and to a decent standard of living.

'7. A just redistribution of the social income.

'8. All citizens have the right to education and culture.' (Zaremba, *La Commune de Varsovie* (Fel.) Paris, 1947, pp. 39-40).

Although the Warsaw uprising had basically a national-liberatory and social revolutionary character, it nevertheless had many negative, reactionary elements in its leadership. The P.P.S. leaders, with their inclination to compromise, and in the name of 'national unity', agreed to keep the military leadership in the hands of army experts headed by General Bor-Komorowski. The Russian Government let Hitler murder the rebels of Warsaw, not because their commander came from the old Polish Army, but because the rebellion was an expression of new forces, nationally and socially independent of the Kremlin.

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829 and demagoguery, which he considers to be characteristic of the West. But at the same time, these encumbrances assure the private citizen a certain security. To seize a man on the street and deport him to a concentration camp is obviously an excellent means of dealing with an individual who displeases the administration; but such means are difficult to establish in countries where the only criminal is the man who has committed an act clearly defined as punishable in a specific paragraph of the law. Nazi and
● 671 Communist criminal codes are alike in that they efface the
829 frontier between penal and non-penal deeds—the first, by defining crime as any act directed against the interests of the German nation; the second, as any act directed against the interests of the dictatorship of the proletariat. What the man of the East calls the "lifeless formalism of the bourgeoisie" does, on the other hand, afford some guarantee that the father of a family will return home for supper instead of taking a trip to a region where polar bears thrive but human beings do not.

Nor is it easy in legally minded countries to adopt the use of scientific torture under which every man confesses with equal fervor whether he be innocent or guilty. Propaganda tries to convince the citizens of the people's democracies that law in the West is no more than a fiction subservient to the interests of the ruling classes. Perhaps it is a fiction, but it is not too subservient to the wishes of the rulers. If they want to condemn a man, they must sweat to prove him guilty in fact; his defense lawyers hide behind all the technicalities of the law; the case drags on through various appeals, etc. Obviously, crimes are committed under its cover, but so far Western law serves to bind the hands of the rulers as well as of the ruled which, depending on one's beliefs, may be a source of either strength or weakness.

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chosen by lot. Then at the appointed hour in the night they pounce on their victim and hack him to pieces in a bestial fashion.

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Such is the situation in Russia. There are also concentration camps in the satellite countries, called in Communist language "People's Democracies." It has been estimated that more than 1,000,000 persons have been sent to such camps, and the number may be far greater. Not included in this figure, for example, are Eastern Germany and the former Baltic States. The existence of concentration camps has been widely advertised, and decrees establishing them are on the statute books of all the People's Democracies. The decrees merely apply to the country in question the provisions of Article 59 of the Criminal Code of U.S.S.R. The first Article of the Criminal Code of Rumania, for example, as reported by Albert K. Herling, reads as follows:

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> Criminal law has for its purpose defending the Rumanian People's Republic and its legal order against actions dangerous to society by enforcing legal measures of social defense against persons who commit such actions. In the meaning of the preceding paragraph any action and omission that brings harm to the economic, social and political structure, or to the security of the Rumanian People's Republic, or which disturbs the legal order established by the people under the leadership of the working class is to be considered dangerous to society. The actions which are considered dangerous for society can be punished even when they are not expressly prohibited by law. In such cases the extent and limit of criminal responsibility is to be determined in accordance with the legal provisions in force for similar crimes.*

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The number of camps in the area reported by persons who assert that they were present in them is so vast that the names by

* Statement issued on June 18, 1952, in behalf of the International League for the Rights of Man.

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If they do not return voluntarily, they can be called up by the branch labour office (that is, assigned to compulsory labour groups). In Hungary the government published a decree on January 9th, 1950, laying down severe penalties for workers who leave their place of employment without permission. In all the 'People's Democracies' the labour book was copied from Russia. In Yugoslavia an 'improvement' was introduced: every citizen has a *karakteristika*, a record of his political reliability which has to be shown every time he takes a new job. As it is sealed, he does not know its contents, and is not even able to appeal against what is written in it.

Slave Labour

An institution which is of paramount importance in Russia, which is beginning to appear in the satellites and is bound to increase in importance as time goes on, is slave labour.

Some figures regarding the number of slave labourers in Russia are given by D. J. Dallin in a book that he wrote with B. I. Nicolaevsky, *Forced Labor in Soviet Russia.* (London, 1948). 'Kiseliev-Gromov, himself a former G. P. U. official in the northern labor camps, states that in 1928 only 30,000 men were detained in the camps . . . The total number of prisoners in the entire network of camps in 1930 he gives as 662,257 . . . " (p. 52). Dallin comes to the conclusion on the basis of available evidence that the number of people in labour camps in 1931 was nearly 2 million, in 1933-35 about 5 million. He says that in 1942 there were from eight to fifteen million (pp. 53-62). The former Yugoslav Communist leader, Anton Ciliga, who was for many years in a Russian concentration camp, estimates that the number of prisoners was about 10 million (*The Russian Enigma*, London, 1940, p. 249).

A conclusive proof of the existence of slave labour on a big scale in Russia can be gained from the following quotations from *Pravda*. On June 4, 1947, the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of the U.S.S.R. passed a decree on 'Protection of Citizens' Private Property' the first article of which reads: 'Theft—that is, covert or open appropriation of the private property of citizens—is punishable by confinement in a reformatory labour camp for a period of five to six years. Theft committed by a gang of thieves or for a second time is punishable

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685 by confinement at a reformatory labour camp for a period of
466 six to ten years.' (*Pravda*, 5th June, 1947).

On the same day another decree was passed on 'Embezzlement of State and Public Property' which includes the following articles:

'(1) Theft, appropriation, defalcation or other embezzlement of state property is punishable by confinement in a reformatory labour camp for 7 to 10 years, with or without confiscation of property.

'(2) Embezzlement of state property for a second time, as well as when committed by an organized group or on a large scale, is punishable by confinement in a reformatory labour camp for 10 to 25 years, with confiscation of property.

'(3) Theft, appropriation, defalcation or other embezzlement of collective farm, cooperative or other public property is punishable by confinement in a reformatory labour camp for 5 to 8 years, with or without confiscation of property.

'(4) Embezzlement of collective farm, cooperative or other public property for a second time, as well as that committed by an organised group or gang or on a large scale, is punishable by confinement in a reformatory labour camp for 8 to 20 years, with confiscation of property.' (Ibid.).

A month after these decrees were passed the U.S.S.R. Public Prosecutor's Office gave ten examples showing how the decrees were carried out in practice (*Pravda* July 9th, 1947):

'(1) In the city of Saratov, V. F. Yudin, who had been previously convicted for theft . . . stole fish from a smoke factory. On June 24th, 1947, . . . Yudin was sentenced to fifteen years' imprisonment in corrective-labour camps . . .

'(2) On June 11th, 1947, an electrician on the power lines of the Moscow-Ryazan railroad, D. A. Kiselev, stole fur goods from a railroad car . . . On June 24th, 1947, the war tribunal of the Moscow-Ryazan railroad sentenced D. A. Kiselev to ten years' imprisonment in the corrective-labour camps.

'(3) In the town of Pavlov-Posad in the Moscow region, L. N. Markelov . . . stole clothing from the Pavlov-Posad textile factory. On June 20th, 1947 . . . Markelov was sentenced to eight years' imprisonment in corrective-labour camps.

'(4) In the Rodnikov district of the Ivanov region, Y. V. Smirnov and V. V. Smirnov . . . stole 375 pounds of oats from

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a collective farm. On June 26th, 1947 . . . both were sentenced to eight years' imprisonment in corrective-labour camps. 685 466

'(5) In the Kirov district of Moscow, E. K. Smirnov, a chauffeur, was arrested for stealing 22 pounds of bread from a bakery. The people's court . . . sentenced E. K. Smirnov to seven years' imprisonment in corrective-labour camps.

'(6) In Saratov, E. I. Gordeyev . . . stole various products from a warehouse. On June 21st, 1947 . . . Gordeyev was sentenced to seven years' imprisonment in corrective-labour camps.

'(7) In Kuibyshev, E. T. Poluboyarov stole a wallet from a train traveller . . . On 4th July he was sentenced to 5 years' imprisonment in corrective-labour camps.

'(8) On June 7th, 1947, in Kazan at the collective farm market, V. E. Bukin snatched money from the hand of Citizeness Pustinsky . . . On June 20th, 1947 . . . Bukin was sentenced to eight years' imprisonment in corrective-labour camps.

'(9) On June 6th, 1947, in the village of Subovka in the Kutuzovsk district of the Kuibyshev region, A. A. Chubarkin and V. G. Morozov stole from a cellar 88 pounds of potatoes belonging to Citizeness Presnyakov. On June 17th, 1947 . . . both were sentenced to five years' imprisonment in corrective-labour camps.

'(10) On June 5th, 1947, in Moscow . . . K. V. Greenwald, who had been previously convicted for theft, took advantage of the absence of his neighbour, entered the room of Citizeness Kovalev and stole various household articles . . . Greenwald was sentenced . . . to ten years' imprisonment in corrective-labour camps.'

That people steal bread and other elementary necessities of life under the cruel threat of a minimum of five years' slave labour if caught, shows what dire provery they are suffering.[1] [735]

That slave labour in U.S.S.R. is very widespread is clear not only from the large amount of evidence given by former inmates of these camps (collected in the above-mentioned book of D. J. Dallin and B. I. Nicolaevsky) and from the facts published in the Russian Press of heavy punishments for the most elementary crimes—if the theft of bread can be so called. There is further evidence which is conclusive even if indirect. Soviet

1 [See examples, category 116, pp. 94-95 -- Analyst]

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* Statement issued on June 18, 1952, in behalf of the International League for the Rights of Man.

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659 people was called on relentlessly. It was not merely that the
793 press and the radio ridiculed belief and practice incessantly
798 and without rebuke. The faithful among the clergy were hunted
687 down one by one. The following typical report is cited from ČTK, the Government News Service, of September 1, 1952:

> Josef Maršálek, Catholic Priest and teacher of religion in Velké-Meziříci, confessed his illegal activities to the Senate of the District Court of Iglau. The accused was brought to trial because of the hatred he had shown towards the peace efforts of the progressive populations of the world, and because of his faithful service to the war efforts of the Imperialistic Powers and the Vatican. . . . Maršálek approved of imperialist aggression in Korea and spread the war propaganda contained in foreign broadcasts. In conversations with his pupils and in his religion classes he systematically spread hatred against the people's democracy and chief personalities of our state. . . . He also tried to hamper the constructive efforts of the workers, and forbade his pupils to cooperate with working brigades on Sundays and Holydays. By his subtly clever inventiveness he sullied our economic and cultural expansion effort. Indeed, the evidence indicates that this reactionary slave of the Vatican strictly forbade his pupils to see the progressive films. . . . The accused Josef Maršálek was condemned to fifteen years in jail and to financial penalties. All his property was confiscated. The Court also deprived him of his civil rights and exiled him from County Iglau forever.

687 Two months later, Czechoslovakia was the scene of the sensational trials of Rudolf Slánský and his associates in the government. And perhaps no document in the history of the unfortunate country is more harrowing than the following, translated from the official Communist newspaper, *Rudé Právo*, of November 25, 1952. It is addressed by the son of one of the doomed men, Ludwig Frejka, to his judge:

> Esteemed Comrade:
>
> I ask that there be inflicted on my father the heaviest penalty—the

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even for a day, makes the culprit liable to six months' corrective labour—which means a cut of 25 per cent in his earnings during that time. It is symptomatic that a few months after the promulgation of this law a few women wrote a letter to *Izvestia* suggesting that domestic servants also be subject to this law. *Izvestia*, in its comment on this question (December 30th, 1940), although disagreeing with this suggestion, showed no astonishment as to its content in this period of the 'transition from Socialism to Communism'. 466

Not only are workers prohibited from calling strikes, but strikers are liable, according to law, to be sentenced to death for such an offence. (Item 14 of Article 58 of the Criminal Code. As capital punishment has now been abolished, twenty years penal servitude is given instead).* [681]

The Russian model is now being copied in the 'People's Democracies'. This time it will not take so many years to reach perfection. Until 1928, strikes in Russia were legal and were conducted without police intervention, even though the bureaucratic rulers opposed them more and more as their power grew.†

The 'People's Democracies', however, from the beginning avoided the mistake of allowing strikes. Not one of the new Constitutions includes the right to strike. The explanation is simple, and was put in a nutshell by the spokesman of the Yugoslav Government when he was replying to a proposal to include 'freedom to strike' in the Constitution: 'Now when our

*The following article is the only item in the "Collection of Laws" which touches on or covers any cases that can be interpreted by the courts as strikes: "Counter revolutionary sabotage, i.e., knowingly *omitting to discharge a given duty* or discharging it with deliberate carelessness, with the specific object of weakening the authority of the government or the operation of the government machine, entails—deprivations of liberty for a period of not less than one year, and confiscation of property in whole or in part, provided that where there are aggravating circumstances of a particularly serious nature the penalty shall be increased to the supreme measure of social defence: death by shooting, with confiscation of property". (My emphasis—Y.G. Criminal Code, Article 58 (14), June 6, 1927, "Collection of Laws", No. 49, Article 330, Moscow, 1937, p. 31).

†In 1922-3 there were 500 strikes with 150,000 participants in 1925, 196 strikes with 37,600 participants; in 1926, 337 strikes with 43,200 participants; in 1927, 396 strikes with 25,400 participants. More than 90 per cent of the participants in these strikes were workers employed by the State. Not only were strikes allowed, but at that time the Bolshevik leaders insisted on the active support of Party members for strikes whenever the majority of the workers of an enterprise took this step. (See, for instance, the speeches of Lozovsky and Tomsky to the 11th Congress of the Russian Communist Party, 1922).

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466 constitution fully guarantees the rights of the working class, such a proposal is outright reactionary and anti-national'. (20th January, 1946). In opposing strikes the Communist Party leaders showed themselves very willing to use the help of the bourgeois politicians, and these, on their side, did not hesitate to use the authority of the Communist Party leaders in opposing strikes. For instance, the Czechoslovak Minister of Justice, Dr. Drtina ('purged' in the coup of February, 1948) said on 17th March, 1947, about recent unofficial strikes: 'They were . . . in effect strikes against the Government and Premier Gottwald . . . What is more serious is the fact that these strikes against the legal order occurred after the Revolution. Therefore, they are of a terroristic and anarchic character'. (*East Europe*, 26th March, 1947). Of course, from the suppression of the 'anarchic' strikes, the real benefactors were not [687] Dr. Drtina and his friends, but Gottwald and his. In Rumania Decree No. 183 bans strikes, defining them as 'an economic offence'. Participation in strikes is punishable by imprisonment of 1 to 12 years and by fines of Lei 10,000 to 100,000. A member of the Communist Party of any of the Western countries, making use of the double thinking so common to him, will find it quite consistent to support the banning of strikes in Russia and the People's Democracies (except of course, Yugoslavia after 28 June, 1948—the day of the excommunication of Tito by the Cominform) and at the same time oppose any limitation of the right to strike in any enterprise owned by a democratically elected public body in his own country.

The first steps have also been taken to abolish the right of workers to change their place of work. On April 16th, 1948, a law was passed in Yugoslavia prohibiting any state employee from leaving his place of work without permission from a special government commission. On August 19th Sofia Radio reported that the Labour Directorate had decided that the workers 'have no longer the right to leave their working places without permission' of the factory administration. Permission to employ or to dismiss will be granted only in accordance with the needs of production. Workers who leave their employment without permission of the Labour Directorate must be sent back to their original jobs, in accordance with Cabinet Decree No. 7.

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661 although the present Prime Minister is a member of this party, he is rarely mentioned in the Hungarian press and his name, István Dóbi, is hardly known to the people.

The peasant parties of Yugoslavia, which in the past were very strong, apparently exist officially even today, but none of them has a daily, weekly, or any other paper and none of them is represented in Parliament. Their last representative was Dragoljub Jovanović, whose record included years of imprisonment under King Alexander's dictatorship. He was a secretary of the People's Front and a Minister in Tito's Government. But how could Tito forgive him when he declared in Parliament: 'The Communists are wonderful. They liberated us from the King and the Church; it only remains for them to liberate us from the Communist Party'? He was immediately expelled from the Government, from the People's Front, from his own Serbian Peasant Party and from his position as a professor at the University of Belgrade. Thus he became the one-man opposition to the Government in Parliament. But Tito could not tolerate any dissentient voice and steps were taken to close his mouth. In February, 1947, he was beaten up and severely wounded by hooligans. (The Yugoslav press did not mention this incident). Immediately afterwards he was tried and sentenced to nine years' imprisonment.

The fate of Stalin's quislings in the sham peasant parties was often grim. Thus, for instance, Romulus Zăroni, Minister of Agriculture in the first Groza Government, and Moga and Belea, the people who had led the Ploughman's Front since its foundation in 1934 in South Transylvania, when it was a small organisation with genuine peasant suppport at least locally, were removed from any positions they held after Moscow found they had served their purpose. The two most prominent leaders of the Hungarian 'village explorers' (after the war renamed the National Peasant Party) were Imre Kovács and Péter Veres: the former resigned his post as General Secretary and succeeded in escaping abroad; the latter was driven out of public life.

687 The important part played by the Communist-controlled
625 police in the liquidation of the peasant parties not only in Yugoslavia but also in the other 'People's Democracies' is clear from the following testimony of Peter Koev, an M.P. and a

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close friend of Petkov's. As Koev himself was too weak after his 'interrogation' to read his own statement in Parliament, Petkov read it for him: 687 625

'I shall first describe to you how the interrogation at the Militia Prison was carried out, so that you may have an idea of how "confessions" are produced, and of how Communist charges are built up. You reach a state of utter physical and moral collapse. You become completely indifferent towards your own life and fate, and you long only for an end, any end, which will bring a reprieve from suffering. But the complete collapse comes only at the moment when you realize that you are defenceless, that there is no law and no authority to protect you, and that you are in the hands of your interrogators for ever. This is actually what they try to make you believe right from the very beginning.

'The procedure is different from the one we have known so far. Now they first explain your guilt and then they ask confessions to prove it. The methods to obtain the confessions are mainly three: physiological—hunger, thirst, and lack of sleep; physical—torture; psychological—hints that your family have been arrested, will be tortured, etc.

'But let me tell you exactly what happened to me. For two days after my arrest I was confined to a small dark cell and given no food whatever. On the third day I was taken to the office of the chief of the Department of State Security. There I met Ganev, the chief of the Department "A" and the militia inspector, Zeev. They told me that I had been found guilty of an act of sabotage—the burning of Russian cotton stocks at the port of Burgas, in 1945, and that I had also taken part in the organization of a planned *coup d'etat* against the Government by Generals Velchev and Stanchev. They told me that I was the link between General Velchev and General Stanchev. Then they read confessions written by several officers giving details of their own guilt as well as of my own "participation" in the conspiracy.

'Immediately after that I was sent back to my cell and was not bothered with any interrogations for twenty-one days. I was left to "ripen". The first method used to achieve this was hunger—I was given only a little bread and water every day On the twenty-second day, a Saturday, at eight o'clock in the

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687 625 morning, I was taken up to the fourth floor for the second interrogation. It lasted without a break until eleven o'clock of the following Thursday morning. The interrogation went on, day and night, for twenty-four hours round the clock, without a stop, the interrogators themselves being changed every three hours. During all this time I was left standing, without any sleep, without any bread and, what is worse, without any water. I was handcuffed and I was not allowed to lean either on the wall or on the table. Every three hours the new interrogators asked the same identical questions, so that in the end I knew every question by heart. After the first twenty-four hours I did not feel any hunger. The lack of sleep makes your head feel hollow, and then it starts making funny noises. The interrogators insist that you repeat the same dates, the same names, the same hours, etc. On the fifth day I collapsed and was taken back to my cell, where I immediately fell asleep and slept for twelve hours.

'Waking up I thought the interrogation was over, but the same night, at eleven o'clock, they took me upstairs again into a bigger room. The Inspector Zeev, who was in charge of my interrogation said my obstinacy had obliged him to change his methods to something really tough. At his orders I was put on the floor. My hands were tied behind my back, and I was gagged. Then, for about two hours, I was beaten on the feet with a thick rubber whip. During the beating Inspector Zeev asked the same questions. The interrogations and the beatings were repeated four nights in succession. During the last night, besides many inspectors and militiamen, the Chief of the Sofia Militia, Veselin Georgiev, was also present. I was then thrown back into my cell, and I was not disturbed until 4th November, at half-past ten in the evening, when I was set free. After ninety days under arrest I was not asked any more questions, nor have I been given notice of any official charge against me.

(Signed) PETER KOEV.

Sofia, 29th November, 1946, National Assembly.'

(Michael Padev, *Dimitrov Wastes no Bullets*, London, 1948, pp. 93–4).

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666 but votes openly'. The Communist Party followed this up by declaring that only reactionaries were ashamed of their policy and would vote secretly. At the polling booths a voter had to show his identification papers and state whether he wished to cast his ballot paper into the ballot boxes exposed to public view or into boxes in a secret booth. Even if he was bold enough to choose the latter course his ordeal was still not at an end. Two ballot papers, one with the government list of candidates *printed on both sides*, the other a blank slip, were issued to him, and after throwing one of them into the secret ballot box, he had to throw the discarded one into a waste paper basket more or less in full view of the election officers.

[687] If the elector wished to show his disapproval of the government not by voting against it—a path fraught with dangers—but simply by abstaining, he could do so only if he were prepared to pay the penalty the law demands of all who do not vote—imprisonment for a month and a fine of 10 thousand crowns (£50).

Even if the elector was bold enough to vote against the government list, what assurance had he that his vote would be counted, as the only people on the electoral commissions are those who support the official list? When there is only one list of candidates, and when voting is open and counting secret instead of the other way about, the official list cannot possibly lose. Indeed in all the general elections that have taken place since 1948 in the 'People's Democracies' there has not been a *single* case of an official candidate not being elected.

Indirect testimony to the faking of the elections is given by the following fact. In all the Constitutions of the 'People's Democracies', the electoral laws declare the right of a very small group of electors to put up a list of candidates, or a single candidate, if they wish. In Bulgaria every group of *ten* citizens is allowed to do so, in Yugoslavia every group of a hundred, and so on. But although this fine democratic law exists, and although it was stated that thousands voted against the Government (for example, in Bulgaria, in the elections of December, 1949, 109,983 blank or invalid votes were cast and in Yugoslavia in March, 1950, 613,125 voted against the Government) not one case is recorded of a group of ten or a hundred citizens putting up any candidate against the official one.

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CHAPTER VII

'TITOISTS' BEFORE TITO

TITOISM expresses the struggle of a small nation led by its bureaucracy against oppression by the Great Russian bureaucracy. The Tito-Stalin conflict throws light not only on the Rajk-Stalin, Gomulka-Stalin or Kostov-Stalin conflicts, where the issue is the national oppression of the peoples of Stalin's new vassal states, but also on the national question in the U.S.S.R. herself. It is instructive to survey this little-known aspect of Russian policy.

The most numerous non-Russian people in the U.S.S.R. are the Ukrainians. Their national aspirations have constantly been suppressed by a series of purges. In 1930 the Ukrainian Academy of Sciences was dissolved and members of it arrested for 'national deviations'. In 1933, Skrypnik, the most prominent leader of the Ukrainian Communist Party and a member of its Central Committee and Political Bureau, committed suicide in order to avoid arrest. At the same time Kostubinsky, the Vice-President of the Council of People's Commissars of the Ukraine (the Ukrainian Government), Kovnar, the Commissar of Agriculture, and a few score of high officials were shot as nationalists. To prevent further deviations, Postyshev was sent to Ukraine from Moscow in 1933 to reorganise the party and the state administration. He was given dictatorial powers. At the 12th Congress of the Ukrainian Communist Party in 1933, he said: 'In Ukraine our leading Party members and Comrade Stalin himself are specially hated. The class enemy has been to a good school in this country and has learned how to struggle against Soviet rule. In Ukraine have settled the remnants of many counter-revolutionary parties and organizations. Kharkov has gradually become the centre of attraction for all sorts of nationalistic and other counter-revolutionary organizations. They have all been drawn to this centre and they have spread their webs all over the Ukraine, making use of our Party system for their own ends. You remember, Comrades,

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661 186 687 when twenty Secretaries of Party Regional Committees dared to declare that it was impossible to fulfil the Harvest Plan' (Nos. 15–21 of *Proletarian*, Kharkov, 1934, quoted by W. E. D. Allen, *The Ukraine*, Cambridge, 1940, p. 326). Postyshev expelled more than a quarter of the members of the Ukrainian Communist Party. Three years later he himself suffered a similar fate, being expelled and arrested. In his place came Kosior, from Moscow. He, in due course, was also arrested. In 1937, Lyubchenko, Chairman of the Council of People's Commissars of Ukraine, committed suicide in order to avoid arrest. The Commissars Petrovski and Eiche were liquidated.

Other republics have a similar history. In the Republic of White Russia, Goloded, who for ten years was Chairman of the Council of People's Commissars, was in 1937 arrested as a Trotskyist. Some months later his successor as chairman, Cherviakov, committed suicide to avoid arrest He had been Chairman of the Central Executive Committee of White Russia (i.e., President of the Republic) for seventeen years.

In Tadjikistan, the Chairman of the Executive Committee was purged as a nationalist in 1934. His successor held the position for three years and then suffered a similar fate. Walter Padley, in his article 'Empire or Free Union?' in *Politics*, New York, Spring, 1948, gives the following list of some of the foremost people in the national republics who were purged in 1937:

Presidents	*Republic*
Cherviakov	White Russia
Rahkhimbayev	Tadjikistan
Arkupov	Karelian
Shotemur	Tadjikistan
Lordkipanide	Adjar
Dolgat	Daghestan
Kunz	Volga-German
Prime-Ministers	*Republic*
Goloded	White Russia
Mgalobishvili	Georgia
Khodjaev	Uzbekistan
Rakhinov	Tadjikistan
Bondarenko	Ukraine
Ovakabelashvili	Transcaucasia.

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642 somely large proportion of state funds was used for political
578 competition. Taxes were high and the entire taxation system was geared to make the poor people pay for the political and economic program of the government or of the ruling classes.
647 Planning was poor and administration far from efficient. Bohemia-Moravia had inherited from Austria a relatively competent administrative machinery, and Hungary's was organized along nineteenth-century lines. Administrative systems in former Russian and Turkish areas were a continuation of the previous imperial regimes, and were considered
[687] definitely the worst in Eastern Europe. Inefficiency and corruption mitigated somewhat the dictatorial character of these administrations. Bribery was customary and necessary on every level and affected the poor and the minorities. The problem of corruption was most serious in high official circles. Often the biggest fortunes were made in politics through embezzling discretionary funds that were left at the disposal of government members. Selling protective tariffs to industrialists in order to receive shares from foreign companies for concessions was a prevalent practice. Administrative officials were endowed with the nickname "bicyclists," which carried the implication that these officials trampled upon their subordinates and bowed before their bosses.

578 This attitude and the belief that the masses should support all projects of the ruling circles produced a harsh conflict of interests between the bourgeoisie, the mixed aristocratic and middle class, and the industrial workers and peasants. The fundamental conflict, however, was between the bureaucracy and the peasantry. The great differences in the cultural levels in many of the Eastern European countries made things worse. Different religious and ethnic groups and contrasting social standards contributed to regional hostilities and did nothing to facilitate the task of the administrators. The fault lay not alone with the rulers and administrators as is so often supposed by Western authors and statesmen. The people in

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641 665 of the population of the given country. Finally, even the internal structure of the Communist Party is dictatorial. The delegates of the local organizations accept only the projects and decisions of the party elite or of the chief dictator.

641 The Rumanian constitution, just like the others, appears to guarantee freedom of speech, freedom of the press, freedom of assembly, freedom of public processions and manifestations. Article 85 states that "These rights are ensured by placing at the disposal of the working masses and their organizations printing presses, stocks of paper, public buildings, the streets, communications facilities and other material requisites." In practice, the printing presses, paper mills, public buildings, radio, and so forth are owned by the state and are completely controlled by the leadership of the Communist Party. Even religious processions and manifestations require the consent of the state.

641 666 In theory, under the Communist system, every citizen over eighteen years of age has the right to vote. In practice, the elections are a tragic farce. They do not mean the right to select a candidate, to participate in the adoption of a party program, or even to defend social or national interests. They signify a compulsion to vote for one's hated enemies. The elector is forced to march to the polls to the accompaniment of music played by his foes while pain wrenches his heart and his fists clench in hatred and anger. The official results of the elections always show that the candidates of the Communist Party have received 99 per cent of the votes.

692 641 Does the administration of justice stand guard over civil liberties? No, it definitely does not, either in practice or in theory. The constitutions of the People's Republics have clear provisions in this respect. Article 41 of the Hungarian constitution states: "The courts shall punish the enemies of the people, defend and secure the political, economic and social order of the People's Democracy . . . they shall edu-

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cate the workers to respect the rule of socialist communal 692
life." The Polish and Rumanian constitutions of 1952 pro- 641
vide that "The courts defend the system of People's Democracy and the gains of the working people, and ensure the people's law, social property and citizens' rights."

In practice it is always the duty of the judge and the 692
prosecutor to take the side of the Communist State—that 661
is, of the Communist Party. It is always the duty of the defense to help the state prosecute the accused and to help him to accuse himself. The defendant's duty is to prove his guilt. The courts are a tool of the Communist regimes and are not independent institutions for the administration of justice. Communism introduces not only the judicial murder of innocent people but a debasement of man unparalleled in the history of mankind. The innocent defendant is forced to accuse himself of crimes which he has never committed, to accuse other innocent people, to trample upon his own dignity, to humiliate himself in the eyes of his friends and family, to spit upon the ideals in which he has believed, and to praise the loathsome practices of his enemy and prosecutor as he awaits death by the hands of his oppressor or by slow agony in a prison or forced labor camp.

V

Although it proclaims the liberation of the masses, the 641
communist system has created unprecedented privilege for 565
the ruling Communist elite. Everyone who has seen the living conditions of the highest Communist dignitaries in Russia as well as in the captive countries knows that these men enjoy a very high standard of living. They have privileges in all spheres of life—political, economic, social, and cultural. The life of the Communist elite is, however, not to be envied. Generally, the members of this group are hated. They are constantly threatened, even by the members of

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511 all kinds of diseases and a steep rise of the mortality rate;
242 corpses were thrown into sewers adjacent to the houses.
145 3. Universal poverty conducive to the spread of venereal diseases . . . one out of twelve persons is syphilitic according to recent reports furnished by the Minister of Health . . .'

All this time the fortunes of the capitalists were not touched as they were working for reparations for Russia. They and the new state bureaucracy flourished, while the lion's share of the surplus value produced in Rumania was taken, of course, by the Kremlin.*

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●693 state was not altered and many of the former officials remained
645 in office. Of the legal system, Pătrăşcaru could say: 'The procedures, methods, traditions and structure of Rumanian jurisprudence have remained unchanged since a Communist became Minister of Justice. No more than 20 new judges out of 2,000 have been appointed. About a quarter of the old staff have been purged or pensioned'. (*Christian Science Monitor*, 12th December, 1945). This policy is symbolised by the fact that 'Just two weeks before the start of the trial of Iuliu Maniu . . . a discreet announcement was published in Bucharest newspapers recording the appointment of a new chief of the military tribunal of the second army corps district (the one to preside over Maniu's trial—Y.G.) . . . the wartime director general of all prisons and concentration camps in Rumania'. (*New York Herald Tribune*, 7th November, 1947).

701 The structure of the army remained hierarchical, with the
645 complete subordination of the soldiers to their officers, and with no soldiers' committees. For three years even the composition of its personnel showed a marked continuity with the past. For instance, Lieutenant-Colonel Nicolae Cambrea, commander of the Rumanian units fighting against Russia at Stalingrad, was promoted by the Groza government to the rank of General, and appointed Assistant Chief of Staff. Major Popescu-Argetoia, an active Fascist in the past, was put at the head of the secret police. General Vasiliu Rascanu, Chief of Military Police during the war against Russia, was appointed Minister of War. Another old general, Pretorian, was appointed Chief of Staff at the same time. General Lascar,

*See above pp.

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161 These figures are subject to correction, but are adequate for the present purpose. They indicate that the population of Stamford, Connecticut, could be multiplied into this total subjected European population about fourteen hundred times. That is, every man, woman, and child in such a community has fourteen hundred counterparts over there. Fourteen hundred Stamfords with its schools and churches, its jails and railroad station, its doctors and lawyers, its butchers and bakers, its little children and its grandfathers—all of them, every day and every night, first under the heel of Hitler and then under the heel of Stalin.
668 And every living soul has been steeped in a bath of propaganda for twelve years, one version being that there exists a master race, and another that "Anglo-American imperialism" does an endless series of misdeeds, such as sending potato bugs to Eastern Germany and disease-spreading insects to Korea. He may not believe all this, but he must not say so even to himself.

For the nerve center of this propaganda is terror. The Communist always begins with the devices of infiltration. These he is taught to handle adroitly. He can take over a labor union almost before its members suspect that he has any desire to do so. In the presence of liberals he can be a boon companion, and discreetly assent to his neighbor's views about Whitehead or St. Thomas Aquinas. But when the Russian Army is on hand to support him he is camouflaged only moderately. Everyone knows that his bosses have arrived from Moscow after a period of intensive training. But so long as "imperialist powers" are in relative control he appreciates each and every opportunity to pretend that he is some one else.

668 697 He uses the radio and the newspaper, the friendly gathering of citizens, and the picture magazine. But the instrumentalities upon which he really relies are the secret police and the concentration camp. The police are not primarily there to ferret out plots. It is their business to cajole a vast army of informers

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into thinking that if they report the conversations and the past histories of others they themselves will be able to keep their skins relatively intact. The concentration camp is, however, the Communists' trump card. Anyone who causes trouble can be sent to one, and the supply is unlimited. The existence of such camps is, to be sure, so well known to the average person outside the Russian orbit that mention of them arouses relatively little interest. How many remember any longer the names of Dachau and Auschwitz?

Nevertheless the concentration camps operated by the Russians are very serious matters even to Americans, and may the Lord forbid that we ever get into them. But if we suppose that Thomas Murphy of Dubuque, Iowa, proprietor of a stationery store, were suddenly put into one before his wife could get much more than his toothbrush into his briefcase, we shall have a fairly good idea of what has been happening to hundreds of thousands of poor people in Eastern Europe for a long time and to all Central Europeans since 1945.

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We know rather less about Russia's slave-labor camps than, perhaps, we should; but even so the information is considerable. Some of what is known comes from sources which cannot be divulged. A good deal has also been supplied by persons who once resided in such camps. The system as such is thirty years old, though it has probably never been so extensive and well organized as it now is. Two purposes are served by it, which we may assume are those which the Nazis also posited as goals, even if their social objectives and methods were in some respects different from those of the Communists. Human beings can be used as beasts of burden in carrying out enterprises sponsored by the government. Secondly, if anyone is suspected of disloyalty, "sabotage," or difference of opinion, he can be removed from normal social life. Soviet society is a Gargantuan feat of human engineering. In the present state of tech-

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chosen by lot. Then at the appointed hour in the night they pounce on their victim and hack him to pieces in a bestial fashion. 697

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Such is the situation in Russia. There are also concentration camps in the satellite countries, called in Communist language "People's Democracies." It has been estimated that more than 1,000,000 persons have been sent to such camps, and the number may be far greater. Not included in this figure, for example, are Eastern Germany and the former Baltic States. The existence of concentration camps has been widely advertised, and decrees establishing them are on the statute books of all the People's Democracies. The decrees merely apply to the country in question the provisions of Article 59 of the Criminal Code of U.S.S.R. The first Article of the Criminal Code of Rumania, for example, as reported by Albert K. Herling, reads as follows: 697 466 177. 69 671 687

> Criminal law has for its purpose defending the Rumanian People's Republic and its legal order against actions dangerous to society by enforcing legal measures of social defense against persons who commit such actions. In the meaning of the preceding paragraph any action and omission that brings harm to the economic, social and political structure, or to the security of the Rumanian People's Republic, or which disturbs the legal order established by the people under the leadership of the working class is to be considered dangerous to society. The actions which are considered dangerous for society can be punished even when they are not expressly prohibited by law. In such cases the extent and limit of criminal responsibility is to be determined in accordance with the legal provisions in force for similar crimes.*

E.

The number of camps in the area reported by persons who assert that they were present in them is so vast that the names by 466 697

* Statement issued on June 18, 1952, in behalf of the International League for the Rights of Man.

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466 which they go and the places where they are situated would fill
● 697 a small directory. Thus 179 have been reported from Czechoslovakia alone. If the information gathered is correct, there are at least six hundred slave-labor institutions in the People's Democracies. The use to which this labor is put, according to reports, is significant. In Rumania slave laborers, for example, work on farms, at power plants, on the construction of railroads and bridges, on the digging of canals, and in factories. Of interest also is the manner in which the system has been developed. Both Poland and Czechoslovakia witnessed the deportation to Russia, during the early stages of the occupation, of hundreds of thousands of people deemed hostile to Communism. Popular resentment of this brought about a temporary lull. What happened next, if one can judge by the experience of the Czechs and Slovaks, is that the government was authorized to compel workers to remain on jobs deemed to be in the national interest. This action was described as an emergency measure. The net result, however, was that young workers suspected of being hostile to the Communist regime were disciplined.

466 After the seizure of power by the Communists in 1948, several decrees were issued authorizing the government of Czechoslovakia to establish commissions of three to determine whether citizens should be sentenced to forced labor. Liability was very broadly defined. Thus one decree stipulated that "persons who are not less than eighteen and not more than sixty years of age, and are physically and mentally capable of working but evade work or threaten the establishment of the people's democratic order," might be sent to work camps for periods not less than three months and not longer than two years. In addition very stringent regulations were laid down concerning the supply of labor. No one was any longer to change his place of employment unless the responsible au-

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642 Stalin-Tito relations her communist system was much fur-
177 ther advanced than that of any other Iron Curtain country, and since the break with Stalin only insignificant changes have been made in the structure of the highest organs of government. Tito still declares clearly and without any reservation that he intends to maintain the communist system in that country at any price.

IV

208 When communist propaganda speaks of the liberation of
661 the oppressed masses from the slavery of the privileged and the rich, it stresses the term, People's Democracy. But does this term really signify freedom? Does it respect human dignity? Does it recognize equality among the people? Does it abolish undue privileges and the exploitation of the working people? It does not. In practice, it does not even provide personal freedom or personal security.

• 697 The overcrowded prisons and the many thousands of peo-
661 ple in the forced labor camps bear witness to this. The Soviet Union and all the countries occupied by it are a large prison from which the majority of the people would escape if they only could. They would flee from the "Communist paradise" partly because of the difficult economic conditions, but mostly because of the unbearable atmosphere created by the insecurity and complete lack of freedom which are part of this system.

The majority of the people escaping today are average people—workers, peasants, craftsmen, small merchants, and others who have never belonged to any privileged or exploiting class. I have read a number of books on the living conditions in the Soviet forced labor camps; I have studied thousands of reports of Poles who have passed through Soviet camps and prisons; I have had hundreds of talks with the victims of the Soviet regime. And I have come

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o the belief that human language is unable to express the whole truth about the greatest disgrace to mankind that the wentieth century will know—the Soviet forced labor camps. 697 661

A sentence to a forced labor camp amounts to a sentence f death because the enormous majority of the inmates in hese camps cannot exist under the conditions prevailing here and die before they are released. The inmate of such a amp works beyond his strength, knowing that if his productivity falls his starvation-level food ration will be cut. The nstinct for self-preservation urges him to defend himself rom death, and his reactions become those of a hungry animal. All his human feelings disappear, even his attitude toward his fellow inmates. Degraded and humiliated as a uman being, the prisoner works like an animal for his enemies only to prolong his life by a year or two and then inevitably to perish. [466]

Political freedom does not exist in the Communist countries either under law or in practice. Let us take for example Article 72 of the Polish constitution of July 1952. Similar provisions will be found in all other Communist constitutions. The first lines of Article 72 say that the citizens have the right of political organization, but the third paragraph of the same article says that organization of assemblies and participation in an organization which opposes the political and social system of People's Poland are forbidden. In other words, any party which does not recognize the Communist political system is forbidden, and membership in it is punishable. 641 665

Since membership in a political party presupposes some right to influence that party, the question arises whether the Communists find it advisable to allow every citizen to belong to his country's Communist Party. The answer is no. The official statistics of the Communist parties in the occupied countries as well as in the Soviet Union show that the number of members of these parties ranges from 5 to 10 per cent

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511 all kinds of diseases and a steep rise of the mortality rate;
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*See above pp.

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Brigadier-General on the anti-Soviet Front in 1941, who received the Knight Cross of the Iron Cross from Hitler, was, after joining the Communist Party, considered 'loyal' enough to be appointed Minister of War!

The enthusiasm of the Communist Party for 'law and order' is illustrated by their ardour for the monarchy. On November 3rd, 1946, Premier Groza declared: 'The King, the Church, the Army, the People and the Government are one'. A few days later, at a meeting of the Communist-controlled Front organisation, the National Democratic Bloc, Vice-Premier Tătărescu said: 'From Gheorghiu Dej (leader of the Communist Party—Y.G.) to myself we shall all fight together for the consolidation of the Monarchy, because we are convinced that the King is the strongest factor that rallies all Rumanians. We shall fight for the consolidation of the National Church and of private property, the source of all creative enterprise'. (*East Europe*, an informative London weekly, 13th November, 1946). On November 8th, King Michael's birthday, the Communist daily *Era Noua* said: 'The people of Rumania have faith in their King.' (*East Europe*, 20th November, 1946). In the election demonstrations of the National Democratic Bloc, a constantly repeated slogan was 'Trăiască Regele!'—'Long live the King!' On 17th November, 1946, at an army electoral meeting in Bucharest, Gheorghiu Dej concluded his speech appealing for a vote for the 'King's Government': 'Long live the King!' 'Long live his commanders and soldiers! Long live the Army which is his and the people's!' The monarchist enthusiasm of the Communist Party reached such heights that they attacked the Peasant Party leader, Maniu as . . . anti-monarchist. Thus *Era Noua* of December 3rd, 1946, referring to the withdrawal of Maniu and his followers from parliament, suggested that 'in fact, Maniu's unparliamentary attitude is only a guise for his anti-dynastic policy. Maniu has already tried his first obstructive move in King Michael's reign . . . Neither Ferdinand nor King Carol were exempt from Maniu's political tactics'! (*East Europe*, 18th December, 1946). To crown the hypocrisy of the leaders of the Communist Party, on November 8th, 1947, their paper, *Scanteia*, wrote: 'The people wish to His Majesty the King a long life, good health, and a reign rich in democratic achievements' (*The New York Times*, November 9th,

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or rich peasants under their control and therefore no obvious targets for social discontent. 668 471

After that the industrial bourgeoisie was expropriated, without a formal renunciation of the Bihać programme, by the legal confiscation of the property of traitors. It was not until 5th December, 1946, that a nationalisation law was passed and this simply registered what was already an accomplished fact.

Because the Partisans operated far from the industrial centres, they consisted almost entirely of peasants. Although the workers of Yugoslavia supported the Communist Party almost to a man, they played a very small part in the movement. In the words of Bogdan Raditsa, a former press service director of the Tito government: ' . . . the working class was far from being a vital factor in the resistance, as the Communists allege in their propaganda. For the workers remained in the big-city factories or were sent into Hitler's labor camps'. (*New Republic*, September 16th, 1946). The peasant character of the Partisan movement explains its original plebeian and democratic character. It also explains why the Communist Party of Yugoslavia could easily impose its conservative programme upon it during 1941-44 and why the Partisan Army was easily transformed into a stratified army, a development common to many peasant guerillas, for instance, the Spanish guerillas fighting Napoleon. 668 701

In the beginning there was real democracy in the army. There were no ranks and no medals and after each operation meetings were held at which each partisan had the opportunity of making a public criticism of any aspect of the operation. For two years during the first four Offensives which put the Partisans to their severest test, this procedure was followed. But on May Day, 1943, the ranks of officers and N.C.O.'s were introduced, and in the next four months about 5,000 officers and 11 generals were created; Tito was raised to the rank of Marshal in November, 1943. In the state administration, the principle of electing People's Committees was rigorously adhered to in the countryside until the Partisans advanced from the mountainous and backward areas to the large towns, when they were no longer elected but *appointed*. When, as sometimes happened, elections were held, they were only a formality, as there was only one list of candidates. The

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668 The generals, colonels and other officers of the[1] army became the
701 backbone of the new state administration and monopolised all
471 political power. It was this new bureaucratic caste which carried out the nationalisation of industry, transferring all the industrial wealth of the country into its own hands.

Thus the Partisan movement passed from being a plebeian democracy with a progressive policy on the national question and a conservative social programme, to bureaucratic state capitalism.

[1] [Partisan army of Yugoslavia -- Analyst]

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Minister of Foreign Trade in Czechoslovakia until February, 1948, and who is now in exile. He states that on the eve of the Communist coup of February 'All the important posts in the Ministry of the Interior were occupied by Communists; in the division of the security police, of nine departmental heads, five were Communists. At the head of the three branches of the Corps of National Security Police (S.N.B.) there were only militant Communists: Colonel Krystof, Dr. Hora and Dr. Goerner. In one of the particularly important sections of the security police (Section III–2), of nineteen officers, fourteen were Communists. In the directing office of the Corps of the National Security Police, of thirteen officers, nine were Communists. At Central headquarters of the political police, the three chief posts were in Communist hands. In the intelligence services the Communists dominated, even in the lower ranks. In the Prague headquarters of the provincial S.N.B., of five high officers, four were members of the Communist Party. Of seventeen regional directors of the S.N.B. in Bohemia, twelve were Communists. Of a total of seventy high officers of the S.N.B., about sixty were members of the Communist Party'. (*Czechoslovakia Enslaved*, London, 1950, p. 195). In the other satellites, there is no doubt that the Communist infiltration into key positions in the police was even more thorough. It is an apt comment that Andrássy Ut in Budapest, in which the dreaded headquarters of the Special Security Police is found, now bears instead the name of Stalin!

A similar situation existed in the army. A symbol of the complete control of the Kremlin over the armies of the satellite countries was the appointment of the Soviet Army Marshal, Constantin Rokossovsky, as Polish Minister of National Defence (7th November, 1949) in place of Marshal Michal Rola-Zymierski.* Rokossovsky was born in Warsaw when it was part of Russian Poland, but has had as much to do with Poland as the Irish-born Field-Marshal Montgomery with his native country. He became famous, or more exactly notorious, in Poland, at the time of the Warsaw uprising, as the commander

*Rola-Zymierski was one of the few of Pilsudski's Legionnaires who took an oath of allegiance to the Germans in World War I. He was a commander of the Polish Army in the war against Russia in 1920. In 1927 he was tried and convicted on a charge of bribery, degraded, cashiered and sentenced to five years' imprisonment. The Kremlin raised him to the position of Commander-in-Chief of the Polish forces and Minister of National Defence.

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of the Russian armies which passively looked on while the Nazis massacred the rebels. After the war he was groomed for command of the Polish Army by being kept in Poland as Commander-in-Chief of the Soviet troops guarding Russia's lines of communication with the Soviet Zone of Germany. 661 701

The Chief of Staff of the Polish Army, General Korczyc, and the Vice-Minister of Defence, General Poplawski, are also former commanders of the Soviet Army. On April 24th, 1950, the emigre Hungarian Communist monthly *Magyar Kommunista* reported that Soviet Commander General Mensikov, had been appointed 'Supervisor of the Hungarian Army.'

Besides controlling the 'national' armies the Kremlin keeps troops in four of the satellite countries, officially to protect the lines of communication leading to the Soviet Zones of Germany and Austria. These are Rumania, Hungary, Bulgaria and Poland. The only two countries with no Russian army are Czechoslovakia and Yugoslavia. The former, bordering on the U.S.S.R. and squeezed between Poland, Hungary, the Soviet Zone of Germany and the Soviet Zone of Austria (with a short frontier with the American Zone of Germany) is from the military point of view well 'looked after'. In Yugoslavia, the non-existence of a Russian army and the fact that there is no frontier with the U.S.S.R. were of no small importance in the daring revolt of Tito against the Kremlin.

Secure in their control over army and police, the Communists could proceed to the elimination of all other parties. 1/1

1/1 [See category 116, pp. 160 - 182 -- Analyst]

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642 have been made to the peasants, state cooperatives are still maintained in the heavy grain producing areas by forces other than the peasants' love of the soil and its products.

If the Yugoslav government will learn the meaning of Lord Acton's axiom on the nature of power, and if the West pursues an intelligent, long-range foreign policy supporting Yugoslavia against Soviet aggression, it may be possible to revive in Yugoslavia and hence in the Balkans as a whole the elements of an independent political life.

V

000 The months following the death of Premier Stalin in March 1953, saw a number of internal changes in the various people's democracies. The principal means of coercion and political control nevertheless remained unchanged: the army and the police forces. These were still bound tightly to Russian controls.

177, 70 701 625 The total number of men in the satellite armies available for service with the Soviet army has been estimated at a million and one-half. Since they are not only trained under Soviet commanders, but operate under the Soviet military code, it is possible to state that the Sovietization of the satellite armies has been completed. Together with the armies, the satellite police form the backbone of the Soviet instruments of coercion. Estimated at a total of 700,000 men, police units organized in military formations range in function from the well-known secret police to People's Militia, Frontier Guards, and Railway Guards. Like the satellite armies, the satellite police are governed by Soviet regulations. Together they enforce a system of order which has been designed to conform with the Soviet model.

241 656 In common with Yugoslavia, certain states in the orbit are strengthening the weakest sector of the economy: agriculture. It is not certain that the Yugoslav experience compelled the

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701, 648

[For military organization in Czechoslovakia, Poland, Hungary, and Romania and for the Russian domination of the military in these satellite countries see category 116, pp. 1-117, 147-154]

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648 area. It is unjust to accuse the Eastern European states of
439 favoring Germany when this country alone was willing to trade with them and did not demand hard currency payments. Germany bought large quantities of Eastern European products and forced the sellers to buy from her various articles, including gadgets, luxury goods, and many other products, the prices of which were beyond the purchasing power of the buyers.

668 Antisemitic movements in Eastern Europe often received
578 aid in the form of money from Nazi Germany which practice increased dependence upon that country. Through the various Nazi-supported parties in almost every country and through fifth column organizations, the Germans instigated conflicts between the ruling classes and the dissatisfied social elements. At the same time antibolshevik propaganda was strongly and successfully supported by German diplomacy.

648 Czechoslovakia, in 1938, was the first to lose her independence. Poland fell in 1939, and Yugoslavia followed in 1941. The years 1939 through 1944 were truly critical for Eastern Europe. The German-Russian imperialistic pincers tightened steadily. Nazi Germany won easy diplomatic victories over the Western European powers whose conciliatory policies were astounding. Even more astounding was their sudden turn to anti-German propaganda and war. Squeezed between the arbitrary policy of the Western powers and the expanding German and Soviet giants, the Eastern European nations had no other choice than to muddle through. Apprehensively watching an alliance of giants and often impressed by the achievements of these powers, they tried to appease them, aid them, or fight them.

• 722 Peace economy was turned into war economy. This decreased unemployment, and war losses decreased it even further. The most active age group, already reduced by the slump in birth rate after the First World War, was thinned even more. Youth, accustomed to tackling problems in terms

722 of romantic politics, opposed everything that
represented the traditions and experience of the
older generation. The potential balancing factor,
which was the activity of the middle-aged group,
was already weak due to the small numbers of
000 this group. The West did not offer any stable
philosophy and the East had only a negative one--
that of destroying the West. In the midst of
this confusion stood Eastern Europe, a region
of mixed peoples and small countries inimical
to one another and not fully understanding the
rights and responsibilities that they had so
recently acquired. Although they foresaw the
dangers ahead, they could not resist the pre-
ssure of their larger neighbors. The traditional
society and the new institutions of these
countries disintegrated, and once again they
became an area of military conflict between the
great powers.

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648 tionist. The first, which is roughly the one described above,
642 is not tenable. Documentary evidence which has appeared since the war makes it difficult to consider the Popular Front as anything but an instrument of Communist advance. It is quite evident that the Communists were not renouncing their ultimate aims either in Eastern Europe or elsewhere. It is also clear that the U.S.S.R. was not seriously prepared to stand up for the collective security it was calling for, although admittedly it was never required to do so. At the time of Munich, the Germans were not particularly anxious about the danger from the Soviet side. Moreover, it appears from the diplomatic memoirs of the Eastern European statesmen that they tended, as a group, to view the Soviet danger in the traditional terms of the "colossus of the East" as a perennial threat, whether or not it had a Communist regime. Thus their suspicions of the U.S.S.R. cannot be reduced to a reflection of the "class conflict."

Regarding the second interpretation, it should be recognized that there was a special antipathy to the U.S.S.R. on the part of the Eastern European countries, which led to certain misjudgments of the relative dangers existing in the 1930's. Pilsudski, for example, after ordering an intelligence survey of his two powerful neighbors in 1933-34, concluded that, while both were dangerous from the Polish point of view, in the short run the Soviet Union was more likely than Germany to follow an erratic and aggressive course. This proved to be a miscalculation. One nevertheless gains the impression that a similar mood was prevalent in the diplomatic circles of Eastern Europe. This served to reduce the area of maneuverability in the final crisis and did not afford any way out of the tragic impasse of 1939.

648 During the war years, Eastern Europe disappeared as a
722 region of independent states. Germany and the Soviet Union divided most of the area into spheres of influence and, with the German attack on Russia in June 1941, the whole region

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fell directly or indirectly under German domination. There 648
was, nevertheless, some continuity. Among the governments- 722
in-exile, the struggle for future independence was clear and explicit. Likewise, among the German satellites, there was a persistent attempt to maintain a degree of independence. The extent of the resistance of Hungary to Hitler has come out quite clearly since the war in the memoirs of the statesmen involved. Even such an active and cooperative Eastern European satellite leader as Marshal Antonescu seems finally to have placed his hopes on a German defeat from the West, while he continued in the effort to keep Russia at bay in the East.

It should also be noted, however, that the old frictions did 648
not disappear. One major motive for Antonescu's entering 186
the war, apart from the desire to recover Bessarabia, was his wish to put himself in a favorable position vis-à-vis Germany to press for the return of Northern Transylvania, which had been lost to Hungary in 1940. This old conflict continued unabated throughout the war.

It is worth noting, finally, the importance to Eastern Eu- 000
rope of the fact that Russia did not emerge victorious in the First World War. We do not know what such a Russian regime would have been like or how it would have treated Eastern Europe, but we do have some clues from the secret treaties and arrangements made by the Entente powers during the war. Poland, including the German and Austrian sections, would probably have been incorporated into Russia. By an agreement in 1915 Russia was to obtain Constantinople and the Turkish territory in Europe. In a Russian-French exchange of notes in February 1917, Russia was given complete freedom to determine its own western frontiers. Thus the intrusion of Russia far into Eastern Europe was a likelihood in 1914-18, and was staved off in 1919-21 only to reappear as a reality in 1945 under new and decidedly more dangerous circumstances. In this sense there had been

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382 synthetic oil; at the end of 1943, despite increasingly heavy Allied strafing from the air, this output increased to over six million tons, almost 80 percent of which was produced by the Bergius method. More than half, and possibly as much as three quarters of that oil, was produced in the present captive area, mainly by the Leuna, Most, and Pölitz plants. At that time the synthetic oil plants were consuming 16 percent of all electric power produced by "Greater" Germany, and used 10 million tons of coal and 60 million tons of lignite per year.

Nearly all these plants were heavily damaged during the last months of the war and some of them, like Pölitz, practically [727] destroyed from the air.[32] When the Russians moved into the present captive area in 1945, they dismantled all Polish and many German plants and sent their installations to Russia. The Most plant, taken intact, was declared war trophy and subsequently returned to the Czech government in exchange for the Jachymov uranium mines nearby.[33] All remaining German plants were taken over by the Soviet "state trusts." Several of these plants, like Zeitz and Schwarzheide, belong to the Soviet trust, "Synthese," while Leuna and Lützkendorf constitute special units. Though situated in German territory, the synthetic oil plants are operated under Russian management and may be considered for all practical purposes as Soviet property.

It is difficult to appraise the present capacity and production of the synthetic oil plants in the captive area, since information on this type of production is a closely guarded state secret. It is known, however, that the Leuna, Zeitz, Böhlen, and one of the two Lützkendorf plants in Eastern Germany,[34] as well as the Most plant in Bohemia and the Dwory plant in Poland, do produce synthetic oil on a much lesser scale than during the last war. They also produce the innumerable by-products made by plants of this kind. Speaking on the subject in January 1951, the Eastern German minister of heavy industry, Selbmann, said that he was proud of the "balance-sheet" of this type of industry and its performance in 1950: the annual plan was overfulfilled by 16 percent, with particularly good results at Leuna and

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1 HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVE

114 FOR A YEAR AND a half I had some concern with the Iron Curtain as United States Land Commissioner for Bavaria.
● 727 It took seven days of hard driving to inspect all of it that was of interest to our side. Across one part of it, that contiguous to East Germany, you could move rather freely if you were not an American. The other part, bordering on Czechoslovakia, was quite different. For here the Curtain on the Czech side was a strip of evacuated terrain, normally about four miles wide, inside which houses were falling into ruin and grass was growing up through the pavement. This was patrolled by young men in nondescript uniforms carrying tommy guns. Sometimes strange things happened, as when a group of Czechs commandeered a train and simply steamed across the border into the land of at least relative freedom. Or there was the afternoon when a coachful of aged and sick nuns was suddenly dumped on the platform of the German frontier station. Some of them died right there, and others were driven off by the Bavarians to friendly convents where they could pass their last days. One never knew what was coming—bullet or straggler or escapee

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114 seeking asylum. There was a campful of escapees, mostly
727 Czechs and Slovaks, at Valka near Nuremberg.

We Americans used before the war to roam freely in the countries on the other side. Many of us either came from there or are descended from people who did. It is strange not to be able to cross the border now, and of course the fact makes it only too easy to consign the whole region to a sort of mono-
181 chrome limbo. We need to remind ourselves constantly that here are some of the oldest, most cultivated, most individualistic, and most heroic of the nations of the West. Were one merely to list all the deeds of great valor which have been wrought here in more than two thousand years, or all the notable works of art, music, and literature which were created by men at home in these regions, the summary would be a brilliant one, indeed. Yet it is no doubt primarily dedication to religion that gave these cultures their individuality and vitality.

121 For convenience's sake we may follow Julius Caesar's example and divide the whole area into three parts. The first embraces the lands which were once portions of the Austro-Hungarian Empire, which collapsed in 1918 but, despite its faults, must in retrospect be termed one of the most coherent and civilized states known to modern history. Once I compared notes with Arnold Toynbee about the singular fact that wherever one crossed those vanished boundaries, whether to the north of Cracow or to the east of Budapest, the sense of coming into the familiar world of the West was immediate and unmistakable. There was a manifest ease and gracefulness of the art of living, reflected in all the many buildings, humble or ornate, in which that art found expression. Vienna, Prague, Budapest, Cracow, Zagreb, Bratislava—these cities were built by the collective genius which Austria somehow managed to evoke and nurture, even though the people who lived in them might more often than not talk of tyranny.

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The second part used to be called the Balkans, because these /21/
lands, north of the Greek seas, were identified with the mountains which traversed them. Ancient Rome had established its power on their slopes, and later the peoples who settled there after the Slovenian invasions of the Dark Ages accepted the faith of the Eastern Church. To this they clung with fidelity during centuries of subjection to the Turks; and as soon as their freedom had been regained this faith was everywhere restored in cities and rural communes alike. It is unfortunate that so little about this aspect of Rumanian and Bulgarian history has been known to us generally. Recalled recently with philosophic nostalgia in such books as Gheorghiu's *Twenty-fifth Hour*, some awareness of it is an indispensable prerequisite for judging what has happened during the last terrible years.

The third part consists of Poland outside the old Austrian /21/
border, the small Baltic States to the north (Latvia, Estonia, 927
and Lithuania) given back to bondage by Hitler in an hour of mad bargaining for power, and those territories taken from Germany in the aftermath of the Yalta and Potsdam conferences. The tragedy which has befallen these peoples is heartrending. It is believed, for example, that one-fourth of the population of Estonia has been deported to Siberia by the Russians. Whatever the blunders of all governments concerned may have been, it is difficult to read the chronicles of horror inflicted on their erstwhile subjects without shuddering. There is little even in the history of Nazi savagery which can outdo, for example, the conquest of German Silesia. Consider, by way of illustration, the fate of Neisse, center of Silesian Catholic activity, which was entered by the Russian army on Palm Sunday, 1945. After scenes of rape, murder, and violence almost unparalleled even in the long history of war, the little city with its priceless churches was put to the torch, so that the thousand inmates of the great home for the aged burned to death in their

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121 beds. All these lands will never again become what they once
● 727 were—regions of constant struggle and short-lived serenity, of poverty and its exploitation, of poetry, fervor, and sadness. Those of us who have, for example, seen peasant women trudging for many miles through the omnipresent dust to kneel for an hour at the shrines of Silesia will never forget either the fact or its meaning.

781 There is not a foot of the old soil of Central Europe which
156 has not been consecrated by endurance for the sake of the things of the spirit and the mind. Indeed, I have sometimes wondered, reading the Polish and Silesian poets and novelists, why the longing to hold out should have persisted during many difficult centuries—why, for instance, Polish forests in thrall to the Czars should have hidden priest and ritual with such fidelity. Perhaps the explanation, in so far as it is of this world, can be found in the deep human urge for the preservation of identity. Custom and language were vital symbols of the self, and without them men felt they could not live. But stronger than all else was the deep, primitive, mystical desire for identification with Eternal Righteousness, manifest to the believer in the life of the Redeemer. To give up the faith was to surrender not merely one's self but the world as well.

798 To be sure these men and women were very human, often
563 poverty-stricken and untutored, sometimes intolerant and oppressive. The effort to conserve themselves and their identity spilled over into moments of vengeful outrage inflicted upon others because they were different. Thus anti-Semitism has a long history in Eastern Europe studded with bloody pogroms. Although curbed in Austro-Hungarian regions it was latent there, too, as the shameful events of 1938 proved, but manifest elsewhere continuously with varying intensity. Or who can forget the repression of the Ukrainians in Poland under the Pilsudski government, the conflict between Czechs and Slovaks,

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10 The Structure of the Soviet Orbit

JACOB B. HOPTNER

000 Political satellite systems are not unknown in recorded history. Maintaining the myth of independence, satellite governments are always similar in structure and political ideology to the primary political planet around which they revolve. Thus the path or orbit in which the secondary planets travel is preordained by the major planet.

I

727 The Soviet orbit was born in the winter of 1944-45, when the standards of the victorious Soviet armies were firmly implanted by their bearers into the soil of Eastern Europe. By May 1945, the flag of the Kremlin flew from Stettin in the Baltic to the frontiers of Greece and Turkey. This territorial conquest cannot be ascribed to the success of Russian diplomacy alone. The decisions reached at the diplomatic conference tables merely confirmed the advances of the Red Army divisions. The diplomatic agreements, which were derived from wartime military developments, nevertheless contributed their share to the extension of Communism over Eastern Europe. The Soviet Union successfully utilized the

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main body of interallied agreements—particularly those of Moscow, Teheran, Yalta, and Potsdam, along with the armistice agreements and the subsequent peace treaties—as their authority to impress the Soviet system of controls over the territories newly taken from the Germans.

By the end of 1945, the Soviet Union was in a position to control the political destinies of Rumania, Hungary, and Bulgaria under the sanctions provided by the armistice terms. However, the process of coordination into the Soviet sphere was anything but smooth and gave little evidence of the much-vaunted Russian planning. Although Rumania was under the Russian thumb within twelve days after the signing of the Yalta agreement, that unhappy country remained a monarchy until December 1947. Czechoslovakia did not fall completely into the Soviet net until 1948, while Hungary fought a losing battle until 1947. Controlled elections elsewhere facilitated the extension of Communist power, so that between the period 1945 and the end of the year 1947 the process of political assimilation was completed. Local Communist parties were installed in all countries—save Yugoslavia where political control had been in the hands of the Communist Party since 1944—by the grace of the Soviet power. In this period the Soviet pattern of inculcating obedience through terror was rapidly imposed.

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From the Soviet point of view this revolution was but an action on the part of sovereign states, rather than of satellite states as that term is used in the West. Not only were the states of Eastern Europe sovereign, according to Communist doctrine, but the Communist parties that controlled the political life of their respective countries held that their major function was to protect the national independence of their states against the imperialism of the West. This theory had expression in the basic document of the Communist Information Bureau—the resolution on world affairs which appeared on October 5, 1947.

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648 significance. It represents the application of the old Russian distrust and fear of multilateral groupings formed by neighbor states along Russia's borders. This traditional attitude has been applied by the Kremlin to its satellites in the Soviet orbit to prevent federation schemes and especially closer economic and ultimately political ties between Communist Poland and Communist Czechoslovakia, that might eventually give groups of these countries bargaining power with the Soviet Union.

III

648 In any discussion of the Soviet orbit—particularly during
727 the developments of the first postwar years—a clear distinction must be made by the reader between two types of states. The first includes the former enemy countries: Rumania, Hungary, and Bulgaria. In the second are the countries that were in the Allied camp: Albania, Czechoslovakia, Poland, and Yugoslavia.

The former Axis satellites were required by the peace treaties to pay reparations not only to the Soviet Union but to certain allied countries as well. Thus Hungary was to pay reparations to Yugoslavia and to Czechoslovakia while Bulgaria was to pay Yugoslavia and Greece. Since payments were made in goods, they represented a budget item rather than items in international trade. The armistice agreements further established the right of the Soviet Union to charge Bulgaria, Hungary, and Rumania with the costs of occupation. The Potsdam Agreement also recognized the right of the Soviet Union to the so-called German and Italian assets located in the territories in these three countries. In this period the orbit served as a source of raw materials and a processor of finished and semifinished goods for the Soviet Union.

As early as 1945, the Soviet Union began to negotiate

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incapacity of Russia to supply their needs made it more and more pressing for them to try to get equipment from Western Europe. This need expressed itself in the case of Yugoslavia in a revolt against the Moscow ukase (see Part III, *The Rebellious Satellite*) and in the case of the other satellites in an appeal to the West to supply the goods—an appeal that, because of its expediency, was not vetoed by Moscow. At the Conference of the Economic Commission for Europe of the United Nations, the Polish and Czech delegates asked for trade with Western Europe, by which they could obtain capital goods. The Bulgarian delegate stated that his country could not improve her economic position to any extent without increasing her imports, especially of machines, from the West. (United Nations Documents, E/ECE/SR4/1-25).

Russia, with the majority of her population engaged in agriculture, is faced with the same problem as her satellites (apart from the Czech lands of Czechoslovakia and the Soviet Zones of Germany and Austria)—large-scale industrialisation. The terrible destruction suffered by the U.S.S.R. in World War II, as well as the preparations for World War III, which require the same materials as industrialisation—steel, coal, machinery, etc.—render Russia even less able to help the countries of Eastern Europe.

Dismantling, Looting, Requisitioning

When the populations of Eastern Europe, mainly of the ex-enemy countries, first met the Russian Army and State officials, they did not see them bringing gifts, supplying machinery, locomotives, etc., but looting their country.

Stalin forgot that the Communist International had preached for years against the reparation articles of the Versailles Treaty, and had reiterated that the German workers bore the real burden of reparations, although they did not profit in any way from the war. In World War II the crimes of the Nazi Army were incomparably worse than those of the Kaiser Army in World War I, yet the German people drew no benefit at all from this. On the contrary, the first victim of the Hitler terror was the German people itself. The 800 thousand German Communists, Socialists, trade unionists, Catholics, etc. (not including the German Jews) who passed through prisons and

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648 concentration camps in the twelve years of Hitler's rule are
• 728 testimony to this. What magnificent heroism on the part of unarmed and helpless people to challenge the brutal state machine with its all-seeing eye and unlimited terror!

The Communist Parties knew all this very well. Immediately after June 1941 they emphasised that this time, because of Russia's part in the war, no new Versailles Treaty with reparations clauses would be imposed and that the German people would not be made to pay for the crimes of their rulers. The German proletariat, they said, was not more responsible for the war than the English or the French, and they repeated the same views on the question of reparations as the Communist International had after World War I. At that time the leaders of the French Communist Party explained why the French workers should oppose the exaction of reparations from Germany. Thus Gabriel Peri wrote in an article entitled 'On the Eve of the Reparations Conference': '. . . the workers of France and Germany have only *one* interest, viz., that of forming a revolutionary front against financial capital and the heavy industries in both countries. For the enormous sums at stake (the reparations—YG) will naturally be squeezed out of the working masses'. (*International Press Correspondence*, February 1st, 1929).

But all this changed with the hope of Russian victory. With Russia becoming the Power able to extract reparations, her opposition in principle to reparations vanished. Instead she decided to take reparations on a far larger scale than ever the French Government had dared after World War I.

648 Edward Charles in his article 'Reparations, 1919-31', in
728 *The Banker* of April, 1945, writes on the reparations that
434 Germany paid after the first world war: 'Reparations before the Dawes Plan brought in some 8 milliard gold marks. From September, 1924, to the end they yielded a further 10 milliards'. There is no reliable calculation of the national income of Germany between the end of the first world war and the introduction of the Dawes Plan. It is therefore impossible to calculate what proportion of the national income reparations made up. But for the years 1924-32 this figure is available. The total national income of Germany for these 9 years was calculated at 564.3 milliard marks, and in the same period

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Germany paid reparations to the extent of 9.8 milliard marks, or 1.7 per cent of the national income. In no year after the first world war did the reparations paid by Germany exceed 4 per cent of the national income. To calculate the burden of these reparations, other criteria besides the national income, such as budget revenue or exports, can be applied. The reparations Germany paid rose from 12.9 per cent of the budget revenue of Germany or 9.9 per cent of the value of its exports in 1924-5, to 25.7 per cent and 18.4 per cent respectively in 1928-9.

With regard to Germany's looting of Europe during the second world war, German official statistics admit that up to 1943 the Reich got from the occupied countries 'special incomes' amounting to 50 milliard marks. British official estimates give a figure of 12.8 milliard dollars for the same period. The two figures thus nearly tally. Nearly all the German robbery took place immediately after the occupation. If we, therefore, assume that the annual looting of the occupied countries by Germany after 1943 was the same as the annual average of 1939 to 1943, we shall certainly not underestimate it: on this basis the total German looting amounted to 20-25 milliard dollars.

A comparison between the reparations paid by Germany after the first world war—about 18 milliard marks or 3.6 milliard dollars—with the 'reparations' that Germany took from Europe in the second world war—20-25 milliard dollars—reveals the increasingly plunderous character of declining capitalism, as exemplified by the Hitler regime.

Russia's attitude to the question of reparations after the second world war was expressed clearly by Prof. Varga in an article published in *War and the Working Class*, 15th October, 1943. He concluded that Germany must pay reparations to the tune of 90 milliard marks or about 22 milliard dollars, and he stated that the Russian government asked in addition for ten million German workers to be sent to Russia for reconstruction work.

A claim for such large reparations, coupled with a demand for ten million workers, i.e., nearly a third of the total German working class, was incompatible with the existence of Germany as an important industrial country. At Yalta, consequently,

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648 Stalin had to demand that 80 per cent of German industry
● 728 should be dismantled within two years of the cease-fire. (James F. Byrnes, *Speaking Frankly*, London, 1948, pp. 26-7).

In view of the division of Germany between East and West, Russia did not want to exclude the possibility of the Communist Party's influencing the German people, and so she did not press her claim for ten million slave labourers or the dismantling of 80 per cent of German industry. Nevertheless the total sum lost by Germany directly and indirectly under the post-war arrangements in the East exceeded the total sum for which Varga asked.

It is difficult to get a full picture of this looting, as it was carried out in many guises, and those responsible for it were of course extremely anxious to conceal what was happening. But the following facts are incontestable.

First, millions of Germans were expelled from their homes and lost their property. The President of Poland, Bierut, estimated that Poland's gains in the West, i.e., from Germany, have an investment value of 9½ milliard dollars. The property of the Sudeten Germans of Czechoslovakia was estimated at 4 milliard dollars. If we assume that the rest of the Germans who inhabited the former territory of Poland, Hungary, Rumania, etc., were on the average as wealthy as the inhabitants of the portion of Eastern Germany that was annexed to Poland and the Sudetan region, their property must be evaluated at about 6 milliard dollars. Therefore the expulsion of the Germans alone brought in 'reparations' amounting to about 20 milliard dollars.

The Yalta Agreement decided in principle that Germany would pay reparations amounting to 20 milliard dollars, half of which would go to Russia.

Unlike what happened after the first world war, after this war no figures were published of the quantity of reparations taken or the form in which they were taken.

Reparations from Rumania

648 The armistice imposed on Rumania required payment to
728 Russia of reparations in the form of goods amounting in value
434 to 300 million dollars in 1938 world market prices, or 700-800 million dollars today. The reparations were made up as

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follows :—petroleum products, 50 per cent; ships, barges, locomotives and industrial equipment, 32 per cent; agricultural goods and timber 18 per cent. The second group did not make up even as much as 10 per cent of Rumanian exports before the war.

There are no estimates of the proportion of the national income which these reparations represent. The only clue is that given in June 1947 by the vice-Premier, Tatarescu, who gave the proportion as 50 per cent of the total production of Rumanian industry. It would be very unwise to accept this figure uncritically, as it was given on the eve of Tătărescu's conflict with the Communist Party which ended in his expulsion from the Government. Even if it were accurate, this figure would not be very useful as it relates only to industrial production, and not to the whole national product.

In addition to the reparations, Rumania had to give as restitution for goods looted from Russia 100,000 wagon loads of cereals, 260,000 head of cattle, 5,500 wagon loads of sugar, 250 tractors. (Of course, most of the loot taken from Russia by the Rumanians when they occupied it had already been destroyed and lost, and 'restitution' meant taking new products or those in good condition.)

The most important machinery of the Ploesti Oil Refineries was dismantled by the Russian military authorities, and the Rumanians also had to hand over a fifth of the machinery of the textile and metallurgical industries. It must also be remembered that the Russian army lived off the land. There are no statistics of the total cost thus incurred by the country, but it was certainly very great. According to the estimate made in February, 1946, by La Guardia, who was the head of U.N.R.R.A. at the time, the four occupation armies in Austria cost the country 200 million dollars a year. For three years the Russian army in Rumania was not smaller than all the four occupation armies in Austria put together at the beginning of 1946. In view of the complete silence of the Russian authorities about the amount of reparations they took from Rumania, it is impossible to ignore the estimate given by the U.S. delegate to the Paris Peace Conference, Willard L. Thorp, who said on September 23rd, 1946, that Rumania paid in reparations of all kinds 1,050 million dollars and that he estimated that

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648 950 million dollars remained to be paid. E. D. Tappe wrote:
● 728 'It has been estimated that in fact Roumania, from the armistice to 1 June 1948, paid the U.S.S.R. $1,785 million in goods, etc.; a figure which would represent 84 per cent of Roumania's national income for that period.' (R. R. Betts, editor, *Central and South East Europe, 1945-1948*, London, 1950, pp. 20-21).

Reparations from Hungary

Hungary had to pay reparations in goods amounting to 300 million dollars at 1938 prices, 200 million to U.S.S.R., 50 million to Czechoslovakia and 50 million to Yugoslavia. Industrial goods constituted 83 per cent and agricultural goods 17 per cent of this total. Yet in 1936-7, the proportion of agricultural goods in the total exports of Hungary was 62 per cent, while industrial goods did not make up even a third of all the exports. From this it is clear that Hungarian industry had to make a tremendous effort to supply the reparation goods, especially in view of the terrible devastation her industry suffered in the war, and her own great needs.

An U.N.R.R.A. estimate shows that in 1945, 94 per cent of
648 the working capacity of the metal and engineering industries in
728 Hungary was being used for reparation-goods for Russia. The
434 British parliamentary delegation which visited Hungary in the spring of 1946 estimated that reparation demands amounted to 18 per cent of the national income.

The Hungarian budget for the year 1946-7 set aside for reparations a sum eight times bigger than that allocated to reconstruction (and we must not forget that a large part of the Russian loot is not even included in the budget as it was taken from industries officially in Russian hands). On 23 July, 1946, in a note to the Soviet Government, the U.S. Ambassador in Moscow pointed out that half the current industrial production of Hungary was absorbed in meeting Russia's demands. In some industries, including coal, iron and machine production the proportion was 80-90 per cent. At the Peace Conference in Paris in October, 1946, the U.S. representatives claimed that in the year since the armistice about 35 per cent of the national income of Hungary was spent on the costs of Soviet reparations, occupation and requisitions. The British parliamentary delega-

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tion mentioned above estimated the occupation costs at 12 per cent of the national income of Hungary, making with reparations a total of 30 per cent. Now that the Russian Army has been very much reduced and production has passed the pre-war level, the importance of reparations, acquisitions, etc., in the national income has very much declined. According to T. Mende, who was not unsympathetic to the post-war regime in Hungary, they amounted to 7-11 per cent of the national income (*Fortnightly Review*, July, 1948). When Ernö Gerö, the Minister of Finance, introduced the budget for 1949 in the Hungarian parliament on December 15th, 1948, he said that in 1948, 25.4 per cent of the total expenditure went to pay the reparations, while in 1949, 9.8 per cent of the budget would be allocated for this purpose. This reduction is due largely to the fact that Russia cancelled 50 per cent of the remainder of the reparations from July, 1948.

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The value of dismantled machinery, locomotives, wagons, etc., taken by the Russian army in Hungary was estimated at 124 million dollars, and the requisitions of the Russian army that lived on the country were very great. According to the American note of 23rd July, 1946, the Soviet forces had up to June, 1945, taken out of Hungary four million tons of wheat, rye, barley, maize and oats (the total pre-war annual production of these grains was a little over 7 million tons). Of the foodstuffs available for the urban population in the second half of 1945 the Soviet army had appropriated nearly all the meat, one-sixth of the wheat and rye, one-quarter of the legumes, nearly three-quarters of the lard, a tenth of the vegetable oils and a fifth of the milk and dairy products. The note added that extensive requisitioning of food was going on as late as April, 1946. And we must not forget that at the same time the food shortage in Hungary was so serious that not more than 850 calories a day per person were provided, which was even fewer than in Germany and Austria. The death rate, especially among babies, reached alarming proportions.

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Even countries which were not allies of Germany during the war did not escape the Russian appetite for loot. 60 big industrial enterprises in the Sudeten region and a number of enterprises in other parts of Czechoslovakia were dismantled by the Russian army. In the part of Germany annexed to

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648 Poland the Russian army dismantled, according to the estimates
728 of the Communist Minister of Industry, Hilary Minc, 25-30 per cent of all the industrial equipment of the area. (Speech delivered in Warsaw on 20th October, 1945). In Old Poland too, the Russian army dismantled machinery, notably in the Lodz and Bialystok textile works.*

Trade Between Russia and her Satellites

439 An important feature of the foreign trade policy of Russia and her satellites is the tendency towards self-sufficiency or autarchy. The following table illustrates this as far as Russia herself is concerned:

U.S.S.R. FOREIGN TRADE (IN MILLION PRE-1914 GOLD RUBLES)

Year	*Export*	*Import*
1913†	1520.1	1375.0
1924/5..	577.8	723.4
1927/8..	791.6	945.5
1932	574.9	704.0
1937	377.2	294.2
1938	287.8	300.4

The tendency towards economic isolation from the West on the part of the satellites is shown by the following table dealing with the foreign trade of Czechoslovakia, Hungary, Poland, Rumania, Yugoslavia and Bulgaria: (see top of page 63).

As Yugoslavia did not publish figures of foreign trade for the years 1947 and 1948 it was not possible to take them into consideration in drawing up this table. Otherwise the tendency of these countries to trade mainly among themselves and with Russia and to restrict trade relations with countries independent of Russia would have been even more pronounced.

It would of course be one-sided to conclude that this tendency is entirely the result of the choice of these countries them-

000 *Incidentally, even backward China was not left untouched by the greed of the Russian bureaucracy. In June, 1946, Edwin Pauley, U.S. Reparations Commissioner, visited Manchuria and inspected 80 per cent of the Japanese war industry. In his report he stated that the Russian removal of equipment was on such a scale as to retard Manchuria's development by a generation and reduce the country to an agricultural economy. The principal items of equipment removed were machine tools and electrical equipment, although in some cases whole plants were completely stripped. Steel production was reduced by more than 50 per cent. Pauley estimated that altogether the machinery dismantled by the Russians was worth 850 million dollars. (*The World Today*, August, 1946). That this was a very heavy burden for Manchuria is clear from the fact that in 1932-1943 the total Japanese investments in Manchuria were evaluated at 5,393 million yen (about 1,200 million dollars).

†In the pre-1914 boundaries.

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CHAPTER I

THE INITIAL SOVIET INTERVENTION: BULGARIA, RUMANIA, HUNGARY

648 661 NAPOLEON'S WORDS, 'Une armée dehors c'est l'État qui voyage', apply very well to the Russian armies which overran the countries of Eastern Europe as a result of the Second World War. If the Russian state had been a liberating democracy where power was in the hands of the people, the entry of the Red Army into the Eastern Europen countries would have inspired their populations to take their fate into their own hands, put an end to the military police dictatorships that terrorized them and establish the full sovereignty of the people. But the policy of the Russian occupation authorities was entirely different. For the first two or three years their primary objective was to preserve as strong an army and police force as possible under the control of the Communist Parties. With this task in mind the Communist leaders skilfully manipulated the pressure of the masses to introduce 'loyal' elements into the army and police and at the same time allied themselves with reactionary, even ex-fascist, heads of the old army and police. The second aim of the Kremlin was to call a halt to any action of the peoples which bore a really democratic and spontaneous character and which might therefore impede the Gleichshaltung of all public life. To achieve this, the same method was adopted of making alliances with the most right-wing, reactionary elements against the authentic Socialist Parties, Peasant Parties and, above all, against the peoples themselves.

A study of political life in the satellite states must begin with an analysis of this policy.

Pre-War Political Regime in Eastern Europe

642 661 728 Before the war, all the countries dealt with (except Czechoslovakia) had lived under a military dictatorship camouflaged

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642 by a parlimentary facade. Workers' parties, peasant parties
661 and trade unions were all persecuted or forbidden, strikes were
728 suppressed in blood, and brutal mass executions were not unknown. To give only one example, 20-30 thousand workers and peasants lost their lives after the overthrow of the Peasant Government of Alexander Stamboliisky in Bulgaria in 1923. The secret police of Rumania, Yugoslavia and Bulgaria could boast of rivalling the Gestapo in all the refinements of torture. The press was gagged. Parliamentary elections were a farce, as votes were bought, electors were terrorized, and voting was open, although the counting of the votes was secret. It was no accident that in only one out of the many national elections held in Rumania between the two world wars, did the government that was called upon by the king to arrange the elections fail to get the expected majority! The corruption and depravity of the public administration was immense. Symbolical of this corruption was King Carol's notorious mistress, Magda Lupescu, who appointed and dismissed Ministers and high officials, distributed government contracts, etc. National minorities in general, and the Jews in particular, suffered from official oppression and from 'spontaneous' outbursts of hooliganism organised by government agents. The alliance with Hitlerite Germany of Rumania, Hungary, Bulgaria and many of the rulers of Yugoslavia seemed natural.

In view of these facts, it is not surprising that the collapse of the German military machine was greeted with joy by the overwhelming majority of the peoples of Eastern Europe, who hoped to get rid of the previous shameful political and social order. The breakdown of the Gestapo unleashed a tremendous. independent upsurge of the people. The first task of the Russian occupation authorities was to grapple with this mass activity.

Bulgaria

669 In Sofia and other towns armed workers arrested fascists
642 *en masse*, held mass demonstrations, set up elected people's
728 tribunals, disarmed the police and established a workers' militia. Local committees took over the administration and the red flag was hoisted over all public buildings. The ferment was equally great in the Bulgarian army. Thus *The Economist* of October 7th, 1944, could write:

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'Reports on the Bulgarian forces of occupation in Western Thrace and Macedonia vividly recall the picture of the Russian army in 1917. Soldiers' councils have been set up, officers have been degraded, red flags hoisted, and normal saluting has been abolished.' 728 669 642

But the Russian and Bulgarian Communist leaders did not welcome the initiative of the masses. On the contrary, they did everything to stop 'anarchy' and restore 'order'. When Molotov met the Bulgarian armistice delegation, he made the following declaration: 'If certain Communists continue their present conduct, we will bring them to reason. Bulgaria will remain with her democractic Government and her present order . . . You must retain all valuable army officers from before the *coup d'etat*. You should reinstate in service all officers who have been dismissed for various reasons'. (*The New York Times*, January 16th, 1945). And earlier, on September 21st, 1944, *The New York Times* correspondent in Sofia reported that 'Communist leaders are doing everything they can to prevent extremists in the party from agitating for sovietization of the country'. Of the Red Army he said: 'On several occasions when local Communists in the provinces tried to displace city officials and take matters into their own hands they were ordered by the Russian military authorities to return the jobs to the old officials until orders were received from the Fatherland Front Government in Sofia'. The Fatherland Front government hastened to establish order.

As regards the restoration of 'order' in the Bulgarian Army, the same article in *The Economist* states: 'M. Velchev (Minister of War in the Fatherland Front Government—Y.G.) has issued a stern order to the troops to return immediately to normal discipline, to abolish Soldiers' Councils and to hoist no more red flags. Now Sofia reports that the Bulgarian army has been placed under the supreme command of Marshal Tolbukhin. Apparently, the Soviet commander has no patience with Balkan repetitions of 1917 . . . The Bulgarian Left seems to be ready to accept this policy, but it may be questioned whether it would have agreed to it so easily if its author had been Colonel Velchev and not Marshal Tolbukhin.'

In its programme, the Fatherland Front Government was careful to emphasize that it stood for the social *status quo* and

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●728 642 669 for the maintenance of private property, Immediately after its establishment, the Communist leader, Anton Yugov, the Minister of the Interior, declared: 'This government, of which I am a member and on whose behalf I speak, categorically denies that it has any intention of establishing a Communist regime in Bulgaria. There is no truth in rumours that the government intends to nationalise any private enterprise in the country.' (*The New York Times*, 22nd September, 1944).

642 471 A few months later, at the national congress of the Fatherland Front in March, 1945, another Communist leader declared: 'We are building a democractic country based on private property and private initiative. Consequently the Government by its very nature is reformist.' He severely attacked those members of the Communist Party who opposed the Fatherland Front Government and wanted 'to establish a completely Communist government.' An article in the official paper of the Fatherland Front, *Otechestven Front* (9th March, 1945) described the programme of the Front in these words: 'It is the programme of the Bulgarian workers, peasants, craftsmen and women, honest, intellectual, patriotic individuals, industrialists, merchants and patriotic soldiers.' In a congress of the industrialists of Bulgaria on September 27th, 1945, a Communist Minister, Dobri Terpeshev, said on behalf of the Supreme Economic Council: 'Private initiative will not be handicapped but supported. The Communists intend to revive it because our economy needs your initiative . . . Let us all work without being led on by thought of gain alone.' A year later the Communist Prime Minister, Georgi Dimitrov, declared: 'The immediate task is neither the realisation of Socialism nor the introduction of the Soviet system but the consolidation of a truly democratic and Parliamentarian system.'

642 661 From September, 1944, to October, 1946, the Fatherland Front Government was headed by General Kimon Georgiev who not only played a leading part in the military, semi-fascist *coup d'etat* of Tsankov in 1923, as a result of which tens of thousands of workers and peasants were massacred, but was also the author of the military coup of 1934 which led to the immediate dismissal of Parliament, the terrible persecution of Communists, Agrarians and others, and, for the first time in

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Bulgarian history, the dissolution of the trade unions and their illegalisation.* Georgiev's supporters wielded such power in the Fatherland Front Government that *The Observer* of 10th September, 1944, could remark: 'The composition of the Government suggests that the group that has now taken over in Sofia is the famous Military League which took power by a *coup d'etat* in 1934.' But *The Observer* did not mention one very important exception. The Minister of the Interior, who controls the police, was the Communist leader, Anton Yugov. The Communist leaders joined hands with the old Military League in order to keep 'order', the first victims of which were any workers who demanded an improvement in their condition, or—even worse—dared to press for immediate steps in the direction of socialism. Thus Constantine Poulos, writing from Sofia on June 2nd, 1945, said: 'Bulgarian Socialists (are) far to the left of the Communists . . . The Greek workers who demanded "bread and work" last fall are now dead, in jail or terrorized into silence. The Bulgarian workers who recently made similar demands were publicly denounced by the Communists as diversionists and enemies of the state; a handful of coal miners who struck for higher wages in March were castigated as "anarchists" and rushed off to jail by the Communist-controlled militia.' (*The Nation*, June 23rd, 1945).

In spite of these precautions, the transfer of Bulgaria from the German side to the Russian was not carried out as smoothly as the transfer of Finland, Rumania and Hungary, because Bulgaria does not belong geographically to the Russian sphere proper, but is on the border between the Russian and Anglo-American zones. Hence when the Germans retreated, many members of the ruling strata of Bulgaria hoped to switch over from the side of Germany, not to Russia, but to England and the United States. Russia therefore could not rely implicitly on the Bulgarian state machine, and between September, 1944, and March, 1945, a large-scale purge was carried out by

*This is what *Inprecor*, the official Comintern paper, wrote about the 1934 coup: 'A new military-fascist *coup d'etat* has been carried out in Bulgaria. In the night prior to May 19th the Muchanov-Gitchev government was overthrown and a military-fascist dictatorship established under the leadership of *Kimon Georgiev*, a Lieutenant-Colonel of the Reserve'. 'The leading elements in the present coup also played a leading role in the 1923 coup'. (*Inprecor*, 1st June, 1934). Now the official *Free Bulgaria* describes Georgiev's role in the 1934 coup in these words: 'In 1934 he took the post of Prime Minister and re-established diplomatic relations between Bulgaria and the Soviet Union.' (August 1st, 1949).

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661 the law courts. As a result, two thousand people were con-
● 728 demned to death and executed and another few thousands sentenced to very long terms of imprisonment.

That the Bulgarian people were successfully 'kept quiet' is illustrated by the fact that until April, 1948, the Communists did not find it necessary to hold even sham elections to local authorities; heads of villages and members of local councils were officially appointed by the Minister of the Interior!

Rumania

728 Rumania was the first of the Eastern European countries
642 reached by the Red Army, and Russia hastened to declare its intention of non-intervention in her internal regime. On April 2nd, 1944, Molotov declared: 'The Soviet Government declares that it does not pursue the aim of acquiring any part of Rumanian territory or of changing the existing social order in Rumania. It equally declares that the entry into Rumania of Soviet troops is solely the consequence of military necessities and of the continuation of resistance by the enemy forces.'

Russia's intention of keeping 'order' was reciprocated by the willingness of the Rumanian King and governing circles to collaborate with her. With scarcely a ripple Rumania changed her allegiance from Germany to Russia, the whole state apparatus—army, police and administration—going over to the Russian side when King Michael on 23rd August, 1944, arrested the Prime Minister, Marshal Ion Antonescu and appointed General Sănătescu in his place.

In March, 1945, after a number of changes in the Rumanian government, brought about by direct threats and pressure from the Russian army of occupation numbering a million men, Petru Groza became Premier, supported by Vice-Premier Gheorghe Tătărescu and four of his friends from the so-called 'Liberal Party', an equal number of Communists, and a number of individuals representing nobody.

728 Of Tătărescu, the Comintern paper, *Imprecor*, of December
642 8th, 1933, had said: 'In 1907 the Liberal Party, at that time led
661 by Sturdza, caused no less than 11,000 peasants to be murdered. The bloody suppression of the peasant insurrection in Tatar-Bunar was also the work of the Liberals, under the leadership of *Tătărescu*, who is now the Minister for Trade and

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Industry. The Liberal Party is also responsible for the volleys fired on the 13th of December against striking workers, as a result of which over 100 were killed. 728 661 642

'In December, 1927, it was the Liberal Party which organised the bloody anti-Jewish pogroms. Bands of students roamed through the streets beating up passers-by. The Minister of the Interior at the time was Duca, and the Secretary of State, Tătărescu. Under Liberal government corruption and jobbery reached their culminating point. The same Liberal Party exercised a brutal repressive terror against the revolutionary organisations; it suppressed all revolutionary newspapers and caused numerous workers to be murdered. Under Liberal government the class courts of the Rumanian bourgeoisie have sentenced many of the best leaders of the working class to long years of hard labour or to long terms of banishment in the salt mines.'

Tătărescu represented the extreme authoritarian wing of the Liberal Party and helped King Carol to establish his dictatorship. His foreign policy was oriented towards Hitler Germany. The British Communist weekly *World News and Views* of November 19th, 1938, described him thus: 'Tătărescu, the leader of the Right pro-Hitler wing of the National Liberal Party.' 728 642

Mihail Ralea, Minister of Culture in the March, 1945, Cabinet, was formerly a Minister under King Carol and an open admirer of the Hitler regime. Today he is Rumanian Ambassador to Washington. Father Burducea, the Minister of Cults in the March, 1945, Government, was one of the most notorious Iron Guardists (he had the decoration of the Buna Vestire, which was awarded to only thirty-two Guardists). Lotar Radaceanu, the Minister of Labour, was in Carol's totalitarian 'Renaissance Front.' One of the chiefs of the Propaganda Ministry, responsible for controlling the press, was Gheorghe Macovescu. Under Antonescu's fascist regime he held the same position, writing articles hailing the German-Rumanian alliance against Russia. Groza himself, the Premier since March, 1945, was before the war a very rich man, an owner of a big estate, factories and large hotels, and with big banking interests. He had been a Minister in two extremely right-wing governments under General Averescu (1920-1, 1926-7).

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642 1947). A few weeks later the Communist leaders compelled
662 Michael to abdicate (30th December).
665

Hungary

642 The policy of the Communist Party in Hungary in the first
728 stage of Russian intervention was similar to their policy in
471 Rumania and it is therefore unnecessary to describe it in detail.[1] The following quotation from the report of Nagy Imre, a member of the Political Bureau of the Party, to its congress in September, 1946, is typical of many declarations: 'While the war was still being fought, we have determined, and this is one of the basic principles, that in Hungary this is not the time for transition from capitalism to socialism, for struggle between the two social systems, but for uprooting the powerful remants of feudalism. It is not a question then of struggle between the two social systems but of the struggle between democracy and reaction within capitalism.'

The connection between this policy and Russia's interest in gaining control of the Hungarian economy (through mixed companies) and in extorting reparations from her, has already been described.[2] Here it is only necessary to repeat that for three years the Communist Party leaders continued to harp upon the same theme, that they were against abandoning the capitalist structure of the country.

1/1 [See category 116, pp. 136-141 -- Analyst]
2/1 [See category 116, pp. 60-62 -- Analyst]

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Only after the events of spring 1947 in Hungary which consolidated the power of the Communist Party, and the February, 1948, coup in Czechoslovakia did Moscow consider nationalistic conflicts between Hungarians on the one hand and Slovaks and Czechs on the other superfluous. And duly in autumn 1948, an agreement was concluded between Czechoslovakia and Hungary regularising the status of the Hungarian minority in Slovakia. In January, 1949, the Czechoslovak parliament decided to restore full civil rights to the Hungarians, and to allow them to remain permanently in the country. 563 661

Conflicts Between Rumanians and Hungarians

The bone of contention between Rumania and Hungary was Transylvania in which nearly 2 million Hungarians live. Within 24 hours of the time that the Groza government was established, northern Transylvania, taken from Rumania by Hitler and given to Hungary, was given back to Rumania, even though the majority of its population is Hungarian. Vishinsky openly admitted that this was a reward for the establishment of the Groza Government. Pătrăşcanu, then leader of the Rumanian Communist Party, gratefully acknowledged the fact that Russia was responsible for the transfer. Strange as it may seem, Rákosi also used the conflict to pay a tribute to Russia, stating on 1st June, that at the Paris Conference Britain and the U.S.A. decided on the transfer because of their interests in Rumanian oil. 'Rumania's oil production is 10 times that of Hungary and naturally those countries which are interested in oil, share out their sympathy or antipathy according to whether 100,000 or 1,000,000 tons of oil are at stake. Naturally this fact has an important bearing on their political judgment. Thus when the Hungarian-Rumanian frontier issue was raised at the Paris Conference, the U.S.A. suggested that Rumania should regain her 1940 frontiers without change. Britain immediately agreed to this proposal and the matter was settled.' (*East Europe*, 12th June, 1946). 563 728 [382]

The Hungarian Communist Party demanded on 12th August, 1946, that the Peace Settlement be changed to allow at least that part of Transylvania inhabited by Hungarians to be given back to Hungary. At the same time the Rumanian

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563 Communist Party declared their opposition to any changes in
728 the Peace Settlement.

But once it became absolutely clear that Russia supported the pre-1940 frontiers of Hungary and Rumania the quarrel between the two governments ceased and on the whole a very liberal attitude was taken by the Rumanian government towards the large Hungarian minority.

Poles and Czechs in Teschen

563 As soon as the war ended a sharp conflict broke out between
728 Poland and Czechoslovakia over the fixing of the border between them. There were Slovaks and Czechs in Polish Špiš, in the Orava district which was divided between Czechoslovakia and Poland and in Silesian Ratibor and Hlubčice which were in the hands of Poland. In all these areas Czechoslovakia wanted to change the border in her favour. But the most serious conflict broke out over the possession of the rich area of Teschen. After World War I Teschen was divided between Poland and Czechoslovakia; in 1938, during the Munich crisis Poland walked into the part of Teschen occupied by Czechoslovakia. At the end of the war, the Polish army, commanded by Marshal Rola-Zymierski, again occupied all Teschen. The Poles and Czechs were called upon next day to send representatives to Moscow to discuss the question. It was decided to give back to Czechoslovakia the area they had held prior to Munich, as compensation for the loss of Western Ukraine (Ruthenia) to Russia. But the chauvinistic fury did not abate, and the national minority of Czechoslovaks in the Polish area and Poles in the Czechoslovakian area were the victims of it. The *Central European Observer* of October 19th, 1945, wrote: 'In Hlubčice and Ratibor, Czech people are suffering injustices: their harvest is taken away, their property confiscated. They are being arrested and taken into the interior of the country. Church services in the Czech language or in the local dialect have been forbidden. Czechs are fleeing across the frontier. There are already several thousands of refugees.' On 27th December, 1945, Radio Prague complained that the Poles had dissolved the National Committees in the part of Teschen inhabited by Czechs, had replaced them with Polish mayors appointed by themselves, and had closed all schools except the

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Polish ones. On 27th March, 1946, the Czech National Council in Morawska-Ostrawa in retaliation forbade the use of the Polish language in Teschen schools which had Polish pupils. (*East Europe*, 3rd April, 1946). 563 728

In Conclusion

The policy of keeping national antagonisms alive, especially between Slavs and Teutons, was a liability for the Kremlin after its agents took full control of the satellite countries and after the main pivot of its policy became the struggle against the Western Powers over Germany. Hence since about the end of 1947, when the Cominform was established, the former policy on the national question was dropped, and was replaced by 'internationalism', which is in reality equally the instrument of Russian imperialist national policy. In June, 1948, a conference of the Foreign Ministers of the U.S.S.R. and the 'People's Democracies' held in Warsaw, declared its friendship to the German people. In January, 1949, Fierlinger congratulated the German Stalinists (the Socialist Unity Party) on the fact that they were 'proudly professing the old and unadulterated internationalism.' The same theme was repeated time and again by other leaders in Czechoslovakia, Poland, Rumania and the other 'People's Democracies.' Stalin himself wrote in a letter to Pieck, president of the 'German Democratic Republic', on October 13th, 1949, that the German and Russians were 'the two peoples possessing the greatest potentialities in Europe to complete great actions of world significance.' Woe betide anyone who should now mention the unity of the 'Slavs' against the 'Teutons.' 648

The new policy was mainly directed against the satellites who dared to strive for national independence and against the transformation of their countries into Russian gubernias.

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stable, fair prices for agricultural products and to secure 439
them a market. The Czechoslovakian Grain State Monopoly, established in 1934, was the only institution to bring any real benefit to the farming population. In other Eastern European countries, the situation reduced even further both the internal market and the income per head of the rural population. Less money than ever was available for improvements or for educating the peasants in new methods and techniques.

The alleviation of this situation came from Nazi Germany. Since 1935 Germany had been buying the greatest proportion of this region's agricultural surpluses and, in return, had been sending its own industrial goods into that area. Eastern Europe, and the Balkan states especially, became so dependent upon Germany's buying that the term "economic conquest" became a reality. This conquest, which was later political and military, of course did not bring any remedy to the agricultural problem of this region.

III

The Second World War devastated whole countries. No- 728
where did the four horsemen of the Apocalypse reap a 167
greater harvest than in Poland and Yugoslavia. In their wake came a troubled period which brought with it all the miseries and hardships that have always attended political and social revolutions. Vast numbers of the population were killed during the war. In Poland alone these numbered six million. The unbalance which this caused was greatly aggravated by enormous shifts of population in many of the Eastern European countries. The Germans were expelled from Poland and Czechoslovakia in millions, and from Hungary, Yugoslavia, and Rumania in hundreds of thousands. The total number of Germans expelled from this region was estimated at over eleven million. Changes in state

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728 frontiers were another cause for great migrations. Four mil-
167 lion Poles moved from the territory which was incorporated into the U.S.S.R., and millions of Poles, Czechs, and Slovaks moved into districts formerly inhabited by the Germans. Although these changes alleviated the problem of rural overpopulation in Eastern Europe, there was still, at the end of the Second World War, a surplus population estimated at nine million.

665 The Communist parties in various Eastern European
423 states knew very well how to exploit this situation. They
656 knew that it was vital to the success of revolution that the peasantry should not be opposed to it. They knew that the Russian Revolution had been achieved only because Lenin was fully aware of the desire of the peasant for more land.

471 Orthodox Marxist theory required that the land be nation-
423 alized and that it be administered by the state. Land was
662 considered the most important means of production, and it
656 had to be treated as such. This dogma was abandoned by Lenin for tactical reasons. He nationalized land in the Soviet Union during the revolution of 1917, but distributed it under ninety-nine-year leases to small and medium peasants for private exploitation. It was the political pressure of the peasants which forced Lenin to change his political doctrine and implement the agrarian program of the Populists, his political opponents. Lenin and his followers did not approve of the peasant who, according to them, was a relic of the precapitalistic society. It was Lenin's view that "small, individual farming gives birth to capitalism and the bourgeoisie daily, hourly, spontaneously and on a mass scale," and that in the future classless society the peasant was to assume the status of a worker on the land as his fellow in town was a worker in industry.

Political expediency determined Lenin's change in tactics. He supported small agrarian property holders only because

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a collective farm. On June 26th, 1947 . . . both were sentenced to eight years' imprisonment in corrective-labour camps. 685 466

'(5) In the Kirov district of Moscow, E. K. Smirnov, a chauffeur, was arrested for stealing 22 pounds of bread from a bakery. The people's court . . . sentenced E. K. Smirnov to seven years' imprisonment in corrective-labour camps.

'(6) In Saratov, E. I. Gordeyev . . . stole various products from a warehouse. On June 21st, 1947 . . . Gordeyev was sentenced to seven years' imprisonment in corrective-labour camps.

'(7) In Kuibyshev, E. T. Poluboyarov stole a wallet from a train traveller . . . On 4th July he was sentenced to 5 years' imprisonment in corrective-labour camps.

'(8) On June 7th, 1947, in Kazan at the collective farm market, V. E. Bukin snatched money from the hand of Citizeness Pustinsky . . . On June 20th, 1947 . . . Bukin was sentenced to eight years' imprisonment in corrective-labour camps.

'(9) On June 6th, 1947, in the village of Subovka in the Kutuzovsk district of the Kuibyshev region, A. A. Chubarkin and V. G. Morozov stole from a cellar 88 pounds of potatoes belonging to Citizeness Presnyakov. On June 17th, 1947 . . . both were sentenced to five years' imprisonment in corrective-labour camps.

'(10) On June 5th, 1947, in Moscow . . . K. V. Greenwald, who had been previously convicted for theft, took advantage of the absence of his neighbour, entered the room of Citizeness Kovalev and stole various household articles . . . Greenwald was sentenced . . . to ten years' imprisonment in corrective-labour camps.'

That people steal bread and other elementary necessities of life under the cruel threat of a minimum of five years' slave labour if caught, shows what dire provery they are suffering.[1] [735]

That slave labour in U.S.S.R. is very widespread is clear not only from the large amount of evidence given by former inmates of these camps (collected in the above-mentioned book of D. J. Dallin and B. I. Nicolaevsky) and from the facts published in the Russian Press of heavy punishments for the most elementary crimes—if the theft of bread can be so called. There is further evidence which is conclusive even if indirect. Soviet

1 [See examples, category 116, pp. 94-95 --Analyst]

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186 be improved by secession. All of them thought that they could
178 improve their position by finding that exact size of political unit in which their own language and their own national culture could be made to predominate and in which their own nationality or ethnic group could be turned into the leading class or social and political elite.

Nationalism in Eastern Europe was thus a reaction to the rapid diffusion of Western claims and to the expectations of security and opportunity throughout a group of societies that were only slowly, if at all, acquiring the productive skill and equipment to satisfy them. National secession, national expansion, and the national state appeared to almost all nationalities in the region as plausible short cuts to the prosperity, power, and prestige they all desired.

178 In the course of events, the experiment was actually made.
433 The Austro-Hungarian monarchy was destroyed and a num-
641 ber of successor states arose from its remains. There is no doubt on the whole that the emergence of these national states represented a significant step forward toward higher levels of popular participation in public affairs, toward political democracy, toward popular education, and even, in some respects, toward greater economic opportunities. But at the same time it seems clear that the change in the size of political units did little or nothing to come to grips with the fundamental causes of the poverty and backwardness of the region, or with the fundamental sources of its peculiar psychological and political frustrations and resentments. National and regional markets and consumer preferences remained as small and as unfavorable to mass production in the new states as they had in the old. Capital remained as scarce and productive investment as uneven and erratic as before.
178 Tools, technologies, and work habits changed slowly if at
[935] all. Poverty persisted. Purchasing power remained low and
464 prices high. Production remained scattered over many small and inefficient factories. Innovations were accepted reluc-

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369 ulation showed any tendency toward decentralization, with
162 30 per cent of her total industrial population living in the district of Sofia.

The industrial population of these countries was occupied as follows: 25 to 30 per cent in the textile and clothing industries; 18 to 21 per cent in heavy and metallurgy industries; 11 to 22 per cent in the food industry; and 7 to 17 per cent in the lumber industry. A variation in industrial goods and in producing plants was found only in Czechoslovakia and Hungary, in southern Poland and Transylvania, and in the areas of the former Austro-Hungarian Empire.

466 One of the major problems facing the new governments
• 745 in their industrialization programs was to equate the growth
185 of the industrial working populations with improvement in industrial working and social conditions. Social legislation in the interwar period attained considerable progress in this direction. Prior to 1914 there already existed in Eastern Europe various social insurance and pension plans, and these were expanded between 1919 and 1939. Compulsory workers' accident and health insurance plans were introduced whereby both employers and wage earners contributed to a central fund to provide coverage for accident, illness, maternity, disability, old age, death, and unemployment. Generally speaking, the working day was reduced to eight hours, with a maximum forty-eight hour week, and the age minimum for child and woman labor was fixed at fourteen years or, in the case of heavy and dangerous work, such as mining, at sixteen to eighteen years. However, rigid application of these measures was far from universal.

A notable innovation was the establishment by the agrarian regime in Bulgaria of a compulsory labor service for the development of public works in place of the traditional military service which had been prohibited by the peace treaty. Expenditures in 1937 for social services for the entire region averaged 3 per cent of the estimated national in-

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come. Once again, Czechoslovakia headed the list with 5.5 per cent while the Balkan countries devoted only 1.5 per cent of their national income to social services. In the same year the number of persons registered as unemployed in the various countries was as follows: Czechoslovakia, 408,000; Poland, 347,000; Hungary, 47,000; Yugoslavia, 21,600; and Rumania, 10,800.

A major consequence of industrialization and urbanization was the rapid growth both of an urban proletariat and of the bureaucracy. Those people who had been separated from their ancestral rural surroundings and traditions and often from the influence of their families became increasingly detached from spiritual matters and turned more and more towards materialistic and technical spheres. The number of bureaucrats grew rapidly and this resulted in political favoritism and in desk-level programs which very seldom touched the people of the countryside.

It cannot be said, however, that no progress was made or that standards of living were consistently low. It must be remembered that it was not until the First World War that many of these countries attained independence. A part of Poland had just emerged from Russian domination and certain areas of the Balkan states had just freed themselves from Ottoman rule. Even Hungary, Czechoslovakia, Croatia, and parts of Poland had been freed only recently from Austro-German political and economic controls. Under these circumstances, the progress made by these countries, notwithstanding failures and mistakes, was considerable indeed.

III

The states that had dominated this region before the First World War—Germany, Austria-Hungary, Russia, and the Ottoman empire—showed little interest in improving the educational standards of the large masses in Eastern Europe.

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511 tion capacity of cement plants and brick factories would have to be increased before there can be any question of more housing. This is but one example out of many of its kind. There is a manifest contradiction between the present Russian-enforced armament production in the area, which has not been curtailed, and the intended mass production of consumer goods. The two cannot be carried on simultaneously. For these reasons alone, the recent statements of the Communist governments should be regarded with much scepticism.

288 295 433 The situation as regards clothing and footwear is even worse. The problem of obtaining it is nearly insoluble for the average family. It is far more difficult than in Russia where millions wear Polish textiles and Czech shoes. To discuss this question in detail is beyond the scope of this essay. Suffice it is to say that, according to the present long-range plans, Eastern Germany expects to produce in 1955 only 1.3 pairs of leather shoes per capita, Rumania 1.2 pairs, Hungary 1 pair, and Poland 0.7 pairs. No one can say what proportion of this footwear will be earmarked for export to Russia and China or assigned in advance to the army and security police and what will be left for the population. It is for such reasons that behind the Iron Curtain it is illegal to photograph the people on the streets or to export abroad such documentary evidence of their poor garb.

657 745 In contrast to the situation regarding food, housing, and clothing, the number and range of social services have been considerably extended, and these state services should in all fairness be regarded as significant steps taken to offset the low standard of living. It is little known that prewar Poland and Czechoslovakia, not to speak of Germany, had state-operated systems of social insurance and public health more advanced than any existing at the time in France or the United States. These systems have been enlarged under Communism. The quality of their services is too often insufficient, but the

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people accept them as their due and can no longer visualize 657
life without them. A large and, according to official claims, 745
growing part of national income is being spent on social insurance, public health, family allowances, maternity and children care, workers' vacations, so-called physical culture, and the like. There is no comparison between the philosophy of the welfare state in Britain and that of Communism in Eastern Europe, but there are some similar functions in both systems. For much the same reasons that the Conservative government in London could never think of taking back the social reforms of the Labor government, no post-Communist government in Eastern Europe will be able to consider curtailing the privileges accorded to the working class by the present regimes.

V

The most important and politically the most decisive of 641
the privileges granted by the State is education, understood 208
always strictly in the Communist sense of the term. The Communist regimes are aware that they cannot seriously expect to win the minds of the majority of the adult population. Anyone who was twenty years old in 1938 in Bohemia or Moravia, in 1939 in Poland, in 1941 in Serbia, and as late as 1944 in Hungary or Rumania, can contrast his present situation as an individual and as a part of his nation to his situation under a non-Communist government, however imperfect the latter may have been. There is no way of knowing how many of these men and women regret the past and hate the present, but they undoubtedly constitute a large majority of the adult population of the area. From the Communist point of view, these men and women are incurable. The future of the Red regimes depends on the youngsters who know nothing about the past, are isolated from the freedoms of the West, and are daily taught that Russia is their shin-

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It rather *gathers them under its wings for protection, whenever they have mental tasks to perform*'. A. Brady, who quotes these words, adds: '"Protection" here has the same meaning as in "protective" custody, or as in ordinary gangster terminology. It means, be protected or arrested; be protected or dissolved' (*The Spirit and Structure of German Fascism*, London, 1937, p. 104). In an exchange of greetings with the new Catholic Bishop of Berlin, Konrad Graf von Preysing, the Minister for Ecclesiastical Affairs, made clear the basis upon which the Catholic Church was to be tolerated: 'If you, Sir, in an unbiased appreciation of the requirements of the present, *cultivate among your clergy and diocesans loyalty to the new State and its Führer* and respect for its authorities, you may rest assured that the German and Prussian Governments will assume full guarantee for freedom of religious exercises and will show complete understanding for the necessities of the Church.' (Ibid. p. 105).

Religion in U.S.S.R.

Marx saw in religion an 'illusory happiness', the inverse reflection of the 'real misery' of mankind. There are two sources of this misery, first dependence on and weakness before Nature and secondly impotence against oppressive social forces. The stupendous technical advances under capitalism which gives man ever-increasing power over nature has undermined and continues to undermine the former basis of religion. But these very advances, within the framework of capitalism, tend not to abolish, but to strengthen the latter. Poverty in the midst of plenty, insecurity and fear, lead men to seek a secure point of support, to believe in the supernatural.

When the Russian Government inaugurated the Five Year Plans which tremendously increased the power of man over nature, they believed that they were inaugurating the abolition of poverty; the establishment of socialism in Russia would thus undermine both sources of religion. When the Government announced the Second Five Year Plan (1933–37), which was to establish a fully-fledged socialist society, the League of Militant Atheists declared a parallel 'Five Year Plan of Atheism' whose aim was to increase the number of members of the League from 5½ to 15 million in 1937 and to see that 'not a

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77/ single house of prayer shall remain in the territory of the U.S.S.R., and the very concept of God must be banished from the Soviet Union as a survival of the Middle Ages and an instrument for the oppression of the working masses.'

This plan of frontal attack failed miserably. The persecution of religion did not uproot religion at all. Instead of 15 million members of the League in 1937, there were only two million, and even though after much effort the number increased to 3½ million in 1941, it never reached the level of 1932. Prof. N. S. Timasheff, in his book *Religion in Soviet Russia, 1917–1942* (London, 1943), gives many quotations from the Russian press to show the widespread influence of religion: 'During one of the few anti-religious conferences held in recent years, the chairman said that he had been appointed by mistake, that he did not see any progress and that actually the members of the League accomplished nothing. (*Antireligioznik*, 1939, No. 2). In the Petrograd (Leningrad) province, an attempt was made to revive the local organization of the League, but the provincial conference stated three months later that the attempt was futile. At the conference, the secretary of the provincial organization exclaimed bitterly that all the anti-religious work in the province was in his pocket, that is, that it consisted of a few trifling papers. (*Krasnaya Gazeta*, Nov. 15th, 1938; *Antireligioznik*, 1939 No. 1) . . .

'Early in 1940, one could read that "the enemies of anti-religious work had obtained that, in the majority of provinces, there is no anti-religious work at all. Local cells have ceased to exist, lecturers are unavailable". (*Bezbozhnik*, 1939, No. 5, *Antireligioznik*, 1939 No. 11). In September, 1940, the Central Committee of the League convoked a special conference. The report delivered to the conference acknowledged that anti-religious propaganda was dying; the Party and the Young Communist League no longer co-operated. Members of the Conference could not say anything that might mitigate the pessimistic findings of the Central Committee. (*Pravda*, Sept. 22nd, 1940)'. (pp. 99–101).

In 1937, Yaroslavski, Chairman of the League, declared that the number of religious people in Russia was 80 million. In 1940 another leader of the League gave the figure as 90 million, i.e., about half the population. In the same year,

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Antireligioznik declared that half the industrial proletariat believed in God and it was almost impossible to find atheists in the villages. 771

According to Timasheff: 'In 1938, the official paper of the Militant Atheists League acknowledged that churches in rural districts were well attended and that young people often observed religious holidays. According to the same journal, a large number of children were seen in the churches of Moscow at the Easter service in 1939; and at Christmas, in the Tambov and Voronezh provinces, many children took part during school hours in processions in honour of the Nativity. In the Tambov province, seven tenths of the children were absent from school on Christmas day and celebrated the Feast in their homes. In Moscow and Tiflis, children with candles in their hands prayed in the churches. In Kursk many children were absent from school during Lent, and attended church and received Holy Communion. In the province of Riazan, many received Holy Communion at the Easter mass, and in the Smolensk province, they took an active part in ceremonies linked with Easter'. (Ibid. p. 67).

It is very natural that Yaroslavski met the situation with a despairing cry: 'It is impossible to build up Communism in a society half of which believes in God and the other half fears the devil.' (*Bezbozhnik*, 1939, No. 14).

The defeat of the 'Five Year Plan of Atheism' cannot be explained only, or even mainly, by opposition of the pre-revolutionary generation, as four-fifths of the present population of U.S.S.R. was either born after the October Revolution or were not yet adult when it broke out, so that they were educated in the schools of the new regime; moreover, the Communist Party had limitless means of propaganda, while the priests did not publish a single paper or book.

The 'Five Year Plan of Atheism' failed because the 'real misery' of the people did not abate. The logic of reality was stronger than all the ukazes of the Kremlin and, confronted with this, Stalin made a complete *volte face*, from the persecution of religion to its regimentation. 659

By 1935 it had already become clear to the Government that the policy of suppression had failed and the turn began then. At Easter, 1935, religious tokens began to be sold in both state

626 line by allowing for complete cynicism, and therefore for
155 elasticity in adjusting oneself to changing tactics.

626 *Metaphysical Ketman*[1] occurs generally in countries with
• 719 a Catholic past. Most examples of it within the Imperium are found in Poland. This Ketman depends upon a *suspended* belief in a metaphysical principle of the world. A man attached to this Ketman regards the epoch in which he lives as anti-metaphysical, and hence as one in which no metaphysical faith can emerge. Humanity is learning to think in rationalistic and materialistic categories; it is burdened with immediate problems and entangled in a class war. Other-worldly religions are crumbling, living through a period of crisis and, what is worse, serving to defend the obsolete order. This does not mean that mankind will not return to a better and purified religion in the future. Perhaps the New Faith is an indispensable purgatory; perhaps God's purpose is being accomplished through the barbarians, i.e. the Center,[2] who are forcing the masses to awaken out of their lethargy. The spiritual fare these masses receive from the New Faith is inferior and insufficient. Still one must commend the Center for breaking new ground and for demolishing externally splendid but internally rotten façades. One should cooperate in this task without betraying one's attachment to the Mystery. All the more so because the Mystery has no possibility of appearing in literature, for example, and because neither the language nor the ideas at the disposal of contemporary man are ripe enough to express it.

This metaphysical Ketman in its turn has a number of varieties. Certain practicing Catholics serve even in the security police, and *suspend* their Catholicism in executing their inhumane work. Others, trying to maintain a Christian community in the bosom of the New Faith, come out publicly as Catholics. They often succeed in preserving

[1] [For a definition of Ketman, see cat 116, no 5760 Analyst]
[2] [Moscow — Analyst]

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Catholic institutions, because the dialecticians are ready to accept so-called "progressive" and "patriotic" Catholics who comply in political matters. The mutual game is rather ambiguous. The rulers tolerate such Catholics as a temporary and necessary evil, reasoning that the stage has not yet arrived at which one can utterly wipe out religion, and that it is better to deal with accommodating bigots than with refractory ones. "Progressive Catholics" are, however, conscious of being relegated to a not particularly honorable place, that of shamans or witch-doctors from savage tribes whom one humors until one can dress them in trousers and send them to school. They appear in various state spectacles and are even sent abroad as shining testimonials to the Center's tolerance toward uncivilized races. One can compare their function to that of "noble savages" imported to the metropolis by colonial powers for state occasions. Their defense against total degradation is metaphysical Ketman: they swindle the devil who thinks he is swindling them. But the devil knows what they think and is satisfied.

What holds for such Catholics can be applied to members of other religions, as well as to persons outside any denomination. One of the most ominous reproaches leveled against writers is the suspicion that their verses, plays, or novels contain a "metaphysical residue." Since a writer is a civilizer who dares not be a shaman or a sorcerer, the slightest signs of a metaphysical tendency in him are unforgivable. The literature of the countries which, until the Second World War, were free from Moscow's domination betrayed especially strong inclinations in that direction, so that metaphysical deviation is of constant and imperative concern to the rulers. For instance, a play that introduces "strangeness," revealing the author's interest in the tragedy of life, has no chance of being produced be-

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626 cause the tragedy of human fate leads to thoughts about
● 779 the mystery of human destiny. One forgives certain writers like Shakespeare these predispositions, but there is no question of permitting any contemporary author to harbor them. It is for this reason that Greek tragedies are not deemed suitable for theater repertoires. Marx loved the Greek tragedians, but let us not forget that the connection between the New Faith and Marx is rather superficial.

517 The New Faith is a Russian creation, and the Russian
626 intelligentsia which shaped it had developed the deepest contempt for all art that does not serve social ends directly. Other social functions of art, probably the most important ones, consistently escaped its understanding. As for poetry, since its sources are hard to differentiate from the sources of all religion, it is singularly exposed to persecution. True, the poet is free to describe hills, trees, and flowers, but if he should feel that boundless exaltation in the face of nature that seized Wordsworth on his visit to Tintern Abbey, he is at once suspect. This is an excellent means of eliminating the legions of bad poets who like to confess their pantheistic flights publicly, but it is also a means of exterminating poetry as a whole and replacing it by jingles little better than the singing commercials broadcast over the radio in America. A painter, in turn, may be attacked quite as easily for using abbreviated and synthesized forms (formalism), as for an excessive love of the beauty of the world, i.e. a contemplative attitude which signifies that he is a metaphysicist by temperament. A musician should see to it that his compositions are easy to translate into the language of common activities (enthusiasm for work, folk festivities, etc.), and that no element remains which is difficult to grasp and hence dangerous. If metaphysical Ketman is tolerated in the "savages," i.e. those who profess the Christian religion, in the artists

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● 779 Christianity that can be attacked successfully. Not without reason did the Catholic Church defend the feudal structure against nascent capitalism during the Reformation. Capitalism created scientific thinking and dealt a powerful blow to religion in Europe by removing the best minds from the confines of theology. Modern society reveals how swiftly ideas that were at first the property of the intellectual few can spread; to discover along what lines society will develop, it is sometimes useful to trace the trend in the thinking of a small number of clear-sighted sensitive people. What is on the surface at a given moment, e.g. a literary style, gives way to new elements, though it may survive for a long time on a second or third level. (Revivals are, of course, possible.) This is what happened to theology in Europe. The Church lost its top-level position when, during the industrial upheavals, it lost the intellectuals and failed to win the new class of workers. And these are the two groups to which the Party attaches most importance. Today, the intellectual life of Christianity grows on the outer fringes of the Church, in little circles that are trying to adapt Christian philosophy to the new needs of the century.

Still, religious needs exist in the masses and it would be a mistake, from the Party's point of view, to deny them. Perhaps they will disappear once the entire population has been transformed into workers; but no one knows when that will happen. We are dealing here with imponderable elements. Mysterious, indeed, is the instinct which makes man revolt against a reasonable explanation of all phenomena. Christianity's armor is so thin in the twentieth century, a child in school is so deeply immersed in the new way of thinking, and yet the zone of shadow eludes the light of reason. We suddenly stumble upon puzzles. Professor Pavlov, who originated the theory of conditioned

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reflexes, was a deeply religious man. Moscow caused him 777
no trouble over this because he was an eminent scientist and because he was old. The creator of the theory of conditioned reflexes—the very theory that constitutes one of the strongest arguments against the existence of some sort of constant called "human nature"! The defenders of religion maintain that this "human nature" cannot change completely; that gods and churches have existed over thousands of years and in all kinds of civilizations, and that one can expect this to be true of the future as well. What went on in Professor Pavlov's head if two systems of concepts, one scientific and one religious, existed simultaneously there?

The Party teaches that "existence shapes consciousness," 659
that circumstances alter men. But it matters little whether religious drives result from "human nature" or from centuries of conditioning; they exist. During the war against Hitler, the Soviet Union had to dust off its priests as well as appeal to nationalistic feelings. When imminent death brings that moment of absurd revelation that *everything is senseless,* dialectical materialism suddenly discloses its mathematical structure. Man falls from the industriously built bridges. He prefers to surrender to the magic of icons.

In its own fashion, the Party too is a church. Its dictator- 626
ship over the earth and its transformation of the human 777
species depend on the success with which it can channel 659
irrational human drives and use them to its own ends. No, logical arguments are not enough. "Club" ceremonies, poetry, novels, films are so important because they reach deeper into the stratum on which the emotional conflict rages. No other church can be tolerated; Christianity is 777
Public Enemy No. 1. It fosters all the skepticism of the 829
masses as to the radical transformation of mankind. If,

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•779 as the Gospel teaches, we must not do harm unto others,
829 then perhaps we must not harm kulaks? If the highest glory does not belong to man, then perhaps worship of Lenin and Stalin is idolatry?

I have known many Christians—Poles, Frenchmen, Spaniards—who were strict Stalinists in the field of politics but who retained certain inner reservations, believing God would make corrections once the bloody sentences of the all-mighties of History were carried out. They pushed their reasoning rather far. They argue that history develops according to immutable laws that exist by the will of God; one of these laws is the class struggle; the twentieth century marks the victory of the proletariat, which is led in its struggle by the Communist Party; Stalin, the leader of the Communist Party, fulfills the law of history, or in other words acts by the will of God; therefore one must obey him. Mankind can be renewed only on the Russian pattern; that is why no Christian can oppose the one—cruel, it is true—idea which will create a new kind of man over the entire planet. Such reasoning is often used by clerics who are Party tools. "Christ is a new man. The new man is the Soviet man. Therefore Christ is a Soviet man!" said Justinian Marina, the Rumanian patriarch.

In reality, such Christians (even omitting men like Marina) perpetuate one of the greatest lies of all centuries. They renounce their faith but are ashamed to admit it. The contradiction between Christianity and Stalinist philosophy cannot be overcome. Christianity is based on a concept of *individual* merit and guilt; the New Faith, on *historical* merit and guilt. The Christian who rejects individual merit and guilt denies the work of Jesus, and the God he calls upon slowly transforms himself into History. If he admits that only individual merit and guilt

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exist, how can he gaze indifferently at the suffering of 779
people whose only sin was that they blocked the path of 829
"historical processes"? To lull his conscience he resorts to the thesis that a reactionary cannot be a good man.

Who is the reactionary? Everyone who opposes the in- 626
evitable historical processes, i.e. the Politburo police. The thesis of the "sin of the reactionary" is argued very cleverly: every perception is "oriented," i.e. at the very moment of perceiving we introduce our ideas into the material of our observations; only he sees reality truly who evaluates it in terms of the interests of the class that is the lever of the future, i.e. the proletariat. The writings of Lenin and Stalin teach us what the interests of the proletariat are. Whoever sees reality otherwise than as the proletariat sees it falsely; in other words, his picture of reality is deformed by the pressure of the interests of classes that are backward and so destined to disappear. Whoever sees the world falsely necessarily acts badly; whoever acts badly is a bad man; therefore the reactionary is a bad man, and one should not feel sorry for him.

This line of reasoning has at least one flaw—it ignores the facts. The pressure of an all-powerful totalitarian state creates an emotional tension in its citizens that determines their acts. When people are divided into "loyalists" and "criminals" a premium is placed on every type of conformist, coward, and hireling; whereas among the "criminals" one finds a singularly high percentage of people who are direct, sincere, and true to themselves. From the social point of view these persons would constitute the best guarantee that the future development of the social organism would be toward good. From the Christian point of view they have no other sin on their conscience save their contempt for Caesar, or their incorrect evaluation of his might.

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of the State, to an extent undreamed of in Czarist Russia. We were wont, many of us, to make uncomplimentary references to the clergy of the old regime. Some of the strictures were too sweeping. But, alas, what we must be prepared to say about the Russian Church under the Soviets is far more devastating. It has become an institution which all but blesses the concentration camp system, and escorts slave labor to its doom with a kind of liturgical brass band.

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The Soviet objective is to reduce religious organizations outside Russia to the status of the Orthodox Church at home. The formula is always and everywhere the same, though it may be applied with greater or lesser rigor. Therefore inevitably the Vatican becomes the great antagonist, to be fought with every means. The Holy See, pledged to the profession of the Christian Gospels without dilution of the ethical obligations which they impose upon everyone who accepts them in the Catholic sense, cannot agree that the Church is to be an instrument of the State —even, indeed, a benign and merciful instrument. The Vatican is therefore the ignoble Fascist Beast of the Bolshevik Apocalypse. Upon the heads of persons who remain loyal to the ancient See of Catholic Christendom, blows have rained in constant succession. This is the direst persecution the Church has suffered since the days of the Caesars.

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Because most of what may be reported concerns the Catholic Church, a brief review of its history and endeavors in Eastern Europe will help to bring events into perspective. The cleavage of the Roman Empire, establishing the rivalry between the emperors of Rome and Byzantium, begot two Churches also, each claiming for itself the charisma of Apostolic Christianity. With the passing of time, profound differences of a dogmatic, moral, and canonical kind developed. The organizational character of religion was also modified radically, so that, while in the East the ties binding the religious nations to the historic pa-

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triarchal See of Constantinople were either broken completely 175
or allowed to become loose and tenuous, in the West the struc- 795
ture of the Roman Catholic Church became more monolithic 779
in fact, if not in theory. No doubt this divergence was rooted partly in theology, but one cause was the decline of Constantinople as an important Christian center and its subjection to Turkish rule.

Yet there could never be any doubt that both Churches were [793]
intensely and ardently Catholic. They kept the tradition of the
priesthood as a sacramental ordination administered by bish- [796]
ops whose authority had been handed down in direct line of succession from the Apostles. Both retained the Mass as that in which the Sacrifice of Christ was reenacted so that His body and blood might be with the Church always. Devotion to the Virgin Mary, so long a thorn in the flesh of Western Protestantism, was a common heritage and treasure, however different the conceptions of Mary's personality and presence or the liturgies in which her praise was spelled out in prayer. Therefore efforts to effect reunion have never flagged since the Middle Ages. The fact that they have failed may well be, as many writers have thought, one of the great tragedies of history.

For every thoughtful Western Catholic the virtues and atti- 000
tudes cherished in the East are precious because they reflect mystical prayer and thought and often the vital, profound humility of the human sinner who does not lose himself in "personalism": the personalism which in the West has so often favored the delusion that the rights and righteousness of man are pearls grown within himself through the practice of religion or morality, independent of the sacred order which is in God and which, when he is sometimes devout and submissive, he may possess in the deepest core of his being. On the other hand the West, unlike the East, has an illustrious tradition of endeavor to permeate the speculative and practical intelligence by holi-

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000 ness, so that the other human being, the brother, with his needs, fears, and failings as well as his innate good qualities, may be brought into a community of charity and justice. The great Saints of Roman Catholicism are not seldom found among men who, like Francis, Dominic, Benedict, and Ignatius, were builders of communities that sought the fullest possible human expression of man's sense of union with God and with his fellows upon the earth.

S.U. 653 Yet it is over the question of authority that the contest between East and West has been most keen. In Western eyes the great failure of the Orthodox Church has been its inability to disassociate itself from the control of the secular state. We see, for example, in Communist Russia today as well as we seem to see in czarist history, a religion which does what it is told to do, which lulls the consciences of men into obedience to tyranny. But if I understand such writers as Berdyaev correctly, freedom to find Christ in the Church is all that matters to the Russian Christian, and any authoritatively formulated faith is in his eyes a serious denial of a cardinal rule by which the soul must live. This philosophical restatement of the remarks concerning the Grand Inquisitor which are familiar to readers of Dostoievski's *Brothers Karamazov* is, of course, a valid critique of those moments in the history of Western Catholicism when E force was used to insure men's allegiance to the Church; but it does not deal at all with the central and abiding doctrines of 795 Western Catholicism on authority. The Papacy is not, in the 779 view of those who recognize it, an institution with the purpose of driving people into the Church and holding them there, but is rather the sublime instrumentality through which Divine Grace wards off from the Catholic communion all that, whatever its source, was not present from the beginning in Christ's teaching, literally or implicitly. For this reason Western Catholics have loved it, died for it, borne persecution for its sake.

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and reverenced those who, however worthily or unworthily, represented it to the world. The Western Catholic is as free as anyone else to come to his insight into the fullness of the meaning of Christianity but he has a certainty held with profound gratitude that when he is in his Church he will not unwittingly find strange gods upon the altars.

In any event, the quest for reunion continued and reached, as has been indicated, an initial nadir during the period of the Crusades and a moment of optimistic hopefulness at the Councils of Ferrara and Florence during the fifteenth century. Only a brief reference to either is possible here. The Crusaders, who were roused by eloquent preachers like St. Bernard to take up arms and make the long journey eastward to wrest the Holy Places associated with the life and death of Our Lord from the Turks, served a consecrated cause; but many of them were very human, indeed. Some historians conclude from the sermons of St. Bernard and other preachers of the time that the purely mundane benefits which accrued to the men who took up the Cross were so great that many ruffians (contrary to romantic historians, the Middle Ages had their share of them) embarked on the adventure. It is also evident that although the Crusades owed their origin to an appeal for help from the Byzantine Emperor, to which the monks of Cluny responded as best they could, the net cultural result was that the East was not only disappointed in what the West could achieve but disgusted with the conduct of the armies, even as since that time many another occupied country has been with foreign soldiers who have been billeted on its soil. On the other hand, the West heard many a report about the corruption and venality of the East, even as the home people in this our day have listened to shocking stories of lands which their soldier sons have seen. It must be added that the subsequent continued dominion of the Turks likewise dampened the ardor of friendship.

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Pontificate did Pius XI reaffirm the desirability of the more 795
secular associations. And in Germany after World War II 668
Catholics elected to create an interconfessional party, the Christian Democratic Union, instead of resurrecting the old Center Party (which emerged as a small minority movement only).

In any event, wide circles of the clergy and the laity looked 795
upon the Russian Church with deep if sometimes nostalgic re- 779
spect, particularly when the yearning for the reunion of Christendom was spiritually motivated and sincere. Despite many efforts, the outlook for an eventual peace with the Roman See which would obliterate the divisive past seemed to be unpromising. And on the other hand the "Social Christianity" to which American Protestantism appeared to be irretrievably committed impressed the more traditional European theologians as being thin and relatively mundane. There remained the hope that by forging a bond with the Orthodox East a new Christian community, transcending national boundaries, could be established. The writings of Russian exiles were read with avidity; and the authors were of such talent, insight, and sometimes genius that they exerted a great influence. There can be no doubt that, if after victory in 1945 Stalin had adopted a conciliatory policy and had conceded genuine religious and social freedom, Central and Eastern Europe would have become strongly, even ardently pro-Russian. The response in Protestant communities would have been particularly sincere.

The hope for such a policy was at times as fervent as a 000
messianic dream, and it died hard. Pastor Martin Niemoeller has perhaps been its most eloquent exponent, but there have been many others. It is not possible to understand fully the situation that developed unless one bears these things in mind. Only with great difficulty could Europe resign itself to accepting the intellectual and cultural leadership of the United States. This sobering thought may also be a healing one.

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other than Lenin, who wrote of that very Church: 'That shameful and accursed past when the Church was in feudal dependence on the State and Russian citizens were in feudal dependence on the established Church'. The Church, however, conveniently forgets Lenin's words and rewrites its past. Thus Karpov said: 'The Russian Orthodox Church in the days of hard trial, which our Fatherland repeatedly underwent in the past, did not break its link with the people, it lived with their needs, their hopes, their wishes and contributed its mite to the common struggle . . .' 659

Religious Denominations in Eastern Europe

The experience of Russia has served the Kremlin as a pattern for its handling of the religious question in the satellite countries. 162 779

In these countries there are two main religious denominations, the Roman Catholic and the Greek Orthodox.

The available statistics on the distribution of population according to religion are pre-war censuses. Since then changes in boundaries, the migration of populations, and the annihilation of many people during the war, including nearly the whole of the Jewish population of these countries (of nearly 5 million Jews only 700 thousand remained) have made these statistics obsolete. But for lack of more recent data they will have to be used, and if care is taken the margin of error need not be too big.

There are big Roman Catholic communities in all the satellite countries except Bulgaria. In Poland, Roman Catholics comprise more than 90 per cent of the population, in Czechoslovakia 73 per cent, in Hungary 64 per cent, in Yugoslavia 37 per cent and in Rumania 6 per cent. In three of these countries there are considerable Greek Orthodox communities: in Bulgaria, 86 per cent of the population, in Rumania 70 per cent and in Yugoslavia 49 per cent. In Hungary and Czechoslovakia there are important Protestant minorities (26 per cent and 8 per cent of the population respectively). In Bulgaria, Moslems form 13 per cent of the population and in Yugoslavia 11 per cent.

The Communists' Attitude to the Orthodox Church

From the beginning the Communist Parties and Governments showed entirely different attitudes towards the Greek Orthodox 659

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121 beds. All these lands will never again become what they once
727 were—regions of constant struggle and short-lived serenity, of poverty and its exploitation, of poetry, fervor, and sadness. Those of us who have, for example, seen peasant women trudging for many miles through the omnipresent dust to kneel for an hour at the shrines of Silesia will never forget either the fact or its meaning.

781 There is not a foot of the old soil of Central Europe which
156 has not been consecrated by endurance for the sake of the things of the spirit and the mind. Indeed, I have sometimes wondered, reading the Polish and Silesian poets and novelists, why the longing to hold out should have persisted during many difficult centuries—why, for instance, Polish forests in thrall to the Czars should have hidden priest and ritual with such fidelity. Perhaps the explanation, in so far as it is of this world, can be found in the deep human urge for the preservation of identity. Custom and language were vital symbols of the self, and without them men felt they could not live. But stronger than all else was the deep, primitive, mystical desire for identification with Eternal Righteousness, manifest to the believer in the life of the Redeemer. To give up the faith was to surrender not merely one's self but the world as well.

798 To be sure these men and women were very human, often
563 poverty-stricken and untutored, sometimes intolerant and oppressive. The effort to conserve themselves and their identity spilled over into moments of vengeful outrage inflicted upon others because they were different. Thus anti-Semitism has a long history in Eastern Europe studded with bloody pogroms. Although curbed in Austro-Hungarian regions it was latent there, too, as the shameful events of 1938 proved, but manifest elsewhere continuously with varying intensity. Or who can forget the repression of the Ukrainians in Poland under the Pilsudski government, the conflict between Czechs and Slovaks,

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795 and peace would ensue. In so far as Catholics were concerned, tactful Papal diplomacy insured the continuance of the work of the Church, under altered conditions. But the position of all religions in Eastern Europe was considerably improved. New currents of thought and new forms of group action strengthened Protestantism. Anticlericalism gave way in many quarters to [793] a desire for cordial relationships with the churches. To a very considerable extent Eastern Europe profited by the extraordinary effectiveness and freshness of Christian theological and philosophical writing in France and Germany. But the strongest impetus came from the younger clergy, many of them veterans, who devised and directed new agencies to cope with social problems. It could no longer be said that Catholics, for example, were all bedfellows of special privilege. Confidence was nearly everywhere greater than it had been for generations. It is scarcely extravagant to say that if Hitler had not arisen to inflict doom and agony on countless millions, the great effort of Christian reconstruction in Eastern Europe might have succeeded.

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For every thoughtful Western Catholic the virtues and atti- 000
tudes cherished in the East are precious because they reflect mystical prayer and thought and often the vital, profound humility of the human sinner who does not lose himself in "personalism": the personalism which in the West has so often favored the delusion that the rights and righteousness of man are pearls grown within himself through the practice of religion or morality, independent of the sacred order which is in God and which, when he is sometimes devout and submissive, he may possess in the deepest core of his being. On the other hand the West, unlike the East, has an illustrious tradition of endeavor to permeate the speculative and practical intelligence by holi-

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829 thought; but dynamic traditionalism transformed the Church
795 of the Master into a genteel and eminently historical institution, with the role of conferring the august dignity of an assumed other world upon the power politics of the here-and-now. The robes of prelates fitted very well into the pageantry of the State, and so there were not a few who thought that a benediction might well be expended upon Nazis and Fascists, to the accompaniment of incense and carefully selected items of Gregorian chant, if only their grandiose parades would include a section devoted exclusively to the clergy. It may be said parenthetically that today no one knows whether the Russia of Stalin was a devotee of Marxism or of dynamic traditionalism. Had Stalin donned the robes of Ivan, who could have told which heresy he was espousing?

175 A succession of great Popes, possibly the most remarkable
● 793 in the long annals of the Church, accepted the challenge. Leo
795 XIII, intellectual and aristocratic, recognized the necessity for demonstrating to the workers that they were not at present inside the realms of a Christian civilization that doomed them to a condition of perennial peonage. His successor, Pope Pius X, left to the world the conviction that the Church is the servant of peace; and Benedict XV committed all Catholics to the support of an international order. In 1922 began the vigorous pontificate of Pius XI, distinguished for the world-wide scope of his interests and sympathies. Whereas during several centuries the See of Rome had worn an air of Roman provincialism, the tireless leadership of this learned, mountain-climbing North Italian imparted to it a new tinge of contemporaneousness and cosmopolitanism. The Vatican ended its old quarrel with the Italian State over the Papal territories, even though at some risk of seeming to assent to the dictatorship of Mussolini. It acquired a radio station, an Americanized library system, and even a scientific academy. Through adroit and concilia-

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tory diplomatic activity agreements were reached with the new states of Europe as well as with many countries overseas concerning relationships between Church and State. In ways which were often startlingly new, the laity was associated with the clergy in the work of the Church; and social reform was advocated, in the spirit of a great Encyclical letter restating and re-forming the principles of the moral teaching concerning society which are implicit in the Catholic tradition. All these things were then kept alive under the next Pope, Pius XII.

It is part of the universal tragedy of our time that so very much of what seemed so promising should have been engulfed by the fearful upheavals which, originating in Europe, for a time threatened to shatter the foundations of human society everywhere. In Adolf Hitler appeared the demagogic voluntarist who gave the heresy of dynamic traditionalism its most drastic and frightening formulation. Meanwhile, in nearly every other country Marxism became the gospel of the dissident intellectuals, who often were able to commit to their view sections of the working population, indeed not infrequently unwilling sections. Yet Pius XI had felt, almost from the moment he assumed Pontificate, that a great and shattering storm was brewing in Europe. That is why he labored so vigorously for the development of the Church in other parts of the world, including Africa and Asia. He took steps to forestall the disaster, opposing the mighty heresies whenever he could even though sometimes the infection had spread so far among Catholics themselves that—as in the case of the *Action française*—Princes of the Church did not concur with him.

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In Eastern Europe the position of the Church was inevitably and critically affected by inability to arrive at a *modus vivendi* with the Bolshevik government. The lengthy story of efforts to reach an agreement cannot be told here; but it may be recalled that until the summer of 1924 a Papal Relief Mission was ac-

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659 or guardians forward a written statement to the school that
872 they do not wish their children to participate.

'The programme and text-books for teaching religion are prepared by church organs and submitted to the Ministry of Education. The text-books for all grades of elementary schools were prepared by a special commission attached to the Metropolitan Curia of Cracow.

'Children who attend religious classes participate in the following religious practices:—(a) On Sundays, holidays, and the beginning and end of the school year, they attend church services; (b) They participate in "recollections"; (c) A prayer is recited at the beginning and end of each school day.'

'A network of Catholic theological seminaries which prepare for priesthood and missionary work is spread throughout Poland.'

659 Another issue of *Polish Facts and Figures*, dated August
873 6th, 1949, gives the following facts about religion in Poland: 'Catholic clergymen enjoy many personal privileges which have long ago been abolished or restricted in other countries . . .

'Ecclesiastical seminaries have nearly 18,000 students. Three hundred children's homes, 15,000 pupils, 600 kindergartens with 22,000 children and 40 secondary schools with 9,000 students are under monastic management. The Catholic school system is crowned by the Lublin Catholic University.

659 'Poland is one of those few countries where religious teaching
793 exists in schools. The 6,300 priests teaching religion are paid by the State.

'The number of religious orders has grown during the existence of the People's Poland. While in 1939 there were 1,742 monasteries and convents in Poland, there are now 2,010. The number of nuns has grown from 17,000 to nearly 19,000. Despite the housing shortage, nuns enjoy such privileges as enable them to live in comfortable, big houses.

'Poland holds first place in Europe for the number of Catholic periodicals. Their circulation amounts to 6,387,000.

'. . . 62 Catholic journals were published in Poland as compared with 20 such journals in France.'

659 In all the Army and police units of Poland there are official chaplains.

To demonstrate the devotion of the Communists to Catholicism, General Karol Swierczewski, commander of the

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641 their own party. They live a life of fear in a golden cage,
565 from which they cannot withdraw, even if they wish to do so.

In a democratic state a president elected to office lives like any free and private citizen. Under the Communist system this is unthinkable. The system of privileges finds support even in Communist theory. "It is time it was understood that Marxism is an enemy of equalization," Stalin stated in his report to the Seventeenth Communist Congress in January of 1934. "By equality Marxism means, not equalization of individual requirements and individual life, but abolition of classes. . . ." In the same connection he quoted Lenin's statement that "the claim that we want to make all men equal to one another is an empty phrase and a stupid invention of intellectuals."[4]

641 Freedom of religion and of faith under the Communist system does not exist, either in theory or in practice. The first articles of Communist constitutions always proclaim many civil liberties. But, when we analyze more closely the following passages of these articles, we see that as a rule they contradict and abolish the provisions contained in the first lines. Let us take for example, Article 70 of the constitution of the Polish People's Republic, which appears to guarantee the citizens freedom of conscience and of faith. It also says, however, that abuse of freedom of faith for purposes detrimental to the interest of the Polish People's Republic is punishable. In practice, of course, this means that every pronouncement against the atheistic and materialistic principles of the Communist system is detrimental to the People's Republic and is therefore punishable.

641 But that is not all. The Communists who proclaim the
•793 division between the church and the state do not intend to leave any freedom to the church. They demand the clergy's help in the building of socialism and consider any refusal to be detrimental to the interests of the People's State. In

[4] Joseph Stalin, *Problems of Leninism*, pp. 521-522.

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practice, church organizations and the clergy are meant to have no function but that of a helpful tool in the communization of the nation. 641 793

The function of education is the same. The Communists do not even pretend to support freedom of knowledge and bluntly state in their legislation that the duty of higher schools is to educate the younger generation in the spirit of socialist dialectics and materialistic doctrines. Theoretically, the Communist system assures the youth of education. In practice, an individual's right to education is not determined by intellectual ability and progress but by membership in the Young Communist League (Komsomol), by informing on "unorthodox" professors, and by success in examinations on Communist politics and doctrines. 641 871

The articles of the Communist constitutions that deal with the rights of the citizens stress above all the rights to work, rest, and medical treatment. The Communist attitude toward the individual is like that of the horse-owner when he thinks that the main duty of his animal is to work and believes that it must be assured of rest and medical treatment only to insure the fulfillment of this duty. Actually, most farmers in the free countries treat their animals better than the Communists treat the people. Out of hatred, the Communists destroy whole social groups and even perpetrate the genocide of whole nations. 641

The Communists claimed that when they had freed the working man from capitalist exploitation they would not allow the exploitation of one man by another. Is this claim realized in practice? Again, the answer is no. The Communist state created the worst kind of exploitation by giving the rule of the people to the Communist elite and by providing this elite with the formidable weapons of both police and army. In a democratic state, even where large industries and sources of raw materials are nationalized, the interests of the people are guarded by trade unions, politi- 661 565

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held this poor, often stricken community in thrall was different from that which the Christian peasant nursed at his fireside, with his children and his beasts about him, the words with which it was conjured up were very often the same for both. Love the Lord, thy God; love thy neighbor as thou dost thyself —the affection so hard to find in the daily street, but longed for even more earnestly, desperately than a dear woman is desired, seemed for the moment to have been ushered in over the sagging thresholds. . . . And then, of course, the Sabbath would end and the bitterness would return, and Leah would stand in the street to see the Gentile curse her children. Yet even so there was a bond between the spurner and the spurned. They knew in their hearts that they were all God's children, dirty and dissolute children, but they were certain they had a place to go home to, come the eve of the Lord's Day.

In any event, the general character of the Church and its activities in Central and Eastern Europe was formed historically by the dramatic tension between mass tendencies and leadership. In Austria-Hungary religious institutions grew rich and powerful, sometimes paying for their prosperity with a measure of undue dependence on the Habsburg state. Even now, in a drab time, the traveler through Austria will look with admiration on the great monasteries—St. Peter in Salzburg, Melk on the Danube, St. Florian, Klosterneuburg on a hill above Vienna, and many others—which outdo in splendor manorial castles and are surrounded by rich lands. These were centers of humanistic education, and numerous merited tributes have been paid to them. And in many another place, urban or rural, the Church owned important properties amassed through the generosity of the faithful or received through royal donation. In every part of the Empire, church bells rang rich and deep, even when the piety to which they appealed was woefully superficial.

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But in the end these possessions stirred the envy not merely 794
of ambitious and worldly men but also of the land-hungry 471
poor. To be sure the Abbot of a flourishing monastery might 578
correctly point out that the revenues did not enrich the monks, who normally lived under his guidance by an austere religious rule. These religious in their bare cells did not taste the fine vintages pressed from monastery grapes carefully tended by brothers who rose at four for Matins and then expended themselves zealously for the cause of God. Nevertheless the critics were not by any means only emancipated spirits who found moral discipline irksome and the Church old-fashioned. They were also earnest, weather-beaten peasants, with no soil to till, and often desperately poor, who understandably looked upon Church estates with a covetous eye. And of course everywhere the well applauded and sharp-tongued ideologies of the time—Marxism, Nationalism, Nihilism—were allied against the Church, often looked upon by the seemingly more enlightened folk of those days as the heritor of a creed outworn. And it must be admitted that sometimes a segment of the clergy, grown comfortable and worldly, acted as if they thought so, too.

Protestantism inside the old Empire clung to the enclaves 795
which had been established during the era of the Reformation
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Thirty Years' War both Lutheranism and Calvinism maintained themselves resolutely in Hungary, for example, so that prior to the outbreak of World War II Catholics in that country constituted about 67 per cent of the population, while Protestants numbered nearly 27 per cent and adhered to both the Lutheran and the Calvinist tradition. In Czechoslovakia the situation was relatively the same, though the number of Protestant groups was greater. A considerable part of the population —6 per cent in 1932—professed no religion of any kind. Another characteristic of the old Empire was the presence of the

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tion of separate states. Therewith a tide of Liberalism merged 175
with the currents of upsurging tribal nationalism to create the 186
pattern of conflict which was later to prove so advantageous to the totalitarians. Czech nationalism, having in Thomas Masaryk a brilliantly effective standard-bearer, seemed at first blush to usher in a new era of democratic and progressive social thought. It soon became obvious, however, that the autonomism of the Czechs—which led at the outset even to the establishment of a National Church—would of necessity engender comparable feelings in the breasts of the other peoples in the Czechoslovak Republic. The Slovaks rallied round their own traditions of language and culture, and swiftly but surely became committed to a quest for autonomy which found a temporary though unsatisfactory haven under Hitler. Among Sudeten Germans feeling was almost as strong and led ultimately to the fateful formation of a political party which advocated union with Germany. Nor was the situation different elsewhere. Yugoslavia was plagued from the beginning by deep and bitter conflict among the Serbs, the Croats, and the Slovenes.

In Hungary a violent Communist revolution, spearheaded in 175
late 1918 by Béla Kun, ruled for a time by bloodshed. But ere 669
long this uprising, which had very little popular support, was 794
put down; reaction set in, and a dictatorial government was established after it had compiled its own catalogue of excesses. Here was made manifest, probably for the first time, how significant the stability of religious groups could prove to be. Not only did they temper noticeably the excesses of extremists, but under the leadership of great churchmen they began to build organizations dedicated to social improvement. It is also true [829]
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In attempting to visualize the complex continuous effort by the Church in these lands to educate the people and to meet their physical and spiritual needs we deal not with an island in the stream of modern life—as we should if, for example, we set out to evaluate the influence of religion on the art, music, and architecture of present-day America—but verily with that stream itself. For example, the press that appeared under Catholic auspices in Poland, Hungary, and Czechoslovakia was a mighty force, in all its ramifications from the daily newspaper to the monthly periodical, for the shaping of public opinion. On the other hand, hospitals and refuges, schools and day nurseries, conducted for the most part under the supervision of religious orders, were almost the only institutions of such character to be found in some countries. Therefore the Communist onslaught upon this manifold activity was not merely against tradition but verily against action. It could not have succeeded unless its directors were safely established behind a dense array of Russian machine guns. It was an invasion resembling in some respects the earlier inroads from the East under which all these lands had suffered not once but many times. Assuredly the men in the Vatican, pondering the news each day, must often have let their thought return to times when Turk and Tartar bombarded the ancient citadels of once Christian Europe.

We shall now summarize, though of necessity far too briefly, Protestant efforts to establish ecumenical union with the Russian Orthodox Church. On the one hand they resulted to some extent from the failure during the Pontificate of Pope Leo XIII to prepare the way for the union of the Anglican Church with Rome. This failure, it will be recalled, was in large measure due to Rome's decision that Anglican Orders were not valid. On the other hand, Protestant Churches in Eastern Europe often felt that the attitude of Russian Orthodoxy toward the State was more compatible with the traditional views of

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●795 Greek Orthodox Church, which though united in its Uniate form with Rome, preserved its old language and customs. This Church became the target of special Russian propagandistic and repressive efforts as soon as the Iron Curtain was established.

565 Elsewhere outside the former realm of the Habsburgs the
795 situation was comparable. In Poland a Catholic peasantry
369 whose loyalty was deeply moving lived confidently though primitively in the light of a mystical faith, while worldliness and skepticism were prevalent among the upper classes. It was commonly said there, after World War I, that the most religious of peoples was governed by the most morally lax of bureaucrats; and that may well have been the case. Nor could the coming of industrialism to such mushroom cities as Lodz, so bitterly lamented by Ladislas Reymont, bring about the immediate solution of any grave social problem. Nevertheless, as we shall see, there existed in Poland religious elites of extraordinary quality and dedication. In eastern Germany, overwhelmingly Protestant despite certain vigorous centers of Catholic activity such as the Ermland in East Prussia and the border districts west of Poznan (Silesia was a province apart, its culture having been developed under the Habsburgs), one could go from the old conservative, rural Church communities of the landed estates along the Baltic Sea to the liberal atmosphere of Saxony, where the social problems inherent in modern industrial society dominated thought and action. Concerning the Balkans one need say here only that, though they suffered from the normal diseases of feudalism, they offered much of vital and absorbing interest to the student of religious life.

175 These observations will help to explain the situation which
186 followed the First World War. The old Austro-Hungarian Empire was dissolved, and dissident nationalist sentiment, supported by the will of the victorious Allies, demanded the crea-

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of the State, to an extent undreamed of in Czarist Russia. We were wont, many of us, to make uncomplimentary references to the clergy of the old regime. Some of the strictures were too sweeping. But, alas, what we must be prepared to say about the Russian Church under the Soviets is far more devastating. It has become an institution which all but blesses the concentration camp system, and escorts slave labor to its doom with a kind of liturgical brass band.

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The Soviet objective is to reduce religious organizations outside Russia to the status of the Orthodox Church at home. The formula is always and everywhere the same, though it may be applied with greater or lesser rigor. Therefore inevitably the Vatican becomes the great antagonist, to be fought with every means. The Holy See, pledged to the profession of the Christian Gospels without dilution of the ethical obligations which they impose upon everyone who accepts them in the Catholic sense, cannot agree that the Church is to be an instrument of the State —even, indeed, a benign and merciful instrument. The Vatican is therefore the ignoble Fascist Beast of the Bolshevik Apocalypse. Upon the heads of persons who remain loyal to the ancient See of Catholic Christendom, blows have rained in constant succession. This is the direst persecution the Church has suffered since the days of the Caesars.

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Because most of what may be reported concerns the Catholic Church, a brief review of its history and endeavors in Eastern Europe will help to bring events into perspective. The cleavage of the Roman Empire, establishing the rivalry between the emperors of Rome and Byzantium, begot two Churches also, each claiming for itself the charisma of Apostolic Christianity. With the passing of time, profound differences of a dogmatic, moral, and canonical kind developed. The organizational character of religion was also modified radically, so that, while in the East the ties binding the religious nations to the historic pa-

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ops whose authority had been handed down in direct line of succession from the Apostles. Both retained the Mass as that in which the Sacrifice of Christ was reenacted so that His body and blood might be with the Church always. Devotion to the Virgin Mary, so long a thorn in the flesh of Western Protestantism, was a common heritage and treasure, however different the conceptions of Mary's personality and presence or the liturgies in which her praise was spelled out in prayer. Therefore efforts to effect reunion have never flagged since the Middle Ages. The fact that they have failed may well be, as many writers have thought, one of the great tragedies of history.

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tudes cherished in the East are precious because they reflect mystical prayer and thought and often the vital, profound humility of the human sinner who does not lose himself in "personalism": the personalism which in the West has so often favored the delusion that the rights and righteousness of man are pearls grown within himself through the practice of religion or morality, independent of the sacred order which is in God and which, when he is sometimes devout and submissive, he may possess in the deepest core of his being. On the other hand the West, unlike the East, has an illustrious tradition of endeavor to permeate the speculative and practical intelligence by holi-

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000 ness, so that the other human being, the brother, with his needs, fears, and failings as well as his innate good qualities, may be brought into a community of charity and justice. The great Saints of Roman Catholicism are not seldom found among men who, like Francis, Dominic, Benedict, and Ignatius, were builders of communities that sought the fullest possible human expression of man's sense of union with God and with his fellows upon the earth.

S.U. 659 Yet it is over the question of authority that the contest between East and West has been most keen. In Western eyes the great failure of the Orthodox Church has been its inability to disassociate itself from the control of the secular state. We see, for example, in Communist Russia today as well as we seem to see in czarist history, a religion which does what it is told to do, which lulls the consciences of men into obedience to tyranny. But if I understand such writers as Berdyaev correctly, freedom to find Christ in the Church is all that matters to the Russian Christian, and any authoritatively formulated faith is in his eyes a serious denial of a cardinal rule by which the soul must live. This philosophical restatement of the remarks concerning the Grand Inquisitor which are familiar to readers of Dostoievski's *Brothers Karamazov* is, of course, a valid critique of those moments in the history of Western Catholicism when E force was used to insure men's allegiance to the Church; but it does not deal at all with the central and abiding doctrines of 795 Western Catholicism on authority. The Papacy is not, in the 779 view of those who recognize it, an institution with the purpose of driving people into the Church and holding them there, but is rather the sublime instrumentality through which Divine Grace wards off from the Catholic communion all that, whatever its source, was not present from the beginning in Christ's teaching, literally or implicitly. For this reason Western Catholics have loved it, died for it, borne persecution for its sake.

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175 The great Councils to which we have referred opened in a
● 795 spirit of optimism, despite the nationalistic bickering to which
648 Europe was then subject. The Greeks were in a conciliatory mood, due largely to their need of Western allies against the followers of Mohammed, but they arrived in Europe at a time of bitter conflict over whether a Council took precedence over the Pope. The Decree of Union did not satisfy the great mass of the Greeks, even though the overwhelming majority of their ecclesiastical representatives assented to it in accordance with the wishes of the Emperor. The only positive result was the formation of the Greek Churches in union with Rome, usually called the Uniate Churches. In Russia, as we have seen, the Czar vetoed any plan of reunion.

But the great dream of reunion did not die, and after World War I it was revived especially by Pope Pius XI, who had intimate personal knowledge of conditions in Eastern Europe from the high vantage point of the Holy See. Institutions under the auspices of the Papacy were established to promote the achievement of One Fold and One Shepherd. At the same time the Protestant Ecumenical Council likewise began to search for ways in which to draw the Eastern Churches into union, with the Churches bound together under its roof. These efforts were not wholly useless, but it was again obvious that the disunity of the Christian West had puzzled and confused rather than attracted the East.

175 Meanwhile great changes had taken place. The Papacy was
829 compelled to reckon with the rise of secularism, which swept
795 across Eastern Europe from the West during the nineteenth century. Medieval ecclesiastical institutions were widely identified with feudalism; and in addition new intellectual and scientific movements gave rise to a widespread conviction that religion was in itself a barrier to the development of the good, or at least the prosperous, society. The attack on feudalism

[1. Councils of Ferrara and Florence, 15th cent. - Analyst.]

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which became the great French Revolution of 1789 was also a 175
rebellion against the privileged Church; and after the rise of 829
a capitalistic society the estrangement of the poor from religion 795
became the dominant fact in the cultural history of Western Europe. Hegelian philosophy—combining a doctrine of the constantly mobile and shifting Mind with a theory of the State as the sole primordially ordained center of permanence in an otherwise impermanent world—came to prominence at a time when dissatisfaction with Liberalism (in the continental sense) was breeding myths of political utopianism among the masses. Of these myths the strongest, temporarily at least, was the Marxist faith, rooted in a class-conscious usurpation of Hegelian thought. Yet observers who looked deeply into the wellsprings from which the intellectual behavior of the time was fed could see that a creed drastically counter to Marxism was arising in many different places, almost spontaneously. This might be termed dynamic traditionalism—that is, investing the past of man with sacredness and subsequently selecting from it forces and figures that could be made objects of the cult, in which the concept of human sacrality might receive a quasi-liturgical form. Perhaps such a force might be race, or classical antiquity, or one of the urges which some historians read into the Renaissance. To the exponents of dynamic traditionalism, the Catholic Church often seemed to be one great force among many others. For did it not have discipline, as Charles Maurras observed, and a heritage of beauty ranging all the way from the austerity of Cluny to the gorgeous splendor of St. Peter's?

This traditionalism tempted many Catholics—was indeed a 829
far greater peril to orthodoxy than even the antecedent, all- 795
pervading Liberalism. That no doubt had led not a few to believe that the Christian creed was outmoded and so could be made serviceable only by adapting it, more or less subtly, to the assumptions of modern scientific and philosophical

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829 thought; but dynamic traditionalism transformed the Church
795 of the Master into a genteel and eminently historical institution, with the role of conferring the august dignity of an assumed other world upon the power politics of the here-and-now. The robes of prelates fitted very well into the pageantry of the State, and so there were not a few who thought that a benediction might well be expended upon Nazis and Fascists, to the accompaniment of incense and carefully selected items of Gregorian chant, if only their grandiose parades would include a section devoted exclusively to the clergy. It may be said parenthetically that today no one knows whether the Russia of Stalin was a devotee of Marxism or of dynamic traditionalism. Had Stalin donned the robes of Ivan, who could have told which heresy he was espousing?

175 A succession of great Popes, possibly the most remarkable
793 in the long annals of the Church, accepted the challenge. Leo
795 XIII, intellectual and aristocratic, recognized the necessity for demonstrating to the workers that they were not at present inside the realms of a Christian civilization that doomed them to a condition of perennial peonage. His successor, Pope Pius X, left to the world the conviction that the Church is the servant of peace; and Benedict XV committed all Catholics to the support of an international order. In 1922 began the vigorous pontificate of Pius XI, distinguished for the world-wide scope of his interests and sympathies. Whereas during several centuries the See of Rome had worn an air of Roman provincialism, the tireless leadership of this learned, mountain-climbing North Italian imparted to it a new tinge of contemporaneousness and cosmopolitanism. The Vatican ended its old quarrel with the Italian State over the Papal territories, even though at some risk of seeming to assent to the dictatorship of Mussolini. It acquired a radio station, an Americanized library system, and even a scientific academy. Through adroit and concilia-

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tory diplomatic activity agreements were reached with the new states of Europe as well as with many countries overseas concerning relationships between Church and State. In ways which were often startlingly new, the laity was associated with the clergy in the work of the Church; and social reform was advocated, in the spirit of a great Encyclical letter restating and re-forming the principles of the moral teaching concerning society which are implicit in the Catholic tradition. All these things were then kept alive under the next Pope, Pius XII.

It is part of the universal tragedy of our time that so very much of what seemed so promising should have been engulfed by the fearful upheavals which, originating in Europe, for a time threatened to shatter the foundations of human society everywhere. In Adolf Hitler appeared the demagogic voluntarist who gave the heresy of dynamic traditionalism its most drastic and frightening formulation. Meanwhile, in nearly every other country Marxism became the gospel of the dissident intellectuals, who often were able to commit to their view sections of the working population, indeed not infrequently unwilling sections. Yet Pius XI had felt, almost from the moment he assumed Pontificate, that a great and shattering storm was brewing in Europe. That is why he labored so vigorously for the development of the Church in other parts of the world, including Africa and Asia. He took steps to forestall the disaster, opposing the mighty heresies whenever he could even though sometimes the infection had spread so far among Catholics themselves that—as in the case of the *Action française*—Princes of the Church did not concur with him.

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In Eastern Europe the position of the Church was inevitably and critically affected by inability to arrive at a *modus vivendi* with the Bolshevik government. The lengthy story of efforts to reach an agreement cannot be told here; but it may be recalled that until the summer of 1924 a Papal Relief Mission was ac-

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797 tive in Russia at the request of the government, bringing food,
659 clothing, and medicine to many tens of thousands. Yet even while this work of charity was in progress, priests and prelates
798 were sentenced to death and executed, churches were looted
648 and closed, and many of the faithful were exiled. The Bolsheviks insisted that, until the Vatican recognized the regime as a lawfully constituted government, clergymen professing allegiance to Rome must be regarded as enemies; Russian émigré circles were just as vehement in demanding that no such recognition be accorded; and circles representative of the Orthodox Church opposed even the Papal Relief Mission, on the ground that its directors were in reality proselytizers. In the circumstances, the Vatican tried to carry on its relief work as long as possible, and to use whatever influence it could muster to save the persecuted bishops and priests. In the end, however, the isolated remnants of Roman Catholicism in Russia lost even
E the remotest hope that Rome could do anything for them.

659 The countries west of Russia, most of them newly estab-
186 lished, presented less formidable obstacles to the mission of
795 the Church; but in not a few of them conditions were turbulent enough. In Czechoslovakia, for example, insurgent nationalism combined with anticlericalism to create within the Catholic clergy a sizable group who not only wished to rid the Church of every vestige of association with the Habsburgs but also strove to "reform" the ecclesiastical organization itself and to do away with such constraints as celibacy. However, the secession and subsequent excommunication of this group led to a great strengthening of the loyal majority. Catholics were collectively more resolute, and by 1925 the fever had abated, and relations between Church and State were established on a solid foundation. Elsewhere the story was similar, though perhaps less stormy and tawdry.

000 In attempting to visualize the complex continuous effort by

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In attempting to visualize the complex continuous effort by the Church in these lands to educate the people and to meet their 794 physical and spiritual needs we deal not with an island in the stream of modern life—as we should if, for example, we set out to evaluate the influence of religion on the art, music, and architecture of present-day America—but verily with that stream itself. For example, the press that appeared under Catholic auspices in Poland, Hungary, and Czechoslovakia was a mighty force, in all its ramifications from the daily newspaper to the monthly periodical, for the shaping of public opinion. On the other hand, hospitals and refuges, schools and day nurseries, conducted for the most part under the supervision of religious orders, were almost the only institutions of such character to be found in some countries. Therefore the Communist [798] onslaught upon this manifold activity was not merely against tradition but verily against action. It could not have succeeded unless its directors were safely established behind a dense array of Russian machine guns. It was an invasion resembling in some respects the earlier inroads from the East under which all these lands had suffered not once but many times. Assuredly the men in the Vatican, pondering the news each day, must often have let their thought return to times when Turk and Tartar bombarded the ancient citadels of once Christian Europe.

We shall now summarize, though of necessity far too briefly, 795 Protestant efforts to establish ecumenical union with the Russian Orthodox Church. On the one hand they resulted to some 659 extent from the failure during the Pontificate of Pope Leo XIII to prepare the way for the union of the Anglican Church with Rome. This failure, it will be recalled, was in large measure due to Rome's decision that Anglican Orders were not valid. On the other hand, Protestant Churches in Eastern Europe often felt that the attitude of Russian Orthodoxy toward the State was more compatible with the traditional views of

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795 Protestantism than were those of Roman Catholicism. Luther-
659 ans, for example, were not averse to identifying their Church with a political power; but their belief that the Kingdom of God and the kingdoms of this world are radically different also led to the conclusion that the Church could accept responsibility for approving or opposing actions by the State only when these controverted directly the moral and religious truths which had been made explicit in the teachings of the Lord Jesus. Thus a section of the German Lutheran Church opposed Nazism with sublime courage because Hitler had repudiated in principle such central teachings as that of the validity of Christian baptism when administered to persons of Jewish origin.

795 But Protestants viewed with uneasiness the Catholic practice
668 of creating organizations of the faithful for political and social action—which led in Germany to the creation of the Center Party on the basis of organizational efforts that had their origin in 1840. This was by no means merely an opportunistic reaction, even though upon occasion ecclesiastical rivalry may have played a part. While some loyal Protestants cooperated with and even voted for the Center Party, even as did a number of Jews, the great majority felt—no doubt, upon occasion, quite properly—that partisan activity brought the Church into realms where religious teaching was compromised for the sake of political expediency. This cleavage was intensified after Karl Barth and his associates formulated a neo-orthodox theology whose profound influence extended beyond Germany to Calvinism and Lutheranism in the whole of Eastern Europe. How strongly this criticism affected Catholic practice cannot be discussed here; but it may be pointed out that, during much of the Pontificate of Pius XI, Rome contemplated withdrawing the faithful completely from organizations of a political and social character, and building up instead the groups which received the generic name Catholic Action. Only toward the close of his

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Pontificate did Pius XI reaffirm the desirability of the more 795
secular associations. And in Germany after World War II 668
Catholics elected to create an interconfessional party, the Christian Democratic Union, instead of resurrecting the old Center Party (which emerged as a small minority movement only).

In any event, wide circles of the clergy and the laity looked 795
upon the Russian Church with deep if sometimes nostalgic re- 779
spect, particularly when the yearning for the reunion of Christendom was spiritually motivated and sincere. Despite many efforts, the outlook for an eventual peace with the Roman See which would obliterate the divisive past seemed to be unpromising. And on the other hand the "Social Christianity" to which American Protestantism appeared to be irretrievably committed impressed the more traditional European theologians as being thin and relatively mundane. There remained the hope that by forging a bond with the Orthodox East a new Christian community, transcending national boundaries, could be established. The writings of Russian exiles were read with avidity; and the authors were of such talent, insight, and sometimes genius that they exerted a great influence. There can be no doubt that, if after victory in 1945 Stalin had adopted a conciliatory policy and had conceded genuine religious and social freedom, Central and Eastern Europe would have become strongly, even ardently pro-Russian. The response in Protestant communities would have been particularly sincere.

The hope for such a policy was at times as fervent as a 000
messianic dream, and it died hard. Pastor Martin Niemoeller has perhaps been its most eloquent exponent, but there have been many others. It is not possible to understand fully the situation that developed unless one bears these things in mind. Only with great difficulty could Europe resign itself to accepting the intellectual and cultural leadership of the United States. This sobering thought may also be a healing one.

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triarchal See of Constantinople were either broken completely 175
or allowed to become loose and tenuous, in the West the struc- 795
ture of the Roman Catholic Church became more monolithic 779
in fact, if not in theory. No doubt this divergence was rooted partly in theology, but one cause was the decline of Constantinople as an important Christian center and its subjection to Turkish rule.

Yet there could never be any doubt that both Churches were [793]
intensely and ardently Catholic. They kept the tradition of the
priesthood as a sacramental ordination administered by bish- [796]
ops whose authority had been handed down in direct line of succession from the Apostles. Both retained the Mass as that in which the Sacrifice of Christ was reenacted so that His body and blood might be with the Church always. Devotion to the Virgin Mary, so long a thorn in the flesh of Western Protestantism, was a common heritage and treasure, however different the conceptions of Mary's personality and presence or the liturgies in which her praise was spelled out in prayer. Therefore efforts to effect reunion have never flagged since the Middle Ages. The fact that they have failed may well be, as many writers have thought, one of the great tragedies of history.

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tudes cherished in the East are precious because they reflect mystical prayer and thought and often the vital, profound humility of the human sinner who does not lose himself in "personalism": the personalism which in the West has so often favored the delusion that the rights and righteousness of man are pearls grown within himself through the practice of religion or morality, independent of the sacred order which is in God and which, when he is sometimes devout and submissive, he may possess in the deepest core of his being. On the other hand the West, unlike the East, has an illustrious tradition of endeavor to permeate the speculative and practical intelligence by holi-

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In any event, the quest for reunion continued and reached, as has been indicated, an initial nadir during the period of the Crusades and a moment of optimistic hopefulness at the Councils of Ferrara and Florence during the fifteenth century. Only a brief reference to either is possible here. The Crusaders, who were roused by eloquent preachers like St. Bernard to take up arms and make the long journey eastward to wrest the Holy Places associated with the life and death of Our Lord from the Turks, served a consecrated cause; but many of them were very human, indeed. Some historians conclude from the sermons of St. Bernard and other preachers of the time that the purely mundane benefits which accrued to the men who took up the Cross were so great that many ruffians (contrary to romantic historians, the Middle Ages had their share of them) embarked on the adventure. It is also evident that although the Crusades owed their origin to an appeal for help from the Byzantine Emperor, to which the monks of Cluny responded as best they could, the net cultural result was that the East was not only disappointed in what the West could achieve but disgusted with the conduct of the armies, even as since that time many another occupied country has been with foreign soldiers who have been billeted on its soil. On the other hand, the West heard many a report about the corruption and venality of the East, even as the home people in this our day have listened to shocking stories of lands which their soldier sons have seen. It must be added that the subsequent continued dominion of the Turks likewise dampened the ardor of friendship.

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121 beds. All these lands will never again become what they once
727 were—regions of constant struggle and short-lived serenity, of poverty and its exploitation, of poetry, fervor, and sadness. Those of us who have, for example, seen peasant women trudging for many miles through the omnipresent dust to kneel for an hour at the shrines of Silesia will never forget either the fact or its meaning.

781 There is not a foot of the old soil of Central Europe which
156 has not been consecrated by endurance for the sake of the things of the spirit and the mind. Indeed, I have sometimes wondered, reading the Polish and Silesian poets and novelists, why the longing to hold out should have persisted during many difficult centuries—why, for instance, Polish forests in thrall to the Czars should have hidden priest and ritual with such fidelity. Perhaps the explanation, in so far as it is of this world, can be found in the deep human urge for the preservation of identity. Custom and language were vital symbols of the self, and without them men felt they could not live. But stronger than all else was the deep, primitive, mystical desire for identification with Eternal Righteousness, manifest to the believer in the life of the Redeemer. To give up the faith was to surrender not merely one's self but the world as well.

• 798 To be sure these men and women were very human, often
563 poverty-stricken and untutored, sometimes intolerant and oppressive. The effort to conserve themselves and their identity spilled over into moments of vengeful outrage inflicted upon others because they were different. Thus anti-Semitism has a long history in Eastern Europe studded with bloody pogroms. Although curbed in Austro-Hungarian regions it was latent there, too, as the shameful events of 1938 proved, but manifest elsewhere continuously with varying intensity. Or who can forget the repression of the Ukrainians in Poland under the Pilsudski government, the conflict between Czechs and Slovaks,

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or the expulsion of the Sudeten Germans from their homes during 1945, an action flagrantly in violation of the principles for which the war against Nazism had been fought? 798 563

Against this background one must set the figures of those who, whether of the clergy or of the laity, lived and preached the law of charity. Nowhere more than amongst such men—Princes of the Church, professors, men of affairs, labor leaders, simple religious, and common people—was this law manifest. It is imperative that their memory be not obscured, now that so mighty an army of the mean and servile has arisen. Let us note what we shall have mournful occasion to repeat again and again. Marxism, which had its rise in the concern of intellectuals for the worker, and which formulated that concern in terms of a materialist version of the Hegelian dialectic, has come round with Stalin to the view that the laboring man must have no intellectuals on his side. To suppress élites has become the cornerstone of the totalitarian theory of practical politics. That is why the peoples in chains retain their passions and their weaknesses, their hatreds and their greed, while those who might give them counsel or reasons for constraint are dead or silent. 829

Then, too, there was the presence and also the example of the Ghetto. Place of reputed ignominy, of poverty, of rasping and grasping humanity, it was nevertheless awesomely, breathtakingly beautiful when the Sabbath eve descended upon it. Prayer became not so much what was engaged in but rather that which swept the world aside and created a wonderland of peace and holiness. One knew that in all the shabby little rooms which sheltered human beings in their wretchedness a fire had been lighted which had gleamed for thousands of years—the same leaping flame which had set the bush ablaze for Moses and had kindled the light that danced before the Ark of the Covenant. And though the vision of sanctification which now 000

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795 and peace would ensue. In so far as Catholics were concerned, tactful Papal diplomacy insured the continuance of the work of the Church, under altered conditions. But the position of all religions in Eastern Europe was considerably improved. New currents of thought and new forms of group action strengthened Protestantism. Anticlericalism gave way in many quarters to [793] a desire for cordial relationships with the churches. To a very considerable extent Eastern Europe profited by the extraordinary effectiveness and freshness of Christian theological and philosophical writing in France and Germany. But the strongest impetus came from the younger clergy, many of them veterans, who devised and directed new agencies to cope with social problems. It could no longer be said that Catholics, for example, were all bedfellows of special privilege. Confidence was nearly everywhere greater than it had been for generations. It is scarcely extravagant to say that if Hitler had not arisen to inflict doom and agony on countless millions, the great effort of Christian reconstruction in Eastern Europe might have succeeded.

● 798 The strangely magnetic and mentally diseased Austrian artist who became the dictator of Germany was the spokesman for a derouted, unhappy, and unsettled following. As his power was extended over Eastern Europe the Christian churches suffered only less horribly than Judaism. Priests were shot, sent to concentration camps, exiled from their parishes. Religious communities were suppressed, and their property and their schools were removed from under the jurisdiction of the Church; journals of religious opinion were silenced. The long catalogue of acts of oppression contains almost every kind of persecution save those spectacular mass executions by which the Jewish people were decimated. But at least it was made apparent that there was only one kind of opposition which the Nazis needed to fear—the refusal of faithful Christians, both

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Catholic and Protestant, to accept one of the most flagrant heresies of all time. 798

There can be no doubt that Nazism dealt a crippling blow to religion, not only by reason of the attack on elites—men and women of intellectual status and forceful character, able to lead the people—but also because of the widespread perversion of youth which resulted from the activities of the Hitlerjugend and similar organizations. It is true that Hitler's attack on the Church lacked both the decisiveness and the skill which we have since come to identify with Communism. The Nazi intention was, however, to launch such an attack as soon as victory had been gained. Himmler's plans, as we study them in retrospect, bear the stamp of his diseased romantic imagination; but it may well be that in an hour of world-shattering victory he could have put them into effect. Fortunately there was no such triumph. Even so the scars left on the spirit of Europe by years of unrestrained and vicious Nazism will not be healed over for a long time to come. Thus, the Communist advance 829
westward after the close of the war was aided on the one hand by the corrosion of spirit which was a bequest of Hitler, and on the other hand by the belief, prevalent in many quarters, that Sovietism was the opposite of German tyranny and was friendly to democratic institutions. This was unfortunately accepted as something close to self-evident truth in our own United States, so that there is little reason why we should wonder at the illusions of Europeans.

Stalin's road into one of the heartlands of the Christian faith was at all events open. The second stage in the passion of sorely tried peoples was to begin. How feeble the surviving elements of Liberalism, counted upon sometimes to impede the Russian dictator's progress, had become, is amply demonstrated by the fate of Eduard Beneš. Less imaginative and resourceful, less courageous or determined, few statesmen have seemed to be,

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659 of the State, to an extent undreamed of in Czarist Russia. We
829 were wont, many of us, to make uncomplimentary references to the clergy of the old regime. Some of the strictures were too sweeping. But, alas, what we must be prepared to say about the Russian Church under the Soviets is far more devastating. It has become an institution which all but blesses the concentration camp system, and escorts slave labor to its doom with
E a kind of liturgical brass band.

659 The Soviet objective is to reduce religious organizations out-
648 side Russia to the status of the Orthodox Church at home. The
798 formula is always and everywhere the same, though it may be applied with greater or lesser rigor. Therefore inevitably the Vatican becomes the great antagonist, to be fought with every means. The Holy See, pledged to the profession of the Christian Gospels without dilution of the ethical obligations which they impose upon everyone who accepts them in the Catholic sense, cannot agree that the Church is to be an instrument of the State —even, indeed, a benign and merciful instrument. The Vatican is therefore the ignoble Fascist Beast of the Bolshevik Apocalypse. Upon the heads of persons who remain loyal to the ancient See of Catholic Christendom, blows have rained in constant succession. This is the direst persecution the Church has
E suffered since the days of the Caesars.

175 Because most of what may be reported concerns the Catholic
795 Church, a brief review of its history and endeavors in Eastern
779 Europe will help to bring events into perspective. The cleavage of the Roman Empire, establishing the rivalry between the emperors of Rome and Byzantium, begot two Churches also, each claiming for itself the charisma of Apostolic Christianity. With the passing of time, profound differences of a dogmatic, moral, and canonical kind developed. The organizational character of religion was also modified radically, so that, while in the East the ties binding the religious nations to the historic pa-

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In attempting to visualize the complex continuous effort by the Church in these lands to educate the people and to meet their physical and spiritual needs we deal not with an island in the stream of modern life—as we should if, for example, we set out to evaluate the influence of religion on the art, music, and architecture of present-day America—but verily with that stream itself. For example, the press that appeared under Catholic auspices in Poland, Hungary, and Czechoslovakia was a mighty force, in all its ramifications from the daily newspaper to the monthly periodical, for the shaping of public opinion. On the other hand, hospitals and refuges, schools and day nurseries, conducted for the most part under the supervision of religious orders, were almost the only institutions of such character to be found in some countries. Therefore the Communist onslaught upon this manifold activity was not merely against tradition but verily against action. It could not have succeeded unless its directors were safely established behind a dense array of Russian machine guns. It was an invasion resembling in some respects the earlier inroads from the East under which all these lands had suffered not once but many times. Assuredly the men in the Vatican, pondering the news each day, must often have let their thought return to times when Turk and Tartar bombarded the ancient citadels of once Christian Europe.

We shall now summarize, though of necessity far too briefly, Protestant efforts to establish ecumenical union with the Russian Orthodox Church. On the one hand they resulted to some extent from the failure during the Pontificate of Pope Leo XIII to prepare the way for the union of the Anglican Church with Rome. This failure, it will be recalled, was in large measure due to Rome's decision that Anglican Orders were not valid. On the other hand, Protestant Churches in Eastern Europe often felt that the attitude of Russian Orthodoxy toward the State was more compatible with the traditional views of

8: Black S-4 (no date) 1954 El Europe El

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party and, as a consequence, were strongly influenced by demagogues. The Polish and Rumanian universities especially were exploited by politicians, and often even by the police, for political purposes. Frequent political meetings aroused a discontented idealism and produced only too often regrettable chauvinistic or antisemitic behavior.

Anti-Semitism became a common denominator with which 798 ●
Hitler was able to unite the rising youth and the politicians of Eastern Europe. The responsibility for this state of affairs lay with the governments and the ruling groups.

Although the new boundaries had been drawn on the 563
principle of national self-determination, the mixture of nationalities in many areas, as well as historical and geographical factors, had resulted in the inclusion of important minorities within the new states. These minorities were fragments of peoples rather than whole nations as had been the case before the war and, since they were in many cases unwilling citizens of the new states, their presence constituted a grave problem. The eight million inhabitants of Poland, Rumania, and Czechoslovakia that spoke Russian, Ukrainian (Ruthenian), and White Russian as their mother tongue, the almost six million German-speaking citizens of Czechoslovakia, Poland, Rumania, Yugoslavia, and Hungary, and the almost three million Hungarian-speaking inhabitants of neighboring Rumania, Czechoslovakia and Yugoslavia—these represented the most important, but by no means all, the minority

31: Slater S-5 (1916-1917) 1918 AW1 India AW1
South India

423 unless it is at the critical period, the period of the critical operation, of the agricultural year. One ryot told me, when questioned on this point, that he had recently gone to great expense to buy an extra bit of land to serve as a seed bed to the lands he had adjoining. In that way he would save time for the critical operation. But very seldom are villagers willing to make the smallest sacrifice of area or value in order to have their lands continuous instead of scattered. I can only account for this by supposing that the fragmentation in actual practice makes less difference than might be supposed. With regard to this question also, the only definite conclusion I have come to is that more information is required.

000 *Some urgent reforms.*—But while it is advisable to wait for further information before embarking on such heroic measures as altering the law of inheritance or throwing villages into the melting pot, at least in South India, there are many reforms concerning which no more discussion or enquiry is needed. To stop starving the Agricultural Department is one; to stop starving the Industrial Department another. Extension and improvement of roads and railways is urgently needed. There appears to be no reason for delay in giving the medical service the powers it requires in order to stamp out plague and to utilize fully its knowledge of the best means of combating cholera. That accomplished, the serious organization, with adequate resources, of the campaign against malaria, hook-worm and the other great pestilences should naturally follow.

Further, there is an intimate connexion between agricultural progress and educational reform. The idea that elementary education should develope the capacity for facing the problems of life intelligently and with determination, has not yet been acted on in India very completely or very successfully.

A smaller matter, but still one of sufficient importance, is the clearing up of the unimaginable chaos of Indian weights and measures. Decades ago the first step was taken towards the adoption of the metric system, by fixing the statutory weight of the seer at one kilogramme. But nothing has been done to make people understand that a seer is a definite weight. While India [804] has seers innumerable—in the same district the seer may vary from 22 to 180 times the weight of a rupee—I doubt if a true seer can be found outside French territory. Side by side with the seer or kilo, we want the "Sirkar Measure," which should obviously be the volume of water which weighs a seer. The Government itself muddles up all its statistical statements by wandering about between seers and pounds, tons and maunds. If it started by working out its own arithmetic in true seers and Sirkar measures, and imposed the same on the railways, kept sample weights and measures in all police stations, post offices and schools, and arranged for the supply at cheap rate of certified weights and measures to all who wished to purchase, the establishment of the metric system in weights and volumes would be accomplished without difficulty. Metres could follow. The boon to India would be great; the indirect benefit to the whole British Empire might be greater.

GILBERT SLATER.

2: Milosz S-5 (no date)1953 El Europe El

829 thing completely foreign to the great majority of people.
156 A theory developed that art should become a substitute for religion: "metaphysical feelings" were to be expressed in the "compression of pure form"; and so form soon came to dominate content.

To belong to the masses is the great longing of the "alienated" intellectual. It is such a powerful longing that, in trying to appease it, a great many of them who once looked to Germany or Italy for inspiration have now become converted to the New Faith. Actually, the rightist totalitarian program was exceptionally poor. The only gratification it offered came from collective *warmth:* crowds, red faces, mouths open in a shout, marches, arms brandishing sticks; but little rational satisfaction. Neither racist doctrines, nor hatred of foreigners, nor the glorification of one's own national traditions could efface the feeling that the entire program was improvised to deal with
829 problems of the moment. But Murti-Bing is different. It
812 lays scientific foundations. At the same time, it scraps all
156 vestiges of the past. Post-Kantian philosophy, fallen into disrepute because of its remoteness from the life of men; art designed for those who, having no religion, dare not admit that to seek the "absolute" through a juxtaposition of colors and sounds is cowardly and inconclusive thinking; and the semi-magic, semi-religious mentality of the peasants—these are replaced by a *single* system, a single language of ideas. The truck driver and elevator operator employed by a publishing firm now read the same Marxist classics as its director or staff writers. A day laborer and a historian can reach an understanding on this basis of common reading. Obviously, the difference that may exist between them in mental level is no smaller than that which separated a theologian from a village blacksmith in the middle ages.

[See category 11B, p. 4 — Analysis]

2: Milosz S-5 (no date)1953 El Europe El

But the fundamental principles are universal; the great spiritual schism has been obliterated. Dialectical materialism has united everyone, and philosophy (i.e., dialectics) once more determines the patterns of life. It is beginning to be regarded with a respect one reserves only for a force on which important things depend: bread and milk for one's children, one's own happiness and safety. The intellectual has once more become *useful*. He who may once have done his thinking and writing in his free moments away from a paying job in a bank or post office, has now found his rightful place on earth. He has been restored to society, whereas the businessmen, aristocrats, and tradespeople who once considered him a harmless blunderer have now been dispossessed. They are indeed delighted to find work as cloakroom attendants and to hold the coat of a former employee of whom they said, in pre-war days, "It seems he writes." We must not oversimplify, however, the gratifications of personal ambition; they are merely the outward and visible signs of social usefulness, symbols of a recognition that strengthens the intellectual's feeling of *belonging*.

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THE ABSURD

Even though one seldom speaks about metaphysical motives that can lead to a complete change of people's political opinions, such motives do exist and can be observed in some of the most sensitive and intelligent men. Let us imagine a spring day in a city situated in some country similar to that described in Witkiewicz's novel. One of his heroes is taking a walk. He is tormented by what we may call the *suction* of the absurd. What is the significance of the lives of the people he passes, of the senseless bustle, the laughter, the pursuit of money, the stupid

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8: Black S-4 (no date) 1954 El Europe El

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CHAPTER I

The Pill of Murti-Bing

• 829 IT was only toward the middle of the twentieth century that the inhabitants of many European countries came, in general unpleasantly, to the realization that their fate could be influenced directly by intricate and abstruse books of philosophy. Their bread, their work, their private lives began to depend on this or that decision in disputes on principles to which, until then, they had never paid any attention. In their eyes, the philosopher had always been a sort of dreamer whose divagations had no effect on reality. The average human being, even if he had once been exposed to it, wrote philosophy off as utterly impractical and useless. Therefore the great intellectual work of the Marxists could easily pass as just one more variation on a sterile pastime. Only a few individuals understood the causes and probable consequences of this general indifference.

538 A curious book appeared in Warsaw in 1932. It was a
829 novel, in two volumes, entitled *Insatiability*. Its author was Stanislaw Ignacy Witkiewicz, a painter, writer, and philosopher, who had constructed a philosophical system akin to the monadology of Leibnitz. As in his earlier novel, *Farewell to Autumn*, his language was difficult, full of neologisms. Brutal descriptions of erotic scenes al-

2: Milosz S-5 (no date)1953 El Europe El

829 ternated with whole pages of discussions on Husserl, Car-
538 nap, and other contemporary philosophers. Besides, one could not always tell whether the author was serious or joking; and the subject matter seemed to be pure fantasy.

The action of the book took place in Europe, more precisely in Poland, at some time in the near future or even in the present, that is, in the thirties, forties, or fifties. The social group it portrayed was that of musicians, painters, philosophers, aristocrats, and higher-ranking military officers. The whole book was nothing but a study of decay: mad, dissonant music; erotic perversion; widespread use of narcotics; dispossessed thinking; false conversions to Catholicism; and complex psychopathic personalities. This decadence reigned at a time when western civilization was said to be threatened by an army from the East, a Sino-Mongolian army that dominated all the territory stretching from the Pacific to the Baltic.

Witkiewicz's heroes are unhappy in that they have no faith and no sense of meaning in their work. This atmosphere of decay and senselessness extends throughout the entire country. And at that moment, a great number of hawkers appear in the cities peddling Murti-Bing pills. Murti-Bing was a Mongolian philosopher who had succeeded in producing an organic means of transporting a "philosophy of life." This Murti-Bing "philosophy of life," which constituted the strength of the Sino-Mongolian army, was contained in pills in an extremely condensed form. A man who used these pills changed completely. He became serene and happy. The problems he had struggled with until then suddenly appeared to be superficial and unimportant. He smiled indulgently at those who continued to worry about them. Most affected were all questions pertaining to unsolvable ontological difficulties. A man who swallowed Murti-Bing pills became imper-

2: Milosz S-5 (no date)1953 El Europe El

vious to any metaphysical concerns. The excesses into which art falls when people vainly seek in form the wherewithal to appease their spiritual hunger were but outmoded stupidities for him. He no longer considered the approach of the Sino-Mongolian army as a tragedy for his own civilization. He lived in the midst of his compatriots like a healthy individual surrounded by madmen. More and more people took the Murti-Bing cure, and their resultant calm contrasted sharply with the nervousness of their environment. 829 538

The epilogue, in a few words: the outbreak of the war led to a meeting of the armies of the West with those of the East. In the decisive moment, just before the great battle, the leader of the Western army surrendered to the enemy; and in exchange, though with the greatest honors, he was beheaded. The Eastern army occupied the country and the new life, that of Murti-Bingism, began. The heroes of the novel, once tormented by philosophical "insatiety," now entered the service of the new society. Instead of writing the dissonant music of former days, they composed marches and odes. Instead of painting abstractions as before, they turned out socially useful pictures. But since they could not rid themselves completely of their former personalities, they became schizophrenics.

So much for the novel. Its author often expressed his belief that religion, philosophy, and art are living out their last days. Yet he found life without them worthless. On September 17, 1939, learning that the Red Army had crossed the eastern border of Poland, he committed suicide by taking veronal and cutting his wrists.

Today, Witkiewicz's vision is being fulfilled in the minutest detail throughout a large part of the European continent. Perhaps sunlight, the smell of the earth, little everyday pleasures, and the forgetfulness that work brings 829

829 can ease somewhat the tensions created by this process of fulfillment. But beneath the activity and bustle of daily life is the constant awareness of an irrevocable choice to be made. One must either die (physically or spiritually), or else one must be reborn according to a prescribed method, namely, the taking of Murti-Bing pills. People in the West are often inclined to consider the lot of converted countries in terms of might and coercion. That is wrong. There is an internal longing for harmony and happiness that lies deeper than ordinary fear or the desire to escape misery or physical destruction. The fate of completely consistent, non-dialectical people like Witkiewicz is a warning for many an intellectual. All about him, in the city streets, he sees the frightening shadows of internal exiles, irreconcilable, non-participating, eroded by hatred.

829 In order to understand the situation of a writer in a
156 people's democracy, one must seek the reasons for his activity and ask how he maintains his equilibrium. Whatever one may say, the New Faith affords great possibilities for an active and positive life. And Murti-Bing is more tempting to an intellectual than to a peasant or laborer. For the intellectual, the New Faith is a candle that he circles like a moth. In the end, he throws himself into the flame for the glory of mankind. We must not treat this desire for self-immolation lightly. Blood flowed freely in Europe during the religious wars, and he who joins the New Faith today is paying off a debt to that European tradition. We are concerned here with questions more significant than mere force.

I shall try to grasp those profound human longings and to speak about them as if one really could analyze what is the warm blood and the flesh, itself, of man. If I should try to describe the reasons why a man becomes a revolu-

1/A [see category 116, p. 4 -- Analyst]

2: Milosz S-5 (no date)1953 El Europe El

tionary I would be neither eloquent nor restrained enough. I admit that I have too much admiration for those who fight evil, whether their choice of ends and means be right or wrong. I draw the line, however, at those intellectuals who *adapt* themselves, although the fact that they are adapted and not genuine revolutionaries in no way diminishes their newly acquired zeal and enthusiasm.

829 156

There are, I believe, a few key concepts which may lead us to understand why they accept Murti-Bing.

THE VOID

The society portrayed by Witkiewicz is distinguished by the fact that in it religion has ceased to exist as a force. And it is true that religion long ago lost its hold on men's minds not only in the people's democracies, but elsewhere as well. As long as a society's best minds were occupied by theological questions, it was possible to speak of a given religion as the way of thinking of the whole social organism. All the matters which most actively concerned the people were referred to it and discussed in its terms. But that belongs to a dying era. We have come by easy stages to a lack of a common system of thought that could unite the peasant cutting his hay, the student poring over formal logic, and the mechanic working in an automobile factory. Out of this lack arises the painful sense of detachment or abstraction that oppresses the "creators of culture." Religion has been replaced by philosophy which, however, has strayed into spheres increasingly less accessible to the layman. The discussions of Husserl by Witkiewicz's heroes can scarcely interest a reader of even better-than-average education; whereas the peasants remained bound to the Church, be it only emotionally and traditionally. Music, painting, and poetry became some-

829 thing completely foreign to the great majority of people.
156 A theory developed that art should become a substitute for religion: "metaphysical feelings" were to be expressed in the "compression of pure form"; and so form soon came to dominate content.

To belong to the masses is the great longing of the "alienated" intellectual. It is such a powerful longing that, in trying to appease it, a great many of them who once looked to Germany or Italy for inspiration have now become converted to the New Faith. Actually, the rightist totalitarian program was exceptionally poor. The only gratification it offered came from collective *warmth:* crowds, red faces, mouths open in a shout, marches, arms brandishing sticks; but little rational satisfaction. Neither racist doctrines, nor hatred of foreigners, nor the glorification of one's own national traditions could efface the feeling that the entire program was improvised to deal with
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1 [See category 116, p. 4 -- Marxist]

2: Milosz S-5 (no date)1953 El Europe El

But the fundamental principles are universal; the great spiritual schism has been obliterated. Dialectical materialism has united everyone, and philosophy (i.e., dialectics) once more determines the patterns of life. It is beginning to be regarded with a respect one reserves only for a force on which important things depend: bread and milk for one's children, one's own happiness and safety. The intellectual has once more become *useful*. He who may once have done his thinking and writing in his free moments away from a paying job in a bank or post office, has now found his rightful place on earth. He has been restored to society, whereas the businessmen, aristocrats, and tradespeople who once considered him a harmless blunderer have now been dispossessed. They are indeed delighted to find work as cloakroom attendants and to hold the coat of a former employee of whom they said, in pre-war days, "It seems he writes." We must not oversimplify, however, the gratifications of personal ambition; they are merely the outward and visible signs of social usefulness, symbols of a recognition that strengthens the intellectual's feeling of *belonging*.

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CHAPTER II

Looking to the West

"ARE Americans *really* stupid?" I was asked in Warsaw. In the voice of the man who posed the question, there was despair, as well as the hope that I would contradict him. This question reveals the attitude of the average person in the people's democracies toward the West: it is despair mixed with a residue of hope.

During the last few years, the West has given these people a number of reasons to despair politically. In the case of the intellectual, other, more complicated reasons come into play. Before the countries of Central and Eastern Europe entered the sphere of the Imperium, they lived through the Second World War. That war was much more devastating there than in the countries of Western Europe. It destroyed not only their economies, but also a great many values which had seemed till then unshakeable.

Man tends to regard the order he lives in as *natural*. The houses he passes on his way to work seem more like rocks rising out of the earth than like products of human hands. He considers the work he does in his office or factory as essential to the harmonious functioning of the world. The clothes he wears are exactly what they should be, and he laughs at the idea that he might equally well be wear-

2: Milosz S-5 (no date)1953 El Europe El

or the world of war? Both are natural, if both are within the realm of one's experience. All the concepts men live by are a product of the historic formation in which they find themselves. Fluidity and constant change are the characteristics of phenomena. And man is so plastic a being that one can even conceive of the day when a thoroughly self-respecting citizen will crawl about on all fours, sporting a tail of brightly colored feathers as a sign of conformity to the order he lives in.

The man of the East cannot take Americans seriously because they have never undergone the experiences that teach men how relative their judgments and thinking habits are. Their resultant lack of imagination is appalling. Because they were born and raised in a given social order and in a given system of values, they believe that any other order must be "unnatural," and that it cannot last because it is incompatible with human nature. But even they may one day know fire, hunger, and the sword. In all probability this is what will occur; for it is hard to believe that when one half of the world is living through terrible disasters, the other half can continue a nineteenth-century mode of life, learning about the distress of its distant fellowmen only from movies and newspapers. Recent examples teach us that this cannot be. An inhabitant of Warsaw or Budapest once looked at newsreels of bombed Spain or burning Shanghai, but in the end he learned how these and many other catastrophes appear in actuality. He read gloomy tales of the N.K.V.D., until one day he found he himself had to deal with it. *If something exists in one place, it will exist everywhere.* This is the conclusion he draws from his observations, and so he has no particular faith in the momentary prosperity of America. He suspects that the years 1933–45 in Europe pre-figure what will occur elsewhere. A hard school, where ignorance was punished

2: Milosz S-5 (no date)1953 El Europe El

829 not by bad marks but by death, has taught him to think sociologically and historically. But it has not freed him from irrational feelings. He is apt to believe in theories that foresee violent changes in the countries of the West, for he finds it unjust that they should escape the hardships he had to undergo.

The only system of thought that is accessible to him is dialectical materialism, and it attracts him because it speaks a language that is understandable in the light of his experience. The illusory "natural" order of the Western countries is doomed, according to dialectical materialism (in the Stalinist version), to crash as a result of a crisis. Wherever there is a crisis, the ruling classes take refuge in fascism as a safeguard against the revolution of the proletariat. Fascism means war, gas chambers, and crematoria. True, the crisis in America predicted for the moment of demobilization did not occur; true, England introduced social security and socialized medicine to a hitherto unknown degree; and it is true, as well, that anti-Communist hysteria in the United States, whatever else may have inspired it, was largely motivated by fear of an armed and hostile power. Still these are merely modifications of a formula that is being proved in other respects. If the world is divided between Fascism and Communism, obviously Fascism must lose since it is the last, desperate refuge of the bourgeoisie. The bourgeoisie rules through demagoguery, which in practice means that prominent positions are filled by irresponsible people who commit follies in moments of decision. Just such follies were Hitler's ruthless policy toward the Eastern peoples, or Mussolini's involvement of Italy in the war.

A man need not be a Stalinist to reason thus. On the contrary, knowing how doubtful are any benefits from the system evolved in the Center, he would be overjoyed

2: Milosz S-5 (no date)1953 El Europe El

to see a gigantic meteor wipe that cause of his misery off the face of the earth. He is, however, only a man. He weighs his chances and concludes it is unwise to align himself with the side that has been damned by the Being which has taken the place of God in this century, i.e. History. The propaganda to which he is subjected tries by every means to prove that Nazism and Americanism are identical in that they are products of the same economic conditions. He believes this propaganda only slightly less than the average American believes the journalists who assure him that Hitlerism and Stalinism are one and the same.

Even if he stands on a higher rung of the hierarchy and so has access to information about the West, he is still unable to weigh the relative strength and weakness of that half of the world. The optical instrument he sees through is so constructed that it encompasses only pre-determined fields of vision. Looking through it, he beholds only what he expected to see. For example, accustomed to living in a society in which law exists exclusively as a Party tool, and in which the sole criterion of human action is its effectiveness, he finds it hard to imagine a system in which every citizen feels himself bound by the sanctions of the law. These sanctions may have been introduced in order to protect the interests of privileged groups, but they remain even after the interests change; and it is not easy to supplant old laws with new. Every citizen is entangled in a network of statutes whose origin lies in some remote past. As a result, the mechanism of collective life is so unwieldy that anyone who tries to be truly active struggles helplessly to free himself of its restrictions.

The inhabitant of Central or Eastern Europe is incapable of understanding delays, absurd decisions, political campaigns, mutual recriminations, public opinion polls,

2: Milosz S-5 (no date)1953 El Europe El

829 and demagoguery, which he considers to be characteristic of the West. But at the same time, these encumbrances assure the private citizen a certain security. To seize a man on the street and deport him to a concentration camp is obviously an excellent means of dealing with an individual who displeases the administration; but such means are difficult to establish in countries where the only criminal is the man who has committed an act clearly defined as punishable in a specific paragraph of the law. Nazi and
671 Communist criminal codes are alike in that they efface the
829 frontier between penal and non-penal deeds—the first, by defining crime as any act directed against the interests of the German nation; the second, as any act directed against the interests of the dictatorship of the proletariat. What the man of the East calls the "lifeless formalism of the bourgeoisie" does, on the other hand, afford some guarantee that the father of a family will return home for supper instead of taking a trip to a region where polar bears thrive but human beings do not.

Nor is it easy in legally minded countries to adopt the use of scientific torture under which every man confesses with equal fervor whether he be innocent or guilty. Propaganda tries to convince the citizens of the people's democracies that law in the West is no more than a fiction subservient to the interests of the ruling classes. Perhaps it is a fiction, but it is not too subservient to the wishes of the rulers. If they want to condemn a man, they must sweat to prove him guilty in fact; his defense lawyers hide behind all the technicalities of the law; the case drags on through various appeals, etc. Obviously, crimes are committed under its cover, but so far Western law serves to bind the hands of the rulers as well as of the ruled which, depending on one's beliefs, may be a source of either strength or weakness.

2: Milosz S-5 (no date)1953 El Europe El

Americans, aware of the nature of their law, compare 829 ● democracy to an awkward raft on which everyone paddles in a different direction. There is much hubbub and mutual abuse, and it is difficult to get everyone to pull together. In comparison with such a raft, the trireme of the totalitarian state, speeding ahead with outspread oars, appears indomitable. But on occasion, the totalitarian ship crashes on rocks an awkward raft can sail over.

New developments in the West are not easily ascertained in the people's democracies. In certain Western countries, above all in the United States, something has occurred which is without analogy in the preceding centuries: a new civilization has arisen which is popular, vulgar, perhaps in some respects distasteful to more "refined" people, but which assures its masses a share in the output of its machine production. It is true that what these masses rejoice in is frequently tawdry and superficial, and that they purchase it with hard labor. Yet a girl working in a factory, who buys cheap mass-production models of a dress worn by a movie star, rides in an old but nevertheless private automobile, looks at cowboy films, and has a refrigerator at home, lives on a certain level of civilization that she has in *common* with others. Whereas a woman on a collective farm near Leningrad cannot foresee the day when even her great-granddaughter will live on a level that approaches such an average.

What he refers to as the "stupidity" of the American masses, who are satisfied by the purely material advantages of this new civilization, is exceptionally irritating to the Eastern intellectual. Raised in a country where there was a definite distinction between the "intelligentsia" and the "people," he looks, above all, for ideas created by the "intelligentsia," the traditional fermenting element in revolutionary changes. When he meets with a society in which

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829 the "intelligentsia," as it was known in Central or Eastern Europe, does not exist, he has great difficulty in translating his observations into conceptual terms. The ideas he finds are clearly obsolete and far outdistanced by economic and technical developments. The purely pragmatic and empirical resolution of problems and the inability to swallow even a small dose of abstraction (whereas the German bourgeoisie, for example, had this ability in abundance) introduce unknowns into his calculations. If one regards these characteristics as signs of "backwardness" in comparison with Europe, then one must acknowledge that the "stupidity" which produced a technology immeasurably superior to that of Europe is not entirely a source of weakness.

In fact, if the impetus to perfect and use new discoveries has lost none of its drive, the credit lies with the West. The effort Japan made to overtake the West ended unsuccessfully; and Japan was beaten by the peace-minded and internally disunited United States of Roosevelt's day. Russia, copying Western models of automobiles, airplanes, jet engines, television sets, atom bombs and submarines, and such things as radar and penicillin, has now entered the race. The youngest generation in Eastern Europe, raised in the worship of Russia, is beginning to believe that she is taking the foremost place in the realm of science and technology. The older people consider such a belief absurd; but, given her untapped natural resources, a planned economy and the subsequent ability to allocate unlimited sums of money to scientific research and experimentation, they feel she may be well on the way toward supremacy.

This supposition seems to be refuted by the purely practical aims of contemporary Russian science for, as we know, the greatest discoveries are perfected in the course

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of long, disinterested work on the part of many scientists 829 ● and often bear no immediate concrete results. It seems to be refuted, as well, by the insistence with which propaganda attributes most discoveries to the Russians even while they copy American construction, from bridges to motors, in the minutest detail. Such propaganda, pushed often to the point of the ridiculous, does not indicate a high degree of self-confidence. And such occurrences as the sale of Swedish machinery to the people's democracies under the stamp of Russian manufacture disproves its boastful claims. Nonetheless, this propaganda effort to destroy the Russian inferiority complex and to raise "technological morale" is proof of the importance the Center places upon this scientific race. Who knows to what results such a concentration of will may lead? Perhaps all that Russia needs is time.

Let us admit—and the Eastern or Central European will do so—that *at this moment* the superiority of the West in potential production, technology, and replacement of human hands by machines (which means the gradual effacing of the distinction between physical and mental work) is unquestionable. But, the Eastern intellectual asks, what goes on in the heads of the Western masses? Aren't their souls asleep, and when the awakening comes, won't it take the form of Stalinism? Isn't Christianity dying out in the West, and aren't its people bereft of all faith? Isn't there a void in their heads? Don't they fill that void with chauvinism, detective stories, and artistically worthless movies? Well then, what can the West offer us? Freedom *from something* is a great deal, yet not enough. It is much less than freedom *for something*.

While such questions are posed, actually they can be countered with others. American Communists (mostly

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● 829 the intellectually minded sons of middle-class or lower middle-classes families) complain about the spiritual poverty of the masses. They do not realize, however, that the Imperium they pine for is a combination of material poverty and lack of technology, plus Stalinism. Nor do they realize how fascinating it might be to try to imagine a combination of prosperity and technology, plus Stalinism. The new man of the Imperium is being remolded under the slogan of the struggle against poverty (which is simultaneously induced and conquered), and the advancement of technology (which is simultaneously demolished and rebuilt). If these two powerful motives were absent, what would happen? One suspects that the wheels of that gigantic machine would then turn in a vacuum. The stage of fully realized Communism is the "holy of holies." It is Heaven. One dare not direct one's eyes toward it. Yet if one dared to visualize that Paradise, he would find it not unlike the United States in periods of full employment. He would find (granting the alleviation of fear, which is improbable) the masses living physiologically, profiting from the material achievements of their civilization. But their spiritual development would meet an insuperable obstacle in a doctrine which considers its aim to be the liberation of man from material cares towards something which it, itself, defines as sheer nonsense.

These are utopian considerations which Western Communists may avoid, but their Eastern brothers do not. I remember one who said, "I do not want to live to see Communism realized, it will probably be so boring." When the great re-educational task is accomplished and the hated "metaphysical being" in man is utterly crushed, what will remain? It is doubtful whether Party imitations of Christian liturgy, and mass-like rites performed

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before portraits of the leaders will give the people perfect satisfaction. 829

More than the West imagines, the intellectuals of the East look to the West for *something*. Nor do they seek it in Western propaganda. The *something* they look for is a great new writer, a new social philosophy, an artistic movement, a scientific discovery, new principles of painting or music. They rarely find this *something*. The people of the East have already become accustomed to thinking of art and society on an organizational and mass scale. The only forms of culture in the West which attain such a scale are movies, best sellers, and illustrated magazines. No thinking person in the West takes most of these means of mass recreation seriously; whereas, in the East, where everything has a mass character, they take on the dignity of being the sole representatives of the "decadent culture of the West." It is easy to sneer at most films, novels, or articles (to say nothing of the fact that one is well-paid for such criticism and that it releases one from the more painful obligation of writing enthusiastically about the Center). Hence it is the pet activity of most Eastern journalists, and the influence that this sort of criticism has on its public is considerable.

The real cultural life of the West is very different. But even there the Eastern intellectual stumbles upon treacherous appearances, for he finds both imitation and innovation, decadence and vigor, advertised mediocrity and imperfectly recognized greatness. The social and intellectual currents, which he knows from his pre-war trips to the West, continue to exist and arouse his impatience as products of a stage he has left behind. Still these are the aspects that attract his attention, and not the new creative forces sending up shoots amid a forest of dead trees.

The gravest reproach leveled against Western culture is

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The gravest reproach leveled against Western culture is
829 that it is exclusive and inaccessible to the masses. This re-
517 proach is largely valid. Poetry, painting, and even music, shutting themselves up in ivory towers, become susceptible to numerous stylistic maladies. At the same time, however, their link with the everyday life of the people is considerably stronger than it seems to be at first glance. For example, avant-garde painting which is so "difficult" and "obscure" reaches a tremendous number of people through its influence on advertising, dress design, stage sets, interior decoration, and most important of all, perhaps, on the shape of universally used machines. In comparison with this, the "Soviet Empire" style, which is based on the painting on huge canvases of groups of dignitaries standing about in various positions and poses, is completely severed from everyday life. By destroying all experimentation in art, the Center confined its applied art (if one can speak of its existence at all) to a clumsy imitation of Western applied art which, however, is constantly renewed under the influence of experimental easel painting. When the cult of ugliness reigns in painting or sculpture and any daring passes as formalism, then applied art, cut off from its roots, is bound to prove sterile.

The multi-colored setting of Western life is subject to the law of osmosis. The average citizen of the West has no idea that a painter in a garret, a little-known musician, or a writer of "unintelligible" verse is a magician who shapes all those things in life which he prizes. Government officials give little thought to such matters for they consider them a waste of time. Since it is not a planned economy, the Western state cannot come to the aid of people working in the various arts. They go on, each pursuing his own chimera, sometimes dying of hunger; while nearby, wealthy men, not knowing what to do with

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their money, spend it on the latest whims of their benighted souls. 829 517

This order of things revolts a person from the East. In his country, anyone who displays any talent is used. In the West, the same man would have very little chance of success. Western economy squanders talent to an incredible degree; and the few who do succeed owe their success as often to pure luck as to native ability. In the countries of the New Faith, the counterpart to this waste lies in the fact that the capacity to follow the political line is a selective criterion by which the most mediocre often attain the greatest renown. Nevertheless, the artist or scholar in the East earns his living more easily than his colleague in the West. Even though the pressure of the Method is burdensome, its material compensations are not to be scorned. Many musicians, painters, and writers who had the opportunity to flee to the West did not do so because they felt it was better to compose, paint, or write somehow or other, rather than to teach or work in a factory, with no time or energy left in which to perfect their true craft. Many of those who were abroad returned to their own countries chiefly for this reason.

Fear of the indifference with which the economic system of the West treats its artists and scholars is widespread among Eastern intellectuals. They say it is better to deal with an intelligent devil than with a good-natured idiot. An intelligent devil understands their mutual interests and lets them live by a pen, a chisel, or a brush, caring for his clients and making his demands. A good-hearted idiot does not understand these interests, gives nothing and asks nothing—which in practice amounts to polite cruelty.

To the people of the East it is axiomatic that the basic means of production should belong to the State, that they 829 471

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829 [471] should be regulated according to a planned economy, and that their proceeds should be used for hygienic, cultural, scientific, and artistic ends. It is naïve to seek partisans of capitalism in their midst. The *something* these people look for in the West is certainly not warmed-over watchwords of the French Revolution or the American War of Independence. They laugh at the argument that factories and mines should belong to private individuals. Their search for *something* springs from a more or less clear understanding of the fact that the New Faith is incapable of satisfying the spiritual needs of mankind, for its efforts in that direction have with inexorable regularity turned into caricature. If they were forced to formulate what they seek, they would undoubtedly reply that they want a system with a socialist economy, but one in which man need not struggle desperately in the snake-like embrace of the Method. So they seek some sign indicating that real cultural values can arise outside the scope of the Method. But they must be lasting values, geared to the future, and therefore not products of obsolete concepts. Anything less would serve merely to confirm the Method. The people in the countries of the New Faith know that *only* in the West can there appear works that will bear the seeds of hope for the future. Perhaps discoveries no less important than those of Marx or Darwin have already been perfected in the workrooms of isolated philosophers. But how does one find them?

The Eastern intellectual is a severe critic of everything that penetrates to him from the West. He has been deceived so often that he does not want cheap consolation which will eventually prove all the more depressing. The War left him suspicious and highly skilled in unmasking sham and pretense. He has rejected a great many books that he liked before the War, as well as a great many

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trends in painting or music, because they have not stood the test of experience. The work of human thought *should* withstand the test of brutal, naked reality. If it cannot, it is worthless. Probably only those things are worth while which can preserve their validity in the eyes of a man threatened with instant death.

A man is lying under machine-gun fire on a street in an embattled city. He looks at the pavement and sees a very amusing sight: the cobblestones are standing upright like the quills of a porcupine. The bullets hitting against their edges displace and tilt them. Such moments in the consciousness of a man *judge* all poets and philosophers. Let us suppose, too, that a certain poet was the hero of the literary cafés, and wherever he went was regarded with curiosity and awe. Yet his poems, recalled in such a moment, suddenly seem diseased and highbrow. The vision of the cobblestones is unquestionably real, and poetry based on an equally *naked* experience could survive triumphantly that judgment day of man's illusions. In the intellectuals who lived through the atrocities of war in Eastern Europe there took place what one might call the *elimination of emotional luxuries.* Psychoanalytic novels incite them to laughter. They consider the literature of erotic complications, still popular in the West, as trash. Imitation abstract painting bores them. They are hungry—but they want bread, not hors d'oeuvres.

Dialectical materialism awakens a response in them because it is *earthy*. They would willingly espouse a literature and art born outside the sphere of the Method, but on condition that it be earthy, strong, and healthy. If only they could find it! It is significant that everything in the West that is strong enough for their taste turns on questions of social structure and mass belief. Such books are frequently Stalinist, but even more often anti-Stalinist.

829 A great many of them have read Koestler's *Darkness at Noon*. A few have become acquainted with Orwell's *1984*; because it is both difficult to obtain and dangerous to possess, it is known only to certain members of the Inner Party. Orwell fascinates them through his insight into details they know well, and through his use of Swiftian satire. Such a form of writing is forbidden by the New Faith because allegory, by nature manifold in meaning, would trespass beyond the prescriptions of socialist realism and the demands of the censor. Even those who know Orwell only by hearsay are amazed that a writer who never lived in Russia should have so keen a perception into its life. The fact that there are writers in the West who understand the functioning of the unusually constructed machine of which they themselves are a part astounds them and argues against the "stupidity" of the West.

Usually, what is strong in the West is purely negative. Its criticism of the New Faith is often accurate, but despite this, it points no way out, and introduces nothing to replace the Method. One can, it is true, say that it introduces a living man unashamed of his thoughts and capable of moving without the stilts supplied by citations from the authorities. To the Eastern intellectual, this is insufficient. One does not defeat a Messiah with common-sense arguments.

The Christian religion which is restricted or even exterminated in the countries of the New Faith always evokes a considerable (albeit unhealthy) amount of interest. Do Western Christians take the necessary advantage of their freedom? One is forced to the conclusion that they do not. Religion has become something in the nature of a vestigial custom, instances of which one finds in the folklore of various nations. Perhaps some pressure

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is needed if Christianity is to be reborn. The religious fervor of the Christians in the people's democracies would seem to indicate as much. One merely wonders if theirs isn't the piety of a mouse caught in a trap, and if it hasn't come just a bit too late. 829

The official order is to evince the greatest horror of the West. Everything is evil there: trains are late, stores are empty, no one has money, people are poorly dressed, the highly praised technology is worthless. If you hear the name of a Western writer, painter, or composer, you must scoff sarcastically, for to fight against "cosmopolitanism" is one of the basic duties of a citizen. Cosmopolitanism is defined as admiration for the (bourgeois) culture of the West. The term was invented in Moscow, and is not new in the history of Russia. Over a hundred years ago, Tsarist historians spoke with aversion of the "decadent West." It was in the decadent West of that time that Marx and Engels were writing, and it is from that West that it later proved necessary to import not only their work, but many other discoveries as well. In practice the fight against cosmopolitanism in the people's democracies takes the form of elaborate prescriptions indicating which Western writers of the past (those "progressive for their day") can be translated, what Western painting and music (usually created before 1870) is "healthy," etc. 829 208

No mattter how much trouble these detailed orders create for editors, publishers, and music directors, the "fight against cosmopolitanism" is not entirely without rational justification. Its motive in the Center is clear: too broad a scale of comparison is incompatible with the moral health of the citizens. In the people's democracies, which have been subjected to Western influence for centuries, it is a question of liquidating bad habits. You break a smoker of his habit by taking away his cigarettes.

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in turn surrender. Despite its apparent appeal to reason, 575
the "club's" activity comes under the heading of collec- 626
tive magic. The rationalism of the doctrine is fused with sorcery, and the two strengthen each other. Free discussion is, of course, eliminated. If what the doctrine proclaims is as true as the fact that 2 × 2 equals 4, to tolerate the opinion that 2 × 2 equals 5 would be indecent.

From his first day in school, the young citizen receives 626
an education based on this truth. There is a great differ- 876
ence between schools in the people's democracies and schools in the West, for example the schools I attended in pre-war Poland. My friends and I were exposed to a dual 829
system of values. Mathematics, physics, and biology taught us scientific laws, and inculcated respect for a materialistic outlook inherited from the nineteenth century. History and Letters seemed to elude scientific laws, while the history of the Catholic Church and Apologetics cast doubt, though often naïvely, on what physics and biology taught. In the people's democracies, the materialistic outlook of the nineteenth century has been extended consistently to every subject; history and every branch of human creativity are presented as governed by unshakeable and *already known* laws.

In the nineteenth century, with the rise of literacy, brochures popularizing scientific theories made their appearance. Regardless of the intrinsic worth of these theories, we must grant that from the moment they take on a popular form they become something other than what they were as hypotheses of scientific research. For example, the simplified and vulgarized version of Darwin's theory of the origin of species and the struggle for existence is not the same concept that it was for Darwin or for his scholarly opponents. It takes on emotional coloration, and changes into an important sociological element.

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● 829 The leaders of the twentieth century, like Hitler for instance, drew their knowledge from popular brochures, which explains the incredible confusion in their minds. Evidently, there is no place in such digests for the humble remarks of true scientists who assure us that the laws discovered are hypothetical and relative to the method chosen and the system of symbols used. Vulgarized knowledge characteristically gives birth to a feeling that *everything* is understandable and explained. It is like a system of bridges built over chasms. One can travel boldly ahead over these bridges, ignoring the chasms. It is forbidden to look down into them; but that, alas, does not alter the fact that they exist.

Once the science of nature taught that a forest was a collective of trees governed by a few elementary laws. It seemed that if one cut out the forest and replanted it, after a definite period of years a new forest, exactly like the old, would appear. Today we know this is not so; a forest is an organism arising out of complicated interactions of mosses, soil, fungi, trees, and grasses. The moment these mosses and fungi are destroyed by the cutting out of the forest, the symbiotic pattern is disturbed and the new forest is a completely different organism from what might be expected by someone who ignored the sociology of plants. Stalinists have no knowledge of the conditions human plants need in order to thrive. Forbidding any research in this direction because such study contradicts orthodoxy, they bar mankind from the possibility of acquiring fuller knowledge of itself.

Dialectical materialism, Russian-style, is nothing more than nineteenth-century science vulgarized to the second power. Its emotional and didactic components are so strong that they change all proportions. Although the Method was scientific at its origins, when it is applied to

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humanistic disciplines it often transforms them into edifying stories adapted to the needs of the moment. But there is no escape once a man enters upon these convenient bridges. Centuries of human history, with their thousands upon thousands of intricate affairs, are reduced to a few, most generalized terms. Undoubtedly, one comes closer to the truth when one sees history as the expression of the class struggle rather than a series of private quarrels among kings and nobles. But precisely because such an analysis of history comes closer to the truth, it is more dangerous. It gives the illusion of *full knowledge;* it supplies answers to all questions, answers which merely run around in a circle repeating a few formulas. What's more, the humanities get connected with the natural sciences thanks to the materialistic outlook (as, for example, in theories of "eternal matter"), and so we see the circle closing perfectly and logically. Then, Stalin becomes the crowning point of the evolution of life on our planet.

The son of a worker, subjected to such an education, cannot think otherwise than as the school demands. Two times two equals four. The press, literature, painting, films, and theater all illustrate what he learns, just as the lives of saints and martyrs serve as illustrations of theology. It would be wrong to assert that a dual set of values no longer exists. The resistance against the new set of values is, however, emotional. It survives, but it is beaten whenever it has to explain itself in rational terms. A man's subconscious or not-quite-conscious life is richer than his vocabulary. His opposition to this new philosophy of life is much like a toothache. Not only can he not express the pain in words, but he cannot even tell you which tooth is aching.

Thanks to excellent means of vulgarization, unprepared people (i.e., those whose minds work feebly) are taught to

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829 reason. Their training convinces them that what is happening in the people's democracies is necessary, even if temporarily bad. The greater the number of people who "participate in culture"—i.e. pass through the schools, read books and magazines, attend theaters and exhibitions—the further the doctrine reaches and the smaller grows the threat to the rule of philosophers.

But some people, even with sufficient education, reason "badly." They are impervious to the influence of Hegelian philosophy. A chicken cannot be taught to swim; just so, those who belong to the social groups condemned to disappear cannot be convinced of the truth of dialectics. According to the Party, if these people were clearly aware of their situation, they would have to confess that there is no hope for them. Therefore they look for mental subterfuges. Those people are enemies. They must be ejected to the margins of society not because of what they do, but because of what they *are*. Despite the fact that their intentions may be subjectively good, their guilt has an *objective* character.

Dialecticians have to know the enemy's mentality. Studying the reactionary as a social type, they establish certain features by which he can be recognized. The reactionary, they argue, even though he be an educated man, is incapable of grasping the concept of the interdependence of phenomena. Therefore his political imagination is limited. A man who has been trained sociologically can deduce a whole line of reasoning as to the causes and consequences of every phenomenon. Like a paleontologist, he can divine a whole formation from a single fossil. Show him the verse of a poet from any country, a picture, even an item of clothing and he immediately fits it into a historical context. His line of reasoning may be false; nonetheless he sees everything within the sphere of a given

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civilization as a symptom, not an accident. The reactionary, incapable of this type of thinking, sees the world as a series of unrelated, parallel occurrences. 829

Thus, Nazism was for the reactionary merely the result of the activity of Hitler and his clique; revolutionary movements are the effects of Moscow's machinations, etc. All the changes occurring in the people's democracies seem to him to resolve themselves into a question of superior force; if some miraculous accident were to remove this force, everything would return to "normal." He is like a man whose garden has been inundated by a raging river, and who expects to find his old flower beds intact after the waters subside. But a flooding river does not merely *exist;* it tears up and carries away whole banks of soil, fells trees, piles up layers of mud, overturns stones, until the garden of old becomes nothing more than a given number of square meters of unrecognizable land. The reactionary cannot grasp movement. His very language is static; his concepts, unchangeable, never renewed by observation. Laurel and Hardy once made a film in which Laurel, an American soldier in the First World War, is ordered to remain in the trench at his machine-gun post when the company moves to attack. Immediately thereafter the Armistice is signed, and in the resultant confusion he is forgotten. They find him twenty years later, his trench surrounded by a mountain of empty cans. He is still at his post, shooting at every commercial airplane that flies by. The reactionary, like Laurel, knows he must shoot, and he cannot realize that the plane is no longer what it was when he got his orders.

No matter how many books the reactionary reads about the dialectical method, he cannot understand its essence. Some little spring is missing in his mind. As a result he cannot properly evaluate human psychology. Dialecticians

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829 work on the premise that a man's mental and emotional life is in constant motion, that it is senseless to treat individuals as if they retained a certain stable, innate character in all circumstances. They know that by changing living conditions they change people's beliefs and reflexes. The reactionary is amazed by the changes people undergo. He awkwardly explains his friends' gradual conversion to the system as "opportunism," "cowardice," "treachery." Without such labels he feels lost. Reasoning on the principle of "either—or," he tries to divide the people about him into "Communists" and "non-Communists"; but such a differentiation loses all meaning in a people's democracy. Where dialectics shapes life whoever tries to resort to old-world logic must feel completely out of his depth.

Such misfortune always befalls the reactionary. The content suddenly flees from his concepts, and all he has left are empty words and phrases. His friends, who only a year ago used these words and phrases fondly, have rejected them as too general, too ill-defined, too remote from reality. He despairingly repeats "honor," "fatherland," "nation," "freedom," without comprehending that for people living in a changed (and daily changing) situation these abstractions take on a concrete and totally different meaning than before.

Because they so define a reactionary, dialecticians consider him a mentally inferior, and therefore not very dangerous, creature. He is no match for them. Once the propertied class is liquidated, the old intelligentsia (which was reactionary in these terms) can be brought to heel with no great difficulty. Its more vigorous representatives cross over to new ideological positions, while the rest lag further and further behind the transformations occurring all about them and so sink ever lower both socially and mentally.

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The new and the old intelligentsia no longer speak a common language. Reactionary tendencies exist in the peasants and the former petty bourgeoisie, but they are unexpressed. The masses are being educated by their new living conditions, and though they are discontented, with every month the mental distance between them and the program of the reactionaries increases. Émigré politicians help greatly to facilitate the work of the government. Ninety per cent of them are, according to the above definition, reactionaries. Their appeals and radio talks resemble poor Laurel's barrages at the airplanes. Their listeners are not displeased to hear them abuse a government they, too, dislike; still they cannot treat their formulations seriously. The discrepancy between these politicians' favorite words and the real situation is too clear; the superiority of the dialecticians, whose reasoning is always adapted to actuality, is too obvious. The reactionaries always lose by such comparison; the people's instinctive judgment is tinged with something like embarrassment, with shame that those who oppose dictatorship are not mentally up to its stature. Because man instinctively senses weakness, the people become ever more reluctant to side with the reactionaries. Thus, the feeling of fatalism grows stronger.

Rule over the minds of the masses, therefore, is not seriously threatened. Wherever it appears, intellectual energy can find only one outlet. It is a different matter, however, when one considers the emotional life of the masses and the terrible hatred that dominates it. This hatred cannot be explained on purely economic grounds. The Party senses that in this realm, which Marxism has studied least, surprises and real threats lie hidden.

Above all, there exists the question of religion. This problem still persists despite the many weak points in

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reflexes, was a deeply religious man. Moscow caused him 779
no trouble over this because he was an eminent scientist and because he was old. The creator of the theory of conditioned reflexes—the very theory that constitutes one of the strongest arguments against the existence of some sort of constant called "human nature"! The defenders of religion maintain that this "human nature" cannot change completely; that gods and churches have existed over thousands of years and in all kinds of civilizations, and that one can expect this to be true of the future as well. What went on in Professor Pavlov's head if two systems of concepts, one scientific and one religious, existed simultaneously there?

The Party teaches that "existence shapes consciousness," 659
that circumstances alter men. But it matters little whether religious drives result from "human nature" or from centuries of conditioning; they exist. During the war against Hitler, the Soviet Union had to dust off its priests as well as appeal to nationalistic feelings. When imminent death brings that moment of absurd revelation that *everything is senseless,* dialectical materialism suddenly discloses its mathematical structure. Man falls from the industriously built bridges. He prefers to surrender to the magic of icons.

In its own fashion, the Party too is a church. Its dictator- 626
ship over the earth and its transformation of the human 779
species depend on the success with which it can channel 659
irrational human drives and use them to its own ends. No, logical arguments are not enough. "Club" ceremonies, poetry, novels, films are so important because they reach deeper into the stratum on which the emotional conflict rages. No other church can be tolerated; Christianity is 779
Public Enemy No. 1. It fosters all the skepticism of the 829
masses as to the radical transformation of mankind. If,

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as the Gospel teaches, we must not do harm unto others, then perhaps we must not harm kulaks? If the highest glory does not belong to man, then perhaps worship of Lenin and Stalin is idolatry?

I have known many Christians—Poles, Frenchmen, Spaniards—who were strict Stalinists in the field of politics but who retained certain inner reservations, believing God would make corrections once the bloody sentences of the all-mighties of History were carried out. They pushed their reasoning rather far. They argue that history develops according to immutable laws that exist by the will of God; one of these laws is the class struggle; the twentieth century marks the victory of the proletariat, which is led in its struggle by the Communist Party; Stalin, the leader of the Communist Party, fulfills the law of history, or in other words acts by the will of God; therefore one must obey him. Mankind can be renewed only on the Russian pattern; that is why no Christian can oppose the one—cruel, it is true—idea which will create a new kind of man over the entire planet. Such reasoning is often used by clerics who are Party tools. "Christ is a new man. The new man is the Soviet man. Therefore Christ is a Soviet man!" said Justinian Marina, the Rumanian patriarch.

In reality, such Christians (even omitting men like Marina) perpetuate one of the greatest lies of all centuries. They renounce their faith but are ashamed to admit it. The contradiction between Christianity and Stalinist philosophy cannot be overcome. Christianity is based on a concept of *individual* merit and guilt; the New Faith, on *historical* merit and guilt. The Christian who rejects individual merit and guilt denies the work of Jesus, and the God he calls upon slowly transforms himself into History. If he admits that only individual merit and guilt

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exist, how can he gaze indifferently at the suffering of 779
people whose only sin was that they blocked the path of 829
"historical processes"? To lull his conscience he resorts to the thesis that a reactionary cannot be a good man.

Who is the reactionary? Everyone who opposes the in- 626
evitable historical processes, i.e. the Politburo police. The thesis of the "sin of the reactionary" is argued very cleverly: every perception is "oriented," i.e. at the very moment of perceiving we introduce our ideas into the material of our observations; only he sees reality truly who evaluates it in terms of the interests of the class that is the lever of the future, i.e. the proletariat. The writings of Lenin and Stalin teach us what the interests of the proletariat are. Whoever sees reality otherwise than as the proletariat sees it falsely; in other words, his picture of reality is deformed by the pressure of the interests of classes that are backward and so destined to disappear. Whoever sees the world falsely necessarily acts badly; whoever acts badly is a bad man; therefore the reactionary is a bad man, and one should not feel sorry for him.

This line of reasoning has at least one flaw—it ignores the facts. The pressure of an all-powerful totalitarian state creates an emotional tension in its citizens that determines their acts. When people are divided into "loyalists" and "criminals" a premium is placed on every type of conformist, coward, and hireling; whereas among the "criminals" one finds a singularly high percentage of people who are direct, sincere, and true to themselves. From the social point of view these persons would constitute the best guarantee that the future development of the social organism would be toward good. From the Christian point of view they have no other sin on their conscience save their contempt for Caesar, or their incorrect evaluation of his might.

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CHAPTER I

THE HISTORICAL PRECEDENT

1. *Marxist-Leninist Theory to the Eve of the Russian Revolution* (1848-1917)

In the little over a century that has passed since the proclamation of *The Communist Manifesto* in 1848, the attitude of Marxists toward the peasant and his role in society has undergone a series of marked shifts, ranging from Engels' caustic assertion that the peasant was the "barbarian of civilization" to Mao Tse-tung's frank reliance on a predominantly peasant army for the conquest of China.[1] Marx's own estimate of the socialist potential of the Russian *obshchina* (the traditional peasant commune) changed considerably in the last years of his life.[2] Lenin's well-known division of the peasantry into distinct and antagonistic segments stemmed from a more optimistic appraisal of the revolutionary role of the peasantry than had hitherto been accepted by Marxist theoreticians, and resulted after 1905 in the advocacy of a "democratic dictatorship of the workers and peasants."[3] And although Lenin was always eloquent after the 1917 Revolution on the "error" of applying force to the middle peasantry, he set in motion the ponderous social machinery whose very life eventually depended upon the most forceful manipulation of the middle peasantry. The traditional Marxist glorification of urban, cosmopolitan values (so especially pronounced in a man like Trotsky) contrasts sharply with the more

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[1] For an excellent discussion of the ideological gymnastics by which Mao justified his turn from a proletarian to a peasant base in the early 1930's, see Benjamin Schwartz, *Chinese Communism and the Rise of Mao* (Cambridge, 1951), pp. 113-125.

[2] Kark Marx and Friedrich Engels, *The Russian Menace to Europe*, (Blackstock and Hozelitz, editors), Glencoe, Illinois, 1952, pp. 218-26.

[3] The classic exposition of Lenin's thesis is contained in his "The Agrarian Question in Russia at the End of the 19th Century," in *Selected Works* (International Publishers, New York, 1943), Vol. 1, pp. 13-94.

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● 829 recent Communist policy of deriding "cosmopolitan" culture and cynically glorifying the folk and the land.[4]

This variegated and complex pattern of views indicates some of the pitfalls involved in an effort to generalize on Marxist agricultural theories. The great doctrinal flexibility implied in this pattern makes it imperative that Communist land policy be studied in the context of particular situations, for these variations reflect not merely *tactical* shifts but the changing character of Communism itself. This is not to suggest that Communist agrarian doctrine lacks a thread of historical continuity. It is to be found in the consistent conviction that the land problem is secondary to the basic urban and industrial developments in society. This attitude derives from the fact that the Communist Parties have always been urban in character, concerned with the advancement of urban groups, first the industrial proletariat, and then, in post-revolutionary times, the Party-industrial bureaucracy.[5] Consequently, Marxist solutions to the agrarian problem have been shaped largely by needs of the urban group to which the Communists attached themselves, not by the needs of the peasants or of the land. Within this general social framework the various Marxist formulations on the land question were enunciated over the years.

The Traditional 19th Century Marxist View

When Engels termed the peasant the "barbarian of civilization," Marx himself cited the epithet with approval; and in his own words he was more contemptuous still, terming the peasantry a "sack of potatoes," a class whose very way of life constituted a brake on human progress, and whose lack of social cohesion and drive made them incapable of forceful political action and vulnerable to reactionary ideologies.[6] Marx's greatest scorn was reserved for the East European peasantry (chiefly Slavic) whose half-mystical attachment to the land and folk-directed culture led them to serve the most conservative interests of Europe. He assigned major blame for the failure of the Hungarian revolution of 1848 to the "reactionary" Croatian and Russian peasants who had "betrayed" their own best interests in following their leaders and crush-

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[4] See Leon Trotsky, *Literature and Revolution* (New York, 1928), for a full exposition of the early Marxist identification with urbanism.

[5] The discussion of these trends in David Mitrany's *Marx Against the Peasant* (Chapel Hill, 1951) is excellent.

[6] *Ibid.*, pp. 7-21.

ing Kossuth.[7] In mid-nineteenth century Europe Marx's entire sympathies were with the energetic city bourgeoisie and the rising proletariat.[8]

Consequently it was clear to most 19th century Marxists that until radical changes had transformed the land, the peasantry would continue to be an anomaly in the developing industrial society. The prospect of radical change seemed to be offered in the early 19th century trend toward amalgamation of independent farm holdings under capitalist, or *Junker* ownership; and the day was foreseen when the growth of the massive latifundia would have converted the once backward and provincial European peasant into a class-conscious and alert proletarian, capable of being organized along modern political lines. Furthermore, it was imagined that in conjunction with the proletarian revolution the small peasant holding, that "most primitive mode of exploitation," would give way to efficient, modernized production units capable of direct transformation in the crucible of revolution into "vital socialist forms."

The Modified Marxist View

At the close of the 19th century it became increasingly evident that agrarian conditions in Europe had not developed in the Marxist-prescribed manner. On the contrary, land reform and the abolition of serfdom, even in such backward regions as Russia and the Balkans, had created an increasing class of property-conscious peasants. The task of reconciling these facts with the traditional belief in the historical obsolescence of the peasantry was critical for Marxists.[9] In France, Germany, and the Netherlands "reformist"

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[7] Marx wrote: "Except for the Poles, the Russians, and at best the Slavs in Turkey, no Slavic people has a future, for the simple reason that all Slavs lack the most basic historic, geographic, political and industrial prerequisites for independence and vitality." (Blackstock and Hoselitz, p. 72). And Engels on this point: "Now you may ask me whether I have no sympathy whatever for the small Slavic peoples, and remnants of peoples. . . . In fact, I have damned little sympathy for them." (*Ibid.*, p. 119).

[8] Thus Marx rejoiced at the victory of the advanced and enterprising Americans over the Mexicans in the war of the 1840s, identified himself with the North over the South in the American Civil War, favored British imperialism over Russian imperialism in Central Asia, and supported a German victory in the Franco-Prussian War of 1870. In those situations where the "burgeoisie" acted with great boldness in overthrowing antiquated forms and empires Marx celebrated its victories in lavish fashion.

[9] See Mitrany, pp. 13-23, for discussion of the problems facing the Socialist movement in the late 19th century as it attempted to come to grips with land changes.

829 theoreticians sought to revise the traditionally harsh view of the peasant, and contended that the victory of "socialism" did not hinge on complete destruction of the peasant way of life. The rise of peasant political consciousness which accompanied these developments had necessitated revaluation even from Marx and Engels who, for example, came to see a limited capacity for growth in the Russian *obshchina*. Engels went so far as to concede that revolution need not necessarily be accompanied by the expropriation of the property-conscious peasant, but that socialization of the land might follow only when the peasant was convinced of its benefits.[10]

The Leninist Development

It is probably no accident that the single European Socialist party to develop a program which took some account of growing peasant demands was the only one to meet with revolutionary success. That such a program was developed was more than a tribute to Lenin's political genius; equally important was the fact that Russia possessed both a proletariat large and concentrated enough to generate an advanced Socialist party and a peasantry so enormous that revolutionary tactics without its cooperation were, in the long run, unthinkable.

Lenin's initial opinion of the Russian peasantry was based on the classical Marxist conceptions expounded by his mentor Plekhanov.[11] But the swift movement of events in the countryside at the turn of the century made Lenin increasingly aware of the revolutionary potential of the Russian peasantry and he sought to turn the growing peasant hatred of the land-owning class to his own ends. Thus, in *The Development of Capitalism in Russia* (1899), he had propounded the standard Marxist thesis that further pauperization, and so proletarianization, of the peasantry was a necessary condition to revolution in the countryside; but the active participation of sections of the peasantry in the 1905 Revolution changed Lenin's mind. "Our mistake," he observed after the 1905 Revolution, "consisted in underestimating the breadth and depth of the democratic, or rather bourgeois-democratic, movement among the peasantry. It is stupid to persist in this mistake now when the

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[10] See Karl Marx and Friedrich Engels, *Izbranniye Proizvedeniia* (Moscow, 1948), Vol. II, p. 415.

[11] A brief discussion of Plekhanov's ideas may be found in N. Popov, *Outline History of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union* (Moscow, 1934), Vol. 1, pp. 18-28.

Revolution has taught us so much."[12] The lessons of 1905 were 829
summarized in *The Agrarian Question* (1908). In this work he postulated two possible courses for Russian agriculture: The "Prussian road" of government-sponsorship of the "predatory" kulak farmers, and the "American road" of the complete destruction of all feudal traces and the creation of a small-holding, independent peasantry. Lenin's readiness to support the "American road" aligned him with peasant demands for increased land and the destruction of all feudal remnants.[13]

However, Lenin cautioned, as a Social Democrat he could not assure the peasants that he would forever support their property-conscious demands, and a "socialist agriculture" remained his final goal. Thus Lenin foresaw the inevitable clash of interests between the peasant and proletarian revolutions which Engels had anticipated when he wrote:

> We say frankly that, given the prejudices flowing from their economic position, education, and isolated way of life . . . we can bring the peasants to our side only by making promises which we know beforehand we shall not be able to keep.[14]

These promises were made and temporarily honored by the first victorious Socialist party. It was not, however, until the eve of the 1917 Revolution, when the vast and spontaneous peasant rebellion convulsed the Russian countryside, that Lenin moved to cement the alliance between the peasant and proletarian revolutions. The working agreement beteween the two forces was based on common opposition to the land-owning classes (allies of the "bourgeois" government which the Bolsheviks sought to destroy) and was made possible by Lenin's temporary acquiescence to the peasant's own land program as formulated by the Social-Revolutionary Party. "These reforms are not our idea," Lenin said, but "we support them because they are demanded by the overwhelming majority of the peasants."[15] The Bolsheviks did not administer, or even attempt to oversee, the expropriation of the Russian landed estates in the revolutionary period; but their seizure of power in November 1917 permitted the militant peasantry to complete the agrarian revolution begun many months before.

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[12] Quoted by Bertram Wolfe, *Three Who Made a Revolution* (New York, 1948), p. 364.
[13] Lenin, *Selected Works* (Moscow, 1934-39), Vol. I, pp. 84-91.
[14] Karl Marx and Friedrich Engels, *Izbranniye Proizvedenia*, (Moscow, 1948), Vol. II, p. 414.
[15] Lenin, *Selected Works*, Vol. III, p. 200.

Satellite industrial program. The oustanding case in point is, of course, Hungary, whose extremely poor harvest of 1952 provided the impetus which paved the way for the crisis of 1953.[19] 423 668

2. The reliance upon slow economic strangulation rather than direct administrative force in collectivization inevitably meant greater reliance on the voluntary will of the peasantry than was necessary in the Soviet collectivization drive. Therefore, the regimes had to take some account of the individual tastes of the peasantry. The variety of intermediate types of collective, the special privileges granted kolkhoz members, reflect the Communist desire to soften the impact of collectivization.[20] The strenuous efforts made to demonstrate to the peasant the economic superiority of collectivism were also part of this effort.

This policy made collectivization possible but at the same time detracted from the very usefulness originally intended for the collectivized farms; that is, the effort to render the collectives attractive to the independent peasant (limited as they were) did not facilitate exploitation of the peasants which was their major economic justification. As was evident from the analysis presented in Chapted IV, the degree of exploitation of the "Socialist sector" was not much greater than the exploitation of the private sector. The difference was, in any case, smaller than that achieved in the Soviet Union, where a prolonged period of persuasion and intra-peasantry discrimination had been unnecessary.

4. *The East European Peasant*

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Peasant resistance is a social force extremely difficult to measure either quantitatively or qualitatively. It expresses itself in many forms and guises, both in open revolt and passive resistance. This is partly because peasant sentiment rarely expresses itself in organizational form but more commonly in individual economic acts. In modern history, governments have found it difficult to elicit fanatical loyalty from the peasant; at best he is obedient. For the same reasons, the peasant has rarely been drawn into the organized revolutionary movements of the time. He has succumbed to few

[19] There was, of course, other factors involved in the Hungarian agricultural crisis of 1953 (see above pp. 109-10).

[20] Mention should be made here of Communist efforts throughout the sphere to flatter the peasant by a superficial glorification of his traditional dance, costumes, handiwork, and other expressions of the peasant culture which once graced the covers of pre-World War II East European tourist guides.

565 of the sophisticated slogans of modern politics and tends to judge
829 governments in terms of provincial and pragmatic considerations
668 which cannot be encompassed in the romantic slogans of either the State or the Revolution. For a fleeting moment in 1917, the peasants of Russia involved themselves in the maelstrom of a proletarian revolution. Between the wars they gave occasional support to genuinely peasant parties, but invariably their interest lagged or the parties betrayed them. Otherwise, the peasants have in general been passive rather than active participants in 20th Century political history.

The vast uprising of the Russian peasants in 1917-18 was probably their greatest show of strength in the 20th century, and certainly absorbed more peasant energies and resentments than either the 1907 Romanian rebellion or the Bulgarian peasant victories of the early 1920s. But their victory was short-lived, and was achieved at a tremendous price. The cataclysmic forces of the Russian Revolution so shattered the old structure of both countryside and city that the gains the peasant made remained at the mercy of terrible forces. The destruction of traditional institutions which occurred in 1917-21 in defense of the Revolution prepared the land for the collectivization onslaught 10 years later.

The peasants of Eastern Europe have not participated in such a revolution, and their institutions knew no such cataclysmic overturn. Furthermore, East European peasants have had a longer tradition of private property and as a result were less capable of revolutionary opposition to their oppressors but more capable of that type of passive resistance which in the long run is most effective. Russian peasants might destroy the livestock in defiance of the Bolshevik cadres but East European peasants could more easily sabotage the plan by day-to-day non-cooperation. The revolutionary traditions of the Russian peasantry made possible greater heroism, but no greater improvement of their economic situation. The less militant traditions of the East European peasantry (in part the consequence of more humane governments) guaranteed that there would be no repetition of the victories of 1917-18, nor any exact repetition of the terrible defeats of 1929-32.

There are many national factors affecting the total picture: the proximity of peasant victory in Hungary of 1945-46; the power of the Catholic Church in rural Poland; the relative prosperity of the Czech farmers; the communal traditions of the Bulgarian and

Yugoslav peasants; the special position which Romania occupies in the Soviet empire. These differences are important, and explain many of the variations within the framework of agricultural policy. But these variations fall into that historical experience which distinguishes East European peasantry from its Russian counterpart. These historical differences are of the utmost importance in explaining the failure of the East European Communists to emulate successfully the Soviet example. 565 829 668

5. *The Communist Role in Eastern Europe*

The Communist Parties of Eastern Europe consider themselves progressive forces of the area. In agriculture, they assert that by lifting the backward peasantry out of its traditional lethargy and provincialism, they are performing a service for the peasants and the entire society. The opposition of the peasantry to Communist plans for the rationalization of the land stems from stubborn allegiance to outmoded customs and habits. Vulko Chervenkov, the Bulgarian Premier, gave the classical formulations on this point: 829 668

> The Bulgarian peasant has two souls. One is the love of work and the other is the sense of private ownership. His spirit of private ownership brings him close to the capitalist. His spirit of work brings him close to the working class. Therefore the peasant is hesitant. We Communists, through our tactics and by the collective method, should kill their spirit of private ownership and build our socialist world.[19]

It is precisely this conception of the Communist role in Eastern Europe which the material gathered together here calls into question.

No doubt it is partly true that peasant resistance to collectivization is based on their passionate attachment to the land they till and own. But as has been pointed out, the major issue in the struggle between the Communists and the peasants was the question of the *distribution* of the fruits of the land, rather than the more abstract question of conflicting ideologies. 423 829

The peasants fight not only to protect their ancient traditions but even more to protect their economic rights, and they frequently employ the ancient traditions in defense of their own economic interests. The Communists, for their part, struggle against these traditions not merely out of doctrinaire antagonism but because these customs stand in the way of further exploitation of the

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[21] *Rabotnicheско Delo* (Sofia) September 9, 1953.

423 829 peasants and their full incorporation into the state-industrial machinery.[20]

423 Like the great land reforms which followed the First and Second World Wars, the Communist "solution" to the land problem of Eastern Europe is no real solution at all, and since it does not attack the problem at its roots, is not intended to be one. Rather, like the great reforms, the Communist agricultural program is only a means of redistributing the products of the land to suit new political realities. The chief difference between the two movements lies in the fact that while the reforms redistributed the wealth among the peasants themselves, collectivization was designed to redistribute a portion of the national wealth in favor of the new urban Communist bureaucratic class.

[20] The working class has been already incorporated into that structure. But that does not mean that, despite the absence of traditional ties, they are any less opposed to the Communist regimes than the peasants. On the contrary, as the East German and Czechoslovak revolts of mid-1953 demonstrated, the workers are likely to play the leading role in anti-Communist agitation and revolt.

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or the expulsion of the Sudeten Germans from their homes during 1945, an action flagrantly in violation of the principles for which the war against Nazism had been fought? 798 563

Against this background one must set the figures of those who, whether of the clergy or of the laity, lived and preached the law of charity. Nowhere more than amongst such men—Princes of the Church, professors, men of affairs, labor leaders, simple religious, and common people—was this law manifest. It is imperative that their memory be not obscured, now that so mighty an army of the mean and servile has arisen. Let us note what we shall have mournful occasion to repeat again and again. Marxism, which had its rise in the concern of intellectuals for the worker, and which formulated that concern in terms of a materialist version of the Hegelian dialectic, has come round with Stalin to the view that the laboring man must have no intellectuals on his side. To suppress élites has become the cornerstone of the totalitarian theory of practical politics. That is why the peoples in chains retain their passions and their weaknesses, their hatreds and their greed, while those who might give them counsel or reasons for constraint are dead or silent. 829

Then, too, there was the presence and also the example of the Ghetto. Place of reputed ignominy, of poverty, of rasping and grasping humanity, it was nevertheless awesomely, breathtakingly beautiful when the Sabbath eve descended upon it. Prayer became not so much what was engaged in but rather that which swept the world aside and created a wonderland of peace and holiness. One knew that in all the shabby little rooms which sheltered human beings in their wretchedness a fire had been lighted which had gleamed for thousands of years—the same leaping flame which had set the bush ablaze for Moses and had kindled the light that danced before the Ark of the Covenant. And though the vision of sanctification which now 000

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tion of separate states. Therewith a tide of Liberalism merged 175
with the currents of upsurging tribal nationalism to create the 186
pattern of conflict which was later to prove so advantageous to the totalitarians. Czech nationalism, having in Thomas Masaryk a brilliantly effective standard-bearer, seemed at first blush to usher in a new era of democratic and progressive social thought. It soon became obvious, however, that the autonomism of the Czechs—which led at the outset even to the establishment of a National Church—would of necessity engender comparable feelings in the breasts of the other peoples in the Czechoslovak Republic. The Slovaks rallied round their own traditions of language and culture, and swiftly but surely became committed to a quest for autonomy which found a temporary though unsatisfactory haven under Hitler. Among Sudeten Germans feeling was almost as strong and led ultimately to the fateful formation of a political party which advocated union with Germany. Nor was the situation different elsewhere. Yugoslavia was plagued from the beginning by deep and bitter conflict among the Serbs, the Croats, and the Slovenes.

In Hungary a violent Communist revolution, spearheaded in 175
late 1918 by Béla Kun, ruled for a time by bloodshed. But ere 669
long this uprising, which had very little popular support, was 994
put down; reaction set in, and a dictatorial government was established after it had compiled its own catalogue of excesses. Here was made manifest, probably for the first time, how significant the stability of religious groups could prove to be. Not only did they temper noticeably the excesses of extremists, but under the leadership of great churchmen they began to build organizations dedicated to social improvement. It is also true [929] ●
that bitter experience under the Béla Kun regime made Hungary one of the most anti-Communist countries of Europe.

And so, as the turbulence engendered by the war apparently 995
subsided, it seemed probable that a period of relative security

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Catholic and Protestant, to accept one of the most flagrant heresies of all time. 798

There can be no doubt that Nazism dealt a crippling blow to religion, not only by reason of the attack on elites—men and women of intellectual status and forceful character, able to lead the people—but also because of the widespread perversion of youth which resulted from the activities of the Hitlerjugend and similar organizations. It is true that Hitler's attack on the Church lacked both the decisiveness and the skill which we have since come to identify with Communism. The Nazi intention was, however, to launch such an attack as soon as victory had been gained. Himmler's plans, as we study them in retrospect, bear the stamp of his diseased romantic imagination; but it may well be that in an hour of world-shattering victory he could have put them into effect. Fortunately there was no such triumph. Even so the scars left on the spirit of Europe by years of unrestrained and vicious Nazism will not be healed over for a long time to come. Thus, the Communist advance 829 ● westward after the close of the war was aided on the one hand by the corrosion of spirit which was a bequest of Hitler, and on the other hand by the belief, prevalent in many quarters, that Sovietism was the opposite of German tyranny and was friendly to democratic institutions. This was unfortunately accepted as something close to self-evident truth in our own United States, so that there is little reason why we should wonder at the illusions of Europeans.

Stalin's road into one of the heartlands of the Christian faith was at all events open. The second stage in the passion of sorely tried peoples was to begin. How feeble the surviving elements of Liberalism, counted upon sometimes to impede the Russian dictator's progress, had become, is amply demonstrated by the fate of Eduard Beneš. Less imaginative and resourceful, less courageous or determined, few statesmen have seemed to be,

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though the verdict is not wholly just. There remained no intellectual obstacle save the stark Christian faith to one of the most ruthless powers humanity has known.

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Accordingly we shall glance briefly at the historical relations between Church and State in Russia in order to gain insight into the formation of Soviet policy on the religious question. It is not easy to do so. Russia, which possesses a great literature, has had no school of cultural historians; and, though many noble refugee scholars—Berdyaev, Timasheff, Stepan, von Eckardt, Gurian among them—have written significantly on cultural topics, persons who do not know Russia are hard put to follow the convolutions of a history very different from that of our own peoples. There is, however, a line of development which one can observe with reasonable ease if one asks a few questions. What were the relations between Western Christianity and Russia? When and how did the Russian Church become subservient to the Czars? How did that Church confront the rising strength of Bolshevism? Did it make its peace with Stalin?

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Christianity came to Kiev from Byzantium in the year 988. This does not, however, mean that the Russians were deeply committed to the Eastern Church in contradistinction to Rome. Missionaries came from both centers of Christendom, and there seems to have been little difference in the welcome accorded them; but at the time of the occupation of Constantinople by the Crusaders in 1204 a change had set in. Excesses committed by uproarious defenders of the Cross deeply embittered the Greeks, and some of this feeling was communicated to the Russians. The charge that Rome was the seat of an archheretical Papacy, prevalent in Greek writing of the time, found an echo in Kiev. Then came the Mongol invasion of Russia, followed by a period of occupation lasting two hundred and fifty years. Autocratic rule by the Mongolian masters deepened

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175 795 641 The great Councils to which we have referred opened in a spirit of optimism, despite the nationalistic bickering to which Europe was then subject. The Greeks were in a conciliatory mood, due largely to their need of Western allies against the followers of Mohammed, but they arrived in Europe at a time of bitter conflict over whether a Council took precedence over the Pope. The Decree of Union did not satisfy the great mass of the Greeks, even though the overwhelming majority of their ecclesiastical representatives assented to it in accordance with the wishes of the Emperor. The only positive result was the formation of the Greek Churches in union with Rome, usually called the Uniate Churches. In Russia, as we have seen, the Czar vetoed any plan of reunion.

But the great dream of reunion did not die, and after World War I it was revived especially by Pope Pius XI, who had intimate personal knowledge of conditions in Eastern Europe from the high vantage point of the Holy See. Institutions under the auspices of the Papacy were established to promote the achievement of One Fold and One Shepherd. At the same time the Protestant Ecumenical Council likewise began to search for ways in which to draw the Eastern Churches into union, with the Churches bound together under its roof. These efforts were not wholly useless, but it was again obvious that the disunity of the Christian West had puzzled and confused rather than attracted the East.

175 829 995 Meanwhile great changes had taken place. The Papacy was compelled to reckon with the rise of secularism, which swept across Eastern Europe from the West during the nineteenth century. Medieval ecclesiastical institutions were widely identified with feudalism; and in addition new intellectual and scientific movements gave rise to a widespread conviction that religion was in itself a barrier to the development of the good, or at least the prosperous, society. The attack on feudalism

[1. Councils of Ferrara and Florence, 15th cent. - Analyst.]

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which became the great French Revolution of 1789 was also a 175
rebellion against the privileged Church; and after the rise of 829
a capitalistic society the estrangement of the poor from religion 795
became the dominant fact in the cultural history of Western Europe. Hegelian philosophy—combining a doctrine of the constantly mobile and shifting Mind with a theory of the State as the sole primordially ordained center of permanence in an otherwise impermanent world—came to prominence at a time when dissatisfaction with Liberalism (in the continental sense) was breeding myths of political utopianism among the masses. Of these myths the strongest, temporarily at least, was the Marxist faith, rooted in a class-conscious usurpation of Hegelian thought. Yet observers who looked deeply into the wellsprings from which the intellectual behavior of the time was fed could see that a creed drastically counter to Marxism was arising in many different places, almost spontaneously. This might be termed dynamic traditionalism—that is, investing the past of man with sacredness and subsequently selecting from it forces and figures that could be made objects of the cult, in which the concept of human sacrality might receive a quasi-liturgical form. Perhaps such a force might be race, or classical antiquity, or one of the urges which some historians read into the Renaissance. To the exponents of dynamic traditionalism, the Catholic Church often seemed to be one great force among many others. For did it not have discipline, as Charles Maurras observed, and a heritage of beauty ranging all the way from the austerity of Cluny to the gorgeous splendor of St. Peter's?

This traditionalism tempted many Catholics—was indeed a 829
far greater peril to orthodoxy than even the antecedent, all- 795
pervading Liberalism. That no doubt had led not a few to believe that the Christian creed was outmoded and so could be made serviceable only by adapting it, more or less subtly, to the assumptions of modern scientific and philosophical

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829 thought; but dynamic traditionalism transformed the Church
795 of the Master into a genteel and eminently historical institution, with the role of conferring the august dignity of an assumed other world upon the power politics of the here-and-now. The robes of prelates fitted very well into the pageantry of the State, and so there were not a few who thought that a benediction might well be expended upon Nazis and Fascists, to the accompaniment of incense and carefully selected items of Gregorian chant, if only their grandiose parades would include a section devoted exclusively to the clergy. It may be said parenthetically that today no one knows whether the Russia of Stalin was a devotee of Marxism or of dynamic traditionalism. Had Stalin donned the robes of Ivan, who could have told which heresy he was espousing?

175 A succession of great Popes, possibly the most remarkable
793 in the long annals of the Church, accepted the challenge. Leo
795 XIII, intellectual and aristocratic, recognized the necessity for demonstrating to the workers that they were not at present inside the realms of a Christian civilization that doomed them to a condition of perennial peonage. His successor, Pope Pius X, left to the world the conviction that the Church is the servant of peace; and Benedict XV committed all Catholics to the support of an international order. In 1922 began the vigorous pontificate of Pius XI, distinguished for the world-wide scope of his interests and sympathies. Whereas during several centuries the See of Rome had worn an air of Roman provincialism, the tireless leadership of this learned, mountain-climbing North Italian imparted to it a new tinge of contemporaneousness and cosmopolitanism. The Vatican ended its old quarrel with the Italian State over the Papal territories, even though at some risk of seeming to assent to the dictatorship of Mussolini. It acquired a radio station, an Americanized library system, and even a scientific academy. Through adroit and concilia-

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tory diplomatic activity agreements were reached with the new states of Europe as well as with many countries overseas concerning relationships between Church and State. In ways which were often startlingly new, the laity was associated with the clergy in the work of the Church; and social reform was advocated, in the spirit of a great Encyclical letter restating and re-forming the principles of the moral teaching concerning society which are implicit in the Catholic tradition. All these things were then kept alive under the next Pope, Pius XII.

It is part of the universal tragedy of our time that so very much of what seemed so promising should have been engulfed by the fearful upheavals which, originating in Europe, for a time threatened to shatter the foundations of human society everywhere. In Adolf Hitler appeared the demagogic voluntarist who gave the heresy of dynamic traditionalism its most drastic and frightening formulation. Meanwhile, in nearly every other country Marxism became the gospel of the dissident intellectuals, who often were able to commit to their view sections of the working population, indeed not infrequently unwilling sections. Yet Pius XI had felt, almost from the moment he assumed Pontificate, that a great and shattering storm was brewing in Europe. That is why he labored so vigorously for the development of the Church in other parts of the world, including Africa and Asia. He took steps to forestall the disaster, opposing the mighty heresies whenever he could even though sometimes the infection had spread so far among Catholics themselves that—as in the case of the *Action française*—Princes of the Church did not concur with him.

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In Eastern Europe the position of the Church was inevitably and critically affected by inability to arrive at a *modus vivendi* with the Bolshevik government. The lengthy story of efforts to reach an agreement cannot be told here; but it may be recalled that until the summer of 1924 a Papal Relief Mission was ac-

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2 The Liberal Tradition

HUBERT RIPKA

121 This essay will endeavor to show that liberalism
829 has its own tradition in the countries of Eastern Europe and that the liberal regimes set up in this area succumbed not so much to internal factors as to the unfavorable international situation. In other words, the development of liberalism in this region between the two world wars was a part of the course of liberal democracy in Europe as a whole.

I

829 It is necessary first to define liberalism. This force will not be interpreted here as a political ideology of certain political parties or social classes. Although, historically speaking, liberalism has been identified most often with the so-called middle classes, its ideology has a far wider basis. It aims above and beyond the demands of one social class to a political and social order of all society which is based on liberty, equality, and the reign of law. It is in this sense that liberalism will be dealt with in this essay.

It would be impossible to understand the liberalism of any one country if it were discussed only in terms of the

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political parties which profess liberalism or which, more precisely, adopt only those elements of liberalism which further their own political aims. Regarded in this light, England, where the Liberal Party is the weakest among the principal political parties, would not be a liberal country. Similarly, in France, Italy, and Belgium, liberalism has not been limited to the so-called liberal parties. The situation was the same in the countries of Eastern Europe. 829

In Czechoslovakia there were only two liberal parties (the National Democrats and the National Socialists), but liberal ideology greatly influenced the Agrarian Party, the Social Democrats and, to a large extent, the Czech Catholics. In Poland, the National Democratic Party was, at first, the only party to accept any of the liberal principles (it endorsed particularly economic liberalism), but the Polish Agrarian and Socialist parties were influenced strongly by liberalism. In Hungary, the Liberal Party was small and without any influence. A similar situation prevailed in Bulgaria, but liberal aspirations for greater freedom and for more civil rights were not limited to members of the Liberal Party. In Rumania, the Liberal Party was very strong, but it was hardly more "liberal" than Maniu's National Peasant Party. In Yugoslavia, the Radicals and the Democrats who found their support chiefly among the Serbians and the Slovene liberals stood for certain principles of political and economic liberalism, but it is a recognized fact that the Croatian and Serbian Agrarians, as well as the Radicals and the Democrats, fought in the name of liberal democracy against dictatorship. In Bulgaria, the Agrarians of Stambolisky represented a party devoted to democratic principles. 665 829

The position and influence of liberalism in Eastern Europe is best illustrated by T. G. Masaryk. His own political party was numerically insignificant but Masaryk, as the most prominent liberal in this region, influenced not only the

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665 Czechs and the Slovaks, but also neighboring peoples, par-
829 ticularly the Yugoslavs. A large proportion of the Croatian, Serbian, and Slovene politicians from the Yugoslav provinces that had formerly formed a part of Austria-Hungary were educated before the First World War in the school of Masaryk's liberal thought. Among these men was Stjepan Radić, who later was to become leader of the Croatian Peasant Party.

829 Liberalism in Eastern Europe, and this is true for other
565 countries as well, cannot be identified only with the so-called middle classes or with supporters of the free enterprise system. The middle classes, with the exception of those in Czechoslovakia and Austria, were not numerically or economically strong or influential. The capitalistic economic order was strongly defended, not only by the liberals, but by pronounced conservatives among whom were those who began to support authoritarian regimes in the 'thirties. The peasants, insofar as they did not adhere politically to parties of the conservative right, were usually very devoted and often even radical supporters of democracy. Similarly, a great number of socialistically oriented workers and intelligentsia, in supporting political democracy, were influenced by ideas of liberalism. Many liberals, usually those belonging to the intelligentsia, were sympathetic to socialistic tendencies. This socialistically-minded liberalism, which had its counterpart in France among the Radical Socialists or the so-called "Independent" Socialists, and in Britain among the British Fabians, was best represented in Czechoslovakia by T. G. Masaryk and his disciple, Eduard Beneš. Both men, although they rejected Marxism, accepted many ideas of the socialistic school of thought. This liberal socialistic orientation was the basis of the Czechoslovakian party of National Socialists whose adherents were chiefly recruited from the small bourgeoisie, the intelligentsia, and the workers. The National Socialists endeavored to combine liberal-

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ism with socialism, in the belief that political democracy should be accompanied by "economic democracy." 829 565

The importance and influence of liberalism in this region did not, therefore, rest with any particular political parties or social groupings which gave themselves the liberal label or which explicitly professed liberal principles. The influence of liberalism lay in the force of the liberal ideology which exercised influence on the whole national community.

It is often held today, due to the conception of liberalism held in Anglo-Saxon countries and, to some extent, in other countries of Western Europe, that the influence of liberalism in the Eastern European countries was not of great importance. This is accounted for by a theory that the so-called middle classes were weak and that the popular masses, predominantly peasant, had a low social and cultural standing. Czechoslovakia is cited as an example to support this analysis. It is said that Czechoslovakia was able to maintain her democracy because she had an influential and prosperous middle class and because the cultural level of her population was approximately the same as the cultural level of the West. There is no doubt that a weak middle class and a low social standard among the popular masses were serious handicaps to the development of liberal democracy in the agricultural countries of this region. Liberal democracy required, from the social and economic points of view, not uniformity and equalization, but a diversified and well-balanced social structure and an economy with a fair degree of balance between industry and agriculture. Above all, liberal democracy required the "liberal spirit," a combination of a desire for freedom, a devotion to political and social rights, and an eagerness for justice. The existence of liberal democracy, therefore, cannot be defined in terms of social and economic requirements alone. 829 565 511

In support of this premise, several examples can be cited. Before the First World War, in the small Serbia of King 829 511

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829 571 Peter I, there was much more freedom, in spite of the social and cultural backwardness of the people, than there had been under the dictatorship of the Crown in the '30's when the economic and social level of the country was much higher than in prewar years. It is sufficient to compare the liberal Radical, Nikola Pašić, with the unprincipled opportunist Milan Stojadinović (whom Ciano praised as a "true fascist") to realize that the betterment of economic conditions did not prevent the disintegration of democracy in Yugoslavia. Between the two world wars, Poland progressed economically and made great strides in industrialization, yet from 1926 on she was subjected to the semidictatorship of Pilsudski.

[433] In Hungary, after the First World War, the economic situation was not much better than it was in Austria. Yet, in spite of both this and the reactionary regime of Admiral Horthy in Budapest, some vestiges of liberalism survived even the Second World War. In Austria, in spite of the substantial influence exercised in Vienna by the Social Democrats and by the liberal bourgeoisie, a semidictatorial regime was installed in 1934. Germany's economic and social structure was more advanced than that of Czechoslovakia. The grave economic crisis of the '30's caused wide unemployment in both these countries, yet the small Czechoslovakian Republic remained faithful to liberal democracy until she fell before Nazi aggression, while in Germany Hitler was already in power in 1933.

829 These examples are surely sufficient to show that the strength or weakness of liberalism in Eastern Europe did not depend solely, or even mostly, upon economic and social conditions. These were certainly very important factors, but of more importance were the psychological climate and the political tradition within each individual nation. Czechoslovakia remained democratic until her fall because, ever since the Hussite revolution in the fifteenth century, the substantial majority of both Czechs and Slovaks had been

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"liberal-minded" even if they had not expressed this through formal Liberal parties. In Hungary, there was a long tradition of liberalism which had been inspired by the Golden Bull of 1222 and which, in the penetrating words of the British historian, Hugh Seton-Watson, maintained "within the Hungarian ruling class . . . a kind of Whiggish liberalism which permitted a measure of intellectual freedom." This explains why Hungary was able to preserve some, if not all, of her parliamentary formalities. On the other hand, in Poland and, to a great extent, in the Balkan countries, the tradition of nationalism pushed liberal tendencies into the background. Austria, whose desire for independence was not sufficiently strong, became a victim of strong pressures exercised by both her fascist neighbors. 829

In addition to special political conditions in the individual Eastern European countries, international influences and a combination of outside forces greatly affected the development of liberalism in this region. It should be remembered that the prospects for liberalism were favorable only as long as Western democracies exercised leadership in Europe and that the decline of liberalism was in direct proportion to the rise of fascism in certain important European countries. The decline of liberal democracy in Eastern Europe was, therefore, a reflection of the general crisis of liberalism in the whole of Europe.

II

Liberalism in Eastern Europe was related, historically and ideologically, to liberalism in the West, although each had developed certain distinctive features. 829

The liberals of Eastern Europe, like those of the West, saw as the fulfillment of the political ideals of liberalism a democratic regime based on free elections and on the principle of checks and balances whose purpose is to keep the

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●829 government under the control of parliament and of the free electorate. They hoped for a regime which would guarantee all the classical civil rights and which would preserve the independence of the courts. To achieve this, these liberals, regardless of political party, fought against authoritarian tendencies and dictatorial regimes.

829 471 Liberals in Eastern Europe, unlike those in the West, were not ardent supporters of the type of economic liberalism that is based on competition in a free market and admits only the least degree of state control. These liberals had in common with the supporters of the capitalist system a belief in the economic and social advantages of the principle of private ownership, but only a few among them had a clear-cut conception of the free enterprise system with its economic and social consequences, as it is accepted in the United States or in other Western countries. This difference of conception between Western and Eastern European liberals can be explained easily. In Eastern Europe, modern capitalistic enterprises (in this area predominantly agricultural), and particularly large-sized enterprises, were in an early stage of development. They were somewhat further developed in Czechoslovakia and Austria, and in the '30's began to attain some stature in Poland and Hungary. Under these circumstances and in the face of the limited resources of individual private entrepreneurs, it is understandable that the Eastern European liberals, desiring the industrialization of their countries, sought state support. They asked protection from the state in the form of high customs tariffs, financial subsidies, and currency, credit, and other protective measures. Thus, from an economic point of view, they were influenced far more by the German than by the Western European attitude. German liberalism, guided by the protectionist theories of G. F. List and by Bismarckian power politics, definitely favored building capitalism with the direct and permanent assistance of the state.

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Contrary to many Germans, Eastern European liberals remained true to political democracy but, in the field of economic policy, they were in accord with German views, giving preference to state interference and support rather than to free competition and individual initiative. 829 471

Differences in the economic development of Western Europe and the United States, on the one hand, and of Germany and Eastern Europe, on the other hand, influenced the thinking of socialists in these countries and account for the differences in their outlook and their method of political action. While Western socialists sought to realize their aims by their own concerted self-help action (in Anglo-Saxon countries and Scandinavia particularly through trade unionism and political influence exercised in parliaments, in Latin countries either through revolution or political infiltration of public institutions), German and Eastern European socialists tended more and more towards economic and political statism. Moreover, the agrarians of Eastern Europe, like the liberals, socialists, and Christian (Catholic) Democrats, also asked for state action to further their economic and social aims. This tendency to look towards the state for aid in economic matters explains why many liberals, particularly in Czechoslovakia, favored vast social reforms benefiting the working class. It is also worth mentioning that the representatives of the liberal-minded bourgeoisie in Czechoslovakia were always in favor of the highly progressive social legislation enacted in that country.

The tendency to ask the state for support in economic matters was a characteristic of the nationalism of Eastern European liberals. On the whole, however, the nationalism of liberals and of many others in this region was no more intense than the nationalism of similar groups in any of the Western countries, and among the liberals themselves there were great differences in interpreting liberalism. 186

In Eastern Europe, liberalism was more closely connected

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•829 History clearly proves the accuracy of this analysis. In the second half of the nineteenth century, a "liberal" climate prevailed in Europe. At that time liberalism penetrated even into Tsarist Russia. The belief that Russia has an inherent tendency toward despotism and slavery leads one to forget that liberal ideas found excellent propagandists and defenders there; to mention but a few: Radishchev, Pestel, Herzen, Soloviev, Milyukov, Chernov, and the Decembrists. In the nineteenth century, liberal tendencies were growing in strength and influence in Eastern Europe and contributed considerably to the struggle for national liberation. The victory of the liberal Western democracies in 1918 led to the liberal democratization of almost all Eastern Europe.

III

668 642 The obstacles faced by liberalism in Eastern Europe included both the threat of Communist, and later of fascist and Nazi, interference and the efforts of domestic authoritarian groups that saw in dictatorship the answer to the problems of this region. In spite of these highly unfavorable circumstances, democratic liberalism maintained itself even when dictatorial governments were formed. A courageous opposition fought these regimes without fearing the persecution to which it was exposed. It is easy to prove that Pilsudski and, later, Beck in Poland, Horthy in Hungary, Carol in Rumania, Boris in Bulgaria, Alexander and Paul in Yugoslavia, and Dolfuss and Schuschnigg in Austria, were opposed by democratic forces stronger than, or at least as strong as, the forces which Hitler, Mussolini, and Stalin were meeting in their respective countries. In Germany and Russia and, to a large extent, in Italy, the dictatorial regimes were totalitarian and therefore opposition was almost impossible. But the fact that in Eastern Europe only limited dictatorships were established shows that antiliberal, antidemocratic trends were hampered by the opposition of democratic forces. In

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weak in comparison with that of the Agrarian Party which still followed Stambolisky's tradition. 668 642

The Agrarian and the Socialist parties and some Catholics, as well as the liberals, carried on the struggle against dictatorship in Bulgaria, Rumania, Poland, and Hungary. They fought for real democracy in the sense of the best liberal tradition. In Austria the Social Democrats were the main force opposing clerical fascism. It is interesting that in Hungary the conservative aristocrats opposed fascist trends. Szálasi, who led the important Arrow-Cross movement, was the most conspicuous of these men. Count Bethlen and Count Teleki also opposed the Nazi pressure, and the latter's efforts were climaxed by his symbolic suicide in 1941.

The opposition to dictatorship and to fascism or Nazism was motivated differently in the individual Eastern European countries and was carried on by different political parties. Notwithstanding these differences, the original inspiration to opposition lay in two main ideas: a longing for freedom and a patriotic devotion to national independence. Pure democratic liberalism is the expression of these two ideas, both of which prove convincingly that the love of freedom was deeply rooted in these countries. Internal antiliberal forces alone would not have been able to crush democratic aspirations. Whenever the elections were more liberal than usual, for instance, in Rumania in 1928 or in Bulgaria in 1931, the democratic parties won. In Poland, Pilsudski's followers, who represented only a small minority of the nation, were well aware that the only means by which they could maintain their regime was political terror. In spite of the pressure of the reactionaries and the influence of fascists and Nazis, the remnants of liberalism in Hungary survived until nearly the end of the Second World War. In view of these facts, it is clear that the liberal democratic forces could have mastered internal difficulties successfully 186 668 829

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186 668 829 had they not been broken or dangerously weakened by the foreign forces of fascism and Communism.

Czechoslovakia bears witness to this thesis. In Czechoslovakia, as in the other countries, there existed antiliberal, reactionary, nationalist, and fascist trends which attracted certain of the bourgeoisie and rich farmers. These forces were held in check by the democratic thought and genuine patriotism of a great majority of the nation, including the so-called middle classes and the intelligentsia. Nearly everybody followed the principles of the great democrat, Masaryk. Conditions were more favorable to democratic liberalism in Czechoslovakia than in the other Eastern European countries, because this nation was highly industrialized, even in agriculture, because her social structure was happily balanced between industry, agriculture, and bureaucracy, or intelligentsia, and because the cultural level of her people was high. The middle classes, strong in numbers and in social value, and the progressive farmers, who owned middle-sized farms, were reliable support for the liberal democratic regime. The Social Democratic Party, headed by Hampl, Bechyně, Meissner, and Dérer, was influenced spiritually far more by Masaryk than by Marx. The Agrarian Party had liberal-minded leaders among whom Antonín Švehla and Milan Hodža proved to have statesmen's abilities. The Catholic Party, under the wise leadership of the great patriot Jan Šrámek, was progressive in social matters. In Slovakia the process of democratization met with greater difficulties. Slovakia, because of its agrarian structure, resembled the other Eastern European countries more than it did the industrialized Bohemia. However, the transformation of Slovakia into a democratically functioning part of Czechoslovakia proves that other Eastern European countries could have developed in a similar way had democracy been given enough time to exercise its influence upon them.

It is certainly to the credit of Czechoslovakia that she

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continually improved her democratic regime during the twenty years of her existence and that her democracy was destroyed only by an attack from without by Nazi Germany. Nevertheless, the other countries of Eastern Europe, economically, socially, and culturally less progressive, cannot be blamed if, in the antiliberal climate of the '30's, they were unable to develop into genuine democracies. The people in these countries did not long less for freedom and for social progress than did the people in other parts of Europe or on other continents. If the unremitting struggle for freedom of the Eastern European countries and their difficult geographic position were kept in mind, the liberal striving of these countries and their aptitude for democratic development would be judged more favorably than is sometimes the case. 829 178

In Germany, which was probably economically and technically the most highly developed country on the European continent and which had a high cultural and social level, liberalism was no more influential than in the agrarian countries of Eastern Europe. It was certainly infinitely weaker than in Czechoslovakia. In Germany and in Italy, democracy did not succumb to foreign, but to internal, antiliberal forces. In Russia, liberalism undoubtedly was far weaker than in Eastern Europe.

IV

The development of liberalism in Eastern Europe in the period between the two wars shows clearly that this force was far stronger there than in Germany, Italy, or Russia, and that it attained real success in Czechoslovakia. There were conditions in Eastern Europe that favored the development of liberalism into an influential spiritual, political, and social movement. The most promising forces in this regard were the striving of these nations for freedom 829

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829 and social progress and their genuine patriotism. The success of Czechoslovakian democracy gave substance to the hope that other countries in Eastern Europe would gradually become democratized. Development in this direction, however, was suddenly halted by the European crisis and by the rise of totalitarian dictatorships in the three great neighbors of the small nations of Eastern Europe. In 1938 the expansion of aggressive Nazism destroyed the Czechoslovakian democracy which, until then, had been an isolated island of liberalism east of the Rhine.

This essay has demonstrated that liberalism has its own tradition in Eastern Europe and that, after the liberation of these countries, it will surely play an even more important role than it did before. Liberalism is not a thing of the past. It is the most dynamic force in the present struggle for the liberation of man and for a community of nations based on the reign of law and mutual service. The greatness of liberalism, as Masaryk maintained, lies in its effort to make Jesus, and not Caesar, rule the world.

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178 voked political and social movements, such as had never been known in the West, and which expressed the distinctive socio-economic programs and political and social philosophies of the area.

565 Before any analysis of these peasant movements can be undertaken, it will be necessary to examine their human element, the peasantry. There are three points which are of most significance to this discussion: first, what is a peasantry; second, what are the differences between a peasantry and the rural population of the West, usually known as farmers; and third, what are the special characteristics of the Eastern European peasantry which have justified and made possible its separate political organization.

565 Despite the fact that the peasantry still represents a con-
● 829 siderable majority of the world's population, a uniform definition for it cannot be found. The reason for this is the different approach of various social and economic schools to the peasant problem. While the Marxists consider the peasantry from a purely economic point of view, evaluating this group only in the system of socialist production, liberals believe that there are aspects to the peasantry besides the economic which should be considered. The liberals point out the importance of the peasant's relationship to his land and the influence of his environment upon him. They realize that there are two elements, the sociological and the cultural, which are of great and equal significance in appraising the peasant society. The sociological element includes the individual's family life, the customs, traits, and trends of neighborhood and village communities, and the peasant's attachment to religious and other traditions. These traditions are upheld by a special type of "progressive conservatism." The cultural element includes all such features as folk songs, folk customs and habits, and so forth, which have developed independent of the cosmopolitan civilization.

In view of the foregoing, the peasantry may be defined

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tentatively as a group settled on a determined territory, having its principal source of livelihood in a cultivation of the soil that is based on the system of the small farm, and possessing its own way of life and its own indigenous culture.

This definition will help us answer our second question; namely, what are the differences between the peasants and the farmers. For a long time the rural sociologists of the West made no distinction between these two groups, and it is only recently that adequate attention has been given to this problem. Today it is generally recognized that between these two rural societies there exist essential dissimilarities which result from a permanent infiltration by the cosmopolitan civilization into the rural orbit. This process has been far more intense in the European and American rural groups, the farmers, than in the genuine peasant population.

With this distinction in mind, the farmers and the genuine peasantry may be contrasted. Economically speaking, the farmers produce primarily for the market, abiding by the established norms of offer and demand. Although they are attached to the land, they consider it almost impersonally and from an economic point of view. Therefore, they are willing to move from one area to another when there are economic reasons. The peasants, on the other hand, produce primarily for home consumption. Because their land is a part of their heritage, they consider it personally, as a part of their life and of their family tradition.

Socially, life in the rural communities of the West has become increasingly urbanized. The peasant society of Eastern Europe has been infiltrated by urban ideas to a far lesser degree and has preserved, generally speaking, many of its original aspects.

Culturally, the indigenous traditions of the farmer population, if not completely vanished, are disappearing rapidly. In the genuine peasant society, cultural traits are still clearly

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641 however, following its policy of economic freedom, did not
565 deem it necessary to intervene in this problem, and left the
178 peasants open to the merciless exploitation of private banks and usurers. Economic individualism, accentuated by liberalism, induced individual members of the large peasant family groups, known among the Southern Slavs as *zadrugas*, to seek their economic independence. This process provoked a hasty and uncontrolled parcellation of the peasant land and contributed further to the economic weakness and inefficiency of the peasant system of farming.

The solemnly proclaimed social equality of the peasant was a farce. The ruling groups, derived from the bourgeoisie, the newly created bureaucracy, and the remnants of the aristocratic elements, looked upon the peasants with contempt and mistrust, considering them, although necessary to agrarian production, neither fitted nor qualified to take part in politics or public affairs. Social inequality was expressed both by the attitude of dominant ethnical groups to the "peoples of lower categories" and by the division within these groups between intelligentsia and the common people, or peasants.

Obviously, remedies were sought to correct the adverse conditions created in the liberal era, but before these are discussed, it is necessary to credit liberalism for those ideas and measures which, in principle, were universally accepted by the masses and which made possible their political organization. Generally speaking, the ideas of political freedom and of general education and a belief in the individual's capabilities were the stimulating forces behind the organization of the people. However, these ideas did not save liberalism, but prepared the road for its destruction.

829 The first reaction to the flaws in liberalism was the appearance of the "scientific socialism" of Karl Marx. It is important to note that this philosophy was conceived exclusively for the newly created industrial proletariat. The peasants, if

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considered at all, were reviewed and evaluated only from the 829
point of view of production with no attention paid to the human side of their problems. Moreover, the contempt of Marx for the peasantry is well known. He called them a "class of barbarians," and proclaimed his desire to save humanity from the "idiocy of rural life."

The reaction to scientific socialism and a simultaneous opposition to liberalism brought about the birth of Christian democracy which attempted to formulate a middle-road policy between the economic freedom of liberalism and the socialist doctrine of the total negation of the absolute truth, of private property, and of human dignity. Being primarily a reaction to the liberal-socialist dispute on capital-labor relations, this new doctrine was concerned very little, if at all, with the peasant problem which "remained the stepchild of public opinion and of the social policy."

The first attempt to use the contemporary social and eco- 668
nomic ideas for the organization of the peasant masses was 565
partly accountable for the appearance of Populism in Russia in the 1870's. More specifically, Populism was an endeavor to create an ideal agrarian peasant community by applying the theories of scientific socialism. This very fact converted the effort into a unique social and economic movement sharply in conflict with the orthodox Marxism. It became clear very soon to the promoters of Populism that the formulas conceived by Marx were inefficient in a rural society and that diversified methods must be sought if the needs and hopes of the peasants were to be satisfied. This new movement, although peasant, was of revolutionary character, not only demanding the land for the peasants but also advocating its collective ownership under a particular form of Russian organization known as the *mir*. It pointed out that the essence of the Populist program must be the institutions and desires inherent in the people and that it must not represent scientific formulas imported from abroad.

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•829 Although Populism exerted some influence on the establishment of the Rumanian peasant movement, it had very little influence upon the other peasant movements in Eastern Europe. At the time when Populism was already an organized political force in Russia, the peasantry in Eastern Europe was still politically inactive. When the peasant mobilization began, more than two decades later, it was influenced little, if at all, by the Populist ideas.

668 565 423 The main reason for the relatively late organization of the peasantry in Eastern Europe was the presence of political and economic conditions essentially different from those prevailing in Tsarist Russia. Whereas regular political life was unknown in Russia, European liberalism favored the formation of political parties which would try to win the sympathies of the peasants by promising them the realization of their desires. Collective ownership of land was not a common institution in Eastern Europe. However, the prediction of Marx relating to the accumulation of capital and further expansion of large estates proved to be incorrect. On the contrary, many large land holdings, unable to accommodate themselves to modern capitalist management, commenced to disintegrate. The land was usually bought, in spite of heavy material sacrifices, by land-hungry neighboring peasants, and thus many new independent peasant holdings were created, which contributed considerably to the strengthening of the peasantry.

Hence, the establishment of a revolutionary peasant movement was checked by existing political conditions: the traditions of the Eastern European peasantry were opposed to collective forms of land ownership and to the socialist tenets of Populism. However, none of the existing political groups was fit to meet the increased desire of the peasantry for an organized action of their own, and, at the turn of the century, on an independent basis and in opposition to the contemporary political and social groups, peasant organization began.

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668 565 ganization did not exist until the Second World War; the organization itself was established after the war by exiled political leaders.

In Slovenia, Slovakia, and Lithuania, on the other hand, truly peasant political organizations have never developed fully. In these Catholic countries the peasantry was influenced from the beginning by the Catholic political thought and subsequently organized on the principles of Christian democracy.

Although the immediate motives for peasant organization in different countries were varied, its demands were everywhere identical because of its common general source—its ideological basis. The programs made the following demands for the peasants: full political rights, proportional participation in public affairs, agrarian reform and distribution of the land to the peasants, social justice, and rights for the peasants in educational facilities equal to the rights of other classes in the state.

● 829 668 565 To understand better the peasant movements and their aims, three elements of their ideological and organizational structure must be discussed: first, their ideological basis; second, the dogmatic differences between these and other contemporary political and socio-economic trends; and third, the effective points of their practical programs.

829 665 The peasant ideology, or peasantism, is the outlook of the peasantry on the complex of political and socio-economic issues in which the peasants are interested and for whose solution they are fighting. The organizational forms of peasantism, established for the purposes of current political struggle, are the various peasant political parties. Unlike scientific socialism or Christian democracy, peasantism is not the artificial creation of an individual or group of individuals; it contains only those ideas which are inherent in the peasant soul and character. Consequently, the peasant leaders do not conceive the political soul of peasantism but merely interpret

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and articulate its principles. Hence, considerable differences must exist between peasantism and other contemporary movements. 829 665

Between peasantism and scientific socialism, there are irreconcilable differences, reflected in philosophical, economic, social, and political concepts. Philosophically, scientific socialism advocates economic determinism, dialectic materialism, and the materialistic interpretation of history. Consequently, it repudiates the existence of a superior being, rejects religion and spiritual values as detrimental to human development, and minimizes the significance of tradition. Peasantism, on the contrary, relies on the idealistic principles of philosophical reasoning, stresses the existence of God, points out the necessity for religious beliefs, and indicates the importance of spiritual values. It emphasizes as of equal importance the significance of tradition in human development and reaffirms its position in the peasant society. 829 668

Economically, scientific socialism demands the collectivization of the means of production, including land, and the introduction of a planned socialist economy. It evaluates individuals and collective groups exclusively on the basis of their role in socialist production and repudiates economic individualism in any form. Peasantism, on the contrary, defends firmly the principle of private ownership of the means of production, especially of the peasant land, and teaches that the right to dispose of the fruits of one's own labor is sacred and inviolable. It rejects the planned economy of socialism and favors private initiative and the system of free cooperation.

Socially, scientific socialism teaches the necessity of a permanent class struggle and considers as inevitable the revolutionary overthrow of the existing social and economic order by the proletariat. Peasantism, on the contrary, rejects the idea of class struggle and believes in the possibility of a peaceful coexistence of all classes of society. It also rejects

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the revolutionary methods advocated by scientific socialism, believing that the necessary changes in society can be achieved by peaceful means and evolutionary methods.

Politically, scientific socialism is totalitarian in its concept. It does not tolerate the existence of other political and social systems, nor is it willing to share power with other political groups. Peasantism, on the contrary, is genuinely democratic and ready to collaborate with other political and social forces provided they are democratically disposed and have their roots in the will of the people.

The differences between peasantism and other current ideologies, although existent, are less emphatic. Peasantism distinguishes itself from liberalism mainly in its economic ideas. While it agrees with liberalism on the concepts of political freedom and social equality, it rejects the ideas of the latter on uncontrolled economic liberties. Past experience has proved to the followers of peasantism that in peasant countries unrestricted economic liberties are detrimental to peasant farming and to national economies.

Ideological differences between peasantism and Christian democracy are more subtle. Both ideologies cherish the fundamental principles of human dignity and of individual freedom; both teach the existence of God, reject the materialistic interpretation of the world, and seek to establish a middle road between total economic freedom and complete submission of the individual to the community. Yet, there is an important structural element which has contributed essentially to a separate organization of the peasantry in Eastern Europe. Since 1891 when the papal encyclical, *Rerum Novarum*, was issued, and especially since 1931 with the appearance of the encyclical, *Quadragesimo Anno*, Christian democracy has been an eminently Catholic doctrine and, consequently, not best fitted to attract the peasantry which is made up of different religious denominations. Peasantism, on the contrary, while pointing out the necessity of religion,

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has no preference for any particular religious denomination and is for this reason better adapted to the peasantry. 829 668

Finally, peasantism rejects definitely the political and social concepts of modern totalitarianism. Totalitarian and undemocratic regimes in Eastern Europe during the interwar period were always upheld by military cliques, aristocratic and bureaucratic groups, or by the ruling dynasties whose aims were to keep the power at all costs and whose political methods and social views were diametrically opposed to the fundamental principles of peasantism.

Politically, peasantism advocates a system of parliamentarianism with two additional features: accentuation of local self-government and direct participation in the government of the greatest number of people. Economically, peasantism favors free cooperatives because it believes that cooperation preserves the principles of private property and permits the exercise of private initiative. The latter is favored when cooperative arrangements are not adequate to meet economic requirements.

III

Although the peasant movements and parties were initiated before the First World War, they achieved their full strength and political significance only after the war was over. There were three causes for this postwar rise of peasant political organizations: the formation of the national states, the universal franchise, and the agrarian reforms. 668 641

The formation of national states in Eastern Europe contributed enormously to the development of political life. While the people of this area had heretofore directed most of their political endeavors against the oppression of the ruling nations, in the new era they directed their efforts toward the solution of vital economic and social issues. 641

Universal franchise enabled the peasant population to

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non-Magyar minorities. Thus in a parliament that as late as 1910 represented scarcely more than one quarter of the adult male population, the Magyars who numbered just over one half the population, apart from Croatia, had 405 seats to 8 for the Slovak and Rumanian minorities. The Croatians were represented by 40 deputies when mutual Croatian-Hungarian affairs were under discussion. The Czechs and the Poles in the Austrian provinces developed an aristocratic form of local self-government in the latter half of the nineteenth century and contributed distinguished statesmen to the Austrian government, and at least the Czechs gained experience in the techniques and responsibilities of democracy in local government and in unofficial organizations. Similarly in the Polish-inhabited lands of the German and Russian empires, little opportunity was available for gaining experience in electoral and parliamentary procedures.

177 642 563

Educational opportunities in Eastern Europe were steadily improved in the century after 1815 despite frequently hostile government attitudes. The greatest progress in this field was made in the Czech-inhabited provinces of the Habsburg monarchy, where general compulsory education was introduced in 1869. In Hungary popular education was started somewhat later, and illiteracy among the Magyars declined rapidly. The schools, however, were used as a vehicle for the Magyarization of the non-Magyar minorities of Hungary and, as a consequence, the great majority of Slovak and Rumanian children were compelled to get their education in the Magyar language. In Hungary, discounting Croatia, there were four times as many Magyar-language schools as non-Magyar and five times as many Magyar schoolteachers. The Slovenes under Austrian rule and the autonomous Croatians fared a great deal better, while in independent Montenegro, Serbia, Bulgaria, and Rumania, national school systems were developed insofar as meager resources permitted. The Poles fared differently in their three parts. In

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•871 Austrian Galicia they underwent a great cultural revival in
563 the latter part of the nineteenth century, and this was the only area in which schools and universities using the Polish language could develop freely. The Polish population in Prussia lived under better educational conditions than did their co-nationals in Russia, but in both countries they were subjected to vigorous programs of denationalization.

871 The state of popular education in Eastern Europe is re-
212 vealed by illiteracy figures for the years 1920-21, before the new independent states had exerted an influence on education. The rate of illiteracy for males and females of school age and over was 7 per cent for Czechoslovakia, 15 per cent for Hungary, and between 30 and 40 per cent for Poland and Yugoslavia. The rate was between 40 and 50 per cent for Rumania and Bulgaria, and in Albania it was much higher. These figures may be compared with illiteracy rates of under 1 per cent for Great Britain and Germany, 6 per cent for the United States, and about 50 per cent for Russia.

[873] It is worth noting that the low level of literacy in most of Eastern Europe did not prevent the development of a high level of culture among educated persons. The universities of Prague, Cracow, and Budapest were the most distinguished among many of high level, and very significant contributions to European culture in the arts and sciences came from this region. The "intelligentsia," as those with higher education and professional skills were referred to, provided both the leadership of the national movements and the statesmen of the nations born at the end of the First World War. As individuals they were the equals of the political leaders of the great powers and included in their number many great Europeans.

566 Agricultural improvement, or the increase in produc-
423 tivity and in the welfare of the population dependent on
178 agriculture, is a complex process. In Eastern Europe, it involved in particular the release of the peasants from feudal

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practice, church organizations and the clergy are meant to have no function but that of a helpful tool in the communization of the nation. 641 793

The function of education is the same. The Communists do not even pretend to support freedom of knowledge and bluntly state in their legislation that the duty of higher schools is to educate the younger generation in the spirit of socialist dialectics and materialistic doctrines. Theoretically, the Communist system assures the youth of education. In practice, an individual's right to education is not determined by intellectual ability and progress but by membership in the Young Communist League (Komsomol), by informing on "unorthodox" professors, and by success in examinations on Communist politics and doctrines. 641 871

The articles of the Communist constitutions that deal with the rights of the citizens stress above all the rights to work, rest, and medical treatment. The Communist attitude toward the individual is like that of the horse-owner when he thinks that the main duty of his animal is to work and believes that it must be assured of rest and medical treatment only to insure the fulfillment of this duty. Actually, most farmers in the free countries treat their animals better than the Communists treat the people. Out of hatred, the Communists destroy whole social groups and even perpetrate the genocide of whole nations. 641

The Communists claimed that when they had freed the working man from capitalist exploitation they would not allow the exploitation of one man by another. Is this claim realized in practice? Again, the answer is no. The Communist state created the worst kind of exploitation by giving the rule of the people to the Communist elite and by providing this elite with the formidable weapons of both police and army. In a democratic state, even where large industries and sources of raw materials are nationalized, the interests of the people are guarded by trade unions, politi- 661 565

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come. Once again, Czechoslovakia headed the list with 5.5 per cent while the Balkan countries devoted only 1.5 per cent of their national income to social services. In the same year the number of persons registered as unemployed in the various countries was as follows: Czechoslovakia, 408,000; Poland, 347,000; Hungary, 47,000; Yugoslavia, 21,600; and Rumania, 10,800.

A major consequence of industrialization and urbanization was the rapid growth both of an urban proletariat and of the bureaucracy. Those people who had been separated from their ancestral rural surroundings and traditions and often from the influence of their families became increasingly detached from spiritual matters and turned more and more towards materialistic and technical spheres. The number of bureaucrats grew rapidly and this resulted in political favoritism and in desk-level programs which very seldom touched the people of the countryside.

It cannot be said, however, that no progress was made or that standards of living were consistently low. It must be remembered that it was not until the First World War that many of these countries attained independence. A part of Poland had just emerged from Russian domination and certain areas of the Balkan states had just freed themselves from Ottoman rule. Even Hungary, Czechoslovakia, Croatia, and parts of Poland had been freed only recently from Austro-German political and economic controls. Under these circumstances, the progress made by these countries, notwithstanding failures and mistakes, was considerable indeed.

III

The states that had dominated this region before the First World War—Germany, Austria-Hungary, Russia, and the Ottoman empire—showed little interest in improving the educational standards of the large masses in Eastern Europe.

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● 871 Illiteracy in the prewar era was extremely prevalent except in
212 Bohemia, Slovenia, a part of Hungary, and the formerly German-ruled section of Poland. Following the various educational reforms and the expansion of facilities during the '20's, the illiteracy rates were: 31.4 per cent (1934) for Bulgaria, 4.1 per cent (1930) for Czechoslovakia, 6.0 per cent (1941) for Hungary, 23.1 per cent (1931) for Poland, 23.1 per cent (1948) for Rumania, and 45.2 per cent (1931) for Yugoslavia. In spite of the notable progress attained within a decade and a half of liberation, the problem of achieving literacy and education for the masses remained a considerable one.

658 In the interwar period, a vast number of schools were built and many universities were founded or enlarged. National statistics show that on the average 3 per cent of the estimated national incomes was devoted to education for the region as a whole. Czechoslovakia, with 3.5 per cent, had the largest budgetary provision for education, spending in 1937 the
871 equivalent of eighty-four million dollars. Universal compulsory elementary education was introduced widely in this area. However, the number and quality of teachers did not increase
[565] as rapidly as did the buildings. Therefore, especially in the eastern and southern regions, semieducated or semiskilled individuals were numerous, and anyone who had been exposed to education considered himself an "intellectual." Under such circumstances, this term very often stood for mere prestige, and the "intellectuals" exerted influence out of proportion to their training. A poor system of communication, a dispersed settlement pattern, mediocre teachers and, last but not least, the rather uncooperative behavior of the peasants impeded the possibilities of an adequate education for the peasant class, which represented the majority of Eastern Europe's population.

000 Due to the prevalence of a liberalism linked with national-

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Due to the prevalence of a liberalism linked with national- 186
ism, studies concentrated on history, which was generally 871
given a romantic interpretation. The study of geography was 814
heavily larded with political convictions and misinterpretations of ethnography. Although the universities of Czechoslovakia and Hungary were on a high academic level at a time when other universities were just becoming active, their students spent too much time in petty politics. Most of the 186
student organizations supported some political person or 668
party and, as a consequence, were strongly influenced by demagogues. The Polish and Rumanian universities especially were exploited by politicians, and often even by the police, for political purposes. Frequent political meetings aroused a discontented idealism and produced only too often regrettable chauvinistic or antisemitic behavior.

Anti-Semitism became a common denominator with which 798
Hitler was able to unite the rising youth and the politicians of Eastern Europe. The responsibility for this state of affairs lay with the governments and the ruling groups.

Although the new boundaries had been drawn on the 563
principle of national self-determination, the mixture of nationalities in many areas, as well as historical and geographical factors, had resulted in the inclusion of important minorities within the new states. These minorities were fragments of peoples rather than whole nations as had been the case before the war and, since they were in many cases unwilling citizens of the new states, their presence constituted a grave problem. The eight million inhabitants of Poland, Rumania, and Czechoslovakia that spoke Russian, Ukrainian (Ruthenian), and White Russian as their mother tongue, the almost six million German-speaking citizens of Czechoslovakia, Poland, Rumania, Yugoslavia, and Hungary, and the almost three million Hungarian-speaking inhabitants of neighboring Rumania, Czechoslovakia and Yugoslavia—these represented the most important, but by no means all, the minority

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visions were included in the peace treaties with Hungary and 563
Bulgaria, and the states that had been created or enlarged 648
as a result of the war assumed similar obligations. The provisions for the protection of minorities were concerned with the use of language in schools and courts, the practice of religion, and the equitable administration of social security. Their implementation by the respective governments was supervised by a Minorities Commission in the League of Nations, and a system of petitions was established for bringing injustices to the attention of the League. Although the principles underlying this system represented a great advance over pre-war practice, the efforts at implementation failed to meet the needs of the situation. In many cases the minorities continued to be discriminated against, and even when they were not, nationalist movements sponsored by neighboring countries often proved irresistible. As a result, the problem of minorities became one of the fundamental sources of political instability in Eastern Europe.

Another unfavorable factor was that richer families sent /77
their children to foreign universities, especially to France, .87
Germany, and Great Britain, while there was little student 871
exchange among the Eastern European countries themselves. Educated people knew a great deal about Western Europe, but much less about neighboring states and peoples. Naturally, this was even more so among nations which had been enemies in the First World War and which now fiercely condemned their citizens if they praised the culture or progress of a former enemy. However, this situation was not unique to this region. It was characteristic of Europe as a whole and, like the development of nationalism and industry, moved from West to East.

Many of Eastern Europe's difficulties stemmed from the 642
instability of its political life. Governments changed con- 578
stantly and political parties fought each other to the last breath. Due to the many changes of government, an unwhole-

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more of them survive infancy. In consequence, if rather fragmentary national statistics are to be believed, the rate of increase in population has risen to what it was a generation before. Roughly speaking, the number of Hungarians has been increasing annually by 60,000, that of Czechs and Slovaks (mainly Slovaks) by 140,000, that of Yugoslavs by 180,000, and that of Poles by over 400,000. Whether this trend will continue for a long time, no one can say.

The second point of the program in respect to youth is an all-out attack on illiteracy. Before the war, the area as such was making rapid progress in schooling, and in its western part illiteracy was no longer known. In its eastern and southeastern regions, however, there were still large residues of illiteracy in the adult population and, in spite of compulsory elementary education, there were not enough schools in some rural districts. The result was that some children never went to school. The Communist regimes claim that they have done away with a large proportion of illiteracy among adults and even elderly people, and that illiteracy as a condition is gone forever. There is no way of checking this assertion but it is likely that it is correct. The obvious comment is that the more literate people there are, the stronger a weapon Communist printed propaganda will be. Thus, the new schools behind the Iron Curtain are but the first installment of a vast campaign of propaganda and indoctrination.

The third and, in a sense, the most important point of the program is the great effort of the Communist regimes to promote professional and technical education on secondary and academic levels. The fulfillment of the long-range economic plans depends, in the last analysis, on its cadres, that is, on its trained personnel. To use a Communist simile, the new industrial army, millions strong, needs hundreds of thousands of noncommissioned and commissioned officers. These men and women are being graduated all over the captive area from technical schools of every description. The numbers

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decades had supported the White Terror and Horthy's 659
dictatorship, who had preached the extermination of Com- 471
munists and Socialists, had fulminated as a Magyar nationalist against the Slovaks, Rumanians and other Danubian nations who acquired territory from Hungary after 1918, and had welcomed the extermination of millions of Jews by the Nazis. When the Hungarian Parliament in June, 1948, passed a bill nationalising all Church-sponsored schools, Cardinal Mindszenty, in excommunicating all the Catholic deputies who supported the bill, certainly did not stand on democratic ground. The educational systems in the United States and Britain go much farther in secularisation than this bill, which still maintained compulsory religious instruction in schools to be given by monks and nuns.

In Poland and Czechoslovakia, where the Church was not a large landowner or an ally of the feudal opposition to land reform,* the Communist Parties were much more cautious.

In Poland, where the main church is the Roman Catholic Church, the Communist leaders were forced to find a *modus vivendi* with it. In a completely opportunistic manner they pandered to the wishes of the Church to an extent which would horrify bourgeois liberals, particularly the French Radicals, to say nothing of atheists.

Polish Facts and Figures, issued by the Polish Embassy in London, reports (December 11th, 1948): 'In contrast to most countries where land reform starts with the division of church lands, Polish land reform left the large church estates amounting to 841,300 acres untouched. In addition to leaving the church's lands untouched, the government also returned lands and goods taken away from the church by the Germans.'

'Religious instruction by priests is provided in each school 659
as part of the school curriculum (government directive of 872
December, 1926). The only children who may be exempted from religious instruction in schools are those whose parents

*This does not mean that the heads of the Catholic Church, especially Poland, were progressive. We need but mention one of them, the late Primate Cardinal Hlond. He found the time after the Kielce pogrom of 4th July, 1946, in which 41 Jews were killed, to accuse the Jews of backing the present regime and implied that the absurd medieval tales of Jewish ritual murder of Christian children—which had played their part in the pogrom—may not have been without foundation. This was but one incident in the career of this politician-clergyman, an enthusiastic supporter of the rule of the 'Colonels'.

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659 or guardians forward a written statement to the school that
872 they do not wish their children to participate.

'The programme and text-books for teaching religion are prepared by church organs and submitted to the Ministry of Education. The text-books for all grades of elementary schools were prepared by a special commission attached to the Metropolitan Curia of Cracow.

'Children who attend religious classes participate in the following religious practices:—(a) On Sundays, holidays, and the beginning and end of the school year, they attend church services; (b) They participate in "recollections"; (c) A prayer is recited at the beginning and end of each school day.'

'A network of Catholic theological seminaries which prepare for priesthood and missionary work is spread throughout Poland.'

659 Another issue of *Polish Facts and Figures*, dated August
873 6th, 1949, gives the following facts about religion in Poland: 'Catholic clergymen enjoy many personal privileges which have long ago been abolished or restricted in other countries . . .

'Ecclesiastical seminaries have nearly 18,000 students. Three hundred children's homes, 15,000 pupils, 600 kindergartens with 22,000 children and 40 secondary schools with 9,000 students are under monastic management. The Catholic school system is crowned by the Lublin Catholic University.

659 'Poland is one of those few countries where religious teaching
793 exists in schools. The 6,300 priests teaching religion are paid by the State.

'The number of religious orders has grown during the existence of the People's Poland. While in 1939 there were 1,742 monasteries and convents in Poland, there are now 2,010. The number of nuns has grown from 17,000 to nearly 19,000. Despite the housing shortage, nuns enjoy such privileges as enable them to live in comfortable, big houses.

'Poland holds first place in Europe for the number of Catholic periodicals. Their circulation amounts to 6,387,000.

' . . . 62 Catholic journals were published in Poland as compared with 20 such journals in France.'

659 In all the Army and police units of Poland there are official chaplains.

To demonstrate the devotion of the Communists to Catholicism, General Karol Swierczewski, commander of the

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• [873] It is worth noting that the low level of literacy in most of Eastern Europe did not prevent the development of a high level of culture among educated persons. The universities of Prague, Cracow, and Budapest were the most distinguished among many of high level, and very significant contributions to European culture in the arts and sciences came from this region. The "intelligentsia," as those with higher education and professional skills were referred to, provided both the leadership of the national movements and the statesmen of the nations born at the end of the First World War. As individuals they were the equals of the political leaders of the great powers and included in their number many great Europeans.

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423 tivity and in the welfare of the population dependent on
178 agriculture, is a complex process. In Eastern Europe, it involved in particular the release of the peasants from feudal

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874 both of graduates and of schools are several times larger than
185 before the war and are still increasing. The educational level is much lower than it was either before the war or in the free West, but it tallies with the Communist conception of superior education which aims at mass production of technicians specialized in one limited field and not instructed in general culture. Here again, these countries have to follow Soviet precedents, and narrow specialization is the method and the aim of education.

874 The emergence before long of thousands of newly gradu-
565 ated engineers, chemists, and the like, will have a profound effect on the economic and social structure of the area. These young people will be the managerial class of the future. Their lives will be dependent on the industrial trend of the economy of the captive nations. Unlike the new teachers, lawyers, writers, and other intellectuals, who will have to be agents of the Communist political machine, the new technicians will be allowed to serve both their own and national interests without being associated day in and day out with the sinister doings of the police state. Technology, like medicine, is one of the very few fields of creative activity open to non-Communists. When this is taken into consideration, it will be seen that the young men and women who besiege institutes of technology and other technical schools behind the Iron Curtain are very largely those who wish to preserve some independence of spirit. In their own domain, they will be able to dedicate themselves to creating national material wealth without paying more than lip service to the political framework in which they exist. This kind of work, where there is much less political supervision, may possibly come to be
565 considered the closest thing to individual initiative. In contrast to the 'Commissar' group of the new middle class, the new managerial stratum of these societies is, or may become, aware of the superiority of life in the free world and thus be a potential ally of the West. There seems to be, however, a

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NOTES

000 1. Protokoll des II. Welt Kongresses der Kommunistischen Internationale (Hamburg: 1921), p. 390.

1a. "The Role of Brains in the Total State," Commentary, August 1953, pp. 167-173.

2. Quoted in Reuben H. Markham, Rumania Under the Soviet Yoke (Boston: Meador Publishing Co., 1949), p. 407.

Cf. also the following statement from the Kosice program of the new Czech government, March 27, 1945: "Commissioning and promoting of officers shall not be based on formal rules only; extraordinary faster advancement (or commissioning) of the ablest . . . shall be supported." Za novou lidovou demokratickou armádu (Prague: Svoboda, 1945), pp. 7-11.

*701 *648 661 3. These were originally one. They were separated in Russia so the satellites followed suit. In 1950 Czechoslovakia, in November 1951 Poland, and September 1952 Romania, for example, separated them. Under the Malenkov regime in Russia, however, they were recombined under Beria. The satellites imitated and recombined them (e.g. the Czechs) in September 1953. After Beria was purged in Russia, they too were purged.

3a. But cf. Hans Speur, "Psychological Warfare Reconsidered" in Daniel Lerner and Harold Lasswell, The Policy Sciences (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1951) p. 266.

3b. Cf. Morris Janowitz, Working Paper on the Professional Soldier and Political Power (Mimeographed), Bureau of Government, Institute of Public Administration, University of Michigan, July 1953.

4. Spencer Wilkinson, War and Policy: Essays (London: Constable and Co. Ltd., 1910), p. 361.

5. Edward Shils and Morris J. Janowitz, "Cohesion and Disintegration in the Wehrmacht" in Daniel Lerner, Propaganda — War and Crisis (New York: George W. Stewart, 1951), p. 373.

5a. There is some reason to believe that in Russia itself after the death of Stalin the desired monolithic control was shaken. In the period before the purge of Beria, at least, there was a jockeying for power. Some observers believe that the Russian Army even now retains some potential independent power as against Malenkov and the party.

* 6. Op. cit.

*701 *648 874 7. The emphasis in the period since 1948 on military training was fully foreshadowed in the plans of the Russians as revealed in the Kosice program of the new Czech government in 1945. This announced that the government "shall request from the Red Army professors and instructors for instruction in the Czechoslovak military schools. It shall endeavor to send the largest possible number of the ablest officers to Soviet military schools, up to the highest military institutes and academies." Za novou lidovou demokratickou armádu pp. 7-11.

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SATELLITE GENERALS

7a. For example, the New York Times of August 4, 1951 reported that Marshal Govorov had started a course in Moscow for satellite staff officers.

8. As a control we collected similar data on general officers in pre-Communist periods in those countries and on general officers in four non-Communist countries. The latter included: one democratic country, Sweden, and one country that has not generally been democratic, Japan; one country, Spain, in which the army, like the satellite armies, came into present form through civil war, though a civil war in which the outcome was an anti-Communist victory; and one country with a brand new but non-Communist army, namely India. The data on these control samples have not been as intensively analyzed as those on the satellites and are not reported here. Cf. Some Comparative Data on Military Elites, Hoover Institute, 1953. (Mimeographed.) The following table reports the number of biographies studied:

TABLE 1
TOTAL BIOGRAPHIES

China	129
Czechoslovakia	167
Hungary	173
India	65
Japan	294
Poland	152
Romania	132
Spain	179
Sweden	62
U.S.S.R.	217
	1570

9. The nature of the armed forces of the countries with which we are concerned led to the overwhelming majority of the general officers studied being army officers.

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TABLE 2
SATELLITES

	Army	Navy	Air Force	Police and Security Troops	Combined Service Forces	Total
Czech						
1. 1918-44	85		3	5		93
2. 1945-48	35		2	2		39
3. 1948-	26		2	7		35

2: Milosz S-5 (no date)1953 El Europe El

in turn surrender. Despite its apparent appeal to reason, 575
the "club's" activity comes under the heading of collec- 626
tive magic. The rationalism of the doctrine is fused with sorcery, and the two strengthen each other. Free discussion is, of course, eliminated. If what the doctrine proclaims is as true as the fact that 2 × 2 equals 4, to tolerate the opinion that 2 × 2 equals 5 would be indecent.

From his first day in school, the young citizen receives 626
an education based on this truth. There is a great differ- 816
ence between schools in the people's democracies and schools in the West, for example the schools I attended in pre-war Poland. My friends and I were exposed to a dual 829
system of values. Mathematics, physics, and biology taught us scientific laws, and inculcated respect for a materialistic outlook inherited from the nineteenth century. History and Letters seemed to elude scientific laws, while the history of the Catholic Church and Apologetics cast doubt, though often naïvely, on what physics and biology taught. In the people's democracies, the materialistic outlook of the nineteenth century has been extended consistently to every subject; history and every branch of human creativity are presented as governed by unshakeable and *already known* laws.

In the nineteenth century, with the rise of literacy, brochures popularizing scientific theories made their appearance. Regardless of the intrinsic worth of these theories, we must grant that from the moment they take on a popular form they become something other than what they were as hypotheses of scientific research. For example, the simplified and vulgarized version of Darwin's theory of the origin of species and the struggle for existence is not the same concept that it was for Darwin or for his scholarly opponents. It takes on emotional coloration, and changes into an important sociological element.

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The direction of people's minds along the groove required by Moscow begins at school. Pupils in Ukraine are made to pay tribute to Kutuzov, known as the hangman of the Ukrainians. Chmelnitzki, who massacred the Jews and betrayed the Ukrainian peasants into Russian serfdom must be acclaimed a national hero. Pupils in Azerbaidjan must be taught that the Russian occupation of their country in 1806 was not symbolic of the superiority of Russian arms alone, but shows the long attachment of Azerbaidjan to Russian culture. It is often very difficult for the non-Russian scholars to explain their history in the way required, and they are frequently accused of nationalism. In the summer of 1944, the Central Committee of the C.P.S.U. severely criticized the cultural work of the Tartar Republic, its main defalcation being nationalist falsifications in the teaching of its national history. The Tartars were instructed to emphasize the elements in their history which united them with Russia (*Propagandist*, 15th June, 1944). The journal *Kultura i Zhizn* of 30th November, 1945, is devoted mainly to criticisms of 'nationalist deviations' in the teaching of history. The institutes of history in the Ukrainian, Tartar, Bashkir, Armenian, Georgian, Latvian and White Russian Republics all come in for their measure of stern criticism.

The war proved a great test for Stalin's national policy. The fact that the soldiers of the U.S.S.R. fought with great courage proves nothing by itself. Russia's greatest military victories in the eighteenth century were won by Suvorov in Catherine the Great's reign, the worst period of serfdom. The serfs who were so cruelly exploited showed immense heroism and self-sacrifice in the army. In the Second World War the German and Japanese soldiers doggedly persisted in their struggle even when all hope of military victory was lost, but this fact does not prove that there were harmonious social relations within these countries.

It is extremely difficult to discover the whole truth about the number of quislings in Russia. The case of General Vlassov is well known. He received the highest orders of the Red Army at the beginning of the war, but on being taken prisoner by the Germans, organised an army of between 100,000 and 1,000,000 prisoners of war from the U.S.S.R. to fight by the side of the Germans. This by itself, however, indicated very little. Hitler,